Right to a teaching surcharge for a teacher reassigned due to health reasonsDerecho al sobresueldo por recargo de docente reubicada por razones de salud

**Review of the Document** ***150010200166LA*** Supreme Court of Justice SECOND CHAMBER File: 15-001020-0166-LA Resolution: 2018-001763 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours twenty-five minutes on the twenty-sixth of October of two thousand eighteen.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre1], educator, divorced, and resident of Puntarenas, against the STATE (MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION), represented by its Deputy Procurator, Licenciada Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, married, resident of Alajuela. The special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Licenciado Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, single, resident of San José. All are of legal age and attorneys, with the exception noted.

**WHEREAS:** 1.- The special judicial attorney for the plaintiff, in the complaint filed on July twenty-seventh, two thousand fifteen, brought this action so that, in judgment, the defendant be ordered, in favor of his principal, to restore the payment for the Preschool Education overload, differences in vacation pay, year-end bonus (aguinaldo), school salary, annual increases, incentive for extension of the academic year, didactic incentive, professional career, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

2.- The State's representative answered in the terms indicated in the brief dated November twentieth, two thousand fifteen, and raised the defense of lack of right.

3.- The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at ten hours twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand sixteen, ordered: "Pursuant to the foregoing, legal citations, invoked case law, articles 492 and following of the Labor Code, the ordinary labor lawsuit brought by [Nombre1], identification number CED1, against THE STATE, represented by the Deputy Procurator, MSc. Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, bearer of identity card number CED2, is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The State is ordered to restore the payment of the supplementary salary calculated on the base salary for the concept of Preschool overload that the plaintiff was receiving at the time of being reassigned due to health problems, to recognize it from February 1, 2014, and for as long as the reassigned condition continues; plus the resulting differences in the year-end bonus (aguinaldo) vacations and school salary for the owed differences. All these items shall be settled in the administrative venue, and only in the event of disagreement by any party, shall it be heard in the judgment enforcement stage; since the necessary evidence for such quantification is not available. The defense of lack of right is rejected for what was granted and is upheld for the items of annual increases, incentive for extension of the academic year, didactic incentive, professional career. Likewise, the State is ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding, setting the personal costs at twenty percent of the total condemnatory amount, and to pay the corresponding interest on the amounts awarded in this judgment, from when they should have been paid and until their effective payment, according to the percentage established by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month colón deposits...". (Sic).

4.- The defendant party appealed, and the Labor Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, by judgment at seven hours forty-five minutes on September fourth, two thousand seventeen, resolved: "In accordance with the foregoing, no procedural defects capable of causing nullity or defenselessness to the parties are noted. On the grounds that were the subject of the appeal, the first-instance judgment IS CONFIRMED.-". (Sic).

5.- The State's representation filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief received on October eleventh, two thousand seventeen, which is based on the reasons that will be set forth in the considering part.

6.- The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Magistrate Aguirre Gómez drafts; and, **CONSIDERING:** I.- BACKGROUND: By means of the complaint, the plaintiff stated that she is a tenured employee as a Preschool teacher for the Ministry of Public Education at the Filadelfo Salas Céspedes educational center, in Cartago, but since 2013 she has been performing administrative duties due to health problems, following a request made to the Personnel Director of the Ministry of Public Education. She stated that while she held the Preschool Teaching position, she worked with the Preschool Education Overload for which she was paid a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) of 50% of her base salary, and upon being reassigned (reubicada), that payment was reduced, so salary differences have been accumulating since that date. Consequently, she requested the restoration of the payment equivalent to the Preschool Education overload for as long as she remains in a condition of disability (incapacidad) or health-related reassignment; the payment of the differences owed for the concept of Preschool Education overload from January 2014 until its effective payment, as well as the proportional items for year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacation pay, annual increases, incentive for extension of the academic year, didactic incentive, professional career, and school salary; and the payment of interest and personal and procedural costs (brief incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 07/27/2015 at 11:33:42 hours). The State representative answered in the negative and raised the defense of lack of right. She requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding, as well as the respective interest. If decided otherwise, she requests that the defendant be exempted from paying costs for having litigated in good faith (brief incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 11/20/2015 at 15:32:25 hours). The first-instance judge partially granted the lawsuit. She ordered the payment of the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) calculated on the base salary for the concept of Preschool overload, recognized from February 1, 2014, and for as long as the reassigned condition continues, plus the resulting differences in the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacation pay, and school salary, and their respective interest. Finally, she ordered the defendant to pay both costs of the proceeding, setting the personal costs at 20% of the total condemnatory amount (judgment incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 10/07/2016 at 11:47:01 hours). The State representation, in disagreement, appealed the decision (brief incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 10/12/2016 at 15:30:13 hours); and the Tribunal confirmed the appealed judgment (judgment incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 09/05/2017 at 15:02:34 hours).

II.- GRIEVANCES: The State's representative expresses disagreement with the order to restore the preschool overload and recognize salary differences from February 1, 2014, until its effective payment and for as long as the plaintiff maintains her reassigned condition, plus the payment for differences in the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), the school salary, and the costs of the proceeding. She alleges that the plaintiff was assigned a temporary Preschool Education overload equivalent to 50% of the base salary for the 2013 academic year, which expired on January 31, 2014. She alleges that on May 20, 2013, the plaintiff requested reassignment to administrative duties, which took place on June 17 of the same year, with a workday of 8 hours per day. For the 2014 academic year, the extension of her reassignment was communicated to her, but her workday was reduced to 4 hours and 10 minutes, since the overload was not taken into account because it was assigned temporarily only for the 2013 academic year, which was also maintained during 2015. She highlights that for a large part of the 2013 academic year, the payment of the overload was maintained while it was in effect. She points out that it is illogical for that overload to be recognized when it is known in advance that she will not effectively perform the personal service. She considers that there is an incorrect reasoning and application of article 174 of the Civil Service Statute. She notes that in compliance with the principle of legality, the recognition of the overload for duties of Ministry of Public Education employees is regulated in article 118, subsection j) of the Education Code and ordinal 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Decreto number 12915-E-P of September 21, 1981) and does not have a permanent or indefinite character for it to be recognized throughout the employment relationship, much less when the teaching person does not perform the overload functions because they are assigned to administrative duties. She objects that, based on canon 174 of the Civil Service Statute, it was considered that the plaintiff is disabled (incapacitada) by illness, and therefore, the overloads worked in teaching duties should not be maintained for her while she performs other administrative duties, given the reassignment agreed in her favor. She points out that the plaintiff was reassigned for health reasons, pursuant to numerals 254 of the Labor Code and 22 bis, subsection a), of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute, but that does not mean she is disabled (incapacitada) by illness, or that she has a special or permanent leave, rendering article 174 of that Statute inapplicable. She transcribes numeral 13 of the cited Procedures Manual, as well as 118 of the Education Code. Likewise, in support of her thesis, she invokes the criterion of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Public Education regarding the temporary nature of overloads, without which they cannot be conceived as an acquired right. On the other hand, she states that articles 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute were incorrectly interpreted and applied, because the plaintiff is not disabled (incapacitada) by illness nor is she on maternity leave, since she is only reassigned for health reasons. She indicates that the purpose of disability (incapacidad) is for the person to recover their health and return to their usual duties, whereas reassignment seeks for the person to perform other functions so that their health condition does not worsen. She insists that the assumptions of those rules are not present. She adds that the plaintiff has received all the fixed components of the salary while she has been reassigned. She indicates that the Special Leave Regulations are grounded in canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute, which was repealed, and therefore do not support the plaintiff's claim. She states that the decision affects public funds and educational programs, since it orders the continued payment of supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) for teaching duties that are not being performed. She accuses the violation of articles 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law, 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, while disregarding the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber on the subject. In relation to the first rule, it is inferred that overloads are exceptional and temporary in nature, in order to satisfy the public interest and guarantee the continuity and efficiency of the service. She insists that said overloads do not constitute an acquired right. She states that the second rule penalizes the granting of improper salary benefits as a crime. She emphasizes the temporary nature of the overloads, which are only maintained if the facts that gave rise to them persist. She points out that this same thesis was upheld by the Tribunal of Alajuela, Third Section, based in San Ramón, a jurisdictional body that considered that overloads for functions do not have an indefinite nature. She transcribes the criterion of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal on the temporary nature of overloads and the obligation to work them in order for them to be payable. In conclusion, she requests that the judgment be revoked and the lawsuit declared without merit in all its items.

