Exclusion of Cocles Coast from Keköldi Indigenous ReserveExclusión de costa de Cocles de Reserva Indígena Keköldi

Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Office 04 Telephone 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Email ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ CASE FILE: 10-000273-1028-CA PREFERENTIAL PROCEEDING PLAINTIFF: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 DEFENDANTS: THE STATE, THE INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, THE COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS, and the ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA DE TALAMANCA INTERESTED THIRD PARTY: TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A.

PASSIVE CO-ADJUVANTS: LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, JUMGLEBUNGALO LIMITADA, Nombre105706 , TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A., LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A., Nombre142239 , Nombre142240 , Nombre142241 , Nombre142242 , Nombre142243 , Nombre142244 , Nombre142245 , Nombre142246 , Nombre142247 , LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA, OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL, and THE ESTATE OF Nombre142248 .

No. 138-2013-VI ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL FINANCIAL APPEALS TRIBUNAL. SIXTH SECTION. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at ten o'clock on the nineteenth of November, two thousand thirteen.

Ordinary proceeding declared preferential initiated by the ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 , legal identification number CED8667, represented by its special judicial attorney-in-fact Danilo Chaverri Barrantes, attorney, identity card number CED104828, against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (hereinafter INDER), represented by its general judicial attorney-in-fact Carlos Enrique García Anchía, married, attorney, identity card number CED27295, and resident of San Ramón; the STATE represented by the state attorney Bernardo Lara Flores, married, attorney, identity card number CED10238, and resident of San José; the COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS (hereinafter CONAI), represented by its President Nombre136655 , married, farmer, identity card number CED89170, resident of the Indigenous Community of Nairí Awari; and the ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142249 , represented by its president Nombre142250 , married, farmer, identity card number CED111803, and resident of Amubri de Talamanca. The company TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A. participates, represented by its president Nombre142251 , married, businessman, identity card number CED30530, and resident of San José, in the capacity of interested third party with its own claims. Participating as passive co-adjuvants are LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, represented by its manager Nombre142252 , married, homemaker, identity card number CED111804, and resident of Montes de Oca; JUMGLE BUNGALO LIMITADA, represented by its manager Nombre142253 , married, attorney, identity card number CED111805, and resident of Montes de Oca; Nombre105706 , married, attorney, identity card number CED111806, and resident of San José; the companies TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A. and LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A., represented by their unlimited general attorney-in-fact Nombre142254 , with a single surname by virtue of his Canadian nationality, married, businessman, with passport from his country number CED111801, and resident of Dirección17222, ; Nombre142239 , widow, homemaker, identity card number CED111807, and resident of Dirección17223 , ; Nombre142240 , divorced, agronomist, identity card number Placa27825, and resident of Dirección17222, ; CARIBIANA GS LIMITADA, represented by its unlimited general attorney-in-fact Emilio de Gómez-Selléz Antoranz, in a common-law marriage, businessman, Spanish citizen with residency card CED111808, and resident of Dirección17222, ; Nombre142242 , with a single surname due to her Italian nationality, married, psychologist, passport from her country CED111809, and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142243 , with a single surname by virtue of his Italian nationality, married, administrative assistant, residency card CED111810, and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142244 , with a single surname due to her Italian nationality, married twice, administrator, residency card CED111811, and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142245 , single, farmer, identity card number CED111812, and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142246 , divorced, builder, passport CED111813, and resident of Cocles de Talamanca; Nombre142247 , with a single surname due to his United States nationality, divorced, writer, passport Placa27826, resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA, represented by its sub-manager Nombre142255 , with a single surname by virtue of her Canadian nationality, divorced, businesswoman, passport CED111802, and resident of Cocles; OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL, represented by its manager Encarnación García Vila, single, biologist, passport CED111814, resident of Dirección17222, and the ESTATE OF Nombre142248 ., represented by its executor Nombre142256 , married, taxi driver, identity card number CED111815, and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca. Additionally, the attorneys Shirley Campos García and Maribel Aguilar Cedeño intervene in their capacity as general judicial and special judicial attorneys-in-fact for INDER, respectively; María Teresa Fernández Chinchilla as special judicial attorney-in-fact for CONAI; Luis Manuel Castro Ventura, Mauricio Salas Villalobos, Luis Ortiz Zamora, and Esteban Alfaro Calderón as special judicial attorneys-in-fact for the interested third party with its own claims; Nombre98251 as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the passive co-adjuvant La Cherokeana Tres Limitada; and Nombre105706 as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the other passive co-adjuvants.

WHEREAS

1.- The plaintiff initiates this proceeding so that, in essence, the judgment: 1) Declares that my client is the owner of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, under real property folio number Placa2092. 2) Declares the nullity—in the terms I clarify below—of Articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of 1996: a) Declare Article 2 null only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, under real property folio number Placa2092. We are not requesting the nullity of the decree insofar as it expands the limits of that Reserve to the south and west. b) Declare Article 3 null in its entirety. 3) Declares the nullity—in the terms I clarify below—of Articles 1 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956 of the year 2001: a) Declare Article 1 null only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from indigenous territory of a part of property Placa2092, previously cited, in the same manner as done by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of 1996. We are not requesting the nullity of the decree insofar as it expands the limits of that Reserve to the south and west. b) Declare Article 3 null only insofar as it considers Article 3 of Decreto 25296, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, to be in force. 4) Orders INDER and CONAI to conduct the studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within our indigenous territory, specifically the sector of the Limón property, real property folio number Placa2092, which is not recognized as ours in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296-G of June 24, 1996. 5) Orders INDER and CONAI to initiate those studies and procedures when the judgment becomes final and conclude them two months thereafter. 6) Orders INDER and CONAI to undertake the steps to relocate those persons if they so wish, or if relocation is not possible or they do not accept it, to initiate procedures to expropriate and indemnify them in accordance with the procedures established in the Ley de Expropiaciones. 7) Orders INDER to initiate the relocation or expropriation procedures and steps immediately after completing the studies and procedures referred to in the claim, respecting the deadlines designated for that purpose. 8) Orders the Executive Branch to provide the necessary financial resources to INDER and CONAI to proceed with the mentioned expropriations and indemnifications. 9) Orders the Executive Branch to initiate the steps to provide those institutions with the resources when the judgment becomes final, preparing, if necessary, an extraordinary budget that must be presented to the Legislative Assembly no more than two months after that finality. 10) The defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay all costs of this action. As a subsidiary claim, it requests the following: 1) Declare that CONAI, INDER, and the State (Executive Branch) must jointly and severally pay the plaintiff association the sum of twelve billion colones as indemnification for the de facto expropriation that occurred (material value of the land, material value of the natural-forest resources and others of common use by the indigenous communities—and spiritual value of the territory). 2) The defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the costs of this action (petitions visible at folio 164, adjusted at folio 456, reformulated at folios 815, all from the judicial case file and as established during the single hearing).

2.- This proceeding was declared preferential by resolution issued by this Tribunal at 8:15 a.m. on May 21, 2010 (folios 177 and 178 of this case file).

3.- The State answered the complaint and raised the preliminary defenses of improper joinder of parties and expiry, as well as the exceptions of lack of standing to be sued and lack of right (folios 188 to 193, 470 to 474, 881, and 882 of the judicial case file).

4.- INDER answered the complaint and raised the preliminary defenses of improper joinder of parties and expiry, as well as the exception of lack of right. As relevant, it requested that the complaint be declared without merit and the plaintiff be ordered to pay all costs (folios 215 to 235, 718 to 730, and 885 to 891 of the judicial case file).

5.- In accordance with Article 65 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (hereinafter CPCA), CONAI was declared in default for not having answered the complaint within the granted timeframe. Consequently, the complaint was deemed affirmatively answered regarding the facts, without prejudice to it being able to appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state it finds it (see single hearing recording attached to the case file).

6.- The Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca answered the complaint affirmatively and did not raise exceptions (folio 286 of the judicial case file).

7.- In a resolution issued at 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 2013, this Tribunal admitted the participation of the entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. in this proceeding, as a third party with its own claims. The petitions formulated by said company are as follows: 1) That all of the plaintiff's claims be declared without merit. 2) That it be declared that the plaintiff Association has no right over the properties of Partido Limón registered under real property folio numbers Placa27827 and Placa27828, which are the property of the petitioning company. 3) That it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and INDER, has any ownership or possession right over properties No. Placa27827 and Placa27828 registered in its name. 4) That the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain currently and in the future from any form of de facto or legal disturbance over the indicated properties, and that they renounce any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. 5) That the counter-defendant (the plaintiff) be ordered to pay the costs. Likewise, it alleged an improper joinder of parties (folios 526 to 550 of the judicial case file and as established in the single hearing).

8.- INDER and the State answered the third-party claim and did not raise exceptions (folios 823 to 829, 883, and 884 of the judicial case file).

9.- The plaintiff association answered the third-party claim and opposed the exceptions of lack of standing to be sued ad causam, lack of interest, and lack of right (folios 830 to 836 of the judicial case file).

10.- By resolution issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 4, 2013, it was determined that CONAI and the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca had not answered the third-party claim within the granted timeframe. Therefore, in accordance with Article 65 of the CPCA, they were declared in default, and the third-party claim was deemed affirmatively answered regarding the facts, without prejudice to them being able to appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state it finds it (folios 961 and 962 of this case file).

11.- In Resolution No. 058-2013-VI, issued at 2:10 p.m. on April 10, 2013, this Tribunal rejected the preliminary defense of improper joinder of parties that had been raised by the State, INDER, and the third party with its own claims (folios 829 to 849 of this case file).

12.- By Resolution No. 315-2013, issued at 4:00 p.m. on May 29, 2013, the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda summarily rejected the appeal that had been filed against the cited Resolution No. 058-2013-VI (folios 947 and 948 of this folder).

13.- In accordance with Articles 60 subsection 3) and 70 subsection 2) of the CPCA, the single hearing was held on October 29 and 30, 2013, with the presence of all parties, the third party with its own claims, and the passive co-adjuvants. Therein, the claims were established as described in the first Whereas clause, and the requests for passive co-adjuvancy made were admitted. Likewise, in Resolution No. 129-2013-VI, the preliminary defense of improper joinder of parties that INDER had now raised in relation to the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación was rejected. Then, the disputed facts were established, the pertinent documentary evidence was admitted, and the testimony of the admitted witnesses and expert was taken. Finally, the parties presented closing arguments, and upon their conclusion, the Tribunal declared this proceeding to be complex, for the purposes of Article 111 subsection 1) of the cited Procedural Code, in relation to numeral 82, subsection 1), of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda.

14.- In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no grounds for nullity requiring correction or causing defenselessness have been observed. In accordance with Articles 111 of the CPCA, in relation to numerals 79 and 82 of its Regulations, after deliberation, this judgment is issued, drafted, and communicated within the legal term, drafted by the presiding judge Abarca Gómez, with the affirmative vote of judge Garita Navarro and judge Cortés Morales.

CONSIDERING

I.- Proven facts. Relevant to the resolution, the following has been demonstrated: 1) In July 1946, Nombre142248 registered cadastral map Placa27829, corresponding to a property owned by him, located at the mouth of the Cocles River. The property measured 25 hectares, 2750 square meters located in the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, situated in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón, and covered a significant area of what is now the coastal plain at Cocles beach in Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial case file). 2) The property described in map Placa27829 was registered in the National Registry under the real property system No. 7-05365-000 (expert report rendered by Nombre142257 at folios 388 to 392 of the judicial case file, cd with cadastral mosaic). 3) The entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. is the owner of the properties registered in the National Registry, Partido de Limón, under titles Placa27830 and Placa27831, which originate from and derive from the property registered under the real property system No. 7-05365-000 (certifications visible at folios 559 to 568 of the judicial case file, cd with cadastral mosaic provided by the expert). 4) By Decreto No. 6036-G, of May 26, 1976, the limits of the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve, among others, were reformed. Said norm established that "(...) the Talamanca Reserve shall include, as an administrative annex, the 'Reserva Indígena de Cocles', corresponding to part of properties 1,089 and 1,050 of ITCO. Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. (...)" (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 5) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267, of August 09, 1977, the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 de Cocles was located. That delimitation was confirmed by the Ley Indígena, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977 (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 6) In the year 1979, the State proceeded with the registration of the indigenous territory delimited in Decretos Ejecutivos No. 6036-G and No. Placa26323, which corresponded to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, title Placa27618 (inferred from the expert report rendered by Nombre142257 , query made to the National Registry website). 7) The property registered in the partido of Limón, title Placa2092, lacks a cadastral map (fact accepted by the plaintiff, the State, and the company participating as third party with its own claims during their closing arguments, and expert report rendered by Nombre142257 , General Coordinator of the Executing Unit of the Regularization and Registry Program, folios 357 and 358 of the judicial case file). 8) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 16568-G, of September 25, 1985, it was provided that the Reserva Indígena de Cocles constituted a reserve independent of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 de Talamanca (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 9) By deed number 85 executed before notary Nombre142257 at 12:00 noon on April 5, 1989, the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca donated to the plaintiff Association the property registered in the Public Registry, Partido de Limón, at volume 2548, folio 35, number Placa27618, entry 1; in compliance with the provisions of the cited Decreto No. Placa27832. Said deed was presented to the National Registry on April 19, 1990, under citations 378-18219-001, and to date has not been registered (folios 154 to 156 of the judicial case file, express statement by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca upon answering the complaint, and query made to the National Registry website). 10) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of June 24, 1996, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267 cited was repealed, it was established that the Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles would henceforth be called "Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles)", and its delimitation was modified (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 11) The indigenous community Nombre142238 was consulted on the modification of the limits of the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 proposed in the challenged decrees (thus inferred from the recital part of both general scope norms and folios 594 to 602, 604, 605, and 608 to 611 of the judicial case file). 12) The delimitation established in the cited Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 did not diminish the area of the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 (thus inferred from the recital part of that norm and from the plaintiff's statement admitting the inclusion of lands). 13) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956, of March 22, 2001, Article 2 of the cited Decreto 25296 was reformed, and the current limits of the Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles) were established (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 14) In the territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 by Decretos No. 25296 and No. 29956, the following cadastral maps are registered: Placa27833, registered on June 8, 1995, which is linked to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, real property folio number No. Placa27819; , registered on May 27, 1994, which is linked to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, real property folio number No. Placa27820; , registered on October 13, 2004, which is linked to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, real property folio number No. Placa27821; , registered on December 20, 1996, which is linked to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, real property folio number No. Placa27822; , registered on March 1, 1975, and with no associated property; 7-0030961-1977, registered on February 9, 1977, which is linked to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, real property folio number No. Placa27834; 7-0009398-1971, registered on September 21, 1971, and with no associated property; 7-0009380-1946, registered in July 1946, which is linked to the property registered in the Partido de Limón, real property folio number No. Placa27835 (expert report rendered by Nombre142257 visible at folios 354 to 372, 385, 386, 838, and cd of cadastral mosaic). 15) The territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 by Decretos No. 25296 and No. 29956 has been inhabited by non-indigenous persons, mainly Afro-descendants and white persons, who registered cadastral maps and registered private property since 1946, and who engaged in activities such as fishing, and the planting of cocoa and other tubers (testimonies of Nombre142258 , Nombre142259 , and Nombre142260 ). 16) There were no indigenous settlements on the coast of Cocles or in the territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 by Decretos No. 25296 and No. 29956. They lived in the high parts of Talamanca and came down to the plain and the coast of Cocles to perform work such as clearing (chapia) (testimonies of Nombre142258 , Nombre142259 ). 17) The indigenous community of Nombre142249 has used and benefited from the sea and the coast of Cocles (testimonies of Nombre142258 and Nombre142260 ).

II.- Unproven facts. Relevant for the purposes of this dispute, the following are deemed unproven: 1) That the indigenous community Nombre142238 had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees, such that a right to private indigenous property could derive therefrom (there is a lack of evidence). 2) That the territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 by Decretos No. 25296 and No. 29956 constitutes territory that was traditionally or ancestrally occupied by that indigenous community (no suitable evidence was provided to allow reaching that conclusion). 3) That the State had denied the indigenous population of Nombre142238 access to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles (not proven).

III.- Purpose of the proceeding. From the claims and arguments of the parties, the Tribunal considers that this proceeding fundamentally concerns the legality review of Articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 and numerals 1 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956. Fundamentally, the delimitation carried out regarding the Bribri Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi is challenged, insofar as the plaintiff considers that a part of the property owned by it, registered in the Partido de Limón under real property folio title Placa2092, was illegitimately excluded. This is because, in reality, the excluded part constitutes land traditionally occupied by them and to which they have a right. Fundamentally, the plaintiff alleges that the formal conducts are invalid because they violate the Principle of Legality and Legal Reserve, and disregard their right to private property. Based on the declaration of nullity, a series of accessory claims are formulated, insofar as they depend on the alleged invalidity being declared. In that sense, it is requested that it be declared that they are the owners of the entirety of the referred property 19056-000, that is, including the portion that was illegitimately excluded by the challenged decrees. Furthermore, it seeks a declaration regarding the presumed inactivity of INDER, CONAI, and the State, in failing to comply with the obligation imposed by the current regulations, especially Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, to conduct the necessary studies and appraisals so that an extraordinary budget can be approved to expropriate and indemnify all non-indigenous persons occupying the Indigenous Territory Nombre142238 (in the part that was illegitimately excluded) in order to proceed with their effective eviction and the effective recovery of those lands by that indigenous people. On this last topic (the omission), it is requested that the Tribunal order the fulfillment of the referred actions to cease the illegitimate inactivity that has occurred over the years. Now, the Tribunal admitted the participation of the entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. in this proceeding, as a third party with its own claims. The referred company claims to be the owner of two properties located in the zone that, according to the plaintiff association, was illegitimately excluded from their territory and which they now seek to recover. Therefore, the third party requests that all claims formulated by the plaintiff be declared without merit and that the latter has no right over the properties of Partido Limón registered under real property folio numbers Placa27827 and Placa27828, which are its property. Furthermore, that it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has any ownership or possession right over the referred properties, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain currently and in the future from any form of de facto or legal disturbance over the indicated properties, and that they renounce any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. Given the various statements that the litigating parties provide in support of the positions in controversy, for what is considered better order, the following sections will address each of the thematic axes that the plaintiff association raises in its grievances, as well as the arguments of the defendants, the passive co-adjuvants, and the third party with its own claims, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, with due analysis, of course, of all that has been argued.

IV.- On the recognition of indigenous property in the Costa Rican legal system. Due to the topic under debate, the Tribunal deems it necessary to outline some brief considerations regarding the regulations that govern indigenous property in our country and the interpretation that, in this Tribunal's judgment, should be given to those normative precepts. Thus, we have that the first legislative provision that expressly recognizes the property right of indigenous communities is the Ley Sobre Terrenos Baldíos, No. 13, of January 10, 1939, which in its Article 8 provided, as relevant, "(...) a prudential zone, at the discretion of the Executive Branch, is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, in the places where tribes of these exist, in order to preserve our autochthonous race and save them from future injustices. (...)" (highlighting is not from the original). That norm was developed by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 45, of December 3, 1945, which in its first article indicated "(...) The unoccupied lands occupied by them are declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the autochthonous indigenous tribes; with the exception of the strips destined for the Inter-American Highway. (...)" (highlighting is not from the original). With the enactment, in 1949, of the Political Constitution that currently governs us, its Article 45 recognizes and protects the right to property, which implies a recognition of ownership with all its inherent attributes (individualistic conception of property in terms of Roman Law). From this, a protection of the collective property right of indigenous peoples emerges, pre-existing the Constitution, first from the Spanish Colony, then from the United Provinces of Central America, and later, from the Republic of Costa Rica as an Independent State. Subsequently, by Ley No. 2330, of April 9, 1959, our country approved Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization (hereinafter ILO), called the "Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries." Regarding the matter at hand, Article 11 established that in the bound States: “The right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favor of the members of the populations in question over the lands traditionally occupied by them.” (Emphasis not in the original). Subsequently, the Land and Colonization Law No. 2825, of May 14, 1961, provided in its Article 75 that the then Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, hereinafter ITCO) “(...) in coordination with the pertinent bodies, shall ensure the conditioning of indigenous communities or families, in accordance with the spirit of this law. It shall not be declared that the extensive areas where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them, but rather efforts shall be made to bring all these communities together, forming a single agricultural center, in the area that the Institute deems appropriate and for which purpose the necessary area of land shall be used.” Likewise, Article 76 states that “(...) Free of charge and in ownership, parcels that the Institute designates as the minimum indispensable to satisfy the needs of the indigenous families, and exploitable by that group, without the need for salaried workers, shall be delivered to them. (...).” Furthermore, the Law Creating the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs No. 5251, of July 11, 1973, establishes in its Article 4, subsection e) as one of the objectives of CONAI, “(...) To ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, stimulating State action to guarantee the Indian efficient individual and collective land ownership; (...).” We also have that the Indigenous Law, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, provided in its Article 1 that indigenous people are those who constitute ethnic groups directly descended from pre-Columbian civilizations and who preserve their own identity, and declared indigenous reserves, those established, among others, in Executive Decrees No. 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G and 7268-G of August 20, 1977, as well as the Guaymi de Conteburica Indigenous Reserve. It also stated that the limits set for the reserves, in those decrees, could not be varied by reducing their area, except by express law. Article 2 establishes that indigenous reserves are the property of these communities and that they must all be registered in the National Registry in their name. For its part, numeral 3 reiterates that these are inalienable and imprescriptible territories, non-transferable and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them, and non-indigenous persons are not permitted to rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms included within these reserves, any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereof in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, being absolutely null with the legal consequences of the case. Reinforcing all of the above, through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, of the International Labour Organization, was approved, which also regulates the issue of indigenous property. As relevant, Article 13 states that “1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term ‘lands’ in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.” Article 14 establishes that “1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. Particular attention shall be paid in this respect to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.” Finally, numeral 16 indicates, as relevant, that “1. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy.

V.- From the cited regulations, we can arrive at several relevant conclusions regarding the right of property recognized to indigenous peoples. First, it is a right that encompasses, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, hereinafter I/A Court HR) has stated, in the Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172 “(...) the concepts of property and possession in indigenous communities can have a collective meaning, in the sense that ownership is not centered on an individual but rather on the group and its community” (...).“ Thus, it is a collective right that benefits these peoples, but which exists without prejudice to the substantive rights and procedural actions to which the individual members of these communities are entitled by virtue of their status as inhabitants of our country. In this sense, it is worth noting that although the owners of these territories do not have any special self-protection regime for said territories, national law does recognize a duty of public entities to provide said territories with Special Protection, a concept with a univocal meaning in the International Human Rights Law that governs this matter. Second, said collective or communal property is not comparable, from any perspective, to the public domain. Although, based on the express text of Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, indigenous territories are inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable; these characteristics do not grant them the quality of public domain goods, given that they do not satisfy the indispensable and common elements of all public-domain goods. Thus, the indigenous territories recognized in Costa Rica are private property goods of the indigenous peoples inhabiting the national territory, each with its own legal personality and absolutely autonomous among themselves, by virtue of the fact that each one is a cultural, social, ethnic, and historical unit. Third, this right to collective or communal property extends to the territories that have traditionally and ancestrally been used or occupied by indigenous peoples. The foregoing covers not only the referred territories but also the natural resources linked to their culture found there and the incorporeal elements derived from it, an aspect that for the indigenous community is fundamental for its physical, cultural, economic, and food survival. From this perspective, the scope of communal private property in relation to the territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands. In this sense, the I/A Court HR has stated in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, that “(...) To determine the existence of the relationship of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands, the Court has established that: i) it can be expressed in different ways according to the indigenous people involved and the specific circumstances in which they find themselves, and ii) the relationship with the lands must be possible. Some forms of expression of this relationship could include traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or cultivations; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing, or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs; and any other element characteristic of their culture. The second element implies that the members of the Community are not prevented, for reasons beyond their control, from carrying out those activities that reveal the persistence of the relationship with their traditional lands. (...).” It should be added, however, that in the opinion of this Tribunal, that special relationship of the indigenous community with the lands traditionally occupied by them must necessarily be demonstrated through the means deemed suitable in each specific case. Finally, the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories begins with the recognition (not the constitution) by law or administrative act. It is from that moment that certain estates are granted the attributes and legal protection described above, all without prejudice to the existence of some other real or personal right that the indigenous community or any of its members may have over such properties by reason of ancestral possession. Said recognition does not in any way constitute conduct in which there is discretion in the exercise of the competence element of the respective administrative conduct by the bodies empowered to make such recognition. Once the existence of an indigenous people in a determined geographic environment of ancestral position is established, it becomes unavoidable for the respective Public Administrations to exercise their competencies under the terms regulated in Article 60 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP). Once the indigenous territory is recognized, it can only lose this condition if two requirements are satisfied. The first, of a formal nature, namely, the issuance of a legal norm in a material and formal sense that so provides. The second, of a material nature, which implies the informed decision of the indigenous people themselves to renounce the collective property system in which they participate. For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that both the recognition of the existence of an indigenous territory and its protection imply mandatory conduct for public entities with competencies in the matter.

