Statute of Limitations to Execute Dismissal of Civil Service EmployeePlazo de prescripción para ejecutar despido de funcionario del Régimen de Servicio Civil

IV. REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (plazo de prescripción) TO BE APPLIED IN THE SPECIFIC CASE

It is true that Article 44 of Ley 8422 establishes that "*The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe, according to Article 43 of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno) and Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, of September 7, 1994...*"; it is also true that the five-year period provided for in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic —to which numeral 43 of the General Internal Control Law also refers— refers to the period to initiate the disciplinary administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo disciplinario) against those persons who are alleged to have committed infractions of the regulations relating to the Public Treasury and/or those provided for in Laws 8422 and 8292; not to the period to execute the final act, through which a specific sanction is imposed on someone who was found responsible for incurring one of the infractions mentioned above.

In that regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in judgment number 2006-13926 of fourteen hours and forty-four minutes on September twenty, two thousand six, considered: "*...in Article 71 a lapsing period (plazo de caducidad) is established for initiating the administrative sanctioning procedure—formerly two years, and now five—starting from the knowledge of the facts, and of two years in the case that the head of the entity (jerarca) terminates the employment relationship...*" As indicated previously, the scenario provided for in Article 71 of that regulatory body refers to the exercise of disciplinary power by the head of the entity or the competent authority of a public entity, body, or company, regarding a person who has committed an infraction of the Organic Law of the CGR or the superior control and oversight regulations. Consequently, the five-year period—prior to the reform introduced by Law 8292, it was two years—to initiate the administrative procedure shall be counted from the occurrence of the irregular event—if it were notorious—, and otherwise, from the date the audit report or preliminary investigation is brought to the attention of the head of the entity or competent authority.

When the alleged perpetrator of the infraction is the head of the entity, the five-year period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, public company, or body. In summary, Article 71 of the LOCGR regulates the lapsing period for the head of the entity or competent authority to initiate the administrative procedure to investigate acts contrary to the superior oversight and control regulations of the Public Treasury, which are alleged against a person who holds or held a position of that nature *(see in the same sense, judgment 3553-2010 issued by the Sixth Section of this Court, at eight hours on September twenty-one, two thousand ten, already confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice)*. In this specific case, the purpose of the proceeding is centered on determining whether the act by which the dismissal authorized by the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil) in resolution number 11666 was ordered to be executed, was or was not executed within the period provided for that purpose by Article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and not whether the disciplinary administrative procedure that concluded with the issuance of resolution 11666 was initiated within the five-year period provided for by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, to which numerals 44 of Law 8482 and 43 of Law 8292 refer.

Added to the above, and for the specific case of officials under the Civil Service Regime (Régimen del Servicio Civil), there is a specific rule—which reproduces what is established in Article 603 of the Labor Code—that regulates the statute of limitations period for the employer to execute the final resolution—this by virtue of what is established in numeral 44 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)—that authorizes the imposition of a specific sanction. We are referring to Article 99 of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil), whose subsection c) establishes the following: "... The following shall prescribe in one month: (...) c) The actions of Ministers to initiate the dismissal management of regular employees for justified cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by law and internal work regulations, starting from the day on which cause for the sanction arose, or, as the case may be, from when the corresponding facts or infractions became known..." (the boldface is not from the original).

Consequently, and for all of the foregoing, this Court considers that, contrary to what the State representative asserts, the statute of limitations period to be applied in this specific case, for the employer to execute the final act in which the sanction of dismissal without employer liability was imposed on the plaintiff, is not the one provided for in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, to which numerals 44 of Law 8482 and 43 of Law 8292 refer.

V.REGARDING THE NULLITY DEFECTS ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN RELATION TO OFFICIAL LETTER D.R.H. 10-2961-RC OF DECEMBER 8, TWO THOUSAND TEN. It is necessary to highlight that the analysis of the challenged formal conduct is limited to the reasons on which the plaintiff bases her challenge, namely: that it constitutes an act that, in an extemporaneous manner according to the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code, attempts to execute the dismissal sanction imposed against the plaintiff by the Civil Service Tribunal, as repeatedly stated by the representative of the plaintiff party during the preliminary hearing. Based on the foregoing, and contrary to what the plaintiff asserts, this Court considers that official letter number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC issued by the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of the MOPT, on December 8, two thousand ten, cannot be considered a valid parameter to consider the actions of the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and the Minister of the branch) to have prescribed, which were aimed at executing resolution number 11666 issued at seven hours and forty-five minutes on October twenty-seven, two thousand ten, by the Civil Service Tribunal. This is for the following reasons:

