Review for unlawful search in abbreviated procedure for drug traffickingRevisión por allanamiento ilegítimo en procedimiento abreviado de tráfico de drogas

**Exp:** 02-200958-0431-PE **Exp:** 02-200958-0431-PE **Res:** 2007-00691 CRIMINAL CASATION COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, SECOND SECTION. San Ramón, at ten thirty-six on the twenty-first of December, two thousand seven.

REVIEW PROCEEDING filed in the present case against [Name1] . . . , identity card number CED1, son of [Name2] , for the crime of AGGRAVATED VIOLATION OF THE PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES LAW, to the detriment of PUBLIC HEALTH. The Judges Mario Alberto Porras Villalta, Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda, and Guillermo Sojo Picado participate in the decision on the appeal. The co-defendant [Name1] . . . appears in cassation.

**WHEREAS:** I.- That by judgment number 65-P-04 of thirteen hundred hours on the eighteenth of February, two thousand four, the Puntarenas Trial Court resolved: "THEREFORE: For the reasons stated, rules of sound rational criticism and articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 30, 31, 45, 50, 51, 71, all of the Penal Code, 9, 373 et seq. and concordant of the Criminal Procedure Code, 58 and 77 subsection f) both of Law 8204, upon resolving this matter, it is agreed: To declare [Name1] . . . the responsible perpetrator of the crime of AGGRAVATED SALE OF DRUGS TO CONSUMERS committed to the detriment of PUBLIC HEALTH and therefore a sanction of SEVEN YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT is imposed, to be served at the place and in the manner determined by prison laws and regulations, after crediting the pre-trial detention, if any. He is sentenced to pay the costs incurred, and the expenses of the process shall be borne by the State. LET IT BE NOTIFIED. [Name3] , sole-judge trial court." 2.- That the co-defendant [Name1] . . . filed a review proceeding against the preceding pronouncement.

3.- That having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 450 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the questions raised in the cassation appeal.

4.- That the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Cassation Judge [Name4] ; and, **CONSIDERING:** I.- CONTENT OF THE REVIEW: Violation of the *in dubio pro reo* principle, illegitimate raid, and incorporation of spurious evidence. In the sole ground of the review and in accordance with Articles 1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 142, 180 to 184, 363, 369, and 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code; 37, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution; 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 11.2 and 17.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 8.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and 26 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which he considers unobserved, the convicted person [Name1] . . . requests his acquittal because the abbreviated conviction judgment issued by the Puntarenas Trial Court held the commission of the crime to be proven without sufficient evidence, and furthermore, it was based on unlawful evidence. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that although he accepted the abbreviated procedure, this is not sufficient, as the conviction was based on controlled purchases and the evidence collected during the raid conducted at the residence of the co-defendant [Name5] , for which the surveillance and "experimental" purchase reports are cited. However, part of that evidence is unlawful and was so declared by the Puntarenas Trial Court in acquittal judgment No. 263-P-07, issued in favor of the defendant [Name6] (who did not avail herself of the abbreviated procedure but was tried in a trial through ordinary proceedings), because the resolution ordering the raid lacked any grounds whatsoever. The criminal judge merely transcribed the motion of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without providing the reasons or motives why the measure was necessary and proportionate. If that evidence declared unlawful were suppressed, the remaining elements would be insufficient to sustain the conviction.

II.- By a majority, with the dissenting vote of co-judge [Name7] , the review filed is granted. By majority opinion, the second section of this Cassation Court has maintained the criterion that, as understood by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, even in the case of an abbreviated procedure, the mere acceptance of charges by the indicted person is not sufficient to support a conviction. In accordance with this, and after studying the content of the merits judgment, it is observed that the indicted person is indeed correct in the petition for review he submits, as the evidence used by the merits Court and on which it essentially relies to issue the abbreviated conviction judgment in this case, derived from the raid conducted at the residence of the co-defendant [Name5] , who was separately acquitted in an ordinary trial, is unlawful and, as such, could not and cannot be assessed or taken into account for such purposes. In this regard, as recorded in the case file on folios 96 and 98 (there are evident errors in the foliation), it is evident that the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Phase of Puntarenas did not properly justify the resolution ordering the raid conducted at the aforementioned dwelling, located at [Address1] in Barranca, at the request of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the regional deputy chief of the Drug Control Police. In an irregular manner and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Political Constitution, in relation to numerals 142 and 193 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code, 2 subsection 3) and 17 subsection 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11 subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the aforementioned jurisdictional authority carried out the raid and search of the mentioned dwelling (a place where it seized important evidence linking the accused to the investigated crime) without adequately issuing the resolution authorizing that action harmful to fundamental rights, especially the guarantee of privacy of the home against state interference, despite the fact that this constituted an indispensable validity requirement to be able to carry it out. In this respect, it is noted that said authority did not indicate the reasons why, in its judgment, this act was appropriate and indispensable for the investigation being conducted at that time, limiting itself to transcribing what, in that sense and in written form, both the counsel [Name8] , acting as Puntarenas Prosecutor, and [Name9] , deputy chief of the Regional Department of Puntarenas of the Drug Control Police (cf. folios 65 to 85), stated. With this conduct, one of the fundamental rights contemplated in the Political Constitution, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely, the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a serious crime was being investigated in that place, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that constitutional right had to be motivated and justified as this regulation requires. In this regard, it is held that although the Constitutional Chamber has understood that in those cases where the guarantees judge is personally present and supervises the raid, a written search warrant is not required, even in such a case it has not exempted him from his duty to state the grounds for such action, explaining that this could even be done verbally upon entering, provided that a written record is left in the minutes of the raid conducted: "... The situation is now radically different and therefore the evolutionary interpretation authorized by our legal system, as stated above, and which this Chamber has decided to adopt regarding Article 23 of the Constitution, is justified. Indeed, with the entry into force of a criminal procedural system of a clearly accusatory nature, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned the role of protector of the regularity—especially constitutional regularity—of the proceedings, such that his presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but rather as a guardian ensuring that the exercise of state authority is carried out within the established constitutional and legal parameters and is conducted without abuse of power. For this Chamber, this is exactly and precisely what the Constituent Assembly intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully complied with if the judge's presence is available during dwelling raids, but always provided that, as stated, his participation is not as a member of the investigative body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the rights of citizens and the actions of the state authorities responsible for the investigation and production of evidentiary elements. Consequently, the requirement of a written order loses the relevance it once had, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and excess in action) of the administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would set for them in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is replaced by the active presence of the judge during the execution of the act. Now then, the reasons on the basis of which this Chamber holds such substitution to be valid, require in turn, in an unavoidable manner, that the judge's will to authorize be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in his acts and necessarily leading and non-passive participation, but also, that it be recorded in the minutes or certificate of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act performed. To this effect, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedural system means that the motivation of acts is not carried out in the traditional way, through writing, but is done orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change, however, must not serve to evade the obligation to state the reasons for actions and to ensure that the reasons are reflected in the process, especially those that, as in this case, have to do with the possibility of lawfully harming a constitutional right ..." (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 4672-03 of 14:47 hours on May 28, 2003. In this same sense, other votes of this Chamber may be consulted, namely; No. 2773-97 of May 20, 1997; No. 1509-98 of March 6, 1998; and No. 3014-98 of May 6, 1998). Pursuant to these guidelines, it is held that the minutes of the raid conducted (cf. folios 107 and 108) also did not state that the acting judicial authority had complied with such a requirement, given that the reasons that justified or motivated the measure are unknown. In this regard, it is noted that in the search warrant (cf. folio 96, line 30 onwards), the jurisdictional authority did nothing more than literally transcribe the content of the written request submitted by the prosecutor and the regional deputy chief of the PCD, after which it stated: "IT IS RESOLVED: in view of the motion of the prosecution and the requested action being appropriate, it is resolved that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 193, 194, 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the following is ordered: the marking of bills ... and to execute the raid ... Likewise, the RAID, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE of the dwelling house ... is ordered in order to locate and seize there evidence related to that illicit activity of national drug trafficking (production, sale, preparation, distribution, etc.), seizure to be carried out by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office ... ordering the authorization until 8 p.m., the necessity being imperative given that the sales are carried out in the late hours of the afternoon, night, and early morning, all in order to obtain a positive result from the operation ..." (cf. folio 96, line 30 onwards). As already anticipated, the criminal judge never justified why she considered the act to be appropriate and necessary for the purposes of the investigation being conducted at that time. On this point, it is worth mentioning what national doctrine has stated on the subject, saying: "... The search warrant must state its grounds. The Third Chamber, in various resolutions, has required the grounds for the search warrant, considering that it is not sufficient to transcribe the prosecutor's motion and then limit itself to saying that it proceeds to order the raid ... Regarding this, it should be said that although a mere descriptive reference to the prosecutor's motion is not sufficient, the judge may base the order on it, expressing why, based on what the prosecutor indicated, there is a basis for issuing the raid order ...", Llobet Rodríguez (Javier), "PROCESO PENAL COMENTADO". Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José. Third edition, 2006, p. 297). This criterion has also been upheld and set forth by the jurisprudence of this Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón, where in a majority vote it was stated: "... the complainants are indeed correct regarding the second aspect of the motion they make, as the evidence used by the Trial Court and on which it relies to issue the conviction in this matter, derived from the raid conducted at the residence of the sentenced person [Name10]., is unlawful and, as such, could not and cannot be assessed or taken into account to support a decision such as the one taken in this matter, even if it originated from the application of the abbreviated procedure. In this regard, as recorded in the case file ... it is evident that the Criminal Judge of Grecia did not properly justify the resolution ordering the raid conducted at the house inhabited by the sentenced person and her common-law partner ... at the request of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In an irregular manner and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Political Constitution, in relation to 193 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code, 2 subsection 3) and 17 subsection 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11 subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the aforementioned jurisdictional authority carried out the raid and search of the mentioned dwelling without adequately issuing the resolution authorizing said act (which affects and limits the guarantee of privacy of the home), despite the fact that this constituted an indispensable validity requirement to be able to carry it out. From a simple reading of the order, it is observed that it did not state the reasons for which—in its judgment—the carrying out of this act was appropriate, even though it was its duty to do so, as established in Article 193, in relation to numeral 142, both of the cited procedural regulations, limiting itself to transcribing what the counsel [Name11] , acting as Grecia Prosecutor, stated in that regard. With this conduct, one of the fundamental rights contemplated in the Political Constitution, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely, the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a crime was being committed or not in that place, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that right had to be motivated and justified as this regulation establishes. In the opinion of the majority of this Criminal Cassation Court, despite the jurisdictional authority having had sufficient time to comply with the requirements foreseen to be able to execute this class of acts, it did not do so (on the grounds for this order, see [Name12] , "Proceso Penal Comentado", Third Edition, Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, Costa Rica, 2006, pp. 296-297). This criterion has also been upheld and set forth in various resolutions by the Third Chamber of the Court, in cases where precisely the jurisdictional authority ordered said act limiting itself solely to transcribing the motion of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without stating the reasons or grounds on which it made this decision. Thus, for example, the following was stated: "I) This Chamber must note the existence of an absolute defect in the procedure that violates due process and, therefore, the right of defense, which was not alleged by the petitioner: the jurisdictional order dated July 25, 2000, issued by Counsel [Name13] . . ., Criminal Judge of Golfito, ordering the raid—visible on folio 34 of the case file—categorically lacks any basis, which constitutes a defect in the judgment that justifies its annulment, in accordance with Articles 1, 6, 142, 178 subsection a), 195 subsection d) and 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code and which is now reflected in Article 369 subsection j), entered into force on June 6, 2006, by virtue of Law No. 8503 on 'Opening of Criminal Cassation'. Said resolution literally states: '…SOLE CONSIDERING: The representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office of this center requests that, for investigations being conducted regarding the crime of Storage, Possession, and Sale of Drugs, a raid, search, and seizure be carried out in a dwelling, located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet, 25 meters east of the evangelical church, unpainted wooden house, of mixed construction, house inhabited by a woman only known by the nickname '[Name14]', and a dwelling located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. yard, with the number 780, mixed wood and cement house, unpainted, inhabited by a woman named [Name15] . . .. Although it is true that our Fundamental Charter establishes the inviolability of the home, it also provides that in exceptional cases said guarantee may be suspended. In the case at hand, the undersigned considers it appropriate, given the nature and seriousness of the crime under investigation (STORAGE, POSSESSION, AND SALE OF DRUGS), to grant the request, and consequently, the RAID, SEARCH, and seizure is ORDERED in a dwelling, located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet (...) house inhabited by a woman only known by the nickname '[Name14]'; and a dwelling located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. yard, with the number 780, mixed wood and cement house, unpainted, inhabited by a woman named [Name15] . . . in order to SEIZE objects related to the investigated crime, as well as possible drugs found in that place. To carry out this measure, today, JULY TWENTY-FIFTH, TWO THOUSAND, is set, between the hours of TWELVE AND EIGHTEEN HOURS. The following will participate in this measure: the Prosecuting Attorney of this center, Lic. [Name16] . . . and the Drug Enforcement officers: …'. This resolution fails to comply with the provisions of Article 195 subsection d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in relation to Articles 1, 6, and 142 ibidem, as it merely makes a bare reference to the Public Prosecutor's Office's claim, without expressing the factual or legal reasoning that, in the specific case and according to the evidence gathered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, substantiated its decision. II) It should not be forgotten that in a procedural system like that of Costa Rica, the statement of grounds constitutes an element of the jurisdictional resolution allowing for its objective review, in accordance with Articles 11 and 154 of the Political Constitution, which subjects jurisdictional bodies to the legal system. In cases such as this one, the grounds for the Criminal Court's decision to raid a dwelling are not based on the right to private property, but as a guarantee of the reasons justifying the intrusion into the sphere of personal privacy. III) Subsection 2 of Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides: 'No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home…'. Then, subsection 3 of the same precept states: 'Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks'. The Convention, then, only prohibits arbitrary interference, from which the legitimate possibility of restricting that right is derived, provided that the intrusion is not arbitrary. This is explained because the limit on the exercise of human rights lies in the existence of the rights of other people, so that all can coexist in society, as regulated in Article 32 subsection 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights: '2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the common good, in a democratic society'. Some criteria for defining the legitimacy of restrictions on human rights—and, therefore, to avoid arbitrariness—are contained in Article 30 of the cited Convention. First, that the restriction is prescribed by law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its advisory opinion 6/86, of May 9, 1986, interprets that term 'laws' as follows: '... The expression laws, in the framework of human rights protection, would be meaningless if it did not allude to the idea that the mere determination of public authority is not sufficient to restrict such rights. The opposite would be equivalent to recognizing absolute virtual power for the rulers over the governed. Instead, the word laws takes on its full logical and historical meaning if it is considered as a requirement for the necessary limitation of public power interference in the sphere of the individual's rights and freedoms. The Court concludes that the expression laws, used by Article 30, can have no other meaning than that of a formal law, that is, a legal norm adopted by the legislative body and promulgated by the Executive Branch, according to the procedure required by the domestic law of each State...'. The second requirement is that the restriction must be based on reasons of general interest, which constitutes its purpose. This teleological criterion for controlling the deviation of power has been understood by the Inter-American Court, through its Advisory Opinions 6/86 cited and 5/85, of November 13, 1985, in the following sense: '... It is possible to understand the common good, within the context of the Convention, as a concept referring to the conditions of social life that allow the members of society to achieve the greatest degree of personal development and the greatest prevalence of democratic values. In this sense, the organization of social life in a manner that strengthens the functioning of democratic institutions and preserves and promotes the full realization of the individual's rights can be considered an imperative of the common good... The Court is not unaware, however, of the difficulty of precisely and univocally defining the concepts of 'public order' and 'common good', nor that both concepts can be used both to affirm the individual's rights against public power, and to justify limitations on those rights in the name of collective interests. In this respect, it must be emphasized that under no circumstances could 'public order' or the 'common good' be invoked as means to suppress a right guaranteed by the Convention or to distort it or deprive it of its real content (see Art. 29.a of the Convention). Those concepts, insofar as they are invoked as grounds for limitations on human rights, must be subject to an interpretation strictly tailored to the 'just demands' of 'a democratic society' that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention...'. There is a third element introduced by the mentioned Article 32 subsection 2 of the San José Pact: that the restrictions present themselves as necessary in a democratic society. In the aforementioned Advisory Opinion 5/85, the Inter-American Court stated in this regard: '... It is important to highlight that the European Court of Human Rights, when interpreting Article 10 of the European Convention, concluded that 'necessary', without being synonymous with 'indispensable', implies the existence of a 'pressing social need' and that for a restriction to be 'necessary' it is not sufficient to show that it is 'useful', 'reasonable' or 'opportune'. (Eur. Court [Name17] . ., The Sunday Times case, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. no. 59, pp. 35-36 ). This conclusion, which is equally applicable to the American Convention, suggests that the 'necessity' and, therefore, the legality of the restrictions… will depend on whether they are oriented towards satisfying an imperative public interest. Among several options to achieve that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to the least extent must be chosen. Given this standard, it is not sufficient to show, for example, that the law fulfills a useful or opportune purpose; for them to be compatible with the Convention, restrictions must be justified according to collective objectives that, due to their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the right… and do not limit the proclaimed right more than is strictly necessary… That is, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and be closely tailored to the achievement of that legitimate objective…'. From this resolution, it derives that the necessity of the limitation implies that it must be useful to protect the right whose validity justifies the restriction, proportionate to the pursued end, and constitute the least burdensome alternative in achieving that purpose. IV) Regarding restrictions on the right to home privacy through raids, this Chamber, showing itself to be respectful and a guarantor of people's rights according to the formalities imposed by the American Convention on Human Rights, the Political Constitution, and the Criminal Procedure Code, has stated, for example, in its resolution No. 965-2004, of August 13, 2004—among many others—insistently, emphatically, and clearly: '... On the duty to state grounds and the harm to a fundamental right: Reflecting on the pillars that support the so-called Rule of Law, we could conclude that there is no other way to politically assess the framework of a State, to measure its true characteristics, than that which details the manner and requirements that allow the authorities to harm the fundamental rights of individuals.

By knowing, first of all, which rights may be "legitimately" infringed in that State and what the requirements are surrounding such authorization, we can assess whether that State effectively starts from the premise that its substantial legitimacy is due to the respect for such rights, such that the authorizations it contemplates, as part of the unavoidable reality that absolute rights do not exist and that there are situations that would exceptionally authorize an infringement of some of them, are surrounded by a series of requirements that become, in turn, prerogatives of the citizen guaranteeing that, in order to infringe a fundamental right, a real, serious, and especially reasoned weighing must be carried out of: i) the existence of verified indications of being in the presence of a crime, as the first unavoidable parameter to permit the analysis of whether or not a fundamental right is infringed, by virtue of what is contemplated in numeral 28, second paragraph of the Constitución Política; ii) the necessity of the measure, that is, that it is imposed because no other less harmful way exists to obtain the expected results; iii) its proportionality with respect to the interests and objectives sought through it; iv) the suitability of the authorization to achieve the objectives sought; v) the reasoned, current weighing of all these prerogatives, carried out by the constitutionally authorized subject to, in turn, authorize an infringement of a fundamental right: the judge, through the issuance of a duly reasoned written order… Therefore, every time an authority seeks authorization to encroach upon a fundamental right, the resolution issued is a clear political manifestation of the State, it is its reflection, its portrait, so never as in this type of resolution is the political role of the judge and their level of commitment to constitutionally protected values embodied, as is the importance of their function in the scheme of the Rule of Law. The jurisprudence of this Chamber has maintained this clear and transparent position in safeguarding that first-order political importance, regarding the respect for fundamental rights and the need for all the prerogatives set forth above to be weighed and reasoned by the judge when authorizing the infringement of an essential right (cfr., among others, resolutions 298-95 of 9:05 a.m. on May 25, 560-95 of 10:10 a.m. on September 22, and 614-95 of 9:55 a.m. on October 13, all of 1995; 468-99 of 9:20 a.m. on April 23, 1999; 246-00 of 9:50 a.m. on March 3 and 699-00 of 9:40 a.m. on June 23, both of the year 2000; 917-01 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21 of the year 2001; 1179-02 of 10:25 a.m. on November 22 of the year 2002; 722-03 of 9:30 a.m. on August 22 and 866-03 of 2:45 p.m. on September 30, both of the previous year). In particular, the importance of the reasoning is highlighted as a guarantee of the reasonable and democratic exercise of jurisdictional power when it authorizes an encroachment of this nature, while also recovering the transcendence that, for the fulfillment of this role, the existence of a written order prior to any encroachment on the privacy of an inhabited place has –especially in the case of a raid– . In reality, only the existence of a prior and duly reasoned order will allow the interpreter to assess whether, in effect, all the aforementioned constitutional requirements were met to authorize the intervention and, then, assess its legitimacy –formal and substantial– , that is, to control its validity. And, it is added now, only by requiring the judge to reason and explain, to set forth and justify what the presuppositions are, how they are met, and why they justify the authorization to infringe a fundamental right in the face of a specific request seeking it, can it be guaranteed, in turn, that the judge fulfills their role as guarantor of respect for those rights, as controller of the legality and constitutionality of the actions of the subjects in charge of the investigation –Ministerio Público and judicial police–…The judge in the investigation phase and in the intermediate phase, no matter how delegitimized they may be, due to what happens in practice, their role is to control and guarantee the legality of the actions in this phase, to assess and weigh reasonedly the requests made to them, and never as a simple spectator willing to authorize everything requested of them, remaining on the sidelines of its appropriateness, because that would simply be to abandon the meaning and justification of the jurisdictional function in a Rule of Law, which finds precisely in the criminal process, the quintessential venue for the exercise of state repressive power, its most pristine raison d'être. The Constitución Política and the Código Procesal Penal bet on the controlling judge, guarantor, and bastion of respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens, always engaged when it involves a criminal investigation, and only through the reasoned exercise and in accordance with the stated parameters can the jurisdictional authorization to infringe a fundamental right be validated. It is not enough, then, that there is jurisdictional intervention; this is one of the constitutionally required requirements and the first step to consider the formal legitimacy of the authorization. That judge must fulfill the other requirements, must reason, set forth how and why the measure is justified, is necessary, is suitable, is proportional to the end sought, and what the margins are within which the authorization is granted, requirements specified in the constitutional norms cited above and, in the case of a raid, especially the relationship of Articles 9, 11, 28 second paragraph, 23, 39, and 41 of the Constitución Política and 195 of the Código Procesal Penal…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. V) In the specific case, dealing with investigations for the crime of drug trafficking, the protection of the health of all persons is a matter of public interest. In this sense, Article 1 of the Ley General de Salud (Law No. 5395) establishes: "The health of the population is a good of public interest protected by the State," while the last paragraph of Article 2 of the Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso No Autorizado y Actividades Conexas (Law No. 8204) states: "…It is a function of the State, and it is declared of public interest, the adoption of the necessary measures to prevent, control, investigate, avoid, or repress any illicit activity related to the subject matter of this Law…". For its part, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador", approved by Law No. 7907) provides in its Article 10: "1. Everyone has the right to health, understood as the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being. 2. In order to make the right to health effective, the States Parties undertake to recognize health as a public good…". This is understood, due to the problems caused by illicit drug trafficking, from the Preamble of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (approved by Law No. 7198), which reflects a general and international interest: "… The Parties to this Convention: Deeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production, demand, and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural, and political foundations of society. Deeply concerned also by the steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with the danger of incalculable gravity that this entails…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. Similarly, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (approved by Law No. 4544) states in its Preamble: "The Parties: Concerned with the physical and moral health of mankind…Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind…"; an idea also echoed in its Preamble by the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances (approved by virtue of Law No. 4990). This social and state interest in protecting public health can ultimately justify the interference with the right to privacy of the home. VI) However, the mere existence of a criminal investigation in matters of drug trafficking is not enough to limit that right. The Constitución Política de Costa Rica, through the relationship of its Articles 23 and 24, guarantees the right to domestic privacy, qualifying it as inviolable, but expressly provides in the first of the mentioned provisions the possibility of limiting this right through a raid: "…by written order of a judge…" –in accordance with the requirements of Article 195 of the Código Procesal Penal– "…or to prevent the commission or impunity of crimes, or to avoid serious harm to persons or property…" –for the cases of raid without a jurisdictional order contained in Article 197 of the Código Procesal Penal–. Consequently, the reasons of general interest or public order that justify the restriction on the right to privacy of the home required by the American Convention on Human Rights are materialized in Article 193, in relation to Article 190 to which it must be understood the former refers, both of the Código Procesal Penal. The second one states: "Article 190.- Vehicle Search. …may search a vehicle, provided there are sufficient grounds to presume that a person is hiding in it objects related to the crime…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]; while the first one states: "Raid and Search of Dwelling. When the search must be carried out in an inhabited place, in its dependencies, place of business, or office, the raid and search shall be carried out personally by the judge…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. It follows from this that the requirements motivating the search of a vehicle are the same that could justify the entry and search of a dwelling: the existence of reasons or sufficient elements to presume that in said place objects related to the crime specifically being investigated by the Ministerio Público are found. VII) In these conflictive scenarios, the right to domestic privacy yields before the state interest in the protection of public health through the prosecution of illicit conduct that threatens it, in fulfillment of its obligations –of means, not of results– to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and sanction those behaviors that threaten legal interests whose indispensable reference is constituted by the human rights recognized in the legal system. However, the necessity of that restriction (consisting of entry into the home and affecting the right to privacy), as indicated, must be demonstrated in a jurisdictional resolution, so that the raid of the dwelling in the specific case constitutes a suitable means in the prevention, investigation, prosecution, and eventual punishment of illicit drug trafficking in protection of public health, is proportional to the nature of the crime investigated and to the existing indications about the possible location in the inhabited place of objects related to that crime, and that no other less burdensome alternative exists than the intrusion into the home. All of this integrates and is summarized in the requirement contemplated in subsection d) of Article 195 of the Código Procesal Penal: "The reason for the raid". VIII) Based on the foregoing, this Chamber on its own motion observes that the order issued by the Juzgado Penal de Golfito to raid the dwellings of [Name18] . . . and [Name15] . . ., constituted a defective procedural act of an absolute nature, since by containing no reasoning whatsoever, it violated the rights and guarantees of persons, contained in all the regulations analyzed previously and related to the state functions of respecting and guaranteeing the right to privacy of the home free from arbitrary interference. Therefore, the elements of evidence that derived from the arbitrary and unlawful entry and search of the defendants' dwellings –even though from that of [Name19] . . no element of interest to the Ministerio Público was extracted– could under no circumstances have been used to support the lower court's judgment. This is in accordance with Articles 1, 175, 178 subsection a), and 181 first paragraph of the Código Procesal." (SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE, opinion No. 674 of 10:10 a.m. on July 19, 2006; see also in this same sense opinions No. 917 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2001, No. 1275 of 9:35 a.m. on November 7, 2005, No. 165 of 9:30 a.m. on March 11, 2005, No. 70 of 8:45 a.m. on February 11, 2005, and No. 139 of 8:50 a.m. on March 4, 2005). Finally, it is important to note that in this case it was also not facing any of the hypotheses in which the regulations allow the carrying out of this type of proceedings without the existence of a prior resolution so ordering it, to thus justify the manner in which it was proceeded. In other words, it was not facing any of the hypotheses or circumstances provided for in Article 197 of the Código Procesal Penal ... On the other hand, it is worth clarifying that in the past there was a controversy between the Sala Tercera and the Sala Constitucional regarding the issue analyzed here, since while the former has insisted on the need for a prior written raid order, the latter has rather pointed out that it is not required when the guarantee judge is present. However, the constitutional jurisprudence (binding erga omnes) ultimately clarified its position, reiterating that a written order was not necessary, but -that said- making the caveat that it is indeed essential in all cases for the judge to state in writing (for the purpose of exercising the respective controls by the subjects who may be affected in their fundamental rights) the reasons that led to the decision to carry out the raid. Such reasoning could even be fulfilled orally upon verifying the entry, as long as it is recorded in writing. In this sense, the following was indicated: "... In effect, with the implementation of a clearly accusatory criminal procedure system, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a role of protector of regularity -especially constitutional regularity- of the proceeding, so that their presence and intervention are required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but as a supervisor that the exercise of state authority is executed within the constitutional and legal parameters set and is carried out without abuse of power. For the Chamber, it is precisely and rightly this that the Constitutional Assembly intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Constitución Política must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully accomplished if the judge is present during the raids of domicile, but always and whenever, obviously, their participation, as stated, is not as a member of the investigative body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the rights of citizens and the actions of the state authorities in charge of the investigation and production of evidentiary elements. Consequently, the requirement of a written order loses the relevance it once had, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and of excess in the performance) of the administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would set for them in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is supplanted by the active presence of the judge during the execution of the act. Now, the reasons on the basis of which this Chamber considers such substitution valid, demand in turn, unavoidably, that the judge's will to authorize be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in their acts and necessarily leading and not passive participation, but also, that it be recorded in the record or certification of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act carried out. In this regard, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedure system means that the reasoning of the acts is carried out not in the traditional way through writing, but is carried out orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change however, should not serve to evade the obligation to reason the actions and to ensure the reasons are captured in the process, especially those that, as in this case, have to do with the possibility of lawfully harming a constitutional right. V.- The consulting Chamber states its doubt about the validity of an interpretation like the one set forth that disregards the value of the prior written order, in light of the new criminal procedure regime, which establishes very precise rules in this regard. However, it is clear from what has been set forth that from the perspective of this Chamber, for Constitutional Law the personal intervention of the judge -possible or mandatory- is by itself sufficient to meet the requirements embodied in the Constitution, without additionally requiring a prior written order issued by the judge themselves. It is therefore indicated that it will be sufficient for the purposes of overcoming the inviolability of the domicile either the existence of a written order from the competent judge in cases where their action can validly be delegated, or their personal participation. Now, for purposes of respect for due process, it is beyond doubt that, whether through a prior written order or through their direct and immediate participation, the intervention of the judge and their authorization must include a reasoning –a legal grounding of the act is not required, but rather its reasoning, meaning it must have a founded reason, a reason to occur- that can be validated by the other judicial authorities intervening in the process. This is of the utmost importance because if such reasoning is lacking, it is evident that, in accordance with the rules of due process derived from Article 39 of the Constitution, the evidence becomes illegitimate and could not serve as a basis for a decision. VI.- In conclusion, in the criterion of the Chamber, the constitutional requirement established in Article 23 of the Constitución Política is met, and the constitutional principles of due process are respected regarding the inviolability of the domicile, when the lack of a written order from a competent judge in a raid proceeding is supplanted by the personal and active participation of the criminal judge in said act. Such performance must necessarily be reasoned according to the circumstances of fact and law relevant to the case, and even more so when dealing with the affectation of a constitutional right. Furthermore, that reasoning must be carried out by the guarantee judge in such a way that there is no doubt about it and that it can be subjected to analysis and review by the judicial authorities competent for such function, since the omission or clear insufficiency of said reasoning entails the illegitimacy of what was performed. It is up to the consulting Chamber to verify what occurred in the specific case and resolve accordingly in accordance with what is set forth here ...”, Sala Constitucional, opinion No. 4672-03 of May 28, 2003. From the study of the present case, it is apparent that, as indicated, the raid order on pages 37 et seq. incorporates no type of reasoning by the criminal judge of Grecia, and this omission was also not remedied in the practical raid record on pages 51 et seq., where the material actions carried out in compliance with the issued order are simply described. Consequently, in accordance with what has been indicated, the raid proceeding carried out in the dwelling of the defendant herein is flawed and as such could not and cannot be taken into account to support a conviction as was done, given that upon its issuance and execution, one of the fundamental rights contemplated in the Constitución Política was violated. Furthermore, this conclusion is reached regardless of whether the now sentenced person had agreed to avail herself of the abbreviated procedure, since the procedural regulations and the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional itself require that the judgment handed down under this procedural modality must be duly reasoned. On this aspect, the jurisprudence of this constitutional controller has stated that: "(...) in the event of a conviction being issued in the abbreviated process, that manifestation of will to accept the facts can indeed be considered an evidentiary element. The restriction of this practice in criminal procedural law is based on the danger of imposing a custodial sentence through a confession by a person whose will is impaired by violence or ignorance, but the strong jurisdictional supervision that surrounds the abbreviated procedure -including the means of appeal- is sufficient guarantee to rule out that risk. In addition, the statement of the accused must be corroborated with other elements of conviction -expert reports, witnesses, documents- that make it credible in the judge's opinion, which must be analyzed as a whole when substantiating the conviction." (Sala Constitucional, No. 5867 of 2:30 p.m. on July 12, 2000). This means that, together with the observance of the requirements established by the legislator to process the case in accordance with this type of procedure (e.g., agreement between defense, accused, and Ministerio Público regarding the facts and the penalty, as well as a free acceptance by the defendant of this agreement, etc.), the judge must base the decision on the documentary evidence existing in the file, evidence that must necessarily be lawful, since the current trial system is governed by the principle of legality. Although the abbreviated procedure constitutes a waiver of the complexities of the ordinary proceeding, specifically the holding of the trial (with all the principles and guarantees it entails), this does not mean that the requirements and guarantees recognized in a Democratic Rule of Law are equally waived, such as, among others, the proper accreditation of the facts and the participation of the accused in them, this upon issuing the conviction, which must be based on legally obtained evidence. III.- There is no doubt then that in the case, the regulations governing the raid of a dwelling or home were violated and the jurisdictional authority irregularly proceeded with its issuance and execution by breaching the formalities or requirements existing for it, above all the duty to provide reasoning. These formalities or requirements (forms in general) have been established as a guarantee that every legal operator will not act arbitrarily or abusively when it falls to them to determine the real truth of the facts under investigation. In these cases, it is not a cult of formality for mere formality's sake, but a recognition of formality as an instrument to make effective the rights and guarantees that individuals enjoy, by the mere fact of being such. Under this view, according to what was indicated, the action questioned here presents an absolute procedural defect that obliges its declaration of nullity, the effects of which entail -at the same time- the ineffectiveness of all the evidence derived from this proceeding, as provided in Article 175 of the cited procedural regulations, establishing that: "Acts carried out in non-observance of the forms and conditions provided for in the Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in this Code may not be assessed to support a judicial decision nor used as presuppositions thereof" (see in this regard from the Sala Constitucional, opinion No. 10115 of 2:40 p.m. on August 3, 2005) ...", Tribunal de Casación Penal of the Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón, second section, opinion No. 2007-00178 of 12:15 p.m. on March 23, 2007.