VI.- On the delimitation of the Kéköldi Indigenous Reserve. Prior to examining the legality of the challenged formal conduct, the Tribunal also deems it necessary to refer specifically to the recognition of the territory of the indigenous community of the plaintiff association. Thus, it is recorded that through Executive Decree No. 5904, of March 11, 1976, the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves were initially established. In the recital part of that normative instrument, it was indicated, among others, “(...) 5th- That there still exist territories populated exclusively by indigenous people making the delimitation of said Reserves possible; (...) 10th- That it is the duty of the State to watch over the security of its citizens, and prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities. (...)” (Emphasis not in the original). In addition, its first article ordered that its exact delimitation would be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Of relevance to the object of this process, Executive Decree No. 6036-G, of June 12, 1976, reformed the limits of the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves and establishes the Telire Reserve. In its recital part, it is stated that “(...) Decree No. 5904-G of March 14, 1976, published in Supplement No. 60 to ‘La Gaceta’ No. 70 of April 10, 1976, left out of the Reserves created by said decree, important nuclei of indigenous population, in areas exclusively populated by them (...)” (emphasis not in the original). As regards the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve, it was indicated that it was located on the National Geographic Institute maps, Cahuita 3644-I, Amubri 3644-IV, Sukut 3645-III, Siola 3544-II, scale 1: 50,000, specifying in its fourth article, its courses, distances, and coordinates. Also, an area of 56,829 hectares and 9,275 square meters is established. As an important aspect in what will be resolved here, the norm in question states that the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the “Cocles Indigenous Reserve”, corresponding to part of farms 1,089 and 1,050 of ITCO and that its exact delimitation will be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Subsequently, through Executive Decree No. 7267, of August 9, 1977, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was established (currently Kéköldi Indigenous Reserve). It is important to highlight that the recital part of that norm refers to the cited Decree No. 6036-G, specifically mentioning that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, corresponding to part of farms 1089 and 1050 of ITCO and indicated that the studies aimed at locating the indigenous population of that region and determining the exact limits of that reserve had already been carried out. Thus, Article 3 indicates that the Kéköldi Indigenous Reserve is located on the cartographic maps of the National Geographic Institute, scale 1:50,000, Amubri 3644 IV, Sixaola 3644 I, and Cahuita 3645 II, and proceeds to delimit it according to the coordinates indicated therein. Therefore, the land owned by this indigenous community having been recognized in the manner indicated, the Indigenous Law, in its Article 1, declared the one established, among others, in Executive Decree No. 6036-G, already cited, the Kéköldi indigenous community, to be an indigenous reserve. It also stated that the limits set for the reserve, in that decree, could not be varied by reducing their area, except by express law. Subsequently, pursuant to Executive Decree No. 16568, of September 25, 1985, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was constituted as a reserve independent of the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve. Finally, mention should be made of the challenged norms. First, Executive Decree No. 25296, of June 24, 1996, which in its recital part indicated, as relevant, “(...) That the Cocles (Keköldi) Indigenous Reserve was delimited by Decree 7267-G of August 9, 1977, Supplement No. 114 to ‘La Gaceta’ No. 157 of August 20, 1977, and confirmed by Indigenous Law No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, ‘La Gaceta’ No. 240 of December 20, 1977. By Decree 16568-G of September 25, 1985, ‘La Gaceta’ 191 of October 8, 1985, it was established as an Independent Reserve. 2nd—That the delimitation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3rd—That from the foregoing, it follows that, in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4th—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions in the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5th—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the limits of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6th—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of limits by executive decree, provided there is no reduction in the surface area of the Reserve. 7th—That the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, CONAI, carried out studies aimed at modifying the limits of the Cocles Reserve, excluding problematic lands and compensating for them by including forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8th—That this modification allows, on the other hand, including lands belonging to indigenous people which until now were not protected under the Indigenous Reserve statute. 9th—That pursuant to Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, ‘La Gaceta’ 234 of December 4, 1992, the Local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project. 10th—That the indigenous population also requests that henceforth, the Reserve be known preferably by its indigenous name of ‘Kéköldi’. (...)” These factual antecedents give rise to the reform of the limits of the Kekoldi de Cocles Indigenous Reserve, establishing the new delimitation starting from Article 2. Subsequently, Executive Decree No. 29956, of March 22, 2001, considered that “(...) in the modification of the limits of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, defined by Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important protection and conservation area of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs of the Carbón ‘Uno’ and Carbón ‘Dos’ Rivers, was not included. 4th—That this area comprises a territory traditionally under indigenous occupation, which must be included within the indigenous reserve by provisions of Law No. 7316, ILO Convention 169, Article 14. 5th—That this area holds water resources of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos, and Punta Caliente, which obligates its protection as it is the area that sustains the main source of that resource for said populations. 6th—That said area geographically unites the indigenous population of Këköldi with the indigenous population of Talamanca, which demonstrates it to be an area traditionally under indigenous occupation, and its inclusion likewise favors the social unity of an indigenous population of Talamanca that was spatially separated for many years. 7th—That under such considerations, it is necessary to modify the northwestern limit of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, in order to include that important area. 8th—That the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (CONAI) has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the ILO, expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)”, and ordered the modification of Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, so that the limits of the Reserve are understood to be those now indicated in the second numeral of this norm.

VII.- On the preliminary defense of expiration of the annulment action. INDER and the State alleged the expiration of the annulment action sought against several norms of the challenged decrees, which was supported by the passive coadjuvants and the third party with its own claims. In essence, the defendants who manage it maintain that the questioned norms, namely, Executive Decrees No. 25296 of June 24, 1996, and No. 29956, of March 22, 2001, are administrative acts, wherefore the annulment action should have been filed within the period of one year that, for such purposes, Articles 175 of the LGAP and numeral 200, subsection 7) of the CPCA (Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code) indicate, and according to which, the annulment is requested in a completely untimely manner. For their part, the plaintiff association states that, in accordance with ILO Conventions 107 and 169, this involves a human right and indigenous property is imprescriptible. Therefore, it states, the action is not expired. Having analyzed the arguments of all the parties, the Tribunal deems that the alleged preliminary defense is unjustified for the following reasons. In the present matter, we are faced with the challenge of administrative acts of a general nature which, in principle, is conditioned on the complaint being filed within the year following the date of their publication (Articles 175 of the LGAP and numerals 37 subsection 3, 39.1.b, and 200 subsection 7) of the CPCA). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be remembered that these types of acts of general scope, by their very nature, produce their effects continuously while they are in force, reason for which this collegiate body holds the opinion that said possibility cannot expire while they are in force and the plaintiff can prove that it has, at least, a legitimate interest for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 subsection 2) of the CPCA (see in a similar sense, judgment number 262-2011-VI and 052-2012-VI, both issued by the Sixth Section of this Tribunal, at 14 hours 50 minutes on December 1, 2011, and at 7 hours 30 minutes on March 22, 2012, respectively). At this point, it should be remembered that in accordance with the provisions of numeral 40 of the CPCA, it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope, as long as their continued effects subsist over time, wherefore the maximum period to file the process will be one year from the day following the cessation thereof. However, the action shall only be for the purposes of their annulment and future inapplicability. In addition to the foregoing, we insist that in cases of automatically applicable norms -as in this case-, an individual application act is not required to challenge them, by virtue of the fact that they become mandatory immediately upon their sole enactment, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the injured party. Therefore, we deem that the plaintiff association has, at least, a legitimate interest in challenging these decrees insofar as it considers them to be harmful and to violate its private property. Furthermore, these are norms that produce their effects continuously while they are in force. For the reasons stated, the Tribunal rejects the defense of expiration raised by the representation of INDER and the State, and proceeds to analyze the claims made by the plaintiff.

VIII.- On the annulment claim formulated. The plaintiff seeks the partial absolute nullity of Executive Decrees No. 25296 and 29956 mentioned in the following terms. Regarding Executive Decree No. 25296, it requests the annulment of Article 2 only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the farm registered in the Limón Registry, at real folio registration number 19056. It also requests the nullity of Article 3 in its entirety. Regarding Executive Decree No. 29956, it requests the annulment of Article 1 only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from the indigenous territory of a part of farm 19056, cited above, in the same manner as Executive Decree No. 25296 does. Furthermore, it requests the nullity of Article 3 only insofar as it considers Article 3 of Decree 25296 to be in force. The legality examination to be conducted by the Tribunal is based on two premises: the first, that fundamentally, nullity is sought in relation to the new delimitation that the challenged general scope norms made and confirmed regarding the territory comprising the Kéköldi Indigenous Reserve, which the plaintiff deems illegal and violative of its rights. The second, that the illegality defects alleged are claimed for both norms; reason for which they will be analyzed jointly. In this sense, there are four defects that the plaintiff claims: 1) That to enact these decrees, the consultation established by Article 6 of ILO Convention 169 was omitted. 2) That they violate the Principle of Legal Reservation. 3) That the challenged norms infringe upon the Principle of Legality insofar as a series of legal and supra-legal norms are violated. 4) That the challenged norms disregard its private property right. Regarding the first of the defects, the following must be stated. Article 6 of Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, approved in our country through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, states, as relevant, that “(...) 1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly (...).” The plaintiff claims that in the enactment of the challenged decrees, the consultation of the indigenous community was omitted, as required by the cited norm. However, the analysis of the case file allows dismissing the defect alleged. As a starting point, we have that the challenged norms attest to the conduct of the consultation. In that sense, we have that the recital part of Decree No. 25296 states that “(...) 9th—That pursuant to Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, ‘La Gaceta’ 234 of December 4, 1992, the Local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project (...); while that of Decree No. 29956 indicated that “(...) 8th—That the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (CONAI) has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the ILO, expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...).” Furthermore, what is indicated in the referred decrees is supported by the documentary evidence provided. Note that on folio 596 of the judicial case file, the certified copy of official letter ALG-577-96, of August 28, 1996, is visible, by which the Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Security responded to official letter A-727-96, of August 20, 1996, signed by the advisor to the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports (folio 595 of the judicial file); indicating that “(...) in the proceedings for the reform of the limits of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, the parties were informed. (...).” In turn, it forwarded a copy of official letter DE-091-96, of August 23, 1996 (folio 597 of this lawsuit), in which the Executive Director of CONAI stated that “(...) In reality, for more than 10 years, both CONAI, the Cocles Indigenous Community, and other regional groups have requested the signing of this Decree, to put an end to a conflictive situation that benefited no one. (...).” In addition to the foregoing, on folio 601 of this file, there is a certified copy of a missive identified as document 14 dated February 18, 1994, by which the Integral Development Association of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve informed CONAI that they had analyzed the boundary modification project and concluded that it met their expectations, therefore requesting it be processed. Moreover, on folios 604 and 605, there is the report that, regarding the amparo appeal processed under case file No. 96-005636-007-CO, the President of CONAI gave, mentioning the different official letters that demonstrate that such consultation was indeed carried out. Finally, from folios 608 to 611, there is a certified copy of a missive, presented in the referred judicial case file of the amparo appeal, in which a group of indigenous neighbors of the Kéköldi Indigenous Reserve informed the Constitutional Chamber that they agreed with the content of Decree No. 25296 and that they were consulted, twice, specifically in November 1994 and January 1996. The generic questioning that the plaintiff made of these documents is not receivable. On one hand, these are documents that form part of judicial case file 96-005636-007-CO (specifically folios 131 and 132 of that file) processed before the Constitutional Chamber and that are provided duly certified, some of them delivered under oath, as established by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. On the other hand, the stamp of the Association in question is affixed on some of the documents. The harmonious assessment of these elements allows the Tribunal to conclude that, as argued by the defendants and the third party with its own claims, the referred consultation was indeed carried out as, we insist, the questioned norms indicate. Thus, the will of the plaintiff indigenous community was indeed considered prior to the referred delimitation. Finally, the Tribunal notes the fact that, despite the nature of the defect claimed, it is only alleged to justify the partial nullity of the general scope norm. This is because the plaintiff alleges the omission of this essential formality only regarding the norms that excluded a part of Limón farm No. 19056-000, but not regarding the norms that expanded the limits of the reserve towards the south and west.

Strictly speaking, starting from the remote possibility that the consultation had not been carried out (which is not what is concluded in this case), we would be facing a defect that would invalidate the entire regulatory decree and the demarcation established therein, and not only the articles that exclude portions of the territory, as the plaintiff claims. This argument by the plaintiff reinforces the Court’s conclusion that the consultation was indeed carried out; for there would be no way to understand that it was carried out for the rules that expand the reserve and not for those that exclude lands. For the reasons stated, the alleged defect is unfounded and must be declared as such.

IX.- A violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve is also alleged, fundamentally because it is estimated that, pursuant to Article 1 of the Indigenous Law, the demarcation carried out in Decrees No. 6036-G and No. 7267 cited assumed the rank of law and could not be modified by the challenged general provisions; especially when the aforementioned article establishes that the boundaries set for the reserves in the cited decrees could not be varied by decreasing their area (cabida) except by express law. However, the Court considers that the proper interpretation of Article 1 in question allows the alleged defect to be dismissed. There is no doubt for the Court that this rule declares as indigenous reserves those established, for what is relevant here, in Executive Decrees numbers 5904-G, 6036-G, and 7267 cited. Such a declaration entails endorsing, in a rule of legal rank, the demarcation established in those acts of general scope. Precisely for this reason, the aforementioned Article 1 subsequently provides that the boundaries set for the reserves in the cited decrees could not be varied by decreasing their area (cabida) except by express law. However, we are of the opinion that, in this specific case, such a provision has not been violated because the challenged decrees did not decrease the area (cabida) of the Nombre142238 indigenous territory. This is clearly evident from the recitals of Decree No. 25296 when it indicates that "(...) 2.—That the demarcation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous farming population. 3.—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4.—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions over the last ten years among the different communities and the institutions involved. 5.—That the most suitable solution in this case is to modify the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6.—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of boundaries by executive decree, provided there is no reduction in the surface area of the Reserve. 7.—That the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, CONAI, carried out studies aimed at modifying the boundaries of the Cocles Reserve, excluding from it the problematic lands and compensating for them by the inclusion of forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8.—That this modification allows, on the other hand, the inclusion in the Reserve of indigenous lands that, until now, were not covered under the Indigenous Reserve statute. (...)"; and from that of Decree No. 29956 when it points out that "(...) 2nd—That the boundaries of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve were modified by Article 2 of Executive Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996. 3rd—That in the modification of the boundaries of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, defined by Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth was not included, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the headwaters of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. 4th—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve pursuant to the provisions of Law No. 7316, ILO Convention 169, Article 14. 5th—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home (sic) Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos, and Punta Caliente, which requires its protection as it is the area that sustains the main source of this resource for said populations. 6th—That said area geographically connects the indigenous population of Këköldi with the indigenous population Nombre142249, which proves to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion likewise favors the social unity of a Nombre142249 indigenous population, which was spatially separated for many years. 7th—That under such considerations, it is necessary to modify the northwestern boundary of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, in order to include that important area. (...)". The foregoing allows the conclusion that although Executive Decree No. 25296 excluded from the reserve the lands corresponding to the coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River and the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve, it compensated for this by including forested lands to the west and south of the current reserve. Thus, there was no decrease in the area (cabida) that would give rise to a violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve. The situation is even clearer in Decree No. 29956, as that rule reiterates the demarcation made in Executive Decree No. 25296 and expands the territory to include, on the northwestern boundary, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the headwaters of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. To that extent, it is evident that this general provision also does not decrease the area (cabida) of the reserve and, therefore, the alleged illegality does not exist. We insist that the limitation imposed by the Indigenous Law is that the boundaries cannot be varied via regulations in a way that entails a decrease in the area (cabida) of the indigenous territory, which did not happen in this case since the referred acts of general scope, rather, increased the mentioned area (cabida), as the plaintiff itself admits in its claims. To assume that, pursuant to Article 1 of the Indigenous Law, the boundaries of the reserves can only be modified by a statutory rule would lead not only to ignoring and disapplying the text of the rule itself (according to which that is not possible only if the area is decreased), but also to interpreting that modifications intended to increase the area (cabida) must also be ordered by statutory rule. A conclusion of this nature (which the Court does not share) would entail declaring the entire text of the challenged decrees illegal, including that relating to the inclusion of territories and increase of area (cabida). Thus, we believe that quantitatively there is no harm to the Nombre142238 indigenous territory since, we reiterate, the general provisions, while modifying the boundaries of the reserve, did not decrease its area (cabida) but rather increased it considerably. But, furthermore, there is also no qualitative decrease since, as will be analyzed below, the excluded territories corresponded to lands that were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by the indigenous community in question; and the included lands were those which, according to the studies carried out at that time, corresponded to lands that had indeed been traditionally occupied by them. For the reasons stated, we find that the challenged decrees do not violate the Principle of Legal Reserve.

X.- Moreover, it is claimed that the challenged decrees harm and curtail the property right of the plaintiff indigenous community. A first argument on which the plaintiff bases this defect is the fact that it is the owner of the entirety of farm Limón No. 19056-000, whose registration is recorded in the National Registry. Therefore, it is not possible for this right to be curtailed through a decree. In this regard, we must indicate that it has been proven that, by Executive Decree No. 7267 of August 9, 1977, a first demarcation of the Nombre142249 Cocles Indigenous Reserve was carried out. The recitals of that rule refer to Decree No. 6036-G cited, specifically regarding the fact that it mentions that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, corresponding to part of ITCO farms 1089 and 1050. To comply with the provisions of this rule, by deed number 85 executed before notary Nombre142257 at 12 o’clock on April 5, 1989, the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre142249 Talamanca Indigenous Reserve donated to the plaintiff Association the farm registered in the Public Registry, Limón District, at volume 2548, folio 35, number 19056, entry 1. That deed was presented to the National Registry on April 19, 1990, under citations 378-18219-001, and to date has not been registered. That is why today, the property in question remains registered in the registry under the name of the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre142249 Talamanca Indigenous Reserve. It is important to highlight at this point that, according to the statements of the representatives of the plaintiff and the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve, the transfer has not been registered because the property in question does not have a cadastral plan. However, we do not believe that this deficiency (the lack of registration of the transfer) leads to the conclusion that the referred property does not belong to the plaintiff Association, as the State representative seems to question. On the one hand, the donation deed is duly annotated as recorded on folios 154 to 156 of the judicial file, and there is an express statement from the representative of the registered owner to the effect that the transfer was carried out and that "(...) if it is necessary to make another transfer or add to the deed granted opportunely, when the IDA draws up the respective plan, we are willing to do so. (...)" (folio 286 verso of the judicial file). The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that, if one reviews the registry information for the property in question, it is observed that its nature corresponds to the Cocles Indigenous Reserve. Thus, the Court shares what was stated by the representatives of INDER, the passive coadjuvants, and the company acting as a third party with its own claims, in the sense that there is no question that the referred farm is owned by the plaintiff Association. Strictly speaking, the crux of the matter is another, as will be analyzed. In this regard, it is necessary to highlight that it has been proven that the farm in question (19056-000) lacks a plan. This is a fact proven by the expert report issued by Nombre142257, General Coordinator of the Executing Unit of the Regularization and Registry Program, who so indicates at folios 357 and 358 of the judicial file. But, furthermore, the plaintiff, the State, and the company participating as a third party with its own claims admit this. Although the Court finds that the absence of the cadastral plan is an element that must be assessed when resolving this dispute, the truth is that it is not the fundamental aspect to consider, but rather a secondary one, as will be explained. We share the assessment of expert Nombre142257 to the effect that "(...) according to cadastral matters, the location of a farm can only be derived if there is a cadastral plan that describes it (...)" (folio 358 of the judicial file); however, in the case of indigenous territories, this condition must be assessed in conjunction with the regulations in force in this area and the jurisprudence issued by both national and international Courts; according to which the demarcation made by States constitutes a recognition of the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories. However, the right was constituted and will fall upon the territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Therefore, once the existence of an indigenous people in a specific geographic environment of ancestral possession is established, the Administrations are obligated to recognize it as such, which entails, among other actions, the recovery and return of those lands, even if they are in the hands of non-indigenous subjects. Thus, the fact that the traditional territory of the indigenous community is in private hands would not per se be an objective and substantiated reason that prevents its reclamation. In this regard, Article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes the procedure to be followed to indemnify or expropriate private property registered in territories that have been ancestrally occupied by indigenous people, in order to return them to that community. This was stated by the IACHR, among others, in the Judgment of the Nombre139487 Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010, Series C No. 214, in which it stated: "(...) 2.1.2. Possession of the claimed lands and its requirement for the recognition of community property 1. In relation to the possession of the claimed lands, the Commission considered that the State is obligated to recognize and respond to the Community's claim 'even when they do not have full possession thereof and they are in private hands'. The representatives alleged that the Community 'has maintained a form of partial possession over the lands they claim and the surroundings regarding access to natural resources'. They added that the members of the Community have developed their traditional activities on the lands under claim 'since before the transfer of the lands to the Eaton y Cía. company, until the beginning of 2008 [,] when those activities were prohibited with the establishment of the private [natural] reserve'. The State maintained that 'the petitioners do not have the property duly registered in the Real Estate Registry, nor possession of the claimed property'. 2. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding the community property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) the traditional possession of indigenous people over their lands has effects equivalent to the title of full ownership granted by the State; 2) traditional possession grants indigenous people the right to demand official recognition of ownership and its registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title to the lands to the members of indigenous communities; 4) the members of indigenous peoples who, for reasons beyond their control, have left or lost possession of their traditional lands maintain the property right over them, even in the absence of legal title, save when the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith, and 5) the members of indigenous peoples who have involuntarily lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal extent and quality. 3. Additionally, as established in the cases of the indigenous communities of Nombre91182 and Sawhomaxa, Paraguay recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to request the return of their lost traditional lands, even when they are under private ownership and they do not have full possession thereof. Indeed, the Paraguayan Statute of Indigenous Communities enshrines the procedure to be followed for the reclamation of lands under private ownership, which is precisely the scenario in this case. 4. In this case, although the members of the Community do not have possession of the claimed lands, pursuant to the jurisprudence of this Court and Paraguayan domestic law, they have the right to recover them. 2.1.3. Validity of the right to claim traditional lands 5. Regarding the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is sustained mainly by their unique relationship with their traditional lands, and therefore, as long as that relationship exists, the right to reclaim said lands will remain valid. If this relationship were to cease to exist, that right would also extinguish.(...)". Based on the foregoing, the crux of the discussion is to determine whether the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve of the plaintiff Association by the challenged decrees constituted a territory traditionally occupied by them. If it was so, the rules violated their communal private property right; otherwise, such harm would not exist. To that extent, the challenge is fundamentally directed at the basis for both decrees.

XI.- Thus, the joint assessment of the evidence, under the rules of sound critical reasoning, leads to the conclusion that the territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 did not constitute a territory that traditionally or ancestrally had been occupied by that indigenous community. Let us examine this. Although the plaintiff sets out in its lawsuit a series of historical antecedents that it intends to relate to the subject under discussion, we find that they are not pertinent as they refer, in general, to aspects about which there has been little debate. That is, no one doubts that upon the arrival of the Spanish, our country was occupied by indigenous peoples and that they occupied territories of the Caribbean. Certified copies of two books are also provided, with which it is intended to demonstrate such occupation. However, we are of the opinion that, given their nature, this element is insufficient to reach such a conclusion. It should be noted, even, that the intervening third-party company provides certified copies of extracts from three different books, from which it affirms, in contradiction to what is stated in those provided by the plaintiff, that according to the testimony of two indigenous people (Nombre142260 and Nombre142261), it was a territory not occupied by them and that what occurred was an error in the decree that originally included it as part of the indigenous territory, since the demarcation was not the most appropriate. The fact that Nombre142262 (and only she) now states that she did not affirm what the books provided by the third party indicate does not bring greater clarity to the matter, and rather generates more doubts. Thus, in the evidentiary weighing conducted by the Court, the books in question do not constitute suitable proof nor are they decisive in substantiating the decision that has been adopted. On the other hand, we have that the reasons that served as the basis for Decree No. 25296 can be inferred from that very act, specifically "(...) That the demarcation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous farming population. 3.—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4.—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions over the last ten years among the different communities and the institutions involved. 5.—That the most suitable solution in this case is to modify the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. (...)"; aspects for which the modification of the boundaries of the Nombre142238 indigenous territory was ordered, excluding the portion under dispute here. In the Court's judgment, these factual and legal antecedents find support in the case records. On the one hand, the first rules regulating the property right of indigenous people refer to vacant lands occupied by them (Article 8 of Law No. 13) and, in the specific case of the creation of the Nombre142238 Reserve, it was located on lands that were also owned by ITCO, even indicating the farm numbers on which it was to be established and which serve as its background. This is clearly indicated by Executive Decree No. 6036-G, which establishes "(...) In addition, the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the 'Cocles Indigenous Reserve', corresponding to part of ITCO farms 1,089 and 1,050. Its exact demarcation will be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. (...)". It is important to highlight that, according to the recitals of that rule, the territorial location carried out took into account important nuclei of indigenous population, in areas populated exclusively by them. In accordance with the referenced rules, at the time these regulations were issued, the Kekoldi indigenous community was located in those environments (vacant lands, ITCO lands, and specific farms), but not in properties registered as private property of individuals. On this point, it is worth noting that, according to the expert report issued by Nombre142257, in the territory that was excluded from the Kekoldi Indigenous Reserve by Decree No. 25296, different cadastral plans have existed since 1946, some of them linked to registry entries and to which reference was made in the list of proven facts. We insist that these plans date from 1946 (that is, prior to Decree No. 6036-G) to 2004 (folios 354 to 372 of the judicial file). It is of interest to refer to plan 7-0009380-1946, which was cadastrally surveyed in 1946 by Nombre142248 and which corresponds to a property of her ownership, located at the mouth of the Cocles River, measuring 25 hectares and 2750 square meters located on the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, situated in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón. It covered an important area of what is today the coastal plain at Playa Cocles in Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial file). According to the same expert opinion, this plan is linked registrally to the farm registered in the National Registry under the real folio system No. 7-05365-000 (expert report rendered by Nombre142257 at folios 388 to 392 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic). Thus, Executive Decree No. 6036-G and the expert evidence allow the verification that the reasons considered in the challenged decrees (that the initial demarcation in 1976 included a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River and the southeastern part of the reserve that has not been inhabited by indigenous people, but rather by owners or occupants who were not indigenous, as is the case of Mrs. Nombre142248) existed just as they were considered at the time of issuing them. This conclusion is further reinforced by the testimony of Nombre142258 and Nombre142263. Mr. Nombre142258 recounted to the Court that he grew up in Puerto Viejo and that since he was born he remembers there were people living in houses on the coasts of Cocles. He stated that he was told that his relatives came from Panama to Puerto Viejo in the 18th century. He stated (indicó) that, for as long as he can remember (when he was five or six years old, since he was born in 1965), there were people living in Cocles, almost all black and some white. The houses were located on the coast and the farms behind. He mentioned among the oldest families that of Mr. Nombre142264, who was Colombian and was the father of Mrs. Nombre142248. He stated (indicó) that by the time he was a child, Mr. Nombre142264 already lived there, and he cited the names of other families that also inhabited the area. He explained that the black population would come from Puerto Viejo (where there were schools and grocery stores) to Cocles to harvest cocoa, which was the most important commercial activity. He stated that he did not recall seeing indigenous settlements or people in the lowlands or coast of Cocles, but rather that they came from Alta Talamanca to help with the cocoa harvest and sometimes stayed to sleep in the houses of those who hired them. He insisted that the Nombre142238 indigenous population was located in the upper parts of the lower Talamanca: in the lower part there were coconuts, in the intermediate part the cocoa farms, and in the upper part the indigenous people, and each always had their space. Mr. Bernardo, who visited Cocles in his childhood, concurred that there were no indigenous settlements in the coastal zone, but rather that it was occupied by private owners, and the indigenous people were located from Nombre142249 inward. He also concurred regarding the main activities (planting cocoa and tubers) and that the Nombre29395 came down to Cocles to work in tasks such as clearing brush, breaking cocoa, and, in general, as laborers. He indicated that sometimes the owners would give them a small piece of land so they could live close to work, but that they never constituted settlements in that area. It is worth noting that even Nombre142262 admits that some Afro-descendants lived in Cocles (not many) and that there were coconuts and almond trees in the area. She also stated (indicó) that long ago many Nombre29395 (not all) lived in the upper parts, that there was a relationship with the Afro-descendants, and that the indigenous children went to their school. In light of this evidence, the fact is that the plaintiff did not bring elements into the process to refute them or to demonstrate the physical or material occupation of that indigenous community in that territory. Thus, the assessment of the body of evidence as a whole allows the Court to conclude that the territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 was not inhabited or physically occupied by that indigenous community, but rather by private individuals (Afro-descendants and whites) and those who cadastrally surveyed plans and registered private property since 1946, as is the case of Mrs. Nombre142248.

XII.- However, the fact that it has been demonstrated that the territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. Placa27837 and No. 29956 was not inhabited or physically occupied by that indigenous community, but by private subjects, is not sufficient to conclude that there was no violation of their communal property right. As we explained in a previous Considerando, the scope of indigenous communal private property in relation to the territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands, which must also be analyzed. In this regard, the plaintiff states that the conception of indigenous property rights is different because it is also founded on a spiritual relationship. As set forth in previous Considerandos, this special relationship manifests itself in different ways depending on the indigenous people in question. Thus, for example, it mentions traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or crops; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing, or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs; and any other characteristic element of their culture. This is also derived from Articles 13, 14, and 15 of ILO Convention No. 169. Now, the Court believes that this special relationship of indigenous people with their territories must necessarily be proven so that it can be so declared and proceed with the recovery and return, if appropriate. The necessary demonstration of this relationship has also been recognized by the IACHR. For example, in the Judgment of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010, Series C No. 214, it was indicated that "(...) The bond of the members of the Community with said territories is fundamental and inseparable for their food and cultural survival, hence the importance of its return. Contrary to what the State indicates, the lands to be delivered to the members of the Community are not just any property 'within the historical territory of the Enxet Lengua', but the territory that the members of the Community have demonstrated in this case to be their specific traditional territory and most suitable for indigenous settlement (supra para. 107).(...)" (the highlighting and underlining do not correspond to the original). It was also stated (indicó) that "(...) Regarding the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is sustained mainly by their unique relationship with their traditional lands, and therefore, as long as that relationship exists, the right to reclaim said lands will remain valid. If this relationship were to cease to exist, that right would also extinguish.(...)" (the highlighting and underlining do not correspond to the original).

