Collective Agreement Benefits for Substitute Workers at JAPDEVABeneficios de la convención colectiva de JAPDEVA para trabajadores suplentes

"III- REGARDING THE SUBJECT OF THE APPEAL: [...]

On this particular point, the Tribunal upholds the decision of the lower court. Conventional clause 33BIS of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo) signed between the Workers and JAPDEVA for the years 2002 and 2003 establishes that when, for any reason, JAPDEVA eliminates the overtime that a worker had been working, the institution must pay them a partial severance indemnity consisting of a sum proportional to the overtime they cease to earn, provided they had effectively worked overtime during the two years prior to the reduction of the overtime. It also establishes that overtime worked on an eventual or occasional basis shall not be compensated.

Thus, for the right to the recognition of said indemnity to arise, the worker must work extraordinary hours (jornada extraordinaria) on a regular basis within their workday and this must be eliminated by the institution. As noted by the trial judge, the factual statements of the complaint make no reference whatsoever to this particular point; therefore, it cannot form part of the denials in the response to the complaint, and as it does not form part of the disputed facts subject to the process, it cannot be granted in the judgment. In the same vein, from the administrative file, of which a physical dossier is attached, it is not observed that the plaintiff worked extraordinary hours on a regular basis.

In summary, the plaintiff, through their appeal, issues subjective assessments without any basis for evaluation. It is not possible to understand how the elements indicated in the challenge as poorly evaluated could have the necessary utility and force to be linked to the subject of this proceeding. Without delving into greater detail on what was the subject of the appeal, the appeal of the plaintiff is dismissed as inadmissible.

Appeal of the defendant: Having analyzed the objections raised by the defendant in the appeal filed, the following is noted: "Article 62 of the Political Constitution recognizes the force of law for collective labor agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) that, in accordance with the law, are signed between employers or employer unions and legally organized worker unions, thereby becoming a source of Law.

This is codified in Article 54 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which indicates that all existing individual or collective contracts, or those subsequently executed within the subscribing company, must conform to the conventional norms; it being understood that the union guarantees established in the ILO Conventions ratified by the country are included in said regulations.

Likewise, Article 55 ibidem establishes: 'the stipulations of the collective agreement (convención colectiva) have the force of law for: a) The parties that have signed it, justifying their legal standing in accordance with the provisions of Article 51; b) All persons who, at the time it comes into effect, work in the company, companies, or production center to which the pact refers, insofar as those stipulations are favorable to them, even if they are not members of the worker union or unions that concluded it; and c) Those who conclude future individual or collective contracts within the same company, companies, or production center affected by the pact, in the understanding that said contracts may not be agreed upon under conditions less favorable to the workers than those contained in the collective agreement.' From the text of these norms, it is inferred that the collective agreement has, as one of its purposes, the regulation of individual working conditions, such that through it, the minimum rights already granted by labor legislation can be reviewed in order to improve or elevate them. Although the collective agreement can address any matter of the individual labor relationship, its norms cannot repeal ordinary laws, which must be respected, but they can be expanded or exceeded in order to grant greater labor benefits, while respecting mandatory public policy norms.

In that same sense, the principle of the non-derogability of conventional norms at the individual level must be kept in mind, which implies their application to all workers according to the terms of the transcribed Article 55. For his part, regarding collective agreements and their special nature, the scholar [Nombre1] points out: 'The collective agreement on working conditions (convenio colectivo de condiciones de trabajo) is the most important manifestation of the access of the autonomy of the will of social groups to normative power, and therefore, to the category of a source of Law. This purpose of overcoming the insufficiencies of individual contracting is what determines the emergence and nature of the collective agreement; it is a factor that determines the emergence and nature of the collective agreement.' It is a pact or agreement typically entered into between trade union organizations or associations of workers on one side, and employers or associative organizations thereof on the other, through which the conditions governing the individual employment relationships included within its scope of application are fixed." (MONTOYA MELGAR, Alfredo. Derecho del Trabajo. 31st edition, Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. 2010. pp.151 and 152). The will of the parties plays a fundamental role regarding the content of the agreement, which is precisely the result of the collective bargaining (negociación colectiva) between the employer and the union. At the same time, it is a fundamental right contemplated in Article 62 of the Political Constitution and in Convention 98 of the International Labour Organization, which states in its Article 4: "Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements." Thus, judicial decisions must respect, at all times, what was agreed upon by the parties, as this free will is the essence of the collective agreements. In the specific case, it is noted that the plaintiff comes before the courts for a judicial decision to recognize the time served as a substitute worker (trabajador suplente) at JAPDEVA, and in turn, to retroactively recognize all the benefits established in the Collective Agreement (Convención Colectiva). This is due to having worked as a "substitute" worker on a discontinuous basis as a mobile equipment operator, that is, an operational worker working 26-day periods, from January 2, 2002, until May 19, 2008, for a total of 719 days. As of that date, the plaintiff was appointed to a permanent position. By means of a personnel action dated July 9, 2009, and according to official memorandum PEL-147-09 from the Executive Presidency of JAPDEVA, the plaintiff was granted two annual increments (anualidades) for the sum of the substitutions performed, effective from January 1, 2009, for a total of three steps (pasos) at the time said personnel action was issued.

As a general reference and by virtue of the principle of legal order completeness, it is of interest to note what the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) indicated in official memorandum 12849, dated November 28, 2008, by the Division of Operational and Evaluative Oversight, Area of Oversight for Public Works and Transportation Services, regarding the topic of "Substitute" officials. "The Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), already cited, regulates matters related to annual increments or steps for public sector officials. Particularly, for the purpose of this matter, what is established in subsection d) of Article 12 is relevant. Likewise, the JAPDEVA Collective Agreement, in Article 54, subsections b) and c), contemplates the recognition of that incentive. The core issue to be defined at this time lies in determining whether the 'substitute' workers who work for that institution can have access to the benefit of annual increments, an aspect that, as this Office of the Comptroller General indicated in the aforementioned official memoranda, had not been sufficiently clarified by JAPDEVA.

