Validity of ecological restoration as a condition for suspended sentenceValidez de la reparación ecológica como condición en la ejecución condicional de la pena

"II.- On the merits.- Citing § 59 of the C.p., in section “d)” the appellant challenges the granting to his client of the benefit of conditional suspension of the sentence (beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena), subject to the elimination of coffee cultivation on the property related to the events, the planting of local species, and the allowance of their natural development, under penalty of revoking said benefit in case of non-compliance. The challenger argues the arbitrariness of such a judicial stipulation ordered without a legal basis, in addition to the failure to establish the timeframe in which it must be fulfilled, both its start and its end. He adds that the accused is not the owner of the land on which he would have to restore the forest, meaning he would be forced to commit a crime against the owner [Nombre1]. The claim is partially granted. In accordance with the provisions of §§ 59, 60, and 61 of the C.p., the judge should have based the conditional suspension of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) on the following aspects; (i) «… that the offender is a first-time offender…» (ii) «… the personality of the convicted person and his life prior to the crime, in the sense that his conduct has conformed to social norms…» (iii) «… and in his behavior subsequent to it, especially in his repentance and demonstrated desire to repair the consequences of the act as much as possible…» (emphasis supplied) (iv) «… in the motives, characteristics of the act, and circumstances surrounding it…» With the exception of the first two requirements, the trial judge omits to analyze the remaining two, which would leave the benefit of conditional suspension of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) without foundation; however, by virtue of the principle of no reformatio in peius provided for in § 451 of the C.p.p., since only the defense appealed, the defendant cannot be prejudiced regarding the sentence imposed or the benefits granted, so that —notwithstanding the partial nullity to be discussed— the conditional suspension of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena) becomes final as of this cassation judgment. Aside from the above, it should be noted that the reason for challenging the judgment, i.e., questioning the repair of the damages caused, stipulated as a condition of said benefit, casts doubt on the accused's repentance and his desire to repair, which would make conditional suspension (ejecución condicional) impossible; however, for the reasons stated, the benefit is upheld. As for the condition imposed itself, this cassation court finds it rational and proportionate to the facts giving rise to the criminal conviction. Note that § 28 of the Const.Pol. establishes the impossibility of legal intervention against private actions that do not cause harm, from which it follows that the limit of the state reaction is marked by the magnitude or seriousness of the injury or danger caused. In the present case, where the damage is the land-use change (cambio del uso del suelo) of the forest to dedicate it to agriculture, the state reaction has its limit in the repair of the damage, which in any case will not be completed in the three years of conditional suspension of the sentence (ejecución condicional de la pena), since the forest is the product of years and years of birth, development, and death of many plant and animal beings; however, the exclusion of the crops and of every element with which the forest has been replaced, as well as the restoration of plant species to the extent adequate to regenerate what was destroyed, are a beginning for the repair that will be achieved in some years. It must be clear that the protection of forest soil enshrined in §§ 2, 6, 10.c, 19, and 38.f of the Ley Forestal, 52 of the Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, 53, 54, and 55 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 53 and 54 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, does not end or is not suspended when, due to acts of human beings (provoked fires, illegal logging, etc.) or acts of nature (floods, earthquakes, fires, etc.), the forest diminishes; on the contrary, in such situations, the State is required to be more aggressive in the recovery and conservation of the forest. To think that the duty to protect forest soil —and other elements of the forest— ends due to any of the indicated events would result in the promotion of illicit activities harmful to the environment, to substitute ecology with agricultural or other exploitation, thus there would be no true protection; that is, the space occupied by forests is irreducible by such means (principle of lifetime tenure of the forest (principio de irreductibilidad del bosque)). In this way, anyone who damages the forest by logging or fire with the purpose of changing the land's designated use, or anyone who seeks to profit from natural disasters that damage forest soil, must understand that there is no possible way to change the soil's designated use, and that the State will do everything possible to recover the forest. That is, in the case at hand, the agricultural activity must disappear from the place where the forest must be regenerated, whether it is done by the convicted person in compliance with the clause for which he was granted —almost as an incentive— the benefit of conditional suspension of the sentence (beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena), or by the action of the State; the officials responsible for enforcement will ensure the effectiveness of the judgment on the merits. There is no disproportionality or abuse in the condition imposed by the judge. This manner of ruling on the part of the trial judge reaffirms the normative value of the Const.Pol., which in its §§ 50 and 74 guarantees to all humanity, with an inalienable character, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In addition to the above, the judicial provision —in this case— is identical to the legislative provision adopted in § 52 of the Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, No. 7779 of April 30, 1998, which provides ad litteram: «… Whoever contaminates or deteriorates the soil resource, regardless of the existence of fault or intent or the degree of participation, shall be responsible for compensating, through the appropriate judicial channels, and for repairing the damages caused to the environment and to affected third parties…» Although in the present matter, the judge's decision does not correspond to the existence of a civil compensatory action, it is true that it does not exceed the will of the law, which requires the repair of damages when a crime is committed, regardless of intent (dolo) or fault (culpa). In this case, the act was intentional, which gives even more reason for the decision of the Criminal Trial Court of Cartago to have full acceptance. However, the appellant is correct in that there must be a schedule for the clause under discussion, to monitor its compliance; thus, the judge must indicate by what date the elimination of the crops must be completed, when the planting of native forest species must begin, what care must be maintained, what methods must be used, and other aspects deemed necessary. Otherwise, the condition by which the benefit is granted is unfounded. Consequently, the grievance is partially upheld and —based on the provisions of § 450 of the C.p.p.