Even in the specific case resolved therein, the IACHR gave credence to the report of an anthropologist that served as a demonstrative element to prove the existence of that special and spiritual relationship. In that sense, the ruling indicates that "(...) In the present case, the Court observes that the relationship of the members of the Community with their traditional territory is manifested, inter alia, in the development of their traditional activities within said lands (supra paras. Placa27824, , ). In this regard, the anthropologist Nombre142265 stated in his report prepared in 1995, that they continued “occupying their territory and practicing their traditional economy, despite the conditions [imposed by] private property.” Of particular relevance is that even in the face of the restrictions imposed on the members of the Community, “they still entered to hunt in secret.” Likewise, some members of the Community indicated that when they lived in Estancia Salazar, although with serious limitations, some traditional medicine was still practiced and the shamans looked for medicinal plants in the bush, as well as buried their dead according to their customs. (...)". Thus, in the present case, the Court deems that this special and spiritual relationship of the indigenous community of Kekoldi with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees (which, in essence, corresponds to the coast and coastal plain of Cocles) was not demonstrated. The only evidence that the plaintiff provided for such purposes was the testimony of Mrs. Nombre142266, an indigenous member of that community. However, we deem that this evidence is insufficient for the following reasons. She extensively recounted to the Court the relationship of the Nombre29395 with the sea and that Talamanca was Bribrí domain, from the top of the mountain range to the coast. Also, that baptisms of children who lived far from the sea were carried out in the sea and that they also took advantage of it: they made salt, used the white shells and the coconuts (they ate the nut, used the shell, and stored the salt). However, Mr. Nombre142258 stated that he did not remember having seen sacred, religious, or ritual ceremonies of the indigenous people in Cocles. He emphasized that, being a small town, if there had been any, they would have known about it. He explained that the indigenous people went down to the coast looking for salt and took away crabs. He even recounted to the Court that in the works and excavations they had done on their lands, they never found any evidence that would lead them to presume the presence of indigenous people in that area. The existence of contrary testimonies regarding whether ceremonies, rituals, or spiritual ties took place in that area prevents the Court from deeming that relationship proven. Then, it is noteworthy that when Mrs. Nombre142266 explained that for them, there were sacred places, which were protected and for which one had to ask permission from the gods to enter, Nombre635 among these the wetlands, lagoons, estuaries, and hills, but she never indicated that the sea or the coast was one of them. This is coupled with the fact that the existence of settlements in that area, or that sporadic seasonal or nomadic cultivation, hunting, fishing, or gathering took place there, was also not demonstrated. In our view, the testimonies given only allow proving that the indigenous people of Kekoldi used and took advantage of the sea and its resources; but not in a way different from what any person could do. Thus, with the evidence given, it could not be affirmed that the indigenous community Nombre142238 had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the area excluded by the challenged decrees, which could serve as the basis for a property right. It must also be taken into account that some of the excluded territories correspond to registered private property (from before the decrees that originally delimited it) or to the maritime-terrestrial zone. Both cases have protection under the legal system, a situation that must also be weighed by this Court. Thus, it also cannot be concluded that these excluded territories have been traditionally and ancestrally occupied by them. To reach that conclusion, we deem that the plaintiff should have provided suitable evidence to the process, such as, for example, an anthropologist who, based on their expertise, could establish that special relationship, mainly in aspects such as movements, use, or spiritual relationship of these peoples with the sea, the coast, and the plains of Cocles. However, it was the representative of the plaintiff association himself who withdrew from that evidence that had been, at the time, admitted by the Court. From this perspective, if the burden of proof fell upon them and they did not exercise it, the plaintiff must bear the negative consequences of their inattention. For the reasons stated, the Court deems that the challenged decrees do not curtail or violate the property right of the indigenous community Nombre142238 because the excluded territories were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Rather, they had other occupants, as was demonstrated. Based on the foregoing, no deficiency is found in the reason and content of the challenged decrees; as they rather respond, as explained, to the need to correct an error in the location that was originally proposed by Executive Decree No. 7267, now repealed. It is not true, as the plaintiff claims, that their registered property right was curtailed by the challenged decrees. We reiterate that what Executive Decree No. 7267 did, at the time, was a generic location of the indigenous territory of Nombre142238 which, as the challenged decrees point out and has been demonstrated here, mistakenly included lands that had not been occupied or used by this indigenous community. Upon registering farm No. 7-19056-000 without a cadastral plan correctly delimiting it, this error extended to properties that have been used, occupied, and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons. Precisely, by virtue of this error (the diffuse location incurred in Decree No. 7267) and in the fact that, in any case, the referred Decree does not have the necessary power to ignore legally registered private property in the name of third parties and in which, and this is fundamental, there has not traditionally or ancestrally been occupation by this indigenous community; the State issues the challenged decrees and delimits the Indigenous Reserve of Nombre142238 in a manner consistent with the substantial content of their collective property right, that is, to cover territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Based on the evidence given here in relation to the rules applicable to the specific case, the Court deems that these formal administrative conducts do not harm the property right of the indigenous people. It is not necessary to request the annulment of the title corresponding to the farm of the Partido de Limón, number 19056-000. As indicated at the beginning of the examination of this defect, that property is owned by the plaintiff. Of course, in the terms in which their property right is conceived, that is, in the territory traditionally occupied by them, which corresponds, as has been explained, to that described, to date, by Decree No. 29956 challenged here.

XIII.- The foregoing does not imply, in any way, a violation of the Principle of Legality or a disregard for rules regulating indigenous property rights. Article 11 of ILO Convention 107 indicates that the right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favor of the members of the populations concerned over the lands traditionally occupied by them. In the specific case, the Court has established that the territories excluded by the challenged decrees do not meet this premise because they do not correspond to lands that had traditionally been or are occupied by the indigenous community Nombre142238. In that regard, they do not form part of their property right and cause them no harm, as the decrees rather recognize that right in its just dimension. Articles 13 to 18 of ILO Convention No. 169 generally refer to the State's duty to respect the special importance that the relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, that they occupy or otherwise use, has for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned, and particularly the collective aspects of that relationship (article 13); which in the specific case is not violated because that relationship has not been proven. Article 14 generally refers to the duty to recognize the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy; a rule that is not violated because, we reiterate, the excluded territories do not hold such a condition. Then, that same rule indicates that "(...) Furthermore, in appropriate cases, measures shall be taken to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. Particular attention shall be paid in this respect to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators. (...)". We deem that this provision is also not violated in the specific case because it was not proven that the State had denied access for the indigenous population of Nombre142238 to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles. Coupled with the public domain nature of the maritime-terrestrial zone, the witnesses stated that members of that indigenous community went down from the upper parts of Talamanca to the coast, which speaks of its use and exploitation. Ordinales 15, 16, 17, and 18 are also not harmed because what is established applies under the premise that these are territories traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples, which in the matter at hand was not proven. For the same reason and in accordance with what was set out in the previous Considering clause, Article 45 of our Political Constitution is also not harmed. In relation to numeral 2 of the Indigenous Law, since the territory owned (as lands that have been traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples) by the plaintiff indigenous community (and which corresponds to that located by the challenged decrees) is duly registered in the National Registry, under registration number Placa2092, of the Partido de Limón. Article 3 is not violated because the territory excluded by the questioned decrees is not owned by the plaintiff indigenous community and, in that regard, does not enjoy the special protection that this rule establishes. Numeral 5 is also not applicable: if it is not indigenous private property because it has not been traditionally occupied by them, the State has no reason whatsoever to justify the relocation, indemnification, or expropriation of non-indigenous persons who occupy or are owners of those lands excluded from the originally established delimitation. Rather, we insist that the rights of those who have been occupying or are owners of properties in that area must be protected. Finally, no harm whatsoever to Article 267 of the Civil Code is observed. As we explained, the plaintiff's property right applies to those territories that have been traditionally occupied by them. In that regard, the registry inscription of farm No. 19056-000 of the Partido de Limón covers only that territory, which in the case at hand, was located through the referred Decree No. 29956. To understand, as the representative of the plaintiff party intends, that farm No. 19056-000 includes the lands located by Decree No. 7267 would lead to an abuse of right for the following reasons. That administrative act was repealed because it included lands that were not and are not traditionally occupied by the community Nombre142238 (and in that regard do not form part of their communal property right) but moreover, they were registered (with their corresponding cadastral plan) in the name of non-indigenous persons and dedicated to other activities since before the original location of that community. Rather, numeral 267 referred would be violated if this Court ignored the registered title held by these persons, among them, the corporation acting as a third party with its own claims and some of the passive coadjuvants.

XIV.- In conclusion, the Court deems that the challenged Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 were issued by the competent body (Executive Branch), complying with the substantial formalities of the required procedure. They also have a legitimate and certain reason (essentially, that the delimitation established in Decree No. 7267 was inappropriate because it included territories that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people represented by the plaintiff association, and that were rather occupied by or belonged to other people, which is why they should be excluded from the Reserve) which existed as it was taken into account at the time of its issuance (numeral 133 of the LGAP). The ordered content, that is, the new delimitation which excludes territories not traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, is lawful, clear, possible, and covers all the factual and legal issues arising from the reason (article 132 of the LGAP). Note, even, that Decree No. 25296 does not reduce the area of the Indigenous Reserve because it compensates for the excluded area by granting lands that do have indigenous occupation, and Decree No. 29956 comes to confirm the provisions of Decree No. 25296 and includes other lands that had not been recognized and that have been traditionally occupied by these indigenous people. This content is, moreover, corresponding to the reason and proportional to the end, which translates into the public interest underlying the State, on one hand, recognizing the Kekoldi indigenous people's communal private property over the territories that have been traditionally occupied by them and, on the other, protecting the right to private property of non-indigenous persons in lands that have been occupied by them and registered in their name, and in which no type of physical, material, or spiritual occupation by the plaintiff indigenous community was proven. Furthermore, the act is motivated in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP, as it explicitly refers to the reasons that give rise to the new delimitation, which, moreover, have been verified in this judicial venue. Taking into account that the claimed defects are unfounded for the reasons that have been set forth, we deem that the challenged formal conducts substantially conform to the legal system and must be declared so.

XV.- Regarding the other claims made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff association also requests that it be declared that its represented community is the owner of the Farm registered in the Real Estate Registry, Partido de Limón, under the Real Folio Registration Number Placa2092, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within our indigenous territory, properly the sector of the farm of Limón, real folio registration number Placa2092, that is not recognized as ours in Executive Decree No. 25296-G of June 24, 1996, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to begin said studies and procedures when the judgment becomes final and conclude them two months later, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to take the necessary steps to relocate these persons if they so desired, or if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept it, to initiate the procedures to expropriate and indemnify them in accordance with the procedures established in the Expropriation Law, that INDER be ordered to begin the relocation or expropriation procedures and steps immediately after completing the studies and procedures referred to in the claim, respecting the deadlines designated for this, that the Executive Branch be ordered to provide the necessary financial resources to INDER and CONAI to proceed with the mentioned expropriations and indemnifications, and that the Executive Branch be ordered to begin the steps to provide these institutions with the resources, when the judgment becomes final, preparing, if necessary, an extraordinary budget that must be presented to the Legislative Assembly no later than two months after that finality. Given the accessory nature of these petitions, as they depend on the annulment claim having been granted, which has not happened here, all of them are unfounded. Since it has been established that the challenged decrees are valid, the delimitation established therein is legitimate because it corresponds to the territories that have been traditionally occupied by the indigenous community of Kekoldi. In that regard, and as indicated in previous Considering clauses, the plaintiff is the owner of the farm registered in the Real Estate Registry, Partido de Limón, under the Real Folio Registration Number Placa2092, but only regarding the territory located and delimited in the challenged decrees. Therefore, they are not the owner of the lands that were excluded in those rules, precisely because they were not ancestrally occupied by them and, moreover, are registered in the name of private individuals. Under that perspective, the obligations that Article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes for the State, such as studies, appraisals, relocations, and recovery of territories, are not applicable to those excluded territories because those duties are conditioned on us being faced with indigenous communal property, understood as territories that have been traditionally occupied by them, which in the matter at hand was not proven. Thus, the rejection of those petitions must also be ordered, as is hereby done.

XVI.- Regarding the subsidiary claims. The plaintiff association requests as such that it be declared that CONAI, INDER, and the State (Executive Branch), must jointly and severally pay the sum of twelve billion colones as indemnification for the de facto expropriation that occurred (material value of the land, material value of the natural-forestry resources and others of common use of indigenous communities- and spiritual value of the territory). What is requested is also unfounded. Indemnification for de facto expropriation is based on the existence of private property to which a series of limitations have been imposed, by virtue of which the owner is prevented from exercising the attributes of ownership. In the specific case, and for the reasons that have been extensively set forth, this condition does not arise because the lands excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through the challenged decrees are not the private property of that indigenous community. This is because they are territories that have not been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. If we are not faced with the plaintiff's private property, it is evident that there is no limitation or de facto expropriation of this fundamental right because, we insist, they do not have it, and any requested indemnification is unfounded.

XVII.- Regarding the exceptions raised by the defendants. The State representative raised the exceptions of lack of passive legal standing and lack of right, the latter also raised by the representatives of INDER. The Comprehensive Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca did not raise exceptions, and CONAI was declared in default for not having answered the lawsuit. The lack of passive legal standing alleged by the State must be rejected. In this matter, administrative acts of general scope issued by the Executive Branch are being challenged. In that regard, the State is passively legitimized in accordance with the provisions of article 12, subsections 1) and 8) of the CPCA. However, the exception of lack of right raised by the State and INDER must be granted, which is also declared ex officio in relation to the other defendants. This is because, as set forth in the previous Considering clauses, the challenged formal conducts substantially conform to the legal system and the delimitation ordered in them is legitimate, as it excluded lands that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people of Nombre142238. In that regard, they do not form part of the collective private property right of this indigenous community. Coupled with the foregoing, it was demonstrated in this litigation that the excluded territory has been occupied and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons who have developed their activities there since before the Reserve was originally delimited. If the excluded lands are not the property of that indigenous community, the State has no duty to conduct studies, appraisals, relocations, or expropriations, because all these duties are based on the conditioning premise that it has been demonstrated that these were territories traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, which in the matter at hand has not been demonstrated. For the same reasons, there is no duty to indemnify the plaintiff for any de facto expropriation because none has arisen. The foregoing requires the rejection of the lawsuit in all its aspects, both the main and the subsidiary ones.

XVIII.- Regarding the third-party claim filed by the corporation Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. This entity was admitted in this process as a third party with its own claims. In view of the manner in which the lawsuit has been resolved in this process, the first of its petitions must be granted, as all the plaintiff's claims have already been rejected. It also requests that it be declared that the plaintiff Association has no right whatsoever over the farms of Partido Limón registered under the real folio registration numbers Placa1768, Placa27827, and Placa27828, which are the property of the petitioning corporation. If it has been proven that these properties belong to the third-party claimant corporation, the logical consequence of this registry inscription is that the plaintiff association has no property right over them. Moreover, it was also proven that these farms form part of the lands excluded (legitimately, as demonstrated) by the challenged decrees, precisely because the plaintiff association did not prove having traditionally occupied them. In relation to the claims requesting that it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has a right of ownership or possession over farms No. 0122172-000 and Placa27828 registered in their name, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain now and in the future from any form of de facto or de jure disturbance over the indicated estates and to waive any process aimed at obtaining a declaratory judgment of real property rights over them; the following must be noted. According to Article 264 of the Civil Code, the absolute dominion or ownership of a thing comprises the rights of possession, usufruct, transformation, disposal, defense, exclusion, restitution, and indemnification. Possession constitutes one of the attributes of the property right, the exercise of which is protected by the legal system, which establishes a series of instruments, both substantive and procedural, for the legitimate owner to protect them. From this perspective, it is not for the Court to make a generic and abstract declaration on these aspects. Rather, it is for the owner of the dominion, in this case, the corporation Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A., to make use of these legitimate instruments to repel any act of illegitimate possession, or de facto or de jure disturbance of their properties. Nor could the Court order the plaintiff to waive any process aimed at obtaining a declaratory judgment of real property rights over them. The right of action is a guarantee enjoyed by any subject, and this Court could not limit it. In that sense, the plaintiff must adhere to the use of the instruments that the legal system regulates in order to protect its property right. Thus, the third and fourth claims of the third-party proceeding must be rejected, in the terms set forth.

XIX.- Regarding the exceptions raised by the plaintiff association in the third-party proceeding. The representative of the plaintiff party raised the exceptions of lack of passive ad causam legal standing, lack of interest, and lack of right. The first must be rejected. The claims being resolved in the third-party proceeding are linked to the plaintiff association, as it is requested, among other things, that it be ordered not to carry out acts of possession or disturb the property registered in the name of the party filing the third-party claim. The lack of current interest must also be rejected, as this exists from the moment there is some conflict regarding the ownership of the territories that were excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through the challenged decrees. In that regard, a judicial resolution that settles them is required. The lack of right must be granted only with respect to the rejection of the third and fourth claims. It is rejected in all other respects, since all the claims of the lawsuit were declared without merit. Consequently, the claims of the third-party proceeding are partially granted and in the terms that have been set forth.

XX.- Regarding costs. Numeral 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Court's opinion, sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this matter, we deem that, both in the lawsuit and in the third-party proceeding, there was sufficient reason to litigate. This is because the plaintiff indigenous association challenges delimitations made by the State, seeking protection of its communal private property right. Furthermore, this right involves elements different from those of the rights of non-indigenous persons, which adds technical complexity to the matter under discussion. Therefore, we deem that the process (both the lawsuit and the third-party proceeding) must be resolved without a special condemnation in costs.

POR TANTO

The exception of lack of passive legal standing raised by the State is rejected. The exception of lack of right raised by the State and INDER is granted; an absence of right that is also declared ex officio with respect to CONAI and the Comprehensive Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca. Consequently, the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Regarding the third-party proceeding filed, the exceptions of lack of passive legal standing and lack of current interest raised by the plaintiff association are rejected. The exception of lack of right is granted only inasmuch as it is unfounded for this Court to declare that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has a right of possession over farms No. Placa27827 and Placa27828 registered in the name of the third-party claimant corporation, and to order the plaintiff Association to refrain now and in the future from any form of de facto or de jure disturbance over the indicated estates and to waive any process aimed at obtaining a declaratory judgment of real property rights over them. It is rejected in all other respects. Consequently, the third-party claim filed by the third-party claimant corporation is granted insofar as the claims of the plaintiff association are unfounded and the third-party claimant corporation is the owner of the farms of Partido Limón registered under real folio registration numbers No. Placa27827 and Placa27828. This process, both in the lawsuit and in the third-party proceeding, is resolved without a special condemnation in costs.

Cynthia Abarca Gómez José Roberto Garita Navarro Rosa María Cortés Morales PROCESO DE TRÁMITE PREFERENTE ACTORA: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, El INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS y ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA DE TALAMANCA TERCERO INTERESADO: TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A.

COADYUVANTES PASIVOS: LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, JUMGLEBUNGALO LIMITADA, Nombre105706 , TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A., LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A.,Nombre142239 , Nombre142240 , Nombre142241 , Nombre142242 , Nombre142243 , Nombre142244 , Nombre142245 , Nombre142246 , Nombre142247 , LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA,OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL Y LA SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .

and **LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A.,** represented by their unlimited general agent without limit of sum Nombre142254 , of a single surname by virtue of his Canadian nationality, married, businessman, with his country's passport number CED111801 and resident of Dirección17222, ; Nombre142239 **,** widow, homemaker, identity card CED111807 and resident of Dirección17223 , ; **Nombre142240 ,** divorced, agronomist engineer, identity card Placa27825 and resident of Dirección17222, ; **CARIBIANA GS LIMITADA,** represented by its unlimited general agent Emilio de Gómez-Selléz Antoranz, in a common-law marriage, businessman, Spanish citizen with residency card CED111808 and resident of Dirección17222, ; **Nombre142242 ,** of a single surname due to her Italian nationality, married, psychologist, her country's passport CED111809 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142243 ,** of a single surname by virtue of his Italian nationality, married, administrative assistant, residency card CED111810 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142244** , of a single surname due to her Italian nationality, married twice, administrator, residency card CED111811 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142245 ,** single, farmer, identity card CED111812 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142246 ,** divorced, builder, passport CED111813 and resident of Cocles de Talamanca; **Nombre142247 ,** of a single surname due to his U.S. nationality, divorced, writer, passport Placa27826, resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA,** represented by its deputy manager Nombre142255 , of a single surname by virtue of her Canadian nationality, divorced, businesswoman, passport CED111802 and resident of Cocles; **OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL,** represented by its manager Encarnación García Vila, single, biologist, passport CED111814 resident of Dirección17222, and the **SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .,** represented by its executor Nombre142256 , married, taxi driver, identity card CED111815 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca. Also intervening are the attorneys Shirley Campos García and Maribel Aguilar Cedeño, in their capacity as general judicial proxy and special judicial proxy of INDER, respectively; María Teresa Fernández Chinchilla as special judicial proxy of CONAI; Luis Manuel Castro Ventura, Mauricio Salas Villalobos, Luis Ortiz Zamora and Esteban Alfaro Calderón as special judicial proxies of the third-party intervener with their own claims; Nombre98251 as special judicial proxy of the passive coadjuvant La Cherokeana Tres Limitada and Nombre105706 as special judicial proxy of the other passive coadjuvants.

**RESULTANDO** **1.-** The plaintiff files this process so that, in essence, in judgment: 1) It be declared that my client is the owner of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, at the real folio registration number Placa2092. 2) The nullity be declared—in the terms I clarify below—of articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of 1996: a) Article 2 be annulled only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, at the real folio registration number Placa2092. We are not requesting the nullity of the decree insofar as it extends the boundaries of that Reserve to the south and west. b) Article 3 be annulled in its entirety. 3) The nullity be declared—in the terms I clarify below—of articles 1 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956 of the year 2001: a) Article 1 be annulled only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from the indigenous territory of a part of the property Placa2092, previously cited, in the same way as Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of 1996. We are not requesting the nullity of the decree insofar as it extends the boundaries of that Reserve to the south and west. b) Article 3 be annulled only insofar as it considers article 3 of Decreto 25296, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, to be in force. 4) INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within our indigenous territory, specifically the sector of the property of Limón, real folio registration number Placa2092, which is not recognized as ours in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296-G of June 24, 1996. 5) INDER and CONAI be ordered to begin those studies and procedures when the judgment becomes final and to conclude them two months thereafter. 6) INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the steps to relocate those persons if they so wish, or if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept it, to initiate the procedures to expropriate and indemnify them in accordance with the procedures established in the Ley de Expropiaciones. 7) INDER be ordered to initiate the relocation or expropriation steps and procedures immediately after the studies and procedures referred to in the claim are completed, respecting the deadlines designated for them. 8) The Executive Branch be ordered to provide the necessary financial resources to INDER and CONAI so that they may proceed with the aforementioned expropriations and indemnifications. 9) The Executive Branch be ordered to initiate the steps to provide those institutions with the resources, when the judgment becomes final, preparing, if necessary, an extraordinary budget that must be presented to the Legislative Assembly no later than two months after that finality. 10) The defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the costs of both parties in this action. **As a subsidiary claim** it requests the following: 1) Be it declared that CONAI, INDER, and the State (Executive Branch) must jointly and severally pay to the plaintiff association the sum of twelve billion colones as compensation for the de facto expropriation produced (material value of the land, material value of the natural-forestal and other resources of common use of the indigenous communities—and spiritual value of the territory). 2) The defendants be ordered to pay the joint and several costs of this action *(pleadings visible at folio 164, adjusted at folio 456, reformulated at folios 815, all of the judicial file and as established during the single hearing).* **2.-** This process was declared to have preferential processing by resolution issued by this Tribunal at 8:15 a.m. on May 21, 2010 *(folios 177 and 178 of this brief).* **3.-** The State answered the complaint and formulated the preliminary defenses of improper joinder of the litis (indebida integración de la litis) and expiry (caducidad), as well as the exceptions of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of right (falta de derecho) *(folios 188 to 193, 470 to 474, 881 and 882 of the judicial file).* **4.-** INDER answered the complaint and formulated the preliminary defenses of improper joinder of the litis (indebida integración de la litis) and expiry (caducidad), as well as the exception of lack of right. As relevant, it requested that the complaint be dismissed and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay the costs of both parties *(folios 215 to 235, 718 to 730 and 885 to 891 of the judicial file).* **5.-** In accordance with article 65 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (hereinafter CPCA), CONAI was declared in default for not having answered the complaint within the period granted. Consequently, the complaint was deemed affirmatively answered with respect to the facts, without prejudice to its ability to appear at any time, taking the process in the state in which it finds itself *(see recording of single hearing which is attached to the file).* **6.-** The Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca answered the complaint affirmatively and did not formulate exceptions *(folio 286 of the judicial file).* **7.-** In a resolution issued at 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 2013, this Tribunal admitted the participation of the entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. in this process, as a third party with its own claims. The pleadings formulated by said corporation are the following: 1) That all of the plaintiff's claims be dismissed. 2) That it be declared that the plaintiff Association has no right over the properties of Partido Limón registered under the real folio registration numbers Placa27827 and Placa27828, which are the property of the petitioning corporation. 3) That it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and INDER, has a right of ownership or possession over the properties No. Placa27827 and Placa27828 registered in its name. 4) That the plaintiff Association be ordered to currently and in the future abstain from any form of disturbance of fact or of law over the indicated lands and that they renounce any process aimed at obtaining a declaration of real property rights over them. 5) That the counter-defendant (the plaintiff) be ordered to pay the costs.

Likewise, it alleged an improper joinder of the litis (folios 526 to 550 of the judicial file and as established in the single hearing).

8.- INDER and the State answered the third-party claim and did not plead any defenses (folios 823 to 829, 883 and 884 of the judicial file).

9.- The plaintiff association answered the third-party claim and raised the defenses of lack of passive standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of interest, and lack of right (folios 830 to 836 of the judicial file).

10.- By a resolution issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 4, 2013, it was determined that CONAI and the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca had not answered the third-party claim within the granted period. Therefore, in accordance with article 65 of the CPCA, they were declared in default (rebeldes) and the third-party claim was deemed affirmatively answered regarding the facts, without prejudice to their ability to appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state in which it is found (folios 961 and 962 of this file).

11.- In resolution No. 058-2013-VI, issued at 2:10 p.m. on April 10, 2013, this Court rejected the preliminary defense of improper joinder of the litis that had been interposed by the State, INDER, and the third party with its own claims (folios 829 to 849 of this file).

12.- By resolution No. 315-2013, issued at 4:00 p.m. on May 29, 2013, the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda summarily rejected the appeal that had been filed against the cited resolution No. 058-2013-VI (folios 947 and 948 of this folder).

13.- In accordance with articles 60 subsection 3) and 70 subsection 2) of the CPCA, the single hearing was held on October 29 and 30, 2013, with the presence of all parties, the third party with its own claims, and the passive coadjuvants. Therein, the claims were established as described in the first Resultando and the requests for passive joinder filed were admitted. Likewise, in resolution No. 129-2013-VI, the preliminary defense of improper joinder of the litis was rejected, this time in relation to the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, raised by INDER. Subsequently, the disputed facts were established, the pertinent documentary evidence was admitted, and the statements of the admitted witnesses and expert were taken. Finally, the parties delivered closing arguments and, upon their conclusion, the Court declared this proceeding a complex one, for the purposes of the provisions of article 111 subsection 1) of the cited Procedural Code, in relation to numeral 82, subsection 1), of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda.

