Cancellation of mining concession in public waterway for non-complianceCancelación de concesión minera en cauce público por incumplimiento de condiciones

**V- MERITS OF THE CASE: V.1. ON THE EVIDENCE** This Court considers that while it is true that the case file has been provided with abundant admitted documentary evidence, not all of it is useful and relevant to support the elements of conviction that have been present in the formation of our criterion during the deliberation process, and therefore, it proceeds to issue its resolution based on the evidentiary elements that have earned its credibility, and which have been listed in the list of proven and unproven facts that precede the recitals section of this judgment. **V.2. CONTENT OF THE CHALLENGED ACTS AND REGARDING THE COMPETENCIES OF MINAE AND THE DIRECCIÓN DE GEOLOGÍA Y MINAS.** One of the two acts challenged in this proceeding is resolution No. 157 issued by the Dirección de Geología y Minas and Registro Nacional Minero, at eight-thirty hours on March tenth, two thousand five, in which said entity ordered the cancellation of the concession for the extraction of materials in a public-domain watercourse in the Río San Carlos, granted to Mrs. Araceli Segura R. who transferred her right in favor of the company Constructora Herrera SA, ordering the immediate suspension of extraction operations. When analyzing the legality elements that support said administrative act, it is necessary to demonstrate that the outstanding reason considered by the aforementioned administration was the breach demonstrated by the concessionaire company of the conditions described under numbers 11 and 12 of the concession extension resolution, No. 314-2002-MINAE of nine hours on July fifteenth, two thousand two, which literally state "... 11- present to the Dirección de Geología y Minas, prior to the start of operations, the exact point of commencement of operations and the methodological sequence, also presenting the schedule indicating the construction times of the groins (espolones), permanence in the watercourse, and extraction activities; 12- in turn, prior to the start of extraction activities, the characteristics and output of the machinery to be used must be presented; it is understood that if there is a change in machinery, this must be notified to the Dirección de Geología y Minas; (...)" Although the Dirección de Geología y Minas mentions, as part of the elements cited in the facts section of the challenged resolution, the existence of a complaint for environmental damage and violation of the conditions under which the resolution authorizing the extension was issued, which was filed before the same head of Environment and Energy by Messrs. Juan Carlos Bolaños and Alexander Dembicki, this was not, however, the reason established by that technical agency to cancel the concession, as reflected in the operative part of said resolution, which is based on the final paragraph of Article 67 of the Mining Code (Código de Minería) and on the recommendation of the Minister of the branch, through official letters DAJ-427 of March 31, 2003 and DAJ-661 of June 24, 2004, in which said superior issues his recommendation to the aforementioned technical agency to cancel the concession.

Thus, from the first of said documents, official letter DAJ-427, addressed by the Minister of Environment and Energy to the Head of the Registro Nacional Minero, it is extracted that the recommendation given by said superior for the cancellation of the concession is being issued precisely in view of the breach not only of the conditions described in the aforementioned numbers 11 and 12 of the concession extension resolution (which finds legal basis in Article 67, first paragraph of the Mining Code), but also from the breach of the term set forth in resolution R-442-2002-MINAE, by which it was requested to present the justification for said breach within a peremptory term (término dispositivo) of three days. In addition to such considerations, the document under discussion demonstrates that the technical documentation presented by the concessionaire, in the context of the indicated obligation, was rejected based on the technical criterion of two MINAE professionals competent in the field, in such a way that there was a technical assessment of the documentation presented, only that it was refuted by the competent administrative entity, indicating at that time the already mentioned breach regarding the conditions of the concession (see literal f on page 2 of the main document). In this same context of analysis, if it is considered that the official letter DAJ-427 from the Minister was issued on March 31, 2003, and that the extension resolution was notified to the concessionaire on July 26, 2002, then a breach of the terms of the concession for a period of eight consecutive and continuous months is established.

For its part, through official letter DAJ-661 of June 24, 2004, the same head of Environment and Energy makes it known to the Head of the Registro Nacional Minero that the recommendation given via resolution DAJ-427 has become final since the incidental challenges against said resolution were dismissed. Thus, this last act is one that reproduces the scope of the preceding one, without introducing a novel element that should be considered in the proposed analysis.

Regarding the procedure used by the superior to formulate the challenged recommendation, the review of the provisions in Article 67, final paragraph of the Mining Code, allows one to conceive that his decision falls within the provisions of said rule, with the specification of the adjustments that must be made regarding the name of the competent entity. Thus, Article 67 of the Mining Code provides:

"Article 67.- The exploitation concession may be canceled if the holder does not comply with the conditions stipulated in the granting resolution, in accordance with this law and its regulation, especially in the following cases: a) If from the second year of validity the concessionaire has not carried out the works tending to perform the exploitation, or if during the validity of the exploitation the works have been suspended for six consecutive months, without justified technical or economic reason. b) If the reports referred to in Article 34 of this law have not been presented. c) If the taxes mentioned in Article 52 of this law have not been paid. ch) If the legal and regulatory norms that regulate environmental contamination and the recovery of renewable natural resources have not been complied with. d) The forfeiture (caducidad) shall occur, likewise, in cases of non-compliance by the concessionaire with the obligations imposed by this law, when that sanction is not expressly provided. The Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, after studying the case, shall give notice to the interested party by notification and shall set a term not exceeding ninety days for it to comply with its obligations or justify itself. The term shall begin to run from the day the interested party receives the notification. If the concession holder does not justify itself or does not comply with what was ordered within the term that is set, the Dirección shall bring the matter to the attention of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce, which shall study the case and may suggest that the Dirección grant a new term, which shall not exceed three months. If this Ministry does not consider a new term appropriate or if the granted term has ended, the Dirección shall issue the corresponding cancellation resolution. This resolution shall be published in the Official Gazette 'La Gaceta' and, once final, the zone shall be free of the respective mining right. (Its numbering was modified by Article 2 of Law No. 8246 of April 24, 2002, which moved it from 63 to 67) ".