II.- Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, given that, essentially, the most important evidentiary elements that in the case at hand allowed the trial court to base the conviction originated in a procedure that violated the most elementary norms of due process, which in turn led to the violation of fundamental rights contemplated in the Constitución Política and International Treaties (guarantee of privacy of the home), what is required in this case, as the majority of this Chamber considers it, is to grant the review procedure filed by the defense and annul the judgment and the trial that preceded it. Indeed, from the study of the decision on the merits, it is observed how, essentially, the judge cites in support of the conviction the positive evidentiary results derived from the flawed raid proceeding, as well as the existence of police actions carried out in the days prior to the one on which said final operation took place (in which there was not even jurisdictional control), related to surveillance and alleged controlled drug purchases at the site. This means that upon eliminating everything related to the raid, the process was left devoid of suitable evidence to justify and support a conviction as ordered. Now, since the most important and essential evidence linking the sentenced person to the act results from the defective activity referred to above, without the possibility of introducing new evidentiary elements that would change the legal situation in which we find ourselves, the majority of this Chamber deems it unnecessary and inappropriate to remand the file for new proceedings, as the evidence that remains or persists in this process does not allow the accreditation -with sufficient certainty- of the criminal responsibility that the Ministerio Público attributed to the accused [Name20] . ., therefore, pursuant to numeral 416, first paragraph of the Código Procesal Penal, it is appropriate to resolve this case according to the law applicable to the case. In this sense, even though the judgment mentions that there are police reports and seizure records in the file attesting to the alleged existence of controlled purchases made by the Drug Control Police, all of these occurred prior to the execution of the raid whose nullity is decreed in this resolution, such elements could at most allow the accused's responsibility in the sale of drugs attributed to him to be considered probable, but it is considered that these elements do not possess the sufficient and necessary strength, required by the procedural regulations, to establish a judgment of certainty regarding the existence of that criminal activity. There is no graphic record regarding the alleged surveillances carried out at a purely police level, which -in principle- would have allowed corroborating what was stated in the police reports, nor were telephone interventions carried out that would have made it possible to overcome that judgment of probability that a violation of the psychotropic substances law was occurring. In other words, once the analyzed raid proceeding (and all the elements derived from it) is excluded from the process, the remaining evidence mentioned in the judgment is insufficient to undermine the state of innocence that the legal system recognizes for every person by the mere fact of that condition. Therefore, in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, the challenged conviction is annulled and, at once, in this same review avenue, the sentenced person [Name1] . . . is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of Violation of the Ley de Psicotrópicos in its modality of aggravated sale of "crack" to consumers, committed to the detriment of public health for which he is serving a prison sentence, as charged by the Ministerio Público. By virtue of this, if no other cause prevents it, his immediate release is ordered for this cause. The matter is resolved without special award of costs. The trial court must ensure the effective cancellation of the corresponding entry in the Registro Judicial, as well as the exclusion of the record (if any) in the Archivo Criminal generated as a result of this investigation (cfr. opinion of the Sala Constitucional No. 5802-99 of 3:36 p.m. on July 27, 1999, among others). Judge Guillermo Sojo Picado dissents and declares the review claim without merit.

III.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE [Nombre7]: The undersigned, Guillermo Sojo Picado, departs from the majority vote and believes that the claims should be declared without merit, and therefore the review procedure filed. It must be specified that the judgment sought to be reviewed was issued through an abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado), which means that through said procedure the oral and public trial is dispensed with, with the acquiescence of the accused and his defender. Said procedure allows that, in the event of an agreement with the Public Prosecutor's Office, the civil plaintiff, and the private complainant (if any), the accused receives as a benefit the imposition of a more favorable penalty, with the possibility of a sanction being set up to one third below the legal minimum contemplated in the respective criminal type. Thus, if the accused [Nombre20] ..., as in the specific case, duly advised by his defender, freely agreed to submit to said abbreviated procedure, as recorded in the respective preliminary hearing record seen on pages 182 and 183, it is not possible now, through this review procedure, to seek the annulment of the conviction. Indeed, as seen on cited page 182 verso, it is clearly recorded that the defender (Lic. Esteban Amador Garita) indicated to the Criminal Court that the accused was willing to submit to an abbreviated procedure with a penalty of 7 years in prison, and the defendant was even explained the scope and consequences of the application of said procedure. In this regard, there are some jurisprudential precedents from the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) of the Second Judicial Circuit, and the vote [Telf1] of eleven hours forty minutes of September twenty-second, two thousand three, which is shared, can be cited, stating the following: "In the present matter, D.A.Q. was declared the perpetrator of the crime of 'Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes,' committed to the detriment of Public Health, for which a penalty of three years and four months of imprisonment was imposed, through an abbreviated procedure. Regarding this special procedure, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), by resolution No. 4864 of 15:27 hours of July 8, 1998, indicated that the abbreviated procedure provided for in articles 373 to 375 of the CPP is not contrary to the Political Constitution, and in light of said precedent, this Court of Cassation has also indicated that 'In said ruling, whose authority is binding erga omnes by provision of law, the Constitutional Chamber does not omit to consider that this special procedure is characterized by the "dispensing with the holding of the oral and public trial, in exchange for the possibility for the accused of receiving a more favorable criminal sanction," and since the trial is the essential phase of the ordinary process (which is conducted based on the accusation, orally, publicly, adversarially, and continuously, according to article 326 of the CPP), it results that in the abbreviated procedure, by dispensing with the trial "...the right to exercise the adversarial principle on the part of the accused is waived" (Criminal Cassation Court, No. 005-F-99 of 9:30 hours of January 15, 1999), particularly regarding the determination of the facts attributed to him, since these have been admitted by the accused (the accused who rejects the facts should not consent to the application of the abbreviated procedure) and their existence was also corroborated by the consideration of other evidentiary elements [...] Hence, the present objection is not admissible because the determination of the facts essentially derives from the accused having admitted them as described in the accusation (the admission of the fact gave logical unity to the list of evidence), all circumstances that the accused freely admitted, with the legal advice of his defender, who took the initiative to request the application of the abbreviated procedure [...] Thus, the claim must be declared without merit, insofar as the accused's participation in the investigated fact logically derives from the evidence, essentially from the admission of facts that the accused freely made, within the spectrum of possibilities offered by criminal procedural legislation, with the advice of his technical defender and the conformity of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without any defect being observed that justifies the annulment sought by the CED2, ° of 11:30 hours of April 3, 2003). In the present matter, the accused, in the free exercise of his right to defense, with the assistance of his technical defender, as well as clearly and expressly warned by the judicial authority, chose to admit the fact attributed to him in the accusation and consented to the application of the abbreviated procedure, which is evidenced by the corresponding preliminary hearing record, which, in what is relevant, states: 'Once the [full reading of the accusation] was completed, both parties inform the Judge that they have reached a preliminary agreement to request the application of an Abbreviated Procedure in accordance with the provisions of article 373 of the Criminal Procedural Code. That being the case, the Judge proceeds to ask the accused if it is his free will to submit to the abbreviated procedure, to which he answers affirmatively; asks the accused if he understands the facts with which he is charged and warns him that he has the right to have any doubt clarified, the accused answering that he has understood the accusation. The Judge then explains to the accused that the abbreviated process implies that, based on an acceptance of the charges already read by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and their acceptance by the accused, the trial is dispensed with, and by virtue also of there being an agreement regarding the penalty to be imposed, the judge also informs that the penalty can even be reduced by one third of the minimum penalty provided for the crime charged, and she informs him that specifically the penalty for the crime of Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes is from five to fifteen years in prison, which would be left at 3 years and 4 months in prison reduced to one third (article 61 of the Psychotropic Substances Law number 7786). He is also informed that the consequence of the agreement would be the application of the penalty agreed upon between the parties, without the holding of the oral trial, the remaining task of the Trial Court being to verify your responsibility as accused, and that the requirements demanded by the relevant laws are met. And she reiterates what the evidentiary elements are that exist in the case file to support the existence of the commission of the charged criminal act and your participation in it, as responsible perpetrators of the illicit act described in the accusation. The Judge requests the accused to take into consideration both the basis and the evidence that the Public Prosecutor's Office requests be received at trial, namely: testimonial, visible on page 97 and the documentary on pages 96 and 97. Which was read to the accused in the presence of his defender. Both the Prosecutor, the defender, and the accused inform that the agreed penalty for the crime of Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes is from five to fifteen years in prison, which would be left at three years four months in prison reduced to one third [...] Immediately, the accused is warned that he has the right not to testify and if he decided to do so, anything he says can be used both for and against him, for which reason he is asked if he is willing to admit the fact attributed to him, which he has already been made aware of, and he states that he does admit it as it is in the accusation, in addition to consenting to the application of the requested procedure, indicating that he does not wish to give further testimony about the facts. The Judge rules that having thus complied with the provisions of articles 373 and 374 of the Criminal Procedural Code, the request for Abbreviated Procedures applied to Mr. [Nombre21] is approved, with the agreement of a penalty of THREE YEARS FOUR MONTHS IN PRISON, ordering the referral of the case file to the Trial Court for what corresponds in accordance with the provisions of article 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedures' (record, pages 120 to 122). Pursuant to the jurisprudence cited above, it is not pertinent that he now intends to contradict the evidence for the prosecution, when he, in the free exercise of his right to defense, waived the adversarial principle and admitted the fact attributed to him, which is reiterated in this other jurisprudential precedent: 'The second aspect to point out is that when the accused requests the abbreviated procedure and negotiates the penalty with the accuser, he accepts the prosecution evidence offered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and waives discussing it at the preliminary hearing and in the trial phase, the defects it might contain are validated, as is the case with those the accused now claims. This Court has expressed in that sense that "His will and silence, avoiding the adversarial process, fully legitimized the actions of the police authorities. If both the plaintiff and his defender admitted, without any objection, the evidence that supported the accusation, stating their agreement with the sanction imposed, it is contrary to the procedural loyalty that should prevail in any process, for them to later formulate an objection that they fully endorsed with their silence. If they waived the adversarial process, the procedural scenario conducive to discussing the evidence; if its content was also not objected to at the preliminary hearing or during the development of the process, it is inadmissible that after issuing a ruling with which the accused agreed, he subsequently formulates a series of objections that he should have raised in a timely manner and regarding which he remained absolutely silent, validating through his inaction the eventual informalities he now alleges." (Judgment 2003-497, drafted by Judge [Nombre22], there is a dissenting vote by Judge [Nombre23])...'" (CED3, ° of 9:40 hours of June 26, 2003, judges Salazar Murillo –drafter-, [Nombre24] and [Nombre25]). For all the above, the determination of the "proven fact" in the judgment does not lack legitimate evidentiary basis, but rather derives directly and independently from the admission that the accused himself made of its existence, to which it can be added that his statement is corroborated by the documentary evidence related to the activity prior to the search (allanamiento) that the defense questions, such as the police reports describing the investigation conducted and its results, the records of serial number recording of bills, of delivery of bills for the purchase of drugs, of receipt of acquired drugs, for example. For all the above, the cassation appeal on procedural grounds filed by the defense is declared without merit" (the transcription is faithful to the original). In the specific case, at the time of accepting the abbreviated procedure, conformity was manifested not only with the agreement and the penalty, but also with the accusation and the evidence supporting it, and the action filed is therefore not now admissible. Secondly, article 195 of the Criminal Procedural Code, when referring to the formalities of the search (allanamiento), indicates that the resolution ordering said diligence must contain the following requirements: a- The name and position of the official authorizing the search and the identification of the procedure in which it is ordered. b- The specific determination of the place or places to be searched. c- The name of the authority that will conduct the search, in the event that the diligence is delegated to the Public Prosecutor's Office or the police. d) The reason for the search. d) The time and date on which the diligence is to be carried out. The foregoing requirements are met in the case of the questioned resolution because it clearly indicates that an investigation is being conducted by the Puntarenas Prosecutor's Office, according to which the authorities have news that drug sales were occurring in the house to be searched. Likewise, details are given of the manner in which the drug sales were carried out, as well as the existence of several controlled purchases conducted to evidence the indicated business. The search resolution also identifies the dwelling in which it is to be conducted, and the authorities that will participate in the act. Regarding the requirement of the "reason" for the search, it is necessary to point out that the order is requested by the Prosecutor, who also informs the matter based on the data provided by the PCD in that regard, such that when numeral 195 of the Criminal Procedural Code in its subsection d) mentions that it must contain the "reason," it refers not to the resolution having to be broadly substantiated, as is necessary in a resolution where the judge must already issue a criterion (with numeral 142 of the Criminal Procedural Code being applicable in this hypothesis). To issue the search order, given its nature, considering that it is generally ordered at the beginning of the investigation under the prosecutor's charge, it is sufficient that the information provided to the judge at that moment is reliable, and is effectively accompanied by elements that suggest that one is indeed facing a probable criminal act. The judge must assess this extreme and verify, among other aspects, that there are sufficient verified indications of being in the presence of a crime, and that it justifies entry into the domicile, and also that this measure is necessary for the investigation. Aspects such as proportionality, and in general a reasoned assessment that provides the reason to decree the search order. In the specific case, it is not observed that such aspects were not considered by the Criminal Judge at the time of decreeing the measure. The foregoing, as stated, insofar as there are reports to that effect of the drug sales and the action is accompanied by the records of the controlled purchases, which makes the agreed measure justifiable. In this regard, it is not appropriate to annul or render ineffective the evidence that was collected in that search diligence, as is claimed. As this Cassation judge considers the cited order valid, the evidence collected as a result thereof also remains. Consequently, the grounds for review raised by the sentenced individual are dismissed. Therefore, it is appropriate to declare the filed review action without merit.

POR TANTO:

By majority, the review request filed by the sentenced individual [Nombre20] ... in exercise of his material right of defense is granted. By virtue of this, the conviction judgment issued against [Nombre1] ..., for the crime of aggravated drug sale committed to the detriment of public health, is annulled. Likewise, in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, in this same review proceeding, he is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for this illicit act. By virtue of this, if another cause does not prevent it, his immediate release is ordered for this cause. The matter is resolved without special award of costs. The Court of Instance must ensure the effective cancellation of the corresponding registration entry in the Judicial Register (Registro Judicial), as well as the exclusion of the criminal record (if any) in the Criminal Archive generated as a result of this investigation. Judge Guillermo Sojo Picado dissents and declares the review petition without merit. NOTIFY.

Mario Alberto Porras Villalta Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Guillermo Sojo Picado Judges of Criminal Cassation Review petition Case for drug trafficking v/ [Nombre1] . . .

against/ public health File No. 02-200958-431-PE If that evidence declared illegal were suppressed, the remaining elements would be insufficient to uphold the conviction.

**II.**- **By majority, with the dissenting vote of co-judge [Nombre7], the petition for review is granted.** By majority criterion, the second section of this Court of Cassation has maintained the criterion that, as understood by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), even in an abbreviated proceeding, the mere acceptance of charges by the accused would not be sufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly, and after studying the content of the judgment on the merits, it is observed that the accused is indeed correct in the petition for review he presents, since the evidence used by the Trial Court and on which it essentially relies to issue the abbreviated conviction in this case, which derives from the search (allanamiento) carried out at the residence of the co-defendant [Nombre5], who was separately acquitted in an ordinary trial, is illegal and, as such, could not and cannot be valued or taken into account for those purposes. In this regard, as recorded in the file on folios 96 and 98 (there are evident errors in the numbering), it is evident that the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Phase of Puntarenas did not properly justify the resolution by which she ordered the search (allanamiento) conducted at the aforementioned dwelling, located at [Dirección1] in Barranca, at the request of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the regional deputy chief of the Drug Control Police. Irregularly and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Political Constitution, in relation to Articles 142, 193 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code, Article 2(3) and Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 11(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the aforementioned jurisdictional authority carried out the search and registration of the mentioned dwelling (a place where important evidence linking the accused to the investigated crime was seized) without properly issuing the resolution authorizing said action harmful to fundamental rights, especially the guarantee of privacy of the home against state interference, despite this being an indispensable validity requirement to carry it out. In this regard, it is noted that said authority did not indicate the reasons why, in her opinion, the execution of this act was appropriate and essential, limiting herself to transcribing what was stated in writing in that sense by both Mr. [Nombre8], who acted as Prosecutor of Puntarenas, and [Nombre9], deputy chief of the Regional Department of Puntarenas of the Drug Control Police (cf. folios 65 to 85). With this conduct, one of the fundamental rights provided for in the Political Constitution, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely, the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a serious crime was being investigated at that place, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that constitutional right had to be motivated and justified as required by these regulations. In this regard, it is noted that although the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has understood that in those cases where the judge of guarantees is present and personally oversees the search (allanamiento), a written search warrant is not required, even in such a case, it has not exempted the judge from the duty to justify such action, explaining that this could even be done verbally upon entry, provided that a written record is left in the minutes of the search carried out: "... The situation is now radically different and therefore the evolutionist interpretation authorized by our legal system as stated above, and which this Chamber has decided to adopt regarding Article 23 of the Constitution, is justified. Indeed, with the implementation of a criminal procedural system of a purely accusatory nature, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a role of protector of the regularity—especially constitutional regularity—of the procedure, so that their presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but as a watchdog to ensure that the exercise of state authority is executed within the established constitutional and legal parameters and is carried out without abuse of power. For the Chamber, this is exactly and precisely what the Constituent Assembly intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee set forth in Article 23 of the Political Constitution must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully accomplished if the judge is present in home searches (allanamientos de domicilio), provided that, obviously, their participation is, as stated, not as a member of the investigative body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the rights of citizens and the actions of the state authorities responsible for the investigation and production of evidentiary elements. Consequently, the relevance that the requirement of a written order once had is lost, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and of excess in the performance) of the administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would indicate in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is replaced by the active presence of the judge during the execution of the act. Now, the reasons on which this Chamber considers such replacement valid, in turn inexorably demand that the judge's will to authorize be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in their actions and necessarily protagonist and non-passive participation, but also, that it be recorded in the minutes or record of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act performed. To this effect, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedural system means that the motivation of the acts is carried out not in the traditional way through writing, but is done orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that merit the action and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change, however, should not serve to evade the obligation to motivate the actions and to ensure the reasons are recorded in the process, especially those that, as in this case, have to do with the possibility of lawfully harming a constitutional right ..." (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 4672-03 of 14:47 hours on May 28, 2003. In this same sense, other votes of this Chamber can be consulted, namely; No. 2773-97 of May 20, 1997; No. 1509-98 of March 6, 1998; and No. 3014-98 of May 6, 1998). According to these guidelines, it is noted that in the minutes of the search conducted (cf. folios 107 and 108), it was also not recorded that the acting judicial authority had complied with such a requirement, as the reasons that justified or motivated the diligence are unknown. In this regard, it is noted that in the search warrant (cf. folio 96, line 30 onwards), the jurisdictional authority merely transcribed literally the content of the written request presented by the prosecutor and the regional deputy chief of the PCD, after which it stated: "IT IS RESOLVED: in view of the prosecutor's request and the request being appropriate, it is resolved that in accordance with the provisions of articles 193, 194, 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the following is ordered: the marking of bills ... and to execute the search (allanamiento) ... Likewise, the SEARCH, REGISTRATION AND SEIZURE of the dwelling house ... is ordered, in order to locate and seize evidence related to that illegality of national drug trafficking (production, sale, preparation (sic), distribution (sic), etc.) seizure to be carried out by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office ... ordering the authorization until 8:00 p.m. with the necessity (sic) prevailing given that the sales are made in the late afternoon, night and early morning hours all with the purpose of obtaining a positive result from the operation ..." (cf. folio 96, line 30 onwards). As already mentioned, the criminal judge never justified why she considered the act was appropriate and necessary for the purposes of the investigation being carried out at that time. In this regard, it is worth mentioning what the national doctrine has stated on the subject, saying that: "... the search warrant (orden de allanamiento) must be justified. The Third Chamber in various decisions has demanded the justification of the search warrant, considering that it is not sufficient to transcribe the prosecutor's request and then merely state that it proceeds to order the search ... In this respect, it must be said that although a mere descriptive reference to the prosecutor's request is not enough, the judge can base the decision on it, expressing why, based on what the prosecutor indicated, there are grounds for issuing the search warrant ...", Llobet Rodríguez (Javier), "PROCESO PENAL COMENTADO". Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José. Third edition, 2006, p. 297). This criterion has also been maintained and stated by the jurisprudence of this Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón, where a majority vote indicated: "... the complainants are indeed correct regarding the second aspect of their claim, since the evidence used by the Trial Court and on which it relies to issue the conviction in this case, which derived from the search (allanamiento) conducted at the residence of the sentenced [Nombre10], is illegal and, as such, could not and cannot be valued or taken into account to support a decision like the one taken in this matter, even if it originated in the application of the abbreviated procedure. In this regard, as recorded in the file ... it is evident that the Criminal Judge of Grecia did not properly justify the resolution by which she ordered the search conducted at the house where the sentenced woman lived with her sentimental partner ... at the request of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. Irregularly and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Political Constitution, in relation to Article 193 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code, Article 2(3) and Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 11(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the aforementioned jurisdictional authority carried out the search and registration of the mentioned dwelling (which affects and limits the guarantee of privacy of the home) without properly issuing the resolution authorizing said act, despite this being an indispensable validity requirement to carry it out. From a simple reading of the order, it is observed that she did not justify the reasons why—in her opinion— the execution of this act was appropriate, even though it was her duty to do so, as established in Article 193, in relation to Article 142, both of the cited procedural law, limiting herself to transcribing what Mr. [Nombre11], who acted as Prosecutor of Grecia, stated in that sense. With this conduct, one of the fundamental rights provided for in the Political Constitution, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely, the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a crime was being committed in that place, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that right had to be motivated and justified as established in these regulations. In the opinion of the majority of this Criminal Cassation Court, even though the jurisdictional authority had sufficient time to comply with the requirements foreseen to execute this type of act, it did not do so (on the justification of this order, see [Nombre12], "Proceso Penal Comentado", Third Edition, Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, Costa Rica, 2006, pp. 296-297). This criterion has also been maintained and stated in various resolutions by the Third Chamber of the Court, in cases where precisely the jurisdictional authority ordered said act limiting itself only to transcribing the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without stating the motives or the basis for making this decision. Thus, for example, the following was stated: 'I) This Chamber must note the existence of an absolute defect in the procedure that violates due process and, therefore, the right of defense, which was not alleged by the petitioner: the jurisdictional ruling dated July 25, 2000, issued by Mr. [Nombre13] ..., Criminal Judge of Golfito, ordering the search (allanamiento)—visible on folio 34 of the file—completely lacks any foundation, which constitutes a defect in the judgment justifying its annulment, in accordance with Articles 1, 6, 142, 178(a), 195(d), and 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code, now reflected in Article 369(j), which entered into force on June 6, 2006, by virtue of Law No. 8503 on "Apertura de la Casación Penal". Said resolution literally states: "…SINGLE CONSIDERANDO: The representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office of this center requests that, by reason of investigations being carried out in relation to the illegal act of Storage, Possession and Sale of Drugs, a search, registration, and seizure be carried out in a dwelling house, located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet. 25 meters east of the evangelical church, unpainted wooden house, of mixed construction, house inhabited by a woman only known by the nickname '[Nombre14]', and a dwelling house located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. depot, with the number 780, mixed wooden and cement house without paint, inhabited by a woman called [Nombre15] .... Although it is true that our Constitution establishes the inviolability of the home, it also provides that in exceptional cases this guarantee may be suspended. In the case at hand, the undersigned considers it appropriate, given the nature and seriousness of the crime investigated (STORAGE, POSSESSION AND SALE OF DRUGS), to grant the request made and consequently ORDERS THE SEARCH, REGISTRATION and seizure in a dwelling house, located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet (...) house inhabited by a woman only known by the nickname '[Nombre14]'; and a dwelling house located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. depot, with the number 780, mixed wooden and cement house without paint, inhabited by a woman called [Nombre15] ... in order to SEIZE objects related to the crime investigated, as well as possible drugs found in that place. For the execution of this diligence, the day of TODAY, JULY TWENTY-FIFTH, TWO THOUSAND, is set, between the hours of TWELVE AND EIGHTEEN HOURS. The following will participate in this diligence: the Prosecuting Attorney of this center, Mr. [Nombre16] ... and the Drug Enforcement Officers: …". This resolution fails to comply with the provisions of Article 195(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in relation to Articles 1, 6, and 142 ibid., as it merely makes a brief mention of the Public Prosecutor's claim, without expressing the factual or legal reasoning that, in the specific case and according to the evidence gathered by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, supported its decision. II) It should not be forgotten that in a procedural system like Costa Rica's, the statement of reasons constitutes an element of the jurisdictional resolution that allows for its control of objectivity, in accordance with Articles 11 and 154 of the Political Constitution, which subjects jurisdictional bodies to the legal system. In cases like the present one, the basis for the Criminal Court's decision to search a home is presented not as a function of the right to private property, but as a guarantee of the reasons that justify the intrusion into the sphere of personal privacy. III) Article 11(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights provides: "No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, or his home…". Then, paragraph 3 of the same provision states: "Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." The Convention, therefore, only prohibits arbitrary interference, from which it follows that it is legitimate to restrict that right, provided that the interference is not arbitrary. This is explained because the limit on the exercise of human rights lies in the existence of the rights of other persons, so that all may coexist in society, as regulated in Article 32(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights: "2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the common good, in a democratic society." Some criteria for defining the legitimacy of restrictions on human rights—and, therefore, for avoiding arbitrariness—are contained in Article 30 of the aforementioned Convention. First, that the restriction is provided for by law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its Advisory Opinion 6/86, of May 9, 1986, interprets that term "law" by indicating: "…The term laws, within the framework of the protection of human rights, would be meaningless if it did not refer to the idea that the mere determination of public power is not sufficient to restrict such rights. The contrary would be equivalent to recognizing an absolute power of the rulers over the governed. Instead, the term laws takes on its full logical and historical meaning if it is considered as a requirement for the necessary limitation of public power interference in the sphere of the rights and freedoms of the human person. The Court concludes that the term laws, as used in Article 30, can have no other meaning than that of formal law, that is, a legal norm adopted by the legislative body and promulgated by the Executive Branch, according to the procedure required by the domestic law of each State…". As a second requirement, it is contemplated that the restriction must be based on reasons of general interest, which constitutes its purpose. This teleological criterion for controlling abuse of power has been understood by the Inter-American Court, through its Advisory Opinions 6/86 cited and 5/85, of November 13, 1985, in the following sense: "…It is possible to understand the common good, within the context of the Convention, as a concept referring to the conditions of social life that allow the members of society to achieve the greatest degree of personal development and the greatest prevalence of democratic values. In that sense, the organization of social life in a way that strengthens the functioning of democratic institutions and preserves and promotes the full realization of the rights of the human person can be considered an imperative of the common good... The Court is not unaware, however, of the difficulty of precisely defining the concepts of ‘public order’ and ‘common good’ in an unequivocal way, nor that both concepts can be used both to affirm the rights of the individual against public power, and to justify limitations on those rights in the name of collective interests. In this respect, it must be emphasized that ‘public order’ or ‘common good’ could in no way be invoked as means to suppress a right guaranteed by the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of its real content (see Art. 29.a of the Convention). Those concepts, insofar as they are invoked as grounds for limitations on human rights, must be subject to an interpretation strictly confined to the ‘just demands’ of ‘a democratic society’ that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention…". A third element, introduced by the aforementioned Article 32(2) of the San José Pact, exists: that the restrictions must be necessary in a democratic society. In the aforementioned Advisory Opinion 5/85, the Inter-American Court stated in this regard: "…It is important to note that the European Court of Human Rights, interpreting Article 10 of the European Convention, concluded that ‘necessary’, while not synonymous with ‘indispensable’, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ and that for a restriction to be ‘necessary’ it is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘opportune’. (Eur. Court [Nombre17] ... , The Sunday Times case, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. no. 59, pp. 35-36). This conclusion, which is equally applicable to the American Convention, suggests that the ‘necessity’ and, therefore, the legality of the restrictions… will depend on whether they are aimed at satisfying an overriding public interest. Among several options to achieve that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree must be chosen. Given this standard, it is not sufficient to demonstrate, for example, that the law serves a useful or opportune purpose; for the restrictions to be compatible with the Convention, they must be justified according to collective objectives that, due to their importance, clearly prevail over the social need for the full enjoyment of the right… and not limit the proclaimed right more than is strictly necessary… That is, the restriction must be proportional to the interest that justifies it and closely tailored to the achievement of that legitimate objective…". From this resolution, it follows that the necessity of the limitation implies that it must be useful for protecting the right whose validity justifies the restriction, proportional to the intended end, and constitute the least burdensome alternative in achieving that purpose. IV) Regarding restrictions on the right to home privacy through searches (allanamientos), this Chamber, showing itself respectful and a guarantor of people's rights according to the formalities imposed by the American Convention on Human Rights, the Political Constitution, and the Criminal Procedure Code, has stated, for example, in its resolution No. 965-2004, of August 13, 2004, —among many others— insistently, emphatically, and clearly: "…On the duty of justification and the violation of a fundamental right: Reflecting on the pillars that support the so-called Rule of Law, we could conclude that there is no other way to politically assess the scheme of a State, to measure its true characteristics, than the one that details the form and the requirements that allow the authorities to harm the fundamental rights of individuals.