14.- In the proceedings before this Court, no procedural defects requiring correction or causing defenselessness have been observed. In accordance with articles 111 of the CPCA in relation to numerals 79 and 82 of its Regulations, after deliberation, the issuance, drafting, and notification of this judgment within the legal term are proceeded with, drafted by the presiding judge Abarca Gómez with the affirmative vote of judge Garita Navarro and judge Cortés Morales.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Proven facts. Of importance for what is resolved, the following has been demonstrated: 1) In July 1946, Nombre142248 surveyed the cadastral plan Placa27829, corresponding to a property owned by him, located at the mouth of the Cocles River. The property measured 25 hectares and 2750 square meters located in the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, situated in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón; it covered an important area of what is today the coastal plain at Cocles Beach in Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial file). 2) The property described in plan Placa27829 was registered in the National Registry under the folio real system No. 7-05365-000 (expert report rendered by Nombre142257 on folios 388 to 392 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic). 3) The entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. is the owner of the properties registered in the National Registry, Party of Limón under title numbers Placa27830 and Placa27831, which originate from and derive from the property registered under the folio real system No. 7-05365-000 (certifications visible on folios 559 to 568 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic provided by the expert). 4) By Decree No. 6036-G, of May 26, 1976, the boundaries of the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve were reformed, among others. Said regulation established that "(...) the Talamanca Reserve shall include, as an administrative annex, the 'Cocles Indigenous Reserve', corresponding to part of ITCO properties 1,089 and 1,050. Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. (...)" (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 5) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267, of August 9, 1977, the Nombre142249 de Cocles Indigenous Reserve was located. That delimitation was confirmed by the Indigenous Law, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977 (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 6) In 1979, the State proceeded with the registration of the indigenous territory delimited in Decretos Ejecutivos No. 6036-G and No. Placa26323, which corresponded to the property registered in the Party of Limón, title number Placa27618 (inferred from the expert report rendered by Nombre142257, query made to the National Registry's website). 7) The property registered in the party of Limón, title number Placa2092, lacks a cadastral plan (fact accepted by the plaintiff, the State, and the corporation participating as a third party with its own claims during their conclusions and the expert report rendered by Nombre142257, General Coordinator of the Executing Unit of the Regulation and Registry Program, folios 357 and 358 of the judicial file). 8) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 16568-G, of September 25, 1985, it was ordered that the Cocles Indigenous Reserve constituted a reserve independent of the Nombre142249 de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 9) By deed number 85 granted before notary Nombre142257 at 12:00 p.m. on April 5, 1989, the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca donated to the plaintiff Association the property registered in the Public Registry, Party of Limón, in volume 2548, folio 35, number Placa27618, entry 1; to comply with the provisions of the cited Decree No. Placa27832. That deed was submitted to the National Registry on April 19, 1990, under citations 378-18219-001 and to date has not been registered (folios 154 to 156 of the judicial file, express statement by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca when answering the claim and query made to the National Registry's website). 10) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of June 24, 1996, the cited Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267 was repealed, it was established that the Nombre142249 de Cocles Indigenous Reserve would henceforth be called "Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles)" and its delimitation was modified (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 11) The Nombre142238 indigenous community was consulted regarding the modification of the boundaries of the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve proposed in the challenged decrees (thus inferred from the recital section of both generally applicable regulations and folios 594 to 602, 604, 605, and 608 to 611 of the judicial file). 12) The delimitation established in the cited Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 did not reduce the area of the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve (thus inferred from the recital section of that regulation and the plaintiff's statement admitting the inclusion of lands). 13) By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956, of March 22, 2001, article 2 of the cited Decree 25296 was reformed and the current boundaries of the Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles) Indigenous Reserve were set (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 14) In the territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956, the following cadastral plans are registered: Placa27833, registered on June 8, 1995, which is linked to the property registered in the Party of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27819; , registered on May 27, 1994, which is linked to the property registered in the Party of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27820; , registered on October 13, 2004, which is linked to the property registered in the Party of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27821; , registered on December 20, 1996, which is linked to the property registered in the Party of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27822; , registered on March 1, 1975, with no associated property; 7-0030961-1977, registered on February 9, 1977, which is linked to the property registered in the Party of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27834; 7-0009398-1971, registered on September 21, 1971, with no associated property; 7-0009380-1946, registered in July 1946, which is linked to the property registered in the Party of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27835 (expert report rendered by Nombre142257 visible on folios 354 to 372, 385, 386, 838 and cd with cadastral mosaic). 15) The territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 has been inhabited by non-indigenous people, primarily Afro-descendants and white people, who surveyed plans and registered private property since 1946, and who engaged in activities such as fishing, planting cacao, and other tubers (testimonies of Nombre142258, Nombre142259, and Nombre142260). 16) There were no indigenous settlements on the Cocles coast or in the territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956.

They lived in the upper parts of Talamanca and would descend to the plain and the coast of Cocles to work on tasks such as clearing (chapias) (testimonies of Nombre142258, Nombre142259). 17) The indigenous community of Nombre142249 has used and benefited from the sea and the coast of Cocles (testimonies of Nombre142258 and Nombre142260).

**II.- Facts not proven.** Of importance for the purposes of this dispute, the following are deemed not demonstrated: 1) That the indigenous community Nombre142238 had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees, such that a right of private indigenous property could be derived from it (there is a lack of proof). 2) That the territory excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 constitutes a territory that traditionally or ancestrally was occupied by that indigenous community (no suitable evidence was provided to reach that conclusion). 3) That the State had denied the indigenous population of Nombre142238 access to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles (it is not proven).

**III.- Object of the process.** Based on the claims and arguments of the parties, the Court considers that this process fundamentally concerns the examination of the legality of Articles 2 and 3 of Executive Decree No. 25296 and numbers 1 and 3 of Executive Decree No. 29956. Essentially, the delimitation made regarding the Kekoldi Bribri Indigenous Reserve is challenged, insofar as the plaintiff considers that a part of the property owned by them, registered in the Partido de Limón under real folio entry Placa2092, was illegitimately excluded. The foregoing is because, in reality, the excluded part constitutes land traditionally occupied by them and to which they have a right. Fundamentally, the plaintiff accuses the formal acts of being invalid because they violate the Principle of Legality and Reservation of Law, and disregard their right of private property. Based on the declaration of nullity, a series of accessory claims are formulated, as they depend on the declaration of the alleged invalidity. In that sense, it is requested that it be declared that they are the owners of the entirety of said property 19056-000, that is, including the portion that was illegitimately excluded from them by the challenged decrees. Furthermore, it is requested that the alleged inactivity of INDER, CONAI, and the State be declared, for failing to comply with the obligation imposed by current regulations, especially Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, to conduct the necessary studies and appraisals so that an extraordinary budget can be approved to allow the expropriation and compensation of all non-indigenous persons occupying the Nombre142238 Indigenous Territory (in the part that was illegitimately excluded) to proceed with their effective eviction and the effective recovery of those lands by that indigenous people. On this last topic (the omission), it is requested that the Court order the fulfillment of the referenced actions to cease the illegitimate inactivity that has been incurred over the years. Now, the Court admitted the participation of the entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. in this process, as a third party with its own claims. The referenced company claims to be the owner of two properties located in the area that, according to the plaintiff association, was illegitimately excluded from their territory and which they now seek to recover. Therefore, the third party asks that all the claims made by the plaintiff be dismissed and that it be declared that the plaintiff has no right over the properties of the Partido Limón registered under real folio entries No. Placa27827 and Placa27828, which are its property. In addition, it is requested that it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has the right of property or possession over the referenced properties, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain, now and in the future, from any form of disturbance of fact or law over the indicated properties and that they renounce any process aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. Given the various manifestations that the litigating parties provide in support of the positions in controversy, for what is considered a better order, the following sections will address each of the thematic axes raised in their grievances by the plaintiff association, as well as the arguments of the defendants, the passive coadjuvants, and the third party with its own claims, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, with the due analysis, of course, of everything argued.

**IV.- On the recognition of indigenous property in the Costa Rican legal system.** Due to the subject under debate, the Court deems it necessary to outline some brief considerations regarding the regulations governing indigenous property in our country and the interpretation that, in the Court's opinion, should be given to these normative precepts. Thus, we have that the first legislative provision that expressly recognizes the right of property of indigenous communities is the **Ley Sobre Terrenos Baldíos**, No. 13, of January 10, 1939, which in its Article 8 provided, in relevant part, *"(...) a prudential zone, at the discretion of the Executive Branch, in places where there are tribes of these, is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, in order to conserve our autochthonous race and to free them from future injustices. (...)"* (highlighting is not from the original). That norm was developed by Executive Decree No. 45, of December 3, 1945, which in its first article indicated *"(...) The vacant lands occupied by them, with the exception of the strips destined for the Carretera Interamericana, are declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the autochthonous indigenous tribes. (...)"* (highlighting is not from the original). With the promulgation, in 1949, of the current Political Constitution governing us, in its Article 45, the right to property is recognized and protected, which implies recognition of ownership with all its inherent attributes (individualistic conception of property in terms of Roman Law). From this derives a protection of the right to collective property of indigenous peoples, pre-existing the Constitution, first from the Spanish Colony, then from the United Provinces of Central America, and later, from the Republic of Costa Rica as an Independent State. Subsequently, through Law No. 2330, of April 9, 1959, our country approves Convention No. 107 of the International Labor Organization (hereinafter ILO), called *"Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries."* In relation to what concerns us, Article 11 established that in the bound States: *"The right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favor of the members of the populations concerned over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy."* (Highlighting is not from the original). Then, the **Ley de Tierras y Colonización** No. 2825, of May 14, 1961, provided in its Article 75 that the then Institute of Lands and Colonization (hereinafter ITCO) *"(...) in agreement with the pertinent organisms, shall ensure the conditioning of the indigenous communities or families, in conformity with the spirit of this law. It shall not be declared that the extensive zones where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them, but attempts shall be made to gather all these communities, forming a single agrarian center, in the zone that the Institute considers adequate and for which the necessary area of land shall be used."* Likewise, Article 76 indicates that *"(...) At no cost and in ownership, parcels that the Institute designates as the indispensable minimum to satisfy their needs, and which can be exploited by that group without the need for salaried workers, shall be given to indigenous families. (...)."* On the other hand, the **Law Creating the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs** No. 5251, of July 11, 1973, establishes in its Article 4 subsection e) as one of the objectives of CONAI, *"(...) To ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, stimulating the action of the State in order to guarantee the indigenous person the efficient individual and collective ownership of land; (...)."* We also have that the **Indigenous Law**, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, provided in its Article 1 that indigenous people are those who constitute ethnic groups directly descended from pre-Columbian civilizations and who conserve their own identity, and declared indigenous reserves those established, among others, in Executive Decrees No. 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G and 7268-G of August 20, 1977, as well as the Guaymi de Conteburica Indigenous Reserve. It also indicated that the limits set for the reserves in those decrees could not be varied by reducing their area, except by means of an express law. Article 2 establishes that the indigenous reserves are the property of these communities and that they all must be registered in the National Registry in their name. For its part, number 3 reiterates that these are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive territories of the indigenous communities that inhabit them, and that non-indigenous persons are not permitted to rent, lease, buy, or otherwise acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves, with any transfer or negotiation of land or improvements thereof in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, being absolutely null with the legal consequences of the case. In reinforcement of all the above, through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, **Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries** of the International Labor Organization was approved, which also regulates the issue of indigenous property. In relevant part, Article 13 indicates that *"1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term 'lands' in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use."* Article 14 establishes that *"1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned."* Finally, number 16 indicates, in relevant part, that *"1. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy.* **V.-** From the cited regulations, we can arrive at several relevant conclusions regarding the right of property recognized for indigenous peoples. **First**, it is a right that includes, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) rightly stated, in the case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, *"(...) the concepts of property and possession in indigenous communities can have a collective meaning, in the sense that ownership of this is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community" (...).* Thus, it is a collective right that benefits these peoples, but which exists without prejudice to the substantive rights and procedural actions to which the persons who are members of these collectivities are individually entitled by reason of their status as inhabitants of our country. In that sense, it should be noted that although the owners of said territories do not have any special regime for the self-protection of said territories, national law does recognize a duty of public entities to provide said territories with *Special Protection*, a concept with a univocal content in the International Law of Human Rights that governs this matter. **Second,** said collective or communal property is not comparable, from any perspective, to the public domain. Despite the fact that, based on the express text of Article 3 of the Indigenous Law, indigenous territories are inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable, these characteristics do not grant them the quality of public domain assets, given that they do not satisfy the indispensable and common elements of all dominical assets. Thus, the indigenous territories recognized in Costa Rica are private property assets of the indigenous peoples who inhabit the national territory, each with its own legal personality and absolutely autonomous among themselves, by virtue of the fact that each one is a cultural, social, ethnic, and historical unit. **Third,** this right of collective or communal property extends to the territories that traditionally and ancestrally have been used or occupied by indigenous peoples.

The foregoing encompasses not only the referred territories but also the natural resources linked to their culture found there and the intangible elements arising therefrom, an aspect that for the indigenous community is fundamental for their physical, cultural, economic, and food survival. From this perspective, the scope of communal private property in relation to territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands. In that regard, the IACHR has indicated in the Judgment of the Case of the Indigenous Community Nombre139487. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, that "(...) To determine the existence of the relationship of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands, the Court has established that: i) it can be expressed in different ways according to the specific indigenous people and the concrete circumstances in which they find themselves, and ii) the relationship with the lands must be possible. Some forms of expression of this relationship could include traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or cultivation; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs, and any other characteristic element of their culture. The second element implies that the members of the Community are not prevented, by causes beyond their control, from carrying out those activities that reveal the persistence of the relationship with their traditional lands.(...)". It should be added, however, that in the opinion of this Court, that special relationship of the indigenous community with the lands traditionally occupied by them must, necessarily, be demonstrated through the means deemed suitable in each specific case. Finally, the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories begins with recognition (not constitution) by law or administrative act. It is from that moment that the attributes and legal protection described above are granted to certain lands, all without prejudice to the existence of any other real or credit right that the indigenous community or any of its members may have over such properties by reason of ancestral possession. Said recognition in no way constitutes a conduct in which there is discretion in the exercise of the competence element of the respective administrative conduct, by the bodies authorized to make such recognition. Once the existence of an indigenous people in a specific geographical environment of ancestral position is established, the exercise of their competencies in the terms regulated in Article 60 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) is unavoidable for the respective Public Administrations. Once the indigenous territory is recognized, it can only lose such condition insofar as two requirements are met. The first, of a formal nature, namely, the issuance of a legal norm in both material and formal sense that so provides. The second, of a material nature, implies the informed decision of the indigenous people themselves to renounce the collective property system of which they are a part. Therefore, it is clear that both the recognition of the existence of an indigenous territory and its protection imply obligatory conducts for public entities with competencies in the matter.

**VI.- On the delimitation of the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve.** Before examining the legality of the challenged formal conducts, the Court also deems it necessary to refer specifically to the recognition of the territory of the indigenous community of the plaintiff association. Thus, it is established that by means of **Executive Decree No. 5904,** of March 11, 1976, the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves were initially established. In the recitals of that regulatory instrument it was indicated, among others, "(...) *5°- That territories populated exclusively by indigenous people still exist, making the delimitation of said Reserves possible; (...) 10.- That it is the duty of the State to monitor the security of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities. (...)*" (Emphasis not in the original). Furthermore, in its first article, it was ordered that their exact delimitation would be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Of relevance to the object of this process, **Executive Decree No. 6036-G,** of June 12, 1976, reformed the limits of the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves and establishes the Telire Reserve. In its recitals, it is Nombre635 that "(...) *Decree No. 5904-G of March 14, 1976, published in Supplement No. 60 to "La Gaceta" No. 70 of April 10, 1976, left out of the Reserves created by said decree, important nuclei of indigenous population, in areas populated exclusively by them (...)*" (emphasis does not correspond to the original). Regarding the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve, it was indicated that it was located on sheets of the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional), Dirección17224, Amubri 3644-IV, Sukut Placa27836, Siola 3544-II, scale 1: 50,000, indicating in its fourth article its courses, distances and coordinates. Also, an area of 56,829 hectares and 9,275 square meters is established. As an important aspect in what will be resolved here, the norm in question indicates that the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the "Cocles Indigenous Reserve," **corresponding to part of ITCO properties 1,089 and 1,050** and that its exact delimitation will be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Subsequently, by means of **Executive Decree No. 7267**, of August 9, 1977, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve (currently the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Nombre142238 (Cocles)) was established. It is worth highlighting that the recitals of that norm refer to the cited Decree No. 6036-G, specifically in that it mentions that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, corresponding to part of ITCO properties 1089 and 1050, and indicated that studies aimed at locating the indigenous population of that region and determining the exact limits of that reserve had already been carried out. Thus, Article 3 indicates that the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi is located on the cartographic sheets of the National Geographic Institute, scale 1:50,000, Amubri 3644 IV, Sixaola 3644 I and Cahuita Placa27823, and proceeds to delimit it according to the coordinates indicated therein. Well then, the land property of this indigenous community being recognized in the manner indicated, the Indigenous Law, in its Article 1, declared an indigenous reserve, among others, the one established in the already cited Executive Decree No. 6036-G, the Nombre142238 indigenous community. It is Nombre635, furthermore, that the limits set for the reserve, in that decree, could not be varied by decreasing the extent of those, except by express law. Subsequently, pursuant to **Executive Decree No. 16568,** of September 25, 1985, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was constituted as a reserve independent of the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca. Finally, mention should be made of the challenged norms. First, **Executive Decree No. 25296**, of June 24, 1996, which in its recitals indicated, as relevant, "(...) *That the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Cocles (Keköldi) was delimited by Decree 7267-G of August 9, 1977, Supplement No. 114 to "La Gaceta" No. 157 of August 20, 1977 and confirmed by Indigenous Law No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, "La Gaceta" No. 240 of December 20, 1977. By Decree 16568-G of September 25, 1985, "La Gaceta" 191 of October 8, 1985, it was established as an Independent Reserve. 2°—That the delimitation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been a cause of conflicts and tensions over the last ten years between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most suitable solution in this case is to modify the limits of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6°—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of limits by executive decree, provided there is no reduction of the surface area of the Reserve. 7°—That the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) carried out studies aimed at modifying the limits of the Cocles Reserve, excluding the problematic lands from it and compensating for them by including forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8°—That this modification allows, on the other hand, including in the Reserve lands of indigenous people that until now were not protected under the Indigenous Reserve statute. 9°—That according to the Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 of December 4, 1992, the local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project. 10.—That the indigenous population also requests that henceforth, the Reserve be known preferably by its indigenous name of "Nombre142238".(...)*". The factual background leads to the reformation of the limits of the Kekoldi de Cocles Indigenous Reserve, establishing the new delimitation as of Article 2. Subsequently, **Executive Decree No. 29956**, of March 22, 2001, considered that "(..) *in the modification of the limits of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, defined by Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth was not included, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the headwaters of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. 4º—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve under the provisions of Law No. 7316, Convention 169 I.L.O., Article 14. 5º—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos and Punta Caliente, which obligates its protection since it is the area that sustains the main source of that mineral for said populations. 6º—That said area geographically unites the indigenous population of Këköldi with the Nombre142249 indigenous population, which demonstrates it to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion likewise favors the social unity of a Nombre142249 indigenous population, which was spatially separated for many years. 7º—That under such considerations, it is necessary to modify the northwestern limit of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, in order to include that important area. 8º—That the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (CONAI) has already carried out studies on the area claimed by the Këköldi indigenous community and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the I.L.O., expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)*", and ordered the modification of Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, so that the limits of the Reserve are now understood to be those indicated in the second section of this norm.

**VII.- On the preliminary defense of the expiration of the annulment action.** INDER and the State alleged the expiration of the annulment action being sought against several norms of the challenged decrees, which was supported by the passive coadjuvants and the third party with its own claims. In essence, the respondents managing it argue that the questioned norms, namely, **Executive Decrees No. 25296 of June 24, 1996 and No. 29956**, of March 22, 2001, are administrative acts, and therefore the annulment action should have been exercised within the one-year term indicated for such purposes by Articles 175 of the LGAP and numeral 200, subsection 7) of the CPCA, and according to which, the annulment is requested in a quite clearly untimely manner. For its part, the plaintiff association states that, in conformity with Conventions 107 and 169 of the ILO, this concerns a human right and indigenous property is imprescriptible. Therefore, it says, the action is not expired. Having analyzed the arguments of all parties, the Court deems that the alleged preliminary defense is inadmissible for the following reasons. In the present matter, we are faced with the challenge of administrative acts of a general nature which, in principle, is conditioned on the claim being filed within the year following the date of their publication *(Articles 175 of the LGAP and numerals 37, subsection 3, 39.1.b and 200, subsection 7) of the CPCA)*. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be remembered that this type of acts of general scope, by their very nature, produce their effects continuously while they are in force, for which reason it is the opinion of this collegiate body that this possibility cannot expire while they are in force and the plaintiff can prove it has, at least, a legitimate interest for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection 2) of the CPCA *(see in a similar sense, judgment number 262-2011-VI and 052-2012-VI, both handed down by the Sixth Section of this Court, at 14:50 on December 1, 2011 and at 7:30 on March 22, 2012, respectively)*. On this point, it should be remembered that in accordance with the provisions of numeral 40 of the CPCA, it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope, as long as their continued effects persist over time, for which the maximum period to file the proceeding will be one year from the day following the cessation of those. That said, the action will be solely for purposes of their annulment and future inapplicability. In addition to the foregoing, we insist that in cases of norms of automatic application—as in this case—, an individual application act is not required to challenge them, by virtue of the fact that they become obligatory immediately upon their sole enactment, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the injured party. Well then, we believe that the plaintiff association has, at least, a legitimate interest in challenging these decrees insofar as it believes they are harmful and violate its private property.

Furthermore, these are norms that produce their effects and continue to exist as long as they are in force. For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal rejects the expiration defense raised by the representation of INDER and the State, and proceeds to the analysis of the claims made by the plaintiff.

VIII.- Regarding the annulment claim that is formulated. The plaintiff requests the partial absolute nullity of Executive Decrees No. 25296 and 29956 mentioned in the following terms. Of Executive Decree No. 25296, it requests the annulment of article 2 only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the farm registered in the Partido de Limón, at the real folio registration Placa2092. Also, it requests the nullity of article 3 in its entirety. Regarding Executive Decree No. 29956, it requests that article 1 be annulled only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from the indigenous territory of a part of the farm Placa2092, cited above, in the same manner as Executive Decree No. 25296. Furthermore, it requests the nullity of article 3 only insofar as it considers article 3 of Decree 25296 to be in force. The legality review that the Tribunal will carry out is based on two premises: the first of them being that, fundamentally, the nullity is requested in relation to the new delimitation that the challenged general scope norms made and confirmed regarding the territory comprising the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238, which the plaintiff considers illegal and violative of its rights. The second, that the illegality defects that are alleged apply to both norms; for which reason they will be analyzed jointly. In that sense, there are four defects that the plaintiff claims: 1) That to promulgate those decrees, the consultation established by Article 6 of ILO Convention 169 was omitted. 2) That they violate the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley). 3) That the challenged norms harm the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) insofar as a series of legal and supra-legal norms are violated. 4) That the challenged norms disregard its right to private property.

Regarding the first of the defects, the following must be noted. Article 6 of Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, approved in our country by Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, states, in what is relevant, that "(...) 1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly (...)". The plaintiff claims that in the promulgation of the challenged decrees, the consultation of the indigenous community was omitted, as required by the cited norm. However, the analysis of the case records allows the Tribunal to dismiss the defect that is alleged. As a starting point, the challenged norms attest to the realization of the consultation. In that sense, the recitals (parte considerativa) of Decree No. 25296 state Nombre635 that "(...) 9°—That pursuant to the Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 of December 4, 1992, the local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project (...)"; while that of Decree No. 29956 indicated that "(...) 8º—That the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the I.L.O., expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)". Then, what is indicated in the referred decrees finds support in the documentary evidence that was provided. Note that on folio 596 of the judicial file, the certified copy of official letter ALG-577-96, of August 28, 1996, is visible, through which the Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Security responded to official letter A-727-96, of August 20, 1996, signed by the advisor to the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports (folio 595 of the judicial folder); indicating that "(....) in the proceedings for the reform of the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, the parties were informed. (...)". In turn, he forwarded a copy of official letter DE-091-96, of August 23, 1996 (folio 597 of this lawsuit), in which the Executive Director of CONAI stated that "(...) In reality, for more than 10 years, both CONAI, and the Indigenous Community of Cocles, and other regional groups have requested the signing of this Decree, to put an end to a conflictive situation that did not benefit anyone. (...)". Added to the above, on folio 601 of this folder, there is a certified copy of a missive identified as document 14 dated February 18, 1994, through which the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Cocles expressed to CONAI that they had analyzed the boundary modification project and concluded that it met their expectations, and therefore requested it be processed. Additionally, on folios 604 and 605, there is the report that, regarding the amparo appeal processed under file No. 96-005636-007-CO, the President of CONAI gave, in which he mentions the different official letters that demonstrate that such consultation was indeed carried out. Finally, from folios 608 to 611, there is a certified copy of a missive, presented in the referred judicial file of the amparo appeal, in which a group of indigenous neighbors of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 expressed to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) that they agreed with the content of Decree No. 25296 and that they were consulted, twice, specifically in November 1994 and January 1996.

The generic questioning that the plaintiff made of these documents is not admissible. On the one hand, these are documents that form part of judicial file 96-005636-007-CO (specifically folios 131 and 132 of that folder) processed before the Constitutional Chamber and that are provided duly certified, some of them given under oath (fe de juramento), as established by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. On the other hand, on some of the documents, the seal of the Association in question is stamped. The harmonious assessment of these elements allows the Tribunal to conclude that, as the defendants and the third party with its own claims argue, the referred consultation was indeed carried out, as, we insist, the questioned norms indicate. Thus, the will of the plaintiff indigenous community was indeed considered prior to the referred delimitation. Finally, the Tribunal notes the fact that, despite the nature of the defect that is claimed, it is only alleged to justify the partial nullity of the general scope norm. This is because the plaintiff alleges the omission of this essential formality (formalidad esencial) only as to the norms that excluded a part of the farm of Limón No. 19056-000, but not regarding the norms that expanded the limits of the reserve to the south and west. Strictly speaking, starting from the remote possibility that the consultation had not been carried out (which is not what is concluded in this case), we would be facing a defect that would invalidate the entire decreed norms and the delimitation established therein, and not only the articles that exclude portions of the territory, as the plaintiff intends. This argumentation by the plaintiff reinforces the Tribunal's conclusion that the consultation was indeed carried out; for there would be no way to understand that it was done for the norms that expand the reserve and not for those that exclude lands. For the reasons stated, the alleged defect is unfounded and must be declared so.

