Primacy of biological paternity over notorious possession when recognition was fraudulentPrimacía de la paternidad biológica sobre la posesión notoria cuando hubo fraude en el reconocimiento

Document Review Res: 2015-001027 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and fifteen minutes on the eighteenth of September of two thousand fifteen.

Special filiation proceeding (challenge of acknowledgment and paternity claim) filed before the Family Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Ciudad Quesada venue, by [[Nombre1] ], [...], against [[Nombre2] ], [...], and [[Nombre3] ], [...]. All of legal age, married, residents of Alajuela, with the indicated exceptions.

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff, in filings dated October fourteenth, two thousand thirteen, and August twenty-fifth, two thousand fourteen, brought this action, so that the judgment declares that he is the father of the minor [[Nombre4] ], the acknowledgment made by the co-defendant [[Nombre3] ] be set aside, and the co-defendants be ordered to pay costs.

2.- The co-defendant answered in the terms indicated in the brief filed on August thirteenth, two thousand fourteen, and raised the defenses of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) and lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva); the co-defendant answered in the terms indicated in the brief filed on October third, two thousand fourteen, and raised the defenses of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) and lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva).

3.- The Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, Ciudad Quesada venue, by judgment of fifteen hours and seven minutes on March sixteenth, two thousand fifteen, ordered: "In accordance with the foregoing, cited legal provisions and Articles 1, 7, 99, 102, 104, 153, 155, and 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, 2, 8, 86, 91, 93, 96, 98, 98 bis of the Código de Familia, 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 53 of the Constitución Política and 5 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. THE PRESENT PROCEEDING FOR CHALLENGE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT, filed by [[Nombre1] ] against [[Nombre3] ] and [[Nombre2] ], IS DECLARED WITH MERIT.- Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 91, 92, 96, 98, 98 Bis, of the Código de Familia, the present action filed by [[Nombre1] ] against [[Nombre2] ] IS DECLARED WITH MERIT and consequently, the latter is held to be the biological father of the minor [[Nombre5] ], consequently the minor has the right to bear the parentage of his progenitor, to succeed him ab intestato, and to be supported by him. Once this judgment is final, by order, record it in the Civil Registry, in the margin of the Birth records of the minor [[Nombre5] ], who henceforth shall have the surnames [[Nombre6] ], of the Province of Alajuela, at VOLUME [Value 001]), PAGE [Value 002]), ENTRY [Value 003]).- The defenses of lack of active and passive standing are rejected.- Decided without special award of costs." (Sic).

4.- The co-defendants appealed and the Family Tribunal of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment of fifteen hours and forty-six minutes on June seventeenth, two thousand fifteen, resolved: "The appealed judgment is affirmed." (Sic).

5.- The co-defendant parties filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief submitted on July twenty-first, two thousand fifteen, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the considering part.

6.- The procedural requirements and time limits of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Judge Echandi Salas writes; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND. The plaintiff filed a special filiation proceeding indicating that he began cohabiting with the defendant as husband and wife under the same roof in April 2012. She became pregnant and gave birth to the minor [[Nombre4] ] on December 13, 2012. About 15 days after the birth, the defendant went to live with her mother and 22 days later she moved in with another man. He affirmed that the defendant does not allow him to visit the minor, to acknowledge him, or to help with his support. He did help with the latter during the pregnancy, accompanied her to medical appointments, ultrasounds, and people saw him as the father. Therefore, he requested that it be declared that he is the father of the minor, who therefore has the right to bear his surname, to be supported by him, and to succeed him ab intestato (folios 1 to 3). The defendant answered indicating that she never cohabited with the plaintiff. She clarified that she had been cohabiting with Mr. [[Nombre3] ] for more than eight years, with whom she had two children at that time. Due to relationship problems, she temporarily changed her domicile and it was there that the plaintiff came to visit her at night for a month. She indicated that in June 2012 she found out she was pregnant since April, meaning from when she was living in her home with her partner and her children. Given that the birth was by cesarean section and she had no one to care for her, she agreed to go to the plaintiff's mother's house, but she only stayed 15 days, afterwards she went to her sister's house and on January 2, 2014, she reconciled with her partner, whom she married. Additionally, her partner acknowledged the minor as his son and has taken care of his support, which is why there is a very close relationship between them. For these reasons, she requested that the complaint be dismissed and raised the defenses of lack of active and passive standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva) (folios 4 to 7). As a result of this answer, the plaintiff amended the complaint and joined the co-defendant [[Nombre3] ] to the proceedings, of whom he said that he acknowledged the minor knowing that he is not his son, and requested that the acknowledgment be annulled (folios 8 to 11). The co-defendant answered negatively, in the same terms as the co-defendant [[Nombre2] ] and affirmed that when she left the house, she was already pregnant. Additionally, he indicated that when he acknowledged the minor he had no idea of the plaintiff's existence nor of the stubbornness he has engaged in to torment his family for the mistake his wife made (folios 12 to 16). By first instance judgment, the complaint was declared with merit and the plaintiff was declared the biological father of the minor (folios 27 to 38). The co-defendants appealed (folios 42 to 53) but the Tribunal affirmed the decision (folios 73 to 78).

II.- GRIEVANCES. The co-defendants file an appeal indicating that Article 86 of the Código de Familia was interpreted erroneously, as it was taken as true that the acknowledgment by co-defendant [[Nombre3] ] was made under falsehood. This is contrary to the Chamber's jurisprudence regarding the best interests of the minor, and they cite vote 33-11 and Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. They mention that the plaintiff is a complete stranger to the minor, who is the only person who could challenge the paternity upon reaching the age of majority. They indicate that the plaintiff only shares blood ties with the minor, as he was not present at the time of birth nor did he acknowledge the baby through the Civil Registry auxiliary at the hospital itself. They reject the Tribunal's statement that the co-defendant engaged in an abusive exercise of rights, as he carried out the acknowledgment under falsehood, which is not true, since when he went to the Civil Registry to make the acknowledgment, he did so with full knowledge that the child did not carry his blood. Therefore, he was never induced by deception, falsehood, or manipulation by the mother, but rather did it as an act of love for his son, voluntarily and consciously. With this, they consider that there was no abusive or antisocial exercise of the minor's rights, but rather a defense of his rights and identity. They cite a vote from the Sala Constitucional and mention others from the Sala Segunda, alleging that the Tribunal's reasoning erroneously considers that paternity can only be biological. They state that the co-defendant has fulfilled all the requirements of notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado), which is essential, according to the jurisprudence, to maintain the existing filiation condition. They add that Articles 90 and 99 of the Código de Familia were disregarded by the Tribunal and that the notorious possession of status in this case has been for the minor's entire life, which will define his whole life, his future, and his identity. They cite doctrine and jurisprudence and state that removing the paternity of the co-defendant, which is socially constituted, would be contrary to the fundamental right of the minor and to the filiation obtained through notorious possession of status. They mention provisions 2 of the Código de Familia and 8.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to support that, in their view, applying the appealed judgment would cause irreparable harm to the minor that would mark his life, that of the other two minors aged 6 and 9, and that of the entire family. Additionally, they state that if the plaintiff were later to seek a visitation schedule in the future, it would be impossible for the minor to agree to go with or have contact with a complete stranger. They point out that the Tribunal gave no importance to the role of the minor's identity regarding family integration. They cite a judgment from the Constitutional Court of Colombia. They add that another refutable aspect of the appealed judgment is that it only cites the confused and complacent testimony of Mr. [[Nombre7] ], without mentioning that of Mrs. [[Nombre8] ] and Mrs. [[Nombre9] ], who are witnesses to the situation and that there has never been any difference in treatment among the minors. They conclude by requesting that the appeal be granted on its merits, the appealed judgment be annulled, and an order be issued to maintain the paternity of co-defendant [[Nombre3] ] over the minor. As evidence for better resolution, they present photographs that, in their view, demonstrate the notorious possession of status and the family bond of the minor (folios 89 to 98).

