Father's tort liability prior to filiation determinationResponsabilidad extracontractual del padre previo a la filiación

IV.- In this matter it is clear that the plaintiff is not invoking either section 96 or section 172, both of the Family Code (Código de Familia). What she is arguing is that the defendant did not provide for the child from birth until the child support claim was filed. The point was made absolutely clear when the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) summarily dismissed the claim precisely by citing those two articles, a decision that this Court overturned, explaining that there are many cases for which no specific legal rule exists and yet they still obtain a favorable decision from the legal system, because in the absence of legislation the judge is empowered to use other mechanisms to resolve disputes, for example, the use of analogy, case law, or the general principles of law (see folios 24 and 25 of this case file). Thus, the question this Court must ask itself is whether there is a legal basis for this claim, understanding the legal system in its entirety and in a systematic manner.

V.- Here it is worth recapitulating some rulings (votos) of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) regarding the application of the legal system. The first citation concerns supplementary sources of law, specifically on the topic of the absence of legislation: “...III.- However: one should not resort to a rule designed to define what happens to the spouses' property upon divorce or judicial separation, or one should not necessarily resort to it, when the situation under discussion is the right claimed by a man or a woman over the other's property —co-ownership—, when there has been a de facto union (unión de hecho) in which those assets were acquired through common effort. Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other legislation —Article 1198 of the Civil Code that its ruling cites—, or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a particular subject matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code; and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing that, pursuant to the first rule cited, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, by claiming a lack of law applicable to the case presented. Judges, therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve matters with an express rule, with extensive (analogical interpretive) application, and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient rule. What does not seem appropriate is to attribute to Article 41 of the Family Code, which was designed to regulate a specific situation, and, if one wishes, the usual one in our environment, discrimination for not referring to other possibilities. That conclusion could not be considered reasonable.- IV.- The insufficiency of our legal system in the matter at hand, as specialized authors have already pointed out, stems from the Political Constitution itself, whose Article 52 establishes that "Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses." Likewise, as the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) details in its report, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 1969), instruments in force in our country, point to that character of marriage as essential to the family and a right for individuals. That does not mean, by any means, as some author has pointed out, that marriage is the sole or exclusive basis of the family. Reality shows that, at least in certain regions of the country, there are high percentages of families founded not on marriage, but on a de facto union. The fact that ordinary legislation has not taken on the task of developing this issue could not be turned against Article 41 as is intended in the consultation, hence the Chamber is compelled to indicate that there is no unconstitutionality attributable to that rule, but rather it is under a parallel duty to indicate to the Court that it has sufficient basis at its disposal to resolve the specific case in accordance with what was stated supra. Situations like those raised in the sub judice matter have been resolved in a favorable manner countless times; we cannot affirm always correctly, but we can emphasize that Courts of different hierarchies have already been establishing guidelines for resolving cases like the one the consulting Court has under its cognizance. In this sense, one can already resort to sufficient specific precedents. The power of case law in Family Law in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the rules of the Family Code originate in court decisions, including some of a markedly dissident or minority tone, but not for that reason lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field, and one could even say it is where this behavior has been noted most rapidly. Consequently, what is appropriate is to address the judicial consultation filed by indicating to the Second Section of the Civil Superior Court of Alajuela (Tribunal Superior Civil de Alajuela, Sección Segunda), that Article 41 of the Family Code is not unconstitutional from the aspect raised by the consultation...” (voto 769-93 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia)) Furthermore, it is important to make the following paraphrase regarding the interpretation and application of legislation: “...V.- This Chamber considers that, for the interpretation of a rule, the creative function of the judge in determining the meaning and scope of laws is vitally important. Consequently, the judge must not analyze only the grammatical meaning or the words the legislator used to give content to the rule, but also the relationships that bind all parts of the articles on the point at issue, the legal situation existing at the time the law under interpretation was enacted, and, finally, to grasp the action exerted by said law in the general order of law and the place it occupies within that order. A creative function that, in the case at hand, must conclude by adapting the rule to practice and reality so that the purposes intended by the legislator are fulfilled, insofar as they serve to define or resolve a question between two or more persons. In this sense, the national judge has proceeded by establishing jurisprudentially the child support quota for the concept of the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) corresponding to the month of December, because such creation evidently falls within the context prescribed by the rule, in this case Article 151 of the Family Code, since said interpretation does not go beyond the conditions set by it, when establishing that child support comprises an economic provision that, maintaining a relationship between the economic possibilities of the provider and the recipient, satisfies certain vital and emotional needs for the latter. It is evident, according to what was previously stated, that, in the month of December, the economic possibilities and the needs of the parties forming the support relationship have varied as a consequence of the activities that occur during the end of the year and which, as already analyzed, are entirely foreseeable...” (voto 6093-94 of the Constitutional Chamber).- It is clear from these texts that the Judge's task is not to decipher the grammatical meaning of a rule, but rather the systematic application of the entire legal system. Clear vectors of emphasis in the current legal system are gender equity and the protection of children's rights, and in light of that, some questions, such as those posed below, must be answered in the negative. For example, does a father's obligation only arise when his parentage with the child is declared? Likewise, must the answer be negative: is responsibility for the child solely the mother's, until the father is declared? And what about this question: must the clarification of filiation only be initiated by the mother, or should the alleged father also be interested in that clarification? The issue is that the de facto situation presented in the specific case has the appearance of law. In many cases, the man has clearly internalized that he is the father of a child, and despite that, he does not react responsibly by contributing to the development of that person. That cannot go unnoticed by our legal system.

VI.- Although there are rules to be applied in a simple manner in specific proceedings on the subject, such as sections 96 and 172 of the Family Code, the truth is that this cannot exhaust the topic of responsibility in the fulfillment of family duties, and that family responsibility must respond to the same principles as civil liability (responsabilidad civil). Three options must be considered. One of them is the quasi-contracts (cuasicontratos) regulated in section 1043 of the Civil Code: “...Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties.” Another possibility is the abuse of rights (abuso del derecho) provided for in sections 20 and 22 of the Civil Code: “Acts carried out under the protection of the text of a rule, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due application of the rule that was intended to be evaded.” “The law does not protect the abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise thereof. Any act or omission in a contract, which, due to the intention of its author, its object, or the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the adoption of judicial or administrative measures to prevent the persistence of the abuse.” (On this topic, consult the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice rulings voto 106-92 of 14:55 hrs. on July 8, 1992, and voto 53-98 of 15:10 hrs. on May 27, 1998.) And the other alternative for application is the subjective non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual subjetiva) of Article 1045 of the Civil Code: “Anyone who, through willful misconduct (dolo), fault, negligence (negligencia), or recklessness (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it along with the consequential damages.” (On the topic of the application of subjective civil liability and the abuse of rights or antisocial exercise thereof, in family law and specifically in matters of filiation, see voto 45-94 issued at 10:10 hrs. on March 3, 1994, by the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice.) It may be that, eventually, the assumptions of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) as a typology of quasi-contracts, where an omission in the fulfillment of responsibilities implies that this shared responsibility was borne entirely by only one of the obligors, or the abuse of rights, according to which we could consider that there is an omission that exceeds the limits of inertia in the face of family responsibility. However, it is Article 1045 of the Civil Code that provides the basis for seeking liability in a case like the one at hand, and it is precisely the subjective parameter of willful misconduct or negligence. That is the measure that corresponds to the application with equity in this type of matters. Transcending the fixed canon of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code must respond to a subjective type of liability, where there is willful misconduct or negligence.

Let us review, with some case law citations, the preconditions of non-contractual civil liability: “...IV.- Regarding non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has stated: "Through civil liability, a subject is attributed the obligation to repair, indemnify, or compensate (the latter being the case of non-pecuniary harm (daño moral)), a harm inflicted on the legal sphere of another subject, as a consequence of an act or an activity carried out by the former.- This liability is divided into subjective liability and objective liability, according to the criterion of imputation used in each case: in the former, the will of the debtor, who acts culpably; in the latter, objective criteria such as risk, expressly established by law. It is also usually divided into contractual and non-contractual, depending on whether it arises from the breach of an obligation freely agreed upon by the parties, or from the breach of the general duty not to cause harm to others... For its part, non-contractual liability falls on whoever, outside of any prior contractual relationship, has caused harm to the legal sphere of another subject, through fault, or through the setting in motion of a risky activity or creation of a social risk. This liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but from the violation of the general duty not to harm others. Its regime is based on Articles 1045, 1046, 1047, and 1048 of the Civil Code. The first of these provides that: 'Anyone who, through willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it along with the consequential damages.' A principle that is the foundation of all civil liability." (Ruling number 320 of 14:20 hrs. on November 9, 1990). Regarding the regulation of Article 1045, this Chamber has said: "IX.- Article 1045 of the Civil Code establishes the foundation of subjective non-contractual civil liability: "Anyone who, through willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it along with the consequential damages." The duty of compensation, in this case, derives from the culpable breach of the general principle of 'not causing harm to others.' For liability to exist, it is required that the harm was caused with fault (negligence, recklessness, or lack of skill (impericia)), or willful misconduct of the agent. The burden of proof then falls on the creditor, that is, on the victim requesting compensation..." (Ruling number 34 of 14:25 hrs. on March 22, 1991). Modern scientific doctrine, when analyzing the figure of willful misconduct, is unanimous in indicating that it implies the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge of its illegality, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without the need for having foreseen, or being able to foresee, all and each of its possible effects. In this sense, it is affirmed, the intention to harm is not necessary; the will to breach the duty is sufficient, along with bad faith, the awareness that an illicit act is being carried out. Willful misconduct presumes the knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual willful misconduct (dolo eventual)). It is also affirmed that the lack of intention does not constitute willful misconduct; here we are in the presence of so-called 'gross negligence' (culpa lata). However, extreme negligence should bring upon the agent the consequences of willful misconduct. For its part, fault (culpa) supposes negligent, careless, imprudent conduct that causes harm without intending it. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The former occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct can lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless hopes that, under the given circumstances, it will not occur; while in the latter, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. In any case, for fault to exist, it is necessary that the harmful result was foreseen as possible, or that it should have been foreseen, a likelihood of the result that cannot be so small that even if the person acted according to their duties, it would not have made them desist from the action. It is affirmed that, to determine if the act is negligent, it is relevant to consider whether a reasonable person could foresee that it will cause harm. Fault, then, consists of a lack of care, caution, and diligence required. Diligence has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harm may derive, according to the type of activity in question, and that which can and should be expected of a normally reasonable and sensible person belonging to the technical sphere of the case. That is, if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding harm to legally protected property of others. Indeed, the doctrine indicates that the required diligence covers not only the precautions and cares ordered in each case by regulations, but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm. Regarding the burden of proof in matters of non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has indicated: "VII.- One of the fundamental differences between contractual and non-contractual civil liability lies in the burden of proof, because in liability derived from a contract, the creditor is not obliged to demonstrate the fault of the debtor, since it is presumed as long as the latter does not demonstrate that their breach or delay is not attributable to them, such as fortuitous event or force majeure; in contrast, in non-contractual liability, the injured party is responsible for proving the culpability of the author of the illicit act. Thus, Article 317, subsection 1), of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), provides that whoever formulates a claim bears the burden of proof regarding the facts constituting their right... On the other hand, one of the constituent elements of subjective non-contractual civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the harm, the latter being the precondition for any type of non-contractual liability, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the compensation claim to succeed..." (Judgment number 17 of 15:00 hrs. on January 29, 1992)....” (Voto 53-98 issued at 15:10 hrs. on May 27, 1998, by the First Chamber).

