Partial annulment of tax assessments for supervening inability to pay after criminal restitutionAnulación parcial de actos tributarios por incapacidad contributiva sobreviniente tras restitución penal

VI.- At this level of analysis, the Tribunal deems it necessary to address an issue that, although not directly raised by the plaintiff (though touched upon in a general manner by the formal conduct challenged), is of fundamental relevance not only for determining whether the income received by the plaintiff can be taxed with the ISR, but also for resolving the claim regarding the violation of the ability-to-pay principle (principio de capacidad contributiva). We refer to the issue of the taxation of unlawful acts, that is, whether income or revenue obtained from a taxpayer's unlawful activities or acts can be taxed, in this case, with the ISR. This is a controversial and complex issue, on which there is no consensus, and indeed the doctrine puts forward various positions. Some are against such a possibility, fundamentally because they consider that if the State collects taxes on manifestations of wealth derived from acts contrary to the legal system, it would be endorsing and legitimizing such conduct, becoming an accomplice by receiving benefits derived from the unlawful act; because it is contradictory and incoherent that if an act is sanctioned by the legal system and deprived of all effect (in this case, an act with an unlawful cause) another sector institutes it as a source of rights and obligations; and because there is an incompatibility between repressive (sanctioning and criminal) measures and tax measures, alluding, in essence, to potential violations of the non bis in idem principle, such that the product of an unlawful act would become an improper sanction against the one who committed it. Other positions favor taxing income from unlawful activities, based fundamentally on tax justice principles such as equality and the ability to pay. They point out that subjection by virtue of economic capacity implies that any manifestation of wealth (regardless of its origin) demonstrates ability to pay and enables the possibility of subjecting it to taxation; that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the activity generating the wealth is extraneous and irrelevant to Tax Law; that the principle of equality would be violated if only the benefits produced by lawful acts were taxed, as this would imply an exemption for those deriving from unlawful acts or a more favorable tax treatment for those who violate the law than for those who respect it. Furthermore, they point out that the tax legislator, being autonomous, can choose to consider as taxable acts that, for other areas of the legal system, are classified as unlawful, such that this classification of the legal transaction is irrelevant for the occurrence of the taxable event (hecho generador) and the arising of the tax obligation. Finally, there are those who advocate an intermediate position, according to which the issue does not admit a general solution but rather a wide spectrum of nuances depending on the specific scenario. They assert that the unlawful nature of an act does not by itself preclude its taxation, provided it demonstrates the same economic ability to pay as other acts that are not contrary to law; warning, however, that there cannot be a duty to pay tax on profits, income, or benefits derived from an activity of an unlawful nature for which the legal system mandates a legal consequence that determines the absence of ability to pay. Ultimately, this is a matter of legislative decision and policy, so the tax legal system must be interpreted in order to determine the position applicable in our country.

VII.- Well, after a measured analysis, the Tribunal considers that, coupled with the fact that the legal system does not establish any rule that prohibits or prevents the Tax Administration (AT) from subjecting income generated from unlawful activities to the ISR; rather, the coherent and harmonious interpretation of the rules in force on the matter allows the conclusion that the necessary normative authorizations for such subjection exist, which are deduced, as we shall see, from the normative configuration of the taxable event of the ISR. As a starting point, we must consider the autonomy of the tax legislator to determine which manifestations of wealth it wishes to tax and in formulating the taxable events, regardless of the classification that other branches of Law may have given to those facts, acts, or activities. A reflection of this autonomy is found in Article 13 of the Tax Code (CNPT), when it states that the tax obligation is not affected by circumstances relating to the validity of the acts or the nature of the object pursued by the parties, nor by the effects that the taxed facts or acts may have in other branches of Costa Rican Positive Law. From this normative precept, it follows with total clarity that the material tax obligation (par excellence, the payment of the tax) will prevail regardless of the type of act that produced the taxable event. For these purposes, aspects that are relevant in other branches of law are irrelevant, such as the cause of the transaction or contract (which, for Civil Law, must be lawful) or that said manifestation of wealth was obtained through activities that constitute a crime (this latter aspect, of vital importance for Criminal Law). Thus, according to the indicated rule, the unlawfulness of the activity generating the wealth does not, per se, entail the exclusion of the duty to contribute to the sustainability of public burdens, but rather, to the extent that said activity has generated effective wealth for the subjects who carry it out, the constitutional mandate established in numeral 18 of the Magna Carta is imposed. It could not be otherwise because, given the neutrality of taxes, the suitability of a fact to reveal ability to pay must be independent of the lawfulness or otherwise of that fact and the activity that produced it. In the case before us, Article 1 of the Income Tax Law (LISR) creates a tax on the profits of companies and of individuals who carry out lucrative activities in general, that is, without excluding those that are unlawful. It also establishes that the taxable event of this tax is the receipt of income in money or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source, again, without excluding income or sources that are unlawful. The tax also levies continuous or eventual income from Costa Rican sources (again, without excluding income resulting from unlawful activities) received or accrued by individuals or legal entities domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not exempted by law, without there being a different treatment depending on the origin of the income or benefits. Finally, it states that income or benefits from a Costa Rican source are understood to be those arising from services rendered, goods located, or capital used (without distinguishing, either, the origin or lawful or unlawful nature) in the national territory, obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law. Thus, we can conclude with absolute clarity that the legislator did not distinguish between the lawful or unlawful origin of the act or activity generating the profits. Therefore, regardless of the consequences that other spheres (civil, criminal, or administrative) may generate for that act or activity, the income obtained in this manner will always be taxable because the tax falls on the benefit or profit obtained and not on the operation or the activity itself. If that benefit increases the economic capacity of the person who obtains it (from a lawful source or not), it will be subject to the ISR because otherwise we would be facing discrimination that would harm the principles of formal and material tax justice. Added to the above, we have that the LISR does not exclude from gross income the income or benefits derived from activities contrary to the legal system. Numeral 5 establishes that gross income is the total of the income or benefits received (regardless of the lawful or unlawful nature of the activity generating them) in the tax period by the taxpayer, by virtue of the activities referred to in the third paragraph of Article One, a rule which, the Tribunal adds, does not distinguish between the legality or otherwise of the source. Neither do we find in the list established by Article 6 of the same law that income generated from activities or acts not in conformity with the legal system has been excluded from gross income. For the reasons stated, the Tribunal leans towards endorsing the AT's power to subject income or benefits received from unlawful activities to the ISR. The foregoing does not contravene the principle of legality and specificity that governs this matter because, as we have explained, the rules that configure the essential elements of this tax do not respond to the origin of the income, but rather to its nature, allowing us to legitimately interpret that such activities are recognized as components of the taxable event of the tax in question. This conclusion is reinforced, more recently, by the enactment of the Law against Organized Crime (Law No. 8754), which in its Article 22, when regulating matters relating to emerging capitals, establishes that the individual or legal entity that cannot justify their assets or the emerging increases will be sentenced to the loss of the emerging assets, the fines, and the costs of the investigation, expressly stating that for purposes of tax assessment, the unlawful cause of the emerging assets or increase is irrelevant. However, the exercise of this tax power over income from unlawful activities is carried out in an administrative channel when the AT, in the exercise of its audit powers, determines that a taxpayer has income that, although coming from activities contrary to the legal system, increases their wealth. In this scenario, we consider that the administrative tax action does not violate the ability-to-pay principle, as long as there is wealth that, by fitting the taxable event, could be taxed. However, the examination must also consider another situation related precisely to the unlawful nature—or nature contrary to the legal system—of the activity generating the taxable income and the effects this could have in other branches of Law. We refer, for example, to scenarios where the activity from which the taxable income derived constitutes a crime and the taxpayer is subjected (along with the determinative or sanctioning administrative procedures) to a criminal proceeding in which a conviction is handed down against them, with effects that impact their economic capacity, such as the restitution of the goods, their seizure, or confiscation. In these cases, it must be taken into account that tax subjection will only be possible if there is an economic capacity that can or must be taxed. Therefore, if the effects of those obligations (seizure or restitution) entirely prevent or nullify the enrichment of the subject, the tax obligation may not arise, or the AT's obligation to refund the undue tax payment may emerge if the tax had already been paid. This is because if the economic capacity that was taxed at the time by the AT subsequently disappears (for example, due to the seizure or restitution of the goods), it would be contrary to the ability-to-pay principle to tax wealth that the taxpayer no longer possesses because it has been handed over to the public entity. If the tax had already been paid, the application of corrective measures such as its refund or deduction would be necessary, of course, under conditions that could not be more favorable than those applied to similar lawful scenarios. Thus, these are two different scenarios: one in an administrative channel and the other in a criminal court. In both, the ability-to-pay principle must be respected and, ultimately, whether or not the tax applies will be determined by different factors, such as the demonstration of economic capacity or the existence of legal consequences that directly affect the benefits obtained from the activity, as would be the case with seizure or restitution of the asset.

