Conviction for Concussion and Embezzlement in the Seasonal Work Card ProgramCondena por concusión y peculado en el programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional

Res: 2003-00176 **THIRD CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at seventeen hours twenty minutes on the twentieth of March two thousand three.

Appeal in cassation, filed in this case against F, of legal age, married twice, Doctor of Law, former Minister of Labor and Social Security, bearer of identity card […], J, of legal age, married, attorney, […] and M, of legal age, married, Costa Rican, […], for the crimes of CONCUSSION AND EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO) IN ITS CONTINUING OFFENSE MODALITY, to the detriment of THE DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE AND NICARAGUAN MIGRANTS. Participating in the decision on the appeal are Magistrates Daniel González Alvarez, Presiding, Jesús Alberto Ramírez Quirós, Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Rodrigo Castro Monge, and José Manuel Arroyo Gutiérrez. Also participating are licensed attorneys Gloria Navas Montero, as private defender of the accused F and M; Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas in their capacity as private co-defenders of the accused J; Amira Suñol Ocampo, representative of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) as complainant on behalf of the State; Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), also acting as civil plaintiff on behalf of the State, as well as licensed attorneys Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público).

**Whereas:**

1- That by judgment No. 1-2000 at fifteen hours on the twenty-sixth of July two thousand, the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit resolved: "**THEREFORE:** By virtue of the foregoing, Articles 20, 36, 39, 41 and 185 of the Political Constitution, Votes of the Fourth Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 2932-99, 4397-99 and 5875-99; 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 75, 77, 111, 113, 114, 115, 119, 128, 141, 142, 143, 182, 184, 244, 265, 266, 267, 336, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 376, 464, Transitional Provision I and Transitional Provision II of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 1, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 30, 31, 45, 49, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 71, 73, 74, 77, 103, 106, 330, 346, 352, 356, 358, 359 and 363 of the Penal Code; 122, 124 and 125 of the 1941 Penal Code on Applicable Rules of Civil Liability according to Law No. 4891 of November 8, 1971; 692 and 693 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 1045, 1046 and 1251 of the Civil Code; Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) No. 7428; Law on Foundations No. 5338; General Law of Public Administration No. 6227; Law on Financial Administration of the Republic No. 1279; Law on Administrative Contracting No. 7494; Framework Law for Institutional Transformation No. 7668; Code of Tax Standards and Procedures; Executive Decrees (Decretos Ejecutivos) No. 20307-J, No. 24432; No. 24811, No. 25647 and No. 26430, it is RESOLVED: F is ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the crime of ILLEGAL EXACTION (EXACCION ILEGAL) attributed to him as committed to the detriment of the DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE, by virtue of the statute of limitations having applied to the criminal action; with the State bearing the costs of the proceedings. F is ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the crime of IDEOLOGICAL FALSEHOOD (FALSEDAD IDEOLOGICA) to the detriment of PUBLIC FAITH (FE PUBLICA); with the State bearing the costs of the proceedings. F is ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for ONE CRIME OF EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO) OF GOODS and TWO CRIMES OF EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO) OF SERVICES to the detriment of the DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE; with the State bearing the costs of the proceedings. F is ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the crimes of FRAUDULENT ADMINISTRATION (ADMINISTRACION FRAUDULENTA), BREACH OF DUTIES (INCUMPLIMIENTO DE DEBERES) and INCOMPATIBLE NEGOTIATIONS (NEGOCIACIONES INCOMPATIBLES) to the detriment of the FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA (FUNDACION PARA EL DESARROLLO HUMANO EN CENTROAMERICA) and the DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE; with the State bearing the costs of the proceedings. J is ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the crimes of FALSIFICATION OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT, USE OF A FALSE DOCUMENT, FRAUDULENT ADMINISTRATION (ADMINISTRACION FRAUDULENTA) and INCOMPATIBLE NEGOTIATIONS (NEGOCIACIONES INCOMPATIBLES) attributed to him to the detriment of PUBLIC FAITH (FE PUBLICA), the FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA (FUNDACION PARA EL DESARROLLO HUMANO EN CENTROAMERICA) and the DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE, with the State bearing the costs of the proceedings. M is ACQUITTED OF ALL PUNISHMENT AND LIABILITY for the crime of FALSIFICATION OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT, TWO CRIMES OF EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO) AND TWO CRIMES OF FRAUD (ESTAFA) attributed to her to the detriment of PUBLIC FAITH (FE PUBLICA), DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE and the STATE'S PATRIMONY, respectively, with the State bearing the costs of the proceedings. The following are DECLARED: F and J as co-perpetrators responsible for the crime of CONCUSSION (CONCUSION) to the detriment of the DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE and NICARAGUAN MIGRANTS. In this capacity, each is sentenced to EIGHT YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. M is declared as the responsible perpetrator of the CRIME OF EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO) IN ITS CONTINUING OFFENSE (ILICITO CONTINUADO) MODALITY and in this capacity is sentenced to SIX YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. Sentences that all shall serve in the penitentiary establishment determined by prison regulations, after credit for pre-trial detention served. They are sentenced to pay the procedural and personal costs of the proceedings. Register the verdict in the Judicial Registry. Remit the corresponding certified copies to the Sentence Enforcement Judge (Juez de Ejecución de la Pena) and the National Institute of Criminology, to whose order the convicts shall remain. They are sentenced to the penalty of special disqualification, for a term of eight years for F and J, and for a term of six years for M, regarding the obtaining of any public office or employment, for which purpose the relevant communication shall be made to the General Directorate of Civil Service, with the request that it be extended to State institutions not dependent on its regime, as well as to the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). The convicts are ordered to report and sign in at this Court on the fifteenth day of each month, starting today. Should the 15th fall on a non-business day, they must fulfill the obligation to sign in on the following business day. If they fail to comply with the above without just cause, they shall be declared in default (rebeldía) and their transfer to the corresponding prison center shall be ordered. The prohibition on leaving the country is ordered for the convicts, and the General Directorate of Migration and Aliens (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería), as well as all authorized border posts, are immediately ordered to be notified. As for the acquittals issued, any precautionary measures that had been ordered shall cease. As for the Civil Action for Damages (Acción Civil Resarcitoria), it is resolved as stated below, those claims on which no ruling is made being understood as denied. The Civil Action for Damages (Acción Civil Resarcitoria) brought by the State against co-defendants F and J is declared WITHOUT MERIT, which is resolved without special order as to costs; the exceptions of Lack of Action, Lack of Active Legal Standing (Legitimación ad causam activa) and Sine Actione Agit raised by the defense of civil defendant J being granted. The resolution being understood, insofar as the lawsuit was established based on the consequences of the crime of Concussion (Concusión). The Civil Action for Damages (Acción Civil Resarcitoria) brought by the State against defendant F is declared WITH MERIT, and he is sentenced in the abstract to repair the material damage and compensate for the losses caused to the State as a result of the crime of Embezzlement (Peculado) of Services that he committed. He is also sentenced to pay both sets of court costs. All items that shall be liquidated through the judgment enforcement procedure, before the appropriate court. The Civil Action for Damages (Acción Civil Resarcitoria) brought by the State against defendant M is declared WITH MERIT, regarding the civil consequences for the unlawful act of Embezzlement (Peculado) in its Continuing Offense (Delito Continuado) modality, and she is sentenced to pay, for material damage, the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED COLONES WITH NO CENTIMOS. She is sentenced to compensate for the respective losses, which will accrue from the finality of the judgment and will be liquidated through the judgment enforcement procedure. For personal costs, she is sentenced to pay the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE COLONES WITH NO CENTIMOS. The total of the sentencing amounts to ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE COLONES WITH NO CENTIMOS, a sum that must be paid by simple order of the Court; if she fails to do so, the interested party must resort to the corresponding civil court. The decree of seizure on the property of those civilly liable is not applicable. BY READING, NOTIFY. FS. ATTY. CARLOS SANCHEZ FERNANDEZ, ATTY. RODOLFO SOLIS TULLOCK, ATTY. ALEX VIQUEZ JIMENEZ (Sic).

2- That against the previous ruling, the following appeals in cassation were filed: appeal filed by licensed attorney Gloria Navas Montero: Licensed attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defender of the accused F, alleges a breach of due process, because the trial began without the presence of technical defense counsel for the defendant F. She considers that Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been violated, as well as articles 39 of the Political Constitution and 8, subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights. The appellant states that the sentencing body has incurred contradictory reasoning. She alleges that in this case, the rules of reasoning regarding a decisive element of judgment have been violated, namely the historical context in which the events of interest here occurred. Attorney Navas Montero alleges erroneous reasoning regarding F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of the action. She indicates that the principle in dubio pro reo was violated, and argues that in this case the rules of sound criticism were violated. She alleges a violation of substantive law, specifically Article 348 of the Penal Code, relating to the crime of concussion (concusión), and complains that in this case an error was made in fixing the sentence, as it is disproportionate to what has been proven. Regarding the appeal filed by defendant F. Exercising his right to material defense, the appellant alleges a breach of due process. Specifically, he considers that in this case the rules of concentration, continuity, immediacy, orality, and publicity have been violated. He considers that the trial court failed to observe the rules of sound criticism and incurred a lack of reasoning in the judgment, claims omitted or illegal reasoning, violation of the rules of sound criticism, and a breach of the principle of experience. He claims illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, breach of the principle of objectivity, and violation of the rules of sound criticism. He alleges illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and breach of the principles of sound criticism. He claims illegal reasoning and breach of the rules of sound criticism, illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and breach of the rules of sound criticism. He alleges illegal and contradictory reasoning, as well as breach of the principle in dubio pro reo, illegal reasoning, breach of the principles of sound criticism, and that the contested verdict is contradictory; he alleges illegal reasoning and arbitrary exclusion of evidence. He alleges illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence and violation of the rules of sound criticism, raises that in this case there has been a lack of reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence and breach of the rules of sound criticism. F alleges a lack of correlation between the accusation and the judgment, considers that fundamental evidence for his interests was not introduced. He alleges an erroneous application of substantive law, since Article 27 of the Penal Code was not applied; that Article 348 of the Penal Code could not be applied, since it was not proven that he acted with intent (dolo), and the appellant argues that Article 71 of the Penal Code was violated, since the penalty of eight years of imprisonment imposed on him is outside any parameter of proportionality. Regarding the appeal filed by licensed attorneys Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas on behalf of J: The appellants maintain that their client's signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was considered in the judgment as a preparatory act for the commission of the crime for which J was sanctioned. The private defenders of this defendant allege a lack of correlation between the accusation and the judgment. They claim a breach of due process in relation to the procedure followed by the Trial Court to issue the judgment. They allege a lack of reasoning, insofar as it would not explain why opening a checking account to manage the funds that FUNDEHCA received from charging migrants would be part of a perpetrator's plan. They argue that there is a defect of lack of reasoning concerning the existence of a close link between J and F. They question the reasoning of the trial court's assertion that J opened FUNDEHCA's checking account using a copy of a certification. It is claimed that it is not duly reasoned why J waited twelve business days to sign for the opening of the account, and it is argued that the friendship link between F and J is duly proven. It is alleged that the Trial Court's assertion that J was involved in the development of the seasonal work card program is improperly reasoned, nor is it reasoned how it is possible that he performed acts characteristic of perpetrating the crime of concussion (concusión). It is stated that it is not reasoned why what happened regarding the executive decrees (decretos ejecutivos) that regulated the seasonal work card program between 1995 and 1997 would entail criminal liability for J. They question the statement that J had a marked interest in FUNDEHCA intervening quickly in the collection for the seasonal work card. A lack of reasoning is claimed on several points, a lack of reasoning regarding why by October 6, 1997, J would have knowledge of the procedure to repeal Decree No. 24811-MTSS. They question the statement that J was aware of the illegality of charging migrants for granting the seasonal work card. They allege a lack of reasoning insofar as it does not explain why Article 16 of the Law on Financial Administration of the Republic is violated. They claim a lack of reasoning regarding why it was required that the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) endorse the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. They claim a lack of reasoning insofar as it would not be duly proven in the verdict. They allege a lack of reasoning insofar as it does not explain why the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had to be sent for endorsement by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). They question that it is not reasoned whether he signed the agreement with the authorization of FUNDEHCA's Board of Directors and whether he knew the terms of the agreement before signing it. J's representatives maintain that it has not been set forth how their client would have incurred in the abuses of office attributed to the former Minister of Labor and Social Security who appears here as an accused. They allege a breach of due process because the Trial Court would have attributed a generic responsibility to J for everything that occurred. They allege a lack of reasoning, considering it to be contradictory, insofar as it does not explain what the means used to determine the migrants to make the undue payment was. The reasoning of the Trial Court's assertion that J used funds that entered FUNDEHCA for his own benefit is questioned. They claim that the contested judgment was not reasoned as to how their client would have abused his capacities as a public official and thereby induced the migrants to make the undue payment. It is alleged that it does not explain why the agreement is illegal or why it had to be endorsed by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). They claim that a contradiction is incurred insofar as J is exonerated from liability for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) for the use of FUNDEHCA's assets, and then that same use is used to support the concussion (concusión). The problem of whether J forced or induced the migrants to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA is taken up again. They maintain that the assertion that the migrants were induced into error or deceived, believing that the money was paid to the Costa Rican Government, is not reasoned, and it is questioned whether the migrants were capable of understanding the compulsion. Regarding the appeal filed by licensed attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M: She alleges a lack of reasoning, for evaluating the respective evidence without following the guidelines of sound criticism, regarding the reason why M's alleged subordinates obeyed her. Regarding the appeal filed by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República): Licensed attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo maintains that the statute of limitations was erroneously applied in favor of F for the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). She questions that the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) was declared time-barred based on the premise that the first formal accusation was the defendant's investigative statement. She indicates that despite having proven abusive use by defendants F and J of FUNDEHCA's assets and funds, the trial court chose to acquit them of all responsibility and punishment for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) attributed to them, that substantive law was violated, she alleges a breach of Article 365 of the Penal Code, she alleges an erroneous application of substantive law, since M was acquitted for two crimes of fraud (estafa). Regarding the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público): Prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández allege contradictory reasoning in the acquittal of defendants F and J for the crimes of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles), as well as in the acquittal of F for the crime of breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes). They allege a lack of reasoning, as they consider it does not explain why subsuming the crimes of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles) and fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) into concussion (concusión) leads to an acquittal for the former. The appellant Prosecutors maintain that the acquittal of F and J for the crime of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles) lacks proper reasoning. They claim a breach of the rules of sound criticism when reasoning the acquittal of F for a crime of embezzlement (peculado) of services. They point out that there was a contradiction in the appealed judgment when explaining why the action to prosecute the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) was time-barred. They allege a lack of reasoning on why F's investigative statement, held on November 26, 1998, was taken as the first formal accusation of the charges for illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and embezzlement (peculado) of services. Regarding the appeal filed by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) in exercise of the civil action: Licensed attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), alleges a lack of reasoning, since the Trial Court considered that the funds collected by FUNDEHCA did not come from the State, but from a large number of migrants.

3- That a hearing was held at 8:50 hours on April 3, 2001.

4- That after completing the respective deliberation, the Chamber proceeded to hear the appeal.

5- That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Magistrate Arroyo Gutiérrez reports; and, **Considering:**

I.By judgment No. 1-2000, issued at 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2000, the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José resolved to declare F and J co-perpetrators responsible for the crime of concussion (concusión), committed to the detriment of the duties of public office and Nicaraguan migrants. For this crime, each of them was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and eight years of special disqualification from holding public office or employment. In that same verdict (which comprises in its entirety Volumes XVI and XVII of the case file), M was declared the responsible perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement (peculado), in its continuing offense (delito continuado) modality, committed to the detriment of the duties of public office, and for that reason, she was given a custodial sentence for a period of six years. Furthermore, in the cited resolution, F was acquitted of all liability and punishment for the crimes of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), embezzlement (peculado) of goods, embezzlement (peculado) of services (he was accused of two of these unlawful acts), fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta), breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes), and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles). Likewise, J was exonerated of criminal liability for the crimes of falsification of a private document, use of a false document, fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta), and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles). It should be added that in the aforementioned judgment, M was also acquitted of the crimes of falsification of a private document, embezzlement (peculado) (two of these punishable acts), and fraud (estafa) (two of these unlawful acts). Finally, it is necessary to note that the trial court declared the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the State against F and J without merit; the foregoing regarding the consequences derived from the crime of concussion (concusión). The civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed by the State against F was declared with merit, sentencing him in the abstract to repair the material damage and the losses caused by the crime of embezzlement (peculado) of services that the Court considers he committed, although it did not convict him criminally for that act (see folios 7632 and 7633 in Volume XVII). Likewise, the lawsuit for damages filed by the State against M was declared with merit, sentencing her to pay the sum of one hundred fifty-four thousand nine hundred colones with no centimos (¢154,900.00) for material damage, as well as another twenty-three thousand two hundred thirty-five colones with no centimos (¢23,235.00) for personal costs. Additionally, she was sentenced to compensate the State for the respective losses, the amount to be paid for that item to be determined in the judgment enforcement proceeding.

II.Against the verdict outlined in the previous Considering clause, seven appeals in cassation were filed, each filed by the following persons: 1) F in his capacity as defendant (Volume XVIII, folio 7696); 2) Amira Suñol Ocampo, representative of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), as complainant on behalf of the State (Volume XX, folio 8050); 3) Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) (Volume XX, folio 8081); 4) Gloria Navas Montero in her capacity as private defender of the accused F (Volume XX, folio 8256); 5) Gloria Navas Montero representing defendant M (Volume XX, folio 8108); 6) Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas in their capacity as private co-defenders of the accused J; regarding the appeal filed on behalf of the latter, it is recalled that this Chamber granted (see resolution 2000-01441 at 10:50 hours on December 15, 2000; folio 8859 of Volume XXII) the request made by the defense (see folio 8358 in volume XX) that the matter be heard and a ruling be issued only on the brief that appears from folio 8360 onward (which constitutes all of volume XXI of the case file); 7) Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), also acting as civil plaintiff on behalf of the State (Volume XXII, folio 8778).

III.Regarding the appeal filed on behalf of defendant F. Licensed attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defender of the accused F, bases her appeal in cassation, visible at folio 8256 in Volume XX, on several grounds. As a first claim, a breach of due process is alleged, because the trial began without the presence of technical defense counsel for the defendant F. She considers that Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been violated, as well as articles 39 of the Political Constitution and 8, subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights. She states that after the resignation of attorney William Guido Madriz as defender of the accused, she assumed his representation. She explains that she was unable to attend the first hearing, which was duly justified before the adjudicating body. She says that indeed the Court accepted her excuse, but made the mistake of granting the request of the accused F that he be temporarily represented by attorney José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal, at that time private defender of co-defendant J. She points out that attorney Madrigal Madrigal was clear in warning that he would only accept the co-defense, as there could potentially be conflicting interests between his client J and the accused F, in which case he would protect the interests of the former. She considers that it was equally wrong to allow those two defendants to defend themselves personally in the hearing of January 3, 2000. The argument is not admissible. In this case, no harm has been caused to F by the start of the trial without the presence of attorney Navas Montero. It can be seen at folio 6674 (Volume XV) that it was the appellant's own client who said he wanted to avoid delays and therefore asked attorney Madrigal Madrigal to assume his co-defense while attorney Navas Montero appeared. In that same section of the trial transcript, it is observed that attorney Madrigal Madrigal expressed surprise at the appointment, as he had prepared to represent the accused J, but – and this is what matters in the specific case – he accepted to take on the representation of F if he was guaranteed that he would do so only as co-defender, while attorney Navas Montero appeared, and if he was immediately separated from the co-defense should any conflict of interest arise between J and F. The latter said (see folio 6675 in the indicated Volume) that he could conduct his own defense along with a co-defender. Faced with that situation, the Court decided that attorney Madrigal Madrigal – who never refused to take on the role, but simply set conditions for doing so – would assume the co-defense of F, while attorney Gloria Navas Montero appeared. Thus, no breach of due process has occurred, because at the beginning of the trial, the aforementioned defendant was not found in a state of defenselessness. It was by decision of the accused himself that attorney Madrigal Madrigal was appointed as his co-defender. The same applies to what happened during the first hearing on January 3, 2000 (see folio 6680 in Volume XV), as the wishes of the defendant were again respected, who said that while the reading of the accusation continued, he would exercise his own defense. As can be seen, F's right of defense has never been limited, because at first, when he considered that he needed professional help, he was granted the one he requested. In the second case, when he considered that he could defend himself while the accusation was being read, his opinion was respected, based on the fact that he is a legal professional and therefore had sufficient knowledge to understand the content of the accusatory document and the complaint. His ability to exercise his defense at this stage of the trial is proven by the fact that he was able to make specific observations to prosecutor Max Chinchilla Fernández regarding what was said in the accusation, as recorded at folio 6678 (still in Volume XV of the case file).

In accordance with the foregoing, Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been violated, given that the right of the accused to have the legal assistance he requires has always been observed. Furthermore, the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 100 of the cited normative body have been applied, because when the exercise of an adequate defense has not been put at risk—as illustrated by the example of the authorization given for him to defend himself during the reading of the accusation—F was permitted to defend himself. In this line of thought, it must be said that Article 39 of the Constitution has also been respected, as the accused was given full opportunity to exercise his defense, and Article 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights has been respected, since he was allowed to have a co-defender of his choice (the case of attorney Madrigal Madrigal) as well as to defend himself personally, as provided in subsection d) of the indicated provision of that international instrument. By virtue of all the foregoing, it being evident that action was taken in accordance with what the defendant himself requested without leaving him unable to defend himself, this Chamber considers that no grievance was caused to F, and therefore, pursuant to Article 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this ground of the appeal must be declared without merit.

IV.As a second ground, the appellant states that the sentencing panel has incurred in contradictory reasoning. She indicates that it is not possible to convict her client as the perpetrator of the crime of concusión, if to do so the Tribunal had to base its ruling on facts it considered constitutive of other crimes—such as exacción ilegal, administración fraudulenta, negociaciones incompatibles, and incumplimiento de deberes—for which it acquitted him. She considers that Articles 1, 11, and 369(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been violated, as well as—indirectly—Article 348 of the Penal Code. The appellant says that the judging panel considered that by issuing and executing the decrees that established the charge for the seasonal work card (tarjeta de trabajo estacional), the crime of exacción ilegal was committed. She adds that if said charge was considered the source of the indicated crime and in relation to it the statute of limitations for the criminal action was deemed to have run, then that same charge could not be used to support the existence of the concusión. She says that if it is affirmed that this exacción ilegal generated by the decrees continued with the signing of the agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) and the Foundation for Human Development in Central America (hereinafter referred to as FUNDEHCA), then reference is being made to a single charge. In this sense, attorney Navas Montero maintains that the cooperation agreement cannot be considered independently to establish the concusión, since that single charge was constitutive of exacción ilegal and the action to pursue it was time-barred. Regarding the offense of administración fraudulenta, the challenger states that her client was absolved of liability for it, and this determination took into account that it could not be known where the funds that entered the foundation were directed; thus, she considers that if this cannot be established, then the elements of the concusión offense cannot be established either, as it would not be known if the charge was made for himself or for another person. Finally, she says it is a contradiction to consider that F's conduct falls within the assumptions of incumplimiento de deberes (Article 332 of the Penal Code) and negociaciones incompatibles (Article 347 of the Penal Code), offenses for which an acquittal was issued upon considering them subsumed into the concusión in this case, and then to use the facts considered constitutive of those crimes to support the existence of the one for which attorney Navas Montero's client was convicted.

V.Before resolving this claim, it is pertinent to summarize the events that the judging panel considers duly accredited. Beginning at folio 6923 in Volume XVI, the statement of proven facts begins, the following situations of interest being noteworthy: Faced with the social problem represented in 1995 by the presence of a large number of illegal migrants (especially Nicaraguans) in national territory, the Government of the Republic at that time developed a policy aimed at regularizing their situation and thus avoiding the collapse of various services (such as social security and education) that are transcendental for the country. Additionally, they sought to avoid formal accusations from the Government of Nicaragua, which threatened to denounce Costa Rica before international organizations for what it termed xenophobic treatment toward Nicaraguans in the country. In this context (see folios 6924 and 6925), the Seasonal Work Card Program (Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional) was created, with the aim of granting an identification document to migrants coming to work in Costa Rican territory, so they could be legally covered by all the services provided by the State. It is important to note that, according to folio 6925, the referred program was created by decree No. 24432-TSS-G, issued on January 25 (the ruling states it was in June, but this Chamber has had before it a copy of the official gazette and has been able to verify that the commented normative text was signed at Casa Presidencial in the month indicated here), 1995, published in Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 141 of July 26 of that year, which was signed by the then President of the Republic, also by the defendant F in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social Security, as well as by the Minister of Governance and Police at that time. Furthermore, it was by another act of the same nature—Executive Decree No. 24811-MTSS of December 1, 1995, published in Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 243 of December 22 of said year—that it was ordered to charge each migrant applying for the Seasonal Work Card the sum of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00), in order to cover the cost involved in granting said document (the above is recorded at folio 6926); this charge was made in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the money collected for this reason was deposited in a checking account in the name of that ministry. Additionally, Executive Decree No. 25647-MTSS-G of August 20, 1996, was issued, published in Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 236 of December 9, 1996, which authorized the charge (always in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security) for the extension of the validity of the Seasonal Work Card, which in some cases was fifty percent and in others one hundred percent of the cost of the original issuance (it is worth noting that these last two decrees—which regulated the charge for the Seasonal Work Card in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security—were repealed by Decree No. 26430-MTSS of October 8, 1997, published in Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 209 of October 30, 1997; as justification for the repeal, that normative text indicates that both the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the National Treasury (Tesorería Nacional) had objected to the charge that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had made to cover the expenses of the Seasonal Work Card program—note that Decree No. 24432-TSS-G, which created the referenced program, was not repealed, meaning it remained in effect, and that instrument did not contemplate any charge for the card, the issuance of which remained the authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Now it is important to mention that in the fourth proven fact (folio 6927, in Volume XVI), the sentencing Tribunal affirms that the aforementioned charge is illegal, since a tax not provided for by any law would have been established via decree. The judges consider that such action is contrary to the provisions of Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), as well as to Articles 4 and 5 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), which state that taxes can only be established by legal provision. The members of the trial court affirm that these decrees also violated the principle of the State's single treasury account (principio de caja única del Estado), because they allowed the opening of a bank checking account in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to manage the funds collected for the granting and renewal of the seasonal work card. The lower court Tribunal accredited (see proven fact 20 at folio 6936 in Volume XVI) that by a document dated May 29, 1997, the General Directorate of Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security informed the Minister thereof that the Seasonal Work Card Program presented two essential deficiencies, namely: a) the opening of the aforementioned account, for being an act contrary to the principle of the single treasury account, and b) the charge for granting and renewing the aforementioned card, for constituting an abuse of the regulatory powers of the Administration. Faced with that report, F issued Resolution No. 175-97 of June 2, 1997 (see proven fact 17 at folio 6935), by means of which he established an investigatory body to investigate the legality of the opening of checking account No. [...] to manage the funds coming from the Seasonal Work Card Program there. This investigatory body, through a document dated September 27, 1997, rendered a report to the then Minister of Labor and Social Security indicating the following: a) that the aforementioned bank account was opened without the authorization of the National Treasury, b) that no subordinate could be sanctioned for opening it, because everyone acted in accordance with the principle of obedience, and c) that in order to continue using the funds from the repeatedly mentioned program, as well as to be able to charge for the work card, a bill would have to be presented before the Legislative Assembly for it to be the one to authorize it (the above is extracted from proven fact 17, already indicated). Nine days later, on October 6, 1997, three important things occurred, according to folio 6938 of Volume XVI (fact 22): first, F, aware that the migrants could no longer be charged based on the regulatory provisions, instructed Budget Official Dora Orozco Sánchez to proceed to close the checking account of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica No. 182510-8 in which the funds of the Seasonal Work Card Program were managed; second, the client of attorney Gloria Navas Montero instructed the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to proceed to draft a bill to be able to use the resources received for the aforementioned identification document, as well as those that could be received in the future; third, F met with co-defendant J and together they drafted and signed the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Foundation for Human Development in Central America (FUNDEHCA), which establishes that the latter may charge migrants the sum of twenty-five United States dollars or its equivalent in Costa Rican colones, to cover the administrative and material expenses involved in the preparation of the seasonal work card, which would be prepared—by virtue of the agreement—by FUNDEHCA. Finally, as an element of interest to the lower court for the purpose of proving the concusión, it must be mentioned that it considered (see fact 24 at folio 6940) that the aforementioned cooperation agreement was nothing more than a means to induce migrants to pay to said foundation a sum of money they were not obligated to pay.

VI.Having established the above, it must be indicated that the Penal Code establishes in its Article 348 the following: "Se impondrá prisión de dos a ocho años, al funcionario público que, abusando de su calidad o de sus funciones, obligare o indujere a alguien a dar o prometer indebidamente, para sí o para un tercero, un bien o un beneficio patrimonial" (the bold and underline are supplied). This is what the legislator has termed concusión, which is one of the crimes against the duties of public office. What is protected by this criminal type is the correct performance of public servants in the exercise of their duties. The probity referred to by this figure is violated if a public servant commits abuses (his behavior exceeds the inherent powers of the position, so that something unpermitted is done) on the occasion of the position he holds (that is, he does not fulfill the assigned tasks, but rather takes advantage of the status of working for a public entity and thus incurs in abusive conduct). In turn, the abuse of office consists of forcing or inducing a person to give or promise, for the official himself or for a third party other than the State, a property or a patrimonial benefit that is not owed (thus the overstepping of the competencies inherent to the position is configured, and the abuse of it occurs, because something the legal system does not permit is done). It is important to highlight that what the servant asks for (whether the delivery of the property or patrimonial benefit, or the promise to deliver it) is something the legal system does not contemplate as one of the obligations that the individual from whom such a thing is required must fulfill, because if it did, the undue nature of the delivery or commitment to give the property or patrimonial benefit would disappear. On the contrary, it involves an action by the official that is not protected—because it is abusive—by the Law. Note that this property or patrimonial benefit demanded of the passive subject to give or promise may be destined for the benefit of the official himself or even in favor of a third party. Of course, that recipient is not the State, because if the charge were made for the benefit of the latter, one would be facing the crime of exacción ilegal and not the crime of concusión. This Chamber has already warned that the difference between these two crimes lies in the destination given or intended to be given to the property or patrimonial benefits obtained through the prohibited conduct (in this sense, see the resolution of this Office No. 175-A-92 of 10:15 a.m. on April 15, 1992). Thus, it is apparent that concusión is an aggravated form of exacción ilegal. The legislator has considered it more reprehensible (and therefore deserving of a more severe penalty) for the public official to move a person to give or promise a property or a patrimonial benefit that is not owed when said conduct intends to benefit himself or a third party, than cases where the beneficiary of such action would be the State itself. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that for purposes of configuring this offense, it is not essential that the individual indeed deliver or promise to give what is requested; rather, it suffices that he be motivated to promise to do so for the crime to arise in legal life.

VII.In light of the above, it must be said, regarding the claim of attorney Navas Montero, that there is one particular event that is constitutive of the crime of concusión, which is the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA. Indeed, that agreement between the ministerial portfolio and the mentioned foundation constitutes the offense in question. If one reads what the interested parties agreed upon (the document can be seen beginning at folio 1689 in Volume III of the file), it is highlighted (see third clause) that FUNDEHCA receives the applications of the migrant population, prepares the cards, and then delivers them, all with the authorization of the Ministry and other authorities involved in the procedure. Furthermore, for this process, the agreement provides (fifth clause) that the foundation may charge each migrant the sum of twenty-five United States dollars or its equivalent in colones, in order to cover the administrative and material expenses involved in preparing the cards. This is the central problem of this matter. If the granting of the repeatedly mentioned seasonal work card was provided for in the already-cited Decree No. 24432 as an activity proper to the Public Administration and that normative text was still in effect when the aforementioned agreement was drafted and implemented, then it is clear that the only state body with the authority to grant that labor permit to the migrant population was precisely the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. This is reflected in the cooperation agreement, because FUNDEHCA could only materially deliver the cards, with prior authorization from the ministerial portfolio. That is, at its core, the decision on the approval or rejection of the application lay with the body under the charge of the accused F, so it is apparent that this was still a service proper to the Administration (moreover, in the notice itself indicating to migrants that they must pay the five thousand colones to FUNDEHCA – see folio 3736 in Volume IX – one can read that the card is granted by the Ministry). Now, what happens is that through the cited agreement, it was established that migrants would be charged a specific sum of money, in favor of FUNDEHCA. However much one might want to justify this charge by arguing that the foundation had the right to be paid for the work performed for the Labor and Social Security portfolio (an argument maintained by the accused F, as recorded at folio 6969 in Volume XVI), the truth is that there is not a single legal provision (nor even regulatory) that authorizes it, and this absence of normative provision to support it makes such a charge to the migrants undue. It must always be borne in mind that Executive Decrees 24811 and 25647, already cited, authorized the charge for the Seasonal Work Card, but only in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, never in favor of FUNDEHCA or any other third party, meaning those provisions do not cover the charge established by the cooperation agreement, such that the latter is devoid of any normative basis. Let it be recalled that the granting of the seasonal work card occurs within the framework of administrative activity, as it is the State that was trying to solve the national and even international problems caused by the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented foreign workers. The Administration must at all times be subject to the principle of legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution, related to Articles 11 and 111 of the General Law of Public Administration. Thus, it can only do what the law authorizes it to do. Since the legal system does not permit the creation of levies (taxes, fees, and special contributions) except through the enactment of a law (Articles 121(13) of the Political Constitution, 124 of the General Law of Public Administration, 4 and 5 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures), then the establishment—by means of a cooperation agreement—of a fee for a service the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was required to provide is openly illegal, with the aggravating factor that the money ended up going to a person under private law. Let it be recalled that payment was made in order to receive the referenced document, because if payment was not made, the migrant's request to be allowed to work seasonally in Costa Rica was not processed, and without such authorization, he could be deported pursuant to the provisions of the Immigration and Aliens Act (Ley de Migración y Extranjería). That FUNDEHCA's intervention in the process should have resulted in compensation is something that is unrelated to the illegality of the charge, because that foundation served the Ministry and not the migrants; the latter's relationship was with the public body, because it was that ministerial agency—not FUNDEHCA—that was competent to decide whether to grant the labor permit to the foreigners. In this line of thought, it is evident that what the agreement does is allow the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to avoid having to face the payment for the services that FUNDEHCA provided to that institution, for which purpose an illegal charge was created that fell on the migrants requiring a service from that ministry, so that the money was paid in favor of the private entity. That exaction (understood as "the action and effect of demanding taxes, levies, fines, debts, etc.," according to the definition included in the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy) is openly contrary to the legal system, because without any law that so permits, it is demanded (by means of a simple assistance agreement between two organizations) that the migrants pay a specific sum of money to a foundation for a service that the State provides to that population. Equally important is that the defendant motivated a great many people to give money to FUNDEHCA, because he ordered the preparation of the flyer recorded at folio 3736 (first folio of Volume IX of the file), where migrant workers are informed that as a requirement to process the seasonal work card, they had to (among other things) pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) to FUNDEHCA. This being the case, it is evident that this matter involves a public official (in this case F, who at the time the events occurred was Minister of Labor and Social Security) who, abusing his position, motivated a large number of foreigners to unduly give (because there is no legal provision establishing the obligation to pay a private institution a sum of money for the State to decide whether to grant them seasonal work permission in the country) a patrimonial benefit to a third party (FUNDEHCA is outside the individual-Administration relationship; recall it is the Ministry of Labor and Social Security—not the foundation—that must authorize the migrants' status as workers in Costa Rica, so they receive the service from that public agency and not from the private entity). The abusive nature of this accused's conduct is made manifest if one considers that since before the signing (which occurred on October 6, 1997, as recorded at folio 1692 in Volume III) and implementation of the repeatedly mentioned agreement, F already knew it was not legally possible to charge for the issuance of the seasonal work card. Indeed, by a document dated May 27, 1997 (see folio 180 in Volume I), the then Vice Minister of Labor and Social Security, attorney Eugenio Solano Calderón, informed F that the matter concerning the opening of a specific bank account to manage the operating funds of the seasonal work card program should be investigated. As part of the investigation prompted by Mr. S's note, the report prepared by the General Directorate of Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (see folio 192 in Volume I) was presented, in which it is warned that charging migrants a sum of money for the costs of the aforementioned program was contrary to the principle of the State's single treasury account and to the provisions of Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration (which states that the establishment of exactions is a matter reserved to the law). The content of that report and the recommendations of the investigatory body that investigated the matter were brought to the attention of F in September 1997, as recorded at folio 247 in Volume I. It is important to note that the then Minister was recommended (see folio 250) to order the closure of the bank account specially designated for managing the funds of the seasonal work card program. Furthermore, he was told that if he wanted to continue using the resources already received or receive new ones in the future, it was advisable to present a bill to the Legislative Assembly for it to authorize them. Therefore, it is evident that F knew it was illegal to charge for that service provided to migrants by the Costa Rican State. In this sense, to sign and implement an agreement that allowed a foundation to charge foreigners for a service that ultimately remained a state service (it is worth insisting that the one granting or denying the work permit was the Ministry under F's charge) is equivalent to ignoring the illegality he knew of, and that is why it can be accredited that the accused abused the function he performed. It should be noted that this abusive conduct is equally indicative of intentional behavior on the part of the former Minister, because he knew he could not establish that charge in favor of FUNDEHCA because it was illegal, and even less so motivate the migrants to make a payment that was undue, and yet he did it, such that knowledge and the will to adjust his conduct to the typical assumptions of concusión are evident. Furthermore, it is clear that he knew he was moving the migrants to give an undue patrimonial benefit to a third party. In this line of thought, the crime of concusión attributed to F in this case is duly accredited. It must also be pointed out that the judging panel considers all the facts indicated above to be proven. It is sufficient to observe points 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the factual table of the appealed judgment (folios 6935 to 6941 in Volume XVI) to realize that the lower court was clear at all times that F incurred in concusión due to what happened regarding the repeatedly mentioned cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Moreover, at folio 7465 in Volume XVII, the sentencing panel's exposition begins as to why it considers the crime for which this accused was convicted to be established, and it is recorded at folio 7469 that for the lower court, the former Minister knew perfectly well that the charge being made for the seasonal work card program was irregular. It is equally clear that for the judges, having given instructions to various officials to solve the legal problem surrounding the indicated charge (see folio 7471) and then having signed the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA in which the obligation for migrants to pay to be able to receive the work card was maintained, is nothing more than a maneuver to implement a charge known to be illegal (see folio 7472). In accordance with the foregoing, the crime of concusión for which F was convicted is duly accredited and substantiated in the appealed decision.

VIII.Now, returning to the appeal being analyzed here, it should be recalled that attorney Navas Montero accuses the Tribunal of erring in basing the existence of the crime of concusión, because in doing so it considered facts constitutive of other offenses, for which it acquitted her client. On this point, this Chamber considers that there certainly is an error on the part of the lower court in setting out a whole sequence of events in the factual table as if they were part of a single plan, without individualizing the crime they would constitute. However, the problem this causes is minimal, because beginning at folio 7425 in Volume XVII, the reasoning as to why it convicts for concusión and exonerates F from criminal liability for other crimes is perfectly distinguished. What is important to highlight is that the concusión is not confused with the other offenses. Regarding the exacción ilegal, despite the fact that the lower court Tribunal derives the existence of a plan by the referenced defendant and J that encompasses this punishable conduct and the one for which these two persons were sanctioned, the truth is that it offers distinct bases to prove each of them.

Thus, at folio 7460 (Volume XVII) it is explained that the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) would derive from the charge made via executive decrees (decretos ejecutivos) to migrants for the work card and it is mentioned that the monies were paid to the State. In contrast, the graft (concusión) is analyzed starting at folio 7465 (Volume XVII) and it is clear that this is configured in relation to the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA, through which migrants were obligated to pay a sum of money to that private entity for a service (the granting of the work permit) that was provided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Thus, there is no problem whatsoever in acquitting F of illegal exaction (an offense that the lower court considered time-barred, an issue that will be addressed when resolving the Public Prosecutor's appeal) and convicting him for graft, especially considering that the charge to foreigners does not have the same origin (in one case it is imposed by regulatory norms and in the other by a simple cooperation agreement between two organizations), meaning they are distinct conducts. Precisely because of this latter point, the crimes can be differentiated and, therefore, the criteria for the statute of limitations for the criminal action applicable to each of them can be distinguished. Since the illegal exaction and the graft are not based on the same fact, it is legally correct to examine each offense separately to determine whether they are time-barred or not. Furthermore, the fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) attributed to both F and J to the detriment of FUNDEHCA does not encompass any fact related to the graft. The only link between both offenses is made by the Court when it considers that they formed part of a plan to secure disposal of the monies that the entity would collect for the preparation of the work cards. But this does not mean that the facts that allow each offense to be configured are identical, such that acquittal for one would require acquittal for the other. The graft stems—as has been stated several times throughout this ruling—from the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In contrast, the fraudulent administration would be generated internally within the foundation, based on the manner in which it was administered to the detriment of the entity's interests. As can be seen, these are different matters. Now then, the administrative board of the private organization approved the accounting and financial statements of FUNDEHCA and approved all actions taken by the board president, the executive delegate, and the board itself (see folio 7527 in Volume XVII), so it was certainly impossible to prove any harm to the foundation, and in that sense, the trial court judges' decision to acquit the defendants for these facts is correct. What happens is that this is a factual basis separate from that which supports the graft, so the aforementioned acquittal does not obligate their acquittal for the crime provided in Article 348 of the Penal Code. Regarding the crime of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles), the Court acquitted F and J for this offense because it was not duly supported in the alternative accusation, but rather contained simply a repetition of facts already indicated in the main accusation, and it adds that in any case, that negotiation formed part of the plan to commit the graft, so the trial judges subsume it under this criminal figure and acquit them for this offense (see folios 7608 to 7611 in Volume XVII). Here, an error by the lower court is indeed apparent, since what it does is link the incompatible negotiation with the plan it believes the defendants followed to commit the graft, as if the latter subsumed it. In reality, what is provided in Article 348 of the Penal Code does not include what is regulated in Article 347 of the same normative text (due to the date on which the facts of interest for this case occurred, reference is made to the text of this article as it was drafted before the reform made by Law No. 8056 of December 21, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 10 of January 5, 2001, entered into force), so the subsumption exercise is indeed poorly performed (the Public Prosecutor also mentions this problem in its appeal on this point, so the issue will be revisited later). What happens is that the interest that F may have had in the agreement between the Ministry under his charge and FUNDEHCA (of which both he and his son, surnamed F, and the co-defendant J were founding members; furthermore, F was president of the board of directors and J was the executive delegate) is independent of what constitutes graft. Indeed, it is not the same for a public official to be interested in a contract or operation in which he participates due to the position he holds, as it is for that official to induce or obligate—by virtue of the signing and implementation of the agreement, which demonstrates an abuse of office—migrants to pay an undue sum in favor of a foundation. In the first case, the punishable conduct is restricted to the simple personal interest of the public servant in a business deal; in the second, what is sanctioned is not only a broader behavior but one that is distinct from the former, since what is involved is abusing the office so as to move several individuals to deliver to a third party a patrimonial benefit that they do not owe. As can be seen, in the second case, the public employee's interest in the contract itself is not a factor to be considered in determining the subject's criminal liability, so graft does not require it to be configured. Thus, the acquittal rendered for the crime of incompatible negotiations does not affect the offense for which F was convicted. Regarding the crime of breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes), the trial court indicated (see folio 7529 in Volume XVII) that in this particular case there was an apparent concurrence of norms (concurso aparente de normas), since in all crimes against the public function where the active subject is a public official, there is fundamentally a breach of the duties inherent to the office, so the special figure displaces the generic one, meaning it is only possible to apply the one that specifically regulates the demonstrated conduct and not the other, wherefore the lower court acquitted F of all liability and punishment for the crime of breach of duties. This Chamber considers that the acquittal rendered for this offense does not affect the conviction rendered for graft. This is because the lower court erred in considering that an apparent concurrence of norms exists between the two offenses in question. The breach of duties (Article 332 of the Penal Code) is based on the assumption that the public servant omits, refuses to perform, or delays performing an act he is obliged to carry out. In contrast, graft is based on the premise of abusing the office, that is, exceeding (as stated supra in Considerando VI of this judgment) the attributions inherent to the function and, by virtue thereof, moving someone to deliver or promise an undue asset or patrimonial benefit to another subject. As can be seen, the first crime is one of omission and the second of action; moreover, they are not figures that exclude each other but are complementary (not identical), so it was not possible to apply the apparent concurrence of norms. In any case, in this particular case it has not been proven that F omitted doing something he should have, so the acquittal for breach of duties is correct. What occurs is that it has been demonstrated that he did something not permitted (abusing his office and moving migrants to deliver money they did not owe in favor of FUNDEHCA), so his conduct does not fit the provisions of Article 332 of the Penal Code, but does fit those of Article 348 of the same normative text. In accordance with the foregoing, the acquittal rendered for the crime of breach of duties does not exempt the client of Attorney Navas Montero from liability for the crime of graft. To the foregoing it must be added that the execution of the executive decrees that authorized the charge of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the issuance of the seasonal work card is indeed independent of the charge made in favor of FUNDEHCA. The first was protected by regulatory norms; the second by a simple cooperation agreement. The first was deposited into accounts of the public body; the second into the coffers of a private entity. As can be seen, they are distinct conducts, so it is correct that they were analyzed by the lower court as independent crimes. Thus, the statute of limitations for the illegal exaction does not affect the graft, as they are based on independent factual scenarios. It must be added that the fact that the destination of the monies collected by the foundation is unknown is not an obstacle to considering the graft as configured. This is because it is not necessary—for this crime to be configured—to establish the final destination of the asset or patrimonial benefit; what matters is that it was determined (through the abusive exercise of office by a public servant) that migrants were moved to unduly pay a sum of money in favor of FUNDEHCA, and in this manner the offense in question was configured. Based on all the foregoing, this ground of the appeal is dismissed.

IX.As a third ground, Attorney Navas Montero alleges that in this case, the rules of substantiation have been disrespected in relation to a decisive piece of evidence, namely the historical context in which the facts of interest here occurred. She considers that this mistake leads to the incorrect application of a substantive provision. She recalls that in 1995, the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented migrants posed a serious threat to various public services, including social security and education. She adds that the Seasonal Work Card Program originated precisely to combat that problem. She points out that in addition to the above, it must be considered that the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua threatened to sue the Government of Costa Rica in international instances for what it considered xenophobic treatment of its nationals in this country. Thus, she maintains that this is the reason the mentioned program arose and it cannot be considered part of a plan devised by F and J to commit graft. Furthermore, she explains that the foundation was created because it was considered a more suitable way to meet goals set in international agreements. Hence—according to the appellant—it cannot be established that her client's conduct was willful (dolosa) or aimed at committing the crime provided in Article 348 of the Penal Code. She considers that the defendant F acted to confront an urgent situation for the country, seeking to prevent serious harm to Costa Rica. In that sense, she considers that the provisions of articles 27 and 38 of the Penal Code should have been applied in this case, as there was a defense of justification (causa de justificación) or, failing that, a defense of excuse (causa de exculpación). The objection is not tenable. Although it is true that the country's situation in 1995 was delicate due to the problems that attending to the migrant population in the national territory entailed for the State, it is also true that this emergency would at most justify the establishment of the Seasonal Work Card Program. The urgency with which the problem was addressed may allow one to understand (not justify) the issuance of decrees that allowed the State to charge for the issuance of the card (which violates the legal reserve principle (reserva de ley) in matters of exactions) and for the funds to be deposited in a specific account (which contravenes the single treasury account principle (principio de caja única)), but this is not extensible to what occurred with the cooperation agreement and in no way constitutes a state of necessity (estado de necesidad), whether justifying or excusing. In the first place, it must be remembered that it was the Costa Rican State facing the problem, and in seeking to solve it, the aforementioned errors were incurred. But after the illegality of the charge was noticed (both for the exaction itself and for the deposit of the monies in an independent account) and practically two years after the work card program had begun (which demonstrates that although the problem had not been resolved, it was on its way to a solution), F opted—knowingly, as indicated in Considerando VII of this judgment, thereby demonstrating that his willful conduct is correctly proven—to implement a mechanism to charge migrants monies they had no reason to pay, since the service they received (the granting of the work permit) remained a state power (without any exaction for that service having been established by law), with the aggravating factor that the monies no longer went into the State coffers, but into those of a private foundation. As can be seen, this second situation is radically different from the one existing under the protection of the executive decrees that authorized (illegally, as already mentioned) the charge to migrants. Moreover, it should be emphasized that no legal right (bien jurídico) that was endangered by the presence of migrants in Costa Rica can be specified, at either of the two moments alluded to. What is discussed is that there were public services that could collapse, but that was a possibility, and furthermore, the collapse of a service (such as education or social security, which are the ones most mentioned in this case) is something so vague that it can range from slow or delayed provision thereof, to being provided on time but with poor quality, or even not being provided at all. Even so, it is not defined who would be affected in any of those situations. Therefore, it is impossible to know specifically which legal rights were in danger and—precisely because of the indicated vagueness—it is also impossible to determine the actuality or imminence of the threat. Regarding the possible filing of a lawsuit against Costa Rica in international instances, once again the question arises as to which legal right would have been protected by F's actions. The fact that a person (including a legal person, such as the State) is taken before Courts of Justice (national or international) to determine according to Law whether they are responsible for something does not constitute an endangerment of that person's legal rights, because the principle of liability exists. In that line of reasoning, the essential premise upon which the concept of state of necessity is based disappears, namely the existence of a danger to legal rights, which cannot be specified in this case, so the lower court correctly did not apply the provisions of articles 27 and 38 of the Penal Code. It is worth adding that although it is true FUNDEHCA was created with the endorsement of various Ministers of Labor of that time in order to address various common problems of the countries in the area, it is also true that this is irrelevant for purposes of establishing graft. That the trial Court is mistaken in stating that all the facts it finds proven form part of a plan is irrelevant in light of the proof of what does constitute the offense in question. For the latter to come into legal existence, it is sufficient that the delivery of an undue asset or patrimonial benefit (or the promise to do so) be made in favor of the public official or a third party. In this case, FUNDEHCA is that third party, without it mattering for what purpose it was created. For all the foregoing, this allegation is dismissed.

X.As a fourth ground, Attorney Gloria Navas Montero claims erroneous reasoning regarding the knowledge—by F—of the illegality of the action. She indicates that the principle of in dubio pro reo was disrespected. She maintains that the report from the Directorate General of Audit (Dirección General de Auditoría) is not conclusive regarding the illegality of the charge made to the migrants, but rather indicates that it "seemed" so. She also questions (see folio 8325 in Volume XX) the statement that her defendant knew of this report, since there is no record that he received it. She adds that in any case, the executive decrees established that charge and were not declared illegal. She indicates that violating the single treasury account principle does not breach the legal reserve principle in tax matters. Hence, she considers that the willful intent (dolo) in her client's actions is poorly established. The claim must be rejected. Despite the fact that the report from the Directorate General of Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (visible at folio 192 in Volume I) does state in some paragraphs that it seems the mentioned charge was illegal for two factors, namely the violation of the State's single treasury account principle and the infringement of the legal reserve principle in matters of exactions, the truth is that this document is a whole, and it can be read very clearly therein (see folios 208, 209, and 210 in Volume I) that several recommendations were made to the then Minister to correct the legality defects found. Thus, it is evident that the conclusion was reached that the mentioned charge did not conform to Law, due to the two defects already mentioned. Furthermore, by official communication No. DAJ-AI-943-97 of September 24, 1997 (visible at folio 247 in Volume I of the file), addressed to F, it was recommended to the defendant to close the account in which the funds from the work card program were managed and also to present a bill before the Legislative Assembly so that it could authorize charging migrants for the issuance of said document. As can be seen, this document clearly exposes the illegality of the charge made to the migrants, basically because it was an exaction without legal basis (the violation of the State's single treasury account principle only motivated the closing of the special account, but that is secondary with respect to the illegality of the charge to the migrants, which is what matters for the purposes of the graft). This report from the Directorate of Legal Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was indeed known by F, as he himself refers to this opinion to request the closure of the account in which the funds from the work card program were deposited (see document at folio 3 in Volume I). Thus, as already indicated in Considerando VII of this judgment, it is evident that F knew of the illegality of the charge to the migrants for the service provided by the Ministry under his charge, so it is obvious that it was knowingly that he established a new charge for that population as a requirement for the ministerial portfolio in question to grant the work permit so often mentioned. It is important to remember that the second charge to the migrants (the one established through the already cited cooperation agreement) is what matters for the purposes of graft. When this agreement was signed, F already knew that only by law could exactions be imposed on citizens (Administrados) for services provided by the State (such as the granting of the work card, which was an attribution of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Hence, it is irrelevant whether the executive decrees that protected the first charge (which the lower court considered constituted illegal exaction) were declared illegal or not, as that refers to facts independent of those that motivated this defendant's conviction for graft. Finally, it must be indicated that Attorney Navas Montero is correct in indicating that the violation of the single treasury account principle does not necessarily entail a violation of the legal reserve principle in tax matters. What happens is that in this case, each of the infractions is duly proven by separate facts. The single treasury account principle was violated by opening a special account to manage the funds that entered the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the charge made to migrants based on the executive decrees. In contrast, the legal reserve principle in tax matters has been disrespected on two different occasions: first, when the aforementioned decrees were issued (for which the lower court considered the crime of illegal exaction was configured, even though the action to prosecute it was time-barred), and later when, in the cooperation agreement between the Ministry and FUNDEHCA, a charge was established for a state service (which is what serves as the basis for convicting F of graft). Thus, it is clear that the lower court did not incur the error pointed out by the appellant. For all the foregoing, this ground of the appeal is dismissed.

XI.The private defense counsel for the defendant F claims, as a fifth ground, that in this case, the rules of sound criticism (reglas de la sana crítica) were disrespected regarding the assessment of the reasons why the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) did not approve (refrendó) the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. She maintains that the mentioned agreement did not have to be previously consulted with the Comptroller General's Office (Contraloría). She adds that a judgment of harmfulness (juicio de lesividad) is required to strip the administrative act of validity and efficacy. The claim is unfounded. As stated supra in Considerando VII, in this particular case a triangular relationship occurred as a consequence of the implementation of the mentioned cooperation agreement. On one hand, the citizens (the migrant population) required a service (the granting of the work card) from the Costa Rican State (specifically, from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which was the only agency competent to grant such a permit). On the other hand, the State agreed with FUNDEHCA that the latter would assist it (the State) in the material preparation of the cards. Finally, to obtain the card granted to them by the Costa Rican State, the citizen (the migrant) had to pay FUNDEHCA the sum of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00). As can be seen, this is a double mockery of the legal system. The first occurs because the citizen requires a state service (the granting of the work card) for which, as of October 6, 1997 (the date the cooperation agreement was signed), there was no legal provision that allowed for an exaction to be charged in return. Despite this, and knowingly aware of the illegality, F authorized said charge in the agreement in question. The second mockery occurs because the State benefits from a service provided by a private entity (FUNDEHCA) without having to pay, since F illegally transferred that cost to the users. It is true that the Public Administration was compromised in that maneuver, specifically when the cooperation agreement was signed, but that does not mean that Criminal Courts should refrain from ruling on the legality of the actions taken. If the claim of Attorney Navas Montero is examined, it can be seen that what she is trying to do is give primacy to the administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción administrativa) in this matter, since what she seeks is to prevent a criminal court from establishing that the charge via agreement is undue while the other jurisdiction has not resolved whether that agreement is legal or not. The appellant's argument is not acceptable. Observe that Article 4 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) expressly reserves for the criminal jurisdiction everything related to crimes, even if they are connected to acts of the Public Administration. Thus, it is in this venue (not another) where a pronouncement on the legality of the actions taken must be issued, since it is precisely on that basis that the existence of the crime of graft must be determined. Therefore, the discussion about whether the Comptroller General's Office should have approved or not the so-often-mentioned cooperation agreement is irrelevant, since it has already been declared in this venue that the charge established therein for migrants in favor of FUNDEHCA is openly illegal, a circumstance that F knew before signing it (coinciding, by the way, with what was indicated by the Comptroller General's Office in its Resolution No. DAJ-2156 of November 17, 1997, visible at folio 1693 in Volume III), and that is what matters for the purposes of applying Article 348 of the Penal Code. Thus, this Chamber does not find that any grievance is caused to the appellant by the fact that the reason why the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic did not approve the cooperation agreement is not analyzed in greater depth. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss this ground of the appeal.

XII.As a sixth ground, Attorney Navas Montero claims the violation of substantive law, specifically Article 348 of the Penal Code, regarding the crime of graft. She affirms that the facts that the lower court found proven do not fit within what the legislator defines as graft. She indicates that it cannot be deduced from the sentence what the abuse consisted of, nor how her defendant moved the migrants to make the payment to FUNDEHCA. The objection is not tenable. It has already been stated supra in Considerandos VI and VII why the crime of graft attributed to F is duly proven and substantiated by the trial court. The appellant must abide by what was resolved therein.

XIII.As a seventh ground, the private defense counsel for F claims that in this case, an error has been made in setting the penalty, since it is disproportionate relative to what has been proven. For the reasons that will be set forth below, the allegation is acceptable. It can be seen starting from folio 7611 (Volume XVII; see particularly folio 7613) that the trial court considered that in this case it was appropriate to sanction F and J (it is clear that, by extensive effect, what is resolved here must be applied to the latter; however, the issue will be addressed when ruling on the cassation appeal filed in his favor, since it is necessary to address there an issue intimately connected with the penalty for his conduct) with the upper limit of the punitive scale provided for the crime of graft. This Chamber considers that the imposition of the maximum penalty in this case is disproportionate. This is because, although what occurred is very serious, it is also true that in this particular case, no extraordinary circumstances are observed that merit imposing the highest possible sanction. Indeed, having it clear that the graft is configured solely by what occurred in relation to the charge to migrants created through the already alluded cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, it must be added that it was not possible to establish how much money this foundation received for the preparation of the work card, so although it is known that there were migrants who unduly paid that entity what was established in the indicated agreement, it has not been possible to determine how large the patrimonial benefit received by that private organization was. That is a circumstance that must be weighed with the other elements of Article 71 of the Penal Code, and it shows that in this case an unreasonable penalty has been imposed on F. Furthermore, this is a person who has no criminal record and who, after the commission of the offense, has shown willingness to face the process, so the intention to submit again to the legal system, with the legal consequences that this implies, is evident. For the foregoing, it is unreasonable to impose the highest possible sanction on F. Now then, neither can it be thought that this defendant deserves to be sanctioned with the minimum limit of the punitive scale in question, as that would be equally disproportionate. It must be remembered that this is indeed a serious fact, since not only was it a Minister of the Government of the Republic (that is, one of the highest-ranking public officials, even a member of the Supreme Powers) who was the author of the crime of graft, but furthermore, it was many people of limited resources (it cannot be forgotten that they were illegal migrants) who found themselves compelled to pay a sum (which was considerable from their point of view) that they did not owe (although it has not been possible to determine the total income received by FUNDEHCA for that concept, which is a circumstance that must be weighed against the one just described).

Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that F is knowledgeable in the Law, which makes his having acted fraudulently in contravention of the legal system more reprehensible in his case. Therefore, this Chamber finds that the eight-year prison sentence that the lower court set for F in his capacity as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of concusión is indeed disproportionate for being unreasonable and must therefore be reduced to align it with the actual degree of severity of this matter. Thus, given the defect in the application of the substantive law raised by the appellant, this Chamber resolves to grant this ground of the appeal and, in application of the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to partially vacate the contested judgment regarding the penalty that F must serve. Consequently, resolving the matter directly on the merits, a penalty of FOUR YEARS OF PRISON is imposed on F, as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of concusión committed to the detriment of public service duties. Given that the imposed amount exceeds the limits permitted in Article 59 of the Penal Code, the benefit of a suspended sentence (beneficio de condena de ejecución condicional) is not granted to F.

XIV.Regarding the appeal filed by the defendant F. Exercising his right to material defense – guaranteed in Article 8, section 2, subsections c), d), and e) of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 14, section 3, subsections b) and d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in the second and third paragraphs of Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – the accused F challenges in cassation the conviction entered against him. As a first ground (see folio 7714 of Volume XVIII), the appellant alleges a breach of due process. Specifically, he considers that the rules of concentration, continuity, immediacy, orality, and publicity have been disregarded in this case. He bases his claim on the argument that the Judge who presided over the Court handling this matter – Lic. Carlos Sánchez Fernández – asked the parties, prior to closing the trial, to extend the time to deliberate and proceed with the reading of the contested decision. Likewise, he indicates that the aforementioned Judge conditioned the issuance of an objective judgment on his request being granted, since only by extending the deliberation period could the court prepare a broad and detailed work. The defendant considers that this procedure violated Article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as it was not the appropriate time to declare the case as a complex proceeding (causa de tramitación compleja). He adds that, in any case, the legally provided deadline for such matters was not even met, but rather the time allowed by the legislator for these special situations was exceeded. He points out that in the sub judice case, forty-five calendar days (equivalent to thirty-two working days) elapsed from the conclusion of the oral and public trial until the judgment was read. It is the appellant's opinion that such conduct is clearly offensive to the guiding principles of the essential phase of Costa Rican criminal procedure, which is the trial, since allowing so many days to pass results in the loss of immediacy, orality, and continuity. The objection is not admissible. In accordance with the provisions of Article 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant must demonstrate that the defects they state not only exist, but also cause them harm and that they have not contributed to causing them. In the present case, it indeed appears in the case file (read the trial transcript starting at folio 6820 in Volume XV) that Lic. Carlos Sánchez Fernández – who presided over the Trial Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José in this matter – asked the interested parties for extraordinary time to deliberate and thereby "make the decision in an objective, fair manner, and prepare a very broad and detailed work as you [the Judge addressed the parties] have requested . . ." (see folio 6821 in the indicated volume). In support of his request, Lic. Sánchez Fernández cited this Chamber's opinion (voto) No. 565-F-93, dated 9:05 a.m. on October 22, 1993. In that decision (specifically in its Ninth Considerando), a series of reasons are set forth explaining why it was possible – in matters processed in accordance with the regulations provided in the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure – to extend the deliberation period for as long as was reasonably necessary to decide the respective case. When issuing the judgment in question, the following was held: “(i) deliberation must begin immediately after the close of the trial; (ii) its duration is regulated in the final paragraph of Article 392 which refers to 361, such that deliberation may be prolonged for all consecutive sessions as necessary; (iii) the period for concluding deliberation must bear relation to and be proportional to the nature of the matter to be decided; (iv) while deliberation lasts, the judges cannot participate in other matters, unless it has already concluded; and (v) deliberation may be suspended for up to ten days and the grounds are established in Article 392, such that these are solely force majeure or the illness of one of the judges”. When this Chamber issued the just-cited decision, the regulatory instrument in force on this matter was the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure, and the provisions of that legal text allowed deliberation to be extended for all the time reasonably necessary to make the decisions pertaining to the respective case. Until now, what was stated in decision 565-F-93 has guided the decisions of the Courts regarding the time they have to deliberate. However, as of this judgment, it must be noted that this criterion cannot be upheld in matters that must be resolved in accordance with the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike what occurred under the previous procedural norms, the procedural law in effect today expressly contemplates a regulation specifically designed by the Legislature for those cases determined to be processed as complex. The specific rules for this type of case are contemplated in Articles 319, 360, 364, 376, 377, 378, and 379, all of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The rationale for these special rules lies in the fact that not all matters heard by judicial offices are the same. There are some that – due to the facts to be elucidated, as well as the subject matter involved – necessarily demand more time and dedication than others. It is precisely when facing such scenarios that it is possible to request authorization to apply the provisions related to the processing of complex cases. These are intended – essentially – to extend the legal time limits for performing certain actions up to the limits provided in Article 378 of the cited normative text. Note that the word “limit” has been used here, and this is because Article 379 of the same legal body provides that in everything not expressly mentioned in Title II of Book II of the Second Part (Procedures) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the rules of ordinary procedure apply, which implies that the provisions established in the second paragraph of Article 360 of said ordinance become applicable regarding the consequences of failing to comply with (by exceeding) the time provided for deliberation. If this occurs, the rule is that the proceedings are annulled and the trial must be held again before another Court. However, this statement must be related to the provisions of Article 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which contemplates the possibility that the parties for whose benefit a time limit has been established may waive it by express manifestation. It must be clearly understood once and for all that the time established by the Legislature for judges to deliberate and issue the corresponding judgment is conceived in favor of the interests of the parties, since it is they who enjoy the right to prompt and complete justice, as stated in Article 39 of the Political Constitution, in Article 8, section 1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 14, section 3) subsection c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now, in the case under examination, despite the fact that it was the Court itself that promoted the indefinite extension of the period for deliberating and issuing the respective decision, the truth is that all interested parties consented to what the judging body proposed. Thus, they waived the time limit – conceived in their favor – that restricted the time the trial court had to issue the decision of interest here. Under those circumstances, there is indeed a disregard for the temporal limits for issuing the judgment, but in the specific case, this procedure caused no harm to the parties, since they accepted the proposal of the lower court. In that sense, their consent – apart from constituting a waiver of a time limit established for their benefit – constituted an essential factor for what happened to occur: that the trial court judges took so many days to issue the decision now being appealed. By virtue of all the foregoing, this claim is dismissed.

XV.As a second ground, F considers that the lower court disregarded the rules of sound judicial criticism (sana crítica) and incurred in a lack of reasoning for the judgment. He considers that the trial court incorrectly assessed the evidentiary material and wrongly interprets different concepts, all of which resulted in a breach of substantive law. As a basis for the claim, the defendant states the following: a) he affirms that on one hand, the trial Court maintains that the collection (cobro) made by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is the same one that constituted the concusión, but later indicates that it was repealed and that it is a different collection based on the cooperation agreement; and b) he states that in the executive decrees regulating the seasonal work card program, what was reserved for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was the granting of the document, not its material production, so it is not true that competencies were transferred to FUNDEHCA. The objection is inadmissible. It has already been set forth above in Considerandos VII and VIII that in this case, two distinct collections from migrants for the concept of the seasonal work card have been proven: the first of them is supported by the executive decrees that created it in favor of the State; the second, by FUNDEHCA's cooperation agreement. Furthermore, it has already been indicated why they are independent and the reasons why the second constitutes concusión, while the first constitutes illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). It was also explained why the distinction between the collections is extracted from the judgment, and it was stated that the concusión is duly reasoned. The appellant must abide by all of that. As for the distinction between granting and producing the seasonal work card, the appellant himself ratifies what the lower court has said and what is upheld in this decision: the entity granting the document was the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The foregoing, coupled with the fact that the payment of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) was a requirement for the migrants to receive the card, demonstrates that this population was indeed being illegally charged for a service provided to them by the State. The work that FUNDEHCA performed, which was the elaboration or material production – as the appellant says – of the document, was aimed at serving the Ministry, not the migrants, which highlights the illegality of the collection, since the public dependency was not assuming the costs of a service provided to it but was transferring them to the users. It is worth noting that this also derives from the contested judgment, as set forth in Considerando VII of this resolution, so the appellant must abide by what is indicated there. That being the case, this Office finds that none of the alleged defects exist, so the claim must be dismissed.

XVI.As a third ground, a claim is made of omitted or illegal reasoning, violation of the rules of sound judicial criticism, and breach of the principle of experience. He indicates that the functions of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) were not adequately appreciated. He adds that this body of the Legislative Branch is not an advisor nor does it exercise prior control. The criticism is not admissible. It has already been set forth above in Considerando XI – to which the appellant must abide – why it is inconsequential in this case to discuss whether the Comptroller General of the Republic was correct or not in not endorsing the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, since the illegality of said agreement was evident at the time of its signing and in any case has been duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent authority to determine such a thing by virtue of it being an administrative action related to a crime. In this sense, it is irrelevant whether the lower court was mistaken or not when evaluating what the Comptroller's Office did in this matter. Moreover, it must be pointed out to the appellant that – contrary to what he claims – the legislative body is indeed an advisor and does indeed exercise prior control. Its advisory power is not limited to parliamentary bodies (third paragraph of Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which – incidentally – was issued and published in 1994, meaning it was in force when F acted as he did), but rather, since the power to inform (ibidem) and to issue opinions in the exercise of the consultative power (Article 29 of the cited normative text) is provided, it is clear that it does guide (and in that sense, advise) the audited entities, such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, Article 20 of the referenced Law indicates that prior to ordering the execution of the respective contract, the Administration must manage and obtain approval from the Comptroller's Office, making it evident that this is indeed a prior control, since without that endorsement it is not possible to legally execute a contract. In any case, it has already been set forth that whatever may be debated on these points is not essential to prove the concusión, as this is based on the existence of an illegal collection from the migrant population by F, who, in an abusive exercise of his position, induced those persons to deliver an undue patrimonial benefit in favor of FUNDEHCA. For all the foregoing, this claim is dismissed.

XVII.As a fourth ground, a claim is made of illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, breach of the principle of objectivity, and violation of the rules of sound judicial criticism. Specifically, the appellant considers that an error was made by not assessing the testimony of three witnesses, for whom the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security did not have to be endorsed by the Comptroller General of the Republic. He adds that it is not reasoned why the opening of a specific checking account to administer the monies collected (based on the executive decrees) for the concept of the seasonal work card would signify a breach of the single treasury (caja única) principle. He points out that it cannot be derived that he was responsible for opening the mentioned account. He states that it was not clearly understood that FUNDEHCA was useful for solving a national problem, that the context in which the facts occurred was not appreciated, that executive decrees are complex acts that cannot emanate solely from a Minister. The claim is inadmissible. It has already been set forth throughout this decision that it has been duly proven in the criminal jurisdiction – which is the competent authority for this – that the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is openly illegal. In that sense, it is inconsequential to discuss whether the Comptroller General of the Republic was right or wrong in not endorsing said agreement. For this latter reason, the opinion that three legal professionals might have on the point is equally irrelevant. In any case, it is clear that through that instrument, an illegal collection from the migrants was being – knowingly – created for a service that the State provided to them, and simultaneously, the State was avoiding paying FUNDEHCA for a service that entity provided to the State, not to the migrants. The foregoing is sufficient – as has already been stated throughout this judgment – to consider the concusión established. As for the opening of the checking account in which the Ministry of Labor and Social Security managed the monies collected thanks to the collection established in executive decrees for the seasonal work card, it must be pointed out that this relates to the issue of illegal exaction, which is the crime based on what occurred under the cited decrees (the concusión is not based on those facts, but on what occurred concerning the cooperation agreement). Because F was acquitted of the crime of illegal exaction, it lacks interest now to discuss how it was established that applying those decrees violated the single treasury principle, whether he was responsible or not for opening the mentioned account, whether the issuance of the decrees was justified by the national reality at the time they were issued, or whether these are complex acts of the Executive Branch in which not only one Minister participates. As for the role of FUNDEHCA in the development of the seasonal work card program, it must be pointed out that while it is possible to admit that this foundation might have been useful for addressing the migrant problem, it is also true that this does not eliminate an essential aspect for purposes of proving concusión: FUNDEHCA was benefited by receiving from the migrants money that was being illegally collected from them. Thus, it is irrelevant to determine whether that private organization played an important role or not in solving the problems generated by the presence of undocumented migrants in the country. Moreover, it must be recalled that it was set forth above in Considerando IX of this resolution why the situation of Costa Rica as a consequence of the mass of undocumented migrants residing here cannot constitute a cause of justification or exoneration in favor of F. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber finds that none of the alleged defects are present, so it is appropriate to dismiss this ground of the appeal.

XVIII.As a fifth ground, the claimant alleges illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and breach of the principles of sound judicial criticism. Specifically, he points out that in this case, the existence of an error of proscription (error de prohibición) was dismissed without substantial reasoning. He indicates that several legal professionals told him that the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA did not require endorsement by the Comptroller General of the Republic, so he acted under error by not submitting the document to said entity. He maintains that the drafting of executive decrees is not the exclusive work of a Minister of State, so if the illegalities are not noticed in the procedure, then he should not be held responsible for fraudulent conduct. The objection is inadmissible. It has already been set forth above in Considerandos XI and XVI – to which the appellant must abide – why it is inconsequential in this case to discuss whether the Comptroller General of the Republic was correct or not in not endorsing the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, since the illegality of said agreement was duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent authority to declare it. Thus, it is equally irrelevant that different lawyers may have told the defendant whether the repeatedly cited agreement should have been submitted for review by the Comptroller's Office. Furthermore, it has been indicated in this resolution that the crime for which F is held responsible is based on what occurred concerning the cooperation agreement and not on what happened in relation to the executive decrees, so it is of no interest to know whether he incurred an error when signing those normative instruments. Therefore, the claim must be dismissed.

XIX.As a sixth ground, the defendant F claims illegal reasoning and a breach of the rules of sound judicial criticism. Specifically, he affirms that the lower court ignores the value that the law grants to an audit report. He questions that the opinion rendered in such a report is taken as definitive. The objection cannot succeed. What the appellant intends is for it to be discarded that he acted fraudulently in signing the cooperation agreement. This is not possible. As set forth above in Considerandos VII and X of this decision, at the time of signing the agreement with FUNDEHCA, F had knowledge that it was not possible to charge the migrant population for the service provided by the State. This knowledge was acquired not only through the audit report mentioned by the appellant but is also supported by the report and recommendations issued by the procedural body established to carry out the investigation suggested by the then Vice Minister of Labor and Social Security, Eugenio Solano Calderón. Furthermore, the decisions taken by F on October 6, 1997, ordering the closure of the bank account in which the money collected under the executive decrees was deposited, as well as ordering the drafting of a preliminary bill of law to be able to charge a fee for the seasonal work card, are incontrovertible proof that the defendant was aware of the illegality of the situation. In that sense, F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his actions not only does not derive exclusively from the report of the Directorate General of Internal Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but has been fully proven based on other documents and on the actions of the accused himself. For the foregoing, this claim is dismissed.

XX.As a seventh ground, the appellant alleges illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and breach of the rules of sound judicial criticism. He questions the trial Court's assertion that it was before October 6, 1997, that he signed the decree repealing the collection for the seasonal work card. The claim is not admissible. Even though it is certainly not possible to affirm – based on the evidence in the case file – that the defendant signed Decree No. 26430-MTSS of October 8, 1997, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 209 of October 30, 1997, before the 6th day of that same month, it must be said that this is inconsequential for purposes of determining the criminal liability of the defendant. Indeed, the crime of concusión for which F was penalized is proven based on what happened concerning the cooperation agreement between the ministerial portfolio then under his charge and FUNDEHCA; such an offense is not established regarding actions taken under the executive decrees. Thus, the repeal of the fee that was charged to migrants in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the processing of the seasonal work card does not affect the crime for which the defendant is responsible in any way. Furthermore, the knowledge that F had of the unlawfulness of charging the migrant population for a service provided by the State without a legal provision establishing it is duly supported by documents that the accused had access to before October 6, 1997, and also by the actions of the defendant on that date. Therefore, whether or not he signed the aforementioned decree before that day is irrelevant for the purposes of this matter, such that the lower court's assertion in this regard can be removed from the contested judgment without this benefiting the appellant, which demonstrates that the statement causes him no harm whatsoever, so this ground of the appeal must be dismissed.

XXI.As an eighth ground, F alleges illegal and contradictory reasoning, as well as a breach of the principle of in dubio pro reo. Specifically, he indicates that the Comptroller General of the Republic never declared the illegality of the collection from migrants established in the repeatedly cited cooperation agreement. He points out that this entity only expressed having serious doubts about its legality. He affirms that in a dubitative state, his criminal liability cannot be declared. He considers that the recommendation made to him by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to draft a bill of law to utilize the resources from the collection from migrants for the seasonal work card does not suggest that the collection is illegal. He says that the fact that the State's single treasury principle was violated by depositing the funds from the collection from migrants into a special account does not necessarily imply that the collection is illegal. The claims must be rejected. In accordance with what has been set forth throughout this decision, to which the appellant must abide, the illegality of the collection from migrants created through the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is manifest and has been duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent authority for this. Thus, it is inconsequential – for purposes of the crime of concusión – whether or not the Comptroller General of the Republic declared the mentioned agreement illegal, since such a declaration has already been made by the competent body. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that there is no doubt whatsoever about the illegality of this collection, so the dubitative state that the appellant alleges in his favor does not exist. With respect to the argument that the recommendations issued by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security do not imply that the collection from migrants is illegal, it must be pointed out that the appellant is not correct. Indeed, through official letter No. DAJ-AI-943-97 of September 24, 1997 (visible at folio 247 in Volume I of the case file), addressed to F, the defendant was recommended to close the account in which the seasonal work card program funds were managed and also to submit a bill of law before the Legislative Assembly for it to authorize charging the migrants for the issuance of said document. What is important to highlight is that in that document, expressly (see folio 250 in the last Volume indicated), the caveat was made that the legislative authorization to use the future income that could derive from the collection from migrants depended on the collection remaining in force. This warning was formulated in accordance with what was previously indicated by the Office of Internal Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, to the effect that such collection was being conducted in contravention of the legal reservation principle in tax matters (point B.6 of the Legal Affairs report expressly highlights what was warned by the audit body; see folios 249 and 250 in the referenced Volume), so it is evident that not only was F warned about the illegality of opening a special checking account to administer the funds collected for the seasonal work card, but it was also pointed out with complete clarity that the collection itself was illegal, for which mention was made of the Office of Internal Audit's opinion of the aforesaid ministerial portfolio. Therefore, it is not true that the illegality of the oft-mentioned collection from migrants could not be inferred from the Directorate of Legal Affairs' report.

