Rejection of Administrative Charge Against Shipping Agent for Lack of Due Process and Absolute NullityImprocedencia del cobro administrativo a agente naviero por ausencia de debido proceso y nulidad absoluta

**II.- Regarding the grievance concerning the violation of due process in the administrative collection proceeding by INCOP:** In its statement of claim, the plaintiff pointed out a series of alleged violations of due process, to which the administrative collection proceeding was supposedly subjected. On this matter, in the appealed judgment, the lower court stated in recital IV: “a) Regarding the observance of due process and the right of defense, deviation and abuse of power: With respect to the reports of the internal audits, the plaintiff is not correct in asserting that it should have been granted a hearing and participation in accordance with the principle of due process, since these reports do not require its participation, as in this case, particularly if they involve internal investigations related to possible irregularities that may eventually generate liability on the part of public servants; therefore, this argument is not admissible. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated the following: "(...) In this regard, the second and third paragraphs of Article 6 of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno) number 8292 of July 31, 2002, establish that 'the information, documentation and other evidence of the investigations carried out by the internal audits, the administration and the Comptroller General's Office (Contraloría General), the results of which may give rise to the opening of an administrative proceeding, shall be confidential during the formulation of the respective report. Once the corresponding report has been notified and until the final resolution of the administrative proceeding, the information contained in the file shall be classified as confidential information, except for the parties involved, who shall have free access to all documents and evidence contained in the administrative file. In all cases, the Legislative Assembly, in the exercise of the powers contained in subsection 23) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution, may access the reports, documentation and evidence held by the internal audits, the administration or the Comptroller General of the Republic.' This duty of confidentiality is also provided for in Article 32, subsection f) of the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno), which establishes the obligation of Internal Audit officials to maintain the confidentiality of the information to which they have access, and in numeral 34, subsection e), which prohibits such public servants from revealing information about the audits or special audit studies being conducted and about matters that determine a possible civil, administrative or eventual criminal liability of the officials of the entities and bodies subject to the aforementioned regulatory body. Likewise, Article 8 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), Law number 8422 of October 6, 2004, establishes that the 'Comptroller General of the Republic, the Administration and the internal audits of public institutions and companies shall maintain confidentiality regarding the identity of citizens who, in good faith, file complaints for acts of corruption before their offices. The information, documentation and other evidence of the investigations carried out by the internal audits, the Administration and the Comptroller General of the Republic, the results of which may give rise to the opening of an administrative proceeding, shall be confidential during the formulation of the respective report. (...)'" (Ruling 2007-015540 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice). On the other hand, in matters of collection, the point has already been addressed on previous occasions by the same Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in its ruling No. 2003-03899, of 3:29 p.m. on May 13, 2003, precisely in the context of an amparo appeal against INCOP for the collection of services, it indicated: "(…) the appellant also alleges the violation of the right of the protected party to due process, since, to effect the collection in question, he considers that an ordinary proceeding should have been followed because it is a measure that suppresses subjective rights. In this regard, this Chamber differs from the appellant's criteria because it is clear that we are facing a case of mere verification where it is not necessary to carry out the ordinary proceeding regulated in the General Public Administration Law (Ley de la Administración Pública). The foregoing, because in reality it is not a sanctioning process, but rather the Administration is ensuring the collection for a service rendered, such as the use of the dock by a vessel. Thus, the verification of the days the vessel spent at the dock is sufficient for the appealed authority to collect the corresponding amount, leaving the possibility of discussing in the ordinary courts any existing discrepancy regarding the amount or the method of collection, as indicated in the previous recital. (…)” In our opinion, what was expressed by the Constitutional Chamber is applicable to this case. The plaintiff must observe that, indeed, the steps or actions aimed at collecting for services, as in this case, are not of a sanctioning nature nor can they be framed within the assumptions under which the prior verification of the administrative proceeding is mandatory under the protection of the law and the Constitution; consequently, its argument regarding the violation of due process is not admissible. Now, regarding this same issue, it should be noted that INCOP, particularly through official letter CDC-218, informed the plaintiff of its right to make use of the procedural instruments and remedies available for an effective defense, instruments that in the specific case were used and resolved by the Administration, until exhausted, and in the exercise thereof, it had the opportunity to make statements and the pertinent allegations, as well as to provide evidence, if applicable, regarding the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the collection. It should also be taken into account that the audit reports only have effects internally within the institution, they are not subject to any remedy by the administered parties, and this type of internal investigation, especially if it does not deal with corrective sanctioning matters, does not require, nor should it observe, the participation of third parties in its formulation and review process by the Administration. As a consequence of all the foregoing, this Court observes no violation whatsoever of the rules of due process or the right of defense, nor any deviation or abuse of power. b) Regarding the collection itself: It is the criterion of this judge that the collection made by INCOP, such action responds, -since the contrary has not been proven-, to the result of an audit study and the control and verification of the logbooks and records kept at the port, in which the services rendered to the ships to which they are addressed are recorded, as well as the Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero) requesting them; these are actions of control and self-protection (autotutela) over the actions of the administration, as well as over the public resources, entrusted for administration to INCOP, which are acts of mere verification. Thus, having established the legitimacy of INCOP to proceed with the appropriate actions to enforce these monetary obligations, i.e., against the shipowner (naviero), vessel owner (armador) or their shipping agent (agente naviero), if it is alleged that such charges do not correspond to services that would have actually been rendered, the correct course of action would have been to present evidence thereof, in contrast to the logbook records, or of defects therein; this aspect is left aside in the present action, there being no evidentiary elements in the file that allow inferring the lack of correspondence, or the absence thereof, between the services that in reality may or may not have been rendered, and the records on which the collection is based, wherefore the appropriate course of action is the rejection of this allegation. Thus, this Court considers that, once the analysis of the aforementioned aspects has been carried out, the absolute nullity defects referred to by the plaintiff in its lawsuit are not found in the actions taken by INCOP; therefore, as we referred to in point 1 of this section on the merits of the matter, we must proceed to determine whether the lapse (caducidad) or statute of limitations (prescripción) of the action has occurred in the present case, which will be referred to below.” On this matter, in its appeal brief, the plaintiff argues: “In the case at hand, what is sought is the restoration of the legality violated by an arbitrary material act of the Public Administration, since it is evident that the norm or procedure indicated by law was not observed, because by issuing makeshift invoices after the administration, within its competence and under its full responsibility, granted the departure clearance (zarpe) to the vessels, and was satisfied with the payment for those dock users, it comes several years later to issue some makeshift invoices, without following the legal procedure to demonstrate that the service had been rendered, without giving my represented party an opportunity to refute the audit report, but rather manifestly makes the collection, without granting us a hearing regarding the amount, without allowing us to demonstrate whether that service was rendered or not. (...) which, in addition to the defect previously set forth, entail the defect of lack of due process, since the existing administrative procedures were not followed for my represented party by the administration, thus denying her right to defense. Mr. Eduardo Ortiz says: 'the lack or defect of substantial formalities produces the absolute nullity of the act when these are decisive to ensure the fulfillment of the purpose or the rights of the individual.' (Thesis on Administrative Law, Volume II, Editorial Stradtmann S.A. San José, 2000, page 442). In the matter under examination, according to reiterated jurisprudence, the procedure stipulated for this type of collection was not followed. Note that we are dealing with a public service, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos) number 7593, subsection G, therefore it was necessary to follow the procedure stipulated in Book II of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), especially Article 308 et seq., since it was a matter of establishing the liability of Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico SRL, in acts investigated by the audit years after the service had been rendered, and the vessel had been granted departure clearance (zarpe) by the port authority; in which it is supposed that the liability of those responsible for the fact that this allegedly rendered service was not invoiced should have been established, the criminal and administrative liability of the officials allegedly involved and of other entities must be established; 2) this has not been proven, because due process was not followed, making impossible the right of defense guaranteed in Article 39 of the POLITICAL CONSTITUTION and consequently that of due process contained in Article 41 of our Magna Carta; it is the right of contradiction consisting of A) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; B) Right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present the pertinent arguments and offer evidence; C) Opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegation; which necessarily includes the right to information and to the administrative background, linked to the matter in question; D) Right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians and other qualified persons; E) Adequate notification of the final decision issued by the administration and the reasons on which it is based and; F) Right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued. This procedure governs any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration. In the case at hand, this did not occur; rather, without a prior investigation of responsibilities, my represented party is sanctioned, including suspending its activity in the ports administered by INCOP, and seeking to have it pay a million-dollar sum for alleged services for which its liability has not been proven (...). This Tribunal considers that: Based on the foregoing, it is clear to this Section that, regarding the allegations concerning alleged violations of due process by the defendant entity, the appellant makes no objection or challenge to the legal analysis or to the relationship of norms made by the lower court Judge, nor does it allege the inapplicability of the jurisprudential precedents cited by the lower court and applied to the specific case. For this reason, having analyzed the case file, this Section finds it necessary to emphasize that it fully shares the ratio decidendi used by the lower court judge to resolve this aspect of the lawsuit. In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to indicate that, given that the appeal brief, as indicated supra, merely offers a reiteration of the arguments already analyzed in the appealed resolution, the same resolution in which an extensive analysis is set forth regarding the non-existence of the due process violations indicated by the plaintiff, among which can be mentioned: the communication of the preparatory acts in the proceeding carried out by the Audit of the defendant entity, and the inappropriateness of applying to its case precepts 308 et seq. of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which regulate the Ordinary Proceeding, the grievance that is the subject of study in this recital cannot be upheld because, as the lower court well stated, the administrative conducts developed by the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico did comply with the Legality Framework (Bloque de Legalidad), which encompasses not only written norms, but also unwritten norms. This clarification is of special importance in the present matter because the lower court uses, as one of the pillars of the appealed resolution, a jurisprudential precedent of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) which specifically analyzes the scope and content of the due collection process of the defendant, which does not produce the defenselessness alleged by the plaintiff and was not proven in the present case. For the reasons set forth, this aspect of the appeal must inevitably be rejected.