The normal or lawful situations regarding the establishment of paternity are contained, then, in sections 96 and 172 of the Family Code; however, considering a greater liability must be analyzed in terms of whether there was willful misconduct or fault on the part of the father prior to the declaration of paternity. It must be analyzed whether there was a willful or culpable breach of the principle of not causing harm to others, in this case to the child and the mother. We have already seen from the previous citation that willful misconduct implies the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge of the cause, its author knowing it may be harmful to others, but without needing to have foreseen or being able to foresee all and each of its possible effects. Willful misconduct presumes the knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual willful misconduct). On the other hand, fault supposes negligent, careless, imprudent conduct that causes harm without intending it. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The former occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct can lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless hopes that, under the given circumstances, it will not occur; while in the latter, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. Diligence, which is the antonym of negligence, has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harm may derive, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected of a normally reasonable and sensible person belonging to the technical sphere of the case. The absence of liability would exist if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding harm to legally protected property of others. Indeed, the doctrine indicates that the required diligence covers not only the precautions and cares ordered in each case by regulations, but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm.

VII.- In accordance with the principle of iura novit curia, namely, the Judge knows the Law, we must therefore conclude that within the legal system there exists an implicit general duty not to harm others. In the case of paternity and the responsible fulfillment of family duties, there can be no reading that responsibility towards the child only arises upon the judicial declaration of paternity. If a father knows he is the father and even acts like a father, albeit sporadically, his willful misconduct or fault in the face of his inaction regarding the material and psycho-emotional development of the child, and the overloading of responsibility onto the mother, must be questioned. If from the specific case, that willful misconduct or fault arises, the fixed canons of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code must be surpassed, in order to establish specific liability for the omission of the duty of responsible fulfillment of family duties. This is pursuant to the general clause of the legal system, such as Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which regulates subjective civil liability, which in the ambit of family law becomes "family-civil liability" (responsabilidad civil-familiar). But following the line of the theory of subjective liability, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate the willful misconduct or fault. Thus, if an alleged father has been informed that he is the father, and that father becomes convinced that he is, internalizes that situation, and presents himself as such, approaching the concept of notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) (Article 93 of the Family Code), but does not fully comply with his duties, it must truly be established that there is at least culpable conduct on his part, and his subjective liability must be analyzed. In this case, only the material aspect of the child's maintenance has been raised, and that is what must be considered.

VII.- In our specific case, it has been established that the father was with the child's mother during the pregnancy and that he helped her and made sporadic contributions, as inferred from the testimony received and the certified copy of the judgment contained in the case file. This leads us to the conclusion that the now-declared father should have seriously considered whether [Nombre2]. E. was his son, and diligently dispelled any doubts if he had any, and responsibly fulfilled the child's development, not sporadically, but continuously and sufficiently within his means, because it is a notorious fact that human beings must eat and satisfy their needs every day and not sporadically, and that minors depend on their adult parents for the satisfaction of their needs. It need not be demonstrated in a proceeding like this that it was the mother who satisfied the child's needs, because as a normal fact, it must be presumed that this has been the case. This Court, finding that the omission of Mr. [Nombre3] to provide continuous and sufficient economic support for the development of [Nombre2]., was a culpable omission, negligent in the fulfillment of family duties, must therefore consider the preconditions configured to uphold subjective civil (family) liability, and consequently, he must answer for his culpable omissions regarding the development of [Nombre2]., which generated harm by overloading the costs of the child's development onto the mother, the plaintiff. In this way, this Court considers that the decision reached in the first instance must be revoked, dismissing the exceptions of lack of right, lack of active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), and that of sine actione agit, except on the point of retroactive interest going back one year prior to the claim, because that is not possible since this is not a commercial or contractual obligation in which interest was agreed upon. On this point, the claim must be declared without merit. As for the rest, there is no defect in the precondition of the right, since we have seen that legal reason exists by understanding the legal system systematically, under the assumptions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code, in relation to sections 10 and 11 of the Civil Code, and the principles of Article 2 of the Family Code, and the canons of international instruments for the protection of women and children. The argument regarding the non-retroactivity of the law must be understood as contained within this exception of lack of right, but the truth is that the responsible paternity law is not being applied, nor is it to be applied. Nor in that of active and passive standing, since the litigation has taken place between the mother and the father of the child in question. And the exception of sine actione agit, because there is no defect in the current interest, which is the substantive precondition remaining for analysis. It is evident that there is partial expiry due to the passage of time, and this Court agrees with the defendant in his brief filing the statute of limitations exception (excepción de prescripción) that section 869, subsection 1 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case, such that the liability translatable into the maintenance of the minor for the periods prior to April 6, 1998, must be considered time-barred, that is, three years prior to the act interrupting the statute of limitations, which is the notification of this claim (April 6, 2001, see folio 32). Regarding the selected rule, note the considerations made by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in a somewhat similar case: “...IV.- APPEAL ON THE MERITS: The appellant requests that the judgment referred to in the appeal be quashed, insofar as it condemned the defendant estate to pay the maternity expenses and child support for the deceased's child during the three months following his birth. He argues that Article 96 of the Family Code was misinterpreted, and Articles 865, 866, and 868 of the Civil Code were violated by lack of application, since he timely raised the statute of limitations on that point, which was extinguished by the passage of time, because sixteen years elapsed from the birth to the filing of the claim. This Chamber considers that, on this point, the appellant is correct. The opinion of the doctrine is unanimous regarding the imprescriptibility of the right to request child support. This right has a public nuance that distances it from the power of disposition typical of private autonomy, which is why the law, Article 154 of the Family Code, provides that it is not a waivable right, it is not transferable, nor can a child support debt be set off. As we are dealing with a non-property right, the statute of limitations does not affect it. However, it must be clear that what is not susceptible to prescription is the right to request child support, because that right is not within the commerce of men, but a distinction must be made regarding the right to claim pensions already accrued, because these, like any other property right, are susceptible to extinction by the passage of time. Article 159 of the Family Code establishes the possibility of collecting child support arrears, but only for the twelve months prior to the claim, and if it is proven that the recipient had to incur debts to live. The content of this article leads us to conclude that child support debts prior to one year before the filing of the claim cannot be collected; this being based on the nature of the obligation. However, Article 159 of the Family Code exempts from lack of right to collect child support the cases referred to in Article 96 of the same body of law, which is the one the appellant considers misapplied. It cannot be interpreted that the exemption made by the aforementioned Article 159, referring to Article 96 of the same body of law, declares the right to request maternity expenses and child support for the three months after birth to be imprescriptible. To consider it so would violate Articles 865 and 868 of the Civil Code, which embody in our civil law the unanimous doctrinal criterion that, except for the exceptions provided by law, every right and its corresponding action are extinguished by the lapsing of the period in which the negative statute of limitations operates.

**IV.-** In this matter, it is clear that the plaintiff is not invoking either Article 96 or Article 172, both of the Family Code. What she is arguing is that the defendant did not look after the child from birth until the child support (alimentos) claim was filed. The point became absolutely clear when the Family Court summarily dismissed the claim precisely by mentioning those two articles, a decision this Tribunal reversed by explaining that there are many cases for which no specific legal rule exists and yet they obtain a favorable decision from the legal system, because in the absence of a specific rule, the judge is empowered to use other mechanisms to provide solutions to disputes, for example, the use of analogy, jurisprudence, or general principles of law (see folios 24 and 25 of this case file). Thus, the question the Tribunal must ask itself is whether there is a legal basis for this claim, understanding the legal system in its totality and in a systematic manner. **V.-** Here it is worthwhile to recapitulate on some rulings of the Constitutional Chamber regarding the application of the legal system. The first citation concerns supplementary sources of law, specifically on the issue of the absence of specific rules: *“...III.- Now then: one should not turn to a rule designed to define what happens to the spouses' property at the time of divorce or judicial separation, or one should not necessarily turn to it, when the situation under discussion is the right claimed by a man or a woman regarding the property of the other—co-ownership—when there has been a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in which those assets were acquired through common effort. Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could turn to other regulations—Article 1198 of the Civil Code cited in its decision, or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a certain matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the above that, according to the first cited rule, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, by alleging a lack of applicable law to the case presented. Judges, then, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve matters with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient norm. What does not seem appropriate is to attribute to Article 41 of the Family Code, which was designed to regulate a particular situation and, if you will, the usual one in our environment, discrimination for not referring to other possibilities. That conclusion could not be considered reasonable.- IV.- The insufficiency of our legal system in the matter before us, as specialized authors have already pointed out, originates in the Political Constitution itself, whose Article 52 establishes that "Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses." Similarly, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic points out in its report, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 1969), instruments in force in our country, point to that character of marriage as essential to the family and a right for individuals. That does not mean, by any means, as some author has pointed out, that marriage is the sole or exclusive basis of the family. Reality demonstrates that, at least in certain regions of the country, there are high percentages of families founded not on marriage, but on a common-law marriage. That ordinary legislation has not undertaken to develop this issue could not revert against Article 41 as is intended in the consultation, hence the Chamber is obligated to indicate that there is no unconstitutionality attributed to that norm, but rather finds itself in the parallel duty to indicate to the Tribunal that it has sufficient basis to resolve the specific case in accordance with what was stated above. Situations such as those raised in the matter sub judice have been resolved in a favorable manner countless times; we cannot affirm always correctly, but we can affirm to emphasize that Courts of different hierarchy have already been establishing guidelines to resolve cases like the one under its cognizance by the consulting Tribunal. In this sense, one can already turn to sufficient specific precedents. The power of jurisprudence in Family Law in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the rules of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, even some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that reason lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field, and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been noticed most swiftly. Consequently, what is appropriate is to resolve the judicial consultation filed by indicating to the Superior Civil Tribunal of Alajuela, Second Section, that Article 41 of the Family Code is not unconstitutional from the aspect raised in the consultation...”* (Ruling 769-93 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) On the other hand, it is important to make the following paraphrase regarding the interpretation and application of the rules: *“...V.- This Chamber considers that, to interpret a norm, the creative function of the judge is of vital importance to determine the meaning and scope of the laws. Consequently, the judge must not analyze only the grammatical sense or the words that the legislator has used to give content to the norm, but also the relations that unite all parts of the articles on the point in question, the legal situation existing at the time the law subject to interpretation was enacted, and, finally, to take possession of the action exercised by said law in the general order of law and the place it occupies in this order. A creative function that, in the case before us, must conclude by adapting the norm to practice and reality so that the purposes proposed by the legislator are fulfilled, insofar as they serve to define or resolve a dispute between two or more persons. In this sense, the national judge has proceeded by establishing, through jurisprudence, the child support quota for the year-end bonus (aguinaldo) corresponding to the month of December, for such creation is evidently within the context prescribed by the norm, in this case Article 151 of the Family Code, since said interpretation does not go beyond the conditions set by it, by establishing that child support comprises an economic benefit that, maintaining a relation between the economic possibilities of the giver and the receiver, satisfies for the latter certain vital and emotional needs. It is evident, according to the above, that in the month of December, the economic possibilities and the needs of the parties that make up the support relationship have varied as a consequence of the activities that occur during the end of the year and that, as already analyzed, are entirely foreseeable...”* (Ruling 6093-94 of the Constitutional Chamber).