III.- ON THE OVERLOAD: Through official communication DRH-8112-2013-DIR from the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education (image 153 of the complete file that appears in the Court's virtual desktop), it has been duly accredited that the plaintiff was reassigned to an administrative position as of June 17, 2013, based on a medical recommendation grounded in article 254 of the Labor Code, which establishes the obligation of the employer to reinstate in their position those workers who have suffered a risk and can work. It also provides for the employer's duty to offer them a different position according to their possibilities, when, based on a medical recommendation, they cannot return to perform the duties they had been carrying out, but are capable of performing other tasks. Similarly, the evidence is clear that at the time of the reassignment, she was earning a salary supplement, corresponding to a Preschool Education overload. This supplementary salary (sobresueldo) continued to be paid to her, despite the reassignment, until January 31, 2014. This benefit was suspended as of the following February 1st, according to personnel action number 10922593 from the General Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education, and official communication number DRH-PRH-UL-13641-2015 from November 5, 2015, from the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP (images 63-67 of the complete file that appears in the Court's virtual desktop). The appellant argues that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and for this reason, it can only act in accordance with what is duly authorized by the legal system, which is correct (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration). Articles 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel precisely establish the possibility of agreeing to certain overloads. It is also true that the related supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) do not constitute an acquired right and that payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their habitual duties, ceases to meet the factual conditions established for their recognition. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their duties, ceases to meet the conditions that make the overload viable, but rather a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to perform their normal duties. It is not observed, then, that the decision is violative of the cited articles 118 and 13. The appellant argues that numerals 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute were improperly applied, since said rules presuppose the existence of a disability (incapacidad) or a special leave that did not occur in this matter, since there is only a reassignment for health reasons. Regarding this argument, it must be stated that this Chamber has heard and resolved repeated matters of the same characteristics, without observing any circumstance that makes it possible to vary the held criterion. As was explained in the prior instance, it has been considered that in cases of this nature, Executive Decree number 19113, of July 28, 1989, which is the Special Leave Regulations for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education, is applicable, without it being possible to consider, as alleged, that this regulation became baseless upon the repeal of canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute, since this was not the only norm that supported it. Canon one of that regulation establishes the rules and procedures that the cited Ministry must follow to grant leave to employees, due to a decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from a work-related risk or illness. Article two reaffirms that the leaves contemplated in the regulation shall be granted to those who suffer a decrease in their faculties and who, for this reason, cannot perform the functions and responsibilities of the position they had been holding. In accordance with the provisions of numerals 5 and 8, employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros declare a minor or partial permanent disability (incapacidad) and recommend a change of functions are entitled to a special leave. Now, canon 9 stipulates that prior to granting the leave, the Ministry shall proceed with the reassignment (reubicación) of the employee, which is ratified in the following rules, according to which "…this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purpose of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, medical recommendations, and the academic background of the beneficiary, that are required on a temporary basis" and that "…the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that is enjoying special leave for the attention of tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its offices when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs," which is in absolute correspondence with article 254 of the Labor Code. Later, article 17 expressly stipulates that "The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter." In this manner, it has been considered that this regulation rather complements article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which does not make any distinction between permanent or partial disabilities (incapacidades), and hence, differentiation for payment purposes between permanent and special leaves is also not appropriate. Consequently, if at the time of reassignment (reubicación) the plaintiff was earning a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) for Preschool Education, it is indisputable that she has the right, according to that special regulation, for that supplement to be included within her remuneration as an administrative employee. In the stated sense, in judgment number 308 of this Chamber, at 10:30 hours on March 26, 2014, the following was explained: "In the criterion of the defendant, the supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) known as alternating schedule and technical advisory committee, are conceived only for those who perform teaching duties, when enrollment needs so require; and depending on the academic credentials of the employee, thus the plaintiff is not entitled to the payment of those supplements if her position is now administrative in nature. However, it must be clear that in this case, we are not faced with a claim made by an employee of the administrative sector of the Ministry of Public Education for the recognition of the supplements as an integral and indissoluble part of their salary. The situation under study differs from that assumption because here it is a matter of defining the entitlement to that right for a teaching employee who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. The difference that the State representation seeks to assert between 'disability (incapacidad)' and 'reassignment (reubicación)' ignores that the origin of both is an illness of the employee that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service. It is for this reason that the applicable regulations in cases like this are not only those related to the right to recognition of alternating schedule but rather those specifically provided for this purpose. Primarily, the Special Leave Regulations for the Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from work-related risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: 'The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the decrease suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and responsibilities corresponding to the position they had been holding in the capacity of regular employees.' (The highlighting is added). Then, in accordance with article 5, those employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability (incapacidad) or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions are entitled to a special leave. Article 8 specifically deals with the assumption of granting the special leave in the following terms: 'In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: a) That according to their ailment, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social recommends in the final treatment assessment their change of functions. b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work-related risk that occurred, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros determines a minor or partial permanent disability (incapacidad) and recommends their incorporation into service with a change of functions' (emphasis supplied). Next, articles 9 and 10, in order, establish: 'Prior to granting the leave and in accordance with the availability of vacancies and the requirements of the interested party, the Ministry of Public Education shall proceed with their reassignment (reubicación), transfer, or promotion, as appropriate.' And, 'When the application of the provisions of the previous article is immediately viable, the special leave shall be granted until the corresponding personnel movement can be carried out.' Furthermore, numeral 12 states: 'Likewise, the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that is enjoying special leave for the attention of tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its offices when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs.' Finally, article 17 states: 'The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter' (emphasis supplied). This regulation thus complements and does not contradict the provisions of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which states: 'a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled (incapacitarse) due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonaje, for "alternating schedule," or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment. b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary and shall, consequently, be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond.' (The highlighting is added). The regulatory norm develops this express provision, indistinctly contemplating the right to compensation for both the case of permanent leave and special leave." (The highlights appear in the original). The appellant is also incorrect in arguing that the overload was not worked, since this was due to the need to reassign the employee to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. In this case, the right to the benefit does not derive from the exercise of functions but from the application of the regulation that expressly grants the benefit, by reason of their health condition. The regulation contemplates the right to continue receiving, under those circumstances, "a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary." Hence, it cannot be concluded, as intended, that the nature of the overload was distorted or that public funds are unjustifiably affected, since the existing norms are what establish those legal consequences. For the foregoing, it is also not true that articles 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law or 56 of the Law against Illicit Enrichment in Public Office were violated. The first refers to the possibility of exceeding the limit of forty weekly lessons when the service so requires, with the excess being maintained as an overload, of a temporary nature. Such provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is intended for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of employees who enjoy disability (incapacidad) or leave. The other norm could not have been violated, as it refers to the penalization for granting improper supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), which is not the assumption under discussion. Finally, it should be noted that the criteria of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Public Education nor the decisions of other jurisdictional bodies on the matter are binding on this Chamber. Therefore, the decision is not contrary to the criterion of the Constitutional Tribunal that overloads are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active employee in functions that demand or not the overload, but rather the issue is limited to establishing the remuneration that an employee, who has been unable to continue performing their normal duties or the overloads they were carrying out due to a condition, must receive.

IV.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In accordance with what has been explained and in attention to what was the subject of the appeal, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed judgment.

V.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority criterion insofar as it recognizes the plaintiff's payment of the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) for the Preschool Education overload as of February 1, 2014, and for as long as she remains in a reassigned condition. It has been duly accredited that, in 2013, the plaintiff was earning that overload and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties as of June 17, 2013; which is why that supplementary salary (sobresueldo) ceased to be paid (proven facts 2, 3, and 4 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as is clear from official communication number DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible at image 153, respectively, of the complete view of the Court's electronic file, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, grounded in article 254 of the Labor Code. We are not facing a disability (incapacidad) properly speaking. The State argues before this Chamber that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, meaning it can only act in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and that the employee is not within the factual assumptions provided for in article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute, as she is not disabled (incapacitada) by illness as established, which would make her entitled to what is claimed. After reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the applicable regulations to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct. Ordinals 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel stipulate the possibility of assigning certain overloads, which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, the payment of these must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their habitual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Civil Service Statute establishes that: "a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled (incapacitarse) due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonaje, for 'alternating schedule,' or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment. /b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases.

(As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy, and the aids referred to in Article 167, shall be considered salary (salario), and shall, consequently, be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other matters, that may correspond. / (The preceding paragraph was thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (the highlighting is added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that a public servant who is disabled due to illness, or a female official on maternity leave, who had been earning additional salary through surcharges (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these surcharges considered when determining the amount of the subsidy to be paid to her. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual premise of the rule. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that according to the provisions of numerals 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses are granted when the public servant carries out additional functions to those she ordinarily performs in her position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these surcharges depends on the circumstances meriting it and, therefore, they are assigned temporarily, for each school year (curso lectivo), according to the start and end dates regulated in ordinal 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the eventual service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In accordance with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as a surcharge, therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those surcharges that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is intended in this case. There is extensive case law from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that function surcharges (in this case for alternate schedule (horario alterno)) cannot be considered an acquired right of the public servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It should be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the worker's performance that can be categorized as a function surcharge does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned that obliges the Administration to keep him or her in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges - because they address the need to provide the service at a specific time - is temporary in nature and is paid for a quantity of specific tasks, and, logically, its value must be determined by the respondent authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes of September fifth, two thousand three and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes of May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the surcharge constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit that depends on the fact of whether or not the functions are exercised, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that this item continues to be paid to him or her, or so that the surcharge or alternate schedule is maintained for him or her" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which a surcharge was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such a benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met (judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “The same must be said regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited surcharge constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit, which depends on the fact of whether or not the functions are exercised, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that this item continues to be paid to him or her, or so that the indicated surcharge is maintained for him or her, so that the recourse, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…”. Finally, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that surcharges that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a surcharge was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such a benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met.” Pursuant to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for surcharges constitute temporary surcharges, annexed to the salary structure, that although they form part of the final remuneration that the official receives, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on her meeting the prerequisites established in the legal system for its concession and on the needs that arise in each school period. It should be noted that the payment of these surcharges proceeds by reason of the position and the functions performed by the public servant, so it can be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Based on the legal norms cited, the case law mentioned, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remunerations when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as the one at hand (a person reassigned to an administrative position), as there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obliging the State to pay a remuneration for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are exercising functions by surcharge of some type, as they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same surcharge, when it has been necessary for it to be assumed by the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons. As stated before, the Preschool Education (Educación Preescolar) surcharge, as occurs in the case under study, does not constitute an acquired right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it should be kept in mind that in order to demand payment of the surcharge, it is necessarily required that a norm authorize it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and that the conditions and prerequisites established by it are met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the surcharge in question, upon the plaintiff moving from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law. ON COSTS (COSTAS): Although the regulations on costs establish, as a general rule, the condemnation for those expenses to the losing party, the undersigned author of this dissenting vote considers that, in the specific case, there should be acquittal of costs. While it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right she claims, it is observed that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she has the right to maintain the payment of the Preschool Education surcharge during her reassignment to administrative tasks, and the undersigned has reconsidered the issue of the correct interpretation of the norms governing surcharges for any reason (such as that of Preschool Education) in relation to the ordinarily contracted academic load. This exoneration is ordered in application of Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). FINAL PROVISIONS: As a corollary of the foregoing, I revoke the appealed judgment and declare the lawsuit without merit, resolving without special condemnation for costs.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

In what was the subject of grievance, the appealed judgment is confirmed. Magistrate Varela Araya issues a dissenting vote. Revokes the appealed judgment, declares the lawsuit without merit, and resolves the matter without special condemnation for costs.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Héctor Luis Blanco González Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Res: 2018-001763 1 2.- The State representative responded in the terms indicated in the brief dated November twentieth, two thousand fifteen, and raised the defense of lack of right.

3.- The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at ten hours twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand sixteen, ordered: "Pursuant to the foregoing, cited laws, and case law invoked, Articles 492 and following of the Labor Code, the ordinary labor claim filed by [Name1], identity card CED1, against THE STATE, represented by the Deputy Procurator, MSc. Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, bearer of identity card number CED2, is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The State is ordered to restore the payment of the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) calculated on the base salary for the Preschool surcharge (recargo de Preescolar) that the plaintiff was receiving at the time of being reassigned (reubicada) for health reasons, recognizing it from February 1, 2014, and for as long as her reassigned status is maintained; plus the resulting differences in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, and school salary (salario escolar) for the amounts owed. All these items shall be liquidated at the administrative level, and only in the event of disagreement by any party, will they be addressed in the judgment enforcement stage; as the necessary evidence for such quantification is not available. The defense of lack of right is rejected for what has been granted and is accepted for the items of annual raises, incentive for extension of the school year (incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo), didactic incentive (incentivo didáctico), and professional career (carrera profesional). Likewise, the State is ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding, setting personal costs at twenty percent of the total condemnation, and to pay the corresponding interest on the sums granted in this judgment, from the time they should have been paid until their effective payment, according to the rate established by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for deposits in colones at six-month terms..." (Sic).

4.- The defendant party appealed, and the Labor Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, by judgment at seven hours forty-five minutes on September fourth, two thousand seventeen, resolved: "In accordance with the foregoing, no procedural defects capable of causing nullity or defenselessness to the parties are noted. Regarding the matters appealed, the first-instance judgment is CONFIRMED.-" (Sic).

5.- The State representation filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief received on October eleventh, two thousand seventeen, which is based on the reasons that will be stated in the recitals section.