In accordance with said provision, once the consultation of the case was made to the Minister by the Dirección de Geología y Minas, the Minister in this case—not the head of Economy, Industry and Commerce, but rather of Environment and Energy—in accordance with the scope of Articles 3 and 4 of Law 7152, Organic Law of MINAE, published in La Gaceta No. 117 of June 21, 1990, it is that superior who is competent to assume the issuance of this type of act. Those norms provide:

"ARTICLE 3.- The competencies that previous laws would have assigned to other State institutions, referring to those that this law grants to the Ministry of Environment and Energy (*), shall correspond to the latter. "ARTICLE 4.- To comply with the provisions of this law, the Ministry of Environment and Energy (*) shall be composed of the Dirección de Energía, the Dirección de Geología y Minas, the Dirección General Forestal, the Departamento de Vida Silvestre which, by virtue of this law, becomes a Dirección General, and the Servicio de Parques Nacionales; likewise, it shall have attached the Instituto Metereológico Nacional, with the rank of Dirección General. (*) The name of the Ministry was thus reformed by Law No. 7554 of October 4, 1995, Article 116.)

In such a way that this Court does not find that in this procedure, the scope of legally assigned competencies, both to the superior who issued the challenged act and to the competent technical entity to materialize in the mining sphere the recommendation given by that high official, have been violated, nor that with those decisions the legality observable in this type of proceeding has been transgressed, all in accordance with the provisions of Article 67 of the Mining Code.

The other challenged act is resolution No. 335-2005 of 09:15 hours on August 23, 2005, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, which resolves the appeal filed by the concessionaire against resolution 157 of 8:30 hours on March 10, 2005, and which rules on the incident of nullity of proceedings and resolutions against official letter DGM-RNM-527-2002 of September 10, 2002, from the Dirección de Geología y Minas. As reflected by the material text of said act, documented at pages 1736 to 1740 of Volume VI, Adm., it reflects the reasoning used by the head of Environment and Energy to not admit the challenges made by the plaintiff. In its content, this Court finds that the questioned administration has not incurred the causes of illegality and nullity formulated by the plaintiff, since the act itself expresses its motive, content, competencies, object, purpose, and enunciation of arranged effects, which are consistent with the scope of competencies of the Head of Environment and Energy and the Dirección de Geología y Minas, both bodies in the exercise of their competencies provided in the Mining Code. The content of this act complies with regulatory regularity and is derived from a special Law that confers those attributes on the public authorities that issued them, withstanding a frontal analysis of the provisions contained in Articles 128 to 136 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Both MINAE and the Dirección de Geología y Minas turn out to be the public authorities with regular and organic competence to apply the provisions of the Code of that subject matter, aimed at dimensioning specific areas of non-compliance which concessionaires might incur.

In turn, the Regulation to the Mining Code, issued through Executive Decree No. 29300-MINAE effective since March 16, 2001, establishes the scope of the sanctions regime applied by the Dirección de Geología y Minas, as the competent technical body in this matter. In such a way, it is a matter of the exercise of regulated competencies, excluding discretion, except to weigh the level of impact on the natural resource eventually depreciated. However, this Court does not find that, in its entirety, this other challenged act, resolution R-335-2005-MINAE, incurs the cause of nullity that the plaintiff invokes in its favor.

This Court observes that when the Sala Constitucional had the opportunity to hear the scope and contents of what was alleged by the plaintiff company regarding the procedure followed by the questioned administration, both through the intervention of the head of Environment and Energy, in issuing his recommendation before the Registro Nacional Minero, and the action properly speaking of said administration in issuing the concession cancellation resolution, it found that in what was done by the administration there is no violation of the procedural guarantees that comprise due process. The Sala Constitucional states:

"It is deduced from the foregoing, with complete clarity, that the proceeding instituted by the respondents for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture (caducidad) of the concession held by the protected company, far from constituting a substantial violation of its right to defense and due process, conforms to the Law of the Constitution, which is why the appropriate action is to dismiss the appeal. In effect, in the present case it is proven that the respondent authority, after receiving the aforementioned complaint, granted the protected party a term of 3 days to comply with or justify the non-observance of the conditions set in resolution No. R-314-2002-MINAE of 09:00 hrs. on June 15, 2002, therefore it is not observed that it was placed in defenselessness. In any case, it is evident that the transcribed norm also provides for the situation to be heard by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, so it is not appreciated in what way the actions of the respondents violate the fundamental rights of the protected party. No undue restriction of the right to due process of the affected company is proven in this ruling that must be addressed in this Jurisdiction, therefore the appeal must be denied. (Partial excerpt from Voto 2006-01077 of eight hours eight minutes on February third, two thousand six. Expediente 05-013653-0007-CO) In the context of respect for the fundamental right to due process of law and the other constitutional guarantees that the plaintiff alleges were violated, although it concerns a group of rights that enjoy the privilege of being supported by the Political Constitution, thus being superior rights that demand from the judge a jealous scrutiny of the actions in which their non-compliance is alleged as an elementary reason for the jurisdictionally redressable violation, this Court does not share the arguments used by the plaintiff to provide legal support for said alleged violation of constitutional rights. As a starting point, because as reasoned by the Sala Constitucional, according to the already cited Voto 2006-011077, no violation of due process is observed in what was done by the Public Administration; to which the following reasons must be added:

A concessionary right to exploit materials from a public-domain watercourse, understanding by this, that which is acquired through a concession oriented to that end, is neither a vested right nor a consolidated legal situation. Far from such qualifications and the associated legal consequences that each of those legal categories entails, a right to extract materials from a public-domain watercourse constitutes a means used by the administration to allow a private individual to carry out an activity that, for reasons of opportunity or convenience, it cannot perform itself, thereby allowing the realization of interests between the private party managing the activity with eventual lucrative purposes and the public purposes of the active Administration, which allows and authorizes the lawful exercise of the activity. The concession thus becomes a mere instrumental means of the will of the Administration with active competence in that sphere, to allow the satisfaction of other interests that also fall within its competence, as in the present case, effectively the rational and environmentally congruent use of that raw material that supports the public-domain watercourse, which has multiple applications and uses in human industry. However, the concessionary legal instrument does not empower an appropriation of the natural resource involved, but rather a precarious right, stripped of the typically such attributes that are usually present in legal institutes like ownership (dominio) or full property, or other schemes typical of administrative contracting, such as the works and services contract, or the supply contract, in which, apart from the legal regime that regulates them, there is a contracting procedure diametrically opposed to that which is established with these other types of concessionary schemes, where the State can never cease to be the holder of the resource and public interest at stake and the private concession holder holds a precarious right. The concession to extract materials from the public-domain watercourse is temporary in nature, does not confer the right to perpetual exploitation, is subject to a term, as demonstrated by its extinction upon the expiry of the term, and is revocable by the means authorized by law (Art. 154 LGAP). During its validity, the holder can only carry out what is authorized by the granting administration, within the regime of rights and obligations it declares. The set of rules by which the mining concession operates are contained in the Law that regulates the figure, and are embodied in the written material act that grants the concession. The concession is not a right of ownership, nor does its issuance entail the transfer of property over the concession resource. In that sense, as declared by the Mining Code itself, the watercourse bed and whatever is in it are public assets, which the State administers and may grant in concession, it being impossible at any time to admit that because of this fact, the State cedes ownership over that asset to the concessionaire, as there is a legal impossibility for such a thing to happen (Arts. 11 and 121 subsection 14) of the Political Constitution, 66 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 1 of the Mining Code).