VIII.- It is also alleged that there was an improper interpretation of Articles 8 and 12 of the CNPT, which refer, in general, to the principle of interpretation according to economic reality. Regarding this matter, it is necessary to point out that the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 01181, issued at 14 hours 48 minutes on November 12, 2009, indicated, in relevant part, "(...) in tax matters, it is possible to distinguish two areas of application of the cited principle. The first, properly referring to the interpretation of the content of the rule, understanding that the legal operator should not limit himself to the simple meaning of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of carrying out this intellectual operation, must privilege the purpose pursued by the legislator when creating the tax. In the matter in question, the taxing power of the State has the objective of taxing a certain source of wealth, in such a way that, when defining the scope of a rule, the (economic, of course) reality that justified the exercise of this power must be taken into account. At the basis of this approach lies the recognition that the regulation, although carried out from a legal perspective, refers to economic transactions, so it is these particularities that must define the content of the provisions, and not the legal concepts, extraneous in many cases to this reality. However, this does not imply an open type through which it is permitted to modify legislation through interpretations, which would be equivalent to illegitimately substituting the Legislative Assembly, as well as a violation of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. On the contrary, what is sought to be avoided is that the constitutional duty to contribute to public burdens, proper to a Social and Democratic State of Law, is rendered void through legal technicalities, privileging the assessment of reality, the purpose of the tax rule, and the economic capacity that was intended to be taxed.(...)" (the underlining is ours). Along these lines, it refers to the interpretation of the content of the tax rule in the sense that the legal operator should not limit himself to the simple meaning of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of carrying out the intellectual analysis, is obliged to give priority to the purpose pursued by the legislator when creating the tax. But the judgment in question is also clear in indicating that the foregoing does not imply the creation of an open type through which legislation can be modified through interpretations, which would result in an illegitimate substitution of the legislator, as well as the transgression of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. The plaintiff considers that, taking into account that he has never denied having received the income in question, under a correct interpretation of both rules, the AT should have proven that the sum received originated from the provision of a professional service and that there was simulation of the legal transaction. Having analyzed the case file, the Tribunal considers that the claim is unfounded for the following reasons. According to numeral 140 of the CNPT and 19 of the General Regulation on Tax Management, Collection, and Audit, the burden of proof falls on the AT regarding the facts constituting the material tax obligation, while it falls on the taxpayer regarding facts that impede, modify, or extinguish said obligation. According to what has been considered proven, once the audit actions began, the plaintiff filed amended tax returns for the ISR corresponding to the 2002 and 2003 fiscal periods, reporting a sum of $61,000, equivalent to ₡ 22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty colones exactly) and $266,724.16, equivalent to ₡ 99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones), respectively, as non-taxable income. Given this amendment (which changed the economic reality he had declared at the appropriate procedural time and which was under audit), the AT requested that the supporting documentation for that income be provided, a requirement proper to the exercise of its audit powers in a self-assessment system like ours. Well, the plaintiff indicated what such income consisted of, but did not provide the necessary documentation to support his claim. We reiterate that if such income had been a gift or a gratuitous transfer (liberalidad) from the company Electrónica Venetta, it was the plaintiff's duty to prove it through the pertinent means of evidence, as it involved a fact modifying or extinguishing the tax obligation, and he was given the opportunity to do so. It is not true that the AT reversed the burden of proof and forced him to prove a negative fact, i.e., the non-existence of the service consideration. What the AT required of him was to prove that it was a non-taxable income or, in the plaintiff's words, that what he had received was a gift or a mere gratuitous transfer, which was ultimately never proven. Nor is it true that the AT presumed it was a non-exempt and indeed taxable income. As has been explained, it has been considered proven (both in the administrative venue and in this court) that there indeed was a consideration for the plaintiff's services in exchange for the money received, as set forth in the prior Considerandos. This is evident from both the determinative resolution and the one issued by the improper hierarch in this matter and which is challenged here. From this perspective, the AT did fulfill its evidentiary duty and proved, with due force, that there was indeed a consideration for the plaintiff's services in exchange for the money he received, as was also confirmed, moreover, by criminal judgment No. 244-2009 that was handed down against him. That is, there was taxable income. Regarding Article 12 of the CNPT, we agree with the plaintiff on the fact that this rule allows the AT to disregard the legal effects of contracts insofar as they alter the content of the tax obligation and its elements, without necessarily enabling it to disregard any legal relationship or transaction. However, we consider that in this specific case, the AT's action does not violate the referenced rule either because the plaintiff never proved the existence of an agreement or transaction by virtue of which Electrónica Venetta gave him the money in question as a gift. Precisely, that was the document that the AT required of him and which he never provided. Thus, it is entirely inappropriate for the plaintiff to now claim that, in application of the principle of economic reality, his deficiencies in evidentiary burdens should be compensated. Rather, the filed amended returns, the plaintiff's statements, and the subsequent criminal judgment by virtue of which the crime committed by the plaintiff is proven—and that he indeed deployed a series of actions aimed at benefiting the company that subsequently paid him for those services—speak to the AT's adequate interpretation of the economic reality and justify the possibility of adjusting the taxpayer's self-assessed returns to the reality of the facts, as happened here. This being the case, it is not observed that the AT arbitrarily applied the principle in question, so the defect alleged in this regard must be dismissed.

IX.- Up to what has been examined here, the Tribunal finds no defect in the formal conduct challenged. The foregoing therefore taxed income received by the plaintiff that, although coming from activities contrary to the legal system, constituted product income (renta producto) and, without a doubt, could and should have been taxed with the ISR. In this sense, the validity check that has been carried out up to this point allows us to rule out any violation of the principle of legality, insofar as the formal administrative conduct challenged had sufficient normative authorization to tax with the ISR the income that the plaintiff received from the company Electrónica Venetta, as has been explained. Nor is it observed that an excess or deviation of power was incurred, as alleged. The reason that served as the basis for issuing the challenged Resolution No. 277-2011 (as well as the determinative one) existed just as it was taken into account when issuing them (a point that is emphasized and to which reference will be made below), and the purpose intended by the rules was satisfied, that is, that taxpayers who carry out the taxable event of the ISR pay that tax. These are, moreover, acts that comply with the duty to state reasons established by numeral 136 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP). However, to complete the legality review, it remains to contrast the challenged act with a principle of fundamental importance in this matter, namely, the ability-to-pay principle.

X.- At this point, the plaintiff claims a violation of the ability-to-pay principle, fundamentally because, as a result of the criminal judgment handed down against him, he has already reimbursed the State the money received, and even doubled it as compensation; by reason of which there is no longer income to tax. In this regard, we must point out that ability to pay is the potential of individuals subject to the taxing power of the State to contribute to public expenses. It constitutes a measure of equality, such that tax obligations are based on the duty to contribute according to the economic capacity of each person. In the case before us, it has been considered proven that the plaintiff received the sum of $61,000, or its equivalent of ₡ 22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty colones exactly), and $266,724.16, or its equivalent of ₡ 99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones), as a payment or economic retribution from the company Electrónica Venetta for his role in directing the bidding processes carried out at the National Learning Institute (INA), at a time when he was its head, for the purchase of Training Modules. As set forth in the prior Considerandos, this was income that was indeed taxable because it constituted product income and, at that time, increased the plaintiff's wealth and ability to pay. However, the Tribunal cannot ignore that it was also proven that the plaintiff was subject to criminal case No. 04-007707-647-PE for the crime of aggravated corruption, as a result of having received the referred payments from the company Electrónica Veneta for having favored it in different bidding processes. In that criminal proceeding, on January 22, 2009, the plaintiff proposed to the Public Prosecutor's Office that he be subject to an abbreviated procedure, indicating that it was his wish to accept the attributed facts. This proposal was accepted by the Public Prosecutor's Office on the condition that the plaintiff admit the imputed facts in a preliminary hearing before the Criminal Judge of the Intermediate Stage and comply with the plan for compensating the social harm. In exchange, the Public Prosecutor's Office committed to requesting from the judge a penalty of 24 months of imprisonment for the crime of aggravated corruption and disqualification from holding public office for a period of four years, and that he be granted conditional suspension of the sentence (folio 126 of the judicial file). Then, on January 26, 2009, the plaintiff, the INA, and the Public Ethics Prosecutor's Office signed a Settlement Agreement for the Civil Compensation Actions, with the plaintiff committing to pay the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-two thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars), it being indicated that the amount of $252,188.00 that had been deposited on November 8, 2004, by the plaintiff to the order of the Public Prosecutor's Office, would be transferred to the INA as compensation for the damages and losses caused. Likewise, as compensation for social harm, he committed to pay in a single payment the sum of $272,188.00 (two hundred seventy-two thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars) to be allocated to scholarship programs directed at the most disadvantaged sectors of Costa Rican society. The total amount of the settlement corresponds to the indemnity for damages for the eventual losses as well as for the social harm caused by the acts that were being investigated in the case brought against the plaintiff in judicial file No. 04-007707-647-PE (folios 127 to 137 of the judicial file). From the foregoing, the Tribunal considers that, although the income that the plaintiff obtained at that historical moment could well be taxed with the ISR without affecting his ability to pay, it is evident that as a result of the criminal proceeding and the judgment handed down against him, factors supervened that negatively impact that economic capacity. We refer to the return or restitution of the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-two thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars), which he made as part of the settlement agreement with the Public Prosecutor's Office, the INA, and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, as compensation for material damage. As a result of the restitution, that money, which was part of the object taxed in the challenged conduct, left the plaintiff's legal sphere, and we consider that, as of today, it would not be viable to tax wealth that he no longer possesses, having been returned as part of the arrangement established in the criminal case. In other words, the concept of economic profit that grounded the taxable event at the time the challenged resolution was issued disappeared with the effects of the agreement entered into as a result of the criminal proceeding. In this sense, forcing the plaintiff to pay tax on money he no longer possesses (for the reasons already indicated) and which instead belongs to the State becomes confiscatory to the extent that the ability to pay or economic capacity that was verifiable (before the restitution) in the plaintiff's assets no longer exists. Consequently, we consider that as a result of the legal consequence that the legal system provided for the commission of the unlawful act through which the plaintiff obtained income that, in principle, was taxable (specifically, the restitution of part of the money obtained illicitly from the company Electrónica Venetta), the supervening partial nullity of the challenged resolution arises, insofar as one of the conditions required by the tax legal system for its adoption and for being able to tax that income (which has not been paid)—namely, the plaintiff's ability to pay (Article 159 of the LGAP)—disappeared. That economic capacity constitutes, as we have said, a necessary condition for the imposition of any tax, and when it does not exist, taxing the profit received at that time and now returned violates the referenced constitutional principle. Now, we consider that this supervening nullity (the absence of ability to pay as a result of the restitution of part of the taxable income that the plaintiff initially received) affects not only Resolution No.