- It is clear from these texts that the Judge's task is not to unravel the grammatical meaning of a norm, but rather the systematic application of the entire legal system. **Clear emphasis vectors of the current legal system are gender equity and the protection of children's rights**, and in view of this, some questions such as those posed below must be answered negatively. For example, does a father's obligation only arise when his parentage with the child is declared? It must also be answered negatively: is the responsibility for the child solely the mother's, until it is declared who the father is? And what about this question: must the clarification of filiation only originate from the mother, or should the alleged father be interested in that clarification? The issue is that the de facto situation presented in the specific case has the appearance of a legal right. In many cases, the man has clearly internalized that he is the father of a child, and despite this, he does not react responsibly by contributing to that person's development. This cannot go unnoticed by our legal system. **VI.-** Although there are norms to be applied in a simple manner in specific proceedings on the topic, in the case of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code, **the truth is that this cannot exhaust the topic of responsibility in the fulfillment of family duties**, and that family responsibility must respond to the same principles of civil liability. **Three options must be considered.** One of them is the **quasi-contracts (cuasicontratos)** regulated in Article 1043 of the Civil Code: “...Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties.” Another possibility is the **abuse of right (abuso del derecho)** provided for in Articles 20 and 22 of the Civil Code: “Acts carried out under the protection of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be evaded.” “The law does not protect the abuse of right or the antisocial exercise thereof. Any act or omission in a contract, which by the intention of its author, by its purpose, or by the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, with harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence of the abuse.” (On this topic, see from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice rulings 106-92 at 2:55 PM on July 8, 1992, and 53-98 at 3:10 PM on May 27, 1998.) And the other alternative for application is the **subjective non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual subjetiva)** of Article 1045 of the Civil Code: “Anyone who by willful misconduct (dolo), fault, negligence, or imprudence causes damage to another is obligated to repair it together with the consequential damages (perjuicios).” (On the topic of the application of subjective civil liability and abuse of right or antisocial exercise thereof, in family law and specifically regarding filiation, see Ruling 45-94 issued at 10:10 AM on March 3, 1994, by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.) Although eventually the assumptions of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) as a typology of quasi-contracts, in which an omission in the fulfillment of responsibilities implies that said shared responsibility was overloaded onto only one of the obligated parties, or else the abuse of right according to which we could consider that there is an omission that exceeds the limits of inertia in the face of family responsibility. **However, it is Article 1045 of the Civil Code that provides the basis for seeking liability in a case such as the one before us, and it is precisely the subjective parameter of willful misconduct or negligence. That is the measure that corresponds to the application with equity in this type of matter. Going beyond the fixed canon of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code must respond to a subjective type of liability, when willful misconduct or negligence intervenes.** Let us review, with some jurisprudential citations, the assumptions of non-contractual civil liability: “...IV.- Regarding non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has stated: "Through civil liability, a subject is attributed the obligation to repair, indemnify or compensate (the latter being the case for non-material damage (daño moral)), for harm inflicted on the legal sphere of another subject, as a consequence of an act or activity carried out by the former.- This liability is divided into subjective liability and objective liability, according to the criterion of imputation used in each case: in the first, the will of the debtor, who acts in a culpable manner; in the second, objective criteria such as risk, expressly established by law. It is also usually divided into contractual and non-contractual, depending on whether it arises from the breach of an obligation freely agreed upon by the parties, or from the breach of the general duty not to cause harm to others...For its part, non-contractual liability falls upon whoever, outside of any prior contractual relationship, has caused harm in the legal sphere of another subject, by fault, or through the setting in motion of a risky activity or the creation of a social risk. This liability is not born from the breach of a specific bond, but from the violation of the general duty not to harm others. Its regime is based on Articles 1045, 1046, 1047 and 1048 of the Civil Code. The first of these provides that: 'Anyone who by willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or imprudence causes damage to another is obligated to repair it together with the consequential damages'.- A principle that is the foundation of all civil liability." (Decision number 320 at 2:20 PM on November 9, 1990). Regarding the regulation of Article 1045, this Chamber has said: "IX.- Article 1045 of the Civil Code establishes the foundation of subjective non-contractual liability: 'Anyone who by willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or imprudence causes damage to another is obligated to repair it together with the consequential damages.' The duty of compensation, in this case, derives from the culpable breach of the general principle of 'not causing harm to others.' For liability to exist, it is required that the damage was caused with fault (negligence, imprudence or lack of skill), or willful misconduct of the agent. The burden of proof then corresponds to the creditor, that is, to the victim who seeks compensation..." (Decision number 34 at 2:25 PM on March 22, 1991). Modern scientific doctrine, when analyzing the figure of willful misconduct, is in agreement in indicating that it supposes the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge of its illegality, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without the need for having foreseen or having been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. In this sense, it is affirmed, the intention to harm is not necessary; the will to infringe the duty, bad faith, the awareness that an illicit act is being committed, is sufficient. Willful misconduct presumes the knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual willful misconduct—dolo eventual). It is affirmed, likewise, that a lack of intention does not constitute willful misconduct; here we are in the presence of what is called 'gross negligence' (culpa lata). However, extreme negligence should bring the agent the consequences of willful misconduct. For its part, fault supposes a negligent, careless, unforeseeing act that causes harm without wanting it. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct may lead to a certain harmful result, the agent has, nevertheless, the hope that under the given circumstances it will not occur, while in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. In any case, for fault to exist, it is necessary that the harmful result has been foreseen as possible, or that it should have been foreseen, a verisimilitude of the result that cannot be so small that even if the person acts according to their duties it would not have made them desist from the action. It is affirmed that to determine if the act is negligent, it is relevant to consider whether a reasonable person could foresee that it would cause harm. Fault consists, then, in a lack of the required care, precaution, and diligence. Diligence has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harm may arise, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected of a normally reasonable and sensible person, belonging to the technical sphere of the case. That is, if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding prejudice to legally protected rights of others. Indeed, doctrine indicates that the required diligence encompasses not only the precautions and care ordered in each case by regulations, but also all prudence necessary to avoid harm. Regarding the burden of proof in matters of non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has indicated: "VII.- One of the fundamental differences between contractual and non-contractual civil liability lies in the burden of proof, because in liability derived from a contract, the creditor is not obligated to demonstrate the fault of the debtor, since this is presumed unless the latter demonstrates that his breach or delay is not attributable to him, such as fortuitous event or force majeure; in contrast, in non-contractual or [Name1] liability, the injured party bears the burden of demonstrating the culpability of the author of the illicit act. Thus Article 317, subsection 1), of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that he who formulates a claim bears the burden of proof regarding the facts constituting his right...On the other hand, one of the configuring elements of subjective non-contractual liability is the relationship of direct or efficient causality that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of non-contractual liability, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the compensatory claim to prosper..." (Judgment number 17 at 3 PM on January 29, 1992)....” (Ruling 53-98 issued at 3:10 PM on May 27, 1998, by the First Chamber). Normal or lawful situations regarding the establishment of paternity are therefore contained in Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code; however, considering greater liability must be analyzed in terms of whether there was willful misconduct or fault on the part of the father prior to the declaration of paternity. It must be analyzed whether there has been a willful or culpable breach of the principle of not causing harm to others, in this case to the child and the mother. We have already seen from the previous citation that **willful misconduct** supposes the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge of the causes, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without needing to have foreseen or having been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. Willful misconduct presumes the knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual willful misconduct). On the other hand, **fault** supposes a negligent, careless, unforeseeing act that causes harm without wanting it. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct may lead to a certain harmful result, the agent has, nevertheless, the hope that under the given circumstances it will not occur, while in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. **Diligence**, which is the antonym of negligence, has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harm may arise, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected of a normally reasonable and sensible person, belonging to the technical sphere of the case. The absence of liability would occur if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding prejudice to legally protected rights of others. Indeed, doctrine indicates that the required diligence encompasses not only the precautions and care ordered in each case by regulations, but also all prudence necessary to avoid harm.

**VII.-** In accordance with the principle of **iura novit curia**, that is, the Judge knows the Law, we must therefore conclude that **a general duty not to harm others implicitly exists in the legal system.** In the case of paternity and the responsible fulfillment of family duties, one cannot interpret that responsibility toward the child arises only upon a judicial declaration of paternity. If a father knows he is a father and even acts as a father, albeit sporadically, his intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) in his inaction regarding the material and psycho-affective development of the child, and the shifting of responsibility onto the mother, must be questioned. If that intent (dolo) or fault (culpa) arises from the specific case, the fixed canons of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) must be exceeded to establish specific liability for the omission of the duty of responsible fulfillment of family duties. This is pursuant to the general clause of the legal system, which is Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), regulating subjective civil liability (responsabilidad civil subjetiva), which in the field of family law becomes “family civil liability (responsabilidad civil-familiar).” But following the line of subjective liability theory, it is up to the plaintiff to demonstrate intent (dolo) or fault (culpa). Thus, if an alleged father has been informed that he is the father, and that father becomes convinced that he is, internalizes such a situation, and presents himself as such, approaching the concept of notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) (Article 93 of the Family Code (Código de Familia)) but does not fully comply with his duties, it must truly be established that there is at least a faulty (culposo) conduct on his part, and his subjective liability must be analyzed. In this case, what has been raised is only the material aspect of the child’s maintenance and that is what must be considered. **VII.-** In our specific case, it has been established that the father was with the child's mother during the pregnancy and that he helped her and made sporadic contributions, as evidenced by the testimony received and the certified copy of the judgment in the case file. This leads us to the conclusion that the now declared father should have seriously considered whether [Name2] E. was his son, and diligently cleared up any doubts if he had any, and responded responsibly for the child's development, not in a sporadic manner, but in a continuous and sufficient manner within his possibilities, because it is a well-known fact that human beings must eat and satisfy their needs every day and not sporadically, and that minors depend on their adult parents for the satisfaction of their needs. It need not be demonstrated in a process like this that the mother has satisfied the child’s needs, as it must be presumed as a normal fact that this has been the case. This Tribunal finds that Mr. [Name3]'s omission to provide continuous and sufficient economic support for the development of [Name2]. constitutes **a faulty (culposa), negligent omission in the fulfillment of family duties**; therefore, the conditions for admitting subjective civil (family) liability (responsabilidad civil (familiar) subjetiva) must be understood as met, and consequently, he must answer for his faulty (culposas) omissions regarding the development of [Name2]., which caused harm by shifting the costs of the child's development onto the mother, the plaintiff. Thus, this Tribunal considers that the decision of the first instance must be reversed, dismissing the exceptions of lack of standing (falta de derecho), lack of active and passive standing in court (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and that of sine actione agit, except on the point of retroactive interest to one year prior to the lawsuit, since that is not possible because this is not a commercial or contractual obligation in which interest was agreed upon. In this respect, the claim must be declared without merit. As for the rest, there is no defect in the **legal basis (presupuesto del derecho)**, since we have seen that there is a legal reason, understanding the legal system systematically, under the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), in relation to articles 10 and 11 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), and the principles of Article 2 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), and the canons of international instruments for the protection of women and children. The argument regarding the non-retroactivity of the law must be understood as contained within this exception of lack of standing (falta de derecho), but the truth is that the responsible paternity law is not being applied, nor must it be applied. Nor is there one regarding **active and passive standing in court (legitimación activa y pasiva)**, since the litigation has occurred between the mother and the father of the child in question. Nor the exception of **sine actione agit**, since there is no defect in the current interest, which is the remaining substantive matter to analyze. It is evident that there is a partial lapse of time (perención parcial), and this Tribunal agrees with the defendant in his brief filing the **exception of the statute of limitations (excepción de prescripción)** that Article 869, subsection 1 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) applies in this case, such that the liability, translatable into the maintenance of the minor, must be understood as time-barred for periods prior to April 6, 1998, that is, three years before the act interrupting the statute of limitations, which is the notification of this lawsuit (April 6, 2001, see folio 32). Regarding the selected norm, note the considerations made by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in a somewhat similar case: “... **IV.