Furthermore, F having been warned that the migrant population could not be charged for the seasonal work card based on the executive decrees because the creation of fees for state services is a matter reserved to law, his willful conduct is evident, as he without any hesitation ignored that prohibition and instituted a new charge under the cover of a simple cooperation agreement (a normative source of much lower rank than an executive decree and far inferior to law), with the aggravating factor that the beneficiary of that money was no longer the State but FUNDEHCA. Lastly, it should be noted that it is possible that the breach of the State's single treasury principle (principio de caja única del Estado) does not signify the occurrence of illegal acts, but that does not affect the present case. It should be recalled that the cited principle was violated by the opening of the special current account to manage the funds coming from the charge that, thanks to the executive decrees, was made to migrants for the seasonal work card. But it has already been stated that what was done under the cover of those decrees constitutes illegal exaction, a crime for which the defendant was acquitted. The unlawful act for which F was convicted is that of extortion (concusión), which has its roots in what happened regarding the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Thus, it is evident that the issue of the opening of the special account is not linked to the configuration of the crime for which the former Minister becomes criminally liable. For all the foregoing, this ground of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXII.As a ninth ground, the appellant alleges illegal reasoning, breach of the principles of sound criticism (principios de la sana crítica), and that the challenged judgment is contradictory. In particular, F maintains that there is an inconsistency in the sentence issued against him, since it states that the defendants did not act in accordance with the Law when transferring the charge made to migrants from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to FUNDEHCA (he makes reference to page 667 of the judgment; folio 7491 in Volume XVII of the case file). He adds that the same resolution (referring to page 664 of the challenged sentence; folio 7488 in Volume XVII of the case file) indicates that the charge made based on the executive decrees was repealed. Based on these two statements by the trial court, the appellant maintains that there is no basis whatsoever to consider that the charge made by FUNDEHCA should have entered the State coffers. The claim is not admissible. As has been stated many times throughout this resolution, in this case we are dealing with two different charges. One was made based on the executive decrees, and the other purports to be supported by the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. What happens—as has been explained—is that in both cases the entity providing the service to the migrants is the Ministry; that ministry was the only one competent to grant the seasonal work card. This explains why any charge that might have been made for this concept should have entered the state coffers. It should be recalled that FUNDEHCA provided services to the Ministry, not to the migrants, so if anyone should have compensated that foundation, it was precisely the state body, not those who required the service from the Costa Rican State. In accordance with the foregoing, the fact that the questioned resolution says that one of the charges was repealed causes no harm whatsoever to the defendant F. In addition, it does not harm him that it is said that the intention was to transfer the charge that existed under the decrees to a situation governed by the agreement, because if the sentence is read as an integral piece, it is clear that this is not intended to indicate (as the appellant seeks to suggest) that there was a single charge (a circumstance that in the same judgment is deemed disproven, as explained in Considerandos VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution), but rather it is simply an idiomatic turn of phrase to explain that in a new reality (that governed by the cooperation agreement), the intention was to apply a concept (the charge) already known to be illegal from the preceding situation (what happened under the cover of the executive decrees). Based on all the foregoing, this ground of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXIII.As a tenth ground, F alleges illegal reasoning and arbitrary exclusion of evidence. He maintains that even though the sentencing court states that it knows of the existence of a contentious-administrative proceeding brought by FUNDEHCA against the State for the non-approval of the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the lower court (a quo) did not adjust to the prejudiciality rules that, in his opinion, that matter has over the one heard here. The claim is entirely improper. It has already been explained in this resolution that it is the criminal jurisdiction that is competent to rule on the legality of the agreement between the ministerial department and the foundation, so the declaration of such an agreement as illegal is in accordance with the Law, and the appellant must abide by that. The above reveals that the alleged prejudiciality of the contentious-administrative proceeding over the criminal one does not exist, but rather what is decided here affects that jurisdiction. In accordance with the foregoing, having notice of the existence of that other case does not prevent resolving what is appropriate in the criminal jurisdiction, so what was done causes no harm to the defendant, and by virtue of this, it is appropriate to declare this claim without merit.

XXIV.As an eleventh ground, F accuses illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). Specifically, he claims that the appealed sentence (see proven fact No. 27 at folio 6941 in Volume XVI) states that he took for his personal benefit the sum of three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) that on October 16, 1997, was deposited by his secretary into a personal account he had at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica; said monies came from the charges made to migrants at FUNDEHCA. He maintains that although it is true that for that particular account there is no record that in the days following that deposit, withdrawals were made that reaffirm his version that he returned the money, it is also true that it has not been verified whether he had other accounts, so it cannot be ruled out that he returned that money. He adds that the testimonies on which the court's assertion is based are contradictory and that it cannot be maintained that he gave the order for the sum in question to be deposited into his account. The claim must be rejected. Despite the fact that the arguments put forward by F could indeed be useful to question the lower court's (a quo) affirmation that he took for his personal benefit the three hundred thousand colones in question (¢300,000.00), the truth is that this is a completely irrelevant point for the purposes of the conviction issued against him for the crime of extortion (concusión). Firstly, it must be remembered that the trial court accredits the appropriation of that sum both in the list of proven facts (see fact 27 at folio 6941 in Volume XVI) and in the reasoning part directly related to the unlawful act for which F becomes criminally liable (see in particular folio 676 of the sentence; that is, folio 7500 in Volume XVII, located in the section dedicated to the analysis on the merits regarding the crime for which the defendant was sanctioned). What is important to highlight is that those three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) were the product of the payment that migrants made to FUNDEHCA, and after being collected by that entity, they reached F's account. This reveals that the crime was more than sufficiently configured when the transfer of the funds of interest here occurred, since FUNDEHCA had already received them thanks to the inducement that the accused had made for the migrants to pay in favor of that entity something they did not owe, so it is irrelevant to determine if he used them for his own benefit or returned them. Thus, for criminal purposes, the statement in question is something non-essential as support for the conviction, so it can be dispensed with without such action bringing any benefit to the accused. The statement of reference is equally inconsequential concerning the civil aspects derived from the punishable act, because the civil action for damages brought based on what constituted extortion (concusión) was declared without merit (in fact, regarding this accused, the civil claim was accepted only as it pertains to a peculation of services (peculado de servicios)). In accordance with all the foregoing, the questioned assertion causes no harm to the appellant, and therefore this argument must be declared without merit.

XXV.As a twelfth ground, the appellant posits that in this case there has been a lack of reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and breach of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). Specifically, he maintains that the possibility of deporting undocumented foreigners is based on the Immigration and Foreigners Act (Ley de Migración y Extranjería) and therefore it is not illegitimate to warn about it those who needed to apply for the seasonal work card. He maintains that it is not explained why migrants would have felt compelled to carry out the procedure for said document before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and before FUNDEHCA. He reiterates that Costa Rica was threatened by the large number of illegal immigrants inhabiting the country. He indicates that the cooperation agreement did not create a fee, but a voluntary tariff for the migrants. The claim must be rejected. What the appellant seeks is to disprove the configuration of the typical elements of the crime for which he was sanctioned. It was already set forth supra in Considerandos VI and VII of this judgment that the extortion (concusión) is duly accredited, and the appellant must abide by what was resolved there. It is worth adding—for greater abundance—that if by obtaining the seasonal work card migrants were authorized to work in the country, it is clear they could not be deported, and if to obtain the mentioned document it was a requirement to pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) to FUNDEHCA, it is evident that they were obliged to do so, because if they did not do it, they would not obtain the card, and without it they could be deported. Furthermore, the fact that this charge was taken as a requirement to obtain the card shows that it was not a voluntary expenditure on the part of the migrants. Lastly, the fact that the card had to be granted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security reveals that the mentioned charge was indeed a fee—created through a simple cooperation agreement, which demonstrates its illegality—for a public service.

XXVI.As a thirteenth ground, F alleges a lack of correlation between accusation and sentence. Specifically, he says that it is not the same to accuse that reports from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and internal bodies of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security indicate that the charge made to migrants based on the executive decrees is apparently illegal, and declaring such illegality in criminal court. He questions the affirmation that the extortion (concusión) derives from what was done based on the cooperation agreement between the ministerial department under his charge and FUNDEHCA. Likewise, he expresses his disagreement with the fact that it is considered that the charge made by FUNDEHCA to the migrants was mandatory. The reproach is improper. The appellant must abide by what has already been resolved in this ruling regarding the conformity with Law of determining in criminal court that the charges made to migrants (both the one made based on the executive decrees—illegal exaction now time-barred—and the one carried out under the cover of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security—which is the one of interest for the purposes of extortion (concusión)) for the seasonal work card are both illegal. Moreover, it should be highlighted that this situation of illegality derives directly from the facts accused, so no incongruence is observed. That the extortion (concusión) derives from what happened under the aegis of the mentioned agreement does not contradict the accusatory pleading either but rather derives from it. In any case, it should be noted that in the instances where the appellant claims there is no correlation of the sentence with the accusation, in none of them does the appellant specify what one says and what the other says, nor does he compare them, nor explain what the incompatibility consists of. In this sense, it is evident that no harm can be demonstrated, so this argument must be declared without merit.

XXVII.As a fourteenth ground, F considers that evidence fundamental to his interests was not taken. Specifically, he claims that four accounting studies should have been conducted, one in relation to the peculation of goods (peculado de bienes), another to the peculation of services (peculado de servicios), another to the extortion (concusión), and the fourth to the cost of the work card. The claim is unworthy of attention. F was not criminally convicted for any peculation, neither of services nor of goods, so the evidence he misses is irrelevant in the criminal sphere. It is true that he was civilly condemned in the abstract to compensate for the damage generated thanks to a peculation of services (peculado de servicios), but due to the type of condemnation, the accounting study will be relevant in the sentence execution phase, so it does not affect the resolution of interest here. As regards the extortion (concusión), it has already been stated here that this crime was configured in the case by the fact that F induced migrants to pay FUNDEHCA a sum of money they had no reason to pay, so it is inconsequential to know how much was collected as a product of that criminal activity, so the evidence missed is equally irrelevant for the purposes of proving this unlawful act. The same lack of consequence is observed in what refers to the cost of the work card, because it does not matter how much the work assigned to FUNDEHCA by former Minister F would have cost, since that was a task that could not be charged to the migrants. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit.

XXVIII.As a first ground on the merits (por el fondo), the appellant alleges erroneous application of substantive law, since Article 27 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) was not applied. He considers that in this case it was proven that he acted under a state of necessity (estado de necesidad) that justifies his conduct. He recalls the state of relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1995 and the urgency of taking measures to attend to the migrant population and avoid the collapse of services. The reproach is not admissible. The accused must abide by what was already resolved in Considerando IX of this ruling, in which it is explained why in this case there is no state of necessity (estado de necesidad) whatsoever to justify his conduct.

XXIX.As a second ground for defects in judging (vicios in iudicando), F alleges that Article 348 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) could not be applied, since it was not proven that he acted willfully. The claim is unworthy of attention. It was already set forth in Considerandos VII, IX, and X of this judgment why it is duly proven that F committed the crime of extortion (concusión) and that his conduct was willful, to which the appellant must abide.

XXX.As a third ground on the merits (por el fondo), the appellant alleges that Article 71 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) was violated, since the eight-year prison sentence imposed on him is outside any parameter of proportionality. This issue was examined in Considerando XIII of this ruling, and the appellant must abide by what was resolved there.

XXXI.Regarding the appeal filed on behalf of J. For reasons of systematic order, since it contains an argument in which the appellants are correct and which affects the challenged judgment, the two grounds on the merits (por el fondo) will be resolved jointly and firstly. Starting at folio 8539 in Volume XXI of the case file (which contains only the cassation appeal filed by J's defense attorneys), Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas make an exhaustive critique of each and every one of the substantive points on which their client's conviction is based. Despite separating into two sections their arguments on why they believe the criminal law was erroneously applied to the conduct proven against their defendant, they actually raise a single problem, which is that J is not criminally liable for the extortion (concusión) and that even if he were, he would be as an accessory and not as a co-perpetrator, which would affect the proportionality of the imposed sentence. Hence, it is appropriate to issue a single pronouncement on the subject. Specifically, the appellants maintain that their defendant's signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was considered in the judgment as a preparatory act for the commission of the crime for which J was sanctioned. They say that apart from that conduct in the preparatory phase, there is no other that fits within the type of extortion (concusión). They consider that in this state of affairs, J could never be considered a co-perpetrator of said unlawful act, nor even a participant, since his intervention did not occur in the execution phase but in a prior, non-punishable stage. They affirm that if the extortion (concusión) was committed from the moment the executive decrees were issued, which initially supported the charge to migrants for issuing the seasonal work card, and the accused in question did not have the sufficient authority to issue said normative instruments, then he cannot be held criminally responsible for the crime in question. They point out that it has not been demonstrated that J had knowledge of the illegality of the actions of the co-defendant F. They add that if extortion (concusión) is a crime in which the active subject must be a public official, and their defendant is not one, then this circumstance could not be attributed to him as a perpetrator, but as a participant. They consider that in this case, the defense of fulfilling a legal duty was left unapplied, since the migratory problem occurring in Costa Rica in the mid-nineteen-nineties had to be addressed. They allege that their client acted under the concurrence of an error of fact (error de tipo), since he did not know that the charge to migrants was illegal. Finally, they state that what J did would also fall within an error of prohibition (error de prohibición), since he was convinced that the cooperation agreement was valid and did not require approval from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). The claim is partially successful. In accordance with what will be set forth below, certainly J cannot be considered a co-perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión)—the appellants are correct in that—but he is an accessory to it, so he becomes criminally liable, although not in the way the lower court (a quo) established. As set forth supra in Considerando VII, the crime of extortion (concusión) is configured based on what happened regarding the drafting and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Thus, everything referring to whether J participated in the drafting and execution procedure of the executive decrees on which the charge to migrants was based for some time is inconsequential, because this would be related to the illegal exaction regarding which the lower court (a quo) declared the action time-barred. What matters is to know what his level of intervention was concerning the crime of extortion (concusión). According to the facts deemed proven (see folio 6938 in Volume XVI), J, knowing of the objections regarding the illegality of charging migrants for issuing the seasonal work card, drafts, develops, and signs the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, after which it is implemented, with this defendant serving as Executive Director of the foundation. It should be noted that J's knowledge of the illegality of the charge to migrants is duly grounded starting from folio 7472 in Volume XVII, because regardless of the empathy between him and F, what matters is that the latter noted on the report of the Internal Audit Directorate (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which questioned the charge to migrants' conformity to the legal system, that this document had to be studied by the former (see folio 7475 in the last mentioned volume; incidentally, J testified at trial and admitted that F had commented to him about the obstacles facing the seasonal work card program; see folio 7127 in Volume XVI), making it evident that these defendants had contact and discussed the problem. Moreover, as stated in the same Considerando VII, the illegality of that charge was evident and could be clearly extracted from the criteria expressed by both the Internal Audit Directorate (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the procedure body regarding that topic. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to understand that both defendants, due to their closeness as well as the undeniable fact that they shared information and exchanged opinions on the objections raised, knew that charging migrants for the public service of granting the seasonal work card was contrary to the legal system. In accordance with the foregoing, J, like F, was aware of the illegality of said charge, despite which he signed the mentioned agreement and partially directed its execution, in his capacity as Executive Director of FUNDEHCA. It is evident, then, that the client of the appellants here did participate in the acts for which F was declared the perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión). What must now be clarified is whether he becomes criminally liable for his intervention. This Chamber (Sala) considers that he does, but not as a co-perpetrator (which was what the lower court, a quo, resolved), but as an accessory. In accordance with the proven facts, what J did was knowingly lend his cooperation to F to ensure that migrants made a payment they did not owe in favor of FUNDEHCA. The defendant represented by the appellants here signed and implemented, in his capacity as Executive Director of FUNDEHCA, the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry led by F. The entire drafting phase and even the signing of the agreement itself could possibly be placed among the preparatory acts of the crime of extortion (concusión), as mentioned by Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas (who extract some phrases from the challenged judgment that they use as support for their argument). Despite the fact that J's representatives might be correct in that, the truth is that the execution (an aspect that was not classified by the lower court, a quo—not even in the excerpt of the sentence used by the claimants—as a preparatory act) of the mentioned agreement is clearly placed within the execution phase of the unlawful act, so it is in relation to the fulfillment of the agreement that actions by the accused arise that bring him criminal responsibility. It was already set forth supra (see Considerando VII) that the crime of extortion (concusión) comes into legal existence thanks to what happens around the signing and implementation of the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement. It is thanks to this instrument that F managed to improperly charge migrants a sum of money destined for a third party, which was FUNDEHCA. As Executive Director of that foundation, J, who knew that migrants could not be charged for the service provided to them by the State (it should be remembered that granting the seasonal work card never left the scope of the attributions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security), implemented the agreement, thereby contributing substantially with the former Minister in the execution of the crime of interest here. However, that contribution fits only the provisions of Article 47 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) and not those stipulated in Article 45 of the same normative body. J cannot be considered a co-perpetrator of extortion (concusión), because not only was he not a public official when he collaborated with F in the commission of the unlawful act for which the latter was convicted, but he also did not have the possibility of abusing a public office, since he held none, nor could he compel or induce the migrants to make the improper payment in the terms of Article 348 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), since to do so requires abusing the public post. In other words, he does not carry out the criminal offense jointly with F, because he does not meet the conditions to do so. What J did do was assist F so that the latter, who was a public official (one of the highest-ranking in the Costa Rican State), determined that the migrants make an illegal payment in favor of a private entity that provided no service to them (it should be recalled that FUNDEHCA served the State, but the migrants' relationship was with the State and not with that foundation). For all the foregoing, it is appropriate to accept only the part of the claim referring to the manner in which J participated in the events of interest in this case, so his conduct must be reclassified to the degree of accessory. Finally, it should be noted that in this case there is no type of error operating in favor of this defendant, neither error of fact (error de tipo) nor error of prohibition (error de prohibición). It has already been set forth here that this defendant indeed knew it was illegal to charge migrants for granting the seasonal work card. That being the case, there was no possibility whatsoever of incurring an error regarding the improper nature of the charge that F devised to carry out through a cooperation agreement that only bound FUNDEHCA to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but could not impose obligations on the migrants. Furthermore, there is no error whatsoever regarding knowledge of the unlawfulness, because this was reflected in the reports that J discussed with F. Lastly, as has been indicated several times in this resolution, there was never a state of necessity (estado de necesidad) that justifies or exonerates the accused. In accordance with all the foregoing, the cassation appeal on the merits (por el fondo) filed by Drs. Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is declared partially successful, and consequently, the challenged sentence is overturned (se casa), and J is declared an accessory responsible for the crime of extortion (concusión), for which the penalty of THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT is imposed. For a probation period of five years, J is granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence (condena de ejecución condicional). Regarding the penalty imposed on J, it must be explained that it is proportional to what this accused did. It should be remembered that he becomes criminally liable as an accessory in the crime of extortion (concusión) committed by F, which implies that a less severe penalty than that of the perpetrator of the unlawful act can be imposed on him, as stipulated in Article 74 of the Penal Code (Código Penal). The undersigned Judges (Magistrados) consider that although it is true that the act of forcing migrant persons to make an improper payment is very serious, it is also true that the level of reproachability of J for that crime is much lower than that of F, so he deserves a lesser sanction than the latter. His participation occurred to find the means by which the illegal charge to migrants was created, and that is serious, but considerably less so than inducing that population to make it, which is what F did, so there is indeed a substantial difference between the two conducts, with the accessory's being less onerous in this case, so it was deemed proportional to impose the penalty of three years of imprisonment. Moreover, for meeting the requirements established in Articles 59 and 60 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), J is granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence (condena de ejecución condicional).

XXXII.As a first ground relating to procedural errors (por la forma), the private defense attorneys for this defendant allege a lack of correlation between accusation and sentence.

Specifically, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim the following: a) they maintain that in the charging instrument, J is attributed with having signed the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, whereas in the judgment it is indicated that he drafted it, which causes him grievance since the latter is a case of principal liability (autoría) while the former is one of complicity (complicidad); and b) they indicate that in the judgment the iter criminis described in the accusation was altered to hold J liable as a co-perpetrator (coautor) instead of an accomplice (cómplice). The claim is not admissible. Firstly, it must be stated that no substantial variation occurred between what was accused and what was proven, since the essential core of facts is the same. What did occur in this case was an erroneous application of the substantive law, since J certainly could not be sanctioned as a co-perpetrator (coautor), but rather should have been sanctioned as an accomplice (cómplice) to the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión). This error by the lower court (a quo) has already been corrected by this Chamber in the preceding Considerando, so there is no interest in discussing whether the accusation was respected regarding its narration of complicity (complicidad). Furthermore, it is necessary to note that the iter criminis has not been altered, given that the defendant of interest here did indeed participate—as indicated in the preceding section—in the executive phase of the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión). For the foregoing reasons, this argument is declared without merit.

XXXIII.As a second ground regarding form, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim a violation of due process in relation to the procedure followed by the Trial Court to issue the judgment. Specifically, they consider that the deadline for issuing the appealed decision was not respected. They point out that it was not indicated when the trial debate concluded, nor when the deliberation began. The objection is not admissible. As stated supra in Considerando XIV, although it is true that the deadlines for issuing the judgment are peremptory in the Code of Criminal Procedure (and therefore the criterion issued in judgment No. 565-F-93 of this Chamber, from 9:05 a.m. on October 22, 1993, is not applicable to matters processed under this normative body) and that they were disregarded in this matter, it is also true that the parties contributed to causing the error, so that under the terms of Article 424 of the procedural ordinance, it cannot be established that they suffered any grievance. Moreover, it must be highlighted that at folio 6820 in Volume XV, it is recorded that the extraordinary deadline requested by the trial judges from the parties was for deliberating and drafting the judgment, so it is evident that upon concluding said hearing, they proceeded to fulfill such acts, thus it is indeed determined when the debate was concluded and the deliberative phase began. For the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XXXIV.As a third ground for procedural defects (vicios in procedendo), the private defense attorneys for J accuse a lack of reasoning, insofar as it would not be explained why opening a checking account for managing the funds FUNDEHCA received from charging migrants would be part of a perpetrator's plan. The objection must be rejected. J's criminal liability derives from the help he provided to F in inducing the migrants to make an undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA. As stated supra in Considerando XXXI, the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security facilitated the other defendant in committing extortion by a public official (concusión). Evidently, the management of the funds entering the foundation derived from the execution of the agreement between that legal entity and the ministerial portfolio, because it was thanks to this agreement that the money arrived at the entity. What matters is that regardless of whether said account was opened or not, the agreement was being executed and the migrants were paying FUNDEHCA a sum they had no reason to pay to that organization. Thus, the crime would have been consummated even if the mentioned checking account had not been opened, which shows how irrelevant—for the purposes of the conviction against J—the issue in question is. For the stated reasons, the claim is declared without merit.

XXXV.As a fourth ground, the appellants argue that the defect of lack of reasoning exists regarding the existence of a close bond between J and F. The argument is not admissible. To be an accomplice (cómplice) to a crime, one only needs to assist or collaborate with the perpetrator (autor), without it mattering whether they are close individuals or friends. In this matter, it has been duly demonstrated that J helped F commit the extortion by a public official (concusión) and that he did so through the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. What is important to highlight is that this happened, so it becomes irrelevant whether it was due to a close bond between them or for any other reason. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the claim without merit.

XXXVI.As a fifth ground, the reasoning of the lower court's (a quo) assertion that J opened FUNDEHCA's checking account using a copy of a certification is challenged. As a sixth ground, it is claimed that it is not duly reasoned why J waited twelve business days to sign the account opening. As a seventh ground, it is argued that the friendship bond between F and J is duly proven. The objections are inadmissible. As indicated in Considerando XXXIV, regardless of the opening of the aforementioned checking account, J's liability derives from the help he provided to F to commit the extortion by a public official (concusión), which consisted of lending his assistance to sign and implement the cooperation agreement cited so many times. Furthermore, it was indicated in Considerando XXXV that complicity (complicidad) does not depend on proving that the accomplice (cómplice) has a close bond with the perpetrator (autor). Based on what was resolved in due course, what is claimed here becomes irrelevant for the purpose of sustaining the conviction against him, so the objections must be declared without merit.

XXXVII.As an eighth ground, the Trial Court's assertion that J was involved in the development of the seasonal work card program, and how it is possible that he performed acts characteristic of principal liability (autoría) for the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión), is accused of being improperly reasoned. The claim is not admissible. It was already stated in Considerando XXXI that in this particular case, the knowledge J had of the illegality of charging migrants for the seasonal work card is indeed duly established, despite which he signed the cooperation agreement and thus facilitated F in committing the extortion by a public official (concusión). Furthermore, it was explained in that same section why J is an accomplice (cómplice) and not a co-perpetrator (coautor) of that crime. What matters is that from that section it is inferred that J's complicity (complicidad) does not depend on him being in charge of the seasonal work card program, and it is precisely because he does not meet the requirements to be considered a co-perpetrator (coautor) that he is considered an accomplice (cómplice). Therefore, this objection must be declared without merit.

XXXVIII.As a ninth ground, it is stated that it is not reasoned why what happened regarding the executive decrees that regulated the seasonal work card program between 1995 and 1997 would result in criminal liability for J. The argument is not admissible. It was set forth supra in Considerandos VII and VIII that the charge supported by the executive decrees alluded to here was what sustained the illegal exaction for which the criminal action was declared time-barred. It was indicated in those sections that the extortion by a public official (concusión) derived from what happened concerning the drafting and signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, since through that instrument the obligation was established for migrants to make a payment known to be illegal. That is to say, his liability does not derive from the charge made based on the executive decrees, but rather is based on the charge established in the agreement. Hence, the claim that it is not reasoned what penal consequences would result for this defendant from what happened regarding the first of said charges lacks interest, since no criminal liability for J has derived therefrom. For the stated reasons, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXXIX.As a tenth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas question the assertion that J had a marked interest in FUNDEHCA intervening quickly in the charge for the seasonal work card. The argument is not admissible. As stated supra in Considerando XXXV, the only thing that matters to establish complicity (complicidad) on J's part is that he knowingly assisted F in committing the extortion by a public official (concusión), an aspect that is duly demonstrated (see Considerando XXXI of this ruling). Thus, it is completely without interest that it be affirmed he sought for FUNDEHCA to intervene quickly in the charge for the seasonal work card, since what matters is that he did so and that entity was the one benefited by the undue payment made by the migrants. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XL. As an eleventh ground, a lack of reasoning is claimed regarding several aspects, such as why the charge for the seasonal work card could not be transferred from the Ministry to FUNDEHCA, why only Nicaraguans are mentioned if there are migrants of other nationalities, why funds destined for FUNDEHCA are questioned if it is a non-profit entity, and why the beneficiary of these fund diversions would be J. The claim is not admissible. It was set forth supra in Considerandos VII and VIII the reason why no charge for the issuance of the seasonal work card could be created, except by law. Furthermore, it was set forth therein why FUNDEHCA fits within the concept of "third party" mentioned in Article 348 of the Penal Code. Thus, it is evident that it was indeed reasoned why migrants could not be charged for the state service consisting of issuing the seasonal work card. Moreover, for purposes of extortion by a public official (concusión), what matters is that the payment be made to a third party; FUNDEHCA being that third party in the relationship between the State and the migrants, the crime is considered established, without it mattering whether it is a for-profit entity or not. Since the crime arose legally from the moment the charge was made in favor of the foundation, it becomes irrelevant whether those funds ultimately benefited any particular person, so the assertion that J was benefited can be removed without the crime or his participation in it disappearing. Finally, it should be indicated that it is irrelevant that some sections of the appealed judgment emphasize Nicaraguan migrants, since from the accused and proven facts it is inferred that the illegal charge was made to all migrants. In any case, even if only those from the sister Republic of Nicaragua had been charged, the crime would still have been consummated. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XLI. As a twelfth ground, a lack of reasoning is alleged regarding why by October 6, 1997, J would have knowledge of the process to repeal decree No. 24811-MTSS (which is the one supporting the charge made for the seasonal work card in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Furthermore, the lack of reasoning regarding the impact of a pending contentious-administrative proceeding, in which the validity of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the cited ministerial portfolio is being discussed, is accused. The objections are not admissible. As stated in Considerando XXXI of this ruling, J knew that it was illegal to charge migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card and still helped F do it. His complicity (complicidad) derives from this, so it is irrelevant whether or not he knew that the decree authorizing the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (not FUNDEHCA) to charge for that service was going to be repealed (recall that the seasonal work card program had its legal basis in a decree distinct from those that regulated the charge for that document, but none of them authorized charging money in favor of a private entity). What J did know by that October 6, 1997, the date he signed the agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry headed by F, is that it was illegal to charge migrants for that service, despite which he signed the agreement in which a new charge was created, but this time in favor of the foundation he represented. Furthermore, throughout this ruling it has been explained why it is within the criminal jurisdiction that it is appropriate to declare the illegality of the agreement, so it is this venue that prejudges what may be decided in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. For the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XLII. As a thirteenth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas question the assertion that J had knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants for issuing the seasonal work card, as well as having the intention of personally benefiting from the funds destined for FUNDEHCA. The claim must be rejected. The issue of J's knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants has already been duly resolved in Considerando XXXI of this judgment. Furthermore, it was also stated in this ruling that the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión) was consummated from the moment the undue payment of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of FUNDEHCA was established, without it mattering who ultimately benefited from that money. For the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLIII. As a fourteenth ground, the appellants argue a lack of reasoning insofar as it is not explained why Article 16 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic is violated, nor why a public entity cannot have various bank accounts, nor why the charges supported by the executive decrees were illegitimate. The argument is not admissible. It can be observed that the cause of disagreement expressed by the appellants with this argument relates to the charges made to migrants based on the executive decrees. As explained supra in Considerandos VII, VIII, and mainly X, that charge is distinct from the one made based on the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. J is considered an accomplice (cómplice) for what happened in relation to the latter, not for what happened regarding the others, on which the illegal exaction whose criminal action was deemed time-barred is based. Thus, matters related to the violation of the single treasury account principle and the payment made by migrants for a certain time in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (which is different from the act in favor of FUNDEHCA), do not affect J's conviction, so they are not capable of causing him grievance and therefore this part of the challenge is declared without merit.

XLIV. As a fifteenth ground, the private defense attorneys for J claim lack of reasoning regarding why it was required that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic endorse (refrendara) the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, it is questioned why it is indicated that such agreement is illegal, if it has not been declared so. The objection is unfounded. It has already been set forth supra in Considerandos XI, XVI, and XVII—to which the appellants must adhere—why it is in the criminal jurisdiction where it must be decided whether the cited agreement conforms to Law or not. Having established that this instrument is manifestly illegal, it becomes irrelevant to discuss whether the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic should have endorsed (refrendarlo) it or not. Furthermore, it is clear that there is an express declaration of illegality, which has been made by the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent one to do so. Thus, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLV. As a sixteenth ground, a lack of reasoning is claimed insofar as the appealed judgment would not have duly established that J, having the obligation to do so, omitted sending the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic for its endorsement (refrendo). Furthermore, it questions the affirmation that the Office of the Comptroller General would refuse to endorse (refrendar) the agreement. It also questions the affirmation that the oversight body would have declared the illegality of the mentioned instrument. The objections are not admissible. As has been stated throughout this judgment, the illegality of the oft-mentioned agreement has been declared in the competent venue for it, which is the criminal one. Furthermore, it has been explained on several occasions why it is irrelevant to discuss whether or not that agreement should have been sent for endorsement (refrendo) by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. In any case, it must be indicated that the oversight entity did refuse to endorse (refrendar) the agreement, as recorded at folio 1693 in Volume III, and the reasons it gave for not endorsing it were the following: 1) that by having put said contract into execution before endorsing it, a ground for its absolute nullity was incurred (it should be noted that from this reasoning it is inferred that for the Office of the Comptroller General it was evident that the beneficiary of that "agreement" was the Ministry directed by F, so that it was that body that should pay for the services provided by FUNDEHCA, therefore it is an onerous contract of the type that required approval from the oversight body); 2) that attributions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security were being transferred to FUNDEHCA, apart from the fact that a charge known to be illegal was being created; 3) that F could not contract with FUNDEHCA since not only he himself, but also his son were founding members of that entity, so he had to comply with the provisions of Article 22 of the Administrative Contracting Law; 4) that the ordinary contracting procedure was not followed, without specifying why it was dispensed with; 5) that sufficient documentation was not attached to prove that J was authorized to sign that agreement. Thus, it is evident that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic gave legality reasons (some formal, but the most important substantive) for not endorsing (refrendar) the agreement, so the lower court's (a quo) affirmations have the proper evidentiary support and reasoning, as those arguments from the oversight body were set forth by the Trial Court throughout the appealed resolution. For the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLVI. As a seventeenth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas argue a lack of reasoning insofar as it is not explained why the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had to be sent for endorsement (refrendo) by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The claim is not admissible. It has already been stated repeatedly throughout this ruling (see Considerandos XI, XVI, XVII, and XLV) that it is irrelevant to discuss whether the cited agreement should have been endorsed or not, since what matters is that it has already been declared openly illegal in the competent instance for it, which is the criminal one. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XLVII. As an eighteenth ground, J's defense attorneys question that it is not reasoned whether he signed the agreement with authorization from the Board of Directors of FUNDEHCA and whether he knew the terms of the agreement before signing it. The objection is not admissible. It has been stated here that the knowledge J had of the illegality of the charge to migrants created in that instrument is duly reasoned. Given that this is established, it is irrelevant whether he had the endorsement of the Board of Directors to sign that document, because in any case what matters is that he did it knowing that he was helping F induce the migrants to make an undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA. Furthermore, it is obvious that J was aware of the terms of the agreement, since it has been clear that he knew of the illegality of the charge established therein and still signed it. For the stated reasons, this claim is declared without merit.

XLVIII. As a nineteenth ground, J's representatives maintain that it has not been set forth how their client would have incurred the abuses of office attributed to the former Minister of Labor and Social Security who appears here as a defendant. The objection is not admissible. It was already set forth supra in Considerando XXXI that J could not incur such abuses because he did not hold public office and furthermore, it was not he who induced the migrants to make the undue payment, but rather his intervention is limited to collaborating with F in that sense. That is why his conduct was reclassified to the degree of complicity (complicidad) and his sentence was reduced. Thus, the statements now challenged do not cause grievance to the accused. Therefore, this argument is declared without merit.

XLIX. As a twentieth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas accuse a violation of due process because the Trial Court allegedly attributed a generic responsibility to J for everything that occurred. The claim is not admissible. It was already stated in Considerando XXXI that J's criminal liability derives from the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. That intervention was indeed attributed to the defendant, so that even if there are errors in attributing other facts to him, that particular one is indeed constitutive of a crime, so no grievance whatsoever has been caused to this defendant. Thus, it is appropriate to declare this objection without merit.

L. As a twenty-first ground, the appellants accuse a lack of reasoning, considering it contradictory, insofar as it is not explained what means were used to induce the migrants to make the undue payment. The objection must be dismissed. It was set forth supra in Considerandos VII and VIII how the assertion that F induced the migrants to make the undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA is duly reasoned, given that it was established as a requirement to process the seasonal work card. Furthermore, recall that J's criminal liability for these facts derives from the assistance he provided to F, without it mattering—because he is an accomplice (cómplice—whether or not it was he who induced the migrants to make said expenditure; what matters is that he helped the perpetrator (autor) of the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión)commit it. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

LI. As a twenty-second ground, the reasoning of the assertion made by the Trial Court that J used funds entering FUNDEHCA for his own benefit, because he bought carpets, is questioned. The appellants consider that it was never disproven that the foundation had lent that money to the defendant. The claim is not admissible. As has been indicated throughout this ruling (see Considerandos VI, VII, and VIII), the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión) arose legally from the moment the migrants were induced to make an undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA. Thus, the final use given to the money collected by that entity is of no interest for the purposes of establishing the crime, so it is not important to know if J bought the mentioned carpets with money lent to him by FUNDEHCA, because even if that were true, the crime of which he is an accomplice (cómplice) would still exist. For the foregoing, this part of the challenge is declared without merit.

LII. As a twenty-third ground regarding form, the private defense attorneys for J claim that the appealed judgment was not reasoned regarding how their client would have abused the qualities of a public official and thereby induced the migrants to make the undue payment. In the twenty-fourth ground, the claim is reiterated that it is not stated in what manner their client induced the making of said expenditure. In the twenty-fifth ground, it is argued that it is not explained why the agreement is illegal nor why it had to be endorsed (refrendado) by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The objections are not admissible. The appellants must adhere to what was resolved in Considerandos VI, VII, VIII, XI, XVI, XXXI, XLVIII, and L, in which it is resolved why this is indeed a case of extortion by a public official (concusión), why the charge was illegal, how the migrants were induced to make an undue payment, why the principle of legal reservation was violated, why it is not relevant to discuss whether the cooperation agreement should have been endorsed, why the illegality of this instrument has been correctly declared in the criminal jurisdiction, from which facts J's criminal liability derives, why he is an accomplice (cómplice) and not a co-perpetrator (coautor) of extortion by a public official (concusión), as well as why it is not of interest to resolve this last problem based on form, because on the merits it has already been duly resolved.

LIII. As a twenty-sixth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim that a contradiction is incurred insofar as J is exonerated from liability for the crime of fraudulent administration for the use of FUNDEHCA's assets, and then that same use is utilized to sustain the extortion by a public official (concusión). The argument cannot succeed. It was stated supra in Considerando VIII why the acquittal for the crime of fraudulent administration did not affect the conviction for extortion by a public official (concusión). The appellants must adhere to this, as it is applicable to J's case. Furthermore, it has also been explained in this judgment that the crime was consummated from the moment the migrants were induced to make the undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA, a fact which is unaffected by how those funds were managed after they entered the foundation. Therefore, this part of the challenge is declared without merit.

LIV. As a twenty-seventh ground, the problem of whether J obligated or induced the migrants to make the undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA is raised again. Let the appellants adhere to what was resolved in Considerando XXXI regarding why J is criminally liable as an accomplice (cómplice) to the extortion by a public official (concusión).

LV. As a twenty-eighth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas maintain that the assertion that the migrants were induced into error or deceived, because they believed they were paying the money to the Costa Rican Government, is not reasoned. The claim is not admissible. What matters for the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión) is that through the abusive exercise of his office, the public official induces a person to give or promise an undue pecuniary benefit in favor of a third party. That is what is duly established in this case and that the perpetrator (autor) of that conduct is F (Considerando VII), who acted with the assistance of J (Considerando XXXI). Thus, it becomes completely irrelevant to know whether the determination of the migrants' will was due to deception or not, since what matters is that they were required to make the undue payment. In any case, what is established is that through flyers it was announced that paying that money to FUNDEHCA was a requirement, and this aspect is undeniable, regardless of whether it can be classified as deceptive or not. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit.

LVI. As a twenty-ninth ground (the appellants call it twenty-eighth, according to what is observed at folio 8537 in Volume XXI or page 178 of the brief), it is questioned whether the migrants were capable of understanding the compulsion. The claim is not admissible. What is held as demonstrated in this case is that the migrants were induced to make an illegal payment in favor of FUNDEHCA, and it is recorded that this payment was established as a requirement to process their seasonal work card. That is, they were induced to make that illegal payment, and for this F abused his office. Furthermore, J helped F commit that crime.

That is what matters for purposes of determining the criminal liability of these defendants, without it being relevant to know whether the migrants were capable or not of knowing that they were being urged to make said payment, because even if they did not know, the fact is that F motivated them to do so and for that he had the assistance of J. Thus, this argument must be dismissed.

LVII. On the appeal in favor of M. For reasons of procedural economy, since there is one ground on which licensed attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defender of the accused M, is correct, the second ground on procedural grounds is resolved immediately. Attorney Navas Montero alleges a lack of reasoning, for assessing the respective evidence without following the guidelines of sound criticism, regarding the reason why M's alleged subordinates obeyed her. She indicates that the accused was not appointed as F's assistant when he held the position of Minister of Labor and Social Security, nor was she entrusted with administrative tasks. She argues that despite being the Director of the Minister's Office, this only made her a liaison officer and that in any case the position did not formally exist. She considers that it cannot be derived from that position that she had command authority over the staff. She considers that it is not duly proven that by signing the checks corresponding to trips within the country she was certifying that they were carried out. She adds that the evidence shows that it was Mrs. Isela Hernández who handled matters related to the trips and that there is no explanation as to why the public servants involved in the check problem would have been subject to M and not to the Administrative Director, a position held by Mrs. X. The appellant points out that there is no explanation as to why M performed the administrative tasks required for the crime of embezzlement (peculado) to occur, since custody of petty cash (caja chica) funds corresponds to the budget officer of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security itself, Mrs. Dora Orozco, as provided in Articles 23 and 24 of the Organic Law of said ministerial portfolio. She points out that witness Norman Araya, who served as internal auditor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on the date the facts of interest here occurred, stated in the hearing that the execution of trips depended, according to Article 14 of the Financial Administration Law, on petty cash and that this was guarded by the budget officer. She states that even admitting that M was a trusted employee of the Minister of Labor and Social Security, that does not make her responsible for administering institutional funds. She reiterates that her client could not divert funds. She states that it was never explained why other officials should obey her client. The objection is admissible. In accordance with the list of proven facts (see folio 6946 in Volume XVI), the accused entered service at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security as of May 8, 1994, since she was to take charge of an office dedicated to international relations. She served as Director of the Minister's Office and became his main assistant, so she acquired a lot of power within the institution, therefore she exercised command authority over the other public servants. She was authorized by former Minister F to sign travel expense settlements, thereby certifying that the trips had taken place, because if they had not occurred, then she should not sign. If the expense was justified as an official trip, M had to sign a travel allowance (viáticos) settlement order, which had to come signed by the requesting official and then the signatures of the Ministry's Chief Officer (Oficial Mayor) and the Budget Officer (Oficial Presupuestal) had to be collected, who “in their respective order, endorsed the authorization of the settlement and issued the corresponding check, as administrative and financial controls” (folio 6947 in Volume XVI). The judges point out that in this way, M had the authority to dispose of the item budgetarily allocated for trips by officials of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. According to the factual framework established by the trial court, M took advantage of her ability to dispose of those funds and instructed R and MR to fill out travel expense forms in the name of other officials subordinate to the Minister's Office, so that they would sign them and manage the collection for trips not taken. The trial judges point out that the other public servants participated in that fraudulent collection, because M had command authority over them. Thus, she authorized the settlement of expenses and irregularly justified the payment of travel allowances for trips not taken and in this way a total was unduly paid (through checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 and 5905, all from checking account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account (Cuenta Caja Chica)) amounting to one hundred fifty-four thousand nine hundred colones (¢154,900.00) for fraudulent travel settlements. Having summarized the above, it must be said that in the opinion of the undersigned Magistrates, it is not duly substantiated so far how M assumed, by reason of her position, the administration of the funds with which travel allowances for trips within the country were paid. It can be seen on folio 7587 in Volume XVII that the lower court (a quo) states the following: “As we have indicated, although it is true that she did not physically have those funds under her guardianship (tutela), the status of active subject of this illicit act is conferred upon her by that faculty of disposition which implies an administration of the same.” That is, according to the trial court, M did not exercise direct custody (tutela) of the funds. Then the crime could only be configured if she had the funds under her administration or if she received them, in both cases by reason of her position. As the Court focuses on the issue of how she administered them, it must be understood that it implicitly ruled out that she had received them. Thus, to convict M as the perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement, the judging body should have explained why it is that she had—by reason of her position—the administration of the petty cash funds. It was already stated in this Recital (Considerando) that the Court considered it proven that travel settlements within the country require a requesting public servant who signs it. Then, according to what was demonstrated in this case, M had to sign it, but afterwards the signatures of the Chief Officer and of the person holding the position of Budget Officer were required, these latter two as administrative and financial controllers. Now, if the judging body locates M's signature (to whom F would have entrusted that task) as one within the process of authorizing the payment of travel allowances and after her signature the intervention of two more controllers is required, then it would seem that what is described is a phase of oversight of the proper use of public funds. That is, it would be a stage of ensuring that those funds are given proper destination and that would refer precisely to the custody of those funds, but the lower court expressly ruled out that she guarded them, so that possibility cannot now be contemplated. The problem is that despite describing a process of oversight, it denies that this constitutes custody of public funds, compounded by the fact that it does not describe in what way it is that she could have disposed of them, which is what could be framed as their administration (see the conceptual elaboration of what it is to administer, guard and receive public funds in this Chamber's judgment No. 2000-01312, of 9:30 a.m. on November 10, 2000). So far, nothing more has been said than that signing the expense settlement is equivalent to certifying that the trip existed. But it has not been explained why that would be equivalent to saying that M disposed (that is, decided what should be done) of the funds allocated to the payment of travel allowances for trips within the country, especially if after her signature two more were required, which precisely the administrative and financial controllers had to affix. As can be seen, there is a significant error on the part of the sentencing body in substantiating why M must be considered an administrator, by reason of her position, of public funds, which affects the reasoning for her conviction as perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement, since it is not duly motivated so far why her conduct fits within the assumptions of the statutory definition. Thus, it being proven that the defect alleged by the appellant occurs in this case, this claim must be upheld and, consequently, the appealed judgment and the hearing that preceded it are annulled, only in what concerns the case against M for the crime of embezzlement related to checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 and 5905, all from checking account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account, and the matter is ordered remanded to the court of origin for new proceedings on that single aspect, this time in accordance with Law. Having resolved this part of the appeal as has been done, it becomes unnecessary to issue a ruling regarding the remaining claims, since the purpose pursued by them, which is the annulment of M's conviction for the crime of embezzlement and the remand of the case for a new trial for what was attributed to her in relation to the mentioned checks.

LVIII. On the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República). As the sole ground on procedural grounds, licensed attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo maintains that the statute of limitations (prescripción) was erroneously applied in favor of F for the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). She considers that after the first formal charging of F, the statute of limitations period is not reduced by half, but rather runs again in its entirety. The claim is not admissible. This Chamber has already definitively resolved how the statute of limitations periods for criminal prosecution are computed. Indeed, through judgment No. 2002-00383 of 9:40 a.m. on April 30, 2002, it was indicated that the reduction of periods by half occurs on a single occasion, which is when some of the interrupting circumstances provided for in Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) first occurs. In the case of the accused F, the first interrupting circumstance that occurred was formally charging him with the crimes, which took place on November 26, 1998, when he was questioned (indagatoria). The maximum penalty for the crime of illegal exaction being one year of imprisonment, the action to prosecute it would normally have prescribed in three years, as provided in Article 31 subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the first formal charging (the questioning) was in turn the first interrupting circumstance of the statute of limitations period that occurred with respect to this accused, therefore, as of that November 26, 1998, not only is the computation of the statute of limitations interrupted, but the period is also reduced by half, that is, to eighteen months, which expired on May 26, 2000. Between both dates, no other interrupting circumstance is observed (the legislative reform that provides as such the resolution that convenes for the first time a preliminary hearing is subsequent to the date on which the statute of limitations expired), for which reason the lower court is correct in considering that the crime of illegal exaction was time-barred when it proceeded to issue judgment. Based on the foregoing, this argument must be dismissed.

LIX. As the first ground on the merits, attorney Suñol Ocampo questions that the crime of illegal exaction was declared time-barred on the basis that the first formal charging is the accused's questioning. The claim is not admissible. While it is true that from subsection a) of Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is inferred that there is more than one formal charging of the accused (it is not in vain that it speaks of the first), it is also true that the questioning is a formal act (see Articles 91 to 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and that this is the first moment in which the accused is formally informed that he is such (observe Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it can be seen that it is not until a person is individualized as a possible participant in a punishable act that the Public Prosecutor's Office must summon him to testify and for this must follow a specific procedure). Thus, it is evident that the questioning is the first formal charging of the accused. The facts attributed to him may be specified later, but the first ones will always be those formally communicated to him in the questioning. Therefore, this claim is dismissed, which—by the way—was presented as on the merits, although the issue raised is procedural in nature.

LX. As the second ground on the merits, attorney Suñol Ocampo indicates that despite having considered it proven that there was abusive use by the accused F and J of the assets and funds of FUNDEHCA, the lower court chose to acquit them of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) attributed to them. The objection is not tenable. As stated supra in Recital VIII, the administrative board (junta administrativa) of FUNDEHCA was satisfied with the way the entity was managed, therefore the trial court certainly could not find the harm required to consider the crime of fraudulent administration as having been perpetrated. Thus, the decision of the judging body is correct and the claim must be dismissed.

LXI. As the third ground for defects in iudicando, the representative of the Office of the Attorney General accuses that substantive law was violated. She considers that it was through what was investigated in the process that it was concluded that the minutes by which the appointment of the Administrative Board, the President, and the Executive Director are recorded reflected a historical reality, despite the fact that they record the appearance of two people who were out of the country, thus she believes the crime of ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica) was indeed committed. The objection is not admissible. It is evident from folio 7544 in Volume XVII that in the minutes of the installation of the Administrative Board of FUNDEHCA, as well as in the minutes of the extraordinary assembly of founding members of FUNDEHCA, the presence of A and E was recorded, despite the fact that they were not in Costa Rica, yet their signatures appear on those documents. It can be seen on folio 7554 in the referred Volume that for the lower court, the fact that they were not present did not actually cause any harm, since they agreed from the beginning with what was agreed upon in those meetings and with the content of the minutes, and therefore they signed them later. This Chamber considers that the lower court's criterion is correct, since Article 360 of the Criminal Code requires the concurrence of harm for the crime of ideological falsehood to be configured. In the present case, the truth is that such harm does not exist, because the content of the minutes reflects the will of the interested parties, including A and E. If the latter were satisfied with what was recorded in the minutes, despite not having been at the meeting, this is compelling evidence that no harm is caused to them by what was agreed. Thus, the argument must be dismissed.

LXII. As the fourth ground on the merits, attorney Suñol Ocampo accuses the violation of Article 365 of the Criminal Code, since J used the power granted to him as Executive Delegate of FUNDEHCA to open an account at Banco INTERFIN, despite the power of attorney not being valid for such purpose, because the provisions of Article 1251 of the Civil Code for granting it were not followed. The objection is totally improper. For someone to be convicted of using a false document, the document must be false. That is not what the appellant alleges, but rather she considers that the power of attorney used by J was improperly granted to him. As can be seen, she is not saying it is false, but that it is defective, so she does not prove that the defect she alleges occurs in this case, therefore this part of the challenge is dismissed.

LXIII. As the fifth claim for defects in iudicando, the representative of the Office of the Attorney General accuses erroneous application of substantive law, since M was acquitted of two crimes of fraud (estafa). She considers that the lower court erred by making the application of the in dubio pro reo principle fall on the evidence and not on the fact. She considers that it was alleged that there were two trips to Limón that did not take place, but that the Court had a doubt about whether it could be proven that they did not occur. She considers that by not proving that the trips did occur, then it must be proven that they were never carried out. The claim is not tenable. What the appellant seeks is to reverse the burden of proof. It is not for the defense to prove that the mentioned trips occurred; the requesting body (be it the Public Prosecutor's Office or the Office of the Attorney General in this case) must demonstrate that they did not take place. That is what the international human rights instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Political Constitution, and the criminal laws mandate. Now, it is evident from folio 7595 in Volume XVII that M presented at the hearing a report (which was admitted as evidence for a better ruling) in which she detailed for F the result of the trips to Limón. Furthermore, the Court assessed the testimony of Pedro Arias Bermúdez, who was then head of transport of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, as well as the statement of MA, who would have accompanied M on the trips. What is of interest is that although it is true the Court had many doubts about the veracity of the evidence provided by the accused, the fact is that it could not classify it as false, so it was obliged to doubt whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the mentioned trips had not occurred. Thus, if the charge's allegation cannot be demonstrated (i.e., that the trips did not take place) the Court could do nothing but apply the in dubio pro reo principle in favor of this accused for these facts. In accordance with the foregoing, this part of the challenge must be dismissed.

LXIV. On the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández argue, as the first ground, a contradictory reasoning for the acquittal of the accused F and J for the crimes of fraudulent administration and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles), as well as for the acquittal of F for the crime of breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes). They consider that if the judging body considered that the constitutive facts of fraudulent administration, incompatible negotiations, and breach of duties are the same ones for which extortion (concusión) was proven, then they should have been convicted for those other illicit acts. The claim is not admissible. As stated supra in Recital VIII, in reality the constitutive facts of extortion are not the same as those from which the other crimes mentioned by the appellants derive, but rather they are different. Thus, the acquittal for some of them did not compel acquittal for extortion; likewise, the conviction for this latter crime does not compel conviction for the others. In that sense, the contradiction pointed out by the Prosecutors does not exist, therefore the objection must be dismissed. Furthermore, observe in that same Recital VIII why the crime of fraudulent administration does not occur, so the acquittal for that crime is in accordance with the Law. It is timely to point out that in that same Recital VIII it was explained why the subsumption exercise carried out by the lower court regarding incompatible negotiations and breach of duties was poorly executed. Indeed, the typical assumptions on which the latter two mentioned illicit acts are based are different from those on which extortion is based. If that is the case, then the facts capable of being framed within such crimes are also different. Hence, the proof of extortion—which is duly substantiated in accordance with Law—does not necessarily entail conviction for incompatible negotiations and breach of duties. Now, despite the fact that the lower court errs in considering that these crimes are subsumed under extortion, it must be noted that said error does not cause grievance to the Public Prosecutor's Office, because in any case the acquittal was proper. As indicated in Recital VIII, the crime of breach of duties requires an omission for its configuration, but in this case F has not been attributed any omission. The most that has been said is that he did not fulfill his duties because he incurred in infractions of the same (that is, that he did not do something because he did something else), which reveals that it was not specified in what specifically his conduct was omissive. Rather, actions were attributed to him and with these the crime of breach of duties is not configured, so he certainly could not be convicted for this. The same occurs with the incompatible negotiations attributed to F and J, for it was never set forth in what—different from the constitutive elements of extortion, which is duly proven—their interest lay. That is, there were no facts that could be framed within the statutory definition in question, but rather only situations that fit the statutory definition of extortion were proven. Hence, these accused could not be criminally sanctioned for the mentioned illicit act either. For all the foregoing, this argument must be dismissed.

LXV. As the second ground, licensed attorneys Chacón Chang and Chinchilla Fernández accuse a lack of reasoning, as they consider that it is not explained why subsuming the crimes of incompatible negotiations and fraudulent administration under that of extortion leads to an acquittal for the former. The objection is not admissible. It was already set forth in the preceding Recital why the acquittals for the crimes of incompatible negotiations, fraudulent administration, and breach of duties are in accordance with Law, so the appellants must abide by what was resolved there.

LXVI. As the third ground, the appealing Prosecutors maintain that the acquittal of F and J for the crime of incompatible negotiations lacks proper reasoning. They maintain that the alternative accusation explains that by F having contracted with FUNDEHCA, he violated the provisions of Articles 112 and 143 of the Political Constitution, through which Government Ministers are prohibited from directly or indirectly entering into contracts with the Administration. The argument is not tenable. The articles mentioned by the appellants establish prohibitions, but sanctions them only with loss of credentials. One must then turn solely to the Criminal Code to determine when the crime of incompatible negotiations exists. If Article 347 of said normative text is read, it will be seen that what is involved is the public servant being interested in any contract or operation in which he intervenes by reason of his position. What is of interest in this case is that it has not been stated in what way—independent of what constitutes the crime of extortion—they became interested in a contract or operation. Again, it must be said that the proven facts on which the conviction is based only fit the crime of extortion and not another, therefore F and J could only answer for that illicit act and not for others. For the reasons stated, this argument shall be dismissed.

LXVII. As the fourth ground, the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office claim the violation of the rules of sound criticism when substantiating the acquittal of F for a crime of embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios). Specifically, the appellants allege that the former Minister of Labor and Social Security abused the services provided by the ministerial driver Mario Álvarez Eras, as he was used to handle family matters of the accused that were unrelated to the exercise of his position. They consider that the fact that many officials are not prosecuted for using drivers and vehicles of the Administration for personal matters does not imply that this is not a crime. They consider that the matter cannot be described as a peccata minuta, nor is it understood what is meant by such a thing. They add that the judges do not explain why they depart from criteria of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stating that discretion is the freedom to assess the public interest and of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) stating that discretionary use of assets gives greater freedom to the official but for the better performance of the position, not for personal benefit. The claim is not admissible. It was determined in the case file that F certainly used his driver to take his wife and children to perform various errands (proven fact 46 at folio 6950 in Volume XVI). Certainly, the fact that there are officials who use discretionary-use vehicles in the manner described does not necessarily imply that the conduct is not criminal. Nor could such a thing be ruled out because what happened is described as “peccata minuta”. What does totally exonerate F from responsibility for that fact is what is provided in the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). In that normative text (Articles 221 to 243 of said law) state vehicles (also called official) are classified as for discretionary use, administrative use, and Public Force and security. What matters here is that the vehicle for discretionary use is not mentioned by the legislator as covered by the prohibition that it does expressly establish for those of administrative use in Article 234 subsection a) of the law in question. This implies that it is not legally prohibited to use discretionary-use vehicles for activities other than the normal ones of the institution or ministry. Furthermore, the situation does not fall under subsection b) of the same Article 234, since the vehicle was assigned to F and not to his wife or children. Nor is the prohibition of subsection e) of the referenced number infringed, because the type of work for which the vehicle is designated is determined by the official responsible for the same, according to what is established in the second paragraph of Article 225 of the aforementioned Transit Law. Thus, there is no express prohibition whatsoever that prevented F from requesting his driver to use the discretionary-use vehicle to transport his wife and children. Hence, the crime of embezzlement provided for in the second paragraph of Article 354 of the Criminal Code cannot be configured, because that accused could act as he did. It should be added that the precedent of the Constitutional Chamber mentioned by the appellants refers to what administrative discretion is and not to what a discretionary-use vehicle is, so they are different matters. Furthermore, the resolution of the Second Chamber cited by the appellants (judgment 147 of 3:00 p.m. on May 5, 1995) makes no mention of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, nor does it interpret it, but rather resolves (see Recital IV of the Second Chamber's resolution) based on a regulation issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). In addition, the cited pronouncement occurs in a case related to a former official of the Municipality of San José, but it turns out that no municipal official is included in the list of public servants who may use a discretionary-use vehicle, as observed in Article 225 of the Transit Law. Thus, it is evident that the resolution of the Second Chamber cited by the appellants does not relate to factual assumptions or legal provisions identical to those that must be considered in the matter before this Court. In this sense, they are not binding jurisprudence for the present matter, as derived from Articles 9 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). For all the foregoing, this argument is dismissed.

LXVIII.

As a fifth ground, the appellants point out a contradiction in the appealed judgment when explaining why the action to prosecute the crime of illegal exaction was time-barred, since at one point the judges state that the first formal charging of F occurred on April 26, 1998, and in another section they maintain that it occurred on November 26, 1998. The claim is not admissible. It has already been explained in this judgment that the first formal charging of F occurred on April 26, 1998, when he was questioned (indagatoria). Note that this is the second of the two dates mentioned by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), and even so, the statute of limitations for the criminal action for the crime of illegal exaction had run. This reveals that even if the mistake they mention existed, it would not have caused any harm to their interests, since the unlawful act still could not have been prosecuted. Therefore, the argument is declared without merit.

LXIX. As a sixth ground, attorneys Chacón Chang and Chinchilla Fernández allege lack of reasoning as to why F's questioning (indagatoria), held on November 26, 1998, was taken as the first formal charging for illegal exaction and peculation of services. They cite the opinion of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal to the effect that this first formal charging occurs with the reading of the accusation by the Judge of the Intermediate Phase. The claim is inadmissible. The appellants should adhere to what was set forth in Considering LIX regarding why the questioning (indagatoria) is the first formal charging in this matter. Furthermore, if the appellants wish to know the reasons why this Chamber – which is not bound by the criteria of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal, as each Court has its own sphere of competence and they do not intermingle – does not share the position of that high jurisdictional body, they should refer to judgment 2002-01272 of 10:15 a.m. on December 13, 2002, especially Considering V of that resolution.

LXX. Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) in exercise of the civil action. Attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), accuses lack of reasoning, since the Trial Court (Tribunal de instancia) considered that the monies collected by FUNDEHCA did not come from the State, but from a large number of migrants. He considers that reasoning to be erroneous, because the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) acted in representation of collective interests, so that it did not claim for the State, but rather in substitution of the affected parties. The objection is not admissible. Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) the exclusive power to intervene in criminal proceedings to exercise the civil action for social harm. To do so, it allows it to claim the respective compensation for punishable acts that affect collective or diffuse interests. What happens in this case is that we are not before either of these two types of interest. The collective interest refers to that which is proper to a group that unites, de facto or de jure, in pursuit of a specific goal. In contrast, the diffuse interest concerns the individual by the mere fact of being a member of society and allows them to claim for something that does not affect a specific subject, so that a holder of the right to compensation cannot be established, but rather it is suffered by the generality of individuals with the same intensity. None of these scenarios occur in the present case, since the migrants have neither formed a group, nor is the harm suffered by a generality of people. Each of the migrants suffered harm to their assets, which can be measured monetarily. Furthermore, those who paid FUNDEHCA were identifiable and never formed a group in pursuit of a particular end. Thus, this was not a case fitting the scenarios of Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but rather a large number of individual interests, so that each holder is the one who must (by themselves or, had it been done at the opportune moment, through delegation to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público)) claim compensation. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the decision of the lower court (a quo) to reject the standing of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) to substitute the migrants as civil actors for the monies paid to FUNDEHCA is in accordance with Law. Thus, this claim is declared without merit.

LXXI. Regarding the penalty of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial). The Trial Court (Tribunal de instancia) imposed on F, J, and M the penalty of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) for eight years to hold public positions. Furthermore, it ordered that the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil) be notified of the resolution, so that this administrative body would register it and also make the pertinent communications to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and to other public institutions. On this topic, it should be noted that M's potential criminal liability will be discussed again at trial, so the aforementioned penalty of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) is not yet applicable to her. In contrast, after the issuance of this judgment, said sanction does become final regarding F and J. This Chamber considers adequate the lower court's (a quo) provision to communicate the resolution to the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil). However, it is advisable to indicate to the judging body that this same Court is empowered to communicate directly to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), if it considers it appropriate, that the penalty of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) for exercising public positions hangs over these two defendants. The judging body also has the power to order, if it deems it pertinent, the publication of that specific measure in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial La Gaceta), so that the entire state apparatus would be aware that F and J are disqualified from public service for a certain period. Finally, since the disqualification applies to the exercise of all types of public positions, including those by popular election, it could be ordered that the pertinent information be communicated to the Civil Registry (Registro Civil). All these observations are made in the interest of collaborating with the judges of instance in complying with Articles 453 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Por Tanto:

The seventh ground of the cassation appeal filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of F is declared with merit. Consequently, the appealed judgment is reversed (casa) regarding the sentence that F must serve as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of concusion (concusión) committed to the detriment of the duties of public function, which is set at FOUR YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. By virtue of the imposed sanction, the request to grant F the benefit of a suspended conditional execution (condena de ejecución condicional) is denied. The remaining grounds of the challenge filed by attorney Navas Montero on behalf of F are declared without merit. The cassation appeal filed by the defendant F is declared without merit. The cassation appeal on the merits filed by doctors Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is declared partially with merit and, consequently, the challenged judgment is reversed (casa) and J is declared an accessory (cómplice) responsible for the crime of concusion (concusión), for which he is sentenced to THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. For a probationary period of five years, J is granted the benefit of a suspended conditional execution (condena de ejecución condicional). The cassation appeal on procedural defects promoted by doctors Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is declared without merit. The second ground for procedural defects of the cassation appeal promoted by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M is declared with merit: Consequently, the appealed judgment and the trial that preceded it are annulled, only regarding the case brought against this defendant for the crime of peculation (peculado) related to checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731, and 5905, all from checking account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), Petty Cash Account, and the matter is ordered remanded to the Court of origin for a new substantiation of that sole aspect, this time in accordance with Law. As it is unnecessary, a ruling regarding the remaining grounds of the appeal promoted by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M is omitted. The cassation appeal filed by attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) is declared without merit. The cassation appeal promoted by Prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández on behalf of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is declared without merit. The cassation appeal filed by attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) is declared without merit. In everything not expressly indicated in this judgment, the challenged resolution remains unchanged, including the acquittals issued by the lower court (a quo) and the penalty of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) that F and J must serve. The Trial Court (Tribunal de instancia) shall take note of what is indicated in Considering LXXI of this resolution.

Daniel González A.

Jesús Ramírez Q. Afonso Chaves R.

Rodrigo Castro M. José Manuel Arroyo G.

dig.imp.scg.

the Republic. The convicts are ordered to appear and sign in at this Court on the fifteenth day of each month, starting today. If the 15th falls on a non-working day, they must fulfill the signing obligation on the next business day. If the above is not complied with without just cause, they will be declared in default (rebeldía) and their transfer to the corresponding prison center will be ordered. The prohibition against leaving the country for the convicts is ordered, and it is immediately ordered that the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería be notified, as well as all authorized border posts. As for the acquittals issued, the precautionary measures that had been ordered shall cease. As for the Acción Civil Resarcitoria, it is resolved as will be stated, **it being understood as denied regarding those aspects on which no pronouncement is made.** **SIN LUGAR** is declared on the Acción Civil Resarcitoria filed by the State against co-defendants F and J, which is resolved without a special award of costs; the defenses of Falta de Acción, Falta de Legitimación ad causam activa, and Sine Actione Agit filed by the defense of civil defendant J are upheld. It being understood what is resolved insofar as the claim was established for the consequences of the crime of Concusión. **CON LUGAR** is declared on the Acción Civil Resarcitoria filed by the State against defendant F, and he is condemned in the abstract to repair the material damage and to compensate for the damages caused to the State as a consequence of the crime of Peculado de Servicios that he committed. He is also condemned to pay the costs of both phases of the trial. All of these aspects will be liquidated through the judgment execution procedure, before the corresponding venue. **CON LUGAR** is declared on the Acción Civil Resarcitoria filed by the State against defendant M, regarding the civil consequences for the illicit act of Peculado in its modality of Delito Continuado, and she is condemned to pay for material damage the sum of **ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED COLONES AND ZERO CENTS**. She is condemned to compensate for the respective damages, which will accrue from the date the judgment becomes final and will be liquidated through the judgment execution procedure. For personal costs, she is condemned to pay the sum of **TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE COLONES AND ZERO CENTS.** The total condemnation amounts to **ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE COLONES AND ZERO CENTS**, a sum that she must pay by simple order of the Court; if she fails to do so, the interested party must resort to the corresponding civil venue. The decree of embargo (embargo) on the property of those civilly condemned is not granted. **BY READING, LET IT BE NOTIFIED.** **FS. LIC. CARLOS SANCHEZ FERNANDEZ LIC. RODOLFO SOLIS TULLOCK LIC. ALEX VIQUEZ JIMENEZ (Sic).** 2-That against the preceding pronouncement, the following cassation appeals (recursos de casación) were filed: **appeal (recurso) filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero:** Attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defender of the accused F, alleges the violation of due process (debido proceso), because the debate began without the presence of the technical defense of the defendant F. She considers that Article 13 of the Código Procesal Penal has been disrespected, as well as numerals 39 of the Constitución Política and 8 subsection 2) of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. The appellant states that the sentencing body has incurred in contradictory reasoning (fundamentación contradictoria). She alleges that in this case, the rules of reasoning have been disrespected in relation to a decisive element of judgment, which is the historical context in which the facts of interest here occurred. Attorney Navas Montero accuses erroneous reasoning (motivación) regarding F's knowledge of the illegality of the action. She indicates that the principle of in dubio pro reo was disrespected, and she alleges that in this case, the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) were disrespected. She accuses the violation of substantive law, specifically Article 348 of the Código Penal, relative to the crime of concusión, and she claims that in this case, an error was made in setting the penalty because it is disproportionate with respect to what is deemed proven. **Regarding the appeal (recurso) filed by the accused F**. Exercising his right to a material defense, the appellant accuses the violation of due process (debido proceso). Specifically, he considers that in this case, the rules of concentration, continuity, immediacy, orality, and publicity were disrespected. He considers that the lower court (a quo) disregarded the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) and incurred a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) of the judgment; he claims omitted or illegal reasoning (fundamentación), violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), and violation of the principle of experience. He claims illegal reasoning (fundamentación), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, violation of the principle of objectivity, and violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). He accuses illegal reasoning (fundamentación), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the principles of sound judgment (sana crítica). He claims illegal reasoning (fundamentación) and violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), illegal reasoning (fundamentación), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). He alleges illegal and contradictory reasoning (fundamentación), as well as the violation of the principle of in dubio pro reo, illegal reasoning (fundamentación), violation of the principles of sound judgment (sana crítica), and that the contested ruling is contradictory; he alleges illegal reasoning (fundamentación) and arbitrary exclusion of evidence. He accuses illegal reasoning (fundamentación), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica); he argues that in this case, there has been a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). F alleges a lack of correlation between the accusation and the judgment; he considers that fundamental evidence for his interests was not evacuated. He alleges erroneous application of substantive law, since Article 27 of the Código Penal was not applied; that Article 348 of the Código Penal could not be applied, because it was not proven that he acted with intent, and the appellant alleges that Article 71 of the Código Penal was violated, since the eight-year prison sentence imposed on him is outside any parameter of proportionality. **Regarding the appeal (recurso) filed by attorneys Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas on behalf of J:** The appellants maintain that their defendant's signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social was considered in the judgment as a preparatory act (acto preparatorio) for the commission of the crime for which J was sanctioned. The private defenders of this accused allege a lack of correlation between the accusation and the judgment. They claim a violation of due process (debido proceso) in relation to the procedure followed by the Trial Court to issue the judgment. They accuse a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), insofar as it would not explain why opening a checking account to manage the money FUNDEHCA received from charging migrants would be part of a perpetrator's plan. They allege that the defect of lack of reasoning (fundamentación) exists regarding the existence of a close bond between J and F. They question the reasoning (fundamentación) of the lower court's assertion that J opened FUNDEHCA's checking account using a copy of a certification. It is claimed that it is not duly reasoned why J waited twelve business days to sign the opening of the account, and it is alleged that the bond of friendship between F and J is duly proven. It is accused as improperly reasoned the Trial Court's assertion that J was involved in the development of the seasonal work card program, nor how it is possible that he performed acts characteristic of the perpetration of the crime of concusión. It is stated that it is not reasoned why what happened regarding the executive decrees that regulated the seasonal work card program between 1995 and 1997 would entail criminal liability for J. They question stating that J had a marked interest in FUNDEHCA intervening quickly in the collection for the seasonal work card. A lack of reasoning (fundamentación) on several points is claimed, a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) regarding why, by October 6, 1997, J would have known about the repeal process for decree N° 24811-MTSS. They question stating that J was aware of the illegality of charging migrants for issuing the seasonal work card. They allege a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) insofar as it is not explained why Article 16 of the Ley de Administración Financiera de la República is violated. They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) as to why it was required that the Contraloría General de la República endorse the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) insofar as it would not be duly accredited in the ruling. They allege a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) insofar as it is not explained why the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social had to be sent for endorsement by the Contraloría General de la República. They question that it is not reasoned whether he signed the agreement with authorization from the Junta Directiva of FUNDEHCA and whether he knew the terms of the agreement before signing it. J's representatives maintain that it has not been explained how their defendant would have incurred the abuses of office attributed to the former Minister of Trabajo y Seguridad Social who appears here as the accused. They accuse the violation of due process (debido proceso) because the Trial Court would have attributed a generic responsibility to J for everything that happened. They accuse a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), considering it contradictory, insofar as it does not explain what the means used to determine that the migrants make the improper payment is. The reasoning (fundamentación) of the Trial Court's assertion that J used for his own benefit monies that entered FUNDEHCA is questioned. They claim that the contested ruling was not reasoned regarding how their defendant would have abused the qualities of a public official and thereby motivated the migrants to make the improper payment. It is alleged that it is not explained why the agreement is illegal or why it had to be endorsed by the Contraloría General de la República.

They claim that the Republic is being sued. They claim that a contradiction is incurred insofar as J is exonerated from responsibility for the crime of fraudulent administration for the use of FUNDEHCA's assets and then that same use is used to support the charge of concusión. The problem is again taken up of whether J forced or induced the migrants to make the undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA. They argue that the assertion that the migrants were induced into error or deceived is unfounded, since they believed the money was being paid to the Costa Rican Government, and it is questioned whether the migrants were capable of understanding the inducement. Regarding the appeal filed by Attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M: She alleges a lack of reasoning, for evaluating the respective evidence without following the guidelines of sound criticism (sana crítica), regarding the reason why M's alleged subordinates obeyed her. Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General) of the Republic: Attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo argues that the statute of limitations (prescripción) was erroneously applied in favor of F for the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). She questions that the crime of illegal exaction was declared time-barred based on the assumption that the first formal accusation was the accused's investigative statement (indagatoria). She indicates that despite having established an abusive use by the accused F and J of the assets and funds of FUNDEHCA, the lower court (a quo) chose to acquit them of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of fraudulent administration they were charged with, that the substantive law was disrespected, she accuses the violation of Article 365 of the Penal Code, she accuses erroneous application of the substantive law, since M was acquitted of two crimes of fraud (estafa). Regarding the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público): Prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández allege contradictory reasoning for the acquittal of the accused F and J for the crimes of fraudulent administration and incompatible negotiations, as well as the acquittal of F for the crime of breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes). They accuse a lack of reasoning, as they deem that it is not explained why subsuming the crimes of incompatible negotiations and fraudulent administration into the crime of concusión leads to an acquittal for the former. The appellant Prosecutors argue that the acquittal of F and J for the crime of incompatible negotiations lacks proper reasoning. They claim a violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) when reasoning the acquittal of F for a crime of embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios). They point out that there was a contradiction in the appealed judgment when explaining why the action to prosecute the crime of illegal exaction was time-barred. They allege a lack of reasoning as to why F's investigative statement (indagatoria), held on November 26, 1998, was taken as the first formal accusation of the charges for illegal exaction and embezzlement of services. Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General) of the Republic in exercise of the civil action: Attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, accuses a lack of reasoning, since the Trial Court deemed that the funds collected by FUNDEHCA did not come from the State, but from a large number of migrants.

3-That a hearing was held at 8:50 a.m. on April 3, 2001.

4-That having carried out the respective deliberation, the Chamber (Sala) proceeded to hear the appeal.

5-That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Judge Arroyo Gutiérrez provides the report; and,

Considering:

I.By judgment No. 1-2000, handed down at 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2000, the Trial Court (Tribunal Penal) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José resolved to declare F and J as co-perpetrators responsible for the crime of concusión, committed to the detriment of the duties of the public function and Nicaraguan migrants. For this offense, each of them was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and eight years of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) from holding public office or employment. In that same judgment (which comprises in its entirety Volumes XVI and XVII of the case file), M was declared responsible for the crime of embezzlement (peculado), in its modality of a continued offense, committed to the detriment of the duties of the public function, and for this she was given a custodial sentence of six years. Furthermore, in the cited resolution, F was acquitted of all responsibility and penalty for the crimes of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), embezzlement of goods (peculado de bienes), embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios) (he was accused of two of these illicit acts), fraudulent administration, breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes), and incompatible negotiations. Likewise, J was exonerated from criminal responsibility for the crimes of falsification of a private document, use of a false document, fraudulent administration, and incompatible negotiations. It must be added that in the aforementioned judgment, M was also acquitted of the crimes of falsification of a private document, embezzlement (two of these punishable acts), and fraud (estafa) (two of these illicit acts). Finally, it is necessary to note that the lower court (a quo) dismissed the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the State against F and J; the foregoing regarding the consequences derived from the crime of concusión. The civil action for damages brought by the State against F was granted, condemning him in the abstract to repair the material damage and the losses caused on the occasion of the crime of embezzlement of services that the Court deemed he committed, although it did not convict him criminally for that act (see folios 7632 and 7633 in Volume XVII). Likewise, the damages claim (demanda resarcitoria) brought by the State against M was granted, condemning her to pay the sum of one hundred fifty-four thousand nine hundred colones exactly (¢154,900.00) for material damage, as well as another twenty-three thousand two hundred thirty-five colones exactly (¢23,235.00) for personal costs (costas personales). In addition, she was condemned to compensate the State for the respective losses, the amount to be paid for that item to be determined during the execution of the sentence.