In view of the above, it should be noted that the concept of substitution (suplencia) has been interpreted, in accordance with budgetary regulations, as 'Remuneration to personnel who temporarily substitute the holder of a position, who is absent due to leave, vacations, disabilities, or other reasons that imply the holder receives their salary, for a predefined period and implies an employment relationship with the institution.' In the same sense, the doctrine has indicated that: 'Regarding the legal nature of the substitution, national doctrine indicates that it is a phenomenon (of organization) by virtue of which a person is placed in the place of the holder of an office, due to vacancy (death, resignation, definitive disability, removal), or absence of the latter (vacations, leave, temporary disability, suspension), in an extraordinary and temporary manner, while the new holder is not placed in possession of the position. Likewise, and as a regulatory reference, it is important to consider that according to Article 26 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), it is feasible to consider the concept of 'temporary substitute' (interino sustituto) for the case of vacancies. Meanwhile, the Regulation to that Statute indicates, in its Article 10, among other things, that temporary substitute servers will be considered those appointed to temporarily replace a regular server, for any cause of suspension of the service relationship.' According to what has been indicated, and in accordance with what was expressed by the Legal Department of JAPDEVA, in its official memorandum Number AL-584-2008, it is valid to consider that the substitute or substitute official performs functions in their condition as an interim worker (interino).

Understanding that the activity of this substitute is framed within a public service relationship, which obviously must possess the essential elements to determine said relationship, namely: 1) highly personal provision of service (intuitu personae character), 2) salary as economic compensation for their services, and 3) a relationship of subordination. Although there may be some differences regarding the rights corresponding to a temporary substitute versus an interim worker in a vacant position, for the purposes of recognizing annual increments, they can be considered to be in the same condition.

Under that assumption and because both judicial jurisprudence and, more recently, that of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) have considered that continuity in the provision of service is not an element considered by the Salary Law (Ley de Salarios) for granting the annual increment incentive, it is '... appropriate to recognize the interim server for all the time worked in any institution that makes up the Public Sector, for the purposes of paying the corresponding annual increases.' It has also been indicated that '...the scope of that legal provision for its application are relatively broad, insofar as the accumulated seniority for the purposes of paying the annual increases must be recognized not only for the official or server who is occupying a permanent position, but also for one who occupies an interim position. Regardless of whether the latter is for a determined or indefinite period...'" Thus, taking these criteria into account, the defendant entity proceeded to grant the plaintiff two annual increments, resulting from the substitutions performed. This is recorded in Personnel Action PEL-147-09 from the executive presidency, dated July 9, 2009 (Visible on folio 7, front), where it is noted that an entry date to JAPDEVA as of May 19, 2008, was contemplated for the plaintiff, and that at that time, they had 1 step (annual increments), and went to 3 steps (annual increments), which began to take effect as of January 1, 2009. It is from this that it is held that the defendant entity effectively recognized three annual increments for the plaintiff, for the substitutions that the plaintiff worked for JAPDEVA. Now, it must be determined and established, as the defendant has petitioned in its appeal, whether the plaintiff is entitled to said recognition. The trial judge, on this point, in a well-founded manner, established the following: 'regarding the recognition of the annual increments, the plaintiff's claim arises that the steps be recognized from when they had worked 364 days as a substitute at JAPDEVA. In this regard, the Tribunal considers, pursuant to Article 2 of Law 6835, which adds a subsection d) to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), number 2166 of October 9, 1957, that the right to enjoy the first annual increment by the plaintiff was acquired when the sum or computation of the periods of appointment as a substitute amounted to one exact year, and so on successively, because, as the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated, "no distinction should be made based on the precarious nature of the appointment," since that "would lead to a flagrant violation of the generic principle of equality and the specific principle of salary equality, contemplated in Articles 33 and 57 of the Constitution (Carta Magna), given that it would be based solely on the precarious condition of the appointments of some workers compared to others, which is considered discriminatory, insofar as the differentiation would not be based on an objective or rational parameter" (Voto 2015-000634 at ten hours five minutes on June 17, two thousand fifteen, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). For this reason, the defendant must retroactively pay the annual increments from the moment the right to earn each of them arose, that is, each annual increment must be paid from the moment the sum or computation of the periods appointed in substitute work grants the right to enjoy it, and with this, all salary components derived from these must also be paid retroactively, such as vacations, school salary (salario escolar), steps, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), payment for free days, and salary increases (In that same sense, see, among others, Votos 2010-000273, at ten hours forty-five minutes on February nineteen, two thousand ten, and 2012-000315 at ten hours fifteen minutes on March thirty, two thousand twelve, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). For the purposes of this recognition, it cannot be forgotten that as of January 1, two thousand nine, two annual increments were recognized for the plaintiff, which as of that date gives a total of three, as recorded in the document on folio seven. Furthermore, the defendant must obviously recognize total seniority as time worked at JAPDEVA and not in another State Institution, without, however, modifying the year in which the plaintiff was appointed as "permanent" (fijo), but if the plaintiff so requests, it must be included in documents such as certifications or analogous ones, that the plaintiff has worked in a permanent capacity since May 19, two thousand eight, but that prior to that, they performed substitutions at JAPDEVA for a total of 719 days.- In summary, the claims are granted to recognize the steps from when the respective period was completed by adding each substitution one by one, as well as the retroactive payment of all salary components derived from these that the plaintiff ceased to receive, but the claim that the year in which the institution appointed them as permanent at JAPDEVA must be modified is denied; at most, if the plaintiff so requests, it may be included in certifications or similar documents that they previously worked as a substitute..' This Chamber considers that the decision of the lower court (A quo) on this point is appropriate, first, because it is based on a jurisprudentially established foundation regarding the vindication of the labor rights of workers who work as substitutes and interim workers, it being clear that the substantial difference between a permanent worker and an interim worker in the context of public employment is solely the stability in the position; moreover, it performed a correct count of the days effectively worked for determining the rights to be granted. For this reason, regarding this grievance, the challenged decision must be confirmed.

