Compensation for lands in indigenous reserve — good faith requirementIndemnización por terrenos en reserva indígena — requisito de buena fe

Judgment number 125-2020-VI SIXTH SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, Dirección01 , at seventeen hours ten minutes on the [Valor 054] of September two thousand twenty.

Contentious administrative proceeding established by [Nombre 029] SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, legal ID number [Valor 001], represented by [Nombre 001], [...], who acts as President with powers of unrestricted general agent without limit of amount (legal capacity document provided with the complaint); against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, represented by Nombre21224 , married, attorney, ID CED1922, resident of San Gabriel de Aserrí, who acts as general judicial agent of the institution (legal capacity document in the Office's file); the COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS , represented by [Nombre 003] , [...] (legal capacity document provided to the case file); and the ESTADO, represented by the Deputy Procurador, Jorge Oviedo Álvarez, single, ID number CED2623, resident of Heredia (appearance on September twenty-second, two thousand sixteen). The following attorneys appear as special judicial agents for the intervening parties: for the plaintiff: Alex Benjamín Gen Palma, married, attorney, ID CED9954, resident of Ciudad Colón (power of attorney granted on August twenty-first, two thousand seventeen); for the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural: Nombre73110 , married once, ID CED109111, resident of Santa Ana (power of attorney granted on November first, two thousand sixteen); Óscar Alex Soto Flores, married for the first time, identity card number CED109112 (power of attorney granted on August twenty-second, two thousand seventeen); and for the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas: Nombre1112 , ID CED109113, resident of San Vicente de Moravia (power of attorney granted on October twenty-sixth, two thousand sixteen). All intervening parties are of legal age and Costa Rican.

RESULTANDO

1.- By written submission filed with the Office on May sixth, two thousand sixteen, the plaintiff corporation files a contentious complaint so that, based on the factual background and legal arguments given and as defined in the Preliminary Hearing, the following be ordered: "1. To declare this complaint admissible in all its points. / 2.- That it be declared that the farm of the Partido de [Nombre 037], Real Folios [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006] are fully immersed within the boundaries of the [Nombre62 038] Reservation. / 3.- Given that the aforementioned farms were de facto expropriated by the State, the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to carry out the survey and location of the lands subject to this proceeding, to perform the corresponding appraisal of both the Nombre167 of the land and the improvements made, and to order payment of the corresponding compensation referred to in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law. / 4.- That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay statutory interest on the amounts ordered as compensation, from the date the judgment becomes final until effective payment. / 5.- The defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay my represented party the subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo) caused by the harm that the illegitimate actions of the defendants have caused me as the representative of the affected corporation, who at all times created a restriction on the free disposal of the properties subject to this complaint, for more than 30 years, generating a state of uncertainty of invasions carried out under the protection that they are lands within a reservation, in addition to the uncertainty that the defendants cause me regarding the non-compliance with their obligation to survey, value, and pay for said lands, given that my represented party is being dispossessed without any payment having been made, all of which causes me depression, frustration, anguish, and fear or dread of losing part of my represented party's assets without being compensated, non-material damage that I estimate in the amount of 50 million colones. / 6.- That the defendants be ordered to index all economic amounts to which they are sentenced. / 7.- That the defendants be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action." (Complaint written brief, Preliminary Hearing minute in digital format court file and digital backup of the Preliminary Hearing on attached compact disc).

2.- Having granted the statutory transfer, on October twenty-seventh, two thousand sixteen, the representation of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas answers it in the negative, raising for this purpose the substantive defenses of lack of standing to be sued and lack of right. It requested the dismissal of the action in all its points. (Written answer to the complaint in the court file, in digital format).

3.- On November twenty-eighth, two thousand sixteen, the Procuraduría General de la República answered negatively the complaint filed against it, for which it alleged the defenses of lack of standing to be sued and lack of right; accordingly, it requested the dismissal of the action in all its points. (Written answer to the complaint in the court file, in digital format).

4.- On November third, two thousand sixteen, the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural answered negatively the complaint, raising for this purpose the preliminary defenses of improper joinder – to summon the Asociación [Nombre62 040] to the process – and expiration of the action, and the substantive defenses of lack of standing to sue, to be sued, and lack of right. (Written answer to the complaint in the court file, in digital format).

5.- After the corresponding reply hearing, by resolution number 474-2017, at eleven hours twenty-five minutes on March first, two thousand seventeen, the Judge in charge of the matter –Cindy Chavarría Hernández– rejected the defense of joinder. There is no record of challenge against that decision.

6.- The Preliminary Hearing established in numeral 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo began at nine hours ten minutes on August twenty-fourth, two thousand seventeen, under the direction of Procedural Judge Cindy Chavarría Hernández and the presence of the representative of the plaintiff corporation –attorney Alex Benjamín Gen Palma– and the agent of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural –attorney Óscar Alex Soto–, and the designated Procurador –Jorge Oviedo Álvarez–. The representative of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas was absent. Upon a claim by the plaintiff regarding the omission of tax stamps in the powers of attorney and certifications of the defendant institution and Commission, it was clarified that both enjoy tax exemption. The claims were fixed in the manner stated in the first resultando of this ruling. The Instituto de Desarrollo Rural reiterated the defense of expiration of the action and formulated the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción); defenses that were reserved to be resolved in the judgment, not being evident or manifest. The disputed facts of the complaint were determined, and a ruling was made regarding the evidence offered by the intervening parties. The new documentary evidence offered by the defendant institute was rejected. As there was no evidence to be presented at trial, the matter was declared to be a proceeding on legal grounds only (artículo 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), so that all parties present gave their final arguments orally. (Preliminary Hearing minute in digital format court file and digital backup on attached compact disc.)

7.- This proceeding was passed for ruling to the Sixth Section for its decision on the merits, as stated in the respective transfer stamp – visible in the court file in digital format and in the respective folder. Likewise, it is indicated that this matter has been processed entirely in digital format, which conforms to the provisions of the Reglamento sobre Expediente Judicial Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, approved by the Corte Plena, in article XXXI of session number 22-13, held on May twentieth, two thousand thirteen.

8.- No grounds capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed, therefore this judgment is delivered, after deliberation by the members of the Tribunal and unanimously.

Judge Fernández Brenes writes the opinion; and,

CONSIDERANDO

I.- PRIOR WARNING.- Upon careful review of the case file, it is observed that in this matter, the summons to the conciliation hearing referred to in Article 70.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was omitted, without any of the parties having previously expressed their refusal to participate in it. However, considering that conciliation is a waivable procedural step and that at the remedy stage of the preliminary hearing, none of them expressed any objection in this regard; this Tribunal understands that there was a tacit waiver of conciliation, as the parties to the proceeding participated in the Preliminary Hearing and, therefore, there is no defenselessness or nullity that warrants being declared here.

II.- PROVEN FACTS.- Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following is taken as proven, with the indication that all references are from the court file:

1.) By Article 9 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, the Government of the Republic "... recognizes the existence and legal personality of the [Nombre62 038] Community, canton of [Nombre62 007] and declares the [Nombre62 038] Reservation the territory occupied by said community." Likewise, in numeral 11 of this decree, it delegated to the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, in coordination with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, the territorial delimitation of this reservation. This decree was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 113, of June twelfth, nineteen seventy-six (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); 2.) On November eighth, nineteen seventy-nine, the Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine, was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 210, which established the Hamlet (Caserío) [Nombre 038] , and in numeral 3, established its location on the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional and subsequently, in Article 4, indicated that this demarcation corresponded to the geographical and legal area of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de [Nombre 022] (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); 3.) By Decreto Ejecutivo number 13569, of April thirtieth, nineteen eighty-two, the Poder Ejecutivo reaffirmed the creation of the [Nombre 038] Reservation, by Decreto Ejecutivo 6036-G and its delimitation as an indigenous hamlet, by Decreto Ejecutivo number 10707-G. The publication of this decree is recorded in the Colección de leyes y Decretos, Semester 1, Volume 2, page 375 (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); 4.) On May sixteenth, two thousand one, the Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta, effective as of its publication, which modified the Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G – cited – to provide a new location for the [Nombre62 038] Reservation, according to the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (first article); and specified that the delimited zone corresponds to the geographical and legal area of action of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral [Nombre62 038] (Article 2) (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).

5.) On August first, two thousand five, the cadastral map number [Valor 007] was registered in the national cadastre, prepared by the surveyor expert Nombre103154 , to depict the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], with a measurement of "4ha 1931.42 m2." On the reverse of this map, the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas warned that in its entirety, that farm was located within the [Nombre62 038] reservation, but that it authorized the registration of the map, as it was a farm existing prior to the creation of that reservation (certification of the cadastral map provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital court file and representations of the agent in the Preliminary Hearing); 6.) The farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029] originates from the segregation and sale that Mr. [Nombre62 010] makes of the mother farm with registration [Placa25939 ], in favor of his sister [Nombre62 011], on September fourth, nineteen seventy-three (certification of volumes from the Public Property Registry and registry certification of property [Valor 029], documents provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital court file); 7.) The farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029] was the subject of several sale transactions, thus changing registered owner on various occasions; until in public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on July eighth, two thousand eight, in the protocol of notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the unrestricted general agents without limit of amount of the corporations [Nombre62 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre 012] and [Nombre62 013]) and [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre62 001]) appear, and by which, the first corporation sells to the second, the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], located in the district [Nombre 015] ([Nombre 016]), canton [Nombre 017] ([Nombre 007]), of the Province of [Nombre 037]; which is nature: [Nombre 042] land, and with the following boundaries: North: [Nombre 018], South: [Nombre 019] and [Nombre 021], East: [Nombre62 019], West: [Nombre62 021]; and plotted on cadastral map number [Valor 007], with a measurement of forty-one thousand nine hundred thirty-one square meters and forty-two square decimeters. The sale price was defined as the sum of three million colones. It was indicated that the property was current regarding municipal taxes (registry certification of the deed, provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital court file); 8.) The foregoing deed was submitted to the Journal of the Public Property Registry at Volume [Valor 010], Entry [Valor 011], on July tenth, two thousand eight, at twelve hours twenty-four minutes twenty seconds (citation numbers [Valor 012]); and was registered on August sixth, two thousand eight (certification and registry information of the deed, documents provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the court file, in digital format); 9.) On March twentieth, two thousand eleven, the cadastral map number [Valor 013], with an area of 4,808 square meters, was registered in the Catastro Nacional, of the Public Property Registry; prepared by surveyor Nombre103154 and with an indication of being part of the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029] , with a total area of 4,808 square meters. On the back of this map, on March tenth, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas recorded the note that this map was part of Real Folio [Valor 029], located in [Nombre 022], district [Nombre 016], canton of [Nombre 007], Province [Nombre 037], which was located within the [Nombre 038] Reservation; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps – of each one – because the farm as such has existed since before the creation of the Ley Indígena (cadastral map certified on its front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the court file, in digital format); 10.) On March twenty-ninth, two thousand eleven, the cadastral map number [Valor 015], with an area of 1 ha 0000 square meters, was registered in the Catastro Nacional, of the Public Property Registry; prepared by surveyor Nombre103154 and with an indication of being part of the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], with a total area of 1 hectare 0000 square meters. On the back of this map, on March tenth, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas recorded the note that this map was part of Real Folio [Valor 029], located in [Nombre 022], district [Nombre 016], canton of [Nombre 007], Province [Nombre 037], which was located within the [Nombre 038] Reservation; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps – of each one – because the farm as such has existed since before the creation of the Ley Indígena (cadastral map certified on its front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the court file, in digital format); 11.) On March thirty-first, two thousand eleven, the cadastral map number [Valor 016], with an area of 5,825 square meters, was registered in the Catastro Nacional, of the Public Property Registry; prepared by surveyor Nombre103154 and with an indication of being part of the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], with a total area of 41,931.42 square meters. On the back of this map, on March second, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas recorded the note that this map was part of Real Folio [Valor 029], located in [Nombre 022], district [Nombre 016], canton of [Nombre 007], Province [Nombre 037], which was located within the [Nombre 038] Reservation; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps – of each one – because the farm as such has existed since before the creation of the Ley Indígena (cadastral map certified on its front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the court file, in digital format); 12.) On March thirty-first, two thousand eleven, the cadastral map number [Valor 017], with an area of 1 ha 1298 square meters, was registered in the Catastro Nacional, of the Public Property Registry; prepared by surveyor Nombre103154 and with an indication of being part of the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], with a total area of 1 hectare 1,298 square meters. On the back of this map, on March second, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas recorded the note that this map was part of Real Folio [Valor 029], located in [Nombre 022], district [Nombre 016], canton of [Nombre 007], Province [Nombre 037], which was located within the [Nombre 038] Reservation; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps – of each one – because the farm as such has existed since before the creation of the Ley Indígena (cadastral map certified on its front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the court file, in digital format); 13.) In public deed number [Valor 056], of March twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, pages [Valor 052] reverse to [Valor 053] reverse of Volume [Valor 054] of the protocol of notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, [Nombre62 001], acting as President of the Board of Directors, with powers of unrestricted general agent without limit of amount of [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima, carries out four segregations from the farm owned by it, with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], which he described as follows: Lot [Valor 020] : [Nombre 027] land, located in [Nombre 016] (District [Nombre 015]), [Nombre 007] (canton [Nombre 017]), of the Province of [Nombre 037], bounded on the north by lot [Valor 018] hereinafter described, on the south by [Nombre62 019], on the east by lot [Valor 018] hereinafter described, and on the west by [Nombre62 019], with an area of four thousand eight hundred eight square meters, according to cadastral map number [Valor 013]; Lot [Valor 018]: [Nombre 023] land, located in [Nombre 016] (District [Nombre 015]), [Nombre62 007] (canton [Nombre 017]), of the Province of [Nombre 037], bounded on the north by lot [Valor 019] described below; on the south by lot [Valor 020] already described, on the east by [Nombre62 021]; and on the west by [Nombre62 019] and partly by lot [Valor 020] already described; with an area of five thousand eight hundred twenty-five square meters, according to cadastral map [Valor 016]; Lot [Valor 019]: [Nombre 025] land, located in [Nombre 016] (District [Nombre 015]), [Nombre 007] (canton [Nombre 017]), of the Province of [Nombre 037], bounded on the north by lot [Valor 021] hereinafter described; on the south by lot [Valor 018] already described, on the east by [Nombre62 021], and on the west by [Nombre62 019], with an area of eleven thousand two hundred ninety-eight square meters according to cadastral map [Valor 017]; and Lot [Valor 021] : [Nombre 025] land, located in [Nombre 016] (District [Nombre 015]), [Nombre62 007] (canton [Nombre 017]), of the Province of [Nombre 037], bounded on the north by the remainder described below, on the south by lot [Valor 019] already described, on the east by [Nombre62 021], and on the west by [Nombre62 019], with a measurement of ten thousand square meters, according to cadastral map number [Valor 015]. The remainder (mother farm) was described as follows: [Nombre62 025] land, located in [Nombre 016] (District [Nombre 015]), [Nombre62 007] (canton [Nombre 017]), of the Province of [Nombre 037], bounded on the north by [Nombre62 018], on the south by lot [Valor 021] previously described, on the east by [Nombre 021], and on the west by [Nombre62 019], with a measurement of ten thousand forty-two square meters (certification of deed provided by the plaintiff corporation, visible in the digital court file); 14.) The above deed was submitted to the Journal of the Public Property Registry at Volume [Valor 022], Entry [Valor 023], at fourteen hours thirty-four minutes four seconds, on March twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve (citation numbers [Valor 024]), and was registered on April ninth, two thousand twelve, thus giving rise to the following farms, all located in the Province of [Nombre 037], canton of [Nombre 007] ([Nombre 017] ) and district [Nombre 016] ([Nombre62 015]), and whose registered owner is [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; and which have the following Real Folio registrations and characteristics: number [Valor 025], nature: [Nombre 027] land; boundaries: north: [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima, south: [Nombre 019]; east: [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; west: [Nombre62 019], measuring four thousand eight hundred eight square meters and zero square decimeters, mapped on cadastral map [Valor 013]; number [Valor 004]: nature: [Nombre62 023] land; boundaries: north and south: [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; east: [Nombre 021] ; and west: [Nombre62 019] and [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; measuring five thousand eight hundred twenty-five square meters and zero square decimeters, mapped on cadastral map [Valor 016]; number [Valor 005] : nature: [Nombre 025] land, boundaries: north and south: [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; east [Nombre62 021] and west: [Nombre62 019] ; measures: eleven thousand two hundred ninety-eight square meters and zero square decimeters, and mapped on cadastral map number [Valor 017]; and number [Valor 006] : nature: [Nombre 025] land, boundaries: north and south: [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; east [Nombre62 021] and west: [Nombre62 019]; measures: ten thousand square meters and zero square decimeters, and mapped on cadastral map number [Valor 015] (deed receipt stamp on deed certification; certifications of the respective properties and indicated cadastral maps, documents provided by the plaintiff corporation, visible in the digital court file); 15.) As a result of the above segregations, [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 is the registered owner of the farm with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], of the Province of [Nombre 037], canton [Nombre 007] , district [Nombre 016], which is [Nombre62 025] land, which currently measures ten thousand forty-two square meters and zero square decimeters. The following boundaries are recorded: North: [Nombre62 018] , South: [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; East: [Nombre 021] and West: [Nombre 019]; and it corresponds to cadastral map number [Valor 007] (registry certification of April fifteenth, two thousand sixteen and the indicated cadastral map, provided with the complaint, visible in the court file in digital format); and; 16.) This complaint was notified to the defendants on the following dates: to the State on the twenty-first and to the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, on the twenty-second, all dates of the month of September, two thousand sixteen (notification record, as detailed in the virtual desktop folder).

III.- UNPROVEN FACTS.- Also of importance for the decision of this matter, the following is taken as not proven:

1.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and/or the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas have exercised an action of reivindication (acción de reivindicación) in relation to the properties with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], [Valor 030] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] or [Valor 006], all of the Province of [Nombre 037], whose current registered owner is [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; 2.) That the State has titled and transferred the properties with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], [Valor 025] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] or [Valor 006] to the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva [Nombre62 038]; 3.) That the Administration has carried out a physical occupation or a de facto expropriation of the properties with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] or [Valor 006]; 4.) The existence of damage or violation of any right that the Administration has a duty to compensate to the plaintiff corporation; and; 5.) The change of ownership of the farms with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] or [Valor 006].

IV.- OBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT.- The plaintiff corporation files a contentious complaint with several claims of different legal natures. The first , of a declaratory nature, is for it to be declared that the farms of the Partido de [Nombre 037], with Real Folios [Valor 029], [Valor 030] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006] are fully immersed within the boundaries of the [Nombre62 038] Reservation (claim # 2). The others, accessory to the previous one, are for condemnation, and refer to the following points: i.- that the defendants – Estado, Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas – be jointly and severally ordered to conduct the surveys, location, and appraisal of the preceding properties, both the land and the improvements, to proceed with the corresponding compensation for the lands and the improvements made (claim #3); ii.- the recognition of interest and indexation of that compensation (claim #4); iii.- the recognition and order to pay subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo), which it determined in the amount of fifty million colones (claim #5); and the order to pay the procedural and personal costs arising from this proceeding (claim #6). The basis of its complaint is the following: a.) That according to the national legal system – specifically numeral 3 of the Ley Indígena – indigenous reservations have a special legal regime, in that they are inalienable, imprescriptible lands not transferable to non-indigenous persons. By reason of the foregoing, it is in numeral 5 of the referenced Law that it was provided that the owners of properties located in such reservations had to be relocated or expropriated, according to studies and procedures by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural in coordination with the Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas and payments by the State; b.) It states, by Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, of May twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-nine, which modified Decreto Ejecutivo 5904-G, of the fourteenth of March prior, incorporated important nuclei of the indigenous population in areas populated exclusively by indigenous people; among these nuclei, the indigenous community [Nombre62 031], in the canton of [Nombre62 007] (Article 9). Later, the indicated reservation was granted legal recognition, as inferred from the first article of the Ley Indígena, number 6172.

Later, with Executive Decree No. 10,707-G of October 24, 1979, new boundaries were defined for this reserve, and finally, in Executive Decree No. 29452-G of March 21, 2001, its geographic boundaries were expanded; c.) She indicates that, under the protection of the public registry's guarantee of good faith, she acquired the farm [Valor 029] in good faith in 2008, of the District of [Nombre 037]; without it having any restriction under the Indigenous Law; of which she is the registered title holder. She clarified, however, that in the cadastral map corresponding to this property, number [Valor 007], the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs recorded that the farm represented in that graphic is located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], but authorized the registration of the map, because the farm as such existed before the creation of the reserve and the Indigenous Law; d.) She explains that this farm has origins that date back to a private possession, since 1888, by Mr. [Nombre62 032], who possessed it for thirty years, and assigned his right to [Nombre62 033], who possessed it for ten years, and finally, through a possessory information proceeding processed in the Civil Court of San José, title was granted in the name of [Nombre 034] on March 15, 1928, with farm number [Valor 055]. She adds that on September 4, 1973, [Nombre62 010] segregated from the previous farm the portion that gave rise to farm [Valor 029], which he transferred to his sister [Nombre62 011]; e.) She added that, in turn, on March 27, 2012, she performed four segregations from farm [Valor 029], which gave rise to the following properties: [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006], of which she is also the registered owner and maintains her possession without any type of restriction. However, in the cadastral maps referring to the previous farms—[Valor 013], [Valor 016], [Valor 039], and [Valor 015], respectively—the Executive Directorate of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs recorded that such properties and the parent farm [Valor 029] were located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], but authorized the registration of those maps, because the farm as such existed before the creation of the reserve and the Indigenous Law; e.) That by reason of the previous circumstance, she cannot exercise any of the attributes of property provided for in numeral 264 of the Civil Code—possession, usufruct, transformation, alienation, defense and exclusion, restitution, and indemnification—insofar as she does not have free disposition over it, even though her right as owner is registered in the Public Property Registry, without any limitation or encumbrance on the described farm being recorded; given that, according to the terms of numeral 267 of the Civil Code, for limitations on property to be legitimate, they must be registered in the Public Property Registry. Thus, she was able to acquire a real estate property, but the State established that it forms part of an indigenous reserve, and as such, is the absolute property of the Comprehensive Development Association of [Nombre62 022], an action she qualifies as a de facto expropriation, and for which she has not been compensated to date; f.) She alleged that she meets the requirements provided for in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law, as she is a good-faith owner; by virtue of which, she deems the compensation she requests to be recognized in this proceeding to be appropriate and legitimate; since she is the title holder of five private properties, duly registered in the Public Property Registry, acquired in accordance with the law. In this sense, she says that the transaction that gave rise to her right cannot be deemed null and that good faith is not an attribute that registered title holders must prove. Thus, the inalienability of the lands of the indigenous reserves is proclaimed solely and exclusively for those that are comprised within the farm of the reserve as such, which was registered in 2009; a condition that cannot be extended to private lands located in said reserve. She recalled the prevalence of the right of property, in the form enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution and interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence, in rulings 4205-96 and 5207-2004; g.) She accuses that despite the previous encumbrance of her lands, the Administration has omitted to act as required by the legal system governing the matter, regarding the measurement and compensation of her lands; a task in which there is joint and several liability of the defendants, in the manner recognized by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in its ruling number 1604-F-S1-2012; and h.) She indicated that the denounced situation has caused subjective moral damages to the legal representative of the plaintiff company, referring to the state of absolute uncertainty and concern about the situation of her lands, "... because even though the farms were affected by the creation and subsequent expansion of the reserve, through a State regulation, it certainly was never done correctly, as a de facto expropriation was made, their free disposition of the goods was restricted ... and she was not compensated for that expropriation as legally corresponds." In this sense, she added that she suffers constant threats of invasion of her lands by indigenous people. Regarding the defenses of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged by the representation of the Rural Development Institute, she opposed them, considering that this is an omissive conduct, which is maintained over time, which is why Article 40 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code applies; given that admitting the defendant's position would imply allowing the Administration to profit from its own deliberate wrongdoing; given that this is a situation caused by the Administration's own inertia. She added that in this case, the statute of limitations does not apply because this is a special situation, regulated in the Indigenous Law. (Lawsuit brief, in the digital judicial file and statements in the closing arguments, according to digital support, as per backup on attached compact disc.)

V.- ON THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANTS.- The representatives of the State and of the Rural Development Institute answer the lawsuit negatively, in separate (individual) briefs, according to the terms of which, they request that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its aspects, with the corresponding award of costs against the plaintiff; but because the reasons set forth coincide, they will be summarized jointly, with an indication of a divergent consideration being made, when it was so formulated. The basis of their position is as follows: a.) Allegation of the expiration of the action: In the brief answering the lawsuit, the Rural Development Institute indicated that the discussion to determine the appropriateness or not of the requested compensation was expired, both in application of the two-month period provided for in numeral 37 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction, and the annual period established in Article 39 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code; a period that should be counted from the day following the publication, first of the General Law of Vacant Lands and later of the executive decrees that created the reserve [Nombre62 038]; given that the present action was not filed until May 6, 2016; b.) Allegation of statute of limitations of the action: In the Preliminary Hearing, the Rural Development Institute alleged this defense, under the consideration that the compensation established in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law is governed by the ordinary ten-year period—Article 868 of the Civil Code—or by the four-year period, according to the provision of ordinal 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; starting from the promulgation of the General Law of Vacant Lands, number 13 of 1939; or from the decrees creating the reserve [Nombre62 038], in 1976, given that this action was not notified to them until September 22, 2016. c.) Allegation of lack of passive legitimation, on the part of the State: The State representation indicates that the requested compensation must be assumed by the Rural Development Institute, given that according to Law number 6735 of March 29, 1982, it has its own assets and budget, according to the terms of which, it is responsible for the compensation of private lands that have been incorporated into indigenous reserves. It adds that this institution, in coordination with the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, was assigned the guardianship of indigenous lands, as mandated by the Indigenous Law number 6172 of November 29, 1977, and as understood by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling number 1604-F-S1-2012 and the Constitutional Chamber in ruling 2013-7579. It adds that according to the terms of the indicated Law, it is the Rural Development Institute that is responsible for carrying out the studies and appraisals of lands of private individuals—non-indigenous—comprised within the indigenous reserves determined in the national territory and their subsequent compensation; d.) On the lack of passive legitimation of the Rural Development Institute: For its part, and in this same context, the Rural Development Institute indicated that the obligation to compensate corresponds exclusively to the State, charged to the national budget, as inferred from the will of the legislator when approving the Indigenous Law and because it is a matter that concerns the State as a whole. Such funds, it says, are and must be administered by the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, an entity which, in turn, is responsible for carrying out the censuses to determine the properties or possessions of non-indigenous persons in the indigenous reserves, for the corresponding actions. Thus, it concludes that it has no involvement in the matter. Therefore, it indicates that if it intervenes or makes any payment on its own account, it would incur administrative liability under the terms of numeral 110, subsection e) of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets; insofar as the institution is legally prevented from contributing economic resources to make these compensations. In this regard, it cited ruling 74-2013-VII of the Seventh Section of the Contentious Administrative Court; e.) Allegation of lack of right: i.- They say that the decrees that create the indigenous reserves (in general and that of [Nombre62 022], in particular) are valid, insofar as they are issued to make effective the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, in accordance with the international regulations governing their rights. They indicated that it is a special property regime, according to the terms of which the lands are "inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them," such that "non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within the reserves," as provided in Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, number 6172, and also higher-ranking norms, such as Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations, approved by Law number 2330 of April 9, 1959, and which recognizes the right of land tenure to indigenous peoples. It is for this reason that the regulations governing the matter provide mechanisms for compensation of owners and/or possessors of lands incorporated into the indigenous reserves, such as the relocation of the right or compensation; but in turn, prevent them from negotiating those lands, and those who acquire lands under such conditions cannot be compensated; ii.-. The representation of the Rural Development Institute indicates that on the occasion of the promulgation of the executive decrees that determined the geographic location of the reserve [Nombre62 038], the lands comprising it lost their condition as private goods, to acquire the category of a special regime, which excludes them from commerce; given that compensation only proceeds for the good-faith owner or possessor. All those decrees were published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, so that everyone would know of that condition, and ignorance thereof cannot be alleged, under the terms provided in canon 129 of the Political Constitution; iii.- They clarify that the right to compensation is only for non-indigenous owners or possessors who had their right prior to the creation of the respective indigenous reserve, which, in the case of the reserve [Nombre62 038], the temporal limit would be the year 2001, on the occasion of its last territorial demarcation, by Executive Decree No. 29452-G of March 21, 2001. Thus, they explain that after a property is affected (assigned to an indigenous reserve), transfer acts or transactions on the property involving non-indigenous persons cannot be carried out; such that in cases where there is no good faith in the right, compensation does not proceed, but rather eviction, because the treatment the law gives it is that of an invasion. (They cited rulings number 106-2013-I, 74-2013-VII, and 304-213-II as already considered by the Contentious Administrative Court). Therefore, for purposes of proceeding with compensation, it is relevant to know if the title of ownership of the claimant is in good or bad faith; since, if a non-indigenous person acquires a property after that affectation, they are not good-faith purchasers, as these are goods outside of commerce; iv.- Both representations say that the plaintiff company does not meet the requirements provided in numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law for the appropriateness of the claimed compensation, insofar as the tenure or possession of the land in good faith is established as an essential element for this obligation to arise against the Administration. Thus, they note that the Reserve [Nombre62 038] was created in 1976, with two subsequent modifications, in 1979 and in 2001; while the plaintiff company acquired the property in a purchase-sale dated July 8, 2008, and it was registered in the Public Property Registry on August 6 following, that is, thirty-two years after the creation of the reserve. They are not the original owners of the lands whose compensation is sought. Subsequently, from that property, the interested party segregated four lots, all of which—five farms—are located entirely within an indigenous reserve; given that the plaintiff company knew of the farm's limitations due to its location, as indicated in the cadastral map of the first one, and still made the transaction. That single circumstance renders the legal transaction from which the plaintiff's property right arose absolutely null, and with it, the compensation claim inappropriate; v.- They indicate that the alleged dispossession or de facto expropriation, the basis for the action, was not proven, since from the evidence provided, it can be inferred, contrary to what was alleged, that the properties of the plaintiff company do not have any limitation or restriction, which has allowed their full enjoyment by their title holder. Thus, there are no actions by the Administration aimed at the dispossession or limitation of the attributes of the plaintiff's property right; vi.- The representation of the Rural Development Institute questioned the validity of the statements of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs on the cadastral maps of the plaintiff company's properties, for lacking competence to declare the location of such lands within an indigenous reserve, in this case, [Nombre62 022]; and to that effect, it asks the Court to rule on its validity; vii.- The representative of the defendant institute alleged the inappropriateness of the requested interest and indexation, because it was not an obligation of liquid sums to be paid; and warned that indexation is included in interest, and there cannot be a double recognition on the same aspect; viii.- The alleged subjective moral damages, being an accessory claim to the compensation claim, must suffer the same fate as the principal claim, which is inappropriate. In any case, it was added that there is no unlawful damages, because the decrees by which the Reserve [Nombre62 038] was created are in accordance with the law, and therefore the plaintiff company must bear the situation it alleges, given that it knew of the situation that weighed on the farm—which it later segregated—that is, that it acquired a good outside of commerce, thus generating the fault of the victim. On this particular point, the defendant institute added the inappropriateness of the claim, because the plaintiff is a plaintiff company, not its legal representative—Mr. [Nombre62 001]. Finally, the representation of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, even though it opposed the action brought against it, limited itself to indicating that none of the facts of the action were known to it, without further analysis, and formulated the defenses of lack of active legitimation and of right, without explaining them. It should be noted that its representative was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, and therefore, did not formulate closing arguments. (Briefs answering the lawsuit from each of the defendants, in the judicial file in digital format and statements by the representations of the Rural Development Institute and the State at the Preliminary Hearing, according to digital support on the attached compact disc.)

VI.- CLARIFICATION AND ORDER OF PRIORITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS DEBATED IN THE ACTION.- From the foregoing details, it is necessary to note that in this contentious proceeding, no review of legality of any conduct of the Administration has been requested; rather, its purpose is to determine whether or not the compensation sought by the plaintiff company is appropriate, because it alleges that the properties of which it is the registered owner—namely, with Real Folio registration numbers [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006], all of the Province of [Nombre62 037]—are located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], canton of [Nombre62 007]. For this reason, it requested that the aforementioned condition of the indicated farms be declared, and as a consequence thereof, that the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to proceed in the manner prescribed by law, that is, with the compensation of her property right. In view of the preliminary defenses formulated and reserved for this moment, the first thing to be addressed is the fulfillment—or not—of the temporal factor to access this Jurisdictional venue, referring both to the expiration of the action and the statute of limitations of the right. Then, if it passes this admissibility check, the merits of the conflict raised will be addressed. That would entail determining if the alleged affectation occurs on the indicated lands, and then, if the requested compensation is appropriate, in the manner regulated by law. Finally, if the claim is appropriate, it shall be determined who is responsible for the actions and payment of the requested compensation. Having set the order of analysis of the conflict raised, we proceed immediately to it.

VII.- ON THE ALLEGED DEFENSES OF EXPIRATION OF THE ACTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.- It is highlighted that the Rural Development Institute alleged the concurrence of both legal concepts—expiration of the action and statute of limitations—with the intention that it be determined that this action was filed after the time period provided by the procedural regulations in this regard had elapsed, to access the Contentious Jurisdiction in a timely manner. To address this issue, it is considered pertinent to make the following considerations:

First: Distinction between the legal concepts of expiration of the action and statute of limitations: It must be clarified that it is not possible to confuse the foregoing concepts, nor to consider them as if they were the same thing, even though both refer to the same factor of jurisdictional processes, that is, the temporal one, to assess the filing of the corresponding action in a timely manner. Indeed, each concept has its own special and distinct nature, and most importantly, different legal consequences or implications. In the case of expiration of the action, it refers to a period established in the procedural legal norm, which sets the maximum limit for filing that action in time before the jurisdictional authorities; but whose essential characteristic is that it is a single, final, rigid, and strict period, and for this reason inflexible, since it cannot be interrupted (where the counting of the period begins anew, without considering the time already elapsed), nor suspended (counting of the legal period restarts, taking into consideration the time already elapsed), as occurs with the statute of limitations of the right. Another distinctive feature of the expiration of the action is that it can be reviewed ex officio by the Judge, unlike the statute of limitations, which requires being alleged by the interested party. Thus, the occurrence of expiration is objective and inexorable, and the only way to suppress its extinctive effect is the exercise of the action within the term provided by Law. Thus, "... in order to speak of expiration, it is necessary that a certain legal effect has previously occurred; it is necessary that a certain legal situation of axiological possibility has arisen, whose lack of exercise in a certain manner produces its extinction." (PÉREZ VARGAS, Víctor. Derecho Privado, San José, Litografía e Imprenta LIL, S.A, 3rd edition, 1994, p. 203); and this author adds "... when we are faced with a hypothesis of expiration we have as an assumption a burden of peremptory observance of a rigid term (the rigidity of the term,..., is another difference compared to the statute of limitations) for the specific fulfillment of an act (normally it is a potestative right) with the consequence that the right is lost (extinctive effect) if the act of exercise is not fulfilled within the pre-set term or (which is the same) if it is fulfilled extemporaneously." (Op. cit., pp. 203-204). Likewise, Nombre135950 enunciates some differentiating elements by indicating: "In our understanding, the reason and basis of expiration differ from those of the statute of limitations in that expiration does not depend, as the statute of limitations does, on the subjective fact of the inertia of the right holder for a certain time, but exclusively on the objective fact of the lack of exercise of the right within the established time, and in that it is inspired not by the need to conform the legal situation to the factual situation that has lasted for a certain time considered sufficient, for this purpose, by law, but rather by limiting in time the exercise of a right (...) when the diligent exercise thereof is deemed convenient for an individual or superior interest." (Nombre135951, Doctrinas Generales del Derecho Civil, Madrid, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1964, p. 135.) For its part, the statute of limitations, also called "extinctive," "negative," or "liberatory"—by reason of its effects—is created precisely to safeguard social order and security in legal relations, because, although, in principle, the ideal of justice looms as raw material in all legal norms, on some occasions it yields in favor of other aspirations, such as legal certainty. Thus, it is under the influence of this principle that the legal concept of the statute of limitations finds meaning, because it allows refusing to provide protection to one who, holding a subjective right, has allowed a certain period to elapse without managing, in any way, its safeguarding. It is, in short, the consequence of the inaction of the holder of a right, since the jurisdiction, upon protest by the obligated party, of the non-exercise of the right within the period established by law, once verified, must declare the claim barred by the statute of limitations. According to the foregoing, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling number 43-97, of fourteen hours forty minutes on May 28, 1997, made the following comparative table regarding these two concepts:

"V.- Extinctive statute of limitations (prescripción extintiva) and expiration (caducidad) are related legal concepts, which have in common that time acts as an extinctive cause of rights; however, both are profoundly distinguished both by their basis and by their effects. Statute of limitations affects rights that were born with a lifespan, in principle unlimited, and only through inactivity during a period, generally prolonged, can they be extinguished. Expiration, for its part, affects rights that the law or the will of individuals grants with a lifespan already limited in advance for their exercise, so they will be fatally extinguished when the period has elapsed. It operates, therefore, by the mere passage of time that has been set for it, and can be considered ex officio by the judge, unlike the statute of limitations, which must be alleged as an exception by the one who intends to benefit from its effects, since as long as it is not invoked, the right exercised, even after the limitation period, deploys its effectiveness. Expiration refers to the duration of the right itself, such that its passage causes the decadence or extinction and with it that of the action emanating from it; on the contrary, the statute of limitations refers to the action and is based on the need for legal certainty, as a sanction for the inactivity of the holder of a right who does not exercise the action inherent to it. It can be affirmed that in the statute of limitations, the right is lost because the action has been extinguished, and in expiration, on the contrary, the action disappears because the right has been extinguished, due to the passage of the duration period it had set. The extinctive statute of limitations has its basis in the need to put an end to situations of uncertainty in the exercise of rights and in the presumption of abandonment by its holder; therefore, it is possible to prove that this abandonment or inactivity has not existed, that is, it can be interrupted, and for the same reason, it can only be considered at the request of a party. For its part, expiration is based exclusively on the need to provide security to legal transactions, and therefore, it does not admit in any case the interruption of the time whose simple passage originates it." As can be seen at a glance, these distinctions have important legal-procedural consequences, their definition not being a mere semantic or conceptual distinction, as will be seen in the analysis that is to be carried out.

Second: On the inappropriateness of the allegation of expiration of the action: The analysis of expiration leads to the verification of three fundamental aspects: first, the determination of the application of this legal concept, as a temporal requirement of the right of action; second, the determination of the period to challenge the formal administrative conduct; and third, the point or moment to begin counting said period. Regarding the first element, it is necessary to point out that the legislator opted for the expiration of the action to access the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction since long ago, in the case of challenging the Administration's conduct—except for the exceptions established in the procedural regulation itself, which do not apply to this case. Thus, in the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction, number 3667 of March 12, 1966, the period provided was two months from the day following the notification or publication of the challenged conduct, in the case of relative nullity—numeral 37—and four years, in the case of absolute nullity—Article 175 of the General Law of Public Administration, according to its original text, prior to the reform given by virtue of Law number 8508—; and to this day, the same legal concept governs, only that the period was set at one year, according to the text of numeral 39 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, with the sole difference that in this regulation, the period was set at one year, and runs from the effective communication of the administrative act being challenged or from the knowledge of the administrative conduct in question. In this sense, it must be remembered that, in the case of administrative acts, for their effectiveness, effective communication to the interested party (recipient) is required, under the terms established in ordinal 140 of the General Law of Public Administration, which is why subsection 1), sub-subsection a) provides that this one-year period runs "... from the day following the notification.

It is striking that the allegation formulated by the respondent institute refers, as a parameter for the expiration (caducidad) it alleges, both to the prior procedural legislation, i.e., the cited Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in force at the time the executive decrees that created the [Name 038] reserve were issued—numbers 6036-G, of June 12, 1976, and number 10707-G, of October 24, 1979—proven facts 1.) and 2.); and to the legislation in force at the time the plaintiff company acquired ownership of the property, for which compensation is claimed in this proceeding—effective against third parties as of August 6, 2008, proven fact 7.)—i.e., the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code; which denotes the imprecision of the argument made on this point. That said, it is precisely due to the object of this action that the allegation of this defense is clearly inadmissible, since we are not dealing with a review of the legality of any conduct by the Administration carried out in relation to the legal situation of the plaintiff company, but rather, as indicated above, we are dealing with a claim for compensation, which is based on the alleged affectation of the plaintiff's properties due to the creation of the [Name62 038] reserve, which would obligate submission to the special legal regime provided for that purpose. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 41.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, this type of petition is instead governed by the institution of the statute of limitations (prescripción), and not by expiration (caducidad). Thus, the defense of expiration (caducidad) of the action alleged is dismissed.

Third: On the inadmissibility of the alleged defense of statute of limitations (prescripción): Having reached this point, it is deemed necessary to reiterate that we are dealing with a petition for the recognition of compensation to be borne by the respondents (Public Administration), due to the affectation of the properties owned by the plaintiff company, as they are entirely included within the [Name 038] reserve. On this point, the ambiguity of the allegation formulated is again striking, insofar as reference was made both to the ordinary statute of limitations (prescripción) of ten years in the manner provided for in Article 868 of the Civil Code, as well as in Article 61 of the Law for Comprehensive Reform of Law No. 7495, on Expropriations, No. 9286, of November 11, 2011—in force as of February 4, 2015—; and to the four-year period of Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; and furthermore, it establishes various moments from which this temporal calculation must be made, thus, initially, from the entry into force of the General Law on Vacant Lands, No. 13, of January 10, 1939, as it was the first regulation that established the inalienability of indigenous lands (Article 8); or from the promulgation of the decrees that determined the geographic location of the [Name 022] reserve, i.e., from 1976. And to that effect, it is alleged that the given periods, whether ten years or four years, have been exceeded, because this lawsuit was served, at least upon the Rural Development Institute, until September 22, 2016—proven fact 16.)—. Notwithstanding the foregoing indications, after a measured analysis, this Chamber of Judges considers that the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) has not occurred. And this is so in consideration of the right alleged to be infringed and the legal regime governing it, i.e., the right to property, in which the establishment of limitations of social interest is legitimate, which, in principle, are not compensable, as they do not imply the suppression of the right, an assumption in which, if the essential content thereof is emptied, they must be compensated, as they translate into de facto expropriations. Thus, as long as that situation persists, there would be an injury to the detriment of the owner, and the calculation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) for claiming the right could not be made. To this effect, the considerations given by this same Court in judgment No. 88-2020-VI, of fourteen hours twenty minutes of July 29 of the current year, are reiterated, when it distinguished the degree of administrative limitations, after which, if the degree is absolute, it gives rise to the compensation established by constitutional mandate:

"VII.- Regarding administrative limitations, they may consist of mere restrictions. They consist of legal conditions for the exercise of the right to property. It is a tolerance that the owner must bear, as they involve a particular or special sacrifice by the owner that implies a restriction extending to every owner to whom these measures are directed. They are inherent in the content and existence of the right of ownership. Therefore, they are general, constant, and current. They are limited in number and kind, without being able to dismember the right to property, that is, to restrict its use and enjoyment in such a way as to affect the fullness of the right. Given their generality, they are not compensated, with the exception of damages that the Administration may negligently cause when executing the works in which the restriction materializes. However, as an insurmountable limit, they must be proportional to the administrative need that must be satisfied therewith, ergo, they must respond to an administrative need, and they cannot disintegrate the content of the right to property. Regarding the scope and restrictions of these limitations on property, the Constitutional Court in the aforementioned ruling stated the following relevantly: 'VIII. Notwithstanding what is indicated in the preceding considerations, it must be noted that the legitimate limitations that may be imposed on private property find their natural boundary in the degree of affectation to the property; that is, when the restriction on the right to property becomes a true expropriation with the consequent obligation to compensate, because the right to property completely disappears, or when it does not affect the generality of the community. The Full Court so indicated in relation to the limitations to be imposed on property when they exceed the indicated limit, in an extraordinary session of June 16, 1983: "[...] that is, 'limitations' as Article 45 calls them, but not dispossession of private property nor deprivation of a primary attribute of ownership, because preventing the enjoyment of goods is equivalent, at least in this case, to a form of expropriation without the requirement of prior compensation ordered by the political charter"; and as this Court indicated in the cited judgments No. 5097-93 and 2345-96; in which it stated: "IV.) For this Chamber, the reasonable limits that the State may impose on private property, according to its nature, are constitutionally possible as long as they do not empty its content. When that occurs, it ceases to be a reasonable limitation and becomes a deprivation of the right itself." (Judgment No. 5097-93); "That is, the attributes of property may be limited, as long as the owner reserves for himself the possibility of normally exploiting the good, obviously excluding the part or function affected by the limitation imposed by the State. Outside these parameters, if social welfare requires sacrifices from only one or a few, they must be compensated, the same as when the sacrifice imposed on the owner is of such magnitude that it makes him lose the good in its entirety. Thus, the limitation on property withstands constitutional analysis when the affectation of the essential attributes of property, which are those that allow the natural use of the thing within the current socio-economic reality, does not make the nature of the good disappear or makes the use of the thing impossible, because the State imposes authorization or approval requirements so complex that they effectively imply the impossibility of usufructing the good.' (judgment No. 2345-96)." From the foregoing, it is inferred that the right to compensation in favor of the owner of a property arises to the extent that the Administration exercises the expropriation power, for reasons of public interest (Article 45, first paragraph of the Magna Carta), in accordance with the procedure provided for in the Law on Expropriations, or special law on the matter. Furthermore, that right emerges when any other form of affectation or limitation on the full exercise of ownership is used, provided that, in substance, that modality consists of an impossibility of exercising bare ownership. In that vein, Article 13 of the Law on Expropriations states: "The provisions of this Law shall be applicable to constitute easements (servidumbres) and for all types of affectation of goods and rights. When, due to the type of affectation, the availability of the good or the right is substantially limited, processing as an affectation shall be inadmissible and the Administration must execute comprehensive expropriation." Likewise, Article 17 of the Law on Expropriations regulates the so-called dysfunctional remainder, which mandates that, in cases of partial expropriations, the rest of the property cannot be used by the owner in the permitted activities. In both cases, when the material effect is the substantial limitation of the availability of the good, what is due is to establish the total expropriation of that good. The foregoing, since in that assumption, we would be faced not with an affectation of property, typical of the regime of administrative limitations, but with a true de facto expropriation, to the extent that the possibility of disposing of the good is completely suppressed. The foregoing must be analyzed in each specific case, for which it is imperative to consider the permitted use of the land of each property to be expropriated, as well as the minimum subdivision (fraccionamiento) or building lot sizes. For example, if the unexpropriated remainder or the strip of land on which the administrative limitation does not weigh has an area smaller than that established by the regulatory plan to be able to exercise the right of transformation or construction (ius edificandi), in cases of land with urban vocation, the material legal effect is the suppression of the availability of use of the property, leading in such hypotheses to the obligation to expropriate all the land. The same occurs when, on land with urban vocation, the regulatory plan does not permit any type of transformation, because in those cases, the owner is exposed to a kind of impossibility of exploiting his property, being issued as the owner of a good, with the urban obligations imposed by administrative limitations, e.g., construction and maintenance of sidewalks, conservation and security of the property, among many, as well as tax burdens related to the property, including tax on real estate property, various municipal fees, without being able to derive benefit from the use and disposition of the good. It is worth reiterating that one of the characteristics of restrictions and easements (servidumbres) is that the owner does not totally lose that condition and can continue using the good, within the framework of what is permitted and due, however, it does not imply the absolute loss of the availability of the good. Therefore, when, as a consequence of an administrative limitation, the owner cannot use the good at all or cannot make use of it, it would in substance imply a transfer of the good to the totality of public use, which would lead, it is insisted, to a de facto expropriation. Hence, in each case it must be examined whether the property becomes dysfunctional or whether bare ownership is substantially nullified, in which case, as a protection of the right to property, the expropriation order is imposed, so as not to subject the owner to an unjustified dispossession." In the case under study, given that the plaintiff company appears as the registered owner of the properties for which it claims compensation in this proceeding, it remains as the owner, according to the registration certifications accompanying this action—proven facts 14.) and 15.)—, and there is no record that this situation has been modified—unproven fact 5.)—, and as alleged, an affectation weighs upon them by their incorporation into the [Name62 038] reserve, which persists to date, it is not possible to consider that the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) has occurred, a defense that must be rejected. In this same sense, in judgment No. 85-2020-VI, of fifteen forty hours, of June 30 of the current year, this Court considered; "...this Court cannot share an allegation of statute of limitations (prescripción) such as that formulated by the State, given that such an understanding would lead to condoning the confiscation of private property as a result of the mere passage of time, based on a forced acquisition or de facto and illegitimate occupation of a good owned by a private individual, whether or not it is justified by a cause of public utility. Seen from another perspective, accepting the thesis of the prescriptibility of the compensation claim would simultaneously entail admitting that it is legally possible for the State to appropriate goods acquired by confiscation, under the sole excuse that the mere passage of time has elapsed without the affected person claiming. Strictly speaking, if the object of this case lies precisely in the supposed inertia of the State in satisfying the reparation associated with the debated strip of land, the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) is inadmissible and must be rejected as such..." The foregoing considerations are applicable to the sub judice case; and compel the rejection of the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción). On this particular point, it is noted that this pronouncement does not affect the merits of the analysis of the formulated conflict, which we will address forthwith.