**III.- Regarding the grievance concerning the alleged absolute nullity of the administrative conducts of INCOP aimed at effecting the administrative collection against the plaintiff company:** Regarding this aspect of the appeal, the plaintiff party stated in its appeal brief: “In the port administration, in the present case INCOP, the administrative authority that had to verify and invoice, before authorizing the departure clearance (zarpe) of the vessels, the services it had rendered, which are beyond the function of the shipping agent (agente naviero), who is the natural or legal person who acts as an independent intermediary in the name and on behalf of the shipowner (naviero) or vessel owner (armador) who has contracted him, while the vessel is at the terminal; (...) what Mr. Judge A – quo intends is to transfer that liability to the shipping agent (agente naviero) who merely requests services on behalf and at the risk of the Shipowner (Naviero) or vessel owner (armador), since these are the users within the port and the ones called upon to pay for the services; that is why the port authority is the one that grants the departure clearance (zarpe) (...); in the case of INCOP, as a port entity, it must check the G. R. T (Gross Register Tonnage) that comes in the documents held by the Captain of the Ship, in order to define which services the vessel requires, mainly towing. That is not the responsibility of the shipping agent (agente naviero) as the Contentious-Administrative Judge claims. The responsibility is from the moment the vessel docks until it departs by order of the port authority; the port authority itself carries out the operation, controls the port services and, based on that, issues the invoice for port services, which are those service provision activities aimed at achieving the purposes for which the authority is established. The activities and responsibilities of a shipping agent (agente naviero) are: 1- To provide service and attention to the vessel and the crew. 2 - To carry out, on behalf of the vessel owner (armador) or shipowner (naviero), the administrative and technical procedures related to the vessel's stay, but this does not imply the exercise of authority. It should be clarified that, prior to the vessel's arrival, the shipping agent (agente naviero) prepares the proforma invoice based on the specific information that the vessel owner (armador) or shipowner (naviero) sends to him and presents it to the port authority. The captain of the ship is the one who carries with him the documentation that he subsequently delivers to the port authority during the official visit, so that the authority can corroborate the information. The shipping agent (agente naviero) (agent of the vessel owner or shipowner) should not be confused with the consignee of the merchandise (the one to whom the merchandise is destined). The port authority, in this case INCOP, which is an autonomous public law entity, therefore with legal personality, enjoys full capacity to act and is responsible for the control of the entire operation during the vessel's stay and issues the final invoice for the services rendered to the ship, and once the services are verified and the final invoice issued, it grants departure clearance (zarpe) so that the ship can continue its voyage; the shipowner (naviero) is liable for port expenses and the cost of handling the merchandise; therefore, he is responsible for all problems resulting from the operation of the vessel and the port operation. The shipping company, which the Judge does not seem to clearly understand, is the natural or legal person who, using their own or others' merchant vessels, is dedicated to their operation. The shipping agent (agente naviero), as is the case of my represented party, provides assistance to the vessel during its stay in port, and receives payments from the shipowner (naviero) in accordance with the final invoice issued by the port authority. It is necessary to point out that, at the time the alleged events occurred, the services of cargo manifest, stevedoring (estiba), and towing were provided by INCOP, an entity that had to control that these services were rendered, since it is also the entity that charged for them. The captain is the representative of the shipowner (naviero). The shipowner (naviero) is the maritime merchant. The shipping agent (agente naviero) acts on behalf and at the risk of the shipowner (naviero). (...) Furthermore, there is the defect of deviation of power since, in addition to having an unlawful purpose not foreseen by the legal system, it is sought to charge my represented party, AGENCIA DE VAPORES DEL PACÍFICO S.R.L., for an alleged debt that it does not owe, since it has not been demonstrated that it is its responsibility, but rather, if true, it is due to administrative deficiencies of the same port authority, which finds it very easy to transfer blame to a third party, who only did, according to the law, represent during the stay of a shipowner's vessel, on behalf and at the risk of that shipowner. The lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) is evident because my represented party owes absolutely nothing; if any debt existed, the collection must be directed at the shipowner (naviero) or the negligent official who allowed this, granting a final invoice and authorizing the vessel's departure clearance (zarpe). (...) Furthermore, it is evident that the payment in question does not proceed against my represented party, because it acted as a Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero), a body that represents the shipowner (naviero) in the procedures and operations of unloading and dispatch of goods, while the vessel is in the port facilities; once the vessel departs, because the port administration authorizes it because it is satisfied with the payment made by the Shipowner (Naviero), all representation ceases; it is for this reason that the port administration is the one that decides the departure clearance (zarpe). (see Article 375 of the Commercial Code. The Contentious Court must understand that the mandate held by the Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero) is limited to the exercise of its management as an agent solely to fulfill the assignment, which are the activities for which it is contracted; once the ship has departed, there is no longer any liability of the shipping agent; to claim otherwise is arbitrary, illegitimate, illogical, with evident deviation of power and entails de facto actions (vías de hecho), wherefore the lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) for this collection against the Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero) is evident. (...) Let the higher court (sic) take note that the port administration proceeded many years later to prepare the invoices presumably for services that were rendered in the past and were not charged, and directs the collection against the Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero) when its management has already ceased. The legal acts that corresponded to it as a Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero) have ceased; therefore, it can no longer be liable for the actions of the shipowner (naviero), since it represents him only in matters related to the attention of the vessel and while the vessel is in the port facilities.” From the foregoing, it is clear that the plaintiff party seeks a declaration of absolute nullity of administrative conducts of INCOP, based on its character as an agent (mandatario) for being a shipping agent (agente naviero) who is not acting in its own name and on its own behalf. On this matter, the lower court Judge stated in the appealed resolution: “From the foregoing, it is understood that being a shipowner (naviero) or vessel owner (armador) is one thing, and being a shipping agent (agente naviero) of vessels is something else entirely. The functions are different, and so are the services rendered as well as the remuneration received. The shipowner (naviero) is engaged in carrying out transport, has control of the transport and the merchandise from the moment it is received at the port of loading until it is delivered at the agreed place, and throughout the entire transport. The agent, in attending to its relationship with the shipowner (naviero), is limited to a series of administrative procedures at the port where its offices are located; it does not intervene at all in the execution of the transport, does not have control of the merchandise during the transport, neither directly nor through employees, has no decision-making power whatsoever regarding the route to be taken, the type of merchandise to be transported, crew to be employed; the vessels it consigns are not its own nor are they chartered by it. Finally, it does not charge for carrying out any transport since it does not perform it, but rather simply charges a sum for its services. In addition to the foregoing, let it be clearly understood that it is indeed a mandate, and in principle, there is no liability on the part of the shipping agent (agente naviero) towards third parties who are not its direct client. However, regarding the liability of the Shipping Agent (Agente Naviero), in our legal system, there is a norm that contemplates this type of commercial relationship, contained in Article 233 of the Commercial Code, regarding the representation of foreign companies and corporations, which is applicable to the present case for the reasons that will be stated. The cited article reads: 'Article 233.- Anyone who, in the name of a foreign person or company, advertises or does business as an agent or representative, without being provided with the documents that accredit him as an attorney-in-fact, shall incur joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) for the obligations contracted and that must be fulfilled in the country, without prejudice to any criminal liability that may correspond to him if fraud (dolo) has been involved.' The article in question covers activities that, among other reasons, due to custom or the dynamic nature of commercial activity, -where in matters of port services, such as airport services in general involved with the transport of goods, facilitation is a critical component-, are carried out by representation informally, but in good faith, without the accreditation of a valid and effective legal documentary instrument of mandate or power of attorney, which, as in the case of the shipping agent (agente naviero), is not customary or is not necessary, the word of the authorized agent being sufficient for the Administration to consider as existing or to presume the relationship between the agent and the vessel to be served, be it the shipowner (naviero) or vessel owner (armador). The cited numeral provides a solution to the need for the accreditation of representation to be an unavoidable condition for a series of commercial activities, through the formalization and presentation of the legal instruments that are appropriate and customary according to the law, in order to attest to the existence of such representation, which could represent an obstacle to commercial flow, exempting from such requirement, in favor of, or with the purpose of streamlining commerce and not creating obstacles to it, by the mere expression of such circumstance, offering as a solution, however, that the liability for any obligation assumed in the country is attributable jointly and severally (en forma solidaria) to the agent (mandatario) or representative, who claims to act in the name of a third party. Thus, a protection framework is provided for third parties who deal with this agent, so that the non-requirement of such accreditation does not generate an obstacle to commercial activity, in such a way that the liability of the ship owners, shipowner (naviero) or vessel owner (armador), by being represented by the word of their agent, extends their liability to the latter, thereby avoiding the formalization of additional procedures. Obviously, being a shipowner (naviero) is one thing and being an agent or consignee of vessels is something else entirely. The shipowner (naviero) is engaged in carrying out transport, has control of the transport and the merchandise from the moment it is received at the port of loading until it is delivered at the agreed place and throughout the entire transport; the vessel consignee, on the contrary, is limited to a series of administrative procedures at the port where its offices are located and does not intervene at all in the execution of the transport; the vessels it represents are not its own nor are they chartered by it, and of course, it cannot sell or abandon them. Finally, it does not charge for carrying out any transport since it does not perform it, but rather simply charges a sum as payment for the representation and management services it renders. Moreover, on the other hand, regarding its liability before the Administration, the provision of Article 233 of the Commercial Code, as observed, establishes the liability of this type of agent that completely replaces the shipowner (naviero) or vessel owner (armador) in the port. In this manner and under the circumstances in which this type of port activities are developed, Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico S.R.L., is jointly and severally liable (responsable solidario) with its represented parties, in its capacity as agent before the Administration, for the obligations that must be fulfilled in the country, among others, those generated by the obligations derived from the provision of services that, in representation of its clients, it requires as a consequence of the shipping operations at the site; the thesis put forward by the plaintiff to the effect that its activities, since they involve a representation mandate, -which is taken as proven-, do not generate liability on its part before INCOP for these concepts, but that said liability corresponds exclusively to the shipping companies, or vessel owners (armadores), is not admissible.” Furthermore, the contractual formulas under which the shipping agent and its principals establish the conditions governing their commercial relationships, in order to provide for this type of circumstance, remain outstanding, a matter that is not the object of this instrument, and therefore the defect of absolute nullity regarding this point does not arise.” Based on all of the foregoing, this Court considers that this aspect of the appeal is not admissible because, although the legal status of the plaintiff and the nature of its actions—which are intrinsically typical of a mandate relationship—is beyond all discussion, it is true that the lower court (A-quo) is correct regarding the application in the case at bar (sublite) of canon 233 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), a precept which, by express provision of the legislator, expressly establishes joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) for agents, which is the case of the plaintiff company. For its part, the specific challenge also made in the appeal brief, regarding whether canon 375 of the Commercial Code should have been applied in the instant case, is not admissible for two reasons: firstly, said article was repealed by the General Customs Law (Ley General de Aduanas), Law No. 7557 of October 20, 1995, and consequently was not in force at the time the events occurred. Secondly, this argument would also not be applicable, because even if it were in force, the aforementioned rule referred to customs agents or brokers (agentes o corredores de aduana), a function that does not conform to those performed by the plaintiff company. Finally, regarding the indication made by the plaintiff, concerning the alleged existence of a Misuse of Power (Desviación de Poder) by INCOP, given that said entity proceeded to pursue an unlawful purpose by effecting the aforementioned collection to its detriment, it is necessary to indicate that subsection 3 of Article 131 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), when referring to said legal principle, stipulates: "The pursuit of a purpose different from the principal one, to the detriment of the latter, shall constitute misuse of power." On this particular point, this Section considers that such objection becomes improper because, based on what has been stated regarding the particularities of the legal situation of the plaintiff company, all the elements pertaining to the validity of the administrative conduct, including the "purpose" element, deployed by INCOP, are fully in accordance with the Legality Block (Bloque de Legalidad). By reason of the foregoing, and because the decision rendered in the first instance conforms to the Legality Block, this aspect of the appeal must be rejected.

IV.- Regarding the grievance related to the admission of the defense of statute of limitations (caducidad de la acción). In relation to this aspect of the appeal, the plaintiff indicated in its appeal brief that: “The Court is not correct regarding the statute of limitations (caducidad) (Considering IV on the merits of the matter), given that in the specific case, my represented party alleged the absolute nullity (nulidad de pleno derecho) of the challenged acts (see filings of Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico); therefore, the four-year statute of limitations period runs. The ruling that the judge must issue concerns the merits, that is, the eventual nullity of an administrative act, which is what my represented party sought in the present litigation. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 984 of the Commercial Code, applicable to the species, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period is four years. Now then, the statute of limitations (caducidad) is a sanction for the inactivity of the parties, a fact that did not occur in the present case. For my represented party was attentive to the matter.” In this same vein, the plaintiff argued in its statement of grievances the following: “In the specific case, as I repeat, as inferred from the filings of the complaint and its formalization, absolute nullity is alleged. That is, we are faced with the challenge of acts classified by Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico as null and void ab initio (nulos de pleno derecho), both as to form, because NO hearing was given to my represented party regarding the Audit Report, which gave rise to the collection through fabricated and backdated invoices, which caused defenselessness (indefensión), violating the right of defense, as well as because the collection was made ‘manumilitari’ (summarily), that is, without any reasoned act existing and many years after the service was provided, and without having been timely warned that payment was not received to satisfaction, having granted, precisely, the departure clearance (zarpe), because the port administration was considered satisfied with the payment.” Upon review of the case file, it is noted that in the processing of the case at the trial court, some preliminary defenses were heard and resolved, reserving the defense of statute of limitations (caducidad de la acción) for judgment, a procedural moment in which, once the legal regularity of the administrative conduct whose annulment was sought had been determined, the defense of statute of limitations was admitted.

