Dismissal with employer liability for medical unfitness of a traffic officerDespido con responsabilidad patronal por inidoneidad médica de oficial de tránsito

ASUNTO: PURE LAW PROCEEDING ACTOR: [Nombre 001].

DEMANDADO: The State No. 0124-2019-VI.

CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, SIXTH SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at 11 hours 50 minutes on October 4, two thousand nineteen.

Pure law proceeding established by Mr. [Nombre62 001], holder of identity card number [CED62 ], represented by attorney Luis Ballestero Mora, bar incorporation number CED32256, against the State, represented by State Attorney José Armando López Baltondano, identity card number CED1778.

WHEREAS:

1. On November 11, 2015, the plaintiff filed a pre-trial and provisional interim measure (medida cautelar ante causam y provisionalísima), requesting that: "a) The Provisional Interim Measure of reinstatement to the position be ordered. b) The nullity of the procedure followed be declared. c) The nullity of the dismissal act under resolution number 001418 issued by the Office of the Minister of Public Works and Transport on September 29, 2015, be declared." (Images 220-231 of the interim measure file) 2. By resolution at 8:00 p.m. on November 11, 2015, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the requested interim measure and granted a transfer for its ordinary processing. (Images 252-254 of the interim measure file) 3. Once the transfer regarding the interim measure was granted, the State responded negatively. (Images 79-88 of the interim measure file) 4. By Resolution No. 1414-2016-T at 15 hours 10 minutes on June 27, 2016, the procedural judge ordered the rejection of the interim measure filed. (Images 42-48 of the interim measure file) 5. An appeal was filed against the rejection referred to in the preceding section, and by Resolution No. 0304-2016-II at 11 hours 22 minutes on August 3, 2016, Section II of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda upheld the appealed resolution. (Images 37-39 of the interim measure file) 6. On September 21, 2016, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit that gave rise to this proceeding, so that the judgment would order the following claims, as adjusted during the preliminary hearing: "1. The nullity of the dismissal act under resolution number 001418 issued on September 29, 2015, by the Office of the Minister of Public Works and Transport be declared. 2. That he be reinstated to his position in duties that do not require the use of weapons. 3. That the defendant be ordered to pay procedural and personal costs." (Images 38-40, 84-95 of the main file) 7. Once the legal transfer was granted, the State responded negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. (Images 48-57 of the main file) 8. The preliminary hearing established in Article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which is recorded in the digital system of this Court, was held on October 23, 2017, with both parties present. It was suspended to grant a hearing to the State regarding the adjustment of claims made. (Images 38-40 of the main file) 9. The preliminary hearing was continued on February 26, 2018, with both parties. As there was no evidence to admit, in accordance with Article 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the matter was declared a pure law proceeding and the parties presented their closing arguments. (Images 3-6 of the file) 10. The respective case file was sent to this Sixth Section of the Contencioso Administrativo Tribunal for the issuance of the pertinent ruling on July 15, 2019, according to the detail from the Escritorio Virtual System, in which the entirety of the main file is recorded. No procedural nullities that must be declared or that prevent issuing a judgment on the merits are observed.

Judge Garita Navarro writes with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Aguilar Méndez;

CONSIDERING

I.- Proven facts. The following are relevant for the purposes of this proceeding: 1) By document JCE-HMS-0455-2014 of February 25, 2014, the Outpatient Clinic Department of Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certifies: "That as recorded in the medical record of patient [Nombre62 001] Insured Number: [Valor 001], the attending PSYCHIATRY physician Dr. Nombre139072, in a consultation on February 25, 2014, notes: 'Patient continues follow-up in Psychiatry at HMS for having been categorized as a severe depressive disorder under psychopharmacological treatment, therefore it is recommended not to use or carry firearms.' ...". (Folio 45 of the administrative file) 2) In June 2014, the MOPT Occupational Health Department issued a Report on the official [Nombre62 001], prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, in which, fundamentally, it recommends: "Considering that the collaborator presents a behavior pattern suggesting a guarded prognosis; but without ignoring the possibility that the work context may have significantly influenced what has occurred, it is proposed, in the first instance, that Mr. [Nombre62 001] be reassigned to a location outside the Puntarenas Precinct, to perform administrative functions, where contact with users is minimal or none. If this option is chosen, the collaborator must continue psychotherapeutic care for 1 year at the Medical Office of the Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito; to evaluate adaptation to the new workplace; as well as his behavioral adjustment. In the second instance, the dismissal of the collaborator with employer liability is envisioned, which will be assessed by the Consejo de Policía de Tránsito. For this purpose, it will have the input that the Psychology Unit of the Dirección General de Policía de Tránsito provides through a written report. In order to promote a recovery of the work environment at the Puntarenas Precinct, it is also considered pertinent to transfer Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano and to carry out an internal review of the administrative functioning of the same, which will be assumed by the person or team assigned by the Director General de la Policía de Tránsito. Subsequently, after six months, the state of the work environment will be reevaluated through follow-up monitoring at the Precinct; which will be in charge of the Occupational Health Department." This report was sent by the Head of Occupational Health to the Consejo de Personal through official letter DGIRH # 2014-226-SO of June 19, 2014. (Folios 1-13 of the administrative file) 3) Through the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, the Consejo de Personal ordered that: "... in order to obtain a satisfactory work environment at the Puntarenas Traffic Precinct, Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director de la Policía de Tránsito, must be instructed so that, together with Lic. Cristian Méndez Blanco, Director General de Recursos Humanos, proceed immediately to transfer the employee [Nombre62 001] to the Departamento de Vehículos Detenidos in the Canton of San José. At the same time, the Occupational Health Department is requested to continue with the psychotherapeutic treatment so that the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace are achieved, as well as ensuring that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as an Officer of the Policía de Tránsito." This is communicated to the Director General de Tránsito through official letter No. 0626-2014 of July 2, 2014. (Folios 50-51 of the administrative file) 4) By act number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, the Director General de Tránsito communicates to the Human Resources Coordinator that it was agreed to transfer the plaintiff to the Depósito de Vehículos Detenidos, in order to obtain a satisfactory work environment. (Folio 52 of the administrative file) 5) By official letter No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Consejo de Personal communicates to the Director de la Policía de Tránsito that by the sixty-fourth article, sixty-fourth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, the fifty-fourth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, was partially modified, so that in its final part it reads: "... At the same time, Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist of the Medical Office of the Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito, is requested to continue with the psychotherapeutic treatment so that the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace are achieved, as well as ensuring that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as an Officer of the Policía de Tránsito, the foregoing with due coordination with the Occupational Health Department." (Folio 54 of the administrative file) 6) By official letter No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat of the Consejo de Personal delivers a copy of official letter No. 0626-2014 of July 2, 2014, to the plaintiff. (Folio 53 of the administrative file) 7) By official letter No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Consejo de Personal communicates to the Director de la Policía de Tránsito that by the sixty-fifth article, sixty-fifth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, it was ordered that, given the writ of July 18, 2014, filed by the plaintiff opposing the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 11-2014 and sixty-fourth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 12-2014 was immediately suspended, until that appeal action was resolved. (Folio 58 of the administrative file) 8) By official letter of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the MOPT Central and North Macro Region Unit, communicates to the Minister of Public Works and Transport the psychological assessment report regarding the case of officer [Nombre62 001]. In the cited opinion issued on April 10, 2014, it states, relevantly: "4. Recommendations: 1) Given this condition suffered by the official in question, psychological care must be provided, especially since, due to the time he has been taking the medications, their withdrawal is approaching. 2) Due to the degree of affectation to the official, he should not be transferred, as this would be issuing an a priori sentence against him, which could further destabilize his mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant him leave with pay while his situation is defined in all areas, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation for both his colleagues and [Nombre62 001] himself (sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, through qualified personnel not belonging to human resources or attached entities, the truth of the events that occurred and the treatment that has been given, since it is alarming for sound administration how inertia has been the protagonist in this process for two years, causing general discomfort and wear and tear on the parties involved and possible harmful consequences for the administration. (...) 5) It must be reviewed, through personnel with extensive knowledge in the selection field, preferably external, how the entry personnel have been selected, since at the time serious deficiencies were discovered by Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issued recommendations to the Consejo de Personal of the previous government, which never implemented major changes, always showing resistance to modify. (...)". (Images 109-120 of the interim measure file) 9) Through Resolution No. 99-2014 at 11 hours 35 minutes on August 13, 2014, the Consejo de Personal resolves the motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the plaintiff and ordered: "To partially grant the Motion for Reversal filed by the Official de la Policía de Tránsito [Nombre62 001], with qualifications known in the file, against the sixty-fourth Agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minutes of Ordinary Session No. 012-2014, held on Wednesday, July nine, two thousand fourteen of the Consejo de Personal and Official Letter DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director General de la Policía de Tránsito, therefore the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer but it is ordered that this not be to San José, but to a Traffic Precinct as close as possible to his residence, for which the Administration in the Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito and the Dirección de Recursos Humanos must take the appropriate measures for the transfer of Precinct and the change in the duties of the employment contract, in accordance with the reality of the appealing employee. (...)". It ordered the referral of the appeal (recurso de apelación) to the Minister of that portfolio. This was communicated to the plaintiff via fax, to number 2223-4170. (Folios 59-63 of the administrative file) 10) Through official letter No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Consejo de Personal communicates to the Occupational Health Department the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, Ordinary Minutes 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it is requested that a study determine, with complete clarity, if the plaintiff has the suitability to serve as an officer of the Policía de Tránsito, given the existence of a series of complaints and disagreements against him at the Puntarenas Precinct. (Folio 64 of the administrative file) 11) By writ of September 11, 2014, the plaintiff requests a copy of the report referred to in the preceding section. (Folio 16 of the administrative file) 12) By official letter No. 1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Consejo de Personal communicates to the petitioner the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of Ordinary Minutes 18-2014 of October 15, 2014, through which the delivery of a copy of the MOPT Occupational Health report, prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, is allowed. (Folio 18 of the administrative file) 13) By official letter No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Consejo de Personal communicates to the Director de la Policía de Tránsito that by the fortieth article, fortieth agreement of Ordinary Minutes 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that, in view of the official letter of October 29, 2014, from the Labor Court of Puntarenas, the plaintiff should be transferred to another region that is not the Central Pacific. (Folio 84 of the main file) 14) Through official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Consejo de Personal communicates to the Minister of Public Works and Transport what was agreed in the tenth article, tenth agreement of Extraordinary Minutes 09-2015, taken in extraordinary session 09-2015, in which the following was relevantly ordered: “… Based on the factual and legal arguments just set forth, the Consejo de Personal agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos the following: 1. To dismiss, with employer liability, the Official de Policía de Tránsito [Nombre62 001], with qualifications known in this file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76, and 88 of the Ley General de Policía, No. 7410, in conjunction with Article 85 subsection d) of the Código de Trabajo, and in relation to Article 140 of the Constitución Política (…). 2. To recognize the employment severance and rights that this administrative Act determines in accordance with what is indicated in the legal system. Firm agreement.” (Images 241-247 of the interim measure file) 15) Through Resolution No. 1418 at 13 hours 09 minutes on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the content of official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Consejo de Personal is acknowledged and the following was relevantly ordered: “THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT RESOLVES: 1.- To confirm in all its aspects the tenth Article, tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minutes No. 09-2015, taken by the aforementioned Council in Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August five, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Liability the Traffic Officer [Nombre62 001], bearer of identity card number [CED62 ], with qualifications known in this file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76, and 88 of the Ley General de Policía, No. 7410, in conjunction with Article 85 subsection d) of the Código de Trabajo, and in relation to Article 140 of the Constitución Política (…), as well as the provisions of the Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Autoridades de Tránsito. 2./ To request the Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos of this Ministry to proceed, in accordance with its competencies, to forward to the Legal Department of the Ministerial Office the corresponding calculations of the Employment Severance that by right correspond to Traffic Officer [Nombre62 001], for the preparation of the respective administrative payment resolution. (…)”. (Images 89-99 of the interim measure file) 16) That on October 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) before the Sala Constitucional against the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, alleging violation of his right to work and equality. He stated that he was dismissed without having been personally evaluated and that only an analysis of the documents provided by the same Ministry was carried out, omitting to assess that he suffers from a dysthymic disorder, which is a psychological illness, and that the same psychological diagnoses warned that it was due to workplace harassment. Proceeding processed under case file number 15-015384-0007-CO. (Folios 122-139 of the administrative file) 17) By official letter DVA-DGIRH-DGSP-131-2016 of October 19, 2015, the Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos communicates the actor's dismissal with employer liability effective October 30, 2015. (Folio 106 of the administrative file) 18) Through Resolution No. 2015-017427 at 10 hours 10 minutes on November 6, 2015, the Sala Constitucional ordered the rejection of the amparo measure filed by the plaintiff, case file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, deeming that his dismissal had not been based on grounds of discrimination derived from his psychological illness. (Folios 122-139 of the administrative file) II.- Unproven facts. None of relevance to this proceeding.

III.- Allegations of the parties. The plaintiff argues, fundamentally, that the challenged act does not provide adequate reasoning (motivación). He says this is of special importance since the decision taken by the Consejo de Personal de la Policía de Tránsito focuses on a report in which, despite being a psychological evaluation, he was not seen by the treating doctor. His file was simply reviewed and a recommendation was made, of which the most burdensome was adopted. He considers that, since he was not seen by the treating doctor, any recommendation is invalid because it is subjective. He accuses a violation of due process (debido proceso), as there are no notifications, notification of charges (traslado de cargos), or opening of an administrative procedure through which the exercise of the right of defense is allowed, from which the grounds for dismissal can be inferred, but rather what exists is the application of a sanction generated capriciously, without sufficient reasoning. He considers that by not instructing the due process, legality and the reserve of law are violated. He affirms that as of the date of the lawsuit he was unaware of the notification of charges, but rather that he was dismissed arbitrarily and unilaterally. He highlights that the Ley General de la Administración Pública imposes an administrative procedure for cases in which complaints are filed against a public official. He refers to the basic components of administrative due process, which, he states, were omitted by the Consejo de Personal, by making decisions that were never requested of it. He alludes to precedents of the Corte Plena regarding the content of due process. He considers that the actions of the Consejo de Personal are null and void for imposing a sanction contrary to due process.

IV.- Allegations of the State. For its part, the public representative states that the challenged decision was adopted with respect for the official's rights during the processing and in compliance with the special regulations by virtue of the police nature of the position. He emphasizes that these are police officials in the traffic police area, who are guarantors of citizen security and compliance with the law, and who must be suitable in terms of moral, personal, physical, and psychological conditions to carry out their work. He points out that the fact of not having or lacking the conditions required for the position, as is the case of not being able to carry weapons and not having the minimum moral and psychological suitability conditions for the exercise of the position, makes it impossible to keep him in the position, with the special regulations establishing the possibility for the hierarchical superior to dismiss him with employer liability. The public interest prevents keeping an official whose conduct has fostered a tense work environment in the workplace, affecting the rest of the staff and the institutional image itself. He says that sufficient background on the petitioner's actions was reviewed and accredited, including Occupational Health studies from the Psychology Unit of the Medical Office of the Policía de Tránsito and opinions from the relevant areas of Hospital Monseñor Sanabria in Puntarenas, which determined the lack of physical and mental suitability of the employee to act as a Traffic Officer. He continues, multiple reports show his lack of capacity, and medical and psychological reports indicate his impossibility of using the regulation weapon, which, he says, is unavoidable in the exercise of the position for which he was hired. This is coupled with the fact that the plaintiff's conduct affected the peace, cordiality, good relations, and motivation that must prevail in the workplace. He clarifies that the dismissal at issue was ordered with employer liability, respecting his rights and the principles of public employment.

V.- Generalities on the administrative procedure. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It fulfills a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it is imposed as a reference framework that allows the administered party to compare public conduct in order to establish control over whether its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide that conduct. It seeks, therefore, to constitute a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by Article 214 of Law No. 6227, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as grounds for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Hence, Article 216.1 of the same law requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party to fully exercise the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth of the facts (among which can be seen those established in Articles 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that, in these cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same regulatory body provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any procedure that does not satisfy these minimum requirements. This follows from Article 223 of the reference Law, which states that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already held that the control of the administrative function conferred on this jurisdiction by Article 49 of the Carta Magna involves a comparison ensuring that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, at its core, the due process that must be inviolable in that action has been protected. Now, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions that are proper to the directing body and the decision-making body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whoever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that finally resolves the matter. However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, investigatory competences may be delegated to a body in charge of conducting the investigation of the procedure, which has tended to be called the "directing or investigating body." In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to being vested in an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is feasible that, in certain cases, the law itself establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, they must be understood to be performing a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competences, the representation of the investigating administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as clearly follows from Article 282, subsection 3 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with investigatory and procedural management powers (Art. 227 LGAP), in charge of carrying out all the preparatory stages and then forwarding the proceedings to the decision-making body (Art. 330 LGAP). Although, in certain cases, it may make recommendations, these would certainly not be binding, so its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the act of opening, giving procedural momentum, the entire investigatory work of the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the motion for reversal filed against procedural acts, evaluating admitted evidence, and forwarding the file for the issuance of the final act. Among its competences can be seen Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent hierarchical superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act resolving the procedure.

VI.- On the police regime. In accordance with Article 140, subsection 1) of the Carta Magna: "The duties and attributions that correspond jointly to the President and the respective Minister of Government are: 1) To freely appoint and remove members of the public force, employees and officials who serve positions of trust, and others determined, in very qualified cases, by the Ley de Servicio Civil." In this sense, in accordance with Article 3, subsection b) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, members of the Fuerza Pública are not considered included within that statutory regime, with those service relationships being regulated, to date, by the Ley General de Policía, No. 7410 of May 30, 1994. That legal source precisely regulates, starting with Article 50, the so-called "Estatuto Policial." The Article in question states: "Article 50°- Scope and objectives. This Estatuto shall regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and the employee members of the various police forces, for the purpose of guaranteeing efficiency in the maintenance of public security and protecting the rights of these employees." For its part, Article 52 of same law establishes the employees who are not considered covered by the rules that make up the Estatuto Policial, simultaneously recognizing the right to job stability of those who have validly entered that regime. In that sense, that precept provides: "Article 52°-Employees not covered by the Estatuto." The following officials shall not be covered by the provision of subsection a) of Article 59 of this Statute and, consequently, shall not enjoy lifetime tenure (inamovilidad) in their positions: a) Ministers and vice-ministers, advisors, and confidential employees. b) The administrative director general, the director general of the Fuerza Pública, the regional directors and deputy directors thereof, the director of the Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea, and the director of the Policía de Control de Drogas." In accordance with that precept, persons governed by the Estatuto Policial, except for the cases referred to above, enjoy the right of stability (called lifetime tenure (inamovilidad)), which implies that the termination of the public employment relationship may only occur for legally regulated reasons and with the corresponding right to reinstatement, should a breach of said right be proven. Said stability that operates in the police regime is also recognized in the text of canon 75, subsection a) of the cited law, as it expressly states: "Article 75°- Rights. The members of the police forces protected by this Law shall enjoy the following rights: a) Stability in their positions, provided they enter the service in accordance with the requirements demanded in this Statute and if they fulfill their duties in the provision of the service, according to the conditions determined in this Law and its Regulations. / The servant may only be removed from their position when they incur a serious fault (falta grave), in accordance with the legal system, or when, to improve the service, their manifest inefficiency or incompetence is determined, pursuant to the provisions of this Law." For their part, ordinals 77 to 89 ibidem regulate matters concerning the disciplinary regime, indicating faults, sanctions to be imposed, grounds for dismissal, applicable procedure, prescription rules, among other topics relevant to that aspect. For example, numeral 80 of said legal source regulates the procedure applicable for applying warnings. Within that framework, the grounds for dismissal are specified in ordinal 88 of the cited Law No. 7410 (a rule that reiterates the right of stability of that type of public function) as follows: "Article 88°- Justified dismissal. The servants protected by this Statute may only be removed from their positions for the following reasons: a) Upon verification that they have incurred a serious fault (falta grave), as provided in this Law. b) For incurring any of the grounds established in Article 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). c) For manifest and proven inefficiency or lack of skill (impericia) in the performance of the position. d) For what is provided in Article 51 of this Law." Attention is drawn to the provisions in numerals 85 and 86 of the cited Law, as they regulate scenarios for the application of the disciplinary regime when the facts underlying that hierarchical exercise are also the subject of analysis within a jurisdictional case. In that sense, the first of those articles states: "Article 85°- Administrative investigation and jurisdictional investigation. The initiation of a public criminal action does not prevent the simultaneous commencement of an administrative investigation, for the same facts and to apply the disciplinary regime. / The statement of proven facts pronounced in a criminal sentence binds the administrative instance for the disciplinary and labor effects of the case, even if a prior administrative resolution favorable to the servant has been issued; in this case, the servant must be heard summarily before applying the corresponding sanctions. The foregoing does not prevent the administration, while the matter is being resolved in the criminal venue, from taking the provisional measures it deems necessary." For its part, canon 86 ibid expresses that, when prosecution occurs in the criminal venue for a crime linked to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the Administration shall immediately suspend the servant and, until the decision of the case, shall withhold, totally or partially, their salary. From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the Estatuto Policial grants persons serving in the police forces the right of stability, and that regulation expressly indicates the factual scenarios in which the dismissal of the police official is appropriate, as well as the specific positions in which said guarantee does not operate.

VII.- Nevertheless, it is the opinion of this collegiate body that the rules comprising Law No. 7410 must be supplemented and integrated with the provisions of ordinal 140, subsection 1) of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna), this latter rule recognizing the power of whoever holds the Presidency of the Republic, jointly with the hierarchy of the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública), to freely appoint and remove members of the public force (fuerza pública). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself, in various rulings in which it heard claims such as the one analyzed in this proceeding, established the criterion that it was necessary to distinguish personnel covered by the Estatuto Policial from those who were not. Thus, for example, in ruling (voto) No. 2016-18906 of 9:45 a.m. on December 23, 2016, reiterated in precedent No. 2017-006876 of 9:15 a.m. on May 12, 2017, it held in relevant part: "III.- On the merits. From the documents attached to the expediente, it can be deduced that the protected parties were dismissed in accordance with the provisions of Article 140, subsection 1) of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), as established in several executive agreements, and without evidence that they were covered by the Estatuto Policial; therefore, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, the dismissal does not become illegitimate, since the President of the Republic and the Minister of the relevant branch have the power - in accordance with the constitutional text - to freely appoint and remove members of the Fuerza Pública. (...)". Said precedent highlights the need to discriminate between both types of relationship as a parameter prior to using the power granted by the aforementioned constitutional ordinal. However, this collegiate body considers that the grammatical reference to "freely," although it may be considered as the recognition of a discretionary power, is equally subject to the rules of administrative legality, among these, to the impassable limits of the exercise of that type of power, set by ordinals 15, 16, 128, 158.4, and 160 (among others) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), but also, of the rules contained in Law No. 7410, already discussed. In its correct dimension, such a rule grants the aforementioned hierarchical superiors the power to dispense with personnel of the police forces for reasons of convenience and opportunity, without the need for a pre-existing administrative procedure in which the justifiable cause for dismissal is established, provided that such termination of the special internal relationship respects the labor rights inherent to the public function, which supposes that said dismissal will be with the corresponding employer liability. However, those reasons of convenience and opportunity that would allow for the exercise of this power can in no way constitute a disciplinary mechanism, albeit disguised, or a form of substitution (by negation) of that power. In accordance with what has been indicated, it is a power provided for exceptional scenarios, as is the case of confidential personnel, in general, not covered by the Estatuto Policial (Law No. 7410). Indeed, when the cause for using the aforementioned hierarchical power is a disregard, by the person exercising the police function, of the rules of conduct to which they are subject, among these, the rules of probity in the exercise of the public police function, such that the hierarchical superior considers those actions or omissions to be reprehensible, to the degree of deeming their separation from the police forces pertinent, it is the consideration of this Chamber that Law No. 7410 itself — as a necessary complement to a proper understanding of the scope of canon 140.1 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) — imposes the duty to prove the fault (falta) through the respective procedural process and, in those hypotheses, to order the internal corrective measure that corresponds, among these, dismissal, when the merits of the case file so determine. The analysis of the abovementioned rules leads this Court to consider that if the cause for dismissal is the detachment, disregard, non-compliance, or, in general, the violation of the rules of behavior and duties inherent to police personnel, such an effect must occur, necessarily, within the exercise of the disciplinary power and not through a generic, discretionary power to "freely" remove that type of agent. Otherwise, the permissibility of resorting to such (pseudo) free removal of the official without the need for a prior procedure, even in cases where the appropriate course is disciplinary action, subject to assuming the employer liability for those measures, constitutes an illegitimate renunciation of that internal corrective exercise and the conferring of an economic benefit upon the official who fails to comply with their legal and competence-based obligations. In such cases, it is insisted, the mere existence of (reasonable or not) doubts about improper conduct of the police agent should not give way to the exercise of that discretionary removal power, for if it were so, the stability that Law No. Placa3784 enshrines and recognizes, as well as the regulation of the disciplinary regime operating in these fields, would be denied and would have no greater logic or useful effect. As has been noted, appealing to the discretionary termination of the public agent with the corresponding payment of labor entitlements, despite the effective cause of that decision being the commission of a service-related fault (falta funcionarial), although it may be said to be "convenient" for the administrative hierarchy, in reality disregards the rights that operate in the public function and the guarantee provided by express law (No. 7410), as it denies the exercise of the right of defense in order to adopt a decision based on conjecture that has not been proven within an administrative procedure, the purpose of which, in accordance with the doctrine set by ordinal 214 and 223 of the LGAP, is to establish the real truth of the facts. In this way, the dismissal of a person serving in those police functions, even with employer liability, based on alleged but unproven faults (faltas), undoubtedly harms due process through the a priori renunciation of disciplinary action, in order to instead adopt decisions that break the service relationship, despite the fact that the acts constituting the alleged fault (falta) were not committed. Likewise, if the fault (falta) was committed, dismissal with the payment of all labor burdens inherent to employer liability supposes, it is reiterated, conferring an improper benefit to the detriment of public funds that must be safeguarded, with the eventual liability that would derive from those actions as inferred from the superior oversight regime of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) expressed in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, the Law on Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), No. 8131, the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), No. 8422, and the generic framework of public official liability enshrined in Law No. 6227 starting from precept 199. Therefore, this Court considers that although ordinal 140.1 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) recognizes the discretionary power to remove personnel from the public force (fuerza pública), that rule does not enable, when faced with causes that constitute grounds for dismissal without employer liability or, in general, are related to subjecting someone to the disciplinary regime, the renunciation of that action. On the contrary, that possibility, in the context of what has been indicated, only operates in response to qualified circumstances of convenience and opportunity, subject to them being fully and duly expressed in the act of dismissal, reasoning (motivación) that in any case is imposed by the doctrine of precept 136 of Law No. 6227 itself, under penalty of generating the granting of undue pecuniary benefits, or constituting a deviation of power, by using the administrative power for purposes other than the principal one justifying the enabling rule, to its detriment, as explained by Article 131, subsection 3) of the cited LGAP, all of which is controllable by this Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction through the analysis of the validity of the administrative function ordered by numeral 49 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna). But, furthermore, said power is applicable to the case of positions not covered by the Estatuto Policial, in the scenarios provided for by ordinal 52 of Law No. 7410, with the right of stability being imposed in all other cases.