In such a way that because it is not possible through a concession—which contains a precarious title assimilable, in terms of its power of resistance, to mere use permits over public-domain assets (bienes demaniales)—for such a transfer of ownership over the exploited asset to occur, as the plaintiff erroneously alleges, this Court rejects that party's allegation regarding vested rights and consolidated legal situations, and impact on the right to property.

In this same line of thought, nor is the impact on the exercise of commerce or business freedom that the plaintiff alleges were violated evidenced, since the actions credited in the case file are the product of the exercise of competencies legally established for the administration, which are themselves inalienable and non-transferable. Far from sharing the plaintiff's position, this Court considers that the record demonstrates the discontent that the activity carried out by the concessionaire motivated in the complainants, whose basis the head of environment and energy considered in issuing his recommendation.

<b><i>11-</i></b><i> present to the Directorate of Geology and Mines, prior to the start of work, the exact point of commencement of work and the methodological sequence, also present the schedule indicating the construction times of the spurs, permanence in the riverbed (cauce), and extraction activities; <b>12-</b> likewise, prior to the start of extraction activities, the characteristics and yields of the machinery to be used must be presented; it is understood that if there is a change in the machinery, this must be notified to the Directorate of Geology and Mines; (...)"</i>Although the Directorate of Geology and Mines mentions, as part of the elements cited in the factual chapter of the challenged resolution, the existence of a complaint for environmental damage and violation of the conditions under which the resolution authorizing the extension was issued, which was filed before the same head of Environment and Energy by Juan Carlos Bolaños and Alexander Dembicki, this was not, however, the reason that led that technical body to cancel the concession, as reflected in the operative part of said resolution, which is based on the final paragraph of Article 67 of the Mining Code (Código de Minería) and on the recommendation of the Minister of the branch, through official letters DAJ-427 of March 31, 2003, and DAJ-661 of June 24, 2004, in which the aforementioned head issues his recommendation to the referred technical body to cancel the concession. Thus, from the first of said documents, official letter DAJ-427, addressed by the Minister of Environment and Energy to the Head of the National Mining Registry, it is extracted that the recommendation given by said head for the cancellation of the concession is being issued precisely in view of the non-compliance not only with the conditions described in the aforementioned numerals 11 and 12 of the resolution extending the concession (which finds legal basis in Article 67, first paragraph of the Mining Code), but also based on the non-compliance with the term indicated through resolution R-442-2002-MINAE, by which it was requested to present the justification for said non-compliance within a peremptory term of three days. In addition to these considerations, the document under comment demonstrates that the technical documentation presented by the concessionaire, in the context of the indicated obligation, was rejected based on the technical opinion of two professionals from MINAE competent in the field, in such a way that there was indeed a technical assessment (valoración técnica) of the documentation presented, only that it was refuted by the competent administrative entity, indicating at that moment the already indicated non-compliance regarding the conditions of the concession (see literal f of page 2 of the principal). In this same context of analysis, if it is considered that official letter DAJ-427, from the Minister, was issued on March 31, 2003, and that the extension resolution was notified to the concessionaire as of July 26, 2002, then a non-compliance with the terms of the concession is configured for a period of eight consecutive and continuous months. In turn, through official letter DAJ-661 of June 24, 2004, the same head of Environment and Energy makes note to the Head of the National Mining Registry that the recommendation made through resolution DAJ-427 has become final (firmeza) as the challenges against said resolution were resolved without merit. In such a way, that this last is an act that reproduces the scope of the preceding one, without introducing a novel element that must be considered in the proposed analysis. Regarding the procedure used by the head to formulate the challenged recommendation, the review of the provisions of Article 67, final paragraph of the Mining Code, allows conceiving that his decision is framed within the provisions of said norm, with the precision of the adjustments that must be made regarding the name of the competent entity. Thus, Article 67 of the Mining Code provides: <b>"Article 67</b>.- The exploitation concession may be canceled if the holder does not comply with the conditions stipulated in the granting resolution, in accordance with this law and its regulations, especially in the following cases: a) If after the second year of validity the concessionaire has not executed the works aimed at carrying out the exploitation, or if during the validity of the exploitation the works have been suspended for six consecutive months, without justified technical or economic reason. b) If the reports referred to in article 34 of this law have not been submitted. c) If the taxes mentioned in article 52 of this law have not been paid. ch) If the legal and regulatory norms that regulate environmental contamination and the recovery of renewable natural resources have not been complied with. d) The expiration (caducidad) will occur, equally, in cases of non-compliance, by the concessionaire, of the obligations imposed on him by this law, when that sanction is not expressly provided. The Directorate of Geology, Mines, and Hydrocarbons, after studying the case, by means of notification shall give notice to the interested party and shall set a term not exceeding ninety days for him to comply with his obligations or to justify himself. The term shall begin to run from the day the interested party receives the notification. If the holder of the concession does not justify himself or does not comply with what was ordered within the term that is set, the Directorate shall bring the matter to the attention of the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce, which shall study the case and may suggest that the Directorate grant a new term, which shall not exceed three months. If this Ministry does not consider a new term appropriate or if the granted one has ended, the Directorate shall issue the corresponding cancellation resolution. This resolution shall be published in the Official Newspaper 'La Gaceta' and, once final, the zone shall be free of the respective mining right. (Its numbering modified by article 2 of Law N° 8246 of April 24, 2002, which moved it from 63 to 67)". In accordance with said provision, having made the consultation of the case to the Minister by the Directorate of Geology and Mines, the Minister in this case, not the head of Economy, Industry, and Commerce, but of Environment and Energy, in accordance with the scope of Articles 3 and 4 of Law 7152, Organic Law of MINAE, published in La Gaceta Nº 117 of June 21, 1990, it is said head who is competent to assume the dictation of this type of acts. Those norms provide: "ARTICLE 3.- The competencies that previous laws may have assigned to other State institutions, referring to those that this law grants to the Ministry of Environment and Energy (*), shall correspond to the latter. "ARTICLE 4.