On this particular point, this Section considers that, as long as claims related to the declaration of absolute nullities are being heard in a proceeding, the proceeding must be allowed to proceed so that it may be heard and resolved on the merits, for it will only be upon such analysis by the judge that the existence or not of defects of such gravity implying the absolute nullity of the challenged acts can be determined, which will lead to the breaking of the ordinary two-month statute of limitations period for the action and, therefore, make possible the annulment of the act or acts challenged. Regarding the preliminary determination of the noted statute of limitations (caducidad) period, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has already indicated that: “XVII.- Regarding the foregoing, it is necessary to point out the following. This Chamber, since past times, has recognized the possibility that the administered party, in addition to seeking the declaration of absolute nullity of an administrative act, may claim payment for the damages caused by its application within the four-year period provided in Article 175 of the General Law of Public Administration. This is because said article, with respect to the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa), besides being later, turns out to be a special rule, concerning the challenge of absolutely null acts, in particular, regarding the statute of limitations (caducidad) period for filing administrative appeals and the contentious-administrative action. Therefore, the normal periods indicated in this normative body and in other provisions of the General Law of Public Administration itself are not applicable when what is alleged is the absolute nullity of the act.” (The original is not highlighted in bold) First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment No. 810-2003 of 9:45 a.m. on December 3, 2003. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in those cases where the defense of statute of limitations (caducidad de la acción) has been alleged, once the judge has carried out the analysis regarding the concurrence or not of the absolute nullity of the allegedly null acts, and their conformity with the Legality Block has been determined, or even, only defects pertaining to a relative nullity have been proven, a ruling must be made regarding the statute of limitations, and in such case, it may be declared even in the judgment. In this direction, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that: “XIV.- Analysis on the existence and type of nullity. Statute of limitations (Caducidad) of the action. In its sixth count, the appellant (casacionista) criticizes the injury to precept 175 of the General Law of Public Administration, by having applied the two-month statute of limitations period established by canon 37 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction to declare the statute of limitations of the action. In this regard, it should be noted that according to the provisions of the invoked Article 175, the power of the administered party to challenge an administrative act suffering from absolute nullity shall be four years. When the nullity is relative or the act is discussed in that jurisdiction for other aspects not associated with absolute nullity, the period to bring the action shall be two months counted from the exhaustion of the administrative channel in the case of express acts, as deduced from numeral 37 of the cited law. The contentious-administrative judge can declare the inadmissibility of the action or the lawsuit at three procedural moments: first, in the filing phase pursuant to the provisions of numeral 41 of the Regulatory Law; second, upon the filing of preliminary defenses in the terms of articles 50 and 60 ibidem; and third, in the final judgment, in accordance with numeral 60 of the law in question. In this last case, one of the causes giving rise to this declaration is the untimely filing of the action. In the species, it has been proven that the challenged acts were not burdened by severe nullity defects (absolute), and rather, there was no irregularity whatsoever either in their processing or their content. From this perspective, under the shelter of the alluded precept (canon 37), the period to file the lawsuit was two months, which at the time the plaintiff brought the action, were greatly exceeded, ergo, the statute of limitations of its action was imminent. Therefore, there exists no excess whatsoever in having admitted the defense of statute of limitations formulated by the representation of the State, for by virtue of what has been stated, this was the appropriate course within the specific factual framework of this litigation. In this way, no infraction of the cited norms is observed, which leads to the rejection of the count.” First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 907-2006 of 9:50 a.m. on November 17, 2006. By reason of the foregoing, and given that based on what was referred to in the preceding considerandos, this Court lacks sufficient evidentiary elements to consider that any of the appealed acts is substantially non-conforming with the Legality Block, to the point of constituting an absolute nullity, this aspect of the appeal must inevitably be rejected, for the declaration of statute of limitations is fully in accordance with the law.” Note that we are dealing with a public service, pursuant to the provisions of Article 5, subsection G, of Law 7593, the Law of the Regulatory Authority (Autoridad Reguladora) of Public Services; therefore, it was necessary to follow the procedure stipulated in Book II of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), especially Article 308 and following, since it involved establishing the liability of Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico SRL, for acts investigated by the audit (auditoría) years after the service had been provided, and that the vessel had been granted clearance to sail (zarpe) by the port authority, in which it is assumed that the liability of those responsible for the allegedly provided service not being invoiced should have been established, the criminal and administrative liability of the officials allegedly involved and of other entities must be established. 2) This has not been proven, because due process was not followed, making impossible the right of defense guaranteed in Article 39 of the POLITICAL CONSTITUTION (CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA) and consequently the right to due process contained in Article 41 of our Magna Carta, which is the right of contradiction consisting of: A) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; B) The right to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and offer pertinent evidence; C) Opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegations; which necessarily includes the right to information and to the administrative background records linked to the matter at hand; D) The right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; E) Adequate notification of the final decision issued by the administration and the grounds on which it is based; and F) The right of the interested party to appeal the decision rendered. This procedure governs any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration. In the case at hand, this did not occur; rather, without a prior investigation of liabilities, my represented party is sanctioned, even being suspended from activity in the ports administered by INCOP, and is expected to pay a multi-million sum for alleged services for which its liability has not been proven (...).

**This Tribunal considers that:** Based on the foregoing, it is clear to this Section that regarding the allegations concerning alleged violations of due process by the defendant entity, the appellant does not make any objection or challenge to the legal analysis or the relationship of norms made by the Judge of first instance, nor does it allege the inapplicability of the jurisprudential precedents cited by the A-quo and applied to the specific case. For this reason, having analyzed the records, this Section deems it necessary to highlight that it fully shares the *ratio decidendi* used by the judge of first instance to resolve this point of the claim. In addition to the above, it is necessary to indicate that since the appeal brief, as indicated supra, merely offers a reiteration of the arguments already analyzed in the appealed decision, which sets forth an extensive analysis regarding the nonexistence of the violations of due process alleged by the plaintiff, among which can be indicated: the communication of the preparatory acts in the proceeding conducted by the Audit Department of the defendant entity and the inapplicability to its case of precepts 308 and following of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which regulate the Ordinary Proceeding, the grievance under study in this recital cannot be accepted because, as the A-quo correctly stated, the administrative actions carried out by the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico did conform to the Block of Legality, which is comprehensive not only of written norms but also of unwritten norms. This clarification is of special importance in the present matter because the A-quo uses as one of the pillars of the appealed decision a jurisprudential precedent from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in which the scope and content of the due process of collection of the defendant are specifically analyzed, which do not produce the defenselessness alleged by the plaintiff and were not accredited in the present case. For the reasons stated, this part of the appeal must inevitably be rejected.

**III.- Regarding the grievance relating to the alleged absolute nullity of the administrative actions of INCOP, directed at effecting the administrative collection against the plaintiff company:** Regarding this part of the appeal, the plaintiff stated in its appeal brief: *“In the port administration, in the present case INCOP, the administrative authority that had to verify and invoice before authorizing the clearance to sail (zarpe) of the vessels, the services it had provided, which are outside the function of a shipping agent, who is the natural or legal person acting as an independent intermediary in the name and on behalf of the shipowner or carrier who has contracted them, while the vessel is at the terminal (terminal); (...) what the Judge A-quo intends is to transfer that responsibility to the shipping agent who does nothing more than request services on behalf and at the risk of the Shipowner or carrier, as these are the users within the port and the ones called upon to pay for the services, that is why the port authority is the one that grants clearance to sail (zarpe) (...), in the case of INCOP, as a port entity, it must verify the G.R.T (Gross Register Tonnage) that comes in the documents held by the Ship's Captain, in order to define what services the vessel requires, mainly towing. That is not the responsibility of the shipping agent as the Administrative Contentious Judge intends. The responsibility is from when it docks until the vessel leaves by order of the port authority, this same authority performs the operation, controls the port services, and based on that issues the invoice for port services, which are those provision activities tending to achieve the purposes for which the authority is established. The activities and responsibilities of a shipping agent are: 1- Provide service and attention to the vessel and crew. 2 - Perform, on behalf of the carrier or shipowner, administrative and technical steps related to the vessel's stay, but this does not imply the exercise of authority. It should be clarified that before the vessel's arrival, the shipping agent prepares the proforma invoice based on the specific information the carrier or shipowner sends them and presents it to the port authority. The ship's captain carries the documentation that is later given to the port authority in the official visit so that the authority verifies the information. The shipping agent (agent of the carrier or shipowner) should not be confused with the consignee of the goods (the person to whom the goods are addressed). The port authority, in this case INCOP, which is an autonomous entity under public law, therefore with legal personality, enjoys full capacity to act and is responsible for the control of the entire operation during the vessel's stay and issues the final invoice with the services provided to the ship. Once the services are verified and the final invoice issued, it grants clearance to sail (zarpe) for the ship to continue its journey; the shipowner is responsible for the port costs and the cost of handling the goods, therefore is responsible for all problems resulting from the operation of the vessel and the port operation. The shipping company, which the Judge apparently does not have clear, is the natural or legal person who, using their own or others' merchant vessels, is dedicated to their exploitation. The shipping agent, as is the case of my represented party, assists the vessel during its stay in port, and receives payments from the shipowner in accordance with the final invoice issued by the port authority. It is necessary to point out that at the time the alleged events occurred, the services of cargo manifest, stevedoring (estiba), and towing were provided by INCOP, an entity that had to control that they were provided, as it is also the entity that charged for them. The captain is the representative of the shipowner. The shipowner is the maritime merchant. The shipping agent acts on behalf and at the risk of the shipowner. (...) There is also the defect of diversion of power because, besides the fact that the other has an unlawful purpose not foreseen by the legal system, the aim is to charge my represented party AGENCIA DE VAPORES DEL PACÍFICO S.R.L. an alleged debt it does not owe, as it was not proven to be its responsibility but rather, if true, is due to administrative deficiencies of the same port authority, which finds it very easy to transfer to a third party, who did nothing more, according to law, than represent a shipowner's vessel during its stay, on behalf and at the risk of that shipowner. The lack of passive standing is evident because my represented party owes absolutely nothing; if any debt existed, the collection must be directed to the shipowner or to the negligent official who allowed this, granting a final invoice and authorizing the vessel's clearance to sail (zarpe). (...) Moreover, it is evident that the payment in question does not proceed against my represented party, insofar as it acted as a Shipping Agent, an organ that represents the shipowner in the steps and operations of unloading and dispatch of goods, while the vessel is in the port facilities; once the vessel sails (zarpa), because the port administration authorizes it since it considers itself satisfied with the payment made by the Shipowner, all representation ceases, which is why the port administration is the one that decides the clearance to sail (zarpe). (see Article 375 of the Code of Commerce). The Contentious Tribunal must understand that the mandate held by the Shipping Agent is limited to the exercise of its management as an agent solely to fulfill the task, which are the activities for which it is contracted; once the ship has sailed, there is no liability whatsoever of the shipping agent. To claim the contrary is arbitrary, illegitimate, illogical, with evident diversion of power and entails de facto actions, for which the lack of passive standing for this collection regarding the Shipping Agent is evident. (...) Let the ad quen (sic) note that the port administration proceeded many years later to create invoices allegedly for services provided long ago that were not charged for and directs the collection against the Shipping Agent when its management has already ceased. The legal acts that corresponded to it as a Shipping Agent have ceased; therefore, it can no longer be liable for the actions of the shipowner, since it represents the shipowner only in matters related to the attention of the vessel and while it is inside the port facilities.”* From the foregoing, it is clear that the plaintiff seeks a declaration of absolute nullity of administrative actions of INCOP, based on its capacity as an agent because it is a shipping agent not acting in its own name and on its own behalf. On this particular, the Judge of first instance stated in the appealed decision: *“From the foregoing, it is understood that being a shipowner or carrier is one thing, and being a vessel’s shipping agent is something very different. The functions are distinct, and so are the services provided and the remuneration received. The shipowner is dedicated to carrying out transport, has control of the transport and the goods from when they are received at the port of loading until they are delivered at the agreed place, and during the entire transport. The agent, per its relationship with the shipowner, is limited to a series of administrative tasks in the port where its offices are located; it does not intervene at all in the execution of the transport, does not have control of the goods during it, either directly or through employees, has no decision-making power regarding the route to be taken, the type of goods to be transported, the crew to be employed; the vessels it consigns are not its own nor are they chartered by it. Finally, it does not charge for carrying out any transport since it does not perform it, but rather simply charges a sum for its services. Added to the above, let it be clear that it is indeed a mandate, and in principle there is no liability on the part of the shipping agent regarding third parties who are not its direct client, despite which, regarding the liability of the Shipping Agent, our legal system contains a norm that contemplates this type of commercial relationship, contained in Article 233 of the Code of Commerce, on the representation of foreign companies and corporations, applicable to the present case for what will be stated. The cited article reads: 'Article 233.