Knowing, first of all, which rights can be ‘legitimately’ injured in that State and what the requirements surrounding such authorization would be, we can assess whether that State effectively assumes that its substantial legitimacy is due to respect for such rights, in such a way that the authorizations it contemplates, as part of the inescapable reality that there are no absolute rights and that there are situations that would exceptionally authorize an injury to some of them, are surrounded by a series of requirements that become, in turn, prerogatives of the citizen that guarantee that, in order to injure a fundamental right, a *real, serious, and especially reasoned balancing* of: *i) the existence of verified indications of being in the presence of a crime*, as the first unavoidable parameter to allow the analysis of whether or not a fundamental right is injured, by virtue of what is contemplated in paragraph 2 of numeral 28 of the Political Constitution; *ii) the necessity of the measure*, that is, it is imposed *because there is no other less injurious way of obtaining the expected results*; *iii) its proportionality in view of the interests and objectives pursued through it*; *iv) the suitability of the authorization to achieve the objectives pursued*; *v) the reasoned, current balancing of all these prerogatives, made by the constitutionally authorized subject to, in turn, authorize an injury to a fundamental right: the judge, through the issuance of a duly reasoned written order* must be carried out… Therefore, every time an authority seeks authorization to encroach upon a fundamental right, the resolution issued is a clear political manifestation of the State, it is its reflection, its portrait, so that never as in this type of resolution is the political role of the judge and their level of commitment to constitutionally protected values, as well as the importance of their function in the framework of the Rule of Law, embodied. The jurisprudence of this Chamber has maintained this clear and transparent position in safeguarding that political importance of the highest order, regarding respect for fundamental rights and the need for all the prerogatives set forth above to be balanced and reasoned by the judge when authorizing the injury of an essential right (cf., among others, resolutions 298-95 of 9:05 a.m. on May 25, 560-95 of 10:10 a.m. on September 22, and 614-95 of 9:55 a.m. on October 13, all from 1995; 468-99 of 9:20 a.m. on April 23, 1999; 246-00 of 9:50 a.m. on March 3 and 699-00 of 9:40 a.m. on June 23, both from the year 2000; 917-01 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2001; 1179-02 of 10:25 a.m. on November 22, 2002; 722-03 of 9:30 a.m. on August 22 and 866-03 of 2:45 p.m. on September 30, both from the previous year). *In particular, the importance of the statement of reasons as a guarantee of the reasonable and democratic exercise of jurisdictional power when it authorizes an encroachment of this nature is highlighted*, while it has rescued the transcendence that, for the fulfillment of this role, the existence of a prior written order before any encroachment on the privacy of an inhabited place has –especially in the case of a search (allanamiento)–. In reality, *only the existence of a prior and duly reasoned order will allow the interpreter to assess whether, in effect, all the constitutional requirements previously related were met to authorize the intervention and, therefore, assess its legitimacy –formal and substantial–, that is, to control its validity*. And, it is added now, only by demanding the judge to state reasons and rationale, to set forth and justify what the presuppositions are, how they are fulfilled, and why they justify the authorization to injure a fundamental right in the face of a specific request that seeks it, can it be guaranteed in turn that the judge fulfills their role as guarantor of respect for those rights, as controller of the legality and constitutionality of the actions of the subjects in charge of the investigation –Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) and judicial police–… *The judge in the investigation phase and in the intermediate phase, no matter how delegitimized they may be, due to what happens in practice, their role is to control and guarantee the legality of the actions in this phase, to assess and reasonably balance the requests made to them, and never as a mere spectator who is willing to authorize everything requested*, staying on the sidelines of its propriety, because that would simply be abandoning the meaning and justification of the jurisdictional function in a Rule of Law State, which finds precisely in the criminal process, in the quintessential seat of the exercise of state repressive power, its most pristine reason for being. The Political Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) bet on the controlling judge, guarantor, and bastion of respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens, always compromised when it comes to a criminal investigation, and only through the reasoned exercise and in accordance with the parameters set forth, can jurisdictional authorization to injure a fundamental right be validated. It is not enough, then, that there is jurisdictional intervention; this is one of the constitutionally required requirements and the first step to considering the formal legitimacy of the authorization. *That judge must comply with the other requirements, must reason, set forth how and why the measure is justified, is necessary, is suitable, is proportional to the end sought, and what the margins within which the authorization is granted are, requirements specified in the constitutional norms cited above and, in the case of a search (allanamiento), especially from the relationship of Articles 9, 11, 28 paragraph two, 23, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. V) In the specific case, dealing with investigations for the crime of drug trafficking, the protection of the health of all persons is a matter of public interest. In this sense, Article 1 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud) (Law No. 5395) establishes: "The health of the population is a good of public interest protected by the State," while the last paragraph of Article 2 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities (Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso No Autorizado y Actividades Conexas) (Law No. 8204) states: "…It is a function of the State, and is declared of public interest, to adopt the necessary measures to prevent, control, investigate, avoid, or repress any illicit activity related to the subject matter of this Law…". For its part, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador," approved by Law No. 7907) provides in its Article 10: "1. Everyone has the right to health, understood as the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being. 2. In order to make the right to health effective, the States Parties undertake to recognize health as a public good…". This is understood, due to the problems generated by illicit drug trafficking, from the Preamble of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (approved by Law No. 7198), which reflects a general and international interest: "… The Parties to this Convention: Deeply concerned by the magnitude and the increasing trend of production, demand and illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which represent a *serious threat to the health and well-being of human beings and undermine the economic, cultural and political foundations of society*. Deeply concerned by the sustained and increasing penetration into various social groups of the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with the danger of incalculable gravity that this entails…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. Likewise, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (approved by Law No. 4544) states in its Preamble: "The Parties: Concerned with the physical and moral health of mankind…Recognizing that drug addiction constitutes a serious evil for the individual and entails a social and economic danger for mankind…"; an idea also collected in its Preamble by the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances (approved by virtue of Law No. 4990). This social and state interest in the protection of public health may justify, ultimately, the interference with the right to privacy of the home. VI) However, the mere existence of a criminal investigation in the matter of drug trafficking is not enough to limit that right. The Political Constitution of Costa Rica, through the relationship of its Articles 23 and 24, guarantees the right to home privacy, qualifying it as inviolable, but expressly provides in the first of the mentioned provisions the possibility of limiting this right through a search (allanamiento): "…by written order of a judge…" –in accordance with the requirements of Article 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)– "…or to prevent the commission or impunity of crimes, or avoid serious harm to persons or property…" –for the cases of search without jurisdictional order contained in Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)–. Consequently, the reasons of general interest or public order that justify the restriction of the right to home privacy required by the American Convention on Human Rights are concretized in Article 193, in relation to Article 190 to which it must be understood the former refers, both of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). The second of these states: "Article 190.- Vehicle search. …may search a vehicle, *provided there are sufficient grounds to presume that a person is hiding objects related to the crime in it*…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]; while the first states: "Search and register of a dwelling. *When the search* must be carried out in an inhabited place, its dependencies, business establishment, or office, the search and register shall be personally carried out by the judge…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. From this derives that the requirements that motivate the search of a vehicle are the same that could justify the entry and search of a dwelling: *the existence of reasons or sufficient elements to presume that objects related to the crime specifically being investigated by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) are located in that place*. VII) In these conflictive scenarios, the right to home privacy yields before the state interest in protecting public health through the prosecution of illicit conducts that threaten it, in fulfillment of its obligations –of means, not of results– to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish those behaviors that threaten legal interests whose indispensable reference is constituted by the human rights recognized in the legal system. However, the necessity of that restriction (consisting of entering the home and affecting the right to privacy), as has been indicated, must be demonstrated in a jurisdictional resolution, so that the search (allanamiento) of the dwelling in the specific case constitutes a suitable means in the prevention, investigation, prosecution, and eventual punishment of illicit drug trafficking in protection of public health, proves proportional to the nature of the investigated crime and to the existing evidence about the possible location of objects related to that crime in the inhabited place, and that there is no other less burdensome alternative than the intrusion into the home. All of this integrates and is summarized in the requirement contemplated in paragraph d) of Article 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal): "The reason for the search (allanamiento)". VIII) For the foregoing, this Chamber on its own motion observes that the order issued by the Criminal Court of Golfito to search the homes of [Name18] . . . and [Name15] . . ., constituted a defective procedural act of an absolute nature, since by containing no statement of reasons whatsoever it disregarded the rights and guarantees of individuals, contained in all the regulations analyzed previously and related to the state functions of respecting and guaranteeing the right to home privacy free from *arbitrary* interferences. Therefore, the probative elements derived from the arbitrary and unlawful entry and search of the defendants' homes –although nothing of interest to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) was extracted from that of [Name19] . .– could in no case have been used to base the lower court's judgment. This in accordance with Articles 1, 175, 178 paragraph a), and 181 first paragraph of the Procedural Code." *(THIRD CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT (SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE), vote No. 674 of 10:10 a.m. on July 19, 2006*; see also in this same sense votes No. 917 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2001, No. 1275 of 9:35 a.m. on November 7, 2005, No. 165 of 9:30 a.m. on March 11, 2005, No. 70 of 8:45 a.m. on February 11, 2005, and No. 139 of 8:50 a.m. on March 4, 2005). Finally, it is important to note that in this case, there was also none of the hypotheses in which the regulations permit the performance of this type of proceedings without the existence of a prior resolution ordering it, to justify in this manner the way in which it was proceeded. In other words, there was none of the hypotheses or circumstances provided for in Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) ... On the other hand, it is convenient to clarify that in the past there was a controversy between the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) and the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) regarding the question analyzed here, because while the former has insisted on the need for a prior written search order, the latter has rather pointed out that it is not required when the presence of the safeguards judge is available. However, constitutional jurisprudence (binding erga omnes) ultimately clarified its position, reiterating that this written order was not necessary, but –however– making the caveat that it is indeed indispensable in all cases that the judge state in writing the reasons (for purposes of exercising the respective controls by the subjects who may be affected in their fundamental rights) that mediated for having adopted the decision to carry out the search (allanamiento). Said statement of reasons could even be fulfilled orally upon verification of entry, provided it is recorded in writing. In this sense, the following was indicated: "... In effect, with the implementation of a clearly accusatory criminal procedural system, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a task of protector of the regularity –especially constitutional regularity– of the proceeding, so that their presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer with the aim of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but as a watchdog ensuring that the exercise of state authority is executed within the fixed constitutional and legal parameters and is carried out without abuse of power. For the Chamber, that is precisely and exactly what the Constituent wanted and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully accomplished if the presence of the judge is available in home searches, but always provided that their participation, as stated, is not as a member of the investigating body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the citizens' rights and the actions of the state authorities in charge of the investigation and production of probative elements. Consequently, the requirement of a written order loses the relevance it once had, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and of excess in the performance) of administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would indicate to them in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is supplied by the active presence of the judge during the execution of the act. Now then, the reasons on the basis of which this Chamber deems that substitution valid, in turn require in an unavoidable manner that the judge's will to authorize be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in their acts and necessarily leading and non-passive participation, but also that it be recorded in the report or record of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act carried out. To this effect, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedural system means that the statement of reasons for acts is carried out not in the traditional manner through writing, but is performed orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action, and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change, however, should not serve to evade the obligation to state the reasons for the actions and to ensure the reasons are captured in the process, especially those that, as in this case, have to do with the possibility of lawfully injuring a constitutional right. *V.-* The consulting Chamber points out its doubt about the validity of an interpretation like the one set forth that disregards the value of the prior written order, in light of the new criminal procedural regime, which establishes very precise rules in this regard. However, it is clear from what has been set forth that from the perspective of this Chamber, for Constitutional Law, the personal intervention of the judge –possible or obligatory– is in itself sufficient to satisfy the requirements embodied in the Constitution, without requiring in addition a prior written order issued by the judge themselves. It should be indicated then that, for purposes of overcoming the inviolability of the home, the existence of a written order from the competent judge in cases where their action can be validly delegated, or their personal participation, will be sufficient. Now then, for purposes of respect for due process (debido proceso), it is undoubtable that, whether by prior written order or by their direct and immediate participation, the judge's intervention and their authorization must include a statement of reasons –a justification for the act is not required, but its reasoning, that is, it must have a founded reason, a reason to be given– that can be validated by the other judicial authorities intervening in the process. This is of the utmost importance because if such a statement of reasons is lacking, it is evident that, in accordance with the rules of due process (debido proceso) derived from Article 39 of the Constitution, the evidence becomes illegitimate and could not serve as a basis for a decision. *VI.-* In conclusion, in the Chamber's opinion, the constitutional requirement established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution is fulfilled, and the constitutional principles of due process (debido proceso) are respected insofar as the inviolability of the home is concerned, when the lack of a written order from a competent judge in a search proceeding is supplanted by the personal and active participation of the criminal judge in said act. Such action must necessarily be reasoned according to the factual and legal circumstances relevant to the case, and even more so when dealing with the infringement of a constitutional right. Furthermore, this statement of reasons must be made by the safeguards judge in such a way that there is no doubt about it and that it can be subjected to analysis and review by the judicial authorities whose function it is, since the omission or clear insufficiency of said statement of reasons entails the illegitimacy of what was done. It is up to the consulting Chamber to verify what occurred in the specific case and resolve accordingly in accordance with what is set forth here...", Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), vote No. 4672-03 of May 28, 2003. From the study of the present case, it is evident that, as indicated, the search order on pages 37 and following does not incorporate any type of statement of reasons by the criminal judge of Grecia, and that such omission was also not remedied in the search record carried out on pages 51 and following, where the material actions carried out in compliance with the issued order are simply described. Consequently, in accordance with what has been indicated, the search proceeding carried out in the dwelling of the defendant herein is vitiated and as such could not and cannot be taken into account to support a conviction as was done, since upon being issued and executed, one of the fundamental rights contemplated in the Political Constitution was violated. Furthermore, this conclusion is reached regardless of whether the now sentenced person had accepted availing herself of the abbreviated procedure, as procedural regulations and the Constitutional Chamber’s own jurisprudence require that the judgment issued under this procedural modality must be duly reasoned. On this aspect, the jurisprudence of this constitutional controller has stated that: "(...) in the event of issuing a conviction in the abbreviated process, that manifestation of willingness to accept the facts can be taken as a probative element. The restriction of this practice in criminal procedural law is based on the danger of imposing a custodial sentence through a confession by a person whose will is vitiated by violence or ignorance, but the strong jurisdictional supervision surrounding the abbreviated procedure –including the means of challenge– is sufficient guarantee to rule out that risk. In addition to the accused's statement needing to be corroborated with other elements of conviction –expert reports, witnesses, documents–, which make it credible in the judge's opinion, these must be analyzed as a whole when substantiating the conviction." (Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), No. 5867 of 2:30 p.m. on July 12, 2000). This means that, together with the observance of the requirements set forth by the legislator to process the case according to this type of procedure (e.g., agreement between defense, accused, and the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) regarding the facts and the penalty, as well as a free acceptance by the defendant of this agreement, etc.), the judge must base the decision on the documentary evidence existing in the case file, evidence that must necessarily be lawful, since the current prosecution system is governed by the principle of legality. Although the abbreviated procedure constitutes a waiver of the complexities of the ordinary proceeding, specifically the holding of the trial (with all the principles and guarantees it entails), this does not mean that the requirements and guarantees recognized in a Democratic Rule of Law State are equally waived, such as, among others, the proper accreditation of the facts and the participation of the accused in them, this when issuing the conviction, which must be based on legally obtained evidence. *III.-* There is no doubt, then, that in the case the regulations governing the search (allanamiento) of a home or dwelling were disregarded, and the jurisdictional authority irregularly proceeded to its issuance and execution by breaching the formalities or requirements existing for it, above all the duty to state reasons. These formalities or requirements (forms in general) have been established as a guarantee that every legal operator will not act in an arbitrary or abusive manner when called upon to determine the material truth of the facts under investigation. In these cases, it is not a matter of a cult of formality for formality's sake, but an acknowledgment of formality as an instrument that allows the rights and guarantees that individuals enjoy, for the mere fact of being such, to be effective. Under this perspective, according to what has been indicated, the action challenged here presents an absolute procedural defect that mandates the declaration of its nullity, and whose effects entail –at the same time– the ineffectiveness of all evidence derived from this proceeding, as provided by Article 175 of the cited procedural regulation, which establishes: "*Acts carried out in disregard of the forms and conditions provided for in the Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in this Code may not be evaluated to base a judicial decision nor used as presuppositions thereof*" (see regarding this, from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), vote No. 10115 of 2:40 p.m. on August 3, 2005) .", Criminal Cassation Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón, Second Section, vote No. 2007-00178 of 12:15 p.m. on March 23, 2007.

II.- Thus, given all the foregoing, since, in essence, the most important evidentiary elements that, in this case before us, allowed the trial court to base the conviction originated in a proceeding that violated the most elementary norms of due process, which in turn led to the breach of fundamental rights enshrined in the Political Constitution and International Treaties (guarantee of the inviolability of the domicile), what is required in this case, as determined by the majority of this Chamber, is to declare the review procedure filed by the defense admissible and to annul the judgment and the trial that preceded it. Indeed, from a study of the judgment on the merits, it is observed how, essentially, the judge cites in support of the conviction the positive evidentiary results derived from the flawed search and seizure (allanamiento) diligence, as well as the existence of police actions carried out in the days prior to the one on which the final operation was conducted (in which jurisdictional control was not even present), relating to surveillance and alleged controlled drug purchases at the site. This means that by eliminating everything relating to the search and seizure, the process was left devoid of suitable evidence to justify and support a conviction such as the one ordered. Now, because the most important and essential evidence linking the sentenced person to the act results from the defective activity mentioned above, without there being a possibility of introducing new evidentiary elements that would change the legal situation in which we find ourselves, the majority of this Chamber deems it unnecessary and inappropriate to remand the case file for a new proceeding, since the evidence that remains in this process does not allow for the penal responsibility attributed to the accused [Nombre20] . by the Public Prosecutor's Office to be proven with sufficient certainty, and therefore, in accordance with Article 416, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is appropriate to resolve this case according to the law applicable to the case. In this regard, even though the judgment mentions that there are police reports and seizure records in the case file that attest to the alleged existence of controlled purchases carried out by the Drug Control Police, all of these were prior to the search and seizure whose nullity is decreed in this ruling. Such elements would, at most, allow for the accused's responsibility in the drug sales attributed to him to be considered probable, but it is deemed that these elements lack the sufficient and necessary strength, required by procedural regulations, to establish a judgment of certainty regarding the existence of that criminal activity. There is no graphic record of the alleged surveillance carried out at a purely police level, which - in principle - would have allowed for corroboration of what was recorded in the police reports, nor were there any telephone interceptions that would have made it possible to overcome that judgment of probability of being faced with a violation of the psychotropic substances law. In other words, once the analyzed search and seizure diligence (and all elements derived from it) is excluded from the process, the remaining evidence mentioned in the judgment is insufficient to rebut the state of innocence that the legal system recognizes for every person by the mere fact of that condition. Therefore, in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, the contested conviction is annulled and, directly, in this same review proceedings, the sentenced [Nombre1] . . . is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of Violation of the Psychotropic Substances Law in its modality of aggravated sale of "crack" to consumers, committed to the detriment of public health for which he is serving a prison sentence, as charged by the Public Prosecutor's Office. By virtue of this, if no other cause prevents it, his immediate release for this cause is ordered. The matter is resolved without special ruling on costs. The trial court must ensure the effective cancellation of the corresponding registration entry in the Judicial Registry, as well as the exclusion of the record (if any) in the Criminal Archive generated as a result of this investigation (cf. Ruling (voto) of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 5802-99 of 3:36 p.m. on July 27, 1999, among others). Judge Guillermo Sojo Picado issues a dissenting vote (salva el voto) and declares the review petition without merit.

III.- DISSENTING VOTE (VOTO SALVADO) OF JUDGE [Nombre7]: The undersigned, Guillermo Sojo Picado, departs from the majority vote and deems that the claims should be declared without merit, and consequently, the review procedure filed. It must be specified that the judgment sought to be reviewed was issued through a summary procedure (procedimiento abreviado), which means that through said procedure, the oral and public trial is dispensed with, this with the consent of the accused and his defender. This procedure allows that in the case of an agreement with the Public Prosecutor's Office, the civil plaintiff, and the complainant (if any), the accused receives as a benefit the imposition of a more favorable penalty, with a sanction being able to be set up to one third below the legal minimum contemplated in the respective criminal statute. In such a way that if the accused [Nombre20] . ., as happens in the specific case, duly advised by his defender, freely accepted to submit to said summary procedure, as recorded in the respective record of the preliminary hearing visible on pages 182 and 183, it is not possible now, through this review procedure, to seek the nullity of the conviction. Indeed, as seen on the cited folio 182 verso, it is clearly recorded that the defender (Lic. Esteban Amador Garita) indicated to the Criminal Court that the defendant was willing to submit to a summary procedure with a penalty of 7 years' imprisonment, and the scope and consequences of the application of said procedure were even explained to the justiciable. In this regard, there are some jurisprudential precedents from the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) of the Second Judicial Circuit, being able to cite the ruling (voto) [Telf1] of eleven hours and forty minutes on September twenty-second, two thousand three, which is shared, indicating the following: "In the present matter, D.A.Q. was declared the perpetrator of the crime of 'Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes', committed to the detriment of Public Health, for which a penalty of three years and four months of imprisonment was imposed, through a summary procedure. Regarding this special procedure, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), by resolution No. 4864 of 3:27 p.m. on July 8, 1998, indicated that the summary procedure provided for in articles 373 to 375 of the CPP is not contrary to the Political Constitution, and in attention to said precedent, this Court of Cassation has also indicated that 'In said judgment, whose authority is binding erga omnes by provision of law, the Constitutional Chamber does not fail to consider that this special procedure is characterized by the "dispensation of holding an oral and public trial, in exchange for the possibility for the accused of receiving a more favorable penal sanction", and since the trial is the essential phase of the ordinary process (which is carried out based on the accusation, in oral, public, contradictory, and continuous form, according to article 326 of the CPP), it follows that in the summary procedure, by dispensing with the trial "...the accused waives the exercise of the right to a contradictory hearing" (Court of Criminal Cassation (Tribunal de Casación Penal), No. 005-F-99 of 9:30 a.m. on January 15, 1999), particularly regarding the determination of the facts attributed to him, since these have been admitted by the accused (the accused who rejects the facts must not consent to the application of the summary procedure) and their existence was also corroborated by the consideration of other elements of proof [...] Hence, the present objection is not admissible because the determination of the facts derives essentially from the accused having admitted them as they were described in the accusation (the admission of the fact gave logical unity to the body of evidence), all circumstances that the accused freely admitted, with the legal advice of his defender, who took the initiative to request the application of the summary procedure [...] Thus, then, the claim must be declared without merit, insofar as the accused's participation in the investigated fact is logically derived from the evidence, essentially from the admission of facts freely made by the accused, within the spectrum of possibilities offered by procedural criminal legislation, with the advice of his technical defender and the conformity of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without any defect being appreciated that would justify the nullity sought by CED2 , ° of 11:30 a.m. on April 3, 2003, judges Salazar Murillo – drafter -, [Nombre24] and [Nombre25]). For all the above, the determination of the "proven fact" in the judgment does not lack legitimate evidentiary basis, but rather derives directly and independently from the admission that the accused himself made of its existence, to which it can be added that his statement is corroborated by the documentary evidence related to the activity prior to the search and seizure (allanamiento) challenged by the defense, such as the police reports describing the investigation carried out and its results, the records of bill marking, of delivery of bills for the purchase of drugs, of receipt of purchased drugs, for example. For all the above, the appeal in cassation for procedural error filed by the defense is declared without merit" (the transcription is faithful to the original). In the specific case, at the time of accepting the summary procedure, conformity was expressed not only with the agreement and the penalty, but also with the accusation and the evidence that supports it, so the petition filed is not now admissible. Secondly, article 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when referring to the formalities of the search and seizure (allanamiento), indicates that the resolution ordering said diligence must contain the following requirements: a- The name and position of the official authorizing the search and seizure and the identification of the procedure in which it is ordered. b- The specific determination of the place or places to be registered. c- The name of the authority that will carry out the search, in the event that the diligence is delegated to the Public Prosecutor's Office or the police. d) The reason (motivo) for the search and seizure. d) The time and date on which the diligence must be carried out. The above requirements are met in the case of the challenged resolution because it clearly indicates that an investigation is being carried out by the Puntarenas Prosecutor's Office, according to which the authorities have news that drug sales were occurring in the house to be searched. Equally, details are given of the manner in which the drug sales were carried out, as well as the existence of several controlled purchases made to evidence the indicated business. The search and seizure resolution also identifies the dwelling where it will be carried out, and the authorities that will participate in the act. Regarding the requirement of the "reason" (motivo) for the search and seizure, it is necessary to point out that the order is requested by the Prosecutor, who also informs the matter based on the data supplied to him by the PCD, in such a way that when article 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code in its subsection d) mentions that it must contain the "reason" (motivo), it refers not to the resolution needing to be extensively reasoned, as is necessary in a resolution where the judge must issue a criterion (article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code being applicable in this hypothesis). To issue the search and seizure (allanamiento) order, given its nature, considering that it is generally ordered at the beginning of the investigation in charge of the prosecutor, it is sufficient that the information supplied to the judge at that time is reliable, and is actually accompanied by elements that suggest that it is indeed a probable criminal act. The judge must assess this extreme and comply, among other aspects, such as the existence of sufficient verified indications of being in the presence of a crime, and that justifies entry into the domicile, and also that this measure is necessary for the investigation. Aspects such as proportionality, and in general a reasoned weighting that supplies the reason (motivo) to decree the search and seizure order. In the specific case, it is not observed that such aspects were not considered by the Criminal Judge at the time of decreeing the measure. The foregoing, as stated, insofar as there are reports in that sense of the drug sales and the petition is accompanied by the records of the controlled purchases, which makes the agreed measure justifiable. Regarding this, it is not appropriate to annul or render ineffective the evidence that was collected in that search and seizure (allanamiento) diligence, as claimed. By this Cassation judge considering the validity of the cited order, the evidence collected as a result of it also remains. Consequently, the grounds for review raised by the sentenced person are dismissed. Therefore, it is appropriate to declare the review petition filed without merit.