• 1)Final Act (Acto Definitivo) as an essential requirement to execute the imposed sanction. As an exception to the provisions of Article 148 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), numeral 44 of the Civil Service Statute establishes that the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against the final act issued by the Civil Service Tribunal shall be granted with both effects to be heard before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil). This implies that while the appeal is not resolved, the Executive Branch may not execute the sanction imposed in the first instance on an official under said public employment regime (see, among others, judgments number 2010-8767 and 2010-15710 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Consequently, it is a sine qua non requirement to execute sanctions imposed on officials under the statutory regime of the Civil Service that the sanctioning administrative act be final, that is, that it be final and binding (firme);
• 2)Final act as an essential requirement to begin the computation of the statute of limitations period to execute the imposed sanction. Based on the above, under the Statutory Regime of the Civil Service, the sanction can only be executed once the final act is final and binding, either because the interested party did not file the appeal in time and proper form against the formal conduct issued by the Civil Service Tribunal, or because the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service confirmed the appealed resolution. This implies that the statute of limitations period to execute the sanction shall be interrupted, starting from the date on which the Administration is notified of the admission order before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service of the appeal filed by the interested party, a moment from which the execution of the formal conduct shall be suspended until said administrative tribunal resolves the appeal;
• 3)The statute of limitations period to execute the sanction imposed in the specific case is not computable. While it is true that on November four, two thousand ten, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport was notified of resolution number 11666 of seven hours forty-five minutes on October twenty-seven, two thousand ten, through which the Civil Service Tribunal declared "... WITH MERIT the action brought by the Minister of Public Works and Transport to dismiss the employee Leda María Araya Villalobos from her position classified as Civil Service Professional 1-A, without liability for the State. Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss the indicated employee. An appeal may be filed against this resolution, before this Tribunal and with the proper statement of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 and its amendments of the Civil Service Statute..." (folios 258 to 265 of the administrative file); it is also true that the computation of the statute of limitations period to execute the administrative sanction imposed on the plaintiff in said ruling was subject to the condition that said final act become final and binding. In that sense, as of November twelve, two thousand ten, the MOPT was notified of the order of seven hours twenty minutes on November ten, two thousand ten, by means of which the appeal filed by the plaintiff against ruling number 11666 was admitted to be heard before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service and the parties were summoned to appear before said Tribunal within three days to assert their rights (folios 289, 291, and 292 of the administrative file). Added to the above, the plaintiff herself, through a brief submitted on November seventeen, two thousand ten, notified the Director of Human Resources of the MOPT that "... the undersigned timely and in proper form filed before the Civil Service Tribunal, an APPEAL against resolution 11666 of 07:40 File No. 14977, consequently, the dismissal action brought against me, for legal purposes, has not become final and binding..." (folios 33 and 34 of the judicial file). Consequently, it is inadmissible for the plaintiff party to allege that the statute of limitations period has expired for the MOPT to execute the sanction of dismissal without employer liability that was imposed on her, because although the MOPT was notified on November four, two thousand ten, of the final sanctioning resolution number 11666 issued against the plaintiff, it is also true that the statute of limitations period—which in principle expired on December four of the same year—was interrupted as of November twelve, two thousand ten, the date on which the MOPT was notified of the admission with both effects of the appeal filed by the plaintiff and therefore, of the impossibility of executing the dismissal act issued against her. In any case, it is contradictory for the claimant to allege the occurrence of the statute of limitations (prescripción) based on official letter number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC, issued on December 8, two thousand ten and notified on the ninth of the same month and year, by means of which the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of the MOPT informed her "... You are hereby notified of the dismissal for cause effective as of January 01, 2011, in accordance with resolution No. 11666, dated October 27, 2010, of the Civil Service Tribunal and official letter No. 103200 dated December 01, 2010, signed by the (...) General Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport..." (folio 35 of the judicial file), when she herself indicates that the sanction of dismissal without employer liability imposed against her could not be executed because the appeal she filed against the final act had already been admitted with both effects, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of the Civil Service Statute, which was known to the MOPT since November twelve, two thousand ten and reiterated on the seventeenth of the same month and year. On this point, this Court insists that the statute of limitations period could not be computed, because there was no final administrative act, given that on the date on which official letter D.R.H. 10-2961-RC was issued and notified (December 8 and 9, 2010, respectively), the appeal had not only been admitted since November ten, two thousand ten, but was still pending resolution before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service, which is why the statute of limitations period could not run to execute a sanction that had not yet been confirmed by a final act. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Minister of Public Works and Transport was clearly aware that he could not execute the dismissal against the plaintiff for that circumstance, so much so that through official letter number DMOPT-6747-10 of December 15, two thousand ten, the Minister of Public Works and Transport notified the General Director of Human Resources of that Ministry that "... taking into consideration the filing of the Appeal against Administrative Resolution No. 11666 of 07:40 hours of the Civil Service Tribunal, through which the Executive Branch was authorized to proceed to dismiss said employee, the undersigned considers it legally appropriate to order the immediate suspension of the respective dismissal agreement. Thus, it is ordered not to sign the dismissal agreement forwarded by the Legal Directorate of this Ministry through Official Letter No. 20106575 dated November 25, 2010, so that it may be executed after the Administrative Tribunal of Civil Service hears the aforementioned appeal..." (folio 56 of the judicial file, the boldface is not from the original). Therefore, the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be alleged based on a formal conduct that did not have the capacity to make effective the sanction of dismissal ordered against the claimant, when not even the competent authorities (President of the Republic and the Minister of the branch) had ordered the plaintiff's dismissal, in the exercise of the powers granted in Article 140, subsection 2 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). It should also be highlighted that the dismissal of the claimant was not made effective, not only because the Processing Judge, through resolution number 0157-2011 issued orally at ten hours twenty-five minutes on February four, two thousand eleven, resolved: “…The precautionary measure (medida cautelar) granted inaudita altera pars on December 15, 2010 is modified, and the State, in the figure of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, is hereby ordered not to execute the dismissal act authorized by the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service through Resolution No. 11666-2010 of October 27, 2010 and resolution 016-2011-TASC of January 24, two thousand eleven, until the merits of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff are decided or the circumstances motivating the issuance of this resolution change…” (folios 36, 92, and 93 of the judicial file); but also, because since December fifteen, two thousand ten, the Minister of Public Works and Transport had already ordered through official letter number DMOPT-6747-10, “… not to sign the dismissal agreement forwarded by the Legal Directorate of this Ministry through Official Letter No. 20106575 dated November 25, 2010, so that it may be executed after the Administrative Tribunal of Civil Service hears the aforementioned appeal..." (folio 56 of the judicial file). So much so, that in official letter number 11-0012 of January six, two thousand eleven, the General Director of the National Geographic Institute (IGN) of the MOPT notified the Head of the Registration and Control Department of the MOPT that "... Engineer Leda María Araya Villalobos, identity card number 4-138-913, is currently working normally in her duties as an official of the National Geographic Institute, specifically in the Geodesy and Topography Department..." (folios 59 to 61, 174 to 177 of the judicial file). Said situation continues to the present day, because even though the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service rejected the appeal filed by the plaintiff through resolution number 016-2011-TASC of thirteen hours thirty minutes on January twenty-four, two thousand eleven —a ruling that was notified to the MOPT on January twenty-five, two thousand eleven, by fax system (folios 315 to 325 of the administrative file)—; the truth is that, by virtue of the validity of the precautionary measure confirmed by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) (folios 36, 92, 93, 127, and 128 of the judicial file), the dismissal has not been executed until the merits of this proceeding are decided (folio 178 of the judicial file). For all the foregoing, and according to the terms in which it was challenged, official letter number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC issued by the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of the MOPT on December 8, two thousand ten, is not substantially contrary to the legal system, given that on the date the challenged act was issued and notified, the appeal filed against the final act was still pending resolution before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service —which is admitted with both effects in accordance with Article 44 of the Civil Service Statute—, which is why the statute of limitations period could not run to execute a sanction that had not yet been confirmed by a final act.

We refer to Article 99 of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute, whose subsection c) provides as follows: <i>"...The following shall prescribe in one month: (...) c) The actions of Ministers to initiate dismissal proceedings against regular employees for justified cause<b> and to impose disciplinary corrections authorized by law and internal work regulations, from the day on which the cause for the sanction arose, or as applicable, from when the corresponding facts or faults became known..."</b> (the bolding is not from the original).</i>&nbsp; <u>Consequently, and for all the foregoing reasons, this Tribunal considers that, contrary to what the State's representative asserts, the prescriptive period to be applied in this specific case, for the employer to execute the firm act by which the sanction of dismissal without employer liability was imposed on the plaintiff, is not that provided for in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, to which numerals 44 of Law 8482 and 43 of Law 8292 refer</u>.</span> Vo.- AS TO THE DEFECTS OF NULLITY ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN RELATION TO OFFICIAL MEMORANDUM D.R.H. 10-2961-RC OF DECEMBER 8, TWO THOUSAND TEN.