- He who, in the name of a foreign person or company, advertises or conducts business as an agent or representative, **without being provided with the documents that accredit him as an attorney-in-fact, shall incur joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) for the obligations contracted and that must be fulfilled in the country**, without prejudice to the criminal liability he may face if fraud was involved.' The article in question covers activities that, among other reasons, due to custom or the dynamic nature of commercial activity, - where in matters of port services as in airport services generally involved with the transport of goods, facilitation is a critical component -, are performed by representation informally, but in good faith, without the accreditation of a valid and effective legal documentary instrument of mandate or power of attorney, which, as in the case of the shipping agent, is not customary, or is not necessary, the word of the authorized agent being sufficient for the Administration to consider as existing or to presume the relationship between the agent, and the vessel to be served, be it the shipowner or carrier. The cited numeral provides a solution to the need that for some series of commercial activities, the insurmountable condition be the duty to accredit representation, through the formalization and presentation of the legal instruments that, in accordance with the law, are appropriate and customary, in order to attest to the existence of such representation, which can represent an obstacle to commercial flow, exempting from such requirement, in favor of, or with the object of streamlining commerce and not creating obstacles to it, with the simple expression of such circumstance, offering as a solution, yes, that the liability for any obligation assumed in the country be attributable jointly and severally to the agent **or representative**, who claims to act in the name of a third party. A framework of protection is thus provided to third parties who relate with this agent, so that the non-requirement of such accreditation does not generate an obstacle to commercial activity, in such a way that the liability of the vessel owners, shipowner or carrier, when represented by the word of their agent, extends its liability to the latter, thereby avoiding the formalization of additional procedures. Obviously being a shipowner is one thing and being an agent or vessel consignee is very different. The shipowner is dedicated to carrying out transport, has control of the transport and the goods from when they are received at the port of loading until they are delivered at the agreed place and during the entire transport; the vessel consignee, on the contrary, is limited to a series of administrative tasks in the port where its offices are located and does not intervene at all in the execution of the transport, the vessels it represents are not its own nor are they chartered by it, and of course it cannot sell or abandon them. Finally, it does not charge for carrying out any transport since it does not perform it but rather simply charges a sum in concept of payment for the representation and management services it provides. But on the other hand, regarding its liability to the Administration, the provision of Article 233 of the Code of Commerce, as observed, provides for the liability of this type of agents who completely substitute for the shipowner or carrier in the port. In this way and under the circumstances in which this type of port activities are carried out, Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico S.R.L., is jointly and severally liable with its represented parties, in its capacity as agent before the Administration, for the obligations that must be fulfilled in the country, among others, those generated by the obligations derived from the provision of services that, in representation of its clients, are required as a consequence of the shipping operations at the site. The thesis argued by the plaintiff, in the sense that its activities, being a mandate of representation – which is taken as proven – do not generate liability on its part before INCOP for these concepts, but rather that the same corresponds exclusively to the shipping companies or carriers, cannot be accepted. The contractual formulas under which the shipping agent and its represented parties establish the conditions under which their commercial relations operate, in order to foresee this type of circumstance, are a separate matter, which is not the subject of this instrument, so the defect of absolute nullity regarding this point is not present.”* Based on all of the foregoing, this Tribunal deems that this part of the appeal cannot be accepted because, although there is no dispute about the legal status of the plaintiff and the nature of its actions, which intrinsically are typical of a mandate relationship, the truth is that the A-quo is correct regarding the application in the sub lite of canon 233 of the Code of Commerce, a precept which, by express provision of the legislator, expressly enshrines a joint and several liability of agents, which is the case of the plaintiff company. For its part, the specific questioning also made in the appeal brief, regarding the fact that canon 375 of the Code of Commerce should have been applied in the process at issue, cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, said ordinal was repealed by the General Customs Law, Law No. 7557 of October 20, 1995, and consequently was not in force at the time the events occurred. Secondly, such argument would not be applicable either, because even if it were in force, the referred norm referenced customs agents or brokers, a function that does not conform to those performed by the plaintiff company. Finally, regarding the observation made by the plaintiff concerning the alleged existence of a Diversion of Power by INCOP, given that said entity proceeded to pursue an unlawful purpose by effecting the above-indicated collection to its detriment, it is necessary to indicate that subsection 3 of Article 131 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), when referring to said institute stipulates: "The pursuit of a purpose other than the principal one, to the detriment of the latter, shall constitute diversion of power." On this point, this Section considers that such objection becomes inadmissible because, based on what has been stated regarding the particularities of the legal situation of the plaintiff company, all the elements pertaining to the validity of the administrative actions, including the "purpose" element deployed by INCOP, are fully adjusted to the Block of Legality. For this reason, and because the decision at first instance conforms to the Block of Legality, this part of the appeal must be rejected.

**IV.- Regarding the grievance relating to the acceptance of the exception of the expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción).** In relation to this part of the appeal, the plaintiff stated in its appeal brief that: *“The Court is not correct regarding the expiration (caducidad) (Recital IV on the merits of the matter) since in the specific case my represented party alleged the absolute nullity (nulidad de pleno derecho) of the contested acts (see briefs of Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico), therefore the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) of four years applies. The ruling that the judge must issue concerns the merits, i.e., the eventual nullity of an administrative act, which is what my represented party sought in the present litigation. Furthermore, according to Article 984 of the Code of Commerce, applicable to the species, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period is four years. Now then, expiration (caducidad) is a sanction for the inactivity of the parties, a fact that did not occur in the present case. For my represented party was attentive to the matter.”* In this same direction, the plaintiff argued in its expression of grievances brief, the following: *“In the specific case, as I repeat, as inferred from the briefs of filing and formalization of the claim, absolute nullity is alleged. That is, we are faced with the challenge of acts qualified by Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico as absolutely null, both in form, because NO hearing was given to my represented party regarding the Audit Report, which gave rise to the collection through spurious and backdated invoices, which caused defenselessness, violating the right of defense, as well as because the collection was made ‘manumilitari’, that is, without there being a grounded act and many years after the service was provided and without having been opportune warned that payment was not received to satisfaction, having granted, precisely, the clearance to sail (zarpe), because the port administration considered itself satisfied with the payment.”* Upon review of the records, it is evident that in the processing of the case at first instance, some preliminary defenses were heard and resolved, reserving that of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) for judgment, a procedural moment in which, once the legal regularity of the administrative actions whose annulment was sought was determined, the exception of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) was accepted. On this point, this Section considers that, insofar as claims relating to the declaration of absolute nullities are being heard in a process, the process must proceed so that it may be heard and decided on the merits because, it will only be until such analysis by the judge, that the existence or not of defects of such gravity that imply the absolute nullity of the contested acts can be determined, which will lead to the rupture of the ordinary expiration period (plazo de caducidad) of the action of two months and therefore make possible the annulment of the act or acts under attack. Regarding the preliminary determination of the noted expiration period (término de caducidad), the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has already indicated that: *“XVII.- On the referred matter, it is necessary to point out the following. This Chamber, since former times, has recognized the possibility that the administered party, in addition to seeking the declaration of absolute nullity of an administrative act, may claim the payment of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by its application within the four-year period provided for in Article 175 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This* This because said provision, with respect to the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, besides being subsequent, constitutes a special rule concerning the challenge of absolutely null acts, particularly regarding the statute of limitations for filing administrative appeals and the administrative contentious action. Therefore, the normal time limits set forth in this regulatory body and in other provisions of the Ley General de la Administración Pública itself do not apply **when what is alleged is the absolute nullity of the act**." (The original is not highlighted in bold) Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Judgment No. 810-2003 of 9:45 a.m. on December 3, 2003. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in those cases where the statute of limitations defense has been raised, once the judge has conducted the analysis regarding the concurrence or not of absolute nullity of the allegedly null acts, and their conformity with the Block of Legality has been determined, or even when only defects pertaining to a relative nullity have been proven, it is necessary to rule on the statute of limitations of the action, and in such case, it may even be decreed in the judgment. In this regard, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has indicated that: **"XIV.- Analysis of the existence and type of nullity. Statute of limitations of the action. In her sixth charge, the appellant criticizes the infringement of precept 175 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by having applied the two-month statute of limitations period established by canon 37 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa to declare the statute of limitations of the action. In this regard, it should be noted that according to the provisions of the invoked Article 175, the power of the** administered party to challenge an administrative act suffering from absolute nullity shall be four years. When the nullity is relative or the act is discussed in that jurisdiction for other aspects not associated with absolute nullity, the period for filing the action shall be two months from the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the case of express acts, as deduced from numeral 37 of the cited law. The administrative contentious judge may declare the inadmissibility of the action or the claim at three procedural moments: first, at the filing stage in accordance with the provisions of numeral 41 of the Ley Reguladora; second, upon the filing of preliminary defenses under the terms of ordinals 50 and 60 ibidem; and third, in the final judgment, according to what is indicated by numeral 60 of the law in question. In this last scenario, one of the grounds allowing this declaration is the untimely filing of the action. In the case at hand, it has been demonstrated that the challenged acts were not burdened by severe nullity defects (absolute), and rather, there was no irregularity whatsoever, either in their procedure or in their content. From this standpoint, in light of the aforementioned precept (canon 37), the period for filing the claim was two months, which, at the time the plaintiff exercised the action, had been vastly exceeded; ergo, the statute of limitations for her action was imminent. Therefore, there is no grievance whatsoever in having upheld the statute of limitations defense raised by the State's representation, as, by virtue of the foregoing, this was the proper course within the particular factual framework of this litigation. Thus, no infringement of the cited rules is observed, which leads to the rejection of the charge." Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, judgment 907-2006 of 9:50 a.m. on November 17, 2006. By reason of the foregoing, and given that from what has been stated in the preceding recitals, this Court lacks sufficient elements of judgment to allow it to consider that any of the appealed acts is substantially inconsistent with the Block of Legality, to the point of constituting an absolute nullity, this aspect of the appeal must inevitably be rejected, for the declaration of the statute of limitations is fully in accordance with the law." Thus, this office considers that, once the analysis of the aforementioned aspects has been carried out, the actions performed by INCOP do not contain the absolute nullity defects that the plaintiff refers to in its claim; therefore, as mentioned in point 1 of this section on the merits of the case, it is necessary to proceed to determine whether the caducity or statute of limitations (prescripción) of the action has occurred in the present case or not, which will be discussed below." In this regard, in its appeal brief, the plaintiff argues: "In the case at hand, the aim is to restore the legality violated by an arbitrary material action of the Public Administration, as it is evident that the norm or procedure indicated by law was not observed, since by issuing fabricated invoices after the administration, within its competence and under its full responsibility, granted clearance (zarpe) to the vessels, and considered itself satisfied with the payment by those users of the dock, it comes several years later to issue fabricated invoices, without following the legal procedure to demonstrate that the service had been provided, without giving my represented party the opportunity to refute the audit report, but instead manifestly makes the charge, without granting us a hearing regarding the amount, without allowing us to demonstrate whether that service was provided or not. (...) that in addition to the aforementioned defect, they entail the defect of lack of due process, since the existing administrative procedures were not followed for my represented party by the administration, thus denying its right to defense. Mr. Eduardo Ortiz states: 'the lack or defect of substantial formalities produces the absolute nullity of the act when these are decisive to ensure the fulfillment of the purpose or the rights of the individual.' (Thesis of Administrative Law, Volume II, Editorial Strademann S. A. San José, 2000, page 442). In the matter under review, in accordance with reiterated case law, the procedure stipulated for this type of charge was not followed. Note that we are dealing with a public service, according to the provisions of Article 5, subsection G, of Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services No. 7593, therefore it was necessary to follow the procedure stipulated in Book II of the General Law of Public Administration, especially Article 308 et seq., since it was a matter of establishing the liability of Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico SRL, in events investigated by the audit years after the service had been provided, and that the vessel had been granted clearance (zarpe) by the port authority, in which it is supposed that the liability of those responsible for the fact that this allegedly provided service was not invoiced should have been established; the criminal and administrative liability of the allegedly involved officials and other entities should be established, 2) this has not been proven, because due process was not followed, making impossible the right of defense guaranteed in Article 39 of the POLITICAL CONSTITUTION and consequently that of due process contained in Article 41 of our Magna Carta, which is the right of contradiction consisting of: A) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; B) Right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and offer pertinent evidence; C) Opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegation; which necessarily includes the right to information and to the administrative records, linked to the matter in question; D) Right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; E) Adequate notification of the final decision issued by the administration and the reasons on which it is based; and F) Right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued. This procedure governs any administrative procedure carried out by the public administration. In the case at hand, this did not occur, but rather, without prior investigation of liabilities, my represented party is sanctioned, including suspending its activity in the ports administered by INCOP, and intending for it to pay a multi-million sum for alleged services in which its liability has not been proven (...)." **This Court considers that:** Based on the foregoing, it is clear to this Section that regarding the allegations concerning alleged violations of due procedure by the defendant entity, the appellant does not make any objection or challenge to the legal analysis nor the list of norms made by the trial court Judge, nor does it claim the inapplicability of the jurisprudential precedents cited by the A-quo and applied to the specific case. By reason of the foregoing, having analyzed the case file, this Section finds it necessary to emphasize that it fully shares the *ratio decidendi* used by the trial court judge to resolve this part of the claim. In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to indicate that given that in the appeal brief, as indicated above, only a reiteration of the arguments already analyzed in the appealed ruling is offered, in which a broad analysis is presented regarding the non-existence of the due process violations indicated by the plaintiff, among which may be noted: the communication of the preparatory acts in the procedure carried out by the Audit of the defendant entity, and the inadmissibility of applying to its case precepts 308 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration, which regulate the Ordinary Procedure, the grievance that is the subject of study in this Considerando cannot be accepted because, as the A-quo correctly stated, the administrative conduct developed by the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico did adhere to the Legality Block, which includes not only written norms but also unwritten norms. This clarification is especially important in the present matter because the A-quo uses as one of the pillars of the appealed ruling a jurisprudential precedent of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) that specifically analyzes the scope and content of the due collection procedure of the defendant, which did not produce the defenselessness alleged by the plaintiff and was not proven in the present case. For the reasons stated, this part of the appeal must inevitably be rejected.