VIII.- On the cause for dismissal in the specific case. In the present case, the principal claim of the petitioning party lies in the alleged absence of a formal procedure prior to the adoption of the formal act that ordered their dismissal with employer liability. However, from the analysis of the case file, it can be deduced that the decision adopted by the responding Administration is not strictly related to the reflexive exercise of a disciplinary power, but rather to the powers to terminate the employment relationship established by ordinal 88, subsection d) of Law No. 7410, insofar as it relates to the determination of medically proven conditions that make the claimant, in the judgment of their employer, unsuitable for the exercise of the functions inherent to the position they held. Although this Chamber has pointed out in prior rulings, the most recent being No. 074-2019-VI of 9:00 a.m. on June 25, 2019, that the power under ordinal 140.1 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna) is not unrestricted, as it must be interpreted in conjunction with the implications of the labor stability recognized by the Estatuto de Servicio Policial, and that such power does not suppose (nor can it imply) an implicit renunciation of the exercise of disciplinary powers, in cases such as the present one, the exercise of that power is entirely legitimate if it is based on causes associated with the definition of suitability or unsuitability for holding the public position. The foregoing, it is insisted, provided that the weighing of that suitability is not linked to conduct or omissions the approach of which is proper to disciplinary matters. In this case, the cause for the questioned decision is not related to those aspects of a corrective disciplinary nature, but to the technical definition of shortcomings of the claimant, which revealed the lack of conditions that their employer deems necessary and determinant to maintain their investiture and based on which their unsuitability for the position of Transit Police (Policía de Tránsito) was determined. From the analysis of the case file, it appears that by document JCE-HMS-0455-2014 of February 25, 2014, the Department of External Consultation (Jefatura de Consulta Externa) of the Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certifies: " That according to what is recorded in the medical file of patient [Name62 001] Insurance number: [Value 001], the treating physician of PSYCHIATRY, Dr- Name139072 , in a consultation of February 25, 2014, notes: 'Patient continues control in Psychiatry at HMS due to having been classified as a severe depressive disorder under psychopharmacological treatment, therefore it is recommended not to use or carry firearms.' ...". Following up on that diagnosis, in June 2014, the Department of Occupational Health (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional) of the MOPT issued a report prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, in which, after an evaluation performed on the claimant, she concluded: " Considering that the collaborator presents a behavioral pattern suggesting a reserved prognosis; but without overlooking the possibility that the work context may have significantly influenced what occurred, it is proposed, in the first instance, that Mr. [Name62 001] be relocated to a place outside the Delegation (Delegación) of Puntarenas, to perform administrative functions, where contact with the user is minimal or absent. If this is chosen, the collaborator must continue psychotherapeutic care for 1 year at the Medical Office (Consultorio Médico) of the General Directorate of the Traffic Police (Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito) to evaluate adaptation to the new workplace, as well as his behavioral adjustment. In the second instance, the dismissal of the collaborator with labor liability is envisioned, which shall be evaluated by the Traffic Police Council (Consejo de Policía de Tránsito). For this purpose, it will rely on the input that the Psychology Unit of the General Directorate of Traffic Police (Dirección General de Policía de Tránsito) provides through a written report. In pursuit of favoring a recovery of the work environment of the Delegation (Delegación) of Puntarenas, it is also deemed pertinent to transfer Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. And to carry out an internal review of its administrative functioning, which will be assumed by the person or team assigned by the Director General of Traffic Police (Director General de la Policía de Tránsito). Subsequently, after six months have elapsed, the state of the work environment will be re-evaluated through follow-up monitoring at the Delegation (Delegación), which will be in charge of the Department of Occupational Health (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional)." This report was sent by the Head of Occupational Health to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) through official communication DGIRH # 2014-226-SO of June 19, 2014. As observed, that report offered several alternatives to address the plaintiff's situation, the first option being relocation to a place where they would not have contact with the public, with respective monitoring and psychotherapeutic support. As an alternative option, it proposed evaluating a possible dismissal with labor liability. In response to those recommendations, through the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) ordered the transfer of the claimant to the Department of Detained Vehicles (Departamento de Vehículos Detenidos) in the Canton of San José, as well as to request the Department of Occupational Health (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional) to continue psychotherapeutic treatment so that the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace could be achieved, as well as ensuring he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Transit Police Officer (Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito)." The transfer was made effective through official communication number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, from the Director General of Transit (Director General de Tránsito). For its part, through official communication No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the Director of the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito) that by the sixty-fourth article, sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, was partially amended so that its final part reads: "... At the same time, Ms. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist of the Medical Office (Consultorio Médico) of the Traffic Police Directorate (Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito), is requested to continue psychotherapeutic treatment so that the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace can be achieved, as well as ensuring he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Transit Police Officer (Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito), the above in due coordination with the Department of Occupational Health (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional)." Through official communication No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat of the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the actor of the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014, concerning the Occupational Health recommendation for his transfer. Later, in act No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the Director of the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito) that by the sixty-fifth article, sixty-fifth agreement of ordinary minutes 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, in which it was ordered that in view of the writing of July 18, 2014, submitted by the actor opposing the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014 and the sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 12-2014 was immediately suspended until that appeal action was resolved. Through official communication of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the Central and Northern Macro Region Unit MOPT, communicated to the minister of Public Works and Transport (Obras Públicas y Transportes) the report of the psychological assessment regarding the case of officer [Name62 001]. In the cited opinion issued on April 10, 2014, the following is stated, in relevant part: "4. Recommendations: 1) Given said condition suffered by the official in question, psychological care must be provided, especially since, due to the time he has been taking medication, its withdrawal is approaching. 2) Due to the degree of impact on the official, he should not be transferred, as this would be issuing an a priori sentence against him, which could further destabilize his mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant him a leave with pay while his situation is defined in all areas, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation of both his colleagues and [Name62 001] himself (sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, through qualified personnel not belonging to human resources or affiliated entities, the truth of the events that have arisen and the treatment that has been given, as it is alarming for sound administration how inertia has been the protagonist in this process for two years, causing general discomfort and exhaustion to the involved parties and possible harmful consequences for the administration. (...) 5) It is necessary to review, through personnel with extensive knowledge in the field of selection, preferably external, how entry-level personnel have been selected, since at the time, serious deficiencies were discovered by Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issued recommendations to the Personnel Council of the previous government, which never implemented significant changes, always showing resistance to modifying. (...)". Through resolution No. 99-2014 of 11:35 a.m. on August 13, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) resolved the appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the claimant and ordered: "Partially grant the Appeal for Revocation (Recurso de Revocatoria) filed by the Transit Police Officer [Name62 001], with qualities known in the expediente, against the sixty-fourth Agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minutes of ordinary session No. 012-2014, held on Wednesday, July nine, two thousand fourteen, of the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) and Official Communication DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director General of the Traffic Police (Director General de la Policía de Tránsito); therefore, the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer, but it is ordered that this shall not be to San José, but rather to a Traffic Delegation (Delegación de Tránsito) as close as possible to his residence, for which purpose the Administration, through the General Directorate of the Traffic Police (Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito) and the Human Resources Directorate, must take the appropriate measures for the transfer of Delegations and the change in the duties of the employment contract, in accordance with the reality of the appealing servant. (...)". Through official communication No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the Occupational Health Department (Jefatura de Salud Ocupacional) of the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, ordinary minutes 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it was requested to determine through a study, with complete clarity, if the actor had the suitability to serve as a Traffic Police officer, given the existence of a series of complaints and objections against him at the Delegation (Delegación) of Puntarenas. Through official communication No. 1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the petitioner of the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of ordinary minutes 18-2017 of October 15, 2014, by which he was permitted to receive a copy of the Occupational Health report from MOPT, prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, a request he had made on September 11, 2014. In official communication No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the Director of the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito) that by the fortieth article, fortieth agreement of ordinary minutes 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that, in view of the official communication of October 29, 2014 from the Labor Court of Higher Amount (Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía) of Puntarenas, the actor must be transferred to another region that was not the Central Pacific. After the referred medical evaluations, in official communication DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Obras Publicas y Transportes) of what was agreed in the tenth article, tenth agreement of Extraordinary Minutes 09-2015, adopted in extraordinary session 09-2015, in which the following was ordered in relevant part: " … Based on the arguments of fact and law just set forth, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Obras Publicas y Transportes), Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos, the following: 1. Dismiss, with employer liability, the Transit Police Officer [Name62 001], with qualities known in this expediente, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76, and 88 of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. Placa3784, in concordance with Article 85, subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) (…). 2. Acknowledge the labor entitlements and rights that this administrative Act determines in accordance with what is indicated in the legal system. Firm agreement." Through resolution No. 1418 of 1:09 p.m. on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Obras Publicas y Transportes), the content of official communication DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) is acknowledged, and the following was ordered in relevant part: "THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT RESOLVES: 1.- Confirm in all its aspects the Tenth Article, Tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minutes No. 09-2015, adopted by the aforementioned Council in Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August five, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Liability the Transit Officer [Name62 001], bearer of identity card number [CED62 ], with qualities known in this expediente, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76, and 88 of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. Placa3784, in concordance with Article 85, subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) (…), as well as the provisions of the Regulation on the Organization and Service of Traffic Authorities (Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Autoridades de Transito). 2./ Request the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources (Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos) of this Ministry to proceed, in accordance with its competencies, to send to the Legal Directorate of the Ministerial Office (Dirección Jurídica del Despacho Ministerial) the corresponding calculations of the Labor Entitlements that rightfully correspond to Transit Officer [Name62 001], for the preparation of the respective administrative payment resolution. (…)".

IX.- From the analysis of that account, it can be deduced that the effective cause for the dismissal of the actor with employer liability can in no way be linked to an aspect of disciplinary action, but rather to the lack of suitability for the exercise of the position, which, it is insisted, was established in various clinical analyses performed in his case. As has been noted, the power to terminate the employment relationship within the framework of the national police regime includes the undeniable proof of the unsuitability of the public agent for the exercise of the position, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 88 of Law No. Placa3784. In that regard, in the final act that ordered his dismissal, the head of the ministerial portfolio set forth the specific factual reasons that supported his decision in the following sense: "... 2. That the behavior of Officer [Name62 001] is not adequate nor expected of a public servant, even more so when it concerns a member of the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito), who must ensure the integrity and safety of the citizens of the Republic. 3. That the conduct of servant [Name62 001] has fostered a tense work environment in the workplaces where he has been, discomfort on the part of colleagues, superiors, personnel from other instances, and, perhaps most importantly, of the users, materializing in complaints, which diminishes the service that the Traffic Police Directorate (Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito) must provide. 4. That there is sufficient background on the actions of servant [Name62 001], studies from Occupational Health, from the Psychology unit of the Medical Office of the Traffic Police (Consultorio Médico de la Policía de Tránsito), and reports from the pertinent areas of the Hospital Monseñor Sanabria in the city of Puntarenas that lead to questioning the physical and mental suitability of the servant to act as a Transit Officer, to protect and defend the users of the service provided by the institution. 5. That the proven incapacity, demonstrated by medical and psychological reports, of the questioned Officer [Name62 001] does not allow him to use the regulation weapon, in his defense or that of the citizen, from danger. 6.

Peace, cordiality, good relations, and motivation must prevail in all Traffic Police workplaces, in order to achieve the improvement of the service that must be provided to the citizenry, and this will not be possible as long as the employee [Nombre62 001] remains working for this police force at some of its facilities. Contrary to what the claimant argues as the primary framework for his refutations, this is not a matter that was unknown or foreign to him, to the extent that he not only requested copies of the medical reports that led to the decision finally adopted, but also, when he was transferred to an administrative post, he filed the appellate measures that led the Personnel Council to revoke his transfer to the Detained Vehicles Unit in San José. From this perspective of examination, the alleged injury to due process is not admissible. It should be noted that the final act not only clearly sets forth the reasons for the decision adopted, but also, the complainant does not refute or contest the factual circumstances that have given basis to the grounds for the act. Indeed, the reasons for the cited dismissal did not result in discrimination to the detriment of the claimant, upon considering the medical diagnosis of his psychological condition. This aspect was considered within the amparo proceeding filed by the claimant in constitutional court, case file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, in which, as a result of the allegations of discriminatory treatment due to his illness, in vote 2015-017427, the Constitutional Chamber stated, in relevant part: "... It is highlighted that the decision taken by the appellee party had the purpose of satisfying the interest of the community, ensuring harmony in the work environment, and seeking the suitability of the personnel serving the Ministry. Regarding this last point, for example, the protected party was prevented from carrying or using the regulation weapon, which affected his capacity for personal defense and the defense of third parties. On the other hand, the Chamber emphasizes the will that existed within the appellee Administration to provide an alternative solution to the protected case. (...) Subsequently, the Administration even resolved to transfer the protected party to another delegation, in order not to affect his personal situation with the new geographic location. Based on the foregoing elements, the Chamber cannot conclude that the appellee Administration acted in violation of the protected party's rights, as there are clear indications that it instead sought to help him, through his relocation and psychotherapeutic treatment. By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal is declared without merit." This citation demonstrates not only the nonexistence of discriminatory treatment regarding his psychological conditions, but also the existence of actions within MOPT to relocate the claimant to a place where he could perform normally, while also reflecting the accompaniment of medical care regarding his specific situation. Nevertheless, the various clinical analyses reflect that ultimately, the plaintiff is not a suitable person to occupy and exercise the position he holds, an aspect that, it is insisted, the claimant has failed to rebut. This aspect constitutes the motivating element of the act, which, in accordance with what is indicated in mandate 133 of the General Public Administration Law, is decisive in this type of analysis. Thus, the decision issued by the Minister of Public Works does not prove to be arbitrary or lacking in protection of the claimant's rights, as is alleged in the lawsuit, to the extent that it reasons and accredits the circumstances upon which it determines the absence of elements it deems essential to define the claimant's suitability, and based on that, in congruence with the applicable legal framework (Law No. 7410), determines the dismissal with personal responsibility of that public servant. Therefore, the absence or substantial imperfection of any of the elements of the act is not observed in this case, in what has been the subject of reproach, for which reason, in accordance with articles 128, 132, 133, 158, 166, and 167 of the General Public Administration Law, the invalidity of the proceedings is not observed, as a result of which, the rejection of the lawsuit must be ordered regarding the annulment claim.

X.- Regarding the defenses raised. The State's representation raised the defense of lack of right. This substantive exception must be upheld for the reasons already stated. Consequently, what is due is to order the rejection of the lawsuit in all its terms.

XI.- Costs. In accordance with article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this Court does not observe any reason to except the application of this maxim, for which reason, what is due is to impose them on the losing claimant party.

THEREFORE.

The defense of lack of right is upheld. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mr. [Nombre62 001] against the State is declared without merit in all its terms. Both costs are to be borne by the losing claimant. On this aspect, Judge Aguilar Méndez submits a separate note. José Roberto Garita Navarro / Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* NOTE OF JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.

In relation to costs, and with absolute respect for the divergent opinion of my colleagues, I take the liberty of differing in relation to the scope of the condemnation made, since under the new Civil Procedure Code (Law No. 9342), specifically articles 62.1, 73.2, and 73.3, the deciding Court in a case such as this has the duty to grant at once the exact amount of the sums granted for costs, as well as to determine the joint-and-several nature or the divisibility of this obligation. Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*- ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: [Nombre62 001].

DEMANDADO: El Estado.

IGWTHUP.JRGN.2019 At the same time, the Department of Occupational Health (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional) is requested to continue the psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace, as well as to ensure that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Transit Police Officer." This was communicated to the Director General of Transit by official letter No. 0626-2014 of July 2, 2014. (Administrative file, pages 50-51) **4)** By action number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, the Director General of Transit communicated to the Human Resources Coordinator that it was agreed to transfer the plaintiff to the Impounded Vehicle Depot, in an effort to obtain a satisfactory work environment. (Administrative file, page 52) **5)** By official letter No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Director of the Transit Police that by the sixty-fourth article, sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, it partially amended the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, so that its final part reads: "*... At the same time, Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist of the Medical Office of the Transit Police Directorate, is requested to continue the psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace, as well as to ensure that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Transit Police Officer, the foregoing in due coordination with the Department of Occupational Health.*" (Administrative file, page 54) **6)** By official letter No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat of the Personnel Council delivered a copy of official letter No. 0626-2014 of July 2, 2014, to the plaintiff. (Administrative file, page 53) **7)** By official letter No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Director of the Transit Police that by the sixty-fifth article, sixty-fifth agreement of ordinary minute 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, in which it was ordered that, in view of the brief dated July 18, 2014, filed by the plaintiff, opposing the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 and the sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 was immediately suspended, until that appeal action was resolved. (Administrative file, page 58) **8)** By official letter of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the MOPT Central and North Macro Region Unit, communicated to the Minister of Public Works and Transport the psychological expert report regarding the case of Officer [Name62 001]. In the aforementioned opinion issued on April 10, 2014, it was stated, in relevant part: "*4. Recommendations: 1) Given the ailment suffered by the official in question, psychological care must be provided, especially since, due to the time he has been taking the medication, its withdrawal is approaching. 2) Due to the degree of impact on the official, he should not be transferred, as that would be issuing an a priori judgment against him, which could further destabilize his mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant him a paid leave of absence while his situation in all areas is defined, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation for both his colleagues and [Name62 001] himself (sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, using qualified personnel, not belonging to human resources or attached entities, the truth of the events that occurred and the treatment given, as it is alarming for sound administration how inertia has been the protagonist in this process for two years, causing malaise and general wear on the involved parties and possible harmful consequences for the administration. (...) 5) Review, using personnel with extensive knowledge in selection matters, preferably external, how entry-level personnel have been selected, since at the time serious deficiencies were discovered by Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issued recommendations to the Personnel Council of the previous government, which never implemented major changes, always showing resistance to modification. (...)*". (Precautionary measure file, images 109-120) **9)** By resolution No. 99-2014 of 11:35 a.m. on August 13, 2014, the Personnel Council resolved the appeal for revocation filed by the plaintiff and ordered: "*Partially uphold the Appeal for Revocation filed by Transit Police Officer [Name62 001], with qualities known in the file, against the sixty-fourth Agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minute of ordinary session No. 012-2014, on Wednesday, July 9, two thousand fourteen, of the Personnel Council and Official Letter DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director General of the Transit Police, therefore the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer but it is ordered that this not be to San José, but to a Transit Delegation as close as possible to his residence, for which the Administration in the General Directorate of the Transit Police and the Human Resources Directorate must take the appropriate measures for the transfer of Delegation and the change in the duties of the employment contract, in accordance with the reality of the appealing servant. (...)*". It ordered the referral of the appeal to the Minister of that ministry. This was communicated to the plaintiff by fax, to number 2223-4170. (Administrative file, pages 59-63) **10)** By official letter No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Occupational Health Department the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, ordinary minute 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it is requested that a study clearly determine whether the plaintiff has the fitness to serve as a Transit Police officer, given a series of complaints and disagreements against him at the Puntarenas Delegation. (Administrative file, page 64) **11)** By a brief dated September 11, 2014, the plaintiff requested a copy of the report referenced in the preceding section. (Administrative file, page 16) **12)** By official letter No. 1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the petitioner the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of ordinary minute 18-2017 of October 15, 2014, by which he is permitted to receive a copy of the MOPT Occupational Health report, prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés. (Administrative file, page 18) **13)** By official letter No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Director of the Transit Police that by the fortieth article, fortieth agreement of ordinary minute 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that, in view of the official letter of October 29, 2014, from the Labor Court of Major Amount of Puntarenas, the plaintiff must be transferred to another region other than the Central Pacific. (Main file, page 84) **14)** By official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Personnel Council communicated to the Minister of Public Works and Transport what was agreed in the tenth article, tenth agreement of extraordinary Minute 09-2015, taken at extraordinary session 09-2015, in which it was ordered in relevant part: “… Based on the factual and legal arguments just set forth, the Personnel Council agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos, the following: 1. Dismiss, with employer liability, Transit Police Officer [Name62 001], with qualities known in this file, in accordance with articles 8, 10, 76 and 88 of the General Police Law, No. 7410, in conjunction with article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…). 2. Recognize the labor rights and benefits that this administrative Act determines in accordance with the legal system. Firm agreement.” (Precautionary measure file, images 241-247) **15)** By resolution No. 1418 of 1:09 p.m. on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the content of official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Personnel Council is acknowledged and it was ordered in relevant part: “THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT ORDERS: 1.- Confirm in all its aspects the Tenth Article, Tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minute No. 09-2015, taken by the aforementioned Council at Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August 5, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Liability Transit Officer [Name62 001], bearer of identity card number [CED62 ], with qualities known in this file, in accordance with articles 8, 10, 76 and 88 of the General Police Law, No. 7410, in conjunction with article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…), as well as the provisions of the Regulation of Organization and Service of the Traffic Authorities. 2./ Request the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources of this Ministry, to proceed in accordance with its powers, to send to the Legal Directorate of the Ministerial Office, the corresponding calculations of the Labor Rights that rightfully correspond to Transit Officer [Name62 001], for the preparation of the respective administrative payment resolution. (…)”. (Precautionary measure file, images 89-99) **16)** That on October 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Chamber against the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, alleging injury to his right to work and equality. He pointed out that he was dismissed without having been personally evaluated and that only an analysis of the documents provided by the Ministry itself was carried out, omitting to consider that he suffers from a dysthymic disorder, which is a psychological illness, and that the same psychological diagnoses warned that it was due to workplace harassment. Case processed under file number 15-015384-0007-CO. (Administrative file, pages 122-139) **17)** By official letter DVA-DGIRH-DGSP-131-2016 of October 19, 2015, the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources notified the plaintiff of his dismissal with employer liability effective October 30, 2015. (Administrative file, page 106) **18)** By resolution No. 2015-017427 of 10:10 a.m. on November 6, 2015, the Constitutional Chamber ordered the rejection of the amparo measure filed by the plaintiff, file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, considering that his dismissal had not been based on discriminatory reasons derived from his psychological illness. (Administrative file, pages 122-139) **II.- Unproven facts.** None of relevance to this proceeding.

**III.- Arguments of the parties. The plaintiff** alleges, fundamentally, that the challenged act does not provide adequate reasoning. He says this is especially important since the decision made by the Transit Police Personnel Council is centered on a report in which, despite being a psychological evaluation, he was seen by the treating physician. His file was simply reviewed, and a recommendation was issued, of which the most burdensome was adopted. He believes that, not having been seen by the treating physician, any recommendation is invalid for being subjective. He accuses violation of due process, insofar as there are no notifications, notice of charges, or opening of an administrative procedure through which the exercise of the right of defense is permitted, from which the grounds for dismissal would emerge, but rather what exists is the application of a sanction generated in a capricious manner, without sufficient reasoning. He believes that failing to provide due process violates legality and the principle of statutory reservation. He affirms that as of the date of the lawsuit, he was not aware of any notice of charges, but rather was dismissed arbitrarily and unilaterally. He highlights that the General Law of Public Administration imposes an administrative procedure for cases in which complaints are filed against a public official. He refers to the basic components of administrative due process, which, he states, were omitted by the Personnel Council when making decisions that were never requested. He alludes to precedents of the Full Court regarding the content of due process. He believes that what was done by the Personnel Council is null and void for imposing a sanction in violation of due process.

**IV.- Allegations of the State.** For its part, the public attorney states that the challenged decision was adopted respecting the rights of the official in the processing and in compliance with the special regulations by virtue of the police nature of the position. He emphasizes that these are police officers, in the area of transit police, who are guarantors of citizen security and compliance with the law, who must be suitable in terms of moral, personal, physical, and psychological conditions to carry out their work. He points out that lacking the required conditions for the position, as is the case of being unable to carry weapons and not having the minimum moral and psychological fitness for the exercise of the position, makes it impossible to keep him in the position, and the special regulations establish the possibility for the superior to dismiss him with employer liability. The public interest prevents keeping an official whose conduct has fostered a tense work environment in the workplace, affecting the rest of the staff and the institutional image itself. He says that sufficient background on the petitioner's actions was reviewed and accredited, as well as Occupational Health studies from the Psychology Unit of the Medical Office of the Transit Police and opinions from the relevant areas of the Monseñor Sanabria Hospital of Puntarenas, which determined the lack of physical and mental fitness of the servant to act as a Transit Officer. He continues, multiple reports evidence his lack of capacity, and medical and psychological reports indicate his inability to use the regulation weapon, which, he says, is essential in the exercise of the position for which he was hired. This coupled with the fact that the plaintiff's behaviors affected the peace, cordiality, good relations, and motivation that must prevail in the workplace. He specifies that the dismissal in the act was ordered with employer liability, respecting his rights and the principles of public employment.