It is necessary to emphasize that the analysis of the formal conduct challenged is limited to the reasons on which the plaintiff focuses her challenge, namely: that it constitutes an act that, in an untimely manner pursuant to the provisions of Article 603 of the Labor Code, seeks to execute the sanction of dismissal imposed against the plaintiff by the Tribunal de Servicio Civil, as the representative of the claimant party repeatedly stated during the preliminary hearing. Based on the foregoing, and contrary to what the plaintiff claims, this Tribunal considers that official memorandum number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC issued by the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of the MOPT, on December 8, two thousand ten, cannot be taken as a valid parameter for considering the actions of the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and the relevant Minister) to have prescribed, aimed at executing resolution number 11666 issued at seven forty-five hours on October 27, two thousand ten, by the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, for the reasons set forth below:<b> 1)</b> <b><i>Final Act as an essential requirement to execute the sanction imposed.</i></b> As an exception to the provisions of Article 148 of the General Law of the Public Administration, numeral 44 of the Civil Service Statute establishes that the appeal filed against the final act issued by the Tribunal del Servicio Civil shall be granted with both effects (en ambos efectos) before the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil.

This implies that while the appeal is not resolved, the Executive Branch may not execute the sanction imposed at first instance on an employee subject to said public employment regime <i>(see, among others, judgments number 2010-8767 and 2010-15710 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice)</i>. Consequently, it is a sine qua non requirement for executing sanctions imposed on employees subject to the statutory Civil Service regime that the sanctioning administrative act be final, that is, firm; <b><i>2) Final act as an essential requirement to start the calculation of the prescriptive period for executing the sanction imposed.</i></b> From the foregoing, in the case of the Statutory Civil Service Regime, <b>the sanction may only be executed once the final act is firm</b>, either because the interested party did not timely and properly file the appeal against the formal conduct issued by the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, or because the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil confirmed the appealed resolution.

This implies that the prescriptive period for executing the sanction will be interrupted from the date on which the Administration is notified of the admission order (auto de admisión) before the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil of the appeal filed by the interested party, a moment from which the execution of the formal conduct will be suspended until said administrative tribunal resolves the appeal; <b><i>3) The prescriptive period for executing the sanction imposed in the specific case is not computable. </i></b>While it is true that, on November 4, two thousand ten, the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes was notified of resolution number 11666 of seven forty-five hours on October 27, two thousand ten, whereby the Tribunal del Servicio Civil declared <i>"...WITH MERIT the proceeding brought by the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes to dismiss employee Leda María Araya Villalobos from her position of Civil Service Professional 1-A, without liability for the State.

Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss the said employee. Against this resolution, an appeal is admissible, before this Tribunal and with the due expression of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 and its amendments of the Civil Service Statute..."</i> <i>(folios 258 to 265 of the administrative file); </i>it is also true that <u>the calculation of the prescriptive period for executing the administrative sanction imposed on the plaintiff in said ruling was subject to that final act becoming firm</u>. In that sense, <b>as of November 12, two thousand ten, the MOPT was notified</b> of the order (auto) of seven twenty hours on November 10, two thousand ten, by means of which <b>the appeal filed by the plaintiff</b> against ruling number 11666 was admitted before the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, and the parties were summoned to appear before that Tribunal within three days to exercise their rights <i>(folios 289, 291 and 292 of the administrative file).</i> Added to the foregoing, the defendant herself, through a brief filed on November 17, two thousand ten, informed the MOPT Human Resources Director, that <i>"...the undersigned timely and properly filed before the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, an APPEAL against resolution 11666 of 07:40 File No14977, consequently, the dismissal proceeding brought against me has not, for legal purposes, become firm..." (folios 33 and 34 of the judicial file). </i>Consequently, <b>it is improper for the plaintiff to claim that the prescriptive period elapsed</b> for the MOPT to execute the sanction of dismissal without employer liability imposed upon her, <u>because although the MOPT was notified on November 4, two thousand ten, of the final sanctioning resolution number 11666 issued against the plaintiff, it is also true that the prescriptive period </u>–which in principle expired on December 4 of the same year– <u>was interrupted as of November 12, two thousand ten, the date on which the MOPT was notified of the admission, with both effects (en ambos efectos), of the appeal filed by the plaintiff and, therefore, of the impossibility of executing the act of dismissal issued against her</u>.

In any case, <b>it is contradictory</b> that the protected party (la amparada) claims the occurrence of prescription based on official memorandum number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC, issued on December 8, two thousand ten and notified on the ninth of the same month and year, by which the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of the MOPT, informed her <i>"...You are notified of dismissal for cause effective as of January 1, 2011, pursuant to resolution No. 11666, dated October 27, 2010, from the Tribunal del Servicio Civil and official memorandum No. 103200 dated December 1, 2010, signed by the (...) Director General of Human Resources of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes..."</i> <i>(folio 35 of the judicial file), </i><b>when she herself indicates that the sanction of dismissal without employer liability imposed against her could not be executed because the appeal filed against the final act had already been admitted with both effects (en ambos efectos), pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 of the Civil Service Statute, which was known to the MOPT since November 12, two thousand ten, and reiterated on the seventeenth of the same month and year</b>.

On this point, this Tribunal insists that the prescriptive period could not be calculated, because there was no firm administrative act, given that on the date the official memorandum D.R.H. 10-2961-RC was issued and notified (December 8 and 9, 2010, respectively), the appeal had not only been admitted since November 10, two thousand ten, but was still pending resolution before the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, which is why the prescriptive period could not run to execute a sanction that had not yet been confirmed by a firm act. In this sense, it should be noted that the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, <u>was clear that he could not execute the dismissal against the plaintiff due to that circumstance,</u> so much so, that by official memorandum number DMOPT-6747-10 of December 15, two thousand ten, the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes informed the Director General of Human Resources of that Ministry that <i>"...taking into consideration the filing of the Appeal against Administrative resolution No. 11666 of 07:40 hours from the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, through which the Executive Branch was authorized to proceed to dismiss said employee, <b>the undersigned considers it legally appropriate to order the immediate suspension of the respective dismissal agreement.