6.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge Aguirre Gómez; and, RECITALS:

I.- BACKGROUND: By means of a claim brief, the plaintiff stated that she is a tenured official as a Preschool teacher for the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) at the Filadelfo Salas Céspedes educational center, in Cartago, but since 2013 she has been performing administrative duties due to health problems, according to a request made to the Personnel Director of the Ministry of Public Education. She stated that while she held the position of Preschool teacher, she worked with the Preschool Education Surcharge (Recargo de Educación Preescolar) for which she was paid a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) of 50% of her base salary, and upon being reassigned (reubicada), that payment was deducted, which is why salary differences have been accruing since that date. Consequently, she requested that the payment equivalent to the Preschool Education surcharge be restored for as long as she maintains her disability or health reassignment status; payment of the owed differences for the Preschool Education surcharge from January 2014 until their effective payment, as well as the proportional items of Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, annual raises, incentive for extension of the school year (incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo), didactic incentive (incentivo didáctico), professional career (carrera profesional), and school salary (salario escolar); payment of interest and personal and procedural costs (brief incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 07/27/2015 at 11:33:42). The State representative responded in the negative and raised the defense of lack of right. She requested that the claim be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding, as well as the respective interest. If the decision is otherwise, she requests that the defendant be exempted from paying costs for having litigated in good faith (brief incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 11/20/2015 at 15:32:25). The first-instance judge partially granted the claim. She ordered the payment of the supplementary salary calculated on the base salary for the Preschool surcharge, recognized from February 1, 2014, and for as long as her reassigned status is maintained, plus the resulting differences in the Christmas bonus, vacations, and school salary, and their respective interest. Finally, she ordered the defendant to pay both costs of the proceeding, setting personal costs at 20% of the total condemnation (judgment incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 10/07/2016 at 11:47:01). The dissatisfied State representation appealed the decision (brief incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 10/12/2016 at 15:30:13); and the Tribunal confirmed the appealed ruling (judgment incorporated into the Chamber's virtual file on 09/05/2017 at 15:02:34).

II.- GRIEVANCES: The State representative expresses disagreement with the order to restore the preschool surcharge and the recognition of salary differences from February 1, 2014, until their effective payment and for as long as the plaintiff maintains her reassigned status, plus payment for differences in the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), school salary (salario escolar), and costs of the proceeding. She alleges that for the 2013 school year, the plaintiff was assigned a temporary Preschool Education surcharge equivalent to 50% of the base salary, which expired on January 31, 2014. She alleges that on May 20, 2013, the plaintiff requested reassignment to administrative duties, which took place on June 17 of the same year, with an 8-hour workday. For the 2014 school year, she was notified of the extension of her reassignment, but her workday was reduced to 4 hours and 10 minutes, as the surcharge was not taken into account because it was assigned temporarily only for the 2013 school year, a situation which also continues during 2015. She highlights that for a large part of the 2013 school year, the surcharge payment was maintained while it was in effect. She points out that it is illogical for that surcharge to be recognized when it is known in advance that she will not effectively perform the personal provision of the service. She considers that there is an incorrect basis and application of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil). She points out that in compliance with the principle of legality, the recognition of the surcharge for duties of Ministry of Public Education employees is regulated in Article 118, subsection j) of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and section 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) (Decree number 12915-E-P of September 21, 1981) and does not have a permanent or indefinite character to be recognized throughout the entire employment relationship, much less when the teacher is not performing the surcharge duties because she is assigned to administrative duties. She objects that, based on canon 174 of the Civil Service Statute, it was considered that the plaintiff is on sick leave, and therefore, the surcharges earned in teaching duties should not be maintained while she performs other duties of an administrative nature, given the reassignment agreed in her favor. She points out that the plaintiff was reassigned for health reasons, as provided in numerals 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and 22 bis, subsection a), of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento al Estatuto del Servicio Civil), but that does not mean she is on sick leave, or has a special or permanent leave, so Article 174 of said Statute is not applicable. She transcribes numeral 13 of the cited Procedures Manual, as well as 118 of the Education Code. Likewise, in support of her thesis, she invokes the opinion of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Public Education regarding the temporary nature of surcharges, meaning they cannot be conceived as an acquired right. Furthermore, she states that Articles 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute were interpreted and applied incorrectly, because the plaintiff is not on sick leave and is also not enjoying maternity leave, as she is only reassigned for health reasons. She indicates that the purpose of sick leave is for the person to recover their health and return to their usual duties, while reassignment seeks for the person to perform other functions so that their health condition does not worsen. She insists that the circumstances of those rules are not present. She adds that the plaintiff has received all the fixed components of her salary while she has been reassigned. She indicates that the Special Leaves Regulations (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales) are based on canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute, which was repealed, and therefore does not support the plaintiff's claim. She states that the decision affects public funds and educational programs, since it orders the continued payment of supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) for teaching duties that are not being performed. She accuses a violation of Articles 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), while also ignoring the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber on the subject. Regarding the first norm, it is deduced that surcharges are exceptional and temporary in nature, in order to satisfy the public interest and guarantee the continuity and efficiency of the service. She insists that said surcharges do not constitute an acquired right. She states that the second norm criminalizes the granting of improper salary benefits. She stresses the temporary nature of surcharges, which are only maintained if the facts that gave rise to them subsist. She points out that this same thesis was upheld by the Alajuela Tribunal, Third Section, based in San Ramón, a jurisdictional body that considered that duty surcharges do not have an indefinite nature. She transcribes the opinion of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal on the temporary nature of surcharges and the obligation to work them in order for them to be paid. In conclusion, she requests that the judgment be revoked and the claim be declared without merit in all its items.

III.- ON THE SURCHARGE: Through official letter DRH-8112-2013-DIR of the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education (image 153 of the complete file in the Court's virtual desktop), it has been duly accredited that the plaintiff was reassigned to an administrative position as of June 17, 2013, based on a medical recommendation under Article 254 of the Labor Code, which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate workers who have suffered a risk and can work to their position. It also provides for the employer's duty to provide a different position according to their possibilities, when based on a medical recommendation the worker cannot return to perform the functions they had been performing, but is still capable of carrying out other tasks. Similarly, the evidence is clear that at the time of her reassignment, she was earning a salary bonus, corresponding to a Preschool Education surcharge. This supplementary salary (sobresueldo) continued to be paid to her, despite the reassignment, until January 31, 2014. This benefit was suspended as of the following February 1, according to personnel action number 10922593 from the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Public Education, and official letter number DRH-PRH-UL-13641-2015 dated November 5, 2015, from the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP (images 63-67 of the complete file in the Court's virtual desktop). The appellant maintains that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality; for this reason, it can only proceed according to what is duly authorized by the legal system, which is correct (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration). Articles 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel specifically establish the possibility of agreeing to certain surcharges. It is also true that the related supplementary salaries do not constitute an acquired right and that payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their regular duties, ceases to be in the factual conditions required for their recognition. However, this matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their duties, ceases to be in the conditions that make the surcharge viable, but rather a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to perform their regular duties. Therefore, it is not seen that the decision is in violation of the cited Articles 118 and 13. The appellant maintains that numerals 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute were improperly applied, since these rules presuppose the existence of a sick leave or a special leave, which did not occur in this matter, because there is only a reassignment for health reasons. Regarding this argument, it must be stated that this Chamber has heard and resolved repeated matters of the same characteristics, and finds no circumstance that would make it possible to vary the sustained criterion. As was explained in the preceding instance, it has been deemed that in cases of this nature, Executive Decree number 19113, of July 28, 1989, which is the Special Leaves Regulations for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento Licencias Especiales Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública), is applicable. Nor can it be considered, as alleged, that this regulation was left without basis after canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute was repealed, because this was not the only rule that supported it. In the first canon of that regulation, it is established that it provides the rules and procedures that the cited Ministry must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to a decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from a work-related risk or an illness. The second article reaffirms that the leaves contemplated by the regulation will be granted to those who suffer a decrease in their faculties and who, because of this, cannot perform the functions and duties of the position they had been performing. In accordance with the provisions of numerals 5 and 8, employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros declare a minor permanent or partial permanent disability and recommend a change of duties are entitled to a special leave. Now then, canon 9 stipulates that before granting the leave, the Ministry will proceed to reassign the employee, which is ratified in the following rules, according to which "...this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purpose of assigning duties and functions compatible with their personal conditions, medical recommendations, and academic background of the beneficiary, which are required on a temporary basis" and that "...the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that was enjoying a special leave for attending administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical tasks and functions, in any of its offices when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs," which corresponds absolutely with Article 254 of the Labor Code. Then, Article 17 expressly stipulates that "Beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter." In this way, it has been considered that this regulation rather complements Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which does not make any distinction between permanent or partial disabilities, and therefore it is also not appropriate to make a distinction for payment purposes between permanent and special leaves. Consequently, if at the time of her reassignment the plaintiff was earning a supplementary salary for Preschool Education, her right, according to that special regulation, to have that bonus included within her remuneration as an administrative employee is indisputable. In the aforementioned sense, in judgment number 308 of this Chamber, at 10:30 hours on March 26, 2014, the following was explained: "In the defendant's opinion, the supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) known as alternate schedule (horario alterno) and technical advisory committee (comité técnico asesor) are conceived only for those who perform teaching duties, when enrollment needs require it; and depending on the academic credentials of the official, so the plaintiff does not have the right to payment of these bonuses if her position is now one of an administrative nature. However, it must be clear that in this case we are not dealing with a claim made by an official from the administrative sector of the Ministry of Public Education for the recognition of the bonuses as an integral and indissoluble part of their salary. The situation under study differs from that assumption because here it is about defining the correspondence of that right to a teaching official who, for health reasons, had to be reassigned to an administrative position. The difference that the State representation attempts to assert between 'sick leave (incapacidad)' and 'reassignment (reubicación)' ignores that the origin of both is an illness of the official that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service. It is for this reason that the applicable regulations in cases like this are not only those related to the right to recognition of the alternate schedule, but those specifically provided for this purpose. First-hand, the Special Leaves Regulations Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose Article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to a decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from work-related risks or illness. Meanwhile, numeral 2 establishes: 'The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the decrease suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and duties corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees.' (The highlighting is added). Then, in accordance with Article 5, those employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of duties, are entitled to be granted a special leave. Article 8 specifically addresses the supposition of granting the special leave in the following terms: 'In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: a) That according to their ailment, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social recommends a change of duties in the final treatment assessment. b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work-related accident that occurred, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros determines a minor permanent or partial permanent disability and recommends their return to service with a change of duties' (emphasis added). Subsequently, Articles 9 and 10, in order, establish: 'Prior to the granting of the leave and in accordance with the availability of positions and the requirements of the interested party, the Ministry of Public Education will proceed to their reassignment (reubicación), transfer, or promotion, as appropriate.' And, 'When the application of the provisions of the previous article is not feasible immediately, the special leave shall be granted until the corresponding personnel movement can be made.'" Furthermore, paragraph 12 states: "Likewise, the Ministry of Public Education may make use of human resources that are on special leave to attend to administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical tasks and functions in any of its units when such services are required for the proper functioning of institutions or to implement special programs." Finally, Article 17 provides: "Beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall receive a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter" (emphasis supplied). Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: "a) If the employee, at the time of becoming incapacitated due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for a zone bonus (zonaje), an alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive corresponding salary increases. c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items that may apply." (The highlighted text was added). The regulatory framework develops this express provision, indiscriminately contemplating the right to compensation both in the case of permanent leave and special leave. (The highlights appear in the original). Nor is the appellant correct in asserting that the supplementary payment (recargo) was not worked, as this was due to the need to reassign the employee to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. In this case, the right to the benefit does not derive from the performance of duties but from the application of the regulation that expressly grants the benefit by reason of her health condition. The regulation provides for the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, "a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary." Hence, it cannot be concluded, as is claimed, that the nature of the supplementary payment was distorted or that public funds were unjustifiably affected, since the existing rules are what establish these legal consequences. For the foregoing reasons, it is also not true that Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) or Article 56 of the Law against Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) were violated. The former refers to the possibility of exceeding the limit of forty weekly lessons when the service so requires, with the excess being maintained as a temporary supplementary payment (recargo). Said provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is intended for the effective performance of teaching duties, not for cases of employees on sick leave or other leave. The other provision could not have been violated, as it refers to the criminalization of granting improper supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), which is not the scenario under discussion. Finally, it should be noted that the opinions of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Public Education and the decisions of other jurisdictional bodies on this matter are not binding on this Chamber.