III.- REGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER RESOLUTION. The appellant party provides as evidence for better resolution a series of photographs that appear on folios 99 and 100), which must be rejected. This is because, according to the provisions of provision 8 of the Código de Familia, the procedure for this appeal is governed by canon 561 of the Código de Trabajo, under which, at this final instance, it is not permissible to propose or admit evidence, unless it is absolutely essential to resolve the dispute correctly. In the sub litem, this Chamber does not consider that the evidence offered meets the requirements of said provision, therefore its rejection proceeds.

IV.- REGARDING THE MERITS. Once the appeal has been analyzed, the conclusion is reached that the aggrieved party is not correct. It is fundamental to consider that in a case such as this, the aim is to protect both the plaintiff's rights as a father and those of the minor as a son, as the former has rights and duties towards his son, while the latter also has rights concerning his father and related to his identity. Thus, the American Convention on Human Rights (CADH) establishes in its Articles 17.5, 18, and 19, that the law must recognize equal rights both to children born out of wedlock and to those born within it, the right of every person to have their own given name and the surnames of their parents, as well as the right of every minor to the protective measures that such condition requires, from family, society, and the State. The Convention on the Rights of the Child contemplates in its provisions 5, 7, and 8 that the State must respect the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parents to provide direction and guidance to minors so they can exercise their rights, among which is the right to a name, to know their parents, and to be cared for by them. In addition, the minor's identity must be respected, which again includes the name and family relations in accordance with the law, while establishing the state's obligation to provide assistance and protection to restore these elements of identity. Provision 9 of that same regulatory body also mentions, as a State obligation, to ensure that the minor is not separated from their parents against their will, except in cases where the best interests of the minor warrant it, which is not the case at hand. Ordinance 18.1 adds that the State must guarantee the recognition that both parents have common obligations regarding the upbringing and development of the minor, as it is they who are responsible for guaranteeing and promoting their rights, as well as exercising upbringing and promoting their development. In this same vein, Article 53 of the Constitución Política establishes (just as the CADH does), the parents' obligations towards their children, regardless of whether they were born in or out of wedlock, but, additionally, it adds with crystal clarity that every person has the right to know who their parents are. For its part, Article 5 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia establishes that the best interests of the minor must prevail in any public or private action, with the objective of guaranteeing respect for their rights and their full development. To determine the best interests, the regulation indicates that the minor must be taken into account as a subject of rights and responsibilities, considering their age and personal conditions, their socioeconomic conditions, and the correspondence between individual and social interest. In the sub litem, the child is under three years old, and therefore cannot fend for himself or assess what is most beneficial for him, by virtue of which, the judicial authority's decision on this matter must take this condition into account for the purpose of protecting his rights. Both national and international regulations are clear in indicating that the plaintiff, as the biological father of the minor, has obligations towards him, among which are defending his rights and contributing to his development, so that it would not be just or lawful to deprive him of his rights when there is no reason to suppose he is unable to exercise them in the way that most benefits his son. On the contrary, it is valued that he has had an interest in establishing his paternity from the very first moment, as he filed the proceeding for it to be judicially declared a few months after the baby was born. In addition to this, when he found out that the co-defendant had acknowledged the child as his own son, he amended the complaint and requested the annulment of such acknowledgment, so he has not desisted from his intention to look after his son and exercise the rights and duties that correspond to him as a father. For his part, the minor is assisted by the rights to know who his father is, to bear his surname, and to cultivate and maintain his identity and personality. All of this is intimately linked to the recognition of who he is based on his blood and family ties, his name, and his origin. Denying the minor the possibility of having certainty about who his biological father is would nullify these essential rights for the development of his personality and his integral development. Likewise, there is an interest in the correspondence between the biological father and the registered father under normal conditions, that is, when there are no special circumstances that warrant cohabitation prevailing over blood ties. The foregoing for reasons of social interest and even public health. Indeed, the law gives preeminence to blood ties over those arising from cohabitation as a general rule, so that legally declaring the existence of family ties based on cohabitation is the exception. Therefore, notorious possession of status, in a case like this, where the biological father has taken action for his paternity to be legally declared, could not have the prevalence claimed by the appellants. Moreover, it must be taken into account that, although the co-defendant is recognized as the minor's father by people close to his family, it is because both he and his wife have prevented the plaintiff from asserting his rights as a father, so that priority could not be given to notorious possession of status over the biological parentage of a father who has shown interest in legally establishing the family relationship with respect to his son since his birth. Now, Articles 86, 90, and 99 of the Código de Familia are mentioned in the appeal, which refer to the challenge of acknowledgment and filiation by notorious possession of status. The first of these establishes that acknowledgment can be challenged by the acknowledged person or by anyone with an interest, when it was made through falsehood or error, so the appellant party mentions that co-defendant [[Nombre3] ] acknowledged the minor knowing that he was not his son, so they consider the non-existence of error in the acknowledgment and, therefore, it cannot be challenged by the plaintiff. Provision 90 mentions that no acknowledgment is admissible when the child has a filiation established by notorious possession of status, and the appellants consider that the defendant [[Nombre3] ] has held notorious possession with respect to the minor, so the plaintiff's petition would not be admissible. Ordinance 99 indicates that the investigation action is not receivable when the child has a filiation established by notorious possession of status. As for what they allege regarding Article 86, the aggrieved parties assume the fact that Mr. [[Nombre3] ] has a better right to hold the disputed paternity because he acknowledged the minor without falsehood, however, they are not taking into consideration that initially, the plaintiff filed a proceeding for his paternity over the minor to be declared, and it was only later that he had to amend the complaint against the co-defendant to challenge the acknowledgment he made after the proceeding was instituted. It is precisely for this reason that the Tribunal's criterion is shared in that it reasoned that the co-defendant had made an abusive use of rights (Article 22 of the Código Civil), because even though making the acknowledgment protected by law was within his possibilities, the truth is that he abused that possibility with the aim of frustrating the right of the biological father, who initiated the proceeding for the declaration of his paternity before the acknowledgment was made in administrative venue. This is precisely what Article 20 of the Código Civil regulates, which establishes: "Acts performed under the protection of the text of a regulation, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law and shall not prevent the proper application of the regulation that was intended to be evaded." To this must be added that the position maintained by the aggrieved parties in the appeal is contradictory to what they said in their respective responses, as before this venue they come alleging that there was no falsehood in the acknowledgment, but in the responses, they affirmed that the co-defendant was pregnant before she left the common home and that the co-defendant was the father of the child, so that even Mr. [[Nombre3] ] said he was surprised by the judicial proceeding filed. This demonstrates that the good faith required by Article 21 of the Código Civil to exercise a right did not exist. In this way, it is not possible to endorse the position of the appellants, since the acknowledgment of the minor was made fraudulently, to the detriment of the plaintiff's paternity rights and even those of the minor that enshrine the human right to know who his father is. In addition, given that the paternity declaration was requested before the acknowledgment made in administrative venue, the mentioned Article 99 is not opposable, because the notorious possession developed as the proceeding elapsed, so it could not prevail over the interest and right of the biological father of the minor. For this same reason, the fact that the minor is treated by the co-defendant in the same way as he treats his biological children, as indicated by the witnesses [[Nombre8] ] and [[Nombre9] ], is not determinative for resolving the matter, as although this denotes great integrity and sensitivity on the part of the co-defendant, it is insufficient to deprive the biological father of his rights regarding the minor. The fact that the acknowledgment is annulled and the paternity of the plaintiff is declared does not have to change the child's situation in the family in which he is developing, as, as the appellants well mention, that also forms part of his identity.