-** APPEAL ON THE MERITS: The appellant requests that the judgment referred to in the appeal be overturned insofar as it ordered the defendant estate to pay the maternity expenses and child support for the deceased's child, during the three months following his birth. He argues that Article 96 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) was misinterpreted, and that Articles 865, 866, and 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) were violated by lack of application, since he timely raised the statute of limitations on that matter, which was extinguished by the passage of time, because sixteen years passed from the birth to the filing of the lawsuit. The Chamber considers that, on this point, the appellant is correct. The doctrine is unanimous in its opinion regarding the imprescriptibility of the right to request child support. This right has a public aspect that distances it from the power of disposition typical of private autonomy, so the law, Article 154 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), provides that it is not a renounceable right, is not transferable, nor can a child support debt be offset. As we are dealing with a non-property right, the statute of limitations does not affect it. However, it must be clear that what is not susceptible to the statute of limitations is the right to request child support, because that right is not within the commerce of men, but a distinction must be made between the right to claim already accrued payments, because these, like any other property right, are susceptible to extinction by the passage of time. Article 159 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) establishes the possibility of collecting back child support, but only for the twelve months prior to the lawsuit, and if it is proven that the obligee had to incur debts to live. The content of this article leads us to conclude that child support debts predating the year before the lawsuit filing cannot be collected; this being based on the nature of the obligation. However, Article 159 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) preserves the right to claim child support in the cases referred to in Article 96 of the same body of law, which is the article the appellant considers misapplied. It cannot be interpreted that the exception made by the aforementioned Article 159, referring to Article 96 of the same body of law, declares the right to claim maternity expenses and child support for the three months following childbirth imprescriptible. To consider it so would be to violate Articles 865 and 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which enshrine in our civil law the unanimous doctrinal criterion that, except for legal exceptions, every right and its corresponding action are extinguished by the passage of the term in which the negative statute of limitations operates. On this subject, it should not be forgotten that the non-waivability and imprescriptibility of the right to request child support has its foundation in every person's need to live decently, during their minority or in the face of any incapacity to obtain them; hence arises the obligation of relatives or another person obliged under some circumstance to provide them fully and faithfully. But this obligation consists of giving current child support, or as indicated by our Family Code (Código de Familia), it extends to the twelve previous months, except for the exception in Article 69. Other child support that corresponds or may have corresponded to other stages of the obligee's life is extinguished by the passage of time, as will be seen. Regarding Article 96 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), its wording may create some confusion, but even though we are dealing with a special norm, the foundation of the extinctive statute of limitations cannot be set aside, which is found in the opinion, more or less debatable, as referred to by [Name4]. Civil Law I, Introduction and General Part, Volume Two, Third Edition, page 448, 1975, "... that the public power should not protect indefinitely, and with the vigor it dispenses such protection in normal cases, rights that are neither used by their holder nor recognized by the one upon whom they weigh, because this would go against general legal certainty, which would be altered if a situation that has lasted for a long time without being challenged could be attacked later through actions never exercised by anyone." In the case at hand, in addition to the negligent conduct, reflected in the disinterest and inactivity of the right's creditor, it is clear that these uncollected sums no longer have the characteristics of being necessary for subsistence. This being the case, the right granted by Article 96 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) is time-barred in the three-year period of subsection one of Article 869 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), because although the referred norm of the Family Code (Código de Familia), in addition to child support, contemplates another item, which is maternity expenses, the matter related to the child support payment is more important and, consequently, must be considered principal. The first instance Judges erred in not applying the cited Article 869 to the sums claimed for maternity expenses and child support, based on Article 96 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), because even though they are time-barred in a period longer than the twelve months indicated in Article 159 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), being past child support, they are time-barred in the three-year period, as provided in Article 869 of the cited Code. The correct solution is to accept the appellant's request, overturn the appealed judgment on this matter and, deciding on the merits, accept the statute of limitations, and consequently, dismiss the claim regarding maternity expenses and child support for the three months following the birth of the person seeking recognition of their filiation....” There is no expiration (caducidad) as indicated by the appealed judgment, because we are not in the situations indicated by the first instance authority; but we are indeed within the conditions for the statute of limitations (prescripción), and in the matter before us, the term of Article 869, subsection 1 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) must be applied. **VIII.-** Thus, in accordance with the foregoing, the appealed decision must be reversed and in its place, the exceptions of lack of standing (falta de derecho), lack of active and passive standing in court (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and sine actione agit must be dismissed, except regarding the claim for interest, a claim for which these exceptions must be accepted. Therefore, the claim for interest must be dismissed. The exception of the statute of limitations (excepción de prescripción) must be partially accepted, thus the compensation for the maintenance of the child [Name2]. corresponding to periods prior to April 6, 1998, is declared time-barred. The lawsuit is partially granted, and Mr. [Name5] is ordered to pay Mrs. [Name6] compensation for the maintenance of the child K. E. V. J. for the period between April 6, 1998, and June 20, 2000 (the date on which the child support was collected in the regular proceeding), compensation that is reasonable and proportional to regulate in a prudential manner using the current amount of child support as a parameter. Thus, in accordance with Article 156 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), the compensation shall be determined in the sum of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones. Which is the result of multiplying sixty thousand colones by twenty-six months, which is the time from April 6, 1998, to June 6, 2000 (one million five hundred sixty thousand colones), plus a proportion for fourteen days (twenty-eight thousand colones), thus reaching up to June 20, 2000." **IV.-** In this matter, it is clear that the plaintiff is not invoking either Article 96 or Article 172, both of the Family Code (*Código de Familia*). What she is arguing is that the defendant did not look after the child from the time of his birth until the child support claim was filed. The point became absolutely clear at the moment when the Family Court summarily dismissed the claim precisely by citing those two articles, a decision that this Tribunal reversed, explaining that there are many cases for which no specific legal norm exists and yet they still obtain a favorable decision from the legal system, because in the absence of legislation, the judge is empowered to use other mechanisms to provide solutions to disputes, for example, the use of analogy, case law, or the general principles of law (see folios 24 and 25 of this case file). Thus, the question this Tribunal must ask itself is whether a legal basis exists for this claim, understanding the legal system in its entirety and in a systematic manner.

**V.-** Here it is worthwhile to recapitulate some rulings (*votos*) of the Constitutional Chamber (*Sala Constitucional*) regarding the application of the legal system. The first citation relates to the supplementary sources (*fuentes supletorias*) of law, specifically on the topic of the absence of legislation: *“...III.- However: one should not resort to a norm provided to define what happens with the spouses' property at the time of divorce or judicial separation, or one need not necessarily resort to it, when the situation under discussion is the right alleged by a man or a woman with respect to the other's property —co-ownership—, when there has been a de facto union in which those assets were acquired through common effort. Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could resort to other legislation —Article 1198 of the Civil Code cited in its resolution—, or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system when there is an insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the foregoing that, according to the first cited norm, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, by alleging a lack of applicable law to the case presented. Judges, therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. What does not seem appropriate is to attribute to Article 41 of the Family Code, which was designed to regulate a particular and, if you will, the usual situation in our environment, discrimination for not referring to other possibilities. That conclusion could not be considered reasonable.- IV.- The insufficiency of our legal system in the matter at hand, as specialized authors have already pointed out, starts from the Political Constitution (*Constitución Política*) itself, whose Article 52 establishes that “Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equal rights of the spouses.” Similarly, as the General Attorney's Office (*Procuraduría General de la República*) points out in its report, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 1969), instruments in force in our country, indicate that character of marriage as essential to the family and a right for individuals. That does not mean, by any means, as some author has pointed out, that marriage is the sole or exclusive basis of the family. Reality shows that, at least in certain regions of the country, there are high percentages of families founded not on marriage, but on a de facto union. That ordinary legislation has not undertaken to develop this problem could not revert against Article 41 as intended in the consultation, hence the Chamber is obliged to indicate that there is no unconstitutionality attributable to that norm, but rather it is under a parallel duty to indicate to the Tribunal that it has at its disposal a sufficient basis to resolve the specific case in accordance with what was stated supra. Situations like those raised in the case sub judice have been resolved countless times in an estimatory manner, we cannot affirm always correctly, but we can to emphasize that Tribunals of different hierarchies have been establishing guidelines to resolve cases like the one the consulting Tribunal has under its consideration. In this sense, one can already resort to sufficient specific precedents. The power of case law in Family Law in our country has been such, that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, including some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that reason lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where such behavior has been most rapidly noted. Consequently, the appropriate course is to answer the judicial consultation filed, indicating to the Second Section of the Superior Civil Tribunal of Alajuela (*Tribunal Superior Civil de Alajuela, Sección Segunda*) that Article 41 of the Family Code is not unconstitutional from the aspect raised by the consultation...”* (ruling 769-93 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Furthermore, it is important to make the following paraphrase regarding the interpretation and application of legislation: *“...V.- This Chamber considers that, to interpret a norm, the judge’s creative function to determine the meaning and scope of the laws is of vital importance. Consequently, the judge must not only analyze the grammatical sense or the words the legislator has used to give content to the norm, but also the relationships that unite all parts of the articles on the point in question, the existing legal situation at the time the law subject to interpretation was enacted, and, finally, to fully grasp the action exercised by said law in the general order of law and the place it occupies in that order. A creative function which, in the case at hand, must conclude by adapting the norm to practice and reality so that the purposes the legislator set out are fulfilled, insofar as they serve to define or resolve a question between two or more persons. The national judge has proceeded in this manner by establishing through case law the child support payment (*cuota alimentaria*) for the concept of the year-end bonus corresponding to the month of December, since such creation clearly falls within the context prescribed by the norm, in this case Article 151 of the Family Code, as said interpretation does not go beyond the conditions set forth by it, upon establishing that child support comprises an economic provision which, maintaining a relationship between the economic possibilities of the payer and the recipient, satisfies certain vital and emotional needs of the latter. It is evident from the foregoing that, in the month of December, the economic possibilities and the needs of the parties forming the support relationship have changed as a consequence of the activities that occur during the end of the year and which, as already analyzed, are entirely foreseeable...”* (ruling 6093-94 of the Constitutional Chamber).- From these texts, it is clear that the Judge's task is not to decipher the grammatical meaning of a norm, but rather the systematic application of the entire legal system.

**Clear vectors of emphasis in the current legal system are gender equity and the protection of children's rights**, and in light of this, some questions like those posed below must be answered negatively. For example, does a father's obligation only arise when his kinship with the child is declared? An equally negative answer must be given to: is responsibility for the child solely the mother's, until the father is declared? And what about this question: must the clarification of filiation only come from the mother, or should the presumed father also take an interest in that clarification? The issue is that the de facto situation presented in the specific case has an appearance of law. In many cases, the male has clearly internalized that he is the father of a child, and despite this, he does not react responsibly by contributing to the development of that person. This cannot go unnoticed by our legal system.

**VI.-** Although there are norms to be applied simply in specific processes on the subject, as in the case of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code, **the truth is that this cannot exhaust the topic of liability (*responsabilidad*) in the fulfillment of family duties**, and that family liability must respond to the same principles as civil liability. **Three options must be considered.** One of them is the **quasi-contracts (*cuasicontratos*)** regulated in Article 1043 of the Civil Code: “...Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties.” Another possibility is the **abuse of rights (*abuso del derecho*)** provided for in Articles 20 and 22 of the Civil Code: “Acts carried out under the protection of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be circumvented.” “The law does not protect the abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise thereof. Any act or omission in a contract, which, by the intention of its author, by its object, or by the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence of the abuse.” (On this topic, see rulings 106-92 of 2:55 p.m. on July 8, 1992, and 53-98 of 3:10 p.m. on May 27, 1998, from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.) And the other alternative for application is the **subjective extracontractual civil liability (*responsabilidad civil extracontractual subjetiva*)** of Article 1045 of the Civil Code: “Anyone who, through fraud, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it along with the damages.” (On the topic of applying subjective civil liability and the abuse of rights or antisocial exercise thereof, in family law and specifically in matters of filiation, see ruling 45-94 issued at 10:10 a.m.