VIII.- ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPENSATION FOR RIGHTS TO LANDS LOCATED IN INDIGENOUS RESERVES.- For the substantive analysis referred to by this action, we must attend to what is established in the national legal system regarding the requirements for compensation for the rights of non-indigenous persons, whose lands are located in indigenous reserves, according to the geographic delimitations given for that purpose, whether by law or by decrees of the Executive Branch. This has been a topic already addressed consistently and repeatedly by this Court on various occasions, for example, No. 74-2013-VII, of ten hours thirty minutes of October 29, two thousand thirteen, of the Seventh Section, 38-2016-VI, of ten twenty-five minutes of March 8 and 66-2016-VI, of fifteen hours of April 21, the last two issued in the year two thousand sixteen; 15-2019-VI, of eight hours thirty minutes of February 13, two thousand nineteen, 86-2020-VI, of fifteen hours fifty minutes of June 30 and No. 105-2020-VI, of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of August 28, the last two from the year two thousand twenty and of the Sixth Section; and No. 23-2019-IV, of eleven hours eighteen minutes of March 29, two thousand nineteen, of the Fourth Section, all of the Contentious-Administrative Court. From the preceding precedents, it is possible to infer the following: guidelines that guide the decision in this matter.

First: Regarding the indigenous reserves established and recognized in our country, it is necessary to reiterate that these are lands that are destined for the exclusive use of indigenous peoples and, by virtue thereof, are abstracted from commerce among men, i.e., they are inalienable and also imprescriptible, and "non-transferable", given that by legal mandate they are destined "... exclusively for the indigenous communities that inhabit them", and it is clarified that "(N)on-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves"; pursuant to Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, No. 6172, of November 29, nineteen hundred seventy-seven. Consequently, it is a special property regime, insofar as it differs from the concept of private property provided for in the national legal system in accordance with the provision of Article 45 of the Fundamental Charter and in ordinary legislation—whether civil, urban, and agrarian—; and which, due to the limitations it implies for non-indigenous persons, translates into limitations on the ordinary attributes of the (private) right to property, under the terms provided in Article 264 of the Civil Code, given that it is a different regime, as has been indicated.

Second: Having said that, as previously indicated by this Court, the propriety of compensation is conditioned on the concurrence of several elements, as provided by the regulations governing this matter. In this sense, regarding what is of interest to this matter, in judgments No. 15-2019-VI, No. 23-2019-VI, 86-2020-VI, and 105-2020-VI cited above, the following has been set forth regarding what is of interest:

"a) Material element: The first requirement that is of logical preponderance in this type of case is that the land whose expropriation and compensation is petitioned be territorially located within the area of a [Name 038] Reserve. This requires a case-by-case analysis in order to determine that geographic correspondence. Proof of this aspect can be made in various ways, as it may well be supported by a certification issued by the corresponding administrative authorities, as well as by technical evidence, among others, expert topography analyses, satellite topographic surveys, documents from the National Geographic Institute, among others. What is determinative regarding this aspect is to define that belonging of the land to an indigenous reserve area, a deduction that cannot be limited to a particular type of evidence. b) Subjective element: On the one hand, the expropriated party must be a non-indigenous person who is the owner of the right of ownership or possession of a property that is located within the limits of the [Name62 038] Reserve, in this latter case, provided that the possession has been exercised in good faith under the terms of the Civil Code. The foregoing implies that in cases where such possession was in bad faith, there is no right whatsoever to compensation, an aspect that in each case must be analyzed according to the evidentiary elements contributed to the file. At this point, the case of the acquisition of lands from an indigenous person may be cited, in which case, that aspect would lead to the presumption of knowledge that the lands formed part of the communal property that applies in this matter. From this standpoint, in the event of not being possessors in good faith, the administrative authorities must immediately proceed with the eviction of the property without any compensation right to be recognized. c) Temporal Element: Likewise, the regulation requires inferring a temporality rule that conditions the granting of the corresponding compensation, in the sense that the registered ownership of the land or the exercise of possession must have begun before the area in which the specific farm is located was included within the Indigenous Reserve zone. Thus, the date of registration of the good or corresponding acquisition (provided that the transfer was from someone who was not indigenous) or the start of possessory acts must have occurred before the respective zone was declared an indigenous reserve. After that declaration, which is made through Law No. 6172, or the expansion of limits of the respective reserve (when the debated land did not form part of the original area of those reserves), pursuant to the restriction imposed by Article 3 indicated supra, those acts of transfer of ownership or possession rights shall be absolutely null, and therefore, unenforceable against the commented compensation procedure, since they would have as their object a good upon which a legally imposed limitation has already fallen and which, therefore, does not form part of commerce. This is inferred from the aforementioned Article 3 insofar as it indicates: '... Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves. (...).' That regulation enables the commerce of goods only among indigenous persons, sanctioning the nullity of contracts entered into between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, as well as the acquisition by non-indigenous persons of lands that have been declared part of any reserve. Ergo, once the reserve is constituted and its area delimited, the titling of lands, or transfers of ownership over goods that form part of that coverage, shall not be possible. For this, the reference is none other than the legal regulation or the Executive Decree in which the limits of each reserve are defined, or the regulation that expands the previously established territorial parameters. That is, for those purposes, it is necessary to consider the formal act that affects the properties of the non-indigenous person, through a declaration of administrative will that defines that portion of land as part of the indigenous zone. It is worth reiterating that, regardless of the date of acquisition, the same Article 3 establishes the ipso iure nullity (nullity by operation of law) of transfers from an indigenous person in favor of a non-indigenous person, in which case, it is evident that, due to the invalidity of the title transferring ownership, the compensation under discussion would not be proper. Similarly, this element also has an impact on the analysis of the good faith component, because once the declaration of affectation is made, and such circumstance is recorded in the registration margin of the land, acts of acquisition of ownership or possession shall not be considered as in good faith, and therefore, monetary reparation shall not be applicable. …" (Highlighting is from the original.)

Third: From what has been said, it is clear that it is the national legal system itself that established the mechanisms or instruments in favor of "good faith" owners or possessors of properties incorporated into indigenous reserves, according to the boundary delimitation that the law or the Executive Branch makes of each indigenous reserve. Thus, in the first place, relocation, "on other similar lands" and if that is not possible or there is no consent from the affected party, with expropriation and compensation, through the ordinary procedures established in the Law on Expropriations. For this reason, it is of interest to define what is understood by a good faith owner or possessor, since from the fulfillment of this requirement, it is inferred that it gives rise to the corresponding compensation, in protection of the right to property, pursuant to Article 45 of the Political Constitution. Thus, the existence of registered ownership or possession of the property is not sufficient for this obligation to be generated at the expense of the Administration. In this sense, the principles contained in Articles 17 to 22 of the Civil Code serve as a reference (parameter) in relation to Articles 10 and 131.3 of the General Law of Public Administration, pursuant to which, it is absolutely prohibited to seek legal effects not permitted or prohibited by the legal system, such as seeking an antisocial exercise or an abuse of right in relation to private individuals and deviation of power in the case of the Public Administration, given that in the field of Administrative Law and thereby in legal-administrative relations, the regulation '... must be interpreted [and applied] in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect owed to the rights and interests of the individual,' as stated in the cited Article 10 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this matter, and under the protection of the regulations governing it, only the rights (of ownership or possession) acquired by non-indigenous persons prior to that delimitation—and therewith, the affectation of such lands to the legal regime of indigenous property—can be qualified as in good faith, and therewith, give rise to the corresponding compensation for the right to private property and for the damages and losses caused by that affectation. Conversely, it can well be concluded that any act of transfer or disposition of goods comprised within indigenous reserves, carried out after the determination of the lands that make up the respective indigenous reserve—according to the delimitation made either by the Legislative Assembly through law or by the Executive Branch, through a decree issued for that purpose—becomes, in thesis of principle and by provision of law—Article 5 of the Indigenous Law—, null, as it pertains to properties that are outside the commerce of men. In this sense, it is necessary to specify that a direct effect of this affectation on the disposition of the territories declared indigenous reserves is that non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or acquire lands or farms located within the indigenous reserves and if acts of disposition are carried out (purchase, sale, or of any type), after a declaration of a territory as an indigenous reserve, they shall be absolutely null proceedings, as expressly provided by Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, which for greater clarity for its understanding is transcribed literally, regarding what is of interest to this case:

"Article 3.- Indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them. Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves. Indigenous persons may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous persons. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereon in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, is absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case. ..." (Highlighting is not from the original.)

In this sense, we must remember that the decrees creating indigenous reserves, like the rest of the regulatory provisions, are published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, this publicity being sufficient for making them known to the citizenry and population of the Nation. In principle, in consideration of the principle of initial registration of public domain goods, this affectation would not require subsequent indication in the Public Property Registry; however, given that it is a special property regime—it has already been indicated, different from the private property regime, having a special legal connotation, of a communal nature of indigenous peoples, and which permits transmission among indigenous persons—it is understood that this affectation must at least be determined and recorded in some public document, such as the respective decrees of affectation and derived from this, specified at least in some study or map. Therefore, any transfer or occupation made after the area of the indigenous reserve is demarcated must be considered in bad faith, an assumption in which one must proceed with their expulsion (police act) or immediate eviction through the legal channels provided for that purpose (administrative eviction), and consequently, no compensation could be made. On this specific point, in judgment No. 74-2013-VII, cited above, it was considered as follows:

"In the case of persons who are registered owners of the property or of any real right, who have a title and who are in bad faith, the action provided for by the legal system for the removal from the legal world of the corresponding title should be undertaken, in order to subsequently achieve the respective eviction. In the event that the title was granted in the exercise of some administrative power (titling by a public authority among others), this would entail the action through the channel of lesivity if appropriate, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or the direct action exercised by the owner of the affected right. In the case of non-indigenous persons, whether simple possessors, or registered owners of the property and/or any real right over the property, as long as they are acting in good faith, the INDER must proceed to propose an alternative for their relocation on lands that would have to be equivalent as much as possible, to those thus affected for these third parties in the indigenous reserves." IX.- ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE.- We shall proceed to determine whether or not the compensation claim formulated by the plaintiff company regarding the farms with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name62 037], of which it is the registered owner, conforms to the legality framework previously indicated. In the manner indicated, this petition is conditioned on compliance with the requirements established by the legal system governing the matter.

First: On the ownership of the properties and the origin thereof: First of all, the registered ownership of the properties for which the plaintiff company claims compensation must be determined.

These are the properties with Real Folio registry numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], located in the district of [Name 016], canton of [Name 007] - proven facts 14.) and 15.)-. It is recorded in the case file that, through public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on the eighth of July of the year two thousand eight in the protocol of notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the general agents with unlimited sum of the companies [Name 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Name 012] and [Name62 013]) sold to [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Name62 001]) the property with registry number [Value 029], with an area at that date of 41,931 square meters and 42 square decimeters, and corresponding in all respects to cadastral plan number [Value 007] - proven fact 7.)-; a right that was registered on the sixth of August of two thousand eight -proven fact 8.)-. Subsequently, in public deed number [Value 056], dated the twenty-seventh of March of two thousand twelve, at folios [Value 052] verso to [Value 053] verso of Volume [Value 054] of the protocol of notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, the legal representative of the plaintiff company here, [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima-, made four segregations from the previous property -proven fact 13.) -, a deed that was registered on the ninth of April of two thousand twelve, thus giving origin to the four remaining properties [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006], proven fact 14.)-. As can be deduced from the foregoing, the area of the latter properties comprises part of the parent property acquired by [Name62 029] Sociedad Anónima in the year two thousand eight; there being an identity between these and that from which they were segregated.

Second: Regarding the affectation to indigenous property of the plaintiff company's properties: For each property indicated, there is a corresponding cadastral plan, on the reverse of which the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) placed a warning note, indicating that the property represented in the graphic was, in its entirety, within the [Name 038] Reserve, district of [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province of [Name 037], but that the registration of these cadastral plans was authorized because the property existed prior to the creation date of said reserve -proven facts 5.), 9.), 10.), 11.) and 12.)-. For a better understanding, we specify the correspondence between the plaintiff company's properties and their representation in their corresponding cadastral plan in the following table:

In view of the consideration made by the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, it is important to consider that indeed, as was alleged by the plaintiff company in its lawsuit, the parent property existed prior to the creation date of the [Name62 038] reserve, given that, as can be deduced from the registry certification itself, it finds its origin as such in the property [Name167 009], from which it was segregated on the fourth of September, nineteen seventy-three, and its title transferred to Mrs. [Name62 011] - proven fact 6.)- Thus, the assertion made by the Commission regarding the circumstance that the property existed prior to the creation of the reserve, which did not occur until nineteen seventy-six, with the promulgation of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 6036-G, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 113, of the twelfth of June of the indicated year -proven fact 1.)-, proves to be true. But it is important to note that, in this act, no geographical determination of the created reserve was made, given that this was done in Executive Decree number 10707-G, of the twenty-fourth of October, nineteen seventy-nine, which was published on the following eighth of November in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 210 -proven fact 2.)-; a demarcation that was modified by Executive Decree number 29452-G, of the twenty-first of March, two thousand one, the publication of which was made in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 93, of the following sixteenth of May -proven fact 4.)-. This authority understands that it is based on this demarcation that the property initially with real folio number [Value 029], of the Province of [Name62 037], is affected by the special regime of indigenous property, as was noted at the time of registering the corresponding cadastral plan [Value 007], proven fact 5.)-, which consequently implies that the subsequent segregations have the same affectation, by derivation. If the parent property is located in the indigenous reserve, the lots that are segregated will have the same condition, and vice versa, given that the latest geographical demarcation of the indigenous reserve was publicized on the sixteenth of May, two thousand one -proven fact 4.)-. In this regard, it is important to note that the representation of the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural) is incorrect in questioning the validity of the statements made by the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, which located the plaintiff's properties referenced herein within the reserve of [Name62 022]. It should be noted that from the first cited Executive Decree -number 6036-G-, which precisely creates the reserve, its Article 11 delegated to the then Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización) -today the Institute of Rural Development-, so that in coordination with the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, it would carry out the territorial delimitation of the reserve -proven fact 1.) -; a competence that is later confirmed in Article 8 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), number 6172, of the twenty-ninth of November, nineteen seventy-seven. By virtue of the foregoing, as it constitutes a public institution -Article 1 of its Law of creation, number 5251, of the eleventh of November, nineteen seventy-three-, and by such virtue, endowed with its own legal personality, it is fully competent to determine whether a tract of land is or is not located in geographical spaces reserved for the respective indigenous reserves. Therefore, this Court has no doubt whatsoever about the affectation to the indigenous property regime that weighs upon properties [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006], whose registered owner is [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; in the manner as was declared by the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and alleged in this action by the interested party.

Second: Regarding the condition of a bad faith owner: Now, despite the fact that the legal representative of the plaintiff company attempted to dismiss the analysis referring to the determination of compliance with this prerequisite, deeming it superfluous and unnecessary in the case of the ownership of a property right, and not mere possession over the real property located within an indigenous reserve, the rejection of such allegations is warranted. And this, in strict application of the legal norm that establishes as an inescapable prerequisite, for the admissibility of the compensation (indemnización) of the corresponding right, in the manner already indicated in Articles 3 and 5 of the Indigenous Law. And in this sense, it must be clarified to the plaintiff company that, of course, the regulations at hand recognize the right of property and the exercise of possession by non-indigenous persons who, at the time the corresponding geographical demarcation was made, held their right over a real property that became affected by that determination. However, as is clearly expressed in the cited Article 3, once the coordinates of the respective indigenous reserve are geographically determined, whether by Executive Decree -as happened in this case-, or by law, the tracts of land comprised within this delimitation become affected by the special regime of indigenous property, by virtue of which those tracts of land leave the commerce of non-indigenous persons, since the use and enjoyment of those lands is reserved exclusively for indigenous persons; whence any legal transaction (negocio jurídico) in contravention of this special regime is null and void ab initio (nulo de pleno derecho). It must also be taken into consideration that such delimitations are published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, for the purposes of not only the registered owners at that time, but also third parties. Due to the clarity and forcefulness of this legal provision, previously transcribed, it is therefore necessary to review not only the allegations of possessory rights, but also the property titles that are alleged when this type of proceeding is filed. This is imperative under the law, once again, from the relationship of provisions 3 and 5 of the Indigenous Law. By reason of what has been stated, and having reviewed what occurred in this matter, it is concluded that the plaintiff company does not hold a good faith title regarding its properties, for the purpose of requesting the compensation it claims in this action, since on the date it acquired property [Value 029], the [Name62 038] reserve was already not only geographically delimited according to its current limits, but that condition was noted on the respective cadastral plan [Value 007] -proven fact 5.)-, the registration of the plan being permitted or authorized because the property's existence predated the creation of the reserve -proven fact 5.)-, whose latest geographical demarcation was published on the sixteenth of May, two thousand one -proven fact 4.)-. In effect, the sale-purchase deed through which the plaintiff company acquired the alleged property right dates from the eighth of July, two thousand eight -proven fact 7.)-; which was registered in the Public Property Registry (Registro Público de la Propiedad) on the following sixth of August -proven fact 8.)-. In other words, when [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima signed the sale-purchase contract for that property, the affectation to the indigenous property regime already weighed upon it, and therefore, as this case concerns a transaction signed between two legal entities (personas jurídicas) -obviously non-indigenous-, this obliges it to be considered as a transaction that is null and void as a matter of law, in the manner prescribed by law. The subsequent segregations suffer from the same defect, despite the ownership of the new tracts remaining in the same legal entity -the plaintiff here-, but which gives rise to the creation of four new properties -proven facts 13.) and 14.)-. It should be noted in this regard that on the respective cadastral plans, the warning was noted -already known to the interested party- that those lands were located within the [Name 038] reserve -proven facts 9.), 10.), 11.) and 12.)-.

X.- REGARDING THE CLAIMS OF THE LAWSUIT: Based on the foregoing considerations, we proceed to rule on each of the claims (pretensiones) made in this action.

First: Regarding the declaratory judgment claim (claim # 2): It is important to emphasize that it is appropriate to grant the first claim of a declaratory nature made in this action. In effect, in the manner presented in the lawsuit, and confirmed in the Preliminary Hearing, the disposition of the following in judgment was requested by [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima:

" 2.- That it be declared that the property of the party of [Name62 037], Real Folios [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006] are immersed, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Name62 038] Reserve." By reason of the foregoing, it is declared that the properties of the Province of [Name 037], with Real Folio registry numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006] are located, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Name 038] Reserve.

Second: Regarding the claims for condemnation made (claims # 3, 4 and 5):

i.- Despite the fact that the plaintiff company's real properties are located within the [Name62 038] reserve, in the manner previously explained, the plaintiff fails to meet the legal prerequisite provided in the legal framework governing the matter to legitimize a compensation for private lands located in indigenous reserves, which refers to holding a property title in good faith, as a "sine qua non" condition. This circumstance alone makes the compensatory claim made inadmissible. But additionally, it must be considered that, in the manner in which this claim was raised, it established as the cause for the requested compensation, the de facto expropriation by the State of the indicated tracts. In this sense, it is important to consider that notwithstanding the affectation to the indigenous property regime of the plaintiff company's referenced properties, it is important to note that the alleged de facto expropriation, nor dispossession of the aforementioned lands by the public administrations involved in handling these matters, was not proven. In this sense, it is not recorded that the Institute of Rural Development and/or the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs have exercised reivindication actions in relation to the properties with Real Folio registry number [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006], whose current registered owner is [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima - unproven fact 1.)-. Nor has the plaintiff proven that the State has titled those lands in the name of the [Name 040] Association - unproven fact 2.)-. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Administration has carried out any material act of occupation of those properties -unproven fact 3.)-. On the contrary, the plaintiff itself indicated that since acquiring property [Value 029], it has exercised full possession over it, and consequently, over the four segregated lots. Thus, the dismissal of the action in relation to this part of the lawsuit is warranted. For accessoriness, the same fate befalls the request for interest and indexation that was required in this respect.

ii.- A claim for subjective moral damages is inadmissible. Finally, the plaintiff company requested compensation for subjective moral damages, caused on the occasion of the situation raised in the action. It would suffice to point out that, if the compensatory claim for the indicated properties is inadmissible, for not conforming to the prerequisites established in the legal framework and no de facto expropriation having occurred, as was alleged, then this new claim is also so, for accessoriness. Now, it is important to emphasize that despite the tenor of the provisions in Articles 41 of the Constitution (Carta Fundamental) and 197 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), compensation or reparation by the Administration for moral damage or suffering is admissible, in this case the claim is not admissible because it concerns an affectation that refers to natural persons (personas físicas), affecting their internal and psychological sphere, given that in this proceeding, a legal entity appears as the plaintiff. In this sense, the representation of the sued institute is correct in pointing out this situation, given that in this case, the natural person exercising the legal representation cannot assume the position of the legal entity to seek a sort of reparation that is alien to the legal nature of whom they represent.

XI.- REGARDING THE DEFENSES RAISED.- The representations of the defendants alleged the defenses of lack of standing to sue (legitimación activa) and be sued (legitimación pasiva), and lack of right. In this regard, it must be remembered that according to procedural doctrine and contentious-administrative jurisprudence (in this sense, one may consult cassation judgment 34-1961, of ten hours twenty minutes on the twenty-second of March, nineteen sixty-one), the prerequisites relating to the standing of the intervening parties, the interest in the resolution of the conflict, and the right are recognized as substantial requirements for the issuance of any judgment; which are reviewable even ex officio by any judge if not raised by the defendants in a jurisdictional process, and in that rigorous order. Thus, having reviewed this matter, it is deemed that the prerequisite of standing to sue is met, insofar as the party bringing this action does so in defense of its subjective rights and legitimate interests (Article 10, subsection 1) subparagraph a) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)), against the two entities that the national legal system grants powers to act in protection of such rights, that is, the Institute of Rural Development and the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, in the manner regulated in Article 12 subsection 1) of the same procedural code, for which reason the prerequisite of standing to be sued is met with respect to these two institutions. Now, regarding the participation of the State in this process, given that the objection raised concerns whether or not it is obligated to compensate, in this case, given that the inadmissibility of that claim has been declared, the analysis of this point is deemed unnecessary, and we move directly to the analysis of the substantive defense raised by it. Regarding the interest in the resolution of this matter, it is noted that this prerequisite survives, given that it is not recorded that in the processing of this matter, a settlement or withdrawal regarding the conflict raised has occurred. Finally, regarding the right of the action, in the manner reasoned throughout this ruling, it is appropriate to grant the defense of lack of right concerning the inadmissibility of the compensatory claim, because the prerequisites established in the legal system for its declaration are not met; and it is rejected in relation to the declaratory judgment claim, which must be granted.

X.- REGARDING COSTS (COSTAS).- In accordance with Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so. The dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient motive to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, despite there being a reciprocal partial loss, the lack of good faith in bringing this process is evident, which precisely led to its dismissal with respect to the compensation for the title deeds of the plaintiff company, and the amount requested regarding the compensatory claim for moral damages also being excessive (for the sum of fifty million colones) -a case of plus petitio, provided in subsection 1) of Article 194 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. These considerations oblige the condemnation of costs to be borne by the losing party, [Name62 029] Name137351 -, in favor of the defendants -State, Institute of Rural Development, and the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs-. With a majority opinion, the liquidation of costs is reserved for the judgment execution phase, once this ruling is final.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The defenses of expiration (caducidad) of the action, and statute of limitations (prescripción) raised by the Institute of Rural Development are rejected; as is the lack of standing to sue raised by the representation of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the sued institute; and as unnecessary, a ruling is omitted regarding the defense of lack of standing to be sued ad causam raised by the State's representation. The defense of lack of right is partially granted, only in relation to the compensatory claim made. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by [Name 029] SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA against the STATE, the INSTITUTE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT, and the NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS is declared PARTIALLY WITH MERIT (CON LUGAR PARCIAL), for which reason the following rulings are made: It is declared that the properties of the Party of [Name 037], with Real Folio registry numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006], all in the Province of [Name 037], canton [Name 007], district [Name 016], are totally affected by the indigenous property regime, being comprised in their entirety within the [Name 038] Reserve. In all other respects, it is declared WITHOUT MERIT (SIN LUGAR). Procedural and personal costs are borne by the plaintiff company and in favor of the three co-defendants, liquidation which, with a majority opinion, is reserved for the judgment execution phase, once this ruling is final. Judge Aguilar Méndez sets down a separate note regarding this last point. Judge Garita Navarro sets down a separate note on the assessment of the good faith title for the right to compensation in this type of matter.

Silvia Fernández Brenes Daniel Aguilar Méndez Roberto Garita Navarro CLARIFICATORY NOTE BY JUDGE GARITA NAVARRO.- The undersigned judge shares the rejection of the lawsuit proposed in this resolution. However, I must indicate that in the undersigned's judgment, the mere delimitation of the reserve zone does not lead to the denial of compensation, since that sole factor does not allow disregarding the presumption of good faith in the acquisition, an aspect that the sued Public Administration must prove and which must be analyzed in each specific case. Indeed, from the declaration of the reserve, the object of the contract for the transfer of lands forming part of that property regime would be null. However, if there is no record, at least cadastral, of the land's belonging to a reserve zone, the legitimate trust (confianza legítima) of the acquirer is violated, provided they acquired it from a non-indigenous person and there are no formal or material signs allowing them to at least presume the existence of that special domain regime. Thus, irrespective of whether the lands must be placed at the disposition of the indigenous reserve, this does not lead to denying the Administration's duty to compensate the owner for the dispossession of those lands, when the indicated circumstances are present, since, ultimately, it is land that the State (in a broad sense) did not compensated, as mandated and imposed by law. Now, as mentioned in the development of the judgment, in this case, the cadastral plan used for the segregations recorded that belonging to an indigenous property regime, which introduces an objective element from which the impossibility of acquiring those lands was known. In this way, said aspect must be highlighted as the cause for the denial of the reparation claimed in this process. For the purpose of justifying the posture of repairability in cases of concurrence of good faith, one may see ruling No. 15-2019-VI, of this Section VI of the Contentious-Administrative Court, in which the undersigned served as reporting judge.

José Roberto Garita Navarro. Judge.

NOTE BY JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.- Specifically in relation to the condemnation to pay costs, although the opinion that it must indeed be imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so is unanimous, with all due respect I differ from my colleagues regarding the abstract or liquid nature of this ruling. Given the scant regulation that the different procedural regulatory bodies in this matter have had on this point, as was the case in its time with the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) and currently, the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, a widespread application by supplementary operation of the norms of the Civil Procedural Code (Código Procesal Civil) occurred, precisely as authorized by Article 220 idem and Articles 9 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, and according to the current wording of Article 62.1 of the Civil Procedural Code (Law No. 9342), it constitutes an unavoidable duty of the Court to establish in the judgment "… the exact amount of the sums granted, their adjustments up to the judgment, including interests and costs…" (Emphasis not from the original). Therefore, and given that no administrative norm to the contrary exists, the appropriate thing would be to include the determination of the latter items in the costs section of this judgment, as mandated by the legal system, and not to reserve its ruling for the judgment execution phase. - Daniel Aguilar Méndez Judge *OI4O47Y43JN8M61* SILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, DECISOR/A JUDGE DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, DECISOR/A JUDGE ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, DECISOR/A JUDGE Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, Dirección01 , at seventeen hours ten minutes of [Valor 054] of September of two thousand twenty.

Administrative contentious proceeding established by **[Nombre 029] SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, legal identification number [Valor 001]**, represented by [Nombre 001], [...], who acts in the capacity of President with powers of generalísimo attorney-in-fact without limit of sum (legal capacity provided with the complaint); against the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL,** in the person of **Nombre21224** , married, attorney, identification number CED1922, resident of San Gabriel de Aserrí, who acts as general judicial attorney-in-fact of the institution (legal capacity in the Office file); the **COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS** , represented by [Nombre 003] , [...] (legal capacity provided to the case file); and the **ESTADO**, represented by the Deputy Procurador, **Jorge Oviedo Álvarez**, single, identification number CED2623, resident of Heredia (appearance of September twenty-second, two thousand sixteen). The following attorneys appear as special judicial attorneys for the intervening parties: *for the plaintiff*: **Alex Benjamín Gen Palma**, married, attorney, identification number CED9954, resident of Ciudad Colón (power of attorney granted on August twenty-first, two thousand seventeen); *for the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural*: **Nombre73110** **,** married once, identification number CED109111, resident of Santa Ana (power of attorney granted on November first, two thousand sixteen); **Óscar Alex Soto Flores**, married in first nuptials, identity card number CED109112 (power of attorney granted on August twenty-second, two thousand seventeen); and the *Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas*: **Nombre1112** **,** identification number CED109113, resident of San Vicente de Moravia (power of attorney granted on October twenty-sixth, two thousand sixteen). All intervenors are of legal age and Costa Rican.

**RESULTANDO** **1.-** By a brief filed with the Office on May sixth, two thousand sixteen, the plaintiff corporation files a contentious complaint so that, based on the factual background and legal arguments given and as defined in the Preliminary Hearing, the following be ordered: "***1.** Declare this complaint well-founded in all its aspects. / **2.-** That it be declared that the farms of the district of [Nombre 037], Folios Reales [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006] are entirely located, in their totality, within the boundaries of the [Nombre62 038] Reserve. / **3.-** Given that the aforementioned farms were de facto expropriated by the State, the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to carry out the survey and location of the lands subject to this proceeding, to perform the corresponding appraisal of both the land's [Nombre167] and the improvements introduced, and to order the payment of the corresponding compensation referred to in article 5 of the Ley Indígena. / **4.-** That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay legal interest on the amounts ordered as compensation, this from the finality of the judgment and until effective payment. / **5.-** The defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay my represented party the subjective moral damages generated by the affectation caused to me, as the representative of the affected corporation, by the illegitimate actions of the defendants, who at all times generated a restriction on the free disposal of the properties subject to this complaint, for more than 30 years, generating a state of uncertainty of invasions carried out under the protection that they are lands within a reserve, in addition to the uncertainty that the defendants generate for me regarding the failure to fulfill their obligation to measure, assess, and pay for said lands, given that my represented party is being dispossessed without any payment being made, all of which causes me depression, frustration, anguish, fear or dread of losing part of my represented party's patrimony without being compensated, moral damage that I estimate in the sum of 50 million colones. / **6.-** That the defendants be ordered to index all economic amounts to which they are sentenced. / **7.-** That the defendants be ordered to pay both costs of this action." (Complaint brief, minutes of the Preliminary Hearing in the judicial case file in digital format and digital backup of the Preliminary Hearing on attached compact disc).

**2.-** Having been granted the legal transfer, on October twenty-seventh, two thousand sixteen, the representation of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas contests it negatively, opposing for this purpose the substantive defenses of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) and lack of right. It requested the action be dismissed in all its aspects. (Brief contesting the complaint in the judicial case file, in digital format).

**3.-** On November twenty-eighth, two thousand sixteen, the Procuraduría General de la República negatively contested the complaint filed against it, for which it alleged the defenses of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) and lack of right; accordingly, it requested the dismissal of the action in all its aspects. (Brief contesting the complaint in the judicial case file, in digital format).

**4.-** On November third, two thousand sixteen, the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural negatively contested the complaint, opposing for this purpose the preliminary defenses of improper joinder -to call the Asociación [Nombre62 040] into the proceeding- and of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción), and the substantive defenses of lack of active standing (legitimación activa), passive standing (legitimación pasiva), and lack of right. (Brief contesting the complaint in the judicial case file, in digital format).

**5.-** After the corresponding reply hearing, by means of resolution number 474-2017, of eleven hours twenty-five minutes of March first, two thousand seventeen, the Processing Judge in charge of the matter -Cindy Chavarría Hernández- rejected the defense of joinder of the litis. No challenge against that decision is noted.

**6.-** The Preliminary Hearing established in section 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was commenced at nine hours ten minutes of August twenty-fourth, two thousand seventeen, under the direction of Processing Judge Cindy Chavarría Hernández and the presence of the representative of the plaintiff corporation -attorney Alex Benjamín Gen Palma- and the attorney-in-fact of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural -attorney Óscar Alex Soto-, and the designated Procurador -Jorge Oviedo Álvarez-. The representative of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas was absent. Upon a claim from the plaintiff regarding the omission of revenue stamps on the powers of attorney and certifications of the defendant institution and Commission, it was clarified that both enjoy tax exemption. The claims were fixed in the manner recorded in the first resultando of this ruling. The Instituto de Desarrollo Rural reiterated the defense of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and formulated that of extinctive prescription (prescripción); defenses that were reserved to be resolved in judgment, as they were not evident or manifest. The disputed facts of the complaint were determined, and a ruling was made regarding the evidence offered by the intervenors. The new documentary evidence offered by the defendant institute was rejected. As there was no evidence to be presented at trial, the matter was declared to proceed as a matter of pure law (trámite de puro derecho) (article 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), such that all parties present orally rendered their conclusions. (Minutes of the Preliminary Hearing in the judicial case file in digital format and digital backup on attached compact disc.)

**7.-** This proceeding was passed for judgment to the Sixth Section for its resolution on the merits, as stated in the respective transfer stamp -visible in the judicial case file in digital format and in the respective folder. Likewise, it is indicated that this matter has been processed in its entirety in digital format, which conforms to the provisions of the Reglamento sobre Expediente Judicial Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, approved by Corte Plena, in article XXXI of session number 22-13, held on May twentieth, two thousand thirteen.

**8.-** No grounds capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed, therefore this judgment is issued, after deliberation by the members of the Tribunal and unanimously.

Rendered by Judge Fernández Brenes ; and, **CONSIDERANDO** **I.- PRELIMINARY WARNING.-** Having carefully reviewed the case file, it is observed that in this matter, the summons to the conciliation hearing referred to in article 70.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was omitted, without any of the parties having previously expressed their refusal to participate in it. However, considering that conciliation is a waivable procedural step and that in the cleanup stage of the preliminary hearing, none of them raised any objection in that regard; this Tribunal understands that there was a tacit waiver of conciliation, with the parties to the proceeding having participated in the Preliminary Hearing and, therefore, there is no defenselessness or nullity that merits being declared here.

**II.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS.-** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following is considered proven, with the indication that all references are from the judicial case file:

**1.)** By article 9 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, the Government of the Republic "... *recognizes the existence and legal personality of the Comunidad [Nombre62 038], canton of [Nombre62 007] and declares the territory occupied by said community as Reserva [Nombre62 038].*" Likewise, in numeral 11 of this decree, it delegated the territorial delimitation of this reserve to the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, in coordination with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas. This decree was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 113, of June twelfth, nineteen seventy-six (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); **2.)** On November eighth, nineteen seventy-nine, Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine, was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 210, which established the Caserío [Nombre 038] , and in numeral 3, established its location on the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional and subsequently, in article 4, indicated that this demarcation corresponded to the geographical and legal area of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de [Nombre 022] (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); **3.)** By means of Decreto Ejecutivo number 13569, of April thirtieth, nineteen eighty-two, the Poder Ejecutivo reaffirmed the creation of the Reserva [Nombre 038] , by Decreto Ejecutivo 6036-G and its delimitation as an indigenous village (caserío indígena), by Decreto Ejecutivo number 10707-G. The publication of this decree is recorded in the Colección de leyes y Decretos, Semester 1, Volume 2, page 375 (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); **4.)** On May sixteenth, two thousand one, Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, with an effective date from its publication, was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta, which modified the cited Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G, to provide a new location for the Reserva [Nombre62 038], according to the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (first article); and specified that the delimited zone corresponds to the geographical and legal area of action of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral [Nombre62 038] (article 2) (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).

**5.)** On August first, two thousand five, cadastral plan number [Valor 007], prepared by the topographer expert Nombre103154 , was registered in the national cadastre, to depict the farm with Folio Real registration number [Valor 029], with a measurement of "*4ha1931.42 m2.*" On the reverse side of this plan, the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas warned that, in its totality, that farm was located in the [Nombre62 038] reserve, but that it authorized the registration of the plan, because it was a farm existing prior to the creation of that reserve (certification of the cadastral plan provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital judicial case file and statements of the representative at the Preliminary Hearing); **6.)** The farm with Folio Real registration number [Valor 029] originates from the segregation and sale (compraventa) that Mr. [Nombre62 010] made of the parent farm with registration [Placa25939 ], in favor of his sister [Nombre62 011], on September fourth, nineteen seventy-three (certification of volumes from the Registro Público de la Propiedad and registry certification of property [Valor 029], documents provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital judicial case file); **7.)** The farm with Folio Real registration number [Valor 029] was the subject of various sale (compraventa) transactions, thus changing its registered titleholder on various occasions; until in public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on July eighth, two thousand eight, in the protocol of notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the generalísimos attorneys-in-fact without limit of sum of the corporations [Nombre62 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre 012] and [Nombre62 013]) and of [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre62 001]) appear, and by which, the first corporation sells to the second, the farm with Folio Real registration number [Valor 029], located in district [Nombre 015] ([Nombre 016]), canton [Nombre 017] ([Nombre 007]), of the Province of [Nombre 037]; which is nature: [Nombre 042] land, and with the following boundaries: North: [Nombre 018], South: [Nombre 019] and [Nombre 021], East: [Nombre62 019], West: [Nombre62 021]; and depicted in cadastral plan number [Valor 007], with a measurement of forty-one thousand nine hundred thirty-one square meters and forty-two square decimeters. The sale price was defined in the sum of three million colones.

It was indicated that the property was up to date regarding municipal taxes (registrar's certification of the deed, provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the digital judicial file); **8.)** The aforementioned deed was submitted to the Public Property Registry's Daily Entry at Volume [Value 010], Entry [Value 011], on July tenth, two thousand eight, at twelve hours twenty-four minutes twenty seconds (citation [Value 012]); and was registered on August sixth, two thousand eight (registrar's certification of the deed, documents provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **9.)** On March twentieth, two thousand eleven, cadastral map number [Value 013] was registered in the National Cadastre of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 4808 square meters; prepared by the surveyor Nombre103154 and indicating it is part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 4,808 square meters. On the reverse of this map, on March tenth, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs recorded a note that this map was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps—each one—because the property as such existed prior to the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral map on the front and reverse of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **10.)** On March twenty-ninth, two thousand eleven, cadastral map number [Value 015] was registered in the National Cadastre of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 1ha0000 square meters; prepared by the surveyor Nombre103154 and indicating it is part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 1 hectare 0000 square meters. On the reverse of this map, on March tenth, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs recorded a note that this map was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps—each one—because the property as such existed prior to the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral map on the front and reverse of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **11.)** On March thirty-first, two thousand eleven, cadastral map number [Value 016] was registered in the National Cadastre of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 5,825 square meters; prepared by the surveyor Nombre103154 and indicating it is part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 41931.42 square meters. On the reverse of this map, on March second, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs recorded a note that this map was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps—each one—because the property as such existed prior to the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral map on the front and reverse of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **12.)** On March thirty-first, two thousand eleven, cadastral map number [Value 017] was registered in the National Cadastre of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 1ha1298 square meters; prepared by the surveyor Nombre103154 and indicating it is part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 1 hectare 1,298 square meters. On the reverse of this map, on March second, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs recorded a note that this map was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these maps—each one—because the property as such existed prior to the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral map on the front and reverse of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **13.)** In public deed number [Value 056], of March twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, folios [Value 052] verso to [Value 053] verso of Volume [Value 054] of the protocol of notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, [Name62 001], acting in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors, with powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limit of sum of [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima, made four segregations (segregaciones) from the property owned by it, with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], which he described as follows: **Lot [Value 020]**: [Name 027] land, located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], bounded on the north by lot [Value 018] to be mentioned below, on the south by [Name62 019], on the east by lot [Value 018] to be mentioned below and on the west by [Name62 019], with an area of four thousand eight hundred eight square meters, according to cadastral map number [Value 013]; **Lot [Value 018]**: [Name 023] land, located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name62 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], bounded on the north by lot [Value 019] to be mentioned later; on the south by lot [Value 020] already described, on the east by [Name62 021]; and on the west, by [Name62 019] and in part by lot [Value 020] already described; with an area of five thousand eight hundred twenty-five square meters, according to cadastral map [Value 016]; **Lot [Value 019]**: [Name 025] land, located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], bounded on the north by lot [Value 021] to be mentioned below; on the south by lot [Value 018] already described, on the east by [Name62 021] and on the west by [Name62 019], with an area of eleven thousand two hundred ninety-eight square meters according to cadastral map [Value 017]; and **Lot [Value 021]** : [Name 025] land, located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name62 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], bounded on the north by the remainder to be mentioned below, on the south by lot [Value 019] already described, on the east by [Name62 021], and on the west by [Name62 019], with a measurement of ten thousand square meters, according to cadastral map number [Value 015]. The **remainder** (parent property) was described as follows: [Name62 025] land, located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name62 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], bounded on the north by [Name62 018], on the south by lot [Value 021] previously described, on the east by [Name 021] and on the west by [Name62 019], with a measurement of ten thousand forty-two square meters (certification of deed provided by the plaintiff company, visible in the digital judicial file); **14.)** The aforementioned deed was submitted to the Public Property Registry's Daily Entry at Volume [Value 022], Entry [Value 023], at fourteen hours thirty-four minutes four seconds, on March twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve (citation [Value 024]), and was registered on April ninth, two thousand twelve, thus giving rise to the following properties, all located in the Province of [Name 037], canton of [Name 007] ([Name 017]) and district [Name 016] ([Name62 015]), and whose registered titleholder is [Name62 029] Nombre137351 ; and which have the following Real Folio registration numbers and characteristics: **number [Value 025]**, nature: [Name 027] land; boundaries: north: [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima, south: [Name 019]; east: [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; west: [Name62 019], with a measurement of four thousand eight hundred eight square meters and zero square decimeters, plotted on cadastral map [Value 013]; **number [Value 004]**: nature: [Name62 023] land; boundaries: north and south: [Name62 029] Nombre137351 ; east: [Name 021]; and west: [Name62 019] and [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; with a measurement of five thousand eight hundred twenty-five square meters and zero square decimeters, plotted on cadastral map [Value 016]; **number [Value 005]** : nature: [Name 025] land, boundaries: north and south: [Name62 029] Nombre137351 ; east [Name62 021] and west: [Name62 019]; measures: eleven thousand two hundred ninety-eight square meters with zero square decimeters, and plotted on cadastral map number [Value 017]; and **number [Value 006]** : nature: [Name 025] land, boundaries: north and south: [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; east [Name62 021] and west: [Name62 019]; measures: ten thousand square meters with zero square decimeters, and plotted on cadastral map number [Value 015] (receipt stamp of the deed on the deed certification; property certifications and indicated cadastral maps, documents provided by the plaintiff company, visible in the digital judicial file); **15.)** As a result of the previous segregations, [Name62 029] Nombre137351 is the registered titleholder of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], of the Province of [Name 037], canton [Name 007], district [Name 016], which is [Name62 025] land, which currently measures ten square meters and forty-two square decimeters. The following boundaries are recorded: North: [Name62 018], South: [Name62 029] Nombre137351 ; East: [Name 021] and West: [Name 019]; and it corresponds to cadastral map number [Value 007] (registry certification of April fifteenth, two thousand sixteen, and the indicated cadastral map, provided with the complaint, visible in the judicial file in digital format); and; **16.)** This complaint was served on the defendants on the following dates: on the State on the twenty-first and on the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the Institute of Rural Development, on the twenty-second, all dates in September of two thousand sixteen (proof of service, as detailed in the virtual desktop folder).