277-2011 being challenged, but extends to the determinative resolution that was issued by the AT. However, we also consider that this invalidity is only partial. The foregoing because it has been accredited that the non-taxable income the plaintiff declared for the 2002 and 2003 fiscal periods (improperly as non-taxed) was $61,000 or its equivalent of Ë 22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty colones exactly) and $266,724.16 or its equivalent of Ë 99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones). That is, in total $327,724.17 (three hundred twenty-seven thousand seven hundred twenty-four dollars and seventeen cents) was declared; but only the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars) was returned, as restitution for the material damage caused. This shows that the plaintiff retains a sum of $75,536.17 (seventy-five thousand five hundred thirty-six dollars and seventeen cents) of the taxable income that, at that time, he received from Electrónica Venetta. So, there still exists an externalized ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) that, without a doubt, must be taxed, for the reasons already set forth in the preceding recitals. The plaintiff's statements, according to which he returned more than he received, are not acceptable. Strictly speaking, what was returned as social damages has nothing to do with tax aspects or with the wealth that was taxed by the AT at the time. Rather, it is an inherent effect of the criminal action and a civil consequence of the wrongful act he committed, to which he agreed in order to opt for an abbreviated process that ultimately benefited him. From this perspective, we consider that this sum should not be considered as part of the income that was initially taxed with the ISR, for purposes of determining his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In conclusion, we consider that the partial invalidity of the determinative resolution No. SF-DT-01-R-2738-6 and resolution No. 277-2011-P, issued by the AT and the Administrative Fiscal Tribunal, respectively, must be declared, solely to adjust the tax base upon which the ISR that the plaintiff must pay should be calculated, on the occasion of the income received from the company Electrónica Venetta, in the 2002 and 2003 fiscal periods, which constituted an economic compensation that said supplier company made to him for his actions in directing the bidding processes followed at INA, when he was its head, for the purchase of Trainer Modules, so that it is consistent with his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In that sense, it must be understood that the tax base upon which the plaintiff must pay the ISR for the mentioned periods is $75,536.17 (seventy-five thousand five hundred thirty-six dollars and seventeen cents) and not the one indicated by the challenged actions. Matters relating to interest and the amount of the tax will be determined in the sentence execution phase.” Rather, the rectifying declarations filed, the statements of the plaintiff (accionante), and the subsequent criminal judgment by virtue of which the crime committed by the plaintiff (accionante) is accredited and that he did indeed carry out a series of actions aimed at benefiting the company that later paid him for those services, speak to the adequate interpretation by the Tax Administration (AT) regarding the economic reality and justifies that the self-assessed (autorealizadas) declarations by the taxpayer can be adjusted to the reality of the facts, as happened here. Thus, it is not observed that the AT arbitrarily applied the principle in question, so the defect alleged in that sense must be rejected.

IX.- Up to what has been examined here, the Tribunal finds no defect in the formal conduct challenged. The foregoing, therefore, taxed income received by the plaintiff that, although coming from activities contrary to the legal system, constituted income product (renta producto) and without a doubt, could and should be taxed with the Income Tax (ISR). In that sense, the validity comparison that, up to this point, has been carried out allows us to rule out any violation of the principle of legality, inasmuch as the challenged formal administrative conduct had sufficient normative authorization to tax with the ISR the income that the plaintiff (accionante) received from the company Electrónica Venetta, as has been explained. Nor is it observed that an excess or deviation of power was incurred, as accused. The reason that served as the basis for the issuance of the challenged resolution No. 277-2011 (as well as that of the assessment) existed just as it was taken into account at the time of issuing them (a point that is emphasized and to which reference will be made infra) and the purpose desired by the norms was satisfied, that is, that taxpayers who carry out the taxable event (hecho generador) of the ISR pay that tax. These are, moreover, acts that comply with the duty to state reasons (motivación) established by numeral 136 of the LGAP. However, to complete the legality examination, it remains to contrast the challenged act with a principle of fundamental importance in this matter, namely, the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva).