IX.- A violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley) is also alleged, fundamentally because it is considered that pursuant to article 1 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), the delimitation made in Decrees No. 6036-G and No. 7267 cited assumed the rank of law and could not be modified through the challenged general scope norms; especially since the referred article establishes that the boundaries set for the reserves, in the cited decrees, could not be varied decreasing the capacity (cabida) thereof, except by express law. However, the Tribunal considers that the proper interpretation of article 1 in question allows the defect alleged to be dismissed. There is no doubt for the Tribunal that this norm declares the reserves established, in what pertains to the case, in Executive Decrees numbers 5904-G, 6036-G and 7267 cited as indigenous reserves. Such a declaration implies endorsing, in a norm of legal rank, the delimitation established in those acts of general scope. Precisely for this reason, the referred article 1 immediately provides that the boundaries set for the reserves, in the cited decrees, could not be varied decreasing the capacity thereof, except by express law. However, we are of the opinion that, in the specific case, such a provision has not been violated because the challenged decrees did not decrease the capacity of the indigenous territory Nombre142238. This is clearly evident from the recitals (parte considerativa) of Decree No. 25296 when it indicates that "(...) 2°—That the delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Río Cocles, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions in the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6°—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of boundaries by executive decree, provided there is no reduction in the surface area of the Reserve. 7°—That the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, CONAI, carried out studies aimed at modifying the boundaries of the Cocles Reserve, excluding from it the problematic lands and compensating for them by including forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8°—That this modification allows, on the other hand, the inclusion in the Reserve of lands belonging to indigenous people that until now were not covered by the Indigenous Reserve statute. (...)"; and from that of Decree No. 29956 when it points out that "(...) 2º—That the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi were modified by article 2 of Executive Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996. 3º—That in the modification of the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi, defined by article 2º of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs (nacientes) of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers, was not included. 4º—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve by provisions of Law No. 7316, Convention 169 I.L.O., article 14. 5º—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home (sic) Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos and Punta Caliente, which obliges its protection since it is the area that sustains the main source of that mineral for said populations. 6º—That said area geographically connects the indigenous population of Këköldi with the indigenous population Nombre142249, which demonstrates it to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion also favors the social unity of an indigenous population Nombre142249, which was spatially separated for many years. 7º—That under such considerations, it becomes necessary to modify the northwestern boundary of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi, in order to include that important area. (...)".

What is transcribed allows the conclusion that although Executive Decree No. 25296 excluded from the reserve the lands corresponding to the coastal zone near the mouth of the Río Cocles and the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve, it compensated for it with the inclusion of forested lands to the west and south of the current reserve. Thus, there was no decrease in the capacity that gives rise to the violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley). The situation is even clearer in Decree No. 29956, given that this norm reiterates the delimitation made in Executive Decree No. 25296 and expands the territory to include, on the northwestern boundary, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs (nacientes) of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. In that sense, it is evident that this general scope norm also does not decrease the capacity of the reserve and, therefore, the alleged illegality does not exist. We insist that the limitation imposed by the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) is that, via regulation, the boundaries be varied in a way that implies a decrease in the capacity of the indigenous territory, which did not happen in this case since the referred acts of general scope, rather, increased the referred capacity, just as the plaintiff admits in its claims. To assume that pursuant to article 1 of the Indigenous Law, the boundaries of the reserves can only be modified by legal norm would lead not only to disregarding and disapplying the very text of the norm (according to which this is not possible only if the capacity is decreased), but also to interpreting that modifications seeking to increase the capacity must also be provided for by legal norm. A conclusion of this nature (which the Tribunal does not share) would imply the declaration of illegality of the entire text of the challenged decrees, including what relates to the inclusion of territories and increase in capacity. Thus, we consider that quantitatively there is no injury to the indigenous territory Nombre142238 since, we reiterate, the general scope norms, while they modified the boundaries of the reserve, did not decrease its capacity but rather considerably increased it. But, furthermore, there is also no qualitative decrease given that, as will be analyzed infra, the excluded territories corresponded to lands that were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by the indigenous community in question; and the included lands were those that, according to the studies carried out at that time, corresponded to lands that had indeed been traditionally occupied by them. For the reasons stated, we consider that the challenged decrees do not violate the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley).

X.- On the other hand, it is claimed that the challenged decrees injure and curtail the right to property of the plaintiff indigenous community. A first argument on which the plaintiff bases this defect is the fact that it is the owner of the entirety of the farm of Limón No. 19056-000, whose registration is recorded in the National Registry. Therefore, it is not possible that this right be curtailed through a decree. In that sense, we must indicate that it has been proven that, by Executive Decree No. 7267, of August 9, 1977, a first delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Cocles was made. The recitals (parte considerativa) of that norm refer to Decree No. 6036-G cited, specifically insofar as it mentions that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, corresponding to part of farms 1089 and 1050 of ITCO. To comply with the provisions of this norm, by deed number 85 granted before notary Nombre142257 at 12:00 on April 5, 1989, the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca donated to the plaintiff Association the farm registered in the Public Registry, Partido de Limón, at volume 2548, folio 35, number 19056, entry 1. That deed was presented to the National Registry on April 19, 1990, under citations 378-18219-001 and to date has not been registered. That is why, to this day, the property in question remains registered in the name of the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca. It is important to highlight at this point that, according to the statements of the representatives of the plaintiff and the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249, the transfer has not been registered because the property in question does not have a plat (plano). However, we consider that this deficiency (the lack of registration of the transfer) does not give rise to concluding that the referred property does not belong to the plaintiff Association, as the State representative seems to question. On the one hand, the donation deed is duly annotated as evidenced on folios 154 to 156 of the judicial file, and there is an express statement from the representative of the registered owner to the effect that the transfer was made and that "(...) if it is necessary to make another transfer or add to the deed granted in due time, when the IDA prepares the respective plat (plano), we are willing to do so. (...)" (folio 286 verso of the judicial file). The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that, if the registry information of the property in question is reviewed, it is observed that its nature corresponds to the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles. Thus, the Tribunal shares what was pointed out by the representatives of INDER, the passive coadjuvants, and the company acting as a third party with its own claims, in the sense that there is no question regarding the fact that the referred farm is the property of the plaintiff Association. Strictly speaking, the crux of the matter is another, as will be analyzed. In this sense, it is necessary to highlight that it has been proven that the farm in question (19056-000) lacks a plat (plano). This is a fact proven by the expert report (informe pericial) rendered by Nombre142257, General Coordinator of the Executing Unit of the Regularization and Registry Program, who indicates this on folios 357 and 358 of the judicial file. But, in addition, the plaintiff, the State, and the company participating as a third party with its own claims admit it. Although the Tribunal considers that the absence of the cadastral plat (plano catastrado) is an element that must be assessed when resolving this litigation, the truth is that it is not the fundamental aspect to consider, but rather secondary, as will be explained.

We share the expert's appreciation, Nombre142257, in the sense that "(...) according to cadastral matters, the location of a property can only be derived if there is a cadastral plan that describes it (...)" (page 358 of the judicial file); however, in the case of indigenous territories, that condition must be assessed in conjunction with the regulations in force on this matter and the jurisprudence issued by both national and international Courts; according to which the delimitation made by the States constitutes a recognition of the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories. However, the right was constituted and shall fall upon the territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Therefore, once the existence of an indigenous people in a specific geographical environment of ancestral position is established, the Administrations are obliged to recognize it as such, which entails, among other actions, the recovery and return of those lands, even if they are in the hands of non-indigenous subjects. Thus, the fact that the traditional territory of the indigenous community is in private hands would not be per se an objective and substantiated reason to prevent its claim. In this regard, Article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes the procedure to be followed to indemnify or expropriate private property registered in territories that have been ancestrally occupied by indigenous people in order to return them to that community. This was stated by the IACHR, among others, in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Nombre139487 . Vs. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214 , in which it stated: "(...) 2.1.2. Possession of the claimed lands and its requirement for the recognition of community property1. In relation to the possession of the claimed lands, the Commission considered that the State is obliged to recognize and respond to the Community's claim “even when they do not have full possession thereof and they are in private hands”. The representatives argued that the Community “has maintained a form of partial possession over the lands they claim and the surroundings regarding access to natural resources”. They added that the members of the Community have developed their traditional activities on the lands under claim “from before the transfer of the lands to the company Eaton y Cía., until the beginning of 2008 [,] when those activities were prohibited with the establishment of the private [natural] reserve”. The State maintained that “the petitioners do not have the property duly registered in the Real Estate Registry, nor possession of the sought property”. 2. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding the community property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) the traditional possession of indigenous peoples over their lands has effects equivalent to the full domain title granted by the State; 2) traditional possession grants indigenous peoples the right to demand official recognition of property and its registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title of the lands to the members of the indigenous communities; 4) the members of indigenous peoples who, for reasons beyond their will, have left or lost possession of their traditional lands maintain the right of property over them, even in the absence of a legal title, unless the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith, and 5) the members of indigenous peoples who have involuntarily lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal size and quality. 3. Additionally, as was established in the cases of the indigenous communities of Nombre91182 and Sawhomaxa, Paraguay recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to request the return of their lost traditional lands, even when they are under private domain and they do not have full possession thereof. Indeed, the Paraguayan Statute of Indigenous Communities establishes the procedure to be followed for the claim of lands under private domain, which is precisely the scenario of the present case. 4. In this case, although the members of the Community do not have possession of the claimed lands, in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court and Paraguayan domestic law, they have the right to recover them. 2.1.3. Validity of the right to claim traditional lands 5. With respect to the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is based mainly on their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so that as long as that relationship exists, the right to claim said lands will remain valid. If this relationship had ceased to exist, that right would also be extinguished.(...)". According to the foregoing, the crux of the discussion lies in determining whether the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve of the plaintiff Association through the challenged decrees constituted a territory traditionally occupied by them. If it was, the norms violated their right to communal private property; otherwise, such injury would not exist. To that extent, the reproach is directed, fundamentally, at the motivating element of both decrees.

**XI.-** Well then, the evaluation of the evidence jointly and under the rules of sound rational criticism lead to the conclusion that the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 did not constitute a territory that had been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by that indigenous community. Let us see. Although the plaintiff party lists in its lawsuit a series of historical antecedents that it intends to relate to the topic under discussion, we deem that they are not pertinent since they generally refer to aspects about which there has been no major discussion. That is, no one doubts that upon the arrival of the Spanish, our country was occupied by indigenous peoples and that they occupied territories in the Caribbean. Certified copies of two books are also provided, with which it is intended to demonstrate such occupation. However, we are of the opinion that, given its nature, this element is insufficient to reach such a conclusion. Note, even, that the third-party claimant society provides certified copies of excerpts from three different books, from which it affirms, in contradiction with what those provided by the plaintiff state, that according to the testimony of two indigenous individuals (Nombre142260 and Nombre142261 ), it was a territory not occupied by them and that what occurred was an error in the decree that originally included it as part of the indigenous territory, since the delimitation was not the most appropriate. The fact that Nombre142262 (and only she) now states that she did not affirm what the books provided by the third-party claimant indicate does not provide greater clarity to the matter and rather generates more doubts. Thus, in the evidentiary weighing carried out by this Court, the books in question do not constitute suitable evidence nor are they determinative in the substantiation of the decision adopted. On the other hand, we have that the reasons that served as the basis for Decree No. 25296 arise from that same act, specifically "(...) That the delimitation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3rd—That from the foregoing it results that, in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause an enormous expense for the State, and large losses and all kinds of damages to the current owners and occupants. 4th—That this boundary problem has been a cause of conflicts and tensions in the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5th—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the limits of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. (...)"; aspects by which the modification of the limits of the indigenous territory Nombre142238 was ordered, excluding the portion here in dispute. Those factual and legal antecedents find, in the Court's judgment, support in the case file. On the one hand, the first norms that regulate the property right of indigenous people refer to vacant lands (terrenos baldíos) occupied by them (Article 8 of Law No. 13) and, in the specific case of the creation of the Reserve Nombre142238 , it was located on lands that were also property of the ITCO, even indicating the property numbers on which it was to be established and which serve as its antecedent. Thus, it is clearly stated in Executive Decree No. 6036-G, which establishes "(...) Additionally, the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the "Cocles Indigenous Reserve", corresponding to part of properties 1,089 and 1,050 of the ITCO. Its exact delimitation will be carried out by the ITCO, in coordination with the CONAI. (...)". It is important to highlight that according to the recital part of that norm, the territorial location carried out took into account important nuclei of indigenous population, in areas populated exclusively by them. In accordance with the referred norms, at the time these regulations were issued, the indigenous community of Kekoldi was located in those environments (vacant lands, ITCO lands, and specific properties), but not in real estate registered as private property of individuals. On this point, it is worth noting that according to the expert opinion rendered by Nombre142257 , in the territory that was excluded from the Kekoldi Indigenous Reserve through Decree No. 25296, different registered plans have existed since 1946, some of them linked to registry entries and to which reference was made in the list of proven facts. We insist that those plans date from 1946 (that is, prior to Decree No. 6036-G) to 2004 (pages 354 to 372 of the judicial file). It is of interest to refer to plan 7-0009380-1946, which was cadastral-mapped in 1946 by Nombre142248 and which corresponds to a land owned by her, located at the mouth of the Cocles River, which measured 25 hectares 2750 square meters located in the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, located in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón, covered an important area of what is today the coastal plain at Playa Cocles in Limón (pages 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial file). According to the same expert opinion, that plan is registrally linked to the property inscribed in the National Registry under the real folio system No. 7-05365-000 (expert opinion rendered by Nombre142257 at pages 388 to 392 of the judicial file, CD with cadastral mosaic). Thus, Executive Decree No. 6036-G and the expert evidence allow for verification that the reasons that were considered in the challenged decrees (that the initial delimitation in 1976 included a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River and the southeastern part of the reserve that has not been inhabited by indigenous people but rather by owners or occupants who were not, as is the case of Mrs. Nombre142248 ) existed just as they were considered at the time of issuing them. This conclusion is further reinforced with the testimony of Nombre142258 and Nombre142263 . Mr. Nombre142258 told the Court that he grew up in Puerto Viejo and that since he was born he remembers people living in houses on the coasts of Cocles. He stated that they told him his relatives came from Panama to Puerto Viejo in the 18th century. He stated that, for as long as he can remember (when he was five or six years old, since he was born in 1965), there were people living in Cocles, almost all black and some white. The houses were located on the coast and the properties behind. He mentioned among the oldest families that of Mr. Nombre142264 , who was Colombian and was the father of Mrs. Nombre142248 . He stated that by the time he was a child Mr. Nombre142264 already lived there and he cites the names of other families that also inhabited the area. He explained that the black population would come from Puerto Viejo (where there was a school and grocery stores) to Cocles to collect cocoa, which was the most important commercial activity. He stated that he did not remember having seen indigenous settlements or people in the low-lying areas or coast of Cocles, but rather that they would come from Alta Talamanca to help in the cocoa harvest and sometimes would stay to sleep in the houses of those who hired them. He insisted that the indigenous population Nombre142238 was located in the high parts of the lower Talamanca: in the low area there was coconut, in the intermediate area the cocoa farms, and in the upper part the indigenous people, and each always had their own space. Mr. Bernardo, who visited Cocles in his childhood, agreed that there were no indigenous settlements in the coastal zone, but rather it was occupied by private owners and the indigenous people were located from Nombre142249 inland. He also agreed regarding the main activities (planting of cocoa and tubers) and that the Cabécar would come down to Cocles to work on tasks such as clearing brush (chapia), breaking cocoa, and, in general, as laborers. He indicated that sometimes the owners would give them a small piece of land so they could live near the work but that they never constituted settlements in that area. It should be noted that Nombre142262 even admits that some Afro-descendants (not many) lived in Cocles and that there were coconuts and almond trees in the area. She also stated that before, many Cabécar (not all) lived in the high parts, that there was a relationship with the Afro-descendants, and that the indigenous children went to their school. Faced with this evidence, the truth is that the plaintiff party did not bring to the process elements that would refute them or that would demonstrate the physical or material occupation of that indigenous community in that territory. Thus, the evaluation of the evidentiary pool as a whole allows the Court to conclude that the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 was neither inhabited nor physically occupied by that indigenous community but rather by private individuals (Afro-descendants and white people) and those who cadastral-mapped plans and registered private property since 1946, as is the case of Mrs. Nombre142248 .

**XII.-** However, the fact that it is considered proven that the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through Decrees No. Placa27837 and No. 29956 was neither inhabited nor physically occupied by that indigenous community, but rather by private subjects, is not sufficient to conclude that there has been no violation of their right to communal property. As we explained in a previous Considering, the scope of indigenous communal private property in relation to territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands and which must also be analyzed. In that sense, the plaintiff party states that the conception of indigenous property rights is different because it is based, in addition, on a spiritual relationship. According to what was stated in previous Considerings, that special relationship manifests itself in different ways depending on the indigenous people that, in each case, corresponds. Thus, for example, traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties, is mentioned; sporadic settlements or cultivation; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing, or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs, and any other characteristic element of their culture. This is also derived from Articles 13, 14, and 15 of Convention No. 169 of the ILO. Now, the Court deems that this special relationship of indigenous peoples with their territories must necessarily be proven for it to be so declared and to proceed with the recovery and return, if applicable. The necessary demonstration of that relationship has also been recognized by the IACHR. Thus, for example, in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214 , it was indicated that "(...) The bond of the members of the Community with said territories is fundamental and inseparable for their food and cultural survival, hence the importance of their return. Contrary to what the State indicates, the lands to be delivered to the members of the Community is not just any property “within the historical territory of the Enxet Lengua”, but the territory that the members of the Community have demonstrated in this case is their specific traditional territory and the most suitable for the indigenous settlement (supra para. 107).(...)" (the highlighting and underlining are not in the original). It was also stated that "(...) With respect to the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is based mainly on their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so that as long as that relationship exists, the right to claim said lands will remain valid. If this relationship had ceased to exist, that right would also be extinguished.(...)" (the highlighting and underlining are not in the original). Even in the specific case resolved there, the IACHR gave credibility to the report of an anthropologist that served as an evidentiary element to accredit the existence of that special and spiritual relationship. In that sense, the ruling indicates that "(...) In the present case, the Court observes that the relationship of the members of the Community with their traditional territory is manifested, inter alia, in the development of their traditional activities within said lands (supra paras. Placa27824, ). In this regard, the anthropologist Nombre142265 expressed in his report prepared in 1995 that the same continued “occupying its territory and practicing its traditional economy, despite the conditioning factors [imposed by] private property”. Of particular relevance is that even with the restrictions imposed on the members of the Community, “they still entered to hunt in secret”.

Likewise, some members of the Community indicated that when they lived in Estancia Salazar, although with serious limitations, some traditional medicine was still practiced and shamans searched for medicinal plants in the hills, and they also buried their dead according to their customs. (...)". Well, in the present case, the Court considers that this special and spiritual relationship of the indigenous community of Kekoldi with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees (which, in essence, corresponds to the coast and coastal plain of Cocles) was not demonstrated. The only evidence that the plaintiff provided for such purposes was the testimony of Mrs. Nombre142266, an indigenous woman of that community. However, we consider that this evidence is insufficient for the following reasons. She related to the Court, at length, the relationship of the Nombre29395 with the sea and that Talamanca was Bribrí domain, from the top of the mountain range to the coast. Also that baptisms of children who lived far from the sea were carried out in the sea and that they also took advantage of it: they made salt, used white shells and coconuts (they ate the nut, used the shell and stored the salt). However, Mr. Nombre142258 stated that he did not remember having seen sacred, religious, or ritual ceremonies of the indigenous people in Cocles. He emphasized that, being a small town, if there had been any, they would have known about them. He explained that the indigenous people went down to the coast to look for salt and took crabs. He even related to the Court that in the works and excavations they had done on their lands, they never found any indication that would lead them to presume the presence of indigenous people in that area. The existence of contrary testimonies regarding ceremonies, rituals, or spiritual bonds being carried out in that area prevents the Court from considering that relationship as proven. Furthermore, it is striking that when Mrs. Nombre142266 explained that for them, there were sacred places, which were protected and for which permission had to be sought from the gods to enter, Nombre635 among these wetlands, lagoons, estuaries, and hills, but she never indicated that the sea or the coast was one of them. The foregoing is coupled with the fact that the existence of settlements in that area, or that cultivation, hunting, sporadic fishing, seasonal gathering, or nomadic practices were carried out there, was also not demonstrated. In our view, the testimonies given only allow for accrediting that the indigenous people of Kekoldi used and took advantage of the sea and its resources; but not in a manner different from what any person could do. Thus, with the evidence presented, it could not be affirmed that the indigenous community Nombre142238 had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the area excluded by the challenged decrees that could serve as a basis for a property right. Consider, furthermore, that some of the excluded territories correspond to registered private property (since before the decrees that originally delimited it) or to the maritime terrestrial zone. Both scenarios have protection under the legal system, a situation that must also be weighed by this Court. Thus, it also cannot be concluded that those excluded territories were traditionally and ancestrally occupied by them. To reach that conclusion, we consider that the plaintiff should have submitted suitable evidence to the process, such as, for example, an anthropologist who, based on their expertise, could establish that special relationship, mainly in aspects such as movements, use, or spiritual relationship of these peoples with the sea, the coast, and the plains of Cocles. However, it was the representative of the plaintiff association who withdrew from that evidence which was, at the time, admitted by the Court. From this perspective, if the burden of proof corresponded to them and they did not exercise it, the plaintiff must assume the negative consequences of their neglect. For the reasons stated, the Court considers that the challenged decrees do not curtail or violate the property right of the indigenous community Nombre142238 because the excluded territories were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Rather, their occupants were others, as was demonstrated. Based on the foregoing, no deficiency is found in the motive and content of the challenged decrees; since rather they respond, as explained, to the need to correct an error in the location originally set forth by the now-repealed Executive Decree No. 7267. It is not true, as the plaintiff affirms, that its registered property right was curtailed by the challenged decrees. We reiterate that what Executive Decree No. 7267 did, at the time, was a generic location of the indigenous territory of Nombre142238 which, as the challenged decrees indicate and has been demonstrated here, mistakenly included lands that had not been occupied or used by that indigenous community. Upon the registration of farm No. 7-19056-000 without a cadastral map that correctly delimited it, that error extended to properties that have been used, occupied, and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons. Precisely, by virtue of that error (the diffuse location incurred by Decree No. 7267) and in the fact that, in any case, the referred Decree does not have the necessary power to disregard legally registered private property in the name of third parties and on which, and this is fundamental, there has been no traditional or ancestral occupation by that indigenous community; that the State issues the challenged decrees and delimits the Indigenous Reserve of Nombre142238 in a manner consistent with the substantial content of its collective property right, that is, to cover territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Based on the evidence that has been presented here in relation to the applicable norms to the specific case, the Court considers that these formal administrative conducts do not harm the indigenous people's property right. It is not necessary to request the nullity of the title corresponding to the farm in the Partido de Limón, number 19056-000. As indicated at the beginning of the examination of this defect, that property is owned by the plaintiff. Of course, in the terms in which its property right is conceived, that is, in the territory traditionally occupied by them, which corresponds, as has been explained, to the one described, to date, by Decree No. 29956 challenged here.

XIII.- The foregoing does not suppose, by any stretch, a violation of the Principle of Legality or disregard of norms that regulate indigenous property rights. Article 11 of ILO Convention 107 states that the right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favor of the members of the populations in question over the lands traditionally occupied by them. In the specific case, the Court has established that the territories excluded by the challenged decrees do not meet that prerequisite because they do not correspond to lands that traditionally have been or are occupied by the indigenous community Nombre142238. To that extent, they do not form part of their property right and cause them no injury, while rather that right is recognized in its fair dimension. Articles 13 to 18 of ILO Convention No. 169 refer, in general, to the State's duty to respect the special importance that the relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as the case may be, which they occupy or otherwise use, has for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned, and in particular the collective aspects of that relationship (Article 13); which in the specific case is not violated because that relationship has not been accredited. Article 14 refers, in general, to the duty to recognize for the peoples concerned the rights of ownership and possession over the lands which they traditionally occupy; a norm that is not violated because, we reiterate, the excluded territories do not hold such a condition. Then, that same norm indicates that "(...) Furthermore, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. In this regard, particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators. (...)". We consider that the provision is also not violated in the specific case because it was not accredited that the State had denied the indigenous population of Nombre142238 access to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles. In addition to the public domain character of the maritime terrestrial zone, the witnesses stated that the members of that indigenous community came down from the upper parts of Talamanca to the coast, which speaks of their use and exploitation. Ordinals 15, 16, 17, and 18 are also not harmed because what is provided applies under the assumption that they are territories traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples, which in the case at hand was not accredited. For the same reason and according to what was set forth in the preceding recital (Considerando), Article 45 of our Political Constitution is also not harmed. In relation to numeral 2 of the Indigenous Law, since the territory owned (as lands that have been traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples) by the plaintiff indigenous community (and which corresponds to the one located by the challenged decrees) is duly registered in the National Registry, under registration number Placa2092, of the Partido de Limón. Article 3 is not violated because the territory excluded by the questioned decrees is not the property of the plaintiff indigenous community and, to that extent, does not enjoy the special protection that this norm establishes. Nor is numeral 5 applicable: if it is not indigenous private property because it has not been traditionally occupied by them, the State has no reason whatsoever that justifies the relocation, compensation, or expropriation of non-indigenous persons who occupy or are owners of those lands excluded from the originally established delimitation. Instead, we insist that the rights of those who have been occupying or are owners of properties in that area must be protected. Finally, no harm is observed to Article 267 of the Civil Code. As we explained, the plaintiff's property right is for those territories that have been traditionally occupied by them. In that sense, the registry inscription of farm No. 19056-000 of the Partido de Limón covers only that territory, which for the case at hand was located by the referred Decree No. 29956. To understand, as the representative of the plaintiff intends, that farm No. 19056-000 includes the lands located by Decree No. 7267 would lead to an abuse of right for the following reasons. That administrative act was repealed because it included lands that were not and are not traditionally occupied by the Nombre142238 community (and to that extent do not form part of their communal property right) but furthermore, were registered (with their corresponding cadastral map) in the name of non-indigenous persons and dedicated to other activities since before that community was originally located. Rather, numeral 267 referred to would be violated if this Court were to disregard the registered title held by those persons, among them, the company acting as a third party with its own claims and some of the passive coadjuvants.

XIV.- In conclusion, the Court considers that the challenged Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 were issued by the competent body (the Executive Branch) complying with the required substantial formalities of the procedure. They also have a legitimate and certain motive (in essence, that the delimitation provided in Decree No. 7267 was inappropriate because it included territories that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people represented by the plaintiff association and that rather were occupied or belonged to other persons, which is why they had to be excluded from the Reserve) which existed as it was taken into account at the time of its issuance (numeral 133 of the LGAP). The ordered content, that is, the new delimitation that excludes territories not traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, is lawful, clear, possible, and covers all issues of fact and law arising from the motive (Article 132 of the LGAP). Note even that Decree No. 25296 does not diminish the area of the Indigenous Reserve because it compensates for what was excluded by granting lands that do have indigenous occupation, and Decree No. 29956 comes to confirm what was provided in Decree No. 25296 and includes other lands that had not been recognized and that have been traditionally occupied by those indigenous people. That content is, furthermore, corresponding to the motive and proportional to the end, which translates into the public interest behind, on one hand, the State recognizing for the indigenous people of Kekoldi the communal private property over the territories that have been traditionally occupied by them and, on the other, protecting the private property right of non-indigenous persons in lands that have been occupied by them and registered in their name and in which no type of physical, material, or spiritual occupation by the plaintiff indigenous community was proven. Moreover, the act is reasoned in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP insofar as it explicitly refers to the motives that give rise to the new delimitation, which, additionally, have been verified in this judicial venue. Considering that the claimed defects are unfounded for the reasons that have been set forth, we consider that the challenged formal conducts substantially conform to the legal system and so must be declared.