**III.- UNPROVEN FACTS.-** Also of importance for the decision in this matter, the following is deemed not proven:

**1.)** That the Institute of Rural Development and/or the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs have filed a replevin action (acción de reivindicación) in relation to the properties with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], whose current registered owner is [Name62 029] Nombre137351 ; **2.)** That the State has titled and transferred the properties with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006] to the Comprehensive Development Association of the [Name62 038] Reserve; **3.)** That the Administration has carried out a material occupation or a de facto expropriation of the properties with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006]; **4.)** The existence of damage or infringement of any right that the Administration has a duty to indemnify the plaintiff company for; and; **5.)** The change in ownership of the properties with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006].

**IV.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT.-** The plaintiff company filed a contentious-administrative complaint, with several claims of different legal nature. The **first**, of a **declaratory nature (declarativa)**, is for it to be declared that the properties of the Registry Section of [Name 037], with Real Folios [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006] are entirely immersed, within the boundaries of the [Name62 038] Reserve (***claim # 2***). The others, accessory to the foregoing, are **for condemnation (de condena)**, and refer to the following points: **i.-** that the defendants—State, Institute of Rural Development and National Commission for Indigenous Affairs—be jointly and severally ordered to carry out the measurements, location, and valuation of the preceding properties, both of the land and of the improvements, in order to proceed with the corresponding compensation for the lands and the improvements introduced (***claim #3***); ii.- the recognition of interest and indexation on that compensation (***claim #4***); **iii.-** the recognition of and order for payment of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), which it determined in the amount of fifty million colones (***claim #5***); and the order for payment of the procedural and personal costs derived from this proceeding (***claim #6***). The basis of its complaint is the following: **a.)** That according to the national legal system—specifically section 3 of the Ley Indígena—, indigenous reserves have a special legal regime, as they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable lands to non-indigenous persons. Due to the foregoing, section 5 of the referenced Law provided that the owners of properties located in such reserves had to be relocated or expropriated, pursuant to studies and procedures under the charge of the Institute of Rural Development in coordination with the Commission for Indigenous Affairs and payments by the State; **b.)** It states, through Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, of May twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-nine, which amended Decreto Ejecutivo 5904-G, of March fourteenth of the previous year, it incorporated important nuclei of the indigenous population into areas exclusively populated by indigenous persons; among these nuclei, the indigenous community [Name62 031], in the canton of [Name62 007] (article 9). Subsequently, the indicated reserve was granted legal recognition, as derived from article one of the Ley Indígena, number 6172. Later, with Decreto Ejecutivo number 10,707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine, new limits of this reserve were defined and finally, in Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, its geographic limits were expanded; **c.)** It indicates that, under the protection of public registry faith (fe pública registral), in good faith in the year two thousand eight it acquired property [Value 029], of the Registry Section of [Name 037]; without it having any restriction under the Ley Indígena; of which, it is the registered titleholder.

However, it clarified that in the surveyed plan corresponding to this property, number [Valor 007], the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas recorded that the farm represented in that graphic is located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], but authorized the registration of the plan, because the farm as such existed since before the creation of the reserve and the Ley Indígena; d.) It explains that this farm has its origins dating back to a private possession, since eighteen eighty-eight, by Mr. [Nombre62 032], who possessed it for thirty years, and transferred his right to [Nombre62 033], who possessed it for ten years and finally, by means of possessory information processed in the Civil Court of San José, it was titled in the name of [Nombre 034], on March fifteenth, nineteen twenty-eight, with farm number [Valor 055]. It adds that on September fourth, nineteen seventy-three, [Nombre62 010] segregated from the previous farm the portion that gave rise to farm [Valor 029], which he transferred to his sister [Nombre62 011]; e.) It added that in turn, on March twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, it carried out four segregations of farm [Valor 029], which gave rise to the following properties: [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006], of which it is also the registered owner and maintains its possession without any type of restriction. However, in the surveyed plans referring to the previous farms—[Valor 013], [Valor 016], [Valor 039] and [Valor 015], respectively—, the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas recorded that such properties and the parent farm [Valor 029] were located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], but authorized the registration of those plans, because the farm as such existed since before the creation of the reserve and the Ley Indígena; e.) That by reason of the foregoing circumstance, it cannot exercise any of the attributes of property provided for in numeral 264 of the Civil Code—possession, usufruct, transformation, alienation, defense and exclusion, restitution and indemnification—, insofar as it does not have free disposal over it, despite the fact that its right as owner is registered in the Public Property Registry, without any limitation or encumbrance on the described farm being recorded; given that pursuant to numeral 267 of the Civil Code, for limitations on property to be legitimate, they must be recorded in the Public Property Registry. Thus, it was able to acquire a real estate property, but the State established that it forms part of an indigenous reserve, and as such, absolute property of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de [Nombre62 022], an action it describes as a de facto expropriation, and which to date has not been indemnified; f.) It alleged that it meets the requirements provided for in numeral 5 of the Ley Indígena, as it is a good-faith owner; by virtue of which, it deems the indemnification it requests to be recognized in this proceeding to be appropriate and legitimate; since it is the owner of five private properties, duly registered in the Public Property Registry, lawfully acquired. In this sense, it states that the transaction that gave rise to its right cannot be deemed null and that good faith is not an attribute that must be proven by registered owners. Thus, the inalienability of the lands of indigenous reserves is proclaimed solely and exclusively for those that are comprised within the farm of the reserve as such, which was registered in the year two thousand nine; a condition that cannot be extended to private lands located within said reserve. It recalled the prevalence of the right to property, as enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution and interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence, in judgments 4205-96 and 5207-2004; g.) It contends that despite the foregoing encumbrance on its properties, the Administration has omitted to act as required by the legal system governing the matter, regarding the measurement and indemnification of its lands; a task in which there is joint and several liability of the defendants, in the manner recognized by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in its judgment number 1604-F-S1-2012; and h.) It indicated that the reported situation has caused subjective moral damage to the legal representative of the plaintiff company, referring to the state of absolute uncertainty and concern about the situation of its lands, "... because despite the fact that the farms were encumbered by the creation and subsequent expansion of the reserve, through State regulation, it was certainly never done correctly, as a de facto expropriation occurred, their free disposal of the goods was restricted ... and they were not indemnified for that expropriation as is legally required." In this sense, it added that it suffers constant threats of invasion of its lands from indigenous persons. Regarding the defenses of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and statute of limitations (prescripción) raised by the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, it opposed them, considering that it is facing an omissive conduct, which is maintained over time, which is why Article 40 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure applies; given that admitting the defendant's position would imply allowing the Administration to take advantage of its own willful misconduct; since it is facing a situation caused by the Administration's own inertia. It added that in this case, the statute of limitations does not apply because it is a special situation, regulated in the Ley Indígena. (Lawsuit filing, in digital judicial file and statements in the closing arguments, according to digital support, as per attached compact disc backup.)

**V.- ON THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANTS.-** The representatives of the **State** and of the **Instituto de Desarrollo Rural** answer the lawsuit negatively, in separate (individual) filings, pursuant to which, they request that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its aspects, with the corresponding award of costs against the plaintiff; but because the reasons given are coincident, they will be summarized jointly, noting any differing consideration when it was so formulated. The basis of their position is as follows: **a.) Plea of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción):** In the answer to the lawsuit, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural stated that the discussion to determine the appropriateness or not of the requested indemnification was expired, both in application of the two-month term provided for in numeral 37 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, and the one-year term established in Article 39 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure; a term that should be counted from the day following the publication, first of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos and later of the executive decrees that created the reserve [Nombre62 038]; given that the present action was filed only on May sixth, two thousand sixteen; **b.) Plea of statute of limitations (prescripción) of the action:** At the Preliminary Hearing, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural raised this defense, under the consideration that the indemnification established in numeral 5 of the Ley Indígena is governed by the ordinary ten-year term—Article 868 of the Civil Code—, or the four-year term, pursuant to the provision of ordinal 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; counted from the enactment of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, number 13 of nineteen thirty-nine; or from the decrees creating the reserve [Nombre62 038], in nineteen seventy-six, given that this action was notified to them only on September twenty-second, two thousand sixteen. **c.) Plea of lack of standing to be sued (legitimación pasiva), on the part of the State:** The State representation indicates that the intended indemnification must be assumed by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, since according to Law number 6735, of March twenty-ninth, nineteen eighty-two, it has its own assets and budget, pursuant to which, it is responsible for the indemnification of private lands that have been incorporated into indigenous reserves. It adds that this institution, in coordination with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, was assigned the guardianship of indigenous lands, as mandated by the Ley de Indígenas number 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen seventy-seven and as understood by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 1604-F-S1-2012 and the Constitutional Chamber in judgment 2013-7579. It adds that under the terms of the indicated Law, it is the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural that is responsible for carrying out the studies and valuations of lands of private individuals—non-indigenous—included within the indigenous reserves determined in the national territory and their subsequent indemnification; **d.) On the lack of standing to be sued of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural:** For its part, and in this same context, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural stated that the obligation to indemnify corresponds exclusively to the State, charged to the national budget, as inferred from the legislator's will when approving the Ley Indígena and because it is a matter that concerns the State as a whole. Such funds, it says, are and must be administered by the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, an entity that, in turn, is responsible for conducting censuses to determine the properties or possessions of non-indigenous persons in the indigenous reserves, for the corresponding actions. Thus, it concludes that it has no involvement whatsoever in the matter. Therefore, it states that if it intervenes or makes any payment on its own account, it would incur administrative liability under the terms of numeral 110 subsection e) of the Law on Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets; as the institution is legally unable to provide economic resources to make these indemnifications. In this regard, it cited judgment 74-2013-VII of the Seventh Section of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal; **e.) Plea of lack of right: i.-** They say that the decrees creating the indigenous reserves (in general and that of [Nombre62 022], in particular) are valid, as they are issued to make effective the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, in accordance with the international regulations governing their rights. They stated that it involves a special property regime, under which they are lands that are "inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them," so that "non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within the reserves," as stipulated in Article 3 of the Ley Indígena, number 6172 and also higher-ranking norms, such as Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations, approved by Law number 2330, of April ninth, nineteen fifty-nine, and which recognizes the right of land tenure for indigenous peoples. It is for this reason that the regulations governing the matter provide mechanisms for indemnifying owners and/or possessors of lands incorporated into the indigenous reserves, such as the relocation of the right or indemnification; but at the same time, they prevent them from negotiating those lands, and those who acquire lands under such conditions cannot be indemnified; **ii.-** The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural indicates that on the occasion of the enactment of the executive decrees that determined the geographical location of the reserve [Nombre62 038], the lands that comprise it lost their status as private goods, to acquire the category of a special regime, which excludes them from commerce among men; such that only indemnification is appropriate for the good-faith owner or possessor. All those decrees were published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, so that everyone knew of that condition, and ignorance cannot be claimed, under the terms provided in canon 129 of the Political Constitution; **iii.-** They clarify that the right to indemnification is only for non-indigenous owners or possessors who had their right prior to the creation of the respective indigenous reserve, which in the case of the [Nombre62 038] reserve, the temporal limit would be in the year two thousand one, on the occasion of its last territorial demarcation, by Executive Decree number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one. Thus, they explain that after a property is encumbered (to an indigenous reserve), no transfer acts or transactions over the property involving non-indigenous persons can be carried out; so that in cases where there is no good faith in the right, indemnification is not appropriate, but rather eviction, because the law treats it as an invasion. (they cited judgments number 106-2013-I, 74-2013-VII and 304-213-II as already considered by the Administrative Litigation Tribunal). Therefore, for purposes of proceeding with indemnification, it is relevant to know if the claimant's title of ownership is in good or bad faith; since, if a non-indigenous person acquires a property after that encumbrance, they are not good-faith acquirers, as these are goods outside commerce among men; **iv.-** Both representations say that the plaintiff company meets the requirements provided for in numeral 5 of the Ley Indígena for the appropriateness of the claimed indemnification, as it is established as an essential element for this obligation to arise on the part of the Administration, the good-faith tenure or possession of the land. Thus, they note that the [Nombre62 038] Reserve was created in the year nineteen seventy-six, with two subsequent modifications, in the year nineteen seventy-nine and in two thousand one; while the plaintiff company acquired the property through a purchase-sale dated July eighth, two thousand eight, and was registered in the Public Property Registry on August sixth following, that is, thirty-two years after the creation of the reserve. It is not the original owners of the lands whose indemnification it seeks. Subsequently, from that property, the interested party segregated four lots, all of which—five farms—are located entirely within an indigenous reserve; and the plaintiff company knew of the farm's limitations due to its location, as it was indicated in the surveyed plan of the former, and still entered into the transaction. That single circumstance makes the legal transaction from which the plaintiff's property right was born absolutely null, and with it, the indemnification claim inappropriate; **v.-** They state that the alleged dispossession or de facto expropriation claimed as the basis for the action was not proven, since from the evidence provided, it is clear, contrary to what is alleged, that the plaintiff company's properties have no limitation or restriction whatsoever, which has allowed their full enjoyment by their owner. Thus, there are no actions by the Administration aimed at dispossessing or limiting the attributes of the plaintiff's property right; **vi.-** The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural questioned the validity of the statements of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas in the surveyed plans of the plaintiff company's properties, for lacking competence to make the declaration of the location of such lands in an indigenous reserve, in this case, that of [Nombre62 022]; and to this effect, requests the Tribunal to rule on their validity; **vii.-** The representative of the defendant institute alleged the inappropriateness of the requested interest and indexation, since it was not dealing with an obligation of liquid sums to be paid; and warned that indexation is included within the interest, and there cannot be double recognition on the same point; **viii.-** The alleged subjective moral damage, being an accessory claim to the indemnification claim, must suffer the same fate as the principal claim, which is inappropriate. In any case, it was added that there is no unlawful damage, because the decrees by which the [Nombre62 038] Reserve was created are lawful, and therefore the plaintiff company must bear the situation it alleges, since it knew of the situation that weighed on the farm—which it later segregated—, that is, that it acquired a good outside commerce among men, thus giving rise to the victim's fault. On this particular point, the defendant institute added the inappropriateness of the claim, since the plaintiff is a company, not its legal representative—Mr. [Nombre62 001]. Finally, the representation of the **Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas**, even though it opposed the action filed against it, merely stated that none of the facts of the action were known to it, without further analysis, and raised the defenses of lack of standing to sue and lack of right, without explaining them. It should be noted that its representative was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, and therefore, did not make closing arguments. (Answers to the lawsuit from each of the defendants, in the digital judicial file and statements of the representations of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the State at the Preliminary Hearing, according to digital support on attached compact disc.)

**VI.- CLARIFICATION AND ORDER OF PRIORITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS DEBATED IN THE ACTION.-** From the foregoing details, it is necessary to note that in this contentious administrative proceeding, the legality review of any conduct of the Administration has not been requested, but rather its object refers to determining whether or not the indemnification sought by the plaintiff company is appropriate, for alleging that the properties of which it is the registered owner—namely, with Real Folio registration numbers [Valor 029], **[Valor 030]**, [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006], all of the Province of [Nombre62 037]—are located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], canton of [Nombre62 007]. For this reason, it was requested to declare that condition of the indicated farms, and as a consequence of the foregoing, that the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to proceed in the manner prescribed by law, that is, with the indemnification of their property right. In consideration of the preliminary defenses raised and reserved for this moment, the first matter to be addressed is compliance—or not—with the temporal factor to access this Jurisdictional venue, referring both to the expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the right. Then, if it passes this admissibility check, the merits of the conflict raised will be addressed. This would entail determining whether the alleged encumbrance on the indicated properties occurs and then, whether the requested indemnification is appropriate, in the manner regulated by law. Finally, if the claim is appropriate, it will be determined who is responsible for the actions and payment of the required indemnification. Having set the order of analysis for the conflict raised, it is proceeded with immediately.

**VII.- ON THE DEFENSES OF EXPIRATION OF THE ACTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALLEGED.-** It is highlighted that the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural alleged the concurrence of both institutes—expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and statute of limitations (prescripción)—, with the intention of establishing that this action was filed after the expiration of the temporal term provided by procedural regulations in this regard, for timely access to the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction. To address this issue, it is deemed pertinent to make the following considerations:

**First: Distinction between the institutes of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and statute of limitations (prescripción):** It must be clarified that it is not possible to confuse the foregoing institutes, nor to consider them as if they were the same thing, even though both refer to the same factor of jurisdictional processes, that is, the temporal factor, for considering the timely filing of the corresponding action. Indeed, each institute has its own special and distinct nature, and most importantly, diverse legal consequences or implications. In the case of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción), it refers to a term established in the legal norm of procedural order, which establishes the maximum limit for timely filing that action before the jurisdictional authorities; but whose essential characteristic is that it is a single, final, rigid, and strict term, and for this reason inflexible, since it cannot be interrupted—where the counting of the term starts anew, disregarding the time already elapsed—, nor suspended—counting of the legal term resumes, taking into account the time already elapsed—, as occurs with the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the right. Another distinctive feature of the expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) is that it is reviewable ex officio by the Judge, unlike the statute of limitations (prescripción), which must be raised by the interested party. Thus, the configuration of expiration is objective and inexorable and the only way to eliminate its extinguishing effect is the exercise of the action within the term provided for in the Law. So that "… for one to speak of expiration (caducidad), it is necessary that a certain legal effect has previously occurred, it is necessary that a certain legal situation of axiological possibility has arisen, whose lack of exercise in a determined manner produces its extinction." (PÉREZ VARGAS, Víctor. Derecho Privado, San José, Litografía e Imprenta LIL, S.A, 3rd edition, 1994, p.

203); and this author adds "... <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">when we face a hypothesis of expiry (caducidad), we assume a burden of peremptory observance of a rigid term (the rigidity of the term,…, is another difference compared to prescription) for the specific fulfillment of an act (normally it is a potestative right) with the consequence that the right is lost (extinctive effect) if the act of exercise is not fulfilled within the prefixed term or (which is the same) if it is fulfilled extemporaneously.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">" ( </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Op. cit</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">., pp. 203-204). Likewise, Nombre135950</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> enumerates some differentiating elements by indicating</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">:</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">In our understanding, the reason and the foundation of expiry (caducidad) differ from those of prescription in that expiry does not depend, as prescription does, on the subjective fact of the inertia of the right holder over a certain time, but exclusively on the objective fact of the lack of exercise of the right within the established time, and in that it is inspired not in the necessity of conforming the situation of law to the situation of fact that lasts a certain time considered sufficient, for this purpose, by the law, but rather in that of limiting in time the exercise of a right </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(…) </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">when the diligent exercise thereof is deemed convenient for an individual or superior interest.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">”</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">(Nombre135951 , . </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Doctrinas Generales del Derecho Civil</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, Madrid, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1964, p. 135.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">For its part,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">prescription</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, also called "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">extintiva</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">", "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">negativa</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">" or "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">liberatoria</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, due to its effects, is created precisely to safeguard social order and security in legal relations, since, although, in principle, the ideal of justice looms as the raw material in all legal norms, on some occasions it yields in favor of other aspirations, such as that of legal certainty. Thus, it is under the influence of this principle that the institution of prescription finds its meaning, because it allows refusal to grant protection to one who, holding a subjective right, has allowed a certain period to elapse without in any way seeking its safeguard. It is, in sum,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">the </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">consequence of the inaction of the holder of a right</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, for the jurisdiction, upon protest of the obligor, of the non-exercise of the right within the period established by law, once verified, must declare the claim extinguished. In accordance with the foregoing, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 43-97, at fourteen hours forty minutes on May twenty-eighth, nineteen ninety-seven, made the following comparative table regarding these two institutions:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">V.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Extinctive prescription and expiry (caducidad) are related legal institutions, which have in common that time acts as an extinctive cause of rights; however, both are profoundly distinguished by their foundation as well as by their effects. Prescription affects rights that have been born with, in principle, unlimited life, and only through their inactivity during a period, generally prolonged, can they be extinguished. Expiry (caducidad), for its part, affects rights that the law or the will of private parties grants with a life already limited in advance for their exercise, so they will fatally be extinguished when the period has elapsed. It operates, therefore, by the mere passage of the time that has been set for it, and can be taken into account ex officio by the judge, unlike prescription, which must be alleged as a defense by the party seeking to benefit from its effects, since as long as it is not invoked, the right exercised, even after prescription, deploys its effectiveness. Expiry (caducidad) refers to the duration of the right itself, so that its passage causes the decay or extinction and with it that of the action arising from it; on the contrary, prescription refers to the action and is based on the need for legal certainty, as a sanction for the inactivity on the part of the holder of a right who does not exercise the action inherent to it. It can be affirmed that in prescription the right is lost because the action has been extinguished, and in expiry (caducidad), on the contrary, the action disappears because the right has been extinguished, through the passage of the duration period that it had been set. Extinctive prescription has its foundation in the need to put an end to situations of uncertainty in the exercise of rights and in the presumption of abandonment by its holder, for this reason it is possible to prove that this abandonment or inactivity has not existed, that is, it can be interrupted, and for the same reason it can only be considered at the request of a party. For its part, expiry (caducidad) is based exclusively on the need to provide security to legal traffic, and therefore does not admit in any case the interruption of the time whose simple passage originates it.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">As can be seen at a glance, these distinctions have important legal-procedural consequences, their definition not being a mere semantic or conceptual distinction, as will be seen in the analysis that follows.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Second: Regarding the inadmissibility of the allegation of expiry (caducidad) of the action:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">The analysis of expiry (caducidad) leads to the verification of three fundamental aspects: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">first</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> the determination of the application of this legal institution, as a temporal prerequisite of the right of action; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">second</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, the determination of the time limit to challenge the formal administrative conduct; and</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">third</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, the point or instant to begin counting said time limit. Regarding the first element, it is necessary to point out that the legislator opted for the expiry (caducidad) of the action to access the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction since long ago, in the case of challenges to the conduct of the Administration -except for the exceptions established in the procedural regulation itself, which do not apply to this case-. Thus, in the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, number 3667, of March twelfth, nineteen sixty-six, the period provided was two months from the day following the notification or publication of the challenged conduct, in the case of relative nullity -numeral 37- and four years, in the case of absolute nullity -Article 175 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to its original text, prior to the amendment given by virtue of Law number 8508-; and today, the same institution governs, only that the period was set at one year, according to the text of numeral 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, only that in this regulation, the period was set at one year, and runs from the effective communication of the administrative act that is challenged or from the knowledge of the administrative conduct in question. In this sense, it must be remembered that in the case of administrative acts, for their effectiveness, effective communication to the interested party (recipient) is required, in the terms established in ordinal 140 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, for which reason, subparagraph 1) sub-subparagraph a) provides that this one-year period runs "..., </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">from the day following the notification.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">" It is noteworthy that the allegation made by the sued institution refers, as a parameter of the expiry (caducidad) it alleges, both to the previous procedural regulation, that is, the cited Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, in force at the time the executive decrees that created the reserve [Nombre 038] were issued -numbers 6036-G, of June twelfth, nineteen seventy-six and number 10707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven facts 1.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> and</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> 2.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; as well as to the regulation in force at the time the plaintiff company acquired ownership of the property, whose compensation is claimed in this process -with effects for third parties, as of August sixth, two thousand eight, </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 7.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, that is, the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo; which denotes the imprecision of the argumentation made on the matter. Now, it is precisely because of the object of this action, that the allegation of this defense is clearly inadmissible, since we are not facing the review of the legality of any conduct of the Administration deployed in relation to the legal situation of the plaintiff company, but rather, as indicated supra, we are facing a claim for compensation, based on the alleged affectation of the plaintiff's properties, on the occasion of the creation of the [Nombre62 038] reserve, which would oblige, the submission to the special legal regime provided for that purpose. In accordance with the provisions of numeral 41.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, this type of petition is rather governed by the institution of prescription, and not expiry (caducidad). Thus, the defense of expiry (caducidad) of the action alleged is rejected.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Third: Regarding the inadmissibility of the defense of prescription alleged:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Having reached this point, it is deemed necessary to reiterate, that we are facing the petition for the recognition of compensation to be borne by the defendants (Public Administration), on the occasion of the affectation of the real estate owned by the plaintiff company, by being entirely comprised within the [Nombre 038] reserve. On this matter, the ambiguity of the allegation made is again noteworthy, insofar as reference was made both to the ordinary prescription, of ten years in the manner provided both in Article 868 of the Civil Code, and in ordinal 61 of the Ley de reforma integral a la Ley número 7495, de Expropiaciones, number 9286, of November eleventh, two thousand eleven -in force as of February fourth, two thousand fifteen-; and to the four-year period of numeral 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; and furthermore, it establishes various moments from which this temporal computation must be made, thus, initially, from the entry into force of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine, for being the first regulation that established the inalienability of indigenous lands (article 8); or from the promulgation of the decrees that determined the geographic location of the [Nombre 022] reserve, that is, as of nineteen seventy-six. And to this effect, it is alleged that the given periods, whether ten years or four years, have been exceeded, because this lawsuit was notified, at least to the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, until September twenty-second, two thousand sixteen -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 16.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. Notwithstanding the foregoing indications, after a measured analysis, this Chamber of Judges considers that the alleged prescription is not configured. And this is so in attention to the right alleged to be infringed and the legal regime that regulates it, namely the right to property, in which, the establishment of limitations in the social interest is legitimate, which, in principle, are not compensable, as they do not imply the suppression of the right, an assumption in which, if the essential content thereof is emptied, they must be compensated, as they translate into de facto expropriations. Thus, as long as that situation persists, there would be an injury to the detriment of the holder, and the computation of prescription to claim the right could not be made. To this effect, the considerations given by this same Court are reiterated, in judgment number 88-2020-VI, at fourteen hours twenty minutes on July twenty-ninth of the current year, when it distinguished the degree of administrative limitations, after which, if the degree is absolute, it gives rise to the compensation established by the constitutional mandate:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">VII.- Regarding administrative limitations</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, they can consist of mere restrictions. They consist of legal conditions for the exercise of the right to property. It is a tolerance that the owner must bear, so they deal with a particular or special sacrifice of the owner that implies a restriction that extends to every holder to whom these measures are directed. They are inherent in the content and existence of the right of ownership. Therefore, they are general, constant, and current. They are limited in number and kind, without being able to dismember the right to property, that is, restrict its use and enjoyment in such a way that they come to affect the plenitude of the right. Given their generality, they are not compensated, except for damages that the Administration may culpably cause when executing the works in which the restriction materializes. However, as an insurmountable limit, they must be proportional to the administrative necessity that must be satisfied with it, ergo, they must respond to an administrative necessity, they cannot disintegrate the content of the right to property. Regarding the scope and restrictions of these limitations to property, the Constitutional Court in the aforementioned ruling expressed, in relevant part: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">VIII.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Notwithstanding what was indicated in the preceding considerandos, it must be warned that the legitimate limitations that can be imposed on private property find their natural boundary in the degree of affectation to the property; that is, when the restriction on the right to property becomes a true expropriation with the consequent obligation to compensate, because it completely makes the right to property disappear, or when it does not affect the generality of the community. The Full Court so indicated in relation to the limitations to be imposed on property when they exceed the indicated limit, in an extraordinary session of June sixteenth, nineteen eighty-three: "[...] that is, 'limitations' as Article 45 calls them, but not dispossession of private property nor deprivation of a primary attribute of ownership, because preventing the enjoyment of goods is equivalent, at least in this case, to a form of expropriation without the requirement of prior compensation ordered by the political charter"; and as indicated by this Court in the cited judgments number 5097-93 and 2345-96; in which it stated: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">IV.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101">For the Chamber, the reasonable limits that the State can impose on private property, according to its nature, are constitutionally possible as long as they do not empty its content. When this occurs, it ceases to be a reasonable limitation to become a deprivation of the right itself." (Judgment number 5097-93); "That is, the attributes of property can be limited, as long as the owner reserves for himself the possibility of normally exploiting the good, clearly excluding the part or function affected by the limitation imposed by the State. Outside of these parameters, if social welfare demands sacrifices of one or some only, they must be compensated, the same as when the sacrifice imposed on the owner is of such an identity that it makes him lose the good in its entirety. Thus, the limitation on property withstands constitutional analysis when the affectation on the essential attributes of property, which are those that allow the natural use of the thing within the current socio-economic reality, does not make the nature of the good disappear or make the use of the thing impossible, because the State imposes authorization or approval requirements so complex that they imply de facto the impossibility of usufructing the good." (judgment number 2345-96)." From the foregoing, it is inferred that the right to compensation in favor of the owner of a property arises to the extent that the Administration exercises the expropriatory power, for reasons of public interest (numeral 45 first paragraph of the Carta Magna), in accordance with the procedure provided in the Ley de Expropiaciones, or a special law on the matter. Moreover, that right emerges when any other form of affectation or limitation on the full exercise of ownership is used, provided that, in essence, that modality consists of an impossibility to exercise the bare ownership. In that line, canon 13 of the Ley de Expropiaciones states: "The provisions of this Law shall be applicable to constitute easements (servidumbres) and for any type of affectation of goods and rights. When, by the type of affectation, the availability of the good or right is substantially limited, the processing as an affectation shall be improper and must be executed by integral expropriation." In the same sense, ordinal 17 of the Ley de Expropiaciones regulates the so-called dysfunctional remainder, which requires that, in cases of partial expropriations, the rest of the property cannot be used by the holder in the permitted activities. In both cases, when the material effect is the substantial limitation of the availability of the good, what is due is to establish the total expropriation of that good. The foregoing, since, in that assumption, one would not be facing an affectation of property, proper to the regime of administrative limitations, but rather a true de facto expropriation, to the extent that the possibility of disposition of the good is completely suppressed. The foregoing must be analyzed in each specific case, for which it is imperative to consider the permitted land use of each property to be expropriated, as well as the minimum subdivision (fraccionamiento) or building sizes. For example, if the unexpropriated remainder or the strip of land on which the administrative limitation does not weigh has an area smaller than that established by the regulatory plan to be able to exercise the right of transformation or construction (ius edificandi), in cases of land with urban vocation, the material legal effect is the suppression of the availability of use of the estate, leading in such hypotheses to the obligation to expropriate all the land. The same occurs when, on land with urban vocation, the regulatory plan does not allow any type of transformation, because in those cases, the owner is exposed to a sort of impossibility of exploitation of his property, being issued as owner of a good, with the urban obligations imposed by administrative limitations, e.g., construction and maintenance of sidewalks, conservation and security of the property, among many, as well as tax burdens related to the property, among them, tax on real estate property, various municipal rates, without being able to obtain benefit from the use and disposition of the good. It should be reiterated that one of the characteristics of restrictions and easements (servidumbres) is that the owner does not totally lose that condition and can continue using the good, within the framework of what is permitted and due, however, it does not imply the absolute loss of the availability of the good. Therefore, when as a consequence of an administrative limitation, the owner cannot at all use the good or cannot give it use, it would represent at bottom a transfer of the good to the totality of public use, which would lead, it is insisted, to a de facto expropriation. Hence, in each case it must be examined whether the property becomes dysfunctional or whether the bare ownership is substantially enervated, in which case, as protection of the right to property, the expropriatory order is imposed, so as not to subject the holder to an unjustified dispossession.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">In the case under study, given that the plaintiff company presents itself as the registered owner of the real estate properties whose compensation it claims in this process, maintains as owner, according to the registry certifications accompanying this action -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven facts 14.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">15.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-, and there is no record that this situation has been modified -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">unproven fact 5.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-, and as alleged, an affectation weighs upon them by incorporating them into the [Nombre62 038] reserve, which is maintained to date, it is not possible to consider that the alleged prescription has occurred, a defense that must be rejected. In this same sense, in judgment number 85-2020-VI, at fifteen forty hours, on June thirtieth of the current year, this Court considered;</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"… this Court cannot share an allegation of prescription like the one formulated by the State, given that such an understanding would lead to conniving at the confiscation of private property as a result of the mere passage of time, based on a forced acquisition or de facto and illegitimate occupation of a good owned by a private individual, whether or not it is justified by a cause of public utility. Seen from another perspective, accepting the thesis of the prescriptibility of the claim for compensation would entail, at the same time, admitting that it is legally possible for the State to appropriate goods acquired by confiscation, under the sole excuse that the mere passage of time has operated without the affected person claiming. Strictly speaking, if the object of this cause lies precisely in the alleged inertia of the State in the satisfaction of the reparation associated with the strip of land debated, the defense of prescription is inadmissible and as such must be rejected..." </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">The foregoing considerations are applicable to the sub judice; and oblige the rejection of the alleged prescription.</span> Regarding this particular, it is noted that this pronouncement does not affect the merits of the analysis of the conflict raised, which we will address forthwith.

**VIII.- OF THE PREREQUISITES FOR THE INDEMNIFICATION OF RIGHTS TO LANDS LOCATED IN INDIGENOUS RESERVES.-** For the substantive analysis referred to in this action, we must attend to what is established in the national legal system regarding the prerequisites for indemnifications of rights of non-indigenous persons, whose lands are located in indigenous reserves, according to the geographic delimitations given for such purpose, whether by law or by decrees of the Executive Branch. This has been a topic already addressed consistently and repeatedly by this Tribunal on various occasions, thus, for example, rulings number 74-2013-VII, of ten hours thirty minutes on the twenty-ninth of October of two thousand thirteen, of the Seventh Section; 38-2016-VI, of ten twenty-five hours on the eighth of March, and 66-2016-VI, of fifteen hours on the twenty-first of April, the last two issued in the year two thousand sixteen; 15-2019-VI, of eight hours thirty minutes on the thirteenth of February of two thousand nineteen; 86-2020-VI, of fifteen hours fifty minutes on the thirtieth of June, and number 105-2020-VI, of fourteen hours fifteen minutes on the twenty-eighth of August, the last two from the year two thousand twenty and from the Sixth Section; and number 23-2019-IV, of eleven hours eighteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of March of two thousand nineteen, of the Fourth Section, all of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal. From the preceding precedents, it is possible to infer the following: guidelines that guide the decision in this matter.

**First:** Dealing with the indigenous reserves established and recognized in our country, it is necessary to reiterate that these are lands that are destined for the exclusive use of indigenous peoples and, by virtue thereof, are withdrawn from commerce among men, that is, they are inalienable and also imprescriptible, and "*not transferable*", given that by legal mandate they are destined "... *exclusively for the indigenous communities that inhabit them*", and it is clarified that "* (N)on-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other manner acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves*"; pursuant to section 3 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), number 6172, of the twenty-ninth of November of nineteen hundred seventy-seven. Consequently, it involves a special property regime, insofar as it differs from the concept of private property provided for in the national legal system pursuant to the provision of section 45 of the Fundamental Charter and in ordinary legislation - whether civil, urban, and agrarian -; and which, due to the limitations it implies for non-indigenous persons, translates into limitations on the ordinary attributes of the (private) property right, in the terms provided for in article 264 of the Civil Code, given that it is a different regime, as has been indicated.

**Second:** Now then, in the manner already indicated by this Tribunal, the appropriateness of indemnification is conditioned upon the concurrence of several elements, as provided by the regulations governing this matter. In this sense, regarding what is of interest to this matter, in judgments numbers 15-2019-VI, number 23-2019-VI, 86-2020-VI, and 105-2020-VI cited supra, the following has been set forth in what is of interest:

"*a) Material Element: The first prerequisite of logical preponderance in this type of case is that the land whose expropriation and indemnification is requested is territorially located within the area of a [Name 038] Reserve. This requires a case-by-case analysis in order to determine that geographic correspondence. The proof of this aspect can be carried out in various ways, as it may well be based on a certification issued by the corresponding administrative authorities, as well as through technical evidence, among others, expert topographic analyses, satellite topographic surveys, documents from the National Geographic Institute (IGN), among others. The determining factor regarding this aspect is to define that belonging of the land to an indigenous reserve area, a deduction that cannot be limited to a particular type of evidence. b) Subjective Element: On one hand, the expropriated party must be a non-indigenous person who is the holder of the right of ownership or of possession of a property that is located within the limits of the [Name62 038] Reserve, in this latter case, provided that the possession has been exercised in good faith in the terms of the Civil Code. The foregoing implies that in cases where that possession has been in bad faith, no right to indemnification exists, an aspect that in each case must be analyzed in accordance with the evidentiary elements provided to the case file. On this point, one can cite the case of the acquisition of lands from an indigenous person, a case in which that aspect would lead to the presumption of knowledge that the lands formed part of the community property that applies in this matter. From this standpoint, should they not be possessors in good faith, the administrative authorities must proceed immediately to the eviction of the property without any indemnification right to be recognized. c) Temporal Element: Likewise, the norm implies a rule of temporality that conditions the granting of the corresponding indemnification, in the sense that the registral title of the land or the possession exercise must have begun prior to the area in which the specific farm is located being included within the Indigenous Reserve zone. Thus, the registration date of the property or corresponding acquisition (provided the transfer was from someone who was not indigenous) or the start of possessory acts, must have occurred before the respective zone was declared an indigenous reserve. After that declaration, which is made through Law No. 6172, or the expansion of the limits of the respective reserve (when the land in dispute did not form part of the original area of those reserves), in accordance with the restriction imposed by section 3 cited ut supra, those acts of transfer of ownership or possessory rights will be absolutely null, and therefore, unenforceable against the commented indemnification proceeding, because they would have as their object a property upon which a legally imposed limitation has already fallen and which, therefore, does not form part of commerce. This is inferred from section 3 in question, insofar as it states: '... Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other manner acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves. (...).' That norm enables the commerce of goods only among indigenous persons, sanctioning the nullity of contracts signed between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, as well as the acquisition by non-indigenous persons of lands that have been declared part of a reserve. Ergo, once the reserve is constituted and its area delimited, the titling of lands, or transfers of ownership over goods that form part of that coverage will not be possible. For that, the reference point is none other than the legal norm or the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) in which the limits of each reserve are defined, or the norm that expands the previously established territorial parameters. That is, for those effects, it is necessary to consider the formal act that affects the properties of the non-indigenous person, through a declaration of administrative will that defines that portion of land as part of the indigenous zone. It bears reiterating that, independently of the date of acquisition, the same section 3 establishes the ipso iure nullity (nullity by operation of law) of transfers from an indigenous person in favor of a non-indigenous person, in which case, it is evident that, due to the invalidity of the title transferring ownership, the commented indemnification would not be appropriate. Similarly, this element also impacts the analysis of the good faith component, since once the declaration of encumbrance is made, and that circumstance is recorded in the registral margin of the land, the acts of acquisition of ownership or possession will not be deemed in good faith; therefore, monetary compensation will not apply. ..." (Emphasis is from the original.)

**Third:** From what has been said, it is clear that it is the national legal system itself that established the mechanisms or instruments in favor of the owners or possessors "*in good faith*" of properties incorporated into indigenous reserves, in accordance with the boundary delimitation that the law or the Executive Branch makes of each indigenous reserve. Thus, firstly, relocation, "*on other similar lands*" and if that is not possible or there is no consent from the affected party, with expropriation and indemnification, through the ordinary procedures established in the Expropriation Law. For this reason, it is of interest to define what is understood by owner or possessor in good faith, since from the fulfillment of this prerequisite, it is inferred that it gives rise to the corresponding indemnification, in protection of the property right, pursuant to section 45 of the Political Constitution. Thus, the existence of registral ownership or possession of the property is not sufficient for this obligation to be generated on the part of the Administration. In this sense, the principles contained in sections 17 to 22 of the Civil Code serve as reference (parameter) in relation to sections 10 and 131.3 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), according to which, it is absolutely forbidden to seek legal effects not permitted or prohibited by the legal system, such as pursuing an antisocial exercise or an abuse of right in relation to private parties and deviation of power in the case of the Public Administration, being that in the field of Administrative Law and thereby of legal-administrative relations, the norm "... *must be interpreted* [and applied] *in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect due to the rights and interests of the private party*", as stated in the cited section 10 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this matter, and under the protection of the regulations that govern it, only the rights (of ownership or possession) acquired by non-indigenous persons **prior to that delimitation** - and with it, of the encumbrance of such lands to the legal regime of indigenous property - can be qualified as being in good faith, and with it, gives rise to the corresponding indemnification of the private property right and the damages caused by that encumbrance. Conversely, it can well be concluded that any act of transfer or disposition of goods comprised within indigenous reserves, carried out after the determination of the lands that make up the respective indigenous reserve - according to delimitation carried out either by the Legislative Assembly through law or by the Executive Branch, through a decree issued to that effect -, becomes, in principle and by provision of law - article 5 of the Indigenous Law -, null, because they are properties that are outside of commerce among men. In this sense, it is necessary to specify that a direct effect of this encumbrance on the disposition of the territories declared as indigenous reserves is that non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or acquire lands or farms located within the indigenous reserves, and if acts of disposition (purchase, sale, or of any type) are carried out after a declaration of a territory as an indigenous reserve, they will be absolutely null acts, as expressly provided by section 3 of the Indigenous Law, which for greater clarity for its understanding is transcribed literally, in what is of interest to this case:

"*Article 3.- Indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them. Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other manner acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves. Indigenous persons may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous persons. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereon in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, is absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case. ...*" (The emphasis is not from the original.)

In this sense, we must remember that the decrees creating indigenous reserves, like the rest of the normative provisions, are published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, this publication being sufficient for bringing them to the knowledge of the citizenry and population of the Nation. In principle, in attention to the principle of immatriculation of public domain goods, this encumbrance would not require further indication in the Public Property Registry; however, given that it is a special property regime - as already indicated, different from the private property regime, having a special legal connotation, of a community nature of indigenous peoples, and that permits transmission among indigenous persons - it is understood that this encumbrance must at least be determined and recorded in some public document, such as the respective decrees of encumbrance and derived from this, specified at least in some study or map. For this reason, any transfer or occupation that is made after the area of the indigenous reserve is demarcated must be considered in bad faith, a scenario in which one must proceed with their expulsion (police act) or immediate eviction through the legal channels provided for that purpose (administrative eviction), and consequently, no indemnification could proceed. Regarding this specific point, in judgment number 74-2013-VII, cited supra, the following was considered:

"*In the case of persons who are registered titleholders of ownership or of a real right, who have a title and who are so in bad faith, the action provided by the legal system should be taken for the removal from the legal world of the corresponding title, in order to subsequently achieve the respective eviction. In the event that the title was granted in the exercise of some administrative power (titling by a public authority among others), this would entail an action by way of lesivity if applicable, without prejudice to what is provided in article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or the direct action exercised by the holder of the affected right. For the scenario of non-indigenous persons, whether they are mere possessors, or whether they are registered titleholders of ownership and/or some real right over the property, insofar as they are acting in good faith, INDER must proceed to propose to them an alternative for their relocation on lands that should be equivalent insofar as possible, for those thus affected by these third parties in the indigenous reserves.*" **IX.- ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTION.-** We proceed to determine whether the indemnification claim made by the plaintiff corporation regarding the farms with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], of which it is the registered titleholder, is or is not in conformity with the block of legality previously indicated. In the manner indicated, this request is conditioned upon the adequacy of the prerequisites established by the legal system governing the matter.