Now, where the defendant's grievance is well-founded is regarding the recognition of the benefits derived from Articles 41, 54, and 63 of the Collective Agreement of JAPDEVA, for the following reason: As has been noted, the Collective Agreement is the most important manifestation of the access of the autonomy of the will of social groups to normative power, and therefore is a category of source of Law. It is an agreement or pact, signed by the union organization or organizations of workers with the companies or associative organizations thereof, through which the conditions governing the individual employment relationships, included within its scope of application, are fixed. Thus, since it is an agreement between the parties involved, that is, workers, worker unions, and employers or entities representing them, an agreement is subscribed with the aim of improving working conditions, which has the force of law between the parties and, in turn, must be respected not only by those involved (worker - workers - employer - employers), but by third parties, it having been stated that judicial decisions must, at all times, respect what was agreed upon by the parties, since this free will is the essence of the collective agreements. From the above, what was indicated by the Legal Judicial Representative of the defendant entity in its appeal is correct, in that the JAPDEVA Collective Agreement cannot recognize benefits to "substitute" workers that are not contemplated within the agreement, the agreement being a pact between parties and thus professional law, and therefore mandatory compliance between them. Thus, it was clearly defined, and so the parties involved in the Collective Agreement desired, to establish which benefits of the agreement the "substitute" or "interim" workers are entitled to, this being the frame of reference and the legal basis for accessing them. These are found within the JAPDEVA collective agreement, in its Article 1, on Coverage of the Collective Agreement (Cobertura de la Convención Colectiva), and its subsection e) states: Substitute or interim workers shall be entitled to enjoy the following benefits: a) Article 53 - Cost of Living (Costo de Vida), b) Article 55, Computed Salary Supplement (Complemento Salarial cómputo), c) Article 59 Exclusively for personnel of the Treasury Section, d) Article 60 - Height Bonus (Bonificación por Altura), e) Article 64 - Food Subsidy (Subsidio Alimentación), f) Article 63 bis - Police Risk (Riesgo Policial), g) Article 72- Efficiency Bonus (Bonificación por eficiencia). It follows from the above that the JAPDEVA agreement established the benefits that it can grant to "substitute" or "interim" personnel, it being impossible to grant others, since within the liberality of the negotiation subscribed by the parties involved, they so established it, and therefore that agreement must be respected, even by judicial authorities in their decisions, because what was agreed upon by the parties prevails, as free will is the essence of collective agreements.

Now, from the first instance judgment, it is evident that the lower court granted the plaintiff recognition of the benefits contemplated in the collective agreement in its Articles 41, 54, and 63, this being incorrect, since the JAPDEVA Collective Agreement is ABSOLUTELY CLEAR in indicating which benefits the "substitute" or "Interim" worker may opt for, and its Article 1, subsection e), does not contemplate those benefits. This was a liberality of the parties that subscribed the agreement and therefore their will, by which they considered that for that group of "substitute" workers, the benefits that could be granted are already exhaustively established in the collective agreement in Article 1, subsection e), without it being possible to grant more or less. This is a law between the parties and therefore of mandatory compliance, and as stated before, the benefits that can be granted to "substitute" workers are already defined by the Collective Agreement, not involving the items that the [Nombre2] granted in the judgment.

While it is true that there are regulations on the salary law in public administration, as well as other laws and regulations that refer to benefits and salary conditions, which must be respected and complied with, it must not be forgotten that in the Collective Agreement, what prevails is the improvement of the working conditions of the workers who participate in it, and in turn, that said improvements are obtained by new workers who join the institution, provided the agreement is in force. However, since it is an express will of the parties, they set the conditions under which workers or groups of them can access said benefits. Applicable to the case at hand is the fact that for "substitute" or "interim" workers, the benefits to which they may opt were set through the collective agreement, which are basically those established in Article 1 of the agreement, called "Coverage of the Collective Agreement", subsection e); thus, the decision is revoked insofar as it grants the benefits derived from Articles 41, 54, and 63 of the JAPDEVA Collective Agreement." **"III- ON THE SUBJECT OF THE APPEAL**: [...]" Regarding this particular point, the Court upholds what was decided in the previous instance, concerning conventional clause 33BIS of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo) signed between the Workers and JAPDEVA for the years 2002 and 2003, which establishes that if JAPDEVA eliminates the overtime that a worker had been working for any reason, the institution must pay them a partial severance indemnity consisting of a sum proportional to the overtime they cease to earn, provided they have effectively worked overtime during the two years prior to the reduction of the overtime; it also establishes that overtime worked on an eventual or occasional basis will not be indemnified.

Therefore, for the right to recognition of such indemnity to arise, the worker must habitually work extraordinary hours within their workday and these must be eliminated by the institution. As the first instance judge notes, within the factual statements of the complaint there is no reference whatsoever to this particular point; consequently, it cannot form part of the denials in the response to the complaint, and not being part of the disputed facts subject to the process, it cannot be granted in judgment. Furthermore, from the administrative file, of which a physical bundle is attached, it is not apparent that the plaintiff habitually worked extraordinary hours.

In summary, in his appeal, the plaintiff makes subjective assessments without any basis for evaluation; it is not possible to understand the effect that the elements indicated in the challenge as poorly evaluated might have on the utility and force necessary to connect them with the subject of this process. Without going into further detail regarding the object of the appeal, the appeal by the plaintiff is dismissed as inadmissible.

Appeal by the defendant: Once the disagreements raised by the defendant in the filed appeal have been analyzed, the following is noted: "Article 62 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) recognizes the force of law for collective labor agreements that, in accordance with the law, are signed between employers or employer unions and legally organized worker unions, thus configuring them as a source of Law.

This is echoed in Article 54 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which states that all individual or collective contracts existing or that are subsequently executed in the subscribing company must conform to the conventional norms; it being understood that the union guarantees established in the ILO Conventions ratified by the country are included in that regulation.

Likewise, Article 55 of the same code establishes: 'the stipulations of the collective agreement shall have the force of law for: a) The parties that have signed it, justifying their representation in accordance with the provisions of Article 51; b) All persons who, at the time it comes into effect, work in the company, companies, or production center to which the agreement refers, insofar as those provisions are favorable and even if they are not members of the union or unions of workers that concluded it; and c) Those who in the future enter into individual or collective contracts within the same company, companies, or production center affected by the agreement, in the understanding that such contracts may not be entered into under conditions less favorable for the workers than those contained in the collective agreement.' From the text of these norms, it is clear that one of the purposes of the collective agreement is the regulation of individual working conditions, by means of which the minimum rights already granted by labor legislation can be reviewed, with the aim of improving or enhancing them.

While any matter of the individual employment relationship may be the subject of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), its rules cannot derogate ordinary laws, which must be respected, but they may be broadened or exceeded for the purpose of granting greater labor benefits, while respecting mandatory provisions of public order.

In that same sense, the principle of singular non-derogability of conventional rules must be borne in mind, which implies the application to all workers according to the terms of numeral 55 transcribed above. For its part, regarding collective bargaining agreements and their special nature, the scholar [Name1] states: "The collective labor agreement is the most important manifestation of the access of the autonomy of the will of social groups to normative power, and therefore, to the category of source of Law. This purpose of overcoming the inadequacies of individual contracting is what determines the appearance and the nature of the collective agreement; this is a factor that determines the appearance and the nature of the collective agreement.