III.- **Of the grievance concerning the alleged absolute nullity of the administrative conduct of INCOP aimed at making the administrative charge to the plaintiff company:** Regarding this part of the appeal, the plaintiff stated in its appeal brief: *"In the port administration, in the present case INCOP, the administrative authority that had to verify and invoice, before authorizing the clearance (zarpe) of the vessels, the services it had provided, which are beyond the function of the shipping agent, who is the natural or legal person acting as an independent intermediary in the name and on behalf of the shipowner or operator that has contracted them, while the vessel is in the terminal; (...) what Mr. Contentious-Administrative Judge seeks is to transfer that responsibility to the shipping agent who only requests services on behalf and at the risk of the shipowner or operator, as these are the users within the port and the ones called to pay for the services; that is why the port authority is the one that grants clearance (zarpe) (...), in the case of INCOP, as a port entity, it must verify the G.R.T (Gross Register Tonnage) that comes in the documents held by the ship's Captain, in order to define which services the vessel requires, mainly towing. That is not the responsibility of the shipping agent as the Contentious-Administrative Judge claims. The responsibility runs from the moment the vessel docks until it departs by order of the port authority, this same entity carries out the operation, controls the port services, and based on that issues the invoice for port services, which are those provision activities that tend to achieve the purposes for which the authority is established. The activities and responsibilities of a shipping agent are: 1- Provide service and attention to the vessel and its crew. 2 - Carry out on behalf of the shipowner or operator the administrative and technical tasks related to the vessel's stay, but this does not imply an exercise of authority. It should be clarified that prior to the arrival of the vessel, the shipping agent prepares the proforma invoice based on the specific information that the shipowner or operator sends and presents it to the port authority. The ship's captain is the one who carries the documentation that is subsequently delivered to the port authority during the official visit so that it can corroborate the information. The shipping agent (mandatary of the shipowner or operator) should not be confused with the consignee of the merchandise (the one to whom the merchandise is destined). The port authority, in this case, is INCOP, which is an autonomous entity under public law, therefore with legal personality, enjoys full capacity to act, and is responsible for the control of the entire operation during the vessel's stay and issues the final invoice with the services provided to the ship, and once the services have been verified and the final invoice issued, it grants clearance (zarpe) for the vessel to continue its voyage; the shipowner is responsible for the port expenses and the cost of handling the merchandise, therefore it is responsible for all problems resulting from the operation of the vessel and the port operation. The shipping company, which the Judge seems not to be clear about, is the natural or legal person who, using own or third-party merchant vessels, is dedicated to their exploitation. The shipping agent, as is the case with my represented party, provides assistance to the vessel during its stay in the port, and receives payments from the shipowner according to the final invoice issued by the port authority. It is necessary to point out that at the time the alleged events occurred, the services of cargo manifest, stevedoring, and towing were provided by Incop, an entity that had to control that they occurred, as it is also the one that charged for them. The captain is the representative of the shipowner. The shipowner is the maritime merchant. The shipping agent acts on behalf and at the risk of the shipowner. (...) There is also the defect of misuse of power (desviación de poder) because, in addition to the act having an unlawful purpose not foreseen by the legal system, since the intention is to charge my represented party AGENCIA DE VAPORES DEL PACÍFICO S.R.L. an alleged debt it does not owe, as it has not been proven to be its responsibility, but rather, if it is true, it arises from administrative deficiencies of the port authority itself, which finds it very easy to shift the blame to a third party, which only did, according to the law, represent the operator during the stay of a vessel, on behalf and at the risk of that operator. The lack of passive standing is evident, as my represented party owes absolutely nothing; if any debt existed, the charge should be directed to the shipowner or the negligent official who allowed this, by issuing a final invoice and authorizing the vessel's clearance (zarpe). (...) Furthermore, it is evident that the payment in question does not proceed against my represented party, because it acted as a Shipping Agent, an entity that represents the shipowner in the procedures and operations of disembarkation and dispatch of merchandise, while the vessel is in the port facilities; once the vessel sets sail, because the port administration authorizes it as it considers itself satisfied with the payment made by the shipowner, all representation ceases; it is for this circumstance that the port administration is the one that decides the clearance (zarpe). (See Article 375 of the Commercial Code. The Contentious-Administrative Court must understand that the mandate held by the Shipping Agent is limited to the exercise of its management as an agent solely to fulfill the assignment, which are the activities for which it is hired; once the vessel has set sail, the shipping agent no longer has any liability; to claim otherwise is arbitrary, illegitimate, illogical, with evident misuse of power and entails actions by way of de facto paths, which makes evident the lack of passive standing for this charge against the Shipping Agent. (...) Let the ad quem (sic) take note that the port administration proceeded many years later to prepare the invoices, presumably for services previously provided that were not charged, and directs the charge against the Shipping Agent when its management has already ceased. The legal acts that it was responsible for as a Shipping Agent have ceased; therefore, it can no longer be held responsible for the shipowner's actions, as it only represents the shipowner in matters related to the vessel's attention and while the vessel is in the port facilities".* From the foregoing, it is clear that the plaintiff seeks a declaration of absolute nullity of administrative conduct of INCOP, based on its character as a mandatary for being a shipping agent that is not acting in its own name and on its own behalf. On this particular, the trial court Judge stated in the appealed ruling: *"From the foregoing, it is understood that being a shipowner or operator is one thing, and being a shipping agent for vessels is quite another. The functions are different, and so are the services provided and the remunerations received. The shipowner is dedicated to carrying out transports, has control of the transport and the merchandise from the moment it is received at the port of loading until it is delivered at the agreed place, and throughout the entire transport. The agent, in view of its relationship with the shipowner, is limited to a series of administrative tasks in the port where its offices are located, does not intervene in any way in the execution of the transport, has no control over the merchandise during the same, neither directly nor through employees, has no decision-making power regarding the route to be taken, the type of merchandise to be transported, the crew to be employed, the vessels it represents are not its own nor are they chartered by it. Finally, it does not charge for carrying out any transport since it does not do so, but rather simply charges a sum for its services. In addition to the foregoing, it must be clear that it is indeed a mandate, and in principle, there is no liability on the part of the shipping agent towards third parties who are not its direct client, despite which, regarding the liability of the Shipping Agent, our legal system has a norm that contemplates this type of commercial relationships, contained in Article 233 of the Commercial Code, on the representation of foreign companies and partnerships, applicable to the present case for what will be stated. The cited article reads: 'Article 233.- Whoever, in the name of a foreign person or company, advertises or does business as an agent or representative, **without being provided with the documents that accredit them as an attorney-in-fact, shall incur joint and several liability regarding the obligations contracted and that must be fulfilled in the country**, without prejudice to any criminal liability if fraud has been involved.' The article in question covers activities which, among other reasons, due to custom or the dynamic nature of commercial activity, -where in matters of port and airport services generally involved with the transport of merchandise, facilitation is a critical component-, are carried out by representation informally, but in good faith, without the accreditation of a valid and effective documentary legal instrument of mandate or power of attorney, which, as in the case of the shipping agent, is not customary, or is not necessary, the word of the authorized agent being sufficient for the Administration to consider as existing or to presume the relationship between the latter and the vessel to be served, be it the shipowner or operator. The cited article presents a solution to the need that, for a certain series of commercial activities, the duty to prove representation must be an unavoidable condition through the formalization and presentation of the legal instruments that, in accordance with the law, are appropriate and customary, in order to attest to the existence of such representation, which can represent an obstacle to commercial flow, exempting from such a requirement, in favor of, or with the purpose of streamlining trade and not creating obstacles to it, with the simple expression of such circumstance, providing as a solution, however, that the responsibility for any obligation assumed in the country is jointly attributable to the mandatary **or representative**, who claims to act in the name of a third party. A protection framework is thereby provided for third parties who interact with this agent, so that the non-requirement of such accreditation does not generate an obstacle to commercial activity, in such a way that the liability of the vessel owners, shipowner or operator, upon being represented by the word of their mandatary, extends its liability to the latter, thereby avoiding the formalization of additional procedures. Obviously, being a shipowner is one thing, and being an agent or consignee of vessels is quite another. The shipowner is dedicated to carrying out transports, has control of the transport and the merchandise from the moment it is received at the port of loading until it is delivered at the agreed place and throughout the entire transport; the vessel consignee, on the contrary, is limited to a series of administrative tasks in the port where its offices are located and does not intervene in any way in the execution of the transport, the vessels it represents are not its own nor chartered by it, and of course, it cannot sell or abandon them. Finally, it does not charge for carrying out any transport since it does not do so, but simply charges a sum by way of payment for the representation and management services it provides. On the other hand, however, regarding its liability before the Administration, the provision of Article 233 of the Commercial Code, as observed, stipulates the liability of this type of agents who completely substitute the shipowner or operator in the port. In this way, and under the circumstances in which this type of port activity is carried out, Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico S.R.L. is jointly and severally liable with its represented parties, in its condition as agent before the Administration, for the obligations that must be fulfilled in the country, among others, those generated by the obligations derived from the provision of services that, on behalf of its clients, they require because of the shipping operations at the site. The thesis argued by the plaintiff, in the sense that its activities, being a mandate of representation, -which is considered proven-, do not generate liability on its part before INCOP for these concepts, but that this corresponds exclusively to the shipping companies or operators, is therefore not admissible. The contractual formulas under which the shipping agent and its represented parties establish the conditions under which their commercial relations operate, in order to foresee such circumstances, are a matter outside of this instrument, so the defect of absolute nullity regarding this point does not occur."* Based on all of the foregoing, this Court considers that this part of the appeal is not admissible because, although the legal condition of the plaintiff and the nature of its actions are beyond all discussion, which are intrinsically typical of a mandate relationship, the truth is that the A-quo is correct regarding the application in the sub lite of canon 233 of the Commercial Code, a precept that, by express provision of the legislator, expressly enshrines joint and several liability of agents, which is the case of the plaintiff company. For its part, the specific challenge also made in the appeal brief, regarding the fact that canon 375 of the Commercial Code should have been applied in the process in question, is not admissible for two reasons; first, said article was repealed by the General Customs Law, Law No. 7557 of October 20, 1995, and consequently was not in force at the time the events occurred. Second, this argument would also not be applicable, because even if it were in force, the aforementioned norm referred to customs agents or brokers, a function that does not match those carried out by the plaintiff company. Finally, regarding the indication made by the plaintiff concerning the alleged existence of a Misuse of Power (Desviación de Poder) by INCOP, given that said entity proceeded to pursue an unlawful purpose by making the aforementioned charge to its detriment, it is necessary to indicate that subsection 3 of Article 131 of the General Law of Public Administration, when referring to that legal concept, stipulates: "The pursuit of a purpose other than the principal one, to the detriment of the latter, shall be misuse of power". On this particular, this Section considers that such objection becomes inadmissible because, based on what has been stated regarding the particularities of the legal situation of the plaintiff company, all the elements pertaining to the validity of the administrative conduct, including the element "purpose," deployed by INCOP, are fully in accordance with the Legality Block. By reason of the foregoing, and because what was resolved in the first instance conforms to the Legality Block, this part of the appeal must be rejected.