**First: On the ownership of the properties and their origin:** Before anything else, the registral ownership of the properties whose indemnification is claimed by the plaintiff corporation must be determined. These are the farms with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], located in [Name 016] district, canton of [Name 007] - **proven facts 14.)** and **15.)**-. It is recorded in the case file that, through public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on the eighth of July of the year two thousand eight in the protocol of the notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the generalissimi agents without limit of sum of the corporations [Name 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Name 012] and [Name62 013]) sold to [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Name62 001]) the farm with registration [Value 029], with a measurement at that date of 41,931 square meters 42 square decimeters, and corresponding entirely to cadastral map number [Value 007] - **proven fact 7.)**-; a right that was registered on the sixth of August of two thousand eight - **proven fact 8.)**-. Subsequently, in public deed number [Value 056], dated the twenty-seventh of March of two thousand twelve, at folios [Value 052] verso to [Value 053] verso of Volume [Value 054] of the protocol of the notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, the legal representative of the corporation acting here - [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima - made four segregations of the previous farm - **proven fact 13.)** -, a deed that was registered on the ninth of April of two thousand twelve, thus giving origin to the four remaining farms [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], **proven fact 14.)**-. As deduced from the foregoing, the coverage area of the latter farms comprises part of the mother farm acquired by [Name62 029] Sociedad Anónima in the year two thousand eight; there being an identity between these and that from which they were segregated.

**Second: On the encumbrance to indigenous property of the farms of the plaintiff corporation:** For each property indicated, a cadastral map corresponds, on the reverse of which the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (CONAI) placed a warning note, indicating that the property represented in the graphic was located, in its entirety, within the [Name 038] Reserve, [Name 016] district, canton of [Name 007], Province of [Name 037], but that the registration of those cadastral maps was authorized, because the farm existed prior to the creation date of the indicated reserve - **proven facts 5.), 9.), 10.), 11.)** and **12.)**-.

For greater clarity, we set out this correspondence between the properties of the plaintiff company and their depiction in the corresponding cadastral map in the following table:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:428.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Real Folio Number</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Cadastral map number</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Area detailed in the map</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Area registered in the registry certification</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 029]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Parent property (Finca madre)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.), </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">7.) and 15.)</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 007]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">registered in the Catastro Nacional: on August 1, 2005 </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.) </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4ha1931.42 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">corresponds to the entirety of the property, as it was acquired by the plaintiff company in 2008 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 7.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">- upon acquiring the property 2008:</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">41.931.42m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 7.)-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">- after the segregations in 2011:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">10.000,42 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 15.)</span></p></td></tr><tr style="height:126.75pt"><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 025]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 14.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> 9.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">SJ-148703-2011</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">registered in the Catastro Nacional on March 20, 2011</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 9.) </span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4.808 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 9.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed, it corresponded to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">lot 1</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, with a measurement of 4.808 m2</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)- </span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4.808 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 004]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 14.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> 11.)</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 016]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">registered in the Catastro Nacional on March 31, 2011 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 11.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">5.825 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 11.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed it corresponds to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">lot 2</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, with a measurement of 5.825 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">5.825 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 005]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 14.), </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">12.)</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 017]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">registered in the Catastro Nacional on March thirty-first, 2011 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 12.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">1 ha 1.298 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 12.)-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed it corresponds to lot 3, with a measurement of 11.298 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">11.298 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 006]</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 015]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">registered in the catastro nacional on March 29, 2011 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 10.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">1 ha 0000 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 10.)-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed it corresponds to lot 4, with a measurement of 10.000 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">10.000 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">In consideration of the observation made by the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it is important to consider that indeed, as was alleged by the plaintiff company in its lawsuit, the parent property (finca madre) existed prior to the date of creation of the [Nombre62 038] reserve, given that, as can be inferred from the registry certification itself, it finds its origin as such in property [Nombre167 009]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, from which it was segregated on September fourth, nineteen seventy-three, and its ownership transferred to Mrs. [Nombre62 011] -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 6.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">- Thus, the assertion made by the Commission regarding the circumstance that the property existed prior to the creation of the reserve, which only occurred in nineteen seventy-six, with the enactment of Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta 113, of June twelfth of the indicated year -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 1.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, is true. But it is important to note that in this act, no geographic determination of the created reserve was made, given that this was done in Decreto Ejecutivo number 10707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine, which was published on the following November eighth in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 210 -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 2.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; a demarcation that was modified by Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, whose publication was made in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 93, of the following May sixteenth -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 4.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. This authority understands that it is based on this demarcation that the property initially with real folio number [Valor 029], of the Province of [Nombre62 037], is subject to the special regime of indigenous property, as was noted at the time of registering the corresponding cadastral map [Valor 007], </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, which in turn means that the subsequent segregations have the same encumbrance, by derivation. If the parent property (finca madre) is located in the indigenous reserve, the lots that are segregated will have the same condition, and vice versa, given that the last geographic demarcation of the indigenous reserve was publicized on May sixteenth, two thousand one -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 4.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. On this particular point, it is important to note that the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is not correct in questioning the validity of the statements made by the Executive Directorate of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, which located the plaintiff's properties referenced herein, within the [Nombre62 022] reserve. It should be noted that from the first cited Decreto Ejecutivo -number 6036-G-, which precisely creates the reserve, its Article 11 delegated to the then Instituto de Tierras y Colonización -today INDER-, so that in coordination with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it would carry out the territorial delimitation of the reserve -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 1.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; a competence that is later confirmed in Article 8 of the Ley Indígena, number 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen seventy-seven. By virtue of the foregoing, as it constitutes a public institution -article 1 of its creation Law, number 5251, of July eleventh, nineteen seventy-three-, and by such virtue, endowed with its own legal personality, it is fully competent to determine whether a property is or is not located in geographic spaces reserved for the respective indigenous reserves. Therefore, this Court has no doubt as to the encumbrance to the regime of indigenous property that weighs on properties [Valor 029]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006], whose registered owner is [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; in the manner as was declared by the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and alleged in this action by the interested party.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Second: Regarding the condition of bad faith owner:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Now then, despite the fact that the legal representative of the plaintiff company attempted to dismiss the analysis regarding the determination of the fulfillment of this requirement, considering it superfluous and unnecessary when dealing with the ownership of a property right, and not mere possession of the real property (bien inmueble) located within an indigenous reserve, the rejection of such allegations is appropriate. And this is in strict application of the legal provision that establishes it as an unavoidable prerequisite for the propriety of the compensation of the corresponding right, in the manner already indicated in ordinals 3 and 5 of the Ley Indígena. And in this sense, it must be clarified to the plaintiff company that, of course, the legislation at hand recognizes the right of property and the exercise of possession by non-indigenous persons, who at the time of the corresponding geographic demarcation, held their right over a real property (bien inmueble) that became encumbered by that determination. However, as is stated clearly in cited numeral 3, once the coordinates of the respective indigenous reserve are geographically determined, either by Decreto Ejecutivo -as happened in this case-, or by law, the properties (fundos) comprised within this delimitation become subject to the special regime of indigenous property, by virtue of which those properties (fundos) are withdrawn from commerce by non-indigenous persons, since the use and enjoyment of those lands is reserved exclusively for indigenous persons; whence any legal transaction (negocio jurídico) in contravention of this special regime is null and void ab initio (nulo de pleno derecho). Furthermore, it must be taken into consideration that such delimitations are published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta, for the effects, not only of the registered owners at that time, but also of third parties. Due to the clarity and forcefulness of this legal provision, previously transcribed, it is then necessary to review not only the allegations of possessory rights, but also the property titles that are alleged when this type of proceeding is filed. This is imperative under the law, once again, from the interrelation of provisions 3 and 5 of the Ley Indígena. By reason of what has been said, and having reviewed what occurred in this matter, it is concluded that the plaintiff company does not hold a good faith title regarding its properties, for the purpose of requesting the compensation it claims in this action, since on the date it acquired property [Valor 029], the [Nombre62 038] reserve was already not only geographically delimited according to its current boundaries, but that condition was noted in the respective cadastral map [Valor 007] -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, the registration of the map being permitted or authorized because the existence of the property predated the creation of the reserve -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, whose last geographic demarcation was published on May sixteenth, two thousand one -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 4.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. Indeed, the purchase and sale deed (escritura de compraventa) by which the plaintiff company acquired the alleged property right dates from July eighth, two thousand eight -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 7.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; which was registered in the Public Registry of Property on the following August sixth -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 8.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. In other terms, when [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima entered into the purchase-sale contract for that real property (inmueble), the encumbrance to the indigenous property regime was already weighing upon it, and therefore, since this involved a transaction (negocio) entered into between two legal entities -obviously non-indigenous-, this compels it to be considered a transaction (negocio) absolutely null by operation of law, in the manner provided by law. The subsequent segregations suffer from the same defect, despite the fact that the ownership of the new properties (fundos) is maintained in the same legal entity -the plaintiff herein-, but which gives rise to the creation of four new properties (fincas) -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven facts 13.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> and </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">14.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-.</span></p> Note in this regard, that in the respective cadastral plans the warning was left—already known by the interested party—that those lands were located within the [Name 038] reserve — **proven facts 9.), 10.), 11.)** and **12.)**—.

**X.- OF THE CLAIMS OF THE COMPLAINT:** Based on the foregoing considerations, we proceed to rule on each of the claims formulated in this action.

**First: Of the declaratory claim (claim # 2):** It is worth highlighting that it is appropriate to grant the first claim of a declaratory nature formulated in this action. Indeed, in the form presented in the complaint, and confirmed at the Preliminary Hearing, [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima requested that the following be ordered in the judgment:

" **2.-** That it be declared that the farms of the [Name62 037] district, Real Folios [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006] are entirely immersed within the boundaries of the [Name62 038] Reserve." By reason of the foregoing, it is declared that the farms of the Province of [Name 037], with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006] are located, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Name 038] Reserve.

**Second: Of the claims for condemnation formulated (claims # 3, 4, and 5):** **i.-** Notwithstanding that the real estate properties of the plaintiff company are located within the [Name62 038] reserve, in the manner explained above, the plaintiff does not meet the legal prerequisite established in the legal system governing the matter to legitimize compensation for private lands located in indigenous reserves, which refers to the holding of a good faith title of ownership, as a condition "sine qua non". This single circumstance makes the claim for compensation filed inadmissible. But additionally, it must be considered that, in the manner in which this claim was raised, it established the alleged de facto expropriation by the State of the indicated properties as the cause for the requested compensation. In this sense, it is important to consider that, despite the affectation of the indigenous property regime of the referenced farms of the plaintiff company, it is important to note that the alleged de facto expropriation was not proven, nor was the dispossession of the aforementioned lands by the public administrations involved in addressing these matters. In this sense, there is no evidence that the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and/or the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas have exercised reivindicatory actions in relation to the properties with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005], or [Value 006], whose current registered owner is [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima — **unproven fact 1.)** —. Nor has the plaintiff proven that the State has titled those lands in the name of the [Name 040] Association — **unproven fact 2.)** —. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Administration has performed any material act of occupation of those farms — **unproven fact 3.)** —. On the contrary, the plaintiff itself stated that since it acquired farm [Value 029], it has exercised full possession over it, and consequently, over the four segregated lots. Thus, the dismissal of the action in relation to this part of the complaint is appropriate. By accessoriness, the request for interest and indexation that were requested in this regard meets the same fate.

**ii.- Subjective moral damage is not appropriate.** Finally, the plaintiff company requested compensation for subjective moral damage, caused on the occasion of the situation raised in the action. It would suffice to point out that, if the claim for compensation for the indicated properties is inadmissible, for not conforming to the prerequisites established in the body of legality and because no de facto expropriation occurred, as was alleged, this new claim is also inadmissible by accessoriness. Now, it is worth highlighting that notwithstanding that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution and Article 197 of the General Law of Public Administration, compensation or reparation—at the expense of the Administration—is appropriate for moral damage or suffering, the claim is not sustainable in this case, since it concerns an affectation that refers to natural persons, affecting their inner and psychological sphere, given that in this proceeding, a legal entity appears as the plaintiff. In this sense, the representation of the defendant institute is correct in noting this situation, given that, in this case, the natural person exercising the legal representation cannot assume the position of the legal entity to attempt a sort of reparation that is alien to the legal nature of whom they represent.

**XI.- OF THE DEFENSES RAISED.-** The representations of the defendants alleged the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right. In this regard, it must be remembered that according to procedural doctrine and contentious-administrative jurisprudence (in this sense, see cassation judgment 34-1961, of ten hours twenty minutes on March twenty-second, nineteen sixty-one), the following are recognized as substantial prerequisites for the issuance of any judgment: the **standing of the intervening parties**, the **interest in resolving the conflict**, and the **right**; which are reviewable even *ex officio* by any judge if not formulated by the defendants in a jurisdictional process, and in that rigorous order. Thus, having reviewed this matter, it is deemed that the prerequisite of **active standing** is met, insofar as the party filing this action does so in defense of their subjective rights and legitimate interests (Article 10, subsection 1), sub-subsection a) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), against the two entities that the national legal system grants powers to act in protection of such rights, that is, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, in the manner regulated in numeral 12, subsection 1) of the same procedural code, therefore the prerequisite of **passive standing** is met with respect to these two institutions. Now, regarding the participation of the State in this process, given that the objection pertains to whether or not it is obliged to compensate, in this case, due to the inadmissibility of that claim having been declared, the analysis of this point is deemed unnecessary, and we proceed directly to the analysis of the substantive defense raised by it. Regarding the **interest** in resolving this matter, it is noted that this prerequisite persists, as there is no evidence that a settlement or withdrawal regarding the conflict raised has occurred during the processing of this matter. Finally, regarding the **right of action**, in the manner reasoned throughout this ruling, it is appropriate to grant the defense of lack of right regarding the inadmissibility of the claim for compensation, as the prerequisites established in the legal system for its declaration are not met; and it is rejected in relation to the declaratory claim, which must be granted.

**X.- OF THE COSTS.-** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, notwithstanding that there is reciprocal defeat, the lack of good faith in the promotion of this process is evident, which precisely led to its dismissal regarding the compensation for the property titles of the plaintiff company, and the amount requested for the claim for moral damage compensation being also excessive (for the sum of fifty million colones) — a case of plus petitio, provided for in subsection 1) of Article 194 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. These considerations compel the condemnation of costs against the losing party [Name62 029] [Name 137351], in favor of the defendants—the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas—. By majority opinion, the liquidation of costs is reserved for the execution phase of the judgment, once this ruling becomes final.

**THEREFORE:** The defenses of expiration of the action and prescription formulated by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural are rejected; as well as the lack of active standing raised by the representation of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the defendant institute; and as unnecessary, a ruling is omitted regarding the defense of lack of passive standing *ad causam* raised by the state representation. The defense of lack of right is partially granted, only in relation to the claim for compensation formulated. Consequently, the complaint filed by [Name 029] **SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA** against the **STATE**, the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL**, and the **COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS** is declared **PARTIALLY WITH MERIT**, and it is therefore appropriate to make the following pronouncements: It is declared that the farms of the District of [Name 037], with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], canton [Name 007], district [Name 016], are entirely affected by the indigenous property regime, being entirely comprised within the [Name 038] Reserve. In all other respects, the complaint is declared **WITHOUT MERIT**. Procedural and personal costs are charged to the plaintiff company and in favor of the three co-defendants, whose liquidation, by majority opinion, is reserved for the execution phase of the judgment, once this ruling becomes final. Judge Aguilar Méndez provides a separate note regarding this last point. Judge Garita Navarro provides a separate note regarding the weighing of the good faith title for the right to compensation in this type of matter.

**Silvia Fernández Brenes** **Daniel Aguilar Méndez** **Roberto Garita Navarro** **CLARIFYING NOTE FROM JUDGE GARITA NAVARRO.-** The undersigned judge agrees with the dismissal of the complaint proposed in this resolution. However, I must indicate that, in the opinion of the undersigned, the mere delimitation of the reserve zone does not lead to the denial of compensation, since that single factor does not allow ignoring the presumption of good faith in the acquisition, an aspect that the defendant Public Administration must prove and that must be analyzed in each specific case. Certainly, from the declaration of the reserve, the object of the contract transferring lands that form part of that property regime would be null. However, if there is no record, at least cadastral, of the land's belonging to a reserve zone, the legitimate trust of the acquirer is violated, provided they acquired it from a non-indigenous person and there is no formal or material evidence of signs that allow them, at least to presume, the existence of that special domain regime. Thus, regardless of the lands having to be placed at the disposal of the indigenous reserve, this does not lead to denying the Administration's duty to compensate the titleholder for the dispossession of these lands, when the indicated circumstances are present, since, ultimately, it is land that the State (in a broad sense) did not compensate, as mandated and imposed by law. Now, in this case, as mentioned in the development of the judgment, in the cadastral plan used for the segregations, that belonging to an indigenous property regime was recorded, which introduces an objective element from which the impossibility of acquiring those lands was known. In this way, this aspect must be highlighted as the cause for the denial of the reparation claimed in this process. For the purposes of justifying the position of reparability in cases of concurrence of good faith, see ruling No. 15-2019-VI, of this Section VI of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, in which the undersigned served as reporting judge.

**José Roberto Garita Navarro.** **Judge.** **NOTE FROM JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.-** Specifically in relation to the condemnation to pay costs, although it is a unanimous criterion that it must indeed be imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, with all due respect I differ from my colleagues regarding the abstract or liquid nature of this pronouncement. Given the scarce regulation that this point has had in the different procedural normative bodies in this matter, as was the case in its moment with the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and currently with the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, it gave rise to an extended application by supplementarity of the norms of the Civil Procedural Code, precisely as authorized by numerals 220 idem and Articles 9 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, and according to the current wording of Article 62.1 of the Civil Procedural Code (Law No. 9342), it constitutes an unavoidable duty of the Tribunal to establish in the operative part the *“…once the exact amount of the sums granted, their adjustments up to the judgment, **including interest and costs**…”* (Emphasis not in the original). Consequently, and given that there is no administrative rule to the contrary, the appropriate course would be to include in the costs section of this judgment the determination of these latter items, as provided by the legal system, and not to reserve its pronouncement for the execution phase of the judgment.

- </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Daniel Aguilar Méndez </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Judge</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><br /><br /><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:432.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:432.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">- Verification Code -</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><br /><span style="color:#010101">*OI4O47Y43JN8M61*</span><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:8pt; color:#010101">OI4O47Y43JN8M61</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><br /><br /><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:432.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">Document signed by:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">SILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, DECISION-MAKER JUDGE</span><span> </span><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, DECISION-MAKER JUDGE</span><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, DECISION-MAKER JUDGE</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p> In this regard, it should be remembered that in the case of administrative acts, for their efficacy, effective communication to the interested party (addressee) is required, in the terms established in Article 140 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which is why subsection 1), sub-subsection a) provides that this one-year period runs "..., <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>from the day following the notification [...]</em></span></span></p> <p><span idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>Third: Regarding the inadmissibility of the asserted statute of limitations defense:</strong></span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> Having reached this point, it is deemed necessary to reiterate that we are dealing with a request for the recognition of compensation (indemnización) to be borne by the defendants (Public Administration), due to the encumbrance (afectación) on the properties owned by the plaintiff company, as they are entirely included within the </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 038]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> reserve (reserva). On this matter, the ambiguity of the allegation made is again striking, insofar as reference was made both to the ordinary statute of limitations (prescripción), of ten years as provided for in Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), and in Article 61 of the Law for the Comprehensive Reform of Law No. 7495, on Expropriations, No. 9286, of November eleventh, two thousand eleven -in force as of February fourth, two thousand fifteen-; and to the four-year period of Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; and furthermore, it establishes various moments from which this temporal computation must be made, thus, initially, from the entry into force of the General Law on Vacant Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos), No. 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine, as the first regulation that established the inalienability of indigenous lands (Article 8); or from the enactment of the decrees that determined the geographical location of the </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 022]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> reserve, i.e., from nineteen seventy-six. And to that effect, it is alleged that the given time periods, whether ten or four years, have been exceeded, because this lawsuit was served, at least on the Rural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), by September twenty-second of the year two thousand sixteen -</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>proven fact 16.)</strong></span> </span></p> <p><span idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654" style="font-size: 11pt;">-. Notwithstanding the foregoing indications, after a measured analysis, this Chamber of Judges considers that the alleged statute of limitations has not been established. And this is so in consideration of the right claimed to be violated and the legal regime that regulates it, i.e., the right to property, in which the establishment of social interest limitations is legitimate, which, in principle, are not compensable, as they do not imply the suppression of the right, a scenario in which, if the essential content of the right were to be emptied, they must indeed be compensated, as they translate into de facto expropriations. Thus, as long as that situation is maintained, there would be an injury to the detriment of the holder, and the computation of the statute of limitations to claim the right could not be made [...]</span></p> <p><span idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654" style="font-size: 11pt;">&nbsp;The foregoing considerations are applicable to the case at hand (sub judice) and compel the rejection of the alleged statute of limitations. On this particular point, it is noted that this pronouncement does not affect the substance of the analysis of the formulated conflict, which we will address forthwith</span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>VIII.- THE PRECONDITIONS FOR COMPENSATION OF RIGHTS TO LANDS LOCATED IN INDIGENOUS RESERVES.- </strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">For the substantive analysis referred to in this action, we must attend to what is established in the national legal system regarding the preconditions for compensation of rights of non-indigenous persons, whose lands are located in indigenous reserves, in accordance with the geographical delimitations given for this purpose, whether by law or by decrees of the Executive Branch. This has been a topic already addressed consistently and repeatedly by this Court on various occasions, for example, ruling number 74-2013-VII, at ten hours thirty minutes of October twenty-ninth, two thousand thirteen, of the Seventh Section; 38-2016-VI, at ten twenty-five hours of March eighth and 66-2016-VI, at fifteen hours of April twenty-first, the last two issued in the year two thousand sixteen; 15-2019-VI, at eight hours thirty minutes of February thirteenth, two thousand nineteen; 86-2020-VI, at fifteen hours fifty minutes of June thirtieth and number 105-2020-VI, at fourteen hours fifteen minutes of August twenty-eighth, the last two from the year two thousand twenty and of the Sixth Section; and number 23-2019-IV, at eleven hours eighteen minutes of March twenty-ninth, two thousand nineteen, of the Fourth Section, all of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). From the foregoing precedents, it is possible to infer the following: guidelines that guide the decision in this matter.</span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>First: </strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">In the case of indigenous reserves (reservas indígenas) established and recognized in our country, it is necessary to reiterate that these are lands that are destined for the exclusive use of indigenous peoples and, accordingly, are removed from commerce among men, i.e., they are inalienable and also imprescriptible, and "</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>non-transferrable</em></span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">", given that by legal mandate they are destined "...</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em> exclusively for the indigenous communities that inhabit them</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">", and it is clarified that "</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> <em>(N)on-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves\"</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">; in accordance with Article 3 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), No. 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen seventy-seven. Consequently, it involves a special property regime, in that it differs from the concept of private property provided for in the national legal system according to the provision of Article 45 of the Fundamental Charter (Carta Fundamental) and in ordinary legislation -that is, civil, urban, and agrarian law-; and that due to the limitations it implies for non-indigenous persons, it translates into limitations on the ordinary attributes of the right to (private) property, in the terms provided for in Article 264 of the Civil Code, given that it is a diverse regime, as has been indicated [...]</span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>Third: </strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">From what has been said, it is clear that it is the national legal system itself that established the mechanisms or instruments in favor of owners or possessors "</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> <em>in good faith (de buena fe)</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">" of properties incorporated into indigenous reserves, in accordance with the boundary delimitation that the law or the Executive Branch makes for each indigenous reserve. Thus, in the first place, relocation (reubicación), "</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>to other similar lands</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">" and if this is not possible or there is no consent from the affected party, through expropriation and compensation, via the ordinary procedures established in the Law of Expropriations (Ley de Expropiaciones).</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">For this reason, it is important to define what is understood by an owner or possessor in good faith, since the fulfillment of this precondition implies that it gives rise to the corresponding compensation, in protection of the right to property, in accordance with Article 45 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Thus, the existence of registered ownership or possession of the property is not sufficient for this obligation to arise on the part of the Administration. In this sense, the principles included in Articles 17 to 22 of the Civil Code in relation to Articles 10 and 131.3 of the General Law of Public Administration serve as a reference (parameter), under the tenor of which it is absolutely prohibited to seek legal effects not permitted or prohibited by the legal system, such as attempting an anti-social exercise or an abuse of right in relation to private parties, and a misuse of power in the case of the Public Administration, given that in the field of Administrative Law and thereby of legal-administrative relations, the norm "... </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>must be interpreted</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> [and applied] </span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the due respect for the rights and interests of the private party</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">", as the cited canon 10 of the General Law of Public Administration states. In this matter, and under the protection of the regulations that govern it, only the rights (of ownership or possession) acquired by non-indigenous persons </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>prior to that delimitation</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> -and with it, the encumbrance of such lands to the legal regime of indigenous property- can be classified as in good faith, and with that, gives rise to the corresponding compensation for the right to private property and for the damages and losses caused by that encumbrance. Conversely, it can be concluded that any act of transfer or disposal of property included within indigenous reserves, carried out after the determination of the lands that make up the respective indigenous reserve -according to the delimitation made either by the Legislative Assembly through law or by the Executive Branch, through a decree issued for that purpose-, becomes, as a matter of principle and by provision of law -Article 5 of the Indigenous Law-, null and void, as they are properties that are outside commerce among men. In this sense, it is necessary to specify that a direct effect of this encumbrance on the disposal of the territories declared as indigenous reserves is that non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or acquire lands or farms located within the indigenous reserves, and if acts of disposal (purchase, sale, or of any kind) are carried out after a declaration of a territory as an indigenous reserve, they will be absolutely null acts, as expressly provided by Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, which for greater clarity of understanding is transcribed verbatim, in what is relevant to this case:</span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong><em>Article 3.-</em></strong></span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em> Indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferrable and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them.</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong><em> Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves. </em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>Indigenous persons may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous persons. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereof in indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, is absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case. ...</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">" (Highlighting is not from the original.)</span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">In this sense, we must remember that decrees creating indigenous reserves, like all other regulatory provisions, are published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, this publicity being sufficient for them to be brought to the knowledge of the citizenry and population of the Nation. In principle, in attention to the principle of initial registration of public domain property (principio de inmatriculación), this encumbrance would not require subsequent indication in the Public Property Registry (Registro Público de la Propiedad); however, being that it is a special property regime -as already indicated, diverse from the private property regime, having a special legal connotation, of a communal nature for indigenous peoples, and that allows transfer among indigenous persons-, it is understood that this encumbrance must at least be determined and recorded in some public document, such as the respective decrees of encumbrance and, derived from this, specified at least in some study or map. Therefore, any transfer or occupation that takes place after the area of the indigenous reserve has been demarcated, must be considered in bad faith, a scenario in which their expulsion (police act) or immediate eviction must proceed through the legal channels provided for this purpose (administrative eviction - desahucio administrativo), and consequently, no compensation could proceed. On this specific point, in judgment number 74-2013-VII, cited above, it was considered as follows:</span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><em>In the case of persons who are registered holders of ownership or of any right in rem, who have a title and who hold it in bad faith, the action provided for by the legal system for the removal from the legal sphere of the corresponding title should be pursued, to subsequently achieve the respective eviction. In the event that the title was granted in the exercise of some administrative power (titling by a public authority among others), this would entail the action via the action for declaration of lesividad (acción de lesividad) if applicable, without prejudice to what is provided in Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or the direct action brought by the holder of the affected right. For the scenario of non-indigenous persons, whether mere possessors or registered holders of ownership and/or some right in rem over the property, insofar as they are acting in good faith, INDER must proceed to propose an alternative for their relocation on lands that would prove equivalent as much as possible, to those thus affected by these third parties in the indigenous reserves.</em></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">"</span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>&nbsp;IX.- ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE.-</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> We proceed to determine whether or not the compensation claim made by the plaintiff company regarding the farms with Registered Folio number </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 029]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 025]</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 004]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 005]</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> and </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 006]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, all of the Province of </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 037]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, of which it is the registered owner, conforms to the legality framework previously indicated. In the manner indicated, this request is conditional on the conformity with the preconditions established by the legal system governing the matter. </span></span></p> <p><span face="Arial" color="#010101" data-mce-style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;" idextracto="288654" class="example1 288654"><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>First: Regarding the ownership of the properties and their origin:</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> First of all, the registered ownership of the properties for which the plaintiff company claims compensation must be determined. These are the farms with Registered Folio number </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 029]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 030]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 004]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 005]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> and </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 006]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, all of the Province of </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 037]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, located in the district of </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 016]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, canton of </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 007]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> -</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>proven facts 14.)</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> and </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>15.)</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">-. It appears in the case file that, by public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on July eighth of the year two thousand eight in the protocol of the notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the unlimited general agents (apoderados generalísimos sin límite de suma) of the companies </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 041]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> Sociedad Anónima (</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 012]</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> and </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 013]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">) sold to </span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 029]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> Sociedad Anónima (</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">) the farm with registration number </span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 029]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, with a measurement on that date of 41,931 square meters 42 square decimeters, and corresponding entirely to cadastral map number </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 007]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> -</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> <strong>proven fact 7.)</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">-; a right that was registered on August sixth of two thousand eight -</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>proven fact 8.)</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">-. Subsequently, in public deed number </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 056]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, dated March twenty-seventh of two thousand twelve, at folios </span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 052]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> verso to </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 053]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> verso of Volume </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 054]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> of the protocol of the notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, the legal representative of the plaintiff company here -</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 029]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> Sociedad Anónima- made four segregations of the aforementioned farm -</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>proven fact 13.)</strong></span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">-, a deed that was registered on April ninth of two thousand twelve, thus giving rise to the four remaining farms </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 030]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span> <span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 004]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 005]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> and </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Value 006]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"><strong>proven fact 14.)</strong></span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">-. As can be deduced from the foregoing, the coverage area of the latter farms comprises part of the parent farm acquired by </span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;">[Name 029]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt;" data-mce-style="font-size: 11pt;"> Sociedad Anónima in the year two thousand eight; there being an identity of these with the one from which they were segregated.In this regard, it must be remembered that for administrative acts to be effective, actual communication to the interested party (addressee) is required, under the terms set forth in Article 140 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which is why subsection 1), sub-subsection a) provides that the one-year period runs "..., from the day following notification [...]" **Third: Regarding the inadmissibility of the asserted statute of limitations defense:** Having reached this point, it is necessary to reiterate that this is a request for recognition of compensation to be borne by the defendants (Public Administration), by reason of the encumbrance on the properties owned by the plaintiff company, since they are fully located within the [Name 038] reserve. Concerning this matter, the ambiguity of the claim is again striking, as it references both the ordinary statute of limitations, of ten years as provided for in Article 868 of the Civil Code and in Article 61 of the Comprehensive Reform to Law No. 7495 on Expropriations, No. 9286, of November 11, 2011—in force as of February 4, 2015—and the four-year period set forth in Article 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; moreover, it identifies various points from which such limitation period should be computed: initially, from the effective date of the Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, No. 13, of January 10, 1939, as the first regulation establishing the inalienability of indigenous lands (Article 8); or from the issuance of the decrees that determined the geographical boundaries of the [Name 022] reserve, i.e., from 1976. And to that effect, it is asserted that the given time periods, whether ten years or four years, have been exceeded, because this lawsuit was served, at least on the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, on September 22, 2016—**proven fact 16.)** —. Despite the foregoing, after careful analysis, this Chamber of Judges finds that the alleged statute of limitations cannot be sustained. This is so in view of the right claimed to have been violated and the legal framework governing it, namely the right to property, in which the establishment of limitations in the public interest is legitimate, and which, in principle, are not compensable, as they do not entail the suppression of the right; in such a case, should the essential content of the right be emptied, they must indeed be compensated, as they amount to de facto expropriations. Thus, for as long as that situation persists, there is an ongoing injury to the owner, and the statute of limitations for asserting the right cannot begin to run [...]

&nbsp;The foregoing considerations apply to the case at hand and compel the rejection of the asserted statute of limitations. On this particular point, it is noted that this pronouncement does not affect the substantive analysis of the dispute raised, which we will proceed to address immediately.

**VIII.— THE PRECONDITIONS FOR COMPENSATION OF RIGHTS TO LANDS LOCATED WITHIN INDIGENOUS RESERVES.—** For the substantive analysis of this action, we must look to the provisions of the national legal system regarding the preconditions for compensating the rights of non-indigenous persons whose lands are located within indigenous reserves, as per the geographical delimitations established for that purpose, whether by law or by decrees of the Poder Ejecutivo. This is a subject that this Court has consistently and repeatedly addressed on numerous occasions, for example, in rulings No. 74-2013-VII of this Seventh Section, handed down at ten thirty hours on October 29, 2013; 38-2016-VI at ten twenty-five hours on March 8, 2016 and 66-2016-VI at fifteen hours on April 21, 2016, the latter two rendered by the Sixth Section in 2016; and 15-2019-VI at eight thirty hours on February 13, 2019; 86-2020-VI at fifteen fifty hours on June 30, 2020; 105-2020-VI at fourteen fifteen hours on August 28, 2020, the latter two of the Sixth Section in 2020; and No. 23-2019-IV at eleven eighteen hours on March 29, 2019, of the Fourth Section, all of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo. From these precedents, the following guiding principles for this decision can be drawn.

**First:** Regarding the indigenous reserves established and recognized in our country, it is necessary to reiterate that these are lands set aside for the exclusive use of indigenous peoples and, as such, are removed from commerce, that is, they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and "non-transferable," because they are legally mandated "exclusively for the indigenous communities that inhabit them," and it is clarified that "(N)on-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves," in accordance with Article 3 of the Ley Indígena, No. 6172, of November 29, 1977. Consequently, this is a special property regime, differing from the concept of private property provided for in the national legal system under Article 45 of the Constitución Política and in ordinary legislation—civil, urban, and agrarian—whose limitations for non-indigenous persons translate into restrictions on the ordinary attributes of the right to (private) property, under the terms of Article 264 of the Civil Code, since it is a different regime, as indicated [...]

**Third:** From the foregoing, it is clear that the national legal system itself established the mechanisms or instruments for owners or possessors "in good faith (de buena fe)" of properties included within indigenous reserves, according to the boundary delimitation of each indigenous reserve made by law or by the Poder Ejecutivo. Thus, the first mechanism is relocation (reubicación) "to other similar lands," and if this is not possible or the affected party does not consent, then expropriation and compensation by means of the ordinary procedures established in the Ley de Expropiaciones. For this reason, it is important to define what is meant by an owner or possessor in good faith, since meeting this precondition gives rise to the corresponding compensation, in protection of the right to property, per Article 45 of the Constitución Política. The mere existence of registered ownership or possession of the property is not sufficient to create this obligation for the Administration. In this sense, the principles set forth in Articles 17 to 22 of the Civil Code, in relation to Articles 10 and 131.3 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, serve as a (parameter), under whose terms it is absolutely prohibited to seek legal effects not permitted or prohibited by the legal system, such as attempting an antisocial exercise or an abuse of right in relation to private parties, and misuse of power in the case of the Public Administration, since in the sphere of administrative law and legal-administrative relations, the norm "must be interpreted [and applied] in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the due respect for the rights and interests of the private party," as provided in the aforementioned canon 10 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. In this matter, and under the regulations that govern it, only the rights (of ownership or possession) acquired by non-indigenous persons **prior to that delimitation**—and hence, prior to the encumbrance of such lands to the legal regime of indigenous property—may be classified as in good faith, thereby giving rise to the corresponding compensation for the right to private property and for the damages and losses caused by such encumbrance. Conversely, it can be concluded that any act of transfer or disposal of property located within indigenous reserves, undertaken after the determination of the lands comprising the respective indigenous reserve—whether delimitated by the Asamblea Legislativa through law or by the Poder Ejecutivo through a decree issued for that purpose—is, in principle and by operation of law—Article 5 of the Ley Indígena—null and void, because such real estate is outside commerce. In this regard, a direct consequence of this encumbrance on the disposition of territories declared indigenous reserves is that non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or acquire lands or farms located within the indigenous reserves, and any acts of disposal (purchase, sale, or any other type) performed after a territory has been declared an indigenous reserve shall be absolutely null and void, as expressly provided in Article 3 of the Ley Indígena, which, for greater clarity and understanding, is transcribed verbatim as relevant to this case:

"**Article 3.—** *Indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them.* **Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves.** *Indigenous persons may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous persons. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereof within indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, is absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case. ...*" (Emphasis added, not in the original.)

In this sense, we must remember that decrees creating indigenous reserves, like all other normative provisions, are published in the official gazette La Gaceta, this publicity being sufficient for their knowledge by the citizenry and population of the Nation. In principle, pursuant to the principle of initial registration of public domain property, this encumbrance would not require a subsequent notation in the Registro Público de la Propiedad; however, since this is a special property regime—different, as already noted, from the private property regime, having a special legal connotation of a communal nature for indigenous peoples and permitting transfer among indigenous individuals—this encumbrance must at a minimum be defined and recorded in some public document, such as the respective decrees of encumbrance and, deriving from this, specified at least in a study or map. For this reason, any transfer or occupation occurring after the demarcation of the indigenous reserve area must be considered in bad faith, in which case their expulsion (police act) or immediate eviction through the legally established channels must proceed (administrative eviction - desahucio administrativo), and consequently, no compensation whatsoever may proceed. On this specific point, judgment No. 74-2013-VII, cited above, held as follows:

"In the case of persons who are registered holders of ownership or of any right in rem, who hold a title, and who do so in bad faith, the action provided for under the legal system for removing the corresponding title from the legal sphere should be pursued, in order to subsequently achieve the respective eviction. In the event that the title was granted in the exercise of an administrative power (such as titling by a public authority), this would entail an action for declaration of lesividad (acción de lesividad), where applicable, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública or to a direct action brought by the holder of the affected right. In the case of non-indigenous persons, whether mere possessors or registered holders of ownership and/or a right in rem over the property, if they are acting in good faith, INDER must propose an alternative for their relocation to lands that would be as equivalent as possible to those thus encumbered by these third parties within the indigenous reserves." **IX.— ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE.—** We now determine whether the compensation claim brought by the plaintiff company for the farms registered under Folio Real numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all in the Province of [Name 037], of which it is the registered owner, conforms to the legality framework previously described. As indicated, this request is conditional upon satisfaction of the preconditions established by the legal system governing the matter.

**First: Regarding the ownership of the properties and their origin:** First and foremost, we must determine the registered ownership of the properties for which the plaintiff company claims compensation. These are the farms under Folio Real numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all in the Province of [Name 037], located in the district of [Name 016], canton of [Name 007]—**proven facts 14.)** and **15.)**—. It appears in the record that, by public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on July 8, 2008, in the protocol of notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the unlimited general agents of the companies [Name 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Name 012] and [Name 013]) sold to [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Name 001]) the farm under registration number [Value 029], measuring at that time 41,931 square meters and 42 square decimeters, and fully corresponding to cadastral map number [Value 007]—**proven fact 7.)**—; a right that was registered on August 6, 2008—**proven fact 8.)**—. Subsequently, by public deed number [Value 056], dated March 27, 2012, at folios [Value 052] verso through [Value 053] verso of Volume [Value 054] of the protocol of notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, the legal representative of the plaintiff company here—[Name 029] Sociedad Anónima—made four segregations from the aforementioned farm—**proven fact 13.)**—, which deed was registered on April 9, 2012, thereby creating the four remaining farms [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], **proven fact 14.)**—. As can be deduced from the above, the area of coverage of the latter farms comprises part of the parent farm acquired by [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima in 2008; these farms are identical to the one from which they were segregated.

**Second: Regarding the encumbrance on indigenous property of the plaintiff company's farms:** For each property indicated, there is a corresponding cadastral map, on the reverse of which the Executive Directorate of the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs placed a warning note, indicating that the property represented in the drawing was located, in its entirety, within the [Nombre 038] Reserve, [Nombre 016] district, canton of [Nombre 007], Province of [Nombre 037], but that the registration of those cadastral maps was authorized because the farm existed prior to the date of creation of the indicated reserve - **proven facts 5.), 9.), 10.), 11.)** and **12.) [...]** In consideration of the statement made by the Executive Directorate of the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs, it is important to consider that, indeed, as was alleged by the plaintiff company in its lawsuit, the mother farm existed prior to the date of creation of the [Nombre 038] reserve, given that, as is evident from the registration certification itself, it finds its origin as such in farm [Valor 009], from which it was segregated on September fourth, nineteen seventy-three, and its title transferred to Mrs. [Nombre 011] - **proven fact 6.)** - Thus, the assertion made by the Commission regarding the circumstance that the farm existed prior to the creation of the reserve is indeed true, which occurred until nineteen seventy-six, with the promulgation of Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta 113, on June twelfth of the indicated year - **proven fact 1.)** -. But it is important to note that in this act, no geographical determination of the created reserve was made, given that this was done in Decreto Ejecutivo number 10707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine, which was published on the following November eighth in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 210 - **proven fact 2.)** -; a demarcation that was modified by Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, whose publication was made in the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 93, on the following May sixteenth - **proven fact 4.)** -. This authority understands that it is based on this demarcation that the farm initially with real folio number [Valor 029], of the Province of [Nombre 037], is encumbered by the special regime of indigenous property, as was warned at the time of registering the corresponding cadastral map [Valor 007], **proven fact 5.)** -, which entails, in turn, that the subsequent segregations have the same encumbrance, by derivation. If the mother farm is located in the indigenous reserve, the lots that are segregated will have the same condition, and vice versa, given that the last geographical demarcation of the indigenous reserve was publicized on May sixteenth, two thousand one - **proven fact 4.)** -. On this particular matter, it is important to note that the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is not correct in questioning the validity of the statements made by the Executive Directorate of the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs, which located the farms of the plaintiff referenced herein within the [Nombre 022] reserve. Note that from the first cited Decreto Ejecutivo -number 6036-G-, which precisely creates the reserve, its article 11 delegated to the then Instituto de Tierras y Colonización -today Instituto de Desarrollo Rural-, so that in coordination with the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs, it would carry out the territorial delimitation of the reserve - **proven fact 1.)** -; a competence that is later confirmed in article 8 of the Indigenous Law, Ley 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen seventy-seven. By virtue of the foregoing, being constituted as a public institution -article 1 of its Law of creation, Ley 5251, of November eleventh, nineteen seventy-three-, and by such virtue, endowed with its own legal personality, it is fully competent to determine whether or not a property is located in geographical spaces reserved for the respective indigenous reserves. Therefore, this Court has no doubt whatsoever regarding the encumbrance under the indigenous property regime that weighs upon farms [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006], whose registered titleholder is [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; in the manner as declared by the Commission on Indigenous Affairs and alleged in this action by the interested party.

**Second: Regarding the condition of a bad-faith owner:** Now then, notwithstanding that the representative of the plaintiff company attempted to dismiss the analysis regarding the determination of compliance with this requirement, considering it superfluous and unnecessary when dealing with the ownership of a property right, and not mere possession over the immovable property located within an indigenous reserve, the rejection of such allegations is appropriate. And this is in strict application of the legal norm that establishes as an inescapable requirement for the appropriateness of the compensation of the corresponding right, in the manner already indicated in articles 3 and 5 of the Indigenous Law. And in this sense, it is necessary to clarify to the plaintiff company that, of course, the regulations at hand recognize the property right and the exercise of possession by non-indigenous persons, who at the time of the corresponding geographical demarcation had their right over an immovable property that became affected by that determination. However, as is clearly expressed in the aforementioned article 3, once the coordinates of the respective indigenous reserve are geographically determined, whether by Decreto Ejecutivo -as happened in this case-, or by law, the properties comprised within this delimitation are encumbered by the special regime of indigenous property, by virtue of which those properties leave the commerce of non-indigenous persons, since the use and enjoyment of those lands is reserved exclusively for indigenous persons; hence, any legal transaction in contravention of this special regime is null and void ab initio. Consider further that such delimitations are published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, for the effects not only of the registered titleholders at that moment but also of third parties. Due to the clarity and forcefulness of this legal provision, previously transcribed, it is therefore necessary to review not only the allegations of possessory rights but also the titles of property that are alleged when these types of proceedings are formulated. This is imperative under the law, once again, from the relationship of provisions 3 and 5 of the Indigenous Law. Based on what has been said, and having reviewed what occurred in this matter, it is concluded that the plaintiff company does not hold a good-faith title with respect to its properties for the purpose of requesting the compensation it claims in this action, since on the date it acquired farm [Valor 029], the [Nombre 038] reserve was already not only geographically delimited according to the current boundaries but that condition was noted on the respective cadastral map [Valor 007] - **proven fact 5.)** -, permitting or authorizing the registration of the map because the existence of the farm was prior to the creation of the reserve - **proven fact 5.)** -, the last geographical demarcation of which was published on May sixteenth, two thousand one - **proven fact 4.)** -. Indeed, the deed of sale by which the plaintiff company acquired the alleged property right dates from July eighth, two thousand eight - **proven fact 7.)** -; which was registered in the Public Registry of Property on the following August sixth - **proven fact 8.)** -. In other words, when [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima signed the sales contract for that property, the encumbrance under the indigenous property regime already weighed upon it, and therefore, dealing in this case with a transaction entered into between two legal entities -obviously non-indigenous-, this obligates it to be considered a transaction null and void ab initio, in the manner provided in the law. The subsequent segregations suffer from the same defect, notwithstanding that the title of the new properties remains in the same legal entity -the plaintiff herein-, but which gives rise to the creation of four new farms - **proven facts 13.)** and **14.)** -. Note in this sense that on the respective cadastral maps, the warning was placed -already known by the interested party- that those lands were located within the [Nombre 038] reserve - **proven facts 9.), 10.), 11.)** and **12.)** -.