In this manner, it is ordered not to sign the dismissal agreement sent by the Legal Directorate of this Ministry through Official Memorandum No. 20106575 dated November 25, 2010, so that it may be executed after the Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil hears the aforementioned appeal</b>..." (folio 56 of the judicial file, the bolding is not from the original).</i> Therefore, it cannot be claimed that prescription occurred, based on a formal conduct that lacked the virtue to make effective the dismissal sanction ordered against the protected party, when not even the competent authorities (the President of the Republic and the relevant Minister) had ordered the plaintiff's dismissal, in exercise of the powers granted in Article 140, subsection 2 of the Political Constitution. It should also be highlighted, <u>that the removal of the protected party was not made effective</u>, not only because the Jueza Tramitadora, through resolution number 0157-2011 issued orally at ten twenty-five hours on February 4, two thousand eleven, resolved: <i>"...The inaudita altera pars precautionary measure granted on December 15, 2010 is modified, and the State, in the figure of the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, is hereby ordered not to execute the act of dismissal authorized by the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil through resolution No. 11666-2010 of October 27, 2010 and resolution 016-2011-TASC of January 24, two thousand eleven, until the merits of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff are decided or the circumstances motivating the issuance of this resolution change..."</i> <i>(folios 36, 92 and 93 of the judicial file); </i>but also, <u>because since December 15, two thousand ten, the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes</u> had already ordered, through official memorandum number DMOPT-6747-10, "...<i>not to sign the dismissal agreement sent by the Legal Directorate of this Ministry through Official Memorandum No. 20106575 dated November 25, 2010, so that it may be executed after the Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil hears the aforementioned appeal..." (folio 56 of the judicial file). </i>So much so, that through official memorandum number 11-0012 of January 6, two thousand eleven, the Director General of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional of the MOPT, informed the Head of the Department of Registration and Control of the MOPT that <i>"...Ms.

Engineer Leda María Araya Villalobos, identity card number 4-138-913, is, as of today, working normally in her functions as an employee of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, specifically in the Department of Geodesy and Topography..." (folios 59 to 61, 174 to 177 of the judicial file)</i>. This situation continues to the present day, because even though the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil rejected the appeal filed by the plaintiff by resolution number 016-2011-TASC of thirteen thirty hours on January 24, two thousand eleven – a ruling that was<i> </i>notified to the MOPT on January 25, two thousand eleven, via fax <i>(folios 315 to 325 of the administrative file)-; </i>the truth is that, by virtue of the validity of the precautionary measure<i> </i>confirmed by the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda <i>(folios 36, 92, 93, 127 and 128 of the judicial file)</i>, the dismissal has not been executed until the merits of this proceeding are resolved <i>(folio 178 of the judicial file)</i>. For all the foregoing reasons, and in accordance with the terms in which it was challenged, the official memorandum number D.R.H.

10-2961-RC issued by the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of MOPT, on December 8, two thousand ten, is not substantially contrary to the legal system, given that on the date the challenged act was issued and notified, the appeal filed against the final act was still pending resolution before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service—which is admitted with both effects pursuant to article 44 of the Civil Service Statute—for which reason the statute of limitations (prescripción) could not run to execute a sanction that had not yet been confirmed by a definitive act.”

IV. REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PLAZO DE PRESCRIPCIÓN) TO BE APPLIED IN THE SPECIFIC CASE

It is true that article 44 of Law 8422 establishes that *"The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions set forth in this Law, and in the legal system relating to la Hacienda Pública, shall be extinguished by prescription (prescribirá), according to article 43 of la Ley General de Control Interno and article 71 of la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994...";* it is also true that the five-year term provided in article 71 of la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República —to which numeral 43 of la Ley General de Control Interno also refers— refers to the term to initiate the disciplinary administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo disciplinario) against those persons charged with committing alleged violations of the legal system relating to la Hacienda Pública and/or those set forth in Laws 8422 and 8292; not to the term to execute the final act, by which a specific sanction is imposed on someone found responsible for incurring any of the previously mentioned infractions.

In that sense, la Sala Constitucional in ruling number 2006-13926 of fourteen hours and forty-four minutes of September twenty, two thousand six, considered: *“…in article 71 a time limit for expiry (plazo de caducidad) is established to initiate the administrative sanctioning procedure —previously two years, and now five— from the knowledge of the facts, and two years in the event that the head of the entity (jerarca) leaves the employment relationship…”* As indicated above, the scenario contemplated in article 71 of that normative body refers to the exercise of the disciplinary power by the head of the entity (jerarca) or the competent authority of an entity, body, or public company, regarding a person who has incurred a violation of la Ley Orgánica de la CGR or the superior control and oversight regulations. Consequently, the five-year term —prior to the reform introduced by Law 8292, it was two years— to initiate the administrative procedure shall be counted from the occurrence of the irregular event —if it were notorious—, and otherwise, from when the audit report or preliminary investigation is brought to the attention of the head of the entity (jerarca) or competent authority.

When the alleged perpetrator of the violation is the head of the entity (jerarca), the five-year term shall begin to run from the date on which he/she ends his/her service relationship with the respective entity, public company, or body. In summary, article 71 of the LOCGR regulates the expiry term (plazo de caducidad) for the head of the entity (jerarca) or the competent authority to initiate the administrative procedure in order to investigate the acts contrary to the superior oversight and control regulations of la Hacienda Pública, attributed to a person who holds or held a position of that nature *(see in the same sense, ruling 3553-2010 issued by the Sixth Chamber (Sección Sexta) of this Court, at eight hours of September twenty-one, two thousand ten, already confirmed by la Sala Primera of la Corte Suprema de Justicia).* In this specific case, the object of the proceeding is centered on determining whether the act by which the execution of the dismissal (despido) authorized by the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil) in resolution number 11666 was ordered, was executed or not within the term provided for that purpose by article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and not whether the disciplinary administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo disciplinario) that concluded with the issuance of resolution 11666 was initiated within the five-year term provided by article 71 of la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, to which numerals 44 of Law 8482 and 43 of Law 8292 refer.

In addition to the above, and for the specific case of officials assigned to the Civil Service Regime (Régimen del Servicio Civil), there is a specific rule —which is a reproduction of the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)— that regulates the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) for the employer to execute the final resolution —this by virtue of the provisions of numeral 44 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)— that authorizes imposing a specific sanction. We refer to article 99 of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil), whose subsection c) provides the following: *"...The following shall expire by prescription (Prescribirán) in one month: (...) c) The actions of the Ministers to initiate the dismissal (despido) procedure of regular employees for justified cause and to impose the disciplinary corrections authorized by law and the internal work regulations, from the day on which cause for the sanction arose, or, as the case may be, from when the corresponding facts or violations were known..."* (the boldface is not from the original).