Furthermore, the decision reached is not contrary to the Constitutional Court’s criterion that surcharges (recargos) are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active employee in functions that may or may not require the surcharge, but rather the issue is confined to establishing the remuneration that must be received by an employee who has been unable to continue performing their normal duties or the surcharges they had been undertaking, due to a medical condition.

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**IV.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the foregoing explanation and regarding the matter that was the subject of the appeal, the proper course is to uphold the contested ruling.

**V.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA:** The undersigned departs from the majority opinion insofar as it grants the plaintiff payment of the additional salary (sobresueldo) for the Preschool Education surcharge (recargo de Educación Preescolar) starting from February 1, 2014, and for as long as she remains in reassigned (reubicada) status.

It has been duly proven that, in 2013, the plaintiff was earning that additional pay (recargo) and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties as of June 17, 2013; for this reason, that supplementary salary (sobresueldo) was no longer paid to her (proven facts 2, 3, and 4 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as is evident from official communication number DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible at image 153, respectively, of the complete view of the trial court's electronic case file, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, grounded in Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability (incapacidad) proper. Before this Chamber, it is argued that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública), and that the employee does not fall within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), since she is not disabled by illness as established, which would make her eligible for what is sought. After a re-examination of the analysis regarding the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct. Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional pay (recargos), which do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) and, consequently, payment of these must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their regular duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that:

*“a) If the employee,* ***at the time of being disabled by illness or maternity***, *is earning additional salary for location pay (zonaje), for "alternate schedule" (horario alterno), or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo),* ***they shall be entitled to a subsidy*** *equivalent to the* *total salary* *that they were earning at that time. /b) Licenses for illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may apply. / (The preceding subsection added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)”* (emphasis added).

From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that the employee who is disabled by illness, or the female employee on maternity leave, who had been earning additional salary due to supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case before us, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative duties and is neither disabled nor enjoying that leave; therefore, her situation does not fall under the factual circumstances of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 118, subsection j), of the Education Code and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, cited above, these bonuses (pluses) are granted when the employee performs duties additional to those they ordinarily carry out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) depends on whether circumstances so warrant, and for this reason, they are assigned temporarily, for each academic year, according to the start and end dates regulated in Article 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the occasional service would be distorted and converted into an ordinary one. In line with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that *“the excess shall be maintained as an additional pay (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.”* Consequently, those additional pays (recargos) that depend on some particular condition to be granted are not configured as a vested right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the employee's total salary, permanently and independently of the service they provide, as is intended in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that additional pays for duties (recargos de funciones) (in this case, for alternate schedule, horario alterno) cannot be considered a vested right of the employee. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: *“It should be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that* ***the worker's performance that may be classified as an additional pay for duties (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right for the worker to whom it is assigned that obliges the Administration to maintain them in that condition***. *Generally, the assignment of such additional pays -because it is due to the need for service provision at a given time- has a temporary nature and is paid for a specific quantity of duties, and, logically, its value must be determined by the respondent authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve twenty-eight hours on September five, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen forty-seven hours on May thirty, two thousand six, among others). For this reason,* ***the additional pay (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit that depends on whether or not the duties are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such item continues to be paid, or so that the additional pay or alternate schedule (horario alterno) is maintained for them***” (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Similarly, **in ruling (voto) No. 3306**, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: *“…if the assumptions under which a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006)”*. In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: *“A pronouncement must be made in the same way regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited additional pay (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit, which depends on whether or not the duties are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such item continues to be paid to them, or so that the indicated additional pay is maintained for them, meaning that the appeal, with regard to this last objection, is also unfounded…”*. Finally, **in resolution No. 10959**, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: *“This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a supplementary salary was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met”*. Pursuant to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received as additional pays (recargos) constitute temporary supplementary salaries, annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration that the employee receives, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on whether the employee meets the assumptions established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each academic period. It should be highlighted that the payment of these additional pays (recargos) proceeds by reason of the position and the duties performed by the employee, and therefore can be denied when the original conditions for their granting disappear. Based on the norms brought to bear, the cited jurisprudence, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remuneration when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as those herein (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, forcing the State to pay remuneration for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and exercising duties through some type of additional pay (recargo), since they are not in equal conditions yet earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying double (to two employees) for the same additional pay, when it has been necessary for the person replacing the one who was reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated before, the Pre-School Education additional pay (recargo de Educación Preescolar), as occurs in the case under study, does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to be able to demand payment of the additional pay (recargo), it is necessarily required that a rule authorizes it (principle of legality that governs the public sector) and that the conditions and assumptions established by it are met; which is not the case here.

By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) in question, when the plaintiff moved from the condition of teacher to performing administrative duties due to reassignment, is in accordance with law. **REGARDING COSTS:** Although the regulations on costs establish as a general rule, the condemnation to pay those expenses by the losing party, the undersigned author of this dissenting vote (voto salvado) considers that, in this specific case, the party should be absolved from paying costs. While it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right she claims, it is observed that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she has the right to maintain the payment of the Pre-School Education additional pay (recargo de Educación Preescolar) during her reassignment to administrative duties, and the undersigned has reconsidered the issue of the correct interpretation of the rules governing the additional pay (recargo) for some reason (such as that of Pre-School Education) to the ordinarily contracted academic load. This exoneration is ordered in application of Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). **FINAL PROVISIONS:** As a corollary of the foregoing, I revoke the appealed judgment and declare the lawsuit without merit, resolving without special condemnation as to costs.

**POR TANTO:** In that which was the subject of grievance, the appealed judgment is confirmed. Magistrate Varela Araya issues a dissenting vote. She revokes the appealed judgment, declares the lawsuit without merit, and resolves the matter without special condemnation as to costs.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Julia Varela Araya** **Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Héctor Luis Blanco González** **Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga** Res: 2018-001763 1 III.- REGARDING THE SUPPLEMENTARY PAY: With official communication DRH-8112-2013-DIR from the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education (image 153 of the complete file available in the court's virtual desktop), it has been duly accredited that the plaintiff was reassigned to an administrative position as of June 17, 2013, based on a medical recommendation pursuant to Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate to their position workers who have suffered a risk and are able to work. It also provides for the employer's duty to provide a different position, according to its possibilities, when by medical recommendation the worker cannot return to perform the functions they had been carrying out, but is capable of performing other tasks. Likewise, the evidence is clear that at the time of reassignment, she was earning a salary supplement (plus salarial), corresponding to a supplementary pay (recargo) for Preschool Education. This additional pay (sobresueldo) continued to be paid to her, despite the reassignment, until January 31, 2014. This benefit was suspended as of the following February 1, according to personnel action number 10922593 from the General Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Public Education, and official communication number DRH-PRH-UL-13641-2015 dated November 5, 2015, from the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP (images 63-67 of the complete file available in the court's virtual desktop). The appellant argues that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized by the legal system, which is accurate (articles 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)). Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel precisely establish the possibility of agreeing to certain supplementary pays (recargos). It is also true that the related additional pays (sobresueldos) do not constitute an acquired right and that payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their usual functions, ceases to meet the factual conditions established for their recognition. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their functions, ceases to meet the conditions that make the supplementary pay viable, but rather a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to perform their normal tasks. It is therefore not observed that the decision made is a violation of articles 118 and 13 cited above. The appellant argues that numerals 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) were improperly applied, since said rules presuppose the existence of a disability or a special leave (licencia especial) which did not occur in this matter, because there is only a reassignment for health reasons. In relation to that argument, it must be noted that this Chamber has heard and resolved repeated matters of the same characteristics, without observing any circumstance that would make it possible to vary the criterion held. As was explained in the prior instance, it has been considered that in cases of this nature, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 19113, of July 28, 1989, which is the Regulation for Special Leaves for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento Licencias Especiales Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública), is applicable, and it cannot be considered, as alleged, that this regulation was left without support due to the repeal of canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute, since this was not the only rule that supported it. The first canon of that regulation establishes the rules and procedures that the cited Ministry must follow to grant leave (licencia) to its employees, due to a decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from a workplace risk or an illness. The second article reaffirms that the leaves (licencias) contemplated in the regulation will be granted to those who suffer a decrease in their faculties and who, for that reason, cannot perform the functions and duties of the position they had been holding. In accordance with the provisions of numerals 5 and 8, employees to whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) declare a minor or partial permanent disability and recommend a change of functions are entitled to a special leave (licencia especial). Now then, canon 9 stipulates that prior to the grant of the leave (licencia), the Ministry will proceed with the reassignment of the employee, which is ratified in the following rules, according to which “…this special leave (licencia especial) may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purposes of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, with the medical recommendations and the academic background of the beneficiary, that are required on a temporary basis” and that “…the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that is enjoying a special leave (licencia especial) for the attention of tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs”, which is in absolute correspondence with Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Subsequently, Article 17 expressly stipulates that “The beneficiaries of the leaves (licencias) provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación) on the matter”. In this way, it has been considered that this regulation rather complements Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), which does not make any distinction between permanent or partial disabilities, and hence, it is also inappropriate to differentiate, for payment purposes, between permanent and special leaves (licencias). Consequently, if at the time of reassignment the plaintiff was earning additional pay (sobresueldo) for Preschool Education, the right she has, in accordance with that special regulation, for that supplement to be included in her remuneration as an administrative employee is indisputable. In the expressed sense, in judgment of this Chamber number 308, dated 10:30 a.m. on March 26, 2014, the following was explained: “In the defendant's judgment, the additional pays (sobresueldos) known as alternating schedule (horario alterno) and technical advisory committee (comité técnico asesor) are designed only for those who perform teaching functions, when enrollment needs require it; and depending on the academic credentials of the employee, so the plaintiff is not entitled to the payment of those supplements if her position is now of an administrative nature. However, it must be clear that in this case we are not facing a claim made by an employee from the administrative sector of the Ministry of Public Education for the recognition of supplements as an integral and indissoluble part of their salary. The situation under study differs from that scenario because here it is a matter of defining the correspondence of that right to a teaching employee who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative post. The distinction that the state representation seeks to assert between 'disability' and 'reassignment' ignores the fact that the origin of both is an illness of the employee that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service. It is for this reason that the applicable regulations in cases like this are not solely those related to the right to the recognition of alternating schedule (horario alterno), but those specifically provided for the purpose. Firsthand, the Regulation for Special Leaves of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 19113 dated July 28, 1989), whose article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave (licencia) to its employees, due to the decrease of their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from workplace risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: 'The leaves (licencias) referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the decrease suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or to the service, the functions and duties corresponding to the position they had been holding as regular employees.' (The highlighting is added). Then, in accordance with article 5, those employees regarding whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions, are entitled to be granted a special leave (licencia especial). Article 8 specifically addresses the assumption of granting the special leave (licencia especial) in the following terms: 'In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave (licencia especial) to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) recommends, in the final assessment of the treatment, a change of functions. b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the workplace risk that occurred, the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their incorporation into service with a change of functions' (emphasis supplied). Subsequently, articles 9 and 10, in order, establish: 'Prior to the grant of the leave (licencia) and according to the availability of positions and the requirements of the interested party, the Ministry of Public Education shall proceed with their reassignment, transfer, or promotion, as appropriate.' And, 'When the application of the provisions of the previous article is viable immediately, the special leave (licencia especial) shall be granted until the corresponding personnel movement can be carried out.' Furthermore, numeral 12 states: 'Likewise, the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resource that is enjoying a special leave (licencia especial) for the attention of tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs.' Finally, article 17 says: 'The beneficiaries of the leaves (licencias) provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación) on the matter' (emphasis supplied). Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), which reads: 'a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zone pay, alternating schedule, or any additional pay (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. b) Leaves (licencias) for illness, regardless of their duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive corresponding salary increases. c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aid referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other points, that may correspond.' (The highlighting is added). The regulatory norm develops this express provision, contemplating indistinctly the right to compensation for the case of both permanent and special leave (licencia).” (The emphasized parts appear in the original). The appellant is also not correct in arguing that the supplementary pay (recargo) was not worked, as this was due to the need to reassign the employee to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. In this case, the right to the benefit does not derive from the exercise of the functions but from the application of the regulation that expressly grants her the benefit, due to her health condition. The regulation contemplates the right to continue receiving, under those circumstances, “a subsidy equivalent to the totality of their salary.” Hence, it cannot be concluded, as intended, that the nature of the supplementary pay (recargo) was distorted or that public funds are unjustifiably affected, since the existing rules are those that establish these legal consequences. For the foregoing, it is also not true that articles 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) or 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) have been violated. The former refers to the possibility that the limit of forty weekly lessons may be exceeded when the service so requires, with the excess being maintained as a supplementary pay (recargo), of a temporary nature. That provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is provided for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of employees who are on disability or leave (incapacidad or licencia). The other rule could not have been violated, as it refers to the penalization for granting improper additional pays (sobresueldos), which is not the case being discussed. Finally, it should be noted that the criteria of the Legal Advisory Department of the Ministry of Public Education nor the decisions of other jurisdictional bodies on the matter are binding on this Chamber.