**X.- REGARDING THE CLAIMS OF THE LAWSUIT:** Based on the foregoing considerations, we proceed to the ruling on each of the claims formulated in this action.

**First: Regarding the declaratory claim (claim # 2):** It is worth highlighting that it is appropriate to grant the first claim of a declaratory nature formulated in this action. Indeed, as presented in the lawsuit and confirmed in the Preliminary Hearing, [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima requested that the following be ordered in the judgment:

\" **2.-** *That it be declared that the farm of the district of [Nombre 037], Real Folios [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006] are immersed, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Nombre 038] Reserve.* \" Therefore, it is declared that the farms of the Province of [Nombre 037], with Real Folio registration numbers [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] and [Valor 006] are located, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Nombre 038] Reserve.

**Second: Regarding the claims for relief formulated (claims # 3, 4 and 5):** **i.-** Notwithstanding that the immovable properties of the plaintiff company are located within the [Nombre 038] reserve, in the manner previously explained, the plaintiff does not meet the legal prerequisite provided in the regulations governing the matter to legitimize a compensation for private lands located in indigenous reserves, which refers to the holding of a good-faith title of property, as a *sine qua non* condition. This circumstance alone makes the compensatory claim formulated inadmissible. But additionally, it must be considered that, in the manner this claim was presented, it established the cause of the requested compensation as the de facto expropriation by the State of the indicated properties. In this sense, it is important to consider that notwithstanding the encumbrance under the indigenous property regime on the referenced farms of the plaintiff company, it is important to warn that the alleged de facto expropriation was not proven, nor was the dispossession of the aforementioned lands by the public administrations involved in handling these matters. In this sense, there is no record that the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and/or the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs have exercised reivindication actions in relation to the properties with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] or [Valor 006], whose registered owner at present is [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima - **unproven fact 1.)** -. Nor has the plaintiff proven that the State has titled those lands in the name of the [Nombre 040] Association - **unproven fact 2.)** -. No proof whatsoever is found that the Administration has carried out any material act of occupation of those farms - **unproven fact 3.)** -. On the contrary, the plaintiff itself stated that since it acquired farm [Valor 029], it has exercised full possession over it, and consequently, over the four segregated lots. Thus, the dismissal of the action in relation to this part of the lawsuit is appropriate. By accessoriness, the same fate applies to the request for interest and indexation that were required on this matter.

Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, Dirección01 , at seventeen hours ten minutes on [Valor 054] September of two thousand twenty.

Administrative contentious proceeding established by **[Nombre 029] SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, legal identity card [Valor 001]**, represented by [Nombre 001], [...], who acts as President with powers of a general unrestricted attorney-in-fact (authorization provided with the complaint); against the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL,** represented by **Nombre21224** , married, attorney, identity card CED1922, resident of San Gabriel de Aserrí, who acts as the institution's general judicial attorney (authorization on file with the Court); the **COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS**, represented by [Nombre 003] , [...] (authorization provided to the case file); and the **ESTADO**, represented by the Deputy Procurador, **Jorge Oviedo Álvarez**, single, identity card number CED2623, resident of Heredia (appearance on twenty-two September two thousand sixteen). The following attorneys act as special judicial agents for the intervening parties: *for the plaintiff*: **Alex Benjamín Gen Palma**, married, attorney, identity card CED9954, resident of Ciudad Colón (power of attorney granted on twenty-one August two thousand seventeen); *for the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural*: **Nombre73110** **,** married once, identity card CED109111, resident of Santa Ana (power of attorney granted on one November two thousand sixteen); **Óscar Alex Soto Flores**, married in first nuptials, identity card number CED109112 (power of attorney granted on twenty-two August two thousand seventeen); and the *Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas*: **Nombre1112** , identity card CED109113, resident of San Vicente de Moravia (power of attorney granted on twenty-six October two thousand sixteen). All interveners are of legal age and Costa Rican.

**RESULTANDO** **1.-** By a written submission presented to the Court on six May two thousand sixteen, the plaintiff corporation files a contentious-administrative complaint so that, based on the factual background and legal arguments given and as defined in the Preliminary Hearing, the following be ordered: "*1.* Grant the present complaint in all its aspects. / *2.-* Declare that the properties of the district of [Nombre 037], Real Folios [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006] are immersed, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Nombre62 038] Reserve. / *3.-* Given that the aforementioned properties were de facto expropriated by the State, order the defendants jointly and severally to survey and locate the lands that are the subject of this proceeding, to perform the corresponding appraisal both of the value of the land and the improvements introduced, and order the payment of the corresponding compensation referred to in article 5 of the Ley Indígena. / *4.-* Order the defendants jointly and severally to pay legal interest on the amounts awarded as compensation, this from the finality of the judgment and until effective payment. / *5.-* Order the defendants jointly and severally to pay my represented party the subjective moral damages generated by the impact that the illegitimate actions of the defendants have caused me as representative of the affected corporation, who at all times generated a restriction on the free disposal of the properties subject to this complaint, for more than 30 years, generating a state of uncertainty regarding invasions generated under the protection that they are lands within a reserve, in addition to the uncertainty that the defendants generate for me regarding the failure to fulfill their obligation to measure, value, and pay for said lands, given that my represented party is being dispossessed without any payment having been made, all of which causes me depression, frustration, anguish, fear or dread of losing part of my represented party's assets without being compensated, moral damage that I estimate in the sum of 50 million colones. / *6.-* Order the defendants to index all economic amounts to which they are ordered. / *7.-* Order the defendants to pay both sets of costs of this action." (Complaint filing, Preliminary Hearing minutes in digital judicial case file and digital backup of the Preliminary Hearing in attached compact disc).

**2.-** Having granted the legal transfer, on twenty-seven October two thousand sixteen the representation of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas answered negatively, opposing for this purpose the substantive defenses of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of right. It requested the action be dismissed in all its aspects. (Answer to the complaint filing in judicial case file, in digital format).

**3.-** On twenty-eight November two thousand sixteen, the Procuraduría General de la República answered negatively the complaint filed against it, for which it alleged the defenses of lack of passive standing and lack of right; accordingly, it requested the dismissal of the action in all its aspects. (Answer to the complaint filing in judicial case file, in digital format).

**4.-** On three November two thousand sixteen, the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural answered negatively the complaint, opposing for this purpose the preliminary defenses of improper joinder -to call into the proceeding the Asociación [Nombre62 040]- and of expiration (caducidad) of the action, and the substantive defenses of lack of active standing, lack of passive standing, and lack of right. (Answer to the complaint filing in judicial case file, in digital format).

**5.-** After the corresponding reply hearing, by resolution number 474-2017, at eleven hours twenty-five minutes on one March two thousand seventeen, the Procedural Judge in charge of the matter -Cindy Chavarría Hernández- rejected the defense of joinder of the dispute. No challenge against that decision is recorded.

**6.-** The Preliminary Hearing established in ordinal 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was commenced at nine hours ten minutes on twenty-four August two thousand seventeen, under the direction of Procedural Judge Cindy Chavarría Hernández and in the presence of the agent of the plaintiff corporation -attorney Alex Benjamín Gen Palma- and the attorney-in-fact of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural -attorney Óscar Alex Soto-, and the designated Procurador -Jorge Oviedo Álvarez-. The agent of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas was absent. Upon a claim by the plaintiff regarding the omission of tax stamps on the powers of attorney and certifications of the defendant institution and Commission, it was clarified that both enjoy tax exemption. The claims were fixed in the manner recorded in the first resultando of this ruling. The Instituto de Desarrollo Rural reiterated the defense of expiration of the action and formulated that of prescription (prescripción); defenses that were reserved to be resolved in the judgment, as they are not evident or manifest. The contested facts of the complaint were determined, and a ruling was made regarding the evidence offered by the interveners. The new documentary evidence offered by the defendant institute was rejected. As there was no evidence to be presented at trial, the matter was declared as a purely legal proceeding (article 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), such that all parties present orally delivered their conclusions. (Preliminary Hearing minutes in digital judicial case file and digital backup in attached compact disc.)

**7.-** This proceeding was passed for judgment to the Sixth Section for its resolution on the merits, as stated in the respective transfer stamp -visible in the judicial case file in digital format and in the respective folder. Likewise, it is indicated that this matter has been processed entirely in digital format, which conforms to the provisions of the Reglamento sobre Expediente Judicial Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, approved by the Corte Plena, in article XXXI of session number 22-13, held on twenty May two thousand thirteen.

**8.-** No grounds capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed, therefore this judgment is issued, upon prior deliberation by the members of the Tribunal and unanimously.

Drafted by Judge Fernández Brenes ; and, **CONSIDERANDO** **I.- PRELIMINARY WARNING.-** Having carefully reviewed the case file, it is observed that in this matter the summons to the conciliation hearing referred to in article 70.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was omitted, without any of the parties having previously expressed their refusal to participate. That said, considering that conciliation is a waivable step in the proceeding and that during the preliminary hearing’s cleansing stage, none of them expressed any objection in this regard; this Tribunal understands that there was an implicit waiver of conciliation, the parties having participated in the Preliminary Hearing and, therefore, there is no defenselessness or nullity that merits being declared here.

**II.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS.-** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following is deemed proven, with the indication that all references are from the judicial case file:

**1.)** By article 9 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, the Government of the Republic "... *recognizes the existence and legal personality of the Comunidad [Nombre62 038], canton of [Nombre62 007] and declares as the [Nombre62 038] Reserve the territory occupied by said community*." Likewise, in numeral 11 of this decree, it delegated to the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, in coordination with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, the territorial delimitation of this reserve. This decree was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 113, of twelve June nineteen seventy-six (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); **2.)** On eight November nineteen seventy-nine, Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G, of twenty-four October nineteen seventy-nine, was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 210, which established the Caserío [Nombre 038], and in numeral 3, established its location on cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional and subsequently, in article 4, indicated that this demarcation corresponded to the geographic and legal area of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de [Nombre 022] (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); **3.)** By means of Decreto Ejecutivo number 13569, of thirty April nineteen eighty-two, the Poder Ejecutivo reaffirmed the creation of the [Nombre 038] Reserve, by Decreto Ejecutivo 6036-G and its delimitation as an indigenous hamlet (caserío indígena), by Decreto Ejecutivo number 10707-G. The publication of this decree is recorded in the Colección de leyes y Decretos, Semester 1, Volume 2, page 375 (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); **4.)** On sixteen May two thousand one, Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of twenty-one March two thousand one, was published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta, effective from its publication, which modified Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G -cited-, to give a new location for the [Nombre62 038] Reserve, according to the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (article one); and specified that the delimited zone corresponds to the geographic and legal area of action of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral [Nombre62 038] (article 2) (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).

**5.)** On one August two thousand five, cadastral plan number [Valor 007] was registered in the national cadastre, executed by the surveyor expert Nombre103154 , to map the property with the Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], with a measurement of "*4ha1931.42 m2.*" On the reverse of this plan, the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas warned that, in its entirety, that property was located in the [Nombre62 038] reserve, but that it authorized the registration of the plan, as it was a property existing prior to the creation of that reserve (certification of cadastral plan provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital judicial case file and statements of the agent in the Preliminary Hearing); **6.)** The property with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029] originates from the segregation and sale that Mr. [Nombre62 010] made from the parent property with registration [Placa25939 ], in favor of his sister [Nombre62 011], on four September nineteen seventy-three (certification of volumes from the Registro Público de la Propiedad and property registration certification of property [Valor 029], documents provided by the plaintiff corporation with the complaint, visible in the digital judicial case file); **7.)** The property with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029] was the subject of several purchase and sale transactions, thus changing its registered owner on various occasions; until in Public Deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on eight July of the year two thousand eight, in the protocol of Notary Public Marina Murillo Calderón, the unrestricted general attorneys-in-fact of the corporations [Nombre62 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre 012] and [Nombre62 013]) and of [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre62 001]) appear, and by which, the first corporation sells to the second, the property with Real Folio registration number [Valor 029], located in district [Nombre 015] ([Nombre 016]), canton [Nombre 017] ([Nombre 007]), of the Province of [Nombre 037]; which is of nature: land [Nombre 042], and with the following boundaries: North: [Nombre 018], South: [Nombre 019] and [Nombre 021], East: [Nombre62 019], West: [Nombre62 021]; and mapped in cadastral plan number [Valor 007], with a measurement of forty-one thousand nine hundred thirty-one square meters and forty-two square decimeters. The sale price was defined in the sum of three million colones.

It was indicated that the property was up to date regarding municipal taxes (registry certification of the deed, provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the digital judicial file); **8.)** The preceding deed was submitted to the Diario of the Public Property Registry at Volume [Value 010], Entry [Value 011], on July tenth, two thousand eight, at twelve hours twenty-four minutes twenty seconds (citations [Value 012]); and was registered on August sixth, two thousand eight (registry certification of the deed, documents provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **9.)** On March twentieth, two thousand eleven, cadastral plan number [Value 013] was registered in the National Cadastre, of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 4808 square meters; prepared by surveyor Name103154 and with an indication of being part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 4,808 square meters. On the back of this plan, on March tenth, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) recorded the note that this plan was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these plans—of each one—because the property as such existed before the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral plan on the front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **10.)** On March twenty-ninth, two thousand eleven, cadastral plan number [Value 015] was registered in the National Cadastre, of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 1ha0000 square meters; prepared by surveyor Name103154 and with an indication of being part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 1 hectare 0000 square meters. On the back of this plan, on March tenth, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs recorded the note that this plan was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these plans—of each one—because the property as such existed before the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral plan on the front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **11.)** On March thirty-first, two thousand eleven, cadastral plan number [Value 016] was registered in the National Cadastre, of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 5,825 square meters; prepared by surveyor Name103154 and with an indication of being part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 41931.42 square meters. On the back of this plan, on March second, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs recorded the note that this plan was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these plans—of each one—because the property as such existed before the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral plan on the front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **12.)** On March thirty-first, two thousand eleven, cadastral plan number [Value 017] was registered in the National Cadastre, of the Public Property Registry, with an area of 1ha1298 square meters; prepared by surveyor Name103154 and with an indication of being part of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], with a total area of 1 hectare 1,298 square meters. On the back of this plan, on March second, two thousand eleven, the Executive Directorate of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs recorded the note that this plan was part of Real Folio [Value 029], located in [Name 022], district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province [Name 037], which was located within the [Name 038] Reserve; and that according to Legal Opinion DJ.154-12-09, issued by the Legal Department of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, it was recommended to authorize the approvals of these plans—of each one—because the property as such existed before the creation of the Ley Indígena (certified cadastral plan on the front and back of the document, document provided by the plaintiff company with the complaint, visible in the judicial file, in digital format); **13.)** In public deed number [Value 056], of March twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, folios [Value 052] verso to [Value 053] verso of Volume [Value 054] of the protocol of the notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, [Name62 001], acting in his capacity as President of the Board of Directors, with powers of a general unlimited power of attorney agent of [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima, made four segregations (segregaciones) of the property owned by it, with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], which it described as follows: **Lot [Value 020]:** lot (terreno) [Name 027], located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], boundaries to the north with lot [Value 018] to be described, to the south with [Name62 019], to the east with lot [Value 018] to be described and to the west with [Name62 019], with an area of four thousand eight hundred eight square meters, according to cadastral plan number [Value 013]; **Lot [Value 018]:** lot of [Name 023], located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name62 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], boundaries to the north with lot [Value 019] to be described below; to the south with lot [Value 020] already described, to the east with [Name62 021]; and to the west, with [Name62 019] and partly with lot [Value 020] already described; with an area of five thousand eight hundred twenty-five square meters, according to cadastral plan [Value 016]; **Lot [Value 019]:** lot of [Name 025], located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], boundaries to the north with lot [Value 021] to be described; to the south with lot [Value 018] already described, to the east with [Name62 021] and to the west with [Name62 019], with an area of eleven thousand two hundred ninety-eight square meters according to cadastral plan [Value 017]; and **Lot [Value 021]:** lot of [Name 025], located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name62 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], boundaries to the north with the remainder to be described, to the south with lot [Value 019] already described, to the east with [Name62 021], and to the west with [Name62 019], with a measurement of ten thousand square meters, according to cadastral plan number [Value 015]. The **remainder** (parent property) was described as follows: lot of [Name62 025], located in [Name 016] (District [Name 015]), [Name62 007] (canton [Name 017]), of the Province of [Name 037], boundaries to the north with [Name62 018], to the south with lot [Value 021] previously described, to the east with [Name 021] and to the west with [Name62 019], with a measurement of ten thousand forty-two square meters (certification of deed provided by the plaintiff company, visible in the digital judicial file); **14.)** The preceding deed was submitted to the Diario of the Public Property Registry at Volume [Value 022], Entry [Value 023], at fourteen hours thirty-four minutes four seconds, on March twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve (citations [Value 024]), and was registered on April ninth, two thousand twelve, thus giving rise to the following properties, all located in the Province of [Name 037], canton of [Name 007] ([Name 017]) and district [Name 016] ([Name62 015]), and whose registered owner is [Name62 029] Name137351; and which have the following Real Folio registrations and characteristics: **number [Value 025]** , nature: lot [Name 027]; boundaries: north: [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima, south: [Name 019]; east: [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; west: [Name62 019], with a measurement of four thousand eight hundred eight square meters zero square decimeters, charted in cadastral plan [Value 013]; **number [Value 004]** : nature: lot of [Name62 023]; boundaries: north and south: [Name62 029] Name137351; east: [Name 021]; and west: [Name62 019] and [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; with a measurement of five thousand eight hundred twenty-five square meters zero square decimeters, charted in cadastral plan [Value 016]; **number [Value 005]:** nature: lot of [Name 025], boundaries: north and south: [Name62 029] Name137351; east [Name62 021] and west: [Name62 019]; measures: eleven thousand two hundred ninety-eight square meters with zero square decimeters, and charted in cadastral plan number [Value 017]; and **number [Value 006]:** nature: lot of [Name 025], boundaries: north and south: [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima; east [Name62 021] and west: [Name62 019]; measures: ten thousand square meters with zero square decimeters, and charted in cadastral plan number [Value 015] (receipt stamp of deed on certification of deed; certifications of the respective properties and indicated cadastral plans, documents provided by the plaintiff company, visible in the digital judicial file); **15.)** As a result of the preceding segregations, [Name62 029] Name137351 is the registered owner of the property with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], of the Province of [Name 037], canton [Name 007], district [Name 016], which is a lot of [Name62 025], that currently has a measurement of ten square meters with forty-two square decimeters. The following boundaries are recorded: North: [Name62 018], South: [Name62 029] Name137351; East: [Name 021] and West: [Name 019]; and it corresponds to cadastral plan number [Value 007] (registry certification of April fifteenth, two thousand sixteen and indicated cadastral plan, provided with the complaint, visible in the judicial file in digital format); and; **16.)** This complaint was notified to the defendants on the following dates: to the State on the twenty-first and to the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs and the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, INDER), on the twenty-second, all dates, of the month of September two thousand sixteen (proof of notification, as detailed in the virtual desktop folder).

**III.- OF THE UNPROVEN FACTS.-** Also of importance for the decision in this matter, the following is considered as not proven:

**1.)** That the Institute of Rural Development and/or the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs have filed a reclamation action (acción de reivindicación) in relation to the properties with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], whose current registered owner is [Name62 029] Name137351; **2.)** That the State has titled and transferred the properties with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006] to the Comprehensive Development Association of the [Name62 038] Reserve; **3.)** That the Administration has carried out a material occupation or a de facto expropriation of the properties with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006]; **4.)** The existence of damage or impairment of any right that the Administration has a duty to indemnify to the plaintiff company; and; **5.)** The change of ownership of the properties with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005] or [Value 006].

**IV.- OF THE OBJECT OF THE COMPLAINT.-** The plaintiff company files a contentious-administrative lawsuit (demanda contenciosa), with several claims of a different legal nature. The **first**, **of a declaratory nature**, is to declare that the properties of the Partido of [Name 037], with Real Folios [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005] and [Value 006] are entirely immersed within the boundaries of the [Name62 038] Reserve (***claim # 2***). The others, ancillary to the foregoing, are **for relief** and refer to the following points: **i.-** that the defendants—State, Institute of Rural Development and National Commission of Indigenous Affairs—be jointly and severally ordered to carry out the measurements, location, and valuation of the preceding properties, both of the land and of the improvements (mejoras), to proceed with the corresponding compensation for the lands and the improvements introduced (***claim #3***); ii.- the recognition of interest and indexation of that compensation (***claim #4***); **iii.-** the recognition and order to pay subjective moral damages, which it determined in the amount of fifty million colones (***claim #5***); and the order to pay the procedural and personal costs derived from this process (***claim #6***). The basis of its complaint is the following: **a.)** That according to the national legal system—specifically numeral 3 of the Ley Indígena—Indigenous reserves have a special legal regime, as they are inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable lands to non-indigenous persons. Due to the foregoing, numeral 5 of the referenced Law provided that the owners of properties located in such reserves had to be relocated or expropriated, according to studies and procedures under the responsibility of the Institute of Rural Development in coordination with the Commission of Indigenous Affairs and the payments by the State; **b.)** It states, by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 6036-G, of May twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-nine, which modified Executive Decree 5904-G, of March fourteenth of the same year, incorporated important nuclei of the indigenous population in areas populated exclusively by indigenous persons; among these nuclei, the indigenous community [Name62 031], in the canton of [Name62 007] (Article 9). Subsequently, the indicated reserve was granted legal recognition, as inferred from the first article of the Ley Indígena, number 6172. Later, with Executive Decree number 10,707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen seventy-nine, new boundaries of this reserve were defined and finally, in Executive Decree number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, its geographic boundaries were expanded; **c.)** It points out that under the protection of public registry faith, acting in good faith in the year two thousand eight, it acquired property [Value 029], of the Partido of [Name 037]; without it having any restriction under the Ley Indígena; of which, it is the registered owner.

However, it clarified that in the surveyed plan corresponding to this property, number [Valor 007], the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) stated that the farm represented in that graphic is located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], but it authorized the registration of the plan, since the farm as such existed before the creation of the reserve and the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena); **d.)** It explains that this farm has its origins dating back to a privately held possession, from eighteen eighty-eight, of Mr. [Nombre62 032], who possessed it for thirty years, and ceded his right to [Nombre62 033], who possessed it for ten years, and finally, through possessory information proceedings (información posesoria) processed in the Civil Court of San José, it was titled to [Nombre62 034] on the fifteenth of March, nineteen twenty-eight, with farm number [Valor 055]. It adds that on the fourth of September, nineteen seventy-three, [Nombre62 010] segregated from the previous farm the portion that gave rise to farm [Valor 029], which was ceded to his sister [Nombre62 011]; **e.)** It added that in turn, on the twenty-seventh of March of the year two thousand twelve, four segregations were made from farm [Valor 029], which gave rise to the following properties: [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006], of which he is also the registered owner and maintains possession without any type of restriction. However, in the surveyed plans pertaining to the aforementioned farms [Valor 013], [Valor 016], [Valor 039], and [Valor 015], respectively—the Executive Directorate of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs stated that such properties and the parent farm [Valor 029] were located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], but it authorized the registration of those plans, since the farm as such existed before the creation of the reserve and the Indigenous Law; **e.)** That due to the foregoing circumstance, it cannot exercise any of the attributes of property provided for in Article 264 of the Civil Code—possession, usufruct, transformation, alienation, defense and exclusion, restitution, and compensation—as it does not have free disposal over it, despite the fact that its right as an owner is registered in the Public Registry of Property, without any limitation or encumbrance on the described farm being recorded; given that, according to Article 267 of the Civil Code, for limitations on property to be legitimate, they must be registered in the Public Registry of Property. Thus, it was able to acquire real property, but the State established that it forms part of an indigenous reserve, and as such, is the absolute property of the Integral Development Association (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral) of [Nombre62 022], an action it qualifies as a de facto expropriation, for which it has not been compensated to date; **f.)** It alleged that it meets the conditions set forth in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, as it is a good faith owner; by virtue of which, it deems the compensation it requests to be recognized in this proceeding to be appropriate and legitimate; since it is the holder of five private properties, duly registered in the Public Registry of Property, acquired in accordance with the law. In this regard, it states that the transaction that gave rise to its right cannot be deemed null and that good faith is not an attribute that must be proven by registered owners. Thus, the inalienability of the lands of indigenous reserves is proclaimed solely and exclusively for those that are included in the farm of the reserve as such, which was registered in the year two thousand nine; a condition that cannot be extended to private lands located within said reserve. It recalled the prevalence of the right to property, in the manner enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution and interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence, in rulings 4205-96 and 5207-2004; **g.)** It contends that despite the aforementioned encumbrance on its properties, the Administration has failed to act as required by the legal system governing the matter, regarding the measurement and compensation of its lands; a duty for which there is joint and several liability of the defendants, as recognized by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), in its ruling number 1604-F-S1-2012; and **h.)** It pointed out that the reported situation has caused subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) to the legal representative of the plaintiff company, referring to the state of absolute uncertainty and concern over the situation of its lands, "... since even though the farms were affected by the creation and subsequent expansion of the reserve, through State regulation, it was certainly never done correctly, as a de facto expropriation was carried out, the free disposal of the goods was restricted ... and it was not compensated for that expropriation as legally required." In this regard, it added that it suffers constant threats of invasion of its lands by indigenous people. Regarding the defenses of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) and statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged by the representation of the Rural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), it opposed them, considering that it is dealing with an omissive conduct that persists over time, for which reason Article 40 of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) applies; given that accepting the defendant's position would imply allowing the Administration to profit from its own fraud (dolo); since it is a situation caused by the Administration's own inertia. It added that in this case, the statute of limitations institute does not apply because it is a special situation regulated in the Indigenous Law. (Complaint document, in the digital judicial file and statements in the closing arguments, according to digital support, as per backup on the attached compact disc.)

**V.- THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANTS.-** The representatives of the State and the Rural Development Institute respond negatively to the lawsuit, in separate (individual) documents, according to which, they request that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its aspects, with the corresponding award of costs against the plaintiff; but since the reasons presented are coincident, they will be summarized jointly, indicating any dissenting consideration when so formulated. The basis of their position is as follows:

**a.) Allegation of the expiration of the action:** In the response to the lawsuit document, the Rural Development Institute indicated that the discussion to determine the appropriateness or not of the requested compensation was expired, both in application of the two-month period provided for in Article 37 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa), and the one-year period established in Article 39 of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code; a period that should be counted from the day following the publication, first of the General Law of Uncultivated Lands (Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos) and then of the executive decrees that created the reserve [Nombre62 038]; given that the present action was filed only on the sixth of May, two thousand sixteen; **b.) Allegation of statute of limitations of the action:** At the Preliminary Hearing (Audiencia Preliminar), the Rural Development Institute alleged this defense, under the consideration that the compensation established in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law is governed by the ordinary ten-year period—Article 868 of the Civil Code—or four years, according to the provision of Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); counted from the enactment of the General Law of Uncultivated Lands, number 13 of nineteen thirty-nine; or from the decrees creating the reserve [Nombre62 038], in nineteen seventy-six, given that this action was not notified to them until the twenty-second of September, two thousand sixteen.

**c.) Allegation of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva), on the part of the State:** The State representation indicates that the compensation sought must be assumed by the Rural Development Institute, given that according to Law number 6735, of the twenty-ninth of March, nineteen eighty-two, it has its own assets and budget, according to which, it is responsible for the compensation of private lands that have been incorporated into indigenous reserves. It adds that this institution, in coordination with the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, was assigned the guardianship of indigenous lands, as mandated by the Indigenous Law number 6172, of the twenty-ninth of November, nineteen seventy-seven, and as understood by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in ruling 1604-F-S1-2012 and the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling 2013-7579. It adds that according to the indicated Law, it is the Rural Development Institute that is responsible for carrying out the studies and valuations of private lands—non-indigenous—included in the indigenous reserves determined within the national territory and their subsequent compensation; **d.) On the lack of passive standing of the Rural Development Institute:** For its part, and in this same context, the Rural Development Institute indicated that the obligation to compensate corresponds exclusively to the State, charged to the national budget, as inferred from the legislator's intent when approving the Indigenous Law and because it is a matter that concerns the State as a whole. Such funds, it says, are and must be administered by the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, an entity that, in turn, is responsible for conducting the censuses to determine the properties or possessions of non-indigenous people in the indigenous reserves, for the corresponding actions. Thus, it concludes that it has no involvement whatsoever in the matter. Therefore, it indicates that if it intervenes or makes any payment on its own account, it would incur administrative liability under the terms of Article 110, subsection e) of the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos); as the institution is legally unable to provide economic resources to make these compensations. In this regard, it cited ruling 74-2013-VII of the Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo); **e.) Allegation of lack of right: i.-** They say that the decrees creating the indigenous reserves (in general, and that of [Nombre62 022] in particular) are valid, as they are issued to make effective the protection of indigenous rights, in accordance with the international regulations governing their rights. They indicated that it involves a special property regime, according to which these lands are "inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable and exclusive for the indigenous communities that inhabit them," such that "non-indigenous people may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way, acquire lands or farms comprised within the reserves," as provided by Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, number 6172, and also by higher-ranking norms, such as Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations, approved by Law number 2330, of the ninth of April, nineteen fifty-nine, which recognizes the right of land tenure to indigenous peoples. This is why the regulations governing the matter provide mechanisms for compensating owners and/or possessors of lands incorporated into indigenous reserves, such as the relocation of the right or compensation; but in turn, it prevents them from trading those lands, and those who acquire lands under such conditions cannot be compensated; **ii.-** The representation of the Rural Development Institute indicates that upon the enactment of the executive decrees that determined the geographical location of the reserve [Nombre62 038], the lands comprising it lost their status as private goods, to acquire the category of a special regime, which excludes them from commerce among persons; and that compensation only proceeds for the good faith owner or possessor. All those decrees were published in the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial La Gaceta), so that everyone was aware of that condition, and ignorance cannot be alleged, under the terms provided for in Article 129 of the Political Constitution; **iii.-** They clarify that the right to compensation is solely for non-indigenous owners or possessors who held their right prior to the creation of the respective indigenous reserve, and in the case of the reserve [Nombre62 038], the time limit would be the year two thousand one, on the occasion of its last territorial demarcation, by Executive Decree number 29452-G, of the twenty-first of March, two thousand one. Thus, they explain that after a property is encumbered (by an indigenous reserve), no transfer acts or transactions on the property involving non-indigenous persons can be carried out; so that in cases where there is no good faith in the right, compensation does not proceed, but rather eviction, because the legal treatment given is that of an invasion. (They cited rulings number 106-2013-I, 74-2013-VII, and 304-2013-II). Therefore, for the purposes of proceeding with compensation, it is relevant to know whether the claimant's title of ownership is in good or bad faith; since, if a non-indigenous person acquires a property after that encumbrance, they are not good faith acquirers, as these are goods outside of commerce among persons; **iv.-** Both representations say that the plaintiff company does not meet the conditions set forth in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law for the appropriateness of the claimed compensation, as it is established as an essential element for this obligation to be generated on behalf of the Administration, the tenure or possession of the land in good faith. Thus, they note that the Reserve [Nombre62 038] was created in the year nineteen seventy-six, with two subsequent modifications, in the year nineteen seventy-nine and in two thousand one; while the plaintiff company acquired the property through a purchase-sale agreement dated the eighth of July, two thousand eight, and it was registered in the Public Registry of Property on the sixth of August following, that is, thirty-two years after the creation of the reserve. It is not the original owner of the lands whose compensation is sought. Subsequently, from that property, the interested party segregated four lots, all of which—five farms—are located entirely within an indigenous reserve; and the plaintiff company knew of the farm's limitations due to its location, as it was indicated in the surveyed plan of the first one, and yet it conducted the transaction. That circumstance alone renders the legal transaction from which the plaintiff's property right arose absolutely null, and with that, the compensation claim is inappropriate; **v.-** They point out that the alleged dispossession or de facto expropriation, the basis of the action, was not proven, since from the evidence provided, it appears, contrary to what was alleged, that the plaintiff company's properties have no limitation or restriction whatsoever, which has allowed their full enjoyment by their owner. Thus, there are no actions by the Administration aimed at the dispossession or limitation of the attributes of the plaintiff's property right; **vi.-** The representation of the Rural Development Institute questioned the validity of the statements of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs on the surveyed plans of the plaintiff company's properties, for lacking the competence (competencia) to make the declaration of the location of such lands within an indigenous reserve, in this case, of [Nombre62 022]; and to that effect, it requests the Tribunal to rule on their validity; **vii.-** The representative of the defendant institute alleged the inappropriateness of the requested interests and indexation, since it was not a matter of an obligation to pay liquid sums; and noted that indexation is included in the interests, and a double recognition on the same point cannot exist; **viii.-** The alleged subjective moral damages, being an ancillary claim to the compensation claim, must suffer the same fate as the principal one, which is inappropriate. In any case, it was added that there is no unlawful damage (daño antijurídico), since the decrees by which the Reserve [Nombre62 038] was created are in accordance with the law, and therefore the plaintiff company must bear the situation it alleges, given that it knew of the situation affecting the farm—which it later segregated—that is, that it acquired a good outside commerce among persons, thus generating the victim's fault (culpa de la víctima). On this point, the defendant institute added the inappropriateness of the claim, since the plaintiff is a corporate entity, not its legal representative—Mr. [Nombre62 001].

Finally, the representation of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, even though it opposed the action filed against it, limited itself to stating that none of the facts of the action were known to it, without further analysis, and formulated the defenses of lack of active standing and lack of right, without explaining them. It should be noted that its representative was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, and thus, did not formulate closing arguments. (Response to the lawsuit documents from each of the defendants, in the judicial file in digital format and statements of the representations of the Rural Development Institute and the State at the Preliminary Hearing, according to digital support on the attached compact disc.)

**VI.- CLARIFICATION AND ORDER OF PRIORITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS DEBATED IN THE ACTION.-** From the foregoing details, it is necessary to note that in this contentious-administrative proceeding, the legality review of any conduct by the Administration has not been requested; rather, its object pertains to determining whether or not the compensation processed by the plaintiff company is appropriate, because it alleges that the properties of which it is the registered owner—namely, with Real Estate Folio Registration numbers [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006], all from the Province of [Nombre62 037]—are located within the reserve [Nombre62 038], canton of [Nombre62 007]. For this reason, it was requested to declare that condition of the indicated farms, and as a consequence of the foregoing, that the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to proceed in the manner prescribed by law, that is, with the compensation for their property right. In view of the preliminary defenses formulated and reserved for this moment, the first issue to be addressed is the compliance—or not—with the temporal factor to access this Jurisdictional venue, referring both to the expiration of the action and the statute of limitations of the right. Then, if it passes this admissibility review, the merits of the conflict raised will be addressed. This would entail determining whether the alleged encumbrance on the indicated properties occurs, and then, whether the requested compensation is appropriate, in the manner regulated by law. Finally, if the claim is appropriate, it will be determined who is or are responsible for the actions and payment of the required compensation. Having established the order of analysis of the conflict raised, we proceed to it immediately.

**VII.- ON THE ALLEGED DEFENSES OF EXPIRATION OF THE ACTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-** It is highlighted that the Rural Development Institute alleged the concurrence of both institutes—expiration of the action and statute of limitations—with the intention of determining that this action was filed after the temporal period provided by the procedural regulations in this regard had expired, for accessing the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction in time. To address this issue, it is deemed pertinent to make the following considerations:

**First: Distinction between the institutes of expiration of the action and statute of limitations:** It must be clarified that it is not possible to confuse the foregoing institutes, nor to consider them as if they were the same, even though both refer to the same factor in jurisdictional proceedings—the temporal one—for assessing the timely filing of the corresponding action. Indeed, each institute has its own special and distinct nature, and most importantly, different legal consequences or implications. In the case of the expiration of the action, it refers to a period established in the procedural legal norm, which sets the maximum limit for timely filing that action before the jurisdictional authorities; but whose essential characteristic is that it is a single, final, rigid, and strict period, and for this reason inflexible, since it cannot be interrupted—where the period count begins anew, disregarding the time already elapsed—nor suspended—where the legal period count resumes, taking into account the time already elapsed—as occurs with the statute of limitations of the right. Another distinctive feature of the expiration of the action is that it is reviewable ex officio by the Judge, unlike the statute of limitations, which requires being alleged by the interested party. Thus, the configuration of expiration is objective and inexorable, and the only way to suppress its extinguishing effect is the exercise of the action within the term provided by Law. Consequently, "… in order to speak of expiration, it is necessary that a certain legal effect has previously occurred, it is necessary that a certain legal situation of axiological possibility has arisen, whose failure to exercise in a specific manner produces its extinction." (PÉREZ VARGAS, Víctor. Derecho Privado, San José, Litografía e Imprenta LIL, S.A, 3rd edition, 1994, p.

203); and this author adds "… when we face a hypothesis of expiration (caducidad), we assume a burden of peremptory observance of a rigid term (the rigidity of the term,…, is another difference compared to prescription (prescripción)) for the specific fulfillment of an act (normally it concerns a discretionary right), with the consequence that the right is lost (extinctive effect) if the act of exercise is not fulfilled within the prefixed term or (which is the same) if it is fulfilled untimely." (Op. cit., pp. 203-204). Similarly, Nombre135950 states some differentiating elements by indicating: "In our understanding, the reason and the foundation of expiration (caducidad) differ from those of prescription (prescripción) in that expiration (caducidad) does not depend, as prescription (prescripción) does, on the subjective fact of the inertia of the right holder over a certain time, but exclusively on the objective fact of the failure to exercise the right within the established time, and in that it is inspired not by the need to conform the legal situation to the factual situation that has lasted for a certain time considered sufficient, for this purpose, by law, but rather by the need to limit in time the exercise of a right (…) when the diligent exercise thereof is deemed convenient for an individual or superior interest." (Nombre135951, Doctrinas Generales del Derecho Civil, Madrid, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1964, p. 135.) For its part, prescription (prescripción), also called "extinctive," "negative," or "liberatory"—by reason of its effects—is created precisely to safeguard social order and security in legal relations, since, although, in principle, the ideal of justice looms as the raw material in all legal norms, on some occasions it yields in favor of other aspirations, such as that of legal certainty. Thus, it is under the influence of this principle that the institute of prescription (prescripción) finds meaning, because it allows refusing to grant protection to one who, holding a subjective right, has let a certain period elapse without managing, in any way, its protection. It is, in short, the consequence of the inaction of the holder of a right, for the jurisdiction, upon the protest of the obligated party, regarding the non-exercise of the right within the period established by law, once verified, must declare the claim prescribed. In accordance with the foregoing, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 43-97, at fourteen hours and forty minutes on the twenty-eighth of May, nineteen ninety-seven, made the following comparative table regarding these two institutes:

"V.- Extinctive prescription (prescripción extintiva) and expiration (caducidad) are related legal institutions, which have in common that time acts as an extinctive cause of rights; however, both are profoundly distinguished both by their foundation and by their effects. Prescription (prescripción) affects rights that have been born with, in principle, unlimited life, and only through their inactivity during a period, generally prolonged, can they be extinguished. Expiration (caducidad), for its part, affects rights that the law or the will of individuals grants with a life already limited beforehand for their exercise, so they will fatally extinguish when the period has elapsed. It operates, then, by the mere passage of the time that has been set for it, and may be taken into account ex officio by the judge, unlike prescription (prescripción), which must be alleged by way of exception by the one who intends to benefit from its effects, since, as long as it is not invoked, the right exercised, even after prescription, unfolds its efficacy. Expiration (caducidad) refers to the duration of the right itself, so that its passage provokes the decay or extinction and thereby that of the action emanating from it; on the contrary, prescription (prescripción) refers to the action and is based on the need for legal certainty, as a sanction for the inactivity on the part of the holder of a right who does not exercise the action inherent to it. It can be affirmed that in prescription (prescripción) the right is lost because the action has been extinguished, and in expiration (caducidad), on the contrary, the action disappears because the right has been extinguished, by the passage of the duration period that it had fixed. Extinctive prescription (prescripción extintiva) has its foundation in the need to put an end to situations of uncertainty in the exercise of rights and in the presumption of abandonment by its holder; therefore, it is possible to prove that this abandonment or inactivity has not existed, that is, it can be interrupted, and for the same reason it can only be considered at the instance of a party. For its part, expiration (caducidad) is based exclusively on the need to give security to legal transactions, and therefore does not admit in any case the interruption of the time whose simple passage originates it." As can be seen at a glance, these distinctions have important legal-procedural consequences, their definition not being a mere semantic or conceptual distinction, as will be seen in the analysis that proceeds to be carried out.

Second: On the inadmissibility of the allegation of expiration (caducidad) of the action: The analysis of expiration (caducidad) leads to the verification of three fundamental aspects: first, the determination of the application of this legal institute, as a temporal prerequisite of the right of action; second, the determination of the period to challenge the formal administrative conduct; and third, the point or moment to begin counting said period. Regarding the first element, it is necessary to point out that the legislator opted for expiration (caducidad) of the action to access the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction since old times, in the case of challenging the conduct of the Administration—save for the exceptions established in the procedural regulation itself, which do not apply to this case—. Thus, in the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, number 3667, of the twelfth of March, nineteen sixty-six, the period provided was two months from the day following the notification or publication of the challenged conduct, in the case of relative nullity—numeral 37—and four years, in the case of absolute nullity—article 175 of the General Law of Public Administration, according to its original text, prior to the reform given by virtue of Law number 8508—; and to date, the same institute governs, only that the period was set at one year, according to the text of numeral 39 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, except that in this regulation, the period was set at one year, and runs from the effective communication of the administrative act being challenged or from the knowledge of the administrative conduct in question. In this sense, it must be remembered that, in the case of administrative acts, for their efficacy, effective communication to the interested party (recipient) is required, in the terms established in ordinal 140 of the General Law of Public Administration, which is why subsection 1), sub-subsection a) provides that this one-year period runs "..., from the day following the notification." It is striking that the allegation formulated by the sued institute refers, as a parameter of the expiration (caducidad) it alleges, both to the previous procedural regulation, that is, the cited Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in force at the time the executive decrees that created the reserve [Nombre 038] were issued—numbers 6036-G, of the twelfth of June, nineteen seventy-six, and number 10707-G, of the twenty-fourth of October, nineteen seventy-nine—proven facts 1.) and 2.)—; and to the regulation in force at the time the plaintiff company acquired ownership of the property, whose compensation is claimed in this process—with effects for third parties, as of the sixth of August, two thousand eight, proven fact 7.)—, that is, the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code; which denotes the imprecision of the argument made on the matter. Now, it is precisely due to the object of this action that the allegation of this defense is clearly inadmissible, since we are not facing the review of the legality of any conduct of the Administration deployed in relation to the legal situation of the plaintiff company, but rather, as indicated supra, we are facing a compensation claim, which is based on the supposed affectation of the plaintiff's properties, on the occasion of the creation of the [Nombre62 038] reserve, which would oblige submission to the special legal regime provided for that purpose. According to what is established in numeral 41.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, this type of petitions is governed rather by the institute of prescription (prescripción), and not of expiration (caducidad). Thus, the defense of expiration (caducidad) of the action alleged is rejected.