In consequence and for all the foregoing reasons, this Court considers that contrary to what the State's representative affirms, the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) to be applied in this specific case, for the purposes of the employer executing the final act by which the sanction of dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) was imposed on the plaintiff, is not the one established in article 71 of la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, to which numerals 44 of Law 8482 and 43 of Law 8292 refer.

VI.REGARDING THE NULLITY DEFECTS (VICIOS DE NULIDAD) ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF PARTY (PARTE ACTORA) IN RELATION TO OFFICE MEMO D.R.H. 10-2961-RC OF DECEMBER 8, TWO THOUSAND TEN. It is necessary to emphasize that the analysis of the challenged formal conduct is limited to the reasons on which the plaintiff party (parte actora) centers its challenge, namely: that it constitutes an act that extemporaneously, pursuant to the provisions of article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), intends to execute the sanction of dismissal (despido) imposed against the claimant by the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal de Servicio Civil), as the representative of the plaintiff party repeatedly stated during the preliminary hearing. Based on the foregoing, and contrary to what the plaintiff states, this Court considers that office memo number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC issued by the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of MOPT, on December 8, two thousand ten, cannot be taken as a valid parameter to consider the actions of the Executive Branch (Presidenta de la República and the respective Minister), aimed at executing resolution number 11666 issued at seven hours and forty-five minutes of October twenty-seven, two thousand ten, by the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), to have been extinguished by prescription (prescritas), for the reasons set forth below:

• 1)Final Act (Acto Definitivo) as an essential requirement to execute the imposed sanction. As an exception to the provisions of article 148 of la Ley General de la Administración Pública, numeral 44 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) establishes that the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against the final act (acto final) issued by the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), shall be granted with both effects before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil). This implies that as long as the appeal is not resolved, the Executive Branch cannot execute the sanction imposed in the first instance on an official assigned to that public employment regime *(see inter alia, rulings number 2010-8767 and 2010-15710 of la Sala Constitucional of la Corte Suprema de Justicia)*. Consequently, it is a sine qua non requirement to execute the sanctions imposed on officials assigned to the statutory regime of the Civil Service (Régimen Estatutario del Servicio Civil) that the sanctioning administrative act (acto administrativo sancionatorio) be final (definitivo), that is, it must be firm;
• 2)Final Act (Acto Definitivo) as an essential requirement to commence the computation of the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) to execute the imposed sanction. From the above, in the case of the Civil Service Statutory Regime (Régimen Estatutario del Servicio Civil), the sanction may be executed only once the final act (acto final) is final (definitivo), either because the interested party did not file the appeal (recurso de apelación) in time and form against the formal conduct issued by the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), or because the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil) confirmed the appealed resolution. This implies that the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) to execute the sanction shall be interrupted, from the date on which the Administration (la Administración) is notified of the admission order (auto de admisión) before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil) of the appeal filed by the interested party, a moment from which the execution of the formal conduct shall remain suspended until that administrative tribunal resolves the appeal;
• 3)The statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) to execute the imposed sanction is not computable in this specific case. While it is true that on November four, two thousand ten, the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) was notified of resolution number 11666 of seven hours and forty-five minutes of October twenty-seven, two thousand ten, by which the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil) declared *"...WITH MERITS (CON LUGAR) the procedure (gestión) promoted by the Minister of Public Works and Transportation to dismiss (despedir) the employee Leda María Araya Villalobos from her position class Professional de Servicio Civil 1-A, without liability for the State. Consequently, the Executive Branch is authorized to dismiss (despedir) the indicated employee. The appeal (recurso de apelación) may be filed against this resolution, before this Tribunal and with the proper expression of grievances, in accordance with the provisions of article 44 and its reforms of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil)..."* *(folios 258 a 265 of the administrative file);* it is also true that the computation of the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) to execute the administrative sanction imposed on the plaintiff in that ruling was contingent upon that final act (acto final) acquiring firmness (firmeza). In this sense, since November twelve, two thousand ten, MOPT was notified of the order (auto) of seven hours and twenty minutes of November ten, two thousand ten, by which the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff against ruling number 11666 was admitted before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil), and summoned the parties to appear before that Tribunal within three days to assert their rights *(folios 289, 291, and 292 of the administrative file).* In addition to the above, the plaintiff herself, by written submission presented on November seventeen, two thousand ten, informed the Director of Human Resources of MOPT, that *"...the undersigned filed in time and form before the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), an APPEAL (RECURSO DE APELACIÓN), against resolution 11666 of 07:40 File No. 14977, consequently, the dismissal (despido) procedure (gestión) promoted against me, for legal purposes has not acquired firmness (firmeza)..." (folios 33 and 34 of the judicial file).* Consequently, it is improper for the plaintiff party to claim that the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) ran, so that MOPT could execute the sanction of dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) that was imposed on her, because although MOPT was notified on November four, two thousand ten, of the final sanctioning resolution number 11666 issued against the plaintiff, it is also true that the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) —which in principle expired on December four of the same year— was interrupted as of November twelve, two thousand ten, the date on which MOPT was notified of the admission with both effects of the appeal filed by the claimant and therefore, of the impossibility of executing the dismissal (despido) act issued against her. In any case, it is contradictory that the petitioner claims the occurrence of the statute of limitations (prescripción) based on office memo number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC, issued on December 8, two thousand ten and notified on the ninth of the same month and year, by which the Head of Registration and Control of the Human Resources Directorate of MOPT, indicated to her *"...You are hereby notified of your dismissal for cause (despido por causa) effective January 1, 2011, in accordance with resolution No. 11666, dated October 27, 2010, of the Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil) and office memo No. 103200 dated December 1, 2010, signed by the (...) Director General of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation..."* *(folio 35 of the judicial file),* when she herself indicates that the sanction of dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) imposed against her could not be executed by virtue of the fact that the appeal she filed against the final act (acto final) had already been admitted with both effects, pursuant to the provisions of article 44 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), which was known to MOPT since November twelve, two thousand ten and reiterated on the seventeenth of the same month and year. On this point, this Court insists that the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) could not be computed, by virtue of the fact that there was no final administrative act (acto administrativo definitivo), since on the date that office memo D.R.H. 10-2961-RC was issued and notified (December 8 and 9, 2010, respectively), the appeal had not only been admitted since November ten, two thousand ten, but was still pending resolution before the Administrative Tribunal of the Civil Service (Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil), for which reason the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) could not run to execute a sanction that had not yet been confirmed by a final act (acto definitivo). In this sense, it should be noted that the Minister of Public Works and Transportation, was clear that he could not execute the dismissal (despido) against the plaintiff, due to that circumstance, so much so, that through office memo number DMOPT-6747-10 of December 15, two thousand ten, the Minister of Public Works and Transportation, informed the Director General of Human Resources of that Ministry, that *"...taking into consideration the filing of the Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) against Administrative Resolution No.*