of March 3, 1994, from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice) Although the scenarios of unjust enrichment as a typology of quasi-contracts—where an omission in the fulfillment of responsibilities implies that this shared responsibility was overloaded onto only one of the obligors—or the abuse of right, according to which we could consider that there is an omission exceeding the limits of inertia in the face of family responsibility, could eventually apply. <span style="font-weight:bold">However, it is Article 1045 of the Civil Code that provides the basis for seeking liability in a case such as the one before us, and it is precisely the subjective parameter of willful misconduct (dolo) or negligence (negligencia).</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> That is the standard that corresponds to an application with equity in this type of matter.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> Transcending the fixed canon of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code must respond to a subjective type of liability, upon the existence of willful misconduct (dolo) or negligence (negligencia).</span><span> </span><span> Let us review the premises of non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) with some jurisprudential citations: “...IV.- Regarding non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has stated: \" Through civil liability, a subject is attributed the obligation to repair, indemnify, or compensate (the latter being the case of moral damages), a harm inflicted upon the legal sphere of another subject, as a consequence of an act or activity carried out by the former.- This liability is divided into subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva) and objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva), according to the imputation criterion used in each case: in the first, the will of the debtor, who acts culpably; in the second, objective criteria such as risk, expressly established by law. It is also usually divided into contractual and non-contractual, depending on whether it arises from the breach of an obligation freely agreed upon by the parties, or from the breach of the general duty not to cause harm to others... For its part, non-contractual liability falls upon whoever, outside of any prior contractual relationship, has caused harm in the legal sphere of another subject, through fault (culpa), or through the setting in motion of a risky activity or creation of a social risk. This liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but from the violation of the general duty not to harm others. Its regime is based on Articles 1045, 1046, 1047, and 1048 of the Civil Code. The first of these provides that: \"Anyone who, by willful misconduct (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the damages (perjuicios).\"- A principle that is the foundation of all civil liability.\" (Resolution number 320 of 2:20 PM on November 9, 1990). Regarding the regulation of Article 1045, this Chamber has stated: \"IX.- Article 1045 of the Civil Code establishes the foundation of subjective non-contractual liability: \"Anyone who, by willful misconduct (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the damages (perjuicios).\" The duty of compensation, in this case, derives from the culpable breach of the general principle of \"not causing harm to others.\" For liability to exist, it is required that the harm was caused with fault (culpa) (negligence (negligencia), imprudence (imprudencia), or lack of skill (impericia)), or willful misconduct (dolo) of the agent. The burden of proof then falls on the creditor, that is, on the victim requesting compensation...\" (Resolution number 34 of 2:25 PM on March 22, 1991). Modern scientific doctrine, when analyzing the figure of willful misconduct (dolo), is unanimous in indicating that it supposes the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge of its illegality, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without the need to have foreseen or been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. In this sense, it is affirmed that the intention to harm is not required; the will to infringe the duty, bad faith (mala fe), the awareness that an illicit act is being carried out, is sufficient. Willful misconduct (dolo) presumes knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual willful misconduct (dolo eventual)). It is also affirmed that the lack of intention does not constitute willful misconduct (dolo); here we are in the presence of so-called \"gross fault (culpa lata)\". However, extreme negligence should bring upon the agent the consequences of willful misconduct (dolo). For its part, fault (culpa) supposes negligent, careless, unforeseeing conduct that causes harm without intending to. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct may lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless has the hope that under the given circumstances it will not occur, while in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. In any case, for fault (culpa) to exist, it is necessary that the harmful result was foreseen as possible, or that it had to have been foreseen, verisimilitude of the result that cannot be so small that even if the person acted according to their duties it would not have made them desist from the action. It is affirmed that to determine if the act is negligent, it is relevant to consider whether a reasonable person could foresee that it would cause harm. Fault (culpa) consists, then, of a lack of care, precaution, and required diligence. Diligence (diligencia) has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harms may derive, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected from a normally reasonable and sensible person, belonging to the technical sphere of the case. That is, if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding harm to the legally protected property of others. Even doctrine indicates that the required diligence (diligencia) encompasses not only the precautions and care ordered in each case by regulations, but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm. Regarding the burden of proof, in matters of non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has indicated: \"VII.- One of the fundamental differences between contractual and non-contractual civil liability lies in the burden of proof, because in liability derived from a contract, the creditor is not obliged to demonstrate the fault (culpa) of the debtor, since it is presumed as long as the latter does not demonstrate that their non-compliance or delay is not attributable to them, such as a fortuitous event or force majeure; in contrast, in non-contractual liability, [Name1] it is incumbent upon the injured party to demonstrate the culpability of the author of the illicit act. Thus Article 317, subsection 1), of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the burden of proof regarding the facts constituting their right falls upon whoever formulates a claim... Furthermore, one of the configuring elements of subjective non-contractual liability is the relationship of direct or efficient causality that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the harm, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of non-contractual liability, for which its demonstration also constitutes a *sine qua non* requirement for the compensation claim to prosper...\" (Judgment number 17 of 3:00 PM on January 29, 1992)....” (Voto 53-98 issued at 3:10 PM on May 27, 1998, by the First Chamber). The normal or lawful situations regarding the establishment of paternity are contained, then, in numerals 96 and 172 of the Family Code; however, considering greater liability must be analyzed around whether there has been willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa) on the part of the father prior to the declaration of paternity.</span><span> </span><span> It must be analyzed whether there has been a willful or culpable breach of the principle of not causing harm to others, in this case to the child and the mother. </span><span> </span><span>We have already seen with the previous citation that </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">willful misconduct (dolo)</span><span> supposes the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without the need to have foreseen or been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. Willful misconduct (dolo) presumes knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual willful misconduct (dolo eventual)).</span><span> </span><span> On the other hand, </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">fault (culpa)</span><span> supposes negligent, careless, unforeseeing conduct that causes harm without intending to. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct may lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless has the hope that under the given circumstances it will not occur, while in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Diligence (diligencia)</span><span>, which is the antonym of negligence (negligencia), has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harms may derive, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected from a normally reasonable and sensible person, belonging to the technical sphere of the case. The absence of liability would occur if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding harm to the legally protected property of others. Even doctrine indicates that the required diligence (diligencia) encompasses not only the precautions and care ordered in each case by regulations, but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">VII.- </span><span>In accordance with the principle of </span><span style="font-weight:bold">iura novit curia</span><span>, namely, the Judge knows the Law, we must therefore conclude that </span><span style="font-weight:bold">an implicit general duty not to harm others exists in the legal system.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> In the case of paternity and the responsible fulfillment of family duties, one cannot read that it is only upon the judicial declaration of paternity that liability towards the child arises.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> If a father knows himself to be the father and even acts as a father, albeit sporadically, his willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa) must be questioned in light of his inertia regarding the material and psycho-affective development of the child, and the overloading of responsibility onto the mother.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> If from the specific case, such willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa) arises, the fixed canons of Articles 96 and 172 of the Family Code must be surpassed, to establish concrete liability for the omission of the duty of responsible fulfillment of family duties.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold"> This is in accordance with the general clause of the legal system, being Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which regulates subjective civil liability, which, now in the sphere of family law, becomes “family-civil liability”.</span><span> </span><span> But following the line of the theory of subjective liability, it corresponds to the plaintiff to demonstrate willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa),</span><span> </span><span> Thus, if an alleged father has been notified that he is, and that father reaches the conviction that he is, internalizes such a situation, and presents himself as such, approaching the concept of notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) (Article 93 of the Family Code) but does not fully comply with his duties, it must really be established that there is at least a culpable (culposo) act on his part, and his subjective liability must be analyzed. In this case, what has been raised is only the material part of the child's maintenance (manutención) and that is what must be considered. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">VII.-</span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline"> </span><span>In our specific case, it has been established that the father was with the child's mother during the pregnancy and that he helped her and made sporadic contributions, which is inferred from the testimony received and from the certified copy of the judgment contained in the case file.</span><span> </span><span> This leads us to the conclusion that the now declared father should have seriously considered whether [Name2] E. was his child, and diligently cleared up any doubts if there were any, and responsibly fulfilled his duties regarding the child's development, not in a sporadic manner, but in a continuous and sufficient manner within his means, because it is a notorious fact that human beings must eat and satisfy their needs every day and not sporadically, and that minors depend on their adult parents for the satisfaction of their needs.</span><span> </span><span> </span><span> </span><span> It need not be demonstrated in a process such as this one that it was the mother who satisfied the child's needs, since as a normal fact it must be presumed that this was the case.</span><span> </span><span> This Court appreciating that</span><span> </span><span> the omission by Mr. [Name3] to provide continuous and sufficient economic support for the development of [Name2]., </span><span style="font-weight:bold">was a culpable omission, negligent (negligente) in the fulfillment of family duties</span><span>, therefore, the assumptions for accepting subjective civil (family) liability must be understood as configured, and</span><span> </span><span> he must therefore answer for his culpable omissions regarding the development of [Name2]., which generated harm as the costs of the child's development were overloaded onto the mother, the plaintiff. In this manner, this Court considers that the decision in the first instance must be revoked, rejecting the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho),</span><span> </span><span> lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and sine actione agit, except on the point of retroactive interest dating back one year prior to the lawsuit, since this is not possible because it is not a commercial or contractual obligation in which</span><span> </span><span> interest has been agreed upon.