X.- At this point, the plaintiff (accionante) claims a violation of the principle of ability to pay (capacidad contributiva), fundamentally, because as a result of the criminal judgment issued against him, he already reimbursed the State the money received, and even doubled it as compensation; for which reason there no longer exists income to tax. In this regard, we must point out that the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) is the potential to contribute to public expenses possessed by individuals subject to the tax power of the State. It constitutes a measure of equality, so that tax obligations are based on the duty to contribute in accordance with the economic capacity of each person. In the case at hand, it has been held as accredited that the plaintiff received the sum of $61,000 or its equivalent of ₡22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty exact colones) and $266,724.16 or its equivalent of ₡99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones) as a payment or economic retribution from the company Electrónica Venetta for his actions in directing the bidding processes followed at the INA, when he was its head, for the purchase of Training Modules. As stated in the previous Considerandos, this was income that was indeed taxable because it constituted income product (renta producto) and, at that time, increased the wealth and the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) of the plaintiff. However, the Tribunal cannot ignore that it was also accredited that the plaintiff (accionante) was subject to criminal case No. 04-007707-647-PE for the crime of aggravated corruption, as a result of having received the aforementioned payments from the company Electrónica Veneta, for having favored it in different bidding processes. In that criminal process, on January 22, 2009, the plaintiff proposed to the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) that an abbreviated procedure be followed, indicating that it was his desire to accept the attributed facts. Such proposal was accepted by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) on the condition that the plaintiff admit in a preliminary hearing before the Criminal Judge of the Intermediate Stage (Etapa Intermedia) the charged facts and comply with the plan for compensation for social harm. In exchange, the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) agreed to request the judge to impose a sentence of 24 months in prison for the crime of aggravated corruption and disqualification from holding public office for a period of four years, and that the conditional execution of the sentence be granted (folio 126 of the judicial file). Then, on January 26, 2009, the plaintiff, the INA, and the Attorney General's Office for Public Ethics (Procuraduría de la Ética Pública) signed a Settlement Agreement for Compensatory Civil Actions (Acuerdo de Transacción de las Acciones Civiles Resarcitorias), the plaintiff committing to pay the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars), it being indicated that the amount of $252,188.00 that was deposited on November 8, 2004, by the plaintiff at the order of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), would be transferred to the INA as compensation for damages caused. Likewise, for social harm, he committed to pay in a single payment the sum of $272,188.00 (two hundred seventy-two thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars) to be allocated to scholarship programs aimed at the most disadvantaged sectors of Costa Rican society. The total amount of the transaction corresponds to compensation for eventual damages as well as for the social harm caused by the facts being investigated in the case against the plaintiff in judicial file No. 04-007707-647-PE (folios 127 to 137 of the judicial file). From the foregoing, the Tribunal considers that, although the income that the plaintiff obtained at that historical moment could well be taxed with the ISR without affecting his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva); it is evident that on the occasion of the criminal process and the judgment issued against him, supervening factors arose that negatively affect that economic capacity. We refer to the return or restitution of the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars), which he made as part of the agreement settled with the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), the INA, and the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General) of the Republic, for material damage. On the occasion of the restitution, that money, which was part of the object taxed in the challenged conducts, left the legal sphere of the plaintiff, and we consider that, as of today, it would not be viable to tax a wealth that he no longer possesses, having been returned as part of the arrangement established in the criminal case. In other words, the concept of economic benefit that grounded the taxable event (hecho generador) at the time the challenged resolution was issued, disappeared with the effects of the agreement signed on the occasion of the criminal process. In this sense, obliging the plaintiff (accionante) to pay tax on money that he no longer possesses (for the reasons already indicated) and that rather belongs to the State, becomes confiscatory to the extent that there no longer exists the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) or economic capacity that was verifiable (before the restitution) in the plaintiff's assets. As a consequence, we consider that on the occasion of the legal consequence that the legal system provided for the commission of the illicit act through which the plaintiff (accionante) obtained income that, in principle, was taxable (specifically, the restitution of part of the funds obtained illicitly from the company Electrónica Venetta), a partial supervening nullity (nulidad sobrevenida parcial) of the challenged resolution arises, inasmuch as one of the conditions required by the tax legal system for its adoption and to be able to tax that income (which has not been repaid) disappeared, namely, the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) of the plaintiff (article 159 of the LGAP). That economic capacity constitutes, as we said, a necessary condition for the imposition of any tax and, not existing, taxing the profit received at that time and now returned, violates the referenced constitutional principle. Now then, we consider that this supervening nullity (nulidad sobrevenida) (the absence of ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) on the occasion of the restitution of part of the taxable income that the plaintiff (accionante) initially received) affects not only the challenged resolution No. 277-2011, but extends to the assessment resolution that was issued by the AT. However, we also consider that this invalidity is only partial. The foregoing given that it has been held as accredited that the non-taxable income that the plaintiff declared for the 2002 and 2003 tax periods (improperly as non-taxable) was $61,000 or its equivalent of ₡22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty exact colones) and $266,724.16 or its equivalent of ₡99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones). That is, ultimately $327,724.17 (three hundred twenty-seven thousand seven hundred twenty-four dollars and seventeen cents) was declared; but only the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty- six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars) was returned, as restitution for the material damage caused. This shows that the plaintiff (accionante) retains a sum of $75,536.17 (seventy-five thousand five hundred thirty-six dollars and seventeen cents) of the taxable income that, at that time, he received from Electrónica Venetta. That is, there still exists an externalized ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) which, without a doubt, must be taxed, for the reasons already set forth in the preceding recitals. The statements of the plaintiff, according to which he returned more than he received, are not acceptable. Strictly speaking, what was returned as social harm has nothing to do with the tax aspects or with the wealth that was taxed by the AT at the time. Rather, it is an effect proper to the criminal action and a civil consequence of the illicit act he committed, to which he agreed to opt for an abbreviated process that, in the end, benefited him. From this perspective, we consider that this sum should not be considered as part of the income that was initially taxed with the ISR, for the purposes of determining his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In conclusion, we consider that the partial invalidity of the assessment resolution No. SF-DT-01-R-2738-6 and the resolution No. 277-2011-P, issued by the AT and the Administrative Fiscal Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), respectively, must be declared, solely to adjust the tax base (base imponible) on which the ISR that the plaintiff (accionante) must pay must be calculated, on the occasion of the income received from the company Electrónica Venetta, in the 2002 and 2003 tax periods that constituted economic retribution that this supplier company made to him for his actions in directing the bidding processes followed at the INA, when he was its head, for the purchase of Training Modules, so that it is consistent with his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In this sense, it must be understood that the tax base (base imponible) on which the plaintiff (accionante) must pay the ISR for the mentioned periods is $75,536.17 (seventy-five thousand five hundred thirty-six dollars and seventeen cents) and not that which the challenged conducts indicated. Matters relating to interest and the amount of the tax will be determined in the sentencing enforcement phase." VII.- Well, after a measured analysis, the Court considers that, in addition to the fact that the legal system does not establish any rule that prohibits or prevents the Tax Administration (AT) from subjecting income generated from illicit activities to the Income Tax (ISR); rather, a coherent and harmonious interpretation of the rules in force on the matter allows us to conclude that the necessary normative authorizations exist for such subjection, which are deduced, as we shall see, from the normative configuration of the taxable event (hecho imponible) of the ISR. As a starting point, one must adhere to the autonomy of the tax legislator to determine which manifestations of wealth it wishes to tax and in formulating the taxable events, regardless of the classification that other branches of Law may have given to those facts, acts, or activities. A reflection of this autonomy can be found in Article 13 of the Tax Code (CNPT), which states that the tax obligation is not affected by circumstances related to the validity of the acts or the nature of the object pursued by the parties, nor by the effects that the taxed facts or acts may have in other branches of Costa Rican Positive Law. From this regulatory precept, it is clearly inferred that the material tax obligation (par excellence, the payment of the tax) shall prevail independently of the type of act that produced the taxable event (hecho generador). For these purposes, aspects irrelevant to other branches of law become so, such as the cause of the business or contract (which, for Civil Law, must be lawful) or that said manifestation of wealth was obtained through activities that constitute a crime (this last aspect being of vital importance for Criminal Law). Thus, pursuant to the indicated rule, the illegality of the activity that generates the wealth does not, per se, imply the exclusion of the duty to contribute to the sustainability of public burdens; rather, insofar as that activity generated effective wealth for the subjects who carry it out, the constitutional mandate established in numeral 18 of the Magna Carta is imposed. It could not be otherwise because, given the neutrality of taxes, the suitability of a fact to reveal ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) must be independent of its lawfulness or otherwise, and of the activity that produced it. In the case before us, we find that Article 1 of the Income Tax Law (LISR) creates a tax on the profits of companies and natural persons who carry out for-profit activities in general, that is, without excluding those that are illicit. It also establishes that the taxable event (hecho generador) of this tax is the receipt of income (rentas) in money or in kind, continuous or occasional, from any Costa Rican source, again, without excluding illicit income or sources. The tax also applies to income, continuous or eventual, from Costa Rican sources (again, without excluding those resulting from illicit activities) received or accrued by natural or legal persons domiciled in the country; as well as any other income or benefit from a Costa Rican source not exempted by law, without a different treatment depending on the origin of the income or benefits. Finally, it indicates that income (rentas), income (ingresos), or benefits from a Costa Rican source shall be understood as those from services rendered, goods situated, or capital used (without distinguishing, either, on the lawful or unlawful origin or character) in the national territory, obtained during the fiscal period in accordance with the provisions of this law. Thus, we can conclude with absolute clarity that the legislator did not distinguish between the lawful or unlawful origin of the act or the profit-generating activity. Therefore, regardless of the consequences that other areas (civil, criminal, or administrative) may generate for that act or activity, the income obtained in this manner will always be taxable because the tax falls on the benefit or profit obtained and not on the operation or the activity itself. If that benefit increases the economic capacity of the person obtaining it (from a lawful or unlawful source), it will be subject to the ISR because otherwise, we would be facing discrimination that would harm the principles of formal and material tax justice. In addition to the foregoing, the LISR does not exclude from gross income (renta bruta) the income or benefits that come from activities contrary to the legal system. Numeral 5 establishes that gross income is the total income or benefits received (regardless of the lawful or unlawful nature of the activity that generates them) in the tax period by the taxable person (sujeto pasivo), by virtue of the activities referred to in the third paragraph of Article 1, a rule which, the Court adds, does not distinguish between the lawfulness or otherwise of the source. Nor do we find in the list established by Article 6 of the same law that income generated from activities or acts not in accordance with the legal system has been excluded from gross income. For the reasons stated, the Court leans toward endorsing the power of the AT to subject income or benefits received from illicit activities to the ISR. The foregoing does not contravene the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) and specificity (tipicidad) that governs this matter because, as we explained, the rules that configure the essential elements of this tax do not respond to the origin of the income, but rather to its recipient, allowing the legitimate interpretation that said activities are recognized as components of the taxable event of the tax in question. This conclusion is reinforced, more recently, with the enactment of the Law against Organized Crime (Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada) (Law No. 8754), which in its Article 22, when regulating matters related to emerging capital, establishes that the natural or legal person who cannot justify their assets or the emerging increases shall be sentenced to the loss of the emerging assets, fines, and the costs of the investigation, expressly stating that for tax assessment purposes, the illicit cause of the assets or the emerging increase is irrelevant. Now, the exercise of this tax power over income from illicit activities is carried out administratively when the AT, in the exercise of its oversight powers, determines that a taxpayer has income that, although it comes from activities contrary to the legal system, increases their wealth. In this scenario, we consider that the administrative tax action does not harm the principle of ability to pay (principio de capacidad contributiva), insofar as there is wealth that, as it fell within the taxable event (hecho generador), could be taxed. However, in the examination, another related situation must be weighed, precisely related to the illicit nature, or that contrary to the legal system, of the activity that generates the taxable income and the effects it could have in other branches of Law. We refer, for example, to the cases in which the activity from which the taxable income came constitutes a crime and the taxpayer is subjected (along with the determining or sanctioning administrative proceedings) to a criminal process in which a conviction is handed down against them, with effects that impact their economic capacity, such as restitution of goods, their seizure (comiso), or confiscation. In these cases, it must be taken into account that tax subjection will only be possible if there is an economic capacity that can or must be taxed. Therefore, if the effects of those obligations (seizure or restitution) totally prevent or nullify the enrichment of the subject, the tax obligation may not arise, or the obligation of the AT to return the undue tax revenue may emerge if the tax had already been paid. This is because if the economic capacity that was taxed at the time by the AT subsequently disappears (for example, due to the seizure or restitution of the goods), it would be contrary to the principle of ability to pay to tax wealth that the taxpayer no longer possesses, having been handed over to the public entity. If the tax had already been paid, the application of corrective measures such as its refund or deduction would be necessary, of course, under conditions that could not be more favorable than those applied to similar lawful cases. Thus, these are two different scenarios: one in the administrative sphere and another in the criminal sphere. In both, the principle of ability to pay must be respected, and, ultimately, whether or not the income is subject to tax will be determined by different factors, such as the demonstration of economic capacity or the existence of legal consequences that directly affect the benefits obtained from the activity, such as in the case of seizure (comiso) or restitution of the asset.