...11666 of 07:40 hours of the Tribunal del Servicio Civil, through which the Executive Branch was authorized to proceed with the dismissal of said employee, <b>the undersigned considers it legally appropriate to order the immediate suspension of the respective dismissal agreement. Accordingly, it is ordered not to sign the dismissal agreement submitted by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Dirección Jurídica" w:st="on">la Dirección Jurídica</st1:PersonName> of this Ministry via Official Letter No. 20106575 dated November 25, 2010, so that it may be executed after the Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil hears the aforementioned appeal</b>..." (folio 56 of the judicial file, bold text not in the original).</i> Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the statute of limitations (prescripción) has run, based on a formal act that lacked the capacity to make effective the sanction of dismissal ordered against the protected party, when not even the competent authorities (Presidenta de la República and the Minister of the relevant branch) had ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff, in exercise of the powers granted in Article 140, subsection 2, of la Constitución Política.

Furthermore, it should be noted <u>that the dismissal of the protected party was not made effective</u>, not only because la Jueza Tramitadora, by resolution number 0157-2011 issued orally at ten hours twenty-five minutes on February fourth, two thousand eleven, resolved: <i>"...The inaudita altera pars interim measure (medida cautelar inaudita altera pars) granted on December 15, 2010, is modified, and the State, in the person of the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transporte, is ordered not to execute the dismissal act authorized by the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil by resolution No. 11666-2010 of October 27, 2010, and resolution 016-2011-TASC of January 24, two thousand eleven, until a decision is made on the merits of the claim filed by the plaintiff or the circumstances that motivated the issuance of this resolution change..." </i> <i>(folios 36, 92, and 93 of the judicial file); </i>but also, <u>because as of December fifteenth, two thousand ten, the Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes,</u> had already ordered by official letter number DMOPT-6747-10, "...<i>not to sign the dismissal agreement submitted by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Dirección Jurídica" w:st="on">la Dirección Jurídica</st1:PersonName> of this Ministry via Official Letter No. 20106575 dated November 25, 2010, so that it may be executed after the Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil hears the aforementioned appeal..." (folio 56 of the judicial file). </i>So much so, that from official letter number 11-0012 of January sixth, two thousand eleven, the Director General of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional of the MOPT, informed the Chief of the Department of Registration and Control of the MOPT that <i>"...the Engineer Leda María Araya Villalobos, identity card number 4-138-913, is currently working normally in her duties as an official of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, specifically in the Department of Geodesy and Topography..." (folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="59 a" w:st="on">59 to</st1:metricconverter> 61, <st1:metricconverter ProductID="174 a" w:st="on">174 to</st1:metricconverter> 177 of the judicial file)</i>.

This situation continues to the present day, because even though the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff, by resolution number 016-2011-TASC of thirteen hours thirty minutes on January twenty-fourth, two thousand eleven -a ruling that was<i> </i>notified to the MOPT, on January twenty-fifth, two thousand eleven, via the fax system <i>(folios <st1:metricconverter ProductID="315 a" w:st="on">315 to</st1:metricconverter> 325 of the administrative file)-; </i>the fact is, that by virtue of the validity of the interim measure (medida cautelar)<i> </i>confirmed by the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda <i>(folios 36, 92, 93, 127, and 128 of the judicial file)</i>, the dismissal has not been executed until the merits of this proceeding are resolved <i>(folio 178 of the judicial file)</i>. For all the foregoing reasons, and in accordance with the terms in which it was challenged, the official letter number D.R.H. 10-2961-RC issued by the Chief of Registration and Control of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Dirección" w:st="on">la Dirección</st1:PersonName> de Recursos Humanos of the MOPT, on December 8, two thousand ten, is not substantially contrary to the legal system, given that on the date the challenged act was issued and notified, the appeal filed against the final act was still pending resolution before the Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil -which is admitted with both effects (en ambos efectos) in accordance with Article 44 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil-, for which reason the period of statute of limitations (prescripción) could not run to execute a sanction that had not yet been confirmed by a final act." </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> </div> </body> </html>

“IVo.- SOBRE EL PLAZO DE PRESCRIPCIÓN A APLICAR EN EL CASO CONCRETO. Cierto es que el artículo 44 de la Ley 8422 establece que "La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá, según el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994..."; también lo es, que el plazo de cinco años previsto en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República -al que también remite el numeral 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno-, se refiere al plazo para iniciar el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario en contra de aquellas personas a las que se les impute la comisión de presuntas faltas al ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública y/o las previstas en las Leyes 8422 y 8292; no al plazo para ejecutar el acto final, mediante el cual, se le impone una determinada sanción a quién se le encontró responsable de incurrir en alguna de las faltas referidas con anterioridad.

En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 2006-13926 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cuatro minutos del veinte de setiembre del dos mil seis, consideró: “…en el artículo 71 se establece un plazo de caducidad para iniciar el procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio –antes de dos años, y ahora de cinco–a partir del conocimiento de los hechos, y de dos años en el caso de que el jerarca deje la relación laboral…” Tal y como se indicó con anterioridad, el supuesto previsto en el artículo 71 de ese cuerpo normativo, hace referencia al ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria por parte del jerarca o de la autoridad competente de un ente, órgano o empresa pública, respecto a una persona que haya incurrido en un falta a la Ley Orgánica de la CGR o a la normativa de control y fiscalización superiores. En consecuencia, el plazo de cinco años –antes de la reforma introducida por la ley 8292, era de dos años- para iniciar el procedimiento administrativo, se contarán a partir del acaecimiento del hecho irregular –si fuera notorio-, y en caso contrario, a partir de que se ponga en conocimiento el informe de auditoría o la investigación preliminar al jerarca o autoridad competente.

Cuando el presunto autor de la falta, sea el jerarca, el plazo de cinco años empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa pública o el órgano respectivo. En síntesis, el artículo 71 de la LOCGR regula el plazo de caducidad para que el jerarca o la autoridad competente, inicie el procedimiento administrativo a fin de investigar los hechos contrarios a la normativa de fiscalización y control superiores de la Hacienda Pública, que se le imputen a una persona que ocupe u ocupó un cargo de esa naturaleza (ver en igual sentido, la sentencia 3553-2010 dictada por la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal, a las ocho horas del veintiuno de setiembre de dos mil diez, ya confirmada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En este caso concreto, el objeto del proceso se centra en determinar si el acto mediante el cual, se ordenó ejecutar el despido autorizado por el Tribunal de Servicio Civil en resolución número 11666, se ejecutó o no en el plazo previsto al efecto por el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, y no si el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario que concluyó con el dictado de la resolución 11666, se inició en el plazo de cinco años previsto por el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, al que remiten los numerales 44 de la Ley 8482 y 43 de la Ley 8292.