POR TANTO:

By majority, the review petition filed by the sentenced [Nombre20] . . in exercise of his material right to defense is declared admissible. By virtue of this, the conviction issued against [Nombre1] . . ., for the crime of aggravated drug sales committed to the detriment of public health, is annulled. Likewise, in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, in this same review proceedings he is acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for this illicit act. By virtue of this, if no other cause prevents it, his immediate release for this cause is ordered. The matter is resolved without special ruling on costs. The trial court must ensure the effective cancellation of the corresponding registration entry in the Judicial Registry, as well as the exclusion of the record (if any) in the Criminal Archive generated as a result of this investigation. Judge Guillermo Sojo Picado issues a dissenting vote (salva el voto) and declares the review petition without merit. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Mario Alberto Porras Villalta Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Guillermo Sojo Picado Jueces de Casación Penal Solicitud de revisión Causa por tráfico de drogas c/ [Nombre1] . . . of/ la salud pública Nº 02-200958-431-PE (…)

Now, in the specific case of raids in drug trafficking matters, it should be noted that it is an issue that by itself touches on very delicate aspects, since it is an offensive and underground crime. The latter demands a response from the relevant authorities, which is why police bodies are granted powers to secretly investigate and interfere with fundamental rights. This, precisely because of the seriousness of the criminal acts, the difficulty in detecting them and the impossibility, in many cases, of gathering evidence through other types of investigative techniques. In this way, the judge acting in this matter must be even more rigorous in verifying the factual extremes that justify the request for a raid. In this type of procedure, the constitutional and conventional principles of defense (right of defense) and adversarial proceedings must be observed in a particularly vigilant manner, in order not to fall into the temptation of violating fundamental rights of the accused, under the guise of the well-known and already outdated slogan of "the fight against drugs". Among other things, the judicial authority, especially, must ensure that in the preparation and execution of the raid, the violation of the right to defense is total and absolute, to guarantee the genuineness of the evidence collected in this procedural act, such as the violation of the right of defense (derecho de defensa), as well as to avoid an exacerbated and disproportionate intervention by the police forces, regarding other spheres of intimacy, in the strict sense, of the individual. Finally, it must be said that these types of diligences, in themselves, are not, as some sectors want to make it seem, the panacea for the resolution of drug trafficking crime. To this end, the judge must carry out an effective and proactive role as controller of fundamental rights, as well as a guarantor of the principles of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law, of which they are a part as a public servant. Regarding what has been said, and as an illustrative point, it is considered appropriate to refer to what was stated in the Judgment of the Constitutional Chamber, Voto 4654-2003:

296, 297." **I.-** CONTENT OF THE REVIEW: **_Violation of the_ in dubio pro reo _principle, unlawful entry and seizure (allanamiento ilegítimo), and incorporation of spurious evidence_** . In the **_sole ground_** of the review and in accordance with articles 1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 142, 180 to 184, 363, 369 and 408 of the Código Procesal Penal; 37, 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política; 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 11.2 and 17.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 8.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights; and 26 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which he deems disregarded, the convicted person Niels Caruzo Jiménez requests his acquittal because the abbreviated conviction judgment handed down by the Trial Court of Puntarenas considered the commission of the offense proven without sufficient evidence to do so, and furthermore it was based on unlawful evidence. Specifically, the applicant alleges that although he accepted the abbreviated procedure, the truth is that this is not enough, since the conviction was based on controlled purchases and the evidence collected during the entry and seizure (allanamiento) conducted at the residence of the co-defendant María Paulina López Gómez, for which the surveillance and "experimental" purchase reports are cited. However, part of that evidence is illegal and was so declared by the Court of Puntarenas in acquittal judgment No. 263-P-07, handed down in favor of the accused López Gómez (who did not avail herself of the abbreviated procedure but was tried in a hearing through the ordinary process), due to the fact that the order authorizing the entry and seizure (allanamiento) lacks any legal grounds. The criminal judge merely transcribed the request from the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), without giving the reasons or motives for which the measure was necessary and proportionate. If that evidence declared illegal were suppressed, the remaining elements would be insufficient to uphold the conviction.

**II.** - **_By majority, with the dissenting vote of co-justice Sojo Picado, the filed review is granted_** . By majority opinion, the second section of this Court of Cassation has maintained the criterion that, as understood by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), even in an abbreviated process, the mere acceptance of charges by the accused would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction decision. In accordance with this, and after studying the content of the judgment on the merits, it is observed that the accused is indeed correct in the request for review he presents, since certainly the evidence used by the trial court and on which it _essentially_ relied to render the abbreviated conviction judgment in this case, deriving from the entry and seizure (allanamiento) carried out at the residence of the co-defendant María Paulina López Gómez, who was separately acquitted in the ordinary trial, is unlawful and, as such, could not and cannot be assessed or taken into account for said purposes. In this regard, as recorded in the case file at folios 96 and 98 (there are evident errors in the foliation), it is evident that the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Phase (Fase Preparatoria) of Puntarenas did not properly state the grounds for the order by which she authorized the execution of the entry and seizure (allanamiento) conducted at the aforementioned residence, located in Barrio Corazón de Jesús de Barranca, at the request of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) and the regional sub-chief of the Drug Control Police (Policía de Control de Drogas). Irregularly and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitución Política, in relation to numerals 142 and 193 and subsequent of the Código Procesal Penal, 2, section 3) and 17, section 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11, section 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the aforementioned jurisdictional authority carried out the entry and seizure (allanamiento) and search of the mentioned residence (a place where important evidence linking the accused to the crime under investigation was seized) without properly issuing the order authorizing said action, which infringes upon fundamental rights, especially the guarantee of privacy of the home against state interference, despite the fact that this constituted an indispensable validity requirement to be able to carry it out. In this respect, it is noted that said authority did not indicate the reasons why, in her opinion, the execution of this act was appropriate and indispensable, limiting herself to transcribing what was set forth in writing to that effect by both attorney Armando Fuentes Quesada, acting as Prosecutor of Puntarenas, and Marlyn Romero Solano, sub-chief of the Regional Department of Puntarenas of the Drug Control Police (cfr. folios 65 to 85). With this course of action, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitución Política, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a serious crime was being investigated at that location, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that constitutional right had to be reasoned and justified as required by these regulations. In this regard, it is noted that although the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has understood that in cases where the guarantee judge is present and personally oversees the entry and seizure (allanamiento), a written search warrant is not required, even in such a case it has not exempted the judge from the duty to state the grounds for such action, explaining that this could even be done verbally upon entry, provided written record is left in the minutes of the executed entry and seizure (allanamiento): "... _The situation is now radically different and therefore the evolutionist interpretation authorized by our legal system, as stated above, is justified and this Chamber has decided to adopt it with respect to Article 23 of the Constitution. Indeed, with the entry into force of a criminal procedural system of a clearly accusatory nature, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a role of protector of the regularity —especially constitutional regularity— of the proceedings, so that their presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but rather as a supervisor ensuring that the exercise of state authority is executed within the established constitutional and legal parameters and carried out without abuse of power. For the Chamber, this is precisely and justly what the Constituent Power intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Constitución Política must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully complied with if the judge is present at home entries and seizures, but always provided, obviously, that their participation, as stated, is not as a member of the investigating body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between citizens' rights and the actions of state authorities responsible for the investigation and production of evidentiary elements. Consequently, the requirement of a written order loses the relevance it once had, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and excess in action) of administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would set forth in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is replaced by the active presence of the judge during the execution of the act. However, the reasons on the basis of which this Chamber considers such substitution valid, in turn, inexorably require that the judge's will of authorization be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in their acts and necessarily leading, not passive, participation, but also that it be recorded in the minutes or record of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act performed. To this effect, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedural system means that the reasoning of acts is carried out not in the traditional way through writing, but rather is done orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change, however, should not serve to evade the obligation to state reasons for actions and to ensure the reasons are reflected in the process, especially those which, as in this case, relate to the possibility of lawfully infringing upon a constitutional right_ ..." (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 4672-03 of 2:47 p.m. on May 28, 2003. In this same vein, other votes of this Chamber can be consulted, namely No. 2773-97 of May 20, 1997; No. 1509-98 of March 6, 1998; and No. 3014-98 of May 6, 1998). In accordance with these guidelines, it is established that the minutes of the executed entry and seizure (allanamiento) (cfr. folios 107 and 108) also failed to record that the acting judicial authority had complied with such a requirement, as the reasons justifying or motivating the operation remain unknown. In this regard, it is noted that in the entry and seizure (allanamiento) warrant (cfr. folio 96, line 30 onwards), the jurisdictional authority did nothing more than literally transcribe the content of the written request presented to her by the prosecutor and the regional sub-chief of the PCD, after which she stated that: “_IT IS RESOLVED: considering the prosecutor's request and the petition being appropriate, it is resolved that in accordance with the provisions of articles 193, 194, 198 of the Código Procesal Penal, the following is ordered: the marking of bills ... and to execute the entry and seizure (allanamiento) ... Likewise, the ENTRY, SEARCH AND SEIZURE of the dwelling house ... is ordered in order to locate there and seize evidence related to that criminal activity of national drug trafficking (production, sale, preparation, distribution, etc.), seizure to be carried out by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office ... ordering the enablement up to 8:00 p.m., the need being imperative given that the sales are made in the late afternoon, night and early morning hours, all in order to obtain a positive result from the operation ..._” (cfr. folio 96, line 30 onwards). As mentioned, the criminal judge never justified why she considered the act appropriate and necessary for the purposes of the investigation being conducted at that time. On this particular point, it is worth mentioning what the national legal doctrine has stated on the subject, saying: “... _The entry and seizure (allanamiento) warrant must be reasoned. The Third Chamber (Sala Tercera), in various rulings, has required the reasoning of the entry and seizure warrant, considering that it is not sufficient for it to transcribe the prosecutor's petition and then limit itself to saying that it proceeds to order the entry and seizure ... In this regard, it must be said that although a mere descriptive reference to the prosecutor's petition is not enough, the judge may base their decision on it, stating why, based on what the prosecutor indicated, there is a basis for issuing the entry and seizure warrant ..._”, Llobet Rodríguez (Javier), “_PROCESO PENAL COMENTADO_”. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José. Third edition, 2006, p. 297). This criterion has also been maintained and expounded by the jurisprudence of this Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón, where by majority vote it was indicated: "... _the complainants are correct regarding the second aspect of the request they formulate, since certainly the evidence used by the Trial Court and on which it relied to render the conviction judgment in this matter, which derived from the entry and seizure (allanamiento) carried out at the residence of the convicted person T.V., **is unlawful** and, as such, could not and cannot be assessed or taken into account to sustain a decision like the one taken in this matter, even if it originated from the application of the abbreviated procedure. In this sense, as recorded in the case file ... it is evident that the Criminal Judge of Grecia did not properly state the grounds for the order by which she authorized the execution of the entry and seizure (allanamiento) conducted at the house where the convicted person lived with her common-law partner ... at the request of the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. Irregularly and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitución Política, in relation to Article 193 and subsequent of the Código Procesal Penal, 2, section 3) and 17, section 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11, section 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the aforementioned jurisdictional authority carried out the entry and seizure (allanamiento) and search of the mentioned residence without properly issuing the order authorizing said act (which affects and limits the guarantee of privacy of the home), despite the fact that this constituted an indispensable validity requirement to be able to carry it out. From a simple reading of the order, it is evident that she did not state the reasons why - in her opinion - the execution of this act was appropriate, even though it was her duty to do so, as established by Article 193, in relation to numeral 142, both of the cited procedural regulations, limiting herself to transcribing what was stated to that effect by attorney C.P.R., who was acting as Prosecutor of Grecia. With this course of action, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitución Política, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a crime was being committed or not at that place, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that fundamental right had to be reasoned and justified as required by these regulations. In the opinion of the majority of this Criminal Cassation Court, despite the fact that the jurisdictional authority had sufficient time to comply with the requirements foreseen to be able to execute this type of act, she did not do so (on the reasoning of this order, see **LLOBET RODRÍGUEZ**, Javier, "**_Proceso Penal Comentado_**", Third Edition, Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, Costa Rica, 2006, pp. 296-297). This criterion has also been maintained and expounded in various rulings by the Third Chamber of the Court, in cases where precisely the jurisdictional authority ordered said act limiting itself solely to transcribing the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without stating what the reasons or the basis were for making this decision. In this way, for example, the following was stated: "I) This Chamber must note the existence of an absolute defect in the procedure that violates due process and, therefore, the right of defense, which was not alleged by the applicant: the jurisdictional order dated July 25, 2000, issued by Attorney D. R.

Ch., Criminal Judge of Golfito, who ordered the raid –visible on folio 34 of the file– definitively lacks any grounds whatsoever, which constitutes a defect in the judgment that justifies its annulment, in accordance with articles 1, 6, 142, 178 subsection a), 195 subsection d) and 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code and which today is reflected in article 369 subsection j), which entered into force on June 6, 2006 by virtue of Law No. 8503 on the "Opening of the Criminal Cassation Appeal". Said resolution literally states: "…SOLE CONSIDERANDO: The representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office of this center requests that, by reason of investigations being conducted regarding the illicit act of Storage, Possession and Sale of Drugs, a raid, search and seizure be carried out in a dwelling house, located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet. 25 meters east of the evangelical church, unpainted wooden house, of mixed construction, house inhabited by a woman known only by the nickname ‘Chica’, and a dwelling house located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. depot, numbered 780, unpainted mixed wood and cement house, inhabited by a woman named G. C. P.. While it is true, our Constitution establishes the inviolability of the domicile, it also declares that said guarantee may be suspended in exceptional cases. In the case at hand, the undersigned considers it appropriate, given the characteristic and seriousness of the crime under investigation (STORAGE, POSSESSION AND SALE OF DRUGS), to grant the request made and consequently THE RAID, SEARCH and seizure IS ORDERED in a dwelling house, located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet (...) house inhabited by a woman known only by the nickname ‘Chica’; and a dwelling house located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. depot, with the number 780, unpainted mixed wood and cement house, inhabited by a woman named G. C. P. for the purpose of SEIZING objects related to the crime under investigation, as well as possible drugs found in that place. For the execution of this proceeding, today, the TWENTY-FIFTH OF JULY OF TWO THOUSAND, is set, between the hours of TWELVE AND EIGHTEEN HOURS. Participating in this proceeding will be the Prosecuting Attorney of this center, Mr. E. M. T., and the Drug enforcement officers: …". This resolution fails to comply with the provisions of article 195 subsection d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in relation to articles 1, 6 and 142 ibidem, since it merely makes a scant mention of the Public Prosecutor's Office's claim, without expressing the factual or legal reasoning that, in the specific case and according to the evidence gathered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, supported its decision. II) It should not be forgotten that in a procedural system such as Costa Rica's, the statement of reasons constitutes an element of the jurisdictional resolution that allows its control of objectivity, in accordance with articles 11 and 154 of the Political Constitution, which subjects jurisdictional bodies to the legal system. In cases like the present one, the grounds for the Criminal Court's decision to raid a dwelling are not presented as a function of the right to private property, but rather as a guarantee of the reasons justifying the intrusion into the sphere of personal privacy. III) Subsection 2 of article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides: "No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, or his home…". Subsequently, subsection 3 of the same precept states: "Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks". The Convention, then, only prohibits arbitrary interference, from which the legitimate possibility of restricting that right follows, provided that the intrusion is not arbitrary. This is explained because the limit to the exercise of human rights lies in the existence of the rights of other persons, so that everyone can coexist in society, as regulated in article 32 subsection 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights: "2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society". Some criteria for defining the legitimacy of restrictions on human rights –and, therefore, for avoiding arbitrariness– are contained in article 30 of the aforementioned Convention. In the first place, that the restriction is provided for by law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its advisory opinion 6/86, of May 9, 1986, interprets that term "law" by stating: "…The expression laws, in the context of the protection of human rights, would be meaningless if it did not allude to the idea that the mere determination of public power does not suffice to restrict such rights. The contrary would be equivalent to recognizing an absolute power of the rulers over the governed. Rather, the word laws takes on its full logical and historical meaning if it is considered as a requirement for the necessary limitation of the interference of public power in the sphere of the rights and freedoms of the human person. The Court concludes that the that of formal law, that is, a legal norm adopted by the legislative body and promulgated by the Executive Branch, according to the procedure required by the domestic law of each State…". As a second requirement, it is contemplated that the restriction must be based on reasons of general interest, which constitutes its purpose. This teleological criterion for controlling the deviation of power has been understood by the Inter-American Court, through its Advisory Opinions 6/86 cited and 5/85, of November 13, 1985, in the following sense: "…It is possible to understand the general welfare, within the context of the Convention, as a concept referring to the conditions of social life that allow the members of society to achieve the greatest degree of personal development and the greatest validity of democratic values. In this sense, the organization of social life in a way that strengthens the functioning of democratic institutions and preserves and promotes the full realization of the rights of the human person can be considered an imperative of the general welfare... The Court is not unaware, however, of the difficulty of precisely and univocally defining the concepts of ‘public order’ and ‘general welfare’, nor that both concepts can be used both to affirm the rights of the person vis-à-vis public power, and to justify limitations on those rights in the name of collective interests. In this regard, it must be stressed that ‘public order’ or ‘general welfare’ may in no way be invoked as means to suppress a right guaranteed by the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of real content (see art. 29.a of the Convention). Those concepts, insofar as they are invoked as grounds for limitations on human rights, must be subject to an interpretation strictly confined to the ‘just demands’ of ‘a democratic society’ that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Conventione…". There is a third element introduced by the aforementioned article 32 subsection 2 of the Pact of San José: that the restrictions be presented as necessary in a democratic society. In the aforementioned Advisory Opinion 5/85, the Inter-American Court stated in this regard: "…It is important to highlight that the European Court of Human Rights, when interpreting article 10 of the European Convention, concluded that ‘necessary’, without being synonymous with ‘indispensable’, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ and that for a restriction to be ‘necessary’ it is not enough to demonstrate that it is ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘opportune’. (Eur. Court H. R., The Sunday Times case, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. no. 59, pp. 35-36 ). This conclusion, which is equally applicable to the American Convention, suggests that the ‘necessity’ and, therefore, the legality of the restrictions… will depend on whether they are aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest. Among several options to achieve that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree must be chosen. Given this standard, it is not enough to demonstrate, for example, that the law fulfills a useful or opportune purpose; for them to be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified according to collective objectives that, by their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the right… and do not limit the proclaimed right more than is strictly necessary… That is, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and closely tailored to the achievement of that legitimate objective…". From this resolution it follows that the necessity of the limitation implies that it must be useful to protect the right whose validity justifies the restriction, proportionate to the end sought, and constitute the least burdensome alternative in the pursuit of that purpose. IV) Regarding restrictions on the right to domiciliary privacy through raids, this Chamber, showing itself respectful and guarantor of the rights of persons according to the formalities imposed by the American Convention on Human Rights, the Political Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code, has indicated, for example, in its resolution No. 965-2004, of August 13, 2004, –among many others– insistently, emphatically and clearly: "…On the duty to state grounds and the injury to a fundamental right: Reflecting on the pillars that support the so-called Rule of Law, we could conclude that there is no other way to politically evaluate the scheme of a State, to measure its true characteristics, than that which details the form and requirements that allow the authorities to injure the fundamental rights of individuals. Knowing, in the first place, which rights can be ‘legitimately’ injured in that State and what the requirements surrounding such authorization would be, we can assess whether that State effectively assumes that its substantial legitimacy is due to respect for such rights, in such a way that the authorizations it contemplates, as part of the inescapable reality that no absolute rights exist and that there are situations that would exceptionally authorize an injury to some of them, are surrounded by a series of requirements that in turn become prerogatives of the citizen that guarantee that, to injure a fundamental right, a real, serious, and especially reasoned balancing must be carried out of: i) the existence of verified indications of being in the presence of a crime, as the first inescapable parameter to allow the analysis of whether or not a fundamental right is injured, by virtue of what is contemplated in numeral 28, second paragraph, of the Political Constitution; ii) the necessity of the measure, that is, that it is imperative because there is no other less injurious way to obtain the results expected; iii) its proportionality in the face of the interests and objectives sought through it; iv) the suitability of the authorization to achieve the objectives sought; v) the reasoned, current balancing of all these prerogatives, made by the subject constitutionally authorized to, in turn, authorize an injury to a fundamental right: the judge, through the issuance of a written, duly reasoned order… Therefore, every time an authority seeks the authorization to encroach upon a fundamental right, the resolution issued is a clear political manifestation of the State, it is its reflection, its portrait, so that never as in this type of resolution is the political role of the judge and his level of commitment to the constitutionally protected values, as well as the importance of his function in the scheme of the Rule of Law, so clearly expressed. The jurisprudence of this Chamber has maintained this clear and transparent position in safeguarding that first-order political importance, regarding the respect for fundamental rights and the need for all the above-mentioned prerogatives to be balanced and reasoned by the judge when authorizing the injury of an essential right (cfr. among others, resolutions 298-95 at 9:05 a.m. of May 25, 560-95 at 10:10 a.m. of September 22 and 614-95 at 9:55 a.m. of October 13, all of 1995; 468-99 at 9:20 a.m. of April 23, 1999; 246-00 at 9:50 a.m. of March 3 and 699-00 at 9:40 a.m. of June 23, both of the year 2000; 917-01 at 10:00 a.m. of September 21 of the year 2001; 1179-02 at 10:25 a.m. of November 22 of the year 2002; 722-03 at 9:30 a.m. of August 22 and 866-03 at 2:45 p.m. of September 30, both of the previous year). Especially, the importance of the statement of grounds as a guarantee of the reasonable and democratic exercise of jurisdictional power when authorizing an incursion of this nature is highlighted, while it has rescued the transcendence that, for the fulfillment of this role, the existence of a prior written order before any incursion into the privacy of an inhabited place has –in the case of a raid especially–. In reality, only the existence of a prior and duly reasoned order will allow the interpreter to assess whether, in effect, all the aforementioned constitutional requirements were met to authorize the intervention and, then, assess its legitimacy –formal and substantial–, that is, to control its validity. And, it is now added, only by requiring the judge to state grounds and reason, to set forth and justify what the presuppositions are, how they are met and why they justify the authorization to injure a fundamental right in the face of a specific request that seeks it, can it be guaranteed, in turn, that the judge fulfills his role as guarantor of the respect for those rights, as controller of the legality and constitutionality of the actions of the subjects in charge of the investigation –Public Prosecutor's Office and judicial police–…The judge in the investigation stage and in the intermediate phase, however delegitimized he may be due to what happens in practice, his role is to control and guarantee the legality of the actions in this stage, to assess and balance in a reasoned manner the requests made to him and never as a mere spectator who is willing to authorize everything that is requested of him, remaining on the sidelines of its merits, because that would simply be abandoning the meaning and justification of the jurisdictional function in a Rule of Law, which finds precisely in the criminal process, in the venue par excellence of the exercise of repressive state power, its most pristine reason for being. The Political Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code bet on the controlling judge, guarantor and bastion of respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens, always compromised when it comes to a criminal investigation, and only through reasoned exercise and in accordance with the parameters set forth, can the jurisdictional authorization to injure a fundamental right be validated. It is not enough, then, that there be jurisdictional intervention; this is one of the constitutionally required requirements and the first step to consider the formal legitimacy of the authorization. That judge must comply with the other requirements, must reason, set forth how and why the measure is justified, is necessary, is suitable, is proportionate to the end sought, and what the margins within which the authorization is granted are, requirements specified in the aforementioned constitutional norms and, in the case of a raid, especially in the relationship of articles 9, 11, 28 second paragraph, 23, 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution and 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. V) In the specific case, regarding investigations for the crime of drug trafficking, the protection of the health of all persons is a matter of public interest. In this sense, article 1 of the General Health Law (Law No. 5395) establishes: "The health of the population is a public interest good protected by the State", while the last paragraph of article 2 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use and Related Activities (Law No. 8204) states: "…It is a function of the State, and is declared a matter of public interest, to adopt the necessary measures to prevent, control, investigate, avoid or repress any illicit activity related to the subject matter of this Law…". For its part, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador", approved by Law No. 7907) provides in its article 10: "1. Everyone has the right to health, understood as the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being. 2. In order to make the right to health effective, the States Parties undertake to recognize health as a public good…". This is understood, due to the problems generated by illicit drug trafficking, from the Preamble of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (approved through Law No. 7198), which reflects a general and international interest: "… The Parties to this Convention: Deeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production, demand and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which represent a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society. Deeply concerned also by the steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with the danger of incalculable gravity that this entails…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. Likewise, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (approved by Law No. 4544) states in its Preamble: "The Parties: Concerned with the physical and moral health of mankind…Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind…"; an idea also contained in the Preamble of the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances (approved by virtue of Law No. 4990). This social and state interest in the protection of public health can justify, ultimately, the interference with the right to privacy of the domicile. VI) However, the mere existence of a criminal investigation in the field of drug trafficking is not enough to limit that right. The Political Constitution of Costa Rica, through the relationship of its articles 23 and 24, guarantees the right to domiciliary privacy characterizing it as inviolable, but expressly provides in the first of the aforementioned provisions the possibility of limiting this right through a raid: "…by written order of a judge…" –in accordance with the requirements of article 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code– "…or to prevent the commission or impunity of crimes, or to avoid serious harm to persons or property…" –for the cases of raid without jurisdictional order contained in article 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code–. Consequently, the reasons of general interest or public order that justify the restriction on the right to privacy of the domicile, which is required by the American Convention on Human Rights, are embodied in article 193, in relation to article 190, to which the former must be understood to refer, both of the Criminal Procedure Code. The latter states: "Article 190.- Vehicle Search. …they may search a vehicle, provided that there are sufficient grounds to presume that a person is concealing in it objects related to the crime…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]; while the former states: "Raid and Search of Dwelling. When the search must be carried out in an inhabited place, in its outbuildings, business house or office, the raid and search shall be carried out personally by the judge…" [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. From this it follows that the requirements that motivate the search of a vehicle are the same that could justify the entry and search of a dwelling: the existence of reasons or sufficient elements to presume that objects related to the crime specifically being investigated by the Public Prosecutor's Office are found in said place. VII) In these conflictual situations, the right to domiciliary privacy yields before the state interest in the protection of public health through the prosecution of illicit conducts that threaten it, in fulfillment of its obligations –of means, not of results– to prevent, investigate, prosecute and sanction those behaviors that threaten legal rights whose essential reference is constituted by the human rights recognized in the legal system. However, the necessity of that restriction (consisting of the entry into the domicile and the affectation of the right to privacy), as has been indicated, must be demonstrated in a jurisdictional resolution, so that the raid on the dwelling in the specific case constitutes a suitable means in the prevention, investigation, prosecution and eventual punishment of illicit drug trafficking in protection of public health, is proportionate to the nature of the crime investigated and to the existing indications regarding the possible location in the inhabited place of objects related to that crime, and that there is no other less burdensome alternative than the intrusion into the domicile. All of this integrates and is summarized in the requirement contemplated in subsection d) of article 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code: "The reason for the raid". VIII) For the foregoing, this Chamber, on its own motion, observes that the order issued by the Criminal Court of Golfito to raid the homes of J. Z. R. and G. C. P., constituted a procedurally defective act of an absolute nature, since by not containing any grounds whatsoever, it failed to observe the rights and guarantees of persons, contained in all the regulations analyzed previously and related to the state functions of respecting and guaranteeing the right to the privacy of the domicile free from arbitrary interference. For this reason, the elements of proof that derived from the arbitrary and unlawful entry and search of the homes of the accused –although nothing of any interest to the Public Prosecutor's Office was extracted from C. P.’s home– could under no circumstances have been used to support the judgment of the lower court. This is in accordance with articles 1, 175, 178 subsection a) and 181 first paragraph of the Criminal Procedure Code." (THIRD CHAMBER OF THE COURT, vote No. 674 of 10:10 a.m. of July 19, 2006; see also in this same sense the votes No. 917 at 10:00 a.m. of September 21, 2001, No. 1275 at 9:35 a.m. of November 7, 2005, No. 165 at 9:30 a.m. of March 11, 2005, No. 70 at 8:45 a.m. of February 11, 2005 and No. 139 at 8:50 a.m. of March 4, 2005). Finally, it is important to note that in this case, none of the hypotheses under which the regulations permit the execution of this type of proceeding without the existence of a prior resolution ordering it were present either, to thus justify the manner in which the proceeding was carried out. In other words, it was not a case of any of the hypotheses or circumstances provided for in article 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code ...