II.Against the judgment outlined in the previous Considering, seven appeals of cassation (recursos de casación) were filed, each one brought by the following persons: 1) F, in his capacity as accused (Volume XVIII, folio 7696); 2) Amira Suñol Ocampo, representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General) of the Republic, as plaintiff (querellante) on behalf of the State (Volume XX, folio 8050); 3) Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández, representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) (Volume XX, folio 8081); 4) Gloria Navas Montero, in her capacity as private defense counsel for the accused F (Volume XX, folio 8256); 5) Gloria Navas Montero, representing the defendant M (Volume XX, folio 8108); 6) Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas, in their condition as private co-defense counsel for the accused J; regarding the appeal filed in favor of the latter, it is recalled that this Chamber accepted (see resolution 2000-01441 of 10:50 a.m. on December 15, 2000; folio 8859 of Volume XXII) the petition made by the defense (see folio 8358 in Volume XX) to the effect that only the brief starting on folio 8360 (which constitutes the entire Volume XXI of the case file) be heard and ruled upon; 7) Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General) of the Republic, who also intervenes as a civil party (actora civil) on behalf of the State (Volume XXII, folio 8778).

III.Regarding the appeal filed in favor of the accused F. Attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defense counsel for the accused F, bases her appeal of cassation, visible at folio 8256 in Volume XX, on several grounds. As a first claim, the violation of due process is alleged, because the trial began without the presence of the technical defense of the defendant F. She deems that Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) has been violated, as well as Articles 39 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 8, subsection 2), of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). She states that after attorney William Guido Madriz resigned as defense counsel for the accused, she assumed his representation. She explains that she could not attend the first hearing, which was duly justified before the adjudicating body. She says that the Court indeed accepted her excuse, but made the mistake of granting the petition of the accused F that he be temporarily represented by attorney José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal, at that time private defense counsel for the co-accused J. She points out that attorney Madrigal Madrigal was clear in warning that he would accept only the co-defense, since conflicting interests could eventually exist between his client J and the accused F, in which case he would look after the interests of the former. She considers it was equally erroneous to allow those two accused to defend themselves personally in the hearing of January 3, 2000. The claim is unfounded.

In the instant case, no injury whatsoever has been caused to F by the commencement of the trial without attorney Navas Montero being present. It can be observed on folio 6674 (Volume XV) that it was the appellant's own client who stated that he wished to avoid delays and therefore requested that attorney Madrigal Madrigal assume his co-defense while attorney Navas Montero was arriving. In that same section of the trial record, it is observed that attorney Madrigal Madrigal expressed surprise at the designation, as he had prepared to represent the accused J, but—and this is what matters in the specific case—he agreed to assume the representation of F if he was guaranteed that he would do so solely as co-counsel, while attorney Navas Montero was arriving, and if he was immediately relieved of the co-defense in the event that any conflict of interest arose between J and F. The latter stated (see folio 6675 in the indicated Volume) that he could conduct his own defense alongside a co-counsel. In light of that situation, the Court decided that attorney Madrigal Madrigal—who never refused to assume the role, but simply set conditions for doing so—would assume the co-defense of F, while attorney Gloria Navas Montero was arriving. In view of the foregoing, no violation of due process has occurred, since at the beginning of the trial the aforementioned defendant was not left in any state of defenselessness. It was by the decision of the defendant himself that attorney Madrigal Madrigal was designated as his co-counsel. The same applies to what occurred during the first hearing on January 3, 2000 (see folio 6680 in Volume XV), as the will of the accused was once again respected; he stated that while the reading of the accusation continued, he would exercise his own defense. As can be seen, at no time was F's right to defense limited, since initially, when he deemed that he needed professional assistance, he was granted the counsel he requested. In the second instance, when he considered that he could defend himself while the accusation was read, his judgment was respected, on the basis that he is a legal professional and therefore possessed sufficient knowledge to understand the content of the charging document and the criminal complaint. His capacity to exercise his defense at this stage of the trial is proven by the fact that he was able to make specific observations to prosecutor Max Chinchilla Fernández regarding what was being said in the accusation, as recorded on folio 6678 (again in Volume XV of the case file). Pursuant to the foregoing, Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been violated, given that the right of the accused to have the technical assistance he requires has always been observed. Furthermore, the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 100 of the cited normative body have been applied, because when the exercise of an adequate defense was not put at risk—as illustrated by the example of the authorization given to him to defend himself during the reading of the accusation—F was permitted to defend himself. In that vein, it must be stated that Article 39 of the Constitution has also been respected, since the accused was given every possibility to exercise his defense, as has Article 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, given that he was permitted to have a co-counsel of his choice (the case of attorney Madrigal Madrigal) as well as to defend himself personally, as provided for in subsection d) of the indicated article of said international instrument. By virtue of all the foregoing, it being evident that action was taken in accordance with the requests of the defendant himself without rendering him incapable of defending himself, this Chamber finds that no injury whatsoever has been caused to F, and therefore, under the terms stipulated in Article 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, **it is appropriate to declare this ground of the appeal without merit**.

IV.As a **second ground**, the appellant submits that the sentencing body has incurred in contradictory reasoning. She indicates that it is not possible to convict her client as the perpetrator of the crime of concusión if, in order to do so, the Court had to base the ruling on facts it deemed to constitute other crimes—such as that of exacción ilegal, that of administración fraudulenta, that of negociaciones incompatibles, and that of incumplimiento de deberes—for which it acquitted him. She considers that Articles 1, 11, and 369(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been violated, as well as—indirectly—Article 348 of the Criminal Code. The appellant states that the trial court found that by issuing and executing the decrees that established the charge for the tarjeta de trabajo estacional, the illicit act of exacción ilegal was committed. She adds that if said charge was considered to generate the indicated crime and, with respect to it, it was deemed that the statute of limitations for the criminal action had expired, then that same charge could not be used to support the existence of concusión. She states that if it is claimed that that exacción ilegal generated by the decrees continued with the signing of the agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Foundation for Human Development in Central America (hereinafter referred to as FUNDEHCA), then one is referring to a single charge. In that sense, attorney Navas Montero maintains that the cooperation agreement cannot be considered independently to establish the concusión, given that that single charge constituted exacción ilegal and the action to prosecute it was time-barred. With regard to the illicit act of administración fraudulenta, the appellant submits that her client was acquitted of liability regarding it, and to that end it was considered that it was impossible to know where the funds that entered the foundation were directed; for this reason, she considers that if this cannot be established, then the offense of concusión cannot be configured either, since it would be unknown whether the charge was made for himself or for another person. Finally, she states that it is a contradiction to deem that F's conduct falls within the assumptions of incumplimiento de deberes (Article 332 of the Criminal Code) and negociaciones incompatibles (Article 347 of the Criminal Code), illicit acts for which a judgment of acquittal was issued on the grounds that they were subsumed into the concusión in this case, and then to use the facts considered to constitute those crimes to support the existence of the one for which attorney Navas Montero's client was convicted.

V.Before resolving this argument, it is pertinent to summarize the events that the trial court deems duly accredited. Beginning on folio 6923 in Volume XVI is the account of proven facts, the following situations of interest being notable: Given the social problem that the presence of a large number of illegal migrants (especially Nicaraguans) in the national territory represented in 1995, the Government of the Republic at that time developed a policy aimed at regularizing their situation and thus averting the collapse of various services (such as social security and education) of transcendental importance to the country. Furthermore, it was a matter of avoiding formal accusations by the Government of Nicaragua, which threatened to denounce Costa Rica before international organizations for what it called xenophobic treatment of Nicaraguans who were in the country. It is in this context (see folios 6924 and 6925) that the Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional was created, with which it was intended to grant an identification document to migrants who came to work in Costa Rican territory, so that they could be legally covered by all the services provided by the State. What is important to highlight is that, as seen on folio 6925, the program mentioned was created by Decree No. 24432-TSS-G, issued on January 25, 1995 (the ruling indicates it was in June, but this Chamber has had before it a copy of the state bulletin and has been able to verify that the normative text mentioned was signed at the Presidential House in the month indicated here), published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 141 of July 26 of that year, which was signed by the then President of the Republic, also by the defendant F in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social Security, as well as by the Minister of the Interior and Police at that time. In addition, it was through another act of the same nature—Executive Decree No. 24811-MTSS of December 1, 1995, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 243 of December 22 of said year—that it was provided that each migrant who requested the Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional would be charged the sum of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00), in order to cover the cost involved in granting said document (the foregoing is recorded on folio 6926); that charge was made in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the money collected for that purpose was deposited in a checking account in the name of that ministry. Additionally, Executive Decree No. 25647-MTSS-G of August 20, 1996, was issued, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 236 of December 9, 1996, which authorized the charge (always in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security) for the extension of the validity of the Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional, which in some cases was fifty percent and in others one hundred percent of the value of the original issuance (it should be noted that these last two decrees—which regulated the charge for the Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security—were repealed by Decree No. 26430-MTSS of October 8, 1997, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 209 of October 30, 1997; as justification for the repeal, it is stated in that normative text that both the Comptroller General of the Republic and the National Treasury have objected to the charge that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had been making to cover the expenses of the Tarjeta de Trabajo and Social Security program—note that Decree No. 24432-TSS-G, which is the one that created the program mentioned, was not repealed, so it remained in effect, and that instrument did not contemplate any charge for the card, the issuance of which continued to be under the authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). It is now important to mention that in the fourth proven fact (folio 6927, in Volume XVI), the sentencing Court asserts that the aforementioned charge is illegal, given that a tax not provided for in any law would have been established by decree. The judges find that such a procedure is contrary to the provisions of Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration, as well as Articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which state that taxes may only be established by legal provision. The members of the trial court affirm that with said decrees, the principle of the State's single treasury account (caja única) was also being violated, since they permitted opening a bank checking account in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to manage the funds collected for the issuance and renewal of the tarjeta de trabajo estacional there. The lower Court established (see proven fact 20 on folio 6936 in Volume XVI) that by a document dated May 29, 1997, the Office of the Auditor General (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security informed the Minister that the Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional had two essential deficiencies, namely: a) the opening of the aforementioned account, for being an act contrary to the single treasury account principle, and b) the charge for issuing and renewing the mentioned card, for constituting an abuse of the regulatory powers of the Administration.

to the Administration. In light of that report, F issued resolution No. 175-97 of June 2, 1997 (see proven fact 17 a, page 6935), by means of which a disciplinary body was established to investigate the legality of the opening of current account No. [...] to manage the funds from the Seasonal Work Card Program (Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional). That disciplinary body submitted, in a document dated September 27, 1997, a report to the then Minister of Labor and Social Security indicating the following: a) that the aforementioned bank account was opened without the authorization of the National Treasury (la Tesorería Nacional), b) that no subordinate could be sanctioned for opening it, as they all acted in accordance with the principle of obedience, and c) that in order to continue using the funds of the repeatedly mentioned program, as well as to be able to charge for the work card, a bill of law had to be submitted to the Legislative Assembly (la Asamblea Legislativa) so that it would be the one to authorize it (the foregoing is extracted from proven fact 17, already indicated). Nine days later, on October 6, 1997, three important things happen, as seen on page 6938 of Volume XVI (fact 22): first, F, aware that migrants could not continue to be charged based on the regulatory norms, instructed the Budget Officer (Oficial Presupuestal) Dora Orozco Sánchez to proceed to close current account No. 182510-8 at Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in which the Seasonal Work Card Program funds were managed; second, the defendant of attorney Gloria Navas Montero instructed the Legal Affairs Directorate (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to proceed to draft a bill of law to be able to use the resources received for the aforementioned identification document, as well as any that might be received in the future; third, F met with co-defendant J and together they drafted and signed the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Foundation for Human Development in Central America (Fundación para el Desarrollo Humano en Centroamérica, FUNDEHCA), which establishes that the latter may charge migrants the sum of twenty-five United States dollars or its equivalent in Costa Rican colones, to cover the administrative and material expenses involved in producing the seasonal work card, which would be produced—by virtue of the agreement—by FUNDEHCA. Finally, as an element of interest to the lower court for the purpose of proving the exaction (concusión), it must be mentioned that it considered (see fact 24 a, page 6940) that the aforementioned cooperation agreement was nothing more than a means to induce migrants to pay, for the benefit of said foundation, a sum of money they were not obliged to pay.

VI.Having established the foregoing, it must be noted that the Penal Code establishes in its article 348 the following: "A prison term of two to eight years shall be imposed on the **public official** who, **abusing his capacity or functions**, **forces or induces** someone to **unduly give or promise**, **for himself or for a third party**, a **good or patrimonial benefit**" (bold and underline supplied). This is what the legislator has termed **exaction (concusión)**, which is one of the crimes against the duties of the public function. What is protected by this criminal classification is the correct performance of public servants in the exercise of their duties. The probity referred to in this figure is breached if a public servant commits abuses (his behavior exceeds the powers of the position, such that something not permitted is done) on the occasion of the position he holds (meaning he does not comply with assigned tasks but instead takes advantage of the condition of working for a public entity and thus engages in abusive conduct). In turn, the abuse of office consists of forcing or inducing a person to give or promise, for the official himself or for a third party other than the State, a good or patrimonial benefit that is not owed (thus the exceeding of the powers inherent to the office is configured and the abuse thereof occurs, because something the legal system does not permit is done). It is important to highlight that what the servant requests (whether the delivery of the good or patrimonial benefit, or the promise to deliver it) is something that the legal system does not contemplate as one of the obligations that the individual from whom such a thing is required must fulfill, because if it were, the undue character of the delivery or commitment to give the good or patrimonial benefit would disappear. On the contrary, it involves an action by the official that is not protected—by virtue of being abusive—by the Law. Note that the good or patrimonial benefit that the passive subject is required to give or promise may be intended for the benefit of the official himself or even in favor of a third party. Of course, that recipient is not the State, because if the charge were made for the State's benefit, the crime would be illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and not exaction (concusión). This Chamber has already warned that the difference between these two crimes lies in the destination given or intended to be given to the goods or patrimonial benefits obtained through the prohibited conduct (in that sense, see this Court's resolution No. 175-A-92 of 10:15 a.m. on April 15, 1992). Thus, it is evident that exaction (concusión) is an aggravated form of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). The legislator has deemed it more reprehensible (and therefore deserving of a harsher penalty) for the public official to move a person to give or promise a good or patrimonial benefit that is not owed, when that conduct is intended to benefit himself or a third party, than cases in which the beneficiary of such conduct would be the State itself. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that for the purposes of the configuration of this illicit act, it is not essential that the person from whom it is required actually deliver or promise to give what is requested; rather, it is sufficient that he is motivated to promise to do so for the crime to come into legal existence.

VII.Having set forth the foregoing, it must be stated, in what concerns the claim of attorney Navas Montero, that there is one event in particular that constitutes the crime of exaction (concusión), which is the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA. Indeed, that agreement between the ministerial portfolio and the aforementioned foundation constitutes the illicit act in question. Reading what the interested parties agreed upon (the document can be seen starting at page 1689 in Volume III of the case file), it is notable (see third clause) that FUNDEHCA receives the applications from the migrant population, produces the cards, and then delivers them, all with the authorization of the Ministry and other authorities intervening in the procedure. Moreover, for this process, the agreement stipulates (fifth clause) that the foundation may charge each migrant the sum of twenty-five U.S. dollars or its equivalent in colones, in order to cover the administrative and material expenses involved in producing the cards. Here lies the central problem of this matter. If the granting of the repeatedly mentioned seasonal work card was provided for in the cited decree No. 24432 as an activity of the Public Administration (la Administración Pública), and that regulatory text was still in effect when the aforementioned agreement was drafted and implemented, then it is evident that the only state body with the authority to grant that labor permit to the migrant population was precisely the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. This is reflected in the cooperation agreement, as FUNDEHCA could only materially deliver the cards, with prior authorization from the ministerial portfolio. That is to say, at bottom, the one who decided on the approval or rejection of the application was the body under defendant F's charge, such that it is evident that this was still a service of the Administration (la Administración) (furthermore, in the notice itself informing migrants that they must pay five thousand colones to FUNDEHCA—see page 3736 in Volume IX—one can read that the card is granted by the Ministry). Now then, what happens is that by means of the cited agreement, a specific sum of money was to be charged to the migrants, **for the benefit of FUNDEHCA**. However much one might want to justify that charge by arguing that the foundation had the right to be paid for the work performed for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (an argument that defendant F has maintained, as recorded on page 6969 in Volume XVI), **the truth is that there is not a single legal provision (not even a regulatory one) that authorizes it, and this absence of normative provision to support it renders such a charge to the migrants undue**. It must be kept in mind at all times that the executive decrees 24811 and 25647, already cited, authorized the charge for the Seasonal Work Card (Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional), **but only for the benefit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, never for the benefit of FUNDEHCA or any other third party, so those provisions do not cover the charge established by the cooperation agreement, meaning the latter lacks any normative support**. It should be recalled that the granting of the seasonal work card occurs within the framework of administrative activity, as it is the State that was trying to solve the national and even international problems caused by the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented foreign workers. The Administration (La Administración) must be subject at all times to the principle of legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution, related to Articles 11 and 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Thus, it can only do what the law authorizes it to do. Since the legal system does not permit the creation of tributes (taxes, fees, and special contributions) except through the enactment of a law (Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 124 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), 4 and 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), then the establishment—via a cooperation agreement—of a fee for a service that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security should provide is openly illegal, with the aggravating factor that the money went to a private legal entity. It should be recalled that payment was required to receive the document in question, as without payment, the migrant's petition for permission to work seasonally in Costa Rica was not processed, and without such authorization, they could be deported under the provisions of the Migration and Foreigners Law (Ley de Migración y Extranjería). That FUNDEHCA's intervention in the process should be compensated is something beyond the illegality of the charge, because that foundation served the Ministry and not the migrants; the latter's relationship was with the public body, as it was that ministerial dependency—not FUNDEHCA—that was competent to decide whether to grant the labor permit to the foreigners. In that vein, it is evident that the agreement merely prevents the Ministry of Labor and Social Security from having to face the payment for the services that FUNDEHCA provided to that institution, for which purpose an illegal charge was created that fell upon the migrants who required a service from that ministry, such that the money was paid to the private entity. That exaction (exacción) (understood as "action and effect of demanding taxes, benefits, fines, debts, etc.," according to the definition included in the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española)) is openly contrary to the legal system, because without any law whatsoever permitting it, the migrants are required (by a simple assistance agreement between two organizations) to pay a certain sum of money to a foundation for a service that the State provides to that population. Equally important is to highlight that the defendant motivated a great many people to give money to FUNDEHCA, as he ordered the creation of the flyer that appears on page 3736 (the first page of volume IX of the case file), where migrant workers are informed that as a **requirement** for processing the seasonal work card they must (among other things) pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) to FUNDEHCA. This being the case, it is evident that in the present matter we are dealing with a public official (in this case F, who on the date the events occurred was Minister of Labor and Social Security) who, abusing his office, motivated a large number of foreigners to unduly (as there is no legal provision whatsoever that establishes the obligation to pay a private institution a sum of money for the State to decide whether or not to grant them permission to work seasonally in the country) deliver a patrimonial benefit to a third party (FUNDEHCA is outside the relationship between the administered party and the Administration; it should be recalled that it is the Ministry of Labor and Social Security—not the foundation—that must authorize the migrants' status as workers in Costa Rica, so they receive the service from that public dependency and not from the private entity). The abusive character of this defendant's conduct is revealed if one considers that even before the signing (which occurred on October 6, 1997, as recorded on page 1692 in Volume III) and implementation of the oft-mentioned agreement, **F already knew it was not legally possible to charge for the issuance of the seasonal work card**. In effect, by means of a document dated May 27, 1997 (see page 180 in Volume I), the then Vice Minister of Labor and Social Security, attorney Eugenio Solano Calderón, informed F that an investigation should be conducted regarding the opening of a specific bank account to manage the operating funds of the seasonal work card program. As part of the investigation resulting from Mr. S's note, the report prepared by the General Directorate of Auditing (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was presented (see page 192 in Volume I), warning that charging a sum of money to migrants for the costs entailed by the mentioned program was contrary to the State's single treasury principle and the provisions of Article 124 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) (which indicates that the establishment of exactions is a matter reserved to law). The content of that report and the recommendations of the disciplinary body that investigated the matter were brought to F's attention in September 1997, as recorded on page 247 in Volume I. It is important to note that the then Minister was recommended (see page 250) to order the closure of the bank account specifically designated for managing the seasonal work card program funds. Furthermore, he was advised that it was advisable, **if one wished to continue using the resources already received or to receive new ones in the future**, to present a bill of law to the Legislative Assembly (la Asamblea Legislativa) so that it would authorize it. Therefore, it is evident that F knew it was illegal to charge for that service provided by the Costa Rican State to the migrants. In that sense, signing and implementing an agreement that allowed a foundation to charge foreigners for a service that ultimately remained state-run (it is worth insisting that the one who granted or denied the work permit was the Ministry under F's charge) is tantamount to ignoring the illegality of which he was aware, which is why it can be proven that the defendant in question abused the function he performed. It should be noted that this abusive conduct is equally indicative of the former Minister's willful behavior, as he knew he could not establish that charge for the benefit of FUNDEHCA because it was illegal, much less motivate migrants to make a payment that was undue, and yet he did so, such that the knowledge and will to adjust his conduct to the typical elements of exaction (concusión) are evident. Moreover, it is clear that he knew he was moving migrants to deliver an undue patrimonial benefit to a third party. In that vein, the crime of exaction (concusión) attributed to F in this case is duly proven. It must also be noted that the trial court considers all the facts indicated above to be proven. It suffices to observe points 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the factual framework of the appealed judgment (pages 6935 to 6941 in Volume XVI) to realize that the lower court was clear at all times that F incurred in exaction (concusión) due to what happened regarding the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, on page 7465 in Volume XVII, the sentencing body's exposition begins regarding why it considers the crime for which this defendant was convicted to be configured, and it is recorded on page 7469 that for the trial court, the former Minister knew perfectly well that the charge made for the seasonal work card program was irregular. It is equally clear that for the judges, having given instructions to various officials to resolve the legal problem surrounding the indicated charge (see page 7471) and then having signed the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA, which maintained the obligation for migrants to pay to receive the work card, is nothing more than a maneuver to implement a charge known to be illegal (see page 7472). In accordance with the foregoing, **the crime of exaction (concusión) for which F was convicted is duly proven and substantiated in the appealed resolution**.

VIII.Now then, returning to the appeal analyzed here, it must be recalled that attorney Navas Montero argues that the Court erred in substantiating the existence of the crime of exaction (concusión), because to do so it considered facts constituting other illicit acts, for which it acquitted her defendant. On this point, this Chamber considers that there is indeed an error by the lower court in setting forth a whole sequence of events in the factual framework as if they were part of a single plan, without individualizing the crime they would constitute. However, the problem this entails is minimal, because starting at page 7425 in Volume XVII, the reasoning as to why it convicts for exaction (concusión) and exonerates F from criminal liability for other crimes is perfectly distinguished. What is important to highlight is that exaction (concusión) is not confused with the other illicit acts. Regarding illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), despite the trial court deriving the existence of a plan by the defendant in question and J that encompasses this punishable conduct and that for which these two individuals were sanctioned, the truth is that it offers different grounds to prove each one. Thus, on page 7460 (Volume XVII) it is explained that the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) would derive from the charge made to migrants for the work card via executive decrees, and it mentions that the money was paid for the benefit of the State. In contrast, exaction (concusión) is analyzed starting at page 7465 (Volume XVII) and it is clear that this is configured in relation to the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA, by means of which migrants were forced to pay a sum of money to that private entity for a service (the granting of the labor permit) provided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. This being the case, there is no problem whatsoever in acquitting F of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) (an illicit act that the lower court considered time-barred, an issue that will be addressed when resolving the Public Prosecutor's appeal) and convicting him of exaction (concusión), especially considering that the charge to foreigners does not have the same origin (in one case it is imposed by regulatory norms and in another by a simple cooperation agreement between two organizations), such that they are distinct conducts. Precisely because of the latter, the crimes can be differentiated and, therefore, the criteria for the statute of limitations of the criminal action applicable to each one of them. Since illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and exaction (concusión) are not based on the same act, it is legally correct to examine each illicit act separately to see whether they are time-barred or not. Furthermore, the fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) attributed to both F and J to the detriment of FUNDEHCA does not cover any fact related to exaction (concusión). The only link between the two illicit acts is made by the Court when it considers that they were part of a plan to gain control of the funds that the entity would collect for the production of the work cards. But this does not mean that the facts that allow each illicit act to be configured are identical, such that the acquittal for one would compel acquittal for the other. Exaction (concusión) stems—as has been stated several times throughout this ruling—from the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In contrast, fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) would arise internally within the foundation, based on how it was administered to the detriment of the entity's interests. As can be seen, they are different things. Now then, the administrative board of the private organization approved the accounting and financial statements of FUNDEHCA and approved all actions taken by the board president, the executive delegate, and the board itself (see page 7527 in Volume XVII), so indeed no harm to the foundation could be proven, and in that sense, the trial judges' decision to acquit the defendants of these acts is correct. What happens is that this involves a factual basis unrelated to that which serves as support for the exaction (concusión), so the acquittal in question does not compel their acquittal for the crime provided for in Article 348 of the Penal Code. Regarding the crime of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles), the Court acquitted F and J of that illicit act because it was not duly supported in the alternative charge, which instead contained merely a repetition of facts already indicated in the main charge, adding that in any case, that negotiation formed part of the plan to commit exaction (concusión), so the trial judges subsume it under this criminal figure and acquit them of that illicit act (see pages 7608 to 7611 in Volume XVII). Here, an error by the lower court is indeed perceived, because what it does is link the incompatible negotiation (negociación incompatible) with the plan it believes the defendants followed to commit exaction (concusión), as if the latter subsumed it. In reality, the provisions of Article 348 of the Penal Code do not encompass what is regulated in Article 347 of the same normative text (given the date on which the events of interest for this case occurred, reference is made to the text of this article as it was drafted before the reform effected by L

Law No. 8056 of December 21, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 10 of January 5, 2001), meaning the exercise of subsumption is indeed poorly executed (the Public Prosecutor's Office also mentions this problem in its appeal on this point, so the matter will be revisited later). The issue is that the interest F may have had in the agreement between the Ministry under his charge and FUNDEHCA (of which both he and his son, with the last name F, and the co-defendant J were founding members; furthermore, F was the president of the board of directors and J was the executive delegate) is independent of what constitutes the offense of concusión. Indeed, a public official taking an interest in a contract or operation in which they are involved due to their position is not the same as that official inducing or compelling—by virtue of signing and implementing the agreement, which demonstrates an abuse of office—migrants to pay an undue sum to a foundation. In the first case, the punishable conduct is limited to the simple personal interest of the servant in a business deal; in the second, what is sanctioned is not only a broader behavior but one that is distinct from the former, because the issue is abusing one's office in such a way as to move several individuals to give a third party a patrimonial benefit they do not owe. As can be seen, in the second case, the public employee's interest in the contract itself is not a factor to consider in determining the individual's criminal responsibility, meaning concusión does not require it to be configured. Thus, the acquittal handed down for the crime of incompatible negotiations does not affect the unlawful act for which F was convicted. Regarding the crime of breach of duties, the merit body indicated (see folio 7529 in Volume XVII) that an apparent concurrence of norms was at play in the case, given that in all crimes against the public function where the active subject is an official, there is fundamentally a breach of the duties inherent to the office, meaning the special provision displaces the generic one, so that it is only possible to apply the one that specifically regulates the demonstrated conduct and not the other, for which reason the lower court acquitted F of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of breach of duties. This Chamber believes that the acquittal issued for this unlawful act does not affect the conviction imposed for concusión. This is because the lower court erred in considering that an apparent concurrence of norms exists between the two unlawful acts under discussion. Breach of duties (article 332 of the Penal Code) starts from the assumption that the servant omits, refuses to perform, or delays fulfilling an act they are obliged to carry out. In contrast, concusión starts from the premise of abusing one's office, that is, exceeding (as stated supra in Whereas Clause VI of this judgment) the powers inherent to the function and, by virtue thereof, moving someone to deliver or promise an undue asset or patrimonial benefit to another subject. As can be seen, the first crime is one of omission and the second of action; furthermore, we are not dealing with provisions that mutually exclude each other, but rather ones that are complementary (not identical), so it was not possible to apply the apparent concurrence of norms. In any case, in this instance, it has not been proven that F omitted to do something he should have, meaning the acquittal for breach of duties is correct. What happens is that it has been proven he did something not permitted (abusing his office and moving the migrants to give money they did not owe to FUNDEHCA), such that his conduct does not conform to the provisions of article 332 of the Penal Code, but it does conform to article 348 of the same normative text. In accordance with the foregoing, the acquittal issued for the crime of breach of duties does not exempt the client of Licenciada Navas Montero from responsibility for the crime of concusión. To the foregoing, it must be added that the execution of the executive decrees authorizing the collection of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the issuance of the seasonal work card is indeed independent of the collection made in favor of FUNDEHCA. The first was protected by regulatory provisions; the second by a simple cooperation agreement. The first entered the accounts of the public body; the second, the coffers of a private entity. As can be seen, these are distinct behaviors, so it is correct that they were analyzed by the lower court as independent crimes. Thus, the statute of limitations for the illegal levy does not affect the concusión, as they are based on independent fact patterns. It must be added that the fact that the destination of the money collected by the foundation is unknown is not an obstacle to considering concusión as having been configured. This is because it is not necessary—for this crime to be configured—to establish the final destination of the asset or patrimonial benefit; what matters is that it was determined (through the abusive exercise of office by a public servant) that migrants were compelled to unduly pay a sum of money to FUNDEHCA, and in this manner, the unlawful act in question was configured. Based on all the foregoing, this ground of the appeal is dismissed.

IX.As a third ground, Licenciada Navas Montero alleges that the rules of substantiation have been disrespected in this case concerning a piece of evidence of a decisive nature, namely the historical context in which the events of interest here occurred. She believes this mistake leads to the incorrect application of a substantive precept. She recalls that in 1995, the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented migrants posed a serious threat to various public services, including social security and education. She adds that the Seasonal Work Card Program originated precisely to combat this problem. She points out that, in addition to the foregoing, it must be considered that the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua threatened to sue the Government of Costa Rica in international bodies for what the former considered xenophobic treatment of its nationals in this country. Thus, she maintains that this is the reason the aforementioned program emerged and it cannot be considered part of a plan devised by F and J to commit concusión. Furthermore, she explains that the foundation was created because it was considered a more suitable avenue to fulfill goals set in international agreements. Hence—according to the appellant—it cannot be established that her client's conduct was intentional or directed at committing the crime provided for in article 348 of the Penal Code. She considers that the defendant F acted to address an urgent situation for the country, seeking to avoid a grave harm to Costa Rica. In that sense, she believes that the provisions of articles 27 and 38 of the Penal Code should have been applied in the present case, as she was facing a justifying cause or, failing that, an exculpating cause. The objection is not admissible. While it is true the country's situation in 1995 was delicate by virtue of the problems that attending to the migrant population in the national territory entailed for the State, it is also true that this emergency would, at most, justify the establishment of the Seasonal Work Card Program. The urgency with which the problem was addressed may allow one to understand (not justify) the issuance of decrees that allowed the State to charge for the issuance of the card (which violates the reservation of law in matters of levies) and for the funds to be deposited into a specific account (which contravenes the single treasury account principle), but this is not extensive to what happened with the cooperation agreement and in no way constitutes a state of necessity, neither justifying nor exculpating. In the first place, it must be remembered that the entity facing the problem was the Costa Rican State, and in seeking to solve it, the errors noted were incurred. But after the illegality of the charge was noticed (both for the levy itself and for the deposit of the money in an independent account) and practically two years after the work card program had begun (which demonstrates that although the problem had not been solved, it was on its way to being solved), F opted—knowingly, as indicated in Whereas Clause VII of this ruling, which demonstrates his intentional conduct is correctly accredited—to implement a mechanism to charge the migrants money they had no reason to pay, because the service they received (that is, the granting of the work permit) continued to be a state power (without any levy for that service having been established by law), with the aggravating factor that the money no longer entered the State's coffers, but rather those of a private foundation. As can be seen, this second situation is radically different from the one that existed under the protection of the executive decrees that authorized (illegally, as has already been mentioned) the charge to the migrants. Furthermore, it must be highlighted that no specific legal interest can be defined that was endangered on the occasion of the presence of the migrants in Costa Rica, in either of the two moments mentioned. What is discussed is that there were public services that could collapse, but that was a possibility, and furthermore, the collapse of a service (such as education or social security, which are the ones most mentioned in this case) is something so vague that it can mean anything from slow or delayed provision thereof, to the fact that it is provided on time but with poor quality, or even that it is not provided at all. Even so, it is not defined who would be affected in any of those situations. For this reason, it is impossible to know specifically which legal interests were in danger and—precisely because of the vagueness indicated—it is also impossible to determine the actuality or imminence of the threat. Regarding the potential filing of a lawsuit against Costa Rica in international bodies, one must again ask what legal interest would be protected by F's actions. The fact that a person (even a legal one, like the State) is brought before the Courts of Justice (national or international) to determine, according to Law, whether they are responsible for something does not constitute an endangerment of that person's legal interests, because the principle of responsibility exists. In that vein, the essential premise on which the institute of state of necessity is based disappears, which is the existence of a danger to legal interests, which cannot be specified in this case, for which reason the lower court correctly did not apply the provisions of articles 27 and 38 of the Penal Code. It is worth adding that while it is true FUNDEHCA was created with the endorsement of various Ministers of Labor of that time in order to address different problems common to the countries of the area, this is also irrelevant for the purposes of establishing concusión. That the trial court was mistaken in stating that all the facts it deems proven form part of a plan is irrelevant in the face of the accreditation of what does constitute the crime under discussion. For this crime to come into legal existence, it is sufficient that the delivery of an undue asset or patrimonial benefit (or the promise to do so) be made in favor of the public official or a third party. In this case, FUNDEHCA is that third party, regardless of the purpose for which it was created. For all the foregoing reasons, this claim is dismissed.

X.As a fourth ground, Licenciada Gloria Navas Montero accuses erroneous reasoning regarding F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of the action. She indicates that the in dubio pro reo principle was disrespected. She maintains that the report of the Dirección General de Auditoría is not conclusive regarding the illegality of the charge made to the migrants, but rather it indicates that it "seems" ("pareciera") to be so.

He also questions (see folio 8325 in Volume XX) the claim that his client was aware of said report, since there is no record that he received it. He adds that, in any case, the executive decrees established said charge and were not declared illegal. He indicates that a violation of the cash-box unity principle does not necessarily breach the principle of legal reserve in tax matters. It follows that he deems the intent (dolo) in his client's actions was poorly established. **The claim must be rejected**. Although the report of the General Directorate of Auditing of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (visible at folio 192 in Volume I) does state in some paragraphs that the aforementioned charge appeared to be illegal due to two factors, namely the breach of the State's cash-box unity principle and the violation of the legal reserve in matters of levies, the truth is that this document is a whole and in it one can read very clearly (see folios 208, 209, and 210 in Volume I) that several recommendations were made to the then Minister to correct the legality defects found. Thus, it is evident that it was indeed concluded that the aforementioned charge was not in accordance with the Law, due to the two defects already mentioned. Furthermore, through official communication No. DAJ-AI-943-97 of September 24, 1997 (visible at folio 247 in Volume I of the case file), addressed to F, the defendant was recommended to close the account in which the funds from the work card program were managed and also to present a bill before the Legislative Assembly so that it would authorize charging migrants for the issuance of said document. As can be seen, this document clearly exposes the illegality of the charge levied on migrants, basically for being a levy without legal basis (the breach of the State's cash-box unity principle only prompted the closure of the special account, but that is secondary to the illegality of the charge to migrants, which is what matters for the purposes of extortion (concusión)). This report from the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was indeed known to F, since he himself refers to said opinion to request the closure of the account where the funds coming from the work card program were deposited (see document at folio 3 in Volume I). This being the case, as already indicated in Considering VII of this judgment, it is evident that F knew of the unlawfulness of the charge to migrants for the service provided by the Ministry under his charge, making it obvious that it was with full knowledge of the foregoing that he established a new charge for this population as a requisite for the ministerial portfolio under discussion to grant the work permit so often mentioned. It is important to remember that the second charge to migrants (the one established through the already cited cooperation agreement) is the one that matters for the purposes of extortion (concusión). When this agreement was signed, F already knew that levies could only be imposed on the Administered through a law for services provided by the State (such as the granting of the work card, which was a function of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Hence it is immaterial whether the executive decrees supporting the first charge (which the lower court considered to constitute an illegal levy) were declared illegal or not, as this refers to events independent of those that prompted this defendant's conviction for extortion (concusión). Finally, it must be noted that Attorney Navas Montero is correct in stating that a breach of the cash-box unity principle does not necessarily entail a violation of the legal reserve in tax matters. What happens is that in this case, each of the infractions is duly accredited by separate facts. The cash-box unity principle was violated by opening a special account to administer the funds entering the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the charge levied on migrants based on the executive decrees. In contrast, the legal reserve in tax matters has been violated on two distinct occasions, first when the aforementioned decrees were issued (for which the lower court considered the crime of illegal levy was configured, even though the action to prosecute it was time-barred) and later when the cooperation agreement between the Ministry and FUNDEHCA established a charge for a state service (which is what serves as the basis for convicting F for extortion (concusión)). Thus, it is clear that the lower court did not make the mistake pointed out by the appellant. For all the foregoing reasons, **this ground of the appeal is declared without merit**.

XI.The private defense counsel for the defendant F claims, as a **fifth ground**, that in this case the rules of sound critical judgment were violated regarding the assessment of the reasons why the General Comptroller of the Republic did not endorse the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. She argues that the aforementioned agreement did not have to be previously consulted with the Comptroller's Office. She adds that a finding of harmfulness (juicio de lesividad) is required to nullify the validity and effectiveness of the administrative act. **The claim is without merit**. As set forth supra in Considering VII, in this case a triangular relationship occurred as a consequence of the implementation of the aforementioned cooperation agreement. On one hand, the administered (the migrant population) required a service (the granting of the work card) from the Costa Rican State (specifically, from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which was the only agency competent to grant such a permit). On the other, the State agreed with FUNDEHCA that the latter would assist it (the State) in the physical production of the cards. Finally, to obtain the card granted by the Costa Rican State, the administered (the migrant) had to pay FUNDEHCA the sum of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00). As can be seen, this is a double mockery of the legal system. The first occurs because the administered requires a state service (the granting of the work card) for which, as of October 6, 1997 (the date the cooperation agreement was signed), no legal provision existed that allowed a levy to be charged in exchange. Despite this, and with full knowledge of the illegality, F authorized said charge in the agreement under discussion. The second mockery occurs because the State benefits from a service provided by a private entity (FUNDEHCA) without having to pay, since F illegally transferred that cost to the users. It is true that in this maneuver the Public Administration was compromised, specifically upon signing the cooperation agreement, but this does not mean the criminal courts should refrain from ruling on the legality of the actions taken. If Attorney Navas Montero's claim is examined, it can be seen that she is attempting to give primacy to the administrative jurisdiction in this matter, as what she seeks is to prevent the criminal forum from establishing that the charge via the agreement is improper while the other forum has not resolved whether that agreement is legal or not. The appellant's argument is unacceptable. Note that Article 4 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction expressly reserves for the criminal forum everything related to crimes, even if they are connected with acts of the Public Administration. Thus, it is through this channel (not another) where a pronouncement on the legality of the actions must be issued, since it is precisely on this that the existence of the crime of extortion (concusión) must be determined. Therefore, the discussion concerning whether the Comptroller's Office should endorse or not the cooperation agreement mentioned so many times is irrelevant, since this forum has already declared that the charge established therein for migrants in favor of FUNDEHCA is openly illegal, a circumstance F knew before signing it (in this we agree – incidentally – with what was indicated by the Comptroller's Office in its resolution No. DAJ-2156 of November 17, 1997, visible at folio 1693 in Volume III), and that is what matters for the purposes of applying Article 348 of the Penal Code. This being the case, this Chamber does not find that any grievance is caused to the appellant by the fact that the reason why the General Comptroller of the Republic did not endorse the cooperation agreement is not analyzed in greater depth. For the foregoing reasons, **this ground of the appeal is declared without merit**.

XII.As a **sixth ground**, Attorney Navas Montero alleges the violation of substantive law, specifically Article 348 of the Penal Code, regarding the crime of extortion (concusión). She asserts that the facts the lower court deemed proven do not fit within what the legislator defines as extortion (concusión). She indicates that the ruling does not extract what the abuse consisted of, nor how her defendant induced the migrants to make the payment to FUNDEHCA. **The reproach cannot be entertained**. It has already been set forth supra in Considerings VI and VII why the crime of extortion (concusión) attributed to F is duly accredited and substantiated by the trial court. The appellant must abide by what was resolved therein.

XIII.As a **seventh ground**, F's private defense counsel claims that an error has been made in imposing the penalty in this case, as it is disproportionate to what has been deemed proven. For the reasons set forth below, **the argument is accepted**. It can be seen from folio 7611 (Volume XVII; see in particular folio 7613) that the trial court considered that in this case it was appropriate to sanction F and J (it is clear that what is resolved here must be applied to the latter by extension; however, the issue will be addressed when ruling on his cassation appeal, as it is necessary to treat a topic therein that is intimately connected to the penalty for his conduct) with the upper end of the punitive scale provided for the crime of extortion (concusión). This Chamber deems that imposing the maximum penalty in this case is disproportionate. This is because, although what occurred is indeed very serious, it is also true that in this case there are no extraordinary circumstances that warrant imposing the highest possible sanction. Specifically, keeping clear that the extortion (concusión) is configured only by what occurred in relation to the charge to migrants created through the already mentioned cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, it must be added that it could not be established how much money this foundation received for the production of the work card, so that although it is known that there were migrants who unduly paid that entity what was established in the indicated agreement, it has not been possible to determine how large the financial benefit received by that private organization was. This is a circumstance that must be weighed against the other elements of Article 71 of the Penal Code, and it shows that in this case an unreasonable penalty has been imposed on F. Furthermore, he is a person with no criminal record and who, subsequent to the commission of the illicit act, has shown willingness to face the process, such that his intention to submit again to the legal system, with the legal consequences this entails for him, is evident. Therefore, it is unreasonable to impose the highest possible sanction on F. However, it cannot be thought that this defendant deserves to be sanctioned with the minimum end of the relevant punitive scale either, as that would be equally disproportionate. It must be remembered that this is indeed a serious act, since not only was a Minister of the Government of the Republic (that is, one of the highest-ranking public officials, even a member of the Supreme Powers) the perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión), but also many people of limited means (it cannot be forgotten that they are illegal migrants) were compelled to pay a sum (which was considerable from their point of view) that they did not owe (although it has not been possible to determine the total income received by FUNDEHCA for that concept, which is a circumstance that must be weighed against the one just described). Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that F is knowledgeable in Law, making it more reprehensible in his case to have acted with intent to contravene the legal system. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the eight-year prison sentence set by the lower court for F as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión) is indeed disproportionate for being unreasonable and must therefore be reduced to adjust it to the level of gravity this matter truly entails. Thus, the defect in the application of substantive law pointed out by the appellant being configured, this Chamber resolves to **grant this ground of the appeal and, applying the provisions of Article 450 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to vacate the appealed judgment regarding the sanction F must serve. Consequently, resolving the matter directly on its merits, a sentence of FOUR YEARS OF PRISON is imposed on F, as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión) committed to the detriment of the duties of public office**. Since the imposed amount exceeds the limits permitted in Article 59 of the Penal Code, the benefit of a suspended sentence (condena de ejecución condicional) is not granted to F.

XIV. **Regarding the appeal filed by the defendant F**. Exercising his right to a material defense – guaranteed in Article 8, subsection 2), sections c), d), and e) of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 14, subsection 3, sections b) and d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in the second and third paragraphs of Article 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code –, the accused F challenges the conviction issued against him through cassation. As a **first ground** (see folio 7714 of Volume XVIII), the appellant alleges the violation of due process. Specifically, he considers that in this case the rules of concentration, continuity, immediacy, orality, and publicity have been violated. He bases his claim on the argument that the Judge who presided over the Court in charge of this matter – Mr. Carlos Sánchez Fernández – asked the parties, prior to closing the debate, to extend the time to deliberate and proceed to the reading of the appealed judgment. He also indicates that the mentioned Judge conditioned the issuance of an objective ruling on his request being granted, since only by extending the deliberation period could a comprehensive and detailed work be produced by the jurisdictional authority. The defendant considers that this conduct violated Article 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as that was not the appropriate moment to declare the matter as one of complex processing. He adds that, in any case, the legally prescribed period for that type of matter was not even met, but rather the time allowed by the legislator for those special situations was exceeded. He points out that in the case sub judice, forty-five calendar days passed (equivalent to thirty-two business days) from when the oral and public trial was concluded until the judgment was read. It is the appellant's criterion that such action is clearly a violation of the governing principles of the essential phase of the Costa Rican criminal process, which is the trial, since with the passage of so many days, immediacy, orality, and continuity are lost. **The objection cannot be entertained**. In accordance with the provisions of Article 424 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the appellant must demonstrate that the defects he states not only exist, but also cause him grievance and he has not concurred in causing them. In the present case, the case file indeed records (read the debate record starting at folio 6820 in Volume XV) that Mr. Carlos Sánchez Fernández – who presided over the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José in this matter – asked the interested parties for extraordinary time to deliberate and thereby "*make the decision in an objective, fair manner, and produce a very comprehensive and detailed work as you* [the Judge was addressing the parties] *have requested* . . .

(see folio 6821 in the indicated volume). In support of his petition, Mr. Sánchez Fernández cited ruling No. 565-F-93 of this Chamber, issued at 9:05 a.m. on October 22, 1993. In that ruling (specifically in its Considerando noveno), a series of reasons are set forth explaining why it was possible –in matters being processed in accordance with the regulations set forth in the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure– to extend the deliberation period for as long as was reasonably necessary to decide the respective case. When issuing the judgment under consideration, the following was held: “(i) deliberation must begin immediately after the close of the debate; (ii) the duration is regulated in the final paragraph of Article 392, which refers to Article 361, such that deliberation may be prolonged for as many consecutive sessions as are necessary; (iii) the time limit for concluding the deliberation must bear a relationship to and be proportional to the nature of the matter to be decided; (iv) while the deliberation lasts, the judges may not intervene in other matters, unless it has already concluded; and (v) the deliberation may be suspended for a period of up to ten days, and the grounds are established in Article 392, such that they are only force majeure and the illness of one of the judges”. When this Chamber issued the ruling just mentioned, the normative instrument in force on this subject was the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure, and the provisions of that legal text allowed the deliberation to be extended for as long as was reasonably necessary to make the relevant decisions in the respective case. Until now, what was stated in that ruling 565-F-93 has guided the decisions of the Tribunals regarding the time they have to deliberate. However, as of this judgment, it must be noted that this criterion cannot be sustained in matters that must be resolved in accordance with the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike what occurred under the previous procedural rules, the procedural law now in force expressly contains a regulation specially designed by the Legislator for those cases determined to be processed as complex. The specific rules for this type of case are set forth in Articles 319, 360, 364, 376, 377, 378, and 379, all of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The raison d'être of these special rules lies in the fact that not all matters heard by judicial offices are the same. There are some that –due to the facts to be elucidated, as well as the subject matter involved– necessarily demand more time and dedication than others. It is precisely when faced with such circumstances that it becomes possible to request authorization for the provisions relating to the processing of complex cases to be applied to the proceeding. The aim of these provisions is –essentially– to extend the legal time limits for carrying out certain actions up to the limits set forth in Article 378 of the cited normative text. Note that the word “limit” has been used here, and this is because Article 379 of the same body of law provides that, in all matters not expressly mentioned in Title II of Book II of the Second Part (Procedures) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the rules of the ordinary proceeding apply, which implies that what is established in the second paragraph of Article 360 of said ordinance becomes applicable with regard to the consequences of non-compliance (by exceeding) the time provided for deliberation. If this occurs, the rule is that the proceedings are annulled and the trial must be conducted again before another Tribunal. However, this statement must be related to what is established in Article 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the possibility that the parties in whose favor a time limit has been established may waive it by express declaration. It must be made clear once and for all that the time established by the Legislator for the judges to deliberate and issue the corresponding judgment is conceived in favor of the interests of the parties, since it is they who enjoy the right to prompt and complete justice, as set forth in Article 39 of the Political Constitution, in Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now, in the case under examination, despite the fact that it was the Tribunal itself that promoted the indefinite extension of the time limit to deliberate and issue the respective judgment, the truth is that all interested parties consented to what the judging body proposed to them. Thus, they waived the time limit –conceived in their favor– that limited the time available to the trial court to issue the ruling at issue here. In that context, there is indeed a disregard of the time limits for issuing the judgment, but in this specific case, that conduct did not cause harm to the parties, since they accepted the proposal of the lower court (a quo). In that sense, their consent –apart from constituting a waiver of a time limit established in their favor– constituted an essential factor for what occurred to happen: that the lower court judges took so many days to issue the ruling now being appealed. In light of all the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XV.As a second ground, F argues that the lower court failed to observe the rules of sound judgment (reglas de la sana crítica) and incurred a lack of reasoning in the judgment (fundamentación). He considers that the trial court incorrectly evaluated the evidentiary material and erroneously interpreted different concepts, all of which caused a violation of substantive law. As a basis for the claim, the defendant states the following: a) he affirms that on one hand, the sentencing Tribunal holds that the charge made by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is the same one that constituted the crime of concusión, but later indicates that the former was repealed and that it is a different charge based on the cooperation agreement; and b) he states that in the executive decrees that regulated the temporary work card program, what was reserved for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was the granting of the document, not its material production, so it is not true that powers were transferred to FUNDEHCA. The objection is inadmissible. It was already set forth above in Considerandos VII and VIII that in this case, two different charges have been proven against the migrants for the temporary work card: the first is covered by the executive decrees that created it in favor of the State; the second, by FUNDEHCA’s cooperation agreement. Furthermore, it has already been indicated why they are independent and the reasons why the second constitutes concusión, while the first constitutes illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). It was also expressed why the distinction between the charges is drawn from the judgment, and it was stated that the concusión is duly reasoned. The appellant must abide by all of this. As for the distinction between granting and producing the temporary work card, the appellant himself confirms what the lower court stated and what is upheld in this ruling: the entity that granted the document was the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The foregoing, coupled with the fact that the payment of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) was a requirement for the migrants to receive the card, demonstrates that money was indeed illegally charged to this population for a service provided to them by the State. The work that FUNDEHCA performed, which was the material creation or production –as the appellant says– of the document, was aimed at serving the Ministry, not the migrants, which highlights the illegality of the charge, since the public agency was not assuming the costs of a service rendered to it, but rather passing them on to the users. It is worth noting that this also follows from the appealed judgment, as set forth in Considerando VII of this ruling, and the appellant must therefore abide by what is indicated therein. Given these circumstances, this Office finds that none of the alleged defects exist, and therefore the claim must be declared without merit.

XVI.As a third ground, the appellant claims omitted or illegal reasoning (fundamentación omisa o ilegal), violation of the rules of sound judgment (reglas de la sana crítica), and violation of the principle of experience. He indicates that there was an inadequate assessment of the functions of the Comptroller General’s Office (Contraloría General de la República). He adds that this body of the Legislative Branch is not an advisor and does not exercise prior control. The reproach is not accepted. It was already set forth above in Considerando XI –to which the appellant must abide– why it is irrelevant in this case to discuss whether or not the Comptroller General’s Office was correct in not endorsing (refrendar) the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, since the illegality of said agreement was evident at the time of its signing and, in any case, has already been duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal), which is the competent forum to determine this by virtue of the fact that it involves administrative action related to a crime. In that sense, it is irrelevant whether or not the lower court made a mistake when evaluating the actions of the Comptroller General’s Office in this matter. For the sake of completeness, it must be indicated to the appellant that –contrary to what he asserts– the legislative body is indeed an advisor and does exercise prior control. Its advisory power is not only referred to parliamentary bodies (third paragraph of Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic –which, incidentally, was enacted and published in 1994, meaning it was in force when F proceeded as he did), but rather, since the power to inform (ejúsdem) and to issue opinions in the exercise of its consultative power is provided for (Article 29 of the cited normative text), it is clear that it does guide (and in that sense, advise) the audited entities, such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, Article 20 of the referenced Law indicates that prior to ordering the execution of the respective contract, the Administration must manage and obtain the approval of the Comptroller General’s Office, which makes it evident that this is indeed a prior control, since without that endorsement it is not possible to legally execute a contract. In any case, it has already been stated that everything that may be debated on these points is not essential to prove the concusión, since this is based on the existence of an illegal charge made to the migrant population by F, who, in abusive exercise of his position, moved those people to deliver an undue patrimonial benefit in favor of FUNDEHCA. For all the foregoing reasons, this claim is declared without merit.

XVII.As a fourth ground, the appellant claims illegal reasoning (fundamentación ilegal), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, violation of the principle of objectivity, and violation of the rules of sound judgment (reglas de la sana crítica). Specifically, the appellant believes an error was made by not evaluating the statements of three witnesses, for whom the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security did not need to be endorsed (refrendado) by the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic. He adds that no reasoning is provided as to why the opening of a specific checking account to administer the funds collected (based on the executive decrees) for the temporary work card would constitute a violation of the principle of the single treasury account (principio de caja única). He points out that it cannot be deduced that he was responsible for opening the aforementioned account. He states that it was not clearly understood that FUNDEHCA was useful for solving a national problem, that the context in which the events occurred was not appreciated, and that executive decrees are complex acts that cannot emanate from a single Minister. The claim is inadmissible. It has been stated throughout this judgment that it has been duly proven in the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal) –which is the competent forum for doing so– that the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is openly illegal. In that sense, it is irrelevant to discuss whether or not the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic was correct in not endorsing said agreement. For this last reason, the opinion that three legal professionals might have on the point is equally irrelevant. In any case, it is clear that through this instrument, an illegal charge was being –knowingly– created against the migrants for a service that the State provided to them, and incidentally, the State was avoiding paying FUNDEHCA for a service that entity provided to the State, not to the migrants. The foregoing is sufficient –as has already been stated throughout this judgment– to find that the concusión has been established. Regarding the opening of the checking account in which the Ministry of Labor and Social Security managed the funds collected by virtue of the charge established in executive decrees for the temporary work card, it must be indicated that this is related to the issue of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), which is the crime based on what occurred under the cover of the aforementioned decrees (the concusión is not based on those facts, but on what occurred concerning the cooperation agreement). Since F was acquitted of the crime of illegal exaction, it is now of no interest to discuss how it was established that applying those decrees violated the principle of the single treasury account, whether or not he was responsible for opening the aforementioned account, whether the issuance of the decrees was justified by the national reality at the time they were issued, or whether these are complex acts of the Executive Branch in which a single Minister does not intervene. As for the role of FUNDEHCA in developing the temporary work card program, it must be indicated that while it is possible to admit that this foundation may have been useful in addressing the problem of migrants, it is also true that this does not eliminate an essential aspect for the purposes of proving the concusión: FUNDEHCA was benefited by receiving money from migrants that was being illegally charged to them. Thus, it is irrelevant to determine whether or not that private organization played an important role in solving the problems generated by the presence of undocumented migrants in the country. For the sake of completeness, it must be recalled that it was stated above in Considerando IX of this ruling why Costa Rica’s situation as a consequence of the mass of undocumented migrants residing here cannot constitute a ground for justification or exoneration in favor of F. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber finds that none of the alleged defects are present, and therefore it is appropriate to declare this part of the appeal without merit.

XVIII.As a fifth ground, the appellant asserts illegal reasoning (fundamentación ilegal), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the principles of sound judgment (sana crítica). Specifically, he points out that in this case, the existence of a mistake of law (error de prohibición) was dismissed without sufficient reasoning. He indicates that several legal professionals told him that the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA did not require the endorsement (refrendo) of the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic, and therefore he acted under a mistake in not submitting the document to said entity. He maintains that the drafting of executive decrees is not the exclusive work of a State Minister, and therefore if the illegalities are not noticed in the procedure, he should not be held liable for intentional (dolosa) conduct. The reproach is inadmissible. It was already stated above in Considerandos XI and XVI –to which the appellant must abide– why it is irrelevant in this case to discuss whether or not the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic was correct in not endorsing the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, since the illegality of said agreement was duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal), which is the competent forum to decree it. Thus, it becomes equally irrelevant that various lawyers may have told the defendant whether or not the repeatedly mentioned agreement needed to be examined by the Comptroller General’s Office.

Additionally, of the Comptroller General's Office. Additionally, it has been indicated in this resolution that the crime for which F is liable is constituted by what occurred regarding the cooperation agreement and not by what happened in relation to the executive decrees, so it is of no interest to know whether he incurred an error when he signed those normative instruments or not. As such, the argument must be declared without merit.

XIX.As a sixth ground, the accused F claims illegal reasoning and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. Specifically, he asserts that the lower court disregards the value that the law grants to an audit report. He questions that the criteria expressed in such a report is taken as definitive. The objection cannot prosper. What the appellant intends is for it to be dismissed that he acted with malice when signing the cooperation agreement. This is not possible. As stated above in Findings VII and X of this ruling, at the time of signing the agreement with FUNDEHCA, F was aware that it was not possible to charge the migrant population for the service that the State provided to them. That knowledge was attained not only through the audit report mentioned by the appellant, but is also supported by the report and recommendations issued by the procedural body established to carry out the investigation suggested by the then Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Security, Eugenio Solano Calderón. Furthermore, the decisions taken by F on October 6, 1997, to order the closure of the bank account in which the money collected under the executive decrees was deposited, as well as the decision to order the drafting of a preliminary bill to be able to charge a fee for the seasonal work card, are incontrovertible proof that the defendant was aware of the illegality of the situation. In that sense, F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct not only is not exclusively derived from the report of the General Directorate of Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but has been fully accredited based on other documents and on the actions of the accused himself. Due to the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XX.As a seventh ground, the appellant alleges illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. He questions the statement of the sentencing Tribunal to the effect that it was before October 6, 1997, that he signed the decree which repealed the charge for the seasonal work card. The claim is not admissible. Even though it is indeed not possible to affirm – based on the evidence in the record – that the defendant had signed Decree No. 26430-MTSS of October 8, 1997, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 209 of October 30, 1997, before the 6th of that same month, it must be said that this is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the criminal liability of the defendant. Indeed, the crime of concusión (extortion by a public official) for which F was sanctioned is accredited based on what happened regarding the cooperation agreement between the ministry then under his charge and FUNDEHCA; such an offense is not constituted regarding actions taken under the executive decrees. Thus, the repeal of the fee charged to migrants in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for processing the seasonal work card in no way affects the crime for which the accused is liable. Moreover, F's knowledge of the illegality of charging the migrant population for a service provided by the State without a legal provision so establishing it is duly supported by documents that the accused had at his disposal before October 6, 1997, and also by the actions taken by the accused on that date. As such, whether or not he signed the aforementioned decree before that day is irrelevant for the purposes of this matter, so the lower court's assertion in that regard can be removed from the appealed ruling without this having any favorable impact for the appellant, which demonstrates that the assertion causes him no grievance, for which reason this part of the appeal must be declared without merit.

XXI.As an eighth ground, F alleges illegal and contradictory reasoning, as well as a violation of the in dubio pro reo principle. Specifically, he indicates that the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic never declared the illegality of the charge to migrants established in the repeatedly cited cooperation agreement. He points out that said entity only expressed having serious doubts about its legality. He asserts that in the face of a state of doubt, his criminal liability cannot be decreed. He considers that the recommendation made to him by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to draft a bill to utilize the resources from the charge to migrants for the seasonal work card does not suggest that said charge is illegal. He says that the fact that the State's single treasury account principle might have been violated by depositing the funds from the charge to migrants in a special account does not necessarily imply that the charge is illegal. The claims must be rejected. In accordance with what has been stated throughout this ruling, to which the appellant must adhere, the illegality of the charge to migrants created through the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is manifest and has been duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent one for this matter. Thus, it is irrelevant – for the purposes of the crime of concusión – whether the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic declared or not that the mentioned agreement is illegal, given that such a declaration has already been made by the competent body. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that there is no doubt whatsoever about the illegality of such a charge, so the state of doubt the appellant alleges in his favor does not exist. With respect to the argument that the recommendations issued by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security do not imply that the charge to migrants is illegal, it must be indicated that the appellant is not correct. Certainly, through official letter No. DAJ-AI-943-97 of September 24, 1997 (visible at folio 247 in Tome I of the case file), addressed to F, the accused was recommended to close the account in which the funds from the work card program were managed and also to present a bill before the Legislative Assembly so that it would authorize charging migrants for the issuance of said document. What is of interest to highlight is that in that document it was expressly noted (see folio 250 in the last indicated Tome) the caveat that the legislative authorization to use future income that could derive from the charge to migrants depended on the charge remaining in force. That warning was formulated in accordance with what was previously pointed out by the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the effect that such a charge was made in contravention of the legal reserve in tax matters (in point B.6 of the Legal Affairs report, what was warned by the audit body is expressly highlighted; see folios 249 and 250 in the reference Tome), so it is evident that not only was F warned about the illegality of opening a special checking account to manage the funds collected for the work card, but it was also pointed out with complete clarity that the charge itself was illegal, for which purpose mention was made of the criteria of the Internal Audit Office of the ministry in question. As such, it is not true that the illegality of the oft-mentioned charge to migrants was not inferred from the report of the Directorate of Legal Affairs. Moreover, with F being aware that the migrant population could not be charged for the seasonal work card based on the executive decrees by virtue of the fact that the creation of fees for state services is a matter reserved to law, his malicious conduct is evident because without any qualms he ignored that prohibition and instituted a new charge under a simple cooperation agreement (a normative source of much lower rank than an executive decree and far inferior to law), with the aggravating factor that the beneficiary of that money was no longer the State but FUNDEHCA. Finally, it must be indicated that it is possible that the violation of the State's single treasury account principle does not mean the occurrence of illegal acts, but this does not affect the present case. It must be remembered that the cited principle was violated by the opening of a special checking account to manage the funds from the charge that, thanks to the executive decrees, was made to migrants for the seasonal work card. But it has already been said that what was done under those decrees constitutes exacción ilegal (illegal exaction), a crime for which the defendant was acquitted. The offense for which F was convicted is concusión, which has its root in what occurred regarding the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Thus, it is evident that the issue of opening the special account is not linked to the configuration of the crime for which the ex-Minister is criminally liable. For all the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXII.As a ninth ground, the appellant alleges illegal reasoning, a violation of the principles of sound criticism, and that the appealed ruling is contradictory. In particular, F argues that there is an inconsistency in the sentence handed down against him, because it states that the defendants did not act in accordance with the Law when transferring the charge made to migrants from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to FUNDEHCA (he references page 667 of the ruling; folio 7491 in Tome XVII of the case file). He adds that in the same resolution (he refers to page 664 of the impugned sentence; folio 7488 in Tome XVII of the case file) it is indicated that the charge made based on the executive decrees was repealed. Based on those two statements by the trial court, the appellant argues that there is no basis to consider that the charge made by FUNDEHCA should have entered the State's coffers. The claim is not admissible. As has been said many times throughout this resolution, in the present case there are two distinct charges. One was made based on the executive decrees and the other was intended to be protected under the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. What happens – as has been explained – is that in both cases the entity providing the service to migrants is the Ministry; that ministry was the only one competent to grant the seasonal work card. This explains why any charge that might have been made for this concept should have entered the State's coffers. It must be remembered that FUNDEHCA provided service to the Ministry, not to the migrants, so if anyone should have compensated that foundation it was precisely the state body, not those who required the service from the Costa Rican State. In accordance with the foregoing, the statement in the questioned resolution that one of the charges was repealed does not cause any grievance to the defendant F. Furthermore, it also does not harm him that it is said that an attempt was made to transfer the charge that existed under the decrees to a situation governed by the agreement, since if the sentence is read as an integral piece, it is clear that by this it is not intended to indicate (as the appellant tries to make it appear) that there was a single charge (a circumstance that in the same ruling is considered disproven, as explained in Findings VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution), but rather it is simply an idiomatic turn of phrase to explain that in a new reality (the one governed by the cooperation agreement) an attempt was made to apply a figure (the charge) that was already known to be illegal from the preceding situation (what happened under the executive decrees). Based on all the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXIII.As a tenth ground, F alleges illegal reasoning and arbitrary exclusion of evidence. He argues that even though the sentencing Tribunal states that it is aware of a contentious-administrative proceeding filed by FUNDEHCA against the State for the non-approval of the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the lower court did not adhere to the rules of preliminary ruling that, in his judgment, that matter has over the one heard here. The claim is entirely inadmissible. It has already been explained in this resolution that it is the criminal jurisdiction which is competent to rule on the legality of the agreement between the ministry and the foundation, so the declaration of such agreement as illegal is in accordance with the Law and the appellant must adhere to it. The foregoing reveals that the alleged preliminary nature of the contentious-administrative proceeding over the criminal proceeding does not exist, but rather what is decided here impacts that jurisdiction. In accordance with the foregoing, being aware of the existence of that other case does not prevent resolving what is appropriate in the criminal jurisdiction, so what was done does not cause any harm to the defendant and by virtue of this, it is appropriate to declare this claim without merit.

XXIV.As an eleventh ground, F accuses illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. Specifically, he claims that the appealed sentence asserts (see proven fact No. 27 a at folio 6941 in Tome XVI) that he used for his personal benefit the sum of three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) that on October 16, 1997, were deposited by his secretary into a personal account he had at Banco Nacional de Costa Rica; said monies came from the charges made to migrants at FUNDEHCA. He argues that while it is true that for that particular account it is not evident that in the days after that deposit any withdrawals were made that reaffirm his version to the effect that he returned the money, it is also true that it has not been verified if he had other accounts, so it cannot be ruled out that he returned that money. He adds that the testimonies on which the Tribunal's assertion is based are contradictory and that it cannot be sustained that he gave the order for the sum in question to be deposited into his account. The claim must be rejected. Despite the fact that the arguments presented by F could indeed be useful to question the lower court's affirmation that he used the three hundred thousand colones in question (¢300,000.00) for his personal benefit, the truth is that this is a completely irrelevant point for the purposes of the conviction handed down against him for the crime of concusión. In the first place, it must be remembered that the lower Tribunal accredits the seizure of that sum both in the list of proven facts (see fact 27 a at folio 6941 in Tome XVI) and in the section of considerations directly related to the offense for which F is criminally liable (see in particular folio 676 of the sentence; that is, folio 7500 in Tome XVII, which is located in the section dedicated to the substantive analysis with respect to the crime for which the defendant was sanctioned). What is of interest to highlight is that those three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) were the product of the payment that migrants made to FUNDEHCA and after being collected by that entity, they reached F's account. This reveals that the crime was more than sufficiently configured when the transfer of the funds that are of interest here occurred, given that FUNDEHCA had already received them thanks to the inducement made by the defendant so that migrants would pay in favor of that entity something they did not owe, for which reason it is irrelevant to determine whether he used them for his benefit or returned them. Thus, for criminal purposes, the assertion in question is something non-essential as support for the conviction, so it can be dispensed with without such a procedure entailing any benefit to the accused. The referenced assertion is equally irrelevant regarding the civil aspects derived from the punishable act, since the civil action for damages filed based on what constitutes concusión was declared without merit (in fact, regarding this defendant, the civil claim was upheld only in relation to a peculado de servicios (embezzlement of services)). In accordance with all the foregoing, the questioned assertion causes no grievance to the appellant and therefore this argument must be declared without merit.

XXV.As a twelfth ground, the appellant argues that in the present case there has been a lack of reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. Specifically, he argues that the possibility of deporting undocumented foreigners is based on the Immigration and Alien Act and therefore it is not illegitimate to warn those who were required to obtain the seasonal work card about this. He argues that it is not explained why migrants would be compelled to process said document before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and before FUNDEHCA. He reiterates that Costa Rica was threatened by the large number of illegal immigrants inhabiting national soil. He indicates that the cooperation agreement did not create a fee (tasa), but rather a voluntary tariff for migrants. The claim must be rejected. What the appellant intends is to disprove the configuration of the typical elements of the crime for which he was sanctioned. It was already stated above in Findings VI and VII of this sentence that the concusión is duly accredited and the appellant must adhere to what was resolved there. It is worth adding – for greater abundance – that if by obtaining the seasonal work card migrants were authorized to work in the country, it is clear that they could not be deported, and if to obtain the mentioned document it was a requirement to pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) to FUNDEHCA, it is evident that they were obliged to do so, because if they did not, they would not obtain the card and without it they could be deported. Furthermore, the fact that this charge was held as a requirement to obtain the card shows that it is not a voluntary disbursement on the part of the migrants. Finally, the fact that the card had to be granted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security reveals that the mentioned charge was indeed a fee (tasa) – created through a simple cooperation agreement, which evidences its illegality – for a public service.

XXVI.As a thirteenth ground, F alleges a lack of correlation between the accusation and the sentence. Specifically, he says that it is not the same for the accusation to state that reports from the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic and internal bodies of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security indicate that the charge made to migrants based on the executive decrees is apparently illegal, as it is for such illegality to be declared in the criminal jurisdiction. He questions the affirmation that the concusión derives from actions taken based on the cooperation agreement between the ministry under his charge and FUNDEHCA. Likewise, he expresses his disagreement with the fact that it is considered that the charge FUNDEHCA made to migrants was mandatory. The reproach is inadmissible. The appellant must adhere to what has already been resolved in this ruling regarding the conformity with Law that in the criminal jurisdiction it was determined that the charges made to migrants (both the one made based on the executive decrees – exacción ilegal already time-barred – and the one made under the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security – which is the one of interest for the purposes of concusión) for the seasonal work card are both illegal. Moreover, it must be highlighted that this situation of illegality derives directly from the facts charged, so no inconsistency is appreciated. That the concusión derives from what happened under the aegis of the mentioned agreement does not contradict the accusatory document either, but rather derives from it. In any case, it should be noted that in the cases where, according to the appellant, the sentence does not correlate with the accusation, in none of them does the appellant specify what one says and what the other says, nor does he compare them, nor does he explain what the incompatibility consists of. In that sense, it is evident that it is not achieved to demonstrate any grievance, so this argument must be declared without merit.

XXVII.As a fourteenth ground, F considers that fundamental evidence for his interests was not gathered. Specifically, he claims that four accounting studies should have been carried out, one in relation to the peculado de bienes (embezzlement of goods), another regarding the peculado de servicios (embezzlement of services), another regarding the concusión, and the fourth regarding the cost of the work card.

**<b><u>The claim is inadmissible</u></b>.** F was not criminally convicted of any peculation (peculado), neither of services nor of goods, so the evidence whose absence is lamented is irrelevant in the criminal sphere. It is true that he was civilly condemned in the abstract to compensate the damage caused through a peculation of services, but by the type of conviction, the accounting study will have relevance in the sentence execution phase, so it does not affect the resolution of interest here. Regarding the concusión (concussion), it has already been set forth here that this crime was configured in this case by the fact that F motivated the migrants to pay FUNDEHCA a sum of money that they had no reason to hand over, so it is inconsequential to know how much was collected as a product of that criminal activity; therefore, the evidence whose absence is lamented for the purpose of proving this illicit act is equally irrelevant. The same inconsequentiality is observed with regard to the cost of the work card, as it does not matter how much the work assigned by ex-Minister F cost FUNDEHCA, since that was a task that could not be charged to the migrants. For the foregoing reasons, **<b><u>this allegation is hereby declared without merit</u></b>.**

XXVIII.As a **<b><u>first substantive ground</u></b>**, the appellant alleges erroneous application of substantive law, given that Article 27 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) was not applied. He considers that in this case, it was proven that he acted under a state of necessity (estado de necesidad) that justifies his conduct. He recalls the state of relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1995 and the urgency of taking measures to attend to the migrant population and avoid the collapse of services. **<b><u>The reproach is not admissible</u></b>.** The accused must abide by what has already been resolved in Considerando IX of this ruling, which explains why no state of necessity concurred in this case to justify his conduct.

XXIX.As a **<b><u>second ground for *in iudicando* defects</u></b>**, F alleges that Article 348 of the Penal Code could not be applied, because it was not proven that he acted willfully (dolosa). **<b><u>The claim is inadmissible</u></b>.** It has already been set forth in Considerandos VII, IX, and X of this judgment why it is duly proven that F committed the crime of concusión and that his conduct was willful, which the appellant must abide by.

XXX.As a **<b><u>third substantive ground</u></b>**, the appellant alleges that Article 71 of the Penal Code was violated, given that the eight-year prison sentence imposed on him is outside any parameter of proportionality. This issue was examined in Considerando XIII of this ruling, and the appellant must abide by what was resolved therein.