**V.- Generalities on the administrative procedure.** The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it is imposed as a framework of reference that allows the administered party to compare public action, in order to establish control that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide that action. It therefore seeks to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and convenience of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated by canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's goals and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration. Hence, canon 216.1 ibid requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth of the facts (among which those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law, can be seen). This becomes even more relevant in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that, in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same regulatory body provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any procedure that does not satisfy these minimum issues. This follows from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Court has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred on this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta involves a check that the Administration, in the course of these procedures (of a sanctioning nature for this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, fundamentally, the due process that must be infallible in that procedure has been protected. Now, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body and the deciding body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the deciding body, that is, to whomever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that exhausts the administrative channel. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, instructional competencies are delegable to a body responsible for carrying out the procedure's instruction, which has tended to be called the "directing or instructing body." In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the deciding body, for which its validity is subject to it being vested in an attached official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is feasible that, in certain cases, the law itself establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, they must be understood to be performing a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competencies, the representation of the instructing administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as follows with complete clarity from ordinal 282 subsection 3 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with powers of instruction and ordering of the procedure (art. 227 LGAP), charged with carrying out all preparatory stages to then refer the proceedings to the deciding body (art. 330 LGAP). Although, in certain cases it may issue recommendations, they are certainly not binding, so its determinations with a view to adopting a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is its responsibility to issue the act of opening, to give procedural momentum, all the work of instructing the procedure, to direct appearances, resolve preliminary issues, resolve the appeal for revocation filed against procedural acts, evacuate the admitted evidence, as well as to send the file for the issuance of the final act. Among its competencies, articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law, can be seen. For its part, the deciding body is the competent superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act resolving the procedure.

**VI.- On the police regime.** In accordance with ordinal 140 subsection 1) of the Magna Carta: "*The following are duties and powers jointly incumbent upon the President and the respective Minister of Government: 1) To freely appoint and remove the members of the public force, the employees and officials who serve in confidence positions, and others determined, in very qualified cases, by the Civil Service Law.*" In this regard, in accordance with article 3 subsection b) of the Civil Service Statute, members of the Public Force are not considered included within that statutory regime, as said service relationships are currently regulated by the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 30, 1994. That legal source precisely regulates, starting from canon 50, the so-called "Police Statute." The canon 50 in question states: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Article 50°-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Scope and objectives.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic"> This Statute shall regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and the servants who are members of the different police forces, with the purpose of guaranteeing efficiency in the maintenance of public safety and protecting the rights of these servants.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" For its part, canon 52 ejusdem establishes the officials who are not considered covered by the rules comprising the Police Statute, while also recognizing the right to stability of those who have validly entered that regime. In that sense, that precept establishes: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Article 52°-Servants not covered by the Statute. The provision of subsection a) of article 59 of this Statute shall not cover, and consequently, they shall not enjoy lifetime tenure (inamovilidad) in their positions, the following officials: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">a) </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Ministers and vice-ministers, advisors, and confidential employees. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">b) </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">The general administrative director, the general director of the Public Force, its regional directors and sub-directors, the director of the Air Surveillance Service, and the director of the Drug Control Police.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" Pursuant to that precept, persons governed by the Police Statute, except for the cases previously referenced, enjoy the right to stability (called lifetime tenure), which implies that the termination of the public employment relationship may only occur for legally regulated reasons and with the corresponding right to reinstatement, should a breach of that right be proven. Said stability that operates in the police regime is also recognized in the letter of canon 75, subsection a) of the cited law, insofar as it expressly states: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Article 75°-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Rights.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">The members of the police forces protected by this Law shall enjoy the following rights: a) Stability in their positions, provided they enter the service in accordance with the requirements demanded in this Statute and if they fulfill their duties in the provision of the service, according to the conditions determined in this Law and its Regulations. / The servant may only be removed from their position when they incur a serious fault, in accordance with the legal system, or when, to improve the service, their manifest inefficiency or incompetence is determined, pursuant to the provisions of this Law.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" On their side, ordinals 77 through 89 ibidem regulate matters concerning the disciplinary regime, indicating the faults, sanctions to be imposed, grounds for dismissal, applicable procedure, statute of limitations rules, among other topics relevant to that aspect. For example, numeral 80 of said legal source regulates the applicable procedure for applying reprimands. Within this framework, the causes for dismissal are specified in ordinal 88 of the cited Law No. 7410 (a rule that reiterates the right to stability of that type of public function) as follows: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">"Article 88°- </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Justified Dismissal</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. The servants protected by this Statute may only be removed from their positions for the following reasons: a) For the verification that they have incurred a serious fault, as provided in this Law. b) For incurring any of the grounds established in article 81 of the Labor Code. c) For manifest and verified inefficiency or incompetence in the performance of the position. d) As provided in article 51 of this Law.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" Attention is drawn to the provisions in numerals 85 and 86 of the cited Law, insofar as they regulate scenarios for the application of the disciplinary regime, when the facts underlying that hierarchical exercise are simultaneously subject to analysis within a jurisdictional proceeding. In that sense, the first of those articles indicates: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Article 85°-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Administrative investigation and jurisdictional investigation</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. The initiation of public criminal action does not prevent the simultaneous commencement of the administrative investigation for the same facts and to apply the disciplinary regime. / The statement of proven facts pronounced in the criminal sentence binds the administrative instance for the disciplinary and labor effects of the case, even if a prior administrative resolution favorable to the servant has been issued; in this case, they must be heard, summarily, before applying the corresponding sanctions. The foregoing does not prevent the administration from taking the provisional measures it deems necessary while the matter is being resolved in the criminal venue.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" For its part, canon 86 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">ibid</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt"> states that, when prosecution occurs in criminal proceedings for a crime related to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the Administration shall immediately suspend the servant and, until the decision of the case, shall withhold their salary, in whole or in part. From the foregoing, it follows that the Police Statute grants persons serving in the police forces the right to stability, and that regulation expressly indicates the factual scenarios in which the dismissal of the police official is appropriate, as well as the specific positions in which said guarantee does not operate. </span></p><p style="margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:5pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">VII.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Nevertheless, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the rules comprising the cited Law No. 7410 must be complemented and integrated with the provisions of ordinal 140, subsection 1) of the Magna Carta, this latter rule recognizing that whoever holds the Presidency of the Republic, jointly with the hierarchy of the Ministry of Public Security, has the authority to freely appoint and remove members of the public force. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber itself, in various rulings in which it heard claims like the one being analyzed in this proceeding, established the criterion that it was necessary to distinguish personnel covered by the Police Statute from those who were not. Thus, for example, in vote No. 2016-18906 of 09:45 hours on December 23, 2016, reiterated in precedent No. 2017-006876 of 09:15 hours on May 12, 2017, it held, in relevant part: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">III.- On the merits. From the documents attached to the case file (expediente), it is clear that the protected parties were dismissed in accordance with the provisions of article 140, subsection 1) of the Political Constitution, as established in several executive agreements (acuerdos ejecutivos), and without it being shown that they were covered by the Police Statute; therefore, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, the dismissal is not illegitimate, since the President of the Republic and the relevant Minister have the authority—in accordance with the constitutional text—to freely appoint and remove members of the Public Force. (...)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">". This precedent highlights the need to discriminate between both types of relationships, as a prerequisite to using the power granted by the aforementioned constitutional ordinal. However, this collegiate body considers that the grammatical reference to "freely," while it may be considered the recognition of a discretionary power, is also subject to the rules of administrative legality—specifically, the impassable limits on the exercise of such powers established by ordinals 15, 16, 128, 158.4, and 160 (among others) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP)—and additionally, to the rules contained in Law No. 7410, already discussed. In its proper dimension, such a rule grants the aforementioned hierarchical superiors the power to dispense with police force personnel for reasons of convenience and opportunity, without the need for a pre-existing administrative proceeding establishing a justified cause for dismissal, provided such termination of the special internal relationship respects the labor rights inherent to public function, which means that such dismissal shall be with corresponding employer liability. However, those reasons of convenience and opportunity that would allow the exercise of this power can in no way be constituted as a mechanism for disciplinary exercise, even covertly, or as a form of substitution (by negation) of that power. In line with the above, it is a power provided for exceptional cases, such as that of confidential personnel, generally not covered by the Police Statute (Law No. 7410). In effect, when the cause for using the aforementioned hierarchical power is a disregard, by the person exercising the police function, of the rules of conduct to which they are subject—including the rules of probity in the exercise of the public police function—such that the hierarchical superior considers such actions or omissions to be reprehensible to the degree of deeming their separation from the police forces pertinent, it is the consideration of this Chamber that Law No. 7410 itself—as a necessary complement to the proper understanding of the scope of canon 140.1 of the Magna Carta—imposes the duty to prove the fault through the respective procedural process and, in those hypotheses, to order the corresponding internal corrective measure, including dismissal, when the merits of the case file so determine. The analysis of the body of regulations recorded above leads this Tribunal to consider that if the cause for dismissal is a detachment, disregard, non-compliance, or, generally, a violation of the rules of behavior and duties inherent to police personnel, that effect must necessarily occur within the exercise of the disciplinary power and not through a generic, discretionary power to "freely" remove that type of agent. Otherwise, the permissibility of resorting to such a (pseudo) free removal of the official without the need for a prior proceeding, even in cases where disciplinary exercise would be pertinent—with the caveat that employer liability for such measures is assumed—constitutes an illegitimate renunciation of that internal corrective exercise and the conferring of an economic benefit upon the official who is non-compliant with their legal and functional obligations. In such cases, it is reiterated, the mere existence of (reasonable or not) doubts about improper conduct by the police agent should not give rise to the exercise of said discretionary removal power, since if that were the case, it would negate and render illogical and without useful effect the stability consecrated and recognized by Law No. Placa3784, as well as the regulation of the disciplinary regime that operates in these areas. As has been indicated, resorting to the discretionary termination of the public agent with the corresponding payment of labor entitlements (extremos laborales), even though the effective cause of that decision is the commission of a functional fault, while it may be said to be "convenient" for the administrative hierarchy, in reality disregards the rights that operate in public function and are guaranteed by express law (No. 7410), since it denies the exercise of the right of defense to adopt a decision based on conjectures that have not been proven within an administrative proceeding, the purpose of which—in accordance with the doctrine of ordinals 214 and 223 of the LGAP—is to establish the real truth of the facts. In this way, the dismissal of a person serving in such police functions, even with employer liability, based on alleged, unproven faults, undoubtedly harms due process, through the a priori renunciation of disciplinary exercise, in order to adopt decisions that break the service relationship, even though the facts constituting the alleged fault may not have been committed. Likewise, if the fault was committed, dismissal with the payment of all labor charges inherent to employer liability implies, it is reiterated, conferring an improper benefit to the detriment of public funds that must be protected, with the eventual liability that would derive from such actions, as set forth in the superior oversight regime of the Public Treasury expressed in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, No. 8131, the General Internal Control Law, No. 8292, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function, No. 8422, and the generic framework of public official liability consecrated by Law No. 6227, starting from precept 199. Therefore, this Tribunal considers that, while ordinal 140.1 of the Magna Carta recognizes the discretionary power to remove public force personnel, that rule does not authorize the renunciation of disciplinary exercise in the face of causes that imply grounds for dismissal without employer liability or, generally, that relate to subjection to the disciplinary regime. On the contrary, that possibility, in the context of the foregoing, only operates in the face of qualified circumstances of convenience and opportunity, provided they are fully and duly expressed in the dismissal act, a statement of reasons (motivación) which, in any case, is imposed by the doctrine of precept 136 of the same Law No. 6227—under penalty of generating the granting of undue patrimonial benefits, or constituting a misuse of power (desviación de poder), by using the administrative power for purposes different from the principal one that justifies the enabling rule, to its detriment, as explained by article 131, subsection 3) of the cited LGAP—all of which is reviewable by this Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction through validity analysis of the administrative function established by numeral 49 of the Magna Carta. But, furthermore, said power is applicable to the case of positions not covered by the Police Statute, in the scenarios provided for by ordinal 52 of Law No. 7410, whereas in all other cases, the right to stability prevails. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold">VIII.- On the cause for dismissal in the specific case.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">In the instant case, the main complaint of the petitioner lies in the alleged absence of a formal proceeding prior to the adoption of the administrative act (conducta formal) that ordered their dismissal with employer liability. However, from the analysis of the case file, it is clear that the decision adopted by the respondent Administration is not, strictly speaking, related to the reflexive exercise of a disciplinary power, but rather to the powers to terminate the employment relationship established by ordinal 88, subsection d) of Law No. 7410, insofar as it relates to the determination of medically verified conditions which, in the judgment of their employer, render the plaintiff unfit (inidóneo) for the exercise of the functions inherent to the position they held. Although this Chamber has indicated in previous rulings—the most recent being No. 074-2019-VI of 09:00 hours on June 25, 2019—that the power of ordinal 140.1 of the Magna Carta is not unrestricted, as it must be interpreted in conjunction with the implications of the labor stability recognized by the Police Service Statute, and that such power does not imply (nor can it imply) a tacit renunciation of the exercise of disciplinary powers, in cases like the present one, the exercise of this power is entirely legitimate if it is based on causes associated with the definition of suitability or unsuitability for the exercise of the public office. The foregoing, it is insisted, to the extent that the assessment of such suitability is not linked to conduct or omissions whose handling is proper to disciplinary matters. In the instant case, the cause for the questioned decision is not related to such aspects of disciplinary correction, but rather to the technical definition of deficiencies of the plaintiff, which evidenced the lack of conditions that their employer considers necessary and determinative for maintaining their status (investidura) and based on which their unsuitability to hold the position of Traffic Police Officer was determined. From the analysis of the case file, it is shown that by document JCE-HMS-0455-2014 of February 25, 2014, the Head of the Outpatient Clinic of Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certifies: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">That according to the medical record of patient [Name62 001]</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Insured Number: [Valor 001], the treating PSYCHIATRY physician Dr- Nombre139072</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, in a consultation of February 25, 2014, notes: 'Patient continues follow-up in Psychiatry at HMS due to having been categorized as severe depressive disorder under psychopharmacological treatment, therefore it is recommended not to use or carry firearms.' ...</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">". In follow-up to that diagnosis, in June 2014, the Department of Occupational Health (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional) of the MOPT issued a Report prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, in which, after the assessment carried out on the plaintiff, concluded: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">Considering that the employee presents a behavioral pattern suggesting a guarded prognosis; but without ignoring the possibility that the work context may have had a significant impact on what occurred, it is proposed, in the first instance, that Mr. [Name62 001] be relocated to a place outside the Puntarenas Delegation, to perform administrative functions, where contact with the user is minimal or nil. If this option is chosen, the employee must continue psychotherapeutic care for 1 year at the Medical Office of the General Directorate of Traffic Police; to evaluate adaptation to the new workplace, as well as behavioral adjustment. In the second instance, the dismissal of the employee with employer liability is envisioned, which will be assessed by the Traffic Police Council. For this purpose, it will have the input that the Psychology Unit of the General Directorate of Traffic Police provides through a written report. In order to promote a recovery of the work environment of the Puntarenas Delegation, it is also considered pertinent to transfer Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. And to carry out an internal review of the administrative functioning of the same, which will be undertaken by the person or team assigned by the Director General of the Traffic Police. Subsequently, after six months, the state of the work environment will be re-evaluated through follow-up monitoring at the Delegation; which will be the responsibility of the Department of Occupational Health.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" This report was sent by the Head of Occupational Health to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) via official communication DGIRH # 2014-226-SO of June 19, 2014. As can be observed, this report offered several alternatives to address the petitioner's situation, the first option being relocation to a place where they would have no contact with the public, with respective monitoring and psychotherapeutic support. As an alternative option, it stated considering eventual dismissal with employer liability. In response to these recommendations, by article fifty-fourth, agreement fifty-fourth of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, the Personnel Council ordered the transfer of the claimant </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">to the Detained Vehicles Department in the Canton of San José, as well as requesting the Department of Occupational Health to continue with psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the reintegration of the officer and their adaptation to their new workplace, as well as to achieve that they adjust their behavior to the required standards in the function demanded of them as a Traffic Police Officer.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" The transfer was made effective by official communication number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, from the Director General of Traffic. For its part, by official communication No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Director of the Traffic Police that, by article sixtieth-fourth, agreement sixtieth-fourth of ordinary minute 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014 was partially modified, so that its final part reads: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">... At the same time, Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist at the Medical Office of the Traffic Police Directorate, is requested to continue with the psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the reintegration of the officer and their adaptation to their new workplace, as well as to achieve that they adjust their behavior to the required standards in the function demanded of them as a Traffic Police Officer, the foregoing with due coordination with the Department of Occupational Health.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">" By official communication No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat of the Personnel Council notified the plaintiff of article fifty-fourth, agreement fifty-fourth of ordinary minute 11-2014, in relation to the Occupational Health recommendation for their transfer. Later, in act No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Director of the Traffic Police that, by article sixtieth-fifth, agreement sixtieth-fifth of ordinary minute 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, in which it was ordered that, given the written submission of July 18, 2014, presented by the plaintiff, in which they opposed the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 and the sixtieth-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 was immediately suspended, until such time as that appeal action was resolved. By official communication of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the Macro Region Central and North MOPT Unit, communicated to the Minister of Public Works and Transport the psychological assessment report regarding the case of Officer [Name62 001]. In the cited opinion issued on April 10, 2014, it states, in relevant part: "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">4. Recommendations: 1) Given this condition suffered by the official in question, they must be provided psychological care, especially since the time they have been taking medication is approaching its withdrawal. 2) Due to the degree of affectation to the official, they should not be transferred, as this would be issuing an a priori judgment against them, which could further destabilize their mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant them a leave with pay while their situation is being defined in all areas, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation for both the colleagues and [Name62 001] himself (sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, through qualified personnel not belonging to human resources or affiliated entities, the truth of the events that have arisen and the treatment that has been given, as it is alarming for sound administration how inertia has been the protagonist in this process for two years, causing malaise and general wear on the parties involved and possible harmful consequences for the administration. (...) 5) It must be reviewed, by personnel with extensive knowledge in matters of selection, preferably external, how entry-level personnel have been being selected, since deficiencies are discovered at the time by Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issues recommendations to the Personnel Council of the previous government, which never executed major changes, always showing resistance to modifying. (...)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt">". By resolution No.

99-2014 of 11:35 a.m. on August 13, 2014, the Personnel Council resolved the motion to revoke (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the plaintiff and ordered: "Partially grant the Motion to Revoke filed by the Transit Police Officer [Nombre62 001], whose particulars are known in the case file, against the sixty-fourth Agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minutes of ordinary session No. 012-2014, held on Wednesday, July ninth, two thousand fourteen, of the Personnel Council and Official Letter DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director General of the Transit Police, and therefore the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer, but it is ordered that this transfer shall not be to San José, but to a Transit Delegation as close as possible to his residence, for which purpose the Administration, in the Directorate General of the Transit Police and the Human Resources Directorate, must take the appropriate measures for the delegation transfer and the change in the duties of the employment contract, according to the reality of the appealing employee. (...)". Through official letter No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Occupational Health Department the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, of ordinary minutes 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it is requested to determine, by means of a study, with complete clarity, whether the plaintiff has the suitability (idoneidad) to serve as a Transit Police officer, given a series of complaints and disagreements against him at the Puntarenas Delegation. By official letter No. 1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the petitioner the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of ordinary minutes 18-2017 of October 15, 2014, through which he is permitted to receive a copy of the Occupational Health report of the MOPT, prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, a request he had made on September 11, 2014. In official letter No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Director of the Transit Police that, by fortieth article, fortieth agreement of ordinary minutes 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that, in view of the official letter of October 29, 2014 from the Labor Court of Higher Amount of Puntarenas (Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Puntarenas), the plaintiff must be transferred to another region other than the Central Pacific. After the aforementioned medical evaluations, in official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Personnel Council communicated to the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes) what was agreed in the tenth article, tenth agreement of Extraordinary Minutes 09-2015, adopted in the extraordinary session 09-2015, in which it was ordered, in relevant part: "… Based on the factual and legal arguments just set forth, the Personnel Council agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos, the following: 1. Dismiss, with employer liability (responsabilidad patronal), the Transit Police Officer [Nombre62 001], whose particulars are known in this case file, in accordance with articles 8, 10, 76 and 88, of the General Police Law, No. Placa3784, in conjunction with article 85, subsection d) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and in relation to article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…). 2. Recognize the labor entitlements and rights (extremos y derechos laborales) determined by this administrative act in accordance with what is indicated in the legal system. Firm agreement." By resolution No. 1418 of 1:09 p.m. on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the content of official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Personnel Council, is acknowledged and it was ordered in relevant part: "THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT RESOLVES: 1.- Confirm in all its parts the Tenth Article, Tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minutes No. 09-2015, adopted by the aforementioned Council in Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August 5, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Liability the Transit Officer [Nombre62 001], bearer of identity card number [CED62], whose particulars are known in this case file, in accordance with articles 8, 10, 76 and 88, of the General Police Law, No. Placa3784, in conjunction with article 85, subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…), as well as the provisions of the Regulation on Organization and Service of Traffic Authorities (Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Autoridades de Tránsito). 2./ Request the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources of this Ministry, to proceed according to its competencies, to forward to the Legal Directorate of the Ministerial Office, the corresponding calculations of the Labor Entitlements (Extremos Laborales) legally owed to the Transit Officer [Nombre62 001], for the preparation of the respective administrative resolution of corresponding payment. (…)." **IX.-** From the analysis of this account, it is clear that the effective cause for the dismissal with employer liability of the plaintiff cannot, in any way, be linked to a disciplinary matter, but rather to the lack of suitability for the exercise of the position, which, it is insisted, was established in various clinical analyses conducted in his case. As has been noted, the power to terminate the employment relationship within the framework of the national police regime includes the undeniable accreditation of the public agent's lack of suitability for the position, in accordance with the provisions of article 88 of Law No. Placa3784. In that order, in the final act that ordered his dismissal, the head of the ministerial portfolio set forth the specific factual reasons that supported his decision in the following sense: "*... 2. That the behavior of Officer [Nombre62 001] is not adequate nor expected of a public servant, even more so when it concerns a member of the Transit Police, who must ensure the integrity and safety of the citizens of the Republic. 3. That the conduct of the employee [Nombre62 001] has fostered a tense work environment in the workplaces where he has been, unease among colleagues, superiors, personnel from other bodies and, perhaps most importantly, from the users which materialize into complaints, which diminishes the service that the Directorate of the Transit Police must provide. 4. That there are sufficient antecedents regarding the actions of the employee [Nombre62 001], Occupational Health studies, from the Psychology unit of the Medical Clinic of the Transit Police and opinions from the relevant areas of the Monseñor Sanabria Hospital in the city of Puntarenas that lead to questioning the physical and mental suitability of the employee to act as a Transit Officer, to protect and defend the users of the service provided by the institution. 5. That the incapacity, proven by the medical and psychological reports, of the questioned Officer [Nombre62 001] does not allow him to use the regulation weapon, in his defense or that of the citizen from danger. 6. That peace, cordiality, good relations and motivation must prevail in all the workplaces of the Transit Police, to bring about the improvement of the service that must be provided to the citizenry and this will not be possible as long as the employee [Nombre62 001] continues working for this police force, in any of its facilities.*" Unlike what the plaintiff argues as the primary framework for his rebuttals, this is not a matter that was unknown or foreign to him, insofar as he not only requested a copy of the medical opinions that led to the decision ultimately adopted, but also, when he was transferred to an administrative post, he filed the measures of appeal (medidas recursivas) that led the Personnel Council to revoke his transfer to the Detained Vehicles Unit (Unidad de Vehículos Detenidos) in San José. From this perspective of examination, the injury to the due process (debido proceso) alleged is not tenable. It is worth noting that the final act not only clearly sets forth the reasons for the decision adopted, but also, the complainant does not refute or challenge the factual circumstances that have formed the basis for the motive of the act. Even more, the reasons for the said dismissal did not produce discrimination to the detriment of the petitioner, considering the medical diagnosis of his psychological condition. This aspect was subject to consideration within the amparo proceeding filed by the plaintiff in the constitutional jurisdiction, case file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, in which, as a result of the allegations of discriminatory treatment due to his illness, in ruling 2015-017427, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated, in relevant part: "*... It is emphasized that the decision taken by the respondent party had the purpose of satisfying the interest of the community, ensuring harmony in the work environment and seeking the suitability of the personnel serving the Ministry. Regarding this last point, for example, the petitioner was prevented from carrying or using the regulation weapon, which affected his capacity for personal defense and that of third parties. On the other hand, the Chamber stresses the willingness that existed within the respondent Administration to provide an alternative solution to the case under protection. (...) Subsequently, the Administration even resolved to transfer the protected party to another delegation, in order to not affect his personal situation with the new geographic location. Based on the foregoing elements, the Chamber cannot conclude that the respondent Administration acted in violation of the rights of the protected party, since there are clear indications that it sought, rather, to provide him assistance, through his relocation and psychotherapeutic treatment. By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed.*" This citation reveals not only the non-existence of discriminatory treatment regarding his psychological conditions, but also the existence of actions within the MOPT to be able to relocate the plaintiff to a place where he could perform normally, while also reflecting the accompaniment of medical attention for his specific situation. Nevertheless, the various clinical analyses reflect that ultimately, the plaintiff is not a suitable person to hold and exercise the position he performs, an aspect that, it is insisted, the claimant has not managed to rebut. This aspect constitutes the motivating element of the act, which, in accordance with what is stated in article 133 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), is decisive in this type of analysis. In this manner, the decision issued by the Minister of Public Works does not prove to be arbitrary or lacking in the protection of the plaintiff's rights, as alleged in the lawsuit, insofar as it reasons and accredits the circumstances—on the basis of which—it determines the absence of elements it deems essential to define the suitability of the petitioner and, based on that, in congruence with the applicable legal framework (Law No. 7410), determines the dismissal with personal liability of that public servant. Therefore, the absence or substantial imperfection of any of the elements of the act, in what has been objected to, is not observed in this case, so that in accordance with articles 128, 132, 133, 158, 166 and 167 of the General Law of Public Administration, the invalidity of the proceedings is not observed, as a result of which, the dismissal of the lawsuit must be ordered regarding the annulment claim.