— the judgment appealed is partially annulled, solely regarding the deadlines, stages, and forms of monitoring for compliance with the condition by which the benefit of conditional suspension of the sentence (beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena) is granted. If necessary, the relevant expert evidence may be received in a hearing. The case is remanded for resolution of those aspects. In what is not mentioned, the judgment on the merits remains final." In accordance with the provisions of §§ 59, 60 and 61 of the Criminal Code (C.p.), the judge was required to base the suspended sentence on the following aspects: (i) “… that the offender is a first-time offender…” (ii) “… the personality of the convicted person and their life prior to the offense, in the sense that their conduct has conformed to social norms…” (iii) “… and their behavior subsequent to the offense, especially their repentance and demonstrated desire to repair, to the extent possible, the consequences of the act…” (emphasis supplied) (iv) “… the motives, characteristics of the act, and the circumstances surrounding it…” With the exception of the first two requirements, the trial judge omitted analysis of the remaining two, which would leave the benefit of suspended sentence without basis; however, by virtue of the principle of non reformatio in peius established in § 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (C.p.p.), since only the defense appealed, the convicted person cannot be prejudiced regarding the sentence imposed or the benefits granted, such that —notwithstanding the partial nullity that will be declared— the suspended sentence becomes final from this cassation judgment. Apart from the foregoing, it should be noted that the ground on which the judgment is challenged, that is, questioning the repair of the damages caused, stipulated as a condition of said benefit, casts doubt on the accused's repentance and their desire to repair, which would make the suspended sentence impossible; however, for the reasons stated, the benefit is maintained.

Regarding the condition imposed itself, this cassation court finds it rational and proportionate to the acts giving rise to the criminal conviction. It should be noted that § 28 of the Political Constitution (Const.Pol.) establishes the impossibility of legal intervention against private actions that cause no harm, from which it derives that the limit of the state reaction is marked by the magnitude or severity of the injury or danger caused. In the present case, where the damage is the land-use change (cambio del uso del suelo) of the forest to dedicate it to agriculture, the state reaction has its limit in the repair of the damage, which in any event will not be completed within the three years of the suspended sentence, given that the forest is the product of years and years of birth, development, and death of many plant and animal beings; however, the exclusion of the crops and of every element with which the forest has been replaced, as well as the re-establishment of plant species in the appropriate measure to regenerate what was destroyed, are a beginning for the repair that will be achieved in some years. It must be clear that the protection of forest land enshrined in §§ 2, 6, 10.c, 19, and 38.f of the Ley Forestal, 52 of the Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, 53, 54, and 55 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 53 and 54 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, does not end or get suspended when, due to human acts (deliberate fires, illegal logging, etc.) or natural events (floods, earthquakes, fires, etc.), the forest diminishes; on the contrary, in such situations the State is compelled to greater aggressiveness in the recovery and conservation of the forest. To think that the duty to protect forest land —and other elements of the forest— ends by any of the indicated events would translate into the promotion of illicit activities harmful to the environment, to substitute ecology with agricultural or other exploitations, whereby there would be no true protection; that is, the area occupied by forests is subject to lifetime tenure (principio de irreductibilidad del bosque) against such means. In this way, anyone who harms the forest through logging or fires with the purpose of changing the use of the land, or anyone who intends to obtain benefit from natural disasters that damage forest land, must understand that there is no possible way to change the use of the land, and that the State will do everything possible to recover the forest. That is, in the instant case the agricultural activity must disappear from the place where the forest must be regenerated, whether the convicted person does it in compliance with the clause by which the benefit of suspended sentence is granted —almost as an incentive— or through State action; the officials responsible for the execution shall ensure the effectiveness of the judgment on the merits. There is no disproportionality or abuse in the condition imposed by the judge. This manner of deciding by the trial judge reaffirms the normative value of the Political Constitution (Const.Pol.), which in its §§ 50 and 74 guarantees to all humanity, as an inalienable right, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In addition to the foregoing, the judicial provision —in this case— is identical to the legislative provision adopted in § 52 of the Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, No. 7779 of April 30, 1998, which provides ad litteram: “… Whoever contaminates or deteriorates the soil resource, regardless of the existence of fault or intent or the degree of participation, shall be liable to indemnify, through the corresponding judicial channels, and to repair the damages caused to the environment and to affected third parties…” Although in the present matter the decision of the judge does not correspond to the existence of a civil indemnification action, it is certain that it does not exceed the will of the law, which demands the repair of damages when a crime is committed, regardless of intent or fault. In this case, action was taken with intent, so with greater reason the order of the Trial Court of Cartago is fully accepted.