Third: On the inadmissibility of the defense of prescription (prescripción) alleged: Having reached this point, it is deemed necessary to reiterate that we are facing the petition for the recognition of compensation chargeable to the defendants (Public Administration), on the occasion of the affectation of the properties owned by the plaintiff company, by being included in their entirety, in the [Nombre 038] reserve. On this matter, again, the ambiguity of the allegation formulated is striking, insofar as reference was made both to the ordinary prescription (prescripción), of ten years in the manner provided both in article 868 of the Civil Code, and in ordinal 61 of the Law for Comprehensive Reform of Law number 7495, on Expropriations, number 9286, of the eleventh of November, two thousand eleven—in force as of the fourth of February, two thousand fifteen—; and in the four-year period of numeral 198 of the General Law of Public Administration; and furthermore, it establishes various moments from which this temporal computation must be made, thus, as a first approach, from the entry into force of the General Law of Vacant Lands, number 13, of the tenth of January, nineteen thirty-nine, for being the first regulation that established the inalienability of indigenous lands (article 8); or from the enactment of the decrees that determined the geographic location of the reserve of [Nombre 022], that is, from nineteen seventy-six. And to this effect, it is alleged that the given periods, be it ten years or four years, are exceeded, because this lawsuit was notified, at least to the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, INDER), until the twenty-second of September, two thousand sixteen—proven fact 16.)—. Notwithstanding the previous indications, after a measured analysis, this Chamber of Judges considers that the alleged prescription (prescripción) is not configured. And this is so in consideration of the right that is claimed infringed and the legal regime that regulates it, that is, the right of property, in which the establishment of limitations of social interest is legitimate, which, in principle, are not compensable, for not implying the suppression of the right, a case in which, if the essential content thereof is emptied, they must indeed be compensated, as they translate into de facto expropriations. Thus, as long as that situation is maintained, there would be an injury to the detriment of the holder, and the computation of prescription (prescripción) to claim the right could not be made. To this effect, the considerations given by this same Tribunal are reiterated, in judgment number 88-2020-VI, at fourteen hours and twenty minutes on the twenty-ninth of July of the current year, when it distinguished the degree of the administrative limitations, after which, if the degree is absolute, it gives rise to the compensation established by the constitutional mandate:

"VII.- With respect to administrative limitations, they can consist of mere restrictions. They consist of legal conditions for the exercise of the right of property. It is a tolerance that the owner must bear, which is why they deal with a particular or special sacrifice of the owner that implies a restriction that extends to every holder to whom these measures are addressed. They are inherent in the content and existence of the right of ownership. Therefore, they are general, constant, and current. They are limited in number and class, without being able to go so far as to dismember the right of property, that is, to restrict its use and enjoyment in such a way that they come to affect the fullness of the right. Given their generality, they are not compensated, with the exception of damages that the Administration may culpably cause when executing the works in which the restriction materializes. However, as an insurmountable limit, they must be proportional to the administrative need that must be satisfied with it, ergo, they must respond to an administrative need; they cannot disintegrate the content of the right of property. Regarding the scope and restrictions of these limitations to property, the Constitutional Tribunal in the aforementioned ruling expressed in relevant part: 'VIII. Notwithstanding what was indicated in the preceding recitals, it must be warned that the legitimate limitations that may be imposed on private property find their natural border in the degree of affectation to the property; that is, when the restriction on the right of property becomes a true expropriation with the consequent obligation to compensate, because the right of property is made to disappear completely, or when it does not affect the generality of the community. This was indicated by the Full Court in relation to the limitations to be imposed on property when they exceed the indicated limit, in an extraordinary session on the sixteenth of June, nineteen eighty-three: "[...] that is 'limitations' as article 45 calls them, but not dispossession of private property nor deprivation of a primary attribute of ownership, because preventing the enjoyment of goods is equivalent, at least in this case, to a form of expropriation without the requirement of prior compensation ordered by the political charter"; and as indicated by this Tribunal in the cited judgments number 5097-93 and 2345-96; in which it stated: "IV.) For the Chamber, the reasonable limits that the State may impose on private property, according to its nature, are constitutionally possible as long as they do not empty its content. When this occurs, it ceases to be a reasonable limitation to become a deprivation of the right itself." (Judgment number 5097-93); "That is, the attributes of property may be limited, as long as the owner reserves for himself the possibility of normally exploiting the good, excluding, it is clear, the part or function affected by the limitation imposed by the State. Outside these parameters, if social welfare requires sacrifices from one or some only, it must be compensated, the same as occurs when the sacrifice imposed on the owner is of such an identity that it makes him lose the good in its entirety. Thus, the limitation on property withstands constitutional analysis, when the affectation to the essential attributes of property, which are those that allow the natural use of the thing within the current socio-economic reality, does not make the nature of the good disappear or make the use of the thing impossible, because the State imposes authorization or approval requirements so complex that they imply, in fact, the impossibility of usufructing the good." (Judgment number 2345-96).'" From the foregoing, it is inferred that the right to compensation in favor of the owner of a property arises to the extent that the Administration exercises the expropriatory power, for reasons of public interest (numeral 45, first paragraph of the Magna Carta), in accordance with the procedure provided in the Law of Expropriations, or special law on the matter. Furthermore, that right emerges when any other form of affectation or limitation to the full exercise of ownership is used, provided that, in essence, that modality consists of an impossibility of exercising bare ownership. In this line, canon 13 of the Law of Expropriations states: "The provisions of this Law shall be applicable to constitute easements (servidumbres) and for all types of affectation of goods and rights. When, due to the type of affectation, the availability of the good or the right is substantially limited, processing as an affectation shall be inadmissible and integral expropriation must be executed." In the same sense, ordinal 17 of the Law of Expropriations regulates the so-called dysfunctional remainder, which imposes that, in those cases of partial expropriations, the rest of the property cannot be used by the owner in the permitted activities. In both cases, when the material effect is the substantial limitation of the availability of the good, what is due is to establish the total expropriation of that good. The foregoing because, in that scenario, one would be not facing an affectation of property, typical of the regime of administrative limitations, but a true de facto expropriation, to the extent that the possibility of disposing of the good is completely suppressed. The foregoing must be analyzed in each specific case, for which it is imperative to consider the permitted use of the soil of each property to be expropriated, as well as the minimum areas for subdivision (fraccionamiento) or construction. For example, if the non-expropriated remainder or the strip of land not subject to the administrative limitation has an area smaller than that established by the regulatory plan to be able to exercise the right of transformation or construction (ius edificandi), in cases of land with urban vocation, the material legal effect is the suppression of the availability of use of the estate, leading in such hypotheses to the obligation to expropriate all the land. The same occurs when, on lands with urban vocation, the regulatory plan does not permit any type of transformation, for in those cases, the owner is exposed to a sort of impossibility of exploiting their property, finding themselves the owner of a good, with the urban obligations that administrative limitations impose, e.g., construction and maintenance of sidewalks, conservation and security of the property, among many, as well as tax burdens related to the property, among them, real estate tax, various municipal fees, without being able to derive benefit or use from the good. It is worth reiterating that one of the characteristics of restrictions and easements (servidumbres) is that the owner does not totally lose that condition and can continue using the good, within the framework of what is permitted and due, however, it does not imply the absolute loss of the availability of the good. Therefore, when, as a consequence of an administrative limitation, the owner cannot use the good at all or cannot make use of it, it would imply, at bottom, a transfer of the good to the totality of public use, which would lead, it is insisted, to a de facto expropriation. Hence, in each case, it must be examined whether the property becomes dysfunctional or bare ownership is substantially enervated, in which case, as a safeguard of the right of property, the expropriatory order is imposed, so as not to subject the owner to an unjustified dispossession." In the case under study, given that the plaintiff company appears as the registered owner of the properties whose compensation it claims in this process, which it maintains as owner, according to the registry certifications accompanying this action—proven facts 14.) and 15.)—, and it is not recorded that this situation has been modified—unproven fact 5.)—, and as was alleged, an affectation weighs upon them by incorporating them into the [Nombre62 038] reserve, which is maintained to date, it is not possible to consider that the alleged prescription (prescripción) has occurred, a defense that must be rejected. In this very sense, in judgment number 85-2020-VI, at fifteen hours forty minutes, on the thirtieth of June of the current year, this Tribunal considered:

“… this Tribunal cannot share an allegation of prescription (prescripción) like the one formulated by the State, given that such an understanding would lead to condoning the confiscation of private property as a result of the mere passage of time, from a forced acquisition or de facto and illegitimate occupation of a good owned by an individual, whether the same is justified or not by a cause of public utility. Seen from another perspective, accepting the thesis of the prescriptibility of the compensation claim would entail, at the same time, admitting that it is legally possible for the State to appropriate goods acquired by confiscation, under the sole excuse that the mere passage of time has operated without the affected person claiming. In strictness, if the object of this case lies, precisely, in the supposed inertia of the State in satisfying the repair associated with the debated strip of land, the defense of prescription (prescripción) is inadmissible and as such must be rejected…” The foregoing considerations are applicable to the subjudice; and oblige the rejection of the alleged prescription (prescripción).

Regarding this particular, it is noted that this pronouncement does not affect the merits of the analysis of the conflict raised, to which we will now turn.

**VIII.- OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEMNIFICATION OF RIGHTS TO LANDS LOCATED IN INDIGENOUS RESERVES.-** For the substantive analysis to which this action refers, we must attend to what is established in the national legal system regarding the requirements for the indemnification of rights of non-indigenous persons, whose lands are located in indigenous reserves, according to the geographical delimitations given for such purpose, whether by law or by decrees of the Executive Branch. This has been a topic already addressed consistently and repeatedly by this Tribunal on various occasions, for example, number 74-2013-VII, at ten hours thirty minutes on October twenty-ninth, two thousand thirteen, of the Seventh Section, 38-2016-VI, at ten twenty-five hours on March eighth, and 66-2016-VI, at fifteen hours on April twenty-first, the last two issued in the year two thousand sixteen; 15-2019-VI, at eight hours thirty minutes on February thirteenth, two thousand nineteen, 86-2020-VI, at fifteen hours fifty minutes on June thirtieth, and number 105-2020-VI, at fourteen hours fifteen minutes on August twenty-eighth, the last two from the year two thousand twenty and of the Sixth Section; and number 23-2019-IV, at eleven hours eighteen minutes on March twenty-ninth, two thousand nineteen, of the Fourth Section, all of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal. From the above precedents, the following can be inferred: guidelines that guide the decision in this matter.

**First:** In the case of indigenous reserves established and recognized in our country, it is necessary to reiterate that these are lands that are destined for the exclusive use of indigenous peoples and, by virtue of this, are withdrawn from commerce among men, that is, they are inalienable and also imprescriptible, and "*not transferable*", given that by legal mandate they are destined "...*exclusively for the indigenous communities that inhabit them*", and it is clarified that "* (N)on-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves*"; pursuant to numeral 3 of the Indigenous Law, number 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven. Consequently, it is a special property regime, insofar as it differs from the concept of private property provided for in the national legal system according to the provision of numeral 45 of the Fundamental Charter and in ordinary legislation - be it civil, urban, and agrarian -; and which, due to the limitations it implies for non-indigenous persons, translates into limitations on the ordinary attributes of the right of (private) property, in the terms provided for in article 264 of the Civil Code, given that it is a diverse regime, as has been indicated.

**Second:** Now then, in the manner already indicated by this Tribunal, the appropriateness of the indemnification is conditioned on the concurrence of several elements, as provided by the regulations governing this matter. In this sense, regarding what is of interest to this matter, in judgments numbers 15-2019-VI, number 23-2019-VI, 86-2020-VI, and 105-2020-VI cited above, the following has been set forth regarding what is of interest:

"*a) Material element: The first requirement that results from logical preponderance in this type of case is that the land for which expropriation (expropiación) and indemnification is petitioned be located territorially within the area of a [Name 038] Reserve. This requires a case-by-case analysis to determine that geographical correspondence. The proof of this aspect can be done in various ways, as it can well be supported by a certificate issued by the corresponding administrative authorities, as well as through technical evidence, among others, expert topographical analyses, satellite topographic surveys, documents from the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN), among others. The determining factor regarding this aspect is to define that the land belongs to an indigenous reserve area, a deduction that cannot be limited to one particular type of proof. b) Subjective element: On the one hand, the expropriated party must be a non-indigenous person who is the holder of the right of ownership or possession of a parcel that is within the limits of the [Name 038] Reserve, in this latter case, provided that the possession has been exercised in good faith under the terms of the Civil Code. The foregoing implies that in cases where such possession has been in bad faith, there is no right whatsoever to indemnification, an aspect which in each case must be analyzed according to the evidentiary elements provided to the case file. At this point, one can cite the case of the acquisition of lands from an indigenous person, a case in which this aspect would lead one to presume knowledge that the lands formed part of the communal property that applies in this matter. From this standpoint, if they are not possessors in good faith, the administrative authorities must proceed immediately to the eviction (desalojo) of the property without any compensation right to be recognized. c) Temporal Element: Likewise, the norm implies a rule of temporality that conditions the granting of the corresponding indemnification, in the sense that the registered title to the land or the exercise of possession must have begun before the area in which the specific property is located was included within the Indigenous Reserve zone. Thus, the date of registration of the property or corresponding acquisition (provided the transfer was from someone who was not indigenous) or the initiation of possessory acts must have occurred before the respective zone was declared an indigenous reserve. After that declaration, which is made through Law No. 6172, or by the expansion of the limits of the respective reserve (when the land in dispute did not form part of the original area of those reserves), according to the restriction imposed by canon 3 indicated supra, those acts of transferring ownership or possessory rights will be absolutely null, and therefore, unenforceable against the indemnification proceeding discussed, since they would have as their object a property upon which a legally imposed limitation has already fallen and that, therefore, does not form part of commerce. This is derived from canon 3 in question insofar as it indicates: "... Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves. (...)". That norm enables the commerce of goods only among indigenous people, sanctioning the nullity of contracts signed between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, as well as the acquisition by non-indigenous persons of lands that have been declared part of a reserve. Ergo, once the reserve is constituted and its area delimited, the titling of lands or transfers of ownership over properties that form part of that coverage will not be possible. For this, the reference point is none other than the legal norm or the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) in which the limits of each reserve are defined, or alternatively, the norm that expands the previously established territorial parameters. That is, for these purposes, it is necessary to consider the formal act that affects the inheritances of the non-indigenous person, through a declaration of administrative will that defines that portion of land as part of the indigenous zone. It should be reiterated that, independent of the date of acquisition, the same ordinal 3 establishes the ipso iure nullity (nullity by operation of law) of transfers from an indigenous person in favor of a non-indigenous person, in which case it is evident that, due to the invalidity of the title transferring ownership, the indemnification under discussion would not proceed. Likewise, this element has an impact on the analysis of the component of good faith, for once the declaration of affectation is made, and such circumstance is recorded on the registry margin of the land, the acts of acquisition of ownership or possession will not be considered as being in good faith, therefore, monetary compensation will not be appropriate. ...*” (Emphasis is from the original.)

**Third:** From what has been said, it is clear that it is the national legal system itself that established the mechanisms or instruments in favor of the owners or possessors "*in good faith*" of properties incorporated into indigenous reserves, according to the boundary delimitation that the law or the Executive Branch makes of each indigenous reserve. Thus, in the first place, relocation (reubicación), "*on other similar lands*" and if that is not possible or there is no consent from the affected party, with expropriation and indemnification, through the ordinary procedures established in the Expropriations Law (Ley de Expropiaciones). For this reason, it is important to define what is understood by an owner or possessor in good faith, since it is inferred that the fulfillment of this requirement gives rise to the corresponding indemnification, in protection of the right of property, pursuant to numeral 45 of the Political Constitution. Thus, the existence of registered ownership or possession of the property is not enough for this obligation to be generated on the part of the Administration. In this sense, the principles contained in numerals 17 to 22 of the Civil Code in relation to 10 and 131.3 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) serve as a reference (parameter), according to which, it is absolutely prohibited to seek legal effects not permitted or prohibited by the legal system, as would be to procure an antisocial exercise or an abuse of right in relation to private parties and deviation of power in the case of the Public Administration, given that in the sphere of Administrative Law and thus of legal-administrative relations, the norm "...*must be interpreted* [and applied] *in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the due respect owed to the rights and interests of the private party*", as the cited canon 10 of the General Law of Public Administration states. In this matter, and under the protection of the regulations that govern it, only the rights (of property or possession) acquired by non-indigenous persons **prior to that delimitation** - and thus, of the affectation of such lands to the legal regime of indigenous property - can be qualified as in good faith, and thus, give rise to the corresponding indemnification of the right of private property and for the damages and losses caused by that affectation. On the contrary, it can well be concluded that any act of transfer or disposal of properties comprised within indigenous reserves, carried out after the determination of the lands that make up the respective indigenous reserve - according to the delimitation carried out either by the Legislative Assembly through law or by the Executive Branch, via decree issued for that purpose -, becomes, as a matter of principle and by legal provision - article 5 of the Indigenous Law -, null, as these are properties that are outside commerce among men. In this sense, it is necessary to specify that a direct effect of this affectation on the disposition of territories declared indigenous reserves is that non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or acquire lands or properties located within the indigenous reserves and if acts of disposition (sale, purchase, or of any type) are carried out after a declaration of a territory as an indigenous reserve, they will be absolutely null actions, as expressly provided by numeral 3 of the Indigenous Law, which for greater clarity in its understanding is transcribed literally, regarding what is of interest to this case:

"***Article 3º.-** Indigenous reserves are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusively for the indigenous communities that inhabit them.* ***Non-indigenous persons may not rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves.** *Indigenous people may only negotiate their lands with other indigenous people. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereof in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous people and non-indigenous people, is absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case. ...*" (The emphasis is not from the original.)

In this sense, we must remember that the decrees creating indigenous reserves, like the rest of the normative provisions, are published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, this publication being sufficient for bringing them to the knowledge of the citizenry and population of the Nation. In principle, in attention to the principle of initial registration (inmatriculación) of public domain assets, this affectation would not require a further indication in the Public Property Registry; however, given that it is a special property regime - already indicated, different from the private property regime, having a special legal connotation, of a community character of the indigenous peoples, and which allows transmission among indigenous people -, it is understood that this affectation must at least be determined and recorded in some public document, such as the respective decrees of affectation and derived from this, specified at least in some study or plan. Therefore, any transfer or occupation that takes place after the area of the indigenous reserve has been demarcated must be considered as being in bad faith, a scenario in which one must proceed with their expulsion (police act) or immediate eviction through the legal channels provided for such purpose (administrative eviction), and consequently, no indemnification whatsoever could proceed. On this specific point, in judgment number 74-2013-VII, cited above, the following was considered:

"*In the case of persons who are found to be registered titleholders of ownership or of some real right, who have a title and who are in bad faith, one should proceed with the action provided for by the legal system for the removal from the legal world of the corresponding title, to subsequently achieve the respective eviction. In the event that the title has been granted in the exercise of some administrative power (titling by a public authority among others), this would have to entail the action via the lesividad process if applicable, without prejudice to what is provided in article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or the direct action exercised by the holder of the affected right. For the scenario of non-indigenous persons, whether they are mere possessors, or whether they are registered titleholders of ownership and/or some real right over the property, as long as they are acting in good faith, INDER must proceed to propose an alternative to them for their relocation on lands that would have to be equivalent as far as possible, with those thus affected by these third parties in the indigenous reserves.*" **IX.- ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE.-** We proceed to determine whether or not the indemnification claim formulated by the plaintiff company regarding properties with Real Folio Registry numbers [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], of which it is the registered titleholder, conforms to the block of legality previously indicated. In the manner indicated, this petition is conditioned on the adequacy of the requirements established by the legal system governing the matter.

**First: Of the title to the properties and their origin:** First of all, the registered title to the properties whose indemnification the plaintiff company claims must be determined. These are properties with Real Folio Registry numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], located in the district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007] - **proven facts 14.)** and **15.)** -. It is documented in the case file that, through public deed number two hundred fifteen, executed on July eighth, two thousand eight, in the protocol of notary public Marina Murillo Calderón, the general agents with unlimited sum of the companies [Name 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Name 012] and [Name 013]) sold to [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Name 001]) the property with registration number [Value 029], with an area on that date of 41,931 square meters and 42 square decimeters, and corresponding in all respects to cadastral plan number [Value 007] - **proven fact 7.)** -; a right that was registered on August sixth, two thousand eight - **proven fact 8.)** -. Subsequently, in public deed number [Value 056], dated March twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, at folios [Value 052] verso to [Value 053] verso of Volume [Value 054] of the protocol of notary public José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, the legal representative of the company acting here as plaintiff - [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima -, made four segregations from the previous property - **proven fact 13.)** -, a deed that was registered on April ninth, two thousand twelve, thereby originating the four remaining properties [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], **proven fact 14.)** -. As can be deduced from the foregoing, the coverage area of the latter properties comprises part of the parent property acquired by [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima in the year two thousand eight; there being identity of these with that one from which they were segregated.

**Second: Of the affectation to indigenous property of the properties of the plaintiff company:** Regarding each indicated property, a cadastral plan corresponds, on the reverse of which the Executive Directorate of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) placed a note of warning, indicating that the property represented in the graphic was located, in its entirety, within the [Name 038] Reserve, district [Name 016], canton of [Name 007], Province of [Name 037], but that the registration of those cadastral plans was authorized, as the property existed prior to the date of creation of the indicated reserve - **proven facts 5.), 9.), 10.), 11.)** and **12.)** -.

For greater understanding, we set out that correspondence between the properties of the plaintiff company and their representation on the corresponding cadastral map in the following table:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:428.25pt; border:0.75pt solid #000000; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Real Property Folio Number</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Cadastral Map Number</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Area detailed on the map</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Area recorded in the registry certification</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 029]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Parent property</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.), </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to y </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">7.) and 15.)</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 007]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">recorded with the Catastro Nacional: on August 1, 2005 </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.) </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4ha1931.42 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">corresponds to the entirety of the property, as it was acquired by the plaintiff company in 2008 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 7.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">- upon acquiring the property 2008:</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">41,931.42 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 7.)-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">- after the segregations in 2011:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">10,000.42 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 15.)</span></p></td></tr><tr style="height:126.75pt"><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 025]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 14.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> 9.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">SJ-148703-2011</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">recorded with the Catastro Nacional on March 20, 2011</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 9.) </span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4,808 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 9.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed, it corresponded to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">lot 1</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, with a measurement of 4,808 m2</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)- </span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">4,808 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 004]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 14.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> 11.)</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 016]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">recorded with the Catastro Nacional on March 31, 2011 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 11.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">5,825 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 11.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed it corresponds to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">lot 2</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, with a measurement of 5,825 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">5,825 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 005]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 14.), </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">in relation to </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">12.)</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 017]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">recorded with the Catastro Nacional on March thirty-first, 2011 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 12.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-style:solid; border-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">1 ha 1,298 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 12.)-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed it corresponds to lot 3, with a measurement of 11,298 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; border-bottom-style:solid; border-bottom-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">11,298 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:91.5pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 006]</span></p></td><td style="width:141.75pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">[Valor 015]</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">recorded with the catastro nacional on March 29, 2011 -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 10.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-right-style:solid; border-right-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">1 ha 0000 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 10.)-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-In the segregation deed it corresponds to lot 4, with a measurement of 10,000 m2</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">-</span></p></td><td style="width:96pt; border-top-style:solid; border-top-width:0.75pt; border-left-style:solid; border-left-width:0.75pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">10,000 m2</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">-proven fact 14.)-</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">In view of the consideration made by the Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it is important to consider that indeed, as was alleged by the plaintiff company in its claim, the parent property existed prior to the date of creation of the [Nombre62 038] reserve, given that, as is evident from the registry certification itself, it finds its origin as such in property [Nombre167 009]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, from which it was segregated on September fourth, nineteen hundred seventy-three, and its title transferred to Mrs. [Nombre62 011] -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 6.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">- Thus, the assertion made by the Commission regarding the circumstance that the property existed prior to the creation of the reserve, which occurred in nineteen hundred seventy-six with the promulgation of Decreto Ejecutivo number 6036-G, published in Diario Oficial La Gaceta 113, on June twelfth of the indicated year -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 1.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, is true. But it is important to note that in this act, no geographic determination of the created reserve was made, given that this was done in Decreto Ejecutivo number 10707-G, of October twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred seventy-nine, which was published on November eighth following in Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 210 -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 2.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; a demarcation that was modified by Decreto Ejecutivo number 29452-G, of March twenty-first, two thousand one, whose publication was made in Diario Oficial La Gaceta number 93, on May sixteenth following -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 4.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. This authority understands that it is based on this demarcation that the property initially with real property folio number [Valor 029], of the Province of [Nombre62 037], is affected by the special regime of indigenous property, as was noted at the time of recording the corresponding cadastral map [Valor 007], </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, which in turn entails that the subsequent segregations have the same affectation, by derivation. If the parent property is located in the indigenous reserve, the lots that are segregated will have the same condition, and vice versa, given that the last geographic demarcation of the indigenous reserve was publicized on May sixteenth, two thousand one -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 4.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. In this regard, it is important to note that the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is not correct in questioning the validity of the statements made by the Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, which located the plaintiff's properties referenced herein, within the [Nombre62 022] reserve. Note that from the first cited Decreto Ejecutivo -number 6036-G-, which precisely creates the reserve, its Article 11 delegated to the then Instituto de Tierras y Colonización -today Instituto de Desarrollo Rural-, so that, in coordination with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it would carry out the territorial delimitation of the reserve -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 1.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; a competence that is later confirmed in Article 8 of the Ley Indígena, number 6172, of November twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred seventy-seven. By virtue of the foregoing, being constituted as a public institution -Article 1 of its creating Law, number 5251, of November eleventh, nineteen hundred seventy-three-, and by such virtue, endowed with its own legal personality, it is fully competent to determine whether a property is or is not located in geographic spaces reserved for the respective indigenous reserves. Thus, this Court has no doubt whatsoever regarding the affectation by the indigenous property regime that weighs upon properties [Valor 029]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">, [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005], and [Valor 006], whose registered owner is [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; in the manner as was declared by the Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas and alleged in this action by the interested party.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Second: Regarding the condition of owner in bad faith:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">Now, notwithstanding that the representative of the plaintiff company attempted to dismiss the analysis regarding the determination of compliance with this requirement, considering it superfluous and unnecessary when dealing with the ownership of a property right, and not mere possession, over the real property located within an indigenous reserve, the rejection of such allegations is appropriate. And this, in strict application of the legal rule that establishes as an inescapable requirement for the preclusion of the indemnification of the corresponding right, in the manner already indicated in ordinals 3 and 5 of the Ley Indígena. And in this sense, it is appropriate to clarify to the plaintiff company that, of course, the regulation in question recognizes the property right and the exercise of possession of non-indigenous persons, who at the time the corresponding geographic demarcation was made, had their right over a real property that became affected by that determination. However, as is clearly expressed in the aforementioned numeral 3, once the coordinates of the respective indigenous reserve are geographically determined, whether by Decreto Ejecutivo -as happened in this case- or by law, the properties included in this delimitation are affected by the special regime of indigenous property, by virtue of which such properties are removed from commerce by non-indigenous persons, since the use and enjoyment of those lands is reserved exclusively for indigenous persons; hence, any legal transaction in contravention of this special regime is null and void ab initio. Consider also that such delimitations are published in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta, for the purposes, not only of the registered owners at that time, but also of third parties. Given the clarity and forcefulness of this legal provision, previously transcribed, it is therefore necessary to review not only the allegations of possession rights but also the property titles that are alleged when these types of proceedings are formulated. This is mandatory by law, once again, from the relationship of provisions 3 and 5 of the Ley Indígena. By reason of the foregoing, and having reviewed what occurred in this matter, it is concluded that the plaintiff company does not hold a title in good faith with respect to its properties, for the purpose of requesting the indemnification it claims in this action, since on the date it acquired property [Valor 029], the [Nombre62 038] reserve was not only geographically delimited according to the current boundaries, but that condition was noted in the respective cadastral map [Valor 007] -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, the recording of the map being permitted or authorized because the existence of the property predated the creation of the reserve -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 5.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-, whose last geographic demarcation was published on May sixteenth, two thousand one -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 4.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. Indeed, the purchase and sale deed by which the plaintiff company acquired the alleged property right dates from July eighth, two thousand eight -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 7.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-; which was recorded in the Registro Público de la Propiedad on August sixth following -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven fact 8.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-. In other words, when [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima signed the purchase and sale contract for that property, the affectation to the indigenous property regime already weighed upon it, and therefore, as this case involves a transaction entered into between two legal entities -obviously non-indigenous-, this obligates us to consider it a transaction null and void by operation of law, in the manner provided by law. The subsequent segregations suffer from the same defect, notwithstanding that the ownership of the new properties remains with the same legal entity -the plaintiff here-, but which gives rise to the creation of four new properties -</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven facts 13.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101"> and </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">14.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; color:#010101">-.

Note in this regard, that in the respective cadastral plans the warning was left—already known by the interested party—that those lands were located within the [Name 038] reserve — **proven facts 9.), 10.), 11.)** and **12.)**—.

**X.- OF THE CLAIMS OF THE COMPLAINT:** Based on the foregoing considerations, we proceed to rule on each of the claims formulated in this action.

**First: Of the declaratory claim (claim # 2):** It is worth highlighting that it is appropriate to grant the first claim of a declaratory nature formulated in this action. Indeed, in the form presented in the complaint, and confirmed at the Preliminary Hearing, [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima requested that the following be ordered in the judgment:

" **2.-** That it be declared that the farms of the [Name62 037] district, Real Folios [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006] are entirely immersed within the boundaries of the [Name62 038] Reserve." By reason of the foregoing, it is declared that the farms of the Province of [Name 037], with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006] are located, in their entirety, within the boundaries of the [Name 038] Reserve.

**Second: Of the claims for condemnation formulated (claims # 3, 4, and 5):** **i.-** Notwithstanding that the real estate properties of the plaintiff company are located within the [Name62 038] reserve, in the manner explained above, the plaintiff does not meet the legal prerequisite established in the legal system governing the matter to legitimize compensation for private lands located in indigenous reserves, which refers to the holding of a good faith title of ownership, as a condition "sine qua non". This single circumstance makes the claim for compensation filed inadmissible. But additionally, it must be considered that, in the manner in which this claim was raised, it established the alleged de facto expropriation by the State of the indicated properties as the cause for the requested compensation. In this sense, it is important to consider that, despite the affectation of the indigenous property regime of the referenced farms of the plaintiff company, it is important to note that the alleged de facto expropriation was not proven, nor was the dispossession of the aforementioned lands by the public administrations involved in addressing these matters. In this sense, there is no evidence that the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and/or the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas have exercised reivindicatory actions in relation to the properties with Real Folio registration number [Value 029], [Value 025], [Value 004], [Value 005], or [Value 006], whose current registered owner is [Name 029] Sociedad Anónima — **unproven fact 1.)** —. Nor has the plaintiff proven that the State has titled those lands in the name of the [Name 040] Association — **unproven fact 2.)** —. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Administration has performed any material act of occupation of those farms — **unproven fact 3.)** —. On the contrary, the plaintiff itself stated that since it acquired farm [Value 029], it has exercised full possession over it, and consequently, over the four segregated lots. Thus, the dismissal of the action in relation to this part of the complaint is appropriate. By accessoriness, the request for interest and indexation that were requested in this regard meets the same fate.

**ii.- Subjective moral damage is not appropriate.** Finally, the plaintiff company requested compensation for subjective moral damage, caused on the occasion of the situation raised in the action. It would suffice to point out that, if the claim for compensation for the indicated properties is inadmissible, for not conforming to the prerequisites established in the body of legality and because no de facto expropriation occurred, as was alleged, this new claim is also inadmissible by accessoriness. Now, it is worth highlighting that notwithstanding that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution and Article 197 of the General Law of Public Administration, compensation or reparation—at the expense of the Administration—is appropriate for moral damage or suffering, the claim is not sustainable in this case, since it concerns an affectation that refers to natural persons, affecting their inner and psychological sphere, given that in this proceeding, a legal entity appears as the plaintiff. In this sense, the representation of the defendant institute is correct in noting this situation, given that, in this case, the natural person exercising the legal representation cannot assume the position of the legal entity to attempt a sort of reparation that is alien to the legal nature of whom they represent.

**XI.- OF THE DEFENSES RAISED.-** The representations of the defendants alleged the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right. In this regard, it must be remembered that according to procedural doctrine and contentious-administrative jurisprudence (in this sense, see cassation judgment 34-1961, of ten hours twenty minutes on March twenty-second, nineteen sixty-one), the following are recognized as substantial prerequisites for the issuance of any judgment: the **standing of the intervening parties**, the **interest in resolving the conflict**, and the **right**; which are reviewable even *ex officio* by any judge if not formulated by the defendants in a jurisdictional process, and in that rigorous order. Thus, having reviewed this matter, it is deemed that the prerequisite of **active standing** is met, insofar as the party filing this action does so in defense of their subjective rights and legitimate interests (Article 10, subsection 1), sub-subsection a) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), against the two entities that the national legal system grants powers to act in protection of such rights, that is, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, in the manner regulated in numeral 12, subsection 1) of the same procedural code, therefore the prerequisite of **passive standing** is met with respect to these two institutions. Now, regarding the participation of the State in this process, given that the objection pertains to whether or not it is obliged to compensate, in this case, due to the inadmissibility of that claim having been declared, the analysis of this point is deemed unnecessary, and we proceed directly to the analysis of the substantive defense raised by it. Regarding the **interest** in resolving this matter, it is noted that this prerequisite persists, as there is no evidence that a settlement or withdrawal regarding the conflict raised has occurred during the processing of this matter. Finally, regarding the **right of action**, in the manner reasoned throughout this ruling, it is appropriate to grant the defense of lack of right regarding the inadmissibility of the claim for compensation, as the prerequisites established in the legal system for its declaration are not met; and it is rejected in relation to the declaratory claim, which must be granted.

**X.- OF THE COSTS.-** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, notwithstanding that there is reciprocal defeat, the lack of good faith in the promotion of this process is evident, which precisely led to its dismissal regarding the compensation for the property titles of the plaintiff company, and the amount requested for the claim for moral damage compensation being also excessive (for the sum of fifty million colones) — a case of plus petitio, provided for in subsection 1) of Article 194 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. These considerations compel the condemnation of costs against the losing party [Name62 029] [Name 137351], in favor of the defendants—the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas—. By majority opinion, the liquidation of costs is reserved for the execution phase of the judgment, once this ruling becomes final.

**THEREFORE:** The defenses of expiration of the action and prescription formulated by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural are rejected; as well as the lack of active standing raised by the representation of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the defendant institute; and as unnecessary, a ruling is omitted regarding the defense of lack of passive standing *ad causam* raised by the state representation. The defense of lack of right is partially granted, only in relation to the claim for compensation formulated. Consequently, the complaint filed by [Name 029] **SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA** against the **STATE**, the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL**, and the **COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS** is declared **PARTIALLY WITH MERIT**, and it is therefore appropriate to make the following pronouncements: It is declared that the farms of the District of [Name 037], with Real Folio registration numbers [Value 029], [Value 030], [Value 004], [Value 005], and [Value 006], all of the Province of [Name 037], canton [Name 007], district [Name 016], are entirely affected by the indigenous property regime, being entirely comprised within the [Name 038] Reserve. In all other respects, the complaint is declared **WITHOUT MERIT**. Procedural and personal costs are charged to the plaintiff company and in favor of the three co-defendants, whose liquidation, by majority opinion, is reserved for the execution phase of the judgment, once this ruling becomes final. Judge Aguilar Méndez provides a separate note regarding this last point. Judge Garita Navarro provides a separate note regarding the weighing of the good faith title for the right to compensation in this type of matter.

**Silvia Fernández Brenes** **Daniel Aguilar Méndez** **Roberto Garita Navarro** **CLARIFYING NOTE FROM JUDGE GARITA NAVARRO.-** The undersigned judge agrees with the dismissal of the complaint proposed in this resolution. However, I must indicate that, in the opinion of the undersigned, the mere delimitation of the reserve zone does not lead to the denial of compensation, since that single factor does not allow ignoring the presumption of good faith in the acquisition, an aspect that the defendant Public Administration must prove and that must be analyzed in each specific case. Certainly, from the declaration of the reserve, the object of the contract transferring lands that form part of that property regime would be null. However, if there is no record, at least cadastral, of the land's belonging to a reserve zone, the legitimate trust of the acquirer is violated, provided they acquired it from a non-indigenous person and there is no formal or material evidence of signs that allow them, at least to presume, the existence of that special domain regime. Thus, regardless of the lands having to be placed at the disposal of the indigenous reserve, this does not lead to denying the Administration's duty to compensate the titleholder for the dispossession of these lands, when the indicated circumstances are present, since, ultimately, it is land that the State (in a broad sense) did not compensate, as mandated and imposed by law. Now, in this case, as mentioned in the development of the judgment, in the cadastral plan used for the segregations, that belonging to an indigenous property regime was recorded, which introduces an objective element from which the impossibility of acquiring those lands was known. In this way, this aspect must be highlighted as the cause for the denial of the reparation claimed in this process. For the purposes of justifying the position of reparability in cases of concurrence of good faith, see ruling No. 15-2019-VI, of this Section VI of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, in which the undersigned served as reporting judge.

**José Roberto Garita Navarro.** **Judge.** **NOTE FROM JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.-** Specifically in relation to the condemnation to pay costs, although it is a unanimous criterion that it must indeed be imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, with all due respect I differ from my colleagues regarding the abstract or liquid nature of this pronouncement. Given the scarce regulation that this point has had in the different procedural normative bodies in this matter, as was the case in its moment with the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and currently with the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, it gave rise to an extended application by supplementarity of the norms of the Civil Procedural Code, precisely as authorized by numerals 220 idem and Articles 9 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration. Consequently, and according to the current wording of Article 62.1 of the Civil Procedural Code (Law No. 9342), it constitutes an unavoidable duty of the Tribunal to establish in the operative part the *“…once the exact amount of the sums granted, their adjustments up to the judgment, **including interest and costs**…”* (Emphasis not in the original). Consequently, and given that there is no administrative rule to the contrary, the appropriate course would be to include in the costs section of this judgment the determination of these latter items, as provided by the legal system, and not to reserve its pronouncement for the execution phase of the judgment.

- </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Daniel Aguilar Méndez </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Judge</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><br /><br /><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:432.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt"><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="width:432.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt"><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">- Verification Code -</span><span style="font-size:12pt"> </span><br /><span style="color:#010101">*OI4O47Y43JN8M61*</span><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:8pt; color:#010101">OI4O47Y43JN8M61</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><br /><br /><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr><td style="width:432.5pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">Document signed by:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">SILVIA FERNÁNDEZ BRENES, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE</span><span> </span><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">DANIEL AGUILAR MENDEZ, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE</span><br /><span style="font-family:'Arial Unicode'; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">ROBERTO GARITA NAVARRO, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>"

Sentencia número 125-2020-VI SECCIÓN SEXTA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Dirección01 , a las diecisiete horas diez minutos del [Valor 054] de setiembre del dos mil veinte Proceso contencioso administrativo establecido por [Nombre 029] SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, cédula jurídica [Valor 001], representada por [Nombre 001], [...], quien actúa en calidad de Presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma (personería aportada con la demanda); contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, en la persona de Nombre21224 , casada, abogada, cédula CED1922, vecina de San Gabriel de Aserrí, quien actúa como apoderada general judicial de la institución (personería en el archivo del Despacho); la COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS , representado por [Nombre 003] , [...] (personería aportada al expediente); y el ESTADO, representado por el Procurador Adjunto, Jorge Oviedo Álvarez, soltero, cédula número CED2623, vecino de Heredia (apersonamiento del veintidós de setiembre del dos mil dieciséis). Figuran como apoderados especiales judiciales de las intervinientes, los siguientes abogados: de la parte actora: Alex Benjamín Gen Palma, casado, abogado, cédula CED9954, vecino de Ciudad Colón (poder otorgado el veintiuno de agosto del dos mil diecisiete); del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural: Nombre73110 , casado una vez, cédula CED109111, vecino de Santa Ana (poder otorgado el primero de noviembre del dos mil dieciséis); Óscar Alex Soto Flores, casado en primeras nupcias, cédula de identidad número CED109112 (poder otorgado el veintidós de agosto del dos mil diecisiete); y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas: Nombre1112 , cédula CED109113, vecino de San Vicente de Moravia (poder otorgado el veintiséis de octubre del dos mil dieciséis).Todos los intervinientes son mayores y costarricenses.

RESULTANDO

1.- Por escrito presentado al Despacho el seis de mayo dos mil dieciséis, la sociedad actora formula demanda contenciosa para que, con base en los antecedentes fácticos y argumentaciones de derecho dados y fuera definido en la Audiencia Preliminar, se disponga lo siguiente: "1. Declarar con lugar la presente demanda en todos sus extremos. / 2.- Que se declare que la finca del partido de [Nombre 037], Folios Reales [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006] se encuentran inmersas, en su totalidad, dentro de los linderos de la Reserva [Nombre62 038]. / 3.- Siendo que las fincas antes indicadas fueron expropiadas de hecho por parte del Estado, se condene solidariamente a los demandados a realizar la medida y ubicación de los terrenos objeto de este proceso, a realizar el avalúo correspondiente tanto del Nombre167 de la tierra como de las mejoras introducidas y se ordene el pago de la indemnización correspondiente a que hace referencia el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena. / 4.- Que se condene solidariamente a los demandados al pago de los intereses legales sobre los montos condenados por indemnización, esto desde la firmeza de la sentencia y hasta el efectivo pago. / 5.- Se condene solidariamente a los demandados a pagar a mi representada el daño moral subjetivo generado por la afectación que me ha causado como representante de la sociedad afectada, el accionar ilegítimo de los demandados, quienes en todo momento generaron una restricción a la libre disposición de las propiedades objeto de esta demanda, desde hace más de 30 años, generándome un estado de incertidumbre de invasiones generadas al amparo de que son terrenos dentro de una reserva, además de la incertidumbre que me generan los demandados en cuanto al incumplimiento de su obligación de medir, valorar y pagar dichos terrenos, siendo que mi representada está siendo despojada sin que se realizara pago alguno, todo lo cual me causa depresión, frustración, angustia, temor o miedo de perder parte del patrimonio de mi representada sin ser indemnizado, daño moral que estimo en la suma de 50 millones de colones. / 6.- Que se condene a los demandados a la indexación de todos los montos económicos a los que fueren condenados. / 7.- Que se condene a los demandados al pago de ambas costas de esta acción." (Escrito de demanda, minuta de la Audiencia Preliminar en expediente judicial en formato digital y respaldo digital de la Audiencia Preliminar en disco compacto adjunto).

2.- Conferido el traslado de ley, el veintisiete de octubre del dos mil dieciséis la contesta de manera negativa la representación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, oponiendo para ello, las defensas de fondo de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de derecho. Pidió desestimar la acción en todos sus extremos. (Escrito de contestación de la demanda en expediente judicial, en formato digital).

3.- El veintiocho de noviembre del dos mil dieciséis, la Procuraduría General de la República contestó de manera negativa la demanda interpuesta en su contra, para lo cual alegó las defensas de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de derecho; al tenor de lo cual pidió la desestimación de la acción en todos sus extremos. (Escrito de contestación de la demanda en expediente judicial, en formato digital).

4.- El tres de noviembre del dos mil dieciséis, la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural contestó de manera negativa la demanda, oponiendo para ello las defensas previas de indebida integración -para llamar al proceso a la Asociación [Nombre62 040] y de caducidad de la acción y las de fondo de falta de legitimación activa, pasiva y falta de derecho. (Escrito de contestación de la demanda en expediente judicial, en formato digital).

5.- Luego de la audiencia de réplica correspondiente, mediante resolución número 474-2017, de las once horas veinticinco minutos del primero de marzo del dos mil diecisiete, la Juez de Trámite a cargo del asunto -Cindy Chavarría Hernández- rechazó la defensa de integración de la litis. No consta impugnación contra esa decisión.

6.- La Audiencia Preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo fue iniciada a partir de las nueve horas diez minutos del veinticuatro de agosto del dos mil diecisiete, bajo la conducción de la Juez Tramitadora Cindy Chavarría Hernández y la presencia del personero de la sociedad actora -abogado Alex Benjamín Gen Palma- y el apoderado de del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural -abogado Óscar Alex Soto-, y el Procurador designado -Jorge Oviedo Álvarez-. Estuvo ausente el personero de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas. Ante reclamo de la parte actora de la omisión de timbres en los poderes y certificaciones de las institución y Comisión demandadas, se aclaró que ambas gozan de exención fiscal. Se fijaron las pretensiones en la forma consignada en el primer resultando de este pronunciamiento. El Instituto de Desarrollo Rural reiteró la defensa de caducidad de la acción y formuló la de prescripción; defensas que fueron reservadas para ser resueltas en sentencia, por no ser evidentes ni manifiestas. Se determinaron los hechos controvertidos de la demanda e hizo pronunciamiento respecto de la prueba ofrecida por los intervinientes. Se rechazó la prueba nueva documental ofrecida por el instituto accionado. Al no haber prueba que evacuar en juicio, se declaró el asunto con trámite de puro derecho (artículo 98.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), de manera que todas las partes presentes rindieron oralmente sus conclusiones. (Minuta de la Audiencia Preliminar en expediente judicial en formato digital y respaldo digital en disco compacto adjunto.)

7.- Este proceso fue pasado para fallo a la Sección Sexta para su resolución de fondo, según consta en el sello de pase respectivo -visible en el expediente judicial en formato digital y en la carpeta respectiva. Asimismo, se indica, que este asunto ha sido tramitado en su totalidad en formato digital, lo cual se ajusta a lo dispuesto en el Reglamento sobre Expediente Judicial Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, aprobado por Corte Plena, en el artículo XXXI de la sesión número 22-13, celebrada el veinte de mayo del dos mil trece.

8.- No se observan causales capaces de invalidar lo actuado, por lo que se dicta esta sentencia, previa deliberación de los integrantes del Tribunal y por unanimidad.

Redacta la Jueza Fernández Brenes ; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I.- ADVERTENCIA PREVIA.- Revisado cuidadosamente el expediente, se observa que en este asunto se omitió efectuar la citación a la audiencia de conciliación a que se refiere el artículo 70.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, sin que ninguna de las partes hubiese manifestado previamente su negativa a participar en ella. Ahora bien, considerando que la conciliación es un trámite renunciable del proceso y que en la etapa de saneamiento de la audiencia preliminar ninguna de aquellas manifestó objeción alguna al respecto; entiende este Tribunal que existió una renuncia tácita a la conciliación, habiendo participado las partes del proceso en la Audiencia Preliminar y, por ende, no existe indefensión o nulidad alguna que amerite ser declarada aquí.