**X.- Regarding the defenses raised.** The State's representation raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). This substantive exception must be accepted for the reasons already indicated. Consequently, what is due is to order the dismissal of the lawsuit in all its parts.

**XI.- Costs (Costas).** In accordance with article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so. The waiver of this sentence is only viable when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence the existence of which was unknown to the opposing party. In the case at hand, this Court does not observe any reason to exempt the application of such a maxim, and therefore, what is due is to impose them on the losing plaintiff.

**THEREFORE.** The defense of lack of right is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mr. [Nombre62 001] against the State is dismissed in all its parts. Both costs are borne by the losing plaintiff. On this point, Judge Aguilar Méndez files a separate note. **José Roberto Garita Navarro / Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*** **NOTE FROM JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.** In relation to the costs and with absolute respect for the differing opinion of my colleagues, I take the liberty to disagree regarding the scope of the condemnation issued, because under the new Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) (Law No. 9342), specifically articles 62.1, 73.2 and 73.3, the deciding Court in a case like the present one is under a duty to grant at once the exact amount of the quantities awarded as costs, as well as to determine the joint and several character (carácter solidario) or the divisibility of this obligation. **Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-** ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: [Nombre62 001].

DEFENDANT: The State.

**IGWTHUP.JRGN.2019**

**"V.- Generalities on administrative procedure.** The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions. On the other, it imposes itself as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to compare public actions, in order to establish a control ensuring that its actions have been carried out in accordance with the norms that guide that conduct. It seeks, therefore, to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As stated in Article 214 of Law No. 6227, its object is to establish the material truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the better fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Hence, Article 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to arrive at establishing the aforementioned material truth of the facts (among which may be seen those established in Articles 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited Ley General). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, given that, in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on a person's legal sphere. The same normative plexus provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid any procedure that does not satisfy those minimum matters. This is derived from the mandate of Article 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by Article 49 of the Magna Carta entails a comparison to ensure that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, in essence, the due process that must be insurmountable in that proceeding has been protected. Now then, by virtue of what has been alleged, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions proper to the directing body and the decision-making body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whomever has been granted the legal competence to issue the act that exhausts administrative remedies. However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, the instructional competences may be delegated to a body responsible for carrying out the investigation of the procedure, which has come to be called the 'directing or investigating body' (órgano director o instructor). In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. Nevertheless, it is feasible that, in certain cases, the law itself establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body for the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated to constitute as the directing body of the procedure persons who are not regular officials; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations.

As for its powers, the representation of the investigating administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as is clearly evident from subsection 3 of Article 282 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with powers of investigation and management of the procedure (Article 227 LGAP), responsible for carrying out all preparatory stages and then forwarding the case file (autos) to the decision-making body (Article 330 LGAP). Although, in certain cases, it may issue recommendations, these would certainly not be binding, and therefore its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural actions (actos de trámite). Consequently, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, advancing the proceedings, all investigative work of the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed against procedural actions, carrying out the admitted evidence (probanzas), and forwarding the case file for the issuance of the final act. Its powers can be seen in Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the General Law of reference.

For its part, the decision-making body is the competent senior official who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the proceeding."</span></p> VI.- On the police regime.

In accordance with section 140, subsection 1) of the Magna Carta: "The following are duties and powers that belong jointly to the President and the respective Minister of Government: 1) Freely appoint and remove members of the public force, employees and officials who hold positions of trust, and others as determined, in very qualified cases, by the Civil Service Law." In that regard, pursuant to Article 3, subsection b) of the Civil Service Statute, members of the Public Force are not considered included within that statutory regime, and those service relationships are currently regulated by the General Police Law, No.

7410 of May 30, 1994. That legal source precisely regulates, starting from article 50, the so-called "Police Statute" (Estatuto Policial). The article 50 in question states: "Article 50°- Scope and objectives. This Statute (Estatuto) will regulate the relations between the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) and the employee members of the various police forces, with the purpose of guaranteeing efficiency in the maintenance of public safety and protecting the rights of these employees." For its part, article 52 of the same law establishes the public officials who are not considered covered by the rules that make up the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial), while recognizing the right to job stability (derecho de estabilidad) of those who have validly entered that regime. In that regard, that precept establishes: "Article 52°-Employees not covered by the Statute (Estatuto). The following officials shall not be covered by the provision of subsection a) of article 59 of this Statute (Estatuto) and, consequently, shall not enjoy immovability (inamovilidad) in their positions: a) Ministers and vice-ministers, advisors, and confidential employees. b) The general administrative director, the general director of the Public Force (Fuerza Pública), the regional directors and sub-directors thereof, the director of the Air Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea), and the director of the Drug Control Police (Policía de Control de Drogas)." According to that precept, persons governed by the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial), except for the cases previously referred to, enjoy the right to job stability (derecho de estabilidad) (called immovability (inamovilidad)), which implies that the termination of the public employment relationship may only occur for legally regulated reasons and with the corresponding right to reinstatement, should a breach of said right be proven. Said stability (estabilidad) that operates in the police regime is equally recognized in the letter of article 75 subsection a) of the cited law insofar as it expressly states: "Article 75°- Rights. The members of the police forces protected by this Law shall enjoy the following rights: a) Stability (Estabilidad) in their positions, provided they enter the service in accordance with the requirements demanded in this Statute (Estatuto) and if they fulfill their duties in providing the service, according to the conditions determined in this Law and its Regulations. / The employee may only be removed from their position when they incur a serious fault (falta grave), in accordance with the legal system, or when, to improve the service, their manifest inefficiency or incompetence is determined, pursuant to the provisions of this Law." For its part, articles 77 through 89 of the same law regulate everything concerning the disciplinary regime, indicating the faults (faltas), sanctions to impose, grounds for dismissal, applicable procedure, statute of limitations rules, among other relevant topics on that aspect. For example, article 80 of said legal source regulates the applicable procedure for applying warnings. Within this framework, the causes for dismissal are specified in article 88 of the cited Law No. 7410 (a rule that reiterates the right to job stability (derecho de estabilidad) of that type of public function) in the following sense: "Article 88°- Justified dismissal. The employees covered by this Statute (Estatuto) may only be removed from their positions for the following reasons: a) Upon verification that they have incurred a serious fault (falta grave), as provided in this Law. b) For incurring any of the grounds established in article 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). c) For manifest and proven inefficiency or incompetence in the performance of the position. d) As provided in article 51 of this Law." Attention is drawn to what is prescribed in articles 85 and 86 of the cited Law, insofar as they regulate scenarios for applying the disciplinary regime, when the facts underlying that hierarchical exercise are also subject to analysis within a jurisdictional case. In that sense, the first of those articles indicates: "Article 85°- Administrative investigation and jurisdictional investigation. The initiation of public criminal action does not prevent the simultaneous commencement of the administrative investigation, for the same facts and to apply the disciplinary regime. / The statement of proven facts pronounced in the criminal sentence binds the administrative instance, for the disciplinary and labor effects of the case, even if a prior administrative resolution favorable to the employee has been issued; in this case, they must be briefly heard before applying the corresponding sanctions. The foregoing does not prevent the administration from taking the provisional measures it deems necessary while the matter is being resolved in the criminal jurisdiction." For its part, article 86 of the same law expresses that, when prosecution in the criminal jurisdiction occurs for a crime related to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the Administration shall immediately suspend the employee and, until the decision of the case, shall withhold their salary, totally or partially. From the foregoing, it follows that the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial) grants persons working in the police forces the right to job stability (derecho de estabilidad), with that regulation expressly indicating the factual scenarios in which the dismissal of the police official is appropriate, as well as the specific positions in which said guarantee does not operate.

**VII.-** Nonetheless, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the rules making up the cited Law No. 7410 must be complemented and integrated with the provisions of article 140 subsection 1) of the Constitution (Carta Magna), this latter rule recognizing that whoever holds the Presidency of the Republic, jointly with the head of the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública), may freely appoint and remove members of the public force (fuerza pública). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself, in various rulings in which it heard claims like the one analyzed in this process, established the criterion that it was necessary to distinguish between personnel covered by the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial) and those who were not. Thus, for example, in decision No. 2016-18906 of 09:45 hours on December 23, 2016, reiterated in precedent No. 2017-006876 of 09:15 hours on May 12, 2017, it held in relevant part: "III.- On the merits. From the documents attached to the expediente, it is evident that the protected parties were dismissed in accordance with the provisions of article 140 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), as established in several executive decrees (acuerdos ejecutivos), and without evidence that they were covered by the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial); therefore, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, the dismissal does not become illegitimate, since the President of the Republic and the Minister of the branch have the power -according to the constitutional text- to freely appoint and remove members of the Public Force (Fuerza Pública). (...)". Said precedent highlights the need to discriminate between both types of relationships, as a parameter prior to using the power granted by the aforementioned constitutional article. However, this collegiate body considers that the grammatical reference to "freely", while it may be considered as the recognition of a power of discretionary content, is equally subject to the rules of administrative legality, within these, to the insurmountable limits of the exercise of that type of powers, set by articles 15, 16, 128, 158.4, and 160 (among others) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), but also to the norms contained in the already discussed Law No. 7410. In its correct dimension, such rule grants the aforementioned chiefs the power to dispense with personnel of the police forces for reasons of convenience and opportunity, without the need for the pre-existence of an administrative procedure establishing the justifiable cause for dismissal, provided that such rupture of the special internal bond respects the labor rights inherent to the public function, which means that said dismissal will come with the corresponding employer liability (responsabilidad patronal). However, those reasons of convenience and opportunity that would permit the exercise of this power can in no way be constituted as a mechanism for disciplinary exercise, even a covert one, or as a form of substitution (by denial) of that power. In line with what has been indicated, it involves a power envisioned for exceptional cases, as is the case of personnel of trust (personal de confianza), in general, not covered by the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial) (Law No. 7410). Indeed, when the cause for using the aforementioned hierarchical power is a disregard, by the person exercising the police function, of the rules of conduct to which they are subject, including the rules of probity in the exercise of the public police function, such that the hierarchical head considers those actions or omissions to be reprehensible to the degree of deeming their separation from the police forces pertinent, it is the consideration of this Chamber that Law No. 7410 itself —as a necessary complement to the proper understanding of the scope of article 140.1 of the Constitution (Carta Magna)— imposes the duty to prove the fault (falta) through the respective procedural process and, in those hypotheses, to order the corresponding internal corrective measure, including dismissal, when the merit of the case file so determines. The analysis of the rules set forth above leads this Court to consider that if the cause for dismissal is the detachment, disregard, non-compliance, or generally, the violation of the behavioral rules and duties inherent to police personnel, such effect must necessarily occur within the exercise of the disciplinary power and not through a generic, discretionary power to "freely" remove that type of agent. Otherwise, the permissibility of resorting to said (pseudo) free removal of the official without the need for a prior procedure, even in cases where the pertinent action is disciplinary exercise, subject to assuming the employer liability (responsabilidad patronal) for those measures, constitutes an illegitimate waiver of that internal corrective exercise and the conferral of an economic benefit upon the official who has failed to comply with their legal and competence-based obligations. In such cases, it is insisted, the mere existence of doubts (reasonable or not) about improper conduct by the police agent should not give way to the exercise of said discretionary removal power, because if it were so, the job stability (estabilidad) that Law No. 7410 enshrines and recognizes, as well as the regulation of the disciplinary regime that operates in these fields, would be denied and would have little logic or useful effect. As has been indicated, appealing to the discretionary termination of the public agent with the corresponding payment of labor amounts, even though the effective cause of that decision is the commission of a functional fault (falta funcionarial), while it may be said to be "convenient" for the administrative hierarchy, in reality ignores the rights that operate in the public function and the explicit guarantee of Law No. 7410, because it denies the exercise of the right of defense to adopt a decision based on conjectures that have not been proven within an administrative procedure, whose purpose, in accordance with the doctrine of articles 214 and 223 of the LGAP (General Law of Public Administration), is to establish the real truth of the facts. In this way, the dismissal of a person performing those police functions, even with employer liability (responsabilidad patronal), based on alleged, unproven faults (faltas), undoubtedly harms due process (debido proceso), through the a priori waiver of disciplinary exercise, instead adopting decisions that break the employment relationship, despite the fact that the facts constituting the alleged fault (falta) may not have been committed. Likewise, if the fault (falta) was committed, dismissal with the payment of all labor obligations inherent to employer liability (responsabilidad del empleador) entails, it is reiterated, conferring an improper benefit to the detriment of the public funds that must be protected, with the eventual liability that would derive from those actions as inferred from the superior control regime of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) expressed in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), No. 8131, the General Internal Control Law (Ley General de Control Interno), No. 8292, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), No. 8422, and the generic framework of public official liability enshrined in Law No. 6227 starting from precept 199. Therefore, this Court considers that while article 140.1 of the Constitution (Carta Magna) recognizes the discretionary power of removal of public force (fuerza pública) personnel, that rule does not authorize the waiver of disciplinary exercise in the face of causes that would constitute grounds for dismissal without employer liability (responsabilidad patronal) or, in general, are related to submission to the disciplinary regime. On the contrary, that possibility, in the context indicated, only operates in the face of circumstances classified as concerning convenience and opportunity, provided they are fully and duly expressed in the dismissal act, motivation that in any case the doctrine of precept 136 of the same Law No. 6227 imposes, under penalty of generating the granting of undue patrimonial benefits, or of constituting a misuse of power (desviación de poder), by using the administrative power for purposes different from the principal one that justifies the enabling rule, to the detriment thereof, as explained by article 131 subsection 3) of the cited LGAP (General Law of Public Administration), all of which is controllable by this Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción contencioso administrativa) through the analysis of the validity of the administrative function ordered by article 49 of the Constitution (Carta Magna). But, furthermore, said power is applicable to the case of positions that are not covered by the Police Statute (Estatuto Policial), in the scenarios provided for by article 52 of Law No. 7410, whereas in all other cases, the right to job stability (derecho de estabilidad) is imposed.

**VIII.- On the cause for dismissal in the specific case.** In the present case, the main claim of the petitioner rests on the alleged absence of a formal procedure prior to the adoption of the formal act that ordered their dismissal with employer liability (responsabilidad patronal). However, from the analysis of the case file, it is inferred that the decision adopted by the respondent Administration is not related, strictly speaking, to the reflexive exercise of a disciplinary power, but rather to the powers of termination of the employment relationship established by article 88 subsection d) of Law No. 7410, insofar as it relates to the determination of medically verified conditions that make the plaintiff, in the judgment of their employer, unfit for the exercise of the functions inherent to the position they held. Although this Chamber has indicated in previous rulings, the most recent being No. 074-2019-VI of 09:00 hours on June 25, 2019, that the power of article 140.1 of the Constitution (Carta Magna) is not unrestricted as it must be interpreted in conjunction with the implications of labor stability (estabilidad laboral) recognized by the Police Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Policial), and at the same time that such power does not imply (nor can imply) a tacit waiver of the exercise of disciplinary powers, in cases like the present one, the exercise of that power is totally legitimate if it is based on causes associated with the definition of suitability or not for the exercise of the public office. The foregoing, it is insisted, to the extent that the weighing of that suitability is not linked to conduct or omissions whose approach is proper to disciplinary matters. In the present case, the cause of the questioned decision is not related to those aspects of a disciplinary corrective order, but rather to the technical definition of deficiencies of the plaintiff, which made evident the lack of conditions that their employer deems necessary and determining for maintaining their investiture and based on which their unsuitability for occupying the position of Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito) was determined. From the analysis of the case file, it is found that through document JCE-HMS-0455-2014 of February 25, 2014, the Head of the Outpatient Clinic (Jefatura de Consulta Externa) of the Monseñor Sanabria Hospital (Hospital Monseñor Sanabria) certifies: "That according to what is recorded in the medical record of patient [Nombre 001] Insurance number: [Valor 001], the attending PSYCHIATRY physician Dr. Alberto Mora Avila, in a consultation of February 25, 2014, notes: 'Patient continues follow-up in Psychiatry at the HMS for having been cataloged as a severe depressive disorder under psychopharmacological treatment, therefore it is recommended not to use or carry firearms.' ...". Following up on that diagnosis, in June 2014, the Occupational Health Department (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional) of the MOPT (Ministry of Public Works and Transport) issued a Report prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, in which, after the evaluation performed on the plaintiff, she concluded: "Considering that the employee presents a behavioral pattern suggesting a reserved prognosis; but without ignoring the possibility that the work context may have significantly influenced what happened, it is proposed, in the first instance, that Mr. [Nombre 001] be relocated to a place outside the Puntarenas Delegation, to perform administrative functions, where contact with users is minimal or non-existent. If this option is chosen, the employee must continue psychotherapeutic care for 1 year at the Medical Office of the General Directorate of the Traffic Police (Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito); to evaluate adaptation to the new workplace; as well as his behavioral adjustment. In the second instance, the dismissal of the employee with employer liability (responsabilidad laboral) is envisioned, which will be assessed by the Traffic Police Council (Consejo de Policía de Tránsito). For this, it will have the input that the Psychology Unit of the General Directorate of the Traffic Police (Dirección General de Policía de Tránsito) provides through a written report. In an effort to favor a recovery of the work environment of the Puntarenas Delegation, it is also considered pertinent to transfer Mr. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. And to carry out an internal review of the administrative functioning of the same, which will be assumed by the person or team designated by the General Director of the Traffic Police (Director General de la Policía de Tránsito). Subsequently, after six months, the state of the work environment will be re-evaluated, through follow-up monitoring in the Delegation; which will be in charge of the Occupational Health Department (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional)." This report was sent by the Head of Occupational Health (Jefe de Salud Ocupacional) to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) via official communication DGIRH # 2014-226-SO of June 19, 2014. As observed, that report offered several alternatives to address the petitioner’s situation, the first option being relocation to a place where they would have no contact with the public and with respective monitoring and psychotherapeutic accompaniment. As an alternative option, it proposed assessing eventual dismissal with employer liability (responsabilidad laboral). In response to those recommendations, through the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of the ordinary minutes 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) ordered the transfer of the claimant to the Department of Detained Vehicles (Departamento de Vehículos Detenidos) in the Canton of San José, and to request the Occupational Health Department (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional) to continue the psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the officer’s reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace, as well as to get him to adjust his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Traffic Police Officer (Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito)." The transfer was formalized through official communication number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, from the General Director of Traffic (Director General de Tránsito). For its part, through official communication No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) informs the Director of the Traffic Police (Director de la Policía de Tránsito) that by the sixty-fourth article, sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, was partially modified, so that in its final part it reads: "... At the same time, Ms. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist of the Medical Office of the Traffic Police Directorate (Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito), is requested to continue the psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the officer’s reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace, as well as to get him to adjust his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Traffic Police Officer (Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito), the foregoing in due coordination with the Occupational Health Department (Departamento de Salud Ocupacional)." Through official communication No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat (Secretaría Ejecutiva) of the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the plaintiff of the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014, in relation to the recommendation of Occupational Health (Salud Ocupacional) for his transfer. Then, in document No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) informs the Director of the Traffic Police (Director de la Policía de Tránsito) that by the sixty-fifth article, sixty-fifth agreement of ordinary minutes 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, it was ordered that, given the brief of July 18, 2014, presented by the plaintiff, in which he opposed the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 11-2014 and the sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minutes 12-2014 was immediately suspended, until such appeal action was resolved. Through official communication of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the MOPT (Ministry of Public Works and Transport) Central and North Macro Region Unit, communicated to the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes) the report of the psychological expert opinion regarding the case of officer [Nombre 001]. In the cited opinion issued on April 10, 2014, it states, in relevant part: "4. Recommendations: 1) Given said condition suffered by the official in question, psychological attention must be provided, especially since the time he has been consuming the medications approaches their withdrawal. 2) Due to the degree of affectation to the official, he should not be transferred as this would be issuing an a priori sentence against him, which could further destabilize his mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant him a leave with pay while his situation is defined in all areas, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation of both his colleagues and [Nombre 001] (sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, through qualified personnel not belonging to Human Resources or attached entities, the truth of the events that occurred and the treatment that has been given, as it is alarming for sound administration how for two years inertia has been the main feature in this process, causing widespread discomfort and exhaustion in the involved parties and possible harmful consequences for the administration. (...) 5) The way in which entry-level personnel have been selected must be reviewed, using personnel with broad knowledge in the field of selection, preferably external, since at the time serious deficiencies were discovered by the Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issued recommendations to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) of the previous government, which never implemented major changes, always showing resistance to modify. (...)." Through resolution No. 99-2014 of 11:35 hours on August 13, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) resolved the appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the plaintiff and ordered: "To partially grant the Appeal for Revocation (Recurso de Revocatoria) filed by the Traffic Police Officer (Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito) [Nombre 001], with qualities known in the expediente, against the sixty-fourth agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minutes of the ordinary session No. 012-2014 of Wednesday, July ninth, two thousand fourteen of the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) and Official Communication DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Mr. Mario Calderón Cornejo, General Director of the Traffic Police (Director General de la Policía de Tránsito), therefore the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer but it is ordered that this not be to San José, but rather to a Traffic Delegation (Delegación de Tránsito) as close as possible to his residence, for which the Administration in the General Directorate of the Traffic Police (Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito) and the Directorate of Human Resources (Dirección de Recursos Humanos) must take the appropriate measures for the transfer of Delegation and the change in the duties of the employment contract, in accordance with the reality of the appellant employee. (...)." Through official communication No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) notified the Occupational Health Department (Jefatura de Salud Ocupacional) of the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, ordinary minutes 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it is requested that a study be conducted to determine, with complete clarity, if the plaintiff has the suitability to work as a Traffic Police Officer (oficial de la Policía de Tránsito), given the existence of a series of complaints and disagreements in the Puntarenas Delegation against him. Through official communication No.