XXXI. **<b><u>Regarding the appeal filed in favor of J</u></b>.** For reasons of systematic order, since it contains an allegation in which the appellants are right and which affects the contested judgment, **<b><u>the two substantive grounds</u></b>** will be resolved jointly and in the first instance. Starting from folio 8539 in Volume XXI of the expediente (which contains only the appeal (recurso de casación) filed by J’s defense attorneys), Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas present an exhaustive critique of each and every one of the substantive points on which their client's conviction is based. Although they separate their arguments into two sections regarding why they believe the criminal law was erroneously applied to the conduct proven against their defendant, in reality, they raise a single problem: that J is not criminally responsible for the concusión, and that even if he were, he would be so in the capacity of an accomplice (cómplice) and not as a co-perpetrator (coautor), which would affect the proportionality of the sentence imposed. Hence, it is appropriate to issue a single ruling on the issue. Specifically, the appellants maintain that their defendant's signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) was considered in the judgment as a preparatory act for the commission of the crime for which J was sanctioned. They say that apart from that conduct in the preparatory phase, there is no other that fits within the type of concusión. They consider that in this state of affairs, J could never be considered a co-perpetrator of said illicit act, nor even a participant, as his intervention did not occur in the executive phase, but rather in a prior, non-punishable stage. They affirm that if the concusión was committed from the moment the executive decrees (decretos ejecutivos) were issued that first supported charging migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card, and the accused in question did not have sufficient authority to issue such regulatory bodies, then he cannot be held criminally liable for the crime in question. They point out that it has not been demonstrated that J had knowledge of the illegality of co-accused F’s actions. They add that if concusión is a crime in which the active subject must be a public official and their defendant is not one, then that circumstance could not be communicated to him as a perpetrator (autor), but rather as a participant (partícipe). They consider that in this case, the justification ground relating to the fulfillment of a legal duty was not applied, since the migratory problem occurring in Costa Rica in the mid-nineties had to be addressed. They allege that their client acted under the concurrence of an error of type (error de tipo), because he did not know that charging migrants was illegal. Finally, they state that J's actions would also be framed within an error of prohibition (error de prohibición), because he was convinced that the cooperation agreement was valid and did not require the approval of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). **<b><u>The claim is partially granted</u></b>.** In accordance with what will be set forth below, J certainly cannot be considered a co-perpetrator of the crime of concusión—the appellants are right in this—but he is indeed an accomplice to it, and therefore becomes criminally liable, although not in the manner established by the a quo. As set forth supra in Considerando VII, the crime of concusión is configured based on what happened concerning the drafting and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Thus, everything referring to whether J intervened in the procedure for drafting and executing the executive decrees on which the charging of migrants was based for some time is inconsequential, as this would be related to the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) for which the a quo declared the action time-barred. What matters is to know his level of intervention regarding the crime of concusión. According to the facts held as proven (see folio 6938 in Volume XVI), J, knowing the objections of illegality regarding the charging of migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card, drafted, developed, and signed the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, after which it was put into practice, with this indictee acting as the foundation's Executive Director. It should be noted that J's knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants is duly founded starting from folio 7472 in Volume XVII, because independently of the rapport between him and F, what matters is that the latter noted on the report from the General Directorate of Auditing of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Dirección General de Auditoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), which questioned the conformity of the charge to migrants with the legal system, that this document should be studied by the former (see folio 7475 in the last mentioned volume; incidentally, J declared at trial and admitted that F had commented to him about the obstacles faced by the seasonal work card program; see folio 7127 in Volume XVI); thereby it becomes evident that these accused persons had contacts and discussed the problem. Furthermore, as stated in the same Considerando VII, the illegality of that charge was evident and was drawn very clearly from the criteria issued by both the General Directorate of Auditing of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the procedure body regarding that issue. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to understand that both accused persons, due to their closeness as well as the irrefutable fact that they shared information and exchanged opinions about the objections raised, knew that charging migrants for the public service represented by the granting of the seasonal work card contravened the legal system. In accordance with the above, J, like F, was aware of the illegality of said charge, despite which he signed the mentioned agreement and partly directed its execution, in his capacity as Executive Director of FUNDEHCA. It is evident then that the client of the appellants here did intervene in the facts for which F was declared the perpetrator of the crime of concusión. What must now be clarified is whether he becomes criminally liable for his intervention. This Chamber considers that he does, but not as a co-perpetrator (which is what was resolved by the a quo), but rather as an accomplice. In accordance with the facts proven, what J did was knowingly lend his cooperation to F to ensure that the migrants made a payment they did not owe to FUNDEHCA. The defendant represented by the appellants here signed and put into practice, in his capacity as Executive Director of FUNDEHCA, the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry that F headed. The entire drafting phase and even up to the very signing of the agreement could eventually be located among the preparatory acts of the crime of concusión, as mentioned by Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas (who extract some phrases from the contested judgment used as support for their allegation). Despite the fact that J's representatives might be right in this, the truth is that the execution (an aspect that was not qualified by the a quo—not even in the excerpt of the sentence used by the claimants—as a preparatory act) of the mentioned agreement is clearly located within the executive phase of the illicit act, so it is in relation to the fulfillment of the agreement that actions of the indictee derive which entail criminal liability. It has already been set forth supra (see Considerando VII) that the crime of concusión comes into legal existence thanks to what happens concerning the signing and implementation of the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement. It is thanks to this instrument that F manages to improperly charge the migrants a sum of money that goes to a third party, which is FUNDEHCA. As Executive Director of that foundation, J, who knew that migrants could not be charged for the service provided to them by the State (remember that granting the seasonal work card never left the scope of the attributions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security), put the agreement into practice, thus substantially contributing with the ex-Minister in the execution of the crime of interest here. However, this contribution conforms only to the provisions of Article 47 of the Penal Code and not to what is stipulated in Article 45 of the same regulatory body. J cannot be considered a co-perpetrator of concusión, because not only was he not a public official when he collaborated with F in the commission of the illicit act for which the latter was convicted, but he also lacked the possibility of abusing a public office, since he held none, nor could he compel or induce migrants to make the improper payment under the terms of Article 348 of the Penal Code, given that doing so requires abusing public office. In other words, he does not carry out the criminal type jointly with F, as he does not meet the conditions to do so. What J did was assist F so that the latter, who was indeed a public official (one of the highest levels in the Costa Rican State), determined the migrants to make an illegal payment to a private entity that did not provide them any service (recall that FUNDEHCA served the State, but the migrants' relationship was with the latter and not the former). For all the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant only the part of the claim referring to the manner in which J intervened in the facts relevant to this case, so his conduct must be reclassified to the degree of accomplice. Finally, it should be noted that in this case, no type of error operates in favor of this individual subject to justice, neither of type nor of prohibition. It has already been set forth here that this accused certainly knew it was illegal to charge migrants for granting the seasonal work card. That being so, there was no possibility whatsoever of incurring an error regarding the impropriety of the charge that F devised to implement through a cooperation agreement that only bound FUNDEHCA to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but could not entail obligations for the migrants. Moreover, there is no error regarding the knowledge of the illegality, as this was captured in the reports that J discussed with F. Lastly, as has been indicated several times in this resolution, no state of necessity ever existed that justifies or exculpates the accused. In conformity with everything set forth, **<b><u>the appeal on substantive grounds filed by Drs. Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is partially granted, and consequently, the contested judgment is overturned, and J is declared a responsible accomplice (cómplice) of the crime of concusión (concusión), for which he is sentenced to THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. For a probation period of five years, J is granted the benefit of a conditional execution of sentence (condena de ejecución condicional)</u></b>.** Regarding the sentence imposed on J, it must be explained that it is proportional to the actions of this accused. Remember that he bears criminal liability as an accomplice in the crime of concusión committed by F, which implies that a less severe sentence than that of the perpetrator of the illicit act may be imposed on him, according to the provisions of Article 74 of the Penal Code. The undersigned Judges consider that while it is true that the fact of compelling migrant persons to make an improper payment is very serious, it is also true that J's level of blameworthiness for that crime is much lower than F's, and therefore he deserves a lesser sanction than the latter. His participation occurred to find the means by which the illegal charge to migrants was created, and that is serious, but considerably less so than motivating that population to make it, which F did, so there is indeed a substantial difference between the two conducts. The accomplice's conduct being less onerous in this case, it was considered proportional to impose a sentence of three years of imprisonment on him. Additionally, as J meets the requirements established in Articles 59 and 60 of the Penal Code, he is granted the benefit of a conditional execution of sentence.

XXXII.As a **<b><u>first procedural ground</u></b>**, the private defense attorneys for this accused allege a lack of correlation between the accusation and the judgment. Specifically, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim the following: a) they maintain that the accusatory piece attributes to J the signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, while the judgment indicates that he drafted it, which causes him grievance since the second is an assumption of perpetration (autoría) while the first is one of complicity (complicidad); and b) they indicate that the judgment varied the iter criminis described in the accusation to hold J responsible as a co-perpetrator instead of an accomplice. **<b><u>The claim is not admissible</u></b>.**

First, it must be stated that there has been no substantial variation between the accusations and the proven facts, as the essential core of events is the same. What did occur in this case was an erroneous application of the substantive law, since J certainly could not be sanctioned as a co-perpetrator (coautor), but rather should have been sanctioned as an accessory (cómplice) to the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión). This error by the lower court (a quo) has already been corrected by this Chamber in the preceding Considerando, so there is no interest in discussing the issue of whether the accusation was respected in terms of its narration of complicity. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that the iter criminis has not been varied, as the accused in question here did intervene—as indicated in the preceding section—in the executive phase of the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión). For the foregoing reasons, this argument is declared without merit.

XXXIII.As a second procedural ground (motivo por la forma), Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim a violation of due process in relation to the procedure followed by the Trial Court to issue the judgment. Specifically, they consider that the deadline for issuing the appealed decision was not respected. They point out that it was not indicated when the debate concluded, nor at what moment the deliberation began. This objection is not admissible. As stated above in Considerando XIV, although it is true that the deadlines for issuing a judgment are peremptory in the Criminal Procedure Code (meaning the criterion issued in the judgment of this Chamber No. 565-F-93, of 9:05 a.m. on October 22, 1993, is not applicable in matters processed under this regulatory body) and that these were not observed in this case, it is also true that the parties contributed to causing the error, and therefore, pursuant to Article 424 of the procedural ordinance, it cannot be certified that they suffered any grievance. Moreover, it should be noted that on page 6820 of Volume XV, it is recorded that the extraordinary deadline the trial judges requested from the parties was for deliberating and drafting the judgment, so it is evident that upon concluding that hearing, such acts were carried out, meaning that the moment the debate concluded and the deliberative phase began is indeed determined. For the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XXXIV.As a third ground for procedural defects (vicios in procedendo), J's private defense counsel allege a lack of substantiation, insofar as it would not be explained why opening a checking account for managing the monies received by FUNDEHCA from charging migrants would be part of a perpetrator's plan. This objection must be rejected. J's criminal liability derives from the help he gave F to compel migrants to make an undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA. As stated above in Considerando XXXI, the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security facilitated the other accused’s commission of extortion by a public official (concusión). Evidently, the management of the funds entering the foundation derived from the execution of the agreement between that legal entity and the ministerial portfolio, as it is thanks to that agreement that the monies arrived at the entity. The important point is that, regardless of whether such an account was opened or not, the agreement was being executed and migrants were paying FUNDEHCA a sum that they had no reason to pay to that organization. This being the case, the crime would have been consummated even if the mentioned checking account had not been opened, which demonstrates the irrelevance—for the purposes of the conviction against J—of the issue in question. For the stated reasons, the claim is declared without merit.

XXXV.As a fourth ground, the appellants argue that there is a defect of lack of substantiation regarding the existence of a close bond between J and F. This argument is not admissible. To be an accessory (cómplice) to a crime, one only needs to assist or collaborate with the perpetrator, regardless of whether they are close persons or friends. In this case, it has been duly demonstrated that J helped F commit the extortion by a public official (concusión) and that he did so by signing and implementing the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. What is important to highlight is that this occurred, making it irrelevant whether it was due to a close bond between them or for any other reason. For the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to declare the claim without merit.

XXXVI.As a fifth ground, the substantiation of the lower court's (a quo) assertion that J opened FUNDEHCA's checking account using a copy of a certification is questioned. As a sixth ground, it is claimed that the reason why J waited twelve business days to sign the account opening is not duly reasoned. As a seventh ground, it is argued that the friendship bond between F and J is duly proven. These objections are untenable. As indicated in Considerando XXXIV, independently of the opening of the mentioned checking account, J's liability derives from the assistance he rendered to F to commit the extortion by a public official (concusión), which consisted of lending his help to sign and implement the repeatedly cited cooperation agreement. Furthermore, it was indicated in Considerando XXXV that complicity does not depend on proving that the accessory (cómplice) has a close link to the perpetrator. Adhering to what was previously decided, what is claimed here becomes inconsequential for the purposes of sustaining the conviction against him, so the objections must be declared without merit.

XXXVII.As an eighth ground, the Trial Court's assertion that J was involved in the development of the seasonal work card program, and how it is possible that he performed acts characteristic of the perpetration of the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión), is challenged as improperly substantiated. The claim is not admissible. It has already been stated in Considerando XXXI that in this case, J's knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants for the seasonal work card is indeed duly proven, despite which he signed the cooperation agreement and thereby facilitated F's commission of extortion by a public official (concusión). Furthermore, that same section explained why J is an accessory (cómplice) and not a co-perpetrator (coautor) of that crime. The important point is that from that section, it is extracted that J's complicity does not depend on him being in charge of the seasonal work card program and that precisely because he does not meet the requirements to be considered a co-perpetrator (coautor), he is considered an accessory (cómplice). Therefore, this objection must be declared without merit.

XXXVIII.As a ninth ground, it is expressed that the reason why the events surrounding the executive decrees that regulated the seasonal work card program between 1995 and 1997 would entail criminal liability for J is not substantiated. This argument is not admissible. It was set forth above in Considerandos VII and VIII that the charge under the executive decrees referred to here was what supported the illegal exaction for which the action was declared time-barred. It was indicated in those sections that the extortion by a public official (concusión) derived from the events surrounding the preparation and signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, as that instrument established the obligation for migrants to make a payment known to be illegal. That is, his liability does not derive from the charge made based on the executive decrees, but is based on the charge established in the agreement. Hence, the claim that it is not substantiated what penal consequences the events surrounding the first of those charges would entail for this defendant lacks interest, since no criminal liability for J has derived from it. For the stated reasons, this point of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXXIX.As a tenth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas question the assertion that J had a marked interest in FUNDEHCA swiftly intervening in the charge for the seasonal work card. This argument is not admissible. As set forth above in Considerando XXXV, the only thing that matters for establishing J's complicity is that he knowingly aided F in committing the extortion by a public official (concusión), an aspect that is duly demonstrated (see Considerando XXXI of this ruling). Thus, it lacks all interest to assert that he sought for FUNDEHCA to swiftly intervene in the charge for the seasonal work card, as what matters is that he did so and that entity was the beneficiary of the undue payment made by the migrants. For the foregoing reasons, this argument is declared without merit.

XL. As an eleventh ground, a lack of substantiation for several points is claimed, such as why the charge for the seasonal work card could not be transferred from the Ministry to FUNDEHCA, why only Nicaraguans are mentioned if there are migrants of other nationalities, why monies destined for FUNDEHCA are questioned if it is a non-profit entity, and why J would be the beneficiary of those diversions of funds. The claim is not tenable. The reason why no charge for the issuance of the seasonal work card could be created, except by law, was set forth above in Considerandos VII and VIII. Furthermore, why FUNDEHCA fits within the concept of "third party" mentioned in Article 348 of the Criminal Code was also explained there. This being the case, it is evident that the reason why migrants could not be charged for the state service consisting of the issuance of the seasonal work card was substantiated. Additionally, for the purposes of extortion by a public official (concusión), what matters is that the payment be made to a third party; FUNDEHCA being that third party regarding the relationship between the State and the migrants, the crime is considered established, regardless of whether it is a for-profit entity or not. The act having come into legal existence from the moment the charge was made in favor of the foundation, it becomes irrelevant whether, ultimately, those monies benefited any particular person, so the assertion that J was benefited can be eliminated without the crime or his participation in it disappearing. Lastly, it must be indicated that it is inconsequential that some sections of the challenged judgment emphasize Nicaraguan migrants, since from the accused and proven facts, it is evident that the illegal charge was made to all migrants. In any case, even if it had only been charged to those from the sister Republic of Nicaragua, the crime would have been consummated nonetheless. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XLI. As a twelfth ground, a lack of substantiation is alleged regarding why, as of October 6, 1997, J would have had knowledge of the proceeding to repeal Decreto N° 24811-MTSS (which is the one supporting the charge made for the seasonal work card in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Furthermore, the failure to substantiate the incidence that a pending contentious-administrative proceeding—which discusses whether the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the cited ministerial portfolio is valid or not—would have is challenged. These objections are not tenable. As set forth in Considerando XXXI of this judgment, J knew that it was illegal to charge migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card and still helped F to do so. His complicity derives from this, making it inconsequential whether he knew or not that the decree authorizing the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (not FUNDEHCA) to charge for that service was going to be repealed (recall that the seasonal work card program had its legal basis in a decree different from those that regulated the charge for that document, but none of them authorized charging money in favor of a private entity). What J did know by that October 6, 1997, the date he signed the agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry directed by F, was that it was illegal to charge migrants for that service, despite which he signed the agreement that created a new charge, but this time in favor of the foundation he represented. Moreover, throughout this resolution, it has been explained why it is the criminal jurisdiction that is competent to declare the illegality of the agreement, such that it is this venue that prejudges what may be decided in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, this claim is declared without merit.

XLII. As a thirteenth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas question the affirmation that J had knowledge of the illegality of the charge to migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card, as well as that he intended to personally benefit from the funds destined for FUNDEHCA. The claim must be rejected. The issue of J's knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants has already been duly resolved in Considerando XXXI of this judgment. Moreover, it has also been set forth in this ruling that the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión) was consummated from the moment the undue payment of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) was arranged in favor of FUNDEHCA, regardless of who ultimately benefited from that money. For the foregoing, this point of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLIII. As a fourteenth ground, the appellants allege lack of substantiation insofar as it is not explained why Article 16 of the Financial Administration Law of the Republic (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República) is violated, nor why a public entity cannot have various bank accounts, nor why the charges under the executive decrees were illegitimate. This argument is not admissible. It can be observed that the cause of disagreement expressed by the appellants with this argument relates to the charges made to migrants based on the executive decrees. As explained above in Considerandos VII, VIII, and mainly X, that charge is distinct from the one made based on the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. J is considered an accessory (cómplice) for the events related to the latter, not for the events surrounding the others, on which the illegal exaction whose action was determined to be time-barred is based. Thus, matters related to the violation of the single treasury account (caja única) principle and to the payment made by migrants for some time in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (which is different from the act in favor of FUNDEHCA) do not affect the conviction of J, and therefore it is not capable of causing him grievance, and for this reason, this point of the challenge is declared without merit.

XLIV. As a fifteenth ground, J's private defense counsel claim a lack of substantiation regarding why it was required that the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) endorse the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, it is questioned why it is indicated that such agreement is illegal, if it has not been declared so. This objection is improper. It has already been set forth above in Considerandos XI, XVI, and XVII—to which the appellants must adhere—why it is in the criminal jurisdiction where it must be decided whether the mentioned agreement conforms to the Law or not. Having established that this instrument is manifestly illegal, it becomes inconsequential to discuss whether the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) had to endorse it or not. Furthermore, it is clear that there is an express declaration of illegality, which has been made by the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent one to do so. This being the case, this point of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLV. As a sixteenth ground, a lack of substantiation is claimed insofar as it would not be duly proven in the appealed judgment that J, having the obligation to do so, omitted sending the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) for its endorsement. Additionally, it questions the affirmation that the Comptroller General (Contraloría) refused to endorse the agreement. It is also questioned whether it is affirmed that the oversight body (órgano contralor) had declared the illegality of the mentioned instrument. These objections are not admissible. As has been set forth throughout this judgment, the illegality of the many times mentioned agreement has been declared in the competent venue for it, which is the criminal one. Furthermore, it has been explained on several occasions why it is inconsequential to discuss whether that agreement should have been sent for endorsement by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). In any case, it must be noted that the oversight entity did refuse to endorse the agreement, as recorded on page 1693 of Volume III, and that the reasons it gave for not endorsing it were the following: 1) that having put said contract into execution before endorsing it constituted a grounds for absolute nullity of the same (it should be noted that from this reasoning, it can be extracted that for the Comptroller General [Contraloría], it was evident that the beneficiary of that "agreement" was the Ministry directed by F, such that it was that body which had to pay for the services provided by FUNDEHCA, thus it was a burdensome contract of the type requiring approval from the oversight body); 2) that powers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security were being transferred to FUNDEHCA, aside from creating a charge known to be illegal; 3) that F could not contract with FUNDEHCA since not only he himself, but also his son were founding members of that entity, so he had to abide by the provisions of Article 22 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa); 4) that the ordinary contracting procedure was not followed, without specifying why it was dispensed with; 5) that sufficient documentation was not attached to prove that J was authorized to sign that agreement. This being the case, it is evident that the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) gave reasons of legality (some formal, but the most important substantive ones) for not endorsing the agreement, such that the lower court's (a quo) affirmations have the due evidentiary support and reasoning, as those arguments from the oversight body were set forth by the Trial Court throughout the challenged resolution. For the foregoing, this point of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLVI. As a seventeenth ground, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas allege a lack of substantiation insofar as it is not explained why the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had to be sent for endorsement by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República).

of the Republic. <b><u>The claim is without merit</u></b>. It has been stated repeatedly throughout this judgment (see Considerandos XI, XVI, XVII, and XLV) that it is irrelevant to discuss whether the aforementioned agreement should have been countersigned or not, because what matters is that it has already been declared openly illegal in the competent venue, which is the criminal court. Therefore, <b><u>this argument is declared without merit</u></b>.

XLVII. As an <b><u>eighteenth ground</u></b>, J's defense counsel question whether there is sufficient reasoning as to whether he signed the agreement with the authorization of FUNDEHCA's Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) and whether he knew the terms of the agreement before signing it. <b><u>The objection is without merit</u></b>. It has been set forth herein that J’s knowledge of the illegality of the charge to migrants created by that instrument is duly substantiated. That being established, it is irrelevant whether he had the endorsement of the Board of Directors to sign that document, since in any case what matters is that he did so knowing he was helping F determine the migrants to make an undue payment to FUNDEHCA. Moreover, it is obvious that J was aware of the terms of the agreement, since it has been clear he knew of the illegality of the charge established therein and still signed it. For these reasons, <b><u>this claim is declared without merit</u></b>.

XLVIII. As a <b><u>nineteenth ground</u></b>, J's representatives maintain that it has not been set forth how their defendant would have incurred the abuses of office attributed to the former Minister of Labor and Social Security who appears here as a defendant. <b><u>The objection is not admissible</u></b>. It was already set forth above in Considerando XXXI that J could not have incurred such abuses because he did not hold public office and, furthermore, he was not the one who determined the migrants to make the undue payment; rather, his intervention is limited to collaborating with F in that regard. That is why his conduct was reclassified to the degree of complicity and his sentence was reduced. Thus, the statements now challenged cause no harm to the accused. Therefore, <b><u>this argument is declared without merit</u></b>.

XLIX. As a <b><u>twentieth ground</u></b>, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas accuse a violation of due process, alleging the trial court attributed generic responsibility to J for everything that occurred. <b><u>The claim is not admissible</u></b>. It was already set forth in Considerando XXXI that J’s criminal liability derives from the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. That intervention was indeed attributed to the defendant, so even if there were errors in attributing other facts to him, that particular act is constitutive of a crime; therefore, no harm has been caused to this defendant. Consequently, <b><u>it is appropriate to declare this objection without merit</u></b>.

L. As a <b><u>twenty-first ground</u></b>, the appellants accuse a lack of reasoning, deeming it contradictory, insofar as the means employed to determine the migrants to make the undue payment is not explained. <b><u>The challenge must be dismissed</u></b>. It was set forth above in Considerandos VII and VIII how the assertion that F motivated the migrants to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA is duly substantiated, given that it was established as a requirement for processing the seasonal work card. Furthermore, it must be remembered that J’s criminal liability for these facts derives from the assistance he provided to F; it does not matter—since he is an accomplice—whether it was he who determined the migrants to make said disbursement or not. What matters is that he helped the perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión) to commit it. For the foregoing reasons, <b><u>this argument is declared without merit</u></b>.

LI. As a <b><u>twenty-second ground</u></b>, the reasoning of the trial court's assertion that J used money that entered FUNDEHCA for his own benefit because he bought carpets is challenged. The appellants consider it was never refuted that the foundation had lent that money to the accused. <b><u>The claim is without merit</u></b>. As has been indicated throughout this judgment (see Considerandos VI, VII, and VIII), the crime of extortion came into legal existence from the moment the migrants were determined to make an undue payment to FUNDEHCA. Thus, the final use given to the money collected by that entity is of no interest for the purpose of establishing the unlawful act, so it is not important to know whether J bought the aforementioned carpets with money lent to him by FUNDEHCA, because even if that were true, the crime of which he is an accomplice would still exist. Therefore, <b><u>this aspect of the appeal is declared without merit</u></b>.

LII. As a <b><u>twenty-third ground regarding procedural form</u></b>, J's private defense counsel claim that the appealed judgment was not substantiated regarding how their defendant would have abused the qualities of a public official and thereby would have motivated the migrants to make the undue payment. In the <b><u>twenty-fourth ground</u></b>, the claim is reiterated that it is not stated in what manner their client induced the disbursement. In the <b><u>twenty-fifth ground</u></b>, it is alleged that there is no explanation as to why the agreement is illegal or why it should have been countersigned by the General Comptroller of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). <b><u>The objections are without merit</u></b>. The appellants must abide by what was decided in Considerandos VI, VII, VIII, XI, XVI, XXXI, XLVIII, and L, which resolved why this does constitute a crime of extortion, why the charge was illegal, how the migrants were induced to make an undue payment, why the principle of legal reserve was violated, why it is not significant to discuss whether the cooperation agreement should have been countersigned, why the illegality of this instrument is properly declared in the criminal venue, from which facts J’s criminal liability derives, why he is an accomplice and not a co-perpetrator of extortion, as well as why it is not necessary to resolve this latter issue based on procedural form, because it has already been duly resolved on its merits.

LIII. As a <b><u>twenty-sixth ground</u></b>, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim there is a contradiction insofar as J is exonerated from liability for the crime of fraudulent administration for the use of FUNDEHCA's assets, and then that same use is used to support the extortion charge. <b><u>The argument cannot prosper</u></b>. It was stated above in Considerando VIII why the acquittal for the crime of fraudulent administration did not affect the conviction for extortion. The appellants must abide by that, as it is applicable to J’s case. Furthermore, it has also been explained in this judgment that the crime was consummated from the moment the migrants were determined to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA, a fact which is unaffected by how those funds were managed after they entered the foundation. Therefore, <b><u>this aspect of the appeal is declared without merit</u></b>.

LIV. As a <b><u>twenty-seventh ground</u></b>, the issue of whether J forced or induced the migrants to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA is raised again. The appellants shall abide by what was decided in Considerando XXXI regarding why J is criminally liable as an accomplice to extortion.

LV. As a <b><u>twenty-eighth ground</u></b>, Doctors Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas maintain that the assertion that the migrants were induced into error or deceived, because they believed the money was being paid to the Costa Rican Government, is unsubstantiated. <b><u>The claim is without merit</u></b>. What matters for the crime of extortion is that, through the abusive exercise of his office, the public official determines a person to give or promise an undue patrimonial benefit in favor of a third party. That is what has been duly proved in this case, and that the perpetrator of that conduct is F (Considerando VII), who acted with the assistance of J (Considerando XXXI). Thus, it becomes completely irrelevant to know whether the determination of the migrants' will was due to deceit or not, because what matters is that they had to make the undue payment. In any case, what has been proven is that pamphlets announced it was a requirement to pay that money to FUNDEHCA, and that aspect is undeniable, regardless of whether it can be classified as deceitful or not. For the foregoing, <b><u>it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit</u></b>.

LVI. As a <b><u>twenty-ninth ground</u></b> (the appellants call it the twenty-eighth, according to what is seen on folio 8537 in Volume XXI or page 178 of the brief), it is questioned whether the migrants were capable of understanding the compulsion. <b><u>The claim is not admissible</u></b>. What has been proven in this case is that the migrants were determined to make an illegal payment to FUNDEHCA, and it is recorded that this payment was established as a requirement to process their seasonal work card. That is to say, they were determined to make that illegal payment, and for that, F abused his office. Moreover, J helped F commit that crime. That is what matters for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of these defendants, without it being relevant to know whether the migrants were capable of knowing they were being compelled to make said payment, because even if they did not know, the fact is that F motivated them to do it and, for that, he had the assistance of J. Consequently, <b><u>it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit</u></b>.

LVII. <b><u>Regarding the appeal in favor of M</u></b>. For reasons of procedural economy, since there is one ground on which the appellant, Attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defense counsel for the defendant M, is correct, we proceed to immediately resolve the <b><u>second ground regarding procedural form</u></b>. Attorney Navas Montero alleges a lack of reasoning, for evaluating the respective evidence without following the guidelines of sound critical judgment, regarding the reason why M’s alleged subordinates obeyed her. She indicates that the accused was not appointed as F’s assistant when he held the position of Minister of Labor and Social Security, nor was she entrusted with administrative tasks. She alleges that despite being the Director of the Minister’s Office, that only made her a liaison officer and that, in any case, the position did not formally exist. She contends that it cannot be derived from that position that she had command power over the personnel. She considers it is not duly proven that by signing the checks corresponding to domestic field trips (giras), she was certifying that they took place. She adds that it derives from the evidence that it was Ms. Isela Hernández who managed matters related to the field trips, and that it is not explained why the servants involved in the check problem would be subject to M and not to the Administrative Director, a position held by Ms. X. The appellant points out that it is not explained why M performed the administrative tasks required for the crime of embezzlement (peculado) to be configured, given that custody of the petty cash funds corresponds to the budget officer of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security itself, Ms. Dora Orozco, as provided by articles 23 and 24 of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) of said ministerial portfolio. She indicates that witness Norman Araya, who served as the internal auditor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on the date the facts of interest here occurred, stated in the trial that the execution of field trips depended, according to article 14 of the Financial Administration Law (Ley de Administración Financiera), on the petty cash, and that this was under the custody of the budget officer. She expresses that even admitting M was a trusted employee of the Minister of Labor and Social Security, that does not make her responsible for administering the institution's funds. She reiterates that her defendant could not divert funds. She states it was never explained why other officials had to obey her defendant. <b><u>The objection has merit</u></b>. According to the list of proven facts (see folio 6946 in Volume XVI), the accused joined the Ministry of Labor and Social Security as a servant on May 8, 1994, as she was going to take charge of an office dedicated to international relations. She served as Director of the Minister’s Office and became his principal assistant, such that she acquired a great deal of power within the institution, and thus exercised command power over the other servants. She was authorized by former Minister F to sign travel expense reports, thereby certifying that the field trips had taken place, because if they had not occurred, then she should not sign. If the expense was justified as an official field trip, M had to sign a travel allowance settlement order, which had to be signed by the requesting official, and then the signatures of the Ministry’s Chief Officer (Oficial Mayor) and the Budget Officer (Oficial Presupuestal) had to be collected, who “<i>in turn, endorsed the authorization of the settlement and issued the corresponding check, as administrative and financial controls</i>” (folio 6947 in Volume XVI). The judges indicate that in this way, M had the authority to dispose of the budgetarily allocated item for field trips by officials of the Ministry of Public Works and Transports. According to the factual framework established by the lower court, M took advantage of her ability to dispose of those funds and tasked R and MR with filling out travel expense forms in the name of other officials subordinate to the Minister's Office, so that they would sign them and process the collection for field trips not taken. The trial judges indicate that the other servants participated in that fraudulent collection because M had command power over them. Thus, she authorized the settlement of expenses and irregularly justified the payment of travel allowances for field trips not taken, and thus a total of one hundred fifty-four thousand nine hundred colones (¢154,900.00) was unduly paid (by means of checks N° 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 and 5905, all from current account N° 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account [Cuenta Caja Chica]) for fraudulent travel settlements. Summarizing the above, it must be said that in the opinion of the undersigned Magistrates, it has not been duly substantiated so far in what way M assumed, by reason of her office, the administration of the funds with which travel allowances for domestic field trips were paid. It can be seen on folio 7587 in Volume XVII that the lower court states the following: “<i>As we have indicated, although it is true she did not materially have those funds under her custody (tutela), the character of active subject of this illicit act is conferred upon her by that faculty of disposition that implies an administration thereof</i>.” That is, according to the trial court, M did not exercise direct custody of the money. So the crime could only be configured if she had the funds under her administration or if she received them, in both cases by reason of her office. Since the Court focuses on the issue of how she administered them, it must be understood that it implicitly ruled out that she received them. Thus, to convict M as the perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement, the judging body should have explained why it was that she had—by reason of her office—the administration of the petty cash funds. It has already been stated in this Considerando that the Court held it as proven that the settlement of domestic travel requires a requesting servant to sign it. Then, according to what has been demonstrated in this case, M had to sign it, but afterwards the signatures of the Chief Officer and whoever holds the position of Budget Officer were required, these last two acting as administrative and financial comptrollers. Now, if the judging body places M’s signature (whom F would have entrusted with that task) as one part of the travel allowance payment authorization process, and after her rubric the intervention of two more comptrollers is required, then it would seem that what is described is a phase of oversight of the proper use of public funds. That is, it would be a stage of monitoring that those funds are given a proper destination, and that would refer precisely to the custody of those funds, but the lower court expressly ruled out that she had custody of them, so that possibility cannot now be contemplated. The problem is that, despite describing an oversight process, it is denied that this is custody of public funds, with the aggravating factor that it is not described in what manner she could have disposed of them, which is what is susceptible to being framed as administration thereof (see the conceptual elaboration of what it is to administer, have custody of, and receive public funds in the judgment of this Chamber N° 2000-01312, of 9:30 a.m. on November 10, 2000). So far, nothing more has been said than that signing the expense settlement is equivalent to certifying that the field trip existed. But it has not been explained why that would be equivalent to saying that M disposed of (i.e., decided what should be done with) the funds destined for the payment of travel allowances for domestic field trips, especially if after her signature two more were required, which precisely the administrative and financial comptrollers had to affix. As can be seen, there is an important error on the part of the sentencing body in substantiating why M must be considered an administrator, by reason of her office, of public funds, which affects the reasoning of her conviction as the perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement, as it is not duly motivated so far why her conduct fits within the elements of the offense. Thus, it being proven that the defect alleged by the appellant exists in this case, it is appropriate to <b><u>declare this claim with merit and, consequently, annul the appealed judgment and the trial that preceded it, only with regard to the case pursued against M for the crime of embezzlement related to checks N° 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 and 5905, all from current account N° 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account, and to order the referral of the matter back to the trial court of origin for a new proceeding on that single aspect, this time in accordance with the law</u></b>. Having resolved this aspect of the appeal as has been done, it becomes unnecessary to issue a ruling on the remaining claims, since the purpose pursued by them—namely, the annulment of M’s conviction for the crime of embezzlement and the referral of the case back for a new trial concerning what was attributed to her in relation to the mentioned checks—has been achieved.

LVIII. <b><u>Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General) of the Republic.

As the sole ground regarding form, attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo argues that the statute of limitations (prescripción) was erroneously applied in favor of F for the crime of illegal exaction. She considers that after the first formal indictment (primera imputación formal) of F, the statute of limitations period is not reduced by half, but rather runs anew in its entirety. **The claim is without merit**. This Chamber has already definitively resolved how the statute of limitations periods for criminal prosecution are calculated. In effect, through judgment No. 2002-00383 of 9:40 hours on April 30, 2002, it was indicated that the reduction of periods by half occurs on a single occasion, which is when any of the interrupting events provided for in Article 33 of the Código Procesal Penal first occurs. In the case of the accused F, the first interrupting event that occurred was the formal indictment, which happened on November 26, 1998, when he was questioned (indagatoria). Given that the maximum penalty for the crime of illegal exaction is one year of imprisonment, the action to prosecute it would normally have prescribed in three years, pursuant to Article 31, subsection a) of the Código Procesal Penal. However, the first formal indictment (indagatoria) was in turn the first interrupting event of the statute of limitations period that occurred regarding this accused, meaning that from that November 26, 1998, not only is the calculation of the statute of limitations interrupted, but the period is reduced by half, that is, to eighteen months, which expired on May 26, 2000. Between both dates, no other interrupting event is observed (the legislative reform providing that the resolution convening the preliminary hearing for the first time constitutes such an event is subsequent to the date on which the statute of limitations took effect), meaning the lower court (a quo) is correct in deeming that the crime of illegal exaction was time-barred when it proceeded to issue a judgment. Based on the foregoing, **it is appropriate to dismiss this argument**.

LIX. As a **first ground on the merits**, attorney Suñol Ocampo questions that the crime of illegal exaction was declared time-barred based on the first formal indictment being the questioning (indagatoria) of the accused. **The claim is without merit**. While it is true that it can be inferred from subsection a) of Article 33 of the Código Procesal Penal that there is more than one formal indictment against the accused (it is not for nothing that it speaks of the first), it is also true that the questioning (indagatoria) is a formal act (see Articles 91 to 99 of the Código Procesal Penal) and that it is the first moment in which the accused is formally informed of being so (observe Article 91 of the Código Procesal Penal and it can be seen that it is only once a person is identified as a possible participant in a punishable act that the Ministerio Público must summon them to testify, and for this a specific procedure must be followed). Thus, it is evident that the questioning (indagatoria) is the first formal indictment against the defendant. The facts attributed may be specified later, but the first ones will always be those formally communicated in the questioning (indagatoria). For the foregoing reason, **this claim is dismissed**, which—incidentally—was presented as a ground on the merits, although the issue raised is one of form.

LX. As a **second ground on the merits**, attorney Suñol Ocampo indicates that despite having found proven an abusive use by the accused F and J of the assets and funds of FUNDEHCA, the lower court (a quo) chose to acquit them of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of fraudulent administration attributed to them. **The objection is not admissible**. As stated supra in Considerando VIII, the administrative board of FUNDEHCA was satisfied with the way the entity was managed, and therefore the Trial Court indeed could not find the harm required to establish the crime of fraudulent administration. This being the case, the trial body's decision is correct, and **it is appropriate to dismiss the claim**.

LXI. As a **third ground regarding errors in iudicando**, the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República claims that substantive law was violated. She considers that it was through the investigation in the process that it was concluded that the minutes recording the designation of the Junta Administrativa, the President, and the Executive Director reflected a historical reality, despite recording the appearance of two persons who were out of the country, such that she believes the crime of ideological falsehood was indeed committed. **The reproach is without merit**. It is evident from folio 7544 in Volume XVII that in the minutes of installation of the Junta Administrativa of FUNDEHCA, as well as in the minutes of the extraordinary assembly of founding members of FUNDEHCA, the presence of A and E was recorded, despite them not being in Costa Rica, yet they appear signing those documents. It can be seen at folio 7554 in the Volume under comment that for the lower court (a quo), the fact that they were not actually present caused no harm whatsoever, since they agreed from the beginning with what was agreed upon in those meetings and with the content of the minutes, which is why they signed them afterwards. This Chamber considers the lower court's (a quo) criterion to be correct, since Article 360 of the Código Penal requires the concurrence of harm for the crime of ideological falsehood to be established. In the present case, the truth is that such harm does not exist, because the content of the minutes reflects the will of the interested parties, including A and E. If the latter were satisfied with what was recorded in the minutes, despite not being at the meeting, this is conclusive proof that no harm is caused to them by what was agreed upon. This being the case, **the argument must be dismissed**.

LXII. As a **fourth ground on the merits**, attorney Suñol Ocampo claims a violation of Article 365 of the Código Penal, since J used the power of attorney granted to him as Executive Delegate of FUNDEHCA to open an account at Banco INTERFIN, even though the power of attorney was not valid for such purpose, as the provisions of Article 1251 of the Código Civil were not followed in granting it. **The reproach is entirely inadmissible**. For someone to be convicted of using a false document, the document must be false. That is not what the appellant argues, but rather she believes that the power of attorney used by J was improperly granted to him. As can be seen, she is not saying it is false, but rather defective, so she does not prove that the defect she alleges exists in this instance; therefore, **this part of the challenge is dismissed**.

LXIII. As a **fifth claim regarding defects in iudicando**, the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República claims erroneous application of substantive law, since M was acquitted of two fraud (estafa) crimes. She considers that the lower court (a quo) was mistaken in basing the application of the in dubio pro reo principle on the evidence rather than on the fact. She believes that it was alleged that there were two field trips (giras) to Limón that were not carried out, but the Court had a doubt as to whether it could be proven that they were not made. She considers that since it was not proven that the trips did indeed take place, it must then be established that they were never carried out. **The claim is not admissible**. What the appellant seeks is to reverse the burden of proof. It is not for the defense to prove that the trips under comment were made; the requesting body (whether the Ministerio Público or the Procuraduría General de la República in this case) must demonstrate that they were not made. That is what the international human rights instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Constitución Política, and the criminal laws mandate. Now, it is evident from folio 7595 in Volume XVII that M presented a report during the trial (which was admitted as evidence for better resolution) detailing the results of the field trips to Limón for F. Furthermore, the Court evaluated the testimony of Pedro Arias Bermúdez, who was then head of transportation at the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, as well as the statement of MA, who supposedly accompanied M on the trips. What matters is that while it is true the Court had many doubts about the veracity of the evidence provided by the accused, the fact is that it could not classify it as false, and thus found itself obliged to doubt whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the mentioned trips had not taken place. Thus, if the prosecution's allegation cannot be demonstrated (i.e., that the trips were not carried out), the Court could do nothing but apply the in dubio pro reo principle in favor of this defendant for these acts. In accordance with the foregoing, **it is appropriate to dismiss this part of the challenge**.

LXIV. **Regarding the appeal filed by the Ministerio Público**. Prosecutors (Fiscales) Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández allege, as a **first ground**, contradictory reasoning in the acquittal of defendants F and J for the crimes of fraudulent administration and incompatible negotiations, as well as the acquittal of F for the crime of breach of duties. They consider that if the trial body deemed that the acts constituting fraudulent administration, incompatible negotiations, and breach of duties are the same ones for which the extortion (concusión) was proven, then they should have been convicted for those other offenses. **The claim is without merit**. As stated supra in Considerando VIII, in reality the acts constituting extortion (concusión) are not the same as those from which the other crimes mentioned by the appellants derive, but rather they are different. Thus, the acquittal for some of them did not compel acquittal for extortion (concusión); likewise, the conviction for the latter crime does not compel conviction for the others. In that sense, the contradiction the Prosecutors point to does not exist, so the reproach **must be dismissed**. For further elaboration, in that same Considerando VIII one can see why the crime of fraudulent administration does not exist, such that the acquittal for that crime is in accordance with the Law. It is timely to point out that in that same Considerando VIII it was explained why the subsumption exercise performed by the lower court (a quo) with respect to incompatible negotiations and breach of duties was poorly performed. Indeed, the statutory elements on which the last two mentioned offenses are based are different from those on which extortion (concusión) is founded. If that is so, then the facts capable of being framed within such crimes are also different. Hence, proving extortion (concusión)—which is duly founded in accordance with the Law—does not necessarily entail a conviction for incompatible negotiations and breach of duties. Now, despite the lower court (a quo) erring in considering that these crimes are subsumed by extortion (concusión), it must be noted that said error causes no injury to the Ministerio Público, as in any case acquittal was proper. As indicated in Considerando VIII, the crime of breach of duties requires an act or omission for its configuration, but in this case no omission has been attributed to F. At most, it has been said that he did not fulfill his duties because he incurred in faults against them (that is, that he did not do something because he did something else), which reveals that precisely how his conduct was specifically omissive was not specified. Rather, actions are attributed to him, and with these the crime of breach of duties is not established, meaning he certainly could not be convicted for it. The same applies to the incompatible negotiations attributed to F and J, since it was never explained what their interest consisted of—distinct from what constituted the extortion (concusión), which is duly proven. That is, there were no facts that could be framed within the type under comment, but only situations were proven that fit the type of extortion (concusión). Hence, these defendants could not be criminally penalized for the offense under comment either. For all the foregoing reasons, **it is appropriate to dismiss this argument**.

LXV. As a **second ground**, attorneys Chacón Chang and Chinchilla Fernández claim lack of reasoning, because they consider that it is not explained why subsuming the crimes of incompatible negotiations and fraudulent administration into that of extortion (concusión) leads to an acquittal for the former. **The objection is without merit**. It was already explained in the previous Considerando why the acquittals for the crimes of incompatible negotiations, fraudulent administration, and breach of duties are in accordance with the Law, so the appellants must abide by what was resolved there.

LXVI. As a **third ground**, the appealing Prosecutors (Fiscales) argue that the acquittal of F and J for the crime of incompatible negotiations lacks proper reasoning. They assert that the alternative accusation explains that by having contracted with FUNDEHCA, F violated the provisions of Articles 112 and 143 of the Constitución Política, which prohibit Government Ministers from directly or indirectly entering into contracts with the Administration. **The argument is not admissible**. The articles mentioned by the appellants establish prohibitions, but only penalize them with loss of credentials. One must therefore look only to the Código Penal to determine when the crime of incompatible negotiations exists. If one reads Article 347 of said legal text, it will be observed that what is involved is the public servant taking an interest in any contract or operation in which they intervene by reason of their position. What matters in this case is that it has not been stated in what way—independent of what constitutes the crime of extortion (concusión)—they took an interest in a contract or operation. Again, it must be said that the proven facts supporting the conviction fit only the crime of extortion (concusión) and no other, meaning F and J could only answer for that offense and not for others. For the reasons stated, **it is appropriate to dismiss this argument**.

LXVII. As a **fourth ground**, the representatives of the Ministerio Público claim a violation of the rules of sound criticism when reasoning the acquittal of F for a crime of embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios). Specifically, the appellants argue that the former Minister of Trabajo y Seguridad Social abused the services provided by the ministerial driver Mario Álvarez Eras, as he was used to attend to the accused's family matters unrelated to the exercise of his office. They consider that the fact many officials are not prosecuted for using drivers and vehicles of the Administration for personal matters does not mean it is not a crime. They believe the matter cannot be classified as *peccata minuta*, nor is it understood what that thing is. They add that the judges do not explain why they depart from criteria of the Sala Constitucional in the sense that discretion is the freedom to assess the public interest, and of the Sala Segunda in the sense that the discretionary use of assets gives greater freedom to the official but for the better performance of the office, not for personal benefit. **The claim is without merit**. It was determined in the case file that F certainly used his driver to take his wife and children to perform various errands (proven fact 46 at folio 6950 in Volume XVI). Certainly, the fact that there are officials who use discretionary-use vehicles in the described manner does not necessarily mean the conduct is not criminal. Nor could such a thing be dismissed because what happened is classified as "peccata minuta." What does fully exonerate F from responsibility for that act is the provision in the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres. In that normative text (Articles 221 to 243 of said law), state vehicles (also called official) are classified as discretionary use, administrative use, and those of the Fuerza Pública and security. What matters here is that the discretionary-use vehicle is not mentioned by the legislator as covered by the prohibition that is expressly established for administrative-use vehicles in Article 234, subsection a) of the law under comment. This implies that using discretionary-use vehicles for activities other than the normal ones of the institution or ministry is not legally prohibited. Furthermore, this is not the scenario of subsection b) of the same Article 234, because the vehicle was assigned to F and not to his wife or children. Nor is the prohibition in subsection e) of the numeral under reference violated, because the type of work for which the vehicle is destined is determined by the official responsible for it, according to what is established in the second paragraph of Article 225 of the already mentioned Ley de Tránsito. This being the case, there is no express prohibition whatsoever that prevented F from requiring his driver to use the discretionary-use vehicle to transport his wife and children. Hence, the crime of embezzlement (peculado) provided for in the second paragraph of Article 354 of the Código Penal cannot be established, because that defendant could act as he did. It should be added that the precedent of the Sala Constitucional mentioned by the appellants refers to what administrative discretion is, and not to what a discretionary-use vehicle is, so they are different subjects. Moreover, the ruling of the Sala Segunda cited by the appellants (judgment 147 at 15:00 hours on May 5, 1995) does not mention the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, nor does it interpret it, but rather resolves (see Considerando IV of the Sala Segunda ruling) based on a regulation issued by the Contraloría General de la República.

Additionally, the Republic. Additionally, the cited ruling was issued in a case related to a former official of the Municipality of San José, but it turns out that no municipal official is included in the list of public servants who may use a discretionary-use vehicle, as observed in Article 225 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito). Thus, it is evident that the resolution of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) cited by the appellants does not relate to factual scenarios or legal provisions identical to those that must be considered in the matter under review here. In that sense, they are not binding jurisprudence for the present matter, according to what is derived from Articles 9 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). For all the foregoing reasons, this argument is dismissed.

LXVIII. As a fifth ground, the appellants point out that there was a contradiction in the appealed judgment when explaining why the action to prosecute the crime of illegal exaction was time-barred, given that the judges state at one point that the first formal charging of F occurred on April 26, 1998, and in another section they maintain that it occurred on November 26, 1998. The claim is not admissible. It was already set forth in this judgment that the first formal charging of F occurred on April 26, 1998, when he was questioned (indagatoria). Note that this is the second of the two dates mentioned by the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), and even so, the statute of limitations for the criminal action for the crime of illegal exaction took effect. This reveals that even if the error they mention existed, it would not have caused any grievance to their interests, since the unlawful act could not have continued to be prosecuted anyway. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the argument.

LXIX. As a sixth ground, attorneys Chacón Chang and Chinchilla Fernández allege a lack of reasoning as to why the questioning (indagatoria) of F, held on November 26, 1998, was taken as the first formal charging for illegal exaction and embezzlement of services. They cite the opinion of the Criminal Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación Penal) to the effect that this first formal charging occurs with the reading of the accusation by the Judge of the Intermediate Stage (Etapa Intermedia). The claim is inadmissible. Let the appellants refer to what was set forth in Recital (Considerando) LIX regarding why the questioning (indagatoria) is the first formal charging in this matter. For greater abundance, if the appellants wish to know the reasons why this Chamber—which is not bound by the criteria of the Criminal Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación Penal), since each Court has its own scope of competence and they do not intermingle—does not share the position of that high jurisdictional body, let them refer to judgment 2002-01272 of 10:15 a.m. on December 13, 2002, especially Recital (Considerando) V of that resolution.

LXX. Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) in exercise of the civil action. Attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), alleges a lack of reasoning, given that the Trial Court (Tribunal de instancia) considered that the funds collected by FUNDEHCA did not proceed from the State, but from a large number of migrants. He considers that this reasoning is mistaken, because the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) acted in representation of collective interests, therefore it did not claim on behalf of the State, but in substitution of those affected. The reproach is not admissible. Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) grants the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) the exclusive power to intervene in criminal proceedings to exercise the civil action for social damage. For this purpose, it allows it to claim the respective compensation for punishable acts that affect collective or diffuse interests. What happens in this case is that we are not faced with either of those two types of interest. The collective refers to that which is proper to a group that unites, in fact or in law, in pursuit of a specific end. In contrast, the diffuse pertains to the individual by the mere fact of being a member of society and allows them to claim for something that does not affect a determined subject, such that no holder of the right to compensation can be established, but rather it is suffered by the generality of individuals with the same intensity. Neither of these scenarios occurs in the present case, since neither have the migrants formed a group, nor is the harm suffered by a generality of persons. The migrants each suffered a harm to their assets, which can be measured monetarily. Furthermore, those who paid FUNDEHCA were individually identifiable and never formed a group in pursuit of a particular end. Thus, we were not faced with the scenarios of Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), but rather with a large number of individual interests, meaning that each holder is the one who must (by themselves or, if it had been done at the opportune moment, through delegation to the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público)) claim the indemnification. For the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the lower court's (a quo) decision to reject the standing of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to substitute the migrants as civil parties for the money paid to FUNDEHCA is in accordance with the Law. Thus, this claim is dismissed.

LXXI. Regarding the penalty of special disqualification. The Trial Court (Tribunal de instancia) imposed on F, J, and M the penalty of special disqualification for eight years to hold public office. Additionally, it ordered that the resolution be communicated to the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil), so that this administrative body would register it and also make the pertinent communications to the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) and other public institutions. On this matter, it must be warned that the eventual criminal liability of M will be discussed again at trial, so it is not yet appropriate to apply the mentioned penalty of special disqualification to her. In contrast, upon the issuance of this judgment, said sanction does become final with respect to F and J. This Chamber considers that the lower court's (a quo) provision to communicate what was resolved to the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil) is appropriate. However, it is advisable to indicate to the adjudicating body that this same Court is empowered to communicate, if it considers it appropriate, directly to the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) that these two defendants bear the penalty of special disqualification from holding public office. The adjudicating body also has the power to order, if it deems it appropriate, the publication of that specific measure in the Official Gazette La Gaceta (Diario Oficial La Gaceta), so that the entire state apparatus would be aware that F and J are disqualified from public service for a determined time. Finally, as the disqualification is for the exercise of all types of public office, including those by popular election, it could be ordered that what is pertinent be communicated to the Civil Registry. All these observations are made in the interest of collaborating with the instance judges in compliance with Articles 453 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal).

Therefore:

The seventh ground of the cassation appeal filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of F is granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment is reversed with respect to the sentence that F must serve in his condition as responsible perpetrator of the crime of graft committed to the detriment of the duties of public function, which is set at FOUR YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. By virtue of the imposed sanction, the request for F to be granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence is denied. The remaining grounds of the challenge formulated by attorney Navas Montero on behalf of F are dismissed. The cassation appeal filed by the defendant F is dismissed. The cassation appeal on the merits filed by Doctors Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is partially granted, and consequently, the challenged judgment is reversed and J is declared a responsible accomplice of the crime of graft, for which the penalty of THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT is imposed upon him. For a probation period of five years, J is granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. The cassation appeal on procedural grounds filed by Doctors Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is dismissed. The second ground for procedural defects of the cassation appeal filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M is granted: Consequently, the appealed judgment and the debate that preceded it are annulled, only with regard to the case pursued against this accused for the crime of embezzlement related to checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731, and 5905, all from checking account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account, and the matter is remanded (reenvío) to the Court of origin for a new substantiation of that single aspect, this time in accordance with the Law. As unnecessary, a ruling regarding the remaining grounds of the appeal filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M is omitted. The cassation appeal filed by attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo representing the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) is dismissed. The cassation appeal filed by Prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is dismissed. The cassation appeal filed by attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado representing the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) is dismissed.

the Republic. In all matters not expressly indicated in this ruling, the challenged resolution remains unaltered, including the acquittals ordered by the lower court (a quo) and the penalty of special disqualification that F and J must serve. The trial court (Tribunal de instancia) shall take note of what is indicated in Considerando LXXI of this resolution.

Daniel González A.

Jesús Ramírez Q. Afonso Chaves R.

Rodrigo Castro M. José Manuel Arroyo G.

dig.imp.scg.

before the Administration. In response to that report, F issued resolution No. 175-97 of June 2, 1997 (see proven fact 17 a, folio 6935), by means of which he established a proceeding body to investigate the legality of the opening of current account No. 182510-8 at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica to handle therein the funds from the Seasonal Work Card Program (Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional). That proceeding body rendered, by means of a document dated September 27, 1997, a report to the then Minister of Labor and Social Security indicating the following: a) that the aforementioned bank account was opened without the authorization of the National Treasury (Tesorería Nacional), b) that no subordinate could be sanctioned for opening it, since all acted in accordance with the principle of obedience, and c) that in order to continue using the funds of the oft-mentioned program, as well as to be able to charge for the work card, a bill of law had to be submitted before the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) so that it would be the latter that authorized it (the foregoing is extracted from proven fact 17, already indicated). Nine days later, on October 6, 1997, three important things occurred, as seen at folio 6938 of Volume XVI (fact 22): first, F, aware that migrants could not continue to be charged based on the regulatory provisions, issued instructions to Budget Officer (Oficial Presupuestal) Dora Orozco Sánchez to proceed to close current account No. 182510-8 at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in which the funds of the Seasonal Work Card Program (Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional) were handled; second, the defendant of attorney Gloria Navas Montero indicated to the Directorate of Legal Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security that it should proceed to draft a bill of law to be able to use the resources received for the aforementioned identification document, as well as those that could be received in the future; third, F met with co-defendant J and between the two of them they drafted and subscribed the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Foundation for Human Development in Central America (Fundación para el Desarrollo Humano en Centroamérica, FUNDEHCA), in which it is established that the latter may charge migrants the sum of twenty-five United States dollars or its equivalent in Costa Rican colones, to cover the administrative and material expenses involved in the preparation of the seasonal work card, which would be prepared – by virtue of the agreement – by FUNDEHCA. Finally, as an element of interest to the a quo for the purpose of proving the charge of extortion (concusión), it should be mentioned that it deemed (see fact 24 a, folio 6940) that the aforementioned cooperation agreement was nothing more than a means to induce migrants to pay in favor of the said foundation a sum of money that they were not obligated to pay.

VI.Having established the foregoing, it must be indicated that the Penal Code establishes in its article 348 the following: “A prison term of two to eight years shall be imposed on the public official who, abusing his status or his functions, forces or induces someone to give or promise unduly, for himself or for a third party, a good or a patrimonial benefit” (the bold and underlining are supplied). This is what the legislator has denominated extortion (concusión), which is one of the crimes against the duties of public function. What is protected by means of this criminal type is the correct performance of public servants in the exercise of their position. The probity to which this figure refers is breached if a public servant commits abuses (his behavior exceeds the attributions proper to the position, such that something not permitted is done) on the occasion of the position he holds (that is, he does not fulfill the assigned tasks, but rather takes advantage of the condition of working for a public entity and thus incurs in the abusive conduct). In turn, the abuse of the position consists of forcing or inducing a person to give or promise, for the official himself or for a third party distinct from the State, a good or a patrimonial benefit that is not owed (thus the overstepping of the competencies inherent to the position is configured and the abuse thereof occurs, since something that the legal system does not permit is done). It is important to highlight that what the servant requests (be it the delivery of the good or patrimonial benefit, or the promise to deliver it) is something that the legal system does not contemplate as one of the obligations that the individual from whom such a thing is requested must fulfill, for if it were so, the undue nature of the delivery or commitment to give the good or patrimonial benefit would disappear. On the contrary, it is a matter of an action of the official that is not protected – by virtue of its being abusive – by Law. Note that this good or patrimonial benefit that the passive subject is required to give or promise can be destined for the benefit of the official himself or even in favor of a third party. It is clear that this recipient is not the State, for if the charge were made in favor of the latter, one would be facing the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and not extortion (concusión). This Chamber has already warned that the difference between these two crimes lies in the destination that is given or intended to be given to the goods or patrimonial benefits obtained through the prohibited conduct (in that sense, see the resolution of this Office No. 175-A-92 of 10:15 a.m. of April 15, 1992). Thus, it is evident that extortion (concusión) is an aggravated modality of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). The legislator has deemed it more reprehensible (and therefore deserving of a more severe penalty) that the public official move a person to give or promise a good or a patrimonial benefit that is not owed, when that conduct is intended to benefit himself or a third party, than in cases in which the beneficiary of that action would be the State itself. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that for purposes of the configuration of this illicit act, it is not essential that the requested person effectively deliver or promise to give what was requested; rather, it is sufficient that they be motivated to promise to do so for the crime to arise in legal life.

VII. [...] At all times, it must be kept in mind that executive decrees 24811 and 25647, already cited, authorized the charge for the Seasonal Work Card, but only in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, never in favor of FUNDEHCA or any other third party, such that those provisions do not cover the charge that was established through the cooperation agreement, for which reason the latter is devoid of any normative protection. It must be remembered that the granting of the seasonal work card occurs within the framework of administrative activity, since it is the State that was trying to solve the national and even international problems caused by the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented foreign workers. The Administration must subject itself at all times to the principle of legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution, related to Articles 11 and 111 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Thus, it can only do that which the law authorizes it to do. Since the legal system does not permit the creation of taxes (imposts, rates, and special contributions) except through the enactment of a law (Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 124 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), 4 and 5 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures), then the establishment – via a cooperation agreement – of a rate for a service that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was supposed to provide is openly illegal, with the aggravating factor that the money ended up in the hands of a private law entity. It must be remembered that the payment was made in order to receive the document in question, for if payment was not made, the migrant's petition for permission to work seasonally in Costa Rica was not processed, and without such authorization, he could be deported by virtue of the provisions of the Migration and Aliens Act (Ley de Migración y Extranjería). That the intervention of FUNDEHCA in the process had to be compensated is something that is unrelated to the illegality of the charge, since that foundation served the Ministry and not the migrants; the latter's relationship was with the public body, since it was that ministerial dependency – not FUNDEHCA – that was competent to decide whether to grant the work permit to the foreigners. In that line of thought, it is evident that the agreement served to spare the Ministry of Labor and Social Security from having to face the payment for the services that FUNDEHCA provided to that institution, for which purpose an illegal charge was created that weighed on the migrants who required a service from that ministry, such that the money was paid in favor of the private entity. That exaction (understood as "the action and effect of demanding taxes, benefits, fines, debts, etc.", according to the definition included in the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, Diccionario de la Real Academia Española) is openly contrary to the legal system, since without any law existing that permits it, the migrants are required (by means of a simple assistance agreement between two organizations) to pay a determined sum of money to a foundation for a service that the State provides to that population. Equally important is to highlight that the defendant motivated a great many persons to deliver money to FUNDEHCA, since he ordered the preparation of the flyer that appears at folio 3736 (first folio of volume IX of the file), wherein it is communicated to the migrant workers that as a requirement to process the seasonal work card they had to (among other things) pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of FUNDEHCA. Thus, it is evident that in the present matter we are facing a public official (in this case F, who at the date on which the events occurred was Minister of Labor and Social Security) who, abusing his position, has motivated a great number of foreigners to unduly deliver (since there is no legal provision whatsoever that establishes the obligation to pay a private institution a monetary sum for the State to decide whether or not to grant them permission to work seasonally in the country) a patrimonial benefit to a third party (FUNDEHCA is alien to the relationship between the administered party and the Administration; it must be remembered that it is the Ministry of Labor and Social Security – not the foundation – that must authorize the migrants' status as workers in Costa Rica, such that they receive the service from that public dependency and not from the private entity). [...]

VIII. [...] Regarding the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), despite the fact that the trial court derives the existence of a plan by the defendant in question and J that encompasses this punishable conduct and that for which these two persons were sanctioned, the truth is that it offers distinct foundations to prove each one of them. Thus, at folio 7460 (Volume XVII) it is explained that the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) would derive from the charge made via executive decrees to the migrants for the work card, and it is mentioned that the monies were paid in favor of the State. In contrast, the extortion (concusión) is analyzed starting at folio 7465 (Volume XVII), and it is clear that this is configured in relation to the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA, through which the migrants were forced to pay a sum of money to that private entity for a service (the granting of the work permit) that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security provided. Thus, there is no problem whatsoever in acquitting F for the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) (an illicit act that the a quo considered time-barred, a topic that will be addressed when resolving the appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office) and convicting him for extortion (concusión), especially if it is observed that the charge to the foreigners does not have the same origin (in one case it is imposed by regulatory provisions and in the other by a simple cooperation agreement between two organizations), such that they are distinct conducts. [...]

X. [...] Finally, it must be indicated that attorney Navas Montero is correct in indicating that the breach of the single treasury account principle (principio de caja única) does not necessarily entail a violation of the reservation of law in tax matters. What happens is that in this case each one of the infractions is duly proven based on separate facts. The single treasury account principle (principio de caja única) was violated when a special account was opened to administer the funds that entered the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the charge made to the migrants based on the executive decrees. In contrast, the reservation of law in tax matters was disrespected on two distinct occasions, first when the aforementioned decrees were issued (for which the a quo deemed that the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) was configured, despite the fact that the action to prosecute it was time-barred) and then when the cooperation agreement between the Ministry and FUNDEHCA established a charge for a state service (which is what serves as the basis to convict F for extortion (concusión)).

XVI. [...] To be even more thorough, it must be indicated to the appellant that – contrary to what he states – the legislative body does indeed act as an advisor and does exercise a prior control. Its advisory power is not referred only to the parliamentary bodies (third paragraph of Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), which – incidentally – was issued and published in 1994, meaning it was in force when F proceeded as he did), but rather, since the power to inform (ejúsdem) and to render opinions in exercise of the consultative power (Article 29 of the cited normative text) are foreseen, it is clear that it does guide (and in that sense, advise) the audited entities, as is the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, Article 20 of the referenced Law indicates that prior to ordering the execution of the respective contract, the Administration must manage and obtain the approval of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General), which makes it evident that one is indeed facing a prior control, since without that countersignature it is not possible to legally execute a contract. [...]

XLV. [...] As has been stated throughout this judgment, the illegality of the oft-mentioned agreement has been declared in the competent venue for that purpose, which is the criminal venue. Moreover, it has been explained on several occasions why it is irrelevant to discuss whether or not that agreement should have been forwarded for its countersignature by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República).

In any event, it must be noted that the oversight body did refuse to approve the agreement, as recorded on folio 1693 in Volume III, and that the reasons it gave for not approving it were the following: 1) that having put the said contract into effect before approving it incurred a ground for its absolute nullity (it should be noted that from this reasoning it is extracted that for the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría) it was evident that the beneficiary of this “agreement” was the Ministry headed by F, so it was that body that had to pay for the services rendered to it by FUNDEHCA, meaning this is a burdensome contract of the type that required approval by the oversight body); 2) that powers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security were being transferred to FUNDEHCA, apart from the fact that a charge that was known to be illegal was being created; 3) that F could not contract with FUNDEHCA because not only he himself, but also his son were founding members of that entity, and therefore he had to comply with the provisions of Article 22 of the Law on Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa); 4) that the ordinary procurement procedure was not followed, without specifying why it was dispensed with; 5) that sufficient documentation was not attached to prove that J was authorized to sign that agreement.

Thus, it is evident that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) gave reasons of legality (some formal, but the most important substantive) for not approving the agreement, so the assertions of the lower court (a quo) have the proper evidentiary and motivational support, since those arguments of the oversight body were set forth by the trial court throughout the challenged decision.

[...]

LXX Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) grants the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) the exclusive power to intervene in criminal proceedings to exercise the civil action for social harm. To that end, it allows it to claim the respective compensation for punishable acts that affect collective or diffuse interests. What occurs in this case is that neither of these two types of interest is present. The collective interest refers to that which is proper to a group that joins together, de facto or de jure, in pursuit of a specific purpose. By contrast, the diffuse interest concerns the individual by the mere fact of being a member of society and allows them to claim for something that does not affect a specific subject, so that a holder of the right to compensation cannot be established, but rather it is suffered by the generality of individuals with the same intensity. None of these scenarios occur in the present case, since the migrants have neither formed a group, nor is the harm suffered by a generality of people. The migrants each suffered harm to their assets, which can be measured monetarily. Furthermore, those who paid FUNDEHCA were individualizable and never formed a group in pursuit of a particular objective. Thus, this did not fall within the scenarios of Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but rather involved a large quantity of individual interests, so that each holder is the one who must (on their own or, if it had been done at the opportune time, through delegation to the Public Prosecutor's Office) claim compensation.

For the foregoing reasons, this Chamber considers the decision of the lower court (a quo) to deny the standing (legitimación) of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic to substitute itself for the migrants as civil plaintiffs for the money paid to FUNDEHCA to be in accordance with the Law." RODOLFO SOLIS TULLOCK<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>LIC.\r\nALEX VIQUEZ JIMENEZ (Sic).</b> </span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:35.45pt;line-height:24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:\r\nexactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>2-That against the preceding pronouncement, the following cassation appeals (recursos de casación) were filed:<span class=GramE>:<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>appeal (recurso)</u></b></span><b><u>\r\nfiled by attorney Gloria Navas Montero:</u></b><span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defense counsel for the accused F, alleges a violation of due process (debido proceso), because the trial began without the presence of the technical defense of the defendant F.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She considers that Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) has been violated, as well as articles 39 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 8, subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The appellant states that the sentencing body has incurred in contradictory reasoning (fundamentación contradictoria).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She alleges that in this case, the rules of reasoning (reglas de fundamentación) have been violated regarding a decisive element of judgment, which is the historical context in which the events of interest here occurred.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Attorney Navas Montero claims erroneous reasoning (errónea motivación) regarding F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of the action.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She indicates that the principle of in dubio pro reo (in dubio pro reo) was violated, and argues that in this case the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) were disrespected.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>She alleges the violation of substantive law (ley sustantiva), specifically Article 348 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), relating to the crime of concusión (concusión) and claims that in this instance an error was made in setting the penalty, since it is disproportionate to what is considered proven.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) filed by the defendant F</u></b>.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Exercising his right to a material defense, the appellant alleges a violation of due process (debido proceso).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Specifically, he considers that in this case the rules of concentration, continuity, immediacy, orality, and publicity have been violated.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>He considers that the lower court (a quo) disregarded the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and incurred in a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) of the judgment, claims omitted or illegal reasoning, violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), and violation of the principle of experience.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>He claims illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, violation of the principle of objectivity, and violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>He claims illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the principles of sound criticism (sana crítica).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>He claims illegal reasoning and violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>He alleges illegal and contradictory reasoning, as well as the violation of the principle of in dubio pro reo, illegal reasoning, violation of the principles of sound criticism (sana crítica), and that the challenged judgment is contradictory; he alleges illegal reasoning and arbitrary exclusion of evidence.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>He claims illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica); he posits that in this case there has been a lack of reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>F alleges a lack of correlation between the accusation (acusación) and the judgment (sentencia), and considers that fundamental evidence for his interests was not presented.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>He alleges erroneous application of the substantive law (ley sustantiva), since Article 27 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) was not applied; that Article 348 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) could not be applied, as it was not proven that he acted with intent (dolosa), and the appellant argues that Article 71 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) was violated, since the penalty of eight years of imprisonment imposed on him is outside any parameter of proportionality.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) filed by attorneys Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas on behalf of J<span\r\nclass=GramE>:<span style='text-decoration:none;text-underline:none'><span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span></span><span style='font-weight:normal;\r\ntext-decoration:none;text-underline:none'>They maintain</span></span></u></b> that the signing by their client of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) was considered in the judgment as a preparatory act for the commission of the crime for which J was punished.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The private defense attorneys for this accused allege a lack of correlation between the accusation (acusación) and the judgment (sentencia).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim a violation of due process (debido proceso) in relation to the procedure followed by the Trial Court to issue the judgment.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), insofar as it would not be explained why opening a checking account for the management of the money FUNDEHCA received from charging migrants would be part of a mastermind plan.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>They allege that the defect of lack of reasoning (fundamentación) exists concerning the existence of a close relationship between J and F.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They question the reasoning of the lower court's (a quo) assertion that J opened FUNDEHCA's checking account using a copy of a certification.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim that it is not properly reasoned why J waited twelve working days to sign the account opening, and it is argued that the friendship link between F and J is duly proven.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>It is claimed that the Trial Court's assertion that J was involved in the development of the seasonal work card program (tarjeta de trabajo estacional) is improperly reasoned, nor how it is possible that he performed acts characteristic of being a principal in the crime of concusión (concusión).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>It is expressed that the judgment does not reason why the events surrounding the executive decrees (decretos ejecutivos) that regulated the seasonal work card program (tarjeta de trabajo estacional) between 1995 and 1997 would entail criminal responsibility for J.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>They question the assertion that J had a marked interest in FUNDEHCA intervening quickly in the collection for the seasonal work card (tarjeta de trabajo estacional).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>A lack of reasoning (fundamentación) is claimed on several points, a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) regarding why, by October 6, 1997, J would have knowledge of the repeal procedure for decree N° 24811-MTSS.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They question the assertion that J had knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card (tarjeta de trabajo estacional).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They allege a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) insofar as it is not explained why Article 16 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República) is violated. They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) as to why it was required that the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) endorse (refrendara) the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) insofar as it would not be duly proven in the judgment.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They allege a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) insofar as it is not explained why the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) had to be sent for endorsement (refrendo) by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). They question that it is not reasoned whether he signed the agreement with authorization from the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of FUNDEHCA and whether he knew the terms of the agreement before signing it.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The representatives of J maintain that it has not been explained how their client would have incurred in the abuses of office attributed to the former Minister of Labor and Social Security (Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) who appears here as a defendant (encartado).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim a violation of due process (debido proceso) because the Trial Court would have attributed a generic responsibility to J for everything that occurred.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), considering it to be contradictory, insofar as it does not explain what means were used to compel the migrants to make the undue payment.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The reasoning of the Trial Court's assertion that J used money that entered FUNDEHCA for his own benefit is questioned.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>They claim that the challenged judgment was not reasoned regarding how their client would have abused his capacity as a public official and thereby motivated the migrants to make the undue payment. <span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>It is alleged that the judgment does not explain why the agreement is illegal nor why it had to be endorsed (refrendado) by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). They claim that a contradiction is incurred insofar as J is exonerated from responsibility for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) for the use of FUNDEHCA's assets, and then that same use is used to support the concusión (concusión).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The problem of whether J obligated or induced the migrants to make the undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA is taken up again.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><span class=GramE>they maintain</span> that the assertion that the migrants were induced into error or deceived, because they believed they were paying the money to the Costa Rican Government, is unsubstantiated, and it is questioned whether the migrants were in a position to understand the compulsion.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M<span class=GramE>:<span\r\nstyle='text-decoration:none;text-underline:none'><span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span></span><span style='font-weight:normal;\r\ntext-decoration:none;text-underline:none'>She alleges</span></span></u></b> a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), for evaluating the respective evidence without following the guidelines of sound criticism (sana crítica), regarding the reason why M's alleged subordinates obeyed her.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) formulated by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República)<span\r\nclass=GramE>:<span style='text-decoration:none;text-underline:none'><span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span></span><span style='font-weight:normal;\r\ntext-decoration:none;text-underline:none'>Attorney</span></span></u></b> Amira Suñol Ocampo maintains that the statute of limitations (prescripción) was erroneously applied in favor of F for the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She questions that the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) was declared time-barred (prescrito) based on the premise that the first formal accusation (imputación formal) is the preliminary statement (indagatoria) of the defendant.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She indicates that despite finding proven an abusive use by the defendants F and J of FUNDEHCA's assets and funds, the lower court (a quo) chose to absolve them of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) attributed to them; that substantive law (ley sustantiva) was violated; she claims the violation of Article 365 of the Penal Code (Código Penal); she claims erroneous application of the substantive law (ley sustantiva), since M was acquitted of two counts of fraud (estafa).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) raised by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público)<span\r\nclass=GramE>:<span style='font-weight:normal;text-decoration:none;text-underline:\r\nnone'><span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Prosecutors</span></span></u></b> Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández allege contradictory reasoning (fundamentación contradictoria) in the acquittal of the defendants (encartados) F and J for the crimes of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles), as well as the acquittal of F for the crime of breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), as they consider that it is not explained why subsuming the crimes of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles) and fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) into that of concusión (concusión) leads to an acquittal for the former.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The appellant Prosecutors maintain that the acquittal of F and J for the crime of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles) lacks proper reasoning (fundamentación).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They claim a violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) when reasoning the acquittal of F for a crime of embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They point out that a contradiction occurred in the appealed judgment when explaining why the action to prosecute the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) was time-barred (prescrita).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>They allege a lack of reasoning (fundamentación) as to why F's preliminary statement (indagatoria), held on November 26, 1998, was taken as the first formal accusation for the charges of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) raised by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) in exercise of the civil action (acción civil)<span class=GramE>:<span style='font-weight:normal;\r\ntext-decoration:none;text-underline:none'><span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>Attorney</span></span></u></b> Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), claims a lack of reasoning (fundamentación), since the Trial Court considered that the money collected by FUNDEHCA did not come from the State, but from a large number of migrants.</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:35.45pt;line-height:24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:\r\nexactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>3-That a hearing (vista) was held at 8:50 a.m. on April 3, 2001.</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoHeader style='text-align:justify;text-indent:35.45pt;line-height:\r\n24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:exactly;tab-stops:35.4pt center 220.95pt right 441.9pt'><span\r\nlang=ES-TRAD style='mso-ansi-language:ES-TRAD'>4-</span><span lang=ES-CR>That upon verifying the respective deliberation, the Chamber (Sala) proceeded to hear the appeal (recurso).</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:35.45pt;line-height:24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:\r\nexactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>5-That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal requirements have been observed.</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:24.0pt;\r\nmso-line-height-rule:exactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>Judge <a\r\nname=txtSexoMagistrado>Magistrate</a><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>\r\n<a name=txtMagistradoJuez>Arroyo Gutiérrez</a></b><span style='mso-bookmark:\r\ntxtMagistradoJuez'></span> reports; and,</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:24.0pt;\r\nmso-line-height-rule:exactly'><b><span lang=ES-TRAD>Considering (Considerando):<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:35.4pt;line-height:24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:\r\nexactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>I.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>By means of judgment (sentencia) Nº 1-2000, issued at 3:00 p.m. on July 26, 2000, the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José) decided to declare F and J as co-perpetrators (coautores) responsible for the crime of concusión (concusión), committed to the detriment of the duties of the public function and Nicaraguan migrants.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>For this crime, each of them was sentenced to penalties of eight years of imprisonment and eight years of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial) from holding public office or employment.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>In that same judgment (which in its entirety comprises Volumes XVI and XVII of the case file), M was declared the responsible perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement (peculado), in its modality as a continuing offense (delito continuado), committed to the detriment of the duties of the public function, and for this, she was given a custodial sentence for a period of six years.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Furthermore, in the cited ruling, F was acquitted of all responsibility and penalty for the crimes of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), embezzlement of assets (peculado de bienes), embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios) (he was accused of two of these illicit acts), fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta), breach of duties (incumplimiento de deberes), and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Likewise, J was exonerated from criminal responsibility for the crimes of falsification of a private document (falsificación de documento privado), use of a false document (uso de documento falso), fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta), and incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>It must be added that in the judgment already indicated, M was also acquitted for the crimes of falsification of a private document (falsificación de documento privado), embezzlement (peculado) (two of these punishable acts), and fraud (estafa) (two of these illicit acts).<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span>Finally, it is necessary to note that the lower court (a quo) dismissed the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the State against F and J; this regarding the consequences derived from the crime of concusión (concusión).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>The civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by the State against F was granted, and he was sentenced in the abstract to repair the material damage and losses caused on the occasion of the crime of embezzlement of services (peculado de servicios) that the Court considers he committed, although it did not convict him criminally for that act (see folios 7632 and 7633 in Volume XVII).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Likewise, the claim for damages brought by the State against M was granted, sentencing her to pay the sum of one hundred fifty-four thousand nine hundred colones without centavos (¢154,900.00) for material damage, as well as another twenty-three thousand two hundred thirty-five colones without centavos (¢23,235.00) for personal costs (costas personales).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>In addition, she was ordered to compensate the State for the respective damages, the amount to be paid for this item to be determined in the execution of the judgment.</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:35.4pt;line-height:24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:\r\nexactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>II.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Against the judgment outlined in the foregoing Considering (Considerando), seven cassation appeals (recursos de casación) were filed, each promoted by the following persons: <b\r\nstyle='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>1)</b><span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><u>F</u></b> in his capacity as accused (imputado) (Volume XVIII, folio 7696); <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>2) <u>Amira Suñol Ocampo</u></b>, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), as complainant (querellante) on behalf of the State (Volume XX, folio 8050); <b\r\nstyle='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>3)<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><u>Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández</u></b> representing the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) (Volume XX, folio 8081); <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>4)</b><span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><u>Gloria Navas Montero</u></b> as private defense counsel for the defendant (encartado) F (Volume XX, folio 8256); <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>5)<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><u>Gloria Navas Montero</u></b> in representation of the defendant M (Volume XX, folio 8108);<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> \r\n</span><b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>6)<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><u>Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas</u></b> in their capacity as co-defense counsel for the accused J; regarding the appeal filed on behalf of the latter, it is recalled that this Chamber (Sala) granted (see ruling 2000-01441 at 10:50 a.m. on December 15, 2000; folio 8859 of Volume XXII) the request made by the defense (see folio 8358 in Volume XX) that only the brief beginning at folio 8360 (which constitutes the entire Volume XXI of the case file) be heard and ruled upon; <b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'>7)</b>\r\n<b style='mso-bidi-font-weight:normal'><u>Gilberth Calderón Alvarado</u></b>, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), who also intervenes as civil party (actora civil) on behalf of the State (Volume XXII, folio 8778).</span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:35.4pt;line-height:24.0pt;mso-line-height-rule:\r\nexactly'><span lang=ES-TRAD>III.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>On the appeal (recurso) filed on behalf of the accused (imputado) F</u></b>.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>Attorney Gloria Navas Montero, private defense counsel for the accused F, bases her cassation appeal (recurso de casación), visible at folio 8256 in Volume XX, on several grounds.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>As a <b><u>first claim</u></b>, a violation of due process (debido proceso) is alleged, because the trial began without the presence of the technical defense of the defendant F.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She considers that Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) has been violated, as well as articles 39 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 8, subsection 2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos).<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She states that after the resignation of attorney William Guido Madriz as defender of the defendant, she assumed his representation.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She explains that she could not attend the first hearing, which was duly justified before the judging body.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She says that the Court effectively accepted her excuse, but made the error of granting the request of the accused F that he be temporarily represented by attorney José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal, who was at that time the private defense counsel for the co-accused (co-imputado) J.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She points out that attorney Madrigal Madrigal was clear in warning that he would only accept a co-defense, since conflicting interests could eventually arise between his client J and the accused F, in which case he would look after the interests of the former.<span\r\nstyle='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>She considers that it was equally wrong to allow those two accused to defend themselves personally in the hearing of January 3, 2000.<span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span><b><u>The argument is not admissible</u></b>.