Consequently, the decision reached is not contrary to the Constitutional Court’s criterion that surcharges (recargos) are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active employee performing duties that do or do not require the surcharge, but rather the issue is limited to establishing the remuneration that an employee who has been unable to continue performing their normal duties or the surcharges they had been exercising, due to a condition, should receive.

In virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the extra pay (sobresueldo) in question, when the plaintiff went from being a teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment (reubicación), is in accordance with the law.

It notes that in compliance with the principle of legality, the recognition of the additional responsibilities allowance (recargo de funciones) for employees of the Ministry of Public Education is regulated in article 118, subsection j) of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and in section 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) (Decree number 12915-E-P of September 21, 1981) and does not have a permanent or indefinite character to be recognized throughout the employment relationship, much less when the teaching staff member is not performing the additional responsibilities because they are placed in administrative functions. It objects that, based on canon 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil), it was considered that the plaintiff is incapacitated by illness, and therefore the additional responsibilities allowances earned in teaching functions should not be maintained while she performs others of an administrative nature, given the reassignment (reubicación) agreed upon in her favor. It points out that the plaintiff was reassigned (reubicada) for health reasons, as provided for in numerals 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and 22 bis, subsection a), of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento al Estatuto del Servicio Civil), but that does not mean she is incapacitated by illness, or that she has a special or permanent leave, and therefore article 174 of that Statute is not applicable. It transcribes section 13 of the cited Procedures Manual, as well as article 118 of the Education Code. Likewise, in support of its thesis, it invokes the opinion of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Public Education regarding the temporary nature of additional responsibilities allowances, meaning they cannot be conceived as a vested right (derecho adquirido). On the other hand, it states that articles 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute were incorrectly interpreted and applied, because the plaintiff is not incapacitated by illness and is also not enjoying maternity leave, since she is only reassigned (reubicada) for health reasons. It indicates that the purpose of incapacity is for the person to recover their health and return to their usual duties, whereas reassignment (reubicación) seeks for the person to perform other functions so that their health condition does not worsen. It insists that the circumstances described in those rules are not present. It adds that the plaintiff has received all fixed salary components while she has been reassigned (reubicada). It indicates that the Special Leaves Regulation (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales) is based on canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute, which was repealed, and therefore it does not support the plaintiff's claim. It states that the decision affects public funds and educational programs, since it orders the continued payment of supplementary wages (sobresueldos) for teaching functions that are not being performed. It accuses the violation of articles 15 of the Public Administration Salaries Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) and 56 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), while disregarding the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on the subject. In relation to the first norm, it is inferred that additional responsibilities allowances (recargos) are of an exceptional and temporary nature, in order to satisfy the public interest and guarantee the continuity and efficiency of the service. It insists that said additional responsibilities allowances do not constitute a vested right. It states that the second norm punishes as a crime the granting of improper salary benefits. It emphasizes the temporary nature of additional responsibilities allowances (recargos), which are only maintained if the facts that gave rise to them subsist. It points out that this same thesis was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Court of Alajuela, Third Section, based in San Ramón, a jurisdictional body that considered that additional responsibilities allowances (recargos de funciones) do not have an indefinite nature. It transcribes the criterion of the Administrative Appeals Court regarding the temporary nature of additional responsibilities allowances and the obligation to work them in order for them to be paid. In conclusion, it requests that the judgment be revoked and the complaint be declared without merit in all its aspects.

**III.- REGARDING THE ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ALLOWANCE (RECARGO):** With official letter DRH-8112-2013-DIR from the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education (image 153 of the complete file found on the Court's virtual desktop), it has been duly accredited that the plaintiff was reassigned (reubicada) to an administrative position as of June 17, 2013, upon medical recommendation based on article 254 of the Labor Code, which establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate to their position workers who have suffered an occupational hazard and can work. It also provides for the employer's duty to provide them with a different position according to their possibilities, when upon medical recommendation they cannot return to perform the functions they had been carrying out, but are capable of performing other tasks. Likewise, the evidence is clear that at the time of the reassignment (reubicación), she was earning a salary bonus, corresponding to a Preschool Education additional responsibilities allowance (recargo de Educación Preescolar). This supplementary wage (sobresueldo) continued to be paid to her, despite the reassignment (reubicación), until January 31, 2014. This benefit was suspended as of the following February 1st, according to personnel action number 10922593 from the General Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Public Education, and official letter number DRH-PRH-UL-13641-2015 of November 5, 2015, from the Human Resources Directorate of the MEP (images 63-67 of the complete file found on the Court's virtual desktop). The appellant maintains that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, which is why it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized by the legal system, which is correct (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration). Articles 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel precisely establish the possibility of agreeing to certain additional responsibilities allowances (recargos). It is also true that the related supplementary wages (sobresueldos) do not constitute a vested right and that payment must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of their usual functions, ceases to be in the factual conditions established for their recognition. However, the present matter does not concern an employee who, in the normal exercise of their functions, ceases to be in the circumstances that make the additional responsibilities allowance (recargo) viable, but rather a person who, for health reasons, is prevented from continuing to perform their normal duties. It is not apparent then that the decision violates the cited articles 118 and 13. The appellant maintains that numerals 167 and 174 of the Civil Service Statute were improperly applied, since those norms presuppose the existence of an incapacity or a special leave which, in this matter, did not occur, given that there is only a reassignment (reubicación) for health reasons. In relation to that argument, it must be indicated that this Chamber has heard and resolved repeated matters of the same characteristics, without noticing any circumstance that makes it possible to vary the position held. As was explained in the preceding instance, it has been considered that in cases of this nature, Executive Decree number 19113, of July 28, 1989, which is the Regulation of Special Leaves for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento Licencias Especiales Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública), is applicable, and it cannot be considered, as alleged, that this was left without support upon the repeal of canon 167 of the Civil Service Statute, since this was not the only norm that supported it. The first canon of that regulation states that it provides the norms and procedures that the cited Ministry must follow to grant leave to employees, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, derived from an occupational hazard or an illness. The second article reaffirms that the leaves contemplated by the regulation will be granted to those who suffer a diminishment in their faculties and who, therefore, cannot perform the functions and attributions of the position they had been performing. In accordance with the provisions in numerals 5 and 8, employees for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund or the National Insurance Institute declare a permanent minor or partial incapacity and recommend a change of functions have the right to a special leave. Now then, canon 9 stipulates that prior to the granting of the leave, the Ministry will proceed with the reassignment (reubicación) of the employee, which is ratified in the following norms, according to which “…this special leave may be suspended, at the discretion of the Minister of Public Education, for the purposes of assigning tasks and functions compatible with their personal conditions, with medical recommendations and the beneficiary's academic training, that are required on a temporary basis” and that “…the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resources that were enjoying special leave for attending to tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs,” which is absolutely consistent with article 254 of the Labor Code. Then, in article 17, it is expressly stipulated that “The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter.” In this way, it has been considered that this regulation rather complements article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which makes no distinction whatsoever between permanent or partial incapacities, and hence it is also not appropriate to differentiate for payment purposes between permanent and special leaves. Consequently, if at the time of the reassignment (reubicación) the plaintiff was earning a supplementary wage (sobresueldo) for Preschool Education, her right is undisputed, in accordance with that special regulation, to have that bonus included within her compensation as an administrative official. In the sense expressed, in judgment number 308 of this Chamber, of 10:30 a.m. on March 26, 2014, the following was explained: “In the opinion of the defendant, supplementary wages known as alternative schedule (horario alterno) and the technical advisory committee are conceived solely for those who perform teaching functions, when enrollment needs require it; and depending on the academic credentials of the official, and therefore the plaintiff does not have the right to the payment of these bonuses if her position is now of an administrative nature. However, it must be clear that in this case we are not faced with a claim made by an official from the administrative sector of the Ministry of Public Education, for the recognition of bonuses as an integral and indissoluble part of their salary. The situation under study differs from that assumption because here it is a matter of defining the correspondence of that right to a teaching official who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned (reubicada) to an administrative position. The difference that the State representation seeks to assert between 'incapacity' and 'reassignment (reubicación)' ignores that the origin of both is an illness of the official that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service. It is for this reason that the applicable regulations in cases like this are not only those related to the right to recognition of alternative schedule (horario alterno), but those specially provided for this purpose. First hand, the Regulation of Special Leaves Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), whose article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the norms and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, arising from occupational hazards or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: 'The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, are unable to perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees.' (The highlighting is added). Then, in accordance with article 5, those employees for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund or the National Insurance Institute, in their final assessment, declare a permanent minor incapacity or a partial or permanent incapacity and recommend a change of functions have the right to be granted a special leave. Article 8 specifically deals with the assumption of granting the special leave in the following terms: 'In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund recommends, in the final assessment of the treatment, their change of functions. b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the occupational hazard that occurred, the National Insurance Institute determines a permanent minor or partial incapacity and recommends their incorporation into the service with a change of functions' (emphasis supplied). Subsequently, articles 9 and 10, in order, establish: 'Prior to the granting of the leave and in accordance with the availability of positions and the requirements of the interested party, the Ministry of Public Education shall proceed with their reassignment (reubicación), transfer, or promotion, as applicable.' And, 'When the application of the provisions of the previous article is feasible immediately, the special leave shall be granted until the corresponding personnel movement can be carried out.' Furthermore, numeral 12 states: 'Likewise, the Ministry of Public Education may make use of the human resources who are enjoying special leave for attending to tasks and functions of an administrative, administrative-teaching, or technical nature, in any of its dependencies when such services are required for the proper functioning of the institutions or to implement special programs.' Finally, article 17 says: 'The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter' (emphasis supplied). Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: 'a) If the employee, at the time of becoming incapacitated for illness or maternity leave, were earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for alternative schedule (horario alterno), or any supplementary wage (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at said moment. b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. c) For all legal effects, both the subsidy and the aid referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond.' (The highlighting is added). The regulatory norm develops this express provision, indistinctly contemplating the right to compensation for both the case of permanent leave and special leave.” (The highlights appear in the original). Nor is the appellant correct in maintaining that the additional responsibilities allowance (recargo) was not worked, as this was due to the need to reassign (reubicar) the employee to functions different from teaching, for health reasons. In this case, the right to the benefit does not derive from the exercise of the functions but from the application of the regulation that expressly grants the benefit, due to her health condition. The regulations contemplate the right to continue receiving, under those circumstances, “a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary.” Hence, it cannot be concluded, as intended, that the nature of the additional responsibilities allowance (recargo) was distorted or that public funds are unjustifiably affected, since the existing norms are those that establish those legal consequences. For the foregoing reasons, it is also not true that articles 15 of the Public Administration Salaries Law nor 56 of the Law against Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) were violated. The first refers to the possibility that the forty-hour weekly limit may be exceeded when the service so requires, with the excess being maintained as an additional responsibilities allowance (recargo), of a temporary nature. This provision does not regulate the situation raised here and is intended for the effective exercise of teaching functions, not for cases of employees enjoying incapacity or leave. The other norm could not have been violated, since it refers to the penalization for the granting of improper supplementary wages, which is not the case under discussion. Finally, it is worth noting that the criteria of the Legal Advisory Office of the Ministry of Public Education nor the decisions of other jurisdictional bodies on the matter are binding on this Chamber.