IV.- **Of the grievance concerning the acceptance of the exception of caducity of the action.** In relation to this part of the appeal, the plaintiff indicated in its appeal brief that: "*The Court is not correct regarding caducity (Considerando IV on the merits of the case), given that in the specific case, my represented party alleged the nullity by full right of the challenged acts (see the filings of Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico), therefore the four-year caducity period runs. The pronouncement that the judge must issue deals with the merits, that is, the possible nullity of an administrative act, which is what my represented party sought in the present litis. Furthermore, according to Article 984 of the Commercial Code, applicable to the species, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period is four years. Now, caducity is a sanction for the inactivity of the parties, a fact that did not occur in the present case, as my represented party was attentive to the matter."* In this same direction, the plaintiff argued in its statement of grievances brief, the following: "*In the specific case, as I repeat, as inferred from the filing and the formalization briefs of the claim, absolute nullity is alleged. That is, we are facing the challenge of acts classified by Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico as null by full right, both due to form, because my represented party was NOT given a hearing on the Audit Report that gave rise to the charge through fabricated and backdated (antefechadas) invoices, which caused defenselessness, violating the right of defense, as well as because the charge was made 'extrajudicially' (manumilitari), that is, without a founded act existing, and many years after the service was provided and without having been warned in a timely manner that the payment was not received satisfactorily, having granted, precisely the clearance (zarpe), because the port administration considered itself satisfied with the payment."* Having reviewed the case file, it is found that during the processing of the case at the instance level, some preliminary defenses were considered and resolved, reserving that of caducity of the action for the judgment, a procedural stage in which, once the legal regularity of the administrative conduct whose annulment was sought was determined, the exception of caducity of the action was accepted.

…on the action.

On this particular point, this Section considers that, given that in a process claims related to the declaration of absolute nullities are being heard, the process must proceed so that it may be heard and resolved on the merits, since it will only be upon said analysis by the adjudicator that the existence or not of defects of such gravity implying the absolute nullity of the challenged acts can be determined, which will lead to the breaking of the ordinary two-month expiration period (plazo de caducidad) for the action, thus making the annulment of the act or acts under attack possible. Regarding the preliminary determination of the noted expiration period, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has stated that: “XVII.- On the matter referred to, it is necessary to point out the following. This Chamber, since times past, has recognized the possibility for the administered party, besides seeking the declaration of absolute nullity of an administrative act, to claim payment for the damages and losses caused by its application within the four-year period provided for in article 175 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This is because said numeral, regarding the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa), besides being subsequent law, is the special norm concerning the challenge of absolutely null acts, in particular with respect to the expiration period for filing administrative remedies and the contentious-administrative action. Therefore, the normal periods set out in this normative body and in other provisions of the General Law of Public Administration itself, are not applicable when what is claimed is the absolute nullity of the act.” (The original is not highlighted in bold). First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment No. 810-2003 of 9 hours 45 minutes of December 3, 2003. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in those cases where the exception of expiration of the action has been raised, once the adjudicator has carried out the analysis regarding the concurrence or not of the absolute nullity of the allegedly null acts, and their conformity with the Legality Framework (Bloque de Legalidad) has been determined, or even only defects pertaining to a relative nullity have been proven, it is necessary to rule regarding the expiration of the action, with it being possible in such a case to decree it even in the judgment. In this direction, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated that: “XIV.- Analysis regarding the existence and type of nullity. Expiration of the action. In its sixth charge, the appellant reproaches the injury of precept 175 of the General Law of Public Administration, the two-month expiration period established by canon 37 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction having been applied to declare the expiration of the action. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate that according to what is provided by invoked article 175, the power of the administered party to challenge the administrative act that suffers from absolute nullity shall be four years. When the nullity is relative, or the act is discussed in that jurisdiction for other aspects not associated with absolute nullity, the period for formulating the action shall be two months counted from the exhaustion of the administrative route in the case of express acts, as emerges from numeral 37 of the cited law. The contentious-administrative judge may declare the inadmissibility of the action or the claim at three procedural moments, first; in the filing phase in accordance with what is provided by numeral 41 of the Regulatory Law, second; upon the filing of preliminary defenses under the terms of ordinals 50 and 60 ibidem, and third; in the final judgment, according to what is indicated by numeral 60 of the law in question. In this last scenario, one of the causes that gives way to this declaration is the untimely presentation of the action. In the species, it has been proven that the challenged acts were not burdened by defects of a severe (absolute) nullity, and moreover, there was no irregularity whatsoever neither in their procedure nor in their content. From this point, under the shelter of the alluded precept (canon 37), the period to formulate the claim was two months, which, at the moment the plaintiff exercised the action, had been widely exceeded, ergo, the expiration of her action was imminent. Therefore, no unconstitutionality whatsoever exists since the exception of expiration formulated by the representation of the State was upheld, since by virtue of the aforementioned, this was the appropriate course within the particular factual framework of this litigation. Thus, no infringement of the cited norms is observed, which leads to the rejection of the charge.” First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment 907-2006 of 9 hours 50 minutes of November 17, 2006. By reason of the foregoing, and given that from what has been stated in the prior considering clauses, this Tribunal lacks sufficient elements of judgment that would permit it to deem that any of the appealed acts is substantially non-conforming with the Legality Framework, to the point of constituting an absolute nullity, this aspect of the appeal must unavoidably be rejected, as the declaration of expiration is fully in accordance with the law.”

“II.- Del agravio relativo a la violación del debido proceso en la tramitación del cobro administrativo por parte del INCOP: En su deducción de la demanda, la parte actora señaló una serie de presuntas violaciones al debido procedimiento, de las que supuestamente fue objeto el trámite de cobro administrativo. Sobre este particular en la sentencia recurrida el A-quo indicó en el considerando IV: “a) En relación con la observancia debido proceso y derecho de defensa, desviación y abuso de poder: En lo que se relaciona con los informes de las auditorías internas, no lleva razón la actora en cuanto a que debió contarse con audiencia en su favor y participación de conformidad con el principio del debido proceso, pues los mismos no requieren de su participación como lo es este caso, particularmente si los mismos involucran investigaciones internas relacionadas con posibles irregularidades que eventualmente generen responsabilidad de los servidores, por lo que no es de recibo. La Sala Constitucional se ha referido, en el siguiente sentido: "(...) En este sentido, los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 6 de la Ley General de Control Interno número 8292 del 31 de julio de 2002, establecen que “la información, documentación y otras evidencias de las investigaciones que efectúan las auditorías internas, la administración y la Contraloría General, cuyos resultados puedan originar la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, serán confidenciales durante la formulación del informe respectivo. Una vez notificado el informe correspondiente y hasta la resolución final del procedimiento administrativo, la información contenida en el expediente será calificada como información confidencial, excepto para las partes involucradas, las cuales tendrán libre acceso a todos los documentos y las pruebas que obren en el expediente administrativo. Para todos los casos, la Asamblea Legislativa, en el ejercicio de las facultades contenidas en el inciso 23) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política, podrá acceder a los informes, la documentación y las pruebas que obren en poder de las auditorías internas, la administración o la Contraloría General de la República”. Tal deber de confidencialidad está también dispuesto en el artículo 32 inciso f) de la Ley General de Control Interno, que estatuye la obligación de los funcionarios de la Auditoría Interna de guardar la confidencialidad del caso sobre la información a la que tengan acceso, y en el numeral 34 inciso e), que le impide a tales servidores revelar información sobre las auditorías o los estudios especiales de auditoría que se estén realizando y sobre aquello que determine una posible responsabilidad civil, administrativa o eventualmente penal de los funcionarios de los entes y órganos sujetos al citado cuerpo normativo. Asimismo, el artículo 8 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, ley número 8422 del 6 de octubre de 2004, estatuye que la “Contraloría General de la República, la Administración y las auditorías internas de las instituciones y empresas públicas, guardarán confidencialidad respecto de la identidad de los ciudadanos que, de buena fe, presenten ante sus oficinas denuncias por actos de corrupción. La información, la documentación y otras evidencias de las investigaciones que efectúen las auditorías internas, la Administración y la Contraloría General de la República, cuyos resultados puedan originar la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, serán confidenciales durante la formulación del informe respectivo. (...)" (Voto 2007-015540 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Por otro lado, en tratándose de materia cobratoria ya ha sido tratado el punto en oportunidades anteriores, por la misma Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en su voto Nº 2003-03899, de las 15:29hrs. del 13 de mayo del 2003, justamente en conocimiento de recurso de amparo en contra del INCOP por el cobro de servicios indicó: “(…) el recurrente también alega la violación al derecho de la amparada a un debido proceso, pues para efectuar el cobro en cuestión considera que se debía seguir un procedimiento ordinario pues se trata de una medida que suprime derechos subjetivos. Al respecto, difiere esta Sala del criterio del recurrente pues es claro que estamos frente a un supuesto de mera constatación donde no es necesario la realización del procedimiento ordinario regulado en la Ley de la Administración Pública. Lo anterior, por cuanto en realidad no se trata de un proceso sancionador, sino que la Administración se está asegurando el cobro por servicio prestado como lo es la utilización del muelle por parte de una embarcación. Así las cosas, basta la constatación de los días en muelle por la embarcación para que la autoridad recurrida cobre el monto correspondiente, quedando la posibilidad de discutir en la vía ordinaria cualquier discrepancia existente en cuanto al monto o la forma de cobro, tal como se indicó en el considerando anterior. (…)” En nuestro criterio lo externado por la Sala Constitucional resulta aplicable a este caso, debe observar la actora, que efectivamente las gestiones o actuaciones dirigidas al cobro de servicios como lo es este caso, no son de naturaleza sancionatoria ni se pueden enmarcar dentro de los supuestos bajo los que la verificación previa del procedimiento administrativo resulta de obligado al amparo de la ley y la Constitución, consecuencia de lo cual no es de recibo su argumento en cuanto a la violación del debido proceso. Ahora bien, en lo tocante a este mismo tema, obsérvese que el INCOP, particularmente mediante el oficio CDC-218, le indicó a la actora su derecho de hacer uso de los instrumentos y recursos procesales disponibles para una efectiva defensa, instrumentos que en el caso concreto fueron utilizados y resueltos por parte de la Administración, hasta agotarlos, y en ejercicio de los mismos contó con la oportunidad para realizar manifestaciones y los alegatos pertinentes, tanto como para aportar la prueba si fuese del caso respecto de la procedencia o no del cobro. Téngase en cuenta además, que los informes de auditoria solamente tienen efectos a lo interno de la institución, no son susceptibles de recurso alguno por los administrados y este tipo de investigaciones internas, máxime si no retrata de temas sancionatorios correctivos, no requieren ni deben observar la participación de terceros en su proceso de formulación y conocimiento por parte de la Administración. Consecuencia de todo lo anterior, no observa este despacho violación alguna ni a las reglas del debido proceso ni a las del derecho de defensa, como tampoco desviación o abuso de poder. b) En relación con el cobro propiamente dicho: Es criterio de este juzgador, que sobre el cobro que realiza el INCOP, tal actuación responde, -por no haberse acreditado lo contrario-, al resultado de un estudio de auditoria y al control y verificación de las bitácoras y registros llevado en puerto, en los que se consignan los servicios que son prestados a los barcos a los que se les dirigen, así como el Agente Naviero que hace requerimiento de los mismos, acciones de control y autotutela sobre las actuaciones de la administración, así como sobre los recursos públicos, dados en