In the instant case, no injury whatsoever has been caused to F by the commencement of the trial without attorney Navas Montero being present. It can be observed on folio 6674 (Volume XV) that it was the appellant's own client who stated that he wished to avoid delays and therefore requested that attorney Madrigal Madrigal assume his co-defense while attorney Navas Montero was arriving. In that same section of the trial record, it is observed that attorney Madrigal Madrigal expressed surprise at the designation, as he had prepared to represent the accused J, but—and this is what matters in the specific case—he agreed to assume the representation of F if he was guaranteed that he would do so solely as co-counsel, while attorney Navas Montero was arriving, and if he was immediately relieved of the co-defense in the event that any conflict of interest arose between J and F. The latter stated (see folio 6675 in the indicated Volume) that he could conduct his own defense alongside a co-counsel. In light of that situation, the Court decided that attorney Madrigal Madrigal—who never refused to assume the role, but simply set conditions for doing so—would assume the co-defense of F, while attorney Gloria Navas Montero was arriving. In view of the foregoing, no violation of due process has occurred, since at the beginning of the trial the aforementioned defendant was not left in any state of defenselessness. It was by the decision of the defendant himself that attorney Madrigal Madrigal was designated as his co-counsel. The same applies to what occurred during the first hearing on January 3, 2000 (see folio 6680 in Volume XV), as the will of the accused was once again respected; he stated that while the reading of the accusation continued, he would exercise his own defense. As can be seen, at no time was F's right to defense limited, since initially, when he deemed that he needed professional assistance, he was granted the counsel he requested. In the second instance, when he considered that he could defend himself while the accusation was read, his judgment was respected, on the basis that he is a legal professional and therefore possessed sufficient knowledge to understand the content of the charging document and the criminal complaint. His capacity to exercise his defense at this stage of the trial is proven by the fact that he was able to make specific observations to prosecutor Max Chinchilla Fernández regarding what was being said in the accusation, as recorded on folio 6678 (again in Volume XV of the case file). Pursuant to the foregoing, Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been violated, given that the right of the accused to have the technical assistance he requires has always been observed. Furthermore, the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 100 of the cited normative body have been applied, because when the exercise of an adequate defense was not put at risk—as illustrated by the example of the authorization given to him to defend himself during the reading of the accusation—F was permitted to defend himself. In that vein, it must be stated that Article 39 of the Constitution has also been respected, since the accused was given every possibility to exercise his defense, as has Article 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, given that he was permitted to have a co-counsel of his choice (the case of attorney Madrigal Madrigal) as well as to defend himself personally, as provided for in subsection d) of the indicated article of said international instrument. By virtue of all the foregoing, it being evident that action was taken in accordance with the requests of the defendant himself without rendering him incapable of defending himself, this Chamber finds that no injury whatsoever has been caused to F, and therefore, under the terms stipulated in Article 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, **it is appropriate to declare this ground of the appeal without merit**.

IV.As a **second ground**, the appellant submits that the sentencing body has incurred in contradictory reasoning. She indicates that it is not possible to convict her client as the perpetrator of the crime of concusión if, in order to do so, the Court had to base the ruling on facts it deemed to constitute other crimes—such as that of exacción ilegal, that of administración fraudulenta, that of negociaciones incompatibles, and that of incumplimiento de deberes—for which it acquitted him. She considers that Articles 1, 11, and 369(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been violated, as well as—indirectly—Article 348 of the Criminal Code. The appellant states that the trial court found that by issuing and executing the decrees that established the charge for the tarjeta de trabajo estacional, the illicit act of exacción ilegal was committed. She adds that if said charge was considered to generate the indicated crime and, with respect to it, it was deemed that the statute of limitations for the criminal action had expired, then that same charge could not be used to support the existence of concusión. She states that if it is claimed that that exacción ilegal generated by the decrees continued with the signing of the agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Foundation for Human Development in Central America (hereinafter referred to as FUNDEHCA), then one is referring to a single charge. In that sense, attorney Navas Montero maintains that the cooperation agreement cannot be considered independently to establish the concusión, given that that single charge constituted exacción ilegal and the action to prosecute it was time-barred. With regard to the illicit act of administración fraudulenta, the appellant submits that her client was acquitted of liability regarding it, and to that end it was considered that it was impossible to know where the funds that entered the foundation were directed; for this reason, she considers that if this cannot be established, then the offense of concusión cannot be configured either, since it would be unknown whether the charge was made for himself or for another person. Finally, she states that it is a contradiction to deem that F's conduct falls within the assumptions of incumplimiento de deberes (Article 332 of the Criminal Code) and negociaciones incompatibles (Article 347 of the Criminal Code), illicit acts for which a judgment of acquittal was issued on the grounds that they were subsumed into the concusión in this case, and then to use the facts considered to constitute those crimes to support the existence of the one for which attorney Navas Montero's client was convicted.

V.Before resolving this argument, it is pertinent to summarize the events that the trial court deems duly accredited. Beginning on folio 6923 in Volume XVI is the account of proven facts, the following situations of interest being notable: Given the social problem that the presence of a large number of illegal migrants (especially Nicaraguans) in the national territory represented in 1995, the Government of the Republic at that time developed a policy aimed at regularizing their situation and thus averting the collapse of various services (such as social security and education) of transcendental importance to the country. Furthermore, it was a matter of avoiding formal accusations by the Government of Nicaragua, which threatened to denounce Costa Rica before international organizations for what it called xenophobic treatment of Nicaraguans who were in the country. It is in this context (see folios 6924 and 6925) that the Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional was created, with which it was intended to grant an identification document to migrants who came to work in Costa Rican territory, so that they could be legally covered by all the services provided by the State. What is important to highlight is that, as seen on folio 6925, the program mentioned was created by Decree No. 24432-TSS-G, issued on January 25, 1995 (the ruling indicates it was in June, but this Chamber has had before it a copy of the state bulletin and has been able to verify that the normative text mentioned was signed at the Presidential House in the month indicated here), published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 141 of July 26 of that year, which was signed by the then President of the Republic, also by the defendant F in his capacity as Minister of Labor and Social Security, as well as by the Minister of the Interior and Police at that time. In addition, it was through another act of the same nature—Executive Decree No. 24811-MTSS of December 1, 1995, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 243 of December 22 of said year—that it was provided that each migrant who requested the Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional would be charged the sum of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00), in order to cover the cost involved in granting said document (the foregoing is recorded on folio 6926); that charge was made in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the money collected for that purpose was deposited in a checking account in the name of that ministry. Additionally, Executive Decree No. 25647-MTSS-G of August 20, 1996, was issued, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 236 of December 9, 1996, which authorized the charge (always in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security) for the extension of the validity of the Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional, which in some cases was fifty percent and in others one hundred percent of the value of the original issuance (it should be noted that these last two decrees—which regulated the charge for the Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security—were repealed by Decree No. 26430-MTSS of October 8, 1997, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 209 of October 30, 1997; as justification for the repeal, it is stated in that normative text that both the Comptroller General of the Republic and the National Treasury have objected to the charge that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had been making to cover the expenses of the Tarjeta de Trabajo and Social Security program—note that Decree No. 24432-TSS-G, which is the one that created the program mentioned, was not repealed, so it remained in effect, and that instrument did not contemplate any charge for the card, the issuance of which continued to be under the authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). It is now important to mention that in the fourth proven fact (folio 6927, in Volume XVI), the sentencing Court asserts that the aforementioned charge is illegal, given that a tax not provided for in any law would have been established by decree. The judges find that such a procedure is contrary to the provisions of Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration, as well as Articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which state that taxes may only be established by legal provision. The members of the trial court affirm that with said decrees, the principle of the State's single treasury account (caja única) was also being violated, since they permitted opening a bank checking account in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to manage the funds collected for the issuance and renewal of the tarjeta de trabajo estacional there. The lower Court established (see proven fact 20 on folio 6936 in Volume XVI) that by a document dated May 29, 1997, the Office of the Auditor General (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security informed the Minister that the Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional had two essential deficiencies, namely: a) the opening of the aforementioned account, for being an act contrary to the single treasury account principle, and b) the charge for issuing and renewing the mentioned card, for constituting an abuse of the regulatory powers of the Administration.

before the Administration. In response to that report, F issued resolution No. 175-97 of June 2, 1997 (see proven fact 17 a folio 6935), by means of which he established a proceeding body to investigate the legality of the opening of the current account N° […] to manage there the funds coming from the Seasonal Work Card Program. That proceeding body rendered, by means of a document dated September 27, 1997, to the then Minister of Labor and Social Security a report in which the following is indicated: a) that the mentioned bank account was opened without having the authorization of the National Treasury (Tesorería Nacional), b) that no subordinate could be sanctioned for opening it, since all acted in accordance with the principle of obedience, and c) that in order to continue using the funds of the program alluded to so many times, as well as to be able to charge for the work card, a bill should then be presented to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) so that it is the latter that thus authorizes it (the above is extracted from proven fact 17, already indicated). Nine days later, on October 6, 1997, three important things happen, as seen on folio 6938 of Volume XVI (fact 22): first, F, aware that charging migrants could not continue based on the regulatory norms, gave instructions to the Budget Officer (Oficial Presupuestal) Dora Orozco Sánchez to proceed to close the current account of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica No. 182510-8 in which the funds of the Seasonal Work Card Program were managed; second, the defendant of attorney Gloria Navas Montero indicated to the Directorate (Dirección) of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to proceed to draft a bill in order to be able to use the resources received for the aforementioned identification document, as well as those that could be received in the future; third, F met with the co-defendant J and between the two of them they draft and sign the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Foundation (Fundación) for Human Development in Central America (FUNDEHCA), in which it is established that the latter can charge migrants the sum of twenty-five dollars of the United States of America or its equivalent in Costa Rican colones, to cover the administrative and material expenses that the elaboration of the seasonal work card entails, which would be elaborated –by virtue of the agreement– by FUNDEHCA. Finally, as an element of interest to the lower court for the purpose of proving the offense of exaction (concusión), it must be mentioned that it considered (see fact 24 a folio 6940) that the aforementioned cooperation agreement was nothing more than a means to induce migrants to pay in favor of said foundation a sum of money that they were not obligated to pay.

VI.Having established the foregoing, it must be indicated that the Penal Code establishes in its article 348 the following: “Imprisonment of two to eight years shall be imposed on the public official (funcionario público) who, abusing his capacity or his functions (abusando de su calidad o de sus funciones), obliges or induces (obligare o indujere) someone to give or promise unduly (dar o prometer indebidamente), for himself or for a third party (para sí o para un tercero), a good or a patrimonial benefit (bien o un beneficio patrimonial)” (the bold and underlining are supplied). This is what the legislator has called exaction (concusión), which is one of the crimes against the duties of public function. What is protected by this criminal type is the correct action of public servants in the exercise of their office. The probity to which this figure refers is breached if a public servant commits abuses (his behavior exceeds the attributions proper to the position, such that something not permitted is done) on the occasion of the office he holds (that is, he does not fulfill the assigned tasks, but rather takes advantage of the condition of working for a public entity and thus incurs the abusive conduct). In turn, the abuse of office consists of obliging or inducing a person to give or promise, for the official himself or for a third party other than the State, a good or a patrimonial benefit that is not owed (thus the exceeding of the competences inherent to the office is configured and the abuse thereof occurs, since something that the legal system does not permit is done). It is important to highlight that what the servant requests (whether the delivery of the good or patrimonial benefit, or the promise to deliver it) is something that the legal system does not contemplate as one of the obligations that the individual from whom such a thing is required must fulfill, since if it were so, the undue nature of the delivery or commitment to give the good or patrimonial benefit would disappear. On the contrary, it is about an action proper to the official that is not protected –by virtue of being abusive– by the Law. Note that that good or patrimonial benefit that the passive subject is required to give or promise, can be destined for the benefit of the official himself or even in favor of a third party. It is clear that that recipient is not the State, since if the charge were made in favor of the latter, one would be facing the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and not that of exaction (concusión). This Chamber has already warned that the difference between these two crimes lies in the destination that is given or intended to be given to the goods or patrimonial benefits that are obtained through the prohibited conduct (in that sense, resolution of this Office No. 175-A-92 of 10:15 a.m. on April 15, 1992, can be seen). Thus, it is evident that exaction (concusión) is an aggravated modality of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). The legislator has considered it more reprehensible (and therefore deserving of a more severe penalty) that the public official moves a person to give or promise a good or patrimonial benefit that is not owed, when that conduct is intended to benefit himself or a third party, than the cases in which the beneficiary of that proceeding was the State itself. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that for the purposes of the configuration of this illicit act, it is not essential that the required person effectively deliver or promise to give what was requested, but rather it is sufficient that he is motivated to promise to do so for the crime to arise to legal life.

VII.Having expounded the foregoing, it must be said, with regard to the claim of attorney Navas Montero, that there is one particular event that constitutes the crime of exaction (concusión), which is the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA. Indeed, that agreement between the ministerial portfolio and the mentioned foundation constitutes the illicit act under discussion. If one reads what the interested parties agreed (the document can be observed starting from folio 1689 in Volume III of the file), it stands out (see third clause) that FUNDEHCA receives the applications of the migrant population, elaborates the cards, and then delivers them, all with the authorization of the Ministry and other authorities intervening in the procedure. Furthermore, for that process, the agreement provides (fifth clause) that the foundation can charge each migrant the sum of twenty-five United States dollars or its equivalent in colones, for the purpose of covering the administrative and material expenses that the elaboration of the cards entails. Here is the central problem of this matter. If the granting of the seasonal work card mentioned so many times was foreseen in decree No. 24432 already cited as an activity proper to the Public Administration (Administración Pública) and that normative text was still in force when the alluded agreement was drafted and implemented, it is then evident that the only state organ that had the power to grant that labor permit to the migrant population was precisely the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. That is reflected in the cooperation agreement, since FUNDEHCA could only materially deliver the cards, with prior authorization from the ministerial portfolio. That is to say, at bottom, the one who decided on the approval or rejection of the application was the organ in charge of the accused F, so it is evident that it was still a service proper to the Administration (Administración) (moreover, in the notice itself in which migrants are indicated that they must pay the five thousand colones to FUNDEHCA –see folio 3736 in Volume IX– one can read that the card is granted by the Ministry). Now then, what happens is that by means of the cited agreement it was arranged to charge migrants a certain sum of money, in favor of FUNDEHCA. No matter how much one may want to justify that charge by arguing that the foundation had the right to be paid for the work carried out for the Labor and Social Security portfolio (an argument that the accused F has maintained, as recorded on folio 6969 in Volume XVI), the truth is that there is not a single legal provision (not even a regulatory one) that authorizes it, and this absence of normative provision that supports it makes such a charge to the migrants undue. At all times it must be kept in mind that Executive Decrees 24811 and 25647, already cited, authorized the charge for the Seasonal Work Card, but only in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, never in favor of FUNDEHCA nor of any other third party, so those provisions do not support the charge that was established through the cooperation agreement, for which reason the latter is devoid of all normative support. It must be remembered that the granting of the seasonal work card occurs within the framework of administrative activity, since it is the State that was trying to solve the national and even international problems that the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented foreign workers entailed. The Administration (Administración) must be subject at all times to the principle of legality derived from Article 11 of the Constitution, related to Articles 11 and 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Thus, it can only do that which the law authorizes it. As the legal system does not permit the creation of tributes (taxes, tasas, and special contributions) except through the promulgation of a law (Article 121 subsection 13 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 124 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), 4 and 5 of the Code of Norms and Tax Procedures), then the establishment –via cooperation agreement– of a fee (tasa) for a service that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was supposed to provide is openly illegal, with the aggravating circumstance that the money ended up going to a private law person. It must be remembered that the payment was made in order to receive the document under discussion, since if one did not pay, the migrant's petition to be permitted to work seasonally in Costa Rica was not processed, and without such authorization he could be deported by virtue of the provisions of the Migration and Foreigners Law (Ley de Migración y Extranjería). That FUNDEHCA's intervention in the process should be retributed is something that is alien to the illegality of the charge, since that foundation served the Ministry and not the migrants; the relationship of the latter was with the public organ, since it was that ministerial dependency –not FUNDEHCA– that was competent to decide whether to grant the labor permit to the foreigners. In that order of ideas, it is evident that what the agreement does is avoid the Ministry of Labor and Social Security from having to face the payment for the services that FUNDEHCA provided to that institution, for which purpose an illegal charge was created that weighed on the migrants who required a service from that portfolio, so the money was paid in favor of the private entity. That exaction (exacción) (understood as “action and effect of demanding taxes, benefits, fines, debts, etc.”, according to the definition included in the twenty-first edition of the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy (Real Academia Española)) is openly contrary to the legal system, since without any law whatsoever that permits it, migrants are required (through a simple assistance agreement between two organizations) to pay a certain sum of money to a foundation for a service that the State provides to that population. Equally important is to highlight that the accused motivated a great many people to deliver money to FUNDEHCA, since he ordered the drafting of the flyer that appears on folio 3736 (first folio of volume IX of the file), where migrant workers are informed that as a requirement to process the seasonal work card they had to (among other things) pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of FUNDEHCA. Thus, things being as they are, it is evident that in the present matter one is before a public official (in this case F, who on the date the events occurred was Minister of Labor and Social Security) who, abusing his office, has motivated a large number of foreigners to unduly deliver (since there is no legal provision whatsoever that establishes the obligation to pay a private institution a monetary amount for the State to dictate whether or not it grants him permission to work seasonally in the country) a patrimonial benefit to a third party (FUNDEHCA is alien to the administered-Administration relationship; it must be remembered that it is the Ministry of Labor and Social Security –not the foundation– that must authorize migrants their status as workers in Costa Rica, so they receive the service from that public dependency and not from the private entity). The abusive nature of this accused's conduct becomes manifest if one takes into account that even before the signing (which occurred on October 6, 1997, as recorded on folio 1692 in Volume III) and implementation of the agreement mentioned so many times, F already knew that it was not legally possible to charge for the issuance of the seasonal work card. Indeed, through a document dated May 27, 1997 (see folio 180 in Volume I), the then Vice Minister of Labor and Social Security, attorney Eugenio Solano Calderón, informed F that the matter regarding the opening of a specific bank account to manage the operating funds of the seasonal work card program should be investigated. As part of the investigation that the note from Mr. S entailed, the report elaborated by the General Directorate of Audit (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was presented (see folio 192 in Volume I) in which it is warned that charging a sum of money to migrants for the costs that the mentioned program entailed was contrary to the principle of the State's single treasury (caja única del Estado) and to the provisions of Article 124 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) (in which it is indicated that the establishment of exactions (exacciones) is a matter reserved for law). The content of that report and the recommendations of the proceeding body that investigated the matter were made known to F in September 1997, as recorded on folio 247 in Volume I. It is important to warn that it was recommended to the then Minister (see folio 250) that the closure of the bank account specially destined for the management of the funds of the seasonal work card program be ordered. Furthermore, it was indicated to him that it was advisable, if one wanted to continue using the resources already received or receive new ones in the future, that a bill be presented to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) so that it thus authorizes it. Then, it is evident that F knew it was illegal to charge for that service that the Costa Rican State provided to migrants. In that sense, signing and implementing an agreement that allowed a foundation to charge foreigners for a service that in the end continued to be state-provided (it is worth insisting that it was the Ministry in charge of F that granted or denied the work permit) is equivalent to ignoring the illegality he knew about, and it is for that reason that it can be proven that the accused under discussion abused the function he performed. It should be noted that this abusive conduct is equally indicative of his willful behavior on the part of the former Minister, since he knew he could not establish that charge in favor of FUNDEHCA because it was illegal, and even less motivate migrants to make a payment that was undue, and even so he did it, in such a way that the knowledge and the will to adjust his conduct to the typical assumptions of exaction (concusión) are evident. Furthermore, it is obvious that he knew he was moving migrants to deliver an undue patrimonial benefit to a third party. In that order of ideas, the crime of exaction (concusión) attributed to F in this case is duly proven. It must be pointed out, furthermore, that the judging body has all the facts indicated above as demonstrated. It suffices to observe points 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the factual framework of the appealed judgment (folios 6935 to 6941 in Volume XVI) to realize that the lower court was clear at all times that F incurred in exaction (concusión) for what happened around the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security mentioned so many times. Furthermore, on folio 7465 in Volume XVII begins the exposition of the sentencing body as to why it considers the crime for which this accused was convicted as configured, and it is recorded on folio 7469 that for the instance organ, the former Minister knew perfectly well that the charge that was made for the seasonal work card program was irregular. It is equally clear that for the judges, having given instructions to various officials so that the legal problem around the indicated charge could be solved (see folio 7471) and having then signed the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA in which the obligation for migrants to pay in order to receive the work card was maintained, is nothing more than a maneuver to implement a charge that was known to be illegal (see folio 7472). In accordance with the foregoing, the crime of exaction (concusión) for which F was convicted is duly proven and grounded in the challenged resolution.

VIII.Now then, returning to the appeal being analyzed here, it must be remembered that attorney Navas Montero accuses the Tribunal of making a mistake in grounding the existence of the crime of exaction (concusión), since to do so it considered facts constituting other illicit acts, regarding which it acquitted her defendant. On this point, this Chamber considers that there certainly is an error by the lower court in expounding an entire sequence of events in the factual framework as if they were part of a single plan, without individualizing the crime they would constitute. However, the problem this entails is minimal, since starting from folio 7425 in Volume XVII, the reasoning on why it convicts for exaction (concusión) and exonerates F from criminal liability for other crimes is perfectly distinguished. What is important to highlight is that exaction (concusión) is not confused with the other illicit acts. Regarding illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), despite the fact that the Instance Tribunal derives the existence of a plan by the accused under discussion and J that encompasses this punishable conduct and that for which these two persons were sanctioned, the truth is that it offers distinct grounds to prove each of them. Thus, on folio 7460 (Volume XVII) it is explained that the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) would derive from the charge that via executive decrees was made to migrants for the work card, and it is mentioned that the monies were paid in favor of the State. In contrast, exaction (concusión) is analyzed starting from folio 7465 (Volume XVII) and it is clear that this is configured in relation to the cooperation agreement with FUNDEHCA, through which migrants were obligated to pay a sum of money to that private entity for a service (the granting of the labor permit) that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security provided. Thus, things being as they are, there is no problem whatsoever in acquitting F for the illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) (illicit act that the lower court considered time-barred, a topic that will be addressed when resolving the appeal of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público)) and convicting him for exaction (concusión), especially if one observes that the charge to foreigners does not have the same origin (in one case it is imposed by regulatory norms and in another by a simple cooperation agreement between two organizations), so it deals with different conducts. Precisely because of the latter is that the crimes can be differentiated, and, therefore, the criteria for the statute of limitations for the criminal action applicable to each one of them. Since illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) and exaction (concusión) are not based on the same fact, it is legally correct to examine each illicit act separately to see if they are time-barred or not. Furthermore, the fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) that was attributed to both F and J to the detriment of FUNDEHCA does not encompass any fact related to exaction (concusión). The only link between both illicit acts is made by the Tribunal when it considers that they formed part of a plan to manage disposing of the monies that the entity collected for the elaboration of the work cards. But that does not mean that the facts that allow the configuration of each illicit act are identical, such that the acquittal for one obliges acquittal for the other. Exaction (concusión) stems –as has been exposed several times throughout this ruling– from the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In contrast, the fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) would generate internally within the foundation, based on the way it was administered to the detriment of the interests of the entity. As can be seen, they are different things. Now then, the administrative board of the private organization approved the accounting and financial statements of FUNDEHCA and approved everything done by the president of the board, the executive delegate, and the board itself (see folio 7527 in Volume XVII), for which reason no harm to the foundation could certainly be proven, and in that sense the decision of the instance judges to acquit the accused of these facts is correct. What happens is that it is a factual basis alien to that which serves as support for exaction (concusión), for which reason the acquittal under discussion does not oblige acquitting them for the crime foreseen in Article 348 of the Penal Code. Regarding the crime of incompatible negotiations (negociaciones incompatibles), the Tribunal acquitted F and J of that illicit act by virtue of the fact that it was not duly supported in the alternative accusation, but rather that it contained simply a repetition of facts already indicated in the main accusation, and adds that in any case that negotiation formed part of the plan to commit exaction (concusión), so the Instance Judges subsume it into this criminal figure and acquit them of that illicit act (see folios 7608 to 7611 in Volume XVII). Here, an error by the lower court is indeed appreciated, since what it does is link the incompatible negotiation (negociación incompatible) with the plan it considers the accused followed to commit exaction (concusión), as if the latter subsumed it. In reality, the provisions of Article 348 of the Penal Code do not comprise what is regulated in Article 347 of the same normative text (due to the date on which the events of interest for this case occurred, reference is made to the text of this article as it was drafted before the reform carried out by means of L

Law No. 8056 of December 21, 2000, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 10 of January 5, 2001), meaning the exercise of subsumption is indeed poorly executed (the Public Prosecutor's Office also mentions this problem in its appeal on this point, so the matter will be revisited later). The issue is that the interest F may have had in the agreement between the Ministry under his charge and FUNDEHCA (of which both he and his son, with the last name F, and the co-defendant J were founding members; furthermore, F was the president of the board of directors and J was the executive delegate) is independent of what constitutes the offense of concusión. Indeed, a public official taking an interest in a contract or operation in which they are involved due to their position is not the same as that official inducing or compelling—by virtue of signing and implementing the agreement, which demonstrates an abuse of office—migrants to pay an undue sum to a foundation. In the first case, the punishable conduct is limited to the simple personal interest of the servant in a business deal; in the second, what is sanctioned is not only a broader behavior but one that is distinct from the former, because the issue is abusing one's office in such a way as to move several individuals to give a third party a patrimonial benefit they do not owe. As can be seen, in the second case, the public employee's interest in the contract itself is not a factor to consider in determining the individual's criminal responsibility, meaning concusión does not require it to be configured. Thus, the acquittal handed down for the crime of incompatible negotiations does not affect the unlawful act for which F was convicted. Regarding the crime of breach of duties, the merit body indicated (see folio 7529 in Volume XVII) that an apparent concurrence of norms was at play in the case, given that in all crimes against the public function where the active subject is an official, there is fundamentally a breach of the duties inherent to the office, meaning the special provision displaces the generic one, so that it is only possible to apply the one that specifically regulates the demonstrated conduct and not the other, for which reason the lower court acquitted F of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of breach of duties. This Chamber believes that the acquittal issued for this unlawful act does not affect the conviction imposed for concusión. This is because the lower court erred in considering that an apparent concurrence of norms exists between the two unlawful acts under discussion. Breach of duties (article 332 of the Penal Code) starts from the assumption that the servant omits, refuses to perform, or delays fulfilling an act they are obliged to carry out. In contrast, concusión starts from the premise of abusing one's office, that is, exceeding (as stated supra in Whereas Clause VI of this judgment) the powers inherent to the function and, by virtue thereof, moving someone to deliver or promise an undue asset or patrimonial benefit to another subject. As can be seen, the first crime is one of omission and the second of action; furthermore, we are not dealing with provisions that mutually exclude each other, but rather ones that are complementary (not identical), so it was not possible to apply the apparent concurrence of norms. In any case, in this instance, it has not been proven that F omitted to do something he should have, meaning the acquittal for breach of duties is correct. What happens is that it has been proven he did something not permitted (abusing his office and moving the migrants to give money they did not owe to FUNDEHCA), such that his conduct does not conform to the provisions of article 332 of the Penal Code, but it does conform to article 348 of the same normative text. In accordance with the foregoing, the acquittal issued for the crime of breach of duties does not exempt the client of Licenciada Navas Montero from responsibility for the crime of concusión. To the foregoing, it must be added that the execution of the executive decrees authorizing the collection of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the issuance of the seasonal work card is indeed independent of the collection made in favor of FUNDEHCA. The first was protected by regulatory provisions; the second by a simple cooperation agreement. The first entered the accounts of the public body; the second, the coffers of a private entity. As can be seen, these are distinct behaviors, so it is correct that they were analyzed by the lower court as independent crimes. Thus, the statute of limitations for the illegal levy does not affect the concusión, as they are based on independent fact patterns. It must be added that the fact that the destination of the money collected by the foundation is unknown is not an obstacle to considering concusión as having been configured. This is because it is not necessary—for this crime to be configured—to establish the final destination of the asset or patrimonial benefit; what matters is that it was determined (through the abusive exercise of office by a public servant) that migrants were compelled to unduly pay a sum of money to FUNDEHCA, and in this manner, the unlawful act in question was configured. Based on all the foregoing, this ground of the appeal is dismissed.

IX.As a third ground, Licenciada Navas Montero alleges that the rules of substantiation have been disrespected in this case concerning a piece of evidence of a decisive nature, namely the historical context in which the events of interest here occurred. She believes this mistake leads to the incorrect application of a substantive precept. She recalls that in 1995, the presence in the country of a large number of undocumented migrants posed a serious threat to various public services, including social security and education. She adds that the Seasonal Work Card Program originated precisely to combat this problem. She points out that, in addition to the foregoing, it must be considered that the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua threatened to sue the Government of Costa Rica in international bodies for what the former considered xenophobic treatment of its nationals in this country. Thus, she maintains that this is the reason the aforementioned program emerged and it cannot be considered part of a plan devised by F and J to commit concusión. Furthermore, she explains that the foundation was created because it was considered a more suitable avenue to fulfill goals set in international agreements. Hence—according to the appellant—it cannot be established that her client's conduct was intentional or directed at committing the crime provided for in article 348 of the Penal Code. She considers that the defendant F acted to address an urgent situation for the country, seeking to avoid a grave harm to Costa Rica. In that sense, she believes that the provisions of articles 27 and 38 of the Penal Code should have been applied in the present case, as she was facing a justifying cause or, failing that, an exculpating cause. The objection is not admissible. While it is true the country's situation in 1995 was delicate by virtue of the problems that attending to the migrant population in the national territory entailed for the State, it is also true that this emergency would, at most, justify the establishment of the Seasonal Work Card Program. The urgency with which the problem was addressed may allow one to understand (not justify) the issuance of decrees that allowed the State to charge for the issuance of the card (which violates the reservation of law in matters of levies) and for the funds to be deposited into a specific account (which contravenes the single treasury account principle), but this is not extensive to what happened with the cooperation agreement and in no way constitutes a state of necessity, neither justifying nor exculpating. In the first place, it must be remembered that the entity facing the problem was the Costa Rican State, and in seeking to solve it, the errors noted were incurred. But after the illegality of the charge was noticed (both for the levy itself and for the deposit of the money in an independent account) and practically two years after the work card program had begun (which demonstrates that although the problem had not been solved, it was on its way to being solved), F opted—knowingly, as indicated in Whereas Clause VII of this ruling, which demonstrates his intentional conduct is correctly accredited—to implement a mechanism to charge the migrants money they had no reason to pay, because the service they received (that is, the granting of the work permit) continued to be a state power (without any levy for that service having been established by law), with the aggravating factor that the money no longer entered the State's coffers, but rather those of a private foundation. As can be seen, this second situation is radically different from the one that existed under the protection of the executive decrees that authorized (illegally, as has already been mentioned) the charge to the migrants. Furthermore, it must be highlighted that no specific legal interest can be defined that was endangered on the occasion of the presence of the migrants in Costa Rica, in either of the two moments mentioned. What is discussed is that there were public services that could collapse, but that was a possibility, and furthermore, the collapse of a service (such as education or social security, which are the ones most mentioned in this case) is something so vague that it can mean anything from slow or delayed provision thereof, to the fact that it is provided on time but with poor quality, or even that it is not provided at all. Even so, it is not defined who would be affected in any of those situations. For this reason, it is impossible to know specifically which legal interests were in danger and—precisely because of the vagueness indicated—it is also impossible to determine the actuality or imminence of the threat. Regarding the potential filing of a lawsuit against Costa Rica in international bodies, one must again ask what legal interest would be protected by F's actions. The fact that a person (even a legal one, like the State) is brought before the Courts of Justice (national or international) to determine, according to Law, whether they are responsible for something does not constitute an endangerment of that person's legal interests, because the principle of responsibility exists. In that vein, the essential premise on which the institute of state of necessity is based disappears, which is the existence of a danger to legal interests, which cannot be specified in this case, for which reason the lower court correctly did not apply the provisions of articles 27 and 38 of the Penal Code. It is worth adding that while it is true FUNDEHCA was created with the endorsement of various Ministers of Labor of that time in order to address different problems common to the countries of the area, this is also irrelevant for the purposes of establishing concusión. That the trial court was mistaken in stating that all the facts it deems proven form part of a plan is irrelevant in the face of the accreditation of what does constitute the crime under discussion. For this crime to come into legal existence, it is sufficient that the delivery of an undue asset or patrimonial benefit (or the promise to do so) be made in favor of the public official or a third party. In this case, FUNDEHCA is that third party, regardless of the purpose for which it was created. For all the foregoing reasons, this claim is dismissed.

X.As a fourth ground, Licenciada Gloria Navas Montero accuses erroneous reasoning regarding F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of the action. She indicates that the in dubio pro reo principle was disrespected. She maintains that the report of the Dirección General de Auditoría is not conclusive regarding the illegality of the charge made to the migrants, but rather it indicates that it "seems" ("pareciera") to be so.

He also questions (see folio 8325 in Volume XX) the claim that his client was aware of said report, since there is no record that he received it. He adds that, in any case, the executive decrees established said charge and were not declared illegal. He indicates that a violation of the cash-box unity principle does not necessarily breach the principle of legal reserve in tax matters. It follows that he deems the intent (dolo) in his client's actions was poorly established. **The claim must be rejected**. Although the report of the General Directorate of Auditing of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (visible at folio 192 in Volume I) does state in some paragraphs that the aforementioned charge appeared to be illegal due to two factors, namely the breach of the State's cash-box unity principle and the violation of the legal reserve in matters of levies, the truth is that this document is a whole and in it one can read very clearly (see folios 208, 209, and 210 in Volume I) that several recommendations were made to the then Minister to correct the legality defects found. Thus, it is evident that it was indeed concluded that the aforementioned charge was not in accordance with the Law, due to the two defects already mentioned. Furthermore, through official communication No. DAJ-AI-943-97 of September 24, 1997 (visible at folio 247 in Volume I of the case file), addressed to F, the defendant was recommended to close the account in which the funds from the work card program were managed and also to present a bill before the Legislative Assembly so that it would authorize charging migrants for the issuance of said document. As can be seen, this document clearly exposes the illegality of the charge levied on migrants, basically for being a levy without legal basis (the breach of the State's cash-box unity principle only prompted the closure of the special account, but that is secondary to the illegality of the charge to migrants, which is what matters for the purposes of extortion (concusión)). This report from the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was indeed known to F, since he himself refers to said opinion to request the closure of the account where the funds coming from the work card program were deposited (see document at folio 3 in Volume I). This being the case, as already indicated in Considering VII of this judgment, it is evident that F knew of the unlawfulness of the charge to migrants for the service provided by the Ministry under his charge, making it obvious that it was with full knowledge of the foregoing that he established a new charge for this population as a requisite for the ministerial portfolio under discussion to grant the work permit so often mentioned. It is important to remember that the second charge to migrants (the one established through the already cited cooperation agreement) is the one that matters for the purposes of extortion (concusión). When this agreement was signed, F already knew that levies could only be imposed on the Administered through a law for services provided by the State (such as the granting of the work card, which was a function of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Hence it is immaterial whether the executive decrees supporting the first charge (which the lower court considered to constitute an illegal levy) were declared illegal or not, as this refers to events independent of those that prompted this defendant's conviction for extortion (concusión). Finally, it must be noted that Attorney Navas Montero is correct in stating that a breach of the cash-box unity principle does not necessarily entail a violation of the legal reserve in tax matters. What happens is that in this case, each of the infractions is duly accredited by separate facts. The cash-box unity principle was violated by opening a special account to administer the funds entering the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the charge levied on migrants based on the executive decrees. In contrast, the legal reserve in tax matters has been violated on two distinct occasions, first when the aforementioned decrees were issued (for which the lower court considered the crime of illegal levy was configured, even though the action to prosecute it was time-barred) and later when the cooperation agreement between the Ministry and FUNDEHCA established a charge for a state service (which is what serves as the basis for convicting F for extortion (concusión)). Thus, it is clear that the lower court did not make the mistake pointed out by the appellant. For all the foregoing reasons, **this ground of the appeal is declared without merit**.

XI.The private defense counsel for the defendant F claims, as a **fifth ground**, that in this case the rules of sound critical judgment were violated regarding the assessment of the reasons why the General Comptroller of the Republic did not endorse the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. She argues that the aforementioned agreement did not have to be previously consulted with the Comptroller's Office. She adds that a finding of harmfulness (juicio de lesividad) is required to nullify the validity and effectiveness of the administrative act. **The claim is without merit**. As set forth supra in Considering VII, in this case a triangular relationship occurred as a consequence of the implementation of the aforementioned cooperation agreement. On one hand, the administered (the migrant population) required a service (the granting of the work card) from the Costa Rican State (specifically, from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which was the only agency competent to grant such a permit). On the other, the State agreed with FUNDEHCA that the latter would assist it (the State) in the physical production of the cards. Finally, to obtain the card granted by the Costa Rican State, the administered (the migrant) had to pay FUNDEHCA the sum of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00). As can be seen, this is a double mockery of the legal system. The first occurs because the administered requires a state service (the granting of the work card) for which, as of October 6, 1997 (the date the cooperation agreement was signed), no legal provision existed that allowed a levy to be charged in exchange. Despite this, and with full knowledge of the illegality, F authorized said charge in the agreement under discussion. The second mockery occurs because the State benefits from a service provided by a private entity (FUNDEHCA) without having to pay, since F illegally transferred that cost to the users. It is true that in this maneuver the Public Administration was compromised, specifically upon signing the cooperation agreement, but this does not mean the criminal courts should refrain from ruling on the legality of the actions taken. If Attorney Navas Montero's claim is examined, it can be seen that she is attempting to give primacy to the administrative jurisdiction in this matter, as what she seeks is to prevent the criminal forum from establishing that the charge via the agreement is improper while the other forum has not resolved whether that agreement is legal or not. The appellant's argument is unacceptable. Note that Article 4 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction expressly reserves for the criminal forum everything related to crimes, even if they are connected with acts of the Public Administration. Thus, it is through this channel (not another) where a pronouncement on the legality of the actions must be issued, since it is precisely on this that the existence of the crime of extortion (concusión) must be determined. Therefore, the discussion concerning whether the Comptroller's Office should endorse or not the cooperation agreement mentioned so many times is irrelevant, since this forum has already declared that the charge established therein for migrants in favor of FUNDEHCA is openly illegal, a circumstance F knew before signing it (in this we agree – incidentally – with what was indicated by the Comptroller's Office in its resolution No. DAJ-2156 of November 17, 1997, visible at folio 1693 in Volume III), and that is what matters for the purposes of applying Article 348 of the Penal Code. This being the case, this Chamber does not find that any grievance is caused to the appellant by the fact that the reason why the General Comptroller of the Republic did not endorse the cooperation agreement is not analyzed in greater depth. For the foregoing reasons, **this ground of the appeal is declared without merit**.

XII.As a **sixth ground**, Attorney Navas Montero alleges the violation of substantive law, specifically Article 348 of the Penal Code, regarding the crime of extortion (concusión). She asserts that the facts the lower court deemed proven do not fit within what the legislator defines as extortion (concusión). She indicates that the ruling does not extract what the abuse consisted of, nor how her defendant induced the migrants to make the payment to FUNDEHCA. **The reproach cannot be entertained**. It has already been set forth supra in Considerings VI and VII why the crime of extortion (concusión) attributed to F is duly accredited and substantiated by the trial court. The appellant must abide by what was resolved therein.

XIII.As a **seventh ground**, F's private defense counsel claims that an error has been made in imposing the penalty in this case, as it is disproportionate to what has been deemed proven. For the reasons set forth below, **the argument is accepted**. It can be seen from folio 7611 (Volume XVII; see in particular folio 7613) that the trial court considered that in this case it was appropriate to sanction F and J (it is clear that what is resolved here must be applied to the latter by extension; however, the issue will be addressed when ruling on his cassation appeal, as it is necessary to treat a topic therein that is intimately connected to the penalty for his conduct) with the upper end of the punitive scale provided for the crime of extortion (concusión). This Chamber deems that imposing the maximum penalty in this case is disproportionate. This is because, although what occurred is indeed very serious, it is also true that in this case there are no extraordinary circumstances that warrant imposing the highest possible sanction. Specifically, keeping clear that the extortion (concusión) is configured only by what occurred in relation to the charge to migrants created through the already mentioned cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, it must be added that it could not be established how much money this foundation received for the production of the work card, so that although it is known that there were migrants who unduly paid that entity what was established in the indicated agreement, it has not been possible to determine how large the financial benefit received by that private organization was. This is a circumstance that must be weighed against the other elements of Article 71 of the Penal Code, and it shows that in this case an unreasonable penalty has been imposed on F. Furthermore, he is a person with no criminal record and who, subsequent to the commission of the illicit act, has shown willingness to face the process, such that his intention to submit again to the legal system, with the legal consequences this entails for him, is evident. Therefore, it is unreasonable to impose the highest possible sanction on F. However, it cannot be thought that this defendant deserves to be sanctioned with the minimum end of the relevant punitive scale either, as that would be equally disproportionate. It must be remembered that this is indeed a serious act, since not only was a Minister of the Government of the Republic (that is, one of the highest-ranking public officials, even a member of the Supreme Powers) the perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión), but also many people of limited means (it cannot be forgotten that they are illegal migrants) were compelled to pay a sum (which was considerable from their point of view) that they did not owe (although it has not been possible to determine the total income received by FUNDEHCA for that concept, which is a circumstance that must be weighed against the one just described). Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that F is knowledgeable in Law, making it more reprehensible in his case to have acted with intent to contravene the legal system. Therefore, this Chamber considers that the eight-year prison sentence set by the lower court for F as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión) is indeed disproportionate for being unreasonable and must therefore be reduced to adjust it to the level of gravity this matter truly entails. Thus, the defect in the application of substantive law pointed out by the appellant being configured, this Chamber resolves to **grant this ground of the appeal and, applying the provisions of Article 450 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to vacate the appealed judgment regarding the sanction F must serve. Consequently, resolving the matter directly on its merits, a sentence of FOUR YEARS OF PRISON is imposed on F, as the responsible perpetrator of the crime of extortion (concusión) committed to the detriment of the duties of public office**. Since the imposed amount exceeds the limits permitted in Article 59 of the Penal Code, the benefit of a suspended sentence (condena de ejecución condicional) is not granted to F.

XIV. **Regarding the appeal filed by the defendant F**. Exercising his right to a material defense – guaranteed in Article 8, subsection 2), sections c), d), and e) of the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 14, subsection 3, sections b) and d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in the second and third paragraphs of Article 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code –, the accused F challenges the conviction issued against him through cassation. As a **first ground** (see folio 7714 of Volume XVIII), the appellant alleges the violation of due process. Specifically, he considers that in this case the rules of concentration, continuity, immediacy, orality, and publicity have been violated. He bases his claim on the argument that the Judge who presided over the Court in charge of this matter – Mr. Carlos Sánchez Fernández – asked the parties, prior to closing the debate, to extend the time to deliberate and proceed to the reading of the appealed judgment. He also indicates that the mentioned Judge conditioned the issuance of an objective ruling on his request being granted, since only by extending the deliberation period could a comprehensive and detailed work be produced by the jurisdictional authority. The defendant considers that this conduct violated Article 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as that was not the appropriate moment to declare the matter as one of complex processing. He adds that, in any case, the legally prescribed period for that type of matter was not even met, but rather the time allowed by the legislator for those special situations was exceeded. He points out that in the case sub judice, forty-five calendar days passed (equivalent to thirty-two business days) from when the oral and public trial was concluded until the judgment was read. It is the appellant's criterion that such action is clearly a violation of the governing principles of the essential phase of the Costa Rican criminal process, which is the trial, since with the passage of so many days, immediacy, orality, and continuity are lost. **The objection cannot be entertained**. In accordance with the provisions of Article 424 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the appellant must demonstrate that the defects he states not only exist, but also cause him grievance and he has not concurred in causing them. In the present case, the case file indeed records (read the debate record starting at folio 6820 in Volume XV) that Mr. Carlos Sánchez Fernández – who presided over the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José in this matter – asked the interested parties for extraordinary time to deliberate and thereby "*make the decision in an objective, fair manner, and produce a very comprehensive and detailed work as you* [the Judge was addressing the parties] *have requested* . . .

(see folio 6821 in the indicated volume). In support of his petition, Mr. Sánchez Fernández cited ruling No. 565-F-93 of this Chamber, issued at 9:05 a.m. on October 22, 1993. In that ruling (specifically in its Considerando noveno), a series of reasons are set forth explaining why it was possible –in matters being processed in accordance with the regulations set forth in the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure– to extend the deliberation period for as long as was reasonably necessary to decide the respective case. When issuing the judgment under consideration, the following was held: “(i) deliberation must begin immediately after the close of the debate; (ii) the duration is regulated in the final paragraph of Article 392, which refers to Article 361, such that deliberation may be prolonged for as many consecutive sessions as are necessary; (iii) the time limit for concluding the deliberation must bear a relationship to and be proportional to the nature of the matter to be decided; (iv) while the deliberation lasts, the judges may not intervene in other matters, unless it has already concluded; and (v) the deliberation may be suspended for a period of up to ten days, and the grounds are established in Article 392, such that they are only force majeure and the illness of one of the judges”. When this Chamber issued the ruling just mentioned, the normative instrument in force on this subject was the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure, and the provisions of that legal text allowed the deliberation to be extended for as long as was reasonably necessary to make the relevant decisions in the respective case. Until now, what was stated in that ruling 565-F-93 has guided the decisions of the Tribunals regarding the time they have to deliberate. However, as of this judgment, it must be noted that this criterion cannot be sustained in matters that must be resolved in accordance with the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike what occurred under the previous procedural rules, the procedural law now in force expressly contains a regulation specially designed by the Legislator for those cases determined to be processed as complex. The specific rules for this type of case are set forth in Articles 319, 360, 364, 376, 377, 378, and 379, all of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The raison d'être of these special rules lies in the fact that not all matters heard by judicial offices are the same. There are some that –due to the facts to be elucidated, as well as the subject matter involved– necessarily demand more time and dedication than others. It is precisely when faced with such circumstances that it becomes possible to request authorization for the provisions relating to the processing of complex cases to be applied to the proceeding. The aim of these provisions is –essentially– to extend the legal time limits for carrying out certain actions up to the limits set forth in Article 378 of the cited normative text. Note that the word “limit” has been used here, and this is because Article 379 of the same body of law provides that, in all matters not expressly mentioned in Title II of Book II of the Second Part (Procedures) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the rules of the ordinary proceeding apply, which implies that what is established in the second paragraph of Article 360 of said ordinance becomes applicable with regard to the consequences of non-compliance (by exceeding) the time provided for deliberation. If this occurs, the rule is that the proceedings are annulled and the trial must be conducted again before another Tribunal. However, this statement must be related to what is established in Article 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the possibility that the parties in whose favor a time limit has been established may waive it by express declaration. It must be made clear once and for all that the time established by the Legislator for the judges to deliberate and issue the corresponding judgment is conceived in favor of the interests of the parties, since it is they who enjoy the right to prompt and complete justice, as set forth in Article 39 of the Political Constitution, in Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and in Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now, in the case under examination, despite the fact that it was the Tribunal itself that promoted the indefinite extension of the time limit to deliberate and issue the respective judgment, the truth is that all interested parties consented to what the judging body proposed to them. Thus, they waived the time limit –conceived in their favor– that limited the time available to the trial court to issue the ruling at issue here. In that context, there is indeed a disregard of the time limits for issuing the judgment, but in this specific case, that conduct did not cause harm to the parties, since they accepted the proposal of the lower court (a quo). In that sense, their consent –apart from constituting a waiver of a time limit established in their favor– constituted an essential factor for what occurred to happen: that the lower court judges took so many days to issue the ruling now being appealed. In light of all the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XV.As a second ground, F argues that the lower court failed to observe the rules of sound judgment (reglas de la sana crítica) and incurred a lack of reasoning in the judgment (fundamentación). He considers that the trial court incorrectly evaluated the evidentiary material and erroneously interpreted different concepts, all of which caused a violation of substantive law. As a basis for the claim, the defendant states the following: a) he affirms that on one hand, the sentencing Tribunal holds that the charge made by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is the same one that constituted the crime of concusión, but later indicates that the former was repealed and that it is a different charge based on the cooperation agreement; and b) he states that in the executive decrees that regulated the temporary work card program, what was reserved for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was the granting of the document, not its material production, so it is not true that powers were transferred to FUNDEHCA. The objection is inadmissible. It was already set forth above in Considerandos VII and VIII that in this case, two different charges have been proven against the migrants for the temporary work card: the first is covered by the executive decrees that created it in favor of the State; the second, by FUNDEHCA’s cooperation agreement. Furthermore, it has already been indicated why they are independent and the reasons why the second constitutes concusión, while the first constitutes illegal exaction (exacción ilegal). It was also expressed why the distinction between the charges is drawn from the judgment, and it was stated that the concusión is duly reasoned. The appellant must abide by all of this. As for the distinction between granting and producing the temporary work card, the appellant himself confirms what the lower court stated and what is upheld in this ruling: the entity that granted the document was the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The foregoing, coupled with the fact that the payment of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) was a requirement for the migrants to receive the card, demonstrates that money was indeed illegally charged to this population for a service provided to them by the State. The work that FUNDEHCA performed, which was the material creation or production –as the appellant says– of the document, was aimed at serving the Ministry, not the migrants, which highlights the illegality of the charge, since the public agency was not assuming the costs of a service rendered to it, but rather passing them on to the users. It is worth noting that this also follows from the appealed judgment, as set forth in Considerando VII of this ruling, and the appellant must therefore abide by what is indicated therein. Given these circumstances, this Office finds that none of the alleged defects exist, and therefore the claim must be declared without merit.

XVI.As a third ground, the appellant claims omitted or illegal reasoning (fundamentación omisa o ilegal), violation of the rules of sound judgment (reglas de la sana crítica), and violation of the principle of experience. He indicates that there was an inadequate assessment of the functions of the Comptroller General’s Office (Contraloría General de la República). He adds that this body of the Legislative Branch is not an advisor and does not exercise prior control. The reproach is not accepted. It was already set forth above in Considerando XI –to which the appellant must abide– why it is irrelevant in this case to discuss whether or not the Comptroller General’s Office was correct in not endorsing (refrendar) the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, since the illegality of said agreement was evident at the time of its signing and, in any case, has already been duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal), which is the competent forum to determine this by virtue of the fact that it involves administrative action related to a crime. In that sense, it is irrelevant whether or not the lower court made a mistake when evaluating the actions of the Comptroller General’s Office in this matter. For the sake of completeness, it must be indicated to the appellant that –contrary to what he asserts– the legislative body is indeed an advisor and does exercise prior control. Its advisory power is not only referred to parliamentary bodies (third paragraph of Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic –which, incidentally, was enacted and published in 1994, meaning it was in force when F proceeded as he did), but rather, since the power to inform (ejúsdem) and to issue opinions in the exercise of its consultative power is provided for (Article 29 of the cited normative text), it is clear that it does guide (and in that sense, advise) the audited entities, such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, Article 20 of the referenced Law indicates that prior to ordering the execution of the respective contract, the Administration must manage and obtain the approval of the Comptroller General’s Office, which makes it evident that this is indeed a prior control, since without that endorsement it is not possible to legally execute a contract. In any case, it has already been stated that everything that may be debated on these points is not essential to prove the concusión, since this is based on the existence of an illegal charge made to the migrant population by F, who, in abusive exercise of his position, moved those people to deliver an undue patrimonial benefit in favor of FUNDEHCA. For all the foregoing reasons, this claim is declared without merit.

XVII.As a fourth ground, the appellant claims illegal reasoning (fundamentación ilegal), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, violation of the principle of objectivity, and violation of the rules of sound judgment (reglas de la sana crítica). Specifically, the appellant believes an error was made by not evaluating the statements of three witnesses, for whom the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security did not need to be endorsed (refrendado) by the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic. He adds that no reasoning is provided as to why the opening of a specific checking account to administer the funds collected (based on the executive decrees) for the temporary work card would constitute a violation of the principle of the single treasury account (principio de caja única). He points out that it cannot be deduced that he was responsible for opening the aforementioned account. He states that it was not clearly understood that FUNDEHCA was useful for solving a national problem, that the context in which the events occurred was not appreciated, and that executive decrees are complex acts that cannot emanate from a single Minister. The claim is inadmissible. It has been stated throughout this judgment that it has been duly proven in the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal) –which is the competent forum for doing so– that the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is openly illegal. In that sense, it is irrelevant to discuss whether or not the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic was correct in not endorsing said agreement. For this last reason, the opinion that three legal professionals might have on the point is equally irrelevant. In any case, it is clear that through this instrument, an illegal charge was being –knowingly– created against the migrants for a service that the State provided to them, and incidentally, the State was avoiding paying FUNDEHCA for a service that entity provided to the State, not to the migrants. The foregoing is sufficient –as has already been stated throughout this judgment– to find that the concusión has been established. Regarding the opening of the checking account in which the Ministry of Labor and Social Security managed the funds collected by virtue of the charge established in executive decrees for the temporary work card, it must be indicated that this is related to the issue of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal), which is the crime based on what occurred under the cover of the aforementioned decrees (the concusión is not based on those facts, but on what occurred concerning the cooperation agreement). Since F was acquitted of the crime of illegal exaction, it is now of no interest to discuss how it was established that applying those decrees violated the principle of the single treasury account, whether or not he was responsible for opening the aforementioned account, whether the issuance of the decrees was justified by the national reality at the time they were issued, or whether these are complex acts of the Executive Branch in which a single Minister does not intervene. As for the role of FUNDEHCA in developing the temporary work card program, it must be indicated that while it is possible to admit that this foundation may have been useful in addressing the problem of migrants, it is also true that this does not eliminate an essential aspect for the purposes of proving the concusión: FUNDEHCA was benefited by receiving money from migrants that was being illegally charged to them. Thus, it is irrelevant to determine whether or not that private organization played an important role in solving the problems generated by the presence of undocumented migrants in the country. For the sake of completeness, it must be recalled that it was stated above in Considerando IX of this ruling why Costa Rica’s situation as a consequence of the mass of undocumented migrants residing here cannot constitute a ground for justification or exoneration in favor of F. By virtue of all the foregoing, this Chamber finds that none of the alleged defects are present, and therefore it is appropriate to declare this part of the appeal without merit.

XVIII.As a fifth ground, the appellant asserts illegal reasoning (fundamentación ilegal), arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and violation of the principles of sound judgment (sana crítica). Specifically, he points out that in this case, the existence of a mistake of law (error de prohibición) was dismissed without sufficient reasoning. He indicates that several legal professionals told him that the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA did not require the endorsement (refrendo) of the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic, and therefore he acted under a mistake in not submitting the document to said entity. He maintains that the drafting of executive decrees is not the exclusive work of a State Minister, and therefore if the illegalities are not noticed in the procedure, he should not be held liable for intentional (dolosa) conduct. The reproach is inadmissible. It was already stated above in Considerandos XI and XVI –to which the appellant must abide– why it is irrelevant in this case to discuss whether or not the Comptroller General’s Office of the Republic was correct in not endorsing the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and FUNDEHCA, since the illegality of said agreement was duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal), which is the competent forum to decree it. Thus, it becomes equally irrelevant that various lawyers may have told the defendant whether or not the repeatedly mentioned agreement needed to be examined by the Comptroller General’s Office.

Additionally, of the Comptroller General's Office. Additionally, it has been indicated in this resolution that the crime for which F is liable is constituted by what occurred regarding the cooperation agreement and not by what happened in relation to the executive decrees, so it is of no interest to know whether he incurred an error when he signed those normative instruments or not. As such, the argument must be declared without merit.

XIX.As a sixth ground, the accused F claims illegal reasoning and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. Specifically, he asserts that the lower court disregards the value that the law grants to an audit report. He questions that the criteria expressed in such a report is taken as definitive. The objection cannot prosper. What the appellant intends is for it to be dismissed that he acted with malice when signing the cooperation agreement. This is not possible. As stated above in Findings VII and X of this ruling, at the time of signing the agreement with FUNDEHCA, F was aware that it was not possible to charge the migrant population for the service that the State provided to them. That knowledge was attained not only through the audit report mentioned by the appellant, but is also supported by the report and recommendations issued by the procedural body established to carry out the investigation suggested by the then Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Security, Eugenio Solano Calderón. Furthermore, the decisions taken by F on October 6, 1997, to order the closure of the bank account in which the money collected under the executive decrees was deposited, as well as the decision to order the drafting of a preliminary bill to be able to charge a fee for the seasonal work card, are incontrovertible proof that the defendant was aware of the illegality of the situation. In that sense, F's knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct not only is not exclusively derived from the report of the General Directorate of Audit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but has been fully accredited based on other documents and on the actions of the accused himself. Due to the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XX.As a seventh ground, the appellant alleges illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. He questions the statement of the sentencing Tribunal to the effect that it was before October 6, 1997, that he signed the decree which repealed the charge for the seasonal work card. The claim is not admissible. Even though it is indeed not possible to affirm – based on the evidence in the record – that the defendant had signed Decree No. 26430-MTSS of October 8, 1997, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 209 of October 30, 1997, before the 6th of that same month, it must be said that this is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the criminal liability of the defendant. Indeed, the crime of concusión (extortion by a public official) for which F was sanctioned is accredited based on what happened regarding the cooperation agreement between the ministry then under his charge and FUNDEHCA; such an offense is not constituted regarding actions taken under the executive decrees. Thus, the repeal of the fee charged to migrants in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for processing the seasonal work card in no way affects the crime for which the accused is liable. Moreover, F's knowledge of the illegality of charging the migrant population for a service provided by the State without a legal provision so establishing it is duly supported by documents that the accused had at his disposal before October 6, 1997, and also by the actions taken by the accused on that date. As such, whether or not he signed the aforementioned decree before that day is irrelevant for the purposes of this matter, so the lower court's assertion in that regard can be removed from the appealed ruling without this having any favorable impact for the appellant, which demonstrates that the assertion causes him no grievance, for which reason this part of the appeal must be declared without merit.

XXI.As an eighth ground, F alleges illegal and contradictory reasoning, as well as a violation of the in dubio pro reo principle. Specifically, he indicates that the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic never declared the illegality of the charge to migrants established in the repeatedly cited cooperation agreement. He points out that said entity only expressed having serious doubts about its legality. He asserts that in the face of a state of doubt, his criminal liability cannot be decreed. He considers that the recommendation made to him by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to draft a bill to utilize the resources from the charge to migrants for the seasonal work card does not suggest that said charge is illegal. He says that the fact that the State's single treasury account principle might have been violated by depositing the funds from the charge to migrants in a special account does not necessarily imply that the charge is illegal. The claims must be rejected. In accordance with what has been stated throughout this ruling, to which the appellant must adhere, the illegality of the charge to migrants created through the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is manifest and has been duly declared in the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent one for this matter. Thus, it is irrelevant – for the purposes of the crime of concusión – whether the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic declared or not that the mentioned agreement is illegal, given that such a declaration has already been made by the competent body. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that there is no doubt whatsoever about the illegality of such a charge, so the state of doubt the appellant alleges in his favor does not exist. With respect to the argument that the recommendations issued by the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security do not imply that the charge to migrants is illegal, it must be indicated that the appellant is not correct. Certainly, through official letter No. DAJ-AI-943-97 of September 24, 1997 (visible at folio 247 in Tome I of the case file), addressed to F, the accused was recommended to close the account in which the funds from the work card program were managed and also to present a bill before the Legislative Assembly so that it would authorize charging migrants for the issuance of said document. What is of interest to highlight is that in that document it was expressly noted (see folio 250 in the last indicated Tome) the caveat that the legislative authorization to use future income that could derive from the charge to migrants depended on the charge remaining in force. That warning was formulated in accordance with what was previously pointed out by the Internal Audit Office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the effect that such a charge was made in contravention of the legal reserve in tax matters (in point B.6 of the Legal Affairs report, what was warned by the audit body is expressly highlighted; see folios 249 and 250 in the reference Tome), so it is evident that not only was F warned about the illegality of opening a special checking account to manage the funds collected for the work card, but it was also pointed out with complete clarity that the charge itself was illegal, for which purpose mention was made of the criteria of the Internal Audit Office of the ministry in question. As such, it is not true that the illegality of the oft-mentioned charge to migrants was not inferred from the report of the Directorate of Legal Affairs. Moreover, with F being aware that the migrant population could not be charged for the seasonal work card based on the executive decrees by virtue of the fact that the creation of fees for state services is a matter reserved to law, his malicious conduct is evident because without any qualms he ignored that prohibition and instituted a new charge under a simple cooperation agreement (a normative source of much lower rank than an executive decree and far inferior to law), with the aggravating factor that the beneficiary of that money was no longer the State but FUNDEHCA. Finally, it must be indicated that it is possible that the violation of the State's single treasury account principle does not mean the occurrence of illegal acts, but this does not affect the present case. It must be remembered that the cited principle was violated by the opening of a special checking account to manage the funds from the charge that, thanks to the executive decrees, was made to migrants for the seasonal work card. But it has already been said that what was done under those decrees constitutes exacción ilegal (illegal exaction), a crime for which the defendant was acquitted. The offense for which F was convicted is concusión, which has its root in what occurred regarding the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Thus, it is evident that the issue of opening the special account is not linked to the configuration of the crime for which the ex-Minister is criminally liable. For all the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXII.As a ninth ground, the appellant alleges illegal reasoning, a violation of the principles of sound criticism, and that the appealed ruling is contradictory. In particular, F argues that there is an inconsistency in the sentence handed down against him, because it states that the defendants did not act in accordance with the Law when transferring the charge made to migrants from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to FUNDEHCA (he references page 667 of the ruling; folio 7491 in Tome XVII of the case file). He adds that in the same resolution (he refers to page 664 of the impugned sentence; folio 7488 in Tome XVII of the case file) it is indicated that the charge made based on the executive decrees was repealed. Based on those two statements by the trial court, the appellant argues that there is no basis to consider that the charge made by FUNDEHCA should have entered the State's coffers. The claim is not admissible. As has been said many times throughout this resolution, in the present case there are two distinct charges. One was made based on the executive decrees and the other was intended to be protected under the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. What happens – as has been explained – is that in both cases the entity providing the service to migrants is the Ministry; that ministry was the only one competent to grant the seasonal work card. This explains why any charge that might have been made for this concept should have entered the State's coffers. It must be remembered that FUNDEHCA provided service to the Ministry, not to the migrants, so if anyone should have compensated that foundation it was precisely the state body, not those who required the service from the Costa Rican State. In accordance with the foregoing, the statement in the questioned resolution that one of the charges was repealed does not cause any grievance to the defendant F. Furthermore, it also does not harm him that it is said that an attempt was made to transfer the charge that existed under the decrees to a situation governed by the agreement, since if the sentence is read as an integral piece, it is clear that by this it is not intended to indicate (as the appellant tries to make it appear) that there was a single charge (a circumstance that in the same ruling is considered disproven, as explained in Findings VI, VII, and VIII of this resolution), but rather it is simply an idiomatic turn of phrase to explain that in a new reality (the one governed by the cooperation agreement) an attempt was made to apply a figure (the charge) that was already known to be illegal from the preceding situation (what happened under the executive decrees). Based on all the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXIII.As a tenth ground, F alleges illegal reasoning and arbitrary exclusion of evidence. He argues that even though the sentencing Tribunal states that it is aware of a contentious-administrative proceeding filed by FUNDEHCA against the State for the non-approval of the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the lower court did not adhere to the rules of preliminary ruling that, in his judgment, that matter has over the one heard here. The claim is entirely inadmissible. It has already been explained in this resolution that it is the criminal jurisdiction which is competent to rule on the legality of the agreement between the ministry and the foundation, so the declaration of such agreement as illegal is in accordance with the Law and the appellant must adhere to it. The foregoing reveals that the alleged preliminary nature of the contentious-administrative proceeding over the criminal proceeding does not exist, but rather what is decided here impacts that jurisdiction. In accordance with the foregoing, being aware of the existence of that other case does not prevent resolving what is appropriate in the criminal jurisdiction, so what was done does not cause any harm to the defendant and by virtue of this, it is appropriate to declare this claim without merit.

XXIV.As an eleventh ground, F accuses illegal reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. Specifically, he claims that the appealed sentence asserts (see proven fact No. 27 a at folio 6941 in Tome XVI) that he used for his personal benefit the sum of three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) that on October 16, 1997, were deposited by his secretary into a personal account he had at Banco Nacional de Costa Rica; said monies came from the charges made to migrants at FUNDEHCA. He argues that while it is true that for that particular account it is not evident that in the days after that deposit any withdrawals were made that reaffirm his version to the effect that he returned the money, it is also true that it has not been verified if he had other accounts, so it cannot be ruled out that he returned that money. He adds that the testimonies on which the Tribunal's assertion is based are contradictory and that it cannot be sustained that he gave the order for the sum in question to be deposited into his account. The claim must be rejected. Despite the fact that the arguments presented by F could indeed be useful to question the lower court's affirmation that he used the three hundred thousand colones in question (¢300,000.00) for his personal benefit, the truth is that this is a completely irrelevant point for the purposes of the conviction handed down against him for the crime of concusión. In the first place, it must be remembered that the lower Tribunal accredits the seizure of that sum both in the list of proven facts (see fact 27 a at folio 6941 in Tome XVI) and in the section of considerations directly related to the offense for which F is criminally liable (see in particular folio 676 of the sentence; that is, folio 7500 in Tome XVII, which is located in the section dedicated to the substantive analysis with respect to the crime for which the defendant was sanctioned). What is of interest to highlight is that those three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) were the product of the payment that migrants made to FUNDEHCA and after being collected by that entity, they reached F's account. This reveals that the crime was more than sufficiently configured when the transfer of the funds that are of interest here occurred, given that FUNDEHCA had already received them thanks to the inducement made by the defendant so that migrants would pay in favor of that entity something they did not owe, for which reason it is irrelevant to determine whether he used them for his benefit or returned them. Thus, for criminal purposes, the assertion in question is something non-essential as support for the conviction, so it can be dispensed with without such a procedure entailing any benefit to the accused. The referenced assertion is equally irrelevant regarding the civil aspects derived from the punishable act, since the civil action for damages filed based on what constitutes concusión was declared without merit (in fact, regarding this defendant, the civil claim was upheld only in relation to a peculado de servicios (embezzlement of services)). In accordance with all the foregoing, the questioned assertion causes no grievance to the appellant and therefore this argument must be declared without merit.

XXV.As a twelfth ground, the appellant argues that in the present case there has been a lack of reasoning, arbitrary exclusion of evidence, and a violation of the rules of sound criticism. Specifically, he argues that the possibility of deporting undocumented foreigners is based on the Immigration and Alien Act and therefore it is not illegitimate to warn those who were required to obtain the seasonal work card about this. He argues that it is not explained why migrants would be compelled to process said document before the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and before FUNDEHCA. He reiterates that Costa Rica was threatened by the large number of illegal immigrants inhabiting national soil. He indicates that the cooperation agreement did not create a fee (tasa), but rather a voluntary tariff for migrants. The claim must be rejected. What the appellant intends is to disprove the configuration of the typical elements of the crime for which he was sanctioned. It was already stated above in Findings VI and VII of this sentence that the concusión is duly accredited and the appellant must adhere to what was resolved there. It is worth adding – for greater abundance – that if by obtaining the seasonal work card migrants were authorized to work in the country, it is clear that they could not be deported, and if to obtain the mentioned document it was a requirement to pay five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) to FUNDEHCA, it is evident that they were obliged to do so, because if they did not, they would not obtain the card and without it they could be deported. Furthermore, the fact that this charge was held as a requirement to obtain the card shows that it is not a voluntary disbursement on the part of the migrants. Finally, the fact that the card had to be granted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security reveals that the mentioned charge was indeed a fee (tasa) – created through a simple cooperation agreement, which evidences its illegality – for a public service.

XXVI.As a thirteenth ground, F alleges a lack of correlation between the accusation and the sentence. Specifically, he says that it is not the same for the accusation to state that reports from the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic and internal bodies of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security indicate that the charge made to migrants based on the executive decrees is apparently illegal, as it is for such illegality to be declared in the criminal jurisdiction. He questions the affirmation that the concusión derives from actions taken based on the cooperation agreement between the ministry under his charge and FUNDEHCA. Likewise, he expresses his disagreement with the fact that it is considered that the charge FUNDEHCA made to migrants was mandatory. The reproach is inadmissible. The appellant must adhere to what has already been resolved in this ruling regarding the conformity with Law that in the criminal jurisdiction it was determined that the charges made to migrants (both the one made based on the executive decrees – exacción ilegal already time-barred – and the one made under the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security – which is the one of interest for the purposes of concusión) for the seasonal work card are both illegal. Moreover, it must be highlighted that this situation of illegality derives directly from the facts charged, so no inconsistency is appreciated. That the concusión derives from what happened under the aegis of the mentioned agreement does not contradict the accusatory document either, but rather derives from it. In any case, it should be noted that in the cases where, according to the appellant, the sentence does not correlate with the accusation, in none of them does the appellant specify what one says and what the other says, nor does he compare them, nor does he explain what the incompatibility consists of. In that sense, it is evident that it is not achieved to demonstrate any grievance, so this argument must be declared without merit.

XXVII.As a fourteenth ground, F considers that fundamental evidence for his interests was not gathered. Specifically, he claims that four accounting studies should have been carried out, one in relation to the peculado de bienes (embezzlement of goods), another regarding the peculado de servicios (embezzlement of services), another regarding the concusión, and the fourth regarding the cost of the work card.

**<u>The claim is untenable</u>.** F was not criminally convicted of any embezzlement (peculado), neither of services nor of goods, so the evidence he misses is irrelevant in the criminal sphere. It is true that he was civilly convicted in the abstract to compensate the damage caused by an embezzlement of services, but due to the type of conviction, the accounting study will be relevant in the sentence execution phase, so it does not affect the decision of interest here. Regarding the concussione (concusión), it has already been set forth here that this crime was configured in the specific case by the fact that F motivated the migrants to pay FUNDEHCA a sum of money they had no reason to give, so knowing how much was collected as a product of that criminal activity is irrelevant; therefore, the evidence he misses is equally irrelevant for the purposes of proving this illicit act. The same irrelevance is observed regarding the cost of the work card, as it does not matter how much the work assigned by former Minister F might have cost FUNDEHCA, because that was a task that could not be charged to the migrants. Based on the foregoing, **<u>this argument is hereby declared without merit</u>.**

XXVIII.As a **<u>first substantive ground</u>**, the appellant alleges an erroneous application of the substantive law, since Article 27 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) was not applied. He believes that, in this specific case, it was proven that he acted under a state of necessity (estado de necesidad) that justifies his actions. He recalls the state of relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1995 and the urgency of taking measures to assist the migrant population and avoid a collapse of services. **<u>The objection is not admissible</u>.** The accused must abide by what has already been decided in Considerando IX of this ruling, where it is explained why no state of necessity concurred in this specific case to justify his conduct.

XXIX.As a **<u>second ground regarding *in iudicando* defects</u>**, F alleges that Article 348 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) could not be applied, since it was not proven that he acted with criminal intent (dolo). **<u>The claim is untenable</u>.** It has already been set forth in Considerandos VII, IX, and X of this judgment why it is duly proven that F committed the crime of concussione (concusión) and that his actions were intentional, to which the appellant must abide.

XXX.As a **<u>third substantive ground</u>**, the appellant alleges that Article 71 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) was violated, since the eight-year prison sentence imposed on him is outside any parameter of proportionality. This issue was examined in Considerando XIII of this ruling, and the appellant must abide by what was decided there.