II.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tiene como demostrado lo siguiente, haciéndose la indicación de que todas las referencias lo son del expediente judicial:

1.) Por artículo 9 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 6036-G, el Gobierno de la República "... reconoce la existencia y la personalidad jurídica de la Comunidad [Nombre62 038], cantón de [Nombre62 007] y declara Reserva [Nombre62 038] el territorio ocupado por dicha comunidad." Asimismo, en el numeral 11 de este decreto, delegó en el Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, en coordinación con la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, la delimitación territorial de esta reserva. Este decreto fue publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta número 113, del doce de junio de mil novecientos setenta y seis (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); 2.) El ocho de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y nueve se publicó en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta número 210, el Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G, del veinticuatro de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, el cual estableció el Caserío [Nombre 038] , y en el numeral 3, estableció su localización en las hojas cartográfica del Instituto Geográfico Nacional y de seguido, en el artículo 4, indicó que esa demarcación se correspondía al área geográfica y jurídica de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de [Nombre 022] (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); 3.) Mediante Decreto Ejecutivo número 13569, del treinta de abril de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, el Poder Ejecutivo reafirmó la creación de la Reserva [Nombre 038] , por Decreto Ejecutivo 6036-G y su delimitación como caserío indígena, por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 10707-G. La publicación de este decreto consta en la Colección de leyes y Decretos, Semestre 1, Tomo 2, página 375 (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente -SINALEVI-); 4.) El dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno, se publicó en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29452-G, del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, con fecha de rige a partir de su publicación, el cual modificó el Decreto Ejecutivo 10707-G -citado-, para dar una nueva localización de la Reserva [Nombre62 038], conforme a las hojas cartográficas del Instituto Geográfico Nacional (artículo primero); y especificó que la zona delimitada se corresponde al área geográfica y jurídica de acción de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral [Nombre62 038] (artículo 2) (Sistema Nacional de Legislación Vigente, SINALEVI).

5.) El primero de agosto del dos mil cinco, se inscribió en el catastro nacional el plano catastrado número [Valor 007], realizado por el perito topógrafo Nombre103154 , para graficar la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], con una medida de "4ha1931.42 m2." En el reverso de este plano, la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas advirtió que en su totalidad, esa finca estaba ubicada en la reserva [Nombre62 038], pero que autorizaba la inscripción del plano, por ser una finca existente con anterioridad a la creación de aquella reserva (certificación de plano catastrado aportada por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial digital y manifestaciones del personero en la Audiencia Preliminar); 6.) La finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029] nace de la segregación y compraventa que el señor [Nombre62 010] hace de la finca madre con matrícula [Placa25939 ], a favor de su hermana [Nombre62 011], el cuatro de setiembre de mil novecientos setenta y tres (certificación de tomos del Registro Público de la Propiedad y certificación registral de la propiedad [Valor 029], documentos aportados por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial digital); 7.) La finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029] fue objeto de varios negocios de compraventa, cambiando así de titular registral en diversas ocasiones; hasta que en escritura pública número doscientos quince, suscrita el ocho de julio del año dos mil ocho, en el protocolo de la notaria pública Marina Murillo Calderón, comparecen los apoderados generalísimos sin límite de suma de las sociedades [Nombre62 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre 012] y [Nombre62 013]) y de [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre62 001]), y por la cual, la primera sociedad, vende a la segunda, la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], situada en el distrito [Nombre 015] ([Nombre 016]), cantón [Nombre 017] ([Nombre 007]), de la Provincia de [Nombre 037]; que es naturaleza: terreno [Nombre 042], y con los siguientes linderos: Norte: [Nombre 018], Sur: [Nombre 019] y [Nombre 021], Este: [Nombre62 019], Oeste: [Nombre62 021]; y graficado en el plano catastrado número [Valor 007], con una medida de cuarenta y un mil novecientos treinta y un metros con cuarenta y dos decímetros cuadrados. El precio de la compraventa se definió en la suma de tres millones de colones. Se indicó que la propiedad estaba al día en lo relativo a los impuestos municipales (certificación registral de la escritura, aportada por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial digital); 8.) La anterior escritura fue presentada al Diario del Registro Público de la Propiedad al Tomo [Valor 010], Asiento [Valor 011], el diez de julio del año dos mil ocho, a las doce horas veinticuatro minutos veinte segundos (citas [Valor 012]); y quedó inscrita el seis de agosto del dos mil ocho (certificación y registral de la escritura, documentos aportados por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial, en formato digital); 9.) El veinte de marzo del dos mil once, se inscribió en el Catastro Nacional, del Registro Público de la Propiedad el plano catastrado número [Valor 013], con un área de 4808 metros cuadrados; realizado por el topógrafo Nombre103154 y con indicación de ser parte de la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029] , con un área total de 4.808 metros cuadrados. Al dorso de este plano, el diez de marzo del dos mil once, la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas consignó la leyenda de que ese plano era parte del Folio Real [Valor 029], situada en [Nombre 022], distrito [Nombre 016], cantón de [Nombre 007], Provincia [Nombre 037], el cual se encontraba dentro de la Reserva [Nombre 038]; y que según Criterio Legal DJ.154-12-09, emitido por el Departamento legal de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, se recomendaba autorizar los visados de esos planos -de cada uno-, por existir la finca como tal, desde antes de la creación de la Ley Indígena (plano catastrado certificado en su frente y dorso del documento, documento aportado por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial, en formato digital); 10.) El veintinueve de marzo del dos mil once, se inscribió en el Catastro Nacional, del Registro Público de la Propiedad el plano catastrado número [Valor 015], con un área de 1ha0000 metros cuadrados; realizado por el topógrafo Nombre103154 y con indicación de ser parte de la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], con un área total de 1 hectárea 0000 metros cuadrados. Al dorso de este plano, el diez de marzo del dos mil once, la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas consignó la leyenda de que ese plano era parte del Folio Real [Valor 029], situada en [Nombre 022], distrito [Nombre 016], cantón de [Nombre 007], Provincia [Nombre 037], el cual se encontraba dentro de la Reserva [Nombre 038]; y que según Criterio Legal DJ.154-12-09, emitido por el Departamento legal de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, se recomendaba autorizar los visados de esos planos -de cada uno-, por existir la finca como tal, desde antes de la creación de la Ley Indígena (plano catastrado certificado en su frente y dorso del documento, documento aportado por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial, en formato digital); 11.) El treinta y uno de marzo del dos mil once, se inscribió en el Catastro Nacional, del Registro Público de la Propiedad el plano catastrado número [Valor 016], con un área de 5.825 metros cuadrados; realizado por el topógrafo Nombre103154 y con indicación de ser parte de la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], con un área total de 41931.42 metros cuadrados. Al dorso de este plano, el dos de marzo del dos mil once, la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas consignó la leyenda de que ese plano era parte del Folio Real [Valor 029], situada en [Nombre 022], distrito [Nombre 016], cantón de [Nombre 007], Provincia [Nombre 037], el cual se encontraba dentro de la Reserva [Nombre 038]; y que según Criterio Legal DJ.154-12-09, emitido por el Departamento legal de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, se recomendaba autorizar los visados de esos planos -de cada uno-, por existir la finca como tal, desde antes de la creación de la Ley Indígena (plano catastrado certificado en su frente y dorso del documento, documento aportado por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial, en formato digital); 12.) El treinta y uno de marzo del dos mil once, se inscribió en el Catastro Nacional, del Registro Público de la Propiedad el plano catastrado número [Valor 017], con un área de 1ha1298 metros cuadrados; realizado por el topógrafo Nombre103154 y con indicación de ser parte de la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], con un área total de 1 hectárea 1.298 metros cuadrados. Al dorso de este plano, el dos de marzo del dos mil once, la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas consignó la leyenda de que ese plano era parte del Folio Real [Valor 029], situada en [Nombre 022], distrito [Nombre 016], cantón de [Nombre 007], Provincia [Nombre 037], el cual se encontraba dentro de la Reserva [Nombre 038]; y que según Criterio Legal DJ.154-12-09, emitido por el Departamento legal de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, se recomendaba autorizar los visados de esos planos -de cada uno-, por existir la finca como tal, desde antes de la creación de la Ley Indígena (plano catastrado certificado en su frente y dorso del documento, documento aportado por la sociedad actora con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial, en formato digital); 13.) En escritura pública número [Valor 056], del veintisiete de marzo del dos mil doce, folios [Valor 052] vuelto a [Valor 053] vuelto del Tomo [Valor 054] del protocolo del notario público José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, [Nombre62 001], actuando en su condición de Presidente de la Junta Directiva, con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima, hace cuatro segregaciones de la finca de su propiedad, con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], que describió del siguiente modo: Lote [Valor 020] : terreno [Nombre 027], situado en [Nombre 016] (Distrito [Nombre 015]), [Nombre 007] (cantón [Nombre 017]), de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], linderos al norte con el lote [Valor 018] que se dirá, al sur con [Nombre62 019], al este con el lote [Valor 018] que se dirá y al oeste con [Nombre62 019], con un área de cuatro mil ochocientos ocho metros cuadrados, según el plano catastrado número [Valor 013]; Lote [Valor 018]: terreno de [Nombre 023], situado en [Nombre 016] (Distrito [Nombre 015]), [Nombre62 007] (cantón [Nombre 017]), de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], linderos al norte con el lote [Valor 019] que se dirá adelante; al sur con el lote [Valor 020] ya descrito, al este con [Nombre62 021]; y al oeste, con [Nombre62 019] y en parte con lote [Valor 020] ya descrito; con un área de cinco mil ochocientos veinticinco metros cuadrados, según plano catastrado [Valor 016]; Lote [Valor 019]: terreno de [Nombre 025], situado en [Nombre 016] (Distrito [Nombre 015]), [Nombre 007] (cantón [Nombre 017]), de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], linderos al norte con el lote [Valor 021] que se dirá; al sur con el lote [Valor 018] ya descrito, al este con [Nombre62 021] y al oeste con [Nombre62 019], con un área de once mil doscientos noventa y ocho metros cuadrados según el plano catastrado [Valor 017]; y Lote [Valor 021] : terreno de [Nombre 025], situado en [Nombre 016] (Distrito [Nombre 015]), [Nombre62 007] (cantón [Nombre 017]), de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], linderos al norte con el resto que se dirá, al sur con el lote [Valor 019] ya descrito, al este con [Nombre62 021], y al oeste con [Nombre62 019], con una medida de diez mil metros cuadrados, según plano catastrado número [Valor 015]. El resto (finca madre) se describió de la siguiente manera: terreno de [Nombre62 025], situado en [Nombre 016] (Distrito [Nombre 015]), [Nombre62 007] (cantón [Nombre 017]), de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], linderos al norte con [Nombre62 018], al sur con el lote [Valor 021] antes descrito, al este con [Nombre 021] y al oeste con [Nombre62 019], con una medida de diez mil cuarenta y dos metros cuadrados (certificación de escritura aportada por la sociedad actora, visible en el expediente judicial digital); 14.) La anterior escritura fue presentada al Diario del Registro Público de la Propiedad al Tomo [Valor 022], Asiento [Valor 023], a las catorce horas treinta y cuatro minutos cuatro segundos, del veintiocho de marzo del dos mil doce (citas [Valor 024]), y quedó inscrita el nueve de abril del dos mil doce, dando así origen a las siguientes fincas, todas ubicadas en la Provincia de [Nombre 037], cantón de [Nombre 007] ([Nombre 017] ) y distrito [Nombre 016] ([Nombre62 015]), y cuyo titular registral es [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; y que tienen las siguientes matrículas de Folio Real y características: número [Valor 025], naturaleza: terreno [Nombre 027]; linderos: norte: [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima, sur: [Nombre 019]; este: [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; oeste: [Nombre62 019], con una medida de cuatro mil ochocientos ocho metros cero decímetros cuadrados, graficado en el plano catastrado [Valor 013]; número [Valor 004]: naturaleza: de terreno de [Nombre62 023] ; linderos: norte y sur: [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; este: [Nombre 021] ; y oeste: [Nombre62 019] y [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; con una medida de cinco mil ochocientos veinticinco metros cero decímetros cuadrados, graficado en el plano catastrado [Valor 016]; número [Valor 005] : naturaleza: terreno de [Nombre 025], linderos: norte y sur: [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; este [Nombre62 021] y oeste: [Nombre62 019] ; mide: once mil doscientos noventa y ocho metros cuadrados con cero decímetros cuadrados, y graficado en el plano catastrado número [Valor 017]; y número [Valor 006] : naturaleza: terreno de [Nombre 025], linderos: norte y sur: [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; este [Nombre62 021] y oeste: [Nombre62 019]; mide: diez mil metros cuadrados con cero decímetros cuadrados, y graficado en el plano catastrado número [Valor 015] (sello de recibido de escritura en certificación de escritura; certificaciones de las propiedades respectivas y planos catastrados indicados, documentos aportados por la sociedad actora, visible en el expediente judicial digital); 15.) Producto de las anteriores segregaciones, [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 es titular registral de la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], cantón [Nombre 007] , distrito [Nombre 016], que es terreno de [Nombre62 025], que en la actualidad, tiene una medida de diez metros cuadrados con cuarenta y dos decímetros cuadrados. Se registran los siguientes linderos: Al Norte: [Nombre62 018] , al Sur: [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; Este: [Nombre 021] y Oeste: [Nombre 019]; y se corresponde al plano catastrado número [Valor 007] (certificación del registro del quince de abril del dos mil dieciséis y plano catastrado indicado, aportada con la demanda, visible en el expediente judicial en formato digital); y; 16.) Esta demanda fue notificada a los demandados en las siguientes fechas: al Estado el veintiuno y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, el veintidós, todas las fechas, del mes de setiembre del dos mil dieciséis (constancia de notificación, según detalle en la carpeta del escritorio virtual).

III.- DE LOS HECHOS NO PROBADOS.- También de importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se tiene como no demostrado lo siguiente:

1.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y/o la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas hayan ejercido acción de reivindicación en relación a las propiedades con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 030] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] o [Valor 006], todas de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], cuya propietaria registral en la actualidad es [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 ; 2.) Que el Estado haya titulado y traspasado las propiedades con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 025] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] o [Valor 006] a la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva [Nombre62 038]; 3.) Que la Administración haya realizado una ocupación material o una expropiación de hecho de las propiedades con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] o [Valor 006]; 4.) La existencia de daño o afectación de derecho alguno que la Administración tenga el deber de indemnizar a la sociedad actora; y; 5.) El cambio de titularidad de las fincas con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] o [Valor 006].

IV.- DEL OBJETO DE LA DEMANDA.- La sociedad actora, formula demanda contenciosa, con varias pretensiones de distinta naturaleza jurídica. La primera , de orden declarativa, es para que se declare que las fincas del Partido de [Nombre 037], con Folios Reales [Valor 029], [Valor 030] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006] se encuentran inmersas, en su totalidad, dentro de los linderos de la Reserva [Nombre62 038] (pretensión # 2). Las demás, accesorias a la anterior, son de condena, y que refieren a los siguientes extremos: i.- que se condene solidariamente a los demandados -Estado, Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas-, a hacer las mediciones, ubicación y a valúo de los anteriores inmuebles, tanto de la tierra como de las mejoras, para proceder con la correspondiente indemnización de los terrenos y de las mejoras introducidas (pretensión #3); ii.- el reconocimiento de los los intereses e indexación de aquella indemnización (pretensión #4 ); iii.- el reconocimiento y condena al pago del daño moral subjetivo, que determinó en el monto de cincuenta millones de colones (pretensión #5); y la condena al pago de las costas procesales y personales derivadas de ese proceso (pretensión #6) . El fundamento de su demanda es el siguiente: a.) Que conforme al ordenamiento jurídico nacional -propiamente el numeral 3 de la Ley Indígena-, las reservas indígenas tienen un régimen jurídico especial, en tanto son tierras inalienables, imprescriptibles y no transferibles a personas no indígenas. En razón de lo anterior, es que en el numeral 5 de la Ley de referencia, se dispuso que los propietarios de inmuebles ubicados en tales reservas, debían ser reubicados o expropiados, conforme a estudios y trámites a cargo del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural en coordinación con la Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas y los pagos de parte del Estado; b.) Dice, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo número 6036-G, del veintiséis de mayo de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, que modificó el Decreto Ejecutivo 5904-G, del catorce de mazo anterior, incorporó importantes núcleos de la población indígena en zonas pobladas exclusivamente por personas indígenas; entre estos núcleos, la comunidad indígena [Nombre62 031], en el cantón de [Nombre62 007] (artículo 9). Luego, se dotó a la indicada reserva, del reconocimiento legal, como se desprende del artículo primero de la Ley Indígena, número 6172. Más adelante, con el Decreto Ejecutivo número 10.707-G, del veinticuatro de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, se definieron nuevos límites de esta reserva y finalmente, en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29452-G, del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, se ampliaron sus límites geográficos; c.) Señala que al amparo de la fe pública registral, de buena fe en el año dos mil ocho adquirió la finca [Valor 029], del Partido de [Nombre 037]; sin que tuviese ninguna restricción al amparo de la Ley Indígena; de la cual, es su titular registral. No obstante aclaró, que en el plano catastrado correspondiente a esta propiedad, número [Valor 007], la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas consignó que la finca representada en ese gráfico se encuentra ubicado dentro de la reserva [Nombre62 038] , pero autorizó la inscripción del plano, por existir la finca como tal, desde antes de la creación de la reserva y de la Ley Indígena; d.) Explica que esta finca, tiene sus orígenes, que se remontan a una posesión a título privado, desde mil ochocientos ochenta y ocho, del señor [Nombre62 032], quien la poseyó por treinta años, y cedió su derecho a [Nombre62 033], quien la poseyó por diez años y finalmente, mediante información posesoria tramitada en el Juzgado Civil de San José, se tituló a Nombre62 de [Nombre 034], el quince de marzo de mil novecientos veintiocho, con el número de finca [Valor 055]. Agrega que el cuatro de setiembre de mil novecientos setenta y tres, [Nombre62 010] segrega de la anterior finca la porción que dio origen la finca [Valor 029], que cedió a su hermana [Nombre62 011]; e.) Agregó que a su vez, el veintisiete de marzo del año dos mil doce, realizó cuatro segregaciones de la finca [Valor 029], que dieron origen a los siguientes inmuebles: [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], de las cuales también es su propietario registral y mantiene su posesión sin ningún tipo de restricción. No obstante, en los planos catastrados referidos a las anteriores fincas [Valor 013], [Valor 016], [Valor 039] y [Valor 015], respectivamente-, la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas consignó que tales predios y la finca madre [Valor 029], estaban ubicados dentro de la reserva [Nombre62 038], pero autorizó la inscripción de esos planos, por existir la finca como tal, desde antes de la creación de la reserva y de la Ley Indígena; e.) Que en razón de la anterior circunstancia, no pueda ejercer ninguno de los atributos de la propiedad previstos en el numeral 264 del Código Civil -posesión, usufructo, transformación, enajenación, defensa y exclusión, restitución e indemnización-, en tanto no tiene libre disposición sobre ella, no obstante que su derecho como propietaria está inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, sin que conste ninguna limitación o afectación de la finca descrita; siendo que al tenor del numeral 267 del Código Civil, para que sean legítimas las limitaciones a la propiedad, las mismas deben estar inscritas en el Registro Público de la Propiedad. Así, ella pudo adquirir un bien inmueble, pero que el Estado estableció que forma parte de una reserva indígena, y como tal, propiedad absoluta de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de [Nombre62 022], actuación que califica como una expropiación de hecho, y que a la fecha no ha sido indemnizada; f .) Alegó que cumple los presupuestos previstos en el numeral 5 de la Ley Indígena, por tratarse de una propietario de buena fe; en virtud de lo cual, estima procedente y legítima la indemnización que pide se reconozca en este proceso; ya que es titular de cinco inmuebles privados, debidamente inscritos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, adquiridos conforme a derecho. En este sentido, dice que no puede reputarse nulo el negocio que dio origen a su derecho y que la buena fe, no es un atributo que deba de acreditarse de titulares registrales. Así, la inalienabilidad de los predios de las reservas indígenas se pregona única y exclusivamente de aquellos que están comprendidos en la finca de la reserva como tal, que fue inscrita en el año dos mil nueve; condición que no puede extenderse a los terrenos privados ubicados en dicha reserva. Recordó la prevalencia del derecho de propiedad, en la forma consagrada en el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política e interpretada en la jurisprudencia constitucional, en sentencias 4205-96 y 5207-2004; g.) Acusa que no obstante la afectación anterior de sus predios, la Administración ha omitido actuar conforme le exige el ordenamiento jurídico que rige la materia, en lo que refiere a la medición e indemnización de sus tierras; cometido en el que existe una responsabilidad solidaria de los demandados, en la forma reconocida por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en su sentencia número 1604-F-S1-2012; y h.) Señaló que la situación denunciada le ha causado daño moral subjetivo al representante legal de la sociedad actora, referido al estado de incerteza absoluta y preocupación de la situación de sus tierras, "... pues a pesar de que las fincas fueron afectas por la creación y posterior ampliación de la reserva, por medio de una regulación del Estado, ciertamente nunca se hizo en forma correcta, pues se hizo una expropiación de hecho, se restringió su libre disposición de los bienes ... y no se le indemnizó por esa expropiación como en derecho corresponde." En este sentido, agregó que sufre amenazas constantes de invasión de sus tierras de parte de personas indígenas. En relación a las defensas de caducidad de la acción y prescripción alegadas por la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, se opuso, por considerar que se está frente a conducta omisiva, que se mantiene en el tiempo, motivo por el cual aplica el 40 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo; siendo que admitir la postura de la demandada, implicaría permitirle a la Administración sacar provecho de su propio dolo; dado que se está frente a una situación provocada por la propia inercia de la Administración. Agregó que en este caso, no aplica instituto de prescripción porque se está ante una situación especial, regulada en la Ley Indígena. (Escrito de demanda, en expediente judicial digital y manifestaciones en el alegato de conclusiones, conforme a soporte digital, según respaldo en disco compacto adjunto.)

V.- DE LA POSICIÓN DE LOS DEMANDADOS.- Los representantes del Estado y del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, contestan negativamente la demanda, en escritos separados (individuales), al tenor de lo cual, piden se desestime la demanda en todos sus extremos, con la correspondiente condena en costas a la actora; pero por ser coincidentes las razones expuestas, se reseñarán en forma conjunta, haciéndose la indicación de consideración diversa, cuando así haya sido formulada. El sustento de su posición es el siguiente: a.) Alegación de la caducidad de la acción: En escrito de contestación de la demanda, el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural señaló que la discusión para determinar la procedencia o no de la indemnización pedida estaba caduca, tanto en aplicación del plazo de los dos meses previsto en el numeral 37 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, como del plazo anual establecido en el artículo 39 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo; plazo que debía contarse a partir del día siguiente de la publicación, primero de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos y luego de los decretos ejecutivos que crearon la reserva [Nombre62 038]; siendo que la presente acción fue interpuesta hasta el seis de mayo del dos mil dieciséis; b.) Alegación de prescripción de la acción: En la Audiencia Preliminar el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural alegó esta defensa, bajo la consideración de que la indemnización establecida en el numeral 5 de la Ley Indígena, está regida por el plazo decenal ordinario -artículo 868 del Código Civil-, o de los cuatro años, conforme a la previsión del ordinal 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; a partir de la promulgación de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, número 13 de mil novecientos treinta y nueve; o de los decretos de creación de la reserva [Nombre62 038], en mil novecientos setenta y seis, siendo que esta acción les fue notificada hasta el veintidós de setiembre del dos mil dieciséis. c.) Alegación de la falta de legitimación pasiva, de parte del Estado: La representación estatal señala que la indemnización pretendida debe ser asumida por el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, dado que conforme a la Ley número 6735, del veintinueve de marzo de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, tiene patrimonio y presupuesto propio, al tenor de lo cual, le compete la indemnización de los terrenos privados que han sido incorporados a reservas indígenas. Agrega que a esta institución, en coordinación con la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, se les asignó la tutela de los terrenos indígenas, como lo manda la Ley de Indígenas número 6172, del veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete y lo ha entendido la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia número 1604-F-S1-2012 y la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia 2013-7579.. Agrega que al tenor de la indicada Ley, es el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural a quien compete la realización de los estudios y valoraciones de tierras de particulares -no indígenas- comprendidas en las reservas indígenas determinadas en el territorio nacional y su posterior indemnización; d.) De la falta de legitimación pasiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural: Por su parte, y en este mismo contexto, el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural señaló que la obligación de indemnizar corresponde en exclusiva al Estado, a cargo del presupuesto nacional, como se infiere de la voluntad del legislador cuando aprobó la Ley Indígena y por tratarse de un asunto que atañe al Estado en su conjunto. Tales fondos, dice, son y deben ser administrados por la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, ente al que a su vez, le corresponde la realización de los censos para determinar las propiedades o posesiones de no indígenas en las reservas indígenas, para las acciones correspondientes. Así, concluye que no tiene injerencia alguna en el asunto. Por ello, señala que si interviene o hace pago alguno por su cuenta, incurriría en responsabilidad administrativa en los términos del numeral 110 inciso e) de la Ley de Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos; en tanto la institución está legalmente imposibilitada para aportar recursos económicos para hacer estas indemnizaciones. Al respecto citó la sentencia 74-2013-VII de la Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo; e.) Alegación de la falta de derecho: i.- Dicen que los decretos que crean las reservas indígenas (en general y la de [Nombre62 022] , en particular) son válidos, en tanto están dictados para hacer efectiva la tutela de los derechos de los indígenas, conforme a la normativa internacional que regula sus derechos. Indicaron, se trata de un régimen especial de propiedad, al tenor de la cual son tierras "inalienables e imprescriptibles, no transferibles y exclusivas para las comunidades indígenas que las habitan", de manera que " los no indígenas no podrán alquilar, arrendar, comprar o de cualquier otra manera, adquirir terrenos o fincas comprendidas dentro de las reservas", según dispone el artículo 3 de la Ley Indígena, número 6172 y también normas de rango superior, como lo es el Convenio número 107 de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo relativo a la Protección e Integración de las poblaciones indígenas y de otras poblaciones tribales y semitribales, aprobada por Ley número 2330, del nueve de abril de mil novecientos cincuenta y nueve, y que reconoce el derecho de tenencia de la tierra a los pueblos indígenas. Es por esto, que la normativa que rige la materia prevé mecanismos de indemnización de propietarios y/o poseedores de tierras incorporadas en las reservas indígenas, tales como la reubicación del derecho o la indemnización; pero a su vez, les impide negociar aquellas tierras, y quienes adquieren tierras en tales condiciones, no pueden ser indemnizados; ii.-. La representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural señala que con ocasión de la promulgación de los decretos ejecutivos que determinaron la ubicación geográfica de la reserva [Nombre62 038], las tierras que la comprenden perdieron su condición de bienes privados, para adquirir la categoría de un régimen especial, en la cual, que la excluye del comercio de los hombres; siendo que sólo procede la indemnización al propietario o poseedor de buena fe. Todos esos decretos fueron publicados en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, para que todos conocieran de aquella condición, no pudiendo alegarse su ignorancia, en los términos previstos en el canon 129 de la Constitución Política; iii.- Aclaran que el derecho de indemnización es únicamente para los propietarios o poseedores no indígenas, que tenían su derecho previo a la creación de la respectiva reserva indígena, que tratándose de la reserva [Nombre62 038], el límite temporal lo sería en el año dos mil uno, con ocasión de su última demarcación territorial, por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29452-G, del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno. Así, explican que después de afectada una propiedad (a una reserva indígena), no se pueden realizar actos traslativos o negocios sobre el inmueble que involucre personas no indígenas; de manera que en los supuestos en que no hay buena fe en el derecho, no procede la indemnización, sino el desalojo, porque el tratamiento que la ley le da es de una invasión. (citaron las sentencias número 106-2013-I, 74-2013-VII y 304-213-II del como ya lo consideró el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). Por ello, para efectos de proceder a la indemnización, interesa conocer si el título del dominio del reclamante es de buena o mala fe); ya que, si una persona no indígena adquiere una propiedad luego de aquella afectación, no son adquirentes de buena fe, ya que se trata de bienes fuera del comercio de los hombres; iv.- Ambas representaciones dicen que la sociedad actora se cumple los presupuestos previstos en el numeral 5 de la Ley Indígena para la procedencia de la indemnización reclamada, en tanto se establece como elemento esencial para que esta obligación se genere a cargo de la Administración, la tenencia o posesión de la tierra de buena fe. Así advierten que la Reserva [Nombre62 038] fue creada en el año de mil novecientos setenta y seis, con dos modificaciones posteriores, en el año de mil novecientos setena y nueve y en el dos mil uno; mientras que la sociedad actora adquirió el inmueble en compraventa de fecha ocho de julio del dos mil ocho, y quedó inscrita en el Registro Público de la Propiedad el seis de agosto siguiente, sea a los treinta y dos años de creada la reserva. No se trata de los propietarios originarios de las tierras cuya indemnización pretende. Luego, de ese bien, la interesada segregó cuatro lotes, todos los cuales -cinco fincas- están ubicados en su totalidad en una reserva indígena; siendo que sociedad actora sabía de las limitaciones de la finca por su ubicación, por estar indicado en el plano catastrado de la primera, y aún así hizo el negocio. Esa sola circunstancia hace absolutamente nulo el negocio jurídico del que nació el derecho de propiedad de la actora, y con ello, improcedente el reclamo indemnizatorio; v.- Señalan que no fue acreditado el despojo o expropiación de hecho acusada y fundamento de la acción, ya que de la prueba aportada, se desprende, contrario a lo alegado, que las propiedades de la sociedad actora no tienen limitación o restricción alguna, lo que ha permitido su pleno disfrute de parte de su titular. Así, no hay acciones de la Administración tendentes al despojo o limitación de los atributos del derecho de propiedad de la actora; vi.- La representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural cuestionó la validez de las manifestaciones de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas en los planos catastrados de las propiedades de la sociedad actora, por no tener competencia para hacer la declaratoria de la ubicación de tales tierras en reserva indígena, en este caso, de [Nombre62 022]; y a tal efecto, pide al Tribunal pronunciarse sobre su validez; vii.- El representante del instituto demandado alegó la improcedencia de los intereses e indexación requeridos, por cuanto no se estaba frente a una obligación de sumas líquidas, a pagar; y advirtió que la indexación está comprendida en los intereses, no pudiendo haber un doble reconocimiento sobre el mismo extremo; viii.- El daño moral subjetivo alegado, por ser una pretensión accesoria de la indemnizatoria, debe correr la misma suerte que la principal, que es improcedente. En todo caso, se agregó que no hay daño antijurídico, por cuanto los decretos por los que se creó la Reserva [Nombre62 038] son conformes a derecho, de donde la sociedad actora debe soportar la situación que alega, siendo que ésta sabía de la situación que pesaba sobre la finca -que luego segregó-, esto es, que adquirió un bien fuera del comercio de los hombres, generándose así, la culpa de la víctima. Sobre este particular, el instituto demandado agregó la improcedencia del reclamo, por cuanto la actora es una sociedad actora, no su representante legal -señor [Nombre62 001].Finalmente, la representación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, aún y cuando se opuso a la acción formulada en su contra, se limitó a señalar que no le constaba ninguno de los hechos de la acción, sin análisis adicional, y formuló las defensas de falta de legitimación activa y de derecho, sin explicarlas. Es de advertir, que su representante no estuvo presente en la Audiencia Preliminar, con lo cual, no formuló alegato de conclusiones. (Escritos de contestación de las demanda de cada uno de los demandados, en el expediente judicial en formato digital y manifestaciones de las representaciones del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y del Estado en la Audiencia Preliminar, conforme a soporte digital en disco compacto adjunto.)

VI.- ACLARACIÓN Y ORDEN DE PRELACIÓN EN EL ANÁLISIS DE LOS PUNTOS DEBATIDOS EN LA ACCIÓN.- De las precisiones anteriores, es necesario advertir que en este proceso contencioso, no ha sido requerido el control de legalidad de ninguna conducta de la Administración, sino que su objeto refiere a determinar si procede o no la indemnización que gestiona la sociedad actora, por alegar, que las propiedades de la que es titular registral -a saber, con matrícula de Folio Real números [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], todas de la Provincia de [Nombre62 037] están ubicadas dentro de la reserva [Nombre62 038], cantón de [Nombre62 007]. Por tal motivo, se pidió declarar aquella condición de las fincas indicadas, y consecuencia de lo anterior, se condene a los demandados de manera solidaria, a proceder en la forma ordenada en la ley, esto es, con la indemnización de su derecho de propiedad. En atención a las defensas previas formuladas y reservadas para este momento, lo primero que se atenderá es al cumplimiento -o no- del factor temporal para acceder a esta sede Jurisdiccional, referida tanto a la caducidad de la acción como a la prescripción del derecho. Luego, si pasa ese control de admisibilidad, se atenderá al fondo del conflicto planteado. Ello conllevaría a determinar si se produce la afectación alegada en los predios indicados y luego, si resulta procedente la indemnización pedida, en la forma regulada en la ley. Finalmente, de ser procedente el reclamo, se determinará quien o quienes son los responsables de las acciones y pago de la indemnización requerida. Fijado el orden de análisis del conflicto planteado, se procede de inmediato al mismo.

VII.- DE LAS DEFENSAS DE CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN Y DE PRESCRIPCIÓN ALEGADAS.- Se resalta que el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural alegó la concurrencia de ambos institutos -caducidad de la acción y de prescripción-, con la intención de que se determine que esta acción fue interpuesta vencido el plazo temporal que dispone la normativa procesal al respecto, para acceder en tiempo a la Jurisdicción Contenciosa. Para atender a esta cuestión, se estima pertinente hacer las siguientes consideraciones:

Primero: Distinción de los institutos de caducidad de la acción y de prescripción: Debe de aclararse que, no resulta posible confundir los anteriores institutos, ni considerarlos como si se tratase de lo mismo, aún y cuando ambos refieren al mismo factor de los procesos jurisdiccionales, este es, el temporal, para estimar la formulación de la correspondiente acción en tiempo. En efecto, cada instituto tiene su especial y distinta naturaleza, y lo más importante, diversas consecuencias o implicaciones jurídicas. Tratándose de la caducidad de la acción, refiere a un plazo establecido en la norma legal de orden procesal, que establece el límite máximo para interponer en tiempo esa acción ante las autoridades jurisdiccionales; pero cuya característica esencial es que es plazo único, final, rígido y estricto, y por tal motivo inflexible, ya que no puede ser interrumpido -donde el conteo del plazo inicia de nuevo, sin considerar el ya transcurrido-, ni suspendido -conteo del plazo legal reinicia, teniendo en consideración el ya transcurrido-, como ocurre con la prescripción del derecho. Otro rasgo distintivo de la caducidad de la acción es que es revisable de oficio por el Juzgador, a diferencia de la prescripción, que requiere ser alegada por el interesado. Así, la configuración de la caducidad es objetiva e inexorable y la única manera de suprimir su eficacia extintiva, es el ejercicio de la acción dentro del término previsto en la Ley. De manera que "… para que pueda hablarse de caducidad, es preciso que con anterioridad se haya producido un determinado efecto jurídico, es preciso que haya surgido una determinada situación jurídica de posibilidad axiológica, cuya falta de ejercicio en una forma determinada produzca su extinción." (PÉREZ VARGAS, Víctor. Derecho Privado, San José, Litografía e Imprenta LIL, S.A, 3° edición, 1994, p. 203); y agrega este autor "… cuando nos encontramos frente a una hipótesis de caducidad tenemos como supuesto una carga de perentoria observancia de un término rígido (la rigidez del término,…, es otra diferencia frente a la prescripción) para el cumplimiento específico de un acto (normalmente se trata de un derecho potestativo) con la consecuencia de que el derecho se pierde (efecto extintivo) si el acto de ejercicio no es cumplido dentro del término prefijado o (lo que es lo mismo) si es cumplido extemporáneamente." ( Op. cit., p.p. 203-204). De igual manera, Nombre135950 enuncia algunos elementos diferenciadores al indicar: "A nuestro entender, la razón y el fundamento de la caducidad difieren de los de la prescripción en que la caducidad no depende, como la prescripción, del hecho subjetivo de la inercia del titular del derecho durante cierto tiempo, sino exclusivamente del hecho objetivo de la falta de ejercicio del derecho en el tiempo establecido, y en que se inspira no ya en la existencia de conformar la situación de derecho a la situación de hecho que dura un cierto tiempo considerado suficiente, a este propósito, por la ley, sino más bien en la de limitar en el tiempo el ejercicio de un derecho (…) cuando el diligente ejercicio del mismo se estima conveniente para un interés individual o superior.” (Nombre135951 , . Doctrinas Generales del Derecho Civil, Madrid, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1964, p. 135.) Por su parte, la prescripción, también denominada "extintiva", "negativa" o "liberatoria"-, en razón de sus efectos, es creada precisamente para tutelar el orden social y la seguridad en las relaciones jurídicas, por cuanto, aún cuando, en principio, el ideal de justicia se cierne como materia prima en todas las normas jurídicas, en algunas oportunidades cede a favor de otras aspiraciones, tales como el de la seguridad jurídica. Así, es bajo el influjo de este principio, que el instituto de la prescripción encuentra sentido, porque permite rehusar brindar tutela a aquél, que ostentando un derecho subjetivo, ha dejado transcurrir un determinado lapso sin gestionar, en modo alguno, su resguardo. Es, en suma, la consecuencia de la inacción del titular de un derecho, pues la jurisdicción, ante protesta del obligado, del no ejercicio del derecho en el plazo establecido en la ley, una vez constatado, debe declarar prescrito el reclamo. Al tenor de lo anterior, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 43-97, de las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del veintiocho de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y siete, hizo el siguiente cuadro comparativo, respecto de estos dos institutos:

"V.- La prescripción extintiva y la caducidad son instituciones jurídicas afines, que tienen de común que el tiempo actúa de causa extintiva de derechos, sin embargo, ambos se distinguen profundamente tanto por su fundamento como por sus efectos. La prescripción afecta a derechos que han nacido con vida, en principio ilimitada, y sólo por su inactividad durante un plazo, generalmente prolongado, pueden quedar extinguidos. La caducidad por su parte, afecta a derechos que la ley o la voluntad de particulares concede con vida ya limitada de antemano para su ejercicio, por lo que se extinguirán fatalmente cuando haya transcurrido el plazo. Opera pues, por el mero transcurso del tiempo que le ha sido fijado, pudiendo ser tenida en cuenta de oficio por el juez, a diferencia de la prescripción en que debe ser alegada en forma de excepción por el que pretende beneficiarse de sus efectos, ya que mientras no se invoque, el derecho ejercitado, aún después de la prescripción despliega su eficacia. La caducidad hace referencia a la duración del mismo derecho, de manera que su transcurso provoca la decadencia o extinción y con ello la de la acción que del mismo dimana; por el contrario, la prescripción hace referencia a la acción y se funda en la necesidad de seguridad jurídica, como sanción a la inactividad por parte del titular de un derecho que no ejercita la acción que le es inherente. Se puede afirmar que en la prescripción el derecho se pierde porque se ha extinguido la acción, y en la caducidad, por el contrario, desaparece la acción por haberse extinguido el derecho, por el transcurso del plazo de duración que tenía fijado. La prescripción extintiva tiene su fundamento en la necesidad de poner término a las situaciones de incertidumbre en el ejercicio de los derechos y en la presunción de abandono por parte de su titular, por ello cabe hacer prueba de que este abandono o inactividad no ha existido, es decir ser interrumpida, y por lo mismo sólo puede estimarse a instancia de parte. Por su parte, la caducidad se funda exclusivamente en la necesidad de dar seguridad al tráfico jurídico, y por lo tanto no admite en ningún caso la interrupción del tiempo cuyo simple transcurso la origina." Como se observa a simple vista estas distinciones tienen importantes consecuencias jurídico-procesales, no siendo una mera distinción semántica o conceptual su definición, como se verá en el análisis que se procede a realizar.

Segundo: De la improcedencia de la alegación de caducidad de la acción: El análisis de la caducidad lleva a la comprobación de tres aspectos fundamentales: primero, la determinación de la aplicación de este instituto jurídico, como presupuesto temporal del derecho de acción; segundo, la determinación del plazo para impugnar la conducta administrativa formal; y tercero, el punto o instante para iniciar el conteo de dicho plazo. En cuanto al primer elemento, es preciso señalar que el legislador optó por la caducidad de la acción para acceder a la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa desde vieja data, tratándose del supuesto de la impugnación de la conducta de la Administración -salvo las excepciones establecidas en la propia regulación procesal, que no aplican a este caso-. Así, en la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, número 3667, del doce de marzo de mil novecientos sesenta y seis, el plazo previsto fue de dos meses a partir del día siguiente de la notificación o publicación de la conducta impugnada, tratándose de la nulidad relativa -numeral 37- y de cuatro años, tratándose de la nulidad absoluta -artículo 175 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, conforme a su texto original, previo a la reforma dada en virtud de la Ley número 8508-; y al día hoy, rige el mismo instituto, sólo que el plazo fue fijado en un año, conforme al texto del numeral 39 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, solo que en esta regulación, el plazo lo fijó en un año, y corre a partir de la comunicación efectiva del acto administrativo que se impugna o del conocimiento de la conducta administrativa de que se trate. En este sentido debe de recordarse que tratándose de actos administrativos, para su eficacia, se requiere de la efectiva comunicación al interesado (destinatario), en los términos establecidos en el ordinal 140 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, motivo por el cual, el inciso 1) subinciso a) dispone que ese plazo del año corre "..., desde el día siguiente al de la notificación. " Llama la atención que la alegación que formula el instituto accionado refiere como parámetro de la caducidad que alega, tanto a la normativa procesal anterior, sea la citada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa, vigente al momento de dictarse los decretos ejecutivos que crearon la reserva [Nombre 038] -números 6036-G, del doce de junio de mil novecientos setenta y seis y número 10707-G, del veinticuatro de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y nueve -hechos probados 1.) y 2.)-; como a la normativa vigente al momento de adquirir la titularidad del bien la sociedad actora, cuya indemnización se reclamado en este proceso -con efectos para terceros, a partir del seis de agosto del dos mil ocho, hecho probado 7.)-, sea, el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo; lo cual denota la imprecisión de la argumentación que se hace sobre el particular. Ahora bien, es precisamente por el objeto de esta acción, que la alegación de esta defensa es a todas luces improcedente, ya que no se está frente a la revisión de la legalidad conducta alguna de la Administración desplegada en relación a la situación jurídica de la sociedad actora, sino que, como se indicó supra, estamos frente a un reclamo indemnizatorio, que tiene como sustento, la supuesta afectación de las propiedades de la accionante, con ocasión de la creación de la reserva [Nombre62 038], lo que obligaría, al sometimiento del régimen jurídico especial previsto al efecto. Conforme a lo establecido en el numeral 41.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, este tipo de pedimentos se rige más bien por el instituto de la prescripción, y no de la caducidad. Así pues, se rechaza la defensa de caducidad de la acción alegada.