</span><span> </span><span> On this point, the lawsuit must be dismissed. Regarding the rest, there is no defect in the </span><span style="font-weight:bold">presupposition of the right (presupuesto del derecho)</span><span> because we have seen that a legal reason exists, understanding the legal system systematically, in the assumptions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code, in relation to numerals 10 and 11 of the Civil Code, and the principles of Article 2 of the Family Code, and the canons of international instruments for the protection of women and children. The argument regarding the non-retroactivity of the law must be understood as contained in this defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), but the truth is that the responsible paternity law is not being applied nor must be applied. Nor in that of </span><span style="font-weight:bold">active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva)</span><span> since the litigation has occurred between the mother and the father of the child in question.</span><span> </span><span> And the defense of </span><span style="font-weight:bold">sine actione agit</span><span>, because there is no defect in the current interest, which is the substantive presupposition that remains to be analyzed.</span><span> </span><span> It is nevertheless evident that there is partial expiration over time, and this Court agrees with the defendant in their brief submitting the </span><span style="font-weight:bold">defense of statute of limitations (prescripción)</span><span> that numeral 869, subsection 1 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case, such that the liability translatable into the maintenance (manutención) of the minor for periods prior to April 6, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight, must be understood as barred, that is, three years prior to the act interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción), which is the notification of this lawsuit (April 6, two thousand one, see folio 32).</span><span> </span><span> Regarding the selected norm, note the considerations made by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in a somewhat similar case: “...</span><span style="font-weight:bold">IV.-</span><span> </span><span> </span><span> APPEAL ON THE MERITS: The appellant requests that the judgment referred to in the appeal be quashed, insofar as it ordered the defendant estate to pay the maternity expenses and the child support (alimentos) for the son of the deceased, during the three months following his birth. He argues that Article 96 of the Family Code was misinterpreted, and Articles 865, 866, and 868 of the Civil Code were violated by lack of application, since he timely raised the statute of limitations (prescripción) for that claim, which was extinguished by the passage of time, because sixteen years elapsed from the birth to the filing of the lawsuit. The Chamber considers that, on this point, the appellant is right. The opinion of the doctrine is unanimous regarding the imprescriptibility of the right to request support (alimentos). This right has a public nuance that distances it from the power of disposition, typical of private autonomy, for which reason the law, Article 154 of the Family Code, provides that it is not a waivable right, it is not transferable, nor can a support (alimentos) debt be offset. As we are dealing with a non-pecuniary right, it is not affected by the statute of limitations (prescripción). However, it must be clear that what is not susceptible to the statute of limitations (prescripción) is the right to request support (alimentos), because that right is not within the commerce of men, but a distinction must be made regarding the right to claim already accrued pension payments, because these, like any other pecuniary right, are susceptible to extinction by the passage of time. Article 159 of the Family Code establishes the possibility of collecting overdue support (alimentos), but only for the twelve months prior to the lawsuit, and if it is proven that the maintenance creditor had to incur debts to live. The content of this article leads us to conclude that support (alimentos) debts prior to the year of filing the lawsuit cannot be collected; this is based on the nature of the obligation. However, Article 159 of the Family Code exempts from the lack of right to collect support (alimentos) the cases referred to in Article 96 of the same legal body, which is the one the appellant considers misapplied. It cannot be interpreted that the exemption made by Article 159, cited above, referring to Article 96 of the same legal body, declares the right to request maternity expenses and support (alimentos) for the three months after childbirth to be imprescriptible. Considering it so, we would be violating Articles 865 and 868 of the Civil Code, which embody in our civil law the unanimous doctrinal criterion that, save for the exceptions of law, all rights and their corresponding action are extinguished by the lapse of the period in which the negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) operates. On this subject, one must not forget that the non-waivability and imprescriptibility of the right to request support (alimentos) has its foundation in the need of every person to live decently, during their minority or in the face of any inability to obtain it, from which arises the obligation of relatives or another person obligated by some circumstance to provide it fully and completely. But this obligation consists of providing current support (alimentos), or as our Family Code indicates, extends to the twelve previous months, except for the exception in Article 69. The other support (alimentos) that correspond or may have corresponded to other stages of the maintenance creditor's life are extinguished with</span><span> </span><span> the passage of time, as will be seen. With respect to Article 96 of the Family Code, its wording may create some confusion, but even though we are before a special norm, one cannot disregard the foundation of the extinctive statute of limitations (prescripción extintiva), which is found in the opinion, more or less debatable, as [Name4] states in Civil Law I, Introduction and General Part, Second Volume, Third Edition, page 448, 1975, \"... that the public power should not indefinitely protect, and with the vigor that such protection dispenses for normal cases, rights that are neither used by their holder nor recognized by the one upon whom they weigh, because that would go against general legal certainty, which would suffer alteration if a situation that has been prolonged for a long time without being challenged could be attacked later, through actions never asserted by anyone.\". In the case before us, in addition to the negligent conduct, reflected in the disinterest</span><span> </span><span> and inactivity of the creditor of the right, it is clear that those uncollected sums no longer possess the characteristics of being necessary for subsistence. Thus, the right granted by Article 96 of the Family Code is barred by the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the period of three years of subsection one of Article 869 of the Civil Code, because although the referred norm of the Family Code, in addition to support (alimentos), contemplates another item, which is maternity expenses, that relating to the support (alimentos) pension is more important and, consequently, must be considered as the principal one. The lower court Judges erred in not applying the cited Article 869 to the sums claimed for maternity expenses and support (alimentos), based on Article 96 of the Family Code, because although they are barred by the statute of limitations (prescripción) in a period longer than the twelve months indicated by Article 159 of the Family Code, being past support (alimentos), they are barred by the statute of limitations in the period of three years, as provided in Article 869 of the cited Code. The correct solution is to accept the appellant's request, quash the appealed judgment on this point, and, ruling on the merits, uphold the statute of limitations (prescripción), and consequently, dismiss</span><span> </span><span> the</span><span> </span><span> lawsuit, </span><span> </span><span> regarding</span><span> </span><span> the </span><span> </span><span> maternity</span><span> </span><span> expenses</span><span> </span><span> and </span><span> </span><span> support (alimentos) </span><span> </span><span> for</span><span> </span><span> the</span><span> </span><span> three </span><span> </span><span> months</span><span> </span><span> after</span><span> </span><span> the </span><span> </span><span> childbirth </span><span> </span><span> of</span><span> </span><span> the </span><span> </span><span> person who seeks to have their filiation recognized....” There is no expiry (caducidad) as indicated by the appealed judgment, because we are not within the assumptions stated by the first instance authority; but we are indeed within the premises of the statute of limitations (prescripción), and in the matter before us, the period of numeral 869, subsection 1 of the Civil Code must be applied. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">VIII.- </span><span>In this manner, in accordance with what has been stated, the resolution appealed must be revoked and, in its place, the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and sine actione agit must be rejected, except regarding the claim for interest, a claim with respect to which said defenses must be upheld.</span><span> </span><span> Therefore, the claim for interest must be dismissed. The defense of the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be partially upheld, such that the indemnifications for the maintenance (manutención) of the child [Name2] corresponding to the periods prior to April 6, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight are declared time-barred.</span><span> </span><span> The lawsuit is partially granted, and Mr. [Name5] is ordered to pay Mrs. [Name6] an indemnification for the maintenance (manutención) of the child K. E. V. J. for the period between April 6, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight and June 20, two thousand (the date on which the child support (pensión alimentaria) was collected in the regular proceeding), an indemnification that it is reasonable and proportional to adjust in a prudential manner, taking as a parameter the current amount of the child support (pensión alimentaria).</span><span> </span><span> Thus, in accordance with numeral 156 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the indemnization must be determined in the sum of one million five hundred eighty-eight thousand colones. Which is the result of multiplying sixty thousand colones by twenty-six months, which is the period from April 6, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight to June 6, two thousand (one million five hundred sixty thousand colones), plus a proportion for fourteen days (twenty-eight thousand colones), thus reaching June 20, two thousand."</span>

"IV.- En este asunto es claro que la actora no está invocando ni el numeral 96 ni el 172 ambos del Código de Familia. Lo que está planteando es que el demandado no veló por el hijo desde que nació hasta que se planteó la demanda de alimentos. El punto quedó absolutamente claro en el momento en que el Juzgado de Familia rechazó de plano la demanda precisamente haciendo mención de esos dos artículos, resolución que revocó este Tribunal explicando que hay muchos casos para los cuales no existe una norma legal concreta y aún así obtienen una decisión favorable del ordenamiento jurídico, porque ante la ausencia de la normativa el juez está posibilitado de utilizar otros mecanismos para dar soluciones a controversias, verbigracia, el uso de la analogía, la jurisprudencia o los principios generales del derecho (ver folios 24 y 25 de este expediente). Así entonces, la pregunta que debe hacerse el Tribunal es si existe fundamento jurídico para esta demanda, entendiendo el ordenamiento en su totalidad y en una forma sistemática. V.- Aquí vale la pena recapitular en algunos votos de la Sala Constitucional respecto de la aplicación del ordenamiento jurídico. La primera cita es relativa a las fuentes supletorias del derecho, concretamente en el tema de la ausencia de normativa: “...III.- Ahora bien: no debe acudirse a una norma prevista para definir lo que pasa con los bienes de los esposos al momento del divorcio o la separación judicial, o no debe acudirse necesariamente a ella, cuando la situación que se discute es el derecho que alega un hombre o una mujer respecto de los bienes del otro _co-propiedad_, cuando ha habido una unión de hecho en la que por el esfuerzo común se han adquirido esos bienes. Aquí, como lo anticipa el propio Tribunal consultante, podría acudirse a otra normativa _el artículo 1198 del Código Civil que cita su resolución, o a otros parámetros igualmente autorizados por el ordenamiento, cuando haya insuficiencia en la regulación de una determinada materia. Esos criterios podrían ser los principios generales de derecho, que están autorizados por el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el artículo 1 del Código Civil; la equidad, que podría utilizarse a tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 11 del Código Civil, y hasta la aplicación analógica, que el artículo 12 siguiente autoriza. Debe agregarse a lo anterior, que conforme a la primera norma citada, un tribunal no puede excusar el conocimiento de un asunto, ni resolverlo negativamente, alegando falta de ley aplicable al caso planteado. Tienen los jueces, pues, a su haber, amplias posibilidades para resolver con norma expresa, con aplicación extensiva (interpretativa analógica) y hasta mediante la re-creación normativa a base de otra insuficiente. Lo que no parece apropiado es atribuirle al artículo 41 del Código de Familia, que fue diseñado para regular una situación particular y, si se quiere, la usual en nuestro medio, discriminación por no referirse a otras posibilidades. Esa conclusión no podría tenerse como razonable.- IV.