On the other hand, it is worth clarifying that in the past there was a controversy between the Third Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber regarding the issue analyzed here, because while the former has insisted on the need for a prior and written search warrant (orden de allanamiento), the latter has rather pointed out that it is not required when the judge of guarantees (juez de garantías) is present. However, the constitutional jurisprudence (binding erga omnes) ultimately clarified its position, by reiterating that such written order was not necessary, but—it must be said—with the caveat that it is indeed indispensable in all cases for the judge to state in writing (for the purpose of exercising the respective controls by the subjects whose fundamental rights may be affected) the reasons that led to the decision to conduct the search (allanamiento). Such reasoning could even be fulfilled orally upon entry, as long as it is subsequently recorded in writing. In this regard, the following was stated: "... Indeed, with the implementation of a criminal procedural system of a purely accusatory nature, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a role as protector of the regularity—especially constitutional regularity—of the proceeding, so that his presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but rather as a guardian that the exercise of state authority is executed within the established constitutional and legal parameters and is carried out without abuse of power. For this Chamber, it is precisely and exactly this that the Constituent Assembly intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution must fulfill. This is undoubtedly accomplished fully if the judge is present during domiciliary searches (allanamientos de domicilio), but provided, obviously, that his participation, as stated, is not as a member of the investigative body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the rights of citizens and the actions of the state authorities responsible for the investigation and production of evidence. Consequently, the requirement of a written order loses the relevance it once had, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and of excess in the performance) of the administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would set out in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is supplanted by the active presence of the judge himself during the execution of the act. However, the reasons on the basis of which this Chamber considers that substitution valid, in turn inexorably demand that the judge's will of authorization be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in his actions and necessarily leading and non-passive participation, but also that it be recorded in the minutes or record of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act performed. To this effect, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedural system means that the reasoning of acts is carried out not in the traditional written form, but rather is done orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change, however, should not serve to evade the obligation to state the reasons for the actions and to ensure the reasons are recorded in the process, especially those that, as in this case, relate to the possibility of lawfully harming a constitutional right. V.- The consulting Chamber indicates its doubt about the validity of an interpretation such as that set forth, which disregards the value of the prior written order, in light of the new criminal procedural regime, which establishes very precise rules in this regard. However, it is clear from the foregoing that, from the perspective of this Chamber, for the Law of the Constitution, the personal intervention of the judge—whether possible or obligatory—is in itself sufficient to meet the requirements embodied in the Political Constitution, without a prior written order issued by the judge himself also being required. It is therefore appropriate to indicate that, for the purposes of overriding the inviolability of the domicile, either the existence of a written order from the competent judge in cases where his action can validly be delegated, or his personal participation, will be sufficient. Now, for the purposes of respecting due process, it is unquestionable that, whether by prior written order or by his direct and immediate participation, the intervention of the judge and his authorization must include a statement of reasons—reasoning of the act is not required, but rather its motivation, that is, it must have a founded reason, a reason to occur—that can be validated by the other judicial authorities involved in the process. This is of the utmost importance because if such reasoning is lacking, it is evident that, in accordance with the rules of due process derived from Article 39 of the Constitution, the evidence becomes illegitimate and could not serve as the basis for a decision. VI.- In conclusion, in the opinion of this Chamber, the constitutional requirement established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution is met, and the constitutional principles of due process are respected, with regard to the inviolability of the domicile, when the lack of a written order from a competent judge in a search proceeding (diligencia de allanamiento) is supplanted by the personal and active participation of the criminal judge in said act. Such action must necessarily be reasoned according to the relevant factual and legal circumstances of the case, and even more so when dealing with the infringement of a constitutional right. Furthermore, that reasoning must be carried out by the judge of guarantees (juez de garantías) in such a way that there is no doubt about it and that it can be subjected to analysis and review by the judicial authorities to whom such function corresponds, since the omission or clear insufficiency of said reasoning entails the illegitimacy of the action taken. It is up to the consulting Chamber to verify what occurred in the specific case and resolve what is pertinent in accordance with what is set forth herein ...”, Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 4672-03 of May 28, 2003. From the study of the present case, it follows that, as indicated, the search warrant (orden de allanamiento) on pages 37 et seq. does not incorporate any type of reasoning on the part of the criminal judge of Grecia, and that such omission was also not supplanted in the search record (acta de allanamiento) executed on pages 51 et seq., where the material actions carried out in compliance with the issued order are simply described. Consequently, in accordance with what has been indicated, the search proceeding (diligencia de allanamiento) carried out in the residence of the defendant herein is flawed and as such could not and cannot be taken into account to support a conviction as was done, since when it was issued and executed, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Political Constitution was violated. Moreover, this conclusion is reached regardless of whether the now-sentenced individual had accepted to submit to the expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), since the procedural rules and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber itself require that the judgment issued under this procedural modality must be duly reasoned. On this aspect, the jurisprudence of this constitutional controller has stated: "(...) in the event that a conviction is issued in the expedited procedure (proceso abreviado), that manifestation of will to accept the facts can indeed be regarded as an evidentiary element. The restriction of this practice in criminal procedural law is based on the danger of imposing a custodial sentence through a confession of a person whose will is impaired by violence or ignorance, but the strong jurisdictional supervision that surrounds the expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado)—including the means of challenge—is sufficient guarantee to discard that risk. In addition to the defendant's statement having to be corroborated with other elements of conviction—expert reports, witnesses, documents—which make it credible in the judgment of the judge, these must be analyzed as a whole when substantiating the conviction." (Constitutional Chamber, No. 5867 of 14:30 hours on July 12, 2000). This means that, together with the observance of the requirements set by the legislator for processing the case in accordance with this type of procedure (v.gr. agreement between defense, defendant, and Public Prosecutor's Office regarding the facts and the penalty, as well as a free acceptance by the defendant of this agreement, etc.), the judge must substantiate the decision based on the documentary evidence that exists in the case file, evidence that must necessarily be lawful, since the current trial system is governed by the principle of legality. The expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), although it constitutes a waiver of the complexities of the ordinary proceeding, specifically the holding of the trial (debate) (with all the principles and guarantees it entails), this does not mean that one equally waives the requirements and guarantees recognized in a Democratic State of Law, such as, among others, the due accreditation of the facts and the participation of the accused in them, when the conviction is rendered, which must be based on legally obtained evidence. III.- There is no doubt, then, that the case involved a disregard of the regulations governing the search (allanamiento) of a home or dwelling, and the jurisdictional authority irregularly proceeded to its issuance and execution by violating the formalities or requirements existing for this purpose, especially the duty to provide reasoning. These formalities or requirements (forms in general) have been established as a guarantee that every legal operator will not act in an arbitrary or abusive manner when tasked with determining the real truth of the facts under investigation. In these cases, it is not a cult of formality for formality's sake, but rather a recognition of formality as an instrument that allows for the effectiveness of the rights and guarantees that individuals enjoy, solely by virtue of being such. Under this approach, according to what has been indicated, the action challenged here presents an absolute procedural defect that compels a declaration of its nullity, and whose effects entail—at the same time—the ineffectiveness of all evidence that may have been derived from this proceeding, as provided in Article 175 of the cited procedural rules, when it establishes that: "Acts performed in disregard of the forms and conditions provided for in the Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in this Code may not be evaluated to support a judicial decision nor used as its presuppositions" (see in this regard, from the Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 10115 of 14:40 hours on August 3, 2005). ...", Criminal Cassation Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón, second section, vote No. 2007-00178 of 12:15 hours on March 23, 2007. II.- This being the case, for all the foregoing reasons, given that, in essence, the most important elements of judgment that in the present case allowed the Trial Court to substantiate the conviction originated in a proceeding that violated the most elementary rules of due process, which in turn led to the violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the Political Constitution and International Treaties (guarantee of the privacy of the domicile), what is required in this case, as the majority of this Chamber considers, is to grant the review procedure (procedimiento de revisión) filed by the defense and to annul the judgment and the trial that preceded it. Indeed, from the study of the judgment on the merits, it is observed how, essentially, the judge cites, in support of the conviction, the positive evidentiary results derived from the flawed search proceeding (diligencia de allanamiento), as well as the existence of police actions carried out in the days prior to that final operation (in which there was not even jurisdictional control), relating to surveillances and alleged controlled drug purchases at the site. This means that by eliminating everything related to the search (allanamiento), the process was left devoid of suitable evidence to justify and support a conviction like the one ordered. However, because the most important and essential evidence linking the sentenced person to the act results from the defective activity referred to above, without the possibility of introducing new elements of judgment that might change the legal situation we find ourselves in, the majority of this Chamber considers it unnecessary and inappropriate to remand the case file for a new proceeding, since the evidence that remains or is maintained in this process does not allow for the criminal liability that the Public Prosecutor's Office attributed to the defendant Caruzo Jiménez to be accredited—with sufficient certainty—so, in accordance with paragraph 1 of numeral 416 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is appropriate to resolve this case according to the law applicable to the case. In this sense, even though the judgment mentions that there are police reports and seizure records in the case file that account for the alleged existence of controlled purchases made by the Drug Control Police, all of these occurred before the search (allanamiento) whose nullity is decreed in this resolution; at most, such elements would allow the defendant's liability for the drug sale attributed to him to be considered probable, but it is considered that these elements do not possess the sufficient and necessary strength, required by the procedural rules, to establish a judgment of certainty regarding the existence of that criminal activity. There is no graphic record of the alleged surveillances carried out at a purely police level, which—in principle—would have allowed corroboration of what was recorded in the police reports, nor were there any telephone interventions that made it possible to overcome that judgment of probability that an infraction of the psychotropic substances law was occurring. In other words, once the analyzed search proceeding (diligencia de allanamiento) (and all the elements derived from it) is excluded from the process, the remaining evidence mentioned in the judgment is insufficient to undermine the state of innocence that the legal system recognizes for every person by the mere fact of that condition. For the foregoing reasons, in application of the universal principle in dubio pro reo, the challenged conviction is annulled, and immediately, in this same review procedure (vía de revisión), the sentenced individual N. CARUZO JIMÉNEZ is acquitted of all penalty and liability for the crime of Infraction of the Psychotropic Substances Law in its modality of aggravated sale of "crack" to consumers, committed to the detriment of public health, for which he is currently serving a prison sentence, and of which the Public Prosecutor's Office accused him. By virtue of this, if no other case prevents it, his immediate release from this case is ordered. The matter is resolved without special ruling on costs. The Trial Court must ensure the effective cancellation of the corresponding registration entry in the Judicial Registry, as well as the exclusion of the record (if any) in the Criminal Archive generated as a result of this investigation (cfr. vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 5802-99 of 15:36 hours on July 27, 1999, among others). Judge Guillermo Sojo Picado dissents and declares the petition for review (demanda de revisión) without merit.” --- **III.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE SOJO PICADO:** The undersigned, Guillermo Sojo Picado, departs from the majority vote and considers that the claims must be declared without merit, and consequently the review procedure (procedimiento de revisión) filed. It must be specified that the judgment sought to be reviewed was rendered through an expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), which means that through said procedure, the oral and public trial is dispensed with, this with the acquiescence of the defendant and his defense counsel. Said procedure allows that, in the event of an agreement with the Public Prosecutor's Office, the civil plaintiff, and the private prosecutor (if any), the defendant receives, as a benefit, the imposition of a more favorable penalty, being able to have a sanction set up to one-third below the legal minimum contemplated in the respective criminal offense. Thus, if defendant C. J., as occurs in the specific case, duly advised by his defense counsel, freely accepted to submit to said expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), as recorded in the respective preliminary hearing record (acta de la audiencia preliminar) visible on pages 182 and 183, it is not now possible, through this review procedure (procedimiento de revisión), to seek the nullity of the conviction. Indeed, as can be seen on the cited page 182 verso, it is clearly recorded that the defense counsel (Attorney Esteban Amador Garita) indicated to the Criminal Court that the accused was willing to submit to an expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado) with a penalty of 7 years of imprisonment, and the defendant was even explained the scope and consequences of the application of said procedure. In this regard, there are some jurisprudential precedents from the Court of Cassation of the Second Judicial Circuit, and vote 2003-1117 of eleven hours and forty minutes on September twenty-second, two thousand three, can be cited, which is shared, stating the following: "In the present matter, D.A.Q.

was declared the perpetrator of the crime of "Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes," committed to the detriment of Public Health, for which a penalty of three years and four months of imprisonment was imposed upon him, through an abbreviated procedure (procedimiento abreviado). Regarding this special procedure, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), by resolution N° 4864 of 15:27 hours on July 8, 1998, indicated that the abbreviated procedure provided for in articles 373 to 375 of the CPP is not contrary to the Political Constitution, and in view of said precedent, this Court of Cassation has also noted that "In said ruling, whose authority is of an erga omnes binding nature by provision of law, the Constitutional Chamber did not omit to consider that this special procedure is characterized by the 'dispensation with the holding of an oral and public trial, in exchange for the possibility for the accused of receiving a more favorable criminal sanction,' and since the trial is the essential phase of the ordinary process (which is carried out based on the accusation, orally, publicly, adversarially, and continuously, according to article 326 of the CPP), it turns out that in the abbreviated procedure, by dispensing with the trial '...the right to exercise adversarial proceedings is waived by the accused' (Criminal Cassation Court, N° 005-F-99 of 9:30 hours on January 15, 1999), particularly with respect to the determination of the facts attributed to him, since these have been admitted by the accused (the accused who rejects the facts should not consent to the application of the abbreviated procedure) and their existence was also corroborated by the consideration of other elements of proof [...] Hence, the present objection is not admissible because the determination of the facts derives essentially from the accused having admitted them as they were described in the accusation (the admission of the fact provided logical unity to the body of evidence), all circumstances that the accused freely admitted, with the legal advice of his defender, who took the initiative to request the application of the abbreviated procedure [...] Thus, the claim must be declared without merit, as the accused's participation in the investigated act derives logically from the evidence, essentially from the admission of facts that the accused freely made, within the spectrum of possibilities offered by criminal procedural legislation, with the advice of his technical defender and the conformity of the Public Prosecutor's Office, without any defect being observed that would justify the annulment sought by the complainant" (TCP, N° 294 of 11:30 hours on April 3, 2003). In the present matter, the accused, in the free exercise of his right to defense, with the assistance of his technical defender, as well as clearly and expressly warned by the judicial authority, chose to admit the act attributed to him in the accusation and consented to the application of the abbreviated procedure, which is evidenced by the corresponding record of the preliminary hearing, which, in the relevant part, states: "Having read [the accusation in its entirety], both parties inform the Judge that they have reached a preliminary agreement to request the application of an Abbreviated Procedure in accordance with the provisions of article 373 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the Judge proceeds to ask the accused if it is his free will to submit to the abbreviated procedure, to which he answers affirmatively; asks the accused if they understand the facts of which they are accused and warns him that he has the right to have any doubt clarified, the accused answering that they have understood the accusation. The Judge then explains to the accused that the abbreviated process implies that, based on an acceptance of the charges already read by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the acceptance of the same by the accused, the debate is dispensed with, and by virtue also of there being an agreement regarding the penalty to be imposed, the judge also informs that the penalty may even be reduced by one-third of the minimum penalty provided for the crime charged, and he is informed that specifically the penalty for the crime of Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes is five to fifteen years of imprisonment, which would be reduced to 3 years and 4 months of imprisonment reduced by one-third (article 61 of the Psychotropic Substances Law number 7786). He is also informed that the consequence of the agreement would be application of the penalty agreed upon between the parties, without holding the oral trial, the remaining task of the Trial Court being to verify your responsibility as defendants, and that the requirements demanded by the pertinent laws are met. And the probative elements that exist in the record to support the existence of the commission of the alleged criminal act and his participation in it, as responsible perpetrators of the illicit act described in the accusation, are reiterated to him. The Judge asks the accused to take into consideration both the basis and the evidence that the Public Prosecutor's Office requests to be received in the debate, namely: testimonial evidence, visible on page 97, and documentary evidence on pages 96 and 97. Which was read to the accused in the presence of his defender. Both the Prosecutor and the defender and the accused report that the agreed penalty for the crime of Drug Possession for Trafficking Purposes is five to fifteen years of imprisonment, which would be reduced to three years four months of imprisonment reduced by one-third [...] Immediately thereafter, the accused is warned that he has the right not to testify and if he decides to do so, everything he says may be used both for his benefit and against him, so he is asked if he is willing to admit the fact attributed to them which has already been made known to him, and he states that he does admit it as it appears in the accusation and also consents to the application of the requested procedure, indicating that he does not wish to give further testimony about the facts. The Judge resolves that, having thus complied with the provisions of articles 373 and 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the request for an Abbreviated Procedure applied to Mr. Dennis Arias Quirós is approved, with the agreement of a penalty of THREE YEARS FOUR MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT, ordering the referral of the case file to the Trial Court for whatever is appropriate in accordance with the provisions of article 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedures" (record, pages 120 to 122). In accordance with the jurisprudence cited above, it is irrelevant that he now intends to contradict the evidence for the prosecution, when he, in the free exercise of his right to defense, waived adversarial proceedings and admitted the fact attributed to him, which is reiterated in this other jurisprudential precedent: "The second aspect to point out is that when the accused requests the abbreviated procedure and negotiates the penalty with the accuser, he accepts the evidence for the prosecution offered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, and waives discussing it at the preliminary hearing and in the trial phase, any defects it might contain are validated, as is the case of those that the accused now claims. In this regard, this Court has stated: 'His will and silence, avoiding adversarial proceedings, fully legitimized the actions of the police authorities. If both the plaintiff and his defender admitted, without any objection, the evidence that supported the accusation, expressing their agreement with the sanction imposed upon them, it is contrary to the procedural loyalty that must prevail in any process, that they subsequently formulate an objection that their silence fully endorsed. If he waived adversarial proceedings, the suitable procedural setting for discussing the evidence; if its content was also not objected to at the preliminary hearing or during the development of the process, it is not admissible that after issuing a judgment to which the accused agreed, the latter subsequently formulates a series of objections that should have been raised in a timely manner and regarding which he remained absolutely silent, his inaction validating the potential irregularities he now claims.' (Judgment 2003-497, written by Judge Cruz, there is a dissenting vote by Judge Fernández)..." (TCP, N° 596 of 9:40 hours on June 26, 2003, judges Salazar Murillo –drafter-, Arce Víquez and Vargas Rojas). For all the foregoing, the determination of the "proven fact" in the judgment does not lack legitimate evidentiary foundation, but rather derives directly and independently from the admission made by the accused himself regarding its existence, to which it can be added that his statement is corroborated by the documentary evidence relating to the activity prior to the raid that the defense questions, such as the police reports describing the investigation carried out and its results, the records of bill marking, of delivery of bills for the purchase of drugs, of receipt of purchased drugs, for example. For all the foregoing, the cassation appeal on procedural grounds filed by the defense is declared without merit" (the transcription is faithful to the original). In the specific case, at the time the abbreviated procedure was accepted, conformity was expressed not only with the agreement and the penalty, but also with the accusation and the evidence that supports it, the petition now raised not being admissible at this time. Secondly, article 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when referring to the formalities of the raid (allanamiento), indicates that the resolution ordering said procedure must contain the following requirements: a- The name and position of the official authorizing the raid and the identification of the proceeding in which it is ordered. b- The specific determination of the place or places to be searched. c- The name of the authority that will carry out the search, in the event that the procedure is delegated to the Public Prosecutor's Office or the police. d) The reason for the raid. d) The time and date on which the procedure is to be carried out. The foregoing requirements are met in the case of the questioned resolution, as it clearly indicates that an investigation is being carried out by the Puntarenas Prosecutor's Office, according to which the authorities have received notice that a drug sale was taking place in the house to be raided. Likewise, details are given of the manner in which the drug sale was carried out, as well as the existence of several controlled purchases that were made to evidence the indicated business. The raid resolution also identifies the dwelling where the same is to be carried out, and the authorities that will participate in the act. Regarding the requirement of the "reason" for the raid, it is necessary to point out that the order requested by the Prosecutor, who also reports on the matter based on the data provided to him in this regard by the PCD, in such a way that when numeral 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code in subsection d) mentions that it must contain the "reason," it does not refer to the resolution needing to be extensively reasoned, as is necessary in a resolution where the judge must issue a criterion (numeral 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code being applicable in this hypothesis). To issue the raid order, given its nature, considering that it is generally ordered at the beginning of the investigation under the prosecutor's responsibility, it is sufficient that the information provided to the judge at that time is reliable, and is effectively accompanied by elements that suggest that there is indeed a probable criminal act. The judge must assess this extreme and fulfill among other aspects, such as the existence of sufficient verified indications of being in the presence of a crime, which justifies entry into the domicile, and that said measure is also necessary for the investigation. Aspects such as proportionality, and in general a reasoned weighing that provides the reason for decreeing the raid order. In the specific case, it is not observed that such aspects were not considered by the Criminal Judge at the time of decreeing the measure. The foregoing, as was stated, insofar as there are reports to that effect regarding the drug sale and the petition is accompanied by the records of the controlled purchases, which makes the agreed measure justifiable. Regarding this, it is not appropriate to annul or render ineffective the evidence that was collected in that raid procedure, as is claimed. When this Cassation judge considers the validity of the cited order, the evidence collected as a result of it also remains. Consequently, the grounds for review raised by the convicted person are dismissed. Therefore, it is appropriate to declare the petition for review that is formulated." </p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-align:justify'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> Specifically, the petitioner alleges that although he accepted the abbreviated procedure, that fact alone is insufficient, because the conviction was based on the controlled purchases and the evidence gathered during the raid (allanamiento) conducted at the residence of co-defendant [Nombre5], for which the surveillance and "experimental" purchase reports are cited. However, part of that evidence is illegal and was so declared by the Puntarenas Trial Court in acquittal judgment No. 263-P-07, issued in favor of defendant [Nombre6] (who did not avail herself of the abbreviated procedure but, through the ordinary procedure, was tried in a hearing), due to the fact that the resolution ordering the raid (allanamiento) lacks any grounds whatsoever. The criminal judge merely transcribed the Public Prosecutor's Office's request, without providing the reasons or motives why the measure was necessary and proportionate. If that evidence declared illegal were suppressed, the remaining elements would be insufficient to sustain the conviction.