VIII.- An improper interpretation of Articles 8 and 12 of the CNPT is also alleged, which refer, in general, to the principle of interpretation according to economic reality (interpretación conforme a la realidad económica). In relation to the matter, it is necessary to point out that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Judgment No. 01181, issued at 14 hours 48 minutes on November 12, 2009, indicated, in what is relevant, "(...) in tax matters, it is possible to distinguish two areas of application of said principle. The first, properly referring to the interpretation of the content of the rule, understanding that the legal operator should not limit themselves to the simple meaning of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of carrying out this intellectual operation, must prioritize the purpose that the legislator pursued when creating the tax. In the matter in question, the taxing power of the State aims to tax a specific source of wealth, in such a way that, when defining the scope of a rule, one must take into account the (economic, of course) reality that justified the exercise of this power. At the base of this approach lies the recognition that regulation, although carried out from a legal perspective, refers to economic transactions, so it is these particularities that must define the content of the provisions, and not the legal concepts, alien in many cases to this reality. However, this does not imply an open type through which legislation may be modified through interpretations, which would be equivalent to illegitimately substituting the Legislative Assembly, as well as a violation of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality (legalidad), and legal reserve (reserva legal). On the contrary, what is sought to be avoided is that the constitutional duty to contribute to public burdens, proper to a Social and Democratic State of Law, is rendered nugatory through legal technicalities, prioritizing the evaluation of reality, the purpose of the tax rule, and the economic capacity that was intended to be taxed. (...)" (the underlining is ours). In line with this, it refers to the interpretation of the content of the tax rule in the sense that the legal operator should not limit themselves to the simple meaning of the words used by it, but rather, at the time of carrying out the intellectual analysis, is obliged to give priority to the purpose that the legislator pursued when creating the tax. But the cited judgment is also clear in indicating that the foregoing does not imply the creation of an open type through which legislation may be modified through interpretations, which would result in an illegitimate substitution of the legislator, as well as the transgression of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. The claimant (accionante) considers that, taking into account that he has never denied having received the income in question, in a correct interpretation of both rules, the AT had to verify that the sum received originated from the provision of a professional service and that there was simulation of the legal business. Having analyzed the case file, the Court considers the claim inadmissible for the following reasons. Pursuant to numeral 140 of the CNPT and Article 19 of the General Regulation on Tax Management, Collection, and Oversight, the burden of proof falls on the AT regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation, while it falls on the taxpayer regarding facts that impede, modify, or extinguish said obligation. According to what has been accredited, once the oversight actions began, the claimant filed amended ISR returns corresponding to the 2002 and 2003 fiscal periods, reporting a sum of $61,000, for an equivalent of Ë 22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty exact colones), and $266,724.16 for an equivalent of Ë 99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones), respectively, as non-taxable income. Given that amendment (which changed the economic reality he had declared at the appropriate procedural moment and upon which oversight was being exercised), the AT requested that the supporting documentation for that income be provided, a requirement proper to the exercise of its oversight powers in a self-assessment (autodeclarativo) system like ours. Well, the claimant indicated what such income consisted of, but did not provide the necessary documentation to support his claim. We reiterate that if such income had been a gift or liberality from the company Electrónica Venetta, it was the plaintiff's duty to prove it through the relevant means of proof, as it was a fact that modified or extinguished the tax obligation, and he was given the opportunity to do so. It is not true that the AT reversed the burden of proof and forced him to prove a negative fact, i.e., the non-existence of the consideration for services. What the AT required of him was to prove that it was non-taxable income or, in the actor's words, that what he had received was a gift or a mere liberality, which ultimately was never proven. It is also not true that it presumed it was non-exempt income and, rather, taxable. As has been explained, it has been accredited (both in the administrative sphere and in this venue) that there was indeed a consideration for services from the actor in exchange for the money received, as set out in the previous Recitals. This is inferred from both the assessing resolution (resolución determinativa) and that issued by the improper superior official (jerarca impropio) in this matter, which is challenged here. From this perspective, the AT did fulfill its evidentiary duty and proved, with due force, that there was indeed a consideration for services from the claimant in exchange for the money he received, as was confirmed, moreover, by the criminal judgment No. 244-2009 that was handed down against him. That is, there was taxable income. In relation to Article 12 of the CNPT, we share with the claimant the fact that this rule allows the AT to disregard the legal effects of contracts insofar as they alter the content of the tax obligation and its elements, without necessarily enabling it to disregard any relationship or legal business. However, we consider that in the specific case, the AT's action also does not violate the referred rule because the actor never proved the existence of an agreement or business by virtue of which Electrónica Venetta had gifted him the money in question. Precisely, that was the document that the AT requested and that he never provided. This being the case, it is entirely inadmissible for the actor to now claim that, in application of the principle of economic reality, his deficiencies in the evidentiary burdens should be compensated. Rather, the amended returns filed, the manifestations of the claimant, and the subsequent criminal judgment by virtue of which the crime committed by the claimant is accredited and that he indeed carried out a series of actions tending to benefit the company that later paid him for those services, speak to the appropriate interpretation by the AT regarding the economic reality and justify that the self-prepared (autorealizadas) declarations by the taxpayer could be adjusted to the reality of the facts, as happened here. This being the case, it is not observed that the AT arbitrarily applied the principle in question, so the defect alleged in this regard must be rejected.

IX.- Up to what has been examined here, the Court finds no defect in the challenged formal conduct. The foregoing is because income received by the actor was taxed that, although coming from activities contrary to the legal system, constituted income (renta producto) and, without a doubt, could and had to be taxed with the ISR. In this sense, the validity check that has been carried out so far allows us to rule out any violation of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad), insofar as the challenged formal administrative conduct had sufficient normative authorization to tax with the ISR the income that the claimant received from the company Electrónica Venetta, as has been explained. Nor is it observed that an excess or deviation of power was incurred, as is alleged. The reason that served as the basis for the issuance of the challenged resolution No. 277-2011 (as well as that of the assessing resolution) existed as it was taken into account at the time of their issuance (a point that is emphasized and to which reference will be made infra), and the purpose sought by the rules was satisfied, that is, that taxpayers who carry out the taxable event of the ISR pay that tax. These are, moreover, acts that comply with the duty to state reasons (deber de motivación) established by numeral 136 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP). However, to complete the legality examination, it remains to contrast the challenged act with a principle of fundamental importance in this matter, namely, the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva).

X.- At this point, the claimant alleges a violation of the principle of ability to pay (principio de la capacidad contributiva), fundamentally because, as a result of the criminal sentence handed down against him, he has already returned the money received to the State, and even doubled it as compensation; for which reason there no longer exists income to tax. In this regard, we must point out that ability to pay is the potential to contribute to public expenses possessed by individuals subject to the State's taxing power. It constitutes a measure of equality, such that tax obligations are based on the duty to contribute according to the economic capacity of each person. In the case before us, it has been accredited that the actor received the sum of $61,000 or its equivalent of Ë 22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty exact colones) and $266,724.16 or its equivalent of Ë 99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones) as a payment or economic retribution from the company Electrónica Venetta for his actions in directing the bidding processes followed at INA, when he was its superior official, for the purchase of Training Modules. As set out in the previous Recitals, this was income that was indeed taxable because it constituted income (renta producto) and, at that time, increased the wealth and ability to pay of the actor. However, the Court cannot ignore that it was also accredited that the claimant was subject to criminal case No. 04-007707-647-PE for the crime of aggravated corruption, as a result of having received the referred payments from the company Electrónica Veneta, for having favored it in different bidding processes. In that criminal process, on January 22, 2009, the actor proposed to the Public Prosecutor's Office that an expedited procedure (procedimiento abreviado) be followed against him, indicating that it was his desire to accept the attributed facts. Such proposal was accepted by the Public Prosecutor's Office on the condition that the actor admit, in a preliminary hearing and before the Criminal Judge of the Intermediate Stage, the offenses attributed to him and comply with the plan to redress the social harm. In exchange, the Public Prosecutor's Office undertook to request from the judge the penalty of 24 months of imprisonment for the crime of aggravated corruption and disqualification from holding public office for a period of four years, and that the conditional suspension of the sentence be granted to him (folio 126 of the judicial file). Then, on January 26, 2009, the actor, INA, and the Public Ethics Prosecutor's Office signed a Settlement Agreement for Civil Compensatory Actions, with the actor agreeing to pay the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars), it being stated that the amount of $252,188.00 that was deposited on November 8, 2004, by the actor to the order of the Public Prosecutor's Office, would be transferred to INA as compensation for the damages caused. Likewise, as social harm, he agreed to pay in a single payment the sum of $272,188.00 (two hundred seventy-two thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars) to be allocated to scholarship programs aimed at the most disadvantaged sectors of Costa Rican society. The total amount of the settlement corresponds to the compensation for damages for the eventual injuries as well as for the social harm caused by the acts under investigation in the case against the plaintiff in judicial file No. 04-007707-647-PE (folios 127 to 137 of the judicial file). From the foregoing, the Court considers that, although the income that the actor obtained at that historical moment could well be taxed with the ISR without affecting his ability to pay; it is evident that, on the occasion of the criminal process and the sentence handed down against him, factors supervened that negatively affect that economic capacity. We refer to the return or restitution of the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars), which he made as part of the agreement settled with the Public Prosecutor's Office, INA, and the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, as material damage. On the occasion of the restitution, that money, which was part of the object taxed in the challenged conduct, left the legal sphere of the actor, and we consider that, as of today, it would not be viable to tax wealth that he no longer possesses, having been returned as part of the arrangement established in the criminal case. In other words, the concept of economic profit that grounded the taxable event at the time the challenged resolution was issued, disappeared with the effects of the agreement signed on the occasion of the criminal process. In this sense, forcing the claimant to pay tax on money he no longer possesses (due to the causes already indicated) and that rather belongs to the State, becomes confiscatory to the extent that the ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) or economic capacity that was verifiable (before the restitution) in the actor's assets no longer exists. Consequently, we estimate that on the occasion of the legal consequence that the legal system provided for the commission of the illicit act through which the claimant obtained income that, in principle, was taxable (specifically, the restitution of part of the funds illicitly obtained from the company Electrónica Venetta), the partial supervening nullity of the challenged resolution arises, insofar as one of the conditions required by the tax legal system for its adoption and to be able to tax those incomes (which have not been paid) disappeared, namely, the ability to pay of the actor (Article 159 of the LGAP). That economic capacity constitutes, as we have said, a necessary condition for the imposition of any tax, and as it does not exist, taxing the profit received at that time and now returned, harms the referred constitutional principle. Now, we consider that this supervening nullity (the absence of ability to pay on the occasion of the restitution of part of the taxable income that the claimant initially received) affects not only the challenged resolution No. 277-2011, but also extends to the assessing resolution that was issued by the AT. However, we also consider that this invalidity is only partial.

The foregoing, given that it has been deemed accredited that the non-taxable income that the plaintiff declared for the 2002 and 2003 fiscal periods (improperly as non-taxed) was $61,000 or its equivalent of Ë 22,200,340.00 (twenty-two million two hundred thousand three hundred forty colones exactly) and $266,724.16 or its equivalent of Ë 99,731,982.00 (ninety-nine million seven hundred thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two colones). That is to say, ultimately $327,724.17 (three hundred twenty-seven thousand seven hundred twenty-four dollars and seventeen cents) were declared; but only the sum of $252,188.00 (two hundred fifty-six thousand one hundred eighty-eight dollars) was returned, by way of restitution for the material damage caused. This demonstrates that the claimant retains a sum of $75,536.17 (seventy-five thousand five hundred thirty-six dollars and seventeen cents) of the taxable income that, at that time, he received from Electrónica Venetta. In other words, there still exists an externalized ability to pay (capacidad contributiva) which, without doubt, must be taxed, for the reasons already set forth in the preceding recitals. The plaintiff’s statements, according to which he returned more than he received, are not admissible. Strictly speaking, what was returned by way of social damage has nothing to do with tax aspects or with the wealth that was taxed by the Tax Administration (AT) at the time. Rather, it is an effect proper to the criminal action and a civil consequence of the unlawful act he committed, to which he acceded in order to opt for an abbreviated process that, ultimately, benefited him. From this perspective, we consider that said sum should not be considered as part of the income that was initially taxed with the Income Tax (ISR), for purposes of determining his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In conclusion, we consider that the partial invalidity of the determinative resolution (resolución determinativa) No. SF-DT-01-R-2738-6 and resolution No. 277-2011-P, issued by the AT and the Administrative Fiscal Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), respectively, must be declared, solely in order to adjust the taxable base (base imponible) upon which the ISR that the claimant must pay must be calculated, on the occasion of the income received from the company Electrónica Venetta, in the 2002 and 2003 fiscal periods, which constituted an economic retribution that said supplier company made to him for his actions in directing the bidding processes followed at the INA, when he was its head, for the purchase of Training Modules, so that it is consistent with his ability to pay (capacidad contributiva). In that sense, it must be understood that the taxable base (base imponible) upon which the claimant must pay the ISR for the aforementioned periods is $75,536.17 (seventy-five thousand five hundred thirty-six dollars and seventeen cents) and not that which the challenged actions indicated. Matters relating to interest and the amount of the tax shall be determined in the sentence enforcement phase.”