administración al INCOP, que resultan de de mera constatación. Así las cosas, establecida la legitimidad del INCOP, para proceder con las acciones procedentes, para hacer cumplir estas obligaciones dinerarias, sea, en contra del naviero, armador o su agente naviero, si se aduce la no correspondencia de tales cobros con servicios que efectivamente se habrían prestado, lo correcto, lo habría sido dar prueba de ello, en contraposición con los registros en bitácora por defectos en las mismas, aspecto éste que es dejado de lado en la presente acción, no existiendo elementos probatorios en el expediente que permitan inferir la no correspondencia o falta de ella, entre los servicios que en la realidad hayan sido o no prestados, y los registros en que se fundamenta al cobro, en orden a lo cual lo que resulta procedente es el rechazo de este alegato. Así las cosas, estima este despacho que una vez realizado el análisis de los aspectos supra indicados, no se encuentra en las actuaciones realizadas por el INCOP, los vicios de nulidad absoluta que refieren su demanda la actora, por lo que, tal y como referimos en el punto 1, de este apartado sobre el fondo del asunto, se debe proceder a la determinación de si ha operado la caducidad o prescripción de la acción en el presente caso o no lo cual se referirá adelante.” Sobre este particular, en su escrito de apelación la parte actora argumenta: “En el caso que nos ocupa se persigue el restablecimiento de la legalidad violentada por una actuación material arbitraria de la Administración Pública, pues es evidente que no se observó la norma o procedimiento señalado por la ley, pues al emitir las facturas hechizas posteriormente a que la administración, dentro de su competencia, y bajo su entera responsabilidad le otorgó el zarpe a los vapores, y se dio por satisfecha con el pago por esos usuarios del muelle, viene varios años después a emitir unas facturas hechizas, sin seguir el procedimiento de ley para demostrar que el servicio se había otorgado, sin dar oportunidad de desvirtuar el informe de la auditoría, a mi representada, sino que de manera manifiesta efectúa el cobro, sin otorgarnos audiencia en cuanto al monto, sin permitirnos demostrar si ese servicio se otorgó o no. (...) que además del vicio anteriormente expuesto conllevan el vicio de falta al debido proceso, pues no se siguieron los procedimientos administrativos existentes para con mi representada por parte de la administración, negándole así su derecho a defensa. Don Eduardo Ortiz dice: “la falta o el defecto de las formalidades sustanciales produce la nulidad absoluta del acto cuando estas son decisivas para asegurar el cumplimiento del fin o de los derechos del particular.“ (Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo II Editorial Strademan S. A. San José, 2000 pág 442). En el asunto en examen, conforme a la reiterada jurisprudencia no se siguió el procedimiento estipulado al efecto para este tipo de cobros. Nótese que estamos ante un servicio público, conforme a lo estipulado en el artículo 5 de la ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos número 7593, inciso G, por ende era menester seguir el procedimiento estipulado en el libro II de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en especial el artículo 308 y siguientes, pues se trataba de establecer la responsabilidad de Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico SRL, en hechos investigados por la auditoría años después de que se había otorgado el servicio, y que al vapor se le había concedido el zarpe, por la autoridad portuaria, en lo que se supone debió establecerse la responsabilidad de quienes fueran responsables de que ese servicio presuntamente dado no se facturara, deberán establecerse la responsabilidad penal y administrativa de los funcionarios presuntamente involucrados y de otros entes, 2) eso no se ha probado, pues no se siguió el debido proceso, imposibilitando el derecho de defensa garantizado en el artículo 39 de la CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA y por consiguiente el del debido proceso contenido en el artículo 41 de nuestra Carta Magna, es el derecho de contradicción que consiste en A) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento; B ) Derecho de ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y ofrecer las pruebas que sean pertinentes; C) Oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación; lo que incluye necesariamente el derecho a la información y de los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; D) Derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas; E) Notificación adecuada de la decisión final que dicta la administración y los motivos en que ella se funde y; E) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada. Este procedimiento rige para cualquier procedimiento administrativo que lleve a cabo la administración pública. En el caso que nos ocupa, ello no ocurrió, sino que sin previa investigación de responsabilidades se sanciona a mi representada, inclusive suspendiéndole su actividad en los puertos administrados por el INCOP, y pretendiendo que pague una suma millonaria por presuntos servicios en los cuales no se ha comprobado su responsabilidad (...). Este Tribunal considera que: A partir de lo anterior, es claro para esta Sección que respecto de los alegatos atinentes a presuntas violaciones al debido procedimiento por parte del ente demandado, la parte recurrente no efectúa ningún reparo o cuestionamiento al análisis jurídico ni a la relación de normas hechas por el Juzgador de instancia, tampoco acusa la inaplicabilidad de los precedentes jurisprudenciales citados por el A-quo y aplicados al caso concreto. En razón de lo anterior, analizados que fueran los autos, esta Sección entiende necesario destacar que se comparten plenamente la ratio decidendi utilizada por el juzgador de instancia para resolver este extremo de la demanda. A lo anterior, es menester indicar que dado que en el escrito de apelación, según se indicó supra, únicamente se ofrece una reiteración de los argumentos ya analizados en la resolución recurrida, misma en la que se expone un amplio análisis respecto a la inexistencia de las violaciones al debido proceso señaladas por la parte actora, entre las que se pueden indicar: la comunicación de los actos preparatorios en el procedimiento efectuado por la Auditoria del ente demandado y, la improcedencia de aplicación a su caso de los preceptos 308 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, los cuales regulan el Procedimiento Ordinario, el agravio que es objeto de estudio en el presente considerando, no puede ser de recibo pues, como bien lo Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, sí se ajustaron al Bloque de Legalidad, el cual es comprensivo no sólo de las normas escritas, sino también de las normas no escritas. Dicha aclaración reviste especial importancia en el presente asunto pues, el A-quo utiliza como uno de los pilares de la resolución recurrida, un precedente jurisprudencial de la Sala Constitucional en los que se analiza específicamente los alcances y contenido del debido procedimiento de cobro de la demandada, que no producen la indefensión acusada por el actor y no se logró acreditar en el presente caso. Por las razones apelación.

III.- Del agravio relativo a la presunta nulidad absoluta de las conductas administrativos del INCOP, dirigidas a efectuar el cobro administrativo a la empresa actora: Respecto de este extremo del recurso la parte actora indicó en su escrito de apelación: “En la administración portuaria, en el presente caso INCOP, la autoridad administrativa que debía comprobar y facturar antes de autorizar el zarpe de los buques, los servicios que hubiera otorgado, los cuales escapan de la función de agente naviero, quien es la persona física o jurídica que actúa como intermediario independiente en nombre y por cuenta del naviero o armador que lo ha contratado, mientras el buque se encuentra en la terminal; (...) lo que pretende el señor Juez A – quo es trasladar esa responsabilidad al agente naviero que lo único que hace es solicitar servicios por cuenta y riesgo del Naviero o armador, pues estos son los usuarios dentro del puerto y los llamados a pagar los servicios, es por ello que la autoridad portuaria es la que otorga el zarpe (...), en el caso del INCOP, como entidad portuaria, debe comprobar el T. R. B (tonelaje de Registro Bruto) que viene en los documentos que tiene el capitán del Barco, a fin de definir cuales son los servicios que requiere el buque, principalmente el remolque. Esa no es responsabilidad del agente naviero como pretende el señor Juez Contencioso administrativo. La responsabilidad es desde que atraca hasta que se marcha el buque por orden de la autoridad portuaria, esta misma realiza la operación, controla los servicios portuarios y con base en ello emite la factura por servicios portuarios que son aquellas actividades de prestación que tienden a la consecución de los fines para la que está establecida la autoridad. Las actividades y responsabilidades de un agente naviero son: 1- Prestar servicio y atención al buque y a la tripulación. 2 - Realizar por cuenta del armador o naviero las gestiones de carácter administrativo y técnico relacionadas con la estancia del buque, pero no implica ejercicio de autoridad. Cabe aclarar que con antelación a la llegada del buque el agente naviero elabora la factura proforma con base en la información concreta que el armador o naviero le remite y la presenta a la autoridad portuaria. El capitán del barco es el que lleva consigo la documentación que posteriormente entrega a la autoridad portuaria en la visita oficial a fin de que esta corrobore la información. No debe confundirse el agente naviero (mandatario del armador o el naviero) con el consignatario de la mercadería (aquel a quien la mercadería va dirigida). La autoridad portuaria, en este caso es el INCOP, que es un ente autónomo de derecho público, por ende con personería jurídica, goza de plena capacidad de obrar y le corresponde el control de toda la operación durante la estadía del buque y emite la factura final con los servicios que le otorgan a la nave y una vez comprobados los servicios y emitida la factura final da el zarpe para que el barco continué el viaje, el naviero responde por los gastos portuarios y el costo del manejo de las mercaderías, por ende es responsable por todos los problemas resultantes de la operación del buque y de la operación portuaria. La empresa naviera que pareciera no tiene claro el señor Juez, es la persona física o jurídica que utilizando buques mercantes propios o ajenos se dedica a la explotación de los mismos. El agente naviero, como es el caso de mi representada, da asistencia al buque durante su estadía en el puerto, y recibe los pagos del naviero conforme de la factura final que emite la autoridad portuaria. Es menester señalar que en el momento que ocurrieron los presuntos hechos los servicios de manifestación de la carga, estiba, remolque eran proporcionados por Incop, ente que tenía que controlar que se dieran, pues además es quien lo cobraba. El capitán es el representante del naviero. El naviero es el comerciante marítimo. El agente naviero actúa por cuenta y riesgo del naviero. (...) Se da además el vicio de desviación de poder pues además de que el otro tiene un fin antijurídico y no previsto por el ordenamiento jurídico, pues se pretende cobrar a mi representada AGENCIA DE VAPORES DEL PACÍFICO S.R.L. un supuesto adeudo que no debe, pues no se demostró que sea su responsabilidad sino más bien de ser cierto, obedece a deficiencias administrativas de la misma autoridad portuaria, que encuentra muy fácil trasladar a un tercero, que lo único que hizo, conforme a la ley, fue representar durante la estancia de un vapor de un naviero, por cuenta y riesgo de ese naviero. Es evidente la falta de legitimación pasiva pues mi representada no adeuda absolutamente nada, si existiera algún adeudo el cobro debe dirigirse al naviero o al funcionario negligente que permitió esto, otorgando una factura final y autorizando el zarpe del buque. (...) Amén de ello es evidente que el pago de marras no procede contra mi representada, por cuanto actuó como agente Naviero, órgano que representa al naviero en los trámites y operaciones de desembarque y despacho de mercaderías, mientras el buque está en las instalaciones portuarias, una vez que el buque zarpa, por cuanto la administración portuaria lo autoriza porque se da por satisfecha del pago que se ha efectuado por el Naviero, cesa toda representación, es por esta circunstancia que la administración portuaria es la que decide el zarpe. (ver artículo 375 del Código de Comercio. Debe entender el Tribunal Contencioso que el mandato que ostenta el Agente Naviero se limita al ejercicio de su gestión como agente únicamente para cumplir el encargo, que son las actividades para que se le contrata, zarpado el barco ya no existe responsabilidad alguna del agente naviero, pretender lo contrario es arbitrario, ilegítimo, ilógico, con evidente desvío de poder y conlleva vías de hecho, por lo cual es evidente la falta de legitimación pasiva para este cobro en cuanto al agente Naviero. (...) Tome nota el ad quen (sic) que la administración portuaria procedió muchos años después a confeccionar las facturas presuntamente por servicios que otorgaron otrora y que no se cobraron y endereza el cobro contra el agente Naviero cuando ya ha cesado su gestión. Los actos jurídicos que como agente Naviero le correspondieron han cesado, por ende, ya no puede responder por la actuación del naviero, toda vez que lo representa únicamente en lo relacionado con la atención del buque y mientras el mismo se encuentra en las instalaciones portuarias”. De lo anterior, es claro que la parte actora pretende la declaratoria de la nulidad absoluta de conductas administrativas del INCOP, fundamentada en su carácter de mandatario por ser un agente naviero que no está actuando a nombre y por cuenta propia. Sobre este particular, el Juzgador de instancia señaló en la resolución recurrida: “Se tiene de lo anterior que una cosa es ser naviero o armador, y otra muy distinta es ser agente naviero de buques. Las funciones son distintas y también lo son los servicios que se prestan así como las remuneraciones que se reciben. El naviero se dedica a efectuar transportes, tiene el control del transporte y de la mercancía desde que la recibe en el puerto de carga hasta que la entrega en el lugar pactado, y durante todo el transporte. El agente, en atención a su relación con el naviero, se limita a una serie de gestiones de tipo administrativo en el puerto donde se encuentran sus oficinas, no interviene para nada en la ejecución del transporte, no tiene el control de las mercancías durante el mismo ni directamente ni a través de empleados, no tiene poder de decisión alguno en cuanto a la ruta a efectuar, el tipo de mercancía a transportar, tripulación a emplear, los buques que consigna no son suyos ni están fletados por él. Por último no cobra por realizar transporte alguno puesto que no lo realiza, sino que simplemente cobra una suma por sus servicios. Aunado a lo anterior téngase claro que efectivamente se trata de un mandato, y en principio no existe responsabilidad departe del agente naviero respecto a terceros que no sean su cliente directo, pese a lo cual, en punto a la responsabilidad del Agente Naviero, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico existe norma que contempla este tipo de relaciones comerciales, contenida en el artículo 233 del Código de Comercio, sobre la representación de empresas y sociedades extranjeras, de aplicación al presente caso por lo que se dirá. Reza el artículo de cita: “Artículo 233.