XXXI. **<u>Regarding the appeal filed on behalf of J</u>.** For reasons of systematic order, since it contains an argument in which the appellants are right and which affects the appealed judgment, the **<u>two substantive grounds</u>** will be resolved jointly and first. Starting from folio 8539 in Volume XXI of the case file (expediente) (which contains only the cassation appeal filed by J’s defenders), Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas make an exhaustive critique of each and every one of the substantive points on which their client's conviction is based. Although they separate into two sections their arguments on why they believe the criminal law was erroneously applied to the conduct proven against their client, in reality they raise a single problem, which is that J is not criminally liable for the concussione (concusión) and that even if he were, he would be liable as an accomplice and not as a co-author (coautor), which would have an impact on the proportionality of the penalty imposed. Hence, it is appropriate to issue a single pronouncement on the matter. Specifically, the appellants argue that the signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) by their client was considered in the judgment as a preparatory act for the commission of the crime for which J was punished. They say that apart from this conduct in the preparatory phase, there is no other that falls within the definition of concussione (concusión). They consider that in this state of affairs, J could never be considered a co-author of said illicit act, nor even a participant, since his intervention did not occur in the execution phase, but in a prior, non-punishable stage. They state that if the concussione (concusión) was committed since the executive decrees were issued that initially supported charging migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card and the accused in question did not possess the sufficient authority to issue said normative bodies, then he cannot be held criminally liable for the crime in question. They point out that it is not considered proven that J knew of the illegality of the actions of co-defendant F. They add that if concussione (concusión) is a crime in which the active subject must be a public official (funcionario público) and their client is not one, then this circumstance could not be communicated to him as a perpetrator, but as a participant. They believe that in the specific case, the justification defense related to the fulfillment of a legal duty was left unapplied, as the migratory problem occurring in Costa Rica in the mid-nineties had to be addressed. They allege that their client acted under a mistake of fact (error de tipo), as he did not know that charging the migrants was illegal. Finally, they argue that J's actions would also fall under a mistake of law (error de prohibición), as he was convinced that the cooperation agreement was valid and did not require the approval (refrendo) of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). **<u>The claim is partially admissible</u>.** In accordance with what will be set forth below, J certainly cannot be considered a co-author of the crime of concussione (concusión) – the appellants are right in this – but he is an accomplice to it, for which reason he becomes criminally liable, although not in the manner established by the lower court (a quo). As set forth supra in Considerando VII, the crime of concussione (concusión) is configured based on what happened around the drafting and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). Thus, everything referring to whether J intervened in the process of drafting and executing the executive decrees on which the charging of migrants was based for some time is irrelevant, as this would be related to the illegal exaction regarding which the lower court (a quo) declared the action prescribed. What matters is knowing what his level of intervention was regarding the crime of concussione (concusión). According to the facts deemed proven (see folio 6938 in Volume XVI), J, knowingly aware of the illegality objections to charging migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card, drafted, developed, and signed the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), after which it was implemented, with this defendant acting as Executive Director of the foundation. It should be noted that J's knowledge of the illegality of charging the migrants is duly founded starting from folio 7472 in Volume XVII, because regardless of the empathy between him and F, what matters is that the latter noted on the report from the General Directorate of Auditing (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), which questioned the legality of the charge to migrants under the legal system, that this document should be studied by the former (see folio 7475 in the last mentioned volume; incidentally, J testified in trial and admitted that F had commented to him about the obstacles the seasonal work card program faced; see folio 7127 in Volume XVI), making it evident that these defendants had contacts and discussed the problem. Furthermore, as stated in the same Considerando VII, the illegality of that charge was evident and was clearly extracted from the criteria expressed both by the General Directorate of Auditing (Dirección General de Auditoría) of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) and by the procedural body regarding that issue. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to understand that both defendants, both due to their closeness and the undeniable fact that they shared information and exchanged opinions about the objections being raised, knew that charging migrants for the public service represented by granting the seasonal work card was contrary to the legal system. In accordance with the foregoing, J, like F, was aware of the illegality of said charge, despite which he signed the mentioned agreement and partly directed its execution, in his capacity as Executive Director of FUNDEHCA. It is evident then that the client of the appellants here did intervene in the facts for which F was declared the perpetrator of the crime of concussione (concusión). What must now be clarified is whether he becomes criminally liable for his intervention. This Chamber considers that he does, but not as a co-author (coautor) (which was the decision of the lower court, a quo), but as an accomplice. In accordance with the proven facts, what J did was to knowingly lend his cooperation to F to ensure that the migrants made a payment they did not owe to FUNDEHCA. The client of the appellants here signed and implemented, in his capacity as Executive Director of FUNDEHCA, the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry headed by F. The entire drafting phase and even the signing of the agreement itself could possibly be placed among the preparatory acts of the crime of concussione (concusión), as mentioned by Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas (who extract some phrases from the appealed judgment that they use as support for their argument). Although J's representatives might be right in this, the truth is that the execution (an aspect that was not qualified by the lower court, a quo – not even in the excerpt of the sentence used by the claimants – as a preparatory act) of the mentioned agreement is clearly located within the execution phase of the illicit act, so it is in relation to the fulfillment of the agreement that actions of the defendant arise that bring him criminal liability. It has already been set forth supra (see Considerando VII) that the crime of concussione (concusión) comes into legal existence thanks to what happened around the signing and implementation of the oft-mentioned cooperation agreement. It is thanks to this instrument that F manages to wrongly charge the migrants a sum of money destined for a third party, FUNDEHCA. As Executive Director of that foundation, J, who knew that migrants could not be charged for the service the State provided them (remember that granting the seasonal work card never left the scope of the attributions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), implemented the agreement, thus contributing substantially with the former Minister in the execution of the crime of interest here. Now, this contribution fits only the provisions of Article 47 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal) and not those stipulated in Article 45 of the same normative body. J cannot be considered a co-author (coautor) of concussione (concusión), for not only was he not a public official (funcionario público) when he collaborated with F in the commission of the illicit act for which the latter was convicted, but he also had no possibility of abusing a public office, as he held none, nor could he oblige or induce the migrants to make the undue payment under the terms of Article 348 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal), since this requires abusing a public position. In other words, he does not jointly carry out the criminal definition with F, as he does not meet the conditions to do so. What J did do was assist F so that the latter, who was indeed a public official (funcionario público) (one of the highest-ranking in the Costa Rican State), could determine the migrants to make an illegal payment to a private entity that provided them no service whatsoever (remember that FUNDEHCA served the State, but the migrants' relationship was with the latter and not the former). For all the foregoing, it is appropriate to only uphold the part of the claim regarding the manner in which J intervened in the facts of interest in this case, so his conduct must be reclassified to the degree of accomplice. It should be noted, finally, that no type of error (error) operates in favor of this defendant in the specific case, neither a mistake of fact (error de tipo) nor a mistake of law (error de prohibición). It has already been set forth here that this defendant certainly knew it was illegal to charge the migrants for granting the seasonal work card. This being so, there was no possibility of incurring an error (error) regarding the undue nature of the charge that F devised to make through a cooperation agreement that only bound FUNDEHCA to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), but could not create obligations for the migrants. Furthermore, there is no error (error) regarding the knowledge of the unlawfulness, as this was expressed in the reports that J discussed with F. Lastly, as has been indicated several times in this decision, there was never a state of necessity (estado de necesidad) that justifies or exculpates the accused. In accordance with all the foregoing, **<u>the cassation appeal on the merits filed by Drs. Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is partially granted, and consequently, the appealed judgment is overturned and J is declared a responsible accomplice of the crime of concussione (concusión), for which he is sentenced to THREE YEARS IN PRISON. For a probation period of five years, J is granted the benefit of a conditional execution of the sentence (condena de ejecución condicional)</u>.** Regarding the penalty imposed on J, it must be explained that it is proportional to the actions of this defendant. Remember that he is criminally liable as an accomplice in the crime of concussione (concusión) committed by F, which implies that a less severe penalty than that of the perpetrator of the illicit act can be imposed on him, as stipulated in Article 74 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal). The undersigned Magistrates consider that while it is true that the fact of forcing migrant people to make an undue payment is very serious, it is also true that the level of culpability of J for this crime is much lower than that of F, so he deserves a lesser sanction than the latter. His participation occurred to find the means by which the illegal charge to the migrants was created, and that is serious, but considerably less so than motivating that population to make it, which F did, so there is indeed a substantial difference between both conducts, the accomplice’s being less harmful in this case, so imposing a three-year prison sentence was considered proportional. Furthermore, for meeting the requirements established in Articles 59 and 60 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal), J is granted the benefit of a conditional execution of the sentence (condena de ejecución condicional).

XXXII.As a **<u>first procedural ground</u>**, the private defenders of this defendant allege a lack of correlation between the accusation and the sentence. Specifically, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim the following: a) they argue that the accusing document attributes to J the signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), while the sentence indicates that he drafted it, which causes him harm since the latter is a case of perpetration while the former is one of complicity; and b) they indicate that the sentence altered the iter criminis described in the accusation to hold J liable as a co-author (coautor) instead of an accomplice. **<u>The claim is not admissible</u>.**

First of all, it must be stated that there has been no substantial variation between what was alleged and what was proven, since the essential core of facts is the same. What did occur in this case was an erroneous application of the substantive law, since J certainly could not be sanctioned as a co-perpetrator, but rather should have been sanctioned as an accomplice to the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión). This error of the lower court (a quo) has already been corrected by this Chamber in the preceding Considering paragraph, so there is no interest in discussing the issue of whether the accusation was respected in terms of it narrating complicity. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that the iter criminis has not been varied, since the accused who is of interest here did intervene—as indicated in the preceding section—in the executive phase of the offense of extortion by a public official (concusión). For the foregoing reasons, this argument is declared without merit.

XXXIII.As a second procedural ground (motivo por la forma), Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim a violation of due process in relation to the procedure followed by the Trial Court to issue the judgment. Specifically, they consider that the time limit for issuing the appealed decision was disregarded. They point out that it was not indicated when the debate was concluded, nor at what point the deliberation began. The objection is not admissible. As stated above in Considering paragraph XIV, although it is true that the time limits for issuing judgment are peremptory in the Code of Criminal Procedure (which is why the criterion issued in ruling No. 565-F-93 of this Chamber, from 9:05 a.m. on October 22, 1993, is not applicable to matters processed under this regulatory body) and that they were disregarded in this matter, it is also true that the parties contributed to causing the error, and therefore, under Article 424 of the procedural ordinance, it cannot be proven that they suffered any grievance. Additionally, it should be noted that on page 6820 in Volume XV, it is recorded that the extraordinary time period that the trial judges requested from the parties was for deliberating and drafting the judgment, so it is evident that upon concluding said hearing, they proceeded to carry out such acts, and thus it is indeed determined at what point the debate was concluded and the deliberative phase began. For the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XXXIV.As a third ground for procedural defects (vicios in procedendo), J's private defense attorneys allege a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación), insofar as it would not be explained why opening a checking account for managing the money FUNDEHCA received from charging migrants would be part of a perpetrator's plan. The objection must be rejected. J's criminal liability derives from the help he provided to F to induce the migrants to make an undue payment in favor of FUNDEHCA. As stated above in Considering paragraph XXXI, the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between that entity and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security made it easier for the other accused to commit the extortion by a public official (concusión). Evidently, the management of the funds that entered the foundation was derived from the execution of the agreement between that legal entity and the ministerial portfolio, since it was through this agreement that the money reached the entity. What matters is that regardless of whether said account was opened or not, the agreement was being executed and the migrants were paying FUNDEHCA a sum they had no reason to pay to that organization. This being the case, the crime would have been consummated even without having opened the mentioned checking account, which demonstrates the irrelevance—for the purposes of the conviction against J—of the matter in question. For the foregoing, the claim is declared without merit.

XXXV.As a fourth ground, the appellants allege the defect of lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) regarding the existence of a close bond between J and F. The argument is not admissible. To be an accomplice to a crime, one only needs to assist or collaborate with the perpetrator, regardless of whether they are close persons or friends. In this matter, it has been duly proven that J helped F commit the extortion by a public official (concusión) and that he did so through the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. What is important to note is that this occurred, making it irrelevant whether it was due to a close bond between them or for any other reason. For the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the claim without merit.

XXXVI.As a fifth ground, the lower court's (a quo) statement that J opened FUNDEHCA's checking account using a copy of a certification is questioned for its reasoning (fundamentación). As a sixth ground, it is claimed that the reason why J waited twelve business days to sign the opening of the account is not duly reasoned. As a seventh ground, it is alleged that the friendship bond between F and J is duly proven. The objections are unaddressable. As indicated in Considering paragraph XXXIV, regardless of the opening of the aforementioned checking account, J's liability derives from the help he provided to F to commit the extortion by a public official (concusión), which consisted of lending his assistance to sign and implement the cooperation agreement cited so many times. Furthermore, it was indicated in Considering paragraph XXXV that complicity does not depend on proving that the accomplice has a close bond with the perpetrator. In light of what was resolved in due course, what is claimed here becomes inconsequential for the purposes of upholding the conviction against him, and therefore the objections must be declared without merit.

XXXVII.As an eighth ground, the assertion of the Trial Court that J was involved in the development of the seasonal work card program is challenged as improperly reasoned, as is how he could have carried out acts characteristic of perpetrating the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión). The claim is not admissible. It was already stated in Considering paragraph XXXI that in this case, J's knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants for the seasonal work card is indeed duly proven, despite which he signed the cooperation agreement and thereby facilitated F's commission of the extortion by a public official (concusión). Furthermore, it was explained in that same section why J is an accomplice and not a co-perpetrator of that crime. What matters is that from that section, it is inferred that J's complicity does not depend on him being in charge of the seasonal work card program, and that precisely because he does not meet the requirements to be considered a co-perpetrator, he is considered an accomplice. Therefore, this present objection must be declared without merit.

XXXVIII.As a ninth ground, it is stated that there is no reasoning as to why the events surrounding the executive decrees that regulated the seasonal work card program between 1995 and 1997 would entail criminal liability for J. The argument is not admissible. It was stated above in Considering paragraphs VII and VIII that the charge covered by the executive decrees referred to here was what supported the illegal exaction for which the action was declared time-barred. It was indicated in those sections that the extortion by a public official (concusión) derived from the events surrounding the drafting and signing of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, since that instrument established the obligation for migrants to make a payment that was known to be illegal. That is to say, his liability does not derive from the charge made based on the executive decrees, but rather is based on the charge established in the agreement. Hence, the claim that it is not reasoned what penal consequences the events surrounding the first of these charges would entail for this defendant lacks interest, since no criminal liability for J has been derived from it. For the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XXXIX.As a tenth ground, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas question the statement that J had a marked interest in FUNDEHCA intervening quickly in the charge for the seasonal work card. The argument is not admissible. As stated above in Considering paragraph XXXV, the only thing that matters for having J's complicity proven is that he knowingly assisted F to commit the extortion by a public official (concusión), an aspect that is duly demonstrated (see Considering paragraph XXXI of this ruling). Thus, it is completely without interest whether it is stated that he sought for FUNDEHCA to intervene quickly in the charge for the seasonal work card, since what matters is that he did so, and that entity was the one benefited by the undue payment made by the migrants. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XL. As an eleventh ground, a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) is claimed on several points, such as why the charge for the seasonal work card could not be transferred from the Ministry to FUNDEHCA, why only Nicaraguans are mentioned if there are migrants of other nationalities, why funds destined for FUNDEHCA are questioned if it is a non-profit entity, and why J would be the beneficiary of those diverted funds. The claim is not addressable. It was stated above in Considering paragraphs VII and VIII the reason why no charge for the issuance of the seasonal work card could be created, except through a law (ley). Furthermore, it was also stated there why FUNDEHCA fits within the concept of "third party" mentioned in Article 348 of the Penal Code. This being the case, it is evident that the reason why migrants could not be charged for the state service consisting of the issuance of the seasonal work card was indeed reasoned. Moreover, for the purposes of extortion by a public official (concusión), what matters is that the payment is made to a third party; FUNDEHCA being that third party regarding the relationship between the State and the migrants, the crime is considered established, without it being of interest whether it is a for-profit entity or not. Since the offense came into legal existence from the moment the charge was made in favor of the foundation, it becomes irrelevant whether those funds ultimately benefited any particular person, so the statement that J was benefited can be removed without the crime or his participation in it disappearing. Finally, it must be indicated that it is inconsequential if some sections of the appealed judgment emphasize Nicaraguan migrants, since from the alleged and proven facts, it can be inferred that the illegal charge was made to all migrants. In any case, even if it had only been charged to those from the sister Republic of Nicaragua, the crime would still have been consummated. For the foregoing, this argument is declared without merit.

XLI. As a twelfth ground, a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) is alleged regarding why, by October 6, 1997, J would have had knowledge of the process to repeal decree No. 24811-MTSS (which is what underpinned the charge made for the seasonal work card in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security). Furthermore, the lack of reasoning on the impact of a contentious-administrative proceeding that is pending resolution, in which the validity of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the aforementioned ministerial portfolio is being discussed, is also challenged. The objections are not addressable. As stated in Considering paragraph XXXI of this ruling, J knew it was illegal to charge migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card and even so, he helped F do it. His complicity derives from that, so it is inconsequential whether or not he knew that the decree authorizing the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (not FUNDEHCA) to charge for that service was going to be repealed (remember that the seasonal work card program had its legal basis in a decree different from those that regulated the charge for that document, but none of them authorized charging money in favor of a private entity). What J did know on that October 6, 1997, the date he signed the agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry headed by F, was that it was illegal to charge migrants for that service, despite which he signed the agreement which created a new charge, but this time in favor of the foundation he represented. Furthermore, throughout this resolution, it has been explained why it is within the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal) that the competence to declare the illegality of the agreement falls, meaning it is this venue that prejudges what may be decided in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (sede contencioso administrativa). For the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit.

XLII. As a thirteenth ground, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas question the statement that J had knowledge of the illegality of charging migrants for the issuance of the seasonal work card, as well as having the intention to personally benefit from the funds destined for FUNDEHCA. The claim must be rejected. The issue of J's knowledge of the illegality of charging the migrants has already been duly resolved in Considering paragraph XXXI of this judgment. Furthermore, it was also stated in this ruling that the crime of extortion by a public official (concusión) was consummated from the moment the undue payment of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) in favor of FUNDEHCA was arranged, without it being of interest who ultimately benefited from that money. For the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLIII. As a fourteenth ground, the appellants allege a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) insofar as it is not explained why Article 16 of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic is violated, nor why various bank accounts of a public entity cannot exist, nor why the charges under the executive decrees were illegitimate. The argument is not admissible. It can be observed that the cause of disagreement expressed by the appellants with this argument relates to the charges made to the migrants based on the executive decrees. As explained above in Considering paragraphs VII, VIII, and mainly X, that charge is different from the one made based on the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. J is considered an accomplice for what happened in relation to the latter, not for what happened regarding the others, on which the illegal exaction whose action was determined to be time-barred is based. Thus, matters related to the violation of the single treasury account principle and the payment that migrants made for some time in favor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (which is different from the act in favor of FUNDEHCA), do not affect J's conviction, and therefore cannot cause him a grievance, and for this reason, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLIV. As a fifteenth ground, J's private defense attorneys claim a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) regarding why it was required for the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) to approve (refrendar) the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Furthermore, it is questioned why it is indicated that such an agreement is illegal, if it has not been declared so. The objection is inadmissible. It has already been stated above in Considering paragraphs XI, XVI, and XVII—to which the appellants must adhere—why it is within the criminal jurisdiction (sede penal) where it must be decided whether the aforementioned agreement conforms to the Law or not. Having established that this instrument is manifestly illegal, it becomes inconsequential to discuss whether the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) should have approved (refrendar) it or not. Furthermore, it is clear that there is indeed an express declaration of illegality, which has been carried out by the criminal jurisdiction, which is the competent one to do so. This being the case, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLV. As a sixteenth ground, a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) is claimed insofar as the appealed judgment would not have duly proven that J, having the obligation to do so, omitted sending the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) for its approval (refrendo). Furthermore, it questions the statement that the Comptroller's Office (Contraloría) refused to approve the agreement. Also questioned is the statement that the oversight body had declared the illegality of the mentioned instrument. The objections are not admissible. As has been stated throughout this judgment, the illegality of the agreement mentioned so many times has been declared in the competent jurisdiction for it, which is the criminal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has been explained on several occasions why it is inconsequential to discuss whether that agreement should have been sent for approval by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). In any case, it must be indicated that the oversight body did refuse to approve (refrendar) the agreement, as recorded on page 1693 in Volume III, and that the reasons it gave for not approving it were the following: 1) having put said contract into effect before approving it constituted a ground for its absolute nullity (it should be noted that from this reasoning, it can be inferred that for the Comptroller's Office (Contraloría), it was evident that the party benefited by this "agreement" was the Ministry directed by F, meaning it was that body that had to pay for the services provided by FUNDEHCA, thus it was an onerous contract of the type requiring approval from the oversight body); 2) attributions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security were being transferred to FUNDEHCA, apart from creating a charge that was known to be illegal; 3) F could not contract with FUNDEHCA as not only he himself, but also his son, were founding members of that entity, so he had to adhere to the provisions of Article 22 of the Law of Administrative Contracting; 4) the ordinary contracting procedure was not followed, without specifying why it was dispensed with; 5) sufficient documentation was not attached to certify that J was empowered to sign that agreement. This being the case, it is evident that the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) gave reasons of legality (some formal, but the most important ones substantive) for not approving the agreement, so the statements of the lower court (a quo) have the due evidentiary and reasoning support, since those arguments from the oversight body were set forth by the Trial Court throughout the appealed decision. For the foregoing, this part of the appeal is declared without merit.

XLVI. As a seventeenth ground, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas allege a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) insofar as it is not explained why the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security had to be sent for approval by the Comptroller General of the Republic.

of the Republic. <b><u>The claim is without merit</u></b>. It has been repeatedly stated throughout this judgment (see Findings XI, XVI, XVII, and XLV) that it is inconsequential to discuss whether the aforementioned agreement should have been countersigned or not, because what matters is that it has already been openly declared illegal in the competent venue for that purpose, which is the criminal court. For the foregoing reason, <b><u>this argument is declared without merit</u></b>.

XLVII. As an <b><u>eighteenth ground</u></b>, J's defense counsel question the lack of reasoning as to whether he signed the agreement with authorization from FUNDEHCA's Board of Directors and whether he knew the terms of the agreement before signing it. <b><u>The objection is without merit</u></b>. It has been set forth here that J's knowledge of the illegality of the charge to the migrants created in that instrument is duly reasoned. That being established, it is irrelevant whether he had the endorsement of the Board of Directors to sign that document, since in any case what matters is that he did so knowing that he was helping F to determine the migrants to make an undue payment to FUNDEHCA. Furthermore, it is obvious that J was aware of the terms of the agreement, as it has been clear that he knew of the illegality of the charge established therein and still signed it. For the reasons stated, <b><u>this claim is declared without merit</u></b>.

XLVIII. As a <b><u>nineteenth ground</u></b>, J's representatives maintain that it has not been explained how their client would have incurred the abuses of office attributed to the former Minister of Labor and Social Security who appears here as a defendant. <b><u>The objection is not admissible</u></b>. It was already set forth above in Finding XXXI that J could not have incurred such abuses because he did not hold public office and, furthermore, he was not the one who determined the migrants to make the undue payment, but rather his intervention was limited to collaborating with F in that regard. That is why his conduct was reclassified to the degree of complicity and his sentence was reduced. Thus, the statements now challenged cause no harm to the accused. Therefore, <b><u>this argument is declared without merit</u></b>.

XLIX. As a <b><u>twentieth ground</u></b>, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas allege a breach of due process in that the Trial Court would have attributed a generic responsibility to J for everything that occurred. <b><u>The claim is not admissible</u></b>. It was already set forth in Finding XXXI that J's criminal liability derives from the signing and implementation of the cooperation agreement between FUNDEHCA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. That intervention was indeed attributed to the defendant, so even if there are errors in attributing other facts to him, that particular one is constitutive of a crime, and therefore no harm has been caused to this defendant. This being the case, <b><u>it is appropriate to declare this objection without merit</u></b>.

L. As the <b><u>twenty-first ground</u></b>, the appellants allege a lack of reasoning, considering it contradictory, in that it is not explained what means were used to determine the migrants to make the undue payment. <b><u>The objection must be dismissed</u></b>. It was set forth above in Findings VII and VIII how the assertion that F motivated the migrants to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA is duly reasoned, since it was established as a requirement to process the seasonal work card. Furthermore, it should be remembered that J's criminal liability for these facts derives from the assistance he provided to F, without it being relevant – because he is an accomplice – whether or not he was the one who determined the migrants to make said expenditure; what matters is that he helped the perpetrator of the crime of concusion (concusión) to commit it. For the foregoing, <b><u>this argument is declared without merit</u></b>.

LI. As a <b><u>twenty-second ground</u></b>, the Trial Court's reasoning for its assertion that J used funds entering FUNDEHCA for his own benefit, because he bought carpets, is questioned. The appellants believe it was never disproved that the foundation loaned that money to the accused. <b><u>The claim is without merit</u></b>. As has been indicated throughout this judgment (see Findings VI, VII, and VIII), the crime of concusion (concusión) came into legal existence from the moment the migrants were determined to make an undue payment to FUNDEHCA. Thus, the final use given to the money collected by that entity is of no interest for the purposes of the configuration of the unlawful act, so it is not important to know whether J bought the aforementioned carpets with money loaned to him by FUNDEHCA, because even if that were true, the crime of which he is an accomplice would still exist. For the foregoing reason, <b><u>this aspect of the appeal is declared without merit</u></b>.

LII. As a <b><u>twenty-third ground regarding the form</u></b>, J's private defense counsel claim that the appealed judgment was not reasoned regarding how their client would have abused the qualities of a public official and thereby motivated migrants to make the undue payment. In the <b><u>twenty-fourth ground</u></b>, the claim is reiterated that it is not stated in what way their client induced the making of said expenditure. In the <b><u>twenty-fifth ground</u></b>, it is alleged that no explanation is given for why the agreement is illegal or why it should have been countersigned by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. <b><u>The objections are without merit</u></b>. The appellants must abide by what was decided in Findings VI, VII, VIII, XI, XVI, XXXI, XLVIII, and L, which resolve why there is indeed a crime of concusion (concusión), why the charge was illegal, how the migrants were induced to make an undue payment, why the principle of legal reservation was breached, why it is not transcendental to discuss whether the cooperation agreement should have been countersigned, why the illegality of this instrument was correctly declared in the criminal venue, from which facts J's criminal liability derives, why he is an accomplice and not a co-perpetrator of concusion (concusión), and why it is not necessary to resolve this latter issue regarding the form, because on the merits it has already been duly resolved.

LIII. As a <b><u>twenty-sixth ground</u></b>, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas claim that a contradiction is incurred insofar as J is exonerated from liability for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) for the use of FUNDEHCA's assets, and then that same use is used to support the charge of concusion (concusión). <b><u>The argument cannot succeed</u></b>. It was stated above in Finding VIII why the acquittal for the crime of fraudulent administration (administración fraudulenta) did not affect the conviction for concusion (concusión). The appellants must abide by this, as it is applicable to J's case. Furthermore, it has also been explained in this judgment that the crime was consummated from the moment the migrants were determined to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA, a fact which is not affected by how those funds were managed after they entered the foundation. Therefore, <b><u>this aspect of the appeal is declared without merit</u></b>.

LIV. As a <b><u>twenty-seventh ground</u></b>, the problem of whether J forced or induced the migrants to make the undue payment to FUNDEHCA is brought up again. The appellants shall abide by what was decided in Finding XXXI regarding why J is criminally liable as an accomplice to the concusion (concusión).

LV. As a <b><u>twenty-eighth ground</u></b>, Drs. Guzmán Zanetti and Castellón Vargas maintain that the assertion that migrants were induced into error or deceived, believing they were paying the money to the Costa Rican Government, is not reasoned. <b><u>The claim is without merit</u></b>. What matters for the crime of concusion (concusión) is that, through the abusive exercise of his office, the public official determined a person to give or promise an undue patrimonial benefit to a third party. That is what is duly accredited in this case, and the perpetrator of that conduct is F (Finding VII), who acted with the assistance of J (Finding XXXI). Thus, it becomes completely inconsequential to know whether the determination of the migrants' will was due to deceit or not, because what matters is that they were required to make the undue payment. In any case, what is accredited is that flyers announced it was a requirement to pay that money to FUNDEHCA, and that aspect is unquestionable, regardless of whether it can be classified as deceptive or not. For the foregoing reason, <b><u>it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit</u></b>.

LVI. As a <b><u>twenty-ninth ground</u></b> (the appellants call it the twenty-eighth, as seen on folio 8537 in Volume XXI or page 178 of the brief), it is questioned whether the migrants were capable of understanding the conmination. <b><u>The claim is not admissible</u></b>. What is demonstrated in this case is that the migrants were determined to make an illegal payment to FUNDEHCA, and it is recorded that this payment was established as a requirement to process their seasonal work cards. That is, they were determined to make that illegal payment, and F abused his office to that end. Furthermore, J helped F commit that crime. That is what matters for determining the criminal liability of these defendants, without it being relevant to know whether the migrants were capable or not of knowing they were being conminated to make said payment, because even if they did not know, the fact is that F motivated them to do it and had J's assistance in doing so. This being the case, <b><u>it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit</u></b>.

LVII. <b><u>Regarding the appeal in favor of M</u></b>. For reasons of procedural economy, since there is a ground on which Ms. Gloria Navas Montero, private defense counsel for defendant M, is correct, the <b><u>second ground regarding the form</u></b> is resolved immediately. Ms. Navas Montero alleges a lack of reasoning, for assessing the respective evidence without following the guidelines of sound criticism (sana crítica), regarding the reason why M's alleged subordinates obeyed her. She indicates that the defendant was not appointed as F's assistant when he held the position of Minister of Labor and Social Security, nor was she entrusted with administrative tasks. She alleges that despite being the Director of the Minister's Office, this only made her a liaison officer and that, in any case, the position did not formally exist. She believes that it cannot be derived from that position that she had command power over the personnel. She considers that it is not duly accredited that by signing the checks corresponding to domestic trips, she was attesting that they were carried out. She adds that the evidence shows that it was Ms. Isela Hernández who handled matters related to the trips, and that it is not explained why the employees involved in the check problem would be subject to M and not to the Administrative Director, a position held by Ms. X. The appellant points out that it is not explained why M performed the administrative tasks required for the crime of embezzlement (peculado) to be configured, given that the custody of petty cash funds belongs to the budget officer of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security itself, Ms. Dora Orozco, as provided by Articles 23 and 24 of the Organic Law of that Ministry. She points out that witness Norman Araya, who served as internal auditor of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on the date the facts of interest here occurred, stated in the trial that, according to Article 14 of the Financial Administration Law, the execution of trips depended on petty cash, and that this was in the custody of the budget officer. She states that even admitting that M was a trusted employee of the Minister of Labor and Social Security, this does not make her responsible for administering the institution's funds. She reiterates that her client could not divert funds. She manifests that it was never explained why other officials should obey her client. <b><u>The objection is with merit</u></b>. According to the list of proven facts (see folio 6946 in Volume XVI), the defendant entered the service of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security as of May 8, 1994, as she was to be in charge of an office dedicated to international relations. She served as Director of the Minister's Office and became his main assistant, thereby acquiring a great deal of power within the institution, and thus exercised command power over the other employees. She was authorized by former Minister F to sign travel expense settlements, thereby attesting that the trips had been made, since if they had not occurred, she should not sign. If the expense was justified as an official trip, M had to sign a travel allowance settlement order, which had to come signed by the requesting official, and then the signatures of the Ministry's Senior Administrative Officer and the Budget Officer had to be collected, who "in their order, countersigned the authorization of the settlement and issued the corresponding check, as administrative and financial controls" (folio 6947 in Volume XVI). The judges indicate that in this way, M had the power to dispose of the budgetarily allocated item for trips by officials of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. According to the factual framework established by the trial court, M took advantage of her ability to dispose of those funds and tasked R and MR with filling out travel expense forms in the name of other officials subordinate to the Minister's Office, so that they would sign them and process the collection for trips not taken. The trial judges indicate that the other employees participated in this fraudulent collection, because M had command power over them. Thus, she authorized the settlement of expenses and irregularly justified the payment of travel allowances for trips not taken, and in this way a total of one hundred fifty-four thousand nine hundred colones (¢154,900.00) was unduly paid (via checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731, and 5905, all from current account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account) for fraudulent travel settlements. Summarizing the above, it must be said that, in the opinion of the undersigned Judges, it is not yet duly reasoned in what way M assumed, by reason of her position, the administration of the funds with which travel allowances for domestic trips were paid. It can be seen on folio 7587 in Volume XVII that the lower court states the following: "As we indicated, although it is true she did not materially have those funds under her guardianship, the character of active subject of this unlawful act is conferred upon her by that power of disposition which implies an administration of them." That is, according to the Trial Court, M did not exercise direct custody (guardianship) of the funds. Then the crime could only be configured if she had the funds under her administration or if she received them, in both cases by reason of her position. As the Court focuses on the issue of how she administered them, it must be understood that it implicitly ruled out that she had received them. Thus, to convict M as the perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement (peculado), the judging body should have explained why she had – by reason of her position – the administration of the petty cash funds. It was already stated in this Finding that the Trial Court held it as accredited that domestic travel settlements required a requesting employee to sign them. Then, according to what was demonstrated in this case, M had to sign it, but afterwards the signatures of the Senior Administrative Officer and the person holding the Budget Officer position were required, these last two as administrative and financial controllers. Now then, if the judging body places M's signature (who would have been entrusted with that task by F) as one within the travel allowance payment authorization process, and after her signature the intervention of two more controllers is required, then it appears that what is described is a phase of oversight of the proper use of public funds. That is, it would be a stage of vigilance to ensure those funds are properly destined, and that would refer precisely to the custody of those funds, but the lower court expressly ruled out that she had custody of them, so that possibility cannot now be contemplated. The problem is that despite describing an oversight process, it is denied that this is custody of public funds, with the aggravating factor that it is not described in what way she could have disposed of them, which is what could be framed as administration of them (see the conceptual elaboration of what it is to administer, have custody of, and receive public funds in this Chamber's judgment No. 2000-01312, of 9:30 a.m. on November 10, 2000). So far, nothing more has been said than that signing the expense settlement is equivalent to attesting that the trip took place. But it has not been explained why this would be equivalent to saying that M disposed (that is, decided what should be done) of the funds destined for the payment of travel allowances for domestic trips, especially if after her signature, two more were required, which had to be affixed precisely by the administrative and financial controllers. As can be seen, there is a significant error on the part of the sentencing body in reasoning why M must be considered an administrator, by reason of her position, of public funds, which affects the reasoning of her conviction as the perpetrator of the crime of embezzlement (peculado), since it is not yet duly motivated why her conduct fits the elements of the offense. Thus, it being proven that the defect alleged by the appellant exists here, it is appropriate to <b><u>declare this claim with merit and, consequently, annul the appealed judgment and the trial that preceded it, only with respect to the case against M for the crime of embezzlement (peculado) related to checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731, and 5905, all from current account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account, and order the remittal of the matter to the Court of origin for a new substantiation of that sole aspect, this time in accordance with the Law</u></b>. Having resolved this aspect of the appeal regarding the form as has been done, it becomes unnecessary to issue a ruling with respect to the remaining claims, since the goal pursued with them, which is the annulment of M's conviction for the crime of embezzlement (peculado) and the remittal of the case for a new trial on what was attributed to her in relation to the mentioned checks.

LVIII. <b><u>Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.</u></b> As the sole ground of appeal as to form, attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo argues that the institute of prescription was erroneously applied in favor of F for the crime of illegal exaction. She considers that after the first formal charging of F, the prescription period is not reduced by half but rather runs anew in its entirety. This claim is without merit. This Chamber has already definitively resolved how the prescription periods for criminal prosecution are calculated. Indeed, through judgment No. 2002-00383 of 9:40 a.m. on April 30, 2002, it was indicated that the reduction of periods by half occurs on a single occasion, which is when for the first time one of the interrupting events provided for in Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure occurs. In the case of the accused F, the first interrupting event that occurred was that of formally charging him, which took place on November 26, 1998, when he was questioned. Since the maximum penalty for the crime of illegal exaction is one year of imprisonment, the action to prosecute it would normally have prescribed in three years, pursuant to the provisions of Article 31, subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the first formal charging (the questioning) was, in turn, the first interrupting event of the prescription period that occurred with respect to this accused, so it is from that November 26, 1998, that not only is the calculation of prescription interrupted, but the period is also reduced to half, i.e., to eighteen months, which expired on May 26, 2000. Between both dates, it is not apparent that any other interrupting event occurred (the legislative reform providing that the resolution calling for the first time the preliminary hearing constitutes such an event is subsequent to the date on which the prescription took effect), so the lower court is correct in finding that the crime of illegal exaction was prescribed when it proceeded to render judgment. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit.

LIX. As the first ground of appeal on the merits, attorney Suñol Ocampo challenges the declaration that the crime of illegal exaction was prescribed, based on the premise that the first formal charging is the questioning of the accused. This claim is without merit. While it is true that subsection a) of Article 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure implies that there is more than one formal charging of the accused (it is not without reason that it speaks of the first), it is also true that the questioning is a formal act (see Articles 91 to 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and that this is the first moment in which the accused is formally informed that he is such (observe Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it can be seen that it is not until an individual is identified as a possible participant in a punishable act that the Public Prosecutor's Office must call him to testify and for this must follow a specific procedure). Thus, it is evident that the questioning is the first formal charging of the defendant. It may be that the facts attributed to him are later specified, but the first ones will always be those formally communicated to him in the questioning. Based on the foregoing, this claim is declared without merit, which—incidentally—was presented as a ground on the merits, although the issue raised pertains to form.

LX. As the second ground of appeal on the merits, attorney Suñol Ocampo indicates that despite having found an abusive use by the accused F and J of the assets and funds of FUNDEHCA, the lower court opted to acquit them of all responsibility and penalty for the crime of fraudulent administration attributed to them. This objection is not admissible. As stated supra in Considerando VIII, the administrative board of FUNDEHCA was satisfied with the manner in which the entity was managed, so the Trial Court certainly could not find the harm required to consider the crime of fraudulent administration established. This being the case, the decision of the judging body is correct, and it is appropriate to declare the claim without merit.

LXI. As the third ground of appeal based on in iudicando defects, the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República accuses a violation of substantive law. She considers that it was through what was investigated in the process that it was concluded that the minutes through which the designation of the Junta Administrativa, the President, and the Executive Director are recorded reflected a historical reality, despite them stating that two persons who were outside the country appeared, so she believes the crime of ideological falsehood was indeed committed. This reproach is without merit. The record shows, starting from folio 7544 in Volume XVII, that in the minutes of installation of the Junta Administrativa of FUNDEHCA, as well as in the minutes of the extraordinary assembly of founding members of FUNDEHCA, the presence of A and E was recorded, despite them not being in Costa Rica, notwithstanding which they appear signing those documents. It can be seen at folio 7554 in the aforementioned Volume that for the lower court, the fact that they were not present did not actually cause any harm, as they were in agreement from the beginning with what was agreed upon at those meetings and with the content of the minutes, and therefore signed them later. This Chamber considers the lower court's criterion to be correct, since Article 360 of the Penal Code requires the presence of harm for the crime of ideological falsehood to be established. In the present case, the truth is that such harm does not exist, because the content of the minutes reflects the will of those concerned, including A and E. If the latter were satisfied with what was recorded in the minutes, despite not having been at the meeting, this is compelling proof that no harm whatsoever is caused to them by what was agreed upon. This being the case, the argument must be declared without merit.

LXII. As the fourth ground of appeal on the merits, attorney Suñol Ocampo accuses the violation of Article 365 of the Penal Code, given that J used the power of attorney granted to him as Executive Delegate of FUNDEHCA to open an account at Banco INTERFIN, despite the power of attorney not being valid for such purpose, as the procedure established in Article 1251 of the Civil Code for granting it was not followed. This reproach is entirely unfounded. For someone to be convicted of using a false document, the item must be false. That is not what the appellant argues; rather, she believes that the power of attorney used by J was improperly granted to him. As can be seen, she is not claiming it is false, but rather that it is defective, so she does not prove that the claimed defect exists in this case, and therefore this part of the challenge is declared without merit.

LXIII. As the fifth claim based on in iudicando defects, the representative of the Procuraduría General de la República accuses erroneous application of substantive law, given that M was acquitted of two crimes of fraud. She considers that the lower court was mistaken in applying the principle of in dubio pro reo to the evidence rather than to the fact. She believes it was alleged that there were two field trips to Limón that did not take place, but that the Court had a doubt as to whether it could be proven that they were not made. She considers that since it was not proven that the field trips did take place, then it must be established that they were never carried out. This claim is not admissible. The appellant seeks to reverse the burden of proof. It is not for the defense to prove that the field trips in question were made; the prosecuting body (be it the Public Prosecutor's Office or the Procuraduría General de la República in this case) must demonstrate that they were not made. That is what the international human rights instruments applicable in Costa Rica, the Constitución Política, and the criminal laws mandate. Now, the record shows, starting from folio 7595 in Volume XVII, that M presented at the trial a report (which was admitted as evidence for better adjudication) in which she detailed the results of the field trips to Limón for F. Furthermore, the Court assessed the testimony of Pedro Arias Bermúdez, who was then head of transportation at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, as well as the statement of MA, who would have accompanied M on the field trips. What matters is that, while it is true the Court had many doubts about the veracity of the evidence provided by the accused, it is also true that it could not qualify it as false, and therefore was obliged to doubt whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the mentioned field trips had not taken place. Thus, if the prosecutorial allegation (i.e., that the field trips were not carried out) cannot be proven, the Court could do nothing but apply the principle of in dubio pro reo in favor of this defendant for these facts. In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this part of the challenge without merit.

LXIV. Regarding the appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández allege, as the first ground, contradictory reasoning in the acquittal of the defendants F and J for the crimes of fraudulent administration and incompatible negotiations, as well as the acquittal of F for the crime of breach of duties. They consider that if the judging body found that the facts constituting fraudulent administration, incompatible negotiations, and breach of duties are the same ones for which concusión was proven, then it should have convicted them for those other illicit acts. This claim is without merit. As stated supra in Considerando VIII, in reality, the facts constituting concusión are not the same as those from which the other crimes mentioned by the appellants derive; rather, they are different. Thus, the acquittal for some of them did not necessitate an acquittal for concusión; likewise, the conviction for the latter crime does not mandate a conviction for the others. In that sense, the contradiction the Prosecutors point to does not exist, and therefore the reproach must be declared without merit. Furthermore, note in that same Considerando VIII why the crime of fraudulent administration does not exist, so the acquittal for that crime is in accordance with the Law. It is appropriate to point out that in that same Considerando VIII, it was explained why the subsumption exercise carried out by the lower court regarding incompatible negotiations and breach of duties is poorly performed. Indeed, the typical situations on which the last two mentioned illicit acts are based are different from those on which concusión is founded. If this is so, then the facts capable of being framed within such crimes are also different. Hence, the proof of concusión—which is duly grounded in accordance with the Law—does not necessarily entail a conviction for incompatible negotiations and breach of duties. Now, although the lower court is mistaken in considering that these crimes are subsumed by concusión, it must be noted that this error does not cause harm to the Public Prosecutor's Office, as the acquittal was appropriate in any case. As indicated in Considerando VIII, the crime of breach of duties requires an omission for its configuration, but in this case, no omission has been attributed to F. At most, it has been said that he failed to fulfill his duties because he incurred in infractions thereof (i.e., he failed to do something because he did something else), which reveals that it was not specified in what specific way his conduct was an omission. Rather, actions are attributed to him, and the crime of breach of duties is not established through these, so conviction for this certainly could not be imposed. The same occurs with the incompatible negotiations attributed to F and J, because it was never stated in what—distinct from what constitutes concusión, which is duly proven—their interest lay. That is, there were no facts that could be framed within the mentioned criminal type; rather, only situations that fit the type of concusión were proven. Hence, these defendants could also not be criminally sanctioned for the mentioned illicit act. For all the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit.

LXV. As the second ground, attorneys Chacón Chang and Chinchilla Fernández accuse a lack of reasoning, as they believe it is not explained why subsuming the crimes of incompatible negotiations and fraudulent administration into concusión leads to an acquittal for the former. This objection is without merit. It has already been explained in the preceding Considerando why the acquittals for the crimes of incompatible negotiations, fraudulent administration, and breach of duties are in accordance with the Law, so the appellants must abide by what was resolved there.

LXVI. As the third ground, the appellant Prosecutors maintain that the acquittal of F and J for the crime of incompatible negotiations lacks proper reasoning. They maintain that the alternative accusation explains that, by having contracted with FUNDEHCA, F violated the provisions of Articles 112 and 143 of the Constitución Política, by which Government Ministers are prohibited from entering directly or indirectly into contracts with the Administration. This argument is not admissible. The articles cited by the appellants establish prohibitions, but only sanction them with the loss of credentials. One must therefore turn solely to the Penal Code to determine when one is facing the crime of incompatible negotiations. If one reads Article 347 of said legal text, it will be appreciated that what it deals with is the public servant taking an interest in any contract or operation in which they intervene by reason of their office. What matters in this case is that it has not been stated in what manner—independent of what constitutes the crime of concusión—they took an interest in a contract or operation. It must again be stated that the proven facts upon which the conviction is based fit only the crime of concusión and not another, so F and J could only answer for that illicit act and not for others. For the reasons stated, it is appropriate to declare this argument without merit.

LXVII. As the fourth ground, the representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office claim the violation of the rules of sound criticism when reasoning the acquittal of F for a crime of peculation of services. Specifically, the appellants allege that the former Minister of Labor and Social Security abused the services provided by the ministerial driver Mario Álvarez Eras, as he was used to attend to the defendant's family matters that were unrelated to the exercise of his office. They consider that the fact that many officials are not tried for using Administration drivers and vehicles for personal matters does not imply that this is not a crime. They believe the matter cannot be classified as peccata minuta, nor what is meant by this. They add that the judges do not explain why they depart from the criteria of the Sala Constitucional in the sense that discretion is the freedom to assess the public interest, and of the Sala Segunda in the sense that the discretionary use of goods gives the official greater freedom, but for the better performance of their duties, not for their own benefit. This claim is without merit. It was determined in the case file that F certainly used his driver to take his wife and children to perform various errands (proven fact 46a at folio 6950 in Volume XVI). It is true that the fact that there are officials who use discretionary-use vehicles in the manner described does not necessarily imply that the conduct is not criminal. Nor could such a thing be dismissed by the fact that what happened is classified as “peccata minuta.” What does totally exonerate F from responsibility for this fact is the provisions of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres. In that regulatory text (Articles 221 to 243 of said law), state vehicles (also called official vehicles) are classified as discretionary use, administrative use, and Public Force and security vehicles. What is relevant here is that the discretionary-use vehicle is not mentioned by the legislator as covered by the prohibition that is expressly established for administrative-use vehicles in Article 234, subsection a) of the law in question. This implies that it is not legally prohibited to use discretionary-use vehicles for activities other than the normal ones of the institution or ministry. Furthermore, the situation in subsection b) of the same Article 234 does not apply, because the vehicle was assigned to F and not to his wife or children. Nor is the prohibition in subsection e) of the referenced numeral infringed, because the type of work to which the vehicle is destined is determined by the official responsible for it, according to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 225 of the aforementioned Ley de Tránsito. This being the case, there is no express prohibition whatsoever that prevented F from requiring his driver to use the discretionary-use vehicle to transport his wife and children. Therefore, the crime of peculation provided for in the second paragraph of Article 354 of the Penal Code cannot be established, as this accused could act as he did. It should be added that the precedent of the Sala Constitucional that the appellants mention refers to what administrative discretion is, and not to what a discretionary-use vehicle is, so these are different matters. Additionally, the ruling of the Sala Segunda cited by the appellants (judgment 147 of 3:00 p.m. on May 5, 1995) makes no mention of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, nor does it interpret it; rather, it resolves (see Considerando IV of the Sala Segunda ruling) based on a regulation issued by the Contraloría General de la República.

Furthermore, the cited pronouncement arises in a case involving a former official of the Municipality of San José, whereas no municipal official is included on the list of public servants authorized to use a discretionary vehicle, as observed in Article 225 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito). Thus, it is evident that the decision of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) cited by the appellants relates neither to the same factual scenarios nor to the same legal provisions as those to be considered in the matter before us. In that sense, they are not binding jurisprudence for the present case, pursuant to Articles 9 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). For all the foregoing, this argument is dismissed.

LXVIII. As a fifth ground, the challengers point out a contradiction in the appealed judgment when explaining why the action to prosecute the crime of illegal exaction (exacción ilegal) was time-barred, given that the judges state at one point that the first formal charging (imputación formal) of F occurred on April 26, 1998, and in another section maintain that it occurred on November 26, 1998. The claim is not admissible. This judgment has already set forth that the first formal charging of F occurred on April 26, 1998, when he was questioned (indagatoria). Note that this is the second of the two dates mentioned by the representatives of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), and yet the statute of limitations for the criminal action for the crime of illegal exaction still ran. This reveals that even if the mentioned error existed, it would not have caused any harm to their interests, because the offense equally could not have continued to be prosecuted. For the reasons stated, it is proper to dismiss the argument.

LXIX. As a sixth ground, attorneys Chacón Chang and Chinchilla Fernández allege a lack of reasoning as to why the questioning (indagatoria) of F, held on November 26, 1998, was taken as the first formal charging for illegal exaction and misappropriation of services (peculado de servicios). They cite the criterion of the Criminal Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación Penal) to the effect that this first formal charging occurs with the reading of the accusation by the Judge of the Intermediate Stage (Etapa Intermedia). The claim is inadmissible. The challengers should abide by what was set forth in recital (Considerando) LIX regarding why the questioning is the first formal charging in this matter. For greater abundance, if the appellants wish to know the reasons why this Chamber – which is not bound by the criteria of the Criminal Cassation Court, since each Court has its own sphere of competence and they do not intermingle – does not share the position of that high jurisdictional body, they should refer to judgment 2002-01272 of 10:15 a.m. on December 13, 2002, especially recital V of that decision.

LXX. Regarding the appeal filed by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) in exercise of the civil action. Attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representative of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, claims a lack of reasoning, given that the trial court (Tribunal de instancia) held that the funds collected by FUNDEHCA did not come from the State, but from a large number of migrants. He considers this reasoning to be erroneous, because the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic acted in representation of collective interests (intereses colectivos), such that it did not claim on behalf of the State, but in substitution of the affected parties. The reproach is not admissible. Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) grants the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic the exclusive power to intervene in criminal proceedings to exercise the civil action for social harm (daño social). To this end, it allows it to claim the respective compensation for punishable acts that affect collective or diffuse interests (intereses difusos). What occurs in this case is that we are not before either of those two types of interest. The collective interest refers to that which is proper to a group that unites, de facto or de jure, in pursuit of a specific end. In contrast, the diffuse interest concerns the individual by the mere fact of being a member of society and allows them to claim for something that does not affect a specific subject, such that a holder of the right to compensation cannot be established, but rather it is suffered by the generality of individuals with the same intensity. Neither of these scenarios occurs in the present case, because the migrants have neither formed a group, nor is the harm suffered by a generality of persons. The migrants each individually suffered harm to their assets, which can be measured monetarily. Furthermore, those who paid FUNDEHCA were identifiable and never formed a group in pursuit of a particular end. Thus, we were not before the scenarios of Article 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but rather before a large number of individual interests (intereses individuales), such that each holder is the one who must (by themselves or, had it been done at the opportune moment, through delegation to the Public Ministry) claim the indemnity. For the reasons stated, this Chamber finds the decision of the lower court (a quo) to reject the standing of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic to substitute the migrants as civil parties for the funds paid to FUNDEHCA to be in accordance with the Law. Thus, this claim is dismissed.

LXXI. Regarding the penalty of special disqualification (inhabilitación especial). The trial court imposed on F, J, and M the penalty of special disqualification for eight years from holding public office. Additionally, it ordered that the decision be communicated to the General Directorate of Civil Service (Dirección General de Servicio Civil), so that that administrative body could register it and also make the pertinent communications to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and to the other public institutions. On this topic, it must be warned that the eventual criminal liability of M will be discussed again at trial, so it is not yet appropriate to apply the mentioned penalty of special disqualification to her. In contrast, upon the issuance of this judgment, said sanction does become final with respect to F and J. This Chamber finds the provision of the lower court to communicate the decision to the General Directorate of Civil Service to be appropriate. However, it is advisable to indicate to the adjudicating body that this same Court is empowered to directly communicate, if it deems it appropriate, to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic that the penalty of special disqualification from holding public office weighs upon those two defendants. The adjudicating body also has the power to order, if it deems it proper, the publication of that specific measure in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, so that the entire state apparatus would have knowledge that F and J are disqualified from public service for a specific time. Finally, since the disqualification applies to the exercise of all types of public office, including those of popular election, it could be ordered that the pertinent information be communicated to the Civil Registry (Registro Civil). All these observations are made for the purpose of collaborating with the trial judges in compliance with Articles 453 and 459 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Therefore:

The seventh ground of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of F is granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment is reversed with respect to the sentence that F must serve in his condition as responsible perpetrator of the crime of concusión (concusión) committed to the detriment of the duties of public office, which is set at FOUR YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. By virtue of the sanction imposed, the request that F be granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence (condena de ejecución condicional) is denied. The remaining grounds of the challenge filed by attorney Navas Montero on behalf of F are dismissed. The cassation appeal filed by the defendant F is dismissed. The cassation appeal on the merits filed by doctors Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is partially granted and, consequently, the challenged judgment is reversed and J is declared a responsible accomplice of the crime of concusión, for which he is sentenced to THREE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT. For a probationary period of five years, J is granted the benefit of conditional execution of the sentence. The procedural cassation appeal filed by doctors Dora Guzmán Zanetti and Gonzalo Castellón Vargas is dismissed. The second ground for procedural defects of the cassation appeal filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M is granted: Consequently, the appealed judgment and the trial that preceded it are annulled, only with respect to the case against this accused for the crime of misappropriation (peculado) related to checks No. 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731, and 5905, all from checking account No. 7972-3 of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in the name of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Petty Cash Account, and the matter is ordered remanded to the court of origin for a new proceeding on that sole aspect, this time in accordance with the Law. As unnecessary, a ruling is omitted regarding the remaining grounds of the appeal filed by attorney Gloria Navas Montero on behalf of M. The cassation appeal filed by attorney Amira Suñol Ocampo on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is dismissed. The cassation appeal filed by prosecutors Héctor Chacón Chang and Max Chinchilla Fernández on behalf of the Public Ministry is dismissed. The cassation appeal filed by attorney Gilberth Calderón Alvarado on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is dismissed. In all matters not expressly indicated in this judgment, the challenged decision remains unchanged, including the acquittals issued by the lower court and the penalty of special disqualification that F and J must serve. The trial court shall take note of what is indicated in recital LXXI of this decision.

Daniel González A.

Jesús Ramírez Q. Afonso Chaves R.

Rodrigo Castro M. José Manuel Arroyo G.

dig.imp.scg.

Res: 2003-00176 SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diecisiete horas veinte minutos del veinte de marzo de dos mil tres.

Recurso de casación, interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra F, mayor, casado dos veces, Doctor en Derecho, ExMinistro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, portador de la cédula de identidad […], J, mayor, casado, abogado, […] y M, mayor, casada, costarricense, […], por los delitos de CONCUSIÓN Y PECULADO EN SU MODALIDAD DE ILÍCITO CONTINUADO, en perjuicio de LOS DEBERES DE LA FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA Y DE MIGRANTES NICARAGUENSES. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, los Magistrados Daniel González Alvarez, Presidente, Jesús Alberto Ramírez Quirós, Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Rodrigo Castro Monge y José Manuel Arroyo Gutiérrez. También intervienen los licenciados Gloria Navas Montero, en calidad de defensora particular de los encartados F y M; Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas en su condición de co-defensores particulares del acusado J; Amira Suñol Ocampo, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República como querellante a nombre del Estado; Gilberth Calderón Alvarado representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, que interviene también como actora civil a nombre del Estado, así como los licenciados Héctor Chacón Chang y Max Chinchilla Fernández en representación del Ministerio Público.

Resultando:

1-Que mediante sentencia N°1-2000 de las quince horas del veintiséis de julio de dos mil, el Tribunal Penal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial resolvió: "POR TANTO: En virtud de lo anteriormente Votos de la Sala Cuarta de la Corte Suprema de Justicia N° 2932-99, 4397-99 y 5875-99; 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 75, 77, 111, 113, 114, 115, 119, 128, 141, 142, 143, 182, 184, 244, 265, 266, 267, 336, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 376, 464, Transitorio I y Transitorio II del Código Procesal Penal; 1, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 30, 31, 45, 49, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 71, 73, 74, 77, 103, 106, 330, 346, 352, 356, 358, 359 y 363 del Código Penal; 122, 124 y 125 del Código Penal de 1941 sobre Reglas Vigentes de Responsabilidad Civil según Ley N° 4891 de 8 de noviembre de 1971; 692 y 693 del Código Procesal Civil; 1045, 1046 y 1251 del Código Civil; Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República N° 7428; Ley de Fundaciones N° 5338; Ley General de la Administración Pública N° 6227; Ley de Administración Financiera de la República N° 1279; Ley de la Contratación Administrativa N° 7494; Ley Marco para la Transformación Institucional N° 7668; Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; Decretos Ejecutivos N°20307-J, N° 24432; N° 24811, N° 25647 y N° 26430 se RESUELVE: Se ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a F por el delito de EXACCION ILEGAL que se les atribuyó como cometido en perjuicio de los DEBERES DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA, en virtud de haber operado la prescripción de la acción penal; quedando a cargo del Estado los gastos del proceso. Se ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a F por el delito de FALSEDAD IDEOLOGICA en perjuicio de la FE PUBLICA; quedando a cargo del Estado los gastos del proceso. Se ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a F por UN DELITO DE PECULADO DE BIENES y DOS DELITOS DE PECULADO DE SERVICIOS en perjuicio de los DEBERES DE LA FUNCIÓN PUBLICA; quedando a cargo del Estado los gastos del proceso. Se ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a F por los delitos de ADMINISTRACION FRAUDULENTA, INCUMPLIMIENTO DE DEBERES Y NEGOCIACIONES INCOMPATIBLES en perjuicio de la FUNDACION PARA EL DESARROLLO HUMANO EN CENTROAMERICA y los DEBERES DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA; quedando a cargo del Estado los gastos del proceso. Se ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a J por los delitos de FALSIFICACION DE DOCUMENTO PRIVADO, USO DE DOCUMENTO FALSO, ADMINISTRACION FRAUDULENTA y NEGOCIACIONES INCOMPATIBLES que se le atribuyeron en perjuicio de la FE PUBLICA, la FUNDACION PARA EL DESARROLLO HUMANO EN CENTROAMERICA y los DEBERES DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA, quedando a cargo del Estado los gastos del proceso. Se ABSUELVE DE TODA PENA Y RESPONSABILIDAD a M por el delito de FALSIFICACION DE DOCUMENTO PRIVADO, DOS DELITOS DE PECULADO Y DOS DELITOS DE ESTAFA que se le atribuyeron en perjuicio de la FE PUBLICA, DEBERES DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA y del PATRIMONIO DEL ESTADO, respectivamente, quedando a cargo de éste los gastos del proceso. Se DECLARA a: F y a J coautores responsables del delito de CONCUSION en perjuicio de los DEBERES DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA y de MIGRANTES NICARAGUENSES. En tal carácter se le impone a cada uno el tanto de OCHO AÑOS DE PRISION. Se declara a M autora responsable del DELITO DE PECULADO EN SU MODALIDAD DE ILICITO CONTINUADO y en tal carácter se le impone el tanto de SEIS AÑOS DE PRISION. Penas que todos descontarán en el establecimiento carcelario que determinen los reglamentos penitenciarios, previo abono de la preventiva sufrida. Se les condena al pago de las costas procesales y personales del proceso. Inscríbase el fallo en el Registro Judicial. Remítanse los testimonios de estilos para ante el Juez de Ejecución de la Penal y el Instituto Nacional de Criminología, a cuya orden quedarán los convicto. Se les condena a la pena de inhabilitación especial, por el término de ocho años a F y a J y por el término de seis años a M, en relación a la obtención de cargo o empleo público, para lo cual se comunicará lo pertinente a la Dirección General del Servicio Civil, con el ruego de que lo haga extensivo a las instituciones del Estado que no dependan de su régimen, así como a la Contraloría General de la República. Se les impone a los convictos la obligación de presentarse a firmar a este Tribunal los días quince de cada mes, a partir de hoy. En caso que la fecha 15 corresponda a un día no laborable, deberán cumplir con la obligación de firmar al día hábil siguiente. Se incumplieren con lo anterior sin justa causa, se les declarará en estado de rebeldía y se ordenará su remisión al centro carcelario que corresponda. Se dispone el impedimento de salida del país, de los convictos y de inmediato se ordena comunicar a la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, así como a todos los puestos fronterizos autorizados. En cuanto a las absolutorias dictadas, cesarán las medidas cautelares que se hubieran dispuesto. En cuanto a la Acción Civil Resarcitoria se resuelve conforme se dirá, debiendo estimarse por denegado sobre aquellos extremos que no se haga pronunciamiento. Se declara SIN LUGAR la Acción Civil Resarcitoria incoada por el Estado contra los codemandados F y J, la que se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas; acogiéndose las excepciones de Falta de Acción, Falta de Legitimación ad causam activa y de Sine Actione Agit interpuestas por la defensa del demandado civil J. Entendiéndose lo resuelto, en cuanto la demanda se estableció por las consecuencias del delito de Concusión. Se declara CON LUGAR la Acción Civil Resarcitoria incoada por el Estado en contra del demandado F y se condena a éste en abstracto a reparar el daño material y a indemnizar los perjuicios irrogados, al Estado, como consecuencia del delito de Peculado de Servicios que cometió. Se le condena también al pago de ambas costas del juicio. Extremos todos que se liquidarán a través del procedimiento de ejecución de sentencia, ante la vía que corresponda. Se declara CON LUGAR la Acción Civil Resarcitoria incoada por el Estado contra la demandada M, respecto de las consecuencias civiles por el ilícito de Peculado en su modalidad de Delito Continuado y se le condena a pagar por concepto de daño material la suma de CIENTO CINCUENTA Y CUATRO MIL NOVECIENTOS COLONES SIN CENTIMOS. Se le condena a indemnizar los perjuicios respectivos, que correrán a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia y que se liquidarán por el procedimiento de ejecución de sentencia. Por concepto de costas personales se le condena a pagar la suma de VEINTITRES MIL DOSCIENTOS TREINTA Y CINCO COLONES SIN CENTIMOS. El total de la condenatoria alcanza el monto de CIENTO SESENTA Y OCHO MIL CIENTO TREINTA Y CINCO COLONES SIN CENTIMOS suma que deberá cancelar por simple orden del Tribunal, caso de no hacerlo así, deberá acudir la parte interesada a la vía civil correspondiente. No ha lugar al decreto de embargo en bienes de los condenados civilmente. POR LECTURA, NOTIFIQUESE. FS. LIC. CARLOS SANCHEZ FERNANDEZ LIC. RODOLFO SOLIS TULLOCK LIC. ALEX VIQUEZ JIMENEZ (Sic).

2-Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento se presentaron los siguientes recursos de casación: recurso interpuesto por la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero: La licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, defensora particular del acusado F, alega el quebranto del debido proceso, por cuanto el debate dio inicio sin la presencia de la defensa técnica del justiciable F. Estima que se ha irrespetado el artículo 13 del Código Procesal Penal, al igual que los numerales 39 de la Constitución Política y 8 inciso 2) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Expresa la recurrente que el cuerpo sentenciador ha incurrido en fundamentación contradictoria. Alega que en la especie se han irrespetado las reglas de fundamentación en relación con un elemento de juicio de carácter decisivo, cual es el contexto histórico en que ocurrieron los hechos que aquí interesan. La licenciada Navas Montero acusa errónea motivación en cuanto al conocimiento –por parte de F- de la ilicitud de la acción. Indica que se irrespetó el principio in dubio pro reo, aduce que en la especie se irrespetaron las reglas de la sana crítica. Acusa el quebranto de la ley sustantiva, específicamente el artículo 348 del Código Penal, relativo al delito de concusión y reclama que en la especie se ha incurrido en un equívoco al fijar la pena pues la misma resulta desproporcional respecto de lo que se tiene por demostrado. Sobre el recurso interpuesto por el imputado F. Ejerciendo su derecho a la defensa material, el recurrente acusa el quebranto del debido proceso. En concreto, estima que en la especie se han irrespetado las reglas de concentración, continuidad, inmediación, oralidad y publicidad. Estima que el a quo inobservó las reglas de la sana crítica e incurrió en falta de fundamentación de la sentencia, reclama fundamentación omisa o ilegal, violación a las reglas de la sana crítica y quebranto del principio de ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba, quebranto del principio de objetividad y violación de las reglas de la sana crítica. Acusa fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y quebranto de los principios de la sana crítica. Reclama fundamentación ilegal y quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica, fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica. Alega fundamentación ilegal y contradictoria, así como el quebranto del principio in dubio pro reo, fundamentación ilegal, quebranto de los principios de la sana crítica y que el fallo impugnado es contradictorio, alega fundamentación ilegal y exclusión arbitraria de prueba. Acusa fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y violación de las reglas de la sana crítica, plantea que en la especie se ha incurrido en falta de fundamentación, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica. Alega F falta de correlación entre acusación y sentencia, estima que no se evacuó prueba fundamental para sus intereses. Alega errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva, toda vez que se dejó de aplicar el artículo 27 del Código Penal; que no se podía aplicar el artículo 348 del Código Penal, pues no se acreditó que actuase de forma dolosa y aduce el impugnante que se quebrantó el artículo 71 del Código Penal, toda vez que la pena de ocho años de prisión que se le impuso está fuera de todo parámetro de proporcionalidad. Sobre el recurso interpuesto por los licenciados Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas a favor de J: Sostienen los impugnantes que la suscripción por parte de su defendido del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social fue estimado en sentencia como un acto preparatorio para la comisión del delito por el que se sancionó a J. Los defensores particulares de este imputado alegan falta de correlación entre acusación y sentencia. Reclaman quebranto del debido proceso en relación con el procedimiento seguido por el Tribunal de instancia para emitir la sentencia. Acusan falta de fundamentación, en el tanto no se explicaría por qué sería parte de un plan de autor el abrir una cuenta corriente para el manejo de los dineros que recibía FUNDEHCA por el cobro a los migrantes. Alegan que se da el vicio de falta de fundamentación en lo que atañe a la existencia de un estrecho vínculo entre J y F. Cuestionan la fundamentación del aserto del a quo en el sentido de que J abrió la cuenta corriente de FUNDEHCA utilizando una copia de una certificación. Se reclama que no está debidamente motivado el por qué esperó J doce días hábiles para firmar la apertura de la cuenta y se aduce que está debidamente probado el vínculo de amistad entre F y J. Se acusa como indebidamente fundado el aserto del Tribunal de instancia en el sentido de que J estuviese involucrado en el desarrollo del programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional, ni cómo es posible que realizase actos propios de la autoría del delito de concusión. Se expresa que no se fundamenta el por qué lo acontecido en torno a los decretos ejecutivos que entre 1995 y 1997 regularon el programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional acarrearía responsabilidad penal para J. Cuestionan que se afirme que J tuvo un marcado interés de que FUNDEHCA interviniera rápidamente en el cobro por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Se reclama falta de fundamentación de varios extremos, falta de fundamentación respecto de por qué para el 6 de octubre de 1997 J tendría conocimiento del trámite de derogatoria del decreto N° 24811-MTSS. Cuestionan que se afirme que J tenía conocimiento de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes por el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Alegan falta de fundamentación en el tanto no se explica por qué se quebranta el artículo 16 de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República. Reclaman falta de fundamentación en cuanto al por qué se requería que la Contraloría General de la República refrendara el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Reclaman falta de fundamentación en el tanto no se tendría debidamente acreditado en el fallo. Alegan falta de fundamentación en el tanto no se explica por qué debía enviarse el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a refrendo por parte de la Contraloría General de la República. Cuestionan que no se fundamente si él suscribió el convenio con autorización de la Junta Directiva de FUNDEHCA y si conoció los términos del acuerdo antes de firmarlo. Sostienen los representantes de J que no se ha expuesto cómo es que su defendido habría incurrido en los abusos del cargo que se atribuyen al ex Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social que figura aquí como encartado. Acusan el quebranto del debido proceso por cuanto el Tribunal de instancia le habría atribuido a J una responsabilidad genérica por todo lo ocurrido. Acusan falta de fundamentación, por considerar que la misma es contradictoria, en el tanto no se explica cuál es el medio empleado para determinar a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido. Se cuestiona la fundamentación del aserto que hace el Tribunal de instancia en el sentido de que J utilizó en provecho propio dineros que ingresaron a FUNDEHCA. Reclaman que no se fundamentó el fallo impugnado en cuanto a cómo habría abusado su defendido de las calidades de funcionario público y de esa manera habría motivado a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido. Se alega que no se explica por qué el convenio es ilegal ni por qué debía ser refrendado por la Contraloría General de la República. Reclaman que se incurre en una contradicción en el tanto se exonera de responsabilidad a J por el delito de administración fraudulenta por el uso de los bienes de FUNDEHCA y luego se utiliza ese mismo uso para sustentar la concusión. Se retoma nuevamente el problema de si J obligó o indujo a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA. sostienen que no se fundamenta el aserto de que los migrantes fueron inducidos a error o engañados, pues creían que el dinero se lo pagaban al Gobierno costarricense y se cuestiona si por los migrantes estaban en capacidad de comprender la conminación. Sobre el recurso presentado por la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero a favor de M: Alega falta de fundamentación, por valorar la prueba respectiva sin seguir los lineamientos de la sana crítica, respecto del motivo por el cual los presuntos subalternos de M la obedecieron. Sobre el recurso formulado por la Procuraduría General de la República: La licenciada Amira Suñol Ocampo sostiene que se aplicó erróneamente el instituto de la prescripción a favor de F por el delito de exacción ilegal. Cuestiona que se haya declarado prescrito el delito de exacción ilegal partiendo de que la primera imputación formal sea la indagatoria del encausado. Indica que pese a tener por acreditado un uso abusivo por parte de los imputados F y J de los bienes y fondos de FUNDEHCA, el a quo optó por absolverlos de toda responsabilidad y pena por el delito de administración fraudulenta que se les atribuía, que se irrespetó la ley sustantiva, acusa el quebranto del artículo 365 del Código Penal, acusa errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva, toda vez que se absolvió a M por dos delitos de estafa. Sobre el recurso planteado por el Ministerio Público: Los Fiscales Héctor Chacón Chang y Max Chinchilla Fernández, alegan fundamentación contradictoria de la absolutoria de los encartados F y J por los delitos de administración fraudulenta y negociaciones incompatibles, así como de la absolutoria a F por el delito de incumplimiento de deberes. Acusan falta de fundamentación, pues estiman que no se explica por qué el subsumir los delitos de negociaciones incompatibles y de administración fraudulenta en el de concusión conlleva a una absolutoria por los primeros. Los Fiscales recurrentes sostienen que la absolutoria de F y J por el delito de negociaciones incompatibles carece de la debida fundamentación. Reclaman el quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica a la hora de fundamentar la absolutoria de F por un delito de peculado de servicios. Señalan que se dio una contradicción en el fallo recurrido a la hora de explicar por qué la acción para perseguir el delito de exacción ilegal estaba prescrita. Alegan falta de fundamentación sobre por qué se tomó la indagatoria de F, celebrada el 26 de noviembre de 1998, como primera imputación formal de los cargos por exacción ilegal y peculado de servicios. Sobre el recurso planteado por la Procuraduría General de la República en ejercicio de la acción civil: El licenciado Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, acusa falta de fundamentación, toda vez que el Tribunal de instancia estimó que los dineros recaudados por FUNDEHCA no procedían del Estado, sino de gran cantidad de migrantes.

3-Que se celebró vista a las 8:50 horas del 3 de abril de 2001.

4-Que verificada la deliberación respectiva la Sala entró a conocer del recurso.

5-Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Informa el Magistrado Arroyo Gutiérrez; y,

Considerando:

I.Mediante sentencia Nº 1-2000, dictada las 15:00 horas del 26 de julio del 2000, el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José resolvió declarar a F y a J coautores responsables del delito de concusión, cometido en perjuicio de los deberes de la función pública y de migrantes nicaragüenses. Por esa delincuencia a cada uno de ellos le fueron impuestas las penas de ocho años de prisión y ocho años de inhabilitación especial para el ejercicio de cargos o empleos públicos. En ese mismo fallo (que comprende en su totalidad los Tomos XVI y XVII del expediente) se declaró a M autora responsable del delito de peculado, en su modalidad de delito continuado, cometido en perjuicio de los deberes de la función pública y por ello se le fijó la sanción privativa de libertad por el período de seis años. Además, en la citada resolución se absolvió a Fde toda responsabilidad y pena por los delitos de exacción ilegal, falsedad ideológica, peculado de bienes, peculado de servicios (se le acusaba por dos de estos ilícitos), administración fraudulenta, incumplimiento de deberes y negociaciones incompatibles. Igualmente, se exoneró de responsabilidad penal a J por los delitos de falsificación de documento privado, uso de documento falso, administración fraudulenta y negociaciones incompatibles. Debe agregarse que en la sentencia ya indicada también se absolvió a M por los delitos de falsificación de documento privado, peculado (dos de estos hechos punibles) y estafa (dos de estos ilícitos). Finalmente, es necesario advertir que el a quo declaró sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por el Estado contra F y J; lo anterior en cuanto a las consecuencias derivadas del delito de concusión. Se declaró con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria promovida por el Estado contra F, condenándosele en abstracto a reparar el daño material y los perjuicios causados con ocasión del delito de peculado de servicios que el Tribunal estima cometió, aunque no lo condenó penalmente por ese hecho (ver folios 7632 y 7633 en el Tomo XVII). Asimismo, se declaró con lugar la demanda resarcitoria planteada por el Estado contra M, condenándola a pagar la suma de ciento cincuenta y cuatro mil novecientos colones sin céntimos (¢154.900,00) por concepto de daño material, así como otros veintitrés mil doscientos treinta y cinco colones sin céntimos (¢23.235,00) por concepto de costas personales. Además, se le condenó a indemnizar al Estado por los perjuicios respectivos, debiendo determinarse en la ejecución de sentencia el monto a cancelar por ese rubro.

II.Contra el fallo reseñado en el Considerando anterior, se interpusieron siete recursos de casación, promovido cada uno de ellos por las siguientes personas: 1) F en su calidad de imputado (Tomo XVIII, folio 7696); 2) Amira Suñol Ocampo, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, en cuanto querellante a nombre del Estado (Tomo XX, folio 8050); 3) Héctor Chacón Chang y Max Chinchilla Fernández en representación del Ministerio Público (Tomo XX, folio 8081); 4) Gloria Navas Montero en calidad de defensora particular del encartado F (Tomo XX, folio 8256); 5) Gloria Navas Montero en patrocinio de la justiciable M (Tomo XX, folio 8108); 6) Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas en su condición de co-defensores particulares del acusado J; en cuanto al recurso interpuesto a favor de este último, se recuerda que esta Sala acogió (ver resolución 2000-01441 de las 10:50 horas del 15 de diciembre del 2000; folio 8859 del Tomo XXII) la petición formulada por la defensa (ver folio 8358 en el tomo XX) en el sentido de que se conozca y se emita pronunciamiento solamente sobre el escrito que consta a partir del folio 8360 (que constituye todo el tomo XXI del expediente); 7) Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, que interviene también como actora civil a nombre del Estado (Tomo XXII, folio 8778).

III.Sobre el recurso interpuesto a favor del imputado F. La licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, defensora particular del acusado F, basa su recurso de casación, visible a folio 8256 en el Tomo XX, en varios motivos. Como primer reclamo se alega el quebranto del debido proceso, por cuanto el debate dio inicio sin la presencia de la defensa técnica del justiciable F. Estima que se ha irrespetado el artículo 13 del Código Procesal Penal, al igual que los numerales 39 de la Constitución Política y 8 inciso 2) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Manifiesta que tras la renuncia del licenciado William Guido Madriz como defensor del encartado, ella asumió su patrocinio. Explica que ella no pudo asistir a la primera audiencia, lo cual fue debidamente justificado ante el órgano juzgador. Dice que efectivamente el Tribunal dio por válida su excusa, pero cometió el error de acoger la petición del acusado F en el sentido de que lo representara temporalmente el licenciado José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal, en ese momento defensor particular del co-imputado J. Señala que el licenciado Madrigal Madrigal fue claro al advertir que aceptaría sólo la co-defensa, pues eventualmente podrían existir intereses contrapuestos entre su defendido J y el endilgado F, caso en el cual velaría por los intereses del primero. Considera que fue igualmente errado el permitir que esos dos imputados se defendieran personalmente en la audiencia del 3 de enero de 2000. El alegato no es de recibo. En la especie no se ha causado agravio alguno a F por el inicio del debate sin que se encontrara presente la licenciada Navas Montero. Puede apreciarse a folio 6674 (Tomo XV) que fue el propio defendido de la recurrente quien dijo que quería evitar atrasos y por ello pedía al licenciado Madrigal Madrigal que asumiera su co-defensa mientras se hacía presente la licenciada Navas Montero. En ese mismo apartado del acta de debate se observa que el licenciado Madrigal Madrigal se manifestó sorprendido por la designación, pues se había preparado para representar al acusado J, pero –y esto es lo que interesa en el caso concreto- aceptó asumir el patrocinio de F si se le garantizaba que lo haría únicamente como co-defensor, mientras se presentaba la licenciada Navas Montero, y si se le separaba de forma inmediata de la co-defensa en caso de que surgiere algún conflicto de intereses entre J y F. Este último dijo (ver folio 6675 en el Tomo indicado) que él podía asumir su defensa junto con un co-defensor. Ante esa situación, el Tribunal decidió que el licenciado Madrigal Madrigal –quien nunca se negó a asumir el cargo, sino que simplemente puso condiciones para hacerlo- asumiera la co-defensa de F, mientras se presentaba la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero. Así las cosas, no se ha producido quebranto alguno del debido proceso, pues al inicio del debate no se encontró el justiciable de cita en estado de indefensión alguno. Fue por decisión del mismísimo encartado que se designó al licenciado Madrigal Madrigal como su co-defensor. Lo mismo sucede con lo acontecido durante la primera audiencia del día 3 de enero de 2000 (ver folio 6680 en el Tomo XV), pues nuevamente se acató la voluntad del imputado, quien dijo que mientras se siguiese con la lectura de la acusación, él ejercería su propia defensa. Como se ve, en ningún momento se le ha limitado a F su derecho de defensa, pues en un primer momento, cuando estimó que necesitaba ayuda profesional, se le otorgó la que él pidió. En el segundo caso, cuando consideró que él mismo podía defenderse mientras se leía la acusación, se le respetó su criterio, partiendo de que es profesional en Derecho y por ende tenía los conocimientos suficientes para comprender el contenido de la pieza acusatoria y la querella. Su capacidad para ejercer su defensa en este estadio del debate se comprueba por el hecho de que pudo hacer observaciones puntuales al fiscal Max Chinchilla Fernández en cuanto a lo que se decía en la acusación, según consta a folio 6678 (siempre en el Tomo XV del expediente). De conformidad con lo vez que siempre se ha observado el derecho que le asiste al imputado de contar con la asistencia técnica que requiera. Además, se ha aplicado lo dispuesto en el párrafo tercero del artículo 100 del cuerpo normativo de cita, pues cuando no se ha puesto en riesgo el ejercicio de una adecuada defensa –como lo ilustra el ejemplo de la autorización que se le dio para que se defendiese durante la lectura de la acusación-, se ha permitido a F defenderse a sí mismo. En ese orden de ideas, debe decirse que también han sido respetados el artículo 39 constitucional, pues se ha concedido plena posibilidad al acusado de ejercer su defensa, y el artículo 8 inciso 2) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, toda vez que se le ha permitido contar con un co-defensor de su elección (caso del licenciado Madrigal Madrigal) así como defenderse personalmente, tal como se dispone en el apartado d) del numeral indicado de dicho instrumento internacional. En virtud de todo lo expuesto, siendo evidente que se ha actuado de conformidad con lo pedido por el mismo justiciable sin dejarlo en incapacidad de defenderse, estima esta Sala que no se ha causado agravio alguno a F, por lo que al tenor de lo estipulado en el artículo 424 del Código Procesal Penal, procede declarar sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

IV.Como segundo motivo, expresa la recurrente que el cuerpo sentenciador ha incurrido en fundamentación contradictoria. Indica que no es posible condenar a su defendido como autor del delito de concusión, si para ello el Tribunal tuvo que sustentar el fallo en hechos que estimó constitutivos de otros delitos –como el de exacción ilegal, el de administración fraudulenta, el de negociaciones incompatibles y el de incumplimiento de deberes- por los cuales lo absolvió. Considera que se han quebrantado los artículos 1, 11 y 369 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal, así como –indirectamente- el artículo 348 del Código Penal. Dice la recurrente que el cuerpo juzgador estimó que al emitir y ejecutar los decretos mediante los cuales se estableció el cobro por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, se cometió el ilícito de exacción ilegal. Agrega que si dicho cobro fue considerado generador del delito indicado y con respecto al mismo se estimó que había operado la prescripción de la acción penal, entonces no podía ser utilizado ese mismo cobro para fundamentar la existencia de la concusión. Dice que si se afirma que esa exacción ilegal generada por los decretos se continuó con la suscripción del convenio entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y la Fundación para el Desarrollo Humano en Centroamérica (en adelante se hará referencia a ésta como FUNDEHCA), entonces se está haciendo mención de un solo cobro. En ese sentido, sostiene la licenciada Navas Montero que no puede considerarse de forma independiente el acuerdo de cooperación para tener por configurada la concusión, toda vez que ese único cobro era constitutivo de exacción ilegal y la acción para perseguirla estaba prescrita. En lo que atañe al ilícito de administración fraudulenta, expresa la impugnante que su patrocinado fue absuelto de responsabilidad en cuanto al mismo y para ello se tuvo en cuenta que no se podía saber hacia dónde se destinaron los dineros que ingresaron a la fundación, por lo que considera que si esto no puede establecerse, entonces tampoco puede configurarse el tipo de concusión, ya que no se sabría si el cobro se hizo para sí o para otra persona. Por último, dice que es un contrasentido estimar que la conducta de F se enmarca dentro de los supuestos de incumplimiento de deberes (artículo 332 del Código Penal) y negociaciones incompatibles (artículo 347 del Código Penal), ilícitos respecto de los cuales se dictó una sentencia absolutoria al considerar que estaban subsumidos en el de concusión en este caso, y luego se utilicen los hechos que se consideran constitutivos de esos delitos para fundamentar la existencia de aquel por el que se condenó al patrocinado de la licenciada Navas Montero.