XV.- On the other claims formulated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff association also requests that it be declared that its represented party is the owner of the Farm registered in the Real Estate Registry, Partido de Limón, at Folio Real Matrícula Placa2092, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within our indigenous territory, specifically the sector of the farm of Limón, folio real matrícula Placa2092, which is not recognized as ours in Executive Decree No. 25296-G of June 24, 1996, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to begin those studies and procedures when the judgment becomes final and to conclude them two months later, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the efforts to relocate those persons if they so wish, or if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept it, to initiate the procedures to expropriate and compensate them according to the procedures established in the Expropriation Law, that INDER be ordered that the relocation or expropriation efforts and procedures be initiated immediately after the studies and procedures referred to in the claim are completed, respecting the deadlines designated for it, that the Executive Branch be ordered to provide the necessary financial resources to INDER and CONAI so that they proceed with the mentioned expropriations and compensations, and that the Executive Branch be ordered to initiate efforts to provide those institutions with the resources, when the judgment becomes final, preparing, if necessary, an extraordinary budget that must be presented to the Legislative Assembly no more than two months after that finality. Given the accessory nature of those claims, insofar as they depend on the annulment claim having been upheld, which has not happened here, all of them are unfounded. If it has been established that the challenged decrees are valid, the delimitation established there is legitimate because it corresponds to the territories that have been traditionally occupied by the indigenous community of Kekoldi. To that extent, and as indicated in previous recitals (Considerandos), the plaintiff is the owner of the farm registered in the Real Estate Registry, Partido de Limón, at Folio Real Matrícula Placa2092, but only with respect to the territory located and delimited in the challenged decrees. Therefore, it is not the owner of the lands that were excluded in those norms precisely because they were not ancestrally occupied by them and that, furthermore, are registered in the name of private individuals. From that perspective, the obligations that Article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes for the State, such as studies, appraisals, relocations, and recovery of territories, are not applicable to those excluded territories because those duties are conditioned upon us facing indigenous communal property, understanding this as territories that have been traditionally occupied by them, which in the case at hand was not accredited. As such, the rejection of those claims must also be ordered, as is hereby done.

XVI.- On the subsidiary claims. The plaintiff association requests as such that it be declared that CONAI, INDER, and the State (Executive Branch), must jointly and severally pay it the sum of twelve billion colones as compensation for the de facto expropriation that occurred (material value of the land, material value of the natural-forest resources and others of common use of the indigenous communities- and spiritual value of the territory). What is requested is also unfounded. Compensation for de facto expropriation is based on the existence of private property to which a series of limitations have been imposed by virtue of which, the owner is prevented from exercising the attributes of ownership. In the specific case, and for the reasons that have been amply set forth, that condition does not arise because the lands excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 by means of the challenged decrees are not the private property of that indigenous community. The foregoing is because they are territories that have not been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. If we are not facing the private property of the plaintiff, there is evidently no limitation or de facto expropriation of that fundamental right because, we insist, they do not have it, and any compensation requested is unfounded.

XVII.- On the exceptions formulated by the defendants. The State representative formulated the exceptions of lack of passive standing and lack of right, the latter also raised by the representatives of INDER. The Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca did not raise exceptions, and CONAI was declared in default for not having answered the complaint. The lack of passive standing alleged by the State must be rejected. In the case at hand, administrative acts of general scope that were issued by the Executive Branch are challenged. To that extent, the State is passively legitimized in accordance with the provisions of Article 12, subsections 1) and 8) of the CPCA. However, the exception of lack of right formulated by the State and INDER must be upheld, and it is noted sua sponte with respect to the other defendants. The foregoing since, as set forth in the previous recitals (Considerandos), the challenged formal conducts substantially conform to the legal system and the delimitation ordered in them is legitimate because it excluded lands that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people of Nombre142238. In that respect, they do not form part of the collective private property right of that indigenous community. In addition to the foregoing, it was demonstrated in this litigation that the excluded territory has been occupied and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons who have developed their activities there since before the Reserve was originally delimited. If the excluded lands are not the property of that indigenous community, the State does not have the duty to carry out studies, appraisals, relocations, or expropriations because all those duties start from the conditioning prerequisite that it has been demonstrated that they were territories traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, which in the case at hand has not been demonstrated. For the same reasons, there is no duty to compensate the plaintiff for any de facto expropriation because this has not arisen. The foregoing implies the rejection of the complaint in all its aspects, both main and subsidiary claims.

XVIII.- Regarding the third-party claim filed by the company Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. This entity was admitted to this proceeding as a third party with its own claims. In light of the manner in which the main claim has been resolved in this proceeding, the first of its petitions must be granted, as all of the plaintiff's claims have already been dismissed. It also requests that it be declared that the plaintiff Association has no right whatsoever over the properties of Partido Limón registered under folio real registration numbers Placa1768, Placa27827, and Placa27828, which are owned by the petitioning company. If it has been proven that these properties belong to the third-party claimant company, the logical consequence of that registry inscription is that the plaintiff association has no ownership right over them. Furthermore, it was also proven that these properties form part of the lands excluded (legitimately, as was demonstrated) by the challenged decrees, precisely because the plaintiff association did not demonstrate that it had traditionally occupied them. Regarding the claims seeking a declaration that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has any right of ownership or possession over properties No. 0122172-000 and Placa27828 registered in its name, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to currently and in the future refrain from any form of factual or legal disturbance regarding the indicated lands, and that they desist from any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them; the following must be stated. In accordance with Article 264 of the Civil Code, the absolute ownership or title (dominio) over a thing encompasses the rights of possession, usufruct, transformation, alienation, defense, exclusion, restitution, and indemnification. Possession constitutes one of the attributes of the right of ownership; the exercise of which is protected within the legal system that establishes a series of instruments, both substantive and procedural, for the legitimate owner to safeguard them. From that perspective, it is not for this Court to issue a generic and abstract declaration on those aspects. Rather, it is for the titleholder, in this case, the company Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A., to make use of those legitimate instruments to repel any act of illegitimate possession, or factual or legal disturbance of its properties. Nor could this Court order the plaintiff to desist from any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. The right of action is a guarantee enjoyed by any subject, and this Court could not limit it. In that sense, the claimant must abide by the use of the instruments that the legal system regulates in order to protect its right of ownership. Thus, the third and fourth claims of the third-party claim must be dismissed, on the grounds set forth.

XIX.- Regarding the defenses raised by the plaintiff association in the third-party claim. The representative of the plaintiff party raised the defenses of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of interest, and lack of right. The first must be dismissed. The claims being litigated in the third-party claim are linked to the plaintiff association insofar as it is requested, among other things, that it be ordered that it cannot exercise acts of possession or disturb the property registered in the name of the party filing the third-party claim. The defense of lack of current interest must also be dismissed, since this interest exists from the moment there is a conflict regarding the ownership of the territories that were excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by the challenged decrees. To that extent, a judicial resolution is required to resolve them. The defense of lack of right must be upheld only regarding the dismissal of the third and fourth claims. In all other respects, it is dismissed, given that all the claims of the main complaint were declared without merit. Consequently, the claims of the third-party claim are partially upheld, and on the terms that have been set forth.

XX.- Regarding costs. Article 193 of the CPCA provides that procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. Exemption from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, we consider that, both in the main claim and in the third-party claim, there was sufficient reason to litigate. The foregoing, insofar as the plaintiff indigenous association challenges delimitations made by the State, seeking protection of its communal private property right. This right, moreover, involves elements distinct from the rights of those who are not indigenous, which gives technical complexity to the matter under discussion. Therefore, we consider that the proceeding (both the main claim and the third-party claim) must be resolved without a special condemnation for costs.

POR TANTO

The defense of lack of passive standing raised by the State is dismissed. The defense of lack of right raised by the State and INDER is upheld; an absence of right which is also declared sua sponte with respect to CONAI and the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca. Consequently, the main complaint is declared without merit in all its aspects. Regarding the filed third-party claim, the defenses of lack of passive standing and lack of current interest raised by the plaintiff association are dismissed. The defense of lack of right is upheld only insofar as it is inappropriate for this Court to declare that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has any right of possession over properties No. Placa27827 and Placa27828 registered in the name of the third-party claimant company, and to order the plaintiff Association to currently and in the future refrain from any form of factual or legal disturbance regarding the indicated lands, and that they desist from any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. In all other respects, it is dismissed. Consequently, the third-party claim filed by the third-party claimant company is upheld insofar as the claims of the plaintiff association are unfounded and the third-party claimant company is the owner of the properties of Partido Limón registered under folio real registration numbers No. Placa27827 and Placa27828. This proceeding, both the main claim and the third-party claim, is resolved without a special condemnation for costs.

Cynthia Abarca Gómez José Roberto Garita Navarro Rosa María Cortés Morales PROCESO DE TRÁMITE PREFERENTE ACTORA: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, El INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS y ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA DE TALAMANCA TERCERO INTERESADO: TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A.

COADYUVANTES PASIVOS: LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, JUMGLEBUNGALO LIMITADA, Nombre105706 , TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A., LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A., Nombre142239 , Nombre142240 , Nombre142241 , Nombre142242 , Nombre142243 , Nombre142244 , Nombre142245 , Nombre142246 , LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA,OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL Y LA SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .

Of the lawsuit and its answer: a) The Plaintiff: The plaintiffs in this process are the indigenous persons who belong to the Bribrí de Salitre community, and they have standing to appear in this matter in defense of their territory, specifically the lands they claim as traditionally occupied, located in Buenos Aires de Puntarenas, and which were excluded by the decrees challenged herein. This is because, in matters affecting indigenous property, standing must be interpreted broadly, given the collective nature of the right claimed. Both the Political Constitution and the “Ley Indígena” (Indigenous Law), as well as Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, expressly recognize the right to collective property of indigenous lands. The area excluded by the decrees challenged was subject to a special cadastral survey with the participation of the communities. Moreover, these norms also recognize the right of indigenous peoples to a cultural identity linked to their territories, the public interest of these lands, and the special protection to which they are entitled. Consequently, the plaintiffs who file the lawsuit as members of the indigenous community are legitimized to do so. The challenge to their standing alleged by the representative of the State is dismissed. b) The sued State: The lawsuits brought by indigenous peoples for the defense of their collective property and, eventually, the recovery of their lands, are directed against the State, as the party obliged by the Political Constitution and Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples to provide protection and guarantee the right to indigenous communal property, as expressed in the "Ley Indígena." As such, the State has the duty to act as guarantor of these rights, hence its standing as defendant in this process. The defendant is the State, represented by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, with Jose Pablo González Chaves, Senior Attorney, and María de los Ángeles Alvarado Granados, Attorney, appearing as its representatives. c) Co-respondents are excluded: The Organic Law of the Judiciary, in Article 110 item 19, assigns the Agrarian Courts jurisdiction over actions stemming from deeds or contracts in which the State or its institutions are part of a private law relationship. The claims brought by the plaintiffs against the State are not based on acts or contracts subject to private law but constitute an action based on public law, the purpose of which is the defense and claim of indigenous lands, a matter of public interest and, consequently, the jurisdiction lies with the Administrative Litigation Court. The claims brought against the Indigenous Development Associations that were created in the territory of the Salitre Reserve, as well as the Association of Indigenous Small Producers of Salitre, are claims directed against the State for the actions challenged in this lawsuit and must also be heard in this jurisdiction, due to the principle of unity of the claims. In any case, it is necessary to clarify that the Association of Indigenous Small Producers of Salitre lacks standing to be a party in this process, since its organic purpose, as established in its bylaws, is the agricultural production of its members. The other indigenous associations, as recognized by the "Ley Indígena," are entities of a public nature, with their functions related to the territory, and must appear as interested third parties in this process, with the State representing them in the defense of their rights, not in the defense of its own interests as a public authority. A call to the third party process for these associations is not appropriate because the suit is brought against the State, which is obliged to guarantee their rights.

VI. - On the substantive issues: A) Regarding the arguments of formal violation of the challenged decrees and their disregard for constitutional and international norms: The plaintiffs allege that the decrees challenged were issued solely by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock without the participation of the Ministry of Justice and Peace and the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, INDER), contrary to Article 8 of the General Law on Public Lands (Ley General sobre Terrenos Baldíos), and that they therefore violate the law and the indigenous norms that require the participation of indigenous communities in defining their territories. They indicate that a cadastral survey had been conducted with the participation of the communities, and that the challenged decrees left out areas where the indigenous communities had traditionally been located. However, these arguments do not render the challenged decrees invalid. Article 8 of the General Law on Public Lands was enacted prior to the 1949 Political Constitution and the "Ley Indígena," and its procedure is not the one applicable for the delimitation of indigenous reserves, which is governed by its own special norms. The cadastral survey conducted in previous years with the participation of the communities is a technical-physical reference for defining the territory, but it is the Executive Branch that has the power to create, delimit, and demarcate indigenous reserves. Consequently, the fact that the administration did not follow the procedure of Article 8 of the General Law on Public Lands does not invalidate the decrees. Regarding the lack of consultation with indigenous peoples to establish the boundaries of the indigenous territory, it does not constitute a defect that invalidates the challenged decrees. The right to consultation of indigenous peoples, recognized in Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, is a procedural right that must be exercised prior to the adoption of administrative or legislative measures that directly affect them. The delimitation of indigenous reserves by the State is a measure that directly concerns indigenous peoples. However, this right is not absolute and must be balanced with the State's power to define and delimit indigenous territories in defense of public interest, national security, and the rights of third parties. In the case under analysis, the challenged decrees, by excluding certain areas from the indigenous reserve, did not deprive the indigenous plaintiffs of their traditionally occupied lands, but rather rectified the boundaries to exclude areas occupied by non-indigenous persons, who have rights that also deserve protection. The evidence shows that the excluded territory is occupied by non-indigenous populations who have been settled there for a considerable time, in some cases prior to the creation of the reserve itself. The consultation with the indigenous communities was carried out at the time of the initial delimitation of the reserve, and there is no evidence that this excluded territory constitutes an area occupied in a traditional manner by the indigenous plaintiffs. Therefore, it is concluded that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the alleged lack of prior consultation does not invalidate the challenged decrees. B) Regarding the allegation that the challenged norms exclude territories traditionally occupied by the plaintiffs: The plaintiffs have not adequately proven that the territory excluded by the challenged decrees constitutes an area traditionally occupied by them. The claim for recovery or return of territory requires demonstrating a special relationship with their traditional lands. In this case, the expert evidence and other probative elements in the file show that the excluded area is occupied by non-indigenous persons who have had continuous and peaceful possession for many years, with formalized property titles in many cases. The indigenous plaintiffs have not demonstrated effective, continuous, and exclusive possession of that specific territory that would allow for a declaration of traditional occupation. For the above reasons, the challenged decrees are not invalid, nor do they violate the plaintiffs' legally protected rights.

VII. - Conclusion: The claims of the lawsuit must be dismissed in all their extremes. The State has acted within its powers and the challenged decrees are in accordance with the legal system.

**IV.- On the recognition of indigenous property in the Costa Rican legal system.** Given the subject under debate, the Tribunal deems it necessary to outline some brief considerations on the regulations governing indigenous property in our country and the interpretation that, in this Tribunal's judgment, should be given to those normative precepts. Thus, the first legislative provision expressly recognizing the right to property of indigenous communities is the **Ley Sobre Terrenos Baldíos**, No. 13, of January 10, 1939, which in its article 8 provided, as relevant, *"(...) a prudent zone, at the discretion of the Executive Branch, in places **where tribes of these exist**, is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, in order to preserve our autochthonous race and free them from future injustices (...)"* (emphasis not in the original). This rule was developed by **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 45**, of December 3, 1945, which in its first article stated *“(...) The unoccupied lands (terrenos baldíos) occupied by autochthonous indigenous tribes are declared inalienable and the exclusive property thereof, with the exception of the strips destined for the Carretera Interamericana (...)”* (emphasis not in the original). With the enactment, in 1949, of the **Constitución Política** currently governing us, its article 45 recognizes and protects the right to property, which implies a recognition of ownership with all its inherent attributes (an individualistic conception of property in terms of Roman Law). From this derives a protection of the collective property right of indigenous peoples, pre-existing the Constitution, first of the Spanish Colony, then of the United Provinces of Central America, and later, of the Republic of Costa Rica as an Independent State. Subsequently, through Law No. 2330, of April 9, 1959, our country approves **ILO Convention No. 107**, called *"Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries"*. In relation to the matter at hand, article 11 established that in the bound States: *“The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the populations concerned **over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy** shall be recognised.”* (Emphasis not in the original). Then, the **Ley de Tierras y Colonización** No. 2825, of May 14, 1961, provided in its article 75 that the then Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO) “(...) *in agreement with the pertinent bodies, shall ensure the conditioning of indigenous communities or families, in accordance with the spirit of this law. It shall not be declared that the extensive zones where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them, but efforts shall be made to bring all these communities together, forming a single agricultural center, in the zone that the Institute deems adequate and for which the necessary land area shall be used*”. Likewise, article 76 indicates that *"(...) Indigenous families shall be given, free of charge and in ownership, plots that the Institute designates as the minimum indispensable to satisfy their needs, and exploitable by that group, without the need for salaried workers. (...)"*. On the other hand, the **Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas** No. 5251, of July 11, 1973, establishes in its article 4, subsection e) as one of the objectives of CONAI, *"(...) To ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, encouraging State action in order to guarantee the efficient individual and collective ownership of land to the Indian; (…)"*. We also have that the **Ley Indígena**, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, provided in its article 1 that indigenous people are those who constitute ethnic groups directly descended from pre-Columbian civilizations and who preserve their own identity, and declared as indigenous reserves (reservas indígenas) those established, among others, in Decretos Ejecutivos No. 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G and 7268-G of August 20, 1977, as well as the Reserva Indígena Guaymi de Conteburica. It also stated that the boundaries fixed to the reserves in those decrees could not be varied by reducing their area, except by an express law. Article 2 establishes that the indigenous reserves are the property of these communities and that all of them must be registered in the National Registry in their name. For its part, numeral 3 reiterates that they are inalienable and imprescriptible territories, non-transferable and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them, with non-indigenous persons not being permitted to rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves, and any transfer or negotiation of lands or their improvements in the indigenous reserves between indigenous and non-indigenous persons is absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case. Reinforcing all the above, through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, **ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries** was approved, which also regulates the issue of indigenous property. As relevant, article 13 states that *"1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term lands in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use."* Article 14 establishes that *"1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned."* Finally, numeral 16 indicates, as relevant, that *"1. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy."* **V.-** From the cited regulations, we can arrive at several relevant conclusions regarding the property right recognized to indigenous peoples. **First**, it is a right that encompasses, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR Court) correctly noted in the *Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172* case, *"(...) the concepts of property and possession in indigenous communities can have a collective significance, in the sense that ownership thereof is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community" (...)"*. Thus, it is a collective right that benefits these peoples, but one that exists without prejudice to the substantive rights and procedural actions to which the individual members of these collectivities are entitled by reason of their status as inhabitants of our country. In this sense, it should be noted that although the owners of said territories do not have any special self-protection regime for said territories, national law does recognize a duty of public entities to grant said territories *Special Protection*, a concept of univocal content in International Human Rights Law that governs this matter. **Second**, said collective or communal property is not comparable, from any perspective, to public domain. Despite the fact that, based on the express text of article 3 of the Ley Indígena, indigenous territories are inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable, those characteristics do not give them the quality of public domain goods, given that they do not satisfy the indispensable and common elements of all demanial goods. Thus, the indigenous territories recognized in Costa Rica are private property of the indigenous peoples inhabiting the national territory, each with its own legal personality and absolutely autonomous from one another, by virtue of the fact that each one is a cultural, social, ethnic, and historical unit. **Third**, this collective or communal property right extends to the territories that have traditionally and ancestrally been used or occupied by indigenous peoples. The foregoing covers not only the referred territories but also the natural resources linked to their culture that are found there and the incorporeal elements that derive from it, an aspect that for the indigenous community is fundamental for its physical, cultural, economic, and food survival.

From this perspective, the scope of communal private property in relation to the territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands. In this sense, the IACHR has indicated in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, that *"(...) To determine the existence of the relationship of indigenous people with their traditional lands, the Court has established that: i) it can be expressed in different ways according to the indigenous people in question and the specific circumstances in which they find themselves, and ii) the relationship with the lands must be possible. Some forms of expression of this relationship could include traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or cultivation; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs, and any other element characteristic of their culture. The second element implies that the members of the Community are not prevented, by causes beyond their will, from carrying out those activities that reveal the persistence of the relationship with their traditional lands (...)".* It must be added, however, that in the opinion of this Court, that special relationship of the indigenous community with the lands traditionally occupied by them must, necessarily, be demonstrated through the means deemed suitable in each specific case. Finally, the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories begins with the recognition (not constitution) by law or administrative act. It is from that moment that certain properties are granted the attributes and legal protection described above, all without prejudice to the existence of any other real or credit right that the indigenous community or any of its members may have over such real estate by reason of ancestral possession. Said recognition in no way constitutes a conduct in which there is discretion in the exercise of the competence element of the respective administrative conduct, by the bodies empowered to make such recognition. Once the existence of an indigenous people in a determined geographical environment of ancestral position is established, it becomes unavoidable for the respective Public Administrations to exercise their competencies under the terms regulated in Article 60 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). Once the indigenous territory is recognized, it can only lose such condition as long as two requirements are satisfied. The first, of a formal nature, namely, the issuance of a legal norm in a material and formal sense that so provides. The second, of a material nature, which implies the informed decision of the indigenous people themselves to renounce the collective property system of which they are a part. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that both the recognition of the existence of an indigenous territory and its protection imply mandatory conduct for public entities with competencies in the matter.

**VI.-** **On the delimitation of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi.** Prior to examining the legality of the formal conducts challenged, the Court also deems it necessary to refer specifically to the recognition of the territory of the indigenous community of the plaintiff association. Thus, it is seen that by **Executive Decree No. 5904,** of March 11, 1976, the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves were initially established. The recital section of that normative instrument indicated, among others, "(...) *5°- That there still exist **territories populated exclusively by indigenous people** making it possible to delimit said Reserves; (...) 10.- That it is the duty of the State to watch over the safety of its citizens, and prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of indigenous minorities currently affected. (...)"* (The highlighting is not original). Furthermore, its first article ordered that its exact delimitation would be carried out by the ITCO, in coordination with the CONAI. Of relevance to the object of this proceeding, **Executive Decree No. 6036-G,** of June 12, 1976, reformed the limits of the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves and established the Telire Reserve. Its recital section stated that *"(...) Decree No. 5904-G of March 14, 1976, published in Supplement No. 60 a to "La Gaceta" No. 70 of April 10, 1976, left out of the Reserves created by said decree, important nuclei of indigenous population, **in zones populated exclusively by them** (...)"* (the highlighting does not correspond to the original). Regarding the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve, it was indicated that it was located on the sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, Telire 3544-1, Amubri 3644-IV, Sukut 3644-III, Siola 3544-II, scale 1: 50,000, indicating in its fourth article, its directions, distances, and coordinates. Also, an area of 56,829 hectares with 9,275 square meters is established. As an important aspect in what will be resolved here, the norm in question indicates that the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the "Cocles Indigenous Reserve," **corresponding to part of farms 1,089 and 1,050 of the ITCO** and that its exact delimitation will be carried out by the ITCO, in coordination with the CONAI. Then, by **Executive Decree No. 7267**, of August 9, 1977, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve (currently the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Keköldi (Cocles)) was established. It is important to highlight that the recital section of that norm refers to the cited Decree No. 6036-G, specifically regarding the mention that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, corresponding to part of farms 1089 and 1050 of the ITCO and indicated that studies had already been carried out aimed at locating the indigenous population of that region and determining the exact limits of that reserve. Thus, in Article 3 it is indicated that the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi is located on the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, scale 1:50,000, Amubri 3644 IV, Sixaola 3644 I, and Cahuita 3645 III, and proceeds to delimit it according to the coordinates indicated therein. Well then, the land owned by this indigenous community being recognized in the manner indicated, the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), in its Article 1, declared an indigenous reserve the one established, among others, in Executive Decree No. 6036-G, already cited, the Bribrí indigenous community of Këköldi. It also indicated that the limits set for the reserve, in that decree, could not be varied by reducing the area thereof, except by express law. Subsequently, according to **Executive Decree No. 16568,** of September 25, 1985, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was constituted as an independent reserve from the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca. Finally, mention must be made of the challenged norms. First, **Executive Decree No. 25296**, of June 24, 1996, which in its recital section indicated, as relevant, "(...) *That the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Cocles (Keköldi) was delimited by Decree 7267-G of August 9, 1977, Supplement No. 114 a to "La Gaceta" No. 157 of August 20, 1977 and confirmed by the Indigenous Law No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, "La Gaceta" No. 240 of December 20, 1977. By Decree 16568-G of September 25, 1985, "La Gaceta" 191 of October 8, 1985, it was established as an Independent Reserve. 2°—That the delimitation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Río Cocles, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause (sic) an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been a cause of conflicts and tensions in the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the limits of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6°—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of limits by executive decree, provided there is no reduction of the surface area of the Reserve. 7°—That the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, CONAI, carried out studies aimed at modifying the limits of the Cocles Reserve, excluding from it the problematic lands and compensating for them by including forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8°—That this modification allows, on the other hand, the inclusion in the Reserve of indigenous lands that until now were not protected by the Indigenous Reserve statute. 9°—That according to the Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 of December 4, 1992, the local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project. 10.—That the indigenous population also requests that from now on, the Reserve be known preferably by its indigenous name of "Keköldi".(...)".* Those factual antecedents give rise to the reform of the limits of the Kekoldi de Cocles Indigenous Reserve, establishing the new delimitation starting from Article 2. Then, **Executive Decree No. 29956,** of March 22, 2001, considered that "(...)* *in the modification of the limits of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, defined by Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important protection and conservation area of great natural wealth was not included, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. 4º—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve by provisions of Law No. 7316, Convention 169 I.L.O., Article 14. 5º—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos and Punta Caliente, which mandates its protection since it is the area that sustains the main source of that mineral for said populations. 6º—That said area geographically unites the indigenous population of Këköldi with the Bribrí indigenous population of Talamanca, which demonstrates it to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion also favors the social unity of a Bribrí indigenous population, which was spatially separated for many years. 7º—That under such considerations, it becomes necessary to modify the northwestern limit of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, in order to include that important area. 8º—That the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the I.L.O., expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)"*, and ordered the modification of Article 2 of Decree 25296-G, so that the limits of the Reserve are understood to be those now indicated in the second paragraph of this norm.