- To comply with what is established in this law, the Ministry of Environment and Energy (*) shall be composed of the Directorate of Energy, the Directorate of Geology and Mines, the General Forestry Directorate, the Wildlife Department which, by virtue of this law, becomes a General Directorate, and the National Parks Service; likewise, it shall have the National Meteorological Institute attached, with the rank of General Directorate. (*) The name of the Ministry was thus reformed by Law Nº 7554 of October 4, 1995, article 116.) Therefore, this Tribunal does not find that in this procedure, the scope of legally assigned competencies, both of the head who has issued the challenged act and of the competent technical entity to materialize in the mining field the recommendation given by that high official, have been violated, nor that with those decisions the legality observable in this type of procedure has been transgressed, all in accordance with what Article 67 of the Mining Code prescribes. The other challenged act is resolution Nº 335-2005 of 09:15 hours on August 23, 2005, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Energy that resolves the appeal filed by the concessionaire against resolution 157 of 8:30 hours on March 10, 2005, and that rules on the incident of nullity of proceedings and resolutions against official letter DGM-RNM-527-2002 of September 10, 2002, from the Directorate of Geology and Mines. As reflected in the material literalness of said act, documented on folios 1736 to 1740 of Volume VI, Adm., it reflects the reasoning used by the head of Environment and Energy to not admit the challenges made by the plaintiff. In its content, this Tribunal finds that the questioned administration has not incurred in the grounds of defect of legality and nullity formulated by the plaintiff, inasmuch as the motive, content, competencies, object, purpose, and enunciation of arranged effects of the act itself are expressed, which are in accordance with the scope of competencies proper to the Head of Environment and Energy and to the Directorate of Geology and Mines, both bodies in the exercise of their competencies provided in the Mining Code. The content of this act complies with regulatory regularity and derives from a special Law that confers those attributes to the public authorities that have issued them, withstanding a frontal analysis of the provisions contained in Articles 128 to 136 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Both MINAE and the Directorate of Geology and Mines turn out to be the public authorities with regular and organic competence to apply the provisions of the Code of that matter, aimed at sizing concrete areas of non-compliance in which concessionaires could incur. In turn, the Regulation to the Mining Code, issued through Executive Decree Nº 29300-MINAE, in force since March 16, 2001, establishes the scope of the sanction regime applied by the Directorate of Geology and Mines, as the competent technical body in this matter. In such a way, that it concerns the exercise of regulated competencies, with exclusion of discretion, except to weigh the level of impact on the natural resource eventually depreciated. However, this Tribunal does not find that, in its entirety, this other challenged act, resolution R-335-2005-MINAE, incurs in the ground of nullity invoked for her benefit by the plaintiff. This Tribunal observes that when the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) had the opportunity to hear the scope and contents of what was alleged by the plaintiff company regarding the procedure followed by the questioned administration, both through the intervention of the head of Environment and Energy, when issuing his recommendation before the National Mining Registry, and the action proper of said administration, issuing the resolution canceling the concession, it found that in the actions of the administration there is no violation of the procedural guarantees that make up due process. The Constitutional Chamber indicates: "From the foregoing, it is deduced, with complete clarity, that the procedure instituted by the respondents for the purpose of declaring the expiration of the concession enjoyed by the protected company, far from constituting a substantial violation of its right of defense and to due process, is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, which is why the appropriate course is to declare the appeal without merit. Indeed, in the present case, it is held as accredited that the respondent authority, after receiving the aforementioned complaint, granted the protected party a term of 3 days to comply with or justify the non-observance of the conditions established in resolution Nº R-314-2002-MINAE of 09:00 hrs. on June 15, 2002, so it is not observed that it was placed in defenselessness. In any case, it is evident that the transcribed norm also provides for the situation to be known by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, so it is not appreciated in what way the action of the respondents violates the fundamental rights of the protected person. No undue restriction of the right to due process of the affected company is held as accredited in this judgment that must be attended to in this Jurisdiction, for which reason the appeal must be denied. (Partial extract from Voto 2006-01077 of eight hours and eight minutes on February third, two thousand six. Expediente 05-013653-0007-CO) In the context of respect for the fundamental right to due process of law and the other constitutional guarantees, which the plaintiff alleges as violated, although it concerns a group of rights that enjoy the privilege of being supported by the Political Constitution, being consequently superior rights that require from the judge a zealous scrutiny of the actions in which their non-compliance is alleged as the elementary motive for a jurisdictionally protectable breach, this Tribunal does not share with the plaintiff the arguments used to give legal support to the indicated violation of constitutional rights. To begin with, because as reasoned by the Constitutional Chamber, according to the already cited Voto 2006-011077, in the actions of the Public Administration, no violation of due process is observed; to which it would be necessary to add the following reasons: A concession right to exploit materials from a public domain riverbed (cauce del dominio público), understanding by this, that which is acquired through a concession oriented to that end, is not an acquired right nor a consolidated legal situation. Far from such qualifiers and the associated legal consequences that each of such legal categories entails, a right to extract materials from a public domain riverbed constitutes a means used by the administration to allow a private individual to carry out an activity that, for reasons of opportunity or convenience, it cannot carry out by itself, thereby allowing the emergence of the concretion of interests between the private individual who manages the activity with eventual lucrative purposes, and the public purposes of the active Administration, which permits and authorizes the lawful exercise of the activity. The concession thus becomes a simple instrumental means of the will of the Administration with active competence in that area, to allow the satisfaction of other interests that are also the responsibility of the latter, as in the present case, it is indeed the rational and environmentally congruent utilization of that raw material that supports the public domain riverbed, which has multiple applications and uses in human industry. However, the concession legal instrument does not potentiate an appropriation of the involved natural resource, but a precarious right, stripped of the typically such attributes that are usually present in legal institutes such as full ownership or property, or other schemes typical of administrative contracting, such as the contract for works and services, or for supplies, in which, in addition to the legal regime that regulates them, there is a contracting procedure diametrically opposed to that which is concretized with this other type of concession schemes, in which the State can never cease to be the holder of the resource and public interest at stake, and the private holder of the concession holds a precarious right. The concession to extract materials from the public domain riverbed is of a temporary nature, does not confer a right to perpetual exploitation, is subject to a term, as demonstrated by its extinction produced by the occurrence of the deadline, and is revocable by the means that the law authorizes (Art. 154 LGAP). During its validity, the holder can only carry out what is authorized by the granting administration, within the regime of rights and obligations that it declares. The set of rules with which the mining concession operates are contained in the Law that regulates the figure, and which are embodied in the written material act that provides the concession. The concession is not a right of ownership, nor does its issuance entail the transfer of property over the concessioned resource. In that sense, as declared by the same Mining Code, the riverbed and what is found therein are public goods, which the State administers and can grant in concession, being unable at any time to admit that by that fact, the State cedes ownership over that good to the concessionaire, as there is a legal impossibility for such a thing to happen (Arts.