V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS. In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal, with costs to be borne by those who filed it (Article 611 of the Código Procesal Civil).

THEREFORE

The appeal is dismissed, with its costs to be borne by the appellant party.

[Nombre10] [Nombre11] [Nombre12] [Nombre13] [Nombre14] [Nombre15]

Once this judgment becomes final, by means of an enforcement order, it shall be recorded in the Civil Registry, in the margin of the birth record of the minor [[Name5]], who henceforth shall bear the surnames [[Name6]], of the Province of Alajuela, at TOMO [Value 001]), FOLIO [Value 002]), ASIENTO [Value 003]).- The defenses of lack of standing to sue and to be sued are dismissed.- The matter is resolved without a special award of costs." (Sic).

4.- The co-defendants appealed and the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment of fifteen hundred forty-six hours on June seventeenth, two thousand fifteen, decided: "The appealed judgment is affirmed." (Sic).

5.- The co-respondent parties filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief presented on July twenty-first, two thousand fifteen, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the considerative part.

6.- The proceedings have observed the prescriptions and terms of law.

Judge Echandi Salas drafts; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND. The plaintiff filed a special filiation proceeding stating that he began cohabiting with the defendant as husband and wife under the same roof in April 2012. She became pregnant and gave birth to the minor [[Name4]] on December 13, 2012. About 15 days after the birth, the defendant went to live with her mother and 22 days later she moved in with another man. He affirmed that the defendant does not allow him to visit the minor, to recognize him, or to help with his support. He did provide support during the pregnancy, accompanied her to medical appointments and ultrasounds, and people saw him as the father. For this reason, he requested that it be declared that he is the father of the minor, who therefore has the right to bear his surname, to be supported by him, and to succeed him ab intestato (folios 1 to 3). The defendant answered stating that she never cohabited with the plaintiff. She clarified that she had been cohabiting with Mr. [[Name3]] for more than eight years, with whom she had two children at that time. Due to relationship problems, she temporarily changed her domicile and that is where the plaintiff came to visit her at night for a month. She stated that in June 2012 she found out she had been pregnant since April, that is, since she lived in her home with her partner and her children. Given that the delivery was by cesarean section and she had no one to care for her, she agreed to go to the home of the plaintiff's mother, but she only stayed 15 days, after which she went to her sister's house, and on January 2, 2014, she reconciled with her partner, whom she married. Furthermore, her partner recognized the minor as his child and has been responsible for his support, so a very close relationship exists between them. Therefore, she requested the dismissal of the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of standing ad causam to sue and to be sued (folios 4 to 7). As a result of this answer, the plaintiff expanded the lawsuit and joined the co-defendant [[Name3]], asserting that he recognized the minor knowing he was not his child, and requested the annulment of the recognition (folios 8 to 11). The co-defendant answered negatively, in the same terms as the co-defendant [[Name2]], and affirmed that when she left the home, she was already pregnant. Furthermore, he stated that when he recognized the minor, he had no idea of the plaintiff's existence or of the foolishness he has engaged in to torment his family because of the mistake his wife made (folios 12 to 16). By first-instance judgment, the lawsuit was granted and the plaintiff was declared the biological father of the minor (folios 27 to 38). The co-defendants appealed (folios 42 to 53), but the Court affirmed the resolution (folios 73 to 78).

II.- GRIEVANCES. The co-defendants file an appeal stating that article 86 of the Family Code was erroneously interpreted, since it was taken as true that the recognition by the co-defendant [[Name3]] was made under falsehood (consideration III of the judgment). This is contrary to this Chamber's jurisprudence regarding the best interests of the minor and they cite ruling 33-11 and article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. They mention that the plaintiff is a complete stranger to the minor, who is the only person who could challenge paternity upon reaching the age of majority. They state that the plaintiff only shares blood ties with the minor, as he was not present at the time of birth nor did he recognize the baby through the Civil Registry assistant at the hospital itself. They reject the Court's assertion that the co-defendant engaged in an abusive exercise of rights, asserting that he made the recognition under falsehood, which is not true, since when he went to the Civil Registry to make the recognition, he did so with full knowledge that the child did not carry his blood. Therefore, he was never induced by deceit, falsehood, or manipulation by the mother, but rather did it as an act of love toward his child, voluntarily and consciously. Thus, they consider there was no abusive or antisocial exercise of the minor's rights, but rather a defense of his rights and identity. They cite a ruling from the Constitutional Chamber and mention others from this Second Chamber, alleging that the Court's reasoning erroneously considers that paternity can only be biological. They affirm that the plaintiff has fulfilled all the requirements of notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado), which is indispensable, according to jurisprudence, to maintain the existing filiation status. They add that articles 90 and 99 of the Family Code were disregarded by the Court and that the notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) in this case has lasted the minor's entire life, which will define his entire life, his future, and his identity. They cite doctrine and jurisprudence and affirm that removing the paternity of the co-defendant, which is socially constituted, would be contrary to the fundamental right of the minor and to the filiation obtained through notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado). They mention articles 2 of the Family Code and 8.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to support that, in their view, applying the appealed judgment would cause irreparable harm to the minor that would mark his life, that of the other two minors aged 6 and 9, and that of the entire family. Additionally, they affirm that if the plaintiff were later to seek a visitation regime in the future, it would be impossible for the minor to agree to leave or have contact with a complete stranger. They point out that the Court gave no importance to the role of the minor's identity regarding family integration. They cite a judgment from the Constitutional Court of Colombia. They add that another refutable aspect of the appealed judgment is that it only cites the confusing and complacent testimony of Mr. [[Name7]], without mentioning that of Mrs. [[Name8]] and Mrs. [[Name9]], who have knowledge of the situation and that there has never been any difference in treatment among the minors. They conclude by requesting that the appeal be granted on the merits, the appealed judgment be annulled, and the paternity of the co-defendant [[Name3]] over the minor be ordered to be maintained. As evidence to better resolve, they present photographs that, in their view, demonstrate the notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) and the family bond of the minor (folios 89 to 98).