**VII.-** **On the preliminary defense of the expiration of the annulment action.** The INDER and the State alleged the expiration of the annulment action sought against several norms of the challenged decrees, which was supported by the passive co-adjuvants and the third party with its own claims. In essence, the defendants that pursue it argue that the questioned norms, namely, Executive Decrees No. 25296 of June 24, 1996 and No. 29956, of March 22, 2001, are administrative acts, so the annulment action should have been exercised within the one-year period that, for such effects, Articles 175 of the LGAP and numeral 200, subsection 7) of the CPCA indicate, and according to which, the annulment is sought in an amply extemporaneous manner. For its part, the plaintiff association states that, in accordance with ILO Conventions 107 and 169, this concerns a human right and indigenous property is imprescriptible. Therefore, it says, the action is not expired. Having analyzed the arguments of all parties, the Court deems that the preliminary defense alleged is inadmissible for the following reasons. In the present matter, we are facing the challenge of administrative acts of a general nature that, in principle, is conditioned upon the lawsuit being filed within the year following the date of its publication *(Articles 175 of the LGAP and numerals 37 subsection 3, 39.1.b and 200 subsection 7) of the CPCA)*. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be remembered that this type of act of general scope, by its own nature, produces its effects continuously while in force, for which reason, it is the criterion of this collegiate body that this possibility cannot expire while they are in force and the plaintiff can prove that it has, at least, a legitimate interest for such purposes, pursuant to the provisions of Article 10, subsection 2) of the CPCA *(see, in a similar sense, judgment number 262-2011-VI and 052-2012-VI, both issued by the Sixth Section of this Court, at 14:50 on December 1, 2011 and at 7:30 on March 22, 2012, respectively)*. At this point, it should be remembered that pursuant to the provisions of numeral 40 of the CPCA, it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope, as long as their continued effects subsist over time, and therefore, the maximum period to file the proceeding will be one year from the day following the cessation of those. Mind you, the action will only be for purposes of their annulment and future inapplicability. Added to the foregoing, we insist that in the cases of automatically applicable norms -as in this case-, an individual act of application is not required to challenge them, by virtue of the fact that they become immediately obligatory upon their sole promulgation, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the injured party. Well then, we deem that the plaintiff association has, at least, a legitimate interest in the challenge of these decrees insofar as it deems that they are harmful and violate its private property. Furthermore, these are norms whose effects persist continuously while in force. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejects the defense of expiration raised by the representation of the INDER and the State, and proceeds to the analysis of the claims formulated by the plaintiff.

**VIII.-** **On the annulment claim formulated.** The plaintiff seeks the partial absolute nullity of the mentioned Executive Decrees No. 25296 and 29956 in the following terms. Regarding Executive Decree No. 25296, it requests the annulment of Article 2 only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the farm registered in the Registry of Limón, at real folio registration number 19056-000. Also, it requests the nullity of Article 3 in its entirety. Regarding Executive Decree No. 29956, it requests the annulment of Article 1 only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from the indigenous territory of a part of the aforementioned farm 19056-000, in the same manner as Executive Decree No. 25296. Furthermore, it requests the nullity of Article 3 only insofar as it considers Article 3 of Decree 25296 to be in force. The legality examination that the Court will carry out is based on two premises: the first of them, that fundamentally, the nullity is sought in relation to the new delimitation that the challenged general scope norms carried out and confirmed regarding the territory that comprises the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi, which the plaintiff deems illegal and violative of its rights. The second, that the defects of illegality alleged are so for both norms; for which reason they will be analyzed jointly. In that sense, there are four defects that the plaintiff claims: 1) That to promulgate those decrees, the consultation established by Article 6 of ILO Convention 169 was omitted. 2) That they violate the Principle of Legal Reserve. 3) That the challenged norms injure the Principle of Legality insofar as a series of legal and supra-legal norms are violated. 4) That the challenged norms disregard its right to private property. Regarding the first of the defects, the following must be indicated. Article 6 of Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, approved in our country by Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, indicates, as relevant, that *"(...) 1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly (...)".* The plaintiff claims that in the promulgation of the challenged decrees, the consultation with the indigenous community was omitted, as required by the cited norm. However, the analysis of the case file allows discarding the defect alleged. As a starting point, we have that the challenged norms attest to the realization of the consultation. In that sense, we have that the recital section of Decree No. 25296 indicated that "(...) *9°—That according to the Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 of December 4, 1992, the local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project (...)";* while that of Decree No. 29956 indicated that "(...) *8º—That the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the I.L.O., expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)".* Then, what is indicated in the referred decrees finds support in the documentary evidence that was provided. Note that at folio 596 of the judicial file, the certified copy of official letter ALG-577-96, of August 28, 1996, is visible, by which the Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Security responded to official letter A-727-96, of August 20, 1996, signed by the advisor to the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports *(folio 595 of the judicial file)*; indicating that *"(....) in the procedures for the reform of the limits of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, the parties were informed. (...)".* In turn, it sent a copy of official letter DE-091-96, of August 23, 1996 *(folio 597 of this file)*, in which the Executive Director of CONAI stated that *"(...) In reality, for more than 10 years, both CONAI, and the Indigenous Community of Cocles, and other regional groups have requested the signing of this Decree, to put an end to a conflictive situation that did not benefit anyone. (...)".* Added to the foregoing, at folio 601 of this file, there is a certified copy of a missive identified as document 14 dated February 18, 1994, by which the Integral Development Association of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Cocles stated to CONAI that they had analyzed the boundary modification project and concluded that it met their expectations, and therefore requested it be processed. Furthermore, at folios 604 and 605, there is the report that, in the amparo proceeding processed under file No. 96-005636-007-CO, was given by the President of CONAI in which he mentions the different official letters that demonstrate that such consultation was indeed carried out. Finally, from folios 608 to 611, there is a certified copy of a missive, presented in the referred judicial file of the amparo proceeding, in which a group of indigenous neighbors of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi stated to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) that they agreed with the content of Decree No. 25296 and that they were consulted twice, specifically in November 1994 and in January 1996. The generic questioning that the plaintiff made of these documents is not admissible. On one hand, these are documents that form part of judicial file 96-005636-007-CO (specifically folios 131 and 132 of that file) processed before the Constitutional Chamber and that are provided duly certified, some of them rendered under oath, as established by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. On the other hand, on some of the documents, the seal of the Association in question is stamped. The harmonious assessment of these elements allows the Court to conclude that, as the defendants and the third party with its own claims argue, the referred consultation was indeed carried out as, we insist, the questioned norms indicate. Thus, the will of the plaintiff indigenous community was indeed considered prior to the referred delimitation. Finally, the Court notes the fact that, despite the nature of the defect claimed, it is alleged only to justify the partial nullity of the general scope norm. This is because the plaintiff alleges the omission of this essential formality only with regard to the norms that excluded a part of Limón farm No. 19056-000, but not with respect to the norms that expanded the limits of the reserve to the south and west. Strictly speaking, starting from the remote possibility that the consultation had not been carried out (which is not what is concluded in this case), we would be facing a defect that would invalidate the entire decree norms and the delimitation established in them, and not just the articles that exclude portions of the territory, as the plaintiff intends. This argumentation by the plaintiff reinforces the conclusion of the Court regarding that the consultation was indeed carried out; because there would be no way to understand that it was done for the norms that expand the reserve and not for those that exclude lands. For the reasons stated, the alleged defect is inadmissible and must be declared so.

IX.- It is also alleged that there is a violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley), fundamentally because it is considered that, pursuant to article 1 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), the delimitation carried out in the cited Decrees No. 6036-G and No. 7267 assumed the rank of law and could not be modified through the challenged general-scope regulations; especially when the referenced article establishes that the limits fixed for the reserves, in the cited decrees, could not be varied by reducing the size (cabida) of those, except by express law. However, the Tribunal considers that the proper interpretation of article 1 in question allows the defect alleged to be discarded. There is no doubt for the Tribunal that this norm declares the ones established, as is relevant to this case, in the cited Executive Decrees (Decretos Ejecutivos) numbers 5904-G, 6036-G, and 7267, as indigenous reserves. Such a declaration entails endorsing, in a norm of legal rank, the delimitation established in those acts of general scope. Precisely for this reason, the referenced article 1 immediately provides that the limits fixed for the reserves, in the cited decrees, could not be varied by reducing the size of those, except by express law. However, we are of the opinion that, in this specific case, such provision has not been violated because the challenged decrees did not reduce the size of the Bribrí de Kekoldi indigenous territory. This is clearly evident from the recitals (considerativa) of Decree No. 25296 when it indicates that "(...) 2°—That the delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve (Reserva Indígena) of Cocles was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of damages to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions over the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the limits of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6°—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of limits by executive decree, provided that there is no reduction of the surface area of the Reserve. 7°—That the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) carried out studies aimed at modifying the limits of the Cocles Reserve, excluding from it the problematic lands and compensating for them by the inclusion of forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8°—That this modification also allows for the inclusion in the Reserve of indigenous lands that, to date, were not protected by the Indigenous Reserve statute.(...)"; and from that of Decree No. 29956 when it points out that "(...) 2º—That the limits of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi were modified by article 2 of Executive Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of 15 July 1996. 3º—That in the modification of the limits of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi, defined by article 2 of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of 15 July 1996, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs (nacientes) of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers, was not included. 4º—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve by provisions of Law No. 7316, ILO Convention 169, article 14. 5º—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, inclusive for the communities of Bribrí, Home Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos, and Punta Caliente, which obligates its protection since it is the area that sustains the main source of that mineral for these populations. 6º—That said area geographically joins the indigenous population of Këköldi with the Bribrí indigenous population of Talamanca, which proves to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion likewise favors the social unity of a Bribrí indigenous population, which was spatially separated for many years. 7º—That under such considerations, it is necessary to modify the northwest limit of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi, in order to include that important area.(...)". The transcribed text allows concluding that although Executive Decree No. 25296 excluded from the reserve the lands corresponding to the coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River and the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve, it compensated for this with the inclusion of forested lands to the west and south of the current reserve. Thus, there was no reduction in size that gives rise to the violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve. The situation is even clearer in Decree No. 29956, since this norm reiterates the delimitation made in Executive Decree No. 25296 and expands the territory to include, in the northwest limit, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. In that regard, it is evident that this general-scope regulation also does not reduce the size of the reserve and, therefore, the alleged illegality does not exist. We insist that the limitation imposed by the Indigenous Law is that, by regulatory means, the limits are varied in such a way as to entail a reduction of the size of the indigenous territory, which did not occur in this case since the referred acts of general scope, rather, increased the referred size, just as the claimant admits in its claims. To suppose that pursuant to article 1 of the Indigenous Law the limits of the reserves can only be modified by legal norm would lead not only to ignoring and disapplying the very text of the norm (according to which that is not possible only if the size is reduced), but also to interpreting that the modifications that seek an increase of the size must also be ordered by legal norm. A conclusion of this nature (which the Tribunal does not share) would entail the declaration of illegality of the entire text of the challenged decrees, including that relating to the inclusion of territories and increase of the size. Thus, we consider that quantitatively there is no injury to the Bribrí de Kekoldi indigenous territory since, we reiterate, the general-scope regulations, although they modified the limits of the reserve, did not reduce its size but rather increased it considerably. But, in addition, there is no qualitative reduction either, since, as will be analyzed below, the excluded territories corresponded to lands that were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by the indigenous community in question; and the included lands were those that, according to the studies carried out at that time, corresponded to lands that had indeed been traditionally occupied by them. For the reasons stated, we consider that the challenged decrees do not violate the Principle of Legal Reserve.

X.- On another point, it is claimed that the challenged decrees injure and curtail the property right of the claimant indigenous community. A first argument on which the claimant bases this defect is the fact that it is the owner of the entirety of the Limón farm No. 19056-000, the registration of which is recorded in the National Registry. Therefore, it is not possible for that right to be curtailed through a decree. In that sense, we must indicate that it has been held as proven that, through Executive Decree No. 7267, of 09 August 1977, a first delimitation of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Cocles was carried out. The recitals of that norm refer to the cited Decree No. 6036-G, specifically regarding its mention that the Talamanca Reserve would include, as an administrative annex, the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, corresponding to part of ITCO farms 1089 and 1050. To comply with the provisions of this norm, through deed number 85 granted before notary Orlando Leiva Rojas at 12:00 on 05 April 1989, the Integral Development Association of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca donated to the claimant Association the farm inscribed in the Public Registry, Province of Limón, at volume 2548, folio 35, number 19056, entry 1. That deed was presented to the National Registry on 19 April 1990 under citations 378-18219-001 and, to date, has not been registered. It is for this reason that, as of today, the property in question remains registered in the name of the Integral Development Association of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca. It is important to highlight at this point that, according to the statements of the representatives of the claimant and of the Integral Development Association of the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca, the transfer has not been registered because the property in question does not have a cadastral plan (plano). However, we consider that this deficiency (the lack of registration of the transfer) does not lead to concluding that the referred property does not belong to the claimant Association, as the State representative seems to question. On the one hand, the donation deed is duly annotated as evidenced from folios 154 to 156 of the judicial file, and there is an express statement from the representative of the registry owner to the effect that the transfer was made and that "(...) if it is necessary to make another transfer or to supplement the deed granted in due time, when the IDA prepares the respective plan, we are willing to do so. (...)" (folio 286 verso of the judicial file). The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that, if the registry information of the property in question is reviewed, it is observed that its nature corresponds to the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles. Thus, the Tribunal shares what was indicated by the representatives of INDER, the passive coadjuvants, and the company acting as a third party with its own claims, in the sense that there is no questioning regarding the fact that the referred farm is owned by the claimant Association. Strictly speaking, the crux of the matter is another, as will be analyzed. In this sense, it is necessary to highlight that it has been held as proven that the farm in question (19056-000) lacks a cadastral plan. This is a fact that is proven by the expert report rendered by Olman Rojas Rojas, General Coordinator of the Executing Unit (Unidad Ejecutora) of the Regularization and Registry Program, who so indicates at folios 357 and 358 of the judicial file. But, in addition, the claimant, the State, and the company participating as a third party with its own claims so admit. Although the Tribunal considers that the absence of the cadastral plan is an element that must be evaluated when resolving this litigation, the truth is that it is not the fundamental aspect to consider, but rather a secondary one, as will be explained. We share the appreciation of expert Rojas Rojas in the sense that "(...) according to cadastral matter, the location of a farm can only be derived if a cadastral plan exists that describes it (...)" (folio 358 of the judicial file); however, in the case of indigenous territories, that condition must be evaluated in conjunction with the current regulations on this matter and the jurisprudence issued by both national and international Courts; according to which the delimitation made by States constitutes a recognition of the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories. However, the right was constituted and shall fall upon the territories that traditionally or ancestrally have been occupied by them. Therefore, once the existence of an indigenous people in a specific geographical environment of ancestral position is established, the Administrations are obligated to recognize it as such, which entails, among other actions, the recovery and return of those lands, even if they are in the hands of non-indigenous subjects. Thus, the fact that the traditional territory of the indigenous community is found in private hands would not be per se an objective and substantiated reason that prevents its reclamation. In this sense, article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes the procedure to follow for indemnifying or expropriating private property registered in territories that have been ancestrally occupied by indigenous people in order to return them to that community. This was indicated by the IACHR, among others, in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 24 August 2010 Series C No. 214, in which it stated: "(...) 2.1.2. Possession of the claimed lands and its exigency for the recognition of communal property.1. In relation to the possession of the claimed lands, the Commission considered that the State is obligated to recognize and respond to the Community’s claim “even when they do not have full possession of the same and they are in private hands.” The representatives alleged that the Community “has maintained a form of partial possession over the lands they claim and the surroundings with regard to access to natural resources.” They added that the members of the Community have developed their traditional activities on the lands under claim “since before the transfer of the lands to the Eaton and Co. company, until the beginning of 2008 [,] when those activities were prohibited to them with the establishment of the private [natural] reserve.” The State held that “the petitioners do not have the property duly inscribed in the Property Registry, nor the possession of the property claimed.” 2. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding the communal property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) the traditional possession of indigenous peoples over their lands has effects equivalent to the title of freehold ownership granted by the State; 2) traditional possession grants indigenous people the right to demand the official recognition of ownership and its registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title to the lands to the members of the indigenous communities; 4) the members of indigenous peoples who for reasons beyond their control have left or lost possession of their traditional lands maintain the right of ownership over the same, even in the absence of legal title, except when the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith, and 5) the members of indigenous peoples who involuntarily have lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal size and quality. 3. Additionally, as was established in the cases of the indigenous communities of Yakye Axa and Sawhomaxa, Paraguay recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to request the return of their lost traditional lands, even when they are under private ownership and they do not have full possession of the same. Indeed, the paraguayan Statute of Indigenous Communities enshrines the procedure to be followed for the reclamation of lands under private ownership, which is precisely the circumstance of the present case. 4. In this case, although the members of the Community do not have possession of the claimed lands, according to the jurisprudence of this Court and paraguayan domestic law, they have the right to recover them. 2.1.3. Validity of the right to claim traditional lands.5. Regarding the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is sustained principally in their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so that as long as that relationship exists, the right to reclaim said lands will remain in effect. If this relationship were to cease to exist, that right would also be extinguished.(...)". According to the foregoing, the axis of the discussion lies in determining whether the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve of the claimant Association through the challenged decrees constituted a territory traditionally occupied by them. If it was, the norms violated their communal private property right; otherwise, such injury would not exist. In that regard, the reproach is fundamentally directed at the element that motivated both decrees.

XI.- Well then, the assessment of the evidence jointly and under the rules of sound rational criticism leads to the conclusion that the territory excluded from the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 did not constitute a territory that traditionally or ancestrally had been occupied by that indigenous community. Let us see. Although the claimant sets forth in its complaint a series of historical backgrounds that it tries to relate to the topic under discussion, we consider that they are not pertinent since they refer, in general, to aspects about which there has not been major discussion. That is, nobody doubts that upon the arrival of the Spanish, our country was occupied by indigenous peoples and that these occupied territories of the Caribbean. Certified copies of two books with which it is intended to demonstrate such occupation are also provided. However, we are of the opinion that, given their nature, this element is insufficient to reach that conclusion. Note, even, that the third-party company provides certified copies of extracts from three different books, from which it affirms, in contradiction with what is said by those provided by the plaintiff, that, according to the testimony of two indigenous people (Juana Sánchez and Gloria Mayorga), it was a territory not occupied by them and that what occurred was an error in the decree that originally included it as part of the indigenous territory, since the delimitation was not the most appropriate. The fact that Doña Juana (and only she) now states that she did not affirm what the books provided by the third-party company indicate does not provide greater clarity to the matter and, rather, generates more doubts. Thus, in the evidentiary weighing carried out by the Tribunal, the books in question do not constitute suitable proof nor are they determinative in the reasoning of the decision that has been adopted. On the other hand, we have that the reasons that served as the basis for Decree No. 25296 emerge from that same act, specifically "(...) 2°—That the delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of damages to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions over the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the limits of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. (...)" ; aspects by which the modification of the limits of the Bribrí de Kekoldi indigenous territory was ordered, excluding the portion under dispute here. Those factual and legal backgrounds find, in the Tribunal's judgment, support in the case file. On the one hand, the first norms regulating the property right of indigenous people refer to vacant lands (terrenos baldíos) occupied by them (article 8 of Law No. 13) and, in the specific case of the creation of the Bribrí Reserve of Kekoldi, this was located on lands that were also the property of ITCO, even indicating the farm numbers over which it should be established and which serve as its antecedent. This is clearly stated by Executive Decree No. 6036-G, which establishes "(...) Furthermore, the Talamanca Reserve shall include, as an administrative annex, the "Indigenous Reserve of Cocles", corresponding to part of ITCO farms 1,089 and 1,050. Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. (...)". It is important to highlight that according to the recitals of that norm, the territorial localization that was carried out took into account important nuclei of indigenous population, in zones populated exclusively by them. According to the referenced norms, at the time these regulations were issued, the indigenous community of Kekoldi was located in those environments (vacant lands, ITCO lands, and specific farms), but not on properties registered as private property of individuals. On this point, it is worth emphasizing that according to the expert opinion rendered by Olman Rojas Rojas, in the territory that was excluded from the Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi by Decree No. 25296, different cadastral plans have existed since 1946, some of them linked to registry entries and to which reference was made in the list of proven facts. We insist that these plans date from 1946 (that is, prior to Decree No. 6036-G) to 2004 (folios 354 to 372 of the judicial file). It is relevant to refer to plan 7-0009380-1946, which was cadastrally surveyed in 1946 by Delfina Ramírez Ortiz and corresponding to a piece of land of her property, located at the mouth of the Cocles River, which measured 25 hectares 2750 square meters located in the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, situated in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón, covered an important area of what is today the coastal plain at Cocles beach in Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial file). According to the same expert opinion, this plan is linked registrally to the farm inscribed in the National Registry under the real folio system No. 7-05365-000 (expert opinion rendered by Olman Rojas Rojas at folios 388 to 392 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic). Thus, Executive Decree No. 6036-G and the expert evidence allow us to confirm that the reasons that were considered in the challenged decrees (that the initial delimitation in 1976 included a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River and the southeastern part of the reserve that has not been inhabited by indigenous people, but rather by owners or occupants who were not indigenous, as is the case of Doña Delfina Ramírez) existed just as they were considered at the time of issuing them. That conclusion is reinforced, moreover, by the testimony of Edwin Deive Patterson Bent and Bernando Archer Moore. Don Edwin related to the Tribunal that he grew up in Puerto Viejo and that since he was born he remembers there were people living in houses on the coasts of Cocles. He stated that he was told that his relatives came from Panama to Puerto Viejo in the 18th century. He indicated that, for as long as he has use of reason (when he was five or six years old, since he was born in 1965), there were people living in Cocles, almost all of them black and some white. The houses were situated on the coast and the farms behind. He mentioned among the oldest families that of Don Francisco Ramírez Caicedo, who was Colombian and was the father of Doña Delfina Ramírez. He indicated that when he was a child Don Francisco was already living there and cites the names of other families that also inhabited the area. He explained He explained that the black population would come from Puerto Viejo (where there was a school and general stores) to Cocles to collect cacao, which was the most important commercial activity. He stated that he did not remember having seen indigenous settlements or people in the low areas or coast of Cocles, but rather that they came from Alta Talamanca to help with the cacao harvest and sometimes stayed to sleep in the houses of those who hired them. He insisted that the Bribrí indigenous population of Kekoldi was located in the upper parts of baja Talamanca: in the low area there were coconuts, in the intermediate area the cacao farms, and in the upper part the indigenous people, and each always had their own space. Don Bernardo, who visited Cocles in his childhood, agreed that there were no indigenous settlements in the coastal zone, but rather that it was occupied by private owners and the indigenous people were located from Bribrí inward. He also agreed regarding the main activities (planting cacao and tubers) and that the Bribrís came down to Cocles to work in tasks such as clearing brush (chapia), breaking cacao, and, in general, as laborers (peones). He indicated that sometimes the owners would give them a small piece of land to live near the work, but that they never constituted settlements in that zone. It is worth noting that even doña Juana Sánchez admits that some Afro-descendants lived in Cocles (not many) and that in the zone there were coconuts and almond trees. She also pointed out that before, many Bribrís (not all) lived in the upper parts, that there was a relationship with the Afro-descendants, and that the indigenous children went to their school. In light of this evidence, the fact is that the plaintiff did not bring to the process elements to refute them or to demonstrate the physical or material occupation of that indigenous community in that territory. Thus, the assessment of the evidentiary body as a whole allows the Court to conclude that the territory excluded from the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 was not inhabited or physically occupied by that indigenous community but rather by private individuals (Afro-descendants and whites) and those who surveyed maps and registered private property since 1946, as is the case of Doña Delfina Ramírez.

**XII.-** However, the fact that it is proven that the territory excluded from the Bribrí Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi by Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 was not inhabited or physically occupied by that indigenous community, but by private subjects, is not sufficient to conclude that there was no violation of their communal property right. As we explained in a previous Considering clause, the scope of indigenous communal private property in relation to the territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands, which must also be analyzed. In that sense, the plaintiff states that the conception of the property right of indigenous people is different because it is also founded on a spiritual relationship. As set forth in previous Considering clauses, that special relationship manifests in different ways depending on the indigenous people in each case. Thus, for example, traditional use or presence is mentioned, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or cultivation; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing, or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs; and any other characteristic element of their culture. This also derives from Articles 13, 14, and 15 of Convention No. 169 of the ILO. Now, the Court considers that this special relationship of indigenous people with their territories must necessarily be proven so that it can be declared as such and proceed with the recovery and return, if applicable. The necessary demonstration of that relationship has also been recognized by the IACHR. Thus, for example, in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, it was indicated that *"(...) The link of the members of the Community with said territories is fundamental and inseparable for their food and cultural survival, hence the importance of their return. Contrary to what the State indicates, the lands to be delivered to the members of the Community is not any real property "within the historical territory of the Enxet Lengua", but rather* ***the territory that the members of the Community have demonstrated in this case is their specific traditional territory and the most suitable for indigenous settlement*** *(supra para. 107). (...)"* (the highlighting and underlining are not from the original). Also, it was pointed out that *"(...) With respect to the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is sustained mainly on their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so* ***as long as that relationship exists, the right to claim those lands will remain in force. If this relationship had ceased to exist, that right would also be extinguished.*** *(...)"* (the highlighting and underlining are not from the original). Even in the specific case resolved there, the IACHR gave credibility to the report of an anthropologist that served as a demonstrative element to prove the existence of that special and spiritual relationship. In that sense, the ruling indicates that *"(...) In the present case, the Court observes that the relationship of the members of the Community with their traditional territory manifests, inter alia, in the development of their traditional activities within said lands (supra paras. 65, 66, 74 and 75). In this regard, the anthropologist Chase Sardi expressed in his report prepared in 1995, that it continued "occupying its territory and practicing its traditional economy, despite the conditions [imposed by] private property". Of particular relevance is that even before the restrictions imposed on the members of the Community, "they still entered to hunt secretly". Likewise, some members of the Community indicated that when they lived in the Salazar Ranch, although with serious limitations, some traditional medicine was still practiced and shamans looked for medicinal plants in the bush, as well as buried their dead according to their customs. (...)".* Well, in the present case the Court considers that this special and spiritual relationship of the indigenous community of Kekoldi with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees (which, substantively, corresponds to the coast and coastal plain of Cocles) was not demonstrated. The only evidence that the plaintiff brought for such purposes was the testimony of doña Juanita Sánchez, an indigenous woman of that community. However, we consider that this evidence is insufficient for the following reasons. She recounted to the Court, at length, the relationship of the Bribrís with the sea and that Talamanca was Bribrí domain, from the top of the mountain range to the coast. Also that baptisms of children who lived far from the sea were carried out in the sea and that they also used it: they made salt, used white shells and coconuts (ate the nut, used the shell, and stored the salt). However, don Edwin Patterson stated that he did not remember having seen sacred, religious, or ritual ceremonies of the indigenous people in Cocles. He emphasized that, being a small town, if there had been any, they would have known. He explained that the indigenous people came down to the coast to look for salt and carried away crabs. He even told the Court that in the works and excavations they had done on their lands, they never found any indication that would make them presume the presence of indigenous people in that zone. The existence of contrary testimonies regarding ceremonies, rituals, or spiritual ties being carried out in that zone prevents the Court from taking that relationship as proven. Furthermore, it is striking that when doña Juanita explained that for them, there were sacred places, which were protected and for which one had to ask permission from the gods to enter, she pointed out among these the wetlands, the lagoons, the estuaries, and the hills, but never indicated that the sea or the coast was one of them. The foregoing, coupled with the fact that the existence of settlements in that zone was not demonstrated either, or that cultivation, hunting, fishing in a sporadic manner, or seasonal or nomadic gathering was carried out there. In our view, the testimonies given only allow proving that the indigenous people of Kekoldi used and benefited from the sea and its resources; but not in a way distinct from what any person could do. Thus, with the evidence given, it could not be affirmed that the Bribrí indigenous community of Kekoldi had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the zone excluded by the challenged decrees, which could serve as the basis for a property right. Furthermore, take into account that some of the excluded territories correspond to registered private property (since before the decrees that originally delimited it) or to the maritime terrestrial zone. Both cases have protection under the legal system, a situation that must also be weighed by this Court. Hence, it also cannot be concluded that those excluded territories were traditionally and ancestrally occupied by them. To reach that conclusion, we consider that the plaintiff should have brought suitable evidence to the process, such as, for example, an anthropologist who, based on their expertise, could establish that special relationship, mainly in aspects such as displacements, use, or spiritual relationship of those peoples with the sea, the coast, and the plains of Cocles. However, it was the representative of the plaintiff association who withdrew that evidence that had been, in its moment, admitted by the Court. From this perspective, if the burden of proof fell on her and she did not exercise it, the plaintiff must assume the negative consequences of her neglect. For the reasons stated, the Court considers that the challenged decrees neither curtail nor violate the property right of the Bribrí indigenous community of Kekoldi because the excluded territories were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Rather, their occupants were others, as was demonstrated. Based on the foregoing, no deficiency is found in the rationale and content of the challenged decrees; as they rather respond, as explained, to the need to correct an error in the location originally set forth by Executive Decree No. 7267, now repealed. It is not true, as the plaintiff affirms, that their registered property right was curtailed by the challenged decrees. We reiterate that what Executive Decree No. 7267 did, at the time, was a generic location of the indigenous territory of Bribrí Kekoldi which, as the challenged decrees point out and has been demonstrated here, mistakenly included lands that had not been occupied or used by that indigenous community. Upon the registration of farm No. 7-19056-000 without there being a cadastral map that correctly delimited it, that error extended to properties that have been used, occupied, and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons. Precisely, by virtue of that error (the diffuse location incurred by Decree No. 7267) and in the fact that, in any case, the referred Decree does not have the necessary potency to disregard legally registered private property in the name of third parties and on which, and this is fundamental, there has been no traditional or ancestral occupation by that indigenous community; the State issues the challenged decrees and delimits the Indigenous Reserve of Bribrí de Kekoldi in a manner consistent with the substantial content of their collective property right, that is, so that it covers territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Based on the evidence given here in relation to the rules applicable to the specific case, the Court considers that these formal administrative conducts do not injure the property right of the indigenous people. It is not necessary to request the nullity of the title corresponding to the farm of the Partido de Limón, number 19056-000. As indicated at the beginning of the examination of this defect, that property is owned by the plaintiff. Of course, in the terms in which their property right is conceived, that is, in the territory traditionally occupied by them, which corresponds, as has been explained, to what Decree No. 29956 challenged here describes, to date.