“VI.- A este nivel de análisis, el Tribunal estima necesario referirse a un tema que, si bien no fue abordado directamente por la parte actora (aunque sí de modo general por la conducta formal impugnada), resulta de fundamental relevancia no solo para establecer para si los ingresos recibidos por el actor pueden ser gravados con el ISR, sino también para resolver el reclamo referido a la violación del principio de capacidad contributiva. Nos referimos al tema de la fiscalidad de los actos ilícitos, esto es, si es posible que las rentas o ingresos obtenidos por actividades o actos ilícitos del contribuyente puedan ser gravados, en este caso, con el ISR. Se trata de un tema polémico y complejo, respecto del cual no existe una posición consensuada, siendo que más bien la doctrina plantea diversas posturas. Algunas están en contra de tal posibilidad, fundamentalmente, porque estiman que si el Estado cobra impuestos respecto de manifestaciones de riqueza provenientes de actos contrarios al ordenamiento jurídico, estaría amparando y legitimando tal proceder, convirtiéndose en cómplice al estar recibiendo beneficios derivados del ilícito; porque es contradictorio e incoherente que si un hecho es sancionado por el ordenamiento jurídico y se le priva de todo efecto (en este caso, el acto con causa ilícita) otro sector lo instituya como fuente creadora de derechos y obligaciones y porque existe incompatibilidad entre las medidas represivas (sancionatorias y penales) y las tributarias, aludiendo, en lo medular, a eventuales violaciones del principio del non bis in idem, de modo que el producto de un acto ilícito se convertiría en una sanción impropia en contra de quien lo cometió. Otras posturas apuestan en favor de gravar los ingresos provenientes de actividades ilícitas basados, fundamentalmente, en principios de justicia tributaria como la igualdad y la capacidad contributiva. Señalan que la sujeción en virtud de la capacidad económica supone que cualquier manifestación de riqueza (con independencia de su origen) evidencia capacidad contributiva y habilita la posibilidad de someterla a tributación; que la licitud o ilicitud de la actividad que genera la riqueza es ajena e irrelevante para el Derecho Tributario; que se vulneraría el principio de igualdad si solamente se gravaran los beneficios producidos por los actos lícitos ya que supondría una exención respecto de aquellos provenientes de actos ilícitos o un tratamiento fiscal más favorable para quien viole el derecho que para quien lo respete. Además, señalan que el legislador tributario, en tanto autónomo, puede optar por considerar como gravables actos que, para otras áreas del ordenamiento jurídico califican como ilícitos, de modo que ese calificativo del negocio jurídico es irrelevante para el nacimiento del hecho generador y el surgimiento de la obligación tributaria. Finalmente, están quienes propugnan una postura intermedia, conforme a la cual el tema no admite una solución general sino que existe un amplio espectro de matices dependiendo del supuesto que se trate. Afirman que el carácter ilícito de un acto no excluye por sí mismo que pueda someterse a tributación, siempre que muestre la misma capacidad contributiva económica que otros actos no contrarios a derecho; advirtiendo, eso sí, que no puede existir deber de tributar sobre ganancias, ingresos o beneficios que procedan de una actividad de carácter ilícito para la cual el ordenamiento dispone la aplicación de una consecuencia jurídica que determine la ausencia de capacidad contributiva. Se trata, en definitiva de un aspecto de decisión y política legislativa, de modo que deberá interpretarse el ordenamiento jurídico tributario a efectos de determinar la postura que resulta aplicable en nuestro país.

VII.- Pues bien, luego de un mesurado análisis el Tribunal estima que, aunado al hecho de que el ordenamiento jurídico no establece ninguna norma que prohíba o impida a la AT sujetar al ISR los ingresos generados de actividades ilícitas; más bien, la interpretación coherente y armónica de las normas vigentes en la materia permiten concluir que existen las habilitaciones normativas necesarias para tal sujeción, que se deducen, según veremos, de la configuración normativa del hecho imponible del ISR. Como punto de partida habrá que estarse a la autonomía del legislador tributario para determinar cuáles son las manifestaciones de riqueza que desea gravar y en la formulación de los hechos imponibles, al margen del calificativo que otras ramas del Derecho le hubiesen dado a esos hechos, actos o actividades. Un reflejo de esa autonomía la tenemos en el artículo 13 del CNPT cuando señala que la obligación tributaria no se afecta por circunstancias relativas a la validez de los actos o a la naturaleza del objeto perseguido por las partes, ni por los efectos que los hechos o actos gravados tengan en otras ramas del Derecho Positivo costarricense. De tal precepto normativo se desprende, con total claridad, que la obligación tributaria material (por excelencia, el pago del tributo) prevalecerá independientemente del tipo de acto que produjo el hecho generador. Para tales efectos resultan irrelevantes aspectos que si lo son en otras ramas del derecho, como la causa del negocio o contrato (que, para el Derecho Civil requiere ser lícita) o que aquella manifestación de riqueza haya sido obtenida por medio de actividades que constituyen delito (este último aspecto, de vital importancia para el Derecho Penal). Así, conforme a la norma indicada, la ilicitud de la actividad que genera la riqueza no supone, persé, la exclusión del deber de contribuir con la sostenibilidad de las cargas públicas, sino que en la medida de esa actividad haya generado riqueza efectiva para los sujetos que la desarrollan se impone el mandato constitucional establecido en el numeral 18 de la Carta Magna. No podría ser de otra forma porque, dada la neutralidad de los tributos, la idoneidad de un hecho para revelar capacidad contributiva debe ser independiente de la licitud o no de aquel y de la actividad que lo ha producido. En el caso que nos ocupa, tenemos que el artículo 1 de la LISR, crea un impuesto sobre las utilidades de las empresas y de las personas físicas que desarrollen actividades lucrativas en general, sea, sin que se excluyan las que sean ilícitas. También establece que el hecho generador de este impuesto es la percepción de rentas en dinero o en especie, continuas u ocasionales, provenientes de cualquier fuente costarricense, otra vez, sin excluir las rentas o fuentes que sean ilícitas. El impuesto también grava los ingresos, continuos o eventuales, de fuente costarricense (nuevamente, sin excluir los que resulten de actividades ilícitas) percibidos o devengados por personas físicas o jurídicas domiciliadas en el país; así como cualquier otro ingreso o beneficio de fuente costarricense no exceptuado por ley, sin que exista un tratamiento diverso dependiente del origen de los ingresos o beneficios. Finalmente, señala que, se entenderá por rentas, ingresos o beneficios de fuente costarricense, los provenientes de servicios prestados, bienes situados, o capitales utilizados (sin que distinga, tampoco, en el origen o carácter lícito o no) en el territorio nacional, que se obtengan durante el período fiscal de acuerdo con las disposiciones de esta ley. Así, podemos concluir con absoluta claridad que el legislador no distinguió entre el origen lícito o no del acto o la actividad generadora de las utilidades. Por ende, con independencia de las consecuencias que otros ámbitos (civiles, penales o administrativos) pueda generar ese acto o actividad, la renta que se obtenga de esta manera siempre será gravable porque el tributo recae sobre el beneficio o utilidad obtenida y no sobre la operación o la actividad en sí. Si ese beneficio acrecenta la capacidad económica de quien lo obtenga (de fuente lícita o no) estará sujeto al ISR porque de lo contrario estaríamos frente a una discriminación que lesionaría los principios de justicia tributaria formal y material. Aunado a lo anterior tenemos que la LISR no excluye de la renta bruta, los ingresos o beneficios que provengan de actividades contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico. El numeral 5 establece que la renta bruta es el conjunto de los ingresos o beneficios percibidos (al margen de la naturaleza lícita o no de la actividad que los genere) en el período del impuesto por el sujeto pasivo, en virtud de las actividades a que se refiere el párrafo tercero del artículo primero, norma que, agrega el Tribunal, no distingue entre la licitud o no de la fuente. Tampoco encontramos en la lista que establece el artículo 6 de la misma ley, que se haya excluido de la renta bruta los ingresos generados de actividades o actos no conformes con el ordenamiento jurídico. Por las razones expuestas, el Tribunal se inclina por avalar la potestad de la AT de sujetar al ISR los ingresos o beneficios que se perciban de actividades ilícitas. Lo anterior no contraviene el principio de legalidad y tipicidad que rige en esta materia porque, según explicamos, las normas que configuran los elementos esenciales de este tributo no responden al origen de la renta, sino más bien a su destino, permitiendo interpretar legítimamente que se reconocen dichas actividades como integrantes del hecho imponible del tributo en cuestión. Esta conclusión se refuerza, más recientemente, con la promulgación de la Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada (Ley No.8754), la que en su artículo 22, cuando regula lo relativo a los capitales emergentes, establece que la persona, física o jurídica, que no pueda justificar su patrimonio o los incrementos emergentes, será condenada a la pérdida del patrimonio emergente, las multas y las costas de la investigación, señalando irrelevante la causa ilícita del patrimonio o del incremento emergente. Ahora bien, el ejercicio de esta potestad tributaria sobre ingresos provenientes de actividades ilícitas se ejerce en vía administrativa cuando la AT en el ejercicio de sus potestades de fiscalización determina que existen ingresos de un contribuyente que, aunque provienen de actividades contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, acrecentan su riqueza. En este escenario, estimamos que la actuación administrativa impositiva no lesiona el principio de capacidad contributiva, en tanto hay una riqueza que, en tanto encajaba en el hecho generador, podía ser gravada. Sin embargo, en el examen debe ser ponderada otra situación relacionada, precisamente , con la naturaleza ilícita o contraria al ordenamiento jurídico de la actividad que genera los ingresos gravables y los efectos que podría tener en otras ramas del Derecho. Nos referimos, por ejemplo, a los supuestos en que la actividad de la cual provinieron los ingresos gravables tipifica como delito y el contribuyente es sometido (junto con los procedimientos determinativos o sancionadores en vía administrativa) a un proceso penal en el que recae una sentencia condenatoria en su contra, con efectos que inciden sobre su capacidad económica, como pueden ser la restitución de los bienes, su comiso o confiscación. En estos casos, habrá que tomar en cuenta que la sujeción tributaria solo será posible si existe una capacidad económica que pueda o deba ser gravada. Por ende, si los efectos de esas obligaciones (comiso o restitución) impiden o enerven totalmente el enriquecimiento del sujeto, podrá no surgir la obligación tributaria o bien, que emerja la obligación de la AT de devolver el ingreso tributario indebido, si el tributo ya hubiese sido cancelado. Lo anterior por cuanto si la capacidad económica que fue gravada, en su momento, por la AT desaparece en forma sobrevenida (por ejemplo, por el comiso o restitución de los bienes) resultaría contrario al principio de capacidad contributiva gravar una riqueza que ya el contribuyente no posee por haber sido entregada al ente público. Si el tributo ya hubiese sido cancelado, resultaría necesaria la aplicación de medidas correctoras como su devolución o deducción, claro está en condiciones que no podrían ser más favorables de las que se aplican a supuestos lícitos semejantes. Así, se trata de dos escenarios diferentes: uno en vía administrativa y otro en la sede penal. En ambos debe respetarse el principio de capacidad contributiva y, en definitiva, la sujeción o no del tributo vendrá dada por factores diferentes como serían la demostración de la capacidad económica o la existencia de consecuencias jurídicas que afecten directamente los beneficios que con la actividad se obtienen, como sería el caso del comiso o restitución del bien.