III.- CONCERNING THE EVIDENCE TO BETTER RESOLVE. The appealing party provides as evidence to better resolve a series of photographs appearing on folios 99 and 100, which must be rejected. This is because, according to the provisions of article 8 of the Family Code, this recourse is governed by what is regulated in canon 561 of the Labor Code, pursuant to which, at this last instance, it is not permissible to propose or admit evidence, unless it is absolutely essential to correctly resolve the dispute. In the sub litem, this Chamber does not consider that the offered evidence meets the requirements of the said provision, so its rejection proceeds.

IV.- CONCERNING THE MERITS. Once the appeal has been analyzed, the conclusion is reached that the aggrieved party is not correct. It is fundamental to consider that in a case like this, the aim is to protect both the plaintiff's rights in his status as a father, and those of the minor in his status as a child, since the former has rights and duties toward his child, while the latter also has rights regarding his father and related to his identity. Thus, the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) establishes in its articles 17.5, 18, and 19, that the law must recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock as for those born within wedlock, the right of every person to have a given name and the surnames of their parents, as well as the right of every minor to the protection measures required by such condition, from their family, society, and the State. The Convention on the Rights of the Child contemplates in articles 5, 7, and 8 that the State must respect the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parents to provide direction and guidance to minors for the exercise of their rights, among which is the right to a name, to know their parents, and to be cared for by them. Furthermore, the minor's identity must be respected, which again includes the name and family relationships in accordance with the law, while establishing the State's obligation to provide assistance and protection to restore these elements of identity. Article 9 of the same normative body mentions, also as an obligation of the State, to ensure that the minor is not separated from their parents against their will, except in cases where the best interests so warrant, which is not the case at hand. Article 18.1 adds that the State must guarantee the recognition that both parents have common obligations regarding the upbringing and development of the minor, since it is their responsibility to guarantee and promote their rights, as well as to exercise upbringing and promote their development. In this same sense, article 53 of the Political Constitution establishes (as does the ACHR), the obligations of parents toward their children, regardless of whether they were born within or out of wedlock, but, in addition, it adds with absolute clarity that every person has the right to know who their parents are. For its part, article 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code establishes that the best interests of the minor must prevail in any public and private action, with the objective of guaranteeing respect for their rights and their full development. To determine the best interests, the norm indicates that the minor must be considered as a subject of rights and responsibilities, considering their age and personal conditions, their socioeconomic conditions, and the correspondence between individual and social interests. In the sub litem, the child is under three years of age, so he cannot fend for himself nor assess what is most beneficial for himself, by virtue of which, the decision on this matter by the judicial authority must take this condition into account for the purposes of protecting his rights. Both national and international norms are clear in stating that the plaintiff, as the minor's biological father, has obligations toward him, among which are to defend his rights and contribute to his development, so it would not be fair or lawful to deprive him of his rights when there is no reason that suggests his inability to exercise them in the way that most benefits his child. On the contrary, it is valued that he has had an interest in establishing his paternity from the very first moment, since he filed the process for it to be judicially declared a few months after the baby was born. In addition to this, when he found out that the co-defendant had recognized the child as his own, he expanded the lawsuit and requested the nullity of such recognition, so he has not desisted from his intention to look after his child and exercise the rights and duties that correspond to him as a father. For his part, the minor is entitled to the rights to know who his father is, to bear his surname, and to cultivate and maintain his identity and personality. All of this is intimately linked to the recognition of who he is based on his blood and family ties, his name, and his origin. Denying the minor the possibility of having certainty about who his biological father is would make these rights, indispensable for the development of his personality and his integral development, nugatory. Likewise, there is an interest in the correspondence between the biological father and the registered father under normal conditions, that is, when there are no special circumstances warranting that cohabitation prevails over blood ties. This is for reasons of social interest and even public health. Indeed, the law gives preeminence to blood ties over those arising from cohabitation as a general rule, so that legally declaring the existence of family ties based on cohabitation is the exception. Therefore, notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado), in a case like this, where the biological father has taken action to have his paternity legally declared, could not have the prevalence alleged by the appellants. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that, although the co-defendant is recognized as the minor's father by people close to his family, it is because both he and his wife have prevented the plaintiff from asserting his rights as a father, so priority could not be given to notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) over the biological filiation of a father who has shown an interest in legally establishing the relationship of kinship with respect to his child since his birth. Now, the appeal mentions articles 86, 90, and 99 of the Family Code, which refer to the challenge of recognition and filiation by notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado). The first of these establishes that recognition may be challenged by the recognized person or by anyone with an interest, when it has been made through falsehood or error, for which the appealing party mentions that the co-defendant [[Name3]] recognized the minor knowing he was not his son, so they consider there is an absence of error in the recognition and, therefore, it cannot be challenged by the plaintiff. Article 90 mentions that no recognition is admissible when the child has an established filiation through notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado), and the appellants consider that the defendant [[Name3]] has held notorious possession (notoria de estado) with respect to the minor, so the plaintiff's action would not be admissible. Article 99 states that an investigation action is not receivable when the child has an established filiation through notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado). Regarding what they allege concerning article 86, the aggrieved parties start from the fact that Mr. [[Name3]] has a better right to hold the disputed paternity because he recognized the minor without falsehood intervening; however, they are not considering that the plaintiff initially filed a process for his paternity over the minor to be declared, and it is only afterward that he must expand the lawsuit against the co-defendant to challenge the recognition made after the process was initiated. It is precisely for this reason that the Court's criterion is shared in that it reasoned the co-defendant had made an abusive use of rights (article 22 of the Civil Code), because although it was within his possibilities to make the recognition under the protection of the law, the truth is that he abused this possibility with the aim of frustrating the right of the biological father, who initiated the process for the declaration of his paternity before the recognition was made in the administrative venue. This is precisely what is regulated by article 20 of the Civil Code, which establishes: "Acts performed under the protection of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was sought to be circumvented." It must be added to this that the position maintained by the aggrieved parties in the appeal is contradictory to what they stated in their respective answers, since before this Chamber they come alleging that there was no falsehood in the recognition, but in their answers, they affirmed that the co-defendant was pregnant before she left the common home and that the co-defendant was the father of the child, so much so that Mr. [[Name3]] said he was surprised by the judicial process filed. This demonstrates that the good faith required by article 21 of the Civil Code to exercise a right did not exist. In this way, it is not possible to endorse the position of those who appeal, since the recognition of the minor was made fraudulently, to the detriment of the plaintiff's paternity rights and even those of the minor that enshrine the human right to know who his father is. In addition, given that the declaration of paternity was requested before the recognition made in the administrative venue, the mentioned article 99 is not opposable, since the notorious possession (posesión notoria) was developed as the process elapsed, so it could not prevail over the interest and right of the minor's biological father. For this same reason, it is not determinative for resolving the matter that the minor is treated by the co-defendant in the same way he treats his biological children, according to what witnesses [[Name8]] and [[Name9]] stated, since although this denotes great integrity and sensitivity on the part of the co-defendant, it is not sufficient to deprive the biological father of his rights regarding the minor. The fact that the recognition is annulled and the plaintiff's paternity is declared, does not have to change the child's situation within the family in which he develops, since, as the appellants well mention, that also forms part of his identity.