- La insuficiencia de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico en la materia que nos ocupa, como ya lo han señalado autores especializados, parte de la propia Constitución Política, cuyo artículo 52 establece que "El matrimonio es la base esencial de la familia y descansa en la igualdad de derechos de los cónyuges." En igual forma, como lo puntualiza la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe, la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (París, 1948), el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Nueva York, 1966) y la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos (San José, 1969), instrumentos vigentes en nuestro país, señalan ese carácter del matrimonio como esencial de la familia y un derecho para las personas. Eso no significa, de toda suerte, como algún autor ha señalado, que el matrimonio sea la base única o exclusiva de la familia. La realidad demuestra que, por lo menos en ciertas regiones del país, hay altos porcentajes de familias fundadas no en el matrimonio, sino en una unión de hecho. Que la legislación ordinaria no se haya encargado de desarrollar esta problemática, no podría revertir en contra del artículo 41 como se pretende en la consulta, de ahí que la Sala se vea obligada a indicar que no hay la inconstitucionalidad que se le atribuye a esa norma, sino que se encuentra en el deber, paralelo, de indicar al Tribunal que tiene a su haber suficiente base para resolver el caso concreto conforme a lo que se dijo supra. Situaciones como las planteadas en el asunto sub judice han sido resueltas innumerables veces en forma estimatoria, no podemos afirmar que siempre acertadamente, pero sí para enfatizar que ya los Tribunales de diferente jerarquía han ido estableciendo pautas para resolver casos como el que tiene bajo su conocimiento el Tribunal consultante. En este sentido, ya puede acudirse a suficientes precedentes específicos. El poder que la jurisprudencia del Derecho de Familia en nuestro país ha sido tal, que también se ha afirmado con carácter categórico, que muchas de las normas del Código de Familia tienen su origen en decisiones de los tribunales, incluso algunas de tono marcadamente disidente o minoritario, pero no por ello ayunas de justicia o equidad. Por el contrario, el desarrollo histórico del Derecho de Familia nos indica cómo el paso del tiempo ha sido determinante para una evolución de sus conceptos y sus soluciones. Nuestro país no es excepción en este campo e incluso podría decirse que es donde con más celeridad ese comportamiento se ha notado. En consecuencia, lo que procede es evacuar la consulta judicial planteada indicando al Tribunal Superior Civil de Alajuela, Sección Segunda, que el artículo 41 del Código de Familia no es inconstitucional desde el aspecto que lo plantea la consulta...” (voto 769-93 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) Por otra parte, es importante realizar la siguiente paráfrasis respecto a la interpretación y aplicación de la normativa: “...V.- Considera esta Sala que, para interpretar una norma, es de vital importancia la función creadora del juez para determinar el sentido y alcance de las leyes. En consecuencia el juez no debe analizar únicamente el sentido gramatical o las palabras de que se ha servido el legislador para dar contenido a la norma, sino las relaciones que unen todas las partes del articulado sobre el punto de que se trata, la situación jurídica existente a la época en que se dictó la ley objeto de la interpretación y, por último, posesionarse de la acción ejercida por dicha ley en el orden general del derecho y el lugar que en este orden ocupa. Función creadora que, en el caso que nos ocupa, debe de concluir con adaptar la norma a la práctica y a la realidad para que se cumpla con los fines que se propuso el legislador, en cuanto sirven para definir o resolver una cuestión entre dos o más personas. En tal sentido ha procedido el juez nacional al establecer jurisprudencialmente la cuota alimentaria por concepto de aguinaldo correspondiente al mes de diciembre, pues tal creación, es evidente que se encuentra dentro del contexto que prescribe la norma, en este caso el artículo 151 del Código de Familia, ya que dicha interpretación no va más allá de las condiciones fijadas por este, al establecer que los alimentos comprenden una prestación económica que, guardando relación entre las posibilidades económicas de quien las da y quien las recibe, satisfagan a éste, ciertas necesidades vitales y emocionales. Es evidente según lo señalado anteriormente, que, en el mes de diciembre, las posibilidades económicas y las necesidades de las partes que conforman la relación alimentaria, han variado como consecuencia de las actividades que se producen durante el fin de año y que como ya se analizó resultan totalmente previsibles...” (voto 6093-94 de la Sala Constitucional).- Queda claro a partir de estos textos, que la labor del Juez no es desentrañar el sentido gramatical de una norma, sino el de la aplicación sistemática de todo el ordenamiento jurídico. Vectores claros de énfasis del ordenamiento actual son la equidad de género y la tutela de los derechos de los niños, y ante ello, algunas preguntas como las que de seguido se plantean han de responderse en una forma negativa. Por ejemplo ¿la obligación de un padre sólo nace cuando su parentesco con el hijo es declarado?. Igual debe responderse negativamente ¿la responsabilidad en cuanto al hijo es únicamente de la madre, hasta que se declare quién es el padre?. Y que tal esta pregunta ¿La aclaración sobre la filiación sólo debe partir de la madre, o si bien el supuesto padre debe interesarse en esa aclaración?. El asunto es que la situación de hecho que se presenta en el caso concreto tiene una apariencia de derecho. En muchos casos el varón ha internalizado claramente que él es el padre de un niño, y pese a ello no reacciona responsablemente coadyuvando con el desarrollo de esa persona. Ello no puede pasar inadvertidamente para nuestro ordenamiento. VI.- Si bien existen normas a aplicar en una forma sencilla en procesos específicos sobre el tema, caso de los numerales 96 y 172 del Código de Familia, lo cierto es que ello no puede agotar el tema de la responsabilidad en el cumplimiento de los deberes de familia, y esa responsabilidad familiar debe responder a los mismos principios de la responsabilidad civil. Tres opciones han de barajarse. Una de ellas son los cuasicontratos regulados en el numeral 1043 del Código Civil: “...Los hechos lícitos y voluntarios producen también, sin necesidad de convención, derechos y obligaciones civiles, en cuanto aprovechan o perjudican a terceras personas” Otra posibilidad es el abuso del derecho previsto en los numerales 20 y 22 del Código Civil: “Los actos realizados al amparo del texto de una norma, que persigan un resultado prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, o contrario a él, se considerarán ejecutados en fraude de la ley y no impedirán la debida aplicación de la norma que se hubiere tratado de eludir.” “La ley no ampara el abuso del derecho o el ejercicio antisocial de éste. Todo acto u omisión en un contrato, que por la intención de su autor, por su objeto o por las circunstancias en que se realice, sobrepase manifiestamente los límites normales del ejercicio de un derecho, con daño para tercero o para la contraparte, dará lugar a la correspondiente indemnización y a la adopción de las medidas judiciales o administrativas que impidan la persistencia en el abuso.” (Sobre el tema consúltense de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia los votos 106-92 de las 14:55 hrs. del 8 de julio de 1992 y 53-98 de las 15:10 hrs. del 27 de mayo de 1998.) Y la otra alternativa de aplicación es la responsabilidad civil extracontractual subjetiva del artículo 1045 del Código Civil: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios” (Sobre el tema de la aplicación de la responsabilidad civil subjetiva y del abuso del derecho o ejercicio antisocial del mismo, en el derecho de familia y concretamente en materia de filiación véase el voto 45-94 dictado a las 10:10 hrs. del 3 de marzo de 1994 de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) Si bien eventualmente los supuestos del enriquecimiento sin causa como tipología de los cuasicontratos, en que una omisión en el cumplimiento de las responsabilidades implica que esa responsabilidad compartida se recargó en uno solo de los obligados o bien el abuso del derecho según el cual podríamos considerar que existe una omisión que excede los límites de la inercia ante la responsabilidad familiar. No obstante, es el artículo 1045 del Código Civil el que da la base para buscar una responsabilidad en un caso como el que nos ocupa y es precisamente el parámetro subjetivo del dolo o la negligencia. Esa es la media que corresponde a la aplicación con equidad en este tipo de asuntos. El trascender el canon fijo de los artículos 96 y 172 del Código de Familia debe responder a una responsabilidad de tipo subjetivo, al mediar dolo o negligencia. Repasemos con algunas citas de jurisprudencia los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual: “...IV.- Tocante a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, esta Sala ha expresado: " Mediante la responsabilidad civil se atribuye a un sujeto la obligación de reparar, indemnizar o compensar (caso este último del daño moral), un daño infligido a la esfera jurídica de otro sujeto, como consecuencia de un acto o una actividad realizada por aquél.- Esta responsabilidad se divide en responsabilidad subjetiva y responsabilidad objetiva, de acuerdo con el criterio de imputación que se utiliza en cada caso: en el primero, la voluntad del deudor, que actúa en forma culpable; en el segundo, criterios objetivos tales como el riesgo, expresamente establecidos por la ley. También suele ser dividida en contractual y extracontractual, según provenga del incumplimiento de una obligación convenida libremente por las partes, o del incumplimiento del deber general de no causar daño a los demás...Por su parte, la responsabilidad extracontractual recae sobre quien, fuera de toda relación contractual previa, ha causado un daño en la esfera jurídica de otro sujeto, por culpa, o a través de la puesta en marcha de una actividad riesgosa o creación de un riesgo social. Esta responsabilidad no nace del incumplimiento de un vínculo determinado, sino de la violación del deber general de no dañar a los otros. Su régimen está basado en los artículos 1045, 1046, 1047 y 1048 del Código Civil. El primero de ellos dispone que: "Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios".- Principio que es fundamento de toda responsabilidad civil." (Resolución número 320 de las 14:20 Hrs. del 9 de noviembre de 1990). Tocante a la regulación del artículo 1045, esta Sala ha dicho: "IX.- El artículo 1045 del Código Civil establece el fundamento de la responsabilidad extracontractual subjetiva: "Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios." El deber de resarcimiento, en este caso, deriva del incumplimiento culposo del principio general de "no causar daño a los demás." Para que haya responsabilidad, se requiere que el daño haya sido ocasionado con culpa (negligencia, imprudencia o impericia), o dolo del agente. La carga de la prueba corresponde entonces al acreedor, es decir, a la víctima que solicita el resarcimiento..." (Resolución número 34 de las 14:25 Hrs. del 22 de marzo de 1991). La doctrina científica moderna, al analizar la figura del dolo, es conteste al indicar que supone la voluntad de realizar un acto antijurídico con conocimiento de su ilegalidad, sabiendo, su autor, que puede ser dañoso a los demás, pero sin necesidad de que haya previsto o podido prever todos y cada uno de sus posibles efectos. En este sentido, se afirma, no precisa la intención de dañar, basta la voluntad de infringir el deber, la mala fe, la conciencia de que se realiza un acto ilícito. El dolo presume el conocimiento de la producción de un daño, al menos probable, como consecuencia de la acción querida (dolo eventual). Se afirma, asimismo, la falta de intención no constituye el dolo, aquí estamos en presencia de la denominada "culpa lata". Sin embargo, una negligencia extrema debería acarrear para el agente las consecuencias del dolo. Por su parte, la culpa supone un actuar negligente, descuidado, imprevisor que causa un daño sin quererlo. Se ha dividido, la conducta culposa, en consciente e inconsciente. La primera se da cuando, aún reconociendo que la propia conducta puede conducir a cierto resultado dañoso, el agente tiene, sin embargo, la esperanza de que en las circunstancias dadas no se ha de producir, mientras, en la segunda, el autor no reconoce la posibilidad del resultado. En todo caso, para que exista culpa, es preciso que el resultado dañoso haya sido previsto como posible, o que haya tenido que ser previsto, verosimilitud del resultado que no puede ser tan pequeña que aunque la persona actúe conforme a sus deberes no le hubiere hecho desistir de la acción. Se afirma que para determinar si el acto es negligente, es relevante considerar si una persona razonable podía prever que ha de causar daño. La culpa consiste, entonces, en una falta de cuidado, precaución y diligencia exigibles. La diligencia se ha considerado como la racional y ordinaria cautela que debe acompañar a todos los actos de los que puedan derivarse daños, según la clase de actividad de que se trate y la que puede y debe esperarse de persona, normalmente razonable y sensata, perteneciente a la esfera técnica del caso. Es decir, si la persona obró con el cuidado, atención o perseverancia exigibles y con la reflexión necesaria con vistas a evitar el perjuicio de bienes ajenos, jurídicamente protegidos. Incluso, la doctrina indica que la diligencia obligada no abarca sólo las precauciones y cuidados ordenados en cada caso por los reglamentos, sino también toda la prudencia precisa para evitar el daño. Tocante a la carga de la prueba, en materia de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, esta Sala ha indicado: "VII.- Una de las diferencias fundamentales entre la responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual, radica en la carga de la prueba, pues en la responsabilidad derivada de un contrato el acreedor no está obligado a demostrar la culpa del deudor, ya que ésta se presume en tanto el segundo no demuestre que su incumplimiento o el atraso no le son imputables, como el caso fortuito o la fuerza mayor; en cambio, en la responsabilidad extracontractual o [Nombre1] le compete al damnificado demostrar la culpabilidad del autor del acto ilícito. Así el artículo 317, inciso 1), del Código Procesal Civil, dispone que a quien formule una pretensión le incumbe la carga de la prueba respecto de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho...Por otra parte, uno de los elementos configurantes de la responsabilidad extracontractual subjetiva, lo constituye la relación de causalidad directa o eficiente que debe existir entre el comportamiento o conducta antijurídica y el daño, siendo este último el presupuesto de cualquier tipo de responsabilidad extracontractual por lo que su demostración también constituye un requisito sine quo non para que prospere la pretensión resarcitoria..." (Sentencia número 17 de las 15 Hrs. del 29 de enero de 1992)....” (Voto 53-98 dictado a las 15:10 hrs. del 27 de mayo de 1998 por la Sala Primera). Las situaciones normales o lícitas respecto al establecimiento de la paternidad están contenidas entonces en los numerales 96 y 172 del Código de Familia, no obstante, considerar una responsabilidad mayor debe ser analizada en torno a si ha existido dolo o culpa por parte del padre de previo a la declaratoria de paternidad. Se debe analizar si ha existido un quebrantamiento doloso o culposo al principio de no causar daño a los demás, en este caso al niño y a la madre. Ya hemos visto con la cita anterior que el dolo supone la voluntad de realizar un acto antijurídico con conocimiento de causa, sabiendo, su autor, que puede ser dañoso a los demás, pero sin necesidad de que haya previsto o podido prever todos y cada uno de sus posibles efectos. El dolo presume el conocimiento de la producción de un daño, al menos probable, como consecuencia de la acción querida (dolo eventual). Por otra parte la culpa supone un actuar negligente, descuidado, imprevisor que causa un daño sin quererlo. Se ha dividido, la conducta culposa, en consciente e inconsciente. La primera se da cuando, aún reconociendo que la propia conducta puede conducir a cierto resultado dañoso, el agente tiene, sin embargo, la esperanza de que en las circunstancias dadas no se ha de producir, mientras, en la segunda, el autor no reconoce la posibilidad del resultado. La diligencia, que es el antónimo de la negligencia, se ha considerado como la racional y ordinaria cautela que debe acompañar a todos los actos de los que puedan derivarse daños, según la clase de actividad de que se trate y la que puede y debe esperarse de persona, normalmente razonable y sensata, perteneciente a la esfera técnica del caso. La ausencia de responsabilidad se daría, si la persona obró con el cuidado, atención o perseverancia exigibles y con la reflexión necesaria con vistas a evitar el perjuicio de bienes ajenos, jurídicamente protegidos. Incluso, la doctrina indica que la diligencia obligada no abarca sólo las precauciones y cuidados ordenados en cada caso por los reglamentos, sino también toda la prudencia precisa para evitar el daño. VII.