1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Personnel Council notifies the petitioner of the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of ordinary minute 18-2017 of October 15, 2014, by which he is permitted the delivery of a copy of the Occupational Health report of the MOPT, prepared by the psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, a request he had made on September 11, 2014. In official letter No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Personnel Council notifies the Director of the Traffic Police that by the fortieth article, fortieth agreement of ordinary minute 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that, in view of the official letter of October 29, 2014, from the Labor Court of Higher Amount of Puntarenas, the plaintiff should be transferred to another region other than the Central Pacific. Following the aforementioned medical evaluations, in official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Personnel Council notifies the Minister of Public Works and Transport of what was agreed in the tenth article, tenth agreement of Extraordinary Minute 09-2015, adopted in extraordinary session 09-2015, in which the following relevant part was ordered: “ <em>… Based on the factual and legal arguments just set forth, the Personnel Council agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Mr. Carlos Segnini Villalobos, the following: 1. Dismiss, with employer liability, the Traffic Police Officer </em>[Name 001]<em>, whose particulars are known in this case file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76 and 88 of the General Police Law, No. 7410, in conjunction with Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…). 2. Recognize the labor entitlements and rights that this administrative act determines in accordance with what is indicated in the legal system. Firm agreement.</em>” By resolution No. 1418 of 1:09 p.m. on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the content of official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Personnel Council is acknowledged and the following relevant part was ordered: “<em>THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT RESOLVES: 1.- To confirm in all its aspects the Tenth Article, Tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minute No. 09-2015, adopted by the aforementioned Council in Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August fifth, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Liability the Traffic Officer </em>[Name 001]<em>, holder of identity card number </em> [Value 001]<em>, whose particulars are known in this case file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76 and 88 of the General Police Law, No. 7410, in conjunction with Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…), as well as the provisions of the Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Autoridades de Transito. 2./ To request the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources of this Ministry, to proceed according to its competencies, to refer to the Legal Directorate of the Ministerial Office, the corresponding calculations of the Labor Entitlements that rightfully correspond to the Traffic Officer </em>[Name 001]<em>, for the preparation of the respective administrative payment resolution. (…)”.</em> **IX.-** From the analysis of this account, it is clear that the effective cause of the plaintiff's dismissal with employer liability cannot, in any way, be linked to a disciplinary matter, but rather to the lack of suitability for the performance of the position, which, it is insisted, was established in various clinical analyses performed in his case. As has been noted, the power to terminate the employment relationship within the framework of the national police regime includes the indisputable accreditation of the unsuitability of the public agent for the exercise of the position, pursuant to the provisions of section 88 of Law No. 7410. In that order, in the final act that ordered his dismissal, the head of the ministerial portfolio set forth the specific factual reasons that supported his decision as follows: "<em>... 2. That the behavior of Officer </em>[Name 001]<em> is not the adequate nor expected conduct of a public servant, more so when dealing with a member of the Traffic Police, who must ensure the integrity and safety of the citizens of the Republic. 3. That the conduct of the servant </em>[Name 001] <em> has fostered a tense work environment in the workplaces where he has been, discomfort on the part of colleagues, superiors, personnel from other instances and, perhaps more importantly, from users which translate into complaints, which demeans the service that the Traffic Police Directorate must provide. 4. That there exist sufficient records regarding the actions of the servant </em>[Name 001]<em>, Occupational Health studies, from the Psychology Unit of the Traffic Police Medical Office and opinions from the pertinent areas of the Monseñor Sanabria Hospital in the city of Puntarenas that lead to questioning the physical and mental suitability of the servant to act as a Traffic Officer, to protect and defend the users of the service provided by the institution. 5. That the incapacity, proven by medical and psychological reports, of the questioned Officer </em>[Name 001]<em> does not allow him to use the regulation weapon, in his own defense or that of a citizen from danger. 6. That peace, cordiality, good relations and motivation must prevail in all Traffic Police workplaces, to bring about the improvement of the service that must be provided to the citizenry, and this will not be possible as long as the servant </em>[Name 001]<em> remains working for this police force, in any of its facilities.</em>" Unlike what the plaintiff argues as the primary framework of his refutations, this is not a matter that was unknown or alien to him, to the extent that, indeed, he not only requested copies of the medical opinions that led to the decision finally adopted, but also, when he was transferred to an administrative post, he raised the appellate measures that led the Personnel Council to revoke his transfer to the Detained Vehicles Unit in San José. From this angle of examination, the alleged violation of due process is not tenable. It should be noted that the final act not only clearly sets forth the reasons for the adopted decision, but also, the complainant does not refute or challenge the factual circumstances that have formed the basis for the cause of the act. Moreover, the reasons for the cited dismissal did not produce a discrimination to the detriment of the petitioner, considering the medical diagnosis of his psychological condition. This aspect was the subject of consideration within the amparo proceeding filed by the plaintiff in the constitutional jurisdiction, case file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, in which, as a result of the allegations of discriminatory treatment based on his illness, in vote 2015-017427, the Constitutional Chamber indicated the relevant part: "<em>... It is highlighted that the decision taken by the respondent party had the purpose of satisfying the interest of the community, ensuring harmony in the work environment and seeking the suitability of the personnel at the service of the Ministry. Regarding this last point, for example, the amparo petitioner was prevented from carrying or using the regulation weapon, which affected his capacity for personal defense and that of third parties. On the other hand, the Chamber emphasizes the willingness that existed in the respondent Administration to provide an alternative solution to the protected case. (...) Subsequently, the Administration decided even to transfer the protected individual to another delegation, in order not to affect his personal situation with the new geographical location. Based on the foregoing elements, the Chamber cannot conclude that the respondent Administration acted to the detriment of the protected individual's rights, since there are clear indications that it sought rather to provide him with assistance, through his relocation and psychotherapeutic treatment. By virtue of the foregoing, the recourse is declared without merit.</em>" Such a citation reveals not only the nonexistence of discriminatory treatment due to his psychological conditions, but also the existence of actions within the MOPT to be able to relocate the plaintiff to a place where he could perform normally, while also reflecting the accompaniment of medical attention given his specific situation. All in all, the various clinical analyses reflect that, ultimately, the plaintiff is not a suitable person to hold and exercise the position he performs, an aspect that, it is insisted, the claimant has not managed to refute. This aspect constitutes the motivating element of the act, which, pursuant to what is indicated in mandate 133 of the General Law of Public Administration, is decisive in this type of analysis. In this way, the decision issued by the Minister of Public Works does not turn out to be arbitrary or lacking the protection of the plaintiff's rights, as is alleged in the lawsuit, to the extent that it reasons and accredits the circumstances on the basis of which it determines the absence of elements it deems essential to define the petitioner's suitability, and from there, in congruence with the applicable legal framework (Law No. 7410), determines the dismissal with personal liability of that public servant. Therefore, the absence or substantial imperfection of any of the elements of the act is not observed in this case, in what has been the object of reproach, so that, in accordance with sections 128, 132, 133, 158, 166 and 167 of the General Law of Public Administration, the invalidity of the proceedings is not observed, as a result of which, the rejection of the lawsuit regarding the annulment claim must be ordered." (Images 3-6 of the case file)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">10.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">The respective case file was sent to this Sixth Section of the Administrative Contentious Court for the issuance of the pertinent judgment on July 15, 2019, according to the detail of the Virtual Desktop System, where the entirety of the main case file is found. No procedural nullities that must be declared or that prevent issuing a judgment on the merits are observed. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Drafted by Judge Garita Navarro with the affirmative vote of Judge Abarca Gómez and Judge Aguilar Méndez;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">WHEREAS</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">I.- Proven facts. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">Of relevance for the purposes of this proceeding are the following: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">1) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">By document JCE-HMS-0455-2014 of February 25, 2014, the Head of Outpatient Services of the Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certifies: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">That as stated in the medical record of patient [Nombre62 001]</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Insured Number: [Valor 001], the treating PSYCHIATRY physician Dr- Nombre139072</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, in a consultation on February 25, 2014, notes: \"Patient continues follow-up in Psychiatry at HMS for having been classified as a severe depressive disorder under psychopharmacological treatment, therefore it is recommended not to use or carry firearms.\" ...</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">\". (Folio 45 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">2) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">In the month of June 2014, the Department of Occupational Health of MOPT issues a Report on the employee [Nombre62 001], prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, in which, fundamentally, it recommends: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">Considering that the employee presents a behavior pattern suggesting a reserved prognosis; but without ignoring the possibility that the work context has significantly influenced what has occurred, it is proposed, in the first instance, that Mr. [Nombre62 001]</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">be reassigned to a place outside the Puntarenas Delegation, to perform administrative functions, where contact with users is minimal or null. If this option is chosen, the employee must continue psychotherapeutic care for 1 year at the Medical Office of the General Directorate of Transit Police; to evaluate adaptation to the new workplace; as well as his behavioral adjustment. In the second instance, the dismissal of the employee with employer liability is envisioned, which will be evaluated by the Transit Police Council. For which it will have the input that the Psychology Unit of the General Directorate of Transit Police provides through a written report. In order to favor a recovery of the work environment of the Puntarenas Delegation, it is also deemed pertinent to transfer Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. And to carry out an internal review of its administrative functioning, which will be assumed by the person or team assigned by the General Director of the Transit Police. Subsequently, after six months have elapsed, the state of the work environment will be re-evaluated through follow-up monitoring in the Delegation; which will be in charge of the Department of Occupational Health.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">\" This report was sent by the Head of Occupational Health to the Personnel Council via official letter DGIRH # 2014-226-SO of June 19, 2014. (Folios 1-13 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">3)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, the Personnel Council ordered that: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">... in order to obtain a satisfactory work environment in the Puntarenas Transit Delegation, Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director of the Transit Police, must be instructed so that, together with Lic. Cristian Méndez Blanco, General Director of Human Resources, they proceed immediately to transfer the employee [Nombre62 001] to the Department of Impounded Vehicles in the Canton of San José. At the same time, the Department of Occupational Health is requested to continue with the psychotherapeutic treatment so that the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace is achieved, as well as ensuring that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Transit Police Officer.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">\" This is communicated to the General Director of Transit via official letter No. 0626-2014 of July 2, 2014.(Folios 50-51 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">4)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By act number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, the General Director of Transit communicates to the Human Resources Coordinator that it was agreed to transfer the plaintiff to the Impounded Vehicle Depot, in order to obtain a satisfactory work environment. (Folio 52 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">5)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Personnel Council communicates to the Director of the Transit Police that by the sixty-fourth article, sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014 was partially modified, so that in its final part it reads: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">... At the same time, Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist of the Medical Office of the Transit Police Directorate, is requested to continue with the psychotherapeutic treatment so that the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace is achieved, as well as ensuring that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Transit Police Officer, the foregoing with due coordination with the Department of Occupational Health.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">\" (Folio 54 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">6)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat of the Personnel Council delivers a copy of official letter No. 0626-2014 of July 2, 2014 to the plaintiff. (Folio 53 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">7)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Personnel Council communicates to the Director of the Transit Police that by the sixty-fifth article, sixty-fifth agreement of ordinary minute 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, in which it was ordered that given the writing of July 18, 2014 filed by the plaintiff, in which he opposed the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 and the sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 was immediately suspended, until that appeal action was resolved. (Folio 58 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">8)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the MOPT Central and North Macro Region Unit communicates to the Minister of Public Works and Transport the psychological expert evaluation report regarding the case of Officer [Nombre62 001]. In the cited opinion issued on April 10, 2014, it states, in relevant part: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">4. Recommendations: 1) Given said condition suffered by the employee in question, psychological care must be provided, especially since due to the time he has been taking the medications, he is already approaching their withdrawal. 2) Due to the degree of impact on the employee, he should not be transferred since it would be issuing an a priori sentence against him, which could further destabilize his mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant him a leave with pay while his situation is defined in all areas, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation of both his colleagues and [Nombre62 001]</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">(sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, through qualified personnel not belonging to human resources or affiliated entities, the truth of the events that have arisen and the treatment given, since it is alarming for sound administration how, for two years, inertia has been the protagonist in this process, causing general discomfort and exhaustion in the parties involved and possible harmful consequences for the administration. (...) 5) It is necessary to review, through personnel with extensive knowledge in selection matters, preferably external, how the intake personnel have been being selected, since at the time serious deficiencies were discovered by Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issued recommendations to the Personnel Council of the previous government, which never implemented major changes, always showing resistance to modifying. (...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">\". (Images 109-120 of the precautionary file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">9)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By resolution No. 99-2014 at 11:35 a.m. on August 13, 2014, the Personnel Council resolves the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by the plaintiff and ordered: \"</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">To partially grant the Appeal for Reversal filed by Transit Police Officer [Nombre62 001], with qualities known in the case file, against the Sixty-fourth Agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minute of ordinary session No. 012-2014, of Wednesday, July ninth, two thousand fourteen of the Personnel Council and Official Letter DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, General Director of the Transit Police, therefore the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer but it is ordered that this not be to San José, but to a Transit Delegation as close as possible to his residence, for which the Administration in the General Directorate of the Transit Police and the Directorate of Human Resources must take the appropriate measures for the transfer of Delegation and the change in the duties of the employment contract, in accordance with the reality of the appealing employee. (...)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">\". It ordered the referral of the appeal to the Minister of that portfolio. This was communicated to the plaintiff by fax, to number 2223-4170. (Folios 59-63 of the administrative file. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">10)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Personnel Council communicates to the Head of Occupational Health the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, ordinary minute 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it is requested that it be determined through a study, with complete clarity, whether the plaintiff has the suitability to serve as a Transit Police officer, given the existence of a series of complaints and disagreements in the Puntarenas Delegation against him. (Folio 64 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">11)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By writing of September 11, 2014, the plaintiff requests a copy of the report referenced in the preceding section. (Folio 16 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">12)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter No. 1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Personnel Council communicates to the petitioner the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of ordinary minute 18-2017 of October 15, 2014, by which he is allowed the delivery of a copy of the Occupational Health report of MOPT, prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés. (Folio 18 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">13)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Personnel Council communicates to the Director of the Transit Police that by the fortieth article, fortieth agreement of ordinary minute 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that in view of the official letter of October 29, 2014 from the Labor Court of Higher Amount of Puntarenas, the plaintiff must be transferred to another region that is not the Central Pacific. (Folio 84 of the main file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">14)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Personnel Council communicates to the Minister of Public Works and Transport what was agreed upon in the tenth article, tenth agreement of Extraordinary Minute 09-2015, adopted in extraordinary session 09-2015, in which it was ordered in relevant part: “</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">… Based on the arguments of fact and law just set forth, the Personnel Council agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos, the following: 1. To dismiss, with employer liability, Transit Police Officer [Nombre62 001], with qualities known in this case file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76, and 88, of the General Police Law, No. 7410, in conjunction with Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…). 2. To recognize the labor severance and rights that this administrative Act determines in accordance with what is indicated in the legal system. Firm agreement.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">” (Images 241-247 of the precautionary file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">15)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By resolution No. 1418 at 1:09 p.m. on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the content of official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Personnel Council is heard and it was ordered in relevant part: “</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT RESOLVES: 1.- To confirm in all its extremes the Tenth Article, Tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minute No. 09-2015, adopted by the aforementioned Council in Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August fifth, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Liability Transit Officer [Nombre62 001], bearer of identity card number [CED62 ]</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, with qualities known in this case file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76, and 88, of the General Police Law, No. 7410, in conjunction with Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…), as well as the provisions of the Regulation for the Organization and Service of Transit Authorities. 2./ To request the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources of this Ministry, to proceed according to its competencies, to refer to the Legal Directorate of the Ministerial Office, the corresponding calculations of the Labor Severance that by right correspond to Transit Officer [Nombre62 001], for the preparation of the respective administrative resolution of corresponding payment. (…)”.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> (Images 89-99 of the precautionary file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">16)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> That on October 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) before the Constitutional Chamber against the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, alleging injury to his right to work and equality. He stated that he was dismissed without having been personally evaluated and that only an analysis of the documents provided by the same Ministry was carried out, omitting to assess that he is ill with a dysthymic disorder, which is a psychological illness, and that the same psychological diagnoses warned that it was due to workplace harassment. Proceeding processed under case file number 15-015384-0007-CO. (Folios 122-139 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">17)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By official letter DVA-DGIRH-DGSP-131-2016 of October 19, 2015, the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources communicates to the plaintiff his dismissal with employer liability effective October 30, 2015. (Folio 106 of the administrative file) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">18)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> By resolution No. 2015-017427 at 10:10 a.m. on November 6, 2015, the Constitutional Chamber ordered the rejection of the amparo measure filed by the plaintiff, case file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, considering that his dismissal had not been based on discrimination grounds derived from his psychological illness. (Folios 122-139 of the administrative file)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">II.- Unproven facts. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">None of relevance to this proceeding.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">III.- Allegations of the parties. The plaintiff</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">argues</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">, fundamentally, that the challenged act does not provide adequate reasoning. He says this is of special importance since the decision made by the Transit Police Personnel Council focuses on a report in which, despite being a psychological evaluation, he was seen by the treating physician. His file was simply reviewed and a recommendation was issued, of which the most onerous was adopted. He considers that since he was not seen by the treating physician, any recommendation is invalid for being subjective. He accuses injury to due process, insofar as there are no notifications, notice of charges (traslado de cargos), or opening of an administrative proceeding through which the exercise of the right of defense is permitted, from which the grounds for dismissal are derived, but rather what exists is the application of a sanction capriciously generated, without sufficient reasoning. He considers that by not instructing due process, legality and the reservation of law are injured. He affirms that at the date of the lawsuit he was not aware of any notice of charges, but rather he was arbitrarily and unilaterally dismissed. He highlights that the General Law of Public Administration imposes an administrative proceeding for cases in which complaints are filed against a public employee. He refers to the basic components of administrative due process, which, he states, were omitted by the Personnel Council when making decisions that were never requested of it. He alludes to precedents of the Full Court regarding the content of due process. He considers that what was done by the Personnel Council is null by imposing a sanction contrary to due process. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">IV.- Allegations of the State.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\"> For its part, the public attorney states that the challenged decision was adopted with respect for the employee's rights</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">in the processing and in compliance with the special regulations by virtue of the police nature of the position. He highlights that these are police officers, in the transit police area, who are guarantors of citizen security and law enforcement, who must be suitable in terms of moral, personal, physical, and psychological conditions to carry out their work. He points out that not having or lacking the required conditions for the position, as is the case of being unable to carry firearms and not having the minimum moral and psychological suitability conditions for the exercise of the position, makes it impossible to keep him in the position, as the special regulations establish the possibility for the head of agency to dismiss him with employer liability. The public interest prevents maintaining an employee whose conduct has fostered a tense work environment in the workplace, affecting the rest of the staff and the institutional image itself. He says, sufficient background information on the petitioner's actions, studies from Occupational Health of the Psychology Unit of the Transit Police Medical Office, and opinions from the relevant areas of the Hospital Monseñor Sanabria of Puntarenas were reviewed and accredited, which determined the employee's lack of physical and mental suitability to act as a Transit Officer. He continues, multiple reports reveal his lack of capacity; medical and psychological reports indicate his inability to use the service weapon, which, he says, is essential in the exercise of the position for which he was hired. This, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff's conduct affected the peace, cordiality, good relations, and motivation that must prevail in the workplace. He specifies that the dismissal in the act was ordered with employer liability, respecting his rights and the principles of public employment. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">V.- Generalities on the administrative procedure.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:11pt\">The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its conduct. On the other, it is imposed as a reference framework that allows the administered party to establish a comparison of public conduct, in order to set a control that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the norms that guide that conduct. It seeks, therefore, to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As stated in canon 214 of Law No. 6227, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the grounds for the final case. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the best fulfillment of the Administration's purposes and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the General Law of Public Administration.</span></p> Hence, canon 216.1 of the same body of law requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to establish the referred real truth of the facts (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures (procedimientos de control o sancionatorios), given that, in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on the legal sphere of a person. The same regulatory plexus provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering any procedure that does not satisfy those minimum issues to be invalid. This is inferred from mandate 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by canon 49 of the Magna Carta, implies a verification that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that, essentially, the due process which must be inviolable in that proceeding has been safeguarded. Now then, by virtue of the allegations made, it is necessary to address the issue of the functions pertaining to the directing body (órgano director) and the decision-making body (órgano decisor) of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whomever has been legally granted the competence to issue the act that exhausts the administrative channel. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, the instructional competences are delegable to a body in charge of carrying out the procedural instruction, which has tended to be called the "directing or instructing body" ("órgano director o instructor"). In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it being vested in an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is feasible that, in certain cases, the same law establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been tolerated that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; nevertheless, in that specific function, they must be understood to perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competences, the representation of the instructing administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as clearly inferred from ordinal 282 subsection 3 of Law No. 6227/78. It is an instance with powers of instruction and ordering of the procedure (Article 227 LGAP), in charge of conducting all the preparatory stages to later, remit the case records to the decision-making body (Article 330 LGAP). Although, in certain cases, it may render recommendations, they would certainly not be binding, and therefore its determinations regarding the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts (actos de trámite). Consequently, it is responsible for issuing the act of initiation, giving procedural impetus, all the instructional work of the procedure, directing the appearance, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed against procedural acts, reviewing admitted evidence, as well as submitting the case file for the issuance of the final act. Within its competences can be seen Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent head who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act resolving the procedure.

VI.- Regarding the police regime. In accordance with ordinal 140 subsection 1) of the Magna Carta: "The following are joint duties and attributions of the President and the respective Government Minister: 1) Freely appoint and remove the members of the public force, the employees and officials who serve in positions of trust, and the others determined, in very qualified cases, by the Civil Service Law." In that sense, in accordance with Article 3 subsection b) of the Civil Service Statute, the members of the Public Force are not considered included within that statutory regime, given that said service relationships are currently regulated by the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 30, 1994. That legal source precisely regulates, starting from canon 50, the so-called "Police Statute" ("Estatuto Policial"). The canon 50 in question states: "Article 50°- Scope and objectives (Alcance y objetivos). This Statute will regulate the relations between the Executive Branch and the servant members of the distinct police forces, with the purpose of guaranteeing efficiency in the maintenance of public security and protecting the rights of these servants." For its part, canon 52 of the same body of law establishes the public officials not considered covered by the norms that make up the Police Statute, recognizing in turn the right of stability of those who have validly entered that regime. In that sense, that precept establishes: "Article 52°-Servants not covered by the Statute. The following officials shall not be covered by the provision of subsection a) of Article 59 of this Statute and, consequently, shall not enjoy permanence (inamovilidad) in their positions: a) Ministers and vice-ministers, advisors, and confidential employees. b) The general administrative director, the general director of the Public Force, the regional directors and deputy directors thereof, the director of the Air Surveillance Service, and the director of the Drug Control Police." Pursuant to that precept, persons governed by the Police Statute, except for the aforementioned cases, enjoy the right of stability (denominated permanence (inamovilidad)), which implies that the termination of the public employment relationship may only occur for legally regulated reasons and with the corresponding right to reinstatement, should the breach of said right be proven. Said stability that operates in the police regime is equally recognized in the letter of canon 75 subsection a) of the cited law insofar as it expressly indicates: "Article 75°- Rights (Derechos). The members of the police forces protected by this Law shall enjoy the following rights: a) Stability in their positions (Estabilidad en sus puestos), provided they enter the service in accordance with the requirements demanded in this Statute and if they fulfill their duties in the provision of the service, according to the conditions determined in this Law and its Regulations. / The servant may only be removed from their position when they incur a serious fault, in accordance with the legal system, or when, to improve the service, their manifest inefficiency or incompetence is determined, in conformity with the provisions of this Law." On its side, ordinals 77 to 89 of the same body of law regulate what concerns the disciplinary regime, indicating the faults, sanctions to be imposed, grounds for dismissal, applicable procedure, statute of limitations rules, among other matters relevant to that aspect. For example, numeral 80 of said legal source regulates the applicable procedure for applying reprimands. Within that framework, the grounds for dismissal are specified in ordinal 88 of the cited Law No. 7410 (a norm that reiterates the right of stability of that type of public function) in the following sense: "Article 88°- The justified dismissal (El despido justificado). Servants protected by this Statute may only be removed from their positions for the following reasons: a) For the verification that they have incurred a serious fault, according to the provisions of this Law. b) For incurring any of the grounds established in Article 81 of the Labor Code. c) For manifest and verified inefficiency or lack of skill in the performance of the position. d) For what is foreseen in Article 51 of this Law." What is prescribed in numerals 85 and 86 of the cited Law draws attention, insofar as they regulate cases of application of the disciplinary regime, when the facts underlying that hierarchical exercise are at the same time the object of analysis within a jurisdictional matter. In that sense, the first of those articles indicates: "Article 85°- Administrative investigation and jurisdictional investigation (Investigación administrativa e investigación jurisdiccional). The initiation of public criminal action does not impede that, simultaneously, the administrative investigation be commenced, for the same facts and to apply the disciplinary regime. / The statement of proven facts pronounced in the criminal sentence binds the administrative instance, for the disciplinary and labor effects of the case, even if a favorable administrative resolution for the servant has been previously rendered; in this case, the servant must be heard, summarily, before applying the corresponding sanctions. The foregoing does not impede that, while the matter is being resolved in the criminal jurisdiction, the administration take the provisional measures it deems necessary." For its part, canon 86 ibidem expresses that, when prosecution occurs in the criminal jurisdiction, for a crime linked to torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the Administration shall immediately suspend the servant and, until the decision on the case is made, withhold all or part of their salary. From the foregoing, it follows that the Police Statute grants persons serving in the police forces the right of stability, given that this regulation expressly indicates the factual situations in which the dismissal of the police official is proper, as well as the specific positions in which said guarantee does not operate.

VII.- All in all, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that the norms that make up the cited Law No. 7410 must be complemented and integrated with the provisions of ordinal 140 subsection 1) of the Magna Carta, the latter norm recognizing that whoever exercises the Presidency of the Republic, jointly with the head of the Ministry of Public Security, may freely appoint and remove the members of the public force. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself, in various rulings in which it heard claims such as the one analyzed in this process, established the criterion that it was necessary to distinguish personnel covered by the Police Statute from those who were not. Thus, for example, in Voto No. 2016-18906 at 09:45 hours of December 23, 2016, reiterated in precedent No. 2017-006876 at 09:15 hours of May 12, 2017, it provided the relevant part: "III.- On the merits. From the documents attached to the case file, it follows that the protected parties were dismissed in accordance with the provisions of Article 140 subsection 1) of the Political Constitution, as established in several executive agreements, and without it being recorded that they were within the Police Statute, therefore, as this Chamber has repeatedly stated, the dismissal does not become illegitimate, given that the President of the Republic and the Minister of the relevant branch have the faculty -according to the constitutional text- to freely appoint and remove the members of the Public Force. (...)". Said precedent highlights the need to discriminate between both types of relationship, as a parameter prior to using the power granted by the alluded constitutional ordinal. However, this collegiate body considers that the grammatical reference to "freely" (libremente), although it may be considered as the recognition of a power of discretionary content, is equally subject to the rules of administrative legality, among these, to the insurmountable limits of the exercise of this type of powers, established by ordinals 15, 16, 128, 158.4, and 160 (among others) of the General Law of Public Administration, but additionally, of the rules contained in the already commented Law No. 7410. In its correct dimension, such a norm grants the alluded heads the power to dispense with personnel of the police forces for reasons of convenience and opportunity, without the need for the pre-existence of an administrative procedure in which the justifiable cause for dismissal is established, provided that such rupture of the special internal bond respects the labor rights inherent to the public function, which implies that such dismissal will be with the corresponding employer liability. However, those reasons of convenience and opportunity that would give rise to the exercise of this power, can in no way be constituted as a mechanism for disciplinary exercise, even if covert, or as a form of substitution (by denial) of that power. In line with what has been indicated, it is a power foreseen for exceptional cases, as is the case of trust personnel, in general, not covered by the Police Statute (Law No. 7410). Indeed, when the cause for using the alluded hierarchical power is an inattention, by the person exercising the police function, to the rules of conduct to which they are subject, among these, the rules of probity in the exercise of the public police function, such that the hierarchical head considers those actions or omissions to be reprehensible, to the degree of deeming their separation from the police forces pertinent, it is the consideration of this Chamber that the same Law No. 7410, –as a necessary complement to the proper understanding of the scope of canon 140.1 of the Magna Carta– imposes the duty of accrediting the fault through the respective procedural proceeding and, in those hypotheses, ordering the corresponding internal corrective measure, including among these, dismissal, when the merits of the case records so determine. The analysis of the above-consigned regulations leads this Tribunal to consider that if the cause of the dismissal is the detachment, inattention, non-compliance, or in general, the violation of the rules of behavior and duties inherent to police personnel, such effect must necessarily occur within the exercise of the disciplinary power and not through a generic power, of a discretionary nature, to "freely" remove those types of agents. Otherwise, the permissibility of resorting to such (pseudo) free removal of the official without the need for a prior procedure, even in cases where the pertinent course of action is the disciplinary exercise, with the caveat that the employer’s liability for those measures is assumed, constitutes an illegitimate waiver of that internal corrective exercise and the conferral of an economic benefit upon the official who is non-compliant with their legal and competence-based obligations. In such cases, it is insisted, the mere existence of doubts (reasonable or not) about improper conduct of the police agent should not give way to the exercise of said power of discretionary removal, for if it did so, the stability that Law No. Placa3784 enshrines and recognizes, as well as the regulation of the disciplinary regime that operates in these fields, would be denied and would have no greater logic or useful effect. As has been indicated, appealing to the discretionary termination of the public agent with the corresponding payment of labor entitlements, despite the fact that the effective cause of that decision is the commission of an official fault, while it can be said to be "convenient" for the administrative hierarchy, in reality disregards the rights that operate in public service and guarantees by express law (No. 7410), because it denies the exercise of the right of defense to adopt a decision on the basis of conjectures that have not been proven within an administrative procedure, whose purpose, in line with what the doctrine of ordinal 214 and 223 of the LGAP establishes, is to establish the real truth of the facts. In this manner, the dismissal of a person performing those police functions, even with employer liability, on the basis of supposed faults, not proven, undoubtedly injures due process, through the a priori waiver of the disciplinary exercise, to instead adopt decisions that break the service relationship, even though the facts constituting the alleged fault have not been committed. Similarly, if the fault was committed, dismissal with the payment of all the labor burdens inherent to the employer's liability supposes, it is reiterated, conferring an improper benefit to the detriment of public funds that must be safeguarded, with the eventual liability that would derive from those actions as inferred from the regime of superior oversight of the Public Treasury expressed in the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, No. 8131, the General Internal Control Law, No. 8292, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422, and the generic framework of public official liability enshrined in Law No. 6227 starting from precept 199. Therefore, this Tribunal considers that although ordinal 140.1 of the Magna Carta recognizes the discretionary power of removal of public force personnel, that norm does not enable, in the face of causes that imply grounds for dismissal without employer liability or, in general, that relate to subjection to the disciplinary regime, the waiver of that exercise. On the contrary, that possibility, in the context of what has been indicated, only operates in the face of qualified circumstances of convenience and opportunity, subject to the condition that they be fully and duly expressed in the dismissal act, reasoning that in any case imposes the doctrine of precept 136 of the same Law No. 6227, under penalty of generating the granting of undue patrimonial benefits, or constituting a misuse of power, by using the administrative power for purposes other than the principal one justifying the enabling norm, to the detriment of the latter, just as explained by Article 131 subsection 3) of the cited LGAP, all of which is controllable by this Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction through the analysis of the validity of the administrative function provided by numeral 49 of the Magna Carta. But, in addition, said power is applicable in the case of positions that are not covered by the Police Statute, in the cases foreseen by ordinal 52 of Law No. 7410, given that, in the remaining cases, the right of stability is imposed.