Tercero: De la improcedencia de la defensa de prescripción alegada: Llegados a este punto, se estima necesario reiterar, que se está ante el pedimento del reconocimiento de una indemnización a cargo de las demandadas (Administración Pública), con ocasión de la afectación de los inmuebles del que es titular la sociedad actora, por estar comprendidos en su totalidad, en la reserva [Nombre 038]. Sobre el particular, nuevamente llama la atención de la ambigüedad de la alegación que se formula, en tanto se hizo referencia tanto a la prescripción ordinaria, de diez años en la forma prevista tanto en el artículo 868 del Código Civil, como en el ordinal 61 de la Ley de reforma integral a la Ley número 7495, de Expropiaciones, número 9286, del once de noviembre del dos mil once -vigente a partir del cuatro de febrero del dos mil quince-; como en el plazo cuatrienal del numeral 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; y además, establece diversos momentos a partir del cual debe hacerse este cómputo temporal, así, de primera entrada, a partir de la vigencia de la Ley General de Terrenos Baldíos, número 13, del diez de enero de mil novecientos treinta y nueve, por ser la primera regulación que estableció la inalienabilidad de las tierras de los indígenas (artículo 8); o a partir de la promulgación de los decretos que determinaron la ubicación geográfica de la reserva de [Nombre 022], sea a partir de mil novecientos setenta y seis. Y a tal efecto, se alega que los plazos dados, sea de diez años o de cuatro años, están sobrepasados, por haberse notificado esta demanda, al menos al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, hasta el veintidós de setiembre del año dos mil dieciséis -hecho probado 16.) -. No obstante las anteriores indicaciones, luego de un mesurado análisis, esta Cámara de Jueces estimamos que no se configura la alegada prescripción. Y esto es así en atención al derecho que se alega infringido y régimen jurídico que le regula, sea al derecho de propiedad, en el cual, resulta legítimo el establecimiento de limitaciones de interés social, las cuales, en principio no son indemnizables, por no implicar la supresión del derecho, supuesto en el cual, de vaciarse el contenido esencial del mismo, sí deben ser indemnizadas, por traducirse en expropiaciones de hecho. Así, mientras se mantenga aquella situación, habría una lesión en perjuicio del titular, y no podría hacerse el cómputo de la prescripción para reclamar el derecho. A este efecto, se reiteran las consideraciones dadas por este mismo Tribunal, en la sentencia número 88-2020-VI, de las catorce horas veinte minutos del veintinueve de julio del año en curso, cuando distinguió el grado de las limitaciones administrativas, luego de lo cual, si el grado es absoluto da lugar a la indemnización establecida por el mandato constitucional:

"VII.- En lo que respecta a las limitaciones administrativas, pueden consistir en meras restricciones. Consisten en condiciones legales del ejercicio del derecho de propiedad. Es una tolerancia que el propietario debe soportar, por lo que tratan de un sacrificio particular o especial del propietario que implica una restricción que se extiende a todo titular a quien se direccione estas medidas. Están ínsitas en el contenido y existencia del derecho de dominio. Por ende, son generales, constantes y actuales. Son limitadas en número y clase, sin que puedan llegar a desmembrar el derecho de propiedad, es decir, restringir de tal forma su uso y goce que lleguen a afectar la plenitud del derecho. Dada su generalidad, no se indemnizan, excepción hecha de los daños que culposamente pueda ocasionar la Administración al ejecutar los trabajos en que se materializa la restricción. Con todo, como límite infranqueable, deben ser proporcionales a la necesidad administrativa que con ella se debe satisfacer, ergo, deben responder a una necesidad administrativa, no pueden desintegrar el contenido del derecho de propiedad. En cuanto a los alcances y restricciones de esas limitaciones a la propiedad, el Tribunal Constitucional en el fallo aludido expresó en lo relevante: "VIII. No obstante lo señalado en los considerandos anteriores, debe advertirse que las limitaciones legítimas que puedan imponerse a la propiedad privada encuentran su frontera natural en el grado de afectación a la propiedad; esto es, cuando la restricción al derecho de propiedad se convierte en una verdadera expropiación con la consecuente obligación de indemnizar, porque se hace desaparecer completamente el derecho de propiedad, o cuando no se afecte a la generalidad de la colectividad. Así lo señaló la Corte Plena en relación con las limitaciones a imponer a la propiedad cuando traspasan el límite señalado, en sesión extraordinaria del dieciséis de junio de mil novecientos ochenta y tres: "[...] es decir "limitaciones" como las llama el artículo 45, pero no despojo de la propiedad privada ni privación de un atributo primario del dominio, porque impedir el goce de los bienes equivale, al menos en este caso, a una forma de expropiación sin el requisito de previa indemnización que ordena la carta política"; y como lo indicó este Tribunal en las citadas sentencias número 5097-93 y 2345-96; en que señaló: "IV.) Para la Sala los límites razonables que el Estado puede imponer a la propiedad privada, de acuerdo con su naturaleza, son constitucionalmente posibles en tanto no vacíen su contenido. Cuando ello ocurre deja de ser ya una limitación razonable para convertirse en una privación del derecho mismo". (Sentencia número 5097-93); "Es decir, pueden limitarse los atributos de la propiedad, en tanto el propietario reserve para sí la posibilidad de explotar normalmente el bien, excluida claro está, la parte o la función afectada por la limitación impuesta por el Estado. Fuera de estos parámetros, si el bienestar social exige sacrificios de uno o de algunos únicamente, debe ser indemnizado, lo mismo que ocurre cuando el sacrificio que se impone al propietario es de tal identidad, que lo hace perder en su totalidad el bien. Así, la limitación a la propiedad resiste el análisis constitucional, cuando la afectación a los atributos esenciales de la propiedad que son aquellos que permiten el uso natural de la cosa dentro de la realidad socio-económica actual, no hace desaparecer la naturaleza del bien o haga imposible el uso de la cosa, porque el Estado imponga requisitos de autorización o de aprobación tan complejos que impliquen de hecho, la imposibilidad de usufructuar el bien". (sentencia número 2345-96)." De lo anteriormente expuesto se colige que el derecho indemnizatorio a favor del propietario de un inmueble, surge en la medida que la Administración ejerza la potestad expropiatoria, por causas de interés público (numeral 45 párrafo primero de la Carta Magna), conforme al trámite previsto en la Ley de Expropiaciones, o ley especial sobre el particular. Además, ese derecho emerge cuando se utilice cualquier otra forma de afectación o limitación al ejercicio pleno del dominio, siempre que, en el fondo, esa modalidad consista en una imposibilidad de ejercicio de la nuda propiedad. En esa línea, el canon 13 de la Ley de Expropiaciones señala: "Las disposiciones de esta Ley serán aplicables para constituir servidumbres y para todo tipo de afectación de bienes y derechos. Cuando, por el tipo de afectación, se le limite sustancialmente la disponibilidad del bien o el derecho, la tramitación como afectación será improcedente y deberá ejecutarla la expropiación integral." En igual sentido, el ordinal 17 de la Ley de Expropiaciones regula el denominado remanente disfuncional, que impone que, en aquellos casos de expropiaciones parciales, el resto del inmueble no pueda ser utilizado por el titular en las actividades permitidas. En ambos casos, cuando el efecto material sea la limitación sustancial de la disponibilidad del bien, lo debido es establecer la expropiación total de ese bien. Lo anterior ya que, en ese supuesto, se estaría no ante una afectación de la propiedad, propia del régimen de las limitaciones administrativas, sino ante una verdadera expropiación de hecho, en la medida en que se suprime por completo la posibilidad de disposición del bien. Lo anterior debe analizarse en cada caso concreto, para lo cual, es imperativo considerar el uso permitido del suelo de cada inmueble a expropiar, así como las cabidas mínimas de fraccionamiento o edificación. Por ejemplo, si el remanente no expropiado o la franja de terreno sobre la cual no pesa la limitación administrativa tiene una cabida inferior a la que establece el plan regulador para poder ejercer el derecho de transformación o construcción (ius edificandi), en los casos de terrenos con vocación urbanística, el efecto jurídico material es la supresión de la disponibilidad de uso de la heredad, llevando en tales hipótesis a la obligación de expropiar todo el terreno. Igual ocurre cuando en los terrenos con vocación urbana, el plan regulador no permite ningún tipo de transformación, pues en esos casos, se expone al propietario a una suerte de imposibilidad de explotación de su inmueble, expidiéndose ser propietario de un bien, con las obligaciones urbanas que imponen las limitaciones administrativas, v.gr., construcción y mantenimiento de aceras, conservación y seguridad del inmueble, entre muchas, así como cargas tributarias referidas al inmueble, entre ellas, impuesto sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria, tasas municipales varias, sin que pueda sacar provecho de uso y disposición del bien. Cabe reiterar que una de las características de las restricciones y servidumbres es que el propietario no pierde totalmente esa condición y puede continuar utilizando el bien, en el marco de lo permitido y debido, empero, no supone la pérdida absoluta de la disponibilidad del bien. Por ello, cuando como consecuencia de una limitación administrativa, el propietario no pueda del todo utilizar el bien o no pueda darle uso, supondría en el fondo una transferencia del bien a la totalidad del uso público, lo que llevaría, se insiste, a una expropiación de hecho. De ahí que en cada caso deba examinarse si la propiedad se torna disfuncional o se enerva sustancialmente la nuda propiedad, caso en el cual, como tutela del derecho de propiedad, se impone la orden expropiatoria, a fin de no someter al titular a una desposesión injustificada." En el caso en estudio, siendo que la sociedad actora se presenta como titular registral de los bienes inmuebles cuya indemnización reclama en este proceso mantiene como titular, conforme a las certificaciones registrales que acompañan esta acción -hechos probados 14.) y 15.)-, y no consta que esta situación haya sido modificada - hecho no probado 5.)-, y conforme fue alegado, sobre ellas pesa una afectación al incorporarlas a la reserva [Nombre62 038], la cual se mantiene a la fecha, es que no resulta posible estimar que se haya producido la prescripción alegada, defensa que debe ser rechazada. En este mimo sentido, en sentencia número 85-2020-VI, de las quince cuarenta horas, del treinta de junio del año en curso, este Tribunal consideró; “… este Tribunal no puede compartir un alegato de prescripción como el formulado por el Estado, dado que esa comprensión llevaría a cohonestar la confiscación de propiedad privada como resultado del mero paso del tiempo, a partir de una adquisición forzosa u ocupación de hecho e ilegítima de un bien propiedad de un particular, sea que la misma se justifique o no en una causa de utilidad pública. Visto desde otra perspectiva, aceptar la tesis de la prescriptibilidad del reclamo indemnizatorio, conllevaría al mismo tiempo, admitir que resulta jurídicamente posible para el Estado la apropiación de bienes adquiridos por confiscación, bajo la única excusa de que ha operado el mero paso del tiempo sin que la persona afectada reclame. En rigor, si el objeto de esta causa radica, precisamente, en la supuesta inercia del Estado en la satisfacción de la reparación asociada a la franja de terreno debatida, la defensa de prescripción es improcedente y como tal debe ser rechazada...” Las anteriores consideraciones que resultan de aplicación al subjudice; y obligan al rechazo de la prescripción alegada. Sobre este particular, se advierte que este pronunciamiento no incide en el fondo del análisis del conflicto formulado, al cual nos avocaremos de seguido.

VIII.- DE LOS PRESUPUESTOS DE LA INDEMNIZACIÓN DE DERECHOS DE TIERRAS UBICADAS EN RESERVAS INDÍGENAS.- Para el análisis de fondo al que refiere esta acción, debemos atender a lo establecido en el ordenamiento jurídico nacional respecto de los presupuesto para las indemnizaciones de derechos de personas no indígenas, cuyos terrenos se ubican en reservas indígenas, conforme a las delimitaciones geográficas dadas a tal efecto, ya sea mediante ley o en decretos del Poder Ejecutivo. Este ha sido un tema ya abordado de manera consistente y reiterada por este Tribunal en diversas ocasiones, así por ejemplo, la número 74-2013-VII, de las diez horas treinta minutos del veintinueve de octubre del dos mil trece, de la Sección Sétima, 38-2016-VI, de las diez veinticinco minutos del ocho de marzo y 66-2016-VI, de las quince horas del veintiuno de abril, las dos últimas dictadas en el año dos mil dieciséis; 15-2019-VI, de las ocho horas treinta minutos del trece de febrero del dos mil diecinueve, 86-2020-VI, de las quince horas cincuenta minutos del treinta de junio y la número 105-2020-VI, de las catorce horas quince minutos del veintiocho de agosto, las dos últimas del año dos mil veinte y de la Sección Sexta; y la número 23-2019-IV, de las once horas dieciocho minutos del veintinueve de marzo del dos mil diecinueve, de la Sección Cuarta, todos del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo. De los anteriores precedentes es posible inferir lo siguiente: lineamientos que orientan la decisión en este asunto.

Primero: Tratándose de las reservas indígenas establecidas y reconocidas en nuestro país, es necesario reiterar que se trata de terrenos que son destinados para uso exclusivo de los pueblos indígenas y en tal virtud, están abstraídos del comercio de los hombres, es decir son inalienables y además son imprescriptibles, y "no transferibles ", dado que por mandato legal están destinados "... exclusivamente para las comunidades indígenas que las habitan", y se aclara que " (L)os no indígenas no podrán alquilar, arrendar, comprar o de cualquier otra manera adquirir terrenos o fincas comprendidas dentro de estas reservas"; conforme al numeral 3 de la Ley Indígena, número 6172, del veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete. Consecuentemente, se trata de un régimen especial de propiedad, en tanto difiere del concepto de propiedad privada previsto en el ordenamiento jurídico nacional conforme a la previsión del numeral 45 de la Carta Fundamental y en la legislación ordinaria -sea la de orden civil, urbana y agraria-; y que por las limitaciones que implica para los no indígenas, se traduce en limitaciones a los atributos ordinarios del derecho de propiedad (privada), en los términos previstos en el artículo 264 del Código Civil, dado que es un régimen diverso, según se ha indicado.

Segundo: Ahora bien, en la forma ya indicada por este Tribunal, la procedencia de la indemnización está condicionada a la concurrencia de varios elementos, conforme lo dispone la normativa que rige esta materia. En este sentido, en lo que interesa a este asunto, en las sentencias números 15-2019-VI, número 23-2019-VI, 86-2020-VI y 105-2020-VI supra citadas, se ha expuesto lo siguiente en lo que es de interés:

"a) Elemento material: El primer presupuesto que resulta de lógica preponderancia en este tipo de casos, es que el terreno cuya expropiación e indemnización se peticiona, se encuentre territorialmente, dentro del área de una Reserva [Nombre 038]. Esto exige un análisis casuístico a fin de determinar esa correspondencia geográfica. La acreditación de este aspecto puede realizarse de diversas formas, pues bien puede sustentarse en una constancia expedida por las autoridades administrativas correspondientes, así como mediante prueba técnica, entre otras, análisis periciales de topografía, levantamientos topográficos satelitales, documentos del Instituto Geográfico Nacional, entre otros. Lo determinante en cuanto a este aspecto, es definir esa pertenencia del terreno a un área de reserva indígena, deducción que no puede limitarse a un tipo de probanza en particular. b) Elemento subjetivo: Por un lado, el expropiado debe ser un no indígena que sea titular del derecho de dominio o de la posesión de un fundo que se encuentra dentro de los límites de la Reserva [Nombre62 038] , en este último caso, siempre que la posesión haya sido ejercitada de buena fe en los términos del Código Civil. Lo anterior implica que en los casos en que esa posesión lo haya sido de mala fe, no existe derecho alguno a la indemnización, aspecto que en cada caso ha de ser analizado conforme a los elementos de prueba aportados al expediente. En este punto, puede citarse el caso de la adquisición de terrenos de parte de un indígena, caso en el cual, ese aspecto haría presumir el conocimiento de que las tierras formaban parte de la propiedad comunitaria que aplica en esta materia. Desde este plano, en caso de no ser poseedores de buena fe, las autoridades administrativas deberán proceder de inmediato al desalojo del inmueble sin derecho indemnizatorio alguno a reconocer. c) Elemento Temporal: De igual manera, la norma hace inferir una regla de temporalidad que condiciona el otorgamiento de la indemnización correspondiente, en el sentido de que la titularidad registral del terreno o el ejercicio posesorio, ha de haber iniciado de previo a que el área en que se encuentra ubicada la finca en concreto, fuese incluida dentro de la zona de Reserva Indígena. Así, la fecha de inscripción del bien o correspondiente adquisición (siempre que la enajenación fuese de quien no era indígena) o el inicio de actos posesorios, ha de haberse producido antes de que la zona respectiva fuese declarada como reserva indígena. Luego de esa declaratoria que se realiza mediante la Ley No. 6172, o bien, de la ampliación de límites de la reserva respectiva (cuando el terreno en debate no formara parte del área original de esas reservas), al tenor de la restricción impuesta por el canon 3 señalado ut supra, esos actos de traslado de dominio o de derechos de posesión serán absolutamente nulos, y por ende, inoponibles al trámite de indemnización comentado, por cuanto tendrían como objeto un bien sobre el cual ya ha recaído una limitación legalmente impuesta y que por ende, no forma parte del comercio. Así se desprende del canon 3 de marras en cuanto indica: "... Los no indígenas no podrán alquilar, arrendar, comprar o de cualquier otra manera adquirir terrenos o fincas comprendidas dentro de estas reservas. (...)". Esa norma posibilita el comercio de bienes solo entre indígenas, sancionando la nulidad de contratos suscritos entre indígenas y no indígenas, así como la adquisición de parte de no indígenas de terrenos que hayan sido declarados parte de alguna reserva. Ergo, constituida la reserva y delimitada su área, no será posible la titulación de terrenos, o traspasos de dominio sobre bienes que formen parte de esa cobertura. Para ello, el referente no es otro que la norma legal o el Decreto Ejecutivo en el que se definen los límites de cada reserva, o bien, la norma que amplié los parámetros territoriales previamente establecidos. Es decir, para esos efectos, es necesario considerar el acto formal que afecta las heredades del no indígena, mediante una declaración de voluntad administrativa que define esa porción de terreno como parte de la zona indígena. Cabe reiterar que, con independencia de la fecha de adquisición, el mismo ordinal 3 establece la nulidad ipso iure (de pleno derecho) de los traspasos de un indígena a favor de un no indígena, caso en el cual, es evidente que, por la invalidez del título traslativo de dominio, no procedería la indemnización de comentario. De igual modo, este elemento guarda incidencia a su vez en el análisis del componente de la buena fe, pues una vez realizada la declaratoria de afectación, y constando tal circunstancia en el margen registral del terreno, los actos de adquisición de dominio o de posesión no serán tenidos como de buena fe, por ende, no cabrá reparación monetaria. …” (Resaltado es del original.)

Tercero: De lo dicho, queda claro que es el mismo ordenamiento nacional el que estableció los mecanismos o instrumentos en favor de los propietarios o poseedores " de buena fe" de inmuebles incorporados en reservas indígenas, conforme a la delimitación limítrofe que la ley o el Poder Ejecutivo haga de cada reserva indígena. Así, en primer lugar, la reubicación, "en otras tierras similares" y si ello no fuere posible o no hubiere consentimiento de parte del afectado, con la expropiación e indemnización, a través de los procedimientos ordinarios establecidos en la Ley de Expropiaciones. Por este motivo, interesa definir lo que se entiende por propietario o poseedor de buena fe, por cuanto del cumplimiento de este presupuesto, se infiere que da lugar a la indemnización correspondiente, en resguardo del derecho de propiedad, conforme al numeral 45 de la Constitución Política. Así, no basta la existencia de la propiedad registral o la posesión del inmueble para que se genere esta obligación a cargo de la Administración. En este sentido, resultan de referencia (parámetro) los principios comprendidos en los numerales 17 a 22 del Código Civil en relación al 10 y 131.3 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al tenor de los cuales, resulta absolutamente prohibido el pretender efectos jurídicos no permitidos o prohibidos por el ordenamiento jurídico, como lo sería el procurar un ejercicio antisocial o un abuso del derecho en relación a particulares y desviación de poder en el caso de la Administración Pública, siendo que en el ámbito del Derecho Administrativo y con ello de las relaciones jurídico-administrativas, la norma "... deberá ser interpretada [y aplicada] en la forma que mejor garantice la realización del fin público a que se dirige, dentro del respeto debido a los derechos e intereses del particular", según reza el citado canon 10 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. E n esta materia, y al amparo de la normativa que la rige, sólo los derechos (de propiedad o de posesión) adquiridos por personas no indígenas previo a aquella delimitación -y con ello, de la afectación de tales terrenos al régimen jurídico de propiedad indígena- es que se puede calificar como de buena fe, y con ello, da lugar a la correspondiente indemnización del derecho de propiedad privada y de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados con aquella afectación. Al contrario, bien puede concluirse que todo acto de traspaso o disposición de bienes comprendidos en reservas indígenas, realizado con posterioridad a la determinación de las tierras que conforman en la respectiva reserva indígena -según delimitación realizada ya sea por la Asamblea Legislativa a través de la ley o por el Poder Ejecutivo, mediante decreto dictado al efecto-, deviene, en tesis de principio y por disposición de ley -artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena-, en nulo, por tratarse de inmuebles que están fuera del comercio de los hombres. En este sentido es necesario precisar que u n efecto directo de esta afectación en la disposición de los territorios declarados reservas indígenas, es que las personas no indígenas no podrán alquilar, arrendar, comprar o adquirir terrenos o fincas ubicadas dentro de las reservas indígenas y si se realizan actos de disposición (compra, venta, o de cualquier tipo), después de una declaratoria de un territorio como reserva indígena, serán actuaciones absolutamente nulas, como lo dispone de manera expresa el numeral 3 de la Ley Indígena, que para mayor claridad para su comprensión se transcribe en su literalidad, en lo que interesa a este caso:

"Artículo 3º.- Las reservas indígenas son inalienables e imprescriptibles, no transferibles y exclusivas para las comunidades indígenas que las habitan. Los no indígenas no podrán alquilar, arrendar, comprar o de cualquier otra manera adquirir terrenos o fincas comprendidas dentro de estas reservas. Los indígenas sólo podrán negociar sus tierras con otros indígenas. Todo traspaso o negociación de tierras o mejoras de éstas en las reservas indígenas, entre indígenas y no indígenas, es absolutamente nulo, con las consecuencias legales del caso. ..." (El resaltado no es del original.)

En este sentido, debemos recordar que los decretos de creación de reservas indígenas, al igual que el resto de las disposiciones normativas, son publicados en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, bastando con esta publicitación para su puesta en conocimiento de la ciudadanía y población de la Nación. En principio, en atención al principio de inmatriculación de los bienes de dominio público, esta afectación no requeriría ulterior indicación en el Registro Público de la Propiedad; no obstante, siendo que es un régimen especial de propiedad -ya se indicó, diversa al régimen de propiedad privada, al tener una connotación jurídica especial, de carácter comunitario de los pueblos indígenas, y que permite la transmisión entre indígenas-, se entiende que esta afectación al menos debe estar determinada y consignada en algún documento público, como lo son los respectivos decretos de afectación y derivado de esto, especificado al menos en algún estudio o plano. Por eso, cualquier traspaso u ocupación que se haga luego de demarcada el área de la reserva indígena, deberá ser considerado de mala fe, supuesto en el cual se debe proceder con su expulsión (acto de policía) o desalojo inmediato por las vías legales previstas al efecto (desahucio administrativo), y consecuentemente, no podría procederse a indemnización alguna. Sobre este punto en concreto, en sentencia número 74-2013-VII, supra citada, se consideró como sigue:

"En el caso de las personas que se encuentren siendo titulares registrales del dominio o de algún derecho real, que cuenten con título y que lo sea de mala fe, debería procederse con la acción prevista por el ordenamiento jurídico para la remoción de mundo jurídico del título correspondiente, para posteriormente lograr el desalojo respectivo. En el caso de que el título haya sido otorgado en el ejercicio de alguna potestad administrativa (titulación por parte de una autoridad pública entre otros), habría ello de importar la acción por la vía de la lesividad si es del caso, sin perjuicio de lo previsto en el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública o la acción directa ejercida por parte del titular del derecho afectado. Para el supuesto de los no indígenas, ya sean simples poseedores, ya sean titulares registrales del dominio y/o algún derecho real sobre el inmueble, en tanto se encuentren actuando de buena fe, debe procederse por el INDER a proponerles una alternativa para su reubicación en terrenos que habrían de resultar equivalentes en lo posible, con los así afectados por estos terceros en las reservas indígenas." IX.- ANÁLISIS DE LA CUESTIÓN.- Se procede a determinar si resulta o no conforme con el bloque de juridicidad señalado previamente, el reclamo indemnizatorio que formula la sociedad actora respecto de las fincas con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 025] , [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], todas de la Provincia de [Nombre62 037], de la que es su titular registral. En la forma indicada, este pedimento está condicionado a la adecuación de los presupuestos establece el ordenamiento que rige la materia.

Primero: De la titularidad de los inmuebles y el origen de los mismos: Antes que nada, se debe determinar la titularidad registral de los inmuebles cuya indemnización reclama la sociedad actora. Se trata de las fincas con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], todas de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], ubicadas en el distrito [Nombre 016], cantón de [Nombre 007] - hechos probados 14.) y 15.)-. Consta en autos que, mediante escritura pública número doscientos quince, suscrita el ocho de julio del año dos mil ocho en el protocolo de la notaria pública Marina Murillo Calderón, los apoderados generalísimos sin límite de suma de las sociedades [Nombre 041] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre 012] y [Nombre62 013]) le vendieron a [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima ([Nombre62 001]) la finca con matrícula [Valor 029], con una medida en esa data de 41.931 metros cuadrados 42 decímetros cuadrados, y correspondiéndose en todo al plano catastrado número [Valor 007] - hecho probado 7.)-; derecho que quedó inscrito el seis de agosto del dos mil ocho -hecho probado 8.)-. Posteriormente, en escritura pública número [Valor 056], de fecha veintisiete de marzo del dos mil doce, a folios [Valor 052] vuelto a [Valor 053] vuelto del Tomo [Valor 054] del protocolo del notario público José Aurelio Aguilar Sandí, el personero de la sociedad aquí actora [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima-, hizo cuatro segregaciones de la finca anterior -hecho probado 13.) -, escritura que quedó inscrita el nueve de abril del dos mil dos mil doce, dando así origen a las cuatro fincas restantes [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], hecho probado 14.)-. Como se deduce de lo anterior, el área de cobertura de las últimas fincas comprende parte de la finca madre adquirida por [Nombre62 029] Sociedad Anónima en el año de dos mil ocho; existiendo identidad de éstas con aquella de la cual fueron segregadas.

Segundo: De la afectación a la propiedad indígena de las fincas de la sociedad actora: Respecto de cada propiedad indicada, se corresponde un plano catastrado, en el cual la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas puso nota de advertencia en su reverso, en la que indica que la propiedad representada en el gráfico, se encontraba, en su totalidad, dentro de la Reserva [Nombre 038], distrito [Nombre 016], cantón de [Nombre 007] , Provincia de [Nombre 037], pero que se autorizaba la inscripción de esos planos catastrados, por existir la finca con anterioridad a la fecha de creación de la indicada reserva -hechos probados 5.), 9.), 10.), 11.) y 12.)-. Para mayor comprensión, concretamos esa correspondencia entre las fincas de la sociedad actora y su graficación en su plano catastrado correspondiente en el siguiente cuadro:

Número de Folio Real Número de plano catastrado Área que se detalla en el plano Área que se registra en la certificación registral [Valor 029] Finca madre hecho probado 5.), en relación al y 7.) y 15.)

[Valor 007] inscrito el Catastro Nacional: el 1° de agosto del 2005 hecho probado 5.)

4ha1931.42 m2 se corresponde a la totalidad de la finca, de como fue adquirida por la sociedad actora en el año 2008 -hecho probado 7.)- - al adquirir la propiedad 2008:

41.931.42m2 -hecho probado 7.)- - luego de las segregaciones en el 2011:

10.000,42 m2 -hecho probado 15.)

[Valor 025] hecho probado 14.) en relación al 9.)

SJ-148703-2011 inscrito en el Catastro Nacional el 20 de marzo del 2011 hecho probado 9.)

4.808 m2 -hecho probado 9.)

-En escritura de segregación, se correspondió al lote 1, con una medida 4.808 m2 -hecho probado 14.)- 4.808 m2 -hecho probado 14.)- [Valor 004] hecho probado 14.) en relación al 11.)

[Valor 016] inscrito en el Catastro Nacional el 31 de marzo del 2011 -hecho probado 11.)- 5.825 m2 -hecho probado 11.)- -En escritura de segregación se corresponde al lote 2, con una medida de 5.825 m2 -hecho probado 13.)- 5.825 m2 -hecho probado 14.)- [Valor 005] hecho probado 14.), en relación al 12.)

[Valor 017] inscrito en el Catastro Nacional el treinta y uno de marzo del 2011 -hecho probado 12.)- 1 ha 1.298 m2 -hecho probado 12.)- -En escritura de segregación se corresponde al lote 3, con una medida de 11.298 m2 -hecho probado 13.)- 11.298 m2 -hecho probado 14.)- [Valor 006] [Valor 015] inscrito en el catastro nacional el 29 de marzo del 2011 -hecho probado 10.)- 1 ha 0000 m2 -hecho probado 10.)- -En escritura de segregación se corresponde al lote 4, con una medida de 10.000 m2 -hecho probado 13.)- 10.000 m2 -hecho probado 14.)- En atención a la consideración realizada por la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, es importante considerar que en efecto, como fue alegado por la sociedad actora en su demanda, la finca madre existe con anterioridad a la fecha de creación de la reserva [Nombre62 038], dado que como se desprende de la propia certificación registral, encuentra su origen como tal, en la finca [Nombre167 009] , de la cual fue segregada en fecha cuatro de setiembre de mil novecientos setenta y tres, y trasladada su titularidad, a la señora [Nombre62 011] - hecho probado 6.)- Así pues, resulta cierta la aseveración que hiciera la Comisión en relación a la circunstancia de que la finca existía con anterioridad a la creación de la reserva, lo que ocurrió hasta mil novecientos setenta y seis, con la promulgación del Decreto Ejecutivo número 6036-G, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta 113, del doce de junio del año indicado -hecho probado 1.)-. Pero es importante advertir, que en este acto, no se hizo ninguna determinación geográfica de la reserva creada, dado que ello se hizo en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 10707-G, del veinticuatro de octubre de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, el cual fue publicado el ocho de noviembre siguiente en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta número 210 -hecho probado 2.)-; demarcación que fue modificada mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29452-G, del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, cuya publicación se hizo en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta número 93, del dieciséis de mayo siguiente -hecho probado 4.)-. Entiende esta autoridad que es con base en esta demarcación que la finca inicialmente con número de folio real [Valor 029], de la Provincia de [Nombre62 037], se encuentra afectada al régimen especial de la propiedad indígena, como fue advertido al momento de inscribirse el plano catastrado correspondiente [Valor 007], hecho probado 5.)-, lo que conlleva a su vez, que las subsiguientes segregaciones tengan la misma afectación, por derivación. Si la finca madre está ubicada en la reserva indígena, los lotes que se segreguen van a tener la misma condición, y viceversa, siendo que la última demarcación geográfica de la reserva indígena fue publicitada el dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno -hecho probado 4.)-. Sobre este particular es importante advertir que no lleva razón la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural en cuestionar la validez de las manifestaciones que hiciera la Dirección Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, que ubicó las fincas de la actora aquí referenciadas, dentro de la reserva de [Nombre62 022]. Nótese que desde el primer Decreto Ejecutivo citado -número 6036-G-, que precisamente crea la reserva, en su artículo 11 delegó en el entonces Instituto de Tierras y Colonización -hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Rural-, para que en coordinación con la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, hiciese la delimitación territorial de la reserva -hecho probado 1.) -; competencia que luego es confirmada en el artículo 8 de la Ley Indígena, número 6172, del veintinueve de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y siete. En virtud de lo anterior, al constituirse en una institución pública -artículo 1 de su Ley de creación, número 5251, del once de noviembre de mil novecientos setenta y tres-, y en tal virtud, dotado de personalidad jurídica propia, es que resulta plenamente competente para determinar si un fundo está o no ubicado en espacios geográficos reservados para las respectivas reservas indígenas. De manera que, no le cabe la menor duda a este Tribunal de la afectación al régimen de la propiedad indígena que pesa sobre las fincas [Valor 029] , [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], cuya titular registral es [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima; en la forma como fue declarado por la Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas y alegado en esta acción, por la interesada.

Segundo: De la condición de propietario de mala fe: Ahora bien, no obstante que el personero de la sociedad actora intentó desechar el análisis referido a la determinación del cumplimiento de este presupuesto, por estimarlo superfluo e innecesario tratándose de la titularidad de un derecho de propiedad, y no de mera posesión sobre el bien inmueble ubicado dentro de una reserva indígena, procede el rechazo de tales alegaciones. Y ello, en estricta aplicación de la norma legal que establece como presupuesto, ineludible para la procedencia de la indemnización del derecho correspondiente, en la forma ya indicada en los ordinales 3 y 5 de la Ley Indígena. Y en este sentido, cabe aclararle a la sociedad actora, que por supuesto que la normativa que nos ocupa reconoce el derecho de propiedad y el ejercicio de la posesión de personas no indígenas, que al momento de hacerse la demarcación geográfica correspondiente, tenían su derecho sobre un bien inmueble que quedó afectado con aquella determinación. No obstante, como se expresa de manera clara en el citado numeral 3, una vez que son determinadas geográficamente las coordenadas de la respectiva reserva indígena, ya sea mediante Decreto Ejecutivo -como sucedió en este caso-, o legal, los fundos comprendidos en esta delimitación resultan afectados al régimen especial de la propiedad indígena, en virtud de lo cual aquellos fundos salen del comercio de las personas no indígenas, ya que el uso y aprovechamiento de esas tierras está reservado en exclusivo, para las personas indígenas; de donde cualquier negocio jurídico en contravención de este régimen especial, es nulo de pleno derecho. Téngase en consideración además, que tales delimitaciones son publicadas en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, para efectos, no sólo de los titulares registrales en aquel momento, sino de terceros. Por la claridad y contundencia de esta disposición legal, previamente transcrita, resulta entonces necesario revisar, no sólo las alegaciones de derechos de posesión, sino también de los títulos de propiedad que se aleguen cuando se formulan este tipo de gestiones. Esto es imperativo de la ley, una vez más, de la relación de las disposiciones 3 y 5 de la Ley Indígena. En razón de lo dicho, y revisado lo acontecido en este asunto, se concluye que la sociedad actora no ostenta un título de buena fe respecto de sus predios, a efecto de solicitar la indemnización que reclama en esta acción, ya que a la fecha en que adquirió la finca [Valor 029], ya estaba, no sólo delimitada geográficamente la reserva [Nombre62 038], conforme a los límites actuales, sino que aquella condición se hizo notar en el respectivo plano catastrado [Valor 007] -hecho probado 5.)-, permitiéndose o autorizándose la inscripción del plano, por ser anterior la existencia de la finca, a la creación de la reserva -hecho probado 5.)-, cuya última demarcación geográfica se publicó el dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno -hecho probado 4.)-. En efecto, la escritura de compraventa por la que adquirió el supuesto derecho de propiedad la sociedad actora data del ocho de julio del dos mil ocho -hecho probado 7.)-; la cual quedó inscrita en el Registro Público de la Propiedad el seis de agosto siguiente -hecho probado 8.)-. En otros términos, cuando [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima suscribió el contrato de compraventa de aquel inmueble, ya pesaba sobre él la afectación al régimen de propiedad indígena, y por ello, tratándose en este caso, de un negocio suscrito entre dos personas jurídicas -obviamente no indígenas-, ello obliga a tenerlo como un negocio nulo de puro derecho, en la forma prevista en la ley. Las subsecuentes segregaciones padecen del mismo vicio, no obstante que se mantiene la titularidad de los nuevos fundos en la misma persona jurídica -aquí accionante-, pero que da lugar al nacimiento de cuatro nuevas fincas -hechos probados 13.) y 14.)-. Nótese en este sentido, que en los respectivos planos catastrados se dejó la advertencia -ya conocida por la interesada- de que aquellas tierras estaban ubicadas dentro de la reserva [Nombre 038] -hechos probados 9.), 10.), 11.) y 12.)-.

X.- DE LAS PRETENSIONES DE LA DEMANDA: Sobre la base de las anteriores consideraciones se procede al pronunciamiento de cada una de las pretensiones formuladas en esta acción.

Primera: De la pretensión declarativa (pretensión # 2): Interesa resaltar que es procedente acoger la primera pretensión de naturaleza declarativa formulada en esta acción. En efecto, en la forma presentada en la demanda, y confirmada en la Audiencia Preliminar, fue requerido por [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima disponer lo siguiente en sentencia:

" 2.- Que se declare que la finca del partido de [Nombre62 037], Folios Reales [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006] se encuentran inmersas, en su totalidad, dentro de los linderos de la Reserva [Nombre62 038]." En razón de lo anterior, se declara que las fincas de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], con matrícula de Folio Real números [Valor 029] , [Valor 030], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] y [Valor 006] se ubican, en su totalidad, dentro de los linderos de la Reserva [Nombre 038].

Segundo: De la pretensión de condena formuladas (pretensiones # 3, 4 y 5):

i.- No obstante que las propiedades inmuebles de la sociedad actora se ubican dentro de la reserva [Nombre62 038], e n la forma antes explicada, no cumple la accionante con el presupuesto de derecho previsto en el ordenamiento que rige la materia para legitimar una indemnización de tierras privadas ubicadas en reservas indígenas y que está referido a la tenencia de un título de propiedad de buena fe, a modo de condición "sine qua non". Esta sola circunstancia hace improcedente el reclamo indemnizatorio formulado. Pero adicionalmente, debe de considerarse que, en la forma como fue planteada esta pretensión, estableció como causa de la indemnización pedida, la expropiación de hecho por parte del Estado, de los fundos indicados. En este sentido, es importante considerar que no obstante la afectación al régimen de la propiedad indígena de las fincas referenciadas de la sociedad actora, es importante advertir que, no fue acreditada la alegada expropiación de hecho, ni tampoco despojo de las anteriores tierras por parte de las administraciones públicas involucradas en la atención de estos asuntos. En este sentido, no consta que el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y/o la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas hayan ejercido acciones de reivindicación en relación a las propiedades con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 025], [Valor 004], [Valor 005] o [Valor 006], cuya propietaria registral en la actualidad es [Nombre 029] Sociedad Anónima - hecho no probado 1.)-. Tampoco, ha acreditado la actora que el Estado haya titulado aquellas tierras a Nombre62 de la Asociación [Nombre 040] - hecho no probado 2.)-. No se encuentra prueba alguna de que la Administración haya realizado acto material alguno de ocupación de esas fincas -hecho no probado 3.)-. Por el contrario, el propio accionante señaló que desde que adquirió la finca [Valor 029] , ha ejercido plena posesión sobre aquella, y consiguientemente, de los cuatros lotes segregados. Así pues, procede la desestimación de la acción en relación a este extremo de la demanda. Por accesoriedad, igual suerte corre el pedimento de intereses e indexación que sobre el particular fueron requeridos.

ii.- No procede daño moral subjetivo. Finalmente, la sociedad actora requirió la indemnización de un daño moral subjetivo, causado con ocasión de la situación planteada en la acción. Bastaría con señalar que, si es improcedente el reclamo indemnizatorio de los predios indicados, por no adecuarse a los presupuestos establecidos en el bloque de legalidad y no haberse producido expropiación de hecho, como fuera alegado, también lo es, por accesoriedad, este nuevo reclamo. Ahora bien, interesa resaltar que no obstante que al tenor de lo dispuesto en los artículos 41 de la Carta Fundamental y 197 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública resulta procedente la indemnización o reparación -a cargo de la Administración- del daño o padecimiento moral, en el caso no resulta atendible el reclamo por, cuanto se trata de una afectación que está referida a las personas físicas, al afectar el fuero interno y psicológico de aquellas, siendo que en este proceso, figura como actora una persona jurídica. En este sentido lleva razón la representación del instituto accionado en advertir esta situación, siendo que en el caso, la persona física que ejerce la personería no puede asumir el puesto de la persona jurídica, para intentar una suerte de reparación que es ajena a la naturaleza jurídica de a quien representa.

XI.- DE LAS DEFENSAS OPUESTAS.- Las representaciones de las demandadas alegaron las defensas de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de derecho. Al respecto, debe recordarse que conforme a la doctrina procesal y la jurisprudencia contenciosa (en este sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia de casación 34-1961, de las diez horas veinte minutos del veintidós de marzo de mil novecientos sesenta y uno), se reconocen como presupuestos sustanciales para el dictado de toda sentencia, los relativos a la legitimación de las partes intervinientes, el interés en la resolución del conflicto y el derecho; los cuales son revisables aún de oficio por todo juzgador si no fueren formuladas por los demandados en un proceso jurisdiccional, y en ese orden riguroso. Así pues, que revisado este asunto, se estima que se cumple el presupuesto de legitimación activa, en tanto quien formula esta acción lo hace en defensa de sus derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos (artículo 10 inciso 1) subinciso a) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), respecto de las dos entidades que el ordenamiento nacional otorga potestades para actuar en tutela de tales derechos, esto es el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, en la forma regulada en el numeral 12 inciso 1) del mismo código procesal, por lo que se cumple el presupuesto de legitimación pasiva, respecto de estas dos instituciones. Ahora bien, tratándose de la participación del Estado en este proceso, siendo que la objeción que se da en orden a si está o no obligado a indemnizar, en este caso, por haberse declarado la improcedencia de aquel reclamo, se estima innecesario el análisis de este extremo, y se pasa de una vez, al análisis de la defensa de fondo por ella planteada. En cuanto al interés en la resolución de este asunto, se advierte que este presupuesto pervive, siendo que no consta que en el trámite de este asunto, se haya producido un arreglo o desistimiento en relación con el conflicto planteado. Finalmente, en cuanto al derecho de la acción, en la forma razonada a lo largo de este pronunciamiento, procede acogerse la defensa de falta derecho en lo atinente a la improcedencia del reclamo indemnizatorio, por no darse los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su declaración; y se rechaza en relación a la pretensión la declarativa, la cual debe ser acogida.

X.- DE LAS COSTAS.- De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, no obstante que hay un vencimiento recíproco, se evidencia la falta de buena fe en la promoción de este proceso, que cabalmente llevó a sus desestimatoria en lo que refiere a la indemnización de los títulos de propiedad de la sociedad accionante, y siendo también excesivo el monto pedido respecto de reclamo indemnizatorio por daño moral (por la suma de cincuenta millones de colones) -supuesto de plus petitio, previsto en el inciso 1) del artículo 194 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Estas consideraciones obligan a la condena de las costas a cargo de la vencida [Nombre62 029] Nombre137351 -, a favor de los demandados -Estado, Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas-. Con criterio de mayoría, la liquidación de las costas se reserva para la fase de ejecución de sentencia, una vez firme este pronunciamiento.

POR TANTO:

Se rechazan las defensas de caducidad de la acción, prescripción formuladas por el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural; así como la falta de legitimación activa opuesta por la representación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y el instituto accionado; y por innecesario, se omite pronunciamiento respecto de la defensa de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva opuesta por la representación estatal. Se acoge parcialmente la defensa de falta de derecho, únicamente en relación a la pretensión indemnizatoria formulada. En consecuencia, se declara CON LUGAR PARCIAL la demanda interpuesta por [Nombre 029] SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA contra el ESTADO, el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL y la COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS, por lo que procede hacer los siguientes pronunciamientos: Se declara que las fincas del Partido de [Nombre 037] , con matrícula de Folio Real número [Valor 029], [Valor 030], [Valor 004] , [Valor 005] y [Valor 006], todas de la Provincia de [Nombre 037], cantón [Nombre 007], distrito [Nombre 016], están afectadas en su totalidad al régimen de la propiedad indígena, al estar comprendidas en su totalidad, a la reserva Reserva [Nombre 038]. En lo demás, se declara SIN LUGAR. Son las costas procesales y personales a cargo de la sociedad actora y a favor de los tres codemandados, liquidación que con criterio de mayoría se reserva para la fase de ejecución de sentencia, una vez firme este pronunciamiento. El Juez Aguilar Méndez pone nota separada respecto de este último extremo. El Juez Garita Navarro pone nota separada sobre la ponderación del título de buena fe del derecho a indemnizar en este tipo de asuntos.

Silvia Fernández Brenes Daniel Aguilar Méndez Roberto Garita Navarro NOTA ACLARATORIA DEL JUEZ GARITA NAVARRO.- El suscrito juzgador comparte el rechazo de la demanda que se propone en la presente resolución. Empero, debo indicar que a juicio de quien suscribe, la sola delimitación de la zona de reserva, no lleva a la negación de la indemnización, pues ese solo factor no permite desconocer la presunción de buena fe en la adquisición, aspecto que debe probar la Administración Pública accionada y que, ha de ser analizado en cada caso concreto. Ciertamente a partir de la declaración de reserva, el objeto del contrato de transferencia de tierras que formen parte de ese régimen de propiedad, sería nulo. Empero, sino hay consigna, al menos catastral, sobre la pertenencia del terreno a zona de reserva, se vulnera la confianza legítima del adquirente, siempre que haya adquirido de un no indígena y no conste formal o materialmente signos que le permitan, al menos presumir, la existencia de ese régimen especial de dominio. Así, al margen de que las tierras deban ser puestas a disposición de la reserva indígena, ello no lleva a negar el deber de la Administración de indemnizar al titular por la desposesión de esos terrenos, cuando se configuren los supuestos indicados, ya que, a fin de cuentas, es un terreno que el Estado (en sentido amplio) no indemnizó, como lo manda e impone la ley. Ahora, este caso, tal y como se menciona en el desarrollo de la sentencia, en el plano catastral utilizado para las segregaciones, constaba esa pertenencia a un régimen indígena de propiedad, lo que, introduce un elemento objetivo a partir del cual se conocía la imposibilidad de adquirir esos terrenos. De esa manera, dicho aspecto debe ser resaltado como causa de la negación de la reparación que se reclama en este proceso. A efectos de justificar la postura de reparabilidad en los casos de concurrencia de buena fe, puede verse el fallo No. 15-2019-VI, de esta Sección VI del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en la cual, el suscrito fungió como juez ponente.

José Roberto Garita Navarro.

Juez.

NOTA DEL JUEZ AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.- Específicamente en relación a la condenatoria al pago de costas, si bien resulta unánime el criterio de que efectivamente debe imponerse la misma al perdidoso por el sólo hecho de serlo, con todo respeto difiero de mis compañeras en cuanto al carácter abstracto o líquido de este pronunciamiento. Dada la escasa regulación que sobre este punto han tenido los diferentes cuerpos normativos procesales en esta materia, como lo fue en su momento la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y en la actualidad, el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se dio lugar a una extendida aplicación por supletoriedad de las normas del Código Procesal Civil, justamente conforme lo autorizan los numerales 220 ídem y los artículos 9 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En consecuencia y según la vigente redacción del artículo 62.1 del Código Procesal Civil (Ley N° 9342), constituye un deber ineludible del Tribunal, el establecer en el fallo de “…una vez el monto exacto de las cantidades otorgadas, sus adecuaciones hasta la sentencia, incluidos los intereses y las costas…” (Resaltado no es del original). Por consiguiente y dado que se carece de norma administrativa en contrario, lo procedente sería incluir en el acápite de costas de esta sentencia, la determinación de estos últimos rubros, tal y como lo dispone el ordenamiento jurídico y no reservar su pronunciamiento para la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. - Daniel Aguilar Méndez *OI4O47Y43JN8M61*