- Conforme al principio de iura novit curia, a saber, el Juez conoce el Derecho, entonces hemos de concluir, que existe en el ordenamiento implícito un deber general de no dañar a los demás. En el caso de la paternidad y del cumplimiento responsable de los deberes de familia no puede darse una lectura de que únicamente ante la declaratoria judicial de paternidad es que nace la responsabilidad hacia el hijo. Si un padre se sabe padre e incluso actúa como padre aunque sea esporádicamente, ha de cuestionarse su dolo o culpa ante su inercia ante el desarrollo material y sicoafectivo del hijo, y el recargo de responsabilidad sobre la madre. Si del caso concreto surge ese dolo o culpa, los cánones fijos de los artículos 96 y 172 del Código de Familia han de ser rebasados, para establecer la responsabilidad concreta ante la omisión al deber de cumplimiento responsable de los deberes familiares. Ello al tenor de la cláusula general del ordenamiento, como lo es el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, que regula la responsabilidad civil subjetiva, que ya en el ámbito del derecho de familia se convierte en “responsabilidad civil-familiar”. Pero siguiendo la línea de la teoría de la responsabilidad subjetiva, corresponde al actor demostrar el dolo o la culpa, Así si a un supuesto padre se le ha comunicado que lo es, y ese padre llega a la convicción que lo es, internaliza tal situación, y se muestra como tal, acercándonos al concepto de posesión notoria de estado (artículo 93 del Código de Familia) pero no cumple con sus deberes plenamente, realmente ha de establecerse que existe un actuar al menos culposo de su parte, y ha de analizarse su responsabilidad subjetiva. En este caso lo que se ha planteado únicamente es la parte material de la manutención del niño y ello es lo que ha de considerarse. VII.- En nuestro caso concreto, ha quedado establecido que el padre estuvo con la madre del niño durante el embarazo y que le ayudaba y que cumplía con aportes esporádicos, lo que se desprende del testimonio recibido y de la copia de sentencia autorizada que consta en el expediente. Ello nos lleva a la conclusión de que el ahora declarado padre debió plantearse seriamente si [Nombre2]. E. era su hijo, y diligentemente despejar las dudas que hubiese si las hubiese, y cumplir responsablemente con el desarrollo del niño, no en una forma esporádica, sino en una forma continua y suficiente dentro de sus posibilidades, porque es hecho notorio que los seres humanos deben alimentarse y satisfacer sus necesidades todos los días y no esporádicamente y que las personas menores de edad dependen de los adultos progenitores para la satisfacción de sus necesidades. No ha de demostrarse en un proceso como éste que ha sido la madre quien ha satisfecho las necesidades del niño pues como hecho normal ha de presumirse que esto ha sido así. Apreciando este Tribunal que la omisión de don [Nombre3] a brindar en forma continua y suficiente el apoyo económico para el desarrollo de [Nombre2]., una omisión culposa, negligente en el cumplimiento de los deberes de familia, entonces han de entenderse configurados los supuestos para acoger la responsabilidad civil (familiar) subjetiva, y por ende debe responder por sus omisiones culposas ante el desarrollo de [Nombre2]., lo que generó un daño al recargarse los costos del desarrollo del niño en la madre, la actora. De esta manera este Tribunal considera que ha de revocarse lo resuelto en primera instancia, desechándose las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, y la de sine actione agit, salvo en el punto de los intereses retroactivos a un año atrás de la demanda puesto que ello no es posible puesto que no se trata de una obligación comercial o contratactual en la cual se hayan pactado intereses. En este extremo la demanda ha de declararse sin lugar. En lo demás no existe defecto en el presupuesto del derecho por cuanto hemos visto que existe razón jurídica entendiendo el ordenamiento jurídico en forma sistemática, en los supuestos del artículo 1045 del Código Civil, en relación con los numerales 10 y 11 del Código Civil, y los principios del artículo 2 del Código de Familia, y los cánones de instrumentos internacionales de protección a la mujer y al niño. El alegato sobre irretroactividad de la ley ha de entenderse contenido en esta excepción de falta de derecho, pero lo cierto es que no se está aplicando ni ha de aplicarse la ley de paternidad responsable. Tampoco en el de legitimación activa y pasiva puesto que el litigio se ha dado entre la madre y el padre del niño en cuestión. Y la de sine actione agit, por cuanto no existe defecto en el interés actual que es el presupuesto de fondo que resta por analizar. Si es evidente que existe la perención parcial en el tiempo, y este Tribunal coincide con el demandado en su escrito de interposición de la excepción de prescripción que es de aplicación en este caso el numeral 869 inciso 1 del Código Civil, de manera tal que ha de entenderse prescrita la responsabilidad traducible en la manutención de la persona menor de edad, por los periodos anteriores al seis de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, es decir tres años atrás del acto interruptor de la prescripción, que es la notificación de esta demanda (seis de abril del dos mil uno, ver folio 32). En cuanto a la norma seleccionada nótense las consideraciones que realizó la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en un caso un tanto similar: “...IV.- RECURSO POR EL FONDO: Solicita el recurrente, sea casada la sentencia a que se refiere el recurso, en cuanto condenó a la sucesión demandada a pagar los gastos de maternidad y de alimentos del hijo del causante, durante los tres meses posteriores a su nacimiento. Argumenta que fue mal interpretado el artículo 96 del Código de Familia, y violados por falta de aplicación, los artículos 865, 866 y 868 del Código Civil, ya que oportunamente alegó la prescripción de ese extremo, el que se extinguió por el transcurso del tiempo, porque transcurrieron dieciséis años desde el nacimiento, a la presentación de la demanda. Considera la Sala, que en este punto, le asiste la razón al recurrente. Es unánime la opinión de la doctrina, en cuanto a la imprescriptibilidad del derecho a pedir alimentos. Este derecho tiene un matiz público que lo aleja del poder dispositivo, típico de la autonomía privada, por lo que la ley, artículo 154 del Código de Familia, dispone que no es un derecho renunciable, no es transmisible, ni se puede compensar una deuda de alimentos. Como estamos ante un derecho no patrimonial, no lo afecta la prescripción. Sin embargo, debe quedar claro, que lo que no es susceptible de prescripción, es el derecho de pedir alimentos, porque ese derecho no está en el comercio de los hombres, pero debe distinguirse el derecho a reclamar las pensiones ya devengadas, porque éstas, como todo otro derecho patrimonial, sí es susceptible de extinción, por el transcurso del tiempo. El artículo 159 del Código de Familia, establece la posibilidad de cobrar alimentos atrasados, pero sólo en los doce meses anteriores a la demanda, y si se comprueba que el alimentario ha tenido que contraer deudas para vivir. El contenido de este artículo nos hace concluir que, las deudas por alimentos anteriores al año de la presentación de la demanda, no es posible cobrarlas; teniendo esto fundamento en la naturaleza de la obligación. Sin embargo, el artículo 159 de Código de Familia, deja a salvo de falta de derecho para cobrar alimentos, los casos a que se refiere el artículo 96 del mismo cuerpo de leyes, que es el que considera mal aplicado el recurrente. No puede interpretarse que la salvedad que hace el artículo 159 antes citado, refiriéndose al artículo 96 del mismo cuerpo de leyes, declara imprescriptible el derecho a pedir los gastos de maternidad y los alimentos de los tres meses posteriores al alumbramiento. De considerarlo así, estaríamos violentando los artículos 865 y 868 del Código Civil, que plasman en nuestro ordenamiento civil, el unánime criterio doctrinal de que, salvo las excepciones de ley, todo derecho y su correspondiente acción, se extinguen por el transcurso del plazo en el que se opera la prescripción negativa. Sobre este tema, no debe olvidarse que, la irrenunciabilidad y la imprescriptibilidad del derecho de pedir alimentos, tiene su fundamento en la necesidad de toda persona de vivir decorosamente, en su minoridad o ante cualquier incapacidad para obtenerlos, de ahí surge la obligación de los parientes u otra persona obligada por alguna circunstancia, a proveerlos cabal y cumplidamente. Pero esta obligación consiste en dar los alimentos actuales, o como lo indica nuestro Código de Familia, se extiende a los doce meses anteriores, salvo la excepción del artículo 69. Los otros alimentos que correspondan o hayan correspondido a otras etapas de la vida del alimentario, se extinguen con el transcurso del tiempo, como se verá. En lo que respecta al artículo 96 del Código de Familia, su redacción puede crear alguna confusión, pero aunque estemos ante una norma especial, no puede dejarse de lado, el fundamento de la prescripción extintiva, que se encuentra en la opinión, más o menos discutible, como lo refiere [Nombre4]. Derecho Civil I, Introducción y Parte General,Volumen Segundo, Tercera Edición, página 448, 1975, "... de que el poder público no debe proteger indefinidamente, y con el vigor que dispensa esa protección para casos normales, a los derechos que ni se usan por su titular, ni son reconocidos por aquel sobre quién pesan, pues ello iría contra la seguridad jurídica general, que sufriría alteración si una situación que se ha prolongado durante largo tiempo sin ser impugnada, pudiera verse atacada después, mediante acciones no hechas valer nunca por nadie.". En el caso que nos ocupa, además de la conducta negligente, reflejada en el desinterés e inactividad de la acreedora del derecho, está claro que esas sumas no cobradas, ya no tienen las características de necesarias para la subsistencia. Así las cosas, el derecho que otorga el artículo 96 del Código de Familia, prescribe en el plazo de tres años del inciso primero del artículo 869 del Código Civil, pues aunque la referida norma del Código de Familia, además de alimentos contempla otro rubro, que es el de los gastos de maternidad, resulta más importante y, en consecuencia, debe tenerse como principal, lo relativo a la pensión de alimentos. Incurrieron en error los Juzgadores de instancia al no aplicar el artículo 869 citado, a las sumas reclamadas por gastos de maternidad y alimentos, con fundamento en el artículo 96 del Código de Familia, porque aunque prescriben en un plazo mayor a los doce meses que indica el artículo 159 del Código de Familia, por ser alimentos pasados, prescriben en el plazo de tres años, conforme lo dispone el artículo 869 del citado Código. La solución correcta, es acoger la solicitud del recurrente, casar en este extremo la sentencia recurrida y, resolviendo sobre el fondo, acoger la prescripción, y en consecuencia, declarar sin lugar la demanda, respecto de los gastos de maternidad y alimentos de los tres meses posteriores al alumbramiento de la persona que pretende se le reconozca su filiación....” No existe caducidad conforme lo señaló la sentencia apelada, por cuanto no estamos en los supuestos que indica la autoridad de primera instancia; pero sí estamos ante los presupuestos de la prescripción, y en el asunto que nos ocupa ha de aplicarse el plazo del numeral 869 inciso 1 del Código Civil. VIII.- De esta manera conforme con lo dicho, debe revocarse la resolución venida en alzada y en su lugar, deben rechazarse las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, y sine actione agit, salvo en cuanto a la pretensión de intereses, pretensión respecto de la cual han de acogerse dichas excepciones. Por ende, debe declararse sin lugar la pretensión de intereses. Debe acogerse parcialmente la excepción de prescripción, por lo que se declaran prescritas las indemnizaciones por manutención del niño [Nombre2]. correspondientes a los periodos anteriores al seis de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho. Se declara con lugar parcialmente la demanda, y se condena al señor [Nombre5] a pagar a la señora [Nombre6] una indemnización por la manutención del niño K. E. V. J. por el periodo comprendido entre el seis de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho y el veinte de junio del dos mil (fecha en que se cobró la pensión alimentaria en el trámite regular), indemnización que es razonable y proporcional regular en forma prudencial teniendo como parámetro el monto actual de pensión alimentaria. Así de conformidad con el numeral 156 del Código Procesal Civil se ha de determinar la indeminzación en la suma de un millón quinientos ochenta y ocho mil colones. Que es el resultado de multiplicar sesenta mil colones por veintiséis meses, que es lo que hay del seis de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho al seis de junio del dos mil (un millón quinientos sesenta mil colones), más una proporción por catorce días (veintiocho mil colones), hasta llegar así al veinte de junio del dos mil."