VIII.- Regarding the cause for dismissal in the specific case. In the present case, the principal claim of the plaintiff consists of the alleged absence of a formal procedure prior to the adoption of the formal conduct that ordered their dismissal with employer liability. However, from the analysis of the case records, it follows that the decision adopted by the respondent Administration is not related, strictly speaking, to the reflexive exercise of a disciplinary power, but rather to the powers of termination of the employment relationship established by ordinal 88 subsection d) of Law No. 7410, insofar as it relates to the determination of medically verified conditions, that render the plaintiff, in the judgment of their employer, unsuitable for the exercise of the functions inherent to the position they held. While this Chamber has indicated in previous rulings, the most recent being No. 074-2019-VI at 09 hours of June 25, 2019, that the power of ordinal 140.1 of the Magna Carta is not unrestricted insofar as it must be interpreted in conjunction with the implications of the labor stability recognized by the Police Service Statute, and at the same time that such power does not suppose (nor can it imply) a tacit waiver of the exercise of the disciplinary powers, in cases such as the present one, the exercise of that power is completely legitimate if it is based on causes associated with the definition of suitability or not for holding the public office. The foregoing, it is insisted, to the extent that the weighing of that suitability is not linked to conducts or omissions whose handling is typical of disciplinary affairs. In the present case, the cause of the questioned decision is not related to those aspects of a disciplinary corrective nature, but rather to the technical definition of deficiencies of the plaintiff, which evidenced the lack of conditions that their employer deems necessary and determining to maintain their investiture and on the basis of which their unsuitability (inidoneidad) to hold the position of Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito) was determined. From the analysis of the case records, it is evident that through document JCE-HMS-0455-2014 of February 25, 2014, the Chief of External Consultation of Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certified: " That according to the medical record of patient [Nombre62 001] Insured number: [Valor 001], the attending PSYCHIATRY physician Dr- [Nombre13]9072 , in consultation of February 25, 2014, notes: 'Patient continues follow-up in Psychiatry at the HMS for having been categorized as a severe depressive disorder under psychopharmacological treatment, therefore it is recommended not to use or carry firearms.' ...". Following up on that diagnosis, in June 2014, the Occupational Health Department of the MOPT issued a Report prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, in which, after the assessment carried out on the plaintiff, she concluded: " Considering that the collaborator presents a behavioral pattern suggesting a guarded prognosis; but without ignoring the possibility that the work context has significantly impacted what occurred, it is proposed, in the first instance, that Mr. [Nombre62 001] be relocated to a place outside the Puntarenas Delegation, to perform administrative functions, where contact with the user is minimal or non-existent. If this option were chosen, the collaborator must continue psychotherapeutic attention, for 1 year at the Medical Office of the General Directorate of the Traffic Police; to evaluate adaptation to the new workplace; as well as their behavioral adjustment." In the second instance, the dismissal of the employee with employer liability is envisioned, which will be assessed by the Traffic Police Council. For this purpose, it will have the input that the Psychology Unit of the General Directorate of Traffic Police provides through a written report. In order to favor a recovery of the work environment of the Puntarenas Delegation, it is also deemed pertinent to transfer Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. And to carry out an internal review of its administrative functioning, which will be undertaken by the person or team assigned by the General Director of the Traffic Police. Subsequently, after six months have elapsed, the state of the work environment will be reevaluated, through follow-up monitoring in the Delegation; which will be in charge of the Department of Occupational Health." This report was sent by the Head of Occupational Health to the Personnel Council via official letter DGIRH # 2014-226-SO of June 19, 2014. As can be observed, that report offered several alternatives to address the plaintiff's situation, the first option being relocation to a place where he would have no contact with the public and with the respective monitoring and psychotherapeutic support. As an alternative option, it set forth assessing the eventual dismissal with employer liability. In response to those recommendations, through the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, the Personnel Council ordered the transfer of the claimant to the Department of Detained Vehicles in the Canton of San José, as well as requesting the Department of Occupational Health to continue with psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace, as well as to ensure that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Traffic Police Officer." The transfer was materialized through official letter number TCDG-0616-2014 of July 21, 2014, from the General Director of Traffic. For its part, by official letter No. 0692-2014 of July 16, 2014, the Personnel Council informed the Director of the Traffic Police that by the sixty-fourth article, sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 of July 9, 2014, the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 of June 25, 2014, was partially modified so that its final part reads: "... At the same time, Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psychologist of the Medical Office of the Traffic Police Directorate, is requested to continue with psychotherapeutic treatment so as to achieve the officer's reintegration and adaptation to his new workplace, as well as to ensure that he adjusts his behavior to the standards required in the function demanded of him as a Traffic Police Officer, the foregoing in due coordination with the Department of Occupational Health. " By official letter No. 0718-2014 of July 18, 2014, the Executive Secretariat of the Personnel Council communicated to the plaintiff the fifty-fourth article, fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014, in relation to the recommendation from Occupational Health for his transfer. Then, in official document No. 0726-2014 of July 24, 2014, the Personnel Council informed the Director of the Traffic Police that by the sixty-fifth article, sixty-fifth agreement of ordinary minute 13-2014 of July 23, 2014, in which it was ordered that, given the brief of July 18, 2014, filed by the plaintiff, in which he opposed the transfer, the execution of the fifty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 11-2014 and the sixty-fourth agreement of ordinary minute 12-2014 was immediately suspended, until that appeal was resolved. By official letter of August 6, 2014, Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psychologist of the MOPT Central and North Macro Region Unit communicated to the Minister of Public Works and Transport the report of the psychological expert examination regarding the case of officer [Nombre62 001]. The aforementioned opinion issued on April 10, 2014, indicates, in relevant part: "4. Recommendations: 1) Given the affliction suffered by the official in question, psychological care must be provided, especially since, given the time he has been taking the medications, withdrawal from them is approaching. 2) Due to the degree of impairment to the official, he should not be transferred as this would be issuing a priori sentence against him, which could further destabilize his mental and emotional state. 3) Try to grant him leave with pay while his situation is defined in all areas, in order to mitigate the conflictive situation for both his colleagues and [Nombre62 001] himself (sic). 4) Thoroughly investigate, through qualified personnel, not belonging to human resources or affiliated entities, the truth of the events that arose and the treatment that has been given, as it is alarming for sound administration how, for two years, inertia has been the protagonist in this process, causing general discomfort and attrition in the parties involved and possible detrimental consequences for the administration. (...) 5) It must be reviewed, through personnel with extensive knowledge in the field of selection, preferably external, how entrance personnel have been being selected, since at the time serious deficiencies were discovered by Psychologist Hugo Chaves Mora, who issued recommendations to the Personnel Council of the previous government, which never implemented major changes, always showing resistance to modify. (...)". Through resolution No. 99-2014 of 11:35 a.m. on August 13, 2014, the Personnel Council resolved the appeal for reversal filed by the plaintiff and ordered: "Declare partially with merit the Appeal for Reversal filed by Traffic Police Officer [Nombre62 001], of qualities known in the case file, against the sixty-fourth Agreement, sixty-fourth article of the minute of ordinary session No. 012-2014, on Wednesday, July ninth, two thousand fourteen, of the Personnel Council and official letter DGPT-2025-2014, signed by Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, General Director of the Traffic Police, therefore the resolution is confirmed regarding his transfer but it is ordered that this not be to San José, but rather to a Traffic Delegation as close as possible to his residence, for which the Administration, in the General Directorate of the Traffic Police and the Directorate of Human Resources, must take the appropriate measures for the transfer of Delegation and the change in the duties of the employment contract, in accordance with the reality of the appealing employee. (...)". Through official letter No. 0945-2014 of September 8, 2014, the Personnel Council communicated to the Head of Occupational Health the fifty-first article, fifty-first agreement, ordinary minute 15-2014 of August 27, 2014, in which it is requested that a study determine, with all clarity, whether the plaintiff has the suitability to serve as a Traffic Police officer, given the existence of a series of complaints and disagreements in the Puntarenas Delegation against him. By official letter No. 1144-2014 of October 22, 2014, the Personnel Council notified the petitioner of the sixty-first article, sixty-first agreement of ordinary minute 18-2017 of October 15, 2014, through which he is allowed the delivery of a copy of the MOPT Occupational Health report, prepared by psychologist Elke Cortés Cortés, a request he had made on September 11, 2014. In official letter No. 1321-2014 of December 3, 2014, the Personnel Council informed the Director of the Traffic Police that by the fortieth article, fortieth agreement of ordinary minute 21-2014 of November 25, 2014, it was ordered that, in view of the official letter of October 29, 2014, from the Labor Court of Higher Amount of Puntarenas, the plaintiff must be transferred to another region other than the Central Pacific. After the referred medical assessments, in official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, the Personnel Council notified the Minister of Public Works and Transport of what was agreed in the tenth article, tenth agreement of Extraordinary minute 09-2015, taken in extraordinary session 09-2015, in which it was ordered in relevant part: " … Based on the arguments of fact and law just set forth, the Personnel Council agrees to respectfully recommend to the Minister of Public Works and Transport, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos, the following: 1. Dismiss, with employer responsibility, Traffic Police Officer [Nombre62 001], of qualities known in this case file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76 and 88, of the General Police Law, No. Placa3784, in accordance with Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…). 2. Recognize the labor entitlements and rights that this administrative Act determines in accordance with what is indicated in the legal system. Firm agreement. " Through resolution No. 1418 at 1:09 p.m. on September 29, 2015, of the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the content of official letter DOF-CP-2015-830 of August 12, 2015, from the Personnel Council, is acknowledged and it was ordered in relevant part: “THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT ORDERS: 1.- Confirm in all its aspects the tenth Article, tenth Agreement of Extraordinary Minute No. 09-2015, adopted by the aforementioned Council in Extraordinary Session No. 09-2015, held on Wednesday, August fifth, two thousand fifteen, in which it was agreed to dismiss with Employer Responsibility Traffic Officer [Nombre62 001], holder of identity card number [CED62 ], of qualities known in this case file, in accordance with Articles 8, 10, 76 and 88, of the General Police Law, No. Placa3784, in accordance with Article 85 subsection d) of the Labor Code, and in relation to Article No. 140 of the Political Constitution (…), as well as the provisions of the Regulation of Organization and Service of the Traffic Authorities. 2./ Request the Directorate of Institutional Management of Human Resources of this Ministry, to proceed in accordance with its competencies, to the remission to the Legal Directorate of the Ministerial Office, of the corresponding calculations of the Labor Entitlements that by right correspond to Traffic Officer [Nombre62 001], for the preparation of the respective administrative resolution of corresponding payment. (…)”.

**IX.-** From the analysis of this account, it is clear that the effective cause of the plaintiff's dismissal with employer responsibility cannot, in any way, be linked to an aspect of disciplinary exercise, but rather to the lack of suitability for the exercise of the position, which, it is emphasized, was established in various clinical analyses conducted in his case. As has been pointed out, the authority to terminate the employment relationship within the framework of the national police regime includes the undeniable accreditation of the public agent's unsuitability for the exercise of the position, as prescribed by Article 88 of Law No. Placa3784. In that order, in the final act that ordered his dismissal, the head of the ministerial portfolio set forth the specific factual reasons that supported his decision in the following sense: "... 2. That the behavior of Officer [Nombre62 001] is not appropriate nor expected of a public servant, even more so when it concerns a member of the Traffic Police, who must ensure the integrity and safety of the citizens of the Republic. 3. That the conduct of the servant [Nombre62 001] has fostered a tense work environment in the workplaces he has been in, discomfort on the part of colleagues, superiors, personnel from other instances and, perhaps most importantly, from users which is concretized in complaints, which diminishes the service that the Traffic Police Directorate must provide. 4. That there is sufficient background on the actions of servant [Nombre62 001], Occupational Health studies, from the Psychology Unit of the Traffic Police Medical Office, and opinions from the pertinent areas of Monseñor Sanabria Hospital in the city of Puntarenas that lead to questioning the physical and mental suitability of the servant to act as a Traffic Officer, to protect and defend the users of the service the institution provides. 5. That the proven incapacity, by medical and psychological reports, of the questioned Officer [Nombre62 001] does not allow him to use the regulation weapon, in his defense or that of a citizen from danger. 6. That peace, cordiality, good relations, and motivation must prevail in all Traffic Police workplaces, to bring about the improvement of the service that must be provided to the citizenry, and this will not be possible as long as servant [Nombre62 001] remains working for this police force, in one of its facilities. " Unlike what the plaintiff argues as the primary framework of his refutations, this was not a matter unknown or alien to him, insofar as he not only petitioned for copies of the medical opinions that gave way to the decision finally adopted, but also, when he was transferred to an administrative post, he filed the appellate measures that led the Personnel Council to revoke his transfer to the Detained Vehicles Unit in San José. From this perspective of examination, the alleged injury to due process is not tenable. It should be noted that the final act not only clearly exposes the reasons for the decision adopted, but also, the complainant does not refute or contest the factual circumstances that have given basis to the reason for the act. Furthermore, the reasons for the cited dismissal did not produce discrimination to the detriment of the petitioner, considering the medical diagnosis of his psychological condition. This aspect was subject to consideration within the amparo proceeding filed by the plaintiff in constitutional court, case file No. 15-015384-0007-CO, in which, as a result of allegations of discriminatory treatment based on his illness, in ruling 2015-017427, the Constitutional Chamber stated in relevant part: "... It is highlighted that the decision made by the respondent party had the purpose of satisfying the interest of the community, ensuring harmony in the work environment, and seeking the suitability of personnel in the service of the Ministry. Regarding this last point, for example, the protected party was prevented from carrying or using the regulation weapon, which affected his capacity for personal and third-party defense. Furthermore, the Chamber emphasizes the willingness that existed in the respondent Administration to provide an alternative solution to the tutelary case. (...) Subsequently, the Administration even resolved to transfer the protected party to another delegation, in order not to affect his personal situation with the new geographic location. Based on the foregoing elements, the Chamber cannot conclude that the respondent Administration acted to the detriment of the rights of the protected party, as there are clear indications that it rather tried to help him, through his relocation and psychotherapeutic treatment. By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal is declared without merit." Such a citation reveals not only the nonexistence of discriminatory treatment given his psychological conditions, but also the existence of actions within the MOPT to be able to relocate the plaintiff to a place where he could perform normally, while also reflecting the accompaniment of medical care in light of his specific situation. Nevertheless, the various clinical analyses reflect that ultimately, the plaintiff is not a suitable person to hold and exercise the position he performs, an aspect that, it is insisted, the claimant has not managed to refute. That aspect constitutes the motivating element of the act, which, as ordered in mandate 133 of the General Law of Public Administration, is decisive in this type of analysis. Thus, the decision issued by the Minister of Public Works does not prove to be arbitrary or lacking in protection of the plaintiff's rights, as alleged in the lawsuit, insofar as it reasons and accredits the circumstances with support upon which it determines the absence of elements it deems essential to define the suitability of the petitioner and, based on that, in congruence with the applicable legal framework (Law No. 7410), determines the dismissal with personal liability of that public servant. Therefore, the absence or substantial imperfection of any of the elements of the act is not observed in this case, regarding what has been objected to, so in accordance with Articles 128, 132, 133, 158, 166 and 167 of the General Law of Public Administration, the invalidity of what was acted upon is not observed, a product of which, the rejection of the lawsuit regarding the annulment claim must be ordered.

**X.- On the defenses raised.** The State's representation raised the defense of lack of right. This substantive exception must be admitted for the reasons already stated. Consequently, what is due is to order the rejection of the lawsuit in all its aspects.

**XI.- Costs.** In accordance with Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of losing. The exemption from this penalty is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient cause to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the instant case, this Tribunal observes no reason whatsoever to exempt the application of such maxim, therefore, what is due is to impose them on the losing plaintiff party.

**THEREFORE.** The defense of lack of right is admitted. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Mr. [Nombre62 001] against the State is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the losing plaintiff. On this aspect, Judge Aguilar Méndez issues a separate note. **José Roberto Garita Navarro / Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*** **NOTE OF JUDGE AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.** In relation to costs, and with absolute respect for the divergent opinion of my colleagues, I beg to differ regarding the scope of the imposed penalty, since under the protection of the new Civil Procedure Code (Law No. 9342), specifically Articles 62.1, 73.2 and 73.3, the deciding Tribunal in a case such as the present is under the duty to grant at once the exact amount of the sums awarded as costs, as well as to determine the joint and several nature or the divisibility of this obligation. **Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-** CASE FILE: 15-010194-1027-CA MATTER: PURE LAW PROCESS PLAINTIFF: [Nombre62 001].

DEFENDANT: The State.

IGWTHUP.JRGN.2019

ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: [Nombre 001].

DEMANDADO: El Estado No. 0124-2019-VI.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SEXTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las 11 horas 50 minutos del cuatro de octubre del dos mil diecinueve.

Proceso de puro derecho establecido por el señor [Nombre62 001], portador de la cédula de identidad número [CED62 ] , representado por el licenciado Luis Ballestero Mora, carne de incorporación número CED32256, contra el Estado, representado por el señor procurador José Armando López Baltondano, cédula de identidad número CED1778.

RESULTANDO:

1.- En fecha 11 de noviembre del 2015, el accionante presenta medida cautelar ante causam y provisionalísima, a efectos de que se dispusiera: "a) Se ordene la Medida Cautelar Provisionalísima de reintegro al puesto. b) Se declare la nulidad del procedimiento seguido. c) Se declare la nulidad del acto de despido bajo resolución del 29 de setiembre de 2015, número 001418 emitida por el Despacho del Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes.” (Imágenes 220-231 del cautelar) 2.- Mediante resolución de las 20 horas del 11 de noviembre del 2015, el juez de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la medida cautelar peticionada y confirió traslado para su tramitación ordinaria. (Imágenes 252-254 del cautelar) 3.- Conferido el traslado sobre la medida cautelar, el Estado contestó de manera negativa. (Imágenes 79-88 del cautelar) 4.- Por resolución No. 1414-2016-T de las 15 horas 10 minutos del 27 de junio del 2016, la jueza de trámite dispuso el rechazo de la medida cautelar formulada. (Imágenes 42-48 del cautelar) 5.- Formulado recurso de apelación en contra del rechazo referido en el aparte precedente, mediante la resolución No. 0304-2016-II de las 11 horas 22 minutos del 03 de agosto del 2016, la Sección II del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda dispuso confirmar la resolución venida en alzada. (Imágenes 37-39 del cautelar) 6.- En fecha 21 de septiembre del 2016, el accionante interpuso la demanda que ha dado origen a este proceso para que en sentencia se disponga, pretensiones ajustadas en fase de audiencia preliminar en el siguiente sentido: "1.- Se declare la nulidad del acto de despido bajo resolución del 29 de setiembre de 2015, número 001418 emitida por el Despacho del Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes. 2.- Que se le reincorpore a su puesto en labores en las cuales no se requiera el uso de armas. 3.- Que se condene a la demandada al pago de costas procesales y personales." (Imágenes 38-40, 84-95 del principal) 7.- Conferido el traslado de ley, el Estado contestó de manera negativa y opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. (Imágenes 48-57 del principal) 8.- La audiencia preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que se encuentra grabada en el sistema digital de este Despacho, fue celebrada el día 23 de octubre del 2017 con la asistencia de ambas partes. Fue suspendida para dar audiencia al Estado respecto del ajuste de pretensiones realizado. (imágenes 38-40 del principal) 9.- La audiencia preliminar fue continuada el 26 de febrero del 2018, con ambas partes. Al no existir prueba que evacuar, de conformidad con el numeral 98.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, el asunto fue declarado de puro derecho y las partes rindieron sus conclusiones. (Imágenes 3-6 del expediente) 10.- El expediente respectivo fue remitido a esta Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo para la emisión del fallo pertinente en fecha 15 de julio del 2019, según detalle del Sistema Escritorio Virtual, en el que consta la totalidad del expediente principal. No se observan nulidades procesales que deban ser declaradas e que impidan emitir sentencia de fondo.