VIII.- Se alega también una indebida interpretación de los artículos 8 y 12 del CNPT que refieren, en general, al principio de interpretación conforme a la realidad económica. En relación con el tema, es menester señalar que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en la sentencia No. 01181, dictada a las 14 horas 48 minutos del 12 de noviembre de 2009, indicó, en lo que interesa, "(...) en materia tributaria, es posible distinguir dos ámbitos de aplicación del citado principio. El primero, referido propiamente a la interpretación del contenido de la norma, entendiendo que el operador jurídico no debe limitarse al simple sentido de las palabras utilizadas por esta, sino que, al momento de realizar esta operación intelectiva, debe privilegiar la finalidad que persiguió el legislador al crear el tributo. En la materia en cuestión, el poder tributario del Estado tiene por objetivo gravar una determinada fuente de riqueza, de forma tal que, al definir los alcances de una norma se debe tomar en cuenta la realidad (económica, claro está) que justificó el ejercicio de esta potestad. En la base de este planteamiento se ubica el reconocimiento de que la regulación, si bien realizada desde una perspectiva jurídica, se refiere a transacciones económicas, de modo que, son estas particularidades las que deben definir el contenido de las disposiciones, y no los concepto jurídicos, ajenos en muchos de los casos a esta realidad. Empero, esto no implica un tipo abierto a través del cual se permita modificar la legislación mediante interpretaciones, lo que equivaldría a sustituir ilegítimamente a la Asamblea Legislativa, así como un quebranto de los principios de división de funciones, seguridad jurídica, legalidad y reserva legal. Por el contrario, lo que se procura evitar es que se torne nugatorio el deber constitucional de contribuir con las cargas públicas, propio de un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, mediante tecnicismos jurídicos, privilegiando la valoración de la realidad, la finalidad de la norma tributaria y la capacidad económica que se pretendió gravar.(...)" (el subrayado es nuestro). En esa línea, refiere a la interpretación del contenido de la norma tributaria en el sentido que el operador jurídico no debe limitarse al simple sentido de las palabras utilizadas por ésta, sino que, al momento de realizar el análisis intelectivo, se encuentra obligado a dar prioridad a la finalidad que persiguió el legislador al crear el tributo. Pero también es clara la sentencia en cuestión en indicar que lo anterior no implica la creación de un tipo abierto a través del cual se permita modificar la legislación mediante interpretaciones, lo que resultaría en una sustitución ilegítima del legislador, así como la transgresión a los principios de división de funciones, seguridad jurídica, legalidad y reserva legal. El accionante considera que, tomando en cuenta que él nunca ha negado haber recibido los ingresos en cuestión, en una correcta interpretación de ambas normas la AT debía comprobar que la suma recibida se originaba en la prestación de un servicio profesional y que hubo simulación del negocio jurídico. Analizados los autos, el Tribunal estima que lo reclamado es improcedente por las siguientes razones. Conforme al numeral 140 del CNPT y 19 del Reglamento General de Gestión , Recaudación y Fiscalización Tributarias, la carga de la prueba incumbe a la AT respecto de los hechos constitutivos de la obligación tributaria material, mientras que incumbe al contribuyente respecto de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos de aquella. Conforme a lo que se ha tenido por acreditado, una vez iniciadas las actuaciones fiscalizadoras, el accionante presentó declaraciones rectificativas del ISR correspondiente a los períodos fiscales 2002 y 2003, reportando una suma de $61.000, por un equivalente de Ë 22.200.340.00 (veintidós millones doscientos mil trescientos cuarenta colones exactos) y $ 266.724,16 por un equivalente a Ë 99.731.982,00 (noventa y nueve millones setecientos treinta y un mil novecientos ochenta y dos colones), respectivamente, como ingresos no gravables. Ante esa rectificación (que cambió la realidad económica que había declarado en el momento procesal oportuno y sobre la cual se estaba ejerciendo la fiscalización) la AT solicitó que se aportara la documentación de respaldo de esos ingresos, requerimiento propio del ejercicio de sus potestades de fiscalización en un sistema autodeclarativo como el nuestro. Pues bien, el accionante indicó en que consist ían tales ingresos, más no aportó la documentación necesaria que respald ara su dicho. Reiteramos que si tales ingresos hubieran sido un regalo o liberalidad de la empresa Electrónica Venetta, era deber del demandante demostrarlo por los medios de prueba pertinentes, por tratarse de un hecho modificativo o extintivo de la obligación tributaria y se le dio la oportunidad para ello. No es cierto que la AT invirtiera la carga de la prueba y lo obligara a probar un hecho negativo, sea la inexistencia de la contraprestación de servicio. Lo que la AT le requirió fue que comprobara que se trataba de un ingreso no gravable o, en palabras del actor, que lo que había recibido era un regalo o una mera liberalidad, lo que en definitiva nunca se probó. Tampoco es cierto que presumiera que era un ingreso no exento y más bien gravable. Como se ha venido explicando, se ha tenido por acreditado (tanto en sede administrativa como en esta sede) que sí existió una contraprestación de servicios del actor a cambio del dinero recibido, según se expuso en los Considerandos previos. Ello se desprende tanto de la resolución determinativa como de la dictada por el jerarca impropio en esta materia y que aquí esta impugnada. Desde esta perspectiva, la AT sí cumplió con su deber probatorio y acreditó, con la contundencia debida, que sí hubo una contraprestación de servicios del accionante a cambio del dinero que recibió, tal y como se confirmó, además, con la sentencia penal No. 244-2009 que fue dictada en su contra. Sea, sí hubo renta gravable. En relación con el artículo 12 del CNPT, compartimos con el accionante el hecho de que esa norma permite a la AT desconocer los efectos jurídicos de contratos en tanto alteren el contenido de la obligación tributaria y sus elementos, sin que necesariamente le habilite para desconocer cualquier relación o negocio jurídico. Sin embargo, estimamos que el caso concreto la actuación de la AT tampoco lesiona la referida norma porque el actor nunca acreditó la existencia de un convenio o negocio en virtud del cual Electrónica Venetta le hubiese regalo los dineros en cuestión. Precisamente, ese fue el documento que la AT le requirió y que él nunca aportó. Así las cosas, resulta del todo improcedente que el actor pretenda ahora que, en aplicación del principio de realidad económica, se venga a suplir sus deficiencias en las cargas probatorias. Más bien, las declaraciones rectificativas presentadas, las manifestaciones del accionante y la posterior sentencia penal en virtud de la cual se acredita el delito cometido por el accionante y que él sí desplegó una serie de actuaciones tendentes a beneficiar a la empresa que, luego, le pagó por esos servicios, dicen de la adecuada interpretación de la AT respecto de la realidad económica y justifica que puedan ajustarse las declaraciones autorealizadas por el contribuyente a la realidad de los hechos, como aquí sucedió. Así las cosas, no se observa que la AT aplicara de forma arbitraria el principio en cuestión, por lo que debe rechazarse el vicio que en ese sentido se alega.