V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS. In accordance with the foregoing, it is proper to dismiss the appeal, with costs to be borne by those who filed it (article 611 of the Civil Procedure Code).

THEREFORE

The appeal is dismissed, with its costs to be borne by the appealing party.

**[Name10]** **[Name11]** [Name12] **[Name13]** [Name14] ***[Name15]*** Now, the appeal mentions articles 86, 90, and 99 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), which refer to the challenge of recognition and filiation by notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado). The first of these establishes that recognition may be challenged by the recognized person or by anyone with an interest, when it was made through falsity or error, which is why the appellant party mentions that the co-defendant [Name1] recognized the minor knowing that he was not his son, and thus considers the non-existence of error in the recognition, and therefore it cannot be challenged by the plaintiff. Article 90 mentions that no recognition is admissible when the child has a filiation established by notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado), and the appellants consider that the defendant [Name1] has held notorious possession with respect to the minor, so the plaintiff's action would not be admissible. Article 99 states that a filiation investigation action (acción de investigación) is not receivable when the child has a filiation established by notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado). Regarding what they allege with respect to article 86, the aggrieved parties proceed from the fact that Mr. [Name1] has a better right to hold the disputed paternity because he recognized the minor without any falsity intervening; however, they are not taking into consideration that initially the plaintiff filed a proceeding to have his paternity over the minor declared, and it is only afterwards that he had to expand the lawsuit against the co-defendant to challenge the recognition made after the initiation of the proceeding. For this reason, precisely, the criterion of the Court is shared in that it reasoned that the co-defendant had made an abusive use of right (artículo 22 del Código Civil), since while it was within his possibilities to make the recognition under the protection of the law, the truth is that he abused that possibility with the objective of frustrating the right of the biological father, who initiated the proceeding for the declaration of his paternity before the recognition was made in an administrative venue. This is precisely what is regulated by article 20 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which establishes: "Acts performed under the protection of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was intended to be evaded." To this it must be added that the position maintained by the aggrieved parties in the appeal is contradictory to what they said in their respective answers, since before this venue they come alleging that there was no falsity in the recognition, but in the answers they affirmed that the co-defendant was pregnant before she left the common home and that the co-defendant was the father of the child, which is why Mr. [Name1] even said he was astonished by the judicial proceeding filed. This demonstrates that the good faith required by article 21 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) to exercise a right did not exist. In this way, it is not possible to endorse the position of those who appeal, since the recognition of the minor was done fraudulently, to the detriment of the paternity rights of the plaintiff and even those of the minor that enshrine the human right to know who his father is. In addition, given that the declaration of paternity was requested before the recognition made in the administrative venue, the aforementioned article 99 is not enforceable (oponible), since the notorious possession (posesión notoria) was developing as the process progressed, and therefore it could not prevail over the interest and the right of the biological father of the minor. For this same reason, the fact that the minor is treated by the co-defendant in the same manner as he treats his biological children, according to what the witnesses [Name2] and [Name3] indicate, is not determinative for resolving the matter, since although this denotes great integrity and sensitivity on the part of the co-defendant, it is not sufficient to deprive the biological father of his rights with respect to the minor. The fact that the recognition is annulled and the paternity of the plaintiff is declared does not have to change the situation of the child in the family in which he develops, since, as the appellants well mention, that also forms part of his identity.

For his part, the minor holds the rights to know who his father is, to bear his surname, and to cultivate and maintain his identity and personality. All of this is intimately linked to the recognition of who he is based on his blood and family ties, his name, and his origin. Denying the minor the possibility of having certainty about who his biological father is would render nugatory these indispensable rights for the development of his personality and his comprehensive growth. Likewise, there is an interest in the correspondence between the biological father and the registered father under normal conditions, that is, when no special circumstances exist that warrant the prevalence of cohabitation over blood ties. The foregoing is for reasons of social interest and even public health. Indeed, the law gives preeminence to blood ties over those arising from cohabitation as a general rule, so that legally declaring the existence of family ties based on cohabitation is the exception. For this reason, the notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado), in a case such as this, where the biological father has brought an action to have his paternity legally declared, could not have the prevalence claimed by those appealing.

Furthermore, it must be taken into account that, although the co-defendant is recognized as the minor's father by those close to his family, it is because both he and his wife have prevented the plaintiff from asserting his rights as a father, so priority could not be given to the notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) over the biological filiation (filiación biológica) of a father who has shown interest in legally establishing the kinship relationship with respect to his son since his birth.

Now, the appeal mentions Articles 86, 90, and 99 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), which refer to the challenge of recognition (impugnación de reconocimiento) and filiation by notorious possession of status (filiación por posesión notoria de estado). The first of these establishes that recognition may be challenged by the recognized person or by anyone with an interest, when it has been made through falsehood or error, for which the appealing party mentions that the co-defendant [Name3] recognized the minor knowing that he was not his son, such that they consider the non-existence of error in the recognition and, therefore, it cannot be challenged by the plaintiff. Numeral 90 mentions that no recognition is admissible when the child has a filiation established by notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado) and the appellants consider that the defendant [Name3] has held the notorious possession with respect to the minor, so the plaintiff's action would not be admissible. Ordinal 99 indicates that the investigation action is not receivable when the child has a filiation established by notorious possession of status (posesión notoria de estado).

Regarding what they allege with respect to Article 86, the aggrieved parties start from the fact that Mr. [Name3] has a better right to hold the disputed paternity because he recognized the minor without falsehood intervening; however, they are not taking into consideration that the plaintiff initially filed a process to have his paternity over the minor declared, and it is only afterward that he must expand the lawsuit against the co-defendant to challenge the recognition made after the initiation of the process. It is for this reason, precisely, that the criterion of the Court is shared insofar as it reasoned that the co-defendant had made an abusive use of the right (Article 22 of the Civil Code), for although it was within his possibilities to make the recognition protected by law, the fact is that he abused that possibility with the objective of frustrating the right of the biological father, who initiated the process for the declaration of his paternity before the recognition was made in an administrative venue. This is precisely what Article 20 of the Civil Code regulates, which establishes: "Acts performed under the protection of the text of a norm, that pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law (fraude de ley) and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be evaded." To this it must be added that the position maintained by the aggrieved parties in the appeal is contradictory to what they said in their respective responses, since before this body they come alleging that there was no falsehood in the recognition, but in the responses they affirmed that the co-defendant was pregnant before she left the common home and that the co-defendant was the child's father, for which reason Mr. [Name3] even said he was surprised by the judicial process filed. This demonstrates that the good faith required by Article 21 of the Civil Code to exercise a right did not exist. In this way, it is not possible to endorse the position of those appealing, since the recognition of the minor was done fraudulently, to the detriment of the plaintiff's paternity rights and even those of the minor that enshrine the human right to know who his father is.