11 and 121, subsection 14) of the Political Constitution, 66 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 1 of the Mining Code).

Therefore, since it is not possible, through a concession containing a precarious title comparable in its power of resistance to mere use permits over public domain assets, to effect such a transfer of ownership over the exploited asset, as the plaintiff erroneously claims, this Court rejects that party's arguments regarding acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, and any impact on the right of ownership.

Along these same lines, nor is any impact on the exercise of commerce or entrepreneurial freedom, which the plaintiff claims have been violated, evident, given that the actions credited in the expediente are the product of exercising legally established powers of the administration, which are inalienable and non-transferable. Far from sharing the plaintiff's position, this Court considers that the record demonstrates the discontent that the activity carried out by the concession holder caused in the complainants, a basis considered by the environmental and energy authority in issuing its recommendation." However, this Court does not find that, in its entirety, this other challenged act, resolution R-335-2005-MINAE, incurs the ground of nullity that the claimant invokes for its benefit. This Court observes that when the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) had the opportunity to examine the scope and contents of what was alleged by the claimant company regarding the procedure followed by the questioned administration, both through the intervention of the head of the Environment and Energy portfolio in issuing his recommendation before the National Mining Registry, and the actual action of said administration in issuing the resolution canceling the concession, it found that in the actions of the administration there was no violation of the procedural guarantees that make up due process. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) states: "From the foregoing, it is deduced, with all clarity, that the procedure instituted by the respondents with the purpose of declaring the expiry (caducidad) of the concession held by the protected company, far from constituting a substantial violation of its right of defense and to due process, conforms to the Law of the Constitution, for which reason the appropriate course is to declare the appeal without merit. In effect, in the present case, it is taken as proven that the respondent authority, after receiving the aforementioned complaint, granted the protected party a term of 3 days to comply with or justify the non-observance of the conditions set in resolution No. R-314-2002-MINAE of 09:00 hrs. on June 15, 2002, therefore it is not observed that it was placed in a state of defenselessness. In any case, it is evident that the transcribed norm also provides that the situation be known by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, so it is not discerned how the action of the respondents violates the fundamental rights of the protected party. No undue restriction of the right to due process of the affected company is taken as proven in this judgment that must be addressed in this Jurisdiction, for which reason the appeal must be denied. (Partial extract of Vote 2006-01077 of eight hours and eight minutes of February three, two thousand six. File 05-013653-0007-CO)" In the context of respect for the fundamental right to due process of law and the other constitutional guarantees, which the claimant alleges as breached, although this is a group of rights that enjoy the privilege of being supported by the Political Constitution, being consequently superior rights that demand from the judge a zealous scrutiny of the actions in which their non-compliance is alleged as the elementary motive for the judicially actionable breach, this Court does not share with the claimant the arguments used to provide legal support to the indicated breach of constitutional rights. To begin with, because as reasoned by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), according to the already cited Vote 2006-011077, in the actions of the Public Administration, no violation of due process is observed; to which the following reasons must be added: A concessionary right (derecho concesional) to exploit materials from a public domain (dominio público) watercourse, understanding by this, that which is acquired through a concession (concesión) oriented to that end, is not a vested right nor a consolidated legal situation. Far from such qualifications and the attendant legal consequences that each of such legal categories entails, a right to extract materials from a public domain watercourse constitutes a means utilized by the administration to allow an individual to carry out an activity which, for reasons of opportunity or convenience, the administration cannot perform itself, thereby allowing the concretion of interests to arise between the individual who manages the activity with eventual lucrative purposes, and the public purposes of the active Administration, which permits and authorizes the lawful exercise of the activity. The concession (concesión) becomes, consequently, a simple instrumental means of the will of the Administration with active competence in that area, to permit the satisfaction of other interests that also fall within its competence, as in the present case, effectively is the rational and environmentally congruent use of that raw material that supports the public domain watercourse, which possesses multiple applications and uses in human industry. However, the concessionary legal instrument does not empower an appropriation of the involved natural resource, but rather a precarious right, stripped of the typically such attributes that usually are present in legal institutes such as full ownership or property, or other schemes typical of administrative contracting, such as the contract for works and services, or for supplies, in which, in addition to the legal regime that regulates them, there exists a contracting procedure diametrically opposed to that which is concretized with these other types of concessionary schemes, in which the State can never cease to be the holder of the resource and public interest at stake, and the individual holder of the concession holds a right in a precarious manner. The concession to extract materials from the public domain watercourse is of a temporary nature, does not confer a right to perpetual exploitation, is subject to a term, as demonstrated by its extinction produced by the occurrence of the deadline, and is revocable by the means that the law authorizes (Art. 154 LGAP). During its validity, the holder can only do what is authorized by the granting administration, within the regime of rights and obligations that the latter declares. The set of rules with which the mining concession operates are contained in the Law that regulates the figure, and are embodied in the written material act that orders the concession. The concession is not a right of ownership, nor does its issuance entail the transfer of property over the concessioned resource. In that sense, just as the same Mining Code declares, the riverbed and what is contained therein are public goods, which the State administers and can grant in concession, being unable at any moment to admit that by that fact, the State cedes in favor of the concessionaire the ownership over that good, because there exists a legal impossibility for such a thing to happen (Arts. 11 and 121 subsection 14) of the Political Constitution, 66 of the General Law of the Public Administration, and 1 of the Mining Code).