However, the appellant is correct in that there must be a schedule for the clause under discussion, to control its compliance; in this manner, the judge must indicate on what date the elimination of the crops must be concluded, when the planting of forest species must begin, what care must be taken, what methods must be used, and other aspects deemed necessary. Otherwise, the condition for which the benefit is granted is not substantiated. Consequently, the grievance is partially upheld and —based on the provisions of § 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (C.p.p.)— the judgment under appeal is partially annulled, only as regards the deadlines, stages, and forms of control for the fulfillment of the condition for which the benefit of suspended sentence is granted. If necessary, the pertinent expert evidence may be received in a hearing. The case is remanded for those aspects to be resolved. In what is not mentioned, the judgment on the merits remains final."

"II.- Sobre el fondo.- Con cita del § 59 del C.p., en el apartado “d)” el recurrente cuestiona que se otorgara a su patrocinado el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena, sujeto a la eliminación de cultivo de café en el inmueble relacionado a los hechos, a la siembra de especies locales y a la permisión de su desarrollo natural, so pena de revocar el beneficio dicho en caso de incumplimiento. Dice el impugnante de la arbitrariedad de tal estipulación judicial dispuesta sin base legal, amén de no establecerse el tiempo en que debe cumplirse, tanto en su inicio como en su finalización. Agrega que el imputado no es propietario de terreno en que debería restablecer el bosque, por lo que se le obligaría a cometer un delito contra la propietaria [Nombre1] . Se declara parcialmente con lugar el reclamo. De conformidad con lo establecido por los §§ 59, 60 y 61 del C.p., el juzgador debió fundar la condena de ejecución condicional en los siguientes aspectos; (i) «… que se trate de un delincuente primario…» (ii) «… la personalidad del condenado y su vida anterior al delito en el sentido de que su conducta se haya conformado con las normas sociales…» (iii) «… y en el comportamiento posterior al mismo, especialmente en su arrepentimiento y deseo demostrado de reparar en lo posible las consecuencias del acto…» (se suple el destacado) (iv) «… en los móviles, caracteres del hecho y circunstancias que lo han rodeado…» A excepción de los dos primeros requisitos, el juzgador de instancia omite analizar los dos restantes, lo que dejaría sin fundamento el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena; sin embargo, en virtud del principio no reformatio in peius previsto en el § 451 del C.p.p., al haber recurrido solamente la defensa no se le puede perjudicar en cuanto a la pena impuesta ni a los beneficios otorgados, de manera que no obstante la nulidad parcial que se dirá la ejecución condicional de la pena adquiere firmeza a partir de esta sentencia de casación. Al margen de lo anterior, cabe señalar que el motivo por el que se impugna el fallo, esto es cuestionando la reparación de los daños causados estipulada como condición del beneficio dicho, hace dudar del arrepentimiento del imputado y su deseo de reparar, con lo que sería imposible la ejecución condicional; sin embargo, por las razones expuestas se mantiene el beneficio. En cuanto a la condición impuesta en sí, esta corte de casación la encuentra racional y proporcionada a los hechos generadores de la condena penal. Obsérvese que el § 28 de la Const.Pol. establece la imposibilidad de intervención legal ante acciones privadas que no causen daño, de donde deriva que el límite de la reacción estatal viene marcado por la magnitud o gravedad de la lesión o peligro causados. En el presente caso, en que el daño es el cambio del uso del suelo del bosque para dedicarlo a agricultura, la reacción estatal tiene su límite en la reparación del daño, que de todas formas no se completará en los tres años de ejecución condicional de la pena, puesto que el bosque es producto de años y años de nacimiento, desarrollo y muerte de muchos seres vegetales y animales; sin embargo, la exclusión de los cultivos y de todo elemento con que se ha sustituido el bosque, así