- El que en nombre de una persona o sociedad extranjera anuncie o haga negocios como agente o representante, sin estar provisto de los documentos que lo acrediten como apoderado, incurrirá en responsabilidad solidaria respecto de las obligaciones contraídas y que deban cumplirse en el país, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad penal que le tocare si hubiere mediado dolo.” El artículo en mención cubre las actividades que entre otras razones, por la costumbre o la naturaleza dinámica de la actividad comercial, -en donde en materia de servicios portuarios como aeroportuarios en general involucrados con el transporte de mercancías, la facilitación es un componente crítico-, se realizan por representación de manera informal, pero de buena fe, sin mediar acreditación de instrumento documental jurídico válido y eficaz de mandato o poder, que como en el caso del agente naviero no es de uso, o no es necesario, bastando el dicho del agente autorizado para que la Administración tenga como existente o presuma la relación entre éste, y el buque a ser servido, sea el naviero o armador. El numeral de cita presenta una solución a la necesidad de que para alguna serie de actividades comerciales se tenga como condición insalvable, el deber de acreditar la representación, mediante la formalización y presentación de los instrumentos jurídicos que de conformidad con la ley sean procedentes y se estilen, a efecto de dar fe de la existencia de tal representación, lo cual puede representar un obstáculo al flujo comercial, eximiendo de tal requerimiento, en pro, o con el objeto de agilizar el comercio y no producir trabas al mismo, con la simple expresión de tal circunstancia, ofreciendo como solución eso sí, que la responsabilidad de cualquier obligación asumida en el país, sea atrubuible en forma solidaria al mandatario o representante, que aduce actuar en nombre de un tercero. Se provee así, de un marco de protección a terceros que se relacionan con este agente, de forma que la no exigencia de tal acreditación no genere un obstáculo a la actividad comercial, de tal suerte que la responsabilidad de los propietarios de los buques, naviero o armador, al ser representados por el decir de su mandatario, extiende su responsabilidad a éste, con lo que se evita la formalización de trámites adicionales. Obviamente una cosa es ser naviero y otra muy distinta ser agente o consignatario de buques. El naviero se dedica a efectuar transportes, tiene el control del transporte y de la mercancía desde que la recibe en el puerto de carga hasta que la entrega en el lugar pactado y durante todo el transporte, el consignatario de buques por el contrario, se limita a una serie de gestiones de tipo administrativo en el puerto donde se encuentran sus oficinas y no interviene para nada en la ejecución del transporte, los buques que representa no son suyos ni están fletados por él y desde luego no puede venderlos o abandonarlos. Por último no cobra por realizar transporte alguno puesto que no lo realiza sino que simplemente cobra una suma en concepto de pago por los servicios de representación y gestión que presta. Más por otro lado, en cuanto a su responsabilidad ante la Administración, la disposición del artículo 233 del Código de Comercio como se observó, dispone la responsabilidad de este tipo de agentes que sustituyen por completo al naviero o armador en el puerto. De esta manera y bajo las circunstancias en las que se desarrollan este tipo de actividades portuarias, Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico S.R.L., es responsable solidario con sus representados, en su condición de agente ante la Administración, por las obligaciones que deban cumplirse en el país, entre otras, las generadas por las obligaciones derivadas de la prestación de los servicios que en representación de sus clientes requieren como consecuencia de las operaciones navieras en el sitio, no siendo de recibo la tesis esgrimida por la actora en el sentido de que sus actividades, por tratarse de un mandato de representación, -lo cual se tiene por demostrado-, no generan responsabilidad de su parte ante el INCOP por estos conceptos, sino que la misma corresponde exclusivamente a las empresas navieras, o armadores. Quedan por demás, las fórmulas contractuales bajo las que el agente naviero y sus representados establezcan las condiciones bajo las que operan sus relaciones comerciales, a fin de prever este tipo de circunstancias, asunto que no es objeto de este instrumento por lo que el vicio de nulidad absoluta en cuanto a este punto no se presenta.” A partir de todo lo anterior, estima este Tribunal que no es de recibo este extremo del recurso de apelación por cuanto, no obstante está fuera de toda discusión la condición jurídica del actor y la naturaleza de sus actuaciones, mismas que intrínsecamente son típicas de una relación de mandato, es lo cierto que lleva razón el A-quo, en cuanto a la aplicación en el sublite del canon 233 del Código de Comercio, precepto que por disposición expresa del legislador, consagra expresamente una responsabilidad solidaria de los agentes, que es el caso de la empresa actora. Por su parte, el cuestionamiento puntual hecho también en el libelo de apelación, en cuanto a que en el proceso de marras debió aplicarse en canon 375 del Código de Comercio, no es de recibo por dos circunstancias, en primer término dicho ordinal fue derogado mediante Ley General de Aduanas, Ley N° 7557 de fecha 20 de octubre de 1995, y en consecuencia no estaba vigente al momento en que ocurrieron los hechos. En segundo lugar, tampoco resultaría aplicable dicho argumento, pues aún si este estuviese vigente, la referida norma hacía referencia a agentes o corredores de aduana, función que no se ajusta a las realizadas por la empresa actora. Por último, en lo relativo al señalamiento hecho por la parte actora, respecto de la presunta existencia de una Desviación de Poder por el INCOP, dado que dicho ente procedió a perseguir un fin antijurídico al efectuar en su perjuicio el cobro supra indicado, es menester indicar que el inciso 3 del artículo 131 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al referirse a dicho instituto estipula: "La persecución de un fin distinto del principal, con detrimento de éste, será desviación de poder". Sobre este particular, esta Sección considera que tal reparo deviene en improcedente pues, a partir de lo expuesto respecto de las particularidades de la situación jurídica de la empresa actora, todos los elementos atinentes a la validez de las conductas administrativas, incluso el elemento "fin" desplegadas por el INCOP, están plenamente ajustadas al Bloque de Legalidad. En razón de lo anterior, y por ajustarse al Bloque de Legalidad lo resuelto en primera instancia, debe rechazarse este extremo del recurso de apelación.

IV.- Del agravio relativo al acogimiento de la excepción de la caducidad de la acción. En relación con este extremo del recurso la parte actora indicó en su libelo de apelación que: “No lleva razón el Juzgado en cuanto a la caducidad (Considerando IV sobre el fondo del asunto) toda vez que en el caso concreto mi representada alegó la nulidad de pleno derecho de los actos impugnados (ver escritos de Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico) por ende corre el plazo de caducidad de cuatro años. El pronunciamiento que el juez debe emitir versa sobre el fondo, sea la eventual nulidad de un acto administrativo, que es lo que perseguía mi representada en la presente litis. Además conforme al artículo 984 del Código de Comercio, aplicable a la especie, el plazo de prescripción es de cuatro años. Ahora bien, la caducidad es una sanción a la inactividad de las partes, hecho que no ocurrió en el presente caso. Pues mi representada estaba atenta al asunto.” En esta misma dirección la parte actora argumentó en su escrito de expresión de agravios, lo siguiente: “En el caso concreto, como repito, como se infiere de los escritos de interposición como en el de formalización de la demanda, se alega, la nulidad absoluta. Sea estamos ante la impugnación de actos calificados por Agencia de Vapores del Pacífico como nulos de pleno derecho, tanto por la forma, por cuanto NO se le dio audiencia sobre el Informe de la auditoría, a mi representada, que dio pie al cobro mediante facturas hechizas y antefechadas, lo cual le causo indefensión, violando el derecho de defensa, así como también por cuanto el cobro se hizo “manumilitari”, sea sin que existiera un acto fundado y muchos años después de otorgado el servicio y sin que se hubiera advertido oportunamente que no se recibía el pago a satisfacción, habiendo otorgado, precisamente el zarpe, por cuanto se dio por satisfecha la administración portuaria con el pago.” Revisados los autos se tiene que en la tramitación del proceso en instancia se conocieron y se resolvieron algunas defensas previas, reservándose la de caducidad de la acción para sentencia, momento procesal en el que una vez determinada la regularidad jurídica de las conductas administrativas cuya anulación se pretendía, se acogió la excepción de caducidad de la acción. Sobre este particular, estima esta Sección que, dado que en el tanto en un proceso se estén conociendo pretensiones relativas a la declaración de nulidades absolutas, debe darse curso al proceso para que éste sea conocido y resuelto por el fondo pues, será únicamente hasta dicho análisis por parte del juzgador, que se pueden determinar la existencia o no de vicios de tal gravedad que impliquen la nulidad absoluta de los actos impugnados, lo que conllevará a la ruptura del plazo de caducidad de la acción ordinario de dos meses y sean por tanto posible la anulación del o los actos atacados. En cuanto a la determinación preliminar del apuntado término de caducidad, ya la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha indicado que: “XVII.- Sobre lo referido, es menester apuntar lo siguiente. Esta Sala, desde épocas pretéritas, ha reconocido la posibilidad de que el administrado, además de pretender la declaratoria de nulidad absoluta de un acto administrativo, reclame el pago de los daños y perjuicios irrogados por su aplicación dentro del plazo cuatrienal previsto en el artículo 175 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Ello por cuanto, dicho numeral, respecto de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, amén de ser posterior, resulta ser norma especial, tocante a la impugnación de los actos absolutamente nulos, en particular, respecto al plazo de caducidad para formular los recursos administrativos y la acción contencioso administrativa. Por ende, los plazos normales señalados en este cuerpo normativo y, en otras disposiciones de la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública, no resultan de aplicación cuando lo alegado es la nulidad absoluta del acto.” (El original no está destacado en negrita) Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sentencia Nº 810-2003 de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 3 de diciembre de 2003. No obstante lo referido, en aquellos casos en que ha sido alegada la excepción de caducidad de la acción, una vez que el juzgador ha efectuado el análisis respecto de la concurrencia o no de la nulidad absoluta de los actos presuntamente nulos, y se ha determinado su conformidad con el Bloque de Legalidad, o incluso, únicamente han sido acreditados vicios atinentes a una nulidad relativa, es menester pronunciarse respecto de la caducidad de la acción, pudiendo en tal caso decretarse ésta incluso en sentencia. En esta dirección la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha indicado que: “XIV.- Análisis sobre la existencia y tipo de nulidad. Caducidad de la acción. En su sexto cargo, la casacionista recrimina la lesión del precepto 175 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública , al haberse aplicado el plazo de caducidad de dos meses que estatuye el canon 37 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa para declarar la caducidad de la acción. En relación cabe indicar que según lo dispuesto por el artículo 175 invocado, la potestad del administrado para impugnar el acto administrativo que padezca de nulidad absoluta, será de cuatro años. Cuando la nulidad sea relativa o bien se discuta el acto en esa jurisdicción por otros aspectos no asociados a la nulidad absoluta, el plazo para formular la acción será de dos meses contados a partir del agotamiento de la vía administrativa en el caso de actos expresos, según se desprende del numeral 37 de la ley de cita. El juez contencioso puede declarar la inadmisibilidad de la acción o de la demanda en tres momentos procesales, primero; en la fase de interposición conforme a lo dispuesto por el numeral 41 de la Ley Reguladora, segundo; ante la interposición de las defensas previas en los términos de los ordinales 50 y 60 ibidem, y tercero; en la sentencia final, acorde a lo indicado por el numeral 60 de la ley en cuestión. En este último supuesto, una de las causas que da cabida a esta declaratoria es la presentación extemporánea de la acción. En la especie ha quedado acreditado que sobre los actos impugnados no pesaban vicios de nulidad severa (absoluta), y que más bien, del todo no existía irregularidad alguna ni en su trámite ni en su contenido. Desde este plano, al socaire del precepto aludido (canon 37), el plazo para formular la demanda era de dos meses, que al momento en que la actora ejercitó la acción, se encontraban en demasía vencidos, ergo, la caducidad de su acción era inminente. Por ende, no existe desafuero alguno al haberse acogido la excepción de caducidad formulada por la representación del Estado, pues en virtud de lo expuesto, era esto lo procedente dentro del cuadro fáctico particular de este litigio. De este modo, no se observa infracción a las normas citadas, lo que conlleva al rechazo del cargo.” Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 907-2006 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 17 de noviembre de 2006. En razón de lo anterior, y siendo que a partir de lo referido en los considerandos anteriores, este Tribunal no cuenta con elementos de juicio suficientes que le permitan estimar que alguno de los actos recurridos es sustancialmente disconforme con el Bloque de Legalidad, al punto de configurarse una nulidad absoluta, debe indefectiblemente rechazarse este extremo del recurso de apelación, pues la declaratoria de caducidad está plenamente ajustada a derecho.”