Therefore, what was decided does not contradict the criterion of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) that surcharges (recargos) are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active public servant in functions that may or may not require the surcharge, but rather the issue is limited to establishing the remuneration that must be received by a public servant who has been unable to continue performing their normal duties nor the surcharges they had been exercising, due to a condition.

IV.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In accordance with what has been explained and in view of the grounds for appeal, the appropriate course is to uphold the contested ruling.

V.- DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATE VARELA ARAYA: The undersigned departs from the majority opinion insofar as it grants the plaintiff the payment of the salary supplement for the Preschool Education surcharge effective February 1, 2014, and for as long as she remains in reassigned status.

It has been duly established that, in 2013, the plaintiff was receiving that additional pay (recargo) and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions as of June 17, 2013; which is why that supplementary salary (sobresueldo) ceased to be paid to her (proven facts 2, 3, and 4 of the first-instance judgment, ratified by the Tribunal). Likewise, as is evident from official communication number DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible at image 153, respectively, of the complete view of the electronic court file of the Juzgado, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, pursuant to Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability (incapacidad) proper.

Before the Chamber, it is argued that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, such that it may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration—Ley General de la Administración Pública), and that the employee does not fall within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulations to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), since she is not disabled by illness as was established, which would make her entitled to what is sought. After reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the rules applicable to the specific case, I conclude that the appellant is correct.

Articles 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Staff (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional pays (recargos), which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the employee, in the performance of their usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: “a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled by illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location-based supplement (zonaje), for "alternate schedule" (horario alterno), or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. /b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive corresponding salary increases. (As amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other matters, that may apply. / (The preceding subsection was thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it is inferred, in a clear and express manner, that an employee who is disabled by illness, or an employee on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary through supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), has the right for these to be considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave; therefore, her situation does not fall under the factual circumstances of the rule.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, previously cited, these bonuses are granted when the employee performs additional functions to those ordinarily carried out in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) depends on whether the circumstances warrant it, and for this reason, they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in Article 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and become an ordinary one.

Consistent with the foregoing, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as an additional pay (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those additional pays (recargos) that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not become an acquired right that is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and independently of the service they provide, as is claimed in this case. There is ample jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that additional pays for functions (recargos de funciones) (in this case, for alternate schedule—horario alterno) cannot be considered an acquired right of the employee. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, at 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that an employee's performance that may be classified as an additional pay for functions (recargo de funciones) does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, obliging the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such additional pays (recargos)—since they arise from the need to provide service at a given moment—is temporary in nature and is paid for a specific set of tasks, and logically, its value must be determined by the respondent authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 at twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September 5, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May 30, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the additional pay (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are actually performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of establishing a subjective right in favor of the interested party for such item to continue being paid, or for them to keep the additional pay (recargo) or alternate schedule (horario alterno)” (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 at 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 at 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013).

Similarly, in vote No. 3306, at 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met (judgment No. 2006-010959 at 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, at 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “The same must be pronounced regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to cease receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited additional pay (recargo) constitutes a 'plus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are actually performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of establishing a subjective right in favor of the interested party, for such item to continue being paid, or for the indicated additional pay (recargo) to be maintained, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…”. Finally, in resolution No. 10959, at 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions under which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a supplementary salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met.” In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received as additional pays (recargos) constitute temporary supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantial component but an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the conditions set forth in the legal system for their granting and on the needs that arise in each school period. It should be noted that the payment of these additional pays (recargos) is appropriate based on the position and the functions performed by the employee, and therefore, it may be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear.

Based on the rules brought to bear, the cited jurisprudence, and the principles of the primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, I consider that the State's representation is correct when it states that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remuneration when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as those in the case at hand (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to pay for a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, compelling the State to pay remuneration for a counterpart service that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to this, it would give an undue advantage to reassigned persons compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing functions through an additional pay (recargo) of some type, since they are not in equal conditions yet earn the same. Besides, the State would be paying double (to two employees) for the same additional pay (recargo), when it has been necessary for the person replacing the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated earlier, the additional pay for Preschool Education (Educación Preescolar), as is the case in the study, does not constitute an acquired right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching staff. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to demand payment of the additional pay (recargo), it is necessarily required that a rule authorizes it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and that the conditions and requirements established by it be met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the supplementary salary (sobresueldo) in question, when the plaintiff moved from the status of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law.

**ON COSTS (SOBRE LAS COSTAS):** Although the rules on costs establish, as a general rule, that the losing party must be ordered to pay those expenses, the undersigned author of this dissenting vote (voto salvado) considers that, in the specific case, an acquittal in costs is warranted. While it has been demonstrated that the right claimed by the plaintiff does not correspond to her, it is observed that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she had the right to maintain the payment of the Preschool Education (Educación Preescolar) additional pay (recargo) during her reassignment to administrative tasks, and the undersigned has reconsidered the matter of the correct interpretation of the rules governing the additional pay (recargo) for any reason (such as Preschool Education) on the ordinarily contracted academic load. This exoneration is ordered in application of Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil).

**FINAL PROVISIONS (DISPOSICIONES FINALES):** As a corollary of the foregoing, I revoke the appealed judgment and dismiss the claim, resolving without special order as to costs.

**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** Regarding what was the subject of the appeal, the appealed judgment is confirmed. Magistrate Varela Araya issues a dissenting vote (salva el voto). She revokes the appealed judgment, dismisses the claim, and resolves the matter without special order as to costs.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Julia Varela Araya** **Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Héctor Luis Blanco González** **Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga** **Res: 2018-001763** **DRM/RPC** 1 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2234-71-41. Electronic Mail: [...]. y mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr

Revisión del Documento *150010200166LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2018-001763 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas veinticinco minutos del veintiséis de octubre de dos mil dieciocho.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre1] , educadora, divorciada y vecina de Puntarenas, contra el ESTADO (MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN PÚBLICA), representado por su Procuradora Adjunta, la licenciada Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, casada, vecina de Alajuela. Figura como apoderado especial judicial de la actora, el licenciado Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, soltero y vecino de San José. Todos mayores y abogados, con la excepción indicada.

RESULTANDO:

1.- El apoderado especial judicial de la actora, en escrito de demanda presentado el veintisiete de julio de dos mil quince, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condene al demandado, en favor de su poderdante, a la restitución del pago por recargo de Educación Preescolar, diferencias en vacaciones, aguinaldo, salario escolar, aumentos anuales, incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo, incentivo didáctico, carrera profesional, intereses y ambas costas del proceso.

2.- La representante del Estado contestó en los términos indicados en el memorial de fecha veinte de noviembre de dos mil quince y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho.