Redacta el juez Garita Navarro con el voto afirmativo de la jueza Abarca Gómez y del juez Aguilar Méndez;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Hechos probados. De relevancia para los efectos del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes: 1) Por documento JCE-HMS-0455-2014 del 25 de febrero del 2014, la Jefatura de Consulta Externa del Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certifica: "Que según consta en el expediente médico del paciente [Nombre62 001] Número de asegurado: [Valor 001], el médico tratante de PSIQUIATRÍA Dr- Nombre139072 , en consulta de 25 de febrero del 2014, anota: "Paciente sigue control en Psiquiatría del HMS por haberse catalogado como un trastorno depresivo severo en tratamiento psicofarmacológico, por lo que se recomienda no utilizar ni portar armas de fuego." ...". (Folio 45 del administrativo) 2) En el mes de junio del 2014, el Departamento de Salud Ocupacional del MOPT emite Informe sobre el funcionario [Nombre62 001], elaborado por la psicóloga Elke Cortés Cortés, en el que, en lo fundamental recomienda: "Considerando que se presenta en el colaborador un patrón de comportamiento que sugiere un pronóstico reservado; pero sin obviar la posibilidad de que el contexto laboral halla (sic) incidido de manera importante en lo acontecido se propone, en primera instancia, que el señor [Nombre62 001] sea reubicado en un lugar fuera de la Delegación de Puntarenas, para que realice funciones administrativas, donde el contacto con la persona usuaria sea mínimo o nulo. Si se optara por ésta, el colaborador deberá continuar atención psicoterapeútica, durante 1 año en el Consultorio Médico de la Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito; para evaluar la adaptación al nuevo lugar de trabajo; así como su ajuste de comportamiento. En segunda instancia se vislumbra el despido del colaborador con responsabilidad laboral, lo que será valorado por el Consejo de Policía de Tránsito. Para lo cual contará con el insumo que la Unidad de Psicología de la Dirección General de Policía de Tránsito provea mediante informe escrito. En procura de favorecer una recuperación del entorno laboral de la Delegación de Puntarenas se estima pertinente, también, trasladar al Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. Y efectuar una revisión interna del funcionamiento administrativo de la misma, que será asumida por la persona o el equipo que asigne el Director General de la Policía de Tránsito. Posteriormente, transcurridos seis meses, se reevaluará el estado de ambiente laboral, através del monitoreo de seguimiento en la Delegación; que estará a cargo del Departamento de Salud Ocupacional." Este informe fue remitido por el Jefe de Salud Ocupacional al Consejo de Personal mediante el oficio DGIRH # 2014-226-SO del 19 de junio del 2014. (Folios 1-13 del administrativo) 3) Mediante el artículo quincuagésimo cuarto acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014 del 25 de junio del 2014, el Consejo de Personal dispuso que: "... en procura de obtener un clima laboral satisfactorio en la Delegación de Tránsito de Puntarenas, se debe instruir al Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director de la Policía de Tránsito para que, en conjunto con el Lic. Cristian Méndez Blanco, Director General de Recursos Humanos, procedan de inmediato a trasladar al servidor [Nombre62 001] al Departamento de Vehículos Detenidos en el Cantón de San José. Al mismo tiempo, se le solicita al Departamento de Salud Ocupacional, continué con el tratamiento psicoterapeútico de manera que se logre la reinserción del oficial y la adaptación a su nuevo lugar de trabajo, así como lograr que éste ajuste su comportamiento a los estándares requeridos en la función que se le demanda como Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito." Esto es comunicado al Director General de Tránsito mediante el oficio No. 0626-2014 del 02 de julio del 2014.(Folios 50-51 del administrativo) 4) Por acto número TCDG-0616-2014 del 21 de julio del 2014, el Director General de Tránsito comunica al Coordinador de Recursos Humanos que se acordó trasladar al accionante para el Depósito de Vehículos Detenidos, en procura de obtener un clima laboral satisfactorio. (Folio 52 del administrativo) 5) Por oficio No. 0692-2014 del 16 de julio del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Director de la Policía de Tránsito que por artículo sexagésimo cuarto, acuerdo sexagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 12-2014 del 09 de julio del 2014, se modificó parcialmente el acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014 del 25 de junio del 2014, para que en su parte final se lea: "... Al mismo tiempo, se le solicita a la Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psicóloga del Consultorio Médico de la Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito, continué con el tratamiento psicoterapeútico de manera que se logre la reinserción del oficial y la adaptación a su nuevo lugar de trabajo, así como lograr que éste ajuste su comportamiento a los estándares requeridos en la función que se le demanda como Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito, lo anterior con la debida coordinación con el Departamento de Salud Ocupacional." (Folio 54 del administrativo) 6) Por oficio No. 0718-2014 del 18 de julio del 2014, la Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo de Personal entrega copia del oficio No. 0626-2014 del 02 de julio del 2014 al actor. (Folio 53 del administrativo) 7) Por oficio No. 0726-2014 del 24 de julio del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Director de la Policía de Tránsito que por artículo sexagésimo quinto, acuerdo sexagésimo quinto del acta ordinaria 13-2014 del 23 de julio del 2014, en el que se dispuso que ante el escrito del 18 de julio del 2014 presentado por el actor, en el que se opuso al traslado, se suspendía de inmediato la ejecución del acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014 y acuerdo sexagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 12-2014, hasta tanto se resolviera esa acción recursiva. (Folio 58 del administrativo) 8) Por oficio del 06 de agosto del 2014, el Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psicólogo de la Unidad Macro Región Central y Norte MOPT comunica al ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes el informe del peritaje psicológico con respecto al caso del oficial [Nombre62 001]. En el citado dictamen emitido en fecha 10 de abril del 2014 se indica, en lo relevante: "4. Recomendaciones: 1) Ante dicho padecimiento que sufre el funcionario en cuestión se le debe prestar atención psicológica, máxime que por el tiempo que lleva consumiendo los medicamentos ya se aproxima al retiro de los mismos. 2) Por el grado de afectación al funcionario no debería trasladársele ya que sería emitir una sentencia apriori en su contra, lo que podría llevar a desestabilizar aún más su estado mental y emocional. 3) Tratar de brindarle un permiso con goce de salario mientras se define su situación en todos los ámbitos, con el fin de mitigar la situación conflictiva tanto de los compañeros como del mismo [Nombre62 001] (sic). 4) Indagar a fondo mediante personal calificado, no perteneciente a recursos humanos o entes adscritos la verdad de los hechos suscitados y el tratamiento que se le ha dado ya que es alarmante para la sana administración el como durante dos años la inercia ha sido protagonista en este proceso, provocando un malestar y desgaste general en las partes involucradas y posibles consecuencias perjudiciales para la administración. (...) 5) Se debe de revisar mediante personal con amplio conocimiento en la materia de selección, de preferencia externo, el cómo se ha venido seleccionando el personal de ingreso, ya que en su momento se descubre deficiencias graves por parte del Psicólogo Hugo Chaves Mora quien emite recomendaciones al Consejo de Personal del gobierno anterior los cuales nunca ejecutaron mayores cambios mostrando siempre resistencia a modificar. (...)". (Imágenes 109-120 del cautelar) 9) Mediante resolución No. 99-2014 de las 11 horas 35 minutos del 13 de agosto del 2014, el Consejo de Personal resuelve recurso de revocatoria presentado por el accionante y dispuso: "Declarar parcialmente con lugar el Recurso de Revocatoria planteado por el Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito [Nombre62 001], de calidades en el expediente conocidas, contra el Acuerdo sexagésimo cuarto, artículo sexagésimo cuarto del acta de la sesión ordinaria No. 012-2014, del día miércoles nueve de julio del dos mil catorce del Consejo de Personal y Oficio DGPT-2025-2014, suscrito por el Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director General de la Policía de Tránsito, por lo que se confirma la resolución en cuanto a su traslado pero se ordena que éste no sea a San José, sino a una Delegación de Tránsito lo más cercano a su residencia, para lo cual la Administración en la Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito y la Dirección de Recursos Humanos, deberá tomar las medidas oportunas para el traslado de Delegación y el cambio en las labores del contrato de trabajo, acorde con la realidad del servidor recurrente. (...)". Dispuso la remisión del recurso de apelación al Ministro de esa cartera. Esto fue comunicado al accionante mediante fax, al número 2223-4170. (Folios 59-63 del administrativo. 10) Mediante el oficio No. 0945-2014 del 08 de septiembre del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica a la Jefatura de Salud Ocupacional el artículo quincuagésimo primero, acuerdo quincuagésimo primero, acta ordinaria 15-2014 del 27 de agosto del 2014 en el que se le solicita se determine mediante estudio, con toda claridad, si el actor tiene la idoneidad para desempeñarse como oficial de la Policía de Tránsito, al existir una serie de denuncias e inconformidades en la Delegación de Puntarenas en su contra. (Folio 64 del administrativo) 11) Por escrito del 11 de septiembre del 2014, el accionante peticiona copia del informe referido en el aparte precedente. (Folio 16 del administrativo) 12) Por oficio No. 1144-2014 del 22 de octubre del 2014 el Consejo de Personal comunica al petente el artículo sexagésimo primero acuerdo sexagésimo primero del acta ordinaria 18-2017 del 15 de octubre del 2014, mediante el cual se le permite la entrega de una copia del informe de Salud Ocupacional del MOPT, elaborado por la psicóloga Elke Cortés Cortés. (Folio 18 del administrativo) 13) Por oficio No. 1321-2014 del 03 de diciembre del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Director de la Policía de Tránsito que por artículo cuadragésimo acuerdo cuadragésimo del acta ordinaria 21-2014 del 25 de noviembre del 2014, se dispuso que con vista en el oficio del 29 de octubre del 2014 del Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Puntarenas, se debía trasladar al actor a otra región que no fuese el Pacífico Central. (Folio 84 del principal) 14) Mediante el oficio DOF-CP-2015-830 del 12 de agosto del 2015, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Ministro de Obras Publicas y Transportes lo acordado en el articulo décimo, acuerdo décimo del Acta extraordinaria 09-2015, tomado en la sesión extraordinaria 09-2015, en el cual se dispuso en lo relevante: “… Con fundamento en las argumentaciones de hecho y de derecho recién expuestas el Consejo de Personal acuerda recomendar respetuosamente al Ministro de Obras Publicas y Transportes, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos lo siguiente: 1. Despedir, con responsabilidad patronal, al Oficial de Policía de Transito [Nombre62 001], de calidades conocidas en este expediente, de conformidad con los artículos 8, 10, 76 y 88, de la Ley General de Policía, No. 7410, en concordancia con el articulo 85 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, y en relación con el articulo No. 140 de la Constitución Política (…). 2. Reconocer los extremos y derechos laborales que este Acto administrativo determine conforme a lo indicado en el ordenamiento jurídico. Acuerdo firme.” (Imágenes 241-247 del cautelar) 15) Mediante resolución No. 1418 de las 13 horas 09 minutos del 29 de septiembre del 2015 del Ministro de Obras Publicas y Transportes, se conoce contenido del oficio DOF-CP-2015-830 del 12 de agosto del 2015, del Consejo de Personal y se dispuso en lo relevante: “POR TANTO, EL MINISTRO DE OBRAS PUBLICAS Y TRANSPORTES RESUELVE: 1.- Confirmar en todos sus extremos el Artí culo décimo, Acuerdo décimo del Acta Extraordinaria No. 09-2015, tomada por el supracitado Consejo en la Sesión Extraordinaria No. 09-2015, celebrada el día miércoles cinco de agosto del dos mil quince, en la cual se acordó despedir con Responsabilidad Patronal al Oficial de Trá nsito [Nombre62 001], portador de la cédula de identidad n úmero [CED62 ] , de calidades conocidas en este expediente, de conformidad los artículos 8, 10, 76 y 88, de la Ley General de Policía, No. 7410, en concordancia con el articulo 85 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, y en relación con el articulo No. 140 de la Constitución Política (…), así como lo dispuesto en el Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Autoridades de Transito. 2./ Solicitar a la Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos de este Ministerio, que proceda de acuerdo a sus competencias, a la remisión a la Dirección Jurídica del Despacho Ministerial, de los cálculos correspondientes de los Extremos Laborales que por derecho correspondan al Oficial de Transito [Nombre62 001], para la confección de la respectiva resolución administrativa de pago correspondiente. (…)”. (Imágenes 89-99 del cautelar) 16) Que en fecha 15 de octubre del 2015, el accionante interpuso recurso de amparo para ante la Sala Constitucional en contra del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, alegando lesión de su derecho al trabajo e igualdad. Señaló que fue despedido sin haber sido valorado personalmente y que solamente se realizó un análisis de los documentos aportados por el mismo Ministerio, omitiendo valorar que se encuentra enfermo de un trastorno distímico, que es una enfermedad psicológica, y que los mismos diagnósticos psicológicos advirtieron que se debía al acoso laboral. Proceso tramitado bajo el expediente número 15-015384-0007-CO. (Folios 122-139 del administrativo) 17) Por oficio DVA-DGIRH-DGSP-131-2016 del 19 de octubre del 2015 la Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos comunica al actor su despido con responsabilidad patronal a partir del 30 de octubre del 2015. (Folio 106 del administrativo) 18) Mediante resolución No. 2015-017427 de las 10 horas 10 minutos del 06 de noviembre del 2015, la Sala Constitucional dispuso el rechazo de la medida de amparo presentada por el accionante, expediente No. 15-015384-0007-CO, al estimar que su despido no se había sustentado en motivos de discriminación derivados de su enfermedad psicológica. (Folios 122-139 del administrativo) II.- Hechos no probados. Ninguno de relevancia para este proceso.

III.- Alegatos de las partes. El accionante aduce, en lo fundamental, el acto impugnado no realiza una adecuada motivación. Dice, esto es de especial importancia ya que la decisión tomada por el Consejo de Personal de la Policía de Tránsito se centra en un informe, en el cual, pese a ser una valoración psicológica, fue atendido por el médico tratante. Simplemente se revisó su expediente y se rindió una recomendación de la que se acogió la más gravosa. Estima que al no haber sido atendido por el médico tratante, cualquier recomendación es inválida, por ser subjetiva. Acusa lesión al debido proceso, en tanto no existen notificaciones, traslado de cargos, apertura de procedimiento administrativo, mediante el cual se permita el ejercicio del derecho de defensa, de donde se desprenda los motivos del despido, sino que lo que existe es la aplicación de una sanción generada de manera caprichosa, sin contar con suficiente motivación. Estima que al no instruir el debido proceso se lesiona la legalidad y la reserva de ley. Afirma que a la fecha de la demanda no conocía del traslado de cargos, sino que fue despedido de manera arbitraria y unilateral. Resalta que la Ley General de la Administración Pública impone un procedimiento administrativo para casos en que se presente denuncias en contra del funcionario público. Refiere a los componentes básicos del debido proceso administrativo, los cuales, expone, fueron omitidos por el Consejo de Personal, al tomar decisiones que nunca le fueron solicitadas. Alude a precedentes de la Corte Plena en cuanto al contenido del debido proceso. Estima que lo actuado por el Consejo de Personal es nulo al imponer una sanción en contra del debido proceso.

IV.- Alegaciones del Estado. Por su parte el mandatario público expone que la decisión impugnada fue adoptada con el respeto de los derechos del funcionario en la tramitación y con apego a la normativa especial en virtud de la naturaleza policial del cargo. Destaca que se está frente a funcionarios policiales, en el área de policía de tránsito, que son garantes de la seguridad ciudadana y del cumplimiento de la ley, que deben ser idóneos en cuanto a las condiciones morales, personales, físicas y psicológicas para llevar a cabo su labor. Señala, el hecho de no tener o carecer de las condiciones requeridas para el puesto, como es el caso de no poder portar armas y no tener las condiciones de idoneidad moral y psicológicas mínimas para el ejercicio del puesto, hacen imposible mantenerle en el cargo, siendo que la normativa especial establece la posibilidad del jerarca de cesarle con responsabilidad patronal. El interés público impide mantener a un funcionario cuya conducta ha propiciado un clima laboral tenso en el centro de trabajo, con afectación del resto de personal y la misma imagen institucional. Dice, se revisaron y acreditaron antecedentes suficientes sobre el accionar del petente, estudios de Salud Ocupacional de la Unidad de Pisicología del Consultorio Médico de la Policía de Tránsito y dictámenes de las áreas pertinentes del Hospital Monseñor Sanabria de Puntarenas, que determinaron la falta de idoneidad física y mental del servidor para actuar como Oficial de Tránsito. Prosigue, múltiples informes ponen en evidencia su falta de capacidad, informes médicos y psicológicos señalan su imposibilidad de utilizar el arma reglamentaria, lo que dice, es infalible en el ejercicio del cargo, para el cual se le contrató. Ello aunado a que las conductas del actor afectaron la paz, cordialidad, buenas relaciones y motivación que debe privar en el centro de trabajo. Precisa que el despido del acto se dispuso con responsabilidad patronal, respetando sus derechos y los principios del empleo público.

V.- Generalidades sobre el procedimiento administrativo. El procedimiento administrativo constituye un importante elemento formal de la conducta pública. Cumple una doble finalidad. Por un lado, establece el camino que ha de seguir la Administración para adoptar una determinada decisión, orientando su proceder. Por otro, se impone como un marco de referencia que permite al administrado, establecer un cotejo del proceder público, a fin de fijar un control de que sus actuaciones se hayan manifestado acorde a las normas que orientan ese proceder. Busca, por ende, constituirse en un mecanismo de tutela de derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos frente a poder público, así como garantizar la legalidad, oportunidad y conveniencia de la decisión administrativa y correcto funcionamiento de la función pública. Conforme lo señala el canon 214 de la Ley No. 6227, su objeto es establecer la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al caso final. Este elemento formal resulta imperativo para lograr un equilibrio entre el mejor cumplimiento de los fines de la Administración y la tutela de los derechos del particular, tal y como se expresa en el artículo 225.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De ahí que el canon 216.1 ibídem, exija a la Administración adoptar sus decisiones dentro del procedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico. En su curso, el procedimiento pretende establecer las formalidades básicas que permitan al administrado el ejercicio pleno del derecho de defensa y el contradictorio, para llegar a establecer la referida verdad real de los hechos (dentro de las cuales pueden verse las estatuidas en los cánones 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, entre otros, todos de la citada Ley General). Ello adquiere aún mayor relevancia en los denominados procedimientos de control o sancionatorios, siendo que, en esos casos, la decisión final puede imponer un marco represivo en la esfera jurídica de una persona. El mismo plexo normativo dispone la sustancialidad de estas garantías mínimas, considerando inválido el procedimiento que no satisfaga esas cuestiones mínimas. Así se desprende del mandato 223 de la Ley de referencia, en cuanto señala que la omisión de formalidades sustanciales causará nulidad del procedimiento. Desde este plano, esta Tribunal ya ha señalado que el control de la función administrativa que confiere a esta jurisdicción el canon 49 de la Carta Magna, supone un cotejo de que la Administración en el curso de esos procedimientos (de corte sancionatorio para este caso), satisfacen las garantías mínimas fijadas por la normativa aplicable, y que, en lo medular, se ha tutelado el debido proceso que ha de ser infranqueable en ese proceder. Ahora bien, en virtud de lo alegado, es menester abordar el tema de las funciones que le son propias al órgano director y al órgano decisor del procedimiento. La competencia para emitir el acto final dentro de un procedimiento corresponde al órgano decisor, sea, a quien se ha otorgado la competencia legal para emitir el acto que causa estado. Empero, en aras de la eficiencia administrativa, las competencias de instrucción son delegables en un órgano encargado de llevar a cabo la instrucción del procedimiento, el que se ha tendido en denominar "órgano director o instructor". En tesis de principio, la designación de este último corresponde al órgano decisor, para lo cual, su validez se encuentra sujeta a que recaiga en un funcionario adscrito, designado regularmente y en posesión del cargo. Sin embargo, es factible que, en determinados supuestos, la misma ley establezca la unidad administrativa que se constituye en órgano director del trámite. De manera excepcional, se ha tolerado que se constituya como órgano director del procedimiento a personas que no son funcionarios regulares, sin embargo, en esa función específica, debe entenderse que cumplen una función pública, con las obligaciones inherentes. En cuanto a sus competencias, la representación de la administración instructora dentro del procedimiento corresponde a ese órgano director, según se desprende con toda claridad del ordinal 282 inciso 3 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Se trata de una instancia con potestades de instrucción y ordenación del procedimiento (art. 227 LGAP), encargada de llevar todas las etapas preparatorias para luego, remitir los autos al órgano decisor (art. 330 LGAP). Si bien, en determinados supuestos puede rendir recomendaciones, ciertamente no serían vinculantes, por lo que sus determinaciones de cara a la adopción de una decisión final se consideran actos de trámite. Por ende, le corresponde dictar el acto de apertura, dar impulso procesal, toda la labor de instrucción del procedimiento, dirigir la comparecencia, resolver cuestiones previas, resolver el recurso de revocatoria que se interponga contra los actos de trámite, evacuar las probanzas admitidas, así como remitir el expediente para el dictado del acto final. Dentro de sus competencias pueden verse los artículos 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, todos de la Ley General de referencia. Por su parte, el órgano decisor es el jerarca competente que reúne las condiciones necesarias para dictar el acto final que resuelve el procedimiento.

VI.- Sobre el régimen policial. De conformidad con el ordinal 140 inciso 1) de la Carta Magna: "Son deberes y atribuciones que corresponden conjuntamente al Presidente y al respectivo Ministro de Gobierno: 1) Nombrar y remover libremente a los miembros de la fuerza pública, a los empleados y funcionarios que sirvan cargos de confianza, y a los demás que determine, en casos muy calificados, la Ley de Servicio Civil." En ese sentido, de conformidad con el artículo 3 inciso b) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, los miembros de la Fuerza Pública no se consideran incluidos dentro de ese régimen estatutario, siendo que dichas relaciones de servicio se encuentran reguladas, a la fecha, por la Ley General de Policía, No. 7410 del 30 de mayo de 1994. Esa fuente legal precisamente regula a partir del canon 50, el denominado "Estatuto Policial". El canon 50 en cuestión señala: "Artículo 50°- Alcance y objetivos. El presente Estatuto regulará las relaciones entre el Poder Ejecutivo y los servidores miembros de las distintas fuerzas de policía, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia en el mantenimiento de la seguridad pública y de proteger los derechos de estos servidores." Por su parte, el canon 52 ejusdem establece las personas funcionarias que no se consideran cubiertas por las normas que integran el Estatuto Policial, reconociendo a su vez el derecho de estabilidad de quienes hayan ingresado válidamente a ese régimen. En ese sentido, ese precepto estatuye: "Artículo 52°-Servidores no cubiertos por el Estatuto. No estarán cubiertos por la disposición del inciso a) del artículo 59 de este Estatuto y, en consecuencia, no gozarán de inamovilidad en sus puestos, en los siguientes funcionarios: a) Ministros y viceministros, asesores y empleados de confianza. b) El director general administrativo, el director general de la Fuerza Pública, los directores y subdirectores regionales de esta, el director del Servicio de Vigilancia Aérea y el director de la Policía de Control de Drogas." Al tenor de ese precepto, las personas regidas por el Estatuto Policial, salvo los casos anteriormente referidos, gozan del derecho de estabilidad (denominado inamovilidad), lo que implica que la cesación de la relación de empleo público solamente podrá darse por los motivos legalmente regulados y con el correspondiente derecho de reinstalación, caso de acreditarse el quebranto de dicho derecho. Dicha estabilidad que opera en el régimen policial se encuentra igualmente reconocida en la letra del canon 75 inciso a) de la citada ley en cuanto señala de manera expresa: "Artículo 75°-Derechos. Los miembros de las fuerzas de policía protegidos por esta Ley gozarán de los siguientes derechos: a) Estabilidad en sus puestos, siempre y cuando ingresen al servicio de acuerdo con los requisitos exigidos en el presente Estatuto y si cumplen con sus deberes en la prestación del servicio, según las condiciones determinadas en esta Ley y sus Reglamentos. / El servidor solo podrá ser removido de su puesto cuando incurra en una falta grave, de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico, o cuando, para mejorar el servicio, se determine su ineficiencia o incompetencia manifiestas, conforme a las disposiciones de esta Ley." Por su lado, los ordinales 77 al 89 ibídem regulan lo concerniente al régimen disciplinario, señalando las faltas, sanciones a imponer, causales de despido, procedimiento aplicable, reglas de prescripción, entre otros temas relevantes a ese aspecto. Verbigracia, el numeral 80 de dicha fuente legal regula el procedimiento aplicable para aplicar amonestaciones. En ese marco, las causas de despido se precisan en el ordinal 88 de la citada Ley No. 7410 (norma que reitera el derecho de estabilidad de ese tipo de función pública) en el siguiente sentido: "Artículo 88°- El despido justificado. Los servidores amparados por el presente Estatuto solo podrán ser removidos de sus puestos por las siguientes razones: a) Por la comprobación de que han incurrido en una falta grave, según lo dispuesto en la presente Ley. b) Por incurrir en cualquiera de las causales establecidas en el artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo. c) Por ineficiencia o impericia manifiesta y comprobada en el desempeño del puesto. d) Por lo previsto en el artículo 51 de esta Ley." Llama la atención lo preceptuado en los numerales 85 y 86 de la citada Ley, en cuanto regulan supuestos de aplicación del régimen disciplinario, cuando los hechos base de ese ejercicio jerárquico, sean a su vez objeto de análisis dentro de una causa jurisdiccional. En ese sentido, el primero de esos artículos indica: "Artículo 85°- Investigación administrativa e investigación jurisdiccional. El inicio de la acción penal pública no impide que, simultáneamente, se comience la investigación administrativa, por los mismos hechos y para aplicar el régimen disciplinario. / La relación de hechos probados que se pronuncien en la sentencia penal vincula a la instancia administrativa, para los efectos disciplinarios y laborales del caso, aunque con anterioridad haya recaído una resolución administrativa favorable al servidor; en este caso deberá oírsele, sumariamente, antes de aplicar las sanciones que correspondan. Lo anterior no impide que, mientras se resuelve el asunto en la vía penal, la administración tome las medidas provisionales que estime necesarias." Por su parte, el canon 86 ibid expresa que, cuando opere el procesamiento en sede penal, por delito vinculado con torturas, tratos crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, de inmediato la Administración suspenderá al servidor y, hasta la decisión del caso, le retendrá, total o parcialmente, el salario. De lo anterior se desprende que el Estatuto Policial concede a las personas que se desempeñen en las fuerzas policiales el derecho de estabilidad, siendo que esa normativa indica de manera expresa los supuestos de hecho en que procede la destitución del funcionario (a) policial, así como los puestos concretos en los cuales, dicha garantía no opera.