Therefore, since it is not possible that through a concession, which contains a precarious title assimilable, in terms of its power of resistance, to mere use permits over demanial (demaniales) goods, such transfer of ownership over the exploited good could occur, as the claimant incorrectly alleges, this Court rejects what is alleged by said party, regarding vested rights and consolidated legal situations, and affectation of the right to property.

In this same line of thought, nor is the affectation of the exercise of commerce or business freedom that the claimant alleges as breached verified, since the actions that are accredited in the file are the product of the exercise of the legally established competencies for the administration, same which are inalienable and non-transferable to it. Far from sharing the posture of the claimant, this Court considers that in the case file, the discontent that the activity exercised by the concessionaire motivated in the complainants, whose basis was considered by the head of the environment and energy portfolio to issue his recommendation, is accredited."

“V- FONDO DEL ASUNTO: V.1. SOBRE LA PRUEBA Este Tribunal considera que si bien es cierto, el expediente de la causa ha sido proveído con abundante prueba documental admitida, de ésta, no toda resulta útil y conducente para sustentar los elementos de convicción que han estado presentes en la formación de nuestro criterio durante el proceso de deliberación, en razón de lo cual, procede a emitir su resolución con fundamento en los elementos probatorios que han merecido su credibilidad, y que se han enlistado en el elenco de hechos probados e indemostrados que preceden el acápite considerativo de esta sentencia. V.2. CONTENIDO DE LOS ACTOS IMPUGNADOS Y SOBRE LAS COMPETENCIAS DEL MINAE Y LA DIRECCION DE GEOLOGIA Y MINAS. Uno de los dos actos impugnados en este proceso es la resolución Nº 157 emitida por la Dirección de Geología y Minas y Registro Nacional Minero, a las ocho horas treinta minutos del diez de marzo del dos mil cinco, en la cual, dicha entidad dispuso la cancelación de la concesión de extracción de materiales en cauce del dominio público en el Río San Carlos, otorgada a la señora Araceli Segura R. quien cedió su derecho a favor de la empresa Constructora Herrera SA, ordenando la inmediata suspensión de labores de extracción. Al analizar los elementos de legalidad que soportan dicho acto administrativo, es necesario evidenciar que el motivo sobresaliente que tuvo presente la citada administración, ha sido el incumplimiento demostrado por la empresa concesionaria, de las condiciones descritas bajo los numerales 11 y 12 de la resolución de prórroga de la concesión, Nº 314-2002-MINAE de las nueve horas del quince de julio del dos mil dos, que literalmente disponen "... 11- presentar ante la Dirección de Geología y Minas, previo al inicio de labores, el punto exacto de inicio de labores y la secuencia metodológica, presentar a su vez, el cronograma en el cual indique los tiempos de construcción de los espolones, permanencia en el cauce y actividades de la extracción; 12- a su vez, previo al inicio de actividades de extracción, se deberá presentar las características y rendimientos de la maquinaria a usar; queda por enterado que al haber cambio en la maquinaria, ésta debe estar notificada a la Dirección de Geología y Minas; (...)" Si bien la Dirección de Geología y Minas menciona, como parte de los elementos que se citan en el capítulo de hechos de la resolución impugnada, la existencia de una denuncia por daño ambiental y violación a las condiciones bajo las que fue emitida la resolución que autoriza la prórroga, la cual fue presentada ante el mismo jerarca del Ambiente y Energía, por los señores Juan Carlos Bolaños y Alexander Dembicki, no fue este sin embargo, el motivo que estableció aquel organismo técnico para cancelar la concesión, tal y como lo refleja la parte dispositiva de dicha resolución, que se sustenta en el párrafo final del Artículo 67 del Código de Mineria y en lo recomendado por el Ministro del ramo, mediante oficios DAJ-427 del 31 de marzo del 2003 y DAJ-661 del 24 de junio del 2004, en los que el citado jerarca emite su recomendación al referido organismo técnico para cancelar la concesión. Así, del primero de dichos documentos, el oficio DAJ-427, dirigido por el Ministro del Ambiente y Energía a la Jefatura del Registro Nacional Minero, se extrae que la recomendación dada por dicho jerarca para la cancelación de la concesión, está siendo emitida precisamente ante el incumplimiento no sólo de las condiciones descritas en los mencionados numerales 11 y 12 de la resolución de prórroga de la concesión (lo cual encuentra asidero jurídico en el Artículo 67 párrafo primero del Código de Mineria), sino también a partir del incumplimiento del término señalado mediante resolución R-442-2002- MINAE, por la cual se le solicitó presentar la justificación del referido incumplimiento dentro de un término dispositivo de tres días. Además de tales consideraciones, el documento en comentario demuestra que la documentación técnica presentada por la concesionaria, en el contexto de la obligación señalada, fue rechazada con el criterio técnico de dos profesionales del MINAE competentes en el campo, de tal manera, que sí hubo valoración técnica de la documentación presentada, solo que ésta fue refutada por la entidad administrativa competente, señalando en ese momento, el incumplimiento ya indicado respecto a las condiciones de la concesión (véase literal f de la plana 2 del principal). En este mismo contexto de análisis, si se considera que el oficio DAJ-427, del Ministro, fue emitido el día 31 de marzo del 2003 y que la resolución de prórroga le fue notificada a la concesionaria desde el 26 de julio del 2002, entonces se configura un incumplimiento de los términos de la concesión por un período de ocho meses consecutivos y continuos. Por su parte, mediante el oficio DAJ-661 del 24 de junio del 2004, el mismo jerarca del Ambiente y Energía, hace notar a la Jefatura del Registro Nacional Minero, que lo recomendado mediante la resolución DAJ-427, ha adquirido firmeza al haberse resuelto sin lugar las incidencias en contra de dicha resolución. De tal forma, que éste último es un acto que reproduce los alcances del precedente, sin introducir un elemento novedoso que deba ser considerado en el análisis propuesto. Respecto al procedimiento utilizado por el jerarca para formular la recomendación impugnada, la revisión de lo dispuesto en el Artículo 67 párrafo final del Código de Minería, permite concebir que su decisión, se enmarca dentro de lo dispuesto en dicha norma, con la precisión de los ajustes que se deben hacer en cuanto al nombre de la entidad competente. Así el Artículo 67 del Código de Mineria dispone: "Artículo 67.