It is a pact or agreement typically entered into between trade union organizations or associations of workers on one side, and employers or their associative organizations on the other, through which the conditions governing the individual employment relationships included within its scope of application are fixed." (MONTOYA MELGAR. Alfredo. Derecho del Trabajo. 31st edition, Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. 2010. pp. 151 and 152). The will of the parties plays a fundamental role regarding the content of the collective bargaining agreement, which is precisely the result of collective bargaining between the employer and the union. At the same time, it is a fundamental right contemplated in Article 62 of the Political Constitution and in Convention 98 of the International Labor Organization, which states in its numeral 4: "Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organizations and workers' organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements." In this way, judicial decisions must respect, at all times, what was agreed upon by the parties, as that free will is the essence of collective bargaining agreements. In the specific case, the plaintiff resorts to the judicial route so that it is through a judicial ruling that the time served as a substitute (suplente) worker at JAPDEVA is recognized, and in turn, all the benefits established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement are recognized retroactively, due to having worked as a "substitute" worker discontinuously as mobile equipment operator, that is, a 26-day operational worker, from January 2, 2002, to May 19, 2008, for a total of 719 days. Date from which the claimant was appointed permanently (en propiedad). That through personnel action dated July 9, 2009, and according to official communication PEL-147-09 from the Executive Presidency of JAPDEVA, the plaintiff was granted two longevity pay steps (anualidades) for the sum of the substitutions performed, effective January 1, 2009, for a total of three steps as of the date said personnel action was issued.

As a general reference and by virtue of the principle of completeness of the legal system, it is of interest to note what the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) indicated in official communication 12849, of November 28, 2008, by the Division of Operative and Evaluative Oversight, Area of Oversight of Public Works and Transport Services, regarding the issue of "Substitute" officials. "The Public Administration Salary Law, already cited, regulates matters related to longevity pay steps (anualidades) for public sector officials. Particularly, what is relevant for this matter is established in subsection d) of numeral 12. Likewise, the Collective Bargaining Agreement of JAPDEVA, in numeral 54, subsections b) and c), contemplates the recognition of that incentive. The core issue to be defined on this occasion lies in determining whether the 'substitute' workers who work for that institution may have access to the benefit of longevity pay steps, an aspect that, as this Office of the Comptroller General indicated in the aforementioned official communications, had not been sufficiently clarified by JAPDEVA.

In view of the above, it should be noted that the concept of substitution (suplencia) has been interpreted, in accordance with budgetary regulations, as the "Remuneration to personnel who temporarily replace the incumbent of a post, who is absent due to leave, vacations, sick leave, or other reasons that imply the incumbent's enjoyment of salary, for a predefined period and implies an employment relationship with the institution.

In the same vein, legal scholars have indicated that: "Regarding the legal nature of the substitution (suplencia), national doctrine indicates that it is an (organizational) phenomenon by virtue of which a person is placed in the position of the incumbent of an office, due to vacancy (death, resignation, permanent incapacity, removal), or absence of the latter (vacations, leaves, temporary incapacity, suspension), in an extraordinary and temporary manner, while the new incumbent is not placed in possession of the post. Likewise, and as a normative reference, it is important to consider that according to Article 26 of the Civil Service Statute, it is feasible to consider the concept of 'substitute interim (interino sustituto)' in the case of vacancies. Meanwhile, the Regulations to that Statute indicate, in its Article 10, among other things, that substitute interim servants will be considered those appointed to temporarily replace a regular servant, for any reason of suspension of the service relationship. According to what is indicated, and in accordance with what was stated by the Legal Department of JAPDEVA, in its official communication Number AL-584-2008, it is valid to consider that the substitute official exercises functions in their condition as interim (interino).

Understanding the above, that this substitute's activity is framed within a public service relationship, which obviously must possess the essential elements to determine that relationship, namely: 1) highly personal provision of service (intuitu personae nature), 2) salary as economic compensation for their services, and 3) subordination relationship. While there may be some differences regarding the rights corresponding to a substitute interim and an interim in a vacant post, for the purposes of recognition of longevity pay steps, they may be considered as being in the same condition.