VII.- Con todo, es criterio de este cuerpo colegiado que las normas que integran la citada Ley No. 7410 han de complementarse e integrarse con lo dispuesto por el ordinal 140 inciso 1) de la Carta Magna, norma esta última que reconoce a quien ejerza la Presidencia de la República, conjuntamente con la jerarquía del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, nombrar y remover libremente a los miembros de la fuerza pública. En ese sentido, la misma Sala Constitucional, en diversos fallos en los que conoció de reclamos como el que se analiza en este proceso, fijó el criterio de que era necesario distinguir el personal cubierto por el Estatuto Policial de aquel que no lo estuviera. Así, por ejemplo, en el voto No. 2016-18906 de las 09.45 horas del 23 de diciembre del 2016, reiterado en el precedente No. 2017-006876 de las 09.15 horas del 12 de mayo del 2017 dispuso en lo relevante: "III.- Sobre el fondo. De los documentos que se allegaron al expediente, se desprende que los amparados fueron despedidos de conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo 140 inciso 1) de la Constitución Política, según lo establecido en varios acuerdos ejecutivos, y sin que conste que se encontraban dentro del Estatuto Policial, por lo que, como en reiteradas ocasiones lo ha manifestado esta Sala, el despido no deviene en ilegítimo, toda vez que el Presidente de la República y el Ministro del ramo, tienen la facultad -de acuerdo al texto constitucional-, de nombrar y remover libremente a los miembros de la Fuerza Pública. (...)". Dicho precedente pone de manifiesto la necesidad de discriminar entre ambos tipos de relación, como parámetro previo a utilizar la potestad que concede el ordinal constitucional aludido. Sin embargo, considera este cuerpo colegiado que la referencia gramatical a "libremente", si bien puede considerarse como el reconocimiento de una potestad de contenido discrecional, se encuentra igualmente sujeta a las reglas de legalidad administrativa, dentro de estas, a los límites infranqueables del ejercicio de ese tipo de potestades, que fijan los ordinales 15, 16, 128, 158.4 y 160 (entre otras) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, pero además, de las normas contenidas en la Ley No. 7410 ya comentadas. En su correcta dimensión, tal norma concede a los jerarcas aludidos la potestad de prescindir de personal de las fuerzas policiales por aspectos de conveniencia y oportunidad, sin la necesidad de la pre-existencia de un procedimiento administrativo en el que se establezca la causa justificante del despido, siempre que tal ruptura del vínculo especial interno respete los derechos de orden laboral propios de la función pública, lo que supone que ese despido será con la correspondiente responsabilidad patronal. Empero, esas razones de conveniencia y oportunidad que darían cabida al ejercicio de esta potestad, en modo alguno puede constituirse como un mecanismo de ejercicio disciplinario, siquiera encubierto, o bien, en una forma de sustitución (por negación) de esa potestad. En orden a lo indicado, se trata de una potestad prevista para supuestos de excepción, como es el caso del personal de confianza, en general, no cubierto por el Estatuto Policial (Ley No. 7410). En efecto, cuando la causa de utilización de la aludida potestad jerárquica sea una desatención, de quien ejerce la función policial, a las reglas de conducta a las que se encuentra sujeto (a), dentro de estas, las reglas de la probidad en el ejercicio de la función pública policial, de suerte que el titular jerárquico considere que esas acciones u omisiones son reprochables, al grado de estimar pertinente su separación de las fuerzas policiales, es consideración de esta Cámara, que la misma Ley No. 7410, -como complemento necesario de la debida comprensión de los alcances del canon 140.1 de la Carta Magna- impone el deber de acreditación de la falta mediante el trámite procedimental respectivo y en esas hipótesis, disponer la medida correctiva interna que corresponda, dentro de estas, el despido, cuando el mérito de los autos así lo determine. El análisis de la normativa arriba consignada, lleva a este Tribunal a estimar que si la causa del despido es el desapego, desatención, incumplimiento o en general, la vulneración a las reglas de comportamiento y deberes propios del personal policial, tal efecto debe producirse, necesariamente, dentro del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria y no mediante un poder genérico, de orden discrecional, para remover "libremente" a ese tipo de agentes. De otro modo, la permisibilidad de acudir a dicha (pseudo) libre remoción del funcionario (a) sin necesidad de procedimiento previo, aún en casos en que lo pertinente sea el ejercicio disciplinario, a reserva de que se asuma la responsabilidad patronal de esas medidas, constituye una renuncia ilegítima a ese ejercicio correctivo interno y el conferimiento de un beneficio de orden económico al funcionario incumpliente de sus obligaciones legales y competenciales. En tales casos, se insiste, la sola existencia de dudas (razonables o no) de conductas impropias del agente policial, no debe dar paso al ejercicio de dicha potestad de remoción discrecional, pues si así fuese, se negaría y no tendría mayor lógica ni efecto útil, la estabilidad que consagra y reconoce la Ley No. Placa3784, así como la regulación del régimen disciplinario que opera en estos campos. Como se ha señalado, apelar a cesación discrecional de la persona agente público con el correspondiente pago de extremos laborales, pese a que la causa efectiva de esa decisión es la comisión de una falta funcionarial, si bien puede decirse que resulta "conveniente" a la jerarquía administrativa, en realidad desconoce los derechos que operan en la función pública y garantiza la ley expresa (No. 7410), pues niega el ejercicio del derecho de defensa para adoptar una decisión sobre la base de conjeturas que no han logrado ser acreditadas dentro de un procedimiento administrativo, cuya finalidad, en orden a lo que fija la doctrina del ordinal 214 y 223 de la LGAP, es establecer la verdad real de los hechos. De esa manera, el despido de quien se desempeñe en esas funciones policiales, aún con responsabilidad patronal, sobre la base de supuestas faltas, no comprobadas, a no dudarlo lesiona el debido proceso, mediante la renuncia a priori del ejercicio disciplinario, para en su lugar adoptar decisiones que rompen la relación de servicio, a pesar de que los hechos que constituyen la presunta falta no se hayan cometido. De igual manera, si la falta fue cometida, el despido con el pago de todas las cargas laborales propias de la responsabilidad del empleador, supone, se reitera, conferir un beneficio improcedente en detrimento de los fondos públicos que han de ser tutelados, con la eventual responsabilidad que derivaría de esas acciones conforme se desprende del régimen de fiscalización superior de la Hacienda Pública expresado en la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, No. 8131, Ley General de Control Interno, No. 8292, Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422 y el marco genérico de responsabilidad del funcionario público que consagra la Ley No. 6227 a partir del precepto 199. Por ende, estima este Tribunal que si bien el ordinal 140.1 de la Carta Magna reconoce la potestad discrecional de remoción del personal de la fuerza pública, esa norma no habilita que, frente a causas que supongan motivo de despido sin responsabilidad patronal o bien, en general, sea relativas a un sometimiento al régimen disciplinario, se renuncie a ese ejercicio. Por el contrario, esa posibilidad, en el contexto de lo indicado, solamente opera frente a circunstancias calificadas de conveniencia y oportunidad, a reserva de que se encuentren plena y debidamente expresadas en el acto de despido, motivación que en todo caso impone la doctrina del precepto 136 de la misma Ley No. 6227, so pena de generar otorgamiento de beneficios patrimoniales indebidos, o bien, constituirse en desviación de poder, al utilizar la potestad administrativa para fines diversos al principal que justifica la norma habilitante, en detrimento de este, tal y como lo explica el artículo 131 inciso 3) de la citada LGAP, todo lo cual es controlable por esta Jurisdicción contencioso administrativa mediante el análisis de validez de la función administrativa que dispone el numeral 49 de la Carta Magna. Pero, además, dicha potestad es aplicable al caso de los cargos que no se encuentran cubiertos por el Estatuto Policial, en los supuestos previstos por el ordinal 52 de la Ley No. 7410, siendo que, en los demás casos, se impone el derecho de estabilidad.

VIII.- Sobre la causa de despido en el caso concreto. En la especie, el principal reclamo de la parte promovente estriba en la supuesta ausencia de un procedimiento formal de previo a la adopción de la conducta formal que dispuso su despido con responsabilidad patronal. Empero, del análisis de los autos se desprende que la decisión adoptada por la Administración accionada no se relaciona, en rigor, con el ejercicio reflejo de una potestad de orden disciplinario, sino con las potestades de cesación de la relación de empleo que estatuye el ordinal 88 inciso d) de la Ley No. 7410, en tanto se relaciona con la determinación de condiciones médicamente comprobadas, que hacen al accionante, a juicio de su patrono, inidóneo para el ejercicio de las funciones inherentes al cargo que desempeñaba. Si bien esta Cámara ha señalado en fallos precedentes, siendo el más reciente el No. 074-2019-VI de las 09 horas del 25 de junio del 2019, que la potestad del ordinal 140.1 de la Carta Magna no es irrestricta en tanto ha de interpretarse en conjunción con las implicaciones de la estabilidad laboral que reconoce el Estatuto de Servicio Policial, a la vez que tal potestad no supone (ni puede implicar) una renuncia tácita al ejercicio de las potestades disciplinarias, en casos como el presente, el ejercicio de esa potestad resulta totalmente legítimo si se sustenta en causas asociadas a definición de idoneidad o no para el ejercicio del cargo público. Lo anterior, se insiste, en la medida en que la ponderación de esa idoneidad no se vincule a conductas u omisiones cuyo abordaje sea propio de menesteres disciplinarios. En la especie, la causa de la decisión cuestionada no se relaciona con esos aspectos de orden correctivo disciplinario, sino de la definición técnica de falencias del accionante, que pusieron en evidencia la carencia de condiciones que su patrono estima necesarias y determinantes para mantener su investidura y a partir de las cuales se determinó su inidoneidad para ocupar el puesto de Policía de Tránsito. Del análisis de los autos se tiene que por documento JCE-HMS-0455-2014 del 25 de febrero del 2014, la Jefatura de Consulta Externa del Hospital Monseñor Sanabria certifica: " Que según consta en el expediente médico del paciente [Nombre62 001] Número de asegurado: [Valor 001], el médico tratante de PSIQUIATRÍA Dr- Nombre139072 , en consulta de 25 de febrero del 2014, anota: "Paciente sigue control en Psiquiatría del HMS por haberse catalogado como un trastorno depresivo severo en tratamiento psicofarmacológico, por lo que se recomienda no utilizar ni portar armas de fuego." ...". En seguimiento de ese diagnóstico, en junio del 2014, el Departamento de Salud Ocupacional del MOPT emite Informe elaborado por la psicóloga Elke Cortés Cortés, en el que, luego de la valoración realizada al accionante concluyó: " Considerando que se presenta en el colaborador un patrón de comportamiento que sugiere un pronóstico reservado; pero sin obviar la posibilidad de que el contexto laboral halla incidido de manera importante en lo acontecido se propone, en primera instancia, que el señor [Nombre62 001] sea reubicado en un lugar fuera de la Delegación de Puntarenas, para que realice funciones administrativas, donde el contacto con la persona usuaria sea mínimo o nulo. Si se optara por ésta, el colaborador deberá continuar atención psicoterapeútica, durante 1 año en el Consultorio Médico de la Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito; para evaluar la adaptación al nuevo lugar de trabajo; así como su ajuste de comportamiento. En segunda instancia se vislumbra el despido del colaborador con responsabilidad laboral, lo que será valorado por el Consejo de Policía de Tránsito. Para lo cual contará con el insumo que la Unidad de Psicología de la Dirección General de Policía de Tránsito provea mediante informe escrito. En procura de favorecer una recuperación del entorno laboral de la Delegación de Puntarenas se estima pertinente, también, trasladar al Lic. Eduardo Sevilla Galeano. Y efectuar una revisión interna del funcionamiento administrativo de la misma, que será asumida por la persona o el equipo que asigne el Director General de la Policía de Tránsito. Posteriormente, transcurridos seis meses, se reevaluará el estado de ambiente laboral, através del monitoreo de seguimiento en la Delegación; que estará a cargo del Departamento de Salud Ocupacional." Este informe fue remitido por el Jefe de Salud Ocupacional al Consejo de Personal mediante el oficio DGIRH # 2014-226-SO del 19 de junio del 2014. Como se observa, ese informe ofreció varias alternativas para afrontar la situación del promovente, siendo la primera opción la reubicación a un lugar en el que no tuviera contacto con el público y con el respectivo monitoreo y acompañamiento psicoterapeútico. Como opción alternativa, expuso valorar el eventual despido con responsabilidad laboral. Atendiendo a esas recomendaciones, mediante el artículo quincuagésimo cuarto acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014 del 25 de junio del 2014, el Consejo de Personal dispuso el traslado del reclamante al Departamento de Vehículos Detenidos en el Cantón de San José, así como solicitar al Departamento de Salud Ocupacional, continuar con el tratamiento psicoterapeútico de manera que se logre la reinserción del oficial y la adaptación a su nuevo lugar de trabajo, así como lograr que éste ajuste su comportamiento a los estándares requeridos en la función que se le demanda como Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito." El traslado se concretó mediante el oficio número TCDG-0616-2014 del 21 de julio del 2014, del Director General de Tránsito. Por su parte, por oficio No. 0692-2014 del 16 de julio del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Director de la Policía de Tránsito que por artículo sexagésimo cuarto, acuerdo sexagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 12-2014 del 09 de julio del 2014, se modificó parcialmente el acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014 del 25 de junio del 2014, para que en su parte final se lea: "... Al mismo tiempo, se le solicita a la Licda. Ericka Cordero, Psicóloga del Consultorio Médico de la Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito, continué con el tratamiento psicoterapeútico de manera que se logre la reinserción del oficial y la adaptación a su nuevo lugar de trabajo, así como lograr que éste ajuste su comportamiento a los estándares requeridos en la función que se le demanda como Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito, lo anterior con la debida coordinación con el Departamento de Salud Ocupacional." Por oficio No. 0718-2014 del 18 de julio del 2014, la Secretaría Ejecutiva del Consejo de Personal comunicó al actor el artículo quincuagésimo cuarto acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014, en relación con la recomendación de Salud Ocupacional para su traslado. Luego, en el acto No. 0726-2014 del 24 de julio del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Director de la Policía de Tránsito que por artículo sexagésimo quinto, acuerdo sexagésimo quinto del acta ordinaria 13-2014 del 23 de julio del 2014, en el que se dispuso que ante el escrito del 18 de julio del 2014 presentado por el actor, en el que se opuso al traslado, se suspendía de inmediato la ejecución del acuerdo quincuagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 11-2014 y acuerdo sexagésimo cuarto del acta ordinaria 12-2014, hasta tanto se resolviera esa acción recursiva. Por oficio del 06 de agosto del 2014, el Dr. Hugo Chaves Mora, psicólogo de la Unidad Macro Región Central y Norte MOPT comunica al ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes el informe del peritaje psicológico con respecto al caso del oficial [Nombre62 001]. En el citado dictamen emitido en fecha 10 de abril del 2014 se indica, en lo relevante: "4. Recomendaciones: 1) Ante dicho padecimiento que sufre el funcionario en cuestión se le debe prestar atención psicológica, máxime que por el tiempo que lleva consumiendo los medicamentos ya se aproxima al retiro de los mismos. 2) Por el grado de afectación al funcionario no debería trasladársele ya que sería emitir una sentencia a priori en su contra, lo que podría llevar a desestabilizar aún más su estado mental y emocional. 3) Tratar de brindarle un permiso con goce de salario mientras se define su situación en todos los ámbitos, con el fin de mitigar la situación conflictiva tanto de los compañeros como del mismo [Nombre62 001] (sic). 4) Indagar a fondo mediante personal calificado, no perteneciente a recursos humanos o entes adscritos la verdad de los hechos suscitados y el tratamiento que se le ha dado ya que es alarmante para la sana administración el como durante dos años la inercia ha sido protagonista en este proceso, provocando un malestar y desgaste general en las partes involucradas y posibles consecuencias perjudiciales para la administración. (...) 5) Se debe de revisar mediante personal con amplio conocimiento en la materia de selección, de preferencia externo, el cómo se ha venido seleccionando el personal de ingreso, ya que en su momento se descubre deficiencias graves por parte del Psicólogo Hugo Chaves Mora quien emite recomendaciones al Consejo de Personal del gobierno anterior los cuales nunca ejecutaron mayores cambios mostrando siempre resistencia a modificar. (...)". Mediante resolución No. 99-2014 de las 11 horas 35 minutos del 13 de agosto del 2014, el Consejo de Personal resuelve recurso de revocatoria presentado por el accionante y dispuso: "Declarar parcialmente con lugar el Recurso de Revocatoria planteado por el Oficial de la Policía de Tránsito [Nombre62 001] , de calidades en el expediente conocidas, contra el Acuerdo sexagésimo cuarto, artículo sexagésimo cuarto del acta de la sesión ordinaria No. 012-2014, del día miércoles nueve de julio del dos mil catorce del Consejo de Personal y Oficio DGPT-2025-2014, suscrito por el Lic. Mario Calderón Cornejo, Director General de la Policía de Tránsito, por lo que se confirma la resolución en cuanto a su traslado pero se ordena que éste no sea a San José, sino a una Delegación de Tránsito lo más cercano a su residencia, para lo cual la Administración en la Dirección General de la Policía de Tránsito y la Dirección de Recursos Humanos, deberá tomar las medidas oportunas para el traslado de Delegación y el cambio en las labores del contrato de trabajo, acorde con la realidad del servidor recurrente. (...)". Mediante el oficio No. 0945-2014 del 08 de septiembre del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica a la Jefatura de Salud Ocupacional el artículo quincuagésimo primero, acuerdo quincuagésimo primero, acta ordinaria 15-2014 del 27 de agosto del 2014 en el que se le solicita se determine mediante estudio, con toda claridad, si el actor tiene la idoneidad para desempeñarse como oficial de la Policía de Tránsito, al existir una serie de denuncias e inconformidades en la Delegación de Puntarenas en su contra. Por oficio No. 1144-2014 del 22 de octubre del 2014 el Consejo de Personal comunica al petente el artículo sexagésimo primero acuerdo sexagésimo primero del acta ordinaria 18-2017 del 15 de octubre del 2014, mediante el cual se le permite la entrega de una copia del informe de Salud Ocupacional del MOPT, elaborado por la psicóloga Elke Cortés Cortés, petición que había realizado el 11 de septiembre del 2014. En oficio No. 1321-2014 del 03 de diciembre del 2014, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Director de la Policía de Tránsito que por artículo cuadragésimo acuerdo cuadragésimo del acta ordinaria 21-2014 del 25 de noviembre del 2014, se dispuso que con vista en el oficio del 29 de octubre del 2014 del Juzgado de Trabajo de Mayor Cuantía de Puntarenas, se debía trasladar al actor a otra región que no fuese el Pacífico Central. Luego de las valoraciones médicas referidas, en oficio DOF-CP-2015-830 del 12 de agosto del 2015, el Consejo de Personal comunica al Ministro de Obras Publicas y Transportes lo acordado en el articulo décimo, acuerdo décimo del Acta extraordinaria 09-2015, tomado en la sesión extraordinaria 09-2015, en el cual se dispuso en lo relevante: “ … Con fundamento en las argumentaciones de hecho y de derecho recién expuestas el Consejo de Personal acuerda recomendar respetuosamente al Ministro de Obras Publicas y Transportes, Lic. Carlos Segnini Villalobos lo siguiente: 1. Despedir, con responsabilidad patronal, al Oficial de Policía de Transito [Nombre62 001] , de calidades conocidas en este expediente, de conformidad con los artículos 8, 10, 76 y 88, de la Ley General de Policía, No. Placa3784, en concordancia con el articulo 85 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, y en relación con el articulo No. 140 de la Constitución Política (…). 2. Reconocer los extremos y derechos laborales que este Acto administrativo determine conforme a lo indicado en el ordenamiento jurídico. Acuerdo firme.” Mediante resolución No. 1418 de las 13 horas 09 minutos del 29 de septiembre del 2015 del Ministro de Obras Publicas y Transportes, se conoce contenido del oficio DOF-CP-2015-830 del 12 de agosto del 2015, del Consejo de Personal y se dispuso en lo relevante: “POR TANTO, EL MINISTRO DE OBRAS PUBLICAS Y TRANSPORTES RESUELVE: 1.- Confirmar en todos sus extremos el Articulo décimo, Acuerdo décimo del Acta Extraordinaria No. 09-2015, tomada por el supracitado Consejo en la Sesión Extraordinaria No. 09-2015, celebrada el día miércoles cinco de agosto del dos mil quince, en la cual se acordó despedir con Responsabilidad Patronal al Oficial de Transito [Nombre62 001], portador de la cédula de identidad numero [CED62 ], de calidades conocidas en este expediente, de conformidad los artículos 8, 10, 76 y 88, de la Ley General de Policía, No. Placa3784, en concordancia con el articulo 85 inciso d) del Código de Trabajo, y en relación con el articulo No. 140 de la Constitución Política (…), así como lo dispuesto en el Reglamento de Organización y Servicio de las Autoridades de Transito. 2./ Solicitar a la Dirección de Gestión Institucional de Recursos Humanos de este Ministerio, que proceda de acuerdo a sus competencias, a la remisión a la Dirección Jurídica del Despacho Ministerial, de los cálculos correspondientes de los Extremos Laborales que por derecho correspondan al Oficial de Transito [Nombre62 001], para la confección de la respectiva resolución administrativa de pago correspondiente. (…)”.

IX.- Del análisis de ese recuento se desprende que la causa efectiva del despido con responsabilidad patronal del actor no puede, en modo alguno, vincularse a un aspecto de ejercicio disciplinario, sino a la falta de idoneidad para el ejercicio del cargo, lo cual, se insiste, fue establecido en diversos análisis clínicos realizados en su caso. Como se ha apuntado, la potestad de dar por terminada la relación de empleo en el marco del régimen nacional de policía, incluye la acreditación indubitable de la inidoneidad del agente público para el ejercicio del cargo, en orden a lo preceptuado por el ordinal 88 de la Ley No. Placa3784. En ese orden, en el acto final que dispuso su despido, el titular de la cartera ministerial expuso las razones concretas de orden fáctico que sustentaron su decisión en el siguiente sentido: "... 2. Que el comportamiento del Oficial [Nombre62 001] no es el adecuado ni esperado de un servidor público, más cuando se trata de un miembro de la Policía de Tránsito, que debe velar por la integridad y seguridad de los ciudadanos de la República. 3. Que la conducta del servidor [Nombre62 001] ha propiciado un clima laboral tenso en los centros de trabajo en que ha estado, malestar por parte de los compañeros, superiores, personal de otras instancias y, quizás más importante, de los usuarios que se concretan en quejas, lo que demerita el servicio que la Dirección de la Policía de Tránsito debe brindar. 4. Que existen antecedentes suficientes sobre el accionar del servidor [Nombre62 001], estudios de Salud Ocupacional, de la unidad de Psicología del Consultorio Médico de la Policía de Tránsito y dictámenes de las áreas pertinentes del Hospital Monseñor Sanabria de la ciudad de Puntarenas que llevan a cuestionar la idoneidad física y mental del servidor para actuar como Oficial de Tránsito, para proteger y defender a los usuarios del servicio que brinda la institución. 5. Que la incapacidad, comprobada por los informes médicos y psicológicos, del Oficial [Nombre62 001] cuestionado no le permite utilizar el arma reglamentaria, en su defensa o del ciudadano del peligro. 6. Que la paz, cordialidad, buenas relaciones y la motivación deben privar en todos los centros de trabajo de la Policía de Transito, para llevar el mejoramiento del servicio que se debe prestar a la ciudadanía y esto no será posible en tanto permanezca laborando para este cuerpo policial, en algunas de sus instalaciones, el servidor [Nombre62 001]." A diferencia de lo que esgrime el accionante como marco primario de sus refutaciones, no se trata de un asunto que le fuera desconocido o ajeno, en la medida en que, incluso, no solamente peticionó la copia de los dictámenes médicos que dieron paso a la decisión finalmente adoptada, sino que además, cuando fue trasladado a un puesto administrativo, planteó las medidas recursivas que llevaron al Consejo de Personal a revocar su traslado a la Unidad de Vehículos Detenidos en San José. Desde esa arista de examen, la lesión al debido proceso que se alega no es atendible. Cabe señalar que el acto final no solamente expone con claridad las razones de la decisión adoptada, sino que además, el quejoso no refuta ni combate las circunstancias de hecho que han dado base al motivo del acto. Incluso, las razones del citado despido no llegaron a producir una discriminación en detrimento del petente, al considerar el diagnóstico médico de su padecimiento psicológico. Tal aspecto fue objeto de consideración dentro del proceso de amparo formulado por el accionante en sede constitucional, expediente No. 15-015384-0007-CO, en el que, a raíz de las alegaciones de trato discriminatorio por razones de su enfermedad, en el voto 2015-017427, la Sala Constitucional señaló en lo relevante: "... Se resalta que la decisión tomada por la parte recurrida tenía el propósito de satisfacer el interés de la colectividad, velar por la armonía en el ambiente laboral y procurar la idoneidad del personal al servicio del Ministerio. En cuanto a este último punto, por ejemplo, el amparado estaba impedido para portar o utilizar el arma reglamentaria, lo que incidía en su capacidad de defensa personal y de terceros. Por otro lado, la Sala hace hincapié en la voluntad que existió en la Administración recurrida para brindar una solución alternativa al caso tutelado. (...) Posteriormente, la Administración resolvió incluso trasladar al tutelado a otra delegación, con el fin de no afectar su situación personal con la nueva ubicación geográfica. A partir de los elementos anteriores, la Sala no puede concluir que la Administración recurrida haya actuado en lesión de los derechos del tutelado, pues existen indicios claros de que procuró más bien brindarle ayuda, mediante su reubicación y tratamiento psicoterapeútico. En virtud de lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el recurso." Tal cita pone de manifiesto no solamente la inexistencia de un trato discriminatorio ante sus condiciones psicológicas, sino de la existencia de acciones a lo interno del MOPT para poder reubicar al accionante en un sitio en el que pudiese desempeñarse con normalidad, a la vez que refleja el acompañamiento de atención médica frente a su situación concreta. Con todo, los diversos análisis clínicos reflejan que a la postre, el actor no es una persona idónea para ocupar y ejercer el cargo que desempeña, aspecto que, se insiste, no ha logrado rebatir el reclamante. Ese aspecto constituye el elemento motivo del acto, lo cual, en orden a lo señalado en el mandato 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública resulta determinante en este tipo de análisis. De esa manera, la decisión de dictada por el Ministro de Obras Públicas no resulta ser arbitraria o carente de la tutela de los derechos del accionante, como se aduce en la demanda, en la medida en que razona y acredita las circunstancias con sustento en las cuales, determina la ausencia de elementos que estima esenciales para definir la idoneidad del petente y a partir de ello, en congruencia con el marco legal aplicable (Ley No. 7410), determina el despido con responsabilidad personal de ese servidor público. Por ende, no se observa en este caso la ausencia o imperfección sustancial de alguno de los elementos del acto, en lo que ha sido objeto de reproche, por lo que de conformidad con los ordinales 128, 132, 133, 158, 166 y 167 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, no se observa la invalidez de lo actuado, producto de lo que, debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda en cuanto al reclamo anulatorio.

X.- Sobre las defensas opuestas. La representación del Estado opuso la defensa de falta de derecho. Esta excepción de fondo debe acogerse por las razones ya señaladas. En consecuencia, lo debido es disponer el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos.

XI.- Costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, no observa este Tribunal motivo alguno para excepcionar la aplicación de tal máxima, por lo que, lo debido es imponerlas a la parte accionante vencida.

POR TANTO.

Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda formulada por el señor [Nombre62 001] en contra del Estado. Son ambas costas a cargo del accionante vencido. Sobre este aspecto el juez Aguilar Méndez pone nota separada. José Roberto Garita Navarro / Cynthia Abarca Gómez/ Daniel Aguilar Méndez*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* NOTA DEL JUEZ AGUILAR MÉNDEZ.

En relación con las costas y con absoluta respeto por el criterio divergente de mis compañeras, me permito diferir en relación a los alcances de la condenatoria realizada, pues al amparo del nuevo Código Procesal Civil (Ley N° 9342), específicamente los artículos 62.1, 73.2 y 73.3, el Tribunal decisor en un caso como el presente se encuentra en el deber de otorgar de una vez el monto exacto de las cantidades otorgadas por concepto de costas, así como determinar el carácter solidario o la divisibilidad de esta obligación. Daniel Aguilar Méndez. *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*- ASUNTO: PROCESO DE PURO DERECHO ACTOR: [Nombre62 001].

DEMANDADO: El Estado.

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