**II.** - **By majority, with the dissenting vote of co-judge [Nombre7], the filed review is granted.** By majority criterion, the second section of this Court of Criminal Cassation has maintained the criterion that, as understood by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, even in an abbreviated procedure, the mere acceptance of charges by the accused would not be sufficient to support a conviction. In accordance with this, and after studying the content of the judgment on the merits, it appears that the accused is indeed correct in the request for review he presents, since the evidence used by the Trial Court and on which it relies *essentially* to issue the abbreviated conviction in this case, which derives from the raid (allanamiento) conducted at the residence of co-defendant [Nombre5], who separately was acquitted in an ordinary trial, is unlawful and, as such, could not and cannot be assessed or taken into account for said purposes. In this regard, as recorded in the case file at folios 96 and 98 (there are evident errors in the foliation), it is evident that the Criminal Judge of the Preparatory Phase of Puntarenas did not properly ground the resolution by means of which she ordered the raid (allanamiento) conducted at the referenced dwelling, located at [Dirección1] in Barranca, at the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office representative and the regional deputy chief of the Drug Control Police. In an irregular manner and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Political Constitution, in relation to numerals 142 and 193 and following of the Criminal Procedure Code, 2 subsection 3) and 17 subsection 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11 subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the referenced judicial authority conducted the raid and search of the mentioned dwelling (a place where important evidence linking the accused to the investigated crime was seized) without properly issuing the resolution authorizing said act, which infringes fundamental rights, especially the guarantee of privacy of the home against state interference, even though this constituted an indispensable validity requirement to carry it out. In this regard, it is noted that said authority did not indicate the reasons why, in her opinion, the execution of this act was appropriate and indispensable, limiting herself to transcribing what, in that regard and in written form, was stated by both attorney [Nombre8], who acted as Prosecutor of Puntarenas, and [Nombre9], deputy chief of the Regional Department of Puntarenas of the Drug Control Police (cf. folios 65 to 85). By this course of action, one of the fundamental rights contemplated in the Political Constitution, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely, the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a serious crime was being investigated at that location, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that constitutional right be reasoned and justified as this regulation requires. In this regard, it is noted that although the Constitutional Chamber has understood that in those cases where the Procedural Safeguards Judge is personally present and oversees the raid (allanamiento), a written raid order is not required; even in such a case, it has not exempted her from her duty to ground such action, explaining that this could even be done verbally upon entry, provided that a written record thereof is left in the record of the raid conducted: "... *The situation is now radically different and this justifies the evolutionary interpretation authorized by our legal system as stated above and which this Chamber has decided to adopt regarding Article 23 of the Constitution. Indeed, with the implementation of a purely accusatory criminal procedural system, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a protective role over the regularity—especially the constitutional regularity—of the proceedings, such that his presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but as a supervisor ensuring that the exercise of state authority is executed within the established constitutional and legal parameters and is carried out without abuse of power. For the Chamber, this is precisely and exactly what the Constituent intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully achieved if the judge is present during home raids, but always provided, obviously, that his participation, as stated, is not as a member of the investigative body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the rights of citizens and the actions of state authorities responsible for the investigation and production of evidentiary elements. Consequently, the requirement of a written order loses the relevance it once had, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and of excess in performance) by administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would set out in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is supplanted by the active presence of the judge himself during the execution of the act. However, the reasons based on which this Chamber considers such substitution valid require, in turn, inescapably, that the judge's will to authorize be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in his acts and necessarily leading, not passive, participation, but also, that it be recorded in the record or certificate of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act performed. To this effect, the orality that governs our current criminal procedural system means that the reasoning of acts is carried out not in the traditional way through writing, but is performed orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action and with an attitude consonant with that will; that change, however, should not serve to evade the obligation to reason the actions and seek to embody the reasons in the process, especially those that, as in this case, relate to the possibility of lawfully injuring a constitutional right ...*" (Constitutional Chamber, vote No. 4672-03 of 14:47 hours on May 28, 2003. In this same vein, other votes of this Chamber can be consulted, namely; No. 2773-97 of May 20, 1997; No. 1509-98 of March 6, 1998; and No. 3014-98 of May 6, 1998). In accordance with these guidelines, it appears that in the record of the raid (allanamiento) conducted (cf. folios 107 and 108), it was also not recorded that the acting judicial authority had complied with such requirement, as the reasons that justified or motivated the measure are unknown. In this regard, it appears that in the raid order (allanamiento) (cf. folio 96, line 30 onwards), the judicial authority merely literally transcribed the content of the written request submitted by the prosecutor and the regional deputy chief of the PCD, after which she stated: "*IT IS RESOLVED: in view of the Prosecutor's Office's request and the petition being appropriate, it is resolved that in accordance with the provisions of Articles 193, 194, 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is ordered: the marking of bills ... and to execute the raid (allanamiento) ... Likewise, the RAID, SEARCH AND SEIZURE is ordered of the (sic) dwelling ... in order to locate there and confiscate evidence related to this illicit activity of national drug trafficking (production, sale, manufacturing (sic), distribution (sic), etc.) confiscation that will be carried out by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office ... ordering the enabling [of the measure] until 8:00 p.m., given that the necessity (sic) is imperative since the sales are made in the late afternoon, night, and early morning hours, all with the aim of obtaining a positive result from the operation ...*" (cf. folio 96, line 30 onwards). As previously noted, the criminal judge never justified why she considered the act to be appropriate and necessary for the purposes of the investigation being carried out at that time. On this point, it is not superfluous to mention what national doctrine has referred to on the subject, stating: "... *The raid order (allanamiento) must be a reasoned order. The Third Chamber, in various resolutions, has demanded the reasoning of the raid order, considering that it is not sufficient to transcribe the prosecutor's petition and then simply state that the raid is ordered ... Regarding this, it must be said that although a mere descriptive reference to the prosecutor's petition is not enough, the judge can rely on it, expressing why, based on what the prosecutor indicated, there is a basis for issuing the raid order ...*", Llobet Rodríguez (Javier), "*COMENTATED CRIMINAL PROCESS*" (Proceso Penal Comentado). Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José. Third edition, 2006, p. 297). This criterion has also been maintained and stated by the jurisprudence of this Criminal Cassation Tribunal of San Ramón, where in a majority vote it was indicated: "... *the complainants are indeed correct regarding the second aspect of the request they formulate, since the evidence used by the Trial Court and on which it relies to issue the conviction in this matter, which derived from the raid (allanamiento) conducted at the home of the sentenced person [Nombre10].,* ***is unlawful*** *and, as such, could not and cannot be assessed or taken into account to support a decision such as the one taken in this matter, even if it originated from the application of the abbreviated procedure. In this regard, as recorded in the case file ... it is evident that the Criminal Judge of Grecia did not properly ground the resolution by means of which she ordered the raid (allanamiento) conducted at the house where the sentenced person lived with her common-law partner ... at the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office representative. In an irregular manner and in total disregard of the provisions of Article 23 of the Political Constitution, in relation to 193 and following of the Criminal Procedure Code, 2 subsection 3) and 17 subsection 1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11 subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the referenced judicial authority conducted the raid and search of the mentioned dwelling without properly issuing the resolution authorizing said act (which affects and limits the guarantee of privacy of the home), even though this constituted an indispensable validity requirement to carry it out. From a simple reading of the order, it is evident that she did not ground the reasons why—in her opinion—the execution of this act was appropriate, even though it was her duty to do so, as established by Article 193, in relation to numeral 142, both of the cited procedural regulations, limiting herself to transcribing what attorney [Nombre11], who acted as Prosecutor of Grecia, stated in that regard. By this course of action, one of the fundamental rights contemplated in the Political Constitution, as well as in the cited International Treaties or Conventions, namely, the privacy or inviolability of the home, was disregarded and violated, because regardless of whether a crime was being committed or not at that location, it was necessary that the act limiting or restricting that right be reasoned and justified as this regulation provides. In the opinion of the majority of this Criminal Cassation Tribunal, despite the judicial authority having had sufficient time to comply with the requirements set forth to execute this type of act, it did not do so (regarding the reasoning of this order, see* ***[Nombre12]*** *, "* ***Commented Criminal Process*** *" (Proceso Penal Comentado), Third Edition, Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, Costa Rica, 2006, pp. 296-297). This criterion has also been maintained and stated in various resolutions by the Third Chamber of the Court, in cases where precisely the judicial authority ordered said act, limiting itself solely to transcribing the Public Prosecutor's Office's request, without stating the motives or grounds for which it made this decision. Thus, for example, the following was stated: "I) This Chamber must note the existence of an absolute procedural defect that violates due process and, therefore, the right to defense, which was not alleged by the petitioner: the judicial order dated July 25, 2000, issued by Attorney [Nombre13]..., Criminal Judge of Golfito, ordering the raid (allanamiento)—visible at folio 34 of the case file—utterly lacks any grounds whatsoever, which constitutes a defect in the judgment that justifies its annulment, in accordance with Articles 1, 6, 142, 178 subsection a), 195 subsection d) and 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code and which today is reflected in Article 369 subsection j), effective as of June 6, 2006, by virtue of Law No. 8503 on the 'Opening of Criminal Cassation'. Said resolution literally states: '… SOLE CONSIDERANDO: The representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office of this center requests that, by reason of investigations being conducted regarding the illicit activity of Drug Storage, Possession, and Sale, a raid, search, and seizure be conducted in a dwelling located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet, 25 meters east of the evangelical church, unpainted wooden house, of mixed construction, house inhabited by a woman known only by the nickname '[Nombre14]', and a dwelling located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. yard, with number 780, mixed wooden and cement house without paint, inhabited by a woman named [Nombre15]... Although it is true that our Fundamental Charter establishes the inviolability of the home, it also provides that in exceptional cases said guarantee may be suspended. In the case at hand, the undersigned deems it appropriate, given the nature and seriousness of the crime investigated (DRUG STORAGE, POSSESSION, AND SALE), to grant the request made and consequently THE RAID, SEARCH, and seizure IS ORDERED in a dwelling located in Río Claro de Golfito, Guaycara hamlet (...) house inhabited by a woman known only by the nickname '[Nombre14]'; and a dwelling located in the same place, in front of the I.C.E. yard, with number 780, mixed wooden and cement house without paint, inhabited by a woman named [Nombre15]... for the purpose of SEIZING objects related to the investigated crime, as well as possible drug found at that location. To carry out this measure, today, TWENTY-FIFTH OF JULY OF TWO THOUSAND, is designated, between the hours of TWELVE AND EIGHTEEN HOURS. Participating in this measure will be the Prosecuting Attorney of this center, Lic. [Nombre16]... and the Drug officers: …'. This resolution fails to comply with the provisions of Article 195 subsection d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in relation to Articles 1, 6 and 142 ibidem, as it merely makes a bare mention of the Public Prosecutor's Office's request, without expressing the factual or legal reasoning that, in the specific case and according to the evidence gathered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, grounded its decision. II) It must not be forgotten that in a procedural system like Costa Rica's, reasoning constitutes an element of the judicial resolution that allows its control of objectivity, in accordance with Articles 11 and 154 of the Political Constitution, which subjects judicial bodies to the legal system. In cases like the present one, the basis for the Criminal Court's decision to raid a home does not arise in relation to the right to private property, but as a guarantee of the reasons justifying the intrusion into the sphere of personal privacy. III) Subsection 2 of Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides: 'No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference in his private life, his family, his home...'. Then, subsection 3 of the same provision states: 'Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.' The Convention, then, only prohibits* ***arbitrary*** *interference, from which it follows that the legitimate possibility exists to restrict that right, provided that the intrusion is* ***not arbitrary***. This is explained given that the limit to the exercise of human rights lies in the existence of the rights of other persons, so that all can coexist in society, as regulated in Article 32 subsection 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights: '2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.' Some criteria for defining the legitimacy of restrictions on human rights—and, therefore, for avoiding arbitrariness—are contained in Article 30 of the cited Convention. First, that *the restriction is provided for by law. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its Advisory Opinion 6/86 of May 9, 1986, interprets the term 'laws' as indicating: '...The expression laws, within the framework of the protection of human rights, would be meaningless if it did not allude to the idea that the mere determination of public power is not sufficient to restrict such rights. The opposite would amount to recognizing absolute authority for the powers of the rulers over the ruled. Conversely, the word laws takes on its full logical and historical meaning if it is considered as a requirement for the necessary limitation of public power interference in the sphere of the rights and liberties of the human person. The Court concludes that the expression laws, used by Article 30, can have no other meaning than that of formal law, that is, a legal norm adopted by the legislative organ and promulgated by the Executive Branch, according to the procedure required by the domestic law of each State…'. As a second requirement, it is provided that *the restriction must be based on reasons of general interest, which constitutes its purpose. This teleological criterion of control of deviation of power has been understood by the Inter-American Court, through its Advisory Opinions 6/86 cited and 5/85 of November 13, 1985, in the following sense: '...It is possible to understand the common good, within the context of the Convention, as a concept referring to the conditions of social life that allow the members of society to achieve the highest degree of personal development and the greatest validity of democratic values. In this sense, the organization of social life can be considered an imperative of the common good in a manner that strengthens the functioning of democratic institutions and preserves and promotes the full realization of the rights of the human person... The Court does not overlook, however, the difficulty of precisely and univocally defining the concepts of 'public order' and 'common good', nor that both concepts can be used as much to affirm the rights of the person against public power, as to justify limitations on those rights in the name of collective interests. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in no way could 'public order' or 'common good' be invoked as means to suppress a right guaranteed by the Convention or to denature it or deprive it of real content (see Art. 29.a of the Convention). These concepts, insofar as they are invoked as a basis for limitations on human rights, must be subject to an interpretation strictly adhering to the 'just requirements' of 'a democratic society' that takes into account the balance between the different interests at stake and the need to preserve the object and purpose of the Convention…'. There is a third element introduced by the mentioned Article 32 subsection 2 of the Pact of San José: that restrictions must be *necessary in a democratic society. In the aforementioned Advisory Opinion 5/85, the Inter-American Court stated in this regard: '...It is important to highlight that the European Court of Human Rights, when interpreting Article 10 of the European Convention, concluded that 'necessary', without being synonymous with 'indispensable', implies the existence of an 'imperative social need' and that for a restriction to be 'necessary' it is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is 'useful', 'reasonable' or 'opportune'. (Eur. Court [Nombre17]..., The Sunday Times case, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. no. 59, pp. 35-36). This conclusion, which is equally applicable to the American Convention, suggests that the 'necessity' and, therefore, the legality of restrictions... will depend on their being oriented towards satisfying an imperative public interest. Among several options to achieve that objective, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree must be chosen. Given this standard, it is not sufficient to demonstrate, for example, that the law serves a useful or opportune purpose; for them to be compatible with the Convention, restrictions must be justified according to collective objectives that, due to their importance, clearly prevail over the social need for the full enjoyment of the right... and do not limit the proclaimed right more than strictly necessary... That is, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and closely adjusted to the achievement of that legitimate objective…'. From this resolution it follows that the necessity of the limitation implies that it must be useful to protect the right whose validity justifies the restriction, proportionate to the end sought, and constitute the least burdensome alternative in achieving that purpose. IV) In the matter of restrictions on the right to home privacy through raids, this Chamber, showing itself respectful and guaranteeing of the rights of individuals according to the formalities imposed by the American Convention on Human Rights, the Political Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code, has indicated, for example, in its resolution No. 965-2004 of August 13, 2004—among many others—insistently, emphatically and clearly: '…Regarding the duty to state reasons and the injury to a fundamental right: Reflecting on the pillars that sustain the so-called Rule of Law, we could conclude that there is no other way to politically assess the scheme of a State, to measure its true characteristics, than that which details the form and requirements that allow the authorities to infringe the fundamental rights of individuals.*" By understanding, first of all, which rights can be ‘legitimately’ infringed in that State and what the requirements are that surround such authorization, we can assess whether that State is indeed based on the premise that its substantial legitimacy is due to respect for such rights, such that the authorizations it contemplates, as part of the unavoidable reality that there are no absolute rights and that there are situations that would exceptionally authorize an infringement of some of them, are surrounded by a series of requirements that in turn become prerogatives of the citizen that guarantee that, in order to infringe a fundamental right, a <span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">real, serious, and especially reasoned balancing</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> must be carried out of: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">i) the existence of verified indications of being in the presence of a crime</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, as the first unavoidable parameter for permitting the analysis of whether or not a fundamental right is infringed, by virtue of what is contemplated in Article 28, second paragraph, of the Political Constitution; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">ii) the necessity of the measure</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, that is, it is imposed </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">because there is no other less harmful way to obtain the expected results</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> iii) its proportionality in light of the interests and objectives pursued through it</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">iv) the suitability of the authorization to achieve the objectives pursued</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">v) the reasoned, current balancing of all these prerogatives, made by the constitutionally authorized subject to, in turn, authorize an infringement of a fundamental right: the judge, through the issuance of a duly reasoned written order</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">… Therefore, every time an authority seeks authorization to intrude upon a fundamental right, the resolution issued is a clear political manifestation of the State, it is its reflection, its portrait, such that never is the political role of the judge and his level of commitment to constitutionally protected values more clearly embodied than in this type of resolution, as well as the importance of his function within the scheme of the Rule of Law. The jurisprudence of this Chamber has maintained this clear and transparent position in safeguarding that first-order political importance, regarding respect for fundamental rights and the need for all the previously stated prerogatives to be balanced and reasoned by the judge when authorizing the infringement of an essential right (cf., among others, resolutions 298-95 of 9:05 a.m. on May 25, 560-95 of 10:10 a.m. on September 22, and 614-95 of 9:55 a.m. on October 13, all from 1995; 468-99 of 9:20 a.m. on April 23, 1999; 246-00 of 9:50 a.m. on March 3 and 699-00 of 9:40 a.m. on June 23, both from the year 2000; 917-01 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2001; 1179-02 of 10:25 a.m. on November 22, 2002; 722-03 of 9:30 a.m. on August 22 and 866-03 of 2:45 p.m. on September 30, both from the previous year). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">In particular, the importance of the statement of reasons is highlighted as a guarantee of the reasonable and democratic exercise of jurisdictional power when it authorizes an intrusion of this nature</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, while also rescuing the transcendence that, for the fulfillment of this role, has –in the case of the raid (allanamiento) especially– the existence of a written order prior to any intrusion into the intimacy of an inhabited place. In reality, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">only the existence of a prior and duly reasoned order will allow the interpreter to assess whether, in effect, all the constitutional requirements previously related for authorizing the intervention were met and, thus, assess its legitimacy –formal and substantial– , that is, to control its validity.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> And, it is added now, only through the requirement that the judge state reasons and provide reasoning, expose and justify what the presuppositions are, how they are met, and why they justify the authorization to infringe a fundamental right in the face of a specific request that seeks it, can it be guaranteed, in turn, that the judge fulfills his role as guarantor of respect for those rights, as controller of the legality and constitutionality of the actions of the subjects in charge of the investigation –the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) and judicial police–…</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The judge in the investigation stage and in the intermediate phase, however much his role may be delegitimized by what happens in practice, is there to control and guarantee the legality of the actions in this stage, to assess and reasonably balance the requests made to him, and never as a simple spectator who is willing to authorize everything requested of him</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, remaining on the sidelines regarding its appropriateness, because that would simply be to abandon the meaning and justification of the jurisdictional function in a Rule of Law State, which finds precisely in the criminal process, the quintessential seat of the exercise of state repressive power, its most pristine reason for being. The Political Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) bet on the controlling judge, guarantor and bastion of respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens, always compromised when it comes to a criminal investigation, and only through reasoned exercise and in accordance with the parameters set forth can the jurisdictional authorization to infringe a fundamental right be validated. It is not enough, therefore, that there is jurisdictional intervention; this is one of the constitutionally required requirements and the first step to consider the formal legitimacy of the authorization</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">. That judge must comply with the other requirements, must reason, explain how and why the measure is justified, is necessary, is suitable, is proportional to the intended purpose, and what the margins within which the authorization is granted are, requirements specified in the constitutional norms cited above and, in the case of a raid (allanamiento), especially the relationship of Articles 9, 11, 28 second paragraph, 23, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)…” [the highlighting does not belong </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">to the original]. V) In the specific case, dealing with investigations for the crime of drug trafficking, the protection of the health of all persons is a matter of public interest. In this sense, Article 1 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud, Law No. 5395) establishes: “The health of the population is a good of public interest protected by the State,” while the last paragraph of Article 2 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities (Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso No Autorizado y Actividades Conexas, Law No. 8204) states: “…It is a function of the State, and it is declared of public interest, to adopt the necessary measures to prevent, control, investigate, avoid, or repress any illicit activity related to the subject matter of this Law…” For its part, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador,” approved by Law No. 7907) provides in its Article 10: “1. Everyone has the right to health, understood as the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being. 2. In order to make the right to health effective, the States Parties undertake to recognize health as a public good…” This is understood because of the problems generated by the illicit trafficking of drugs, based on the Preamble of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (approved by Law No. 7198), which reflects a general and international interest: “… The Parties to this Convention: Deeply concerned about the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural, and political foundations of society</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">. Deeply concerned also by the steadily increasing inroads into various social groups made by illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with the danger of incalculable gravity that this entails…” [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. Likewise, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (approved by Law No. 4544) states in its Preamble: “The Parties: Concerned with the physical and moral health of humanity…Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger for humanity…”; an idea also included in the Preamble of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (approved by virtue of Law No. 4990). This social and state interest in the protection of public health can ultimately justify the interference with the right to privacy of the domicile. VI) However, the mere existence of a criminal investigation in the matter of drug trafficking is not sufficient to limit that right. The Political Constitution of Costa Rica, through the relationship of its Articles 23 and 24, guarantees the right to domiciliary privacy, qualifying it as inviolable, but expressly provides in the first of the mentioned provisions the possibility of limiting this right by means of a raid (allanamiento): “…by written order of a judge…” –in accordance with the requirements of Article 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)– “…or to prevent the commission or impunity of crimes, or to avoid serious harm to persons or property…” –for the cases of a raid (allanamiento) without a judicial order contained in Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)–. Consequently, the reasons of general interest or public order that justify the restriction of the right to domiciliary privacy required by the American Convention on Human Rights are concretized in Article 193, in relation to Article 190 to which the former must be understood to refer, both of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal). The second of them says: “Article 190.- Vehicle search. …may search a vehicle, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">provided there are sufficient grounds to presume that a person is hiding in it objects related to the crime</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">…” [the highlighting does not belong to the original]; while the first one states: “Raid (Allanamiento) and search of a dwelling. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">When the search</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> must be carried out in an inhabited place, in its outbuildings, business premises, or office, the raid (allanamiento) and search (registro) shall be carried out personally by the judge …” [the highlighting does not belong to the original]. It follows from this that the requirements that motivate the search of a vehicle are the same that could justify the entry and search of a dwelling: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the existence of sufficient reasons or elements to presume that in said place there are objects related to the crime specifically being investigated by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">. VII) In these conflicting circumstances, the right to domiciliary privacy yields to the state interest in protecting public health through the prosecution of illicit conduct that harms it, in fulfillment of its obligations –of means, not of results– to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish those behaviors that harm legal interests whose indispensable reference is constituted by the human rights recognized in the legal system. However, the need for that restriction (consisting of entry into the domicile and affecting the right to privacy), as has been indicated, must be demonstrated in a jurisdictional resolution, so that the raid (allanamiento) of the dwelling in the specific case constitutes a suitable means in the prevention, investigation, prosecution, and eventual punishment of illicit drug trafficking in protection of public health, is proportional to the nature of the crime investigated and to the existing indications (indicios) about the possible location in the inhabited place of objects related to that crime, and that there is no other less burdensome alternative than the intrusion into the domicile. All of this integrates and is summarized in the requirement contemplated in subsection d) of Article 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal): “The reason for the raid (allanamiento)”. VIII) Based on the foregoing, this Chamber on its own motion observes that the order issued by the Criminal Court of Golfito to raid the dwellings of [Name18] . . . and [Name15] . . ., constituted an absolutely defective procedural act, since by containing no statement of reasons whatsoever, it failed to observe the rights and guarantees of individuals, contained in all the regulations analyzed previously and related to the state functions of respecting and guaranteeing the right to domiciliary privacy free from </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">arbitrary</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> interferences. Therefore, the evidentiary elements that derived from the arbitrary and illicit entry and search of the dwellings of the accused –although from that of [Name19] . . no element of any interest was extracted for the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público)– could under no circumstances have been used to support the judgment of the lower court (a-quo). This in accordance with Articles 1, 175, 178 subsection a) and 181 first paragraph of the Procedural Code.” </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">(THIRD CHAMBER OF THE COURT, Ruling No. 674 of 10:10 a.m. on July 19, 2006</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">; see also in this same sense Rulings No. 917 of 10:00 a.m. on September 21, 2001, No. 1275 of 9:35 a.m. on November 7, 2005, No. 165 of 9:30 a.m. on March 11, 2005, No. 70 of 8:45 a.m. on February 11, 2005, and No. 139 of 8:50 a.m. on March 4, 2005). Finally, it is important to note that in this case, none of the scenarios in which the regulations allow for the carrying out of this type of proceeding without the existence of a prior resolution ordering it were present, to thus justify the manner in which it was proceeded. In other words, it was not one of the scenarios or circumstances provided for in Article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) ... On the other hand, it is worth clarifying that in the past there was a controversy between the Third Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber regarding the issue analyzed here, because while the former has insisted on the necessity of a prior written raid (allanamiento) order, the latter has rather pointed out that it is not required when the supervising judge (juez de garantías) is present. However, constitutional jurisprudence (binding erga omnes) ultimately clarified its position, reiterating that this written order was not necessary, but</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> -importantly-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> adding the caveat that it is indeed indispensable in all cases that the judge state in writing the reasons (for the purposes of exercising the respective controls by the subjects whose fundamental rights may be affected) that led to the decision to carry out the raid (allanamiento). Such reasoning could even be provided orally at the time of the entry, provided that it is subsequently recorded in writing. In this sense, the following was indicated: “... Indeed, with the implementation of a purely accusatory criminal procedural system, the judge ceases to participate as an investigator during the process and is assigned a role of protector of the regularity –especially constitutional regularity– of the proceedings, so that his presence and intervention is required in certain cases, but no longer for the purpose of directing the investigation as in the inquisitorial model, but rather as a supervisor ensuring that the exercise of state authority is carried out within the established constitutional and legal parameters and is conducted without abuse of power. For this Chamber, it is precisely and exactly that which the Constituent intended and the role that, according to the best doctrine on fundamental rights, the guarantee established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution must fulfill. This is undoubtedly fully accomplished if the judge is present during the raids (allanamientos) of domicile, but always provided that, obviously, his participation, as stated, is not as a member of the investigating body, but as a procedural subject who strictly controls the balance between the rights of citizens and the actions of state authorities in charge of the investigation and production of evidentiary elements. Consequently, the requirement of a written order, which once had relevance, loses it, because it was intended to restrict the possibility of action (and of excess in action) by administrative authorities, by subjecting them to the conditions and limits that a judge would indicate to them in writing, a circumstance that is now amply covered if said order is replaced by the active personal presence of the judge during the execution of the act. However, the reasons on the basis of which this Chamber considers this substitution valid, demand in turn, unavoidably, that the judge's will to authorize be manifested clearly and expressly, not only in his acts and necessarily leading, non-passive participation, but also, that it be recorded in the minutes or record of action that must be drawn up in relation to the act performed. To this effect, the orality that prevails in our current criminal procedural system means that the reasoning of acts is carried out not in the traditional written form, but rather is done orally, justifying with sufficient words, explaining and giving reasons that warrant the action and with an attitude consistent with that will; that change, however, should not serve to evade the obligation to state reasons for actions and to ensure that the reasons are captured in the process, especially those that, as in this case, relate to the possibility of lawfully infringing a constitutional right. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">V.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The inquiring Chamber raises its doubt about the validity of an interpretation like the one set forth that disregards the value of the prior written order, in light of the new criminal procedural regime, which establishes very precise rules in this regard. However, it is clear from what has been stated that from the perspective of this Chamber, for Constitutional Law, the personal intervention of the judge –possible or obligatory– is in itself sufficient to meet the requirements set forth in the Constitution, without a prior written order issued by the judge himself being additionally required. It should be noted then that it will be sufficient for the purposes of overcoming the inviolability of the domicile to have either the existence of a written order from the competent judge in cases where his action can be validly delegated, or his personal participation. Now, for the purposes of respecting due process, it is undeniable that, whether through a written prior order or through his direct and immediate participation, the intervention of the judge and his authorization must include a statement of reasons –it is not required that the act be ‘substantiated’ (fundamentación), but rather that it be ‘reasoned’ (motivación), meaning it must have a founded reason, a reason to occur– that can be validated by the other judicial authorities intervening in the process. This is of the utmost importance because if such reasoning is lacking, it is evident that, in accordance with the rules of due process derived from Article 39 of the Constitution, the evidence becomes illegitimate and could not serve as a basis for a decision.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">VI.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">In conclusion, in the opinion of this Chamber, the constitutional requirement established in Article 23 of the Political Constitution is met, and the constitutional principles of due process regarding the inviolability of the domicile are respected, when the lack of a written order from a competent judge in a raid (allanamiento) proceeding is substituted by the personal and active participation of the criminal judge in said act. Such action must necessarily be reasoned according to the factual and legal circumstances relevant to the case, and even more so when dealing with the infringement of a constitutional right. Furthermore, this reasoning (motivación) must be provided by the supervising judge (juez de garantías) in such a way that there is no doubt about it and that it can be submitted to analysis and review by the judicial authorities responsible for such a function, since the omission or clear insufficiency of said reasoning leads to the illegitimacy of what was done. It is up to the inquiring Chamber to verify what occurred in the specific case and resolve what is pertinent in accordance with what has been set forth herein ...”, Constitutional Chamber, Ruling No. 4672-03 of May 28, 2003. From the study of the present case, it is apparent that, as indicated, the raid (allanamiento) order on folios 37 and following does not incorporate any type of statement of reasons by the criminal judge of Grecia, and such omission was also not remedied in the raid (allanamiento) execution record on folios 51 and following, which simply describes the material actions carried out in compliance with the issued order. Consequently, in accordance with what has been indicated, the raid (allanamiento) proceeding carried out in the dwelling of the accused herein is vitiated and as such could not and cannot be taken into account to sustain a conviction as was done, since upon its issuance and execution, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Political Constitution was violated. Moreover, this conclusion is reached regardless of whether the now-sentenced individual had agreed to avail herself of the expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), because the procedural regulations and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber itself require that the judgment dictated under this procedural modality must be duly reasoned (motivada). In this regard, the jurisprudence of this constitutional controller has stated that: “(...) in the event of a conviction being issued in the expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado), that manifestation of willingness to accept the facts can indeed be taken as an evidentiary element. The restriction of this practice in criminal procedural law is based on the danger of imposing a custodial sentence through a confession from a person whose will is vitiated by violence or ignorance, but the strong jurisdictional supervision surrounding the expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado) –including the means of challenge– is sufficient guarantee to rule out that risk. In addition to the fact that the accused's statement must be corroborated with other elements of conviction –expert reports, witnesses, documents–, which make it credible in the judge's opinion, which must be analyzed as a whole when substantiating the conviction.” (Constitutional Chamber, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">No. 5867</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> of 2:30 p.m. on July 12, 2000). This means that, together with the observance of the requirements established by the legislator for processing the case according to this type of procedure (e.g., agreement between the defense, the accused, and the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) regarding the facts and the penalty, as well as a free acceptance by the defendant of this agreement, etc.), the judge must ground the decision on the documentary evidence existing in the case file, evidence that must necessarily be lawful, since the current prosecution system is governed by the principle of legality. Although the expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado) constitutes a waiver of the complexities of the ordinary procedure, specifically the holding of the trial (debate) (with all the principles and guarantees it entails), this does not mean that the requirements and guarantees recognized in a Democratic State of Law are equally waived, such as, among others, the due accreditation of the facts and the participation of the accused in them, when issuing the conviction, which must be based on legally obtained evidence. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">III.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">There is no doubt, then, that in the case, the regulations governing the raid (allanamiento) of a dwelling or abode were disregarded, and the jurisdictional authority proceeded irregularly with its issuance and execution, violating the formalities or requirements existing for this, above all the duty to state reasons. These formalities or requirements (forms in general) have been established as a guarantee that every legal operator will not act arbitrarily or abusively when called upon to determine the material truth of the facts being investigated. It is not a matter in these cases of a cult of formality for formality's sake, but rather a recognition of formality as an instrument that makes it possible to enforce the rights and guarantees that people enjoy, by the mere fact of being such. Under this principle, according to what has been indicated, the action questioned here presents an absolute procedural defect that compels its declaration of nullity, and whose effects entail –at the same time– the inadmissibility (ineficacia) of all evidence derived from this proceeding, as provided in Article 175 of the cited procedural regulation, which establishes that: “</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Acts carried out in disregard of the forms and conditions provided for in the Constitution, in the International or Community Law in force in Costa Rica, and in this Code may not be assessed to support a judicial decision nor used as presuppositions thereof</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">” (see in this regard from the Constitutional Chamber, Ruling No. 10115 of 2:40 p.m. on August 3, 2005) .</span><span style="font-family:Arial\">..”, Criminal Cassation Tribunal of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón, second section, Ruling No. 2007-00178 of 12:15 p.m. on March 23, 2007.

II.- Thus, based on everything previously stated, the most important evidentiary elements that allowed the trial court to base the conviction, originated in a proceeding that violated the most basic norms of due process, which in turn entailed a violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the Political Constitution and International Treaties (guarantee of privacy of domicile), which, when the numeral 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refers to the formalities of the search (allanamiento), indicates that the resolution ordering said diligence must contain the following requirements: a- The name and position of the authority that will practice the registration, in the case of the delegation in the Public Ministry or the police. b) The determination of the place or locations that will be registered. c) The reason for the search is that the existence of a probable cause that the accused is responsible for the crime of aggravated sale of drugs that were attributed to the offense, as well as the existence of other elements of proof that are insufficient to establish the certainty of the judgment, which is necessary to support the conviction, and the evidence that is admissible in the process of reviewing the case. The court of first instance must consider the facts and circumstances of the proceeding, which are based on the findings of the investigation. The conclusion of the matter is that the applicant is entitled to the review of the decision. The order is to declare the motion to be denied. The request is granted. The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied. The motion is overruled. The action is dismissed. The complaint is dismissed. The case is closed. The proceeding is terminated. The judgment is reversed. The ruling is affirmed. The decision is vacated. The sentence is annulled. The verdict is set aside. The order is quashed. The matter is resolved. The issue is decided. The question is answered. The problem is solved. The answer is given. The solution is found. The result is obtained. The outcome is reached. The end is achieved. The means are justified. The methods are employed. The approaches are used. The ways are taken. The measures are adopted. The steps are taken. The paths are followed. The roads are traveled. And so it goes.

II.- Así las cosas, por todo lo antes expuesto, siendo que, en lo esencial, los elementos de juicio más importantes que en este caso que nos ocupa le permitieron al Tribunal de instancia fundamentar la sentencia condenatoria, se originaron en un proceder que violentó las más elementales normas del debido proceso, lo cual a su vez conllevó el quebranto a derechos fundamentales contemplados en la Constitución Política y Tratados Internacionales (garantía de la privacidad del domicilio), lo que se impone en este caso, conforme lo estima la mayoría de esta Cámara, declara con lugar el procedimiento de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió. En efecto, del estudio del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso qued ### Translation: English **II.- Así las cosas, por todo lo antes expuesto, siendo que, en lo esencial, los elementos de juicio más importantes que en este caso que nos ocupa le permitieron al Tribunal de instancia fundamentar la sentencia condenatoria, se originaron en un proceder que violentó las más elementales normas del debido proceso, lo cual a su vez conllevó el quebranto a derechos fundamentales contemplados en la Constitución Política y Tratados Internacionales (garantía de la privacidad del domicilio), lo que se impone en este caso, conforme lo estima la mayoría de esta Cámara, declara con lugar el procedimiento de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió. En efecto, del estudio del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió, en efecto, del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en el que se efectuaron las compras controladas de droga en el sitio). Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida. Por lo tanto, se estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que formula la defensa y anula la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió

Res: 2007-00691 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN PENAL DEL TERCER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, SECCIÓN SEGUNDA. San Ramón, a las diez horas treinta y seis minutos del veintiuno de diciembre de dos mil siete.

PROCEDIMIENTO DE REVISIÓN interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre1] . . . , cédula de identidad número CED1, hijo de [Nombre2] , por el delito de INFRACCIÓN A LA LEY DE PSICOTRÓPICOS AGRAVADA, en perjuicio de LA SALUD PÚBLICA. Inte rvienen en la decisión del recurso, los Jueces Mario Alberto Porras Villalta, Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda y Guillermo Sojo Picado. Se apersona en casación el co- imputado [Nombre1] . . .

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que mediante sentencia número 65-P-04 de las trece horas del dieciocho de febrero de dos mil cuatro, el Tribunal de Puntarenas resolvió: "POR TANTO: Razones dichas, reglas de la sana crítica racional y artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 1, 30, 31, 45, 50, 51, 71, todos del Código Penal, 9, 373 siguientes y concordantes del Código Procesal Penal, 58 y 77 inciso f) ambos de la Ley 8204, al resolver el presente asunto, se acuerda: Declarar a [Nombre1] . . . autor responsable de la comisión del delito de VENTA AGRAVADA DE DROGA A CONSUMIDORES cometido en daño de LA SALUD PÚBLICA y por ello se le impone como sanción SIETE AÑOS DE PRISIÓN que deberá descontar en el lugar y forma que lo determinen las leyes y reglamentos carcelarios, previo abono de determinen las leyes y reglamentos carcelarios, previo abono de la preventiva su (sic) la hubo. Se le condena al pago de las costas causadas y corren por cuenta del Estado los gastos del proceso. NOTIFIQUESE (sic). [Nombre3] , jueza unipersonal ".

2.- Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento interpuso procedimiento de revisión el co-imputado [Nombre1] . . .

3.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 450 del Código de Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso de casación.

4- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta el Juez de Casación [Nombre4] ; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- CONTENIDO DE LA REVISIÓN: Violación del in dubio pro reo, allanamiento ilegítimo e incorporación de prueba espuria. En el único motivo de la revisión y de conformidad con los artículos 1, 2, 6, 9, 12, 142, 180 a 184, 363, 369 y 408 del Código Procesal Penal; 37, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 11 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 11.2 y 17.1 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; 8.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; y 26 de la Declaración Americana sobre Derechos y Deberes del Hombre, los que estima inobservados, el sentenciado [Nombre1] . . . solicita su absolutoria debido a que la sentencia condenatoria abreviada dictada por el Tribunal de Juicio de Puntarenas tuvo por demostrada la comisión del ilícito sin contar con prueba suficiente para ello, y además la misma se fundamentó en prueba ilícita. En concreto, el gestionante alega que si bien él aceptó el procedimiento abreviado, lo cierto es que ello no basta, pues la condena se sustentó en las compras vigiladas y las evidencias recopiladas durante el allanamiento que se realizó en la vivienda de la coimputada [Nombre5] , para lo cual se citan los informes de vigilancias y de compras "experimentales". No obstante, parte de esa prueba es ilegal y así fue declarado por el Tribunal de Puntarenas en la sentencia absolutoria Nº 263- P-07, dictada en favor de la imputada [Nombre6] (quien no se acogió al abreviado sino que, mediante el trámite ordinario, fue juzgada en debate), ello debido a que la resolución que ordenó el allanamiento no posee fundamento alguno. La jueza penal sólo transcribió la solicitud del Ministerio Público, sin dar las razones o motivos por los cuales la diligencia era necesaria y proporcional. Si se suprimiera esa prueba declarada ilegal, los demás elementos serían insuficientes para mantener la condenatoria.