In addition, given that the declaration of paternity was requested before the recognition made in an administrative venue, the mentioned Article 99 is not opposable, since the notorious possession (posesión notoria) developed as the process elapsed, so it could not prevail over the interest and the right of the minor's biological father. For this same reason, it is not determinative for resolving the matter that the minor is treated by the co-defendant in the same manner that he treats his biological children, as indicated by the witnesses [Name8] and [Name9], for although this denotes great integrity and sensitivity on the part of the co-defendant, it is not sufficient to deprive the biological father of his rights with respect to the minor. The fact that the recognition is annulled and the plaintiff's paternity is declared does not have to change the child's situation in the family in which he develops, because as the appellants well mention, that also forms part of his identity.

**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS.** In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the appeal without merit, with costs to be borne by those who filed it (Article 611 of the Civil Procedure Code).

**POR TANTO** The appeal is declared without merit, with its costs to be borne by the appealing party.

[Name10] [Name11] [Name12] [Name13] [Name14] *[Name15]*

Revisión del Documento Res: 2015-001027 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas quince minutos del dieciocho de setiembre de dos mil quince.

Proceso especial de filiación (impugnación de reconocimiento y reclamación de paternidad) establecido ante el Juzgado de Familia del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sede Ciudad Quesada, por [[Nombre1] ], [...], contra [[Nombre2] ], [...], y [[Nombre3] ], [...]. Todos mayores, casados, vecinos de Alajuela, con las excepciones indicadas.

RESULTANDO:

1.- El actor, en escritos de fechas catorce de octubre de dos mil trece y veinticinco de agosto de dos mil catorce, promovió la presente acción, para que en sentencia se declare que es el padre del menor [[Nombre4] ], se deje sin efecto el reconocimiento hecho por el coaccionado [[Nombre3] ], y se condene en costas a los codemandados.

2.- La codemandada contestó en los términos que indicó en el memorial presentado en fecha trece de agosto de dos mil catorce y opuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva; el codemandado contestó en los términos que indicó en el memorial presentado en fecha tres de octubre de dos mil catorce y opuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva.

3.- El Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, sede Ciudad Quesada, por sentencia de las quince horas siete minutos del dieciséis de marzo de dos mil quince, dispuso : "De conformidad con lo expuesto, normas legales citadas y artículos 1, 7, 99, 102, 104, 153, 155, y 317 Código Procesal Civil, 2, 8, 86, 91, 93, 96, 98, 98 bis del Código de Familia, 3 de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño, artículo 53 de la Constitución Política y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. SE DECLARA CON LUGAR el presente proceso IMPUGNACIÓN DE RECONOCIMIENTO, establecido por [[Nombre1] ] contra [[Nombre3] ] y [[Nombre2] ].- Por otro lado de conformidad con los artículos 91, 92, 96, 98, 98 Bis, del Código de Familia se DECLARA CON LUGAR el presente acción establecida por [[Nombre1] ] contra [[Nombre2] ] y en consecuencia se tiene a éste como el padre biológico de la persona menor de edad [[Nombre5] ], consecuentemente la persona menor de edad tiene derecho a llevar la filiación de su progenitor, a sucederle ab intestato y a ser alimentado por éste. Firme esta sentencia, mediante ejecutoria, inscríbase en el Registro Civil, al margen de las citas de Nacimiento de la persona menor de edad [[Nombre5] ], quien lo sucesivo tendrá los apellidos [[Nombre6] ], de la Provincia de Alajuela, al TOMO [Valor 001]), FOLIO [Valor 002]), ASIENTO [Valor 003]).- Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva.- Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas.". (Sic).

4.- Los codemandados apelaron y el Tribunal de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, por sentencia de las quince horas cuarenta y seis minutos del diecisiete de junio de dos mil quince, resolvió : "Se confirma la sentencia recurrida.". (Sic).

5.- Las partes coaccionadas formularon recurso para ante esta Sala en memorial presentado en fecha veintiuno de julio de dos mil quince, el cual se fundamenta en los motivos que se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones y términos de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Echandi Salas; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES. El actor interpuso proceso especial de filiación indicando que comenzó a convivir con la demandada como marido y mujer bajo el mismo techo en abril de 2012. Ella quedó embarazada y dio a luz al menor [[Nombre4] ] el 13 de diciembre de 2012. Como a los 15 días del nacimiento, la demandada se fue a vivir con su madre y 22 días después se juntó con otro hombre. Afirmó que la demandada no permite que visite al menor, que lo reconozca ni que le ayude con su manutención. Esto último sí lo hizo durante el embarazo, la acompañaba a las citas médicas, los ultrasonidos y las personas lo veían como el padre. Por ello, solicitó que se declare que él es el padre del menor, por lo que tiene derecho a llevar su apellido, a ser alimentado por él y a sucederle ab intestato (folios 1 a 3). La demandada contestó indicando que nunca convivió con el actor. Aclaró que ella tenía una convivencia con el señor [[Nombre3] ] de más de ocho años, con quien tenía dos hijos para ese momento. Por problemas de pareja, ella cambió de domicilio temporalmente y era ahí donde el actor llegó a visitarla en las noches durante un mes. Indicó que en junio de 2012 se enteró de que estaba embarazada desde abril, sea desde que vivía en su hogar con su pareja y sus hijos. Dado que el parto fue mediante cesárea y no tenía quién la cuidara, aceptó irse para la casa de la mamá del actor, pero sólo estuvo 15 días, después se fue a la casa de su hermana y el 2 de enero de 2014 se reconcilió con su pareja, con quien se casó. Además, su compañero reconoció al menor como su hijo y se ha encargado de su manutención, por lo que existe una relación muy estrecha entre ellos. Por eso, solicitó declarar sin lugar la demanda y opuso las defensas de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva (folios 4 a 7). A raíz de esta contestación, el actor amplió la demanda e integró la litis con el codemandado [[Nombre3] ] de quien dijo que reconoció al menor a sabiendas de que no es su hijo y solicitó que se anulara el reconocimiento (folios 8 a 11). El codemandado contestó negativamente, en los mismos términos que la codemandada [[Nombre2] ] y afirmó que cuando ella se fue de la casa, ya estaba embarazada. Además, indicó que cuando reconoció al menor no tenía idea de la existencia del actor ni de la necedad en la que ha incurrido para atormentar a su familia por el error que cometió su esposa (folios 12 a 16). Mediante sentencia de primera instancia se declaró con lugar la demanda y se declaró al actor como padre biológico del menor (folios 27 a 38). Los codemandados apelaron (folios 42 a 53) pero el Tribunal confirmó lo resuelto (folios 73 a 78).