- La concesión de explotación podrá ser cancelada, si el titular no cumple con las condiciones estipuladas en la resolución de otorgamiento, de acuerdo con esta ley y su reglamento, en especial en los siguientes casos: a) Si a partir del segundo año de vigencia el concesionario no hubiera ejecutado los trabajos tendientes a realizar la explotación, o si en el curso de la vigencia de la explotación se hubieren suspendido los trabajos durante seis meses consecutivos, sin razón técnica o económica justificada. b) Si no se hubieran presentado los informes a los cuales se hace referencia en el artículo 34 de esta ley. c) Si no se hubieran pagado los impuestos mencionados en el artículo 52 de esta ley. ch) Si no se hubiesen cumplido las normas legales y reglamentarias que regulan la contaminación ambiental y la recuperación de los recursos naturales renovables. d) La caducidad se producirá, igualmente, en los casos de incumplimiento, por parte del concesionario, de las obligaciones que le impone esta ley, cuando no estuviere expresamente prevista esa sanción. La Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, después del estudio del caso, mediante notificación dará aviso al interesado y le fijará un plazo no mayor de noventa días, para que cumpla con sus obligaciones o se justifique. El plazo comenzará a correr desde el día en que el interesado reciba la notificación. Si el titular de la concesión no se justificare o no cumpliere con lo ordenado dentro del término que se fije, la Dirección llevará el asunto a conocimiento del Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio, el cual estudiará el caso y podrá sugerir que la Dirección conceda un nuevo plazo, que no será mayor de tres meses. Si este Ministerio no considerare procedente un nuevo plazo o si hubiere finalizado el concedido, la Dirección dictará la resolución de cancelación correspondiente. Esta resolución se publicará en el Diario Oficial "La Gaceta" y, una vez firme, la zona quedará libre del derecho minero respectivo. (Modificada su numeración por el artículo 2 de la Ley N° 8246 de 24 de abril del 2002, que lo pasó del 63 al 67) ". De conformidad con dicha disposición, hecha la consulta del caso al Ministro por parte de la Dirección de Geología y Minas, el Ministro en este caso, no el jerarca de Economía, Industria y Comercio, sino del Ambiente y Energía, de conformidad con los alcances de los Artículos 3 y 4 de la Ley 7152, Orgánica del MINAE, publicada en La Gaceta Nº 117 del 21 de junio de 1990, es dicho jerarca el que resulta competente para asumir el dictado de este tipo de actos. Esas normas disponen: "ARTICULO 3.- Las competencias que leyes anteriores les hubiesen asignado a otras instituciones del Estado, referentes a las que esta ley le otorga al Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (*), corresponderán a éste. "ARTICULO 4.- Para dar cumplimiento a lo establecido en esta ley, el Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (*) estará integrado por la Dirección de Energía, la Dirección de Geología y Minas, la Dirección General Forestal, el Departamento de Vida Silvestre que, en virtud de esta ley, pasa a ser Dirección General, y el Servicio de Parques Nacionales; asimismo, tendrá adscrito al Instituto Metereológico Nacional, con jerarquía de Dirección General. (*) El nombre del Ministerio fue así reformado por Ley Nº 7554 de 4 de octubre de 1995, artículo 116.) De tal manera que no encuentra este Tribunal que en este procedimiento, el ámbito de competencias legalmente asignadas, tanto al jerarca que ha emitido el acto impugnado, como al ente técnico competente de materializar en el ámbito minero la recomendación dada por aquel alto funcionario, se hayan violentado ni que con esas decisiones se haya transgredido la legalidad observable en este tipo de procedimientos, todo de conformidad con lo que preceptua el Artículo 67 del Código de Minería. El otro acto impugnado es la resolución Nº 335-2005 de las 09:15 horas del 23 de agosto del 2005, dictada por el Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía que resuelve el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la concesionaria, en contra de la resolución 157 de las 8:30 horas del 10 de marzo del 2005, y que se pronuncia sobre el incidente de nulidad de actuaciones y resoluciones contra el oficio DGM-RNM-527-2002 del 10 de septiembre del 2002, de la Dirección de Geología y Minas. Tal y como lo refleja la literalidad material de dicho acto, documentado a folios 1736 a 1740 del Tomo VI, Adm., refleja el razonamiento empleado por el jerarca del Ambiente y Energía para no admitir las impugnaciones que realiza la actora. En su contenido encuentra este Tribunal que no ha incurrido la administración cuestionada, en las causales de vicio de legalidad y nulidad que formula la actora, por cuanto, se expresan motivo, contenido, competencias, objeto, finalidad y enunciación de efectos dispuestos del acto en sí, los cuales son conformes con el ámbito de competencias propios del Jerarca del Ambiente y Energía y de la Dirección de Geología y Minas, de ambos órganos en el ejercicio de sus competencias dispuestas en el Código de Mineria. El contenido de este acto cumple con la regularidad normativa, y se deriva de una Ley especial que confiere esos atributos a las autoridades públicas que los han emitido, soportando un análisis frontal de las disposiciones contenidas en los Artículos 128 a 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Tanto el MINAE como la Dirección de Geología y Minas, resultan ser las autoridades públicas con competencia regular y orgánica para aplicar las disposiciones del Código de esa materia, encaminadas a dimensionar concretos ámbitos de incumplimiento en los que pudieren incurrir concesionarios. Por su parte el Reglamento al Código de Minería, emitido mediante Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 29300-MINAE vigente desde el 16 de marzo del 2001, establece los alcances del régimen de sanciones que aplica la Dirección de Geología y Minas, como organismo técnico competente en esta materia. De tal manera, que se trata del ejercicio de competencias regladas, con exclusión de la discrecionalidad, excepto para ponderar el nivel de afectación al recurso natural eventualmente depreciado. Sin embargo, no encuentra este Tribunal, que en su integralidad, este otro acto impugnado, la resolución R-335-2005- MINAE, incurra en la causal de nulidad que invoca en su provecho la parte actora. Observa este Tribunal, que cuando la Sala Constitucional tuvo oportunidad de conocer el alcance y los contenidos de lo alegado por la empresa actora respecto al procedimiento seguido por la administración cuestionada, tanto mediante la intervención del jerarca del Ambiente y Energía, al emitir su recomendación ante el Registro Nacional Minero, como la actuación propiamente tal de dicha administración, emitiendo la resolución de cancelación de la concesión, encontró que en lo actuado