IX.- Hasta lo que aquí se ha examinado, el Tribunal no encuentra ningún vicio en la conducta formal impugnada. Lo anterior por tanto se gravaron ingresos percibidos por el actor que, aunque provenientes de actividades contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, constituían renta producto y sin duda, podían y debían ser gravadas con el ISR. En ese sentido, el cotejo de validez que, hasta este momento, se ha efectuado permite descartar cualquier violación al principio de legalidad, en tanto, la conducta formal administrativa impugnada contaba con habilitación normativa suficiente para gravar con el ISR los ingresos que el accionante recibió de la empresa Electrónica Venetta, según se ha explicado. Tampoco se observa que se haya incurrido en un exceso o desviación de poder, como se acusa. El motivo que sirvió de base al dictado de la resolución No. 277-2011 impugnada (así como el de la determinativa) existía tal y como fue tomado en cuenta al momento de dictarlas (punto que se enfatiza y al cual se hará referencia infra) y se satisfizo el fin querido por las normas, esto es, que los contribuyentes que realicen el hecho generador del ISR paguen ese tributo. Se trata, además, de actos que cumplen con el deber de motivación que establece el numeral 136 de la LGAP. No obstante, para completar el examen de legalidad falta contrastar el acto impugnado con un principio de fundamental importancia en esta materia, a saber, el de capacidad contributiva.

X.- En este punto, el accionante reclama violación del principio de la capacidad contributiva, en lo fundamental, porque producto de la sentencia penal dictada en su contra ya reintegró al Estado el dinero recibido, e incluso lo duplicó a título de resarcimiento; razón por la cual ya no existe renta que gravar. Al respecto debemos señalar que la capacidad contributiva es la potencialidad de contribuir con los gastos públicos que poseen los individuos sometidos al poder tributario del Estado. Constituye una medida de igualdad, de modo que las obligaciones tributarias se fundamentan en el deber de contribuir de acuerdo con la capacidad económica de cada persona. En el caso que nos ocupa se ha tenido por acreditado que el actor recibió la suma de $61.000 o su equivalente de Ë 22.200.340.00 (veintidós millones doscientos mil trescientos cuarenta colones exactos) y $ 266.724,16 o su equivalente de Ë 99.731.982,00 (noventa y nueve millones setecientos treinta y un mil novecientos ochenta y dos colones) como un pago o retribución económica por parte de la empresa Electrónica Venetta por su actuación en el direccionamiento de los procesos licitatorios seguido en el INA, cuando él era su jerarca, para la compra de Módulos Entrenadores . Conforme se expuso en los Considerandos previos, se trató de ingresos que sí eran gravables porque constituyeron renta producto y, en aquel momento, acrecentaron la riqueza y la capacidad contributiva del actor. No obstante, no puede obviar el Tribunal que también se acreditó que al accionante se le siguió la causa penal No. 04-007707-647-PE por el delito de corrupción agravada, a consecuencia de haber recibido los referidos pagos de la empresa Electrónica Veneta , por haberla favorecido en diferentes procesos licitatorios. En ese proceso penal, el 22 de enero de 2009, el actor propuso al Ministerio Público que se le siguiera un procedimiento abreviado, indicando que era su deseo aceptar los hechos atribuidos. Tal propuesta fue aceptada por el Ministerio Público a condición de que el actor admitiera en una audiencia preliminar y ante el Juez Penal de la Etapa Intermedia los hechos imputados y cumpliera con el plan de resarcimiento al daño social. A cambio, el Ministerio Público se comprometió a solicitar al juez la pena de 24 meses de prisión por el delito de corrupción agravada e inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos por un período de cuatro años y que se le concediera la ejecución condicional de la pena (folio 126 del expediente judicial). Luego, el 26 de enero de 2009, el actor, el INA y la Procuraduría de la Ética Pública firmaron un Acuerdo de Transacción de las Acciones Civiles Resarcitorias comprometiéndose el actor a cancelar la suma de $252.188.00 (doscientos cincuenta y seis mil ciento ochenta y ocho dólares) , indicándose que el monto de $252.188.00 que fue depositado el 8 de noviembre de 2004 por el actor a la orden del Ministerio Público, sería transferido al INA por concepto de daños y perjuicios ocasionados. Asimismo, por concepto de daño social se comprometió a cancelar en un solo pago la suma de $272.188.00 (doscientos setenta y dos mil ciento ochenta y ocho dólares) para ser destinados a programas de becas dirigidos a los sectores más desfavorecidos de la sociedad costarricense. El monto total de la transacción corresponde a la indemnización de daños por los eventuales perjuicios lo mismo que por el daño social causado por los hechos que se investigaban en la causa seguida contra el demandante en el expediente judicial No. 04-007707-647-PE (folios 127 a 137 del expediente judicial). De lo aquel momento histórico bien podía ser gravado con el ISR sin afectar su capacidad contributiva; resulta evidente que con ocasión del proceso penal y la sentencia dictada contra, sobrevinieron factores que inciden negativamente sobre aquella capacidad económica. Nos referimos a la devolución o restitución de la suma de $252.188.00 (doscientos cincuenta y seis mil ciento ochenta y ocho dólares) , que él efectuó como parte del acuerdo transado con el Ministerio Público, el INA y la Procuraduría General de la República, por concepto de daño material. Con ocasión de la restitución, ese dinero, que fue parte d el objeto que se gravó en las conductas impugnadas, salió de la esfera jurídica del actor, y estimamos que, al día de hoy, no sería viable gravar una riqueza que él ya no posee, por haber sido devuelta como parte del arreglo establecido en la causa penal. Dicho de otra forma, el concepto de utilidad económica que fundamentó el hecho generador en el momento en que se dictó la resolución impugnada, desapareció con los efectos de l acuerdo suscrito con ocasión del proceso penal. En ese sentido, obligar al accionante a tributar sobre un dinero que ya no posee (por las causas ya indicadas) y que más bien pertenece al Estado , se torna confiscatorio en la medida que ya no existe la capacidad contributiva o económica que fue verificable (antes de la restitución) en el patrimonio del actor. En consecuencia, estimamos que con ocasión de la consecuencia jurídica que el ordenamiento jurídico previó para la comisión del acto ilícito mediante el cual el accionante obtuvo ingresos que, en principio, eran gravables (específicamente, la restitución de parte de los dineros obtenidos ilícitamente de la empresa Electrónica Venetta), surge la nulidad sobrevenida parcial de la resolución impugnada, en tanto desapareció una de las condiciones exigidas por el ordenamiento jurídico tributario para su adopción y para poder gravar aquellos ingresos (que no han sido cancelados), a saber, la capacidad contributiva del actor (artículo 159 de la LGAP). Esa capacidad económica se constituye, según dijimos, en una condición necesaria para la imposición de cualquier tributo y al no existir, gravar la utilidad percibida en aquel momento y ahora devuelta, lesiona el referido principio constitucional. Ahora bien, estimamos que esa nulidad sobrevenida (la ausencia de capacidad contributiva con ocasión de la restitución de parte de los ingresos gravables que, inicialmente, recibió el accionante) afecta no solo a la resolución No. 277-2011 impugnada, sino que se extiende a la resolución determinativa que fuera dictada por la AT. No obstante, estimamos también que esa invalidez lo es únicamente en forma parcial. Lo anterior toda vez que se ha tenido por acreditado que los ingresos no gravables que el actor declaró para los períodos fiscales 2002 y 2003 (indebidamente como no gravados) fueron de $61.000 o su equivalente de Ë 22.200.340.00 (veintidós millones doscientos mil trescientos cuarenta colones exactos) y $ 266.724,16 o su equivalente de Ë 99.731.982,00 (noventa y nueve millones setecientos treinta y un mil novecientos ochenta y dos colones). Es decir, en definitiva se declararon $327.724,17 (trescientos veintisiete mil setecientos veinticuatro dólares con diecisiete centavos); pero se devolvió, a título de restitución por el daño material causado) únicamente la suma de $252 .188.00 (doscientos cincuenta y seis mil ciento ochenta y ocho dólares). Ello evidencia que el accionante mantiene una suma de $75.536,17 (setenta y cinco mil quinientos treinta y seis dólares con diecisiete centavos) de los ingresos gravables que, en aquel momento, recibió de Electrónica Venetta. Sea, aún existe una capacidad contributiva exteriorizada que, sin duda, debe ser gravada, por las razones ya expuestas en los considerandos anteriores. No resultan de recibo las manifestaciones del demandante, según las cuales devolvió más de lo recibido. En rigor, lo que se devolvió a título de daño social no tiene nada que ver con los aspectos tributarios ni con la riqueza que fue gravada por la AT en su momento. Más bien, se trata de un efecto propio de la acción penal y una consecuencia civil del hecho ilícito que cometió a la cual él accedió para optar por un proceso abreviado que, en definitiva, le benefició. Desde esta perspectiva, estimamos que esa suma no debe ser considerada como parte de los ingresos que fueron gravados inicialmente con el ISR, para efectos de determinar su capacidad contributiva. En conclusión, estimamos que debe declararse la invalidez parcial de la resolución determinativa No. SF-DT-01-R-2738-6 y la resolución No. 277-2011-P, dictadas por la AT y Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, respectivamente, únicamente para ajustar la base imponible sobre la cual debe calcularse el ISR que debe pagar el accionante, con ocasión de los ingresos recibidos por parte de la empresa Electrónica Venetta, en los períodos fiscales 2002 y 2003 que constituye ron una retribución económica que esa empresa proveedora le hizo por su actuación en el direccionamiento de los procesos licitatorios seguido en el INA, cuando él era su jerarca, para la compra de Módulos Entrenadores, a efectos de que sea conteste con su capacidad contributiva. En ese sentido, habrá que entender que la base imponible sobre la cual el accionante debe cancelar el ISR de los períodos mencionados es de $75.536,17 (setenta y cinco mil quinientos treinta y seis dólares con diecisiete centavos) y no la que las conductas impugnadas indicaron. Lo relativo a los intereses y el monto del tributo, se determinará en fase de ejecución de sentencia.”