II.- AGRAVIOS. Los codemandados interponen recurso indicando que se interpretó en forma errónea el artículo 86 del Código de Familia, pues se tuvo por cierto que el reconocimiento por parte del codemandado [[Nombre3] ] se hizo bajo falsedad (considerando III de la sentencia). Esto es contrario a la jurisprudencia de la Sala acerca del interés superior del menor y cita el voto 33-11 y el artículo 3 de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño. Mencionan que el actor es un completo desconocido para el menor, quien es la única persona que podría impugnar la paternidad cuando alcance la mayoría de edad. Indican que el actor sólo comparte con el menor los lazos de sangre, pues no estuvo al momento del parto ni reconoció al bebé por medio del auxiliar del Registro Civil en el propio hospital. Rechazan la afirmación del Tribunal en el sentido de que el codemandado realizó un ejercicio abusivo del derecho, pues realizó el reconocimiento bajo falsedad, lo cual no es cierto, ya que cuando fue al Registro Civil a hacer el reconocimiento, lo hizo con el pleno conocimiento de que éste no llevaba su sangre. Por ello, nunca fue inducido a engaño, falsedad ni manipulación por parte de la madre, sino que lo hizo como un acto de amor hacia su hijo, de manera voluntaria y consciente. Con ello, consideran que no hubo ejercicio abusivo ni antisocial de los derechos del menor, sino defensa de sus derechos e identidad. Citan un voto de la Sala Constitucional y mencionan otros de la Sala Segunda, alegando que en el razonamiento del Tribunal se considera erróneamente que la paternidad puede ser sólo biológica. Afirman que el actor ha cumplido con todos los requisitos de la posesión notoria de estado, lo cual es indispensable, según la jurisprudencia, para mantener la condición filiatoria existente. Añaden que los artículos 90 y 99 del Código de Familia fueron inobservados por el Tribunal y que la posesión notoria de estado en este caso ha sido de toda la vida del menor, lo cual definirá toda su vida, su futuro y su identidad. Citan doctrina y jurisprudencia y afirman que quitar la paternidad del codemandado, la cual está socialmente constituida, sería contrario al derecho fundamental del menor y a la filiación obtenida mediante posesión notoria de estado. Mencionan los numerales 2 del Código de Familia y 8.1 de la Convención de Derechos del Niño, para fundamentar que, a su criterio, aplicar la sentencia recurrida traería un daño irreparable para el menor que marcaría su vida, la de los otros dos menores de 6 y 9 años de edad, y la de la familia entera. Adicionalmente, afirman que si el actor después pretendiera un régimen de visitas a futuro, sería imposible que el menor aceptara irse o tener contacto con un completo desconocido. Apuntan que el Tribunal le dio nula importancia al papel de la identidad del menor con respecto a la integración de la familia. Citan una sentencia de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia. Añaden que otro aspecto refutable de la sentencia recurrida es que únicamente se cita el testimonio confuso y complaciente del señor [[Nombre7] ], sin mencionar el de las señoras [[Nombre8] ] y [[Nombre9] ], a quienes les consta la situación y que nunca ha habido diferencia en el trato entre los menores. Concluye solicitando declarar con lugar por el fondo el recurso, anular la sentencia recurrida y ordenar mantener la paternidad del codemandado [[Nombre3] ] sobre el menor. Como prueba para mejor resolver, presentan fotografías que, a su criterio, demuestran la posesión notoria de estado y el vínculo familiar del menor (folios 89 a 98).

III.- ACERCA DE LA PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER. La parte recurrente aporta como prueba para mejor resolver una serie de fotografías que constan a folios 99 y 100), mismas que deben ser rechazadas. Esto debido a que, según lo dispuesto en el numeral 8 del Código de Familia, al trámite de este recurso le resulta aplicable lo regulado en el canon 561 del Código de Trabajo, conforme al cual, ante esta última instancia no es dable proponer ni admitir prueba, salvo que se trate de alguna absolutamente indispensable para resolver con acierto el litigio. En el sub litem, no considera esta Sala que la prueba ofrecida cumpla con los requerimientos del numeral dicho, por lo que procede su rechazo.