V.De previo a resolver este alegato, es pertinente resumir los acontecimientos que el cuerpo juzgador estima debidamente acreditados. A partir del folio 6923 en el Tomo XVI da inicio la relación de hechos probados, siendo destacables las siguientes situaciones de interés: Ante la problemática social que en 1995 representaba la presencia de gran cantidad de migrantes ilegales (especialmente nicaragüenses) en territorio nacional, el Gobierno de la República de ese entonces desarrolló una política tendiente a normalizar su situación y así evitar el colapso de varios servicios (como el de seguridad social y el de educación) trascendentales para el país. Además, se trataba de evitar acusaciones formales por parte del Gobierno de Nicaragua, el cual amenazaba con denunciar a Costa Rica ante organizaciones internacionales por lo que denominaba trato xenófobo hacia los nicaragüenses que se encontraban en el país. En ese contexto (ver folios 6924 y 6925) es que nace el Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional, con el que se pretendía otorgar un documento de identificación a los migrantes que vinieran a trabajar a territorio costarricense, de modo que pudieran ser cubiertos legalmente por todos los servicios que presta el Estado. Lo que interesa destacar es que, según se aprecia a folio 6925, el programa de comentario fue creado mediante decreto N° 24432-TSS-G, emitido el 25 de enero (en el fallo se indica que fue en junio, pero esta Sala ha tenido a la vista un ejemplar del boletín estatal y ha podido constatar que el texto normativo de comentario fue firmado en Casa Presidencial en el mes que aquí se indica) de 1995, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 141 de 26 de julio de ese año, el cual fue firmado por el entonces Presidente de la República, también por el encartado F en su condición de Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, así como por la Ministra de Gobernación y Policía de aquel momento. Además, fue mediante otro acto de la misma naturaleza –el decreto ejecutivo N° 24811-MTSS de 1° de diciembre de 1995, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 243 de 22 de diciembre de dicho año- que se dispuso cobrar a cada migrante que solicitara la Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional la suma de cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00), con el fin de sufragar el costo que implicaba otorgar dicho documento (lo anterior consta a folio 6926); ese cobro se hacía a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y el dinero recaudado por ese concepto se depositaba en una cuenta corriente a nombre de esa cartera. Adicionalmente se dictó el decreto ejecutivo N° 25647-MTSS-G del 20 de agosto de 1996, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 236 de 9 de diciembre de 1996, mediante el cual se autorizó el cobro (siempre a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) por la ampliación de la vigencia de la Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional, que en unos casos era del cincuenta por ciento y en otros del cien por ciento del valor que tenía la emisión original (coviene advertir que estos dos últimos decretos –en los que se regulaba el cobro por la Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social- fueron derogados mediante el decreto N° 26430-MTSS de 8 de octubre de 1997, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 209 del 30 de octubre de 1997; como justificación de la derogatoria se indica en ese texto normativo que tanto la Contraloría General de la República como la Tesorería Nacional han objetado el cobro que el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social ha efectuado para sufragar los gastos del programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo y Seguridad Social -nótese que no se derogó el decreto N° 24432-TSS-G, que es el que creaba el programa de comentario, de modo que el mismo seguía vigente y en ese instrumento no se contemplaba cobro alguno por la tarjeta, cuya emisión seguía siento potestad del Minsterio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social-). Es importante ahora mencionar que en el cuarto hecho probado (folio 6927, en el tomo XVI), el Tribunal sentenciador afirma que el cobro supra mencionado es ilegal, toda vez que se habría establecido vía decreto un tributo no previsto en ley alguna. Estiman los juzgadores que tal proceder es contrario a lo establecido en el artículo 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, así como en los numerales 4 y 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, en los que se dice que los tributos sólo pueden ser establecidos por disposición legal. Afirman los integrantes del órgano de mérito que con dichos decretos también se estaba lesionando el principio de caja única del Estado, pues se permitía abrir una cuenta corriente bancaria a nombre del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social para manejar allí los fondos recaudados por concepto de otorgamiento y renovación de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. El Tribunal de instancia acreditó (ver hecho probado 20 a folio 6936 en el Tomo XVI) que mediante documento fechado 29 de mayo de 1997, la Dirección General de Auditoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social informó al Ministro del ramo que el Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional presentaba dos deficiencias esenciales, cuales son: a) la apertura de la cuenta aludida, por ser un acto contrario al principio de caja única, y b) el cobro por otorgar y renovar la mencionada tarjeta, por constituir un abuso de las potestades reglamentarias de la Administración. Ante ese informe, F emitió la resolución N° 175-97 de 2 de junio de 1997 (ver hecho probado 17 a folio 6935), por medio de la cual instauraba un órgano de procedimiento para investigar la legalidad de la apertura de la cuenta corriente N°[…] manejar allí los fondos provenientes del Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional. Ese órgano de procedimiento rindió, mediante documento fechado 27 de septiembre de 1997, al entonces Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social un informe en el que se indica lo siguiente: a) que la mencionada cuenta bancaria se abrió sin contar con la autorización de la Tesorería Nacional, b) que no podía sancionarse a ningún subalterno por abrirla, pues todos actuaron de conformidad con el principio de obediencia, y c) que para poder seguir utilizando los fondos del programa tantas veces aludido, así como para poder cobrar por concepto de la tarjeta de trabajo, entonces debía presentarse un proyecto de ley ante la Asamblea Legislativa para que sea esta la que así lo autorice (lo anterior se extrae del hecho probado 17, ya indicado). Nueve días después, el 6 de octubre de 1997, suceden tres cosas importantes, según se aprecia a folio 6938 del Tomo XVI (hecho 22): primero, F, consciente de que no podía seguirse cobrando a los migrantes con base en la normativa reglamentaria, giró instrucciones a la Oficial Presupuestal Dora Orozco Sánchez para que procediera a cerrar la cuenta corriente del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica N° 182510-8 en la que se manejaban los fondos del Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional; segundo, el defendido de la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero indicó a la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social que se procediera a elaborar un proyecto de ley para poder utilizar los recursos percibidos por concepto del mencionado documento de identificación, así como los que pudieran recibirse a futuro; tercero, F se reunió con el co-encartado J y entre ambos redactan y suscriben el convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y la Fundación para el Desarrollo Humano en Centroamérica (FUNDEHCA), en el que se establece que la segunda puede cobrar a los migrantes la suma de veinticinco dólares de los Estados Unidos de América o su equivalente en colones costarricenses, para sufragar los gastos administrativos y materiales que implica la elaboración de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, la cual sería elaborada –merced al convenio- por FUNDEHCA. Finalmente, como elemento de interés para el a quo a efectos de acreditar la concusión, debe mencionarse que estimó (ver hecho 24 a folio 6940) que el convenio de cooperación mencionado no era más que un medio para inducir a los migrantes a pagar a favor de la fundación dicha una suma de dinero que no estaban obligados a pagar.

VI.Establecido lo anterior, debe indicarse que el Código Penal establece en su artículo 348 lo siguiente: “Se impondrá prisión de dos a ocho años, al funcionario público que, abusando de su calidad o de sus funciones, obligare o indujere a alguien a dar o prometer indebidamente, para sí o para un tercero, un bien o un beneficio patrimonial” (la negrilla y el subrayado son suplidos). Esto es lo que el legislador ha denominado concusión, que es uno de los delitos contra los deberes de la función pública. Lo que se tutela mediante este tipo penal es la correcta actuación de los servidores públicos en el ejercicio de su cargo. La probidad a la que se refiere esta figura se quebranta si un servidor público comete abusos (su comportamiento extralimita las atribuciones propias del puesto, de modo que se hace algo no permitido) con ocasión del cargo que desempeña (sea que no cumple con las tareas asignadas, sino que aprovecha la condición de laborar para un ente público y así se incurre en la conducta abusiva). A su vez, el abuso del cargo consiste en obligar o inducir a una persona a dar o prometer, para el propio funcionario o para un tercero distinto del Estado, un bien o un beneficio patrimonial que no debe (así se configura la extralimitación de las competencias inherentes al cargo y se da el abuso del mismo, pues se hace algo que el ordenamiento no permite). Es importante destacar que lo que pide el servidor (ya sea la entrega del bien o beneficio patrimonial, o la promesa de entregarlo) es algo que el ordenamiento jurídico no contempla como una de las obligaciones que debe cumplir el individuo a quien se le requiere tal cosa, pues si así fuera, desaparecería el carácter indebido de la entrega o compromiso de dar el bien o beneficio patrimonial. Por el contrario, de lo que se trata es de una actuación propia del funcionario que no resulta amparada –en virtud de que es abusiva- por el Derecho. Nótese que ese bien o beneficio patrimonial que se exige al sujeto pasivo dar o prometer, puede estar destinado al provecho del propio funcionario o incluso a favor de un tercero. Claro está que ese destinatario no es el Estado, pues si fuera a favor de éste que se realiza el cobro, se estaría ante el delito de exacción ilegal y no el de concusión. Ya esta Sala ha advertido que la diferencia entre esos dos delitos radica en el destino que se dé o pretenda darse a los bienes o beneficios patrimoniales que se obtengan mediante la conducta prohibida (en ese sentido puede verse la resolución de este Despacho N° 175-A-92 de las 10:15 horas del 15 de abril de 1992). Así, salta a la vista que la concusión es una modalidad agravada de exacción ilegal. El legislador ha estimado más reprochable (y por ende merecedor de una pena más severa) que el funcionario público mueva a una persona a dar o prometer un bien o un beneficio patrimonial que no debe, cuando con esa conducta se pretende beneficiar él mismo o a un tercero, que los casos en los que el beneficiado con ese proceder sería el propio Estado. Además, es importante resaltar que para efectos de la configuración de este ilícito no resulta indispensable que el requerido efectivamente entregue o prometa dar lo solicitado, sino que basta que se le motive a prometer hacerlo para que el delito surja a la vida jurídica.

VII. licenciada Navas Montero, que hay un acontecimiento en particular que es constitutivo del delito de concusión, cual es la firma y puesta en práctica del convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y FUNDEHCA. En efecto, ese acuerdo entre la cartera ministerial y la fundación mencionadas constituye el ilícito de comentario. Si se lee lo que convinieron las partes interesadas (el documento puede observarse a partir del folio 1689 en el Tomo III del expediente), se destaca (ver cláusula tercera) que FUNDEHCA recibe las solicitudes de la población migrante, elabora las tarjetas y luego las entrega, todo ello con la autorización del Ministerio y demás autoridades intervinientes en el procedimiento. Además, por ese trámite, el convenio dispone (cláusula quinta) que la fundación puede cobrar a cada migrante la suma de veinticinco dólares estadounidenses o su equivalente en colones, con el fin de sufragar los gastos administrativos y materiales que conlleva la elaboración de las tarjetas. Aquí está el problema central de este asunto. Si el otorgamiento de la tantas veces mencionada tarjeta de trabajo estacional fue previsto en el decreto N° 24432 ya citado como una actividad propia de la Administración Pública y ese texto normativo estaba aún vigente cuando se elaboró y puso en práctica el aludido convenio, es entonces evidente que el único órgano estatal que tenía la potestad para conceder a la población migrante ese permiso laboral era precisamente el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Eso se refleja en el acuerdo de cooperación, pues FUNDEHCA sólo podía entregar materialmente las tarjetas, previa autorización de la cartera ministerial. Es decir, en el fondo el que decidía sobre la aprobación o el rechazo de la solicitud era el órgano a cargo del imputado F, de modo que salta a la vista que seguía estándose ante un servicio propio de la Administración (es más, en el propio aviso en el que se indica a los migrantes que deben pagar los cinco mil colones a FUNDEHCA –ver folio 3736 en el Tomo IX- se puede leer que la tarjeta la otorga el Ministerio). Ahora bien, lo que sucede es que mediante el citado convenio se dispuso cobrarle a los migrantes una determinada suma de dinero, a favor de FUNDEHCA. Por más que se quiera justificar ese cobro aduciendo que la fundación tenía derecho a que se le pagara por el trabajo realizado para la cartera de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (argumento que ha sostenido el imputado F, según consta a folio 6969 en el Tomo XVI), lo cierto es que no hay una sola disposición legal (ni siquiera reglamentaria) que lo autorice y esta ausencia de previsión normativa que lo ampare hace que tal cobro a los migrantes sea indebido. En todo momento debe tenerse presente que los decretos ejecutivos 24811 y 25647, ya citados, autorizaron el cobro por la Tarejeta de Trabajo Estacional, pero sólo a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, nunca a favor de FUNDEHCA ni de ningún otro tercero, de modo que esas disposiciones no amparan el cobro que se estableció mediante el convenio de cooperación, por lo que este último está desprovisto de todo amparo normativo. Recuérdese que el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional se da en el marco de la actividad administrativa, pues es el Estado el que trataba de solucionar los problemas nacionales e incluso internacionales que acarreaba la presencia en el país de gran cantidad de trabajadores foráneos indocumentados. La Administración debe sujetarse en todo momento al principio de legalidad derivado del artículo 11 constitucional, relacionado con los artículos 11 y 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Así, sólo puede hacer aquello que la ley le autoriza. Como el ordenamiento jurídico no permite crear tributos (impuestos, tasas y contribuciones especiales) si no es mediante la promulgación de una ley (artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 4 y 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), entonces el establecimiento –vía convenio de cooperación- de una tasa por un servicio que debía prestar el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social es abiertamente ilegal, con la agravante de que el dinero iba a parar a una persona de derecho privado. Recuérdese que el pago se daba para poder recibir el documento de comentario, pues si no se pagaba, no se tramitaba la petición del migrante para que se le permitiese trabajar estacionalmente en Costa Rica y sin tal autorización podía ser deportado en virtud de las disposiciones de la Ley de Migración y Extranjería. Que debiese retribuirse la intervención de FUNDEHCA en el proceso es algo que resulta ajeno a la ilegalidad del cobro, pues esa fundación servía al Ministerio y no a los migrantes; la relación de estos era con el órgano público, pues era esa dependencia ministerial –no FUNDEHCA- la competente para decidir si concedía el permiso laboral a los extranjeros. En ese orden de ideas, es evidente que el acuerdo lo que hace es evitarle al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social tener que hacer frente al pago de los servicios que FUNDEHCA le prestaba a esa institución, para lo cual se creó un cobro ilegal que pesaba sobre los migrantes que requerían un servicio de esa cartera, de modo que el dinero se pagaba a favor de la entidad privada. Esa exacción (entendida como “acción y efecto de exigir impuestos, prestaciones, multas, deudas, etc.”, según la definición que se incluye en la vigésimoprimera edición del Diccionario de la Real Academia Española) es abiertamente contraria al ordenamiento jurídico, pues sin que medie ley alguna que así lo permita, se exige (mediante un simple acuerdo de asistencia entre dos organizaciones) a los migrantes que paguen una determinada suma de dinero a una fundación por un servicio que a esa población se lo presta el Estado. Igualmente importante es destacar que el encartado motivó a muchísimas personas a entregar dinero a FUNDEHCA, pues dispuso la elaboración del volante que consta a folio 3736 (primer folio del tomo IX del expediente), donde se comunica a los trabajadores migrantes que como requisito para tramitar la tarjeta de trabajo estacional debían (entre otras cosas) pagar cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00) a favor de FUNDEHCA. Así las cosas, es evidente que en el presente asunto se está ante un funcionario público (en este caso F, quien a la fecha en que ocurrieron los hechos era Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social) que, abusando de su cargo, ha motivado a gran cantidad de extranjeros a entregar indebidamente (pues no hay disposición legal alguna que establezca la obligación de pagar a una institución privada una cantidad dineraria para que el Estado dictamine si le concede o no permiso para laborar estacionalmente en el país) un beneficio patrimonial a un tercero (FUNDEHCA es ajeno a la relación administrado-Administración; recuérdese que es el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social –no la fundación- el que debe autorizar a los migrantes su condición de trabajadores en Costa Rica, de modo que ellos reciben el servicio de esa dependencia pública y no de la entidad privada). El carácter abusivo de la conducta de este imputado se pone de manifiesto si se toma en cuenta que desde antes de la firma (lo cual aconteció el 6 de octubre de 1997, según consta a folio 1692 en el Tomo III) y puesta en práctica del tantas veces mencionado convenio, ya F sabía que no era legalmente posible cobrar por la emisión de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. En efecto, mediante documento fechado 27 de mayo de 1997 (ver folio 180 en el Tomo I), el entonces Viceministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, licenciado Eugenio Solano Calderón, informó a F que debía investigarse lo referente la apertura de una cuenta bancaria específica para manejar los fondos de operación del programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Como parte de la investigación que acarreó la nota del señor S, se presentó el informe elaborado por la Dirección General de Auditoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (ver folio 192 en el Tomo I) en el que se advierte que el cobro de una suma de dinero a los migrantes por los costos que acarreaba el mencionado programa, resultaba contrario al principio de caja única del Estado y a lo dispuesto en el artículo 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en el cual se indica que el establecimiento de exacciones es materia reservada a la ley). El contenido de ese informe y las recomendaciones del órgano de procedimiento que investigó el asunto fueron puestas en conocimiento de F en septiembre de 1997, según consta a folio 247 en el Tomo I. Es importante advertir que se le recomendó al entonces Ministro (ver folio 250) que se ordenara el cierre de la cuenta bancaria especialmente destinada al manejo de los fondos del programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Además, se le indicó que era recomendable, si se quería continuar utilizando los recursos ya percibidos o percibir nuevos a futuro, que se presentara un proyecto de ley a la Asamblea Legislativa para que esta así lo autorizara. Entonces, es evidente que F sabía que era ilegal cobrar por ese servicio que prestaba el Estado costarricense a los migrantes. En ese sentido, suscribir y poner en práctica un convenio que permitía a una fundación cobrar a los extranjeros por un servicio que a fin de cuentas seguía siendo estatal (vale la pena insistir en que el que concedía o denegaba el permiso de trabajo era el Ministerio a cargo de F) equivale a obviar la ilegalidad que conocía, y es por ello que se puede acreditar que el imputado de comentario abusó de la función que desempeñaba. Cabe acotar que esta conducta abusiva es igualmente indicativa de su comportamiento doloso por parte del ex Ministro, pues sabía que no podía establecer ese cobro a favor de FUNDEHCA porque era ilegal y menos aún motivar a los migrantes a realizar un pago que era indebido y aún así lo hizo, de forma tal que resulta evidente el conocimiento y la voluntad de ajustar su conducta a los supuestos típicos de la concusión. Además, salta a la vista que sabía que estaba moviendo a los migrantes a entregar un beneficio patrimonial indebido a un tercero. En ese orden de ideas, el delito de concusión que se atribuye a F en esta causa está debidamente acreditado. Debe señalarse, además, que el cuerpo juzgador tiene por demostrados todos los hechos supra indicados. Basta observar los puntos 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 y 25 del cuadro fáctico de la sentencia recurrida (folios 6935 a 6941 en el Tomo XVI) para darse cuenta que el a quo tuvo claro en todo momento que F incurrió en concusión por lo acontecido en torno al tantas veces mencionado convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Además, a folio 7465 en el Tomo XVII inicia la exposición del cuerpo sentenciador en cuanto a por qué estima configurado el delito por el que se condenó a este imputado y consta a folio 7469 que para el órgano de instancia el otrora Ministro sabía perfectamente que era irregular el cobro que se realizaba por el programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Queda igualmente claro que para los juzgadores, el haber dado instrucciones a diversos funcionarios para que se solventara el problema legal en torno al indicado cobro (ver folio 7471) y luego haber suscrito el convenio de cooperación con FUNDEHCA en el que se mantenía la obligación para los migrantes de pagar para poder recibir la tarjeta de trabajo, no es más que una maniobra para implementar un cobro que se sabía ilegal (ver folio 7472). De conformidad con lo anterior, el delito de concusión por el que fue condenado F está debidamente acreditado y fundamentado en la resolución impugnada.

VIII.Ahora bien, retomando el recurso que aquí se analiza, debe recordarse que la licenciada Navas Montero acusa que el Tribunal se equivoca al fundamentar la existencia del delito de concusión, pues para hacerlo consideró hechos constitutivos de otros ilícitos, respecto de los cuales absolvió a su defendido. Sobre el punto, estima esta Sala que ciertamente hay un error por parte del a quo al fueran parte de un solo plan, sin individualizar el delito que constituirían. Sin embargo, el problema que ello acarrea es mínimo, pues a partir del folio 7425 en el Tomo XVII sí se distingue perfectamente el razonamiento sobre por qué condena por concusión y se exonera de responsabilidad penal a F por otros delitos. Lo que interesa destacar es que la concusión no se confunde con los demás ilícitos. Respecto de la exacción ilegal, pese a que el Tribunal de instancia deriva la existencia de un plan por parte del imputado de comentario y J que abarca esta conducta punible y aquella por la que se sancionó a estas dos personas, lo cierto es que ofrece fundamentos distintos para acreditar cada una de ellas. Así, a folio 7460 (Tomo XVII) se explica que la exacción ilegal derivaría del cobro que vía decretos ejecutivos se hizo a los migrantes por la tarjeta de trabajo y se menciona que los dineros se pagaban a favor del Estado. En cambio, la concusión se analiza a partir del folio 7465 (Tomo XVII) y queda claro que esta se configura en relación con el convenio de cooperación con FUNDEHCA, mediante el cual se obligaba a los migrantes a pagar una suma de dinero a esa entidad privada por un servicio (el otorgamiento del permiso laboral) que prestaba el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Así las cosas, no hay problema alguno en absolver a F por la exacción ilegal (ilícito que el a quo consideró prescrito, tema que se tratará al resolver el recurso del Ministerio Público) y condenarlo por la concusión, máxime si se observa que el cobro a los extranjeros no tiene el mismo origen (en un caso es impuesto por normativa reglamentaria y en otro por un simple acuerdo de cooperación entre dos organizaciones), de modo que se trata de conductas distintas. Precisamente por esto último es que se pueden diferenciar los delitos y, por ende, los criterios de prescripción de la acción penal aplicables a cada uno de ellos. Al no basarse la exacción ilegal y la concusión en el mismo hecho es jurídicamente correcto examinar por separado cada ilícito para ver si han prescrito o no. Además, la administración fraudulenta que se atribuyó tanto a F como a J en agravio de FUNDEHCA no abarca ningún hecho relacionado con la concusión. El único ligamen entre ambos ilícitos lo hace el Tribunal al estimar que formaban parte de un plan para lograr disponer de los dineros que recaudara la entidad por concepto de la elaboración de las tarjetas de trabajo. Pero ello no significa que los hechos que permiten configurar cada ilícito sean idénticos, como para que la absolutoria por uno obligue a absolver por el otro. La concusión parte –como ya se ha expuesto varias veces a lo largo de este fallo- de la firma y puesta en práctica del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. En cambio, la administración fraudulenta se generaría a lo interno de la fundación, con base en la forma como la misma se hubiese administrado en perjuicio de los intereses de la entidad. Como se ve, son cosas distintas. Ahora bien, la junta administrativa de la organización privada aprobó los estados contables y financieros de FUNDEHCA y aprobó todo lo actuado por el presidente de la junta, el delegado ejecutivo y la propia junta (ver folio 7527 en el Tomo XVII), por lo que ciertamente no se podía acreditar perjuicio alguno para la fundación y en ese sentido es correcta la decisión de los jueces de instancia de absolver a los encartados por estos hechos. Lo que sucede es que se trata de una base fáctica ajena a la que sirve de sustento a la concusión, por lo que la absolutoria de comentario no obliga a absolverlos por el delito previsto en el artículo 348 del Código Penal. Respecto del delito de negociaciones incompatibles, el Tribunal los absolvió a F y a J por ese ilícito en virtud de que el mismo no estaba debidamente sustentado en la acusación alternativa, sino que esta contenía simplemente una repetición de hechos ya señalados en la acusación principal y agrega que en todo caso esa negociación formaba parte del plan para cometer la concusión, de modo que la subsumen los Jueces de instancia en esta figura penal y los absuelve por ese ilícito (ver folios 7608 a 7611 en el Tomo XVII). Aquí sí se aprecia un error del a quo pues lo que hace es ligar la negociación incompatible con el plan que estima siguieron los imputados para cometer la concusión, como si esta última la subsumiera. En realidad lo dispuesto en el artículo 348 del Código Penal no comprende lo que se regula en el 347 del mismo texto normativo (por la fecha en que ocurrieron los hechos de interés para este caso, se hace referencia al texto de este artículo tal cual estuvo redactado antes de que entrase en vigor la reforma efectuada mediante Ley N° 8056 de 21 de diciembre de 2000, publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 10 de 5 de enero de 2001), por lo que el ejercicio de subsunción efectivamente está mal realizado (el Ministerio Público también menciona este problema en su recurso este punto, por lo que luego se volverá sobre el tema). Lo que pasa es que el interés que pudo haber tenido F en el convenio del Ministerio a su cargo con FUNDEHCA (de la cual tanto él como su hijo, de apellidos F, y el co-imputado J eran miembros fundadores; además, F era presidente de la junta directiva y J era el delegado ejecutivo) es independiente de lo que constituye la concusión. En efecto, no es lo mismo que un funcionario público se interese en un contrato u operación en la que interviene por el cargo que ocupa, a que se ese funcionario induzca u obligue –merced a la firma y puesta en práctica del convenio, lo cual evidencia un abuso del cargo- a migrantes a pagar una suma indebida a favor de una fundación. En el primer caso la conducta punible se restringe al simple interés personal del servidor en un negocio; en el segundo, lo que se sanciona no es sólo un comportamiento más amplio, sino que distinto del anterior, pues de lo que se trata es de abusar del cargo de modo que se mueva a varios individuos a entregar a un tercero un beneficio patrimonial que no deben. Como se puede apreciar, en el segundo caso el interés del empleado público en el contrato en sí no es un factor a tomar en cuenta para determinar la responsabilidad penal del sujeto, por lo que no lo requiere la concusión para configurarse. Así, la absolutoria dictada por el delito de negociaciones incompatibles no incide sobre el ilícito por el que fue condenado F. Respecto del delito de incumplimiento de deberes, el órgano de mérito indicó (ver folio 7529 en el Tomo XVII) que en la especie operaba un concurso aparente de normas, toda vez que en todos los delitos contra la función pública en que el sujeto activo es un funcionario hay en el fondo un incumplimiento de los deberes propios del cargo, por lo que la figura especial desplaza la genérica, de modo que sólo es posible aplicar la que específicamente regula la conducta demostrada y no la otra, por lo que el a quo absolvió de toda responsabilidad y pena a F por el delito de incumplimiento de deberes. Estima esta Sala que la absolutoria dictada por este ilícito no incide sobre la condenatoria que se dictó por la concusión. Ello porque el a quo se equivoca al estimar que entre los dos ilícitos de comentario se da un concurso aparente de normas. El incumplimiento de deberes (artículo 332 del Código Penal) parte del supuesto de que el servidor omite, rehúsa hacer o retarda cumplir un acto que está obligado a llevar a cabo. En cambio, la concusión parte de la premisa de que se abusa del cargo, es decir, que se extralimitan (como se dijo supra en el Considerando VI de esta sentencia) las atribuciones propias de la función y merced a ellos se mueve a alguien a entregar o prometer un bien o beneficio patrimonial indebido a otro sujeto. Como se ve, el primer delito es de omisión y el segundo de acción; además, no se está ante figuras que se excluyen entre sí, sino que son complementarias (no idénticas) por lo que no era posible aplicar el concurso aparente de normas. En todo caso, en la especie no se ha acreditado que F haya omitido hacer algo que debía, por lo que la absolutoria por incumplimiento de deberes es correcta. Lo que sucede es que sí se ha demostrado que hizo algo no permitido (abusar de su cargo y mover a los migrantes a entregar dinero que no debían a favor de FUNDEHCA), de modo que su conducta no se ajusta a lo dispuesto en el artículo 332 del Código Penal, pero sí a la del artículo 348 del mismo texto normativo. De conformidad con lo anterior, la absolutoria dictada por el delito de incumplimiento de deberes no exime de responsabilidad al patrocinado de la licenciada Navas Montero por el delito de concusión. A lo expuesto debe agregarse que la ejecución de los decretos ejecutivos que autorizaban el cobro de cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00) a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social por la emisión de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional sí es independiente del cobro que se hizo a favor de FUNDEHCA. El primero estaba amparado en normativa reglamentaria; el segundo en un simple convenio de cooperación. El primero ingresaba en cuentas del órgano público; el segundo a las arcas de una entidad privada. Como se ve, se trata de conductas distintas, por lo que es correcto que fueran analizadas por el a quo como delitos independientes. Así, las prescripción de la exacción ilegal no incide sobre la concusión, pues se basan en cuadros fácticos independientes. Debe agregarse que el hecho de que no se sepa cuál es el destino que se dio a los dineros que fueron recaudados por la fundación no es óbice para tener por configurada la concusión. Ello obedece a que no es necesario –para que se configure este delito- establecer el destino final del bien o beneficio patrimonial; lo que interesa es que se determinó (mediante el ejercicio abusivo del cargo por parte de un servidor público) a los migrantes para que pagaran indebidamente una suma de dinero a favor de FUNDEHCA y de ese modo se configuró el ilícito en mención. Con base en todo lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

IX.Como tercer motivo, la licenciada Navas Montero alega que en la especie se han irrespetado las reglas de fundamentación en relación con un elemento de juicio de carácter decisivo, cual es el contexto histórico en que ocurrieron los hechos que aquí interesan. Estima que ese equívoco acarrea la incorrecta aplicación de un precepto de fondo. Recuerda que en 1995 la presencia en el país de gran cantidad de migrantes indocumentados implicaba una seria amenaza para diversos servicios públicos, incluidos la seguridad social y la educación. Agrega que el Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional se originó precisamente para combatir ese problema. Señala que aunado a lo anterior, debe considerarse que el Gobierno de la República de Nicaragua amenazaba al de Costa Rica con demandarlo en instancias internacionales por lo que aquél consideraba trato xenófobo de sus nacionales en este país. Así, sostiene que ese es el motivo por el que surgió el programa mencionado y no puede considerarse como parte de un plan ideado por F y J para cometer la concusión. Además, explica que la fundación fue creada por considerarse una vía más adecuada para cumplir metas fijadas en acuerdos internacionales. De allí que –según la recurrente- no pueda establecerse que la conducta de su patrocinado fuese dolosa o estuviese dirigida a cometer el delito previsto en el artículo 348 del Código Penal. Considera que el imputado F actuó para enfrentar una situación urgente para el país, procurando evitar un mal grave para Costa Rica. En ese sentido, estima que debía aplicarse en el presente caso lo dispuesto en los artículos 27 y 38 del Código Penal, pues se estaba ante una causa de justificación o, en su defecto, una causa de exculpación. El reparo no es atendible. Si bien es cierto la situación del país en 1995 era delicada en virtud de la problemática que para el Estado acarreaba la atención de la población migrante que se encontraba en territorio nacional, también lo es que esa emergencia a lo sumo justificaría el establecimiento del Programa de Tarjeta de Trabajo Estacional. Puede que la premura con que se atendió el problema permita comprender (no justificar) que se emitieran decretos que permitían al Estado cobrar por la emisión de la tarjeta (lo que vulnera la reserva de ley en materia de exacciones) y que los fondos se depositasen en una cuenta específica (lo que contraviene el principio de caja única), pero eso no es extensivo a lo acaecido con el convenio de cooperación y de ningún modo constituye un estado de necesidad, ni justificante ni exculpante. En primer lugar, debe recordarse que el que enfrentaba el problema era el Estado costarricense y en procura de solucionarlo se incurrió en los errores apuntados. Pero luego de advertida la ilegalidad del cobro (tanto por la exacción en sí como por el depósito de los dineros en una cuenta independiente) y prácticamente dos años después de que se había iniciado el programa de tarjeta de trabajo (lo cual demuestra que si bien el problema no se había resuelto, ya estaba en vías de solución), F optó –a sabiendas, como se indicó en el Considerando VII de este fallo, con lo cual se evidencia que está correctamente acreditado su actuar doloso- por implementar un mecanismo para que se cobrara a los migrantes dineros que no tenían por qué pagar, pues la prestación que ellos recibían (sea el otorgamiento del permiso laboral) seguía siendo una potestad estatal (sin que se hubiese establecido mediante ley exacción alguna por ese servicio), con la agravante de que los dineros ya no ingresaban a las arcas del Estado, sino a las de una fundación privada. Como se ve, esta segunda situación es radicalmente diferente a la que se daba bajo el amparo de los decretos ejecutivos que autorizaban (ilegalmente, como ya se ha mencionado) el cobro a los migrantes. Además, debe destacarse que no se puede precisar bien jurídico alguno que haya sido puesto en peligro con ocasión de la presencia de los migrantes en Costa Rica, en ninguno de los dos momentos aludidos. De lo que se habla es que había servicios públicos que podían colapsar, pero esa era una posibilidad y además el colapso de un servicio (como el de educación o el de seguridad social, que son los que más se han mencionado en esta causa) es algo tan vago que puede significar desde una prestación lenta o tardía del mismo, hasta el hecho de que se preste a tiempo pero con mala calidad, o incluso que no se preste del todo. Aún así, no se define quiénes serían afectados en cualquiera de esas situaciones. Por ello, no se puede saber en concreto cuáles bienes jurídicos estaban en peligro y –precisamente por la vaguedad indicada- tampoco se puede determinar la actualidad o inminencia de la amenaza. En cuanto a la posible instauración de una demanda contra Costa Rica en instancias internacionales, nuevamente cabe preguntarse cuál es el bien jurídico que se protegería con lo actuado por F. El que a una persona (incluso jurídica, como el Estado) se le lleve ante los Tribunales de Justicia (nacionales o internacionales) para que se determine conforme a Derecho si es responsable de algo no constituye una puesta en peligro para los bienes jurídicos de esa persona, pues existe el principio de responsabilidad. En ese orden de ideas, desaparece el presupuesto esencial del que parte el instituto del estado de necesidad, cual es la existencia de un peligro para bienes jurídicos, lo cual no se puede precisar en esta causa, por lo que correctamente el a quo no aplicó lo dispuesto en los artículos 27 y 38 del Código Penal. Cabe agregar que si bien es cierto FUNDEHCA fue creada con el aval de diversos Ministros de Trabajo de aquel entonces en aras de atender distintos problemas comunes a los países del área, también lo es que ello es intrascendente para efectos de establecer la concusión. Que el Tribunal de instancia se equivoque al expresar que todos los hechos que tiene por demostrados forman parte de un plan es irrelevante frente a la acreditación de lo que sí constituye el delito de comentario. Para que éste surja a la vida jurídica es suficiente que la entrega de un bien o un beneficio patrimonial indebido (o la promesa de hacerlo) se haga a favor del funcionario público o un tercero. En este caso, FUNDEHCA es ese tercero, sin que importe para qué fue creada. Por todo lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

X.Como cuarto motivo, la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero acusa errónea motivación en cuanto al conocimiento –por parte de F- de la ilicitud de la acción. Indica que se irrespetó el principio in dubio pro reo. Sostiene que el informe de la Dirección General de Auditoría no es concluyente en cuanto a la ilegalidad del cobro que se hacía a los migrantes, sino que en el mismo se señala que “pareciera” que lo es. También cuestiona (ver folio 8325 en el Tomo XX) que se diga que su defendido conoció dicho informe, pues no consta que él lo haya recibido. Agrega que en todo caso, los decretos ejecutivos establecieron dicho cobro y no fueron declarados ilegales. Indica que no por irrespetarse el principio de caja única se quebranta el de reserva de ley en materia tributaria. De allí que estime mal establecido el dolo en el accionar de su patrocinado. El reclamo debe ser rechazado. Pese a que el informe de la Dirección General de Auditoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (visible a folio 192 en el Tomo I) sí dice en algunos párrafos que parece que el cobro mencionado era ilegal por dos factores, a saber el quebranto del principio de caja única del Estado y la vulneración de la reserva de ley en materia de exacciones, lo cierto es que esa pieza es un todo y en la misma se lee con toda claridad (ver folios 208, 209 y 210 en el Tomo I) que hicieron varias recomendaciones al entonces Ministro para corregir los defectos de legalidad encontrados. Así, es evidente que sí se concluyó que el mencionado cobro no se ajustaba a Derecho, por los dos defectos ya mencionados. Además, mediante oficio N° DAJ-AI-943-97 de 24 de septiembre de 1997 (visible a folio 247 en el Tomo I del expediente), dirigido a F, se recomendó al imputado el cierre de la cuenta en la que se manejaban los fondos del programa de tarjeta de trabajo y también que se presentase un proyecto de ley ante la Asamblea Legislativa para que esta autorizase cobrar a los migrantes por la emisión de dicho documento. Como se ve, en este documento queda claramente expuesta la ilegalidad del cobro que se hacía a los migrantes, básicamente por ser una exacción sin amparo legal (el quebranto del principio de caja única del Estado sólo motivó el cierre de la cuenta especial, pero eso es secundario respecto de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes, que sí interesa para efectos de la concusión). Este informe de la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social sí fue conocido por F, pues él mismo se refiere a dicho dictamen para solicitar el cierre de la cuenta en la que se depositaban los fondos provenientes del programa de tarjeta de trabajo (ver documento de folio 3 en el Tomo I) Así las cosas, como ya se indicó en el Considerando VII de este fallo, es evidente que F conocía la ilicitud del cobro a los migrantes por el servicio que prestaba el Ministerio a su cargo, por lo que salta a la vista que sí fue a sabiendas de lo anterior que estableció un nuevo cobro para esa población como requisito para que la cartera ministerial de comentario otorgara el permiso laboral tantas veces mencionado. Es importante recordar que el segundo cobro a los migrantes (el establecido mediante el ya citado convenio de cooperación) es el que interesa para efectos de la concusión. Cuando este acuerdo se suscribió, ya F sabía que sólo mediante ley podían imponerse exacciones a los Administrados por las prestaciones a cargo del Estado (como lo es el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo, que era una atribución del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). De allí que sea intrascendente que los decretos ejecutivos que amparaban el primer cobro (que el a quo consideró constitutivo de exacción ilegal) hayan sido declarados ilegales o no, pues eso se refiere a hechos independientes de los que motivaron la condena de este justiciable por concusión. Finalmente, debe indicarse que lleva razón la licenciada Navas Montero al indicar que no necesariamente el quebranto del principio de caja única conlleva una violación de la reserva de ley en materia tributaria. Lo que sucede es que en este caso cada una de las infracciones está debidamente acreditada en hechos separados. El principio de caja única se vulneró al abrirse una cuenta especial para administrar los fondos que ingresaban al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social por concepto del cobro que se hacía a los migrantes con base en los decretos ejecutivos. En cambio, la reserva de ley en materia tributaria ha sido irrespetada en dos ocasiones distintas, primero cuando se emitieron los aludidos decretos (por lo que el a quo estimó que se configuró el delito de exacción ilegal, pese a que la acción para perseguirlo estaba prescrita) y luego cuando en el convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio y FUNDEHCA se estableció un cobro por un servicio estatal (que es lo que sirve de base para condenar a F por concusión). Así, queda claro que el a quo no incurrió en la equivocación que apunta la recurrente. Por todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este extremo de la impugnación.

XI.La defensora particular del encartado F acusa, como quinto motivo, que en la especie se irrespetaron las reglas de la sana crítica en cuanto a la apreciación de las razones por las cuales la Contraloría General de la República no refrendó el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Sostiene que el mencionado acuerdo no tenía por qué ser consultado de previo a la Contraloría. Agrega que se requiere de un juicio de lesividad para restar validez y eficacia al acto administrativo. El reclamo es improcedente. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando VII, en la especie se dio una relación triangular como consecuencia de la implementación del mencionado convenio de cooperación. Por un lado, los administrados (la población migrante) requería un servicio (la concesión de la tarjeta de trabajo) al Estado costarricense (en concreto, al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, que era la única dependencia competente para otorgar tal permiso). Por otro, el Estado convino con FUNDEHCA que esta lo asistiera (al Estado) en la elaboración material de las tarjetas. Finalmente, para obtener la tarjeta que le otorgaba el Estado costarricense, el administrado (el migrante) debía pagar a FUNDEHCA la suma de cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00). Como se aprecia, eso es una doble burla del ordenamiento jurídico. La primera se da porque el administrado requiere una prestación estatal (el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo) respecto de la cual no existía al 6 de octubre de 1997 (fecha en que se suscribe el convenio de cooperación) ninguna disposición legal que permitiese que se cobrase una exacción a cambio. Pese a ello y a sabiendas de la ilegalidad, F autorizó dicho cobro en el acuerdo de comentario. La segunda burla se da porque el Estado se beneficia de un servicio que le presta una entidad privada (FUNDEHCA) sin tener que pagar, pues F trasladó ilegalmente ese costo a los usuarios. Cierto es que en esa maniobra se comprometió a la Administración Pública, específicamente al suscribirse el convenio de cooperación, pero no por ello deben dejar de pronunciarse los Tribunales penales sobre la legalidad de lo actuado. Si se examina el reclamo de la licenciada Navas Montero, se puede apreciar que ella lo que trata es de dar primacía a la jurisdicción administrativa en esta materia, pues lo que pretende es impedir que se establezca en sede penal que el cobro vía convenio es indebido mientras en la otra sede no se resuelva si ese acuerdo es legal o no. El planteamiento de la recurrente no es de recibo. Obsérvese que el artículo 4 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa expresamente reserva para la sede penal todo lo relacionado con delitos aunque estos estén conexos con actos de la Administración Pública. Así, es en esta vía (no en otra) donde se debe emitir pronunciamiento sobre legalidad de lo actuado, pues es precisamente sobre ello que debe determinarse la existencia del delito de concusión. Por lo anterior, la discusión en torno a si debía la Contraloría refrendar o no el tantas veces mencionado convenio de cooperación es intrascendente, pues ya en esta sede se declaró que el cobro que allí se estableció para los migrantes a favor de FUNDEHCA es abiertamente ilegal, circunstancia que conocía F antes de firmarlo (en esto se coincide –por cierto- con lo indicado por la Contraloría en su resolución N° DAJ-2156 de 17 de noviembre de 1997, visible a folio 1693 en el Tomo III), y eso es lo que importa para efectos de aplicar el artículo 348 del Código Penal. Así las cosas, no aprecia esta Sala que se cause agravio alguno a la parte impugnante por el hecho de que no se analice con mayor profundidad el por qué la Contraloría General de la República no refrendó el convenio de cooperación. Por lo expuesto, procede declarar sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XII.Como sexto motivo, la licenciada Navas Montero acusa el quebranto de la ley sustantiva, específicamente el artículo 348 del Código Penal, relativo al delito de concusión. Afirma que los hechos que el a quo tuvo por demostrados no se enmarcan dentro de lo que el legislador define como concusión. Indica que de la sentencia no se extrae en qué consistió el abuso, ni cómo fue que su defendido movió a los migrantes a efectuar el pago a FUNDEHCA. El reproche no es atendible. Ya se expuso supra en los Considerandos VI y VII por qué el delito de concusión que se atribuye a F está debidamente acreditado y fundamentado por el órgano de mérito. Debe estarse la recurrente a lo allí resuelto.

XIII.Como séptimo motivo, la defensora particular de F reclama que en la especie se ha incurrido en un equívoco al fijar la pena pues la misma resulta desproporcional respecto de lo que se tiene por demostrado. Por lo que seguidamente se expondrá, el alegato es de recibo. Puede apreciarse a partir del folio 7611 (Tomo XVII; véase en particular el folio 7613) que el Tribunal de mérito estimó que en este caso era adecuado sancionar a F y a J (está claro que a este último debe aplicársele, por efecto extensivo, lo que aquí se resuelve; sin embargo, el tema se tratará a la hora de emitir pronunciamiento sobre el recurso de casación a su favor, pues es necesario tratar allí un tema íntimamente conexo con el de la penalidad de su conducta) con el extremo superior de la escala punitiva prevista para el delito de concusión. Estima esta Sala que la imposición de la pena máxima en este caso resulta desproporcionada. Ello porque si bien es cierto lo acontecido es muy grave, también lo es que en la especie no se aprecian circunstancias extraordinarias que ameriten se imponga la sanción más alta posible. En efecto, teniendo claro que la concusión se configura solamente por lo acontecido en relación con el cobro a los migrantes que se creó mediante el ya aludido convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y FUNDEHCA, debe agregarse que no se logró establecer cuánto dinero percibió esta fundación por la elaboración de la tarjeta de trabajo, de modo que aunque se sabe que hubo migrantes que pagaron indebidamente a esa entidad lo que se establecía en el acuerdo indicado, no se ha podido determinar cuán grande fue el beneficio patrimonial percibido por esa organización privada. Esa es una circunstancia que debe ponderarse con los otros elementos del artículo 71 del Código Penal y de ella se evidencia que en este caso se ha impuesto una pena irrazonable a F. Además, se trata de una persona que no tiene antecedentes penales y que con posterioridad a la comisión del ilícito se ha mostrado anuente a enfrentar el proceso, de modo que es evidente la intención de someterse nuevamente al ordenamiento jurídico, con las consecuencias jurídicas que ello le implique. Por lo anterior, es irrazonable imponerle la sanción más alta posible a F. Ahora bien, tampoco puede pensarse que este justiciable es merecedor de que se le sancione con el extremo mínimo de la escala punitiva de referencia, pues ello sería igualmente desproporcionado. Recuérdese que sí se está ante un hecho grave, pues no sólo fue un Ministro del Gobierno de la República (es decir, uno de los funcionarios públicos de más alto rango, miembro incluso de los Supremos Poderes) el autor del delito de concusión, sino que además fueron muchas las personas de escasos recursos (no puede olvidarse que se trata de migrantes ilegales) quienes se vieron compelidos a pagar una suma (que era considerable desde su punto de vista) que no debían (aunque no se ha podido determinar a cuánto asciende el total de ingresos percibidos por FUNDEHCA por ese concepto, que es una circunstancia que debe ponderarse con la recién descrita). Además, no puede obviarse que F es conocedor del Derecho, por lo que es más reprochable en su caso el haber actuado dolosamente en contravención del ordenamiento jurídico. Por ello, estima esta Sala que ciertamente la pena de ocho años de prisión que fijó el a quo para F en su condición de autor responsable del delito de concusión es desproporcionada por ser irrazonable y por ello debe ser reducida para ajustarla al nivel de gravedad que realmente reviste este asunto. Así, configurándose el defecto en la aplicación de la ley sustantiva señalado por la recurrente, resuelve esta Sala declarar con lugar este extremo del recurso y, en aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 450 del Código Procesal Penal, casar la sentencia impugnada en lo que se refiere a la sanción que debe descontar F. En consecuencia, resolviendo directamente el asunto por el fondo, se impone a F la pena de CUATRO AÑOS DE PRISIÓN, como autor responsable del delito de concusión cometido en perjuicio de los deberes de la función pública. En virtud de que el monto impuesto excede los límites permitidos en el artículo 59 del Código Penal, no se concede a F el beneficio de condena de ejecución condicional.

XIV.Sobre el recurso interpuesto por el imputado F. Ejerciendo su derecho a la defensa material –garantizado en el artículo 8, inciso 2), apartados c), d) y e) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; el artículo 14, inciso 3, apartados b) y d) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, así como en los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 100 del Código Procesal Penal-, el acusado F impugna en casación la condenatoria dictada en su contra. Como primer motivo (ver folio 7714 del Tomo XVIII), el recurrente acusa el quebranto del debido proceso. En concreto, estima que en la especie se han irrespetado las reglas de concentración, continuidad, inmediación, oralidad y publicidad. Basa su reclamo en el argumento de que el Juez que presidió el Tribunal a cargo de este asunto –licenciado Carlos Sánchez Fernández- pidió a las partes, de previo a clausurar el debate, que se prorrogara el tiempo para deliberar y proceder a la lectura del fallo recurrido. Asimismo, indica que el mencionado Juez condicionó el dictado de una sentencia objetiva a que se atendiera su petición, ya que sólo extendiéndose el plazo de deliberación se podría elaborar un trabajo amplio y detallado por parte de la autoridad jurisdiccional. Estima el encartado que con dicho proceder se ha quebrantado el artículo 376 del Código Procesal Penal, pues no era ese el momento oportuno para declarar la causa como de tramitación compleja. Agrega que, en todo caso, ni siquiera se cumplió con el plazo legalmente previsto para ese tipo de asuntos, sino que el tiempo permitido por el legislador para esas situaciones especiales fue excedido. Señala que en el subjúdice pasaron cuarenta y cinco días naturales (lo que equivale a treinta y dos días hábiles) desde que se dio por finalizado el juicio oral y público hasta que se leyó la sentencia. Es el criterio del impugnante que dicha actuación es a todas luces atentatoria contra los principios rectores de la fase esencial del proceso penal costarricense, que es el juicio, pues al transcurrir tantísimos días se pierde la inmediación, la oralidad y la continuidad. El reparo no es de recibo. De conformidad con lo estipulado en el artículo 424 del Código Procesal Penal, quien recurre debe demostrar que los defectos que enuncia no sólo existen, sino que le causan agravio y no ha concurrido a provocarlos. En el presente caso, en efecto consta en autos (leer acta de debate a partir del folio 6820 en el Tomo XV) que el licenciado Carlos Sánchez Fernández –quien presidió el Tribunal Penal de Juicio del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José en este asunto- pidió a los interesados tiempo extraordinario para deliberar y así “tomar la decisión en una forma objetiva, justa, y elaborar un trabajo bien amplio y detallado como ustedes [el Juez se dirigía a las partes] lo han pedido . . .” (ver folio 6821 en el tomo indicado). En respaldo de su petición, el licenciado Sánchez Fernández citó el voto de esta Sala N° 565-F-93, de 9:05 horas del 22 de octubre de 1993. En dicho fallo (específicamente en su Considerando noveno) se expone una serie de razones por las cuales era posible –en los asuntos que se tramitaban de conformidad con las regulaciones previstas en el Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973- extender el período de deliberación por el tiempo que fuese razonablemente necesario para decidir el caso respectivo. A la hora de dictar la sentencia de comentario, se estimó lo siguiente: “(i) la deliberación debe dar inicio inmediatamente después del cierre del debate; (ii) las duración está regulada en el párrafo final del artículo 392 que remite al 361, de manera que la deliberación puede prolongarse todas las sesiones consecutivas que sean necesarias; (iii) el plazo para concluir la deliberación debe guardar relación y proporcionalidad con la naturaleza del asunto a decidir; (iv) mientras dura la deliberación, los juzgadores no pueden intervenir en otros asuntos, salvo que ya haya concluido ésta; y (v) la deliberación puede suspenderse hasta por un plazo de diez días y las causales son establecidas en el artículo 392, de modo que únicamente son la fuerza mayor y la enfermedad de alguno de los jueces”. Cuando esta Sala emitió el fallo recién aludido, el instrumento normativo que estaba vigente en esta materia era el Código de Procedimientos Penales de 1973 y las disposiciones de dicho texto legal permitían extender la deliberación todo el tiempo que fuese razonablemente necesario para tomar las decisiones atinentes a la respectiva causa. Hasta ahora, lo dicho en ese fallo 565-F-93 es lo que ha orientado las decisiones de los Tribunales en lo que respecta al tiempo con que cuentan para deliberar. Sin embargo, a partir de la presente sentencia debe advertirse que ese criterio no puede sostenerse en los asuntos que deben resolverse de conformidad con el Código Procesal Penal de 1996. A diferencia de lo que ocurría con la anterior normativa procesal, la ley de rito que hoy rige contempla de forma expresa una regulación especialmente diseñada por el Legislador para aquellos casos que se determine deben tramitarse como complejos. Las reglas específicas para este tipo de causas están contempladas en los artículos 319, 360, 364, 376, 377, 378 y 379, todos del Código Procesal Penal. La razón de ser de estas reglas especiales radica en que no todos los asuntos que conocen los despachos judiciales son iguales. Hay algunos que –por los hechos a dilucidar, así como por la materia de que se trata- demandan forzosamente más tiempo y dedicación que otros. Precisamente es cuando se está ante dichos supuestos que deviene posible requerir la autorización de que al proceso se apliquen las disposiciones relativas al trámite de casos complejos. Con estas se persigue –esencialmente- extender los plazos de ley para realizar ciertas actuaciones hasta los límites previstos en el artículo 378 del texto normativo de cita. Nótese que aquí se ha utilizado la palabra “límite” y ello se debe a que el numeral 379 del mismo cuerpo legal prevé que en todo aquello no expresamente mencionado en el Título II del Libro II de la Segunda Parte (Procedimientos) del Código Procesal Penal, se aplican las reglas del proceso ordinario, lo cual implica que deviene aplicable lo establecido en el párrafo segundo del artículo 360 de dicha ordenanza en lo que atañe a las consecuencias de incumplir (por exceso) el tiempo previsto para deliberar. Si esto ocurre, entonces la regla es que se anule lo actuado y el juicio deba realizarse nuevamente ante otro Tribunal. Sin embargo, ese enunciado debe relacionarse con lo establecido en el artículo 169 del Código Procesal Penal, donde se prevé la posibilidad de que las partes a cuyo favor se ha establecido un plazo pueden renunciar a él mediante manifestación expresa. Debe quedar claro de una vez que el tiempo establecido por el Legislador para que los jueces deliberen y dicten la sentencia que corresponda, está concebido a favor de los intereses de las partes, pues son éstas quienes gozan del derecho de que se les haga justicia pronta y cumplida, tal como se enuncia en el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política, en el 8 inciso 1) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y en el 14 inciso 3) apartado c) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Ahora bien, en el caso bajo examen, pese a que fue el propio Tribunal el que promovió la extensión indefinida del plazo para deliberar y dictar el respectivo fallo, lo cierto es que todos los interesados consintieron lo que les propuso el cuerpo juzgador. Así las cosas, ellos renunciaron al plazo –concebido a su favor- que limitaba el tiempo con que contaba el órgano de mérito para dictar la resolución que aquí interesa. En esa tesitura, sí hay un irrespeto de los límites temporales para la emisión de la sentencia, pero en el caso concreto ese proceder no causó agravio a las partes, toda vez que ellas aceptaron la proposición del a quo. En ese sentido, su consentimiento –aparte de constituir una renuncia de un plazo establecido a su favor- constituyó un factor esencial para que sucediera lo que acaeció: que los jueces de instancia tomaran tantísimos días para dictar la resolución que ahora se recurre. Al tenor de todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XV.Como segundo motivo, F estima que el a quo inobservó las reglas de la sana crítica e incurrió en falta de fundamentación de la sentencia. Considera que el órgano de mérito valoró incorrectamente el material probatorio e interpreta equivocadamente diferentes conceptos, todo lo cual acarreó un quebranto de la ley sustantiva. Como fundamento del alegato, el imputado un lado el Tribunal sentenciador sostiene que el cobro realizado por el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social es el mismo que constituyó la concusión, pero después indica que aquel fue derogado y que se trata de un cobro distinto fundado en el convenio de cooperación; y b) expresa que en los decretos ejecutivos que regulaban el programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional lo que se reservaba para el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social era el otorgamiento del documento, no su confección material, por lo que no es cierto que se transfiriesen competencias a FUNDEHCA. El reparo es inatendible. Ya se expuso supra en los Considerandos VII y VIII que en esta causa han sido acreditados dos cobros distintos a los migrantes por concepto de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional: el primero de ellos está amparado en los decretos ejecutivos que lo creaban a favor del Estado; el segundo, en el convenio de cooperación de FUNDEHCA. Además, ya se indicó por qué son independientes y las razones por las cuales el segundo es constitutivo de concusión, mientras que el primero lo es de exacción ilegal. También se expresó por qué la distinción de los cobros se extrae de la sentencia y se dijo que la concusión se encuentra debidamente fundamentada. A todo ello debe atenerse el recurrente. En cuanto a la distinción entre lo que es otorgar y confeccionar la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, el mismo impugnante ratifica lo que ha dicho el a quo y se sostiene en este fallo: el que otorgaba el documento era el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Lo anterior, aunado al hecho de que el pago de los cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00) era un requisito para que los migrantes recibieran la tarjeta, demuestra que en efecto se cobraba ilegalmente a esta población por un servicio que les prestaba el Estado. El trabajo que FUNDEHCA hacía, cual era la elaboración o confección –como dice el recurrente- material del documento, estaba dirigido a servirle al Ministerio, no a los migrantes, lo que realza la ilegalidad del cobro, pues la dependencia pública no estaba asumiendo los costos de un servicio que se le prestaba, sino que los estaba trasladando a los usuarios. Cabe acotar que esto también se deriva del fallo impugnado, como se impugnante a lo allí indicado. Así las cosas, estima este Despacho que no se da ninguno de los vicios alegados, por lo que el reclamo debe ser declarado sin lugar.

XVI.Como tercer motivo se reclama fundamentación omisa o ilegal, violación a las reglas de la sana crítica y quebranto del principio de experiencia. Indica que no se apreció adecuadamente cuáles son las funciones de la Contraloría General de la República. Agrega que ese órgano del Poder Legislativo no es asesor ni ejerce control previo. El reproche no es de recibo. Ya se expuso supra en el Considerando XI –a lo cual debe atenerse el impugnante- por qué es intrascendente en este caso discutir si tenía razón o no la Contraloría General de la República de no refrendar el convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y FUNDEHCA, pues la ilegalidad de dicho acuerdo era evidente para el momento de su firma y en todo caso ya fue declarada debidamente en sede penal, que es la competente para determinar tal cosa en virtud de que se trata de actuación administrativa relacionada con un delito. En ese sentido, es irrelevante que el a quo se haya equivocado o no a la hora de evaluar lo actuado por la Contraloría en este asunto. A mayor abundamiento debe indicarse al recurrente que –contrario a lo que expone- el órgano legislativo sí es asesor y sí ejerce un control previo. Su potestad asesora no está referida sólo a los órganos parlamentarios (párrafo tercero del artículo 31 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, la cual –por cierto- fue emitida y publicada en 1994, sea que estaba vigente cuando F procedió como lo hizo), sino que desde que se prevé la potestad de informar (ejúsdem) y de rendir dictámenes en ejercicio de la potestad consultiva (artículo 29 del texto normativo de cita,), queda claro que sí orienta (y en ese sentido, asesora) a las entidades fiscalizadas, como lo es el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Además, en el artículo 20 de la Ley de referencia se indica que de previo a ordenar la ejecución del respectivo contrato, la Administración debe gestionar y obtener la aprobación por parte de la Contraloría, con lo cual se hace evidente que sí se está ante un control previo, pues sin ese refrendo no es posible ejecutar legalmente un contrato. En todo caso, ya se expuso que todo lo que se pueda debatir sobre estos puntos no es esencial para acreditar la concusión, pues esta se basa en la existencia de un cobro ilegal a la población migrante por parte de F, quien en ejercicio abusivo de su cargo movió a esas personas a entregar un beneficio patrimonial indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA. Por todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XVII.Como cuarto motivo se reclama fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba, quebranto del principio de objetividad y violación de las reglas de la sana crítica. En concreto, estima el recurrente se incurrió en un error al no valorar lo declarado por tres testigos, para quienes el convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social no tenía por qué ser refrendado por la Contraloría General de la República. Agrega que no se fundamenta por qué la apertura de una cuenta corriente específica para administrar los dineros que se recaudaban (con base en los decretos ejecutivos) por concepto de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional significaría un quebranto del principio de caja única. Señala que no se puede derivar que él fuese el responsable de la apertura de la cuenta mencionada. Expresa que no se tuvo claro que FUNDEHCA era útil para resolver un problema nacional, que no se apreció el contexto en que ocurrieron los hechos, que los decretos ejecutivos son actos complejos que no pueden emanar solamente de un Ministro. El reclamo es inatendible. Ya se ha expuesto a lo largo de este fallo que está debidamente acreditado en sede penal –que es la competente para ello- que el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social es abiertamente ilegal. En ese sentido, es intrascendente discutir si tenía razón o no la Contraloría General de la República a la hora de no refrendar dicho acuerdo. Por esto último es igualmente irrelevante el criterio que pudieran tener tres profesionales en Derecho sobre el punto. En todo caso, está claro que mediante ese instrumento se estaba creando –a sabiendas- un cobro ilegal a los migrantes por un servicio que a ellos se los prestaba el Estado y de paso se evitaba que éste pagara a FUNDEHCA por un servicio que esa entidad le prestaba al Estado, no a los migrantes. Lo anterior es suficiente –como ya se ha dicho a lo largo de esta sentencia- para tener por configurada la concusión. En cuanto a la apertura de la cuenta corriente en la que el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social manejaba los dineros recaudados merced al cobro que se establecía en decretos ejecutivos por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, debe indicarse que eso se relaciona con el tema de la exacción ilegal, que es el delito que se basa en lo acaecido al amparo de los decretos aludidos (la concusión no se funda en esos hechos, sino en lo ocurrido en torno al convenio de cooperación). Por haber sido absuelto F por el delito de exacción ilegal, carece de interés discutir ahora cómo se estableció que al aplicar esos decretos se vulneró el principio de caja única, si él era responsable o no de la apertura de la mencionada cuenta, si la emisión de los decretos se justificaba por la realidad nacional al momento en que se dictaron, o si éstos son actos complejos del Poder Ejecutivo en los que no interviene solamente un Ministro. En cuanto al papel de FUNDEHCA en el desarrollo del programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional, debe indicarse que si bien es posible admitir que esa fundación pudo haber sido útil para atender la problemática de los migrantes, también lo es que ello no elimina un aspecto esencial para efectos de acreditar la concusión: FUNDEHCA fue beneficiada al recibir de los migrantes dinero que a ellos les estaba siendo cobrado ilegalmente. Así, es irrelevante determinar si esa organización privada jugaba un papel importante o no en la solución de los problemas que generaba la presencia de migrantes indocumentados en el país. A mayor abundamiento debe recordarse que se expuso supra en el Considerando IX de esta resolución, por qué la situación de Costa Rica como consecuencia de la masa de migrantes indocumentados que aquí radicaban no puede constituirse en causa de justificación ni de exculpación a favor de F. En virtud de todo lo anterior, estima esta Sala que no se configura ninguno de los defectos alegados, por lo que procede declarar sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XVIII.Como quinto motivo, el reclamante acusa fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y quebranto de los principios de la sana crítica. En concreto, señala que en la especie se descartó sin mayor fundamento la existencia de un error de prohibición. Indica que varios profesionales en Derecho le Seguridad Social y FUNDEHCA no requería de refrendo por la Contraloría General de la República, por lo que actuó bajo error al no someter el documento ante dicha entidad. Sostiene que la redacción de los decretos ejecutivos no es obra exclusiva de un Ministro de Estado, por lo que si las ilegalidades no se advierten en el procedimiento, entonces no debe responsabilizársele por actuación dolosa. El reproche es inatendible. Ya se expuso supra en los Considerandos XI y XVI –a los cuales debe atenerse el impugnante- por qué es intrascendente en este caso discutir si tenía razón o no la Contraloría General de la República de no refrendar el convenio de cooperación entre el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y FUNDEHCA, pues la ilegalidad de dicho acuerdo fue declarada debidamente en sede penal, que es la competente para decretarla. Así, deviene igualmente irrelevante que distintos abogados le hayan manifestado al justiciable si el acuerdo tantas veces aludido debía ser sometido a examen por la Contraloría. Además, se ha indicado en esta resolución que el delito por el que deviene responsable F se configura por lo acaecido en torno al convenio de cooperación y no por lo que sucedió en relación con los decretos ejecutivos, por lo que carece de interés saber si cuando suscribió esos instrumentos normativos incurrió en error o no. Así las cosas, el alegato debe ser declarado sin lugar.

XIX.Como sexto motivo, el imputado F reclama fundamentación ilegal y quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica. En concreto, afirma que el a quo desconoce el valor que la ley otorga a un informe de auditoría. Cuestiona que se tome el criterio vertido en tal informe como definitivo. El reparo no puede prosperar. Lo que pretende el impugnante es que se descarte que actuó dolosamente al suscribir el convenio de cooperación. Ello no es posible. Tal como se expuso supra en los Considerandos VII y X de este fallo, a la hora de firmar el acuerdo con FUNDEHCA, F tenía conocimiento de que no era posible cobrar a la población migrante por el servicio que el Estado le prestaba. Ese conocimiento se alcanzó no sólo por el informe de auditoría al que hace mención el recurrente, sino que además se sustenta en el informe y las recomendaciones emitidas por el órgano de procedimiento que se instauró para realizar la investigación sugerida por el entonces Vice-Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social Eugenio Solano Calderón. Además, las decisiones tomadas por F el 6 de octubre de 1997 de ordenar el cierre de la cuenta bancaria en que se depositaba el dinero recaudado al amparo de los decretos ejecutivos, así como la de disponer que se elaborara un anteproyecto de ley para poder cobrar una tasa por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, son prueba incontrovertible de que el justiciable estaba consciente de la ilegalidad de la situación. En ese sentido, el conocimiento de la ilicitud en su proceder por parte de F no sólo no deriva exclusivamente del informe de la Dirección General de Auditoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, sino que ha sido plenamente acreditado con base en otros documentos y en lo actuado por el mismo acusado. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XX.Como séptimo motivo, el recurrente alega fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica. Cuestiona la afirmación del Tribunal sentenciador en el sentido de que fue antes del 6 de octubre de 1997 que él firmó el decreto mediante el cual se derogaba el cobro por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. El reclamo no es de recibo. Pese a que ciertamente no es posible afirmar –con base en la prueba que consta en autos- que el encartado haya suscrito el decreto N° 26430-MTSS de 8 de octubre de 1997, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta N° 209 de 30 de octubre de 1997, antes del día 6 de ese mismo mes, debe decirse que ello es intrascendente para efectos de determinar la responsabilidad penal del encartado. En efecto, el delito de concusión por el que se sancionó a F se acredita con base en lo acontecido en torno al convenio de cooperación entre la cartera ministerial entonces a su cargo y FUNDEHCA; tal ilícito no se configura respecto de lo actuado al amparo de los decretos ejecutivos. Así, la derogación de la tasa que se cobraba a los migrantes a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social para que se les tramitase la tarjeta de trabajo estacional en nada incide sobre el delito por el que deviene responsable el imputado. Además, el conocimiento que tenía F de la ilicitud de cobrar a la población migrante por un servicio que presta el Estado sin que medie disposición de rango legal que así lo establezca se encuentra debidamente sustentado en documentos que el endilgado tuvo a su alcance antes del 6 de octubre de 1997 y también en lo actuado por el imputado en esa fecha. Así las cosas, el que hubiese firmado o no el decreto supra indicado antes de ese día es irrelevante para los efectos de este asunto, de modo que la afirmación del a quo en tal sentido puede suprimirse del fallo impugnado sin que ello incida a favor del recurrente, lo que demuestra que el aserto no le causa agravio alguno, por lo que debe declararse sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XXI.Como octavo motivo, F alega fundamentación ilegal y contradictoria, así como el quebranto del principio in dubio pro reo. En concreto, indica que la Contraloría General de la República nunca declaró la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes que se establecía en el convenio de cooperación tantas veces citado. Señala que esa entidad sólo expresó tener serias dudas sobre la legalidad del mismo. Afirma que ante un estado dubitativo no puede decretarse su responsabilidad penal. Estima que la recomendación que se le hizo por parte de la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social de elaborar un proyecto de ley para aprovechar los recursos provenientes del cobro a los migrantes por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional no sugiere que el mismo sea ilegal. Dice que el hecho de que se haya vulnerado el principio de caja única del Estado por depositar los fondos provenientes del cobro a los migrantes en una cuenta especial, no implica necesariamente que el cobro sea ilegal. Los reclamos deben ser rechazados. De conformidad con lo expuesto a lo largo de este fallo, a lo cual debe atenerse el recurrente, la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes que se crea mediante el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social es manifiesta y ha sido debidamente declarada en sede penal, que es la competente para ello. Así, es intrascendente –para efectos del delito de concusión- que la Contraloría General de la República declarase o no que el mencionado acuerdo es ilegal, toda vez que tal declaración ya ha sido hecha por el órgano competente para ello. Además, debe reiterarse que no hay duda alguna sobre la ilegalidad de tal cobro, por lo que no existe el estado dubitativo que alega el impugnante a su favor. En lo que respecta al argumento de que las recomendaciones emitidas por la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social no implican que el cobro a los migrantes sea ilegal, debe indicarse que no lleva razón el recurrente. Ciertamente mediante oficio N° DAJ-AI-943-97 de 24 de septiembre de 1997 (visible a folio 247 en el Tomo I del expediente), dirigido a F, se recomendó al imputado el cierre de la cuenta en la que se manejaban los fondos del programa de tarjeta de trabajo y también que se presentase un proyecto de ley ante la Asamblea Legislativa para que esta autorizase cobrar a los migrantes por la emisión de dicho documento. Lo que interesa destacar es que en ese documento expresamente (ver folio 250 en el último Tomo indicado) se hizo la salvedad de que la autorización legislativa para usar los futuros ingresos que pudieran derivarse del cobro a los migrantes dependía de que se mantuviese la vigencia del cobro. Esa advertencia se formuló de conformidad con lo previamente señalado por la Auditoría Interna del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social en el sentido de que tal cobro se efectuaba en contravención de la reserva de ley en materia tributaria (en el punto B.6 del informe de Asuntos Jurídicos expresamente se resalta lo advertido por el cuerpo auditor; ver folios 249 y 250 en el Tomo de referencia), por lo que es evidente que no sólo se prevenía a F sobre la ilegalidad de la apertura de una cuenta corriente especial para administrar los fondos recaudados por concepto de la tarjeta de trabajo, sino que también se señaló con toda claridad que el cobro en sí era ilegal, para lo cual se hizo mención del criterio de la Auditoría Interna de la cartera ministerial de comentario. Así las cosas, no es cierto que del informe de la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos no se desprendiese la ilegalidad del tantas veces mencionado cobro a los migrantes. Además, estando advertido F de que no se podía cobrar a la población migrante por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional con base en los decretos ejecutivos en virtud de que la creación de tasas por servicios estatales es materia reservada a la ley, es evidente su proceder doloso pues sin reparo alguno hizo caso omiso de esa prohibición e instauró un nuevo cobro al amparo de un simple convenio de cooperación (fuente normativa de mucho menor rango que el decreto ejecutivo y muy inferior a la ley), con el agravante de que el beneficiado con ese dinero ya no era el Estado sino FUNDEHCA. Por último, debe indicarse que es posible que el quebranto del principio de caja única del Estado no signifique el acaecimiento de actos ilegales, pero ello no incide en el presente caso. Recuérdese que el citado principio se vulneró por la apertura de la cuenta corriente especial para manejar los fondos provenientes del cobro que merced a los decretos ejecutivos se hacía a los migrantes por concepto de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Pero ya se dijo que lo actuado al amparo de esos decretos es constitutivo de exacción ilegal, delito por el cual se absolvió al justiciable. El ilícito por el que se condenó a F es el de concusión, el cual tiene su raíz en lo acontecido en torno al convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Así, es evidente que el tema de la apertura de la cuenta especial no está ligado al de la configuración del delito por el que deviene penalmente responsable el ex Ministro. Por todo lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XXII.Como noveno motivo, el recurrente alega fundamentación ilegal, quebranto de los principios de la sana crítica y que el fallo impugnado es contradictorio. En particular, F sostiene que se da una incongruencia en la sentencia dictada en su contra, pues en la misma se afirma que los justiciables no actuaron conforme a Derecho a la hora de trasladar del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a FUNDEHCA el cobro que se hacía a los migrantes (hace una referencia a la página 667 del fallo; folio 7491 en el Tomo XVII del expediente). Agrega que en la misma resolución (remite a la página 664 de la sentencia impugnada; folio 7488 en el Tomo XVII del ejecutivos fue derogado. Con base en esas dos manifestaciones del Tribunal juzgador, sostiene el recurrente que no hay fundamento alguno para estimar que el cobro que hacía FUNDEHCA debiese haber ingresado a las arcas del Estado. El reclamo no es de recibo. Tal como se ha dicho ya muchas veces a lo largo de esta resolución, en la especie se está ante dos cobros distintos. Uno se efectuó con base en los decretos ejecutivos y otro pretende ampararse en el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Lo que sucede –tal como se ha explicado- es que en ambos casos la entidad que presta el servicio a los migrantes es el Ministerio; era esa cartera la única competente para otorgar la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Esto explica por qué cualquier cobro que se hubiese hecho por este concepto debía haber ingresado a las arcas estatales. Recuérdese que FUNDEHCA a la que prestaba servicio era al Ministerio, no a los migrantes, por lo que si alguien debía retribuir a esa fundación era precisamente el órgano estatal, no los que requerían el servicio por parte del Estado costarricense. De conformidad con lo anterior, el que se diga en la resolución cuestionada que uno de los cobros fue derogado no causa agravio alguno al justiciable F. Además, tampoco le perjudica el que se diga que se pretendía trasladar el cobro que existía bajo los decretos a una situación regida por el convenio, pues si se lee la sentencia como una pieza integral queda claro que con ello no se pretende indicar (como lo quiere hacer ver el recurrente) que se estaba ante un solo cobro (circunstancia que en el mismo fallo se tiene por desvirtuada, como se explicó en los Considerandos VI, VII y VIII de esta resolución), sino que simplemente es un giro idiomático para se pretendía aplicar una figura (el cobro) que ya se sabía ilegal desde la situación precedente (lo que sucedía al amparo de los decretos ejecutivos). Con base en todo lo

XXIII.Como décimo motivo, F alega fundamentación ilegal y exclusión arbitraria de prueba. Sostiene que pese a que el Tribunal sentenciador expresa que conoce de la existencia de un proceso contencioso administrativo entablado por FUNDEHCA contra el Estado por el no refrendo del convenio de cooperación entre esa entidad y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, el a quo no se ajustó a las reglas de prejudicialidad que a su juicio tiene aquel asunto sobre el que aquí se conoce. El reclamo es totalmente improcedente. Ya se ha explicado en la presente resolución que es la sede penal a la que compete pronunciarse sobre la legalidad del acuerdo entre la cartera ministerial y la fundación, por lo que la declaratoria de tal convenio como ilegal se encuentra apegada a Derecho y a ello debe atenerse el recurrente. Lo anterior revela que no existe la prejudicialidad alegada del proceso contencioso administrativo sobre el penal, sino que más bien lo aquí decidido incide sobre esa jurisdicción. De conformidad con lo resolver lo que corresponda en sede penal, por lo que lo actuado no causa perjuicio alguno al justiciable y en virtud de ello procede declarar sin lugar este reclamo.