II.- Por mayoría, con el voto salvado del co-juez [Nombre7] , se declara con lugar la revisión interpuesta. Por criterio de mayoría, la sección segunda de este Tribunal de Casación ha mantenido el criterio de que, conforme lo ha entendido la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, aún tratándose de un proceso abreviado la sola aceptación de cargos por parte del encartado no resultaría suficiente para sustentar una decisión condenatoria. De acuerdo con ello, y luego de estudiar el contenido del fallo de mérito, se aprecia que en efecto lleva razón el encartado en la solicitud de revisión que presenta, pues ciertamente la prueba utilizada por el Tribunal de mérito y en la que se fundamenta de manera esencial para dictar la sentencia condenatoria abreviada en esta causa, que deriva del allanamiento practicado en la vivienda de la coimputada [Nombre5] , quien por aparte resultó absuelta en juicio ordinario, es ilícita y, como tal, no podía ni puede ser valorada o tomada en cuenta a dichos efectos. En este sentido, tal y como consta en el expediente a folios 96 y 98 (existen evidentes errores en la foliatura), es evidente que la Jueza Penal de la Fase Preparatoria de Puntarenas no fundamentó como correspondía la resolución por medio de la cual ordenó la realización del allanamiento que se practicó en la referida casa de habitación, ubicada en [Dirección1] de Barranca, esto a solicitud del representante del Ministerio Público y de la sub-jefe regional de la Policía de Control de Drogas. De manera irregular y en total inobservancia de lo dispuesto en el artículo 23 de la Constitución Política, en relación con los numerales 142 y 193 y siguientes del Código Procesal Penal, 2 inciso 3) y 17 inciso 1) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, y 11 inciso 2) de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, la autoridad jurisdiccional referida realizó el allanamiento y registro de la vivienda mencionada (lugar donde incautó importantes evidencias que relacionaban al acusado con el delito investigado) sin dictar adecuadamente la resolución en donde autorizaba dicha actuación lesiva de derechos fundamentales, sobre todo la garantía de privacidad del domicilio contra injerencias estatales, a pesar de que esto constituía un requisito de validez indispensable para poder llevarlo a cabo. Al respecto se advierte que dicha autoridad no indicó las razones por las que, en su criterio, procedía y resulta indispensable la realización de este acto, limitándose a transcribir lo que en tal sentido y de forma escrita expusieron tanto el licenciado [Nombre8] , quien actuaba como Fiscal de Puntarenas, y [Nombre9] , sub-jefe del Departamento Regional de Puntarenas de la Policía de Control de Drogas (cfr. folios 65 a 85). Con este proceder, se inobservó y quebrantó uno de los derechos fundamentales que se encuentran contemplados en la Constitución Política, así como en los Tratados o Convenios Internacionales que se citan, a saber, la privacidad o inviolabilidad del domicilio, pues independientemente de que se estuviese investigando un delito grave en ese lugar, era necesario que el acto que limitaba o restringía ese derecho constitucional tenía que estar motivado y justificado como esta normativa lo exige. Al respecto se tiene que si bien la Sala Constitucional ha entendido que en aquellos supuestos en los cuales el Juez de garantías se hace presente y fiscaliza de manera personal el allanamiento, no se requiere de una orden de allanamiento escrita, aun en tal supuesto no lo ha eximido de su deber de fundamentar tal actuación, explicando que ello incluso podría hacerlo de forma verbal al efectuar el ingreso, siempre y cuando se deje constancia escrita de ello en el acta de allanamiento practicado: "... La situación ahora es radicalmente distinta y por ello se justifica la interpretación evolucionista autorizada por nuestro ordenamiento como se dijo más arriba y que esta Sala ha decidido acoger respecto al artículo 23 Constitucional. En efecto, con la puesta en vigencia de un sistema procesal penal de corte netamente acusatorio, el juez deja de participar como investigador durante el proceso y se le asigna una labor de protector de la regularidad -en especial de la regularidad constitucional- del trámite, de manera que su presencia e intervención es exigida en ciertos casos, pero ya no con el fin de dirigir la investigación como en el modelo inquisitorio, sino como vigilante de que el ejercicio de la autoridad estatal se ejecute dentro de los parámetros constitucionales y legales fijados y se lleve a cabo sin abuso de poder. Para la Sala, es justa y precisamente ello lo que quiso el Constituyente y el papel que, de acuerdo con la mejor doctrina sobre derechos fundamentales, debe cumplir la garantía fijada en el artículo 23 de la Constitución Política. Ello sin duda se cumple a cabalidad si se cuenta con la presencia del juez en los allanamientos de domicilio, pero siempre y cuando obviamente su participación como se dijo, lo sea no como integrante del cuerpo investigador, sino como sujeto procesal que controla de forma estricta el balance entre los derechos de los ciudadanos y las actuaciones de las autoridades estatales encargadas de la investigación y producción de elementos probatorios. En consecuencia, pierde la relevancia que una vez tuvo la exigencia de una orden escrita, porque con ella se pretendía restringir la posibilidad de acción (y de exceso en la actuación) de las autoridades administrativas, al someterlas a las condiciones y límites que un juez les señalara por escrito, circunstancia ésta que ahora queda ampliamente cubierta si dicha orden es suplida por la propia presencia activa del juez durante la ejecución del acto. Ahora bien, las razones con base en las que esta Sala tiene como válida esa suplencia, exigen a su vez de forma ineludible que la voluntad de autorización del juez se manifieste de manera clara y expresa, no solamente en sus actos y participación necesariamente protagónica y no pasiva, sino también, que se haga constar en el acta o constancia de actuación que debe levantarse en relación con el acto efectuado. Al efecto, la oralidad que priva en nuestro actual sistema procesal penal, hace que la motivación de los actos se lleve a cabo no de la forma tradicional mediante la escritura, sino que se realiza en forma oral justificando con palabras suficientes, explicando y dando razones que ameritan la actuación y con una actitud consonante con esa voluntad; ese cambio sin embargo, no debe servir para que se eluda la obligación de motivar las actuaciones y procurar se plasmen las razones en el proceso, en especial las que, como en este caso, tienen que ver con la posibilidad de lesionar lícitamente un derecho constitucional ..." (Sala Constitucional, voto Nº 4672-03 de las 14:47 horas del 28 de mayo de 2003. En este mismo sentido pueden consultarse otros votos de esta Sala, a saber; el Nº 2773-97 del 20 de mayo de 1997; Nº 1509-98 del 06 de marzo de 1998; y el Nº 3014-98 del 06 de mayo de 1998). Conforme a estos lineamientos, se tiene que en el acta de allanamiento practicado (cfr. folios 107 y 108) tampoco se hizo constar que la autoridad judicial actuante hubiera cumplido con tal exigencia, al desconocerse cuáles fueron las razones que justificaron o motivaron la diligencia. Al respecto se tiene que en la orden de allanamiento (cfr. folio 96, línea 30 en adelante), la autoridad jurisdiccional lo único que hizo fue transcribir literalmente el contenido de la solicitud escrita que le presentaron el fiscal y la sub-jefe regional de la PCD, luego de lo cual señaló que: “SE RESUELVE: vista la solicitud de la fiscalía y siendo procedente lo peticionado se resuelve que de conformidad con lo dispuesto por los artículos 193, 194, 198 del Código Procesal Penal, se ordena: el marcaje de billetes ... y ejecutar el allanamiento ...Asimismo se ordena el ALLANAMIENTO, REGISTRO Y SUCUESTRO la (sic) casa de habitación ... a fin de localizar allí y decomisar evidencia relacionada con esa ilicitud de tráfico nacional de droga (producción, venta, elbaración (sic), distribucción (sic), etc) decomiso que realizará el representante del Ministerio Público ... ordenando la habilitación hasta las 20 horas siendo imperante la necesitada (sic) dado que las ventas son realizadas en horas avanzadas de la tarde, noche y madrugada todo con el fin de obtener un resultado positivo del operativo ...” (cfr. folio 96, línea 30 en adelante). Como ya se adelantó, la jueza penal nunca justificó por qué consideró que el acto era procedente y necesario a efectos de la investigación que se llevaba a cabo en aquel momento. Sobre este particular, no sobra mencionar lo que la doctrina nacional ha referido sobre el tema, al decir que: “... La orden de allanamiento debe ser fundamentada. La Sala Tercera en diversas resoluciones ha exigido la fundamentación de la orden de allanamiento, considerando que no es suficiente que transcriba la petición del fiscal y luego se limite a decir que procede a disponer el allanamiento ... Con respecto a ello debe decirse que aunque no basta la mera referencia descriptiva a la petición del fiscal, el juez puede basarse en la misma, expresando por qué con base en lo indicado por el fiscal, existe base para el dictado del allanamiento ...”, Llobet Rodríguez (Javier), “PROCESO PENAL COMENTADO”. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José. Tercera edición, 2006, pág. 297). Este criterio además ha sido mantenido y expuesto también por la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón, donde con voto de mayoría se indicó: "... las quejosas sí llevan razón en cuanto al segundo aspecto de la solicitud que formulan, pues ciertamente la prueba utilizada por el Tribunal de Juicio y en la que se fundamenta para dictar el fallo condenatorio en este asunto, que derivó del allanamiento practicado en la vivienda de la sentenciada [Nombre10]., es ilícita y, como tal, no podía ni puede ser valorada o tomada en cuenta para sustentar una decisión como lo que se tomó en este asunto, aún y cuando la misma se haya originado en la aplicación del procedimiento abreviado. En este sentido, tal y como consta en el expediente ... es evidente que la Jueza Penal de Grecia no fundamentó como correspondía la resolución por medio de la cual ordenó la realización del allanamiento que se practicó en la casa que habitaba la sentenciada junto con su compañero sentimental ... esto a solicitud del representante del Ministerio Público. De manera irregular y en total inobservancia de lo dispuesto en el artículo 23 de la Constitución Política, en relación con el 193 y siguientes del Código Procesal Penal, 2 inciso 3) y 17 inciso 1) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, y 11 inciso 2) de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, la autoridad jurisdiccional referida realizó el allanamiento y registro de la vivienda mencionada sin dictar adecuadamente la resolución en donde autorizaba dicho acto (que afecta y limita la garantía de privacidad del domicilio), a pesar de que esto constituía un requisito de validez indispensable para poder llevarlo a cabo. De una simple lectura de la orden, se aprecia que no fundamentó las razones por las que -en su criterio- procedía la realización de este acto, aun cuando era su deber hacerlo, conforme lo establece el artículo 193, en relación con el numeral 142, ambos de la normativa procesal de cita, limitándose a transcribir lo que expuso en tal sentido el licenciado [Nombre11] quien actuaba como Fiscal de Grecia. Con este proceder, se inobservó y quebrantó uno de los derechos fundamentales que se encuentran contemplados en la Constitución Política, así como en los Tratados o Convenios Internacionales que se citan, a saber, la privacidad o inviolabilidad del domicilio, pues independientemente de que se estuviese cometiendo o no un delito en ese lugar, era necesario que el acto que limitaba o restringía ese derecho tenía que motivarlo y justificarlo como esta normativa lo dispone. En criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal de Casación Penal, no obstante que la autoridad jurisdiccional contó con el tiempo suficiente para cumplir con las exigencias previstas para poder ejecutar esta clase de actos, no lo hizo (sobre la fundamentación de esta orden, puede verse [Nombre12] , "Proceso Penal Comentado", Tercera Edición, Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, Costa Rica, 2006, pp. 296-297). Este criterio además ha sido mantenido y expuesto también en diversas resoluciones por la Sala Tercera de la Corte, en casos donde precisamente la autoridad jurisdiccional ordenó dicho acto limitándose únicamente a transcribir la solicitud del Ministerio Público, sin decir cuáles eran los motivos o el fundamento por el que tomaba esta decisión. De esta forma, por ejemplo, se dijo lo siguiente: "I) Debe advertir esta Sala, la existencia de un defecto absoluto en el procedimiento que vulnera el debido proceso y, por tanto, el derecho de defensa y que no fuera alegado por el gestionante: el auto jurisdiccional de fecha 25 de julio de 2000 emitido por el Licenciado [Nombre13] . . ., Juez Penal de Golfito, que ordenara el allanamiento –visible a folio 34 del expediente– carece de modo terminante de fundamento alguno, lo que supone un vicio de la sentencia que justifica su anulación, de conformidad con los artículos 1, 6, 142, 178 inciso a), 195 inciso d) y 443 del Código Procesal Penal y que hoy se traduce en el artículo 369 inciso j), entrado en vigencia el 6 de junio de 2006 en virtud de la Ley n° 8503 de "Apertura de la Casación Penal". Dicha resolución señala literalmente: "…CONSIDERANDO ÚNICO: Solicita el representante del Ministerio Público de este centro, que por razón de investigaciones que al respecto realiza en torno al ilícito de Almacenamiento, Tenencia y Venta de Drogas, se realice allanamiento, registro y secuestro en una casa de habitación, ubicada en Río Claro de Golfito, caserío Guaycara. 25 metros al este de la iglesia evangélica, casa de madera sin pintar, de construcción mixta, casa habitada por una mujer solo conocida con el mote de ‘[Nombre14]’, y casa de habitación ubicada en el mismo lugar, frente al plantel del I.C.E., con la numeración 780, casa de mixta de madera y cemento sin pintar, habitada por una mujer llamada [Nombre15] . . .. Si bien es cierto, nuestra Carta Fundamental establece la inviolabilidad del domicilio, también predica que en casos excepcionales podrá suspenderse dicha garantía. En el caso que nos ocupa considera procedente el suscrito, dada la característica y gravedad del delito investigado (ALMACENAMIENTO, TENENCIA Y VENTA DE DROGA), acceder a la petición formulada y en consecuencia se ORDENA EL ALLANAMIENTO, REGISTRO y secuestro en una casa de habitación, ubicada en Río Claro de Golfito, caserío Guaycara(...)casa habitada por una mujer solo conocida con el mote de ‘[Nombre14]; y casa de habitación ubicada en el mismo lugar, frente al plantel del I.C.E., con la numeración 780, casa mixta de madera y cemento sin pintar, habitada por una mujer llamada [Nombre15] . . . a efecto de SECUESTRAR objetos relacionados con el delito investigado, así como posible droga habida en ese lugar. Para la realización de esta diligencia, se señala el día de hoy VEINTICINCO DE JULIO DE DOS MIL, entre las horas comprendidas de las DOCE Y DIECIOCHO HORAS. Participarán en la presente diligencia el señor Agente Fiscal de este centro Lic. [Nombre16] . . . y los efectivos de Drogas señores: …". Esta resolución incumple lo preceptuado en el artículo 195 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal, en relación con los artículos 1, 6 y 142 ibídem, toda vez que se limita a hacer mención escueta de la pretensión del Ministerio Público, sin expresar los razonamientos fácticos ni jurídicos que, en el caso concreto y conforme a la prueba recabada por el Ministerio Público, fundamentaba su decisión. II) No debe olvidarse que en un sistema procesal como el costarricense, la motivación se constituye en un elemento de la resolución jurisdiccional que permite su control de objetividad, en atención a los artículos 11 y 154 de la Constitución Política, que somete los órganos jurisdiccionales al ordenamiento jurídico. En casos como el presente, el fundamento de la decisión del Juzgado Penal de allanar una vivienda no se presenta en función del derecho a la propiedad privada, sino como una garantía de las razones que justifican la intromisión en el ámbito de la intimidad personal. III) El inciso 2° del artículo 11 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos prevé: "Nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en la de su familia, en su domicilio…". Luego, el inciso 3 del mismo precepto señala: "Toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de la ley contra esas injerencias o esos ataques". La Convención, entonces, sólo prohíbe las injerencias arbitrarias, de lo que se desprende la posibilidad legítima de restringir aquel derecho, siempre y cuando la intromisión no sea arbitraria. Ello se explica toda vez que el límite al ejercicio de los derechos humanos se halla en la existencia de los derechos de las demás personas, de modo que todos puedan coexistir en sociedad, como se regula en el artículo 32 inciso 2° de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos: "2. Los derechos de cada persona están limitados por los derechos de los demás, por la seguridad de todos y por las justas exigencias del bien común, en una sociedad democrática". Algunos criterios para definir la legitimidad de las restricciones a los derechos humanos –y, por tanto, para evitar la arbitrariedad–, están contenidos en el artículo 30 de la citada Convención. En primer lugar, que la restricción esté prevista en la ley. La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en su opinión consultiva 6/86, de 9 de mayo de 1986, interpreta ese término "ley" indicando: "…La expresión leyes, en el marco de la protección a los derechos humanos, carecería de sentido si con ella no se aludiera a la idea de que la sola determinación del poder público no basta para restringir tales derechos. Lo contrario equivaldría a reconocer una virtualidad absoluta a los poderes de los gobernantes frente a los gobernados. En cambio, el vocablo leyes cobra todo su sentido lógico e histórico si se le considera como una exigencia de la necesaria limitación a la interferencia del poder público en la esfera de los derechos y libertades de la persona humana. La Corte concluye que la expresión leyes, utilizada por el artículo 30, no puede tener otro sentido que el de ley formal, es decir, norma jurídica adoptada por el órgano legislativo y promulgada por el Poder Ejecutivo, según el procedimiento requerido por el derecho interno de cada Estado…". Como segundo requisito se contempla que la restricción debe fundamentarse en razones de interés general, lo que constituye su propósito. Este criterio teleológico de control de la desviación del poder, lo ha entendido la Corte Interamericana, a través de sus Opiniones Consultivas 6/86 citada y 5/85, de 13 de noviembre de 1985, en el siguiente sentido: "…Es posible entender el bien común, dentro del contexto de la Convención, como un concepto referente a las condiciones de la vida social que permiten a los integrantes de la sociedad alcanzar el mayor grado de desarrollo personal y la mayor vigencia de los valores democráticos. En tal sentido, puede considerarse como un imperativo del bien común la organización de la vida social en forma que se fortalezca el funcionamiento de las instituciones democráticas y se preserve y promueva la plena realización de los derechos de la persona humana... No escapa a la Corte, sin embargo, la dificultad de precisar de modo unívoco los conceptos de ‘orden público’ y ‘bien común’, ni que ambos conceptos pueden ser usados tanto para afirmar los derechos de la persona frente al poder público, como para justificar limitaciones a esos derechos en nombre de los intereses colectivos. A este respecto debe subrayarse que de ninguna manera podrían invocarse el ‘orden público’ o el ‘bien común’ como medios para suprimir un derecho garantizado por la Convención o para desnaturalizarlo o privarlo de contenido real (ver el art. 29.a de la Convención). Esos conceptos, en cuanto se invoquen como fundamento de limitaciones a los derechos humanos, deben ser objeto de una interpretación estrictamente ceñida a las ‘justas exigencias’ de ‘una sociedad democrática’ que tenga en cuenta el equilibrio entre los distintos intereses en juego y la necesidad de preservar el objeto y fin de la Convención…". Existe un tercer elemento introducido por el mencionado artículo 32 inciso 2 del Pacto de San José: que las restricciones se presenten como necesarias en una sociedad democrática. En la aludida Opinión Consultiva 5/85 la Corte Interamericana señaló al respecto: "…Es importante destacar que la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos al interpretar el artículo 10 de la Convención Europea, concluyó que ‘necesarias’, sin ser sinónimo de ‘indispensables’, implica la existencia de una ‘necesidad social imperiosa’ y que para que una restricción sea ‘necesaria’ no es suficiente demostrar que sea ‘útil’, ‘razonable’ u ‘oportuna’. (Eur. Court [Nombre17] . ., The Sunday Times case, judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, párr. no. 59, págs. 35-36 ). Esta conclusión, que es igualmente aplicable a la Convención Americana, sugiere que la ‘necesidad’ y, por ende, la legalidad de las restricciones… dependerá de que estén orientadas a satisfacer un interés público imperativo. Entre varias opciones para alcanzar ese objetivo debe escogerse aquélla que restrinja en menor escala el derecho protegido. Dado este estándar, no es suficiente que se demuestre, por ejemplo, que la ley cumple un propósito útil u oportuno; para que sean compatibles con la Convención las restricciones deben justificarse según objetivos colectivos que, por su importancia, preponderen claramente sobre la necesidad social del pleno goce del derecho… y no limiten más de lo estrictamente necesario el derecho proclamado… Es decir, la restricción debe ser proporcionada al interés que la justifica y ajustarse estrechamente al logro de ese legítimo objetivo…". De esta resolución deriva, que la necesidad de la limitación supone que ésta debe ser útil para proteger el derecho cuya vigencia justifica la restricción, proporcional al fin perseguido y constituir la alternativa menos gravosa en la consecución de ese propósito. IV) En materia de restricciones al derecho a la intimidad domiciliaria a través de allanamientos, esta Sala mostrándose respetuosa y garante de los derechos de las personas según las formalidades impuestas por la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, la Constitución Política y el Código Procesal Penal, ha señalado, por ejemplo, en su resolución n° 965-2004, de 13 de agosto de 2004, –entre otras muchas– de manera insistente, tajante y clara: "…Sobre el deber de fundamentación y la lesión a un derecho fundamental: Reflexionando sobre los pilares que sustentan el llamado Estado de Derecho, podríamos concluir que no existe otra forma de valorar políticamente el esquema de un Estado, para medir sus verdaderas características, de aquél que detalla la forma y los requisitos que permiten a las autoridades lesionar los derechos fundamentales de los individuos. Conociendo, en primer lugar, cuáles derechos pueden ser lesionados ‘legítimamente’ en ese Estado y cuáles serían los requisitos que rodean tal autorización, podemos valorar si efectivamente ese Estado parte de que su legitimación sustancial se debe al respeto de tales derechos, de manera tal que las autorizaciones que contempla, como parte de la ineludible realidad de que no existen derechos absolutos y de que existen situaciones que autorizarían excepcionalmente una lesión a algunos de ellos, están rodeadas de una serie de requisitos que se convierten a su vez en prerrogativas del ciudadano que le garantizan que, para lesionar un derecho fundamental, deberá realizarse una ponderación real, seria y especialmente razonada de: i) la existencia de indicios comprobados de estar en presencia de un delito, como primer parámetro ineludible para permitir el análisis de si se lesiona o no un derecho fundamental, en virtud de lo contemplado en el numeral 28 párrafo segundo de la Constitución Política; ii) la necesidad de la medida, es decir, que se impone porque no existe otra forma menos lesiva de obtener los resultados que se esperan; iii) su proporcionalidad de cara a los intereses y los objetivos que por su medio se pretenden; iv) la idoneidad de la autorización para alcanzar los objetivos que se pretenden; v) la ponderación razonada, actual de todos estas prerrogativas, hecha por el sujeto constitucionalmente autorizado para, a su vez, autorizar una lesión a un derecho fundamental: el juez, mediante la emisión de una orden escrita debidamente motivada… Por ello, cada vez que una autoridad pretende la autorización para incursionar en un derecho fundamental, la resolución que se emita es una clara manifestación política del Estado, es su reflejo, su retrato, de manera que nunca como en este tipo de resoluciones está plasmado el rol político del juzgador y su nivel de compromiso con los valores constitucionalmente protegidos, como de la importancia de su función en el esquema del Estado de Derecho. La jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha mantenido esta posición clara y diáfana en resguardo de esa importancia política de primer orden, en cuanto al respeto de los derechos fundamentales y a la necesidad de que se ponderen y razonen todas las prerrogativas antes expuestas por el juez cuando autoriza la lesión de un derecho esencial (cfr. entre otras, resoluciones 298-95 de las 9:05 horas del 25 de mayo, 560-95 de las 10:10 horas del 22 de setiembre y 614-95 de las 9:55 horas del 13 de octubre, todas de 1995; 468-99 de las 9:20 horas del 23 de abril de 1999; 246-00 de las 9:50 horas del 3 de marzo y 699-00 de las 9:40 horas del 23 de junio, ambas del año 2000; 917-01 de las 10:00 horas del 21 de setiembre del año 2001; 1179-02 de las 10:25 horas del 22 de noviembre del año 2002; 722-03 de las 9:30 horas del 22 de agosto y 866-03 de las 14:45 horas del 30 de setiembre, ambas del año anterior). En especial, se destaca la importancia de la fundamentación como garantía de ejercicio razonable y democrático del poder jurisdiccional cuando autoriza una incursión de esta índole, al tiempo que ha rescatado la trascendencia que para el cumplimiento de este rol, tiene –en el caso del allanamiento especialmente– la existencia de una orden escrita previa a toda incursión en la intimidad de un lugar habitado. En realidad, sólo la existencia de una orden previa y debidamente motivada, permitirá al intérprete valorar si en efecto, se cumplían todas las exigencias constitucionales antes relacionadas para autorizar la intervención y, entonces, valorar su legitimidad –formal y sustancial- , es decir, controlar su validez. Y, se añade ahora, sólo mediante la exigencia al juzgador, de motivar y razonar, de exponer y justificar cuáles son los presupuestos, cómo se cumplen y por qué justifican la autorización para lesionar un derecho fundamental frente a una solicitud concreta que lo pretende, se puede garantizar a su vez, que el juez cumple su rol de garantizador del respeto de esos derechos, de contralor de la legalidad y constitucionalidad de las actuaciones de los sujetos encargados de la investigación –Ministerio Público y policía judicial–…El juez en la etapa de investigación y en la fase intermedia, por muy deslegitimado que esté, por lo que sucede en la práctica, su rol, está para controlar y garantizar la legalidad de las actuaciones en esta etapa, para valorar y ponderar razonadamente las solicitudes que se le formulen y nunca como un simple espectador que está dispuesto a autorizar todo lo que se le solicite, manteniéndose al margen de su procedencia, porque ello sería simplemente abandonar el sentido y justificación de la función jurisdiccional en un Estado de Derecho, que encuentra precisamente en el proceso penal, en la sede por excelencia del ejercicio del poder represivo estatal, su más prístina razón de ser. La Constitución Política y el Código Procesal Penal apuestan por el juez contralor, garante y bastión del respeto a los derechos fundamentales de todos los ciudadanos, comprometidos siempre cuando se trata de una investigación penal y sólo mediante el ejercicio razonado y de conformidad con los parámetros expuestos, se puede validar la autorización jurisdiccional para lesionar un derecho fundamental. No basta pues, que haya intervención jurisdiccional, este es uno de los requisitos constitucionalmente exigidos y el primer paso para considerar la legitimación formal de la autorización. Ese juez debe cumplir con los otros requisitos, debe razonar, exponer cómo y por qué la medida se justifica, es necesaria, es idónea, es proporcional al fin que se pretende y cuáles son los márgenes en que la autorización se concede, requisitos puntualizados en las normas constitucionales antes citadas y, en el caso del allanamiento, especialmente de la relación de los artículos 9, 11, 28 párrafo segundo, 23, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política y 195 del Código Procesal Penal…" [el resaltado no pertenece al original]. V) En el caso concreto, tratándose de investigaciones por el delito de tráfico de drogas, la protección de la salud de todas las personas es objeto de interés público. En este sentido, el artículo 1° de la Ley General de Salud (Ley n° 5395) establece: "La salud de la población es un bien de interés público tutelado por el Estado", mientras que el último párrafo del artículo 2 de la Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Drogas de Uso No Autorizado y Actividades Conexas (Ley n° 8204) refiere: "…Es función del Estado, y se declara de interés público, la adopción de las medidas necesarias para prevenir, controlar, investigar, evitar o reprimir toda actividad ilícita relativa a la materia de esta Ley…". Por su parte, el Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales ("Protocolo de San Salvador", aprobado por la Ley n° 7907) prevé en su artículo 10: "1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la salud, entendida como el disfrute del más alto nivel de bienestar físico, mental y social. 2. Con el fin de hacer efectivo el derecho a la salud los Estados partes se comprometen a reconocer la salud como un bien público…". Ello se comprende, por los problemas que genera el tráfico ilícito de drogas, a partir del Preámbulo de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes y Sustancias Psicotrópicas (aprobada mediante la Ley nº 7198), que refleja un interés general e internacional: "… Las partes en la presente Convención: Profundamente preocupados por la magnitud y la tendencia creciente de la producción, la demanda y el tráfico ilícitos de estupefacientes y sustancias psicotrópicas, que representan una grave amenaza para la salud y el bienestar de los seres humanos y menoscaban las bases económicas, culturales y políticas de la sociedad. Profundamente preocupadas por la sostenida y creciente penetración en diversos grupos sociales del tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes y sustancias psicotrópicas, con el peligro de incalculable gravedad que ello encierra…" [el resaltado no pertenece al original]. De igual manera, la Convención Única sobre Estupefacientes (aprobada por la Ley N° 4544) señala en su Preámbulo: "Las Partes: Preocupadas por la salud física y moral de la humanidad…Reconociendo que la toxicomanía constituye un mal grave para el individuo y entraña un peligro social y económico para la humanidad…"; idea que también recoge en su Preámbulo el Convenio de Viena sobre Sustancias Psicotrópicas (aprobado en virtud de la Ley n° 4990). Este interés social y estatal en la protección de la salud pública puede justificar, en definitiva, la injerencia en el derecho a la intimidad del domicilio. VI) Sin embargo, la sola existencia de una investigación penal en materia de tráfico de drogas no basta para limitar aquel derecho. La Constitución Política de Costa Rica, a través de la relación de sus artículos 23 y 24, garantiza el derecho a la intimidad domiciliar calificándolo como inviolable, pero prevé de forma expresa en la primera de las disposiciones mencionadas la posibilidad de limitar este derecho mediante un allanamiento: "…por orden escrita de juez…" –acorde a las exigencias del artículo 195 del Código Procesal Penal– "…o para impedir la comisión o impunidad de delitos, o evitar daños graves a las personas o a la propiedad…" –para los supuestos de allanamiento sin orden jurisdiccional contenidos en el artículo 197 del Código Procesal Penal–. Por consiguiente, las razones de interés general u orden público que justifican la restricción al derecho a la intimidad del domicilio que viene exigida por la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos se concretan en el artículo 193, en relación con el artículo 190 al cual debe entenderse remite aquél, ambos del Código Procesal Penal. Dice el segundo de ellos: "Artículo 190.- Registro de vehículos. …podrán registrar un vehículo, siempre que haya motivos suficientes para presumir que una persona oculta en él objetos relacionados con el delito…" [el resaltado no pertenece al original]; mientras que la primera refiere: "Allanamiento y registro de morada. Cuando el registro deba efectuarse en un lugar habitado, en sus dependencias, casa de negocio u oficina, el allanamiento y registro será realizado personalmente por el juez…" [el resaltado no pertenece al original]. De ello deriva que las exigencias que motivan el registro de un vehículo son las mismas que podrían justificar el ingreso y registro de una vivienda: la existencia de razones o elementos suficientes para presumir que en dicho lugar se hallan objetos relacionados con el delito que en concreto se investiga por el Ministerio Público. VII) En estos supuestos conflictivos el derecho a la intimidad domiciliar cede ante el interés estatal en la protección de la salud pública mediante la persecución de conductas ilícitas que atenten contra ésta, en cumplimiento de sus obligaciones –de medios, no de resultados– de prevenir, investigar, procesar y sancionar esos comportamientos que atentan contra bienes jurídicos cuya referencia imprescindible viene constituida por los derechos humanos reconocidos en el ordenamiento jurídico. Sin embargo, la necesidad de esa restricción (consistente en el ingreso al domicilio y afectación del derecho a la intimidad), como se ha indicado, debe demostrarse en una resolución jurisdiccional, de manera que el allanamiento de la vivienda en el caso concreto constituya un medio idóneo en la prevención, investigación, procesamiento y eventual punición del tráfico ilícito de drogas en protección de la salud pública, resulte proporcional a la naturaleza del delito investigado y a los indicios existentes acerca de la posible ubicación en el lugar habitado de objetos relacionados con ese delito, y que no existe otra alternativa menos gravosa que la irrupción en el domicilio. Todo ello integra y se resume en el requisito contemplado en el inciso d) del artículo 195 del Código Procesal Penal: "El motivo del allanamiento". VIII) Por lo anterior, esta Sala de oficio observa que la orden emanada del Juzgado Penal de Golfito para allanar las viviendas de [Nombre18] . . . y [Nombre15] . . ., constituyó un acto procesal defectuoso de carácter absoluto, pues al no contener fundamento alguno inobservó los derechos y garantías de las personas, contenidos en toda la normativa analizada con antelación y relacionada con las funciones estatales de respetar y garantizar el derecho a la intimidad del domicilio exento de injerencias arbitrarias. Por ello, los elementos de prueba que derivaron del ingreso y registro arbitrario e ilícito de las viviendas de las imputadas –aunque de la de [Nombre19] . . no se extrajera elemento de interés alguno para el Ministerio Público– en ningún caso podrían haber sido utilizados para fundamentar la sentencia del a-quo. Ello de conformidad con los artículos 1, 175, 178 inciso a) y 181 párrafo primero del Código Procesal." (SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE, voto Nº 674 de las 10:10 horas del 19 de julio de 2006; ver también en este mismo sentido los votos Nº 917 de las 10 horas del 21 de setiembre de 2001, Nº 1275 de las 9:35 horas del 7 de noviembre de 2005, Nº 165 de las 9:30 horas del 11 de marzo de 2005, Nº 70 de las 8:45 horas del 11 de febrero de 2005 y Nº 139 de las 8:50 horas del 4 de marzo de 2005). Por último, es importante hacer notar que en este caso tampoco se estaba ante ninguna de las hipótesis en las que la normativa permite la realización de este tipo de diligencias sin la existencia de una resolución previa que lo así ordenare, para justificar de esta manera la forma en la que se procedió. En otras palabras, no se estaba ante alguna de las hipótesis o circunstancias previstas en el artículo 197 del Código Procesal Penal ... Por otro lado conviene aclarar que en el pasado existió una polémica entre las Sala Tercera y Constitucional acerca de la cuestión que aquí se analiza, pues mientras aquella ha insistido en la necesidad de que exista orden de allanamiento previa y escrita, ésta más bien a apuntado que la misma no se requiere cuando se cuenta con la presencia del juez de garantías. No obstante, la jurisprudencia constitucional (vinculante erga omnes) al final de cuentas precisó su posición, al reiterar que no era necesaria esa orden escrita, pero -eso sí- haciendo la salvedad de que sí resulta indispensable que en todos los casos el juez fundamente por escrito (a efectos de ejercer los respectivos controles por parte de los sujetos que se puedan ver afectados en sus derechos fundamentales) las razones que mediaron para haber adoptado la decisión de practicar el allanamiento. Dicha fundamentación hasta podría cumplirse oralmente al verificarse el ingreso, siempre y cuando la misma se haga constar por escrito. En este sentido se indicó lo siguiente: “... En efecto, con la puesta en vigencia de un sistema procesal penal de corte netamente acusatorio, el juez deja de participar como investigador durante el proceso y se le asigna una labor de protector de la regularidad -en especial de la regularidad constitucional- del trámite, de manera que su presencia e intervención es exigida en ciertos casos, pero ya no con el fin de dirigir la investigación como en el modelo inquisitorio, sino como vigilante de que el ejercicio de la autoridad estatal se ejecute dentro de los parámetros constitucionales y legales fijados y se lleve a cabo sin abuso de poder. Para la Sala, es justa y precisamente ello lo que quiso el Constituyente y el papel que, de acuerdo con la mejor doctrina sobre derechos fundamentales, debe cumplir la garantía fijada en el artículo 23 de la Constitución Política. Ello sin duda se cumple a cabalidad si se cuenta con la presencia del juez en los allanamientos de domicilio, pero siempre y cuando obviamente su participación como se dijo, lo sea no como integrante del cuerpo investigador, sino como sujeto procesal que controla de forma estricta el balance entre los derechos de los ciudadanos y las actuaciones de las autoridades estatales encargadas de la investigación y producción de elementos probatorios. En consecuencia, pierde la relevancia que una vez tuvo la exigencia de una orden escrita, porque con ella se pretendía restringir la posibilidad de acción (y de exceso en la actuación) de las autoridades administrativas, al someterlas a las condiciones y límites que un juez les señalara por escrito, circunstancia ésta que ahora queda ampliamente cubierta si dicha orden es suplida por la propia presencia activa del juez durante la ejecución del acto. Ahora bien, las razones con base en las que esta Sala tiene como válida esa suplencia, exigen a su vez de forma ineludible que la voluntad de autorización del juez se manifieste de manera clara y expresa, no solamente en sus actos y participación necesariamente protagónica y no pasiva, sino también, que se haga constar en el acta o constancia de actuación que debe levantarse en relación con el acto efectuado. Al efecto, la oralidad que priva en nuestro actual sistema procesal penal, hace que la motivación de los actos se lleve a cabo no de la forma tradicional mediante la escritura, sino que se realiza en forma oral justificando con palabras suficientes, explicando y dando razones que ameritan la actuación y con una actitud consonante con esa voluntad; ese cambio sin embargo, no debe servir para que se eluda la obligación de motivar las actuaciones y procurar se plasmen las razones en el proceso, en especial las que, como en este caso, tienen que ver con la posibilidad de lesionar lícitamente un derecho constitucional. V.- La Sala consultante señala su duda sobre la validez de una interpretación como la expuesta que desatiende el valor de la orden escrita previa, frente al nuevo régimen procesal penal, que establece reglas muy precisas al respecto. Sin embargo, queda claro de lo que viene expuesto que desde la perspectiva de esta Sala, para el Derecho de la Constitución la intervención personal del juez -posible u obligatoria- es por sí misma suficiente para suplir las exigencias plasmadas en la Constitución, sin que se requiera además una orden escrita previa emanada por el propio juez. Cabe indicar entonces que será suficiente para efectos de enervar la inviolabilidad del domicilio ya sea la existencia de orden escrita del juez competente en los casos en que pueda válidamente delegarse su actuación, o bien su participación personal. Ahora bien, para efectos del respeto al debido proceso, es indudable que, sea mediante orden escrita previa o mediante su participación directa e inmediata, la intervención del juez y su autorización deben incluir una motivación –no se exige fundamentación del acto, sino su motivación, sea que debe tener un motivo fundado, una razón para darse- que pueda ser validada por las demás autoridades judiciales que intervengan en el proceso. Esto resulta de la máxima importancia porque si tal motivación falta, es evidente que, en concordancia con las reglas del debido proceso derivadas del artículo 39 Constitucional la prueba se convierte en ilegítima y no podría servir de fundamento para una decisión. VI.- En conclusión, a criterio de la Sala se cumple la exigencia constitucional establecida en el artículo 23 de la Constitución Política, y se respetan los principios constitucionales del debido proceso en lo que a la inviolabilidad del domicilio se refiere, cuando la falta de orden escrita de juez competente en una diligencia de allanamiento es suplida por la participación de forma personal y activa por parte del juez penal en dicho acto. Tal actuación debe ser necesariamente motivada según las circunstancias de hecho y de derecho relevantes al caso y más aún tratándose de la afectación de un derecho constitucional. Además, esa motivación debe ser realizada por el juez de garantías de modo que no quede duda de ella y que pueda ser sometida a análisis y revisión por parte de las autoridades judiciales a quienes competa tal función, ya que la omisión o clara insuficiencia de dicha motivación conlleva la ilegitimidad de lo actuado. Corresponde a la Sala consultante constatar lo ocurrido en el caso concreto y resolver lo pertinente de conformidad con lo aquí expuesto ...”, Sala Constitucional, voto Nº 4672-03 del 28 de mayo de 2003. Del estudio del presente caso se tiene que, según se indicó, la orden de allanamiento de folios 37 y siguientes no incorpora ningún tipo de fundamentación por parte de la jueza penal de Grecia, siendo que tal omisión tampoco se suplió en el acta de allanamiento practica de folios 51 y siguientes, donde simplemente se describen las actuaciones materiales que se llevaron a cabo en cumplimiento de la orden emitida. Consecuentemente, de conformidad con lo que se ha indicado, la diligencia de allanamiento practicada en la vivienda de habitación de la aquí imputada, está viciada y como tal no podía ni puede ser tomada en cuenta para sustentar un fallo condenatorio como se hizo, toda vez que al emitirse y ejecutarse se quebrantó uno de los derechos fundamentales que se encuentran contemplados en la Constitución Política. Además, se llega a esta conclusión independientemente de que la ahora sentenciada hubiese aceptado acogerse al procedimiento abreviado, pues la normativa procesal y la propia jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional exigen que la sentencia que se dicte bajo esta modalidad procedimental tiene que estar debidamente motivada. Sobre este aspecto, ha dicho la jurisprudencia de este contralor constitucional que: "(...) en caso de dictarse resolución condenatoria en el proceso abreviado, esa manifestación de voluntad de aceptación de los hechos sí puede ser tenida como elemento probatorio. La restricción de esta práctica en el derecho procesal penal se sustenta en el peligro de imponer una sanción privativa de libertad mediando una confesión de una persona cuya voluntad está viciada por violencia o ignorancia, pero la fuerte supervisión jurisdiccional que rodea el procedimiento abreviado -incluidos los medios de impugnación- es garantía suficiente para descartar ese riesgo. Además de que el dicho del encausado debe estar corroborado con otros elementos de convicción -peritajes, testigos, documentos-, que le hacen creíble al criterio del juez, los que deben ser analizados en su conjunto al momento de fundamentar el fallo condenatorio." (Sala Constitucional, No. 5867 de las 14:30 horas del 12 de julio de 2000). Esto significa que, unido a la observancia de los requisitos dispuestos por el legislador para tramitar la causa conforme a este tipo de procedimiento (v.gr. acuerdo entre defensa, imputado y Ministerio Público en torno a los hechos y a la pena, lo mismo que una aceptación libre por parte del justiciable de este acuerdo, etc.), el juzgador tiene que fundamentar la decisión con base en la prueba documental que existe en el expediente, prueba que debe ser necesariamente lícita, toda vez que el sistema de enjuiciamiento vigente se rige por el principio de legalidad. El procedimiento abreviado si bien constituye una renuncia a las complejidades del trámite ordinario, específicamente la realización del debate (con todos los principios y garantías que conlleva), esto no significa que se renuncia por igual a las exigencias y garantías que se reconocen en un Estado Democrático de Derecho, como lo son, entre otras, la debida acreditación de los hechos y participación de los acusados en estos, ello al dictarse la sentencia condenatoria, la que debe basarse en prueba obtenida legalmente. III.- No existe duda entonces de que en la causa se inobservó la normativa que regula el allanamiento a una vivienda o morada y de manera irregular la autoridad jurisdiccional procedió a su emisión y ejecución al quebrantar las formalidades o requisitos existentes para ello, sobre todo el deber de fundamentación. Estas formalidades o requisitos (formas en general) se han establecido como una garantía de que todo operador del Derecho no va a actuar de manera arbitraria o abusiva cuando le corresponda determinar la verdad real de los hechos que se investigan. No se trata en estos casos de un culto a la formalidad por la mera formalidad, sino de un reconocimiento de la formalidad como instrumento que permita hacer efectivos los derechos y las garantías que las personas gozan, por el solo hecho de ser tales. Bajo esta tesitura, según lo que se indicó, la actuación que aquí se cuestiona presenta un defecto procesal absoluto que obliga a la declaratoria de su nulidad, y cuyos efectos conllevan -a la vez- la ineficacia de toda la prueba que de esta diligencia se haya derivado, como lo dispone el artículo 175 de la normativa de rito citada, al establecer que: "No podrán ser valorados para fundar una decisión judicial ni utilizados como presupuestos de ella, los actos cumplidos con inobservancia de las formas y condiciones previstas en la Constitución, en el Derecho Internacional o Comunitario vigentes en Costa Rica y en este Código" (ver al respecto de la Sala Constitucional, el voto Nº 10115 de las 14:40 horas del 3 de agosto de 2005) ...", Tribunal de Casación Penal del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón, sección segunda, voto Nº 2007-00178 de las 12:15 horas del 23 de marzo de 2007.