Under that assumption and because judicial jurisprudence, and more recently that of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), have considered that continuity in the provision of the service is not an element considered by the Salary Law for granting the longevity pay step incentive, it is "... appropriate to recognize the interim servant for all time worked in any institution that makes up the Public Sector, for the purposes of payment of the corresponding annual increases." It has also been indicated that "...the scope of that legal provision for its application is relatively broad insofar as accumulated seniority for the purposes of payment of annual increases must be recognized not only for the official or servant occupying a permanent post, but also for one occupying an interim post. Regardless of whether the latter is for a definite or indefinite term..." Thus, taking into account those criteria, the defendant entity proceeded to recognize the plaintiff two longevity pay steps, resulting from the substitutions performed. This is recorded in Personnel Action PEL-147-09 from the executive presidency, dated July 9, 2009, visible on folio 7 front, where it shows that the plaintiff was assigned an entry date to JAPDEVA of May 19, 2008, and that at that time they had 1 step (longevity pay steps), and moved to 3 steps (longevity pay steps), which became effective as of January 1, 2009. From this, it is established that the defendant entity did indeed recognize three longevity pay steps for the plaintiff, for the substitutions the plaintiff worked for JAPDEVA. Now, it is necessary to determine and establish, as has been petitioned in its appeal by the defendant party, whether the plaintiff is entitled to such recognition; the Trial Judge, on this point in a well-founded manner, established the following: "regarding the recognition of longevity pay steps, the claimant's claim arises that the steps be recognized from when they had completed 364 days of having worked as a substitute at JAPDEVA. In this sense, the Court considers, pursuant to Article 2 of Law 6835, which adds a subsection d) to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, number 2166 of October 9, 1957, that the right to the enjoyment of the first longevity pay step by the claimant was acquired when the summation or calculation of the periods of appointments as a substitute reached exactly one year, and so successively, the foregoing on the basis that, as the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated, 'no distinction should be made based on the precariousness of the appointment,' since that 'would lead to a flagrant violation of the generic principle of equality and the specific principle of equal pay, contemplated in Articles 33 and 57 of the Magna Carta, given that it would be based solely on the precarious condition of the appointments of some workers with respect to others, which is deemed discriminatory, insofar as the differentiation would not be supported by an objective or rational parameter' (Voto 2015-000634 of ten hours five minutes of June 17, 2015, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Therefore, the defendant must retroactively pay the longevity pay steps from the moment the right to earn each one of them arose, that is, each longevity pay step must be paid from the moment the summation or calculation of the periods appointed in substitution duties grants the right to its enjoyment, and with that, all salary components deriving from these must also be paid retroactively, such as for example vacations, school salary, steps, Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), payment of free days, and salary increases (In this same vein, among others, Votos 2010-000273, of ten hours forty-five minutes of February 19, 2010, and 2012-000315 of ten hours fifteen minutes of March 30, 2012, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice may be consulted). For the purposes of this recognition, it cannot be forgotten that as of January 1, 2009, two longevity pay steps were recognized to the plaintiff, which on that date gives a total of three, as recorded in the document on folio seven. Furthermore, obviously, the recognition of total seniority must be made by the defendant as time worked at JAPDEVA and not at another State Institution, without thereby having to modify the year in which they were appointed as 'permanent (fijo),' but if the plaintiff so requested, documents such as certifications or analogous instruments must include that the plaintiff has worked permanently since May 19, 2008, but that prior to that, they performed substitutions at JAPDEVA for a total of 719 days.- In summary, the claims are granted that the steps be recognized from when the respective period was completed, adding each substitution one by one, as well as the retroactive payment of all salary components derived from these that the claimant ceased to receive, but the claim that the year in which the institution appointed them as permanent at JAPDEVA must be modified is denied; at most, if the plaintiff so requested, certifications or similar documents may state that they previously worked as a substitute.." this Chamber considers that what was decided by the lower court (A quo) on this point is appropriate, first, because it does so based on a jurisprudentially established foundation regarding the issue of vindicating the labor rights of workers who work as substitutes and interims, being clear that the substantial difference between a permanent worker and an interim in the context of public employment is solely job stability; furthermore, it performed a correct count of the days effectively worked for the determination of the rights to be granted; it is for this reason that regarding this grievance the appealed judgment must be confirmed. Now, where the defendant party is correct is in the grievance regarding the recognition of the benefits derived from Articles 41, 54, and 63 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement of JAPDEVA, for the following reason: As has been noted, the Collective Bargaining Agreement is the most important manifestation of the access of the autonomy of the will of social groups to normative power, and therefore is a category of source of Law. It is an agreement or pact, entered into by the trade union organization or organizations of workers with the companies or their associative organizations, through which the conditions governing the individual employment relationships, included within its scope of application, are fixed. Thus, since it is an agreement between the involved parties, i.e., workers, trade unions of workers, and employers or entities representing them, an agreement is concluded with the aim of improving working conditions, which has the force of law between the parties and in turn must be respected not only by those involved (worker - workers - employer - employers), but by third parties, it having been said that judicial decisions must respect, at all times, what was agreed upon by the parties, as that free will is the essence of collective bargaining agreements. From the foregoing, the point made by the Judicial Legal Representative of the defendant entity in its appeal is correct, in that the Collective Bargaining Agreement of JAPDEVA cannot recognize benefits to the 'substitute' workers that are not contemplated within the agreement, the agreement being a pact between parties and therefore professional law, and thus of mandatory compliance among them. Thus, it was clearly defined, and so the parties involved in the Collective Bargaining Agreement wished it, to establish which benefits of the agreement the 'substitute' or 'interim' workers are entitled to, this being the legal and reference framework to be able to access them, which we find within the collective bargaining agreement of JAPDEVA, in its Article 1, on the Coverage of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and its subsection e) refers: Substitute or interim workers shall have the right to enjoy the following benefits: a) Article 53 - Cost of Living, b) Article 55, Salary Supplement calculation, c) Article 59 - Exclusively for staff of the Treasury Section, d) Article 60 - Height Bonus, e) Article 64 - Food Allowance, f) Article 63 bis - Police Risk, g) Article 72 - Efficiency Bonus. From the foregoing, the JAPDEVA agreement established the benefits it may grant to the 'substitute' or 'interim' staff, making it impossible to grant others, since within the freedom of the negotiation signed by the involved parties, they so established, and therefore that agreement must be respected, even by judicial authorities in their rulings, because it was what was agreed by the parties that prevails, since it is the free will that is the essence of collective bargaining agreements.

Now, from the first instance judgment, it is observed that the lower court granted the plaintiff recognition of the benefits contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement in its Articles 41, 54, and 63, this being incorrect since the Collective Bargaining Agreement of JAPDEVA is ABSOLUTELY CLEAR in indicating which benefits the 'substitute' or 'Interim' worker may opt for, as its Article 1, subsection e), does not contemplate those benefits, this being a freedom of the parties that signed the agreement and therefore the will of these, for which reason they considered that for that group of 'substitute' workers, the benefits that could be granted are already exhaustively established in the collective bargaining agreement in Article 1, subsection e), without being able to grant more or less, it being a law between the parties and thus of mandatory compliance, and as stated before, the Collective Bargaining Agreement has already defined the benefits that may be granted to 'substitute' workers, not involving the items granted by the [Name2] in judgment.

While it is true that there are regulations on the salary law in public administration, as well as other laws and regulations that refer to salary benefits and conditions, which must be respected and complied with, it should not be lost sight of that in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, what prevails is the improvement of the working conditions of the workers who participate in it, and in turn, that said improvements are obtained by new workers joining the institution, provided the agreement is in force, but since it is an express will of the parties, they establish the conditions under which the workers or groups of them may access said benefits, it being applicable to the case at hand, the fact that for the 'substitute' or 'interim' workers, the benefits they may opt for were set through the collective bargaining agreement, these being basically those established in Article 1 of the agreement, called 'Coverage of the Collective Bargaining Agreement', subsection e); in this way, the judgment is reversed regarding not granting the benefits derived from Articles 41, 54, and 63 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement of JAPDEVA."

"III- SOBRE EL OBJETO DEL RECURSO: [...]

Sobre este particular, el Tribunal avala lo resuelto en la instancia precedente, sobre la cláusula convencional 33BIS de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo suscrita entre los Trabajadores y JAPDEVA para el año 2002 y 2003 establece que cuando por alguna razón JAPDEVA elimine las horas extras que un trabajador venía laborando, la institución deberá pagarle una indemnización parcial de cesantía consistente en una suma proporcional a loas horas extras que deja de devengar, debiendo haber trabajado horas extras efectivamente durante dos años anteriores a la reducción de las extras, además establece que las extras que se labores de manera eventual u ocasional no serán indemnizadas.

De manera que para que surja el derecho del reconocimiento de dicha indemnización el trabajador debe laborar jornada extraordinaria de manera habitual dentro de su jornada laboral y esta debe ser suprimida por la institución, como lo hace ver el juzgador de instancia, dentro de los enunciados fácticos de la demanda no se hace referencia alguna sobre este particular, por ende no puede formar parte de las negaciones de la contestación de la demanda y al no formar parte de los hechos controvertidos objeto de proceso, no puede ser concedido en sentencia, pues en igual sentido, del expediente administrativo del que se adjunta legajo físico, no se aprecia que el accionante haya laborado jornada extraordinaria de manera habitual.