XXIV.Como décimoprimer motivo, F acusa fundamentación ilegal, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y violación de las reglas de la sana crítica. En específico, reclama que se afirme en la sentencia recurrida (ver hecho probado N° 27 a folio 6941 en el Tomo XVI) que él aprovechó en su beneficio personal la suma de trescientos mil colones (¢300.000,00) que el 16 de octubre de 1997 le fueron depositados por su secretaria en una cuenta personal que él tenía en el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica; dichos dineros provenían de los cobros que se hacían en FUNDEHCA a los migrantes. Sostiene que si bien es cierto de esa cuenta en particular no consta que en los días posteriores a ese depósito se hayan efectuado egresos que reafirmen su versión en el sentido de que reintegró el dinero, también lo es que no se ha constatado si él tenía otras cuentas, por lo que no puede descartarse que haya devuelto ese dinero. Agrega que los testimonios en que se basa el aserto del Tribunal son contradictorios y que no puede sostenerse que él haya dado la orden de que la suma de comentario le fuese depositada en su cuenta. El reclamo debe ser rechazado. Pese a que en efecto los argumentos expuestos por F podrían ser útiles para cuestionar la afirmación del a quo en el sentido de que él aprovechó en su beneficio particular los trescientos mil colones de comentario (¢300.000,00), lo cierto es que se trata de un punto completamente irrelevante para efectos de la condena dictada en su contra por el delito de concusión. En primer término, debe recordarse que el Tribunal de instancia acredita el apoderamiento de esa suma tanto en el elenco de hechos probados (ver hecho 27 a folio 6941 en el Tomo XVI) como en la parte considerativa relacionada directamente con el ilícito por el que deviene penalmente responsable F (ver en particular el folio 676 de la sentencia; es decir, el folio 7500 en el Tomo XVII, que se ubica en el acápite dedicado al análisis de fondo en lo que respecta al delito por el que se sancionó al justiciable). Lo que interesa destacar es que esos trescientos mil colones (¢300.000,00) eran producto del pago que los migrantes hacían a FUNDEHCA y después de recaudados por esa entidad es que llegan a la cuenta de F. Ello revela que el delito estaba de sobra configurado cuando se produjo el traslado de los fondos que aquí interesan, toda vez que ya FUNDEHCA los había percibido merced a la motivación que había hecho el encartado para que los migrantes pagaran a favor de esa entidad algo que no debían, por lo que es irrelevante determinar si él los utilizó a su favor o los reintegró. Así, para efectos penales la afirmación de comentario resulta algo no esencial como sustento de la condenatoria, por lo que puede prescindirse de ella sin que tal proceder acarree beneficio alguno al imputado. Igual de intrascendente resulta la afirmación de referencia en lo que se refiere a los aspectos civiles derivados del hecho punible, pues la acción civil resarcitoria incoada con base en lo constitutivo de concusión fue declarada sin lugar (de hecho, respecto de este encartado se acogió el reclamo civil únicamente en lo que atañe a un peculado de servicios). De conformidad con todo lo expuesto, el aserto cuestionado no causa agravio alguno al recurrente y por ello el presente alegato debe ser declarado sin lugar.

XXV.Como décimosegundo motivo, el recurrente plantea que en la especie se ha incurrido en falta de fundamentación, exclusión arbitraria de prueba y quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica. En concreto, sostiene que la posibilidad de deportar extranjeros indocumentados tiene su base en la Ley de Migración y Extranjería y por ello no es ilegítimo advertir sobre ello a quienes debían requerir la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Sostiene que no se explica por qué habrían de sentirse conminados los migrantes a realizar el trámite de dicho documento ante el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y ante FUNDEHCA. Reitera que Costa Rica se veía amenazada por la gran cantidad de inmigrantes ilegales que habitaban suelo patrio. Indica que en el convenio de cooperación no se creó una tasa, sino una tarifa voluntaria para los migrantes. El reclamo debe ser rechazado. Lo que pretende el recurrente es desvirtuar la configuración de los elementos típicos del delito por el que se le sancionó. Ya se expuso supra en los Considerandos VI y VII de esta sentencia que la concusión está debidamente acreditada y a lo allí resuelto debe atenerse el impugnante. Cabe agregar –a mayor abundamiento- que si mediante la obtención de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional los migrantes se veían autorizados a trabajar en el país, está claro que no podían ser deportados y si para obtener el mencionado documento era requisito pagar cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00) a FUNDEHCA, es evidente que estaban obligados a hacerlo, pues si no lo hacían no obtenían la tarjeta y sin esta podían ser deportados. Además, el hecho de que se tenga ese cobro como requisito para obtener la tarjeta evidencia que no se trata de una erogación voluntaria por parte de los migrantes. Por último, el hecho de que la tarjeta la debía otorgar el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social revela que el mencionado cobro sí era una tasa –creada mediante un simple convenio de cooperación, lo que evidencia su ilegalidad- por un servicio público.

XXVI.Como motivo décimotercero, alega F falta de correlación entre acusación y sentencia. En concreto, dice que no es lo mismo que se acuse que en informes de la Contraloría General de la República y de órganos internos del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social se indique que es aparentemente ilegal el cobro que se hacía a los migrantes con base en los decretos ejecutivos, a que se declare tal ilegalidad en sede penal. Cuestiona que se afirme que la concusión deriva de lo actuado con base en el convenio de cooperación entre la cartera ministerial a su cargo y FUNDEHCA. Asimismo, expresa su disconformidad por el hecho de que se estime que el cobro que hacía FUNDEHCA a los migrantes era obligatorio. El reproche es improcedente. Debe atenerse el recurrente a lo ya resuelto en este fallo sobre la conformidad a Derecho de que en sede penal se haya determinado que los cobros hechos a los migrantes (tanto el que se hizo con base en los decretos ejecutivos –exacción ilegal ya prescrita- como el efectuado al amparo del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social –que es el que interesa para efectos de la concusión-) por concepto de tarjeta de trabajo estacional son ambos ilegales. Además, debe destacarse que esa situación de ilegalidad se deriva directamente de los hechos acusados, por lo que no se aprecia incongruencia alguna. El que la concusión se derive de lo acontecido bajo la égida del mencionado convenio no contradice tampoco la pieza acusatoria, sino que se deriva de aquella. En todo caso, adviértase que en los casos en que según el impugnante no hay correlación de la sentencia con la acusación, en ninguno de ellos precisa el recurrente qué dice una y qué otra, ni las compara, ni explica en qué consiste la incompatibilidad. En ese sentido, es evidente que no se logra demostrar agravio alguno, por lo que debe declararse sin lugar este alegato.

XXVII.Como décimocuarto motivo, F estima que no se evacuó prueba fundamental para sus intereses. En concreto, reclama que debían realizarse cuatro estudios contables, uno en relación con el peculado de bienes, otro con el peculado de servicios, otro con la concusión y el cuarto con el costo de la tarjeta de trabajo. El reclamo es inatendible. A F no se le condenó penalmente por peculado alguno, ni de servicios ni de bienes, por lo que es irrelevante en lo penal la prueba que extraña. Cierto es que civilmente sí se le condenó en abstracto a resarcir el daño generado merced a un peculado de servicios, pero por el tipo de condena el estudio contable tendrá relevancia en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, de modo que no incide sobre la resolución que aquí interesa. En lo que atañe a la concusión, ya se ha expuesto aquí que ese delito se configuró en la especie por el hecho de que F motivó a los migrantes a pagar a FUNDEHCA una suma de dinero que no tenían por qué entregar, de modo que es intrascendente saber cuánto fue lo que se recaudó producto de esa delincuencia, de modo que es igualmente irrelevante la prueba que se extraña para efectos de acreditar este ilícito. La misma intrascendencia se observa en lo que se refiere al costo de la tarjeta de trabajo, pues no importa cuánto le hubiese costado a FUNDEHCA el trabajo que le asignó el ex Ministro F, pues esa era una tarea que no podía cobrarse a los migrantes. Por lo anterior, procede declarar sin lugar este alegato.

XXVIII.Como primer motivo por el fondo, el impugnante alega errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva, toda vez que se dejó de aplicar el artículo 27 del Código Penal. Estima que en la especie quedó acreditado que actuó al amparo de un estado de necesidad que justifica su proceder. Recuerda el estado de las relaciones entre Costa Rica y Nicaragua en 1995 y la urgencia de tomar medidas para atender a la población migrante y evitar el colapso de servicios. El reproche no es de recibo. Debe el imputado atenerse a lo ya resuelto en el Considerando IX de este fallo, en el que se justifique su conducta.

XXIX.Como segundo motivo por vicios in iudicando, F alega que no se podía aplicar el artículo 348 del Código Penal, pues no se acreditó que actuase de forma dolosa. El reclamo es inatendible. Ya se expuso en los Considerandos VII, IX y X de esta sentencia por qué está debidamente acreditado que F cometió el delito de concusión y que su proceder fue doloso, a lo cual debe atenerse el recurrente.

XXX.Como tercer motivo por el fondo, alega el impugnante que se quebrantó el artículo 71 del Código Penal, toda vez que la pena de ocho años de prisión que se le impuso está fuera de todo parámetro de proporcionalidad. Este tema fue examinado en el Considerando XIII de este fallo y debe atenerse el recurrente a lo allí resuelto.

XXXI.Sobre el recurso interpuesto a favor de J. Por cuestiones de orden sistemático, pues contiene un alegato en el que le asiste razón a los recurrentes e incide sobre el fallo impugnado, se resolverán conjuntamente y en primer término los dos motivos por el fondo. A partir del folio 8539 en el Tomo XXI del defensores de J), los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas hacen una crítica exhaustiva de todos y cada uno de los puntos sustantivos en que se funda la condenatoria de su patrocinado. Pese a que separan en dos acápites sus argumentos sobre el por qué estiman erróneamente aplicada la ley penal a la conducta que se acreditó a su defendido, en realidad plantean un solo problema, cual es el de que J no es penalmente responsable por la concusión y que aún cuando lo fuera, lo sería en carácter de cómplice y no de coautor, lo que redundaría en la proporcionalidad de la pena impuesta. De allí que sea procedente emitir un solo pronunciamiento sobre el tema. En concreto, sostienen los impugnantes que la suscripción por parte de su defendido del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social fue estimado en sentencia como un acto preparatorio para la comisión del delito por el que se sancionó a J. Dicen que aparte de esa conducta en la fase preparatoria, no hay ninguna otra que se enmarque dentro del tipo de concusión. Consideran que en ese estado de cosas, nunca podría considerarse que J coautor de dicho ilícito, pero tampoco partícipe, pues su intervención no se dio en la fase ejecutiva, sino en una etapa previa no punible. Afirman que si la concusión fue cometida desde que se emitieron los decretos ejecutivos que sustentaron en primer término el cobro a los migrantes por la emisión de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional y el acusado de comentario no gozaba de la investidura suficiente para emitir dichos cuerpos normativos, entonces no puede responsabilizársele penalmente por el delito en cuestión. Señalan que no se tiene por demostrado que J tuviese conocimiento de la ilegalidad de las actuaciones del co-imputado F. Agregan que si la concusión es un delito en el que el sujeto activo debe ser un funcionario público y su defendido no lo es, entonces no podía comunicársele esa circunstancia como autor, sino como partícipe. Estiman que en la especie se dejó de aplicar la causa de justificación atinente al cumplimiento de un deber legal, pues debía atenderse el problema migratorio que se daba en Costa Rica a mediado de la década de los años noventa. Alegan que su patrocinado actuó bajo la concurrencia de un error de tipo, pues no sabía que el cobro a los migrantes era ilegal. Finalmente, prohibición, pues estaba convencido de que el convenio de cooperación era válido y no requería del refrendo por parte de la Contraloría General de la República. El reclamo es parcialmente procedente. De conformidad con lo que seguidamente se expondrá, ciertamente no puede tenerse a J como coautor del delito de concusión –en ello llevan razón los recurrentes-, pero sí es cómplice del mismo, por lo que deviene penalmente responsable, aunque no de la forma como lo estableció el a quo. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando VII, el delito de concusión se configura con base en lo acontecido en torno a la elaboración y puesta en práctica del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Así, es intrascendente todo lo que se refiera a si J intervino en el procedimiento de redacción y ejecución de los decretos ejecutivos en los que se basó por algún tiempo el cobro a los migrantes, pues esto estaría relacionado con la exacción ilegal respecto de la cual el a quo declaró prescrita la acción. Lo que interesa saber es cuál fue su nivel de intervención en lo que ataña al delito de concusión. Según los hechos que se tienen por demostrados (ver folio 6938 en el Tomo XVI), J, a sabiendas de que las objeciones de ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes por la emisión de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, redactan, desarrollan y suscriben el tantas veces mencionado convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, tras lo cual el mismo es puesto en práctica, figurando este encartado como Director Ejecutivo de la fundación. Cabe advertir que el conocimiento que tenía J de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes está debidamente fundado a partir del folio 7472 en el Tomo XVII, pues independientemente de la empatía entre él y F, lo que interesa es que este último anotó sobre el informe de la Dirección General de Autoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social en que se cuestionaba la adecuación del cobro a los migrantes al ordenamiento jurídico que ese documento debía ser estudiado por el primero (ver folio 7475 en el último tomo mencionado; por cierto, J declaró en debate y admitió que F le había comentado los obstáculos que enfrentaba el programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional; ver folio 7127 en el Tomo XVI), con lo cual se hace evidente que estos imputados tenían contactos y discutían sobre el problema. Además, tal como se dijo en el mismo Considerando VII, la ilegalidad de ese cobro era evidente y se extraía con toda claridad de los criterios vertidos tanto por la Dirección General de Auditoría del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social como por el órgano de procedimiento en torno a ese tema. Así, es perfectamente razonable entender que ambos imputados, tanto por su cercanía como por el hecho indebatible de que compartían información e intercambiaban opiniones sobre las objeciones que se planteaban, sabían que contrariaba el ordenamiento jurídico el cobrar a los migrantes por el servicio público que significaba el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. De conformidad con lo anterior, J, al igual que F, estaba al tanto de la ilegalidad de dicho cobro, pese a lo cual suscribió el convenio mencionado y dirigió en parte la ejecución del mismo, en su carácter de Director Ejecutivo de FUNDEHCA. Es evidente entonces que el patrocinado por los aquí impugnantes sí intervino en los hechos por los cuales se declaró a F autor del delito de concusión. Lo que debe ahora aclararse es si deviene penalmente responsable por su intervención. Estima esta Sala que sí, pero no como coautor (que fue lo resuelto por el a quo), sino como cómplice. De conformidad con los hechos probados, lo que hizo J fue prestar –a sabiendas- su cooperación a F para lograr que los migrantes realizaran un pago que no debían a favor de FUNDEHCA. El defendido por los aquí recurrentes suscribió y puso en práctica, en su carácter de Director Ejecutivo de FUNDEHCA, el convenio de cooperación entre esa entidad y el Ministerio que dirigía F. Toda la fase de elaboración e incluso hasta la misma suscripción del acuerdo podrían eventualmente ubicarse en los actos preparatorios del delito de concusión, como lo mencionan los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas (quienes extraen del fallo impugnado unas frases que utilizan como apoyo para su alegato). Pese a que en ello podrían llevar razón los representantes de J, lo cierto es que la ejecución (aspecto que no fue calificado por el a quo –ni siquiera en el extracto de la sentencia que utilizan los reclamantes- como acto preparatorio) del mencionado convenio claramente se ubica dentro de la fase ejecutiva del ilícito, por lo que es en relación con el cumplimiento del convenio que se derivan actuaciones del encartado que le acarrean responsabilidad penal. Ya se expuso supra (ver Considerando VII) que el delito de concusión surge a la vida jurídica merced a lo que acontece en torno a la firma y puesta en práctica del tantas veces mencionado convenio de cooperación. Es gracias a este instrumento que F logra cobrar indebidamente a los migrantes una suma de dinero que se destina a un tercero que es FUNDEHCA. Como Director Ejecutivo de esa fundación, J, quien sabía que no se podía cobrar a los migrantes por el servicio que les prestaba el Estado (recuérdese que nunca salió del ámbito de las atribuciones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social el otorgar la tarjeta de trabajo estacional), puso en práctica el convenio, de modo que contribuyó sustancialmente con el ex Ministro en la ejecución del delito que aquí interesa. Ahora bien, esa contribución se ajusta solamente a lo dispuesto en el artículo 47 del Código Penal y no a lo estipulado en el artículo 45 del mismo cuerpo normativo. No puede tenerse como coautor de concusión a J, pues no sólo no era funcionario público cuando colaboró con F en la comisión del ilícito por el que se condenó a este último, sino que tampoco tenía la posibilidad de abusar de un cargo público, pues no ostentaba ninguno, ni podía obligar o inducir a los migrantes a hacer el pago indebido en los términos del artículo 348 del Código Penal, toda vez que para ello debe abusar del puesto público. En otras palabras, no realiza en conjunto con F el tipo penal, pues no reúne las condiciones para hacerlo. Lo que sí hizo J fue auxiliar a F para que este último, quien sí era funcionario público (uno de los de más alto nivel en el Estado costarricense), determinara a los migrantes a realizar un pago ilegal a favor de una entidad privada que no les prestaba a ellos servicio alguno (recuérdese que FUNDEHCA servía al Estado, pero la relación de los migrantes era con éste y no con aquella). Por todo lo anterior, procede acoger únicamente el extremo del reclamo referente a la forma en que intervino J en los hechos que interesan en esta causa, de modo que debe recalificarse su conducta al grado de cómplice. Cabe acotar, finalmente, que en la especie no media ningún tipo de error a favor de este justiciable, ni de tipo ni de prohibición. Ya se ha expuesto aquí que ciertamente este endilgado sabía que era ilegal cobrar a los migrantes por el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Siendo eso así, no había posibilidad alguna de incurrir en error en cuanto a lo indebido del cobro que ideó realizar F mediante un acuerdo de cooperación que sólo vinculaba a FUNDEHCA con el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, mas no podía acarrear obligaciones para los migrantes. Además, no hay error alguno en cuanto al conocimiento de la ilicitud, pues esta estaba plasmada en los informes que J comentó con F. Por último, como se ha indicado varias veces en esta resolución, nunca medió estado de necesidad que justifique o exculpe a los acusados. De conformidad con todo lo expuesto, se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de casación por el fondo interpuesto por los doctores Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas y, en consecuencia, se casa la sentencia impugnada y se declara a J cómplice responsable del delito de concusión, por lo que se le impone la pena de TRES AÑOS DE PRISIÓN. Por un período de prueba de cinco años, se le concede a J el beneficio de condena de ejecución condicional. En lo que atañe a la pena impuesta a J, debe explicarse que la misma resulta proporcional a lo actuado por este imputado. Recuérdese que él deviene penalmente como cómplice en el delito de concusión cometido por F, lo que implica que puede imponérsele una pena menos severa que la del autor del ilícito, según lo estipulado en el artículo 74 del Código Penal. Consideran los suscritos Magistrados que si bien es cierto el hecho de que se obligue a personas migrantes a realizar un pago indebido es muy grave, también lo es que el nivel de reprochabilidad de J por ese delito es mucho menor que el de F, por lo que merece una sanción inferior a la de este último. Su participación se dio para encontrar el medio mediante el cual se creaba el cobro ilegal a los migrantes y eso es grave, pero bastante menos que motivar a esa población a realizarlo, cosa que sí hizo F, de modo que sí hay una diferencia sustancial entre ambas conductas, siendo en este caso menos gravosa la del cómplice, por lo que se estimó proporcional imponerle la pena de tres años de prisión. Además, por reunir los requisitos establecidos en los artículos 59 y 60 del Código Penal, se concede a J el beneficio de condena de ejecución condicional.

XXXII.Como primer motivo por la forma, los defensores particulares de este imputado alegan falta de correlación entre acusación y sentencia. En concreto, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas reclaman lo siguiente: a) sostienen que en la pieza acusatoria se atribuye a J el haber suscrito el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, mientras que en sentencia se indica que lo redactó, lo cual le causa agravio toda vez que el segundo es un supuesto de autoría mientras que el primero lo es de complicidad; y b) indican que en sentencia se varió el iter criminis descrito en la acusación para responsabilizar a J como coautor en lugar de cómplice. El reclamo no es atendible. En primer término debe decirse que no se ha dado variación sustancial alguna entre lo acusado y lo probado, pues el núcleo esencial de hechos es el mismo. Lo que sí se dio en este caso fue una errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva, pues ciertamente J no podía ser sancionado como coautor, sino que debía serlo como cómplice del delito de concusión. Ese yerro del a quo ya fue corregido por esta Sala en el Considerando anterior, por lo que carece de interés discutir el tema de si se respetó la acusación en cuanto a que en ella se narraba una complicidad. Además, es necesario advertir que el iter criminis no ha sido variado, toda vez que el encartado que aquí interesa sí intervino –tal como se indicó en el acápite precedente- en la fase ejecutiva del ilícito de concusión. Por lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XXXIII.Como segundo motivo por la forma, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas reclaman quebranto del debido proceso en relación con el procedimiento seguido por el Tribunal de instancia para emitir la sentencia. En concreto, estiman que se irrespetó el plazo para dictar la resolución recurrida. Señalan que no se indicó cuándo se dio por finalizado el debate, ni en qué momento dio inicio la deliberación. El reproche no es de recibo. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando XIV, pese a que es cierto que los plazos para dictar la sentencia son perentorios en el Código Procesal Penal (por lo que no es aplicable en los asuntos tramitados con base en este cuerpo normativo el criterio emitido en la sentencia de esta Sala N° 565-F-93, de 9:05 horas del 22 de octubre de 1993) y que los mismos fueron inobservados en este asunto, también lo es que las partes concurrieron a causar el error, por lo que al tenor del artículo 424 de la ordenanza procesal no se puede acreditar que hayan sufrido agravio alguno. Además, debe destacarse que a folio 6820 en el Tomo XV consta que el plazo extraordinario que requirieron los jueces de instancia a las partes lo fue para deliberar y redactar la sentencia, por lo que es evidente que al finalizar dicha audiencia se procedió a cumplir tales actos, de modo que sí se determina en qué momento se dio por concluido el debate y dio inicio la fase deliberativa. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este reclamo.

XXXIV.Como tercer motivo por vicios in procedendo, los defensores particulares de J acusan falta de fundamentación, en el tanto no se explicaría por qué sería parte de un plan de autor el abrir una cuenta corriente para el manejo de los dineros que recibía FUNDEHCA por el cobro a los migrantes. El reparo debe ser rechazado. La responsabilidad penal de J deriva de la ayuda que él le brindó a F para determinar a los migrantes a realizar un pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando XXXI, la suscripción y puesta en práctica del convenio de cooperación entre esa entidad y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social le facilitó al otro encartado cometer la concusión. Evidentemente el manejo de los fondos que ingresaban a la fundación se derivaba de la ejecución del acuerdo entre esa persona jurídica y la cartera ministerial, pues gracias al mismo es que los dineros llegaban a la entidad. Lo que interesa es que independientemente de que se abriera dicha cuenta o no, el convenio estaba en ejecución y los migrantes pagaban a FUNDEHCA una suma que no tenían por qué pagar a esa organización. Así las cosas, el delito estaría consumado aún sin que se hubiese abierto la cuenta corriente mencionada, lo que evidencia lo irrelevante –para los efectos de la condenatoria que pesa sobre J- el tema en cuestión. Por lo dicho, se declara sin lugar el reclamo.

XXXV.Como cuarto motivo, los recurrentes alegan que se da el vicio de falta de fundamentación en lo que atañe a la existencia de un estrecho vínculo entre J y F. El alegato no es de recibo. Para ser cómplice de un delito sólo se requiere auxiliar o colaborar con el autor, sin que importe si son personas cercanas o amigas. En este asunto se ha demostrado debidamente que J ayudó a F a cometer la concusión y que lo hizo mediante la suscripción y puesta en práctica del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Lo que interesa destacar es que eso se dio, de modo que deviene irrelevante si obedece a un estrecho vínculo entre ellos o por cualquier otra razón. Por lo

XXXVI.Como quinto motivo se cuestiona la fundamentación del aserto del a quo en el sentido de que J abrió la cuenta corriente de FUNDEHCA utilizando una copia de una certificación. Como sexto motivo se reclama que no está debidamente motivado el por qué esperó J doce días hábiles para firmar la apertura de la cuenta. Como séptimo motivo se aduce que está debidamente probado el vínculo de amistad entre F y J. Los reproches son inatendibles. Tal como se indicó en el Considerando XXXIV, independientemente de la apertura de la cuenta corriente aludida, la responsabilidad de J deriva de la ayuda que prestó a F para cometer la concusión, la cual consistió en prestar su concurso para suscribir y poner en práctica el convenio de cooperación tantas veces citado. Además, se indicó en el Considerando XXXV que la complicidad no depende de que se acredite que el cómplice tiene un estrecho ligamen con el autor. Ateniéndose a los resuelto en su oportunidad, lo aquí reclamado deviene intrascendente para efectos de sustentar la condena en su contra, por lo que deben declararse sin lugar los reparos.

XXXVII.Como octavo motivo se acusa como indebidamente fundado el aserto del Tribunal de instancia en el sentido de que J estuviese involucrado en el desarrollo del programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional, ni cómo es posible que realizase actos propios de la autoría del delito de concusión. El reclamo no es procedente. Ya se dijo en el Considerando XXXI que en la especie sí está debidamente acreditado el conocimiento que tenía J de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, pese a lo cual suscribió el convenio de cooperación y así le facilitó a F cometer la concusión. Además, se explicó en ese mismo acápite por qué J es cómplice y no coautor de ese delito. Lo que interesa es que de ese apartado se extrae que la complicidad de J no depende de que estuviese a cargo del programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional y que precisamente por no cumplir con los requisitos para tenérsele como coautor es que se le tiene como cómplice. Por ello, el presente reproche debe ser declarado sin lugar.

XXXVIII.Como noveno motivo se expresa que no se fundamenta el por qué lo acontecido en torno a los decretos ejecutivos que entre 1995 y 1997 regularon el programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional acarrearía responsabilidad penal para J. El alegato no es de recibo. Se decretos ejecutivos a los que aquí se alude era lo que sustentaba la exacción ilegal respecto de la cual se declaró prescrita la acción. Se indicó en esos apartados que la concusión derivaba de lo acontecido en torno a la elaboración y firma del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, pues mediante ese instrumento se establecía la obligación para los migrantes de realizar un pago que se sabía ilegal. Es decir, su responsabilidad no deriva del cobro que se hacía con base en los decretos ejecutivos, sino que se basa en el cobro establecido en el convenio. De allí que carezca de interés el reclamo de que no se fundamenta cuáles son las consecuencias penales que acarrearía para este justiciable lo acontecido en torno al primero de dichos cobros, pues del mismo no se ha derivado responsabilidad penal alguna para J. Por lo dicho, se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XXXIX.Como décimo motivo, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas cuestionan que se afirme que J tuvo un marcado interés de que FUNDEHCA interviniera rápidamente en el cobro por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. El alegato no es de recibo. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando XXXV, lo único que interesa para tener por acreditada la complicidad por parte de J es que él auxiliara a sabiendas a F para cometer la concusión, aspecto que está debidamente demostrado (ver Considerando XXXI de este fallo). Así, carece de todo interés que se afirme que procuró que FUNDEHCA interviniera rápidamente en el cobro pro la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, pues lo que importa es que lo hizo y esa fue la entidad beneficiada con el pago indebido que realizaban los migrantes. Por lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XL. Como décimo primer motivo, se reclama falta de fundamentación de varios extremos, como el por qué no podía trasladarse el cobro de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional del Ministerio a FUNDEHCA, por qué se habla sólo de nicaragüenses si hay migrantes de otras nacionalidades, por qué se cuestiona dineros que se destinaran a FUNDEHCA si es una entidad no lucrativa, y por qué el beneficiario de esos desvíos de dineros sería J. El reclamo no es atendible. Se crearse, salvo mediante ley, cobro alguno por el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Además, se expuso allí mismo por qué FUNDEHCA calza dentro del concepto de “tercero” que se menciona en el artículo 348 del Código Penal. Así las cosas, es evidente que sí se fundamentó por qué no podía cobrarse a los migrantes por el servicio estatal consistente en el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Además, para efectos de la concusión lo que interesa es que el pago se haga a un tercero; siendo FUNDEHCA ese tercero respecto de la relación entre el Estado y los migrantes, el delito se tiene por configurado, sin que interese si es una entidad lucrativa o no. Habiendo surgido el ilícito a la vida jurídica desde que se cobró a favor de la fundación, deviene irrelevante que en última instancia esos dineros beneficiaran a alguna persona en particular, por lo que puede suprimirse la afirmación de que se benefició a J sin que desaparezca el delito ni su participación en el mismo. Por último, debe indicarse que es intrascendente que algunos apartados del fallo impugnado se haga énfasis en los migrantes nicaragüenses, pues de los hechos acusados y de los probados se extrae que el cobro ilegal se hacía a todo migrante. En cualquier caso, aún cuando sólo se hubiese cobrado a los procedentes de la hermana República de Nicaragua, el delito igualmente se habría consumado. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XLI. Como décimo segundo motivo, se alega falta de fundamentación respecto de por qué para el 6 de octubre de 1997 J tendría conocimiento del trámite de derogatoria del decreto N° 24811-MTSS (que es en el que se ampara el cobro que se hacía por la tarjeta de trabajo estacional a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). Además, se acusa la no fundamentación de la incidencia que tendría un proceso contencioso administrativo que está pendiente de resolución en el que se discute si el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y la citada cartera ministerial es válido o no. Los reproches no son atendibles. Tal como se expuso en el Considerando XXXI de este fallo, J sabía que era ilegal cobrar a los migrantes por el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional y aún así ayudó a F a hacerlo. De eso deriva su complicidad, de modo que es intrascendente que supiera o no que se iba a derogar el decreto que autorizaba al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (no a FUNDEHCA) a cobrar por ese servicio (recuérdese que el programa de tarjeta de trabajo estacional tenía su fundamento jurídico en un decreto distinto a los que regularon el cobro por ese documento, pero en ninguno de ellos se autorizó cobrar dinero a favor de una entidad privada). Lo que sí sabía J para ese 6 de octubre de 1997, fecha en que firmó el acuerdo entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio dirigido por F, es que era ilegal cobrar a los migrantes por ese servicio, pese a lo cual firmó el convenio en el que se creaba un nuevo cobro, pero esta vez a favor de la fundación que representaba. Además, a lo largo de esta resolución se ha explicado por qué es en sede penal a la que compete declarar la ilegalidad del convenio, de modo que es esta la vía la que prejuzga sobre lo que pueda decidirse en la sede contencioso administrativa. Por lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este reclamo.

XLII. Como décimo tercer motivo, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas cuestionan que se afirme que J tenía conocimiento de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes por el otorgamiento de la tarjeta de trabajo estacional, así como tuviese intención de beneficiarse personalmente con los fondos que se destinaban a FUNDEHCA. El reclamo debe rechazarse. El tema del conocimiento por parte de J de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes ya quedó debidamente resuelto en el Considerando XXXI de esta sentencia. Además, se expuso también en este fallo que el delito de concusión se consumó desde que se dispuso el pago indebido de cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00) a favor de FUNDEHCA, sin que interese quién se benefició en última instancia con ese dinero. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XLIII. Como décimo cuarto motivo, los impugnantes alegan falta de fundamentación en el tanto no se explica por qué se quebranta el artículo 16 de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República, ni por qué no pueden existir diversas cuentas bancarias de una entidad pública, ni por qué los cobros amparados en los decretos ejecutivos fueron ilegítimos. El alegato no es de recibo. Se puede observar que la causa de disconformidad que expresan los recurrentes con este alegato se relaciona con los cobros que se hicieron a los migrantes con base en los decretos ejecutivos. Según se explicó supra en los Considerandos VII, VIII y principalmente el X, ese cobro es distinto al efectuado con base en el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. A J se le tiene como cómplice por lo acaecido en relación con este último, no por lo acontecido en torno a los otros, en los cuales se basa la exacción ilegal cuya acción se determinó prescrita. Así, lo relacionado con el quebranto del principio de caja única y con el pago que hicieron los migrantes durante algún tiempo a favor del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (que es diferente al hecho a favor de FUNDEHCA), no incide sobre la condenatoria de J, por lo que no es susceptible de causarle agravio y por ello se declara sin lugar este extremo de la impugnación.

XLIV. Como décimo quinto motivo, los defensores particulares de J reclaman falta de fundamentación en cuanto al por qué se requería que la Contraloría General de la República refrendara el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Además, se cuestiona por qué se indica que tal acuerdo es ilegal, si no ha sido declarado así. El reproche es improcedente. Ya se expuso supra en los Considerandos XI, XVI y XVII –a los que deben atenerse los recurrentes- por qué es en sede penal donde debe decidirse si el convenio aludido se ajusta a Derecho o no. Habiéndose establecido que ese instrumento es manifiestamente ilegal, deviene intrascendente discutir si la Contraloría General de la República debía refrendarlo o no. Además, queda claro que sí hay una declaratoria de ilegalidad expresa, la cual se ha efectuado por la jurisdicción penal, que es la competente para hacerlo. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XLV. Como décimo sexto motivo se reclama falta de fundamentación en el tanto no se tendría debidamente acreditado en el fallo recurrido que J hubiera, teniendo la obligación de hacerlo, omitido enviar el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a la Contraloría General de la República para su refrendo. Además, cuestiona que se afirme que la Contraloría se negara a refrendar el convenio. También se cuestiona que se afirme que el órgano contralor hubiese declarado la ilegalidad del mencionado instrumento. Los reproches no son de recibo. Tal como se ha mencionado convenio ha sido declarada en la sede competente para ello, cual es la penal. Además, se ha explicado en varias oportunidades por qué es intrascendente discutir si debía remitirse o no ese acuerdo para su refrendo por parte de la Contraloría General de la República. En todo caso, debe indicarse que el ente contralor sí se negó a refrendar el convenio, tal como consta a folio 1693 en el Tomo III y que las razones que dio para no refrendarlo fueron las siguientes: 1) que al haberse puesto en ejecución dicho contrato antes de refrendarlo se incurría en una causal de nulidad absoluta del mismo (cabe advertir que de ese razonamiento se extrae que para la Contraloría era evidente que el beneficiado con ese “convenio” era el Ministerio que dirigía F, de modo que era ese órgano el que debía pagar por los servicios que le prestaba FUNDEHCA, por lo que se está ante un contrato oneroso de los que requerían aprobación del cuerpo fiscalizador); 2) que se estaban trasladando atribuciones del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a FUNDEHCA, aparte de que se creaba un cobro que se sabía ilegal; 3) que F no podía contratar con FUNDEHCA pues no sólo él mismo, sino que también su hijo eran miembros fundadores de esa entidad, por lo que debía sujetarse a lo dispuesto en el artículo 22 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa; 4) que no se siguió el procedimiento ordinario de contratación, sin precisar por qué se prescindía del mismo; 5) que no se adjuntó documentación suficiente para acreditar que J estaba facultado para firmar ese convenio. Así las cosas, es evidente que la Contraloría General de la República dio razones de legalidad (algunas formales, pero las más importantes sustanciales) para no refrendar el convenio, de modo que las afirmaciones del a quo cuentan con el debido respaldo probatorio y de motivación, pues esos argumentos del cuerpo contralor fueron expuestos por el Tribunal de instancia a lo largo de la resolución impugnada. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este extremo del recurso.

XLVI. Como décimo séptimo motivo, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas alegan falta de fundamentación en el tanto no se explica por qué debía enviarse el convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a refrendo por parte de la Contraloría General de la República. El reclamo no es de recibo. Ya se ha Considerandos XI, XVI , XVII y XLV)que es intrascendente discutir si debía refrendarse o no el aludido convenio, pues lo que importa es que el mismo ya fue declarado abiertamente ilegal en la instancia competente para ello, cual es la penal. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XLVII. Como décimo octavo motivo, los defensores de J cuestionan que no se fundamente si él suscribió el convenio con autorización de la Junta Directiva de FUNDEHCA y si conoció los términos del acuerdo antes de firmarlo. El reproche no es de recibo. Se ha expuesto aquí que se encuentra debidamente fundado el conocimiento que J tenía de la ilegalidad del cobro a los migrantes que se creaba en ese instrumento. Estando eso acreditado, es irrelevante que contase con el aval de la Junta Directiva para firmar ese documento, pues en cualquier caso lo que importa es que lo hizo a sabiendas de que ayudaba a F a determinar a los migrantes a realizar un pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA. Además, es obvio que J estaba consciente de los términos del convenio, pues ha estado claro que conocía de la ilegalidad del cobro que se establecía en el mismo y aún así lo firmó. Por lo dicho, se declara sin lugar este reclamo.

XLVIII. Como décimo noveno motivo, sostienen los representantes de J que no se ha expuesto cómo es que su defendido habría incurrido en los abusos del cargo que se atribuyen al ex Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social que figura aquí como encartado. El reproche no es atendible. Ya se expuso supra en el Considerando XXXI que J no pudo incurrir en tales abusos pues no ostentaba cargo público y además no fue él quien determinó a los migrantes a hacer el pago indebido, sino que su intervención se limita a colaborar con F en ese sentido. Por ello es que se recalificó su conducta al grado de complicidad y se le redujo la pena. Así, las manifestaciones que ahora se impugnan no causan agravio al imputado. Por ello, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

XLIX. Como vigésimo motivo, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas acusan el quebranto del debido proceso por cuanto el Tribunal de instancia le habría atribuido a J una responsabilidad genérica por todo lo ocurrido. El reclamo no es atendible. Ya se expuso en el Considerando XXXI que la responsabilidad penal de J deriva de la firma y puesta en práctica del convenio de cooperación entre FUNDEHCA y el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Esa intervención sí le fue imputada al encartado, de modo que aunque haya errores al atribuirle otros hechos, ése en particular sí es constitutivo de delito, por lo que no se ha causado agravio alguno a este encartado. Así las cosas, procede declarar sin lugar este reproche.

L. Como motivo vigésimo primero, los impugnantes acusan falta de fundamentación, por considerar que la misma es contradictoria, en el tanto no se explica cuál es el medio empleado para determinar a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido. El reparo debe ser desestimado. Se expuso supra en los Considerandos VII y VIII cómo está debidamente fundado el aserto de que F motivó a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA, toda vez que el mismo se estableció como requisito para tramitar la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Además, recuérdese que la responsabilidad penal de J por estos hechos se deriva del auxilio que prestó a F, sin que interese –por ser cómplice- si fue él quien determinó o no a los migrantes a realizar dicha erogación; lo que importa es que ayudó al autor del delito de concusión a cometerlo. Por lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

LI. Como motivo vigésimo segundo, se cuestiona la fundamentación del aserto que hace el Tribunal de instancia en el sentido de que J utilizó en provecho propio dineros que ingresaron a FUNDEHCA, pues compró alfombras. Estiman los recurrentes que nunca se desvirtuó que la fundación le hubiera prestado ese dinero al imputado. El reclamo no es de recibo. Tal como se ha indicado a lo largo de este fallo (ver Considerandos VI, VII y VIII), el delito de concusión surgió a la vida jurídica desde que se determinó a los migrantes a realizar un pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA. Así, el uso final que se le haya dado al dinero recaudado por esa entidad no tiene interés para efectos de la configuración del ilícito, de modo que no es importante saber si J compró las mencionadas alfombras con dinero que le prestó FUNDEHCA, pues aún si eso fuera cierto, siempre existiría el delito del que es cómplice. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este extremo de la impugnación.

LII. Como motivo vigésimo tercero por la forma, los defensores particulares de J reclaman que no se fundamentó el fallo impugnado en cuanto a cómo habría abusado su defendido de las calidades de funcionario público y de esa manera habría motivado a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido. En el motivo vigésimo cuarto se reitera el reclamo en cuanto a que no se dice de qué manera indujo su patrocinado a efectuar dicha erogación. En el motivo vigésimo quinto se alega que no se explica por qué el convenio es ilegal ni por qué debía ser refrendado por la Contraloría General de la República. Los reproches no son de recibo. Deben los recurrentes atenerse a lo resuelto en los Considerandos VI, VII, VIII, XI, XVI, XXXI, XLVIII y L, en los que se resuelve por qué sí se está ante un delito de concusión, por qué el cobro era ilegal, cómo es que se indujo a los migrantes a realizar un pago indebido, por qué se quebrantó el principio de reserva de ley, por qué no es trascendente discutir si debía refrendarse el convenio de cooperación, por qué está bien declarada la ilegalidad de este instrumento en sede penal, de cuáles hechos deriva la responsabilidad penal de J, por qué es cómplice y no coautor de concusión, así como por qué no interesa resolver este último problema por la forma, pues por el fondo ya fue debidamente resuelto.

LIII. Como motivo vigésimo sexto, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas reclaman que se incurre en una contradicción en el tanto se exonera de responsabilidad a J por el delito de administración fraudulenta por el uso de los bienes de FUNDEHCA y luego se utiliza ese mismo uso para sustentar la concusión. El alegato no puede prosperar. Se dijo supra en el Considerando VIII se incidía sobre la condenatoria por concusión. A ello deben atenerse los recurrentes, pues es aplicable al caso de J. Además, también se ha explicado en esta sentencia que el delito estaba consumado desde que se determinó a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA, hecho sobre el cual no incide la forma como se hayan manejado esos dineros luego de que ingresaron a la fundación. Por ello, se declara sin lugar este extremo de la impugnación.

LIV. Como motivo vigésimo séptimo, se retoma nuevamente el problema de si J obligó o indujo a los migrantes a realizar el pago indebido a favor de FUNDEHCA. Aténganse los recurrentes a lo resuelto en el Considerando XXXI sobre el por qué J es penalmente responsable como cómplice de la concusión.

LV. Como motivo vigésimo octavo, los doctores Guzmán Zanetti y Castellón Vargas sostienen que no se fundamenta el aserto de que los migrantes fueron inducidos a error o engañados, pues creían que el dinero se lo pagaban al Gobierno costarricenses. El reclamo no es de recibo. Lo que interesa para el delito de concusión es que mediante el ejercicio abusivo de su cargo, el funcionario público determine a una persona a dar o prometer un beneficio patrimonial indebido a favor de un tercero. Eso es lo que se tiene debidamente acreditado en esta causa y que el autor de esa conducta es F (Considerando VII), quien actuó con el auxilio de J (Considerando XXXI). Así, deviene completamente intrascendente saber si la determinación de la voluntad de los migrantes obedece a un engaño o no, pues lo que importa es que debían efectuar el pago indebido. En todo caso, lo que se tiene por acreditado es que mediante volantes se anunciaba que era requisito pagar ese dinero a FUNDEHCA y ese aspecto es indubitable, independientemente de que se pueda catalogar de engañoso o no. Por lo anterior, procede declarar sin lugar este alegato.

LVI. Como vigésimo noveno motivo (los recurrentes lo denominan vigésimo octavo, según lo que se aprecia a folio 8537 en el Tomo XXI o página 178 del escrito) se cuestiona si por los migrantes estaban en capacidad de comprender la conminación. El reclamo no es atendible. Lo que se tiene por demostrado en esta causa es que se determinó a los migrantes a efectuar un pago ilegal a favor de FUNDEHCA y consta que se estableció ese pago como requisito para tramitarles la tarjeta de trabajo estacional. Es decir, se les determinó a realizar ese pago ilegal y para ello F abusó de su cargo. Además, J ayudó a F a cometer ese delito. Eso es lo que interesa para efectos de determinar la responsabilidad penal de estos justiciables, sin que sea relevante conocer si los migrantes estaban en capacidad o no de saber que se les conminaba a efectuar dicho pago, pues aunque no lo supieran, lo cierto es que F los motivó a hacerlo y para ello contó con el auxilio de J. Así las cosas, procede declarar sin lugar este alegato.

LVII. Sobre el recurso a favor de M. Por razones de economía procesal, toda vez que hay un motivo respecto del cual le asiste razón a la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero, defensora particular de la encartada M, se procede a resolver inmediatamente el segundo motivo por la forma. La licenciada Navas Montero alega falta de fundamentación, por valorar la prueba respectiva sin seguir los lineamientos de la sana crítica, respecto del motivo por el cual los presuntos subalternos de M la obedecieron. Indica que la imputada no fue designada asistente de F cuando él ocupó el cargo de Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, ni se le encargaron tareas de administradora. Alega que pese a ser Directora del Despacho del Ministro, ello sólo la hacía funcionaria de enlace y que en todo caso el puesto no existía formalmente. Estima que de ese cargo no puede derivarse que tuviese poder de mando sobre el personal. Considera que no se acredita debidamente que al firmar los cheques correspondientes a giras a lo interno del país ella estuviese dando fe de que las mismas se llevaron a cabo. Agrega que de la prueba se deriva que era la señora Isela Hernández la que manejaba lo respectivo a las giras y que no se habrían de estar sujetos a M y no a la Directora Administrativa, cargo que ocupaba la señora X. Señala la recurrente que no se explica por qué M ejercía las tareas de administración que se requieren para que se configure el delito de peculado, toda vez que la custodia de los dineros de caja chica corresponde a la oficial presupuestal del propio Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, señora Dora Orozco, según lo disponen los artículos 23 y 24 de la Ley Orgánica de dicha cartera ministerial. Señala que el testigo Norman Araya, quien fungió como auditor interno del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a la fecha en que ocurrieron los hechos que aquí interesan, manifestó en debate que la realización de giras dependía, según el artículo 14 de la Ley de Administración Financiera, de la caja chica y que esta era custodiada por la oficial presupuestal. Expresa que aún admitiendo que M fuese una empleada de confianza del Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, ello no la convierte en responsable de administrar fondos de la institución. Reitera que su defendida no podía distraer dineros. Manifiesta que nunca se explicó por qué debían obedecer a su defendida otros funcionarios. El reproche es de recibo. De conformidad con el elenco de hechos probados (ver folio 6946 en el Tomo XVI), la imputada ingresó como servidora al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social a partir del 8 de mayo de 1994, pues se iba a encargar de una oficina dedicada a las relaciones internacionales. Se desempeñó como Directora del Despacho del Ministro y se constituyó en su asistente principal, de modo que adquirió mucho poder dentro de la institución, por lo que ejerció don de mando sobre los demás servidores. Ella fue autorizada por el ex Ministro F para firmar liquidaciones de gastos de viaje, con lo que daba fe de que las giras se había realizado, pues si estas no se habían dado, entonces no debía firmar. Si el gasto se justificaba como gira oficial, M debía firmar una orden de liquidación de viáticos, la cual debía venir firmada por el funcionario solicitante y luego debían recogerse las firmas del Oficial Mayor del Ministerio y de la Oficial Presupuestal, quienes “en su orden, refrendaba la autorización de la liquidación y emitía el cheque correspondiente, como controles administrativo y financiero” (folio 6947 en el Tomo XVI). Señalan los juzgadores que de esa manera, M tenía la facultad de disponer del rubro asignado presupuestariamente para las giras de funcionarios del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Según el cuadro fáctico establecido por el órgano de mérito, M se aprovechó de su posibilidad de disponer de esos fondos y encargó a R y MR que llenaran fórmulas de gastos de viaje a nombre de otros funcionarios subordinados al Despacho del Ministro, para que ellos las firmaran y gestionaran el cobro de giras no realizadas. Señalan los jueces de instancia que los otros servidores participaron en ese cobro fraudulento, pues M tenía poder de mando sobre ellos. Así, ella autorizó la liquidación de gastos y justificó irregularmente el pago de viáticos por giras no realizadas y así se pagó en total (mediante los cheques N° 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 y 5905, todos de la cuenta corriente N° 7972-3 del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a nombre del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Cuenta Caja Chica) indebidamente el total de ciento cincuenta y cuatro mil novecientos colones (¢154.900,00) por liquidaciones de viajes fraudulentas. Resumido lo anterior, debe decirse que a juicio de los suscritos Magistrados no se encuentra debidamente fundamentado hasta ahora de qué manera es que M asumió, en razón de su cargo, la administración de los fondos con los que se pagaban los viáticos por las giras al interior del país. Se puede apreciar a folio 7587 en el Tomo XVII, que el a quo expresa lo siguiente: “Tal como lo indicáramos, si bien es cierto ella no tenía materialmente esos fondos bajo su tutela, el carácter de sujeto activo de este ilícito se lo otorga esa facultad de disposición que implica una administración de los mismos.” Sea que según el Tribunal de instancia, M no ejercía custodia (tutela) directa de los dineros. Entonces sólo podía configurarse el delito si ella tenía los fondos bajo su administración o si los percibió, en ambos casos en razón de su cargo. Como el Tribunal se centra en el tema de cómo los administró, debe entenderse que implícitamente descartó que los hubiera percibido. Así, para condenar a M como autora del delito de peculado, el cuerpo juzgador debió haber explicado por qué es que ella tenía –en razón de su cargo- la administración de los fondos de caja chica. Ya se dijo en este Considerando que el Tribunal tuvo por acreditado que las liquidaciones de viajes a lo interno del país requiere de un servidor solicitante que lo firme. Luego, según lo demostrado en esta causa, debía firmarlo M, pero después se requerían las firmas del Oficial Mayor y de quien ejerce el cargo de Oficial Presupuestal, estos dos últimos como contralores administrativos y financieros. Ahora bien, si el cuerpo juzgador ubica la firma de M (a quien F habría encomendado esa tarea) como una dentro del proceso de autorización del pago de viáticos y tras su rúbrica se requiere de la intervención de dos contralores más, entonces pareciera que lo que se describe es una fase de fiscalización del buen uso de los fondos públicos. Sea que se estaría ante una etapa de vigilancia de que se dé buen destino a esos dineros y eso se referiría precisamente a la custodia de esos dineros, pero el a quo descartó expresamente que ella los custodiara, de modo que esa posibilidad no puede ahora contemplarse. El problema es que pese a describir un proceso de fiscalización, se niega que eso sea custodia de fondos públicos, con el agravante de que no se describe de qué manera es que ella podría haber dispuesto de ellos, que es lo susceptible de ser enmarcado como administración de los mismos (véase la elaboración conceptual de lo que es administrar, custodiar y percibir fondos públicos en la sentencia de esta Sala N° 2000-01312, de las 9:30 horas del 10 de noviembre de 2000). Hasta el momento no se ha dicho más que el firmar la liquidación de gastos equivale a dar fe de que la gira existió. Pero no se ha explicado por qué ello equivaldría a decir que M disponía (es decir, decidía lo que debía hacerse) con los dineros destinados al pago de viáticos por giras al interior del país, máxime si después de su firma se requería de dos más, las cuales debían estampar precisamente los contralores administrativos y financieros. Como se ve, hay un yerro importante por parte del cuerpo sentenciador al fundamentar el por qué debe tenerse a M como administradora, en razón de su cargo, de fondos públicos, lo cual incide en la fundamentación de su condena como autora del delito de peculado, pues no está debidamente motivado hasta ahora por qué su conducta se enmarca en los supuestos del tipo. Así, acreditándose que en la especie se da el vicio alegado por la recurrente, procede declarar con lugar este reclamo y, en consecuencia, anular el fallo recurrido y el debate que le precedió, sólo en lo que atañe a la causa seguida contra M por el delito de peculado relacionado con los cheques N° 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 y 5905, todos de la cuenta corriente N° 7972-3 del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a nombre del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Cuenta Caja Chica, y ordenar el reenvío del asunto al Tribunal de origen para una nueva sustanciación de ese único aspecto, esta vez conforme a Derecho. Habiéndose resuelto este extremo del recurso de la forma como se ha hecho, deviene innecesario emitir pronunciamiento respecto de los restantes reclamos, toda vez que el fin perseguido con ellos, cual es el de la anulación de la condena de M por el delito de peculado y el reenvío de la causa a nuevo juicio por lo que se le atribuía en relación con los cheques mencionados.

LVIII. Sobre el recurso formulado por la Procuraduría General de la República. Como único motivo por la forma, la licenciada Amira Suñol Ocampo sostiene que se aplicó erróneamente el instituto de la prescripción a favor de F por el delito de exacción ilegal. Considera que después de la primera imputación formal de cargos a F, el plazo de prescripción no se reduce a su mitad, sino que corre de nuevo íntegro. El reclamo no es de recibo. Esta Sala ya resolvió de manera definitiva cómo se computan los plazos de prescripción de la acción penal. En efecto, mediante la sentencia N° 2002-00383 de las 9:40 horas del 30 de abril de 2002, se indicó que la reducción de plazos a la mitad ocurre una única ocasión, que es cuando por primera vez concurra alguno de los supuestos interruptores previstos en el artículo 33 del Código Procesal Penal. En el caso del imputado F, el primer supuesto interruptor que ocurrió fue el de imputarle formalmente los cargos, lo cual aconteció el 26 de noviembre de 1998, cuando se le indagó. Siendo la pena máxima del delito de exacción ilegal un año de prisión, la acción para perseguirlo normalmente hubiera prescrito en tres años, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 31 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal. Sin embargo, la primera imputación formal de los cargos (la indagatoria) fue a su vez el primer supuesto interruptor del plazo de prescripción que concurrió respecto de este imputado, por lo que es a partir de ese 26 de noviembre de 1998 que no sólo se interrumpe el cómputo de la prescripción, sino que el plazo se reduce a su mitad, es decir, a dieciocho meses, los cuales vencían el 26 de mayo de 2000. Entre ambas fechas no se aprecia que concurra algún otro supuesto interruptor (la reforma legislativa que prevé como tal la resolución que convoca por primera vez a audiencia preliminar es posterior a la fecha en que operó la prescripción), por lo que lleva razón el a quo al estimar que el delito de exacción ilegal se encontraba prescrito cuando procedió a dictar sentencia. Con base en lo LIX. Como primer motivo por el fondo, la licenciada Suñol Ocampo cuestiona que se haya declarado prescrito el delito de exacción ilegal partiendo de que la primera imputación formal sea la indagatoria del encausado. El reclamo no es de recibo. Si bien es cierto del inciso a) del artículo 33 del Código Procesal Penal se infiere que hay más de una imputación formal de cargos al imputado (no en balde se habla de la primera), también lo es que la indagatoria es un acto formal (ver artículos 91 a 99 del Código Procesal Penal) y que ese es el primer momento en que formalmente se informa al imputado de que lo es (obsérvese el artículo 91 del Código Procesal Penal y podrá apreciarse que no es sino hasta que se individualiza a una persona como posible interviniente en un hecho punible que el Ministerio Público debe llamarlo a declarar y para ello debe seguir un procedimiento específico). Así, es evidente que es la indagatoria la primera imputación formal de los cargos al justiciable. Puede que después se precisen los hechos que se le atribuyen, pero siempre los primeros serán los que formalmente se le informen en la indagatoria. Por lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este reclamo, el cual –por cierto- fue presentado como de fondo, aunque el tema planteado lo es de forma.

LX. Como segundo motivo por el fondo, la licenciada Suñol Ocampo indica que pese a tener por acreditado un uso abusivo por parte de los imputados F y J de los bienes y fondos de FUNDEHCA, el a quo optó por absolverlos de toda responsabilidad y pena por el delito de administración fraudulenta que se les atribuía. El reparo no es atendible. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando VIII, la junta administrativa de FUNDEHCA se dio por satisfecha por la forma como la entidad fue manejada, por lo que ciertamente el Tribunal de instancia no podía el perjuicio que se requiere para tener por configurado el delito de administración fraudulenta. Así las cosas, la decisión del cuerpo juzgador es correcta y procede declarar sin lugar el reclamo.

LXI. Como tercer motivo por vicios in iudicando, la representante de la Procuraduría General de la República acusa que se irrespetó la ley sustantiva. Considera que fue mediante lo investigado en el proceso que se concluyó que las actas mediante las cuales se registra la designación de la Junta Administrativa, del Presidente y del Director Ejecutivo reflejaban una realidad histórica, pese a que en ellas se consigna que comparecieron dos personas que estaban fuera del país, de modo que estima sí se cometió el delito de falsedad ideológica. El reproche no es de recibo. Consta a partir del folio 7544 en el Tomo XVII que en el acta de instalación de la Junta Administrativa de FUNDEHCA, así como en el acta de asamblea extraordinaria de miembros fundadores de FUNDEHCA se consignó la presencia de A y E, pese a que ellos no estaban en Costa Rica, no obstante lo cual aparecen firmando esos documentos. Puede apreciarse a folio 7554 en el Tomo de comentario que para el a quo el hecho de que ellos no estuvieran presentes en realidad no causó perjuicio alguno, pues ellos estuvieron de acuerdo desde el principio con lo que se acordó en esas reuniones y con el contenido de las actas, por lo que las firmaron después. Considera esta Sala que el criterio del a quo es correcto, toda vez que en el artículo 360 del Código Penal se exige la concurrencia de un perjuicio para que se pueda configurar el delito de falsedad ideológica. En el presente caso, lo cierto es que tal perjuicio no se da, pues el contenido de las actas refleja la voluntad de los interesados, incluyendo a A y E. Si estos últimos se dieron por satisfechos con lo consignado en las actas, pese a que no estuvieron en la reunión, ello es prueba contundente de que no se les causa perjuicio alguno con lo acordado. Así las cosas, el alegato debe declararse sin lugar.

LXII. Como cuarto motivo por el fondo, la licenciada Suñol Ocampo acusa el quebranto del artículo 365 del Código Penal, toda vez que J se valió del poder que se le otorgó como Delegado Ejecutivo de FUNDEHCA para abrir una cuenta en el Banco INTERFIN, pese a que el poder no era válido para tal propósito, pues no se siguió lo establecido en el artículo 1251 del Código Civil para otorgarlo. El reproche es totalmente improcedente. Para que se condene a alguien por uso de documento falso se requiere que la pieza sea falsa. Eso no es lo que alega la recurrente, sino que estima que el poder utilizado por J le fue mal otorgado. Como se ve, no está diciendo que sea falso, sino que es defectuoso, de modo que no acredita que en la especie se dé el vicio que alega, por lo que se declara sin lugar este extremo de la impugnación.

LXIII. Como quinto reclamo por defectos in iudicando, la representante de la Procuraduría General de la República acusa errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva, toda vez que se absolvió a M por dos delitos de estafa. Considera que se equivocó el a quo al hacer recaer la aplicación del principio de in dubio pro reo sobre la prueba y no sobre el hecho. Estima que se acusó que hubo dos giras a Limón que no se llevaron a cabo, pero que el Tribunal tuvo una duda sobre si se podía probar que las mismas no se hicieron. Considera que al no probarse que las giras sí se dieron, entonces debe acreditarse que nunca se efectuaron. El reclamo no es atendible. Lo que persigue la recurrente es que se revierta la carga de la prueba. No compete a la defensa probar que las giras de comentario se hayan hecho; debe el órgano requirente (ya sea el Ministerio Público o la Procuraduría General de la República en este caso) demostrar que las mismas no se hicieron. Eso es lo que ordenan los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos aplicables en Costa Rica, la Constitución Política y las leyes penales. Ahora bien, consta a partir del folio 7595 en el Tomo XVII que M presentó en el debate un informe (que le fue admitido como prueba para mejor resolver) en el que detallaba a F el resultado de las giras a Limón. Además, el Tribunal valoró el testimonio de Pedro Arias Bermúdez, quien entonces era jefe de transportes del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, así como la declaración de MA, quien habría acompañado a M en las giras. Lo que interesa es que si bien es cierto el Tribunal tuvo muchas dudas sobre la veracidad de la prueba aportada por la imputada, lo cierto es que no la pudo calificar como falsa, de modo que se vio en la obligación de dudar si había prueba suficiente para acreditar que las mencionadas giras no se habían dado. Así, si no se puede demostrar el alegato de cargo (sea que las giras no se llevaron a cabo) no podía el Tribunal más que aplicar el principio de in dubio pro reo a favor de esta encartada por estos hechos. De conformidad con lo anterior, procede declarar sin lugar este extremo de la impugnación.

LXIV. Sobre el recurso planteado por el Ministerio Público. Los Fiscales Héctor Chacón Chang y Max Chinchilla Fernández alegan, como primer motivo, fundamentación contradictoria de la absolutoria de los encartados F y J por los delitos de administración fraudulenta y negociaciones incompatibles, así como de la absolutoria a F por el delito de incumplimiento de deberes. Consideran que si el órgano juzgador estimó que los hechos constitutivos de la administración fraudulenta, las negociaciones incompatibles y el incumplimiento de deberes son los mismos por los cuales se acreditó la concusión, entonces debió habérseles condenado por esos otros ilícitos. El reclamo no es de recibo. Tal como se expuso supra en el Considerando VIII, en realidad los hechos constitutivos de la concusión no son los mismos de los que se derivan los otros delitos que mencionan los recurrentes, sino que son distintos. Así, la absolutoria por unos de ellos no obligaba a absolver por la concusión; de igual manera, la condena por este último delito no obliga a condenar por los demás. En ese sentido, no se da la contradicción que apuntan los Fiscales, por lo que el reproche debe declararse sin lugar. A mayor abundamiento, obsérvese en ese mismo Considerando VIII por qué no se da el delito de administración fraudulenta, de modo que la absolutoria por ese delito se ajusta a Derecho. Es oportuno señalar que en ese mismo Considerando VIII se explicó por qué el ejercicio de subsunción realizado por el a quo en lo que atañe a las negociaciones incompatibles y al incumplimiento de deberes está mal realizado. En efecto, los supuestos típicos en los que se basan los dos últimos ilícitos mencionados son distintos a aquellos en los que se funda la concusión. Si ello es así, entonces los hechos susceptibles de ser enmarcados en tales delitos también son diferentes. De allí que la acreditación de la concusión –la cual se encuentra debidamente fundada conforme a Derecho- no necesariamente acarrea la condenatoria por negociaciones incompatibles e incumplimiento de deberes. Ahora bien, pese a que el a quo se equivoca al estimar que estos delitos están subsumidos por la concusión, debe advertirse que dicho yerro no causa agravio al Ministerio Público, pues en todo caso la absolutoria era procedente. Tal como se indicó en el Considerando VIII, el delito de incumplimiento de deberes requiere de una conducta omisiva para su configuración, pero en este caso no se le ha atribuido a F omisión alguna. Lo más que se ha dicho es que no cumplió sus deberes porque incurrió en faltas a los mismos (es decir, que no hizo algo porque hizo otra cosa), lo cual revela que no se precisó en qué específicamente fue omisiva su conducta. Más bien se le atribuyen acciones y con estas no se configura el delito de incumplimiento de deberes, por lo que ciertamente no podía condenársele por ello. Lo mismo sucede con las negociaciones incompatibles que se atribuyeron a F y J, pues nunca se expuso en qué –distinto de lo constitutivo de la concusión, que sí está debidamente acreditada- recaía su interés. Sea que no se contaba con hechos que se enmarcaran dentro del tipo de comentario, sino que sólo se acreditaron situaciones que se ajustan al tipo de concusión. De allí que tampoco pudiera sancionarse penalmente a estos encartados por el ilícito de comentario. Por todo lo anterior, procede declarar sin lugar este alegato.

LXV. Como segundo motivo, los licenciados Chacón Chang y Chinchilla Fernández acusan falta de fundamentación, pues estiman que no se explica por qué el subsumir los delitos de negociaciones incompatibles y de administración fraudulenta en el de concusión conlleva a una absolutoria por los primeros. El reparo no es de recibo. Ya se expuso en el Considerando anterior por qué las absolutorias por los delitos de negociaciones incompatibles, administración fraudulenta e incumplimiento de deberes se ajustan a Derecho, por lo que deben atenerse los recurrentes a lo allí resuelto.

LXVI. Como tercer motivo, los Fiscales recurrentes sostienen que la absolutoria de F y J por el delito de negociaciones incompatibles carece de la debida fundamentación. Sostienen que en la acusación alternativa se artículos 112 y 143 de la Constitución Política, mediante los cuales se prohíbe a los Ministros de Gobierno celebrar directa o indirectamente contratos con la Administración. El alegato no es atendible. Los artículos que mencionan los recurrentes establecen prohibiciones, pero los sanciona sólo con pérdida de credenciales. Debe entonces acudirse sólo al Código Penal para determinar cuándo se está ante el delito de negociaciones incompatibles. Si se lee el artículo 347 de dicho texto legal, se apreciará que de los que se trata es de que el servidor se interese en cualquier contrato u operación en que intervenga en razón de su cargo. Lo que interesa en esta causa es que no se ha dicho de qué manera –independiente de lo que es el delito de concusión- se interesaron en un contrato u operación. De nuevo debe decirse que los hechos probados en que se sustenta la condenatoria se ajustan solamente al delito de concusión y no a otro, por lo que sólo podían responder F y J por ese ilícito y no por otros. Por lo expuesto, procede declarar sin lugar este alegato.

LXVII. Como cuarto motivo, los representantes del Ministerio Público reclaman el quebranto de las reglas de la sana crítica a la hora de fundamentar la absolutoria de F por un delito de peculado de servicios. En concreto, alegan los recurrentes que el ex Ministro de Trabajo y Seguridad Social abusó de los servicios que prestaba el chofer ministerial Mario Álvarez Eras, pues se le utilizó para que atendiera asuntos familiares del encartado que no tenían relación con el ejercicio del cargo. Consideran que el hecho de que muchos funcionarios no sean juzgados por utilizar choferes y vehículos de la Administración en asuntos personales no implica que ello no sea delito. Estiman que no se puede calificar el asunto de peccata minuta, ni qué se entiende por tal cosa. Agregan que no explican los juzgadores por qué se separan de criterios de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que discrecionalidad es la libertad de apreciar el interés público y de la Sala Segunda en el sentido de que el uso discrecional de bienes da mayor libertad al funcionario pero para el mejor desempeño del cargo, no para beneficio propio. El reclamo no es de recibo. Se determinó en autos que ciertamente F utilizó a su chofer para que llevara a su esposa e hijos a realizar diligencias varias (hecho probado 46 a folio 6950 en el Tomo XVI). Ciertamente el que haya funcionarios que utilicen vehículos de uso discrecional en la forma descrita no implica necesariamente que la conducta no sea delictiva. Tampoco se podría descartar tal cosa por el hecho de que se califique lo acontecido como “peccata minuta”. Lo que sí exonera totalmente de responsabilidad a F por ese hecho es lo dispuesto en la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres. En ese texto normativo (artículos 221 a 243 de dicha ley) se clasifican los vehículos estatales (a los que se les denomina también oficiales) como de uso discrecional, uso administrativo y de la Fuerza Pública y seguridad. Aquí lo que interesa es que el vehículo de uso discrecional no lo menciona el legislador como cubierto por la prohibición que sí establece expresamente para los de uso administrativo en el artículo 234 inciso a) de la ley de comentario. Ello implica que no está prohibido legalmente utilizar los vehículos de uso discrecional en actividades que no sean las normales de la institución o el ministerio. Además, no se está ante el supuesto del inciso b) del mismo artículo 234, pues el vehículo estuvo asignado a F y no a su esposa ni a sus hijos. Tampoco se infringe la prohibición del inciso e) del numeral de referencia, pues el tipo de trabajo al que se destina el vehículo lo determina el funcionario responsable del mismo, según lo que se establece en el párrafo segundo del artículo 225 de la Ley de Tránsito ya mencionada. Así las cosas, no hay prohibición expresa alguna que le impidiera a F requerir a su chofer que utilizara el vehículo de uso discrecional para trasladar a su esposa e hijos. De allí que no se pueda configurar el delito de peculado previsto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 354 del Código Penal, pues ese encartado podía actuar como lo hizo. Cabe agregar que el precedente de la Sala Constitucional que mencionan los recurrentes se refiere a lo que es la discrecionalidad administrativa y no a lo que es un vehículo de uso discrecional, de modo que se trata de materias distintas. Además, la resolución de la Sala Segunda que citan los recurrentes (sentencia 147 de las 15:00 horas del 5 de mayo de 1995) no hace mención a la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, ni la interpreta, sino que resuelve (véase el Considerando IV de la resolución de la Sala Segunda) con base en un reglamento emitido por la Contraloría General de la República. Además, el pronunciamiento de cita se da en un caso relacionado con un ex funcionario de la Municipalidad de San José, pero resulta que ningún funcionario municipal está contemplado en la lista de servidores públicos que puede utilizar un vehículo de uso discrecional, según lo que se observa en el artículo 225 de la Ley de Tránsito. Así las cosas, es evidente que la resolución de la Sala Segunda que citan los recurrentes no se relaciona con supuestos de hecho ni con disposiciones legales iguales a los que deben considerarse en el asunto que aquí se conoce. En ese sentido no son jurisprudencia vinculante para el presente asunto, según lo que se deriva de los artículos 9 del Código Civil y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Por todo lo anterior, se declara sin lugar este alegato.

LXVIII. Como quinto motivo, los impugnantes señalan que se dio una contradicción en el fallo recurrido a la hora de explicar por qué la acción para perseguir el delito de exacción ilegal estaba prescrita, toda vez que en un momento afirman los juzgadores que la primera imputación formal de los cargos a F se dio el 26 de abril de 1998 y en otro acápite sostienen que ello ocurrió el 26 de noviembre de 1998. El reclamo no es atendible. Ya se el 26 de abril de 1998, cuando se le indagó. Nótese que esta es la segunda de las dos fechas que mencionan los representantes del Ministerio Público y aún así operó la prescripción de la acción penal por el delito de exacción ilegal. Ello revela que aún cuando existiese el equívoco que mencionan, ello no habría acarreado agravio alguno de sus intereses, pues el ilícito igualmente no habría podido seguirse persiguiendo. Por lo expuesto, procede declarar sin lugar el alegato.

LXIX. Como sexto motivo, los licenciados Chacón Chang y Chinchilla Fernández alegan falta de fundamentación sobre por qué se tomó la indagatoria de F, celebrada el 26 de noviembre de 1998, como primera imputación formal de los cargos por exacción ilegal y peculado de servicios. Citan el criterio del Tribunal de Casación Penal en el sentido de que esa primera imputación formal se da con la lectura de la acusación por parte del Juez de la Etapa Intermedia. El reclamo es inatendible. Aténganse los impugnantes a lo que se expuso en el Considerando LIX sobre el por qué la indagatoria es la primera imputación formal en este asunto. A mayor abundamiento, si los recurrentes desean conocer las razones por las cuales esta Sala –que no está vinculada por los criterios del Tribunal de Casación, pues cada Despacho tiene su propio ámbito de competencia y no se entremezclan- no comparte la posición de ese alto órgano jurisdiccional, remítanse a la sentencia 2002-01272 de las 10:15 horas del 13 de diciembre de 2002, especialmente al Considerando V de esa resolución.

LXX. Sobre el recurso planteado por la Procuraduría General de la República en ejercicio de la acción civil. El licenciado Gilberth Calderón Alvarado, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, acusa falta de fundamentación, toda vez que el Tribunal de instancia estimó que los dineros recaudados por FUNDEHCA no procedían del Estado, sino de gran cantidad de migrantes. Considera que ese razonamiento es equivocado, pues la Procuraduría General de la República actuó en representación de intereses colectivos, de modo que no reclamo para el Estado, sino en sustitución de los afectados. El reproche no es atendible. El artículo 38 del Código Procesal Penal otorga a la Procuraduría General de la República la potestad exclusiva de intervenir en el proceso penal para ejercer la acción civil por daño social. Para ello, le permite reclamar el resarcimiento respectivo por hechos punibles que afecten intereses colectivos o difusos. Lo que sucede en esta causa es que no se está ante ninguno de esos dos tipos de interés. El colectivo se refiere al que es propio de un grupo que se une, de hecho o de derecho, en procura de perseguir un fin específico. En cambio, el difuso atañe al individuo por el simple hecho de ser integrante de la sociedad y le permite reclamar por algo que no afecta a un sujeto determinado, de modo que no puede establecerse un titular del derecho al resarcimiento, sino que es sufrido por la generalidad de individuos con la misma intensidad. Ninguno de esos supuestos se dan en el presente caso, pues ni los migrantes han formado un grupo, ni la afectación es sufrida por una generalidad de personas. Los migrantes sufrieron cada uno de ellos una afectación de su patrimonio, la cual puede medirse monetariamente. Además, quienes pagaron a FUNDEHCA eran individualizables y nunca formaron un grupo en persecución de un fin en particular. Así, no se estaba ante los supuestos del artículo 38 del Código Procesal Penal, sino más bien ante gran cantidad de intereses individuales, de modo que cada titular es quien debe (por sí o, si se hubiera hecho en el momento oportuno, mediante delegación en el Ministerio Público) reclamar la indemnización. Por lo expuesto, estima esta Sala que resulta conforme a Derecho la decisión del a quo de rechazar la legitimación de la Procuraduría General de la República para sustituir a los migrantes como actores civiles por los dineros pagados a FUNDEHCA. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar este reclamo.

LXXI. Sobre la pena de inhabilitación especial. El Tribunal de instancia impuso a F, J y M la pena de inhabilitación especial por ocho años para ejercer cargos públicos. Además, dispuso que se comunicara a la Dirección General de Servicio Civil lo resuelto, para que ese cuerpo administrativo lo registrara y además efectuara las comunicaciones pertinentes a la Contraloría General de la República y a las demás instituciones públicas. Sobre el tema, debe advertirse que la eventual responsabilidad penal de M será discutida nuevamente en juicio, por lo que aún no procede aplicarle la pena de inhabilitación especial mencionada. En cambio, tras el dictado del presente fallo, dicha sanción sí queda en firme respecto de F y J. Estima esta Sala que es adecuada la disposición del a quo de comunicar lo resuelto a la Dirección General de Servicio Civil. Sin embargo, conviene indicar al órgano juzgador que ese mismo Despacho está facultado para comunicar, si lo considera apropiado, directamente a la Contraloría General de la República que sobre esos dos encartados pesa la pena de inhabilitación especial para ejercer cargos públicos. También tiene la potestad el cuerpo juzgador de ordenar, si lo estima procedente, la publicación de esa medida específica en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, de modo que todo el aparato estatal tendría conocimiento de que F y J están inhabilitados para el servicio público por un determinado tiempo. Finalmente, como la inhabilitación se da para el ejercicio de todo tipo de cargo público, incluidos los de elección popular, podría disponerse que se comunique lo pertinente al Registro Civil. Todas estas observaciones se hacen en aras de colaborar con los jueces de instancia en el cumplimiento de los artículos 453 y 459 del Código Procesal Penal.

Por Tanto:

Se declara con lugar el séptimo motivo del recurso de casación formulado por la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero a favor de F. En consecuencia, se casa la sentencia recurrida en lo que se refiere a la pena que debe descontar F en su condición de autor responsable del delito de concusión cometido en perjuicio de los deberes de la función pública, la cual se fija en CUATRO AÑOS DE PRISIÓN. En virtud de la sanción impuesta, se deniega la solicitud para que se conceda a F el beneficio de condena de ejecución condicional. Se declaran sin lugar los restantes motivos de la impugnación formulada por la licenciada Navas Montero a favor de F. Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el justiciable F. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de casación por el fondo interpuesto por los doctores Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas y, en consecuencia, se casa la sentencia impugnada y se declara a J cómplice responsable del delito de concusión, por lo que se le impone la pena de TRES AÑOS DE PRISIÓN. Por un período de prueba de cinco años, se le concede a J el beneficio de condena de ejecución condicional. Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación por la forma promovido por los doctores Dora Guzmán Zanetti y Gonzalo Castellón Vargas. Se declara con lugar el segundo motivo por defectos procedimentales del recurso de casación promovido por la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero a favor de M: En consecuencia, se anulan el fallo recurrido y el debate que le precedió, sólo en lo que atañe a la causa seguida contra esta imputada por el delito de peculado relacionado con los cheques N° 5621, 5622, 5623, 5665, 5666, 5731 y 5905, todos de la cuenta corriente N° 7972-3 del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a nombre del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Cuenta Caja Chica, y se ordena el reenvío del asunto al Tribunal de origen para una nueva sustanciación de ese único aspecto, esta vez conforme a Derecho. Por innecesario se omite pronunciamiento respecto de los restantes motivos del recurso promovido por la licenciada Gloria Navas Montero a favor de M. Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por la licenciada Amira Suñol Ocampo en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República. Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación promovido por los Fiscales Héctor Chacón Chang y Max Chinchilla Fernández en representación del Ministerio Público. Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por el licenciado Gilberth Calderón Alvarado en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República. En todo lo no indicado incluyendo las absolutorias dictadas por el a quo y la pena de inhabilitación especial que deben descontar F y J. Tome nota el Tribunal de instancia de lo que se señala en el Considerando LXXI de la presente resolución.

Daniel González A.

Jesús Ramírez Q. Afonso Chaves R.

Rodrigo Castro M. José Manuel Arroyo G.

dig.imp.scg.