3.- El Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por sentencia de las diez horas veinticinco minutos del tres de octubre de dos mil dieciséis, dispuso: "En mérito de lo expuesto, citas de ley, jurisprudenciales invocadas, artículos 492 y siguientes del Código de Trabajo, se declara CON LUGAR PARCIALMENTE la demanda ordinaria laboral promovida por [Nombre1] cédula CED1, contra EL ESTADO, representado por la Procuradora Adjunta, la MSc. Angie Lucía Azofeifa Rojas, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED2. Se ordena al Estado restituir el pago del sobresueldo calculado sobre el salario base por concepto de recargo de Preescolar que percibía la actora al momento de ser reubicada por problemas de salud, reconocerlo desde el 01 de febrero de 2014 y hasta que se mantenga la condición de reubicada; más las diferencias resultantes en el aguinaldo vacaciones y salario escolar por las diferencias adeudadas. Todos estos extremos se liquidarán en sede administrativa, y sólo en caso de disconformidad de alguna parte, se conocerá en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia; por cuanto no se cuenta con las probanzas necesarias para dicha cuantificación. Se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho para lo otorgado y se acoge para los extremos de aumentos anuales, incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo, incentivo didáctico, carrera profesional. Asimismo, se condena al Estado al pago de ambas costas del proceso, fijándose las personales en el veinte por ciento de la total condenatoria y a pagar los intereses correspondientes a las sumas otorgada en esta sentencia, desde que se tenía que cancelar y hasta su efectivo pago, según el porcentaje establecido por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica para los depósitos en colones a seis meses plazo...". (Sic).

4.- La parte demandada apeló, y el Tribunal de Apelación de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, por sentencia de las siete horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del cuatro de setiembre del dos mil diecisiete, resolvió: "De conformidad con lo expuesto, no se nota en los procedimientos vicios capaces de producir nulidad o indefensión a las partes. En lo que ha sido motivo de apelación SE CONFIRMA la sentencia de primera instancia.-". (Sic).

5.- La representación estatal formuló recurso para ante esta Sala en memorial recibido el once de octubre de dos mil diecisiete, el cual se fundamenta en las razones que se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Aguirre Gómez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.-ANTECEDENTES: Mediante escrito de demanda, la actora manifestó que es funcionaria en propiedad como profesora de Preescolar del Ministerio de Educación Pública en el centro educativo Filadelfo Salas Céspedes, en Cartago, pero desde el año 2013 se encuentra cumpliendo funciones administrativas debido a problemas de salud, según solicitud efectuada al Director de Personal del Ministerio de Educación Pública. Refirió que mientras ocupaba el puesto de docente de Preescolar laboraba con Recargo de Educación Preescolar por el cual se le pagaba un sobresueldo del 50% de su salario base, y a la hora de ser reubicada se le rebajó ese pago, por lo que desde esa fecha se han ido generando diferencias salariales a la fecha. En consecuencia, solicitó se le restituya el pago equivalente al recargo de Educación Preescolar mientras se mantenga en la condición de incapacidad o de reubicación por salud; el pago de las diferencias adeudadas por concepto de recargo de Educación Preescolar desde enero del año 2014 y hasta su efectivo pago, así como los extremos proporcionales de aguinaldo, vacaciones, aumentos anuales, incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo, incentivo didáctico, carrera profesional y salario escolar; el pago de los intereses y de las costas personales y procesales (escrito incorporado en el expediente virtual de la Sala el 27/07/2015 a las 11:33:42 horas). La representante estatal contestó de forma negativa e interpuso la excepción de falta de derecho. Solicitó se declare sin lugar la demanda y se condene a la accionante al pago de ambas costas del proceso, así como de los intereses respectivos. De resolverse lo contrario, pide se exima al demandado del pago de costas por haber litigado con buena fe (escrito incorporado en el expediente virtual de la Sala el 20/11/2015 a las 15:32:25 horas). La jueza de primera instancia declaró con lugar parcialmente la demanda. Ordenó el pago del sobresueldo calculado sobre el salario base por concepto de recargo de Preescolar, reconocido desde el 01 de febrero del año 2014 y hasta que se mantenga la condición de reubicada, más las diferencias resultantes en el aguinaldo, vacaciones y salario escolar, y sus respectivos intereses. Por último, condenó al accionado al pago de ambas costas del proceso, fijando las personales en el 20% del total de la condenatoria (sentencia incorporada en el expediente virtual de la Sala el 07/10/2016 a las 11:47:01 horas). La representación estatal inconforme apeló lo resuelto (escrito incorporado en el expediente virtual de la Sala el 12/10/2016 a las 15:30:13 horas); y el Tribunal confirmó el fallo apelado (sentencia incorporada en el expediente virtual de la Sala el 05/09/2017 a las 15:02:34 horas).

II.-AGRAVIOS: La representante del Estado muestra disconformidad con la condena a restituir el recargo de preescolar y reconocimiento de diferencias salariales desde el 01 de febrero de 2014 hasta su efectivo pago y mientras la accionante mantenga su condición de reubicada, más el pago por diferencias en el aguinaldo, el salario escolar y las costas del proceso. Alega que a la actora se le asignó para el curso lectivo 2013 un recargo temporal de Educación Preescolar equivalente al 50% del salario base, el cual vencía el 31 de enero del año 2014. Alega que el 20 de mayo del año 2013 la accionante solicitó reubicación en funciones administrativas, lo cual se llevó a cabo el 17 de junio del mismo año, con una jornada de 8 horas diarias. Para el curso lectivo del año 2014 se le comunica la prórroga de su reubicación, pero se reduce su jornada a 4 horas y 10 minutos, toda vez que no se toma en cuenta el recargo en virtud de que el mismo fue asignado de manera temporal solamente para el curso lectivo del año 2013, lo cual se mantiene también durante el año 2015. Resalta que durante gran parte del curso lectivo 2013 se le mantuvo el pago del recargo mientras éste estuvo vigente. Apunta que resulta ilógico que ese recargo se le reconozca cuando de antemano se sabe que no realizará de manera efectiva la prestación personal del servicio. Considera que existe una incorrecta fundamentación y aplicación del artículo 174 del estatuto del Servicio Civil. Señala que en cumplimiento del principio de legalidad, el reconocimiento del recargo de funciones de los servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública está regulado en el artículo 118, inciso j) del Código de Educación y el ordinal 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente (Decreto número 12915-E-P del 21 de setiembre de 1981) y no tiene carácter permanente o indefinido para que se reconozca durante toda la relación laboral y mucho menos cuando la persona docente no realiza las funciones de recargo por estar ubicada en funciones administrativas. Objeta que con base en el canon 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, se haya considerado que la actora está incapacitada por enfermedad, por lo que no deben mantenérsele los recargos laborados en funciones de docente, mientras ejecuta otras de naturaleza administrativa, dada la reubicación acordada en su favor. Apunta que la demandante fue reubicada por motivos de salud, según lo previsto en los numerales 254 del Código de Trabajo y el 22 bis, inciso a), del Reglamento al Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pero eso no significa que esté incapacitada por enfermedad, o que tenga una licencia especial o permanente, con lo cual no es aplicable el artículo 174 de ese Estatuto. Transcribe el numeral 13 del Manual de Procedimientos citado, así como el 118 del Código de Educación. Asimismo, en sustento de su tesis, invoca el criterio de la Asesoría Jurídica del Ministerio de Educación Pública relativo al carácter temporal de los recargos, sin que puedan entonces concebirse como un derecho adquirido. Por otra parte, refiere que se interpretaron y aplicaron incorrectamente los artículos 167 y 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, porque la actora no está incapacitada por enfermedad y tampoco disfruta de una licencia por maternidad, pues solo está reubicada por razones de salud. Indica que la finalidad de la incapacidad es que la persona recupere la salud y se reincorpore a sus labores habituales, mientras que la reubicación procura que la persona realice otras funciones a fin de que su estado de salud no empeore. Insiste en que no se está en los supuestos de esas normas. Agrega que la actora ha percibido todos los componentes fijos del salario mientras ha estado reubicada. Indica que el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales tiene sustento en el canon 167 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, que fue derogado, por lo que no sustenta la pretensión de la actora. Expone que lo resuelto afecta los fondos públicos y los programas educativos, ya que se ordena mantener el pago de sobresueldos por funciones docentes que no se ejecutan. Acusa la violación de los artículos 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, 56 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, al tiempo que desconoce la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional sobre el tema. En relación con la primera norma, se colige que los recargos son de naturaleza excepcional y temporal, a fin de satisfacer el interés público y garantizar la continuidad y la eficiencia del servicio. Insiste en que dichos recargos no constituyen un derecho adquirido. Refiere que la segunda norma sanciona como delito la concesión de beneficios salariales improcedentes. Recalca la naturaleza temporal de los recargos, que solo se mantienen si subsisten los hechos que le dieron origen. Hace ver que esa misma tesis fue sostenida por el Tribunal de Alajuela, Sección Tercera, con sede en San Ramón, órgano jurisdiccional que consideró que los recargos de funciones no tienen naturaleza indefinida. Transcribe el criterio del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo sobre el carácter temporal de los recargos y la obligación de laborarlos para que puedan ser pagados. En conclusión, solicita se revoque la sentencia y se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.