En síntesis, el actor con su recurso emite apreciaciones subjetivas sin fundamento alguno para ser valorado, no se logra comprender el efecto que los elementos señalados en la impugnación como mal valorados, puedan tener la utilidad y fuerza necesarias para vincularse con el objeto de este proceso; sin ahondar en mayor detalle, en lo que fue objeto de recurso, por improcedente se rechaza la apelación de la parte actora.

Recurso de la parte demandada: Una vez que han sido analizadas las inconformidades planteadas por la parte demandada, en el recurso de apelación planteado, se tiene lo siguiente: " El artículo 62 de la Constitución Política les reconoce fuerza de ley a las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que, con arreglo a la ley, se firmen entre patronos o sindicatos de patronos y sindicatos de trabajadores, legalmente organizados, con lo que se configuran como fuente de Derecho.

Esto es recogido en el numeral 54 del Código de Trabajo, que señala que a las normas convencionales deben adaptarse todos los contratos individuales o colectivos existentes o que luego se realicen en la empresa suscribiente; debiendo entenderse incluida en esa normativa las garantías sindicales establecidas en los Convenios de la OIT, ratificados por el país.

Asimismo, el 55 idídem, establece: " las estipulaciones de la convención colectiva tiene fuerza de ley para: a) Las partes que la han suscrito, justificando su personería de acuerdo con lo dispuesto por el artículo 51; b) Todas las personas que en el momento de entrar en vigor trabajen en la empresa, empresas o centro de producción a que el pacto se refiera, en lo que aquéllas resulten favorables y aun cuando no sean miembros del sindicato o sindicatos de trabajadores que lo hubieren celebrado; y c) Los que concierten en lo futuro contratos individuales o colectivos dentro de la misma empresa, empresas o centro de producción afectados por el pacto, en el concepto de que dichos contratos no podrán celebrarse en condiciones menos favorables para los trabajadores que las contenidas en la convención colectiva.

Del texto de estas normas, se desprende que la convención colectiva tiene, como uno de sus objetos, la regulación de las condiciones individuales de trabajo, por lo que su medio, pueden revisarse los derechos mínimos ya otorgados por la legislación laboral, con el fin de mejorarlos o elevarlos. Si bien puede ser objeto de la convención colectiva cualquier materia de la relación laboral individual, sus normas no puede derogar las leyes ordinarias, las que deben respetarse, pero sí pueden ampliarse o superarse en aras de otorgar mayores beneficios laborales, pero respetando las normas de carácter imperativo de orden.

En ese mismo sentido, debe tenerse presente el principio de inderogabilidad singular de las normas convencionales, que implica la aplicación de todas las personas trabajadorassegún los términos del numeral 55 transcrito. Por su parte, en relación con las convenciones colectivas y su especial naturaleza, el tratadista [Nombre1] señala: " El convenio colectivo de condiciones de trabajo es la manifestación más importante del acceso de la autonomía de la voluntad de los grupos sociales al poder normativo, y por tanto, a la categoría de fuente del Derecho. Este propósito de superar las insuficiencias de la contratación individual es el que determina la aparición y la naturaleza del convenio colectivo, es éste un factor que determina la aparición y la naturaleza del convenio colectivo.

Es éste un pacto o acuerdo suscrito de modo típico entre organizaciones o asociaciones sindicales de trabajadores de un lado, y empresarios u organizaciones asociativas de éstos de otro, a través del cual se fijan las condiciones por las que han de regirse las relaciones singulares de trabajo incluidas en su ámbito de aplicación". (MONTOYA MELGAR. Alfredo. Derecho del Trabajo. 31° edición, Editorial Tecnos. Madrid. 2010. p.151 y 152). La voluntad de las partes juega un papel fundamental en cuanto al contenido de la convención, la cual es precisamente, el resultado de la negociación colectiva entre parte patronal y parte sindical. A la vez, es un derecho fundamental contemplado en el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política y en Convenio 98 de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo, que señala en su numeral 4: " Deberán adoptarse medidas adecuadas a las condiciones nacionales, cuando ello sea necesario, para estimular y fomentar entre los empleadores y las organizaciones de empleadores, por una parte y las organizaciones de trabajadores, por otra, el pleno desarrollo y uso de procedimientos de negociación voluntaria, con objeto de reglamentar, por medio de contratos colectivos, las condiciones de empleo".

De esta manera las resoluciones judiciales deben respetar, en todo momento, lo pactado por las partes, pues esa libre voluntad es la esencia de las convenciones colectivas. Para el caso concreto, se tiene que el actor acude a la vía jurisdiccional a fin de que sea mediante una resolución judicial que se le reconozca el tiempo servido como trabajador suplente en JAPDEVA, y a su vez se le reconozcan en forma retroactiva todos los beneficios que se establecen en la Convención Colectiva, esto en razón de haber laborado como trabajador "suplente" de manera discontinua como operador de equipo móvil, sea, trabajador operativo de 26 días, desde el dos de enero del dos mil dos hasta el diecinueve de mayo del dos mil ocho, por un total de 719 días. Fecha a partir de la cual el accionante fue nombrado en propiedad. Que mediante acción de personal de fecha nueve de julio del dos mil nueve y según oficio PEL-147-09 de la Presidencia Ejecutiva de Japdeva, le reconocieron al actor dos anualidades por la sumatoria de las suplencias realizadas y con un rige a partir del primero de enero del dos mil nueve, para un total de tres pasos para la fecha en que se emitió dicha acción de personal.

Como referencia general y en virtud del principio de plenitud del ordenamiento jurídico, resulta de interés hacer ver lo que indicó la Contraloría General de la República en en el oficio 12849, del 28 de noviembre del 2008, por parte de la División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa, Área de Fiscalización Servicios de Obras Públicas y Transporte, referente al tema de los funcionarios " Suplente". " La Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, ya citada, regula lo referente a anualidades o pasos para funcionarios del sector público. Particularmente, en lo que interesa para este asunto, es relevante lo establecido en el inciso d) del numeral 12. Asimismo, la Convención Colectiva de JAPDEVA, en el numeral 54, incisos b) y c) contempla el reconocimiento de ese incentivo. El asunto medular por definir en esta oportunidad estriba en la determinación de si los trabajadores "suplentes" que laboran para esa institución pueden tener acceso al beneficio de anualidades, aspecto que como indicó esta Contraloría General en los oficios antes mencionados, no había sido suficientemente aclarado por JAPDEVA.