Aunado a lo anterior, y para el caso concreto de los funcionarios adscritos al Régimen del Servicio Civil, existe una norma específica -que es reproducción de lo dispuesto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo-, que regula el plazo de prescripción para que el patrono ejecute la resolución firme -ello en virtud de lo dispuesto en el numeral 44 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil- que autoriza imponerle una determinada sanción. Nos referimos al artículo 99 del Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil, cuyo inciso c) dispone lo siguiente: "...Prescribirán en un mes: (...) c) Las acciones de los Ministros para iniciar la gestión de despido de los servidores regulares por causa justificada y para imponer las correcciones disciplinarias que autoricen la ley y los reglamentos interiores de trabajo, a partir del día en que se dio causa para la sanción, o en su caso, desde que fueren conocidos los hechos o faltas correspondientes..." (la negrilla no es del original).

En consecuencia y por todo lo expuesto, este Tribunal estima que contrario a lo que afirma la representante del Estado el plazo de prescripción a aplicar en este caso concreto, para efectos de que el patrono ejecute el acto firme en que se impuso a la actora la sanción de despido sin responsabilidad patronal, no es el previsto en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, al que remiten los numerales 44 de la Ley 8482 y 43 de la Ley 8292.

Vo.- EN CUANTO A LOS VICIOS DE NULIDAD ALEGADOS POR LA PARTE ACTORA CON RELACIÓN AL OFICIO D.R.H. 10-2961-RC DEL 8 DE DICIEMBRE DEL DOS MIL DIEZ. Es menester resaltar, que el análisis de la conducta formal impugnada, se circunscribe a las razones en que la parte actora centra su impugnación, a saber: que constituye un acto que de manera extemporánea conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, pretende ejecutar la sanción de despido impuesta en contra de la accionante por el Tribunal de Servicio Civil, tal y como de manera reiterada lo manifestó el representante de la parte demandante durante la audiencia preliminar. Con base en lo anterior y contrario a lo que afirma la actora, este Tribunal considera que el oficio número D.R.H. 10-2961-RC emitido por el Jefe de Registro y Control de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del MOPT, el 8 de diciembre del dos mil diez, no puede tenerse como un parámetro válido para tener por prescritas las acciones del Poder Ejecutivo (Presidenta de la República y Ministro del ramo), tendentes a ejecutar la resolución número 11666 dictada a las siete horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintisiete de octubre del dos mil diez, por el Tribunal del Servicio Civil, ello por las razones que de seguido se exponen:

• 1)Acto Definitivo como requisito esencial para ejecutar la sanción impuesta. Como excepción a lo dispuesto en el artículo 148 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el numeral 44 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil establece que el recurso de apelación interpuesto contra el acto final dictado por el Tribunal del Servicio Civil, se concederá en ambos efectos para ante el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil. Ello implica que mientras no se resuelva el recurso de apelación, el Poder Ejecutivo no podrá ejecutar la sanción impuesta en primera instancia, a un funcionario adscrito a dicho régimen de empleo público (ver entre otras, las sentencias número 2010-8767 y 2010-15710 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En consecuencia, es requisito sine qua non para ejecutar las sanciones impuestas a funcionarios adscritos al régimen estatutario del Servicio Civil, que el acto administrativo sancionatorio sea definitivo, o sea, se encuentre firme;
• 2)Acto definitivo como requisito esencial para iniciar el cómputo del plazo de prescripción para ejecutar la sanción impuesta. A partir de lo anterior, en el supuesto del Régimen Estatutario del Servicio Civil, la sanción podrá ejecutarse hasta tanto el acto final sea definitivo, ya sea porque el interesado no formuló en tiempo y en forma el recurso de apelación contra la conducta formal dictada por el Tribunal del Servicio Civil, o bien, porque el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, confirmó la resolución apelada. Ello implica, que el plazo de prescripción para ejecutar la sanción se interrumpirá, a partir de la fecha en que la Administración sea notificada del auto de admisión para ante el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil del recurso de apelación interpuesto por el interesado, momento a partir del cual, la ejecución de la conducta formal quedará suspendida hasta tanto dicho tribunal administrativo no resuelva el recurso;
• 3)No resulta computable el plazo de prescripción para ejecutar la sanción impuesta en el caso concreto. Si bien es cierto, el cuatro de noviembre del dos mil diez, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes fue notificado de la resolución número 11666 de las siete horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintisiete de octubre del dos mil diez, mediante la cual, el Tribunal del Servicio Civil declaró "...CON LUGAR la gestión promovida por el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes para despedir a la servidora Leda María Araya Villalobos de su puesto clase Profesional de Servicio Civil 1-A, sin responsabilidad para el Estado. En consecuencia, queda autorizado el Poder Ejecutivo para despedir a la indicada servidora. Contra la presente resolución procede el recurso de apelación, ante este Tribunal y con la debida expresión de agravios, de conformidad con lo que establece el artículo 44 y sus reformas del Estatuto de Servicio Civil..." (folios 258 a 265 del expediente administrativo); también lo es, que el cómputo del plazo de prescripción para ejecutar la sanción administrativa impuesta a la actora en dicho pronunciamiento estaba supeditado a que dicho acto final adquiriera firmeza. En ese sentido, desde el doce de noviembre del dos mil diez, al MOPT se le notificó el auto de las siete horas veinte minutos del diez de noviembre del dos mil diez, por medio del cual, se admitió para ante el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la actora contra el pronunciamiento número 11666 y emplazó a las partes para que dentro de tercero día se apersonaran ante ese Tribunal a hacer valer sus derechos (folios 289, 291 y 292 del expediente administrativo). Aunado a lo anterior, la propia demandante por escrito presentado el diecisiete de noviembre del dos mil diez, comunicó al Director de Recursos Humanos del MOPT, que "...la suscrita presentó en tiempo y en forma ante el Tribunal del Servicio Civil, RECURSO DE APELACIÓN, en contra de la resolución 11666 de las 07:40 Expediente No14977, por consiguiente la gestión de despido promovida en mi contra, para los efectos legales no ha adquirido firmeza..." (folios 33 y 34 del expediente judicial). En consecuencia, resulta improcedente que la parte actora alegue que operó el plazo de prescripción, a fin de que el MOPT ejecutara la sanción de despido sin responsabilidad patronal que le fue impuesta, pues aunque el MOPT fue notificado el cuatro de noviembre del dos mil diez, de la resolución final sancionatoria número 11666 dictada en contra de la actora, también lo es, que el plazo de prescripción –que en principio vencía el cuatro de diciembre del mismo año- se interrumpió a partir del doce de noviembre del dos mil diez, fecha en que se le notificó al MOPT sobre la admisión en ambos efectos del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la accionante y por ende, sobre la imposibilidad de ejecutar el acto de despido emitido en su contra. En todo caso, resulta contradictorio que la amparada alegue el acaecimiento de la prescripción a partir del oficio número D.R.H. 10-2961-RC, emitido el 8 de diciembre del dos mil diez y notificado el nueve del mismo mes y año, mediante el cual, el Jefe de Registro y Control de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del MOPT, le indicó "...Se le comunica el despido por causa a partir del 01 de enero del 2011, de conformidad con resolución No. 11666, de fecha 27 de octubre del 2010, del Tribunal del Servicio Civil y oficio No. 103200 de fecha 01 de diciembre del 2010, suscrito por el (...) Director General de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes..." (folio 35 del expediente judicial), cuando ella misma indica que la sanción de despido sin responsabilidad patronal impuesta en su contra, no podía ejecutarse en virtud de que ya se había admitido en ambos efectos, el recurso de apelación interpuso contra el acto final, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 44 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, lo que era de conocimiento del MOPT desde el doce de noviembre del dos mil diez y reiterado el diecisiete del mismo mes y año. En este punto, este Tribunal insiste en que, el plazo de prescripción no podía computa rse, en virtud de que no había un acto administrativo definitivo, toda vez que a la fecha en que se dicta y notifica el oficio D.R.H. 10-2961-RC (8 y 9 de diciembre del 2010, respectivamente), el recurso de apelación no sólo se había admitido desde el diez de noviembre del dos mil diez, sino que aún se encontraba pendiente de resolución ante el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, razón por la cual, no podía correr el plazo de prescripción para ejecutar una sanción que aún no había sido confirmada por un acto definitivo. En ese sentido, cabe destacar que el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, tenía claro que no podía ejecutar el despido en contra de la demandante, por esa circunstancia, tan es así, que mediante oficio número DMOPT-6747-10 del 15 de diciembre del dos mil diez, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, comunicó al Director General de Recursos Humanos de ese Ministerio, que "...teniendo en consideración la interposición del recurso de Apelación en contra de la resolución Administrativa No. 11666 de las 07:40 horas del Tribunal del Servicio Civil, a través de la cual se autorizó al Poder Ejecutivo para que procediera a despedir a dicha servidora, el suscrito considera jurídicamente procedente ordenar la inmediata suspensión del acuerdo de despido respectivo. De esta manera, se dispone no suscribir el acuerdo de despido remitido por parte de la Dirección Jurídica de este Ministerio mediante Oficio No. 20106575 de fecha 25 de noviembre del 2010, para que sea ejecutado luego de que el Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil conozca la apelación antes mencionada..." (folio 56 del expediente judicial, la negrita no es del original). Por ende, tampoco puede alegarse que operó la prescripción, tomando como base una conducta formal, que no tenía la virtud de hacer efectiva la sanción de despido dispuesta en contra de la amparada, cuando ni siquiera las autoridades competentes (Presidenta de la República y Ministro del ramo) habían ordenado destituir a la demandante, en ejercicio de las competencias otorgadas en el artículo 140 inciso 2 de la Constitución Política. Cabe destacar además, que la destitución de la amparada no se hizo efectiva , no sólo porque la Jueza Tramitadora por resolución número 0157-2011 dictada de manera oral a las diez horas veinticinco minutos del cuatro de febrero del dos mil once, resolvió: “…Se modifica la medida cautelar inaudita altera pars otorgada en fecha 15 de diciembre del 2010 y se procede a ordenar al Estado en la figura del Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transporte, no ejecutar el acto de despido autorizado por el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil mediante resolución Nº 11666-2010 del 27 de octubre del 2010 y resolución 016-2011-TASC del 24 de enero del dos mil once, hasta tanto no se decida el fondo de la demanda planteada por la actora o varíen las circunstancias que motivan el dictado de esta resolución…” (folios 36, 92 y 93 del expediente judicial); sino también, porque desde el quince de diciembre del dos mil diez, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, ya había ordenado por oficio número DMOPT-6747-10, “…no suscribir el acuerdo de despido remitido por parte de la Dirección Jurídica de este Ministerio mediante Oficio No. 20106575 de fecha 25 de noviembre del 2010, para que sea ejecutado luego de que el Tribunal Administrativo de Servicio Civil conozca la apelación antes mencionada..." (folio 56 del enero del dos mil once, el Director General del Instituto Geográfico Nacional del MOPT, comunicó al Jefe del Departamento de Registro y Control del MOPT que "...la señora Ingeniera Leda María Araya Villalobos, cédula de identidad número 4-138-913, se encuentra a la fecha laborando normalmente en sus funciones como funcionaria del Instituto Geográfico Nacional, específicamente en el Departamento de Geodesia y Topografía..." (folios 59 a 61, 174 a 177 del expediente judicial). Dicha situación se mantiene hasta la actualidad, pues aún y cuando el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, rechazó el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la actora, mediante resolución número 016-2011-TASC de las trece horas treinta minutos del veinticuatro de enero del dos mil once -pronunciamiento que fue notificado al MOPT, el veinticinco de enero del dos mil once, por medio del sistema de fax (folios 315 a 325 del expediente administrativo)-; lo cierto es, que en virtud de la vigencia de la medida cautelar confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda (folios 36, 92, 93, 127 y 128 del resuelva el fondo de este proceso (folio 178 del expediente judicial). Por todo lo expuesto, y conforme a los términos en que fue impugnado, el oficio número D.R.H. 10-2961-RC emitido por el Jefe de Registro y Control de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del MOPT, el 8 de diciembre del dos mil diez, no resulta sustancialmente contrario al ordenamiento jurídico, toda vez que a la fecha en que se dicta y notifica el acto impugnado, aún se encontraba pendiente de resolución ante el Tribunal Administrativo del Servicio Civil, el recurso de apelación interpuesto contra el acto final -el cual se admite en ambos efectos conforme al artículo 44 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil-, razón por la cual, no podía correr el plazo de prescripción para ejecutar una sanción que aún no había sido confirmada por un acto definitivo.”