III.- SOBRE EL RECARGO: Con el oficio DRH-8112-2013-DIR de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Educación Pública (imagen 153 del expediente completo que consta en el escritorio virtual del Juzgado) ha quedado debidamente acreditado que la accionante fue reubicada en un puesto administrativo a partir del 17 de junio del año 2013, por recomendación médica basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo, que establece la obligación de la parte empleadora de reponer en su cargo a las personas trabajadoras que hayan sufrido un riesgo y puedan trabajar. También prevé el deber patronal de proporcionarle un puesto diferente de acuerdo con sus posibilidades, cuando por recomendación médica no pueda regresar a ejercer las funciones que venía desempeñando, pero sí esté en capacidad de realizar otras tareas. De igual manera, las pruebas son claras en el sentido de que al momento de la reubicación venía devengando un plus salarial, correspondiente a un recargo de Educación Preescolar. Dicho sobresueldo le siguió siendo cancelado, pese a la reubicación, hasta el 31 de enero del 2014. Este beneficio le fue suspendido a partir del 1 de febrero siguiente, según acción de personal número 10922593 de la Dirección General de Personal del Ministerio de Educación Pública, y oficio número DRH-PRH-UL-13641-2015 del 05 de noviembre del año 2015 de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos del MEP (imágenes 63-67 del expediente completo que consta en el escritorio virtual del Juzgado). La recurrente sostiene que la Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad; razón por la cual solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado por el ordenamiento jurídico, lo cual es acertado (artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Los artículos 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente precisamente establecen la posibilidad de acordar ciertos recargos. También es verdad que los sobresueldos relacionados no constituyen un derecho adquirido y que debe suspenderse el pago cuando la persona servidora, en el ejercicio de sus funciones habituales, deja de estar en las condiciones de hecho, dispuestas para su reconocimiento. No obstante, el presente asunto no versa sobre un servidor que en el ejercicio normal de sus funciones deja de estar en los supuestos que hacen viable el recargo, sino de una persona que por razones de salud queda impedida para seguir ejecutando sus labores normales. No se advierte entonces que lo decidido resulte violatorio de los artículos 118 y 13 citados. La recurrente sostiene que se aplicaron indebidamente los numerales 167 y 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, por cuanto dichas normas suponen la existencia de una incapacidad o una licencia especial que en este asunto no se dieron, por cuanto solo existe una reubicación por razones de salud. En relación con ese planteamiento, debe indicarse que la Sala ha conocido y resuelto reiterados asuntos de iguales características, sin que advierta alguna circunstancia que haga posible variar el criterio sostenido. Tal y como quedó explicado en la instancia precedente, se ha estimado que en casos de esta naturaleza resulta de aplicación el Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113, del 28 de julio de 1989, que es el Reglamento Licencias Especiales Servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública, sin que pueda considerarse, como se alega, que este quedó sin sustento al haberse derogado el canon 167 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no fue esta la única norma que le dio sustento. En el canon primero de esa reglamentación se establece que ahí se prevén las normas y procedimientos que debe seguir el citado Ministerio para conceder licencia a las personas servidoras, con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, derivada de un riesgo del trabajo o de una enfermedad. En el artículo segundo se reafirma que las licencias que la reglamentación contempla se concederán a quienes sufran una disminución en sus facultades y que por ello no puedan desempeñar las funciones y atribuciones del cargo que venían desempeñando. De conformidad con lo regulado en los numerales 5 y 8, las personas servidoras a las que la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros les declaren una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y recomienden un cambio de funciones tienen derecho a una licencia especial. Ahora bien, el canon 9 estipula que de previo a la concesión de la licencia, el Ministerio procederá a la reubicación de la persona servidora, lo que se ratifica en las normas siguientes, según las cuales “…esta licencia especial podrá ser suspendida, a juicio del Ministro de Educación Pública, a los efectos de asignar labores y funciones compatibles con sus condiciones personales, con las recomendaciones médicas y la formación académica del beneficiario, que con carácter temporal se requiera” y que “…el Ministerio de Educación Pública, podrá hacer uso del recurso humano que estuviere en disfrute de licencia especial para la atención de tareas y funciones de carácter administrativo, administrativo-docente o de carácter técnico, en cualquiera de sus dependencias cuando tales servicios se requieran para la buena marcha de las instituciones o para implementar programas especiales”, lo cual guarda absoluta correspondencia con el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. Luego, en el artículo 17 se estipula, de manera expresa, que “Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en este reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia”. De esa manera, se ha considerado que esta normativa más bien complementa el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, el cual no hace diferencia alguna entre incapacidades permanentes o parciales y de ahí que tampoco proceda realizar diferenciación para los efectos del pago entre las licencias permanentes y especiales. En consecuencia, si al momento de la reubicación la actora devengaba sobresueldo por Educación Preescolar, resulta indiscutible el derecho que tiene, conforme a esa normativa especial, a que dentro de su remuneración como funcionaria administrativa se le contemple ese plus. En el sentido expuesto, en la sentencia de esta Sala número 308, de las 10:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2014, se explicó cuanto sigue: “En criterio del demandado, los sobresueldos conocidos como horario alterno y del comité técnico asesor, están concebidos únicamente para quienes desempeñan funciones de docente, cuando las necesidades de matrícula lo requieran; y dependiendo de los atestados académicos del funcionario o funcionaria, por lo que a la actora no le asiste el derecho al pago de esos pluses si su puesto es ahora, de naturaleza administrativa. Sin embargo, se debe tener claro que en la especie no se está frente al reclamo que hace un funcionario o funcionaria del sector administrativo del Ministerio de Educación Pública, para el reconocimiento de los pluses como parte integrante e indisoluble de su salario. La situación en estudio difiere de ese supuesto porque aquí se trata de definir la correspondencia de ese derecho a una funcionaria docente quien por razones de salud ha debido ser reubicada en un cargo administrativo. La diferencia que pretende hacer valer la representación estatal entre ´incapacidad´ y ´reubicación´ desconoce que el origen de ambas es una enfermedad del funcionario o la funcionaria que le impide mantenerse en el servicio activo de la docencia. Es por esta razón que la normativa aplicable en casos como este no es únicamente la relacionada con el derecho al reconocimiento de horario alterno, sino la especialmente prevista al efecto. De primera mano, el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 del 28 de julio de 1989), cuyo artículo 1° menciona que esta reglamentación tiene por objeto establecer las normas y los procedimientos que deberá seguir el Ministerio de Educación Pública para conceder licencia a sus servidores o servidoras, con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, sobrevinientes de riesgos del trabajo o enfermedad. Por su parte, el numeral 2 establece: ´Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares´. (Lo resaltado es agregado). Luego, de conformidad con el artículo 5 tienen derecho a que se les conceda una licencia especial aquellos servidores y servidoras respecto de los cuales la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en su valoración final, declaren una incapacidad menor permanente o una incapacidad parcial o permanente y recomienden un cambio de funciones. El artículo 8 trata específicamente el supuesto de la concesión de la licencia especial en los siguientes términos: ´De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 5° anterior, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, concederá una licencia especial a aquellos servidores que encuentren en las siguientes circunstancias: a) Que de acuerdo con su dolencia la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, recomiende en la valoración final del tratamiento su cambio de funciones. b) Que en la valoración final de los efectos del riesgo de trabajo acaecido, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, determine una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y recomiende su incorporación al servicio con cambio de funciones´ (énfasis suplido). Seguidamente los artículos 9 y 10, por su orden, establecen: ´De previo a la concesión de la licencia y de acuerdo con las disponibilidades de plazas y con los requisitos del interesado, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, procederá a su reubicación, traslado o ascenso, según corresponda´. Y, ´Cuando fuere viable, en forma inmediata, la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo anterior se concederá la licencia especial hasta tanto se pueda realizar el movimiento de personal correspondiente´. Además, el numeral 12 señala: ´Igualmente el Ministerio de Educación Pública, podrá hacer uso del recurso humano que estuviere en disfrute de licencia especial para la atención de tareas y funciones de carácter administrativo, administrativo-docente o de carácter técnico, en cualquiera de sus dependencias cuando tales servicios se requieran para la buena marcha de las instituciones o para implementar programas especiales´. Finalmente, el artículo 17 dice: ´Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia´ (énfasis suplido). De modo que esta normativa complementa y no contradice lo dispuesto por el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que reza: ´a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder.´ (Lo resaltado es agregado). La normativa reglamentaria desarrolla esta expresa disposición, contemplando de manera indistinta el derecho a la indemnización tanto para el caso de la licencia permanente como de la especial”. (Los destacados constan en el original). Tampoco lleva razón la recurrente en cuanto sostiene que el recargo no fue laborado, pues esto se debió a la necesidad de reubicar a la servidora en funciones diferentes a las de docencia, por razones de salud. En este caso, el derecho al beneficio no deriva del ejercicio de las funciones sino de la aplicación de la normativa que expresamente le otorga el beneficio, en razón de su condición de salud. La normativa contempla el derecho a que se siga percibiendo, en esas circunstancias, “un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario”. De ahí que no pueda concluirse, como se pretende, que se desvirtuó la naturaleza del recargo o que se afectan los fondos públicos de manera injustificada, puesto que las normas existentes, son las que establecen esas consecuencias jurídicas. Por lo expuesto, tampoco es cierto que se hayan violentado los artículos 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública ni el 56 de la Ley contra el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. El primero hace referencia a la posibilidad de que el límite de cuarenta lecciones semanales se exceda cuando el servicio así lo requiera, manteniéndose el exceso como un recargo, de carácter temporal. Tal disposición no regula la situación que aquí se plantea y está prevista para el ejercicio efectivo de las funciones de docencia, no para los casos de personas servidoras que gocen de incapacidad o licencia. La otra norma no pudo resultar violada, pues se refiere a la penalización por el otorgamiento de sobresueldos improcedentes, lo cual no es el supuesto que se discute. Por último, cabe señalar que los criterios de la Asesoría Jurídica del Ministerio de Educación Pública ni las decisiones de otros órganos jurisdiccionales sobre el particular resultan vinculantes para esta Sala. Luego, lo decidido no resulta contrapuesto al criterio del Tribunal Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos tienen naturaleza temporal y no constituyen un derecho adquirido, dado que el caso no se refiere a la situación de un servidor activo en funciones que demanden o no el recargo, sino que el tema se reduce a establecer la remuneración que debe percibir una persona servidora que no ha podido seguir efectuando sus labores normales ni los recargos que venía ejerciendo, en razón de un padecimiento.

IV.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: De conformidad con lo explicado y en atención a lo que fue motivo de recurso, lo procedente es confirmar el fallo impugnado.

V.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA VARELA ARAYA: La suscrita se aparta del criterio de mayoría en cuanto reconoce a la actora el pago del sobresueldo por recargo de Educación Preescolar a partir del 1 de febrero de 2014 y mientras se mantenga en condición de reubicada. Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que, en el año 2013, la demandante devengaba aquel recargo y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas a partir del 17 de junio de 2013; razón por la cual aquel sobresueldo se le dejó de pagar (hechos probados 2, 3 y 4 de la sentencia de primera instancia, ratificados por el Tribunal). Asimismo, según se desprende del oficio número DRH-8112-2013-DIR, visible a imagen 153, respectivamente, de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado, está claro que la reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. Ante la Sala se sostiene que la Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y que la servidora no se encuentra dentro de los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, pues no se encuentra incapacitada por enfermedad como se estableció, que la hagan acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluyo que lleva razón quien recurre. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por "horario alterno", o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)” (el resaltado es agregado). Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada ni disfrutando de aquella licencia, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, antes citados, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones (en este caso por horario alterno) no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno" (énfasis suplido; véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…”. Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por recargos constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede en razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Con base en las normas traídas a colación, la jurisprudencia citada y los principios de primacía de la realidad, razonabilidad e igualdad salarial, considero que la representación del Estado lleva razón cuando manifiesta que no es factible mantener el pago de retribuciones cuando no se da la prestación real del servicio, por motivos como el de autos (persona reubicada en un puesto administrativo), pues no existe sustento fáctico ni jurídico para retribuir un servicio que no se está prestando. Además, obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes, el recargo de Educación Preescolar, como ocurre en el caso de estudio, no constituye un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión del sobresueldo en cuestión, al pasar la actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho. SOBRE LAS COSTAS: Aunque la normativa sobre costas establece como regla de principio, la condenatoria en esos gastos a la parte vencida, quien suscribe este voto salvado considera que, en el caso concreto, se debe absolver en costas. Si bien se ha demostrado que a la parte actora no le corresponde el derecho que reclama, se aprecia que esta ha litigado con evidente buena fe, bajo la creencia de que le asiste el derecho a mantener el pago de recargo de Educación Preescolar durante su reubicación en labores administrativas y, la suscrita se ha replanteado el tema de la interpretación correcta de las normas que rigen el recargo por algún motivo, (como es el de Educación Preescolar) a la carga académica contratada de ordinario. Esta exoneración se dispone en aplicación del artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil. DISPOSICIONES FINALES: Como corolario de lo expuesto, revoco la sentencia recurrida y declaro sin lugar la demanda, resolviendo sin especial condena en costas.

POR TANTO:

En lo que fue objeto de agravio, se confirma la sentencia recurrida. La Magistrada Varela Araya salva el voto. Revoca la sentencia recurrida, declara sin lugar la demanda y resuelve el asunto sin especial condena en costas.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Héctor Luis Blanco González Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Res: 2018-001763 1