por la administración no existe violación a las garantías procesales que integran el debido proceso. La Sala Constitucional señala: "De lo anterior se deduce, con toda claridad, que el procedimiento instaurado por los recurridos con el propósito de declarar la caducidad de la concesión de que goza la empresa amparada, lejos de constituir una violación sustancial de su derecho de defensa y al debido proceso, se adecua al Derecho de la Constitución, motivo por el cual lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso. En efecto, en el caso presente se tiene por acreditado que la autoridad recurrida, luego de recibir la denuncia aludida, confirió a la amparada un término de 3 días para cumplir o justificar la inobservancia de las condiciones fijadas en la resolución Nº R-314-2002-MINAE de las 09:00 hrs. de 15 de junio de 2002, por lo que no se observa que fuera colocada en indefensión. En todo caso, es evidente que la norma transcrita también prevé que la situación sea conocida por el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, por lo que no se aprecia de qué forma la actuación de los recurridos vulnera los derechos fundamentales de la tutelada. Ninguna restricción indebida del derecho al debido proceso de la empresa afectada se tiene por acreditada en esta sentencia que deba ser atendida en esta Jurisdicción, por lo que se debe denegar el recurso. (Extracto parcial de Voto 2006- 01077 de las ocho horas con ocho minutos del tres de febrero del dos mil seis. Expediente 05-013653-0007-CO) En el contexto del respeto al derecho fundamental al debido proceso de ley y a las otras garantías constitucionales, que alega como quebrantadas la parte actora, si bien se trata de un grupo de derechos que gozan del privilegio de estar sustentados en la Constitución Política, siendo por consiguiente derechos superiores que exigen del juzgador un celoso escrutinio de las actuaciones en las que se alega su incumplimiento como motivo elemental del quebranto jurisdiccionalmente tutelable, no comparte este Tribunal con la parte actora, los argumentos utilizados para darle soporte jurídico al señalado quebranto de derechos constitucionales. De partida, porque como lo razonó la Sala Constitucional, según el ya citado Voto 2006-011077, en lo actuado por la Administración Pública, no se observa violación al debido proceso; a lo que habría que agregar, las siguientes razones: Un derecho concesional para explotar materiales de un cauce del dominio público, entendiendo por éste, el que se adquiere mediante una concesión orientada a ese fin, no es un derecho adquirido ni una situación jurídica consolidada. Lejos de tales calificativos y las aparejadas consecuencias jurídicas que comporta cada una de tales categorias jurídicas, un derecho para extraer materiales de un cauce dominio público, constituye un medio que utiliza la administración para permitirle a un particular la realización de una actividad en la que por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia, ésta no puede realizar por sí misma, permitiendo con ello, que surja la concreción de intereses entre el particular que gerencia la actividad con eventuales fines lucrativos, con los fines públicos de la Administración activa, que permite y autoriza el ejercicio lícito de la actividad. La concesión deviene, por consiguiente, en un simple medio instrumental de la voluntad de la Administración con competencia activa en ese ámbito, para permitir la satisfacción de otros intereses que a ésta también le competen, como en el presente caso, efectivamente lo es el aprovechamiento racional y ambientalmente congruente de esa materia prima que sustenta el cauce del dominio público, que posee múltiples aplicaciones y usos en la industria humana. Sin embargo, el instrumento jurídico concesional, no potencia una apropiación del recurso natural involucrado, sino un derecho precario, despojado de los atributos típicamente tales que suelen estar presentes en institutos jurídicos como el dominio o propiedad plena, u otros esquemas propios de la contratación asdministrativa, tales como el contrato de obras y servicios, o el de suministros, en los que, amén al régimen jurídico que los regula, existe un procedimiento de contratación diametralmente opuesto al que se concreta con este otro tipo de esquemas concesionales, en los que el Estado nunca puede dejar de ser el titular del recurso e interés público en juego y el particular titular de la concesión, ostenta un derecho en precario. La concesión para extraer materiales del cauce del dominio público, es de carácter temporal, no confiere derecho a la explotación perpetua, está sujeta a término, como lo demuestra su extinción que produce el acaecimiento del plazo y es revocable por los medios que la ley autoriza (Art. 154 LGAP). Durante su vigencia, el titular sólo puede realizar lo autorizado por la administración concedente, dentro del régimen de derechos y obligaciones que ésta declara. El conjunto de reglas con las que opera la concesión minera, están contenidas en la Ley que regula la figura, y que se plasman en el acto material escrito que dispone la concesión. No es la concesión, un derecho de dominio, ni su emisión comporta la transferencia de la propiedad sobre el recurso concesionado. En ese sentido, tal y como lo declara el mismo Código de Minería, el cauce del río y lo que en el mismo hubiere, son bienes públicos, que el Estado administra y puede dar en concesión, no pudiendo en ningún momento admitir que por ese hecho, el Estado cede en favor del concesionario el dominio sobre ese bien, pues existe una imposibilidad jurídica para que tal cosa suceda (Arts. 11 y 121 inciso 14) de la Constitución Política, 66 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 1º del Código de Minería).

De tal manera que por no ser posible que mediante una concesión, que contiene un título precario asimilable en cuanto a su poder de resistencia, a los meros permisos de uso sobre bienes demaniales, se dé tal transferencia del dominio sobre del bien explotado, como lo alega con desacierto actora, este Tribunal rechaza lo alegado por dicha parte, en cuando a los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, y afectación al derecho de propiedad.

En esta misma línea de pensamiento, tampoco se constata la afectación al ejercicio del comercio o a la libertad empresarial que alega quebrantados la parte actora, toda vez que las actuaciones que están acreditadas en el expediente, son el producto del ejercicio de las competencias legalmente establecidas para la administración, mismas que le resultan irrenunciables e instransferibles. Lejos de compartir la postura de la parte actora, estima este Tribunal que en autos está acreditado el descontento que la actividad ejercida por la concesionaria, motivó en los quejosos cuyo fundamento consideró el jerarca del ambiente y energía para emitir su recomendación.”