Con vista en lo anterior, debe señalarse que el concepto de suplencia se ha venido interpretando de acuerdo con la normativa presupuestaria, como la " Remuneración al personal que sustituye temporalmente al titular de un puesto, que se encuentra ausente por motivo de licencias, vacaciones, incapacidades u otros que impliquen el goce de salario del titular, por un período predefinido e implica relación laboral con la institución.

En igual sentido la doctrina ha señalado que: " En cuanto a la naturaleza jurídica de la suplencia, la doctrina nacional indica que es un fenómeno (de organización) en virtud del cual se coloca a una persona en lugar del titular de un órgano, por vacancia ( muerte, dimisión, incapacidad definitiva, remoción), o ausencia de éste ( vacaciones, licencias, incapacidad temporal, suspensión), en forma extraordinaria y temporal, mientras no es puesto en posesión del cargo el nuevo titular. Asimismo, y a manera de referencia normativa es importante considerar que conforme al artículo 26 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil es factible considerar el concepto de " interino sustituto" para el caso de vacantes. En tanto, el Reglamento a ese Estatuto señala, en su artículo 10, entre otras cosas, que se considerarán servidores interinos sustitutos los que fueren nombrados para reemplazar temporalmente a un servidor regular, por cualquier causa de suspensión de la relación de servicio. Conforme lo indicado, y acorde con lo externado por el Departamento Legal de JAPDEVA, en su oficio Número AL-584-2008, resulta válido considerar que el funcionario suplente o sustituto ejerce funciones en su condición de interino.

Lo anterior entendiendo que la actividad de este suplente se enmarca dentro de una relación de servicio público, que obviamente debe poseer los elementos esenciales para determinar dicha relación, a saber: 1) prestación personalísima del servicio ( carácter intuitu personae), 2) salario como retribución económica por sus servicios, y 3) relación de subordinación. Si bien pueden darse algunas diferencias en cuanto a los derechos que corresponde a un interino suplente con el interino en plaza vacante, para los efectos del reconocimiento de anualidades, pueden considerarse como en igual condición.

Bajo ese supuesto y en razón de que la jurisprudencia tanto judicial y más recientemente la de la Procuraduría General de la República, han considerado que la continuidad en la prestación del servicio no es un elemento considerado por la Ley de Salarios para el otorgamiento del incentivo de anualidad, resulta " .. procedente reconocer al servidor interino todo el tiempo laborado el cualquier institución que integran al Sector Público, para los efectos del pago de los aumentos anuales correspondientes". También se ha indicado que "..los alcances de esa disposición legal para su aplicación, son relativamente amplios en tanto la antigüedad acumulada para los efectos del pago de los aumentos anuales, debe ser reconocida no solo para el funcionario o servidor que se encontrare ocupando un puesto en propiedad, sino también para el que ocupe un puesto interino. Independientemente de si éste último lo es por tiempo determinado o indefinido..".