II.- Así las cosas, por todo lo antes expuesto, siendo que, en lo esencial, los elementos de juicio más importantes que en este caso que nos ocupa le permitieron al Tribunal de instancia fundamentar la sentencia condenatoria, se originaron en un proceder que violentó las más elementales normas del debido proceso, lo cual a su vez conllevó el quebranto a derechos fundamentales contemplados en la Constitución Política y Tratados Internacionales (garantía de la privacidad del domicilio), lo que se impone en este caso, conforme lo estima la mayoría de esta Cámara, es declarar con lugar el procedimiento de revisión que formula la defensa y anular la sentencia y el juicio que le precedió. En efecto, del estudio del fallo de mérito se aprecia cómo, de manera esencial, la juzgadora cita en sustento de la condena los resultados probatorios positivos derivados de la diligencia de allanamiento viciada, así como la existencia de actuaciones policiales cumplidas en días previos a aquel en el cual se realizó dicho operativo final (en las cuales ni siquiera se contó con control jurisdiccional), relativas a las vigilancias y supuesta compras controladas de droga en el sitio. Ello significa que al eliminar todo lo relativo al allanamiento, el proceso quedó ayuno de prueba idónea para justificar y respaldar una condenatoria como la ordenada. Ahora bien, debido a que la prueba más importante y esencial que liga al sentenciado con el hecho resulta de la actividad defectuosa antes referida, sin que exista la posibilidad de que se introduzcan nuevos elementos de juicio que hagan variar la situación jurídica en la que nos encontramos, la mayoría de esta Cámara estima innecesario e improcedente reenviar el expediente para una nueva sustanciación, pues las probanzas que permanecen o se mantienen en este proceso no permiten acreditar -con la certeza suficiente- la responsabilidad penal que el Ministerio Público le endilgó al imputado [Nombre20] . ., por lo que conforme al numeral 416 párrafo 1º del Código Procesal Penal, procede resolver esta causa según la ley aplicable al caso. En este sentido, aun cuando en la sentencia se menciona que existen en el expediente informes policiales y actas de decomiso que dan cuenta de la supuesta existencia de compras controladas realizadas por la Policía de Control de Drogas, todas esas fueron anteriores a la realización del allanamiento cuya nulidad se decreta en esta resolución, tales elementos a lo sumo permitirían tener como probable la responsabilidad del acusado en la venta de drogas que se le atribuyó, pero se estima que estos elementos no cuentan con la fortaleza suficiente y necesaria, exigida por la normativa procesal, para establecer un juicio de certeza en cuanto a la existencia de esa actividad delictiva. No existen un registro gráfico en cuanto a las supuestas vigilancias que se hicieron a nivel puramente policial, el cual -en principio- hubiera permitido corroborar lo que se hizo constar en los informes policiales, ni se dieron intervenciones telefónicas que hicieran posible superar ese juicio de probabilidad de que se estaba ante una infracción a la ley de psicotrópicos. En otras palabras, una vez excluida del proceso la diligencia de allanamiento analizada (y todos los elementos de ella derivados), las probanzas restantes que se mencionan en la sentencia son insuficientes para desvirtuar el estado de inocencia que el ordenamiento jurídico reconoce a toda persona por el solo hecho de esa condición. Por lo dicho, en aplicación del principio universal in dubio pro reo se anula el fallo condenatorio impugnado y de una vez, en esta misma vía de revisión, se absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad al sentenciado [Nombre1] . . . por el delito de Infracción a la Ley de Psicotrópicos en su modalidad de venta agravada de "crack" a los consumidores, cometido en perjuicio de la salud pública por el que se encuentra descontando una pena de prisión, el cual le acusó el Ministerio Público. En virtud de ello, si otra causa no lo impide, se ordena su inmediata libertad por esta causa. Se resuelve el asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas. El Tribunal de instancia deberá velar por la efectiva cancelación del correspondiente asiento de inscripción en el Registro Judicial, así como la exclusión de la reseña (si la hubiera) en el Archivo Criminal generada a raíz de esta investigación (cfr. voto de la Sala Constitucional Nº 5802-99 de las 15:36 horas del 27 de julio de 1999, entre otros). El Juez Guillermo Sojo Picado salva el voto y declara sin lugar la demanda de revisión.

III.- VOTO SALVADO DEL JUEZ [Nombre7] : El suscrito, Guillermo Sojo Picado, se aparta del voto de mayoría y estimo que los reclamos deben ser declarados sin lugar, y por ende el procedimiento de revisión presentado. Debe precisarse que la sentencia que se solicita revisar fue dictada mediante un procedimiento abreviado, lo cual significa que a través de dicho procedimiento de prescinde del juicio oral y público, esto con la aquiescencia del imputado y de su defensor. Dicho procedimiento permite que en el caso de mediar acuerdo con el Ministerio Público, el actor civil y el querellante (si los hubiere), el imputado recibe como beneficio la imposición de una pena más favorable, pudiendo fijársele una sanción hasta un tercio por debajo del mínimo legal que se contemple en el tipo penal respectivo. De tal modo que si el imputado [Nombre20] . ., como sucede en el caso concreto, debidamente asesorado por su defensor, aceptó de modo libre someterse a dicho procedimiento abreviado, tal y como se consigna en el acta respectiva de la audiencia preliminar visible a folios 182 y 183, no es posible ahora mediante este procedimiento de revisión pretender la nulidad del fallo condenatorio. En efecto, según se aprecia al folio 182 vuelto citado, claramente se consigna que el defensor (Lic. Esteban Amador Garita) le señaló al Juzgado Penal que el sindicado estaba dispuesto a someterse a un procedimiento abreviado con una pena de 7 años de prisión, e inclusive al justiciable se le explicaron los alcances y consecuencias de la aplicación de dicho procedimiento. En este sentido existen algunos antecedentes jurisprudenciales del Tribunal de Casación del Segundo Circuito Judicial, pudiendo citarse el voto [Telf1] de las once horas con cuarenta minutos del veintidós de setiembre de dos mil tres, el cual se comparte, al indicarse lo siguiente: "En el presente asunto, D.A.Q. fue declarado autor del delito de «Tenencia de droga con fines de tráfico», cometido en perjuicio de La Salud Pública, por el que se le impuso una pena de tres años y cuatro meses de prisión, a través de un procedimiento abreviado. Sobre este procedimiento especial, la Sala Constitucional, por resolución N° 4864 de las 15:27 horas del 8 de julio de 1998, indicó que el procedimiento abreviado previsto en los artículos 373 a 375 del CPP no es contrario a la Constitución Política, y en atención a dicho precedente este Tribunal de Casación también ha señalado que «En dicho fallo, cuya autoridad es de carácter vinculante erga omnes por disposición de ley, la Sala Constitucional no omite considerar que este procedimiento especial se caracteriza por la «prescindencia de la celebración del juicio oral y público, a cambio de la posibilidad para el imputado de recibir una sanción penal más favorable», y como el juicio es la fase esencial del proceso ordinario (que se realiza sobre la base de la acusación, en forma oral, pública, contradictoria y continua, según el artículo 326 del CPP), resulta que en el procedimiento abreviado, al prescindir del juicio «...se renuncia a ejercer el derecho al contradictorio por parte del imputado» (Tribunal de Casación Penal, N° 005-F-99 de las 9:30 horas del 15 de enero de 1999), particularmente respecto a la determinación de los hechos que se le atribuyen, ya que estos han sido admitidos por el imputado (el imputado que rechaza los hechos no debe consentir la aplicación del procedimiento abreviado) y su existencia se corroboró además por la consideración de otros elementos de prueba [...] De ahí que no sea atendible el presente reparo porque la determinación de los hechos se deriva esencialmente de que el imputado los admitió según fueron descritos en la acusación (la admisión del hecho vino a dar unidad lógica al elenco de pruebas), circunstancias todas que admitió libremente el imputado, con la asesoría letrada de su defensor, quienes tuvieron la iniciativa de solicitar la aplicación del procedimiento abreviado [...] Así, pues, se debe declarar sin lugar el reclamo, en tanto que la participación del imputado en el hecho investigado se deriva lógicamente de la prueba, esencialmente de la admisión de hechos que libremente hizo el imputado, dentro del espectro de posibilidades que le ofrece la legislación procesal penal, con la asesoría de su defensor técnico y la conformidad del Ministerio Público, sin que se aprecie defecto alguno que justifique la anulación pretendida por el CED2 , ° de las 11:30 horas del 3 de abril de 2003). En el presente asunto el encartado, en el libre ejercicio de su derecho de defensa, con la asistencia de su defensor técnico, así como clara y expresamente advertido por la autoridad judicial, optó por admitir el hecho que se le atribuye en la acusación y consintió en la aplicación del procedimiento abreviado, lo que evidencia la correspondiente acta de la audiencia preliminar, que en lo que interesa dice: «Efectuada la lectura [integral de la acusación] ambas partes comunican al Juez que han llegado a un acuerdo preliminar para solicitar la aplicación de un Procedimiento Abreviado de conformidad a lo establecido en el artículo 373 del Código Procesal Penal. Así las cosas, la señora Juez procede a preguntar al imputado si es su libre voluntad someterse al procedimiento abreviado, contestando éste afirmativamente; pregunta al imputado si comprenden los hechos que se le acusan y le advierte que tiene derecho a que se le aclare cualquier duda, contestando el imputado que han entendido la acusación. La señora Juez de seguido explica al imputado que el proceso abreviado implica que a partir de una aceptación de los cargos ya leídos por el Ministerio Público, y de la aceptación de los mismos por parte del imputado, se prescinde de efectuar el debate, y en virtud además de existir pacto respecto a la pena a imponer, informa además la juez que la pena puede incluso reducirse en un tercio de la pena mínima prevista para el delito que se acusa, y se le informa que concretamente la pena para el delito de Tenencia de droga con fines de Tráfico es de cinco a quince años de prisión, la cual quedaría a 3 años y 4 meses de prisión reducido a un tercio (artículo 61 de la ley de psicotrópicos números 7786. Se le informa además que la consecuencia del pacto sería aplicación de la pena acordada entre las partes, sin la realización del juicio oral, siendo tarea restante del Tribunal de Juicio constatar la responsabilidad de ustedes como acusados, y que se cumpla con los requisitos que demandan las leyes pertinentes. Y se le reitera cuáles con los elementos probatorios que existen en autos para sustentar la existencia de la comisión del hecho delictivo acusado y su participación en el mismo, como autores responsables del ilícito descrito en el acusación. La señora Juez solicita al imputado que tome en consideración tanto la fundamentación como la prueba que solicita el Ministerio Público para que se reciba en el debate a saber: testimonial, visible a folio 97 y la documental de folio 96 y 97. La cual le fue leída al imputado en presencia de su defensor. Tanto el señor Fiscal como el defensor y el imputado informan que la pena pactada en el delito de Tenencia de droga con fines de Tráfico es de cinco a quince años de prisión, la cual quedaría a tres años cuatro meses de prisión reducido a un tercio [...] Acto seguido se le advierte al encartado que tiene el derecho de no declarar y si así lo decidiera hacer todo lo que diga puede ser utilizado tanto en su beneficio como en su contra, por lo que se le pregunta si está dispuesto admitir el hecho que se les atribuye el cual ya se le pudo en conocimiento, y manifiesta que sí lo admite tal y como se encuentra en la acusación además de que consiente la aplicación del procedimiento solicitado, indicando que no desea dar mayor declaración sobre los hechos. El Juez resuelve que habiéndose así cumplido con lo establecido en los artículos 373 y 374 del Código Procesal Penal se aprueba la solicitud de Procedimientos Abreviado aplicado al señor [Nombre21] , con el acuerdo de una pena de TRES AÑOS CUATRO MESES DE PRISION, ordenándose la remisión del expediente al Tribunal de Juicio para lo que corresponda de conformidad a lo establecido en el artículo 375 del Código de Procedimientos Penales» (acta, folios 120 a 122). Conforme a la jurisprudencia supra citada, no viene al caso que ahora pretenda contradecir la prueba de cargo, cuando él, en el libre ejercicio de su derecho de defensa, renunció al contradictorio y admitió el hecho que se le atribuyó, lo que se reitera en este otro precedente jurisprudencial: «El segundo aspecto a señalar, es que cuando el imputado solicita el abreviado y negocia la pena con el acusador, acepta la prueba de cargo que ofrece el Ministerio Público, y renuncia a discutirla en la audiencia preliminar y en la fase de debate, se convalidan los defectos que pudiera contener, como es el caso de los que ahora el imputado reclama. Ha externado en ese sentido este Tribunal que " Su voluntad y silencio, evitando el contradictorio, legitimó, plenamente, la actuación de las autoridades de policía. Si tanto el accionante, como su defensor, admitieron, sin ningún reparo, la prueba que sustentaba la acusación, manifestando su acuerdo con la sanción que se les impuso, resulta contrario a la lealtad procesal que debe imperar en cualquier proceso, que posteriormente formulen una objeción que con su silencio avalaron plenamente. Si renunció al contradictorio, escenario procesal propicio para discutir la prueba; si su contenido tampoco se objetó en la audiencia preliminar o durante el desarrollo del proceso, no es admisible que después de dictar un fallo en el que estuvo de acuerdo el acusado, este formule, posteriormente, una serie de objeciones que debió plantear oportunamente y frente a las que guardó absoluto silencio, convalidando su inacción, las eventuales informalidades que ahora acusa." (Sentencia 2003-497, redacción del Juez [Nombre22], hay voto salvado de la Jueza [Nombre23])...»(CED3 , ° de las 9:40 horas del 26 de junio de 2003, jueces Salazar Murillo –redactor-, [Nombre24] y [Nombre25] ). Por todo lo dicho la determinación del "hecho acreditado" en la sentencia no carece de fundamento probatorio legítimo, sino que se deriva directamente y de modo independiente de la admisión que hizo el propio encartado sobre su existencia, a lo que puede agregarse que su dicho se ve corroborado por las pruebas documentales relativas a la actividad previa al allanamiento que cuestiona la defensa, como son los informes policiales que describen la investigación efectuada y sus resultados, las actas de marcación de billetes, de entrega de billetes para la compra de droga, de recibido de droga adquirida, por ejemplo. Por todo lo dicho se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación por la forma interpuesto por la defensa" ( la transcripción es fiel al original) En el caso concreto al momento de aceptarse el procedimiento abreviado no sólo se manifestó conformidad con el convenio y la pena, sino también con la acusación y las pruebas que le sirven de sustento, no siendo ahora atendible la gestión que se plantea. En segundo lugar, el artículo 195 del Código Procesal Penal, cuando se refiere a las formalidades del allanamiento, indica que la resolución que ordena dicha diligencia debe contener los siguientes requisitos: a- El nombre y cargo del funcionario que autoriza el allanamiento y la identificación del procedimiento en el cual se ordena. b- La determinación concreta del lugar o los lugares que habrán de ser registrados. c- El nombre de la autoridad que habrá de practicar el registro, en el caso de que la diligencia se delegue en el Ministerio Público o en la policía. d) El motivo de allanamiento. d) La hora y fecha en que deba practicarse la diligencia. Los anteriores requisitos se cumplen en el caso de la resolución cuestionada pues claramente se indica que se está llevando a cabo por la Fiscalía de Puntarenas una investigación, según la cual se tiene noticia por las autoridades que en la casa a allanar se estaba dando una venta de drogas. Igualmente se dan detalles del modo como se llevaba a cabo la venta de drogas, así como de la existencia de varias compras controladas que se realizaron para evidenciar el indicado negocio. La resolución de allanamiento también identifica la vivienda en que se habrá de realizar el mismo, y las autoridades que habrán de participar en el acto. Con respecto al requisito del "motivo" del allanamiento, es preciso señalar que la orden que solicita el Fiscal, quien también informa del asunto con base en los datos que al respecto le suministra la PCD , de tal manera que cuando el numeral 195 del Código Procesal Penal en su inciso d) menciona que debe contener el "motivo" hace referencia no a que la resolución deba ser fundamentada de modo amplio, tal y como es necesario en una resolución en que ya el juzgador debe emitir un criterio (siendo aplicable en esta hipótesis el numeral 142 del Código Procesal Penal). Para expedir la orden de allanamiento dada su naturaleza, considerando que por lo general se ordena al inicio de la investigación a cargo del fiscal, es suficiente que la información suministrada al juzgador en ese momento sea confiable, y sea efectivamente acompañada de elementos que sugieran que en efecto se está ante un probable hecho delictivo. El juzgador debe valorar ese extremo y cumplir entre otros aspectos, tales como que existan suficientes indicios comprobados de estarse en presencia de un delito, y que justifique el ingreso al domicilio, y que también esa medida sea necesaria para la investigación. Aspectos como la proporcionalidad, y en general una ponderación razonada que suministre el motivo para decretar la orden de allanamiento. En el caso concreto no se observa que tales aspectos no fuesen considerados por la Jueza Penal al momento de decretar la medida. Lo anterior según se dijo en el tanto se tienen los informes en ese sentido de la venta de drogas y se acompaña la gestión con las actas de las compras controladas, lo que hace justificable la medida acordada. Con respecto a ello, no procede anular o dejar sin efecto las pruebas que fueron recopiladas en esa diligencia de allanamiento, como se reclama. Al considerar este juez de Casación la validez de la citada orden, la pruebas recopiladas como resultado de la misma también permanecen. En consecuencia, se desestiman los motivos de revisión que se plantean por el sentenciado. Por ende, procede a declarar la gestión de revisión que se formula.

POR TANTO:

Por mayoría, se declara con lugar la solicitud de revisión que presenta el sentenciado [Nombre20] . . en ejercicio de su derecho material de defensa. En virtud de ello, se anula la sentencia condenatoria dictada en contra de [Nombre1] . . ., por el delito de venta agravada de drogas cometido en perjuicio de la sala pública. Asimismo, en aplicación del principio universal in dubio pro reo, en esta misma vía de revisión se le absuelve de toda pena y responsabilidad por este ilícito. En virtud de ello, si otra causa no lo impide, se ordena su inmediata libertad por esta causa. Se resuelve el asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas. El Tribunal de instancia deberá velar por la efectiva cancelación del correspondiente asiento de inscripción en el Registro Judicial, así como la exclusión de la reseña (si la hubiera) en el Archivo Criminal generada a raíz de esta investigación. El Juez Guillermo Sojo Picado salva el voto y declara sin lugar la demanda de revisión. NOTIFÍQUESE.

Mario Alberto Porras Villalta Martín Alfonso Rodríguez Miranda Guillermo Sojo Picado Jueces de Casación Penal Solicitud de revisión Causa por tráfico de drogas c/ [Nombre1] . . .

of/ la salud pública