como el restablecimiento de especies vegetales en la medida adecuada para regenerar lo destruido, son un principio para la reparación que en algunos años se alcanzará. Debe quedar claro que la protección del suelo de los bosques consagrada en los §§ 2, 6, 10.c, 19 y 38.f de la Ley Forestal, 52 de la Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, 53, 54 y 55 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 53 y 54 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, no termina o se suspende cuando por actos de seres humanos (incendios provocados, talas ilegales, etc.) o por hechos de la naturaleza (inundaciones, terremotos, incendios, etc.) el bosque viene a menos; antes por el contrario, ante esas situaciones se impone al Estado mayor agresividad en la recuperación y conservación del bosque. Pensar que el deber de protección del suelo forestal y de otros elementos del bosque termina por cualquiera de los hechos indicados, se traduciría en la promoción de actividades ilícitas lesivas del medio ambiente, para sustituir la ecología por explotaciones agrícolas o de otra naturaleza, con lo que no habría protección verdadera; es decir, el espacio ocupado por los bosques es irreductible por esas vías (principio de irreductibilidad del bosque). De este modo, cualquiera que lesione el bosque con tala o incendios con el propósito de cambiar el destino del terreno, o cualquiera que pretenda obtener provecho de desastres naturales que dañen el suelo forestal, debe comprender que no hay forma posible de cambiar el destino del suelo, y que el Estado hará cuanto sea para recuperar el bosque. Esto es, en el caso de autos deben desaparecer la actividad agrícola del lugar donde corresponde regenerar el bosque, ya sea que lo haga el condenado en cumplimiento de la cláusula por la que se le otorga casi como incentivo el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena, ya sea por la acción del Estado; los funcionarios responsables de la ejecución verán por la eficacia del fallo de mérito. No hay desproporción o abuso en la condición impuesta por el juzgador. Esta forma de resolver por parte del juez de juicio, reafirma el valor normativo de la Const.Pol., que en sus §§ 50 y 74 garantizan a la humanidad entera, con carácter de irrenunciable, el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Amén de lo anterior, la disposición judicial en este caso guarda identidad con la disposición legislativa adoptada en § 52 de la Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, N° 7779 de 30 de abril de 1.998, que dispone ad litteram: «… Quien contamine o deteriore el recurso suelo, independientemente de la existencia de culpa o dolo o del grado de participación, será responsable de indemnizar, en la vía judicial que corresponda, y de reparar los daños causados al ambiente y a terceros afectados…» Si bien en el presente asunto lo resuelto por el juzgador no corresponde a la existencia de una acción civil resarcitoria, es lo cierto que no sobrepasa la voluntad de la ley, que exige la reparación de los daños cuando se cometa delito, con independencia del dolo o de la culpa. En este caso se actuó dolosamente, por lo que con mayor razón tiene total aceptación lo dispuesto por el Tribunal de Juicio de Cartago. Sin embargo, lleva razón el recurrente en cuanto debe existir una calendarización de la cláusula de comentario, para controlar su cumplimiento; de este modo, el juzgador debe indicar en qué fecha debe concluirse la eliminación de los cultivos, cuándo debe iniciarse la siembra de especies propias del bosque, qué cuidados deben guardarse, qué métodos deben usarse y otros aspectos que considere necesarios. De otro modo, la condición por la que se otorga el beneficio no está fundamentada. En consecuencia, se acoge parcialmente el agravio y con base en lo dispuesto por el § 450 del C.p.p. se anula parcialmente la sentencia venida en alzada, solamente en cuanto a los plazos, etapas y formas de control para el cumplimiento de la condición por la que se otorga el beneficio de ejecución condicional de la pena. De ser necesario podrá recibir en audiencia la prueba pericial pertinente. Se ordena el reenvío para que se resuelvan esos aspectos. En lo que no se menciona queda firme el fallo de mérito."