Es así, que tomando en cuenta dichos criterios, el ente demando, procedió al reconocimiento al actor de dos anualidades, producto de las suplencias realizadas esto consta en la Acción de Personal PEL-147-09 de la presidencia ejecutiva, misma de fecha 9 de julio del 2009 Visible a folio 7 frente), donde hace ver que el actor se le contempla una fecha de ingreso a JAPDEVA a partir del 19 de mayo de 2008, y que para ese momento tenia 1 paso, ( anualidades), y paso a 3 pasos, (anualidades), mismo que empezó a regir a partir del 1 de enero del 2009. Es de ello que se tiene, que efectivamente el ente demando reconoció al actor tres anualidades, esto por las suplencias que el mismo laboró para JAPDEVA. Ahora bien, corresponde determinar y establecer, según lo ha peticionado en su recurso la parte demanda, si al actor le corresponde dicho reconocimiento; el Juez de instancia, en este punto de manera bien fundamentada, estableció lo siguiente: " en cuanto al reconocimiento de las anualidades, surge la pretensión de la parte accionante en cuanto a que los pasos se reconozcan desde que tenía 364 días de haber laborado como suplente en Japdeva. En este sentido, el Tribunal considera al tenor del artículo 2 de la ley 6835, con el cual se agrega un inciso d) al artículo 12 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, número 2166 del 9 de octubre de 1957, que el derecho al disfrute de la primera anualidad por parte de la accionante se adquirió cuando la sumatoria o cómputo de los períodos de nombramientos como suplente dieron un año exacto, y así sucesivamente, lo anterior en razón de que tal y como lo ha dicho la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, "no cabe hacer distinción alguna basada en la precariedad del nombramiento", ya que eso "conllevaría a una violación flagrante del principio genérico de igualdad y del específico de igualdad salarial, contemplados en los artículos 33 y 57 de la Carta Magna, dado que tendría como base únicamente la condición precaria de los nombramientos de unos trabajadores respecto de otros, lo cual se considera discriminatorio, en el tanto en que la diferenciación no estaría sustentada en un parámetro objetivo ni racional" (Voto 2015-000634 de las diez horas cinco minutos del diecisiete de junio de dos mil quince de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En razón de ello, la accionada deberá pagar retroactivamente las anualidades desde el momento en que surgió el derecho a devengar cada una de ellas, es decir, cada anualidad deberá ser pagada desde el momento en que la sumatoria o cómputo de los períodos nombrados en labores de suplente otorguen el derecho al disfrute de la misma, y con ello, deberán pagarse además, retroactivamente todos los componentes salariales que de estas se deriven, a manera de ejemplos vacaciones, salario escolar, pasos, aguinaldo, pago de días libres y aumentos salariales (En ese mismo sentido pueden consultarse, entre otros, los Votos 2010-000273, de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del diecinueve de febrero del dos mil diez y 2012-000315 de las diez horas quince minutos del treinta de marzo de dos mil doce de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). A efectos de este reconocimiento no se puede olvidar que a partir del primero de enero del dos mil nueve le fueron reconocidas dos anualidades a la parte actora, lo que para esa fecha da un total de tres, tal y como consta en documento de folio siete. Además, obviamente el reconocimiento de la antigüedad total, deberá hacerlo la demandada como tiempo laborado en Japdeva y no en otra Institución del Estado, no debiendo eso sí, modificar el año en el que se le nombró como "fijo", pero si el actor así lo solicitara, deberá incluir en documentos tales como certificaciones o análogos, que el actor labora en propiedad desde el diecinueve de mayo del dos mil ocho, pero que previo a ello, realizó suplencias en Japdeva por un total de 719 días.- En síntesis, se conceden las pretensiones de que se reconozcan los pasos desde que se cumplió el período respectivo sumando una a una cada suplencia, así como el pago retroactivo de todos los componentes salariales derivados de estas que dejó de percibir el accionante, pero se deniega la pretensión de que se debe modificar el año en que la institución lo nombró como fijo en Japdeva, a lo sumo, si el actor así lo solicitare, se podrá incluir en certificaciones o documentos semejantes, que previamente laboró como suplente.." considera esta cámara que lo resuelto por el A quo en este punto es procedente, por que primero, lo hace con base en un fundamento jurisprudencialmente establecido relativo al tema de vindicar los derechos laborales de las personas trabajadoras que lo hacen como suplentes e interinos, teniendo claro que la diferencia sustancial entre un trabajador en propiedad y otro interino en el contexto del empleo público, es únicamente la estabilidad en el puesto; además realizó un correcto conteo de los días efectivamente laborados esto para la determinación de los derechos a otorgar; es por ello que en cuanto este agravio la resolución impugnada debe ser confirmada. Ahora bien, en donde si le asiste derecho a la parte demandada, es en el agravio respecto al reconocimiento de los beneficios derivados de los artículos 41, 54 y 63 de la Convención Colectiva de JAPDEVA, por lo siguiente: Como se ha hecho ver, la Convención Colectiva, es la manifestación mas importante del acceso de la autonomía de la voluntad de los grupos sociales al poder normativo, y por lo tanto es categoría de fuente del Derecho. Es un acuerdo o pacto, suscrito por la organización o organizaciones sindicales de trabajadores con las empresas o organizaciones asociativas de éstos, a través del cual se fijan las condiciones por las que han de regirse las relaciones singulares de trabajo, incluidas en su ámbito de aplicación. Es así, que al ser un acuerdo entre las partes involucradas, es decir trabajadores, sindicatos de trabajadores y empresarios o entes que representen a éstos, se suscribe un acuerdo con el fin de mejorar las condiciones laborales, mismo que tiene fuerza de ley entre las partes y a su vez, se debe de respetar no solo por parte de los involucrados ( trabajador - trabajadores - empleador - empleadores), sino por terceros, siendo que se ha dicho que las resoluciones judiciales, deben de respetar, en todo momento lo pactado por las partes, pues esa libre voluntad es la esencia de las convenciones colectivas. De lo anterior, lleva razón lo indicado por parte del Representante Legal Judicial, del ente demandado en su recurso de apelación, en cuanto que la Convención Colectiva de JAPDEVA, no puede reconocer beneficios a los trabajadores "suplentes", los cuales no están contemplados dentro de la convención, siendo la convención un acuerdo entre partes y de lo cual es ley profesional, y por tanto de acatamiento obligatorio entre éstos. Es así, que claramente se definió o y así lo quisieron las partes involucradas en la Convención Colectiva, de establecer cuales beneficios de la convención tienen derechos los trabajadores " suplentes " o "interinos", siendo este el marco de referencia y legal para poder accesar a los mismos, los cuales los encontramos dentro de la convención colectiva de JAPDEVA, en su Artículo 1, de la Cobertura de la Convención Colectiva, y en su inciso e) refiere: Los trabajadores suplentes o interinos tendrán derecho a gozar de los siguientes beneficios: a) Artículo 53 - Costo de Vida, b) Artículo 55, Complemento Salarial cómputo, c) Artículo 59 Exclusivamente al personal de la Sección de Tesorería, d) Artículo 60 - Bonificación por Altura, e) Artículo 64 - SubsidioAlimentación, f) Artículo 63 bis -Riesgo Policial, g) Artículo 72- Bonificación por eficiencia. Es de lo anterior, que la convención de JAPDEVA, estableció los beneficios los cuales puede conceder al personal " suplente " o " interino", siendo imposible otorgar otros, toda vez que dentro de la liberalidad de la negociación que suscribieron las partes involucradas, así lo establecieron y por ende se debe de respetar ese acuerdo, aun por las autoridades judiciales en sus resoluciones, en razón de que fue lo pactado por las partes lo que priva, ya que es la libre voluntad la esencia de las convenciones colectivas.

Ahora bien, de la sentencia de primera instancia, se tiene que el A-quo, concedió al actor, que se le reconociera los beneficios que contempla la convención colectiva, en sus artículos 41, 54 y 63, siendo esto incorrecto toda vez que la Convención Colectiva de JAPDEVA, es ABSOLUTAMENTE CLARA en indicar a cuales beneficios puede optar el trabajador " suplente" o " Interino", siendo que en su artículo 1, inciso e), no contempla dichos beneficios, siendo una liberalidad de las partes que suscribieron la convención y por tanto la voluntad de éstas, por lo cual consideraron que para ese grupo de trabajadores " suplentes", los beneficios que podrían concederse ya están taxativa establecidos en la convención colectiva en el artículo 1, inciso e), sin que se pueda otorgar mas o menos, siendo una ley entre las partes y por ende de acatamiento obligatorio, y según se dijo antes, ya está definido por la Convención Colectiva, los beneficios a los cuales se les puede otorgar a los trabajadores " suplentes", no involucrando los rubros que otorgó el [Nombre2] en sentencia.

Si bien es cierto existe normativa sobre la ley de salarios en la administración pública, así como otras leyes y normativas que hacen referencia a los beneficios y condiciones salariales, las cuales deben de respetarse y acatarse, no hay que perder de vista que la Convención Colectiva, lo que prima es el mejoramiento de las condiciones laborales de los trabajadores que participan de ella, y a su vez que dichas mejoras las obtienen los nuevos trabajadores que ingresen a la institución, siempre y cuando la convención se encuentre vigente, pero que al ser una voluntad expresa de las partes, las mismas fijan las condiciones en las cuales las personas trabajadoras o grupos de ellas, pueden accesar a dichos beneficios, siendo aplicable para el caso que nos ocupa, el hecho de que para los trabajadores " suplentes " o " interinos", se fijaron por medio de la convención colectiva los beneficios a los cuales estos pueden optar, siendo básicamente los que se establecen en el artículo 1 de la convención, denominado " Cobertura de la Convención Colectiva", inciso e); de esta forma la resolución se revoca en cuanto a no conceder los beneficios derivados de los artículos 41, 54 y 63 de la Convención Colectiva de JAPDEVA."