IV.- ACERCA DEL FONDO. Una vez analizado el recurso, se llega a la conclusión de que no lleva razón la parte agraviada. Es fundamental tener en consideración que en un caso como este, se busca tutelar tanto los derechos del actor en su condición de padre, como los del menor en su condición de hijo, pues el primero tiene derechos y deberes frente a su hijo, mientras que el segundo también tiene derechos con respecto a su padre y relacionados con su identidad. Así, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (CADH) establece en sus artículos 17.5, 18 y 19, que la ley debe reconocer iguales derechos tanto a los hijos nacidos fuera de matrimonio como a los nacidos dentro del mismo, el derecho de toda persona a tener un nombre propio y los apellidos de sus padres, así como el derecho de toda persona menor de edad a las medidas de protección que tal condición requiera, por parte de su familia, de la sociedad y del Estado. La Convención de los Derechos del Niño contempla en sus numerales 5, 7 y 8 que el Estado debe respetar las responsabilidades, derechos y deberes de los padres de impartir dirección y orientación a las personas menores de edad para que ejerzan sus derechos, entre los cuales se encuentra el de tener un nombre, conocer a sus padres y ser cuidado por ellos. Además, debe respetársele a la persona menor de edad su identidad, entre lo que se incluye nuevamente el nombre y las relaciones familiares de conformidad con la ley, a la vez que se establece la obligación del estado de prestar asistencia y protección para restablecer estos elementos de identidad. El numeral 9 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo menciona, también como una obligación del Estado, velar por que la persona menor de edad no sea separada de sus padres contra la voluntad de éstos, salvo en casos en que el interés superior lo amerite, lo cual no es el caso de marras. El ordinal 18.1 añade que el Estado debe garantizar el reconocimiento de que ambos progenitores tienen obligaciones comunes en lo que respecta a la crianza y desarrollo de la persona menor de edad, pues es a ellos a quienes incumbe garantizar y promover sus derechos, así como ejercer la crianza y promover su desarrollo. En este mismo sentido, se cuenta con el artículo 53 de la Constitución Política, que establece (al igual que lo hace la CADH), las obligaciones de los padres con respecto a sus hijos, independientemente de si fueron nacidos dentro o fuera del matrimonio, pero, además, añade con meridiana claridad que toda persona tiene derecho a saber quiénes son sus padres. Por su parte, el artículo 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia establece que el interés superior de la persona menor de edad debe privar en cualquier actuación pública y privada, con el objetivo de garantizar el respeto de sus derechos y su pleno desarrollo. Para determinar el interés superior, la norma indica que debe tomarse en cuenta al menor como sujeto de derechos y responsabilidades, considerar su edad y condiciones personales, sus condiciones socioeconómicas y la correspondencia entre el interés individual y el social. En el sub litem, el niño cuenta con menos de tres años, por lo que no puede valerse por sí mismo ni valorar qué es lo más beneficioso para sí, en virtud de lo cual, la decisión de este asunto por parte de la autoridad judicial debe tomar esta condición en cuenta para efectos de tutelar sus derechos. Tanto la normativa nacional como la internacional son claras en indicar que el demandante, como padre biológico del menor, tiene obligaciones para con él, entre las que se cuentan defender sus derechos y contribuir con su desarrollo, de manera que no sería justo ni lícito, privarlo de sus derechos cuando no existe motivo alguno que haga suponer su imposibilidad para ejercerlos de la manera en que más beneficie a su hijo. Por el contrario, se valora que ha tenido interés en establecer su paternidad desde el primer momento, pues interpuso el proceso para que fuera declarada judicialmente unos meses después de que nació el bebé. Además de esto, cuando se dio cuenta de que el codemandado había reconocido al niño como hijo propio, amplió la demanda y solicitó la nulidad de tal reconocimiento, por lo que no ha desistido de su intención de velar por su hijo y ejercer los derechos y deberes que como padre le corresponden. Por su parte, al menor le asisten los derechos de saber quién es su padre, de llevar su apellido y de cultivar y mantener su identidad y personalidad. Todo esto está íntimamente ligado al reconocimiento de quién es a partir de sus lazos sanguíneos y familiares, su nombre y su procedencia. Negarle al menor la posibilidad de tener certeza acerca de quién es su padre biológico, haría nugatorios estos derechos indispensables para el desarrollo de su personalidad y su desenvolvimiento integral. Asimismo, existe un interés en la correspondencia entre el padre biológico y el padre registral en condiciones normales, es decir, cuando no existen circunstancias especiales que ameriten que prevalezca la convivencia sobre los lazos sanguíneos. Lo anterior por motivos de interés social y hasta de salud pública. En efecto, la ley da preeminencia a los lazos sanguíneos sobre los que surgen con la convivencia como regla general, de manera que declarar legalmente la existencia de lazos familiares con base en la convivencia es la excepción. Por ello, la posesión notoria de estado, en un caso como este, en el que el padre biológico ha accionado para que se declare legalmente su paternidad, no podría tener la prevalencia que alegan quienes recurren. Además, debe tenerse en cuenta que, si bien el codemandado es reconocido como padre del menor por las personas cercanas a su familia, es porque tanto él como su esposa han impedido que el accionante haga valer sus derechos como padre, por lo que no podría darse prioridad a la posesión notoria de estado sobre la filiación biológica de un padre que ha mostrado interés en establecer legalmente la relación de parentesco con respecto a su hijo desde su nacimiento. Ahora, se mencionan en el recurso los artículos 86, 90 y 99 del Código de Familia, los cuales se refieren a la impugnación de reconocimiento y la filiación por posesión notoria de estado. El primero de ellos establece que el reconocimiento puede ser impugnado por el reconocido o por quien tenga interés, cuando ha sido hecho mediante falsedad o error, por lo que la parte recurrente menciona que el codemandado [[Nombre3] ] reconoció al menor a sabiendas de que no era su hijo, de manera que considera la inexistencia del error en el reconocimiento y, por tanto, no puede ser impugnado por el actor. El numeral 90 menciona que no es admisible ningún reconocimiento cuando el hijo tenga una filiación establecida por la posesión notoria de estado y los recurrentes consideran que el demandado [[Nombre3] ] ha ostentado la posesión notoria con respecto al menor, por lo que la gestión del actor no sería admisible. El ordinal 99 señala que no es de recibo la acción de investigación cuando el hijo tenga una filiación establecida por la posesión notoria de estado. En cuanto a lo que alegan con respecto al artículo 86, los agraviados parten del hecho de que el señor [[Nombre3] ] tiene mejor derecho de ostentar la discutida paternidad pues reconoció al menor sin que mediara falsedad, sin embargo, no están tomando en consideración que inicialmente el actor interpuso un proceso para que declararan su paternidad sobre el menor y no es sino después, que debe ampliar la demanda contra el codemandado para impugnar el reconocimiento que realizó después de la instauración del proceso. Por ello es, precisamente, que se comparte el criterio del Tribunal en cuanto razonó que el codemandado había hecho un uso abusivo del derecho (artículo 22 del Código Civil), pues si bien estaba dentro de sus posibilidades hacer el reconocimiento amparado en la ley, lo cierto es que abusó de esa posibilidad con el objetivo de frustrar el derecho del padre biológico, quien inició el proceso para la declaración de su paternidad antes de que se hiciera el reconocimiento en sede administrativa. Esto es precisamente lo que regula el artículo 20 del Código Civil, el cual establece: “Los actos realizados al amparo del texto de una norma, que persigan un resultado prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, o contrario a él, se considerarán ejecutados en fraude de ley y no impedirán la debida aplicación de la norma que se hubiere tratado de eludir.” A esto debe agregarse que la posición que mantienen los agraviados en el recurso es contradictoria con lo que dijeron en sus respectivas contestaciones, pues ante esta sede vienen alegando que no hubo falsedad en el reconocimiento, pero en las contestaciones afirmaron que la codemandada estaba embarazada desde antes de que saliera del hogar común y que el codemandado era el padre del niño, por lo que incluso el señor [[Nombre3] ] dijo estar extrañado por el proceso judicial interpuesto. Esto evidencia que no existió la buena fe que exige el artículo 21 del Código Civil para ejercitar un derecho. De esta manera, no es posible avalar la posición de quienes recurren, ya que el reconocimiento del menor se hizo de manera fraudulenta, en perjuicio de los derechos de paternidad del actor e incluso, de aquellos del menor que consagran el derecho humano de conocer quién es su padre. En adición, dado que la declaración de paternidad fue solicitada antes del reconocimiento realizado en sede administrativa, no es oponible el artículo 99 mencionado, pues la posesión notoria fue desarrollándose conforme transcurrió el proceso, por lo que no podría preponderar sobre el interés y el derecho del padre biológico del menor. Por este mismo motivo es que no resulta determinante para resolver el asunto que el menor sea tratado por el codemandado de la misma manera que trata a sus hijos biológicos, según lo que indican las testigas [[Nombre8] ] y [[Nombre9] ], pues si bien esto denota gran entereza y sensibilidad por parte del codemandado, no es suficiente para privar al padre biológico de sus derechos con respecto al menor. El hecho de que se anule el reconocimiento y se declare la paternidad del actor, no tiene por qué cambiar la situación del niño en la familia en la cual se desarrolla, pues como bien lo mencionan los recurrentes, también eso forma parte de su identidad.

V.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES. De conformidad con lo expuesto, procede declarar sin lugar el recurso, con las costas a cargo de quienes lo plantearon (artículo 611 del Código Procesal Civil).

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso, con sus costas a cargo de la parte recurrente.

[Nombre10] [Nombre11] [Nombre12] [Nombre13] [Nombre14] [Nombre15]