**XIII.-** The foregoing does not suppose, in any way, a violation of the Principle of Legality or disregard for rules regulating the indigenous property right. Article 11 of Convention 107 of the ILO indicates that the right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favor of the members of the populations concerned **over the lands traditionally occupied by them.** In the specific case, the Court has established that the territories excluded by the challenged decrees do not meet that prerequisite because they do not correspond to lands that traditionally would have been or are occupied by the Bribri indigenous community of Kekoldi. In that regard, they do not form part of their property right and cause them no injury, as rather they recognize that right in its proper dimension. Articles 13 to 18 of Convention No. 169 of the ILO refer, in general, to the duty of the State to respect the special importance that the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned attach to their relationship with the lands or territories, or both, as the case may be, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of that relationship (Article 13); which in the specific case is not violated because that relationship has not been proven. Article 14 refers, in general, to the duty to recognize for the peoples concerned the rights of ownership and possession over the lands which they traditionally occupy; a rule that is not violated because, we reiterate, the excluded territories do not hold such condition. Subsequently, that same rule indicates that *"(...) Furthermore, in appropriate cases, measures shall be taken to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. In this regard, particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators. (...)".* We consider that the provision is also not violated in the specific case because it was not proven that the State had denied access of the indigenous population of Bribrí Kekoldi to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles. In addition to the public domain character of the maritime terrestrial zone, the witnesses stated that the members of that indigenous community came down from the upper parts of Talamanca to the coast, which speaks to their use and exploitation of it. Ordinals 15, 16, 17, and 18 are also not injured because what is provided applies under the assumption that these are territories traditionally occupied by indigenous people, which in this instance was not proven. For the same reason and as set forth in the previous Considering clause, Article 45 of our Political Constitution is also not injured. In relation to numeral 2 of the Indigenous Law, since the territory owned (as lands that have been traditionally occupied by indigenous people) by the plaintiff indigenous community (and which corresponds to what the challenged decrees locate) is duly registered in the National Registry, under registration number 19056-000, of the Partido de Limón. Article 3 is not violated because the territory excluded by the questioned decrees is not the property of the plaintiff indigenous community and, in that regard, does not enjoy the special protection that that rule establishes. Numeral 5 is also not applicable: if it is not indigenous private property because it has not been traditionally occupied by them, the State has no reason whatsoever that justifies the relocation, indemnification, or expropriation of the non-indigenous persons who occupy or are owners of those lands excluded from the originally established delimitation. Rather, we insist that the rights of those who have been occupying or are property owners in that zone must be protected. Finally, no injury is observed to Article 267 of the Civil Code. As we explained, the property right of the plaintiff is for those territories that have been traditionally occupied by them. In that regard, the registration entry for farm No. 19056-000 of the Partido de Limón encompasses only that territory, which for the case at hand was located by Decree No. 29956 referred to. To understand, as the representative of the plaintiff intends, that No. 19056-000 includes the lands located by Decree No. 7267 would lead to an abuse of right for the following reasons. That administrative act was repealed because it included lands that were not and are not traditionally occupied by the Bribrí community of Kekoldi (and in that regard do not form part of their communal property right) but were also, in addition, registered (with their corresponding cadastral map) in the name of non-indigenous persons and dedicated to other activities since before that community was originally located. Rather, numeral 267 referred to would be violated if this Court were to disregard the registered title held by those persons, among them, the company acting as a third party with its own claims and some of the passive coadjuvants.

**XIV.-** In conclusion, the Court considers that the challenged Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 were issued by the competent body (Executive Branch) complying with the required substantial formalities of the procedure. They also have a legitimate and certain rationale (in essence, that the delimitation set forth in Decree No. 7267 was inappropriate because it included territories that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people represented by the plaintiff association and that were rather occupied or belonged to other persons, which is why they had to be excluded from the Reserve) which existed just as it was taken into account at the time of its issuance (numeral 133 of the LGAP). The ordered content, that is, the new delimitation that excludes territories not traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, is licit, clear, possible, and covers all questions of fact and law arising from the rationale (Article 132 of the LGAP). Note even that Decree No. 25296 does not diminish the area of the Indigenous Reserve because it compensates for what is excluded with the granting of lands that do have indigenous occupation, and Decree No. 29956 comes to confirm what was provided in Decree No. 25296 and includes other lands that had not been recognized and that have been traditionally occupied by those indigenous people. That content is, furthermore, corresponding to the rationale and proportional to the purpose, which translates into the public interest behind the fact that, on the one hand, the State recognizes to the indigenous people of Kekoldi the communal private property over the territories that have been traditionally occupied by them and, on the other, protects the private property right of non-indigenous persons in lands that have been occupied by them and registered in their name and on which no type of physical, material, or spiritual occupation by the plaintiff indigenous community was proven. Besides, the act is motivated in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP insofar as it explicitly refers to the rationales that give rise to the new delimitation, which have, moreover, been confirmed in this judicial venue.

Taking into account that the claimed defects are inadmissible for the reasons that have been set forth, we consider that the formal conducts challenged substantially conform to the legal system and should be so declared." --- **Administrative and Civil Tax Court, Section VI.** Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at ten o'clock on the nineteenth of November of two thousand thirteen.

Declaratory proceeding granted preferential processing filed by the **INTEGRAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS RESERVE Nombre142238**, legal ID number CED8667, represented by its special judicial attorney-in-fact Danilo Chaverri Barrantes, lawyer, identity card number CED104828, against the **RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE** (hereinafter INDER), represented by its general judicial attorney-in-fact Carlos Enrique García Anchía, married, lawyer, identity card number CED27295 and resident of San Ramón; the **STATE**, represented by the state attorney Bernardo Lara Flores, married, lawyer, identity card number CED10238 and resident of San José; the **NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS** (hereinafter CONAI), represented by its President Nombre136655, married, farmer, identity card number CED89170, resident of the Indigenous Community of Nairí Awari; and the **INTEGRAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS RESERVE Nombre142249**, represented by its president Nombre142250, married, farmer, identity card number CED111803 and resident of Amubri de Talamanca. The company **TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A.** participates, represented by its president Nombre142251, married, businessman, identity card number CED30530 and resident of San José, in the capacity of interested third party with its own claims. Participating as passive coadjuvants are **LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA**, represented by its manager Nombre142252, married, homemaker, identity card number CED111804 and resident of Montes de Oca; **JUMGLE BUNGALO LIMITADA**, represented by its manager Nombre142253, married, lawyer, identity card number CED111805 and resident of Montes de Oca; **Nombre105706**, married, lawyer, identity card number CED111806 and resident of San José; the companies **TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A.** and **LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A.,** represented by their unlimited general agent without limit of sum Nombre142254 , who has a single surname by virtue of his Canadian nationality, married, businessman, with his country's passport number CED111801 and resident of Dirección17222, ; Nombre142239 , widow, homemaker, identity card CED111807 and resident of Dirección17223 , ; **Nombre142240 ,** divorced, agronomist, identity card Placa27825 and resident of Dirección17222, ; **CARIBIANA GS LIMITADA,** represented by its unlimited general agent Emilio de Gómez-Selléz Antoranz, in a common-law union, businessman, Spanish citizen with residency card CED111808 and resident of Dirección17222, ; **Nombre142242 ,** who has a single surname due to her Italian nationality, married, psychologist, her country's passport CED111809 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142243 ,** who has a single surname by virtue of his Italian nationality, married, administrative assistant, residency card CED111810 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142244 ,** who has a single surname due to her Italian nationality, married twice, administrator, residency card CED111811 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142245 ,** single, farmer, identity card CED111812 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **Nombre142246 ,** divorced, builder, passport CED111813 and resident of Cocles de Talamanca; **Nombre142247 ,** who has a single surname due to his United States nationality, divorced, writer, passport Placa27826, resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; **LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA,** represented by its deputy manager Nombre142255 , who has a single surname by virtue of her Canadian nationality, divorced, businesswoman, passport CED111802 and resident of Cocles; **OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL,** represented by its manager Encarnación García Vila, single, biologist, passport CED111814 resident of Dirección17222, and the **SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .,** represented by its executor Nombre142256 , married, taxi driver, identity card CED111815 and resident of Puerto Viejo de Talamanca. Also intervening are the lawyers Shirley Campos García and Maribel Aguilar Cedeño, in their capacity as general judicial attorney-in-fact and special judicial attorney-in-fact of INDER, respectively; María Teresa Fernández Chinchilla as special judicial attorney-in-fact of CONAI; Luis Manuel Castro Ventura, Mauricio Salas Villalobos, Luis Ortiz Zamora and Esteban Alfaro Calderón as special judicial attorneys-in-fact of the third party with its own claims; Nombre98251 as special judicial attorney-in-fact of the passive coadjuvant La Cherokeana Tres Limitada and Nombre105706 as special judicial attorney-in-fact of the other passive coadjuvants.

**WHEREAS** **1.-** The plaintiff brings this process so that, in essence, in judgment: 1) It be declared that my client is the owner of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, under real folio registration number Placa2092. 2) The nullity be declared - in the terms I clarify below - of articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of 1996: a) Annul article 2 only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, under real folio registration number Placa2092. We are not requesting the nullity of the decree insofar as it extends the boundaries of that Reserve to the south and west. b) Annul article (sic) 3 in its entirety. 3) The nullity be declared - in the terms I clarify below - of articles 1 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956 of the year 2001: a) Annul article 1 only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from the indigenous territory of a part of property Placa2092, cited above, in the same way as Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of 1996. We are not requesting the nullity of the decree insofar as it extends the boundaries of that Reserve to the south and west. b) Annul article 3 only insofar as it considers article 3 of Decree 25296, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, to be in force. 4) INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within our indigenous territory, specifically the sector of the property in Limón, real folio registration number Placa2092, which is not recognized as ours in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296-G of June 24, 1996. 5) INDER and CONAI be ordered to begin those studies and procedures when the judgment becomes final and to conclude them two months later. 6) INDER and CONAI be ordered to undertake the efforts to relocate those persons if they so wish, or if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept it, to initiate the procedures to expropriate and compensate them in accordance with the procedures established in the Ley de Expropiaciones (Expropriation Law). 7) INDER be ordered to initiate the relocation or expropriation efforts and procedures immediately after the studies and procedures referred to in the claim are completed, respecting the deadlines designated for this. 8) The Executive Branch be ordered to provide the necessary financial resources to INDER and CONAI so that they can proceed with the aforementioned expropriations and compensations. 9) The Executive Branch be ordered to initiate the efforts to provide those institutions with the resources, when the judgment becomes final, preparing, if necessary, an extraordinary budget that must be submitted to the Legislative Assembly no later than two months after that finality. 10) The defendants be ordered to pay jointly and severally both costs of this action. **As a subsidiary claim** it requests the following: 1) Declare that CONAI, INDER, and the State (Executive Branch), must pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff association the sum of twelve billion colones as compensation for the de facto expropriation that occurred (material value of the land, material value of the natural-forestry and other resources of common use of the indigenous communities- and spiritual value of the territory). 2) The defendants be ordered to pay jointly and severally both costs of this action *(claims visible at folio 164, adjusted at folio 456, reformulated at folios 815, all of the judicial file, and thus established during the single hearing).* **2.-** This process was declared to be of preferential processing by means of a resolution issued by this Tribunal at 8 hours 15 minutes on May 21, 2010 *(folios 177 and 178 of this pleading).* **3.-** The State answered the complaint and raised the preliminary defenses of improper joinder of the action and expiration, as well as the exceptions of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of right *(folios 188 to 193, 470 to 474, 881 and 882 of the judicial file).* **4.-** INDER answered the complaint and raised the preliminary defenses of improper joinder of the action and expiration, as well as the exception of lack of right. In what is relevant, it requested that the complaint be dismissed and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs *(folios 215 to 235, 718 to 730 and 885 to 891 of the judicial file).* **5.-** In accordance with article 65 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, CPCA), CONAI was declared in default for not having answered the complaint within the granted period. Consequently, the complaint was considered affirmatively answered with respect to the facts, without prejudice to it being able to appear at any time, taking the process in the state it is in *(see recording of the single hearing that is appended to the file).* **6.-** The Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca answered the complaint affirmatively and did not raise any exceptions *(folio 286 of the judicial file).* **7.-** In a resolution issued at 8 hours on January 28, 2013, this Tribunal admitted the participation of the entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. in this process, as a third party with its own claims. The claims formulated by said corporation are as follows: 1) That all of the plaintiff's claims be dismissed. 2) That it be declared that the plaintiff Association has no right over the properties of Partido Limón registered under real folio registration numbers Placa27827 and Placa27828, which are the property of the applying corporation. 3) That it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and INDER, has any ownership or possession right over properties No. Placa27827 and Placa27828 registered in its name. 4) That the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain now and in the future from any form of disturbance of fact or of right over the indicated lands and to renounce any process aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. 5) That the counter-defendant (the plaintiff) be ordered to pay the costs.

Similarly, it alleged an improper joinder of parties in the litigation </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 526 to 550 of the judicial file and as established in the single hearing) </span></p><p style="margin-top:4.25pt; margin-bottom:4.25pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">8.- </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">INDER and the State answered the third-party claim (tercería) and did not file exceptions</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 823 to 829, 883 and 884</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic"> of the judicial file).</span></p><p style="margin-top:4.25pt; margin-bottom:4.25pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">9.- </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">The plaintiff association answered the third-party claim (tercería) and raised the exceptions of </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\">lack of passive standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of interest, and lack of right</span><span> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 830 to 836 of the judicial file).</span></p><p style="margin-top:4.25pt; margin-bottom:4.25pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">10.- </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">By resolution issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 4, 2013, it was determined that CONAI and</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca had not answered the third-party claim (tercería) within the granted period. Therefore, in accordance with article 65 of the CPCA, they were declared in default (rebeldes) and the third-party claim (tercería) was deemed affirmatively answered with respect to the facts, without prejudice to their ability to appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state in which it finds itself </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 961 and 962 of this file).</span></p><p style="margin-top:4.25pt; margin-bottom:4.25pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">11.- </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">In Resolution No. 058-2013-VI, issued at 2:10 p.m. on April 10, 2013, this Tribunal rejected the preliminary defense of improper joinder of parties in the litigation that had been filed by the State, INDER, and the third party with its own claims </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 829 to 849 of this file).</span></p><p style="margin-top:4.25pt; margin-bottom:4.25pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">12.- </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">By Resolution No. 315-2013, issued at 4:00 p.m. on May 29, 2013, the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda summarily rejected the appeal that had been filed against the aforementioned Resolution No. 058-2013-VI </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 947 and 948 of this folder).</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:4.25pt; margin-bottom:4.25pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">13.- </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">In accordance with articles 60, subsection 3, and 70, subsection 2, of the CPCA, the single hearing was held on October 29 and 30, 2013, with the presence of all parties, the third party with its own claims, and the passive coadjuvants.</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> In it,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> the claims were established as described in the first Resultando and the requested petitions for passive joinder (coadyuvancia pasiva) were admitted. Likewise, in Resolution No. 129-2013-VI, the preliminary defense of improper joinder of parties in the litigation was rejected, which INDER had now raised in relation to the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación.</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> Subsequently, the disputed facts were established,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> the pertinent documentary evidence was admitted, and the statements of the admitted witnesses and expert were heard. Finally, the parties presented closing arguments, and upon their conclusion, the Tribunal declared this proceeding to be complex, for the purposes of the provisions of article 111, subsection 1, of the cited Procedural Code, in relation to numeral 82, subsection 1, of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">14.-</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities requiring correction or causing defenselessness have been observed. In accordance with article 111 of the CPCA in relation to numerals 79 and 82 of its Regulations, after deliberation, we proceed with the issuance, drafting, and communication of this judgment within the statutory term,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> with the drafting by the reporting judge Abarca Gómez and the affirmative vote of judge Garita Navarro and judge Cortés Morales.</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-right:56.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">CONSIDERANDO</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">I.- Proven facts. </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\">Of importance for what is resolved, the following is deemed proven: </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">1) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\">I</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">n July 1946, Nombre142248</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">registered survey plan Placa27829, corresponding to a property owned by him, located at the mouth of the Río Cocles. The property measured 25 hectares and 2,750 square meters, located in the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, situated in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón, and covered a significant area of what is now the coastal plain at Playa Cocles in Limón </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial file). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">2)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">The property described in survey plan Placa27829 was registered in the National Registry under the folio real system No. 7-05365-000 </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(expert report rendered by Nombre142257</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">at folios 388 to 392 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic).</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">3)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> The entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. is the owner of the properties registered in the National Registry, Registry of Limón, under title numbers Placa27830 and Placa27831, which have as their antecedent and derive from the property registered under the folio real system No. 7-05365-000 </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(certifications visible at folios 559 to 568 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic provided by the expert) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">4)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> By Decree No. 6036-G, of May 26, 1976, the boundaries of the Reserva Indígena de Talamanca are reformed, among others. Said regulation established that </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">\"(...) the Talamanca Reserve shall include, as an administrative annex, the \"Reserva Indígena de Cocles\", corresponding to part of properties 1,089 and 1,050 of ITCO. Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">with CONAI. (...)\"</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">5) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> of August 9, 1977, the Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles was located. That delimitation was confirmed by Ley Indígena, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977 </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">6) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">In 1979, the State proceeded with the registration of the indigenous territory delimited in Decretos Ejecutivos No. 6036-G and No. Placa26323, which corresponded to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, title number Placa27618 </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(inferred from the expert report rendered</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\"> by Nombre142257</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">, consultation made to the National Registry's internet page). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">7)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> The property registered in the Registry of Limón, title number Placa2092 lacks a registered survey plan </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(fact accepted by the plaintiff, the State, and the company participating as a third party with its own claims during their conclusions, and expert report rendered by Nombre142257</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">, Coordinador General of the Unidad Ejecutora del Programa de Regularización y Registro,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\"> folios 357 and 358 of the judicial file).</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold"> 8) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\">By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 16568-G,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\"> of September 25, 1985, it was ordered that the Reserva Indígena de Cocles constituted a reserve independent of the Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ).</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">9) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">By deed number 85, granted before the notary Nombre142257</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> at 12:00 p.m. on April 5, 1989, the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca donated to the plaintiff Association the property registered in the Public Registry, Registry of Limón, at volume 2548, folio 35, number Placa27618, entry 1; to comply with the provisions of the cited Decree No. Placa27832. That deed was presented to the National Registry on April 19, 1990, under citations </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\">378-18219-001 and to date has not been registered </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(folios 154 to 156 of the judicial file, express statement of the</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\"> Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca upon answering the complaint, and consultation made to the National Registry's internet page). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">10) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 of June 24, 1996, the cited</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267 was repealed,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> it was established that the Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles would henceforth be called \"Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles)\" and its delimitation was modified</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; color:#010101\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> . </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">11) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">The indigenous community of Nombre142238</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">was consulted on the modification of the boundaries of the Reserva Indígena</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> Nombre142238</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">proposed in the challenged decrees</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(thus inferred from the recital section of both general regulations and folios 594 to 602, 604, 605, and 608 to 611 of the judicial file).</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">12)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> The delimitation established in the cited Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 did not reduce the area of the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(thus inferred from the recital section of that regulation and from the statement of the plaintiff party in admitting the inclusion of lands). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">13)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">By Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> of March 22, 2001, article 2 of the cited Decree 25296 was reformed and the current boundaries of the Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles) were set </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">\". </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">14) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">In the territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">by Decrees</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> No. 25296 and No. 29956,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">the following registered survey plans are located: Placa27833,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> registered on June 8, 1995, which is linked to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27819; , registered on May 27, 1994, which is linked to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27820;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> , registered on October 13, 2004, which is linked to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27821; , registered on December 20, 1996, which is linked to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27822; , registered on March 1, 1975, and without an associated property; 7-0030961-1977, registered on February 9, 1977, which is linked to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27834; 7-0009398-1971, registered on September 21, 1971, and without an associated property; 7-0009380-1946, registered in July 1946, which is linked to the property registered in the Registry of Limón, folio real title number No. Placa27835 </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(expert report rendered</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\"> by Nombre142257</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">visible at folios 354 to 372, 385, 386, 838, and cd with cadastral mosaic). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">15) </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">The territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">by Decrees</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> No. 25296 and No. 29956 has been inhabited by non-indigenous people, mainly Afro-descendants and</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> whites,</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> who registered survey plans and inscribed private property since 1946, and who engaged in activities such as fishing, the planting of cocoa, and other tubers </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic">(testimonies of Nombre142258</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">, Nombre142259</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\">and Nombre142260 ). </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-weight:bold">16)</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">There were no indigenous settlements on the coast of Cocles nor in the territory excluded from the Reserva Indígena Nombre142238</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">by Decrees</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Palatino Linotype'"> No. 25296 and No. 29956.</span> They lived in the upper parts of Talamanca and would descend to the plain and the coast of Cocles to work on tasks such as clearing (chapia) (testimonies of Nombre142258, Nombre142259). **17)** The indigenous community of Nombre142249 has used and benefited from the sea and the coast of Cocles (testimonies of Nombre142258 and Nombre142260).

**II.- Facts not proven.** Of importance for the purposes of this dispute, the following are deemed unproven: **1)** That the indigenous community Nombre142238 had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees, such that a right of indigenous private property could be derived therefrom (there is a lack of proof). **2)** That the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 by means of Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 constitutes a territory that traditionally or ancestrally had been occupied by that indigenous community (suitable evidence permitting that conclusion was not provided). 3) That the State had denied the indigenous population of Nombre142238 access to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles (it is not proven).

**III.- Purpose of the proceeding.** From the claims and arguments of the parties, the Tribunal considers that the present proceeding concerns, at its core, the examination of the legality of articles 2 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 and numerals 1 and 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956. Fundamentally, the delimitation carried out with respect to the Bribri Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi is challenged, insofar as the plaintiff considers that a part of the property owned by it, registered in the Partido de Limón under the real folio registration number Placa2092, was illegitimately excluded. The foregoing because, in reality, the excluded part constitutes land traditionally occupied by them and to which they have a right. Fundamentally, the plaintiff accuses the formal acts of being invalid because they violate the Principle of Legality and Reservation of Law, and disregard their right of private property. Starting from the declaration of nullity, a series of accessory claims are formulated, insofar as they depend on the declaration of the challenged invalidity. In that sense, it is requested that it be declared that they are the owners of the entirety of the referenced farm 19056-000, that is, including the portion that was illegitimately excluded from them by the challenged decrees. Furthermore, it is requested that the presumed inactivity of INDER, CONAI, and the State be declared, for failing to comply with the obligation imposed by the regulations in force, especially Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, to carry out the necessary studies and appraisals so that an extraordinary budget may be approved allowing for the expropriation of and compensation to all non-indigenous persons occupying the Indigenous territory Nombre142238 (in the part that was illegitimately excluded from them) in order to proceed with their effective eviction and the effective recovery of those lands by that indigenous people. On this last topic (the omission), the Tribunal is asked to order the fulfillment of the referenced actions to put an end to the illegitimate inactivity that has been incurred over the years. Now then, the Tribunal admitted the participation of the entity Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. in this proceeding, as a third party with its own claims. The referenced company alleges to be the owner of two immovable properties located in the area that, according to the plaintiff association, was illegitimately excluded from their territory and that they now seek to recover. Therefore, the third party requests that all claims made by the plaintiff be declared without merit and that the plaintiff has no right over the properties in the Partido Limón registered under real folio registration numbers No. Placa27827 and Placa27828, which are its property. Additionally, it requests that it be declared that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and IDA, has a right of ownership or possession over the referenced properties, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain now and in the future from any form of disturbance, in fact or in law, over the indicated properties and to renounce any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. Given the various submissions that the litigating parties provide in support of the positions in controversy, for what is considered a better order, the following sections will address each of the thematic axes raised in their grievances by the plaintiff association, as well as the arguments of the defendants, the passive coadjuvants, and the third party with its own claims, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, with the due analysis, of course, of everything argued.

**IV.- Regarding the recognition of indigenous property in the Costa Rican legal system.** Due to the subject under debate, the Tribunal considers it necessary to outline some brief considerations regarding the regulations that govern indigenous property in our country and the interpretation that, in the judgment of this Tribunal, should be given to those normative precepts. Thus, we have that the first legislative provision that expressly recognizes the property right of indigenous communities is the **Ley Sobre Terrenos Baldíos**, No. 13, of January 10, 1939, which in its Article 8 provided, as relevant, *"(...) a prudential zone, at the discretion of the Executive Branch, is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous peoples, in the places **where tribes of these exist**, in order to preserve our autochthonous race and to free them from future injustices.(...)"* (the highlighting is not from the original). That norm was developed by **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 45**, of December 3, 1945, which in its first article indicated *"(...) The unoccupied lands occupied by them are declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the autochthonous indigenous tribes; with the exception of the strips destined for the Inter-American Highway.(...)"* (the highlighting is not from the original). With the promulgation, in 1949, of the **Constitución Política** that currently governs us, its Article 45 recognizes and protects the right to property, which implies a recognition of ownership with all its inherent attributes (an individualistic conception of property in terms of Roman Law). From this emerges a protection of the right to collective property of indigenous peoples, pre-existing the Constitution, first of the Spanish Colony, later of the Provincias Unidas de Centroamérica, and later still, of the Republic of Costa Rica as an Independent State. Subsequently, through Law No. 2330, of April 9, 1959, our country approves **Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization** (hereinafter ILO), called *"Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries"*. In relation to what concerns us, Article 11 established that in the bound States: *"The right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favour of the members of the populations concerned **over the lands traditionally occupied by them”***. (The highlighting is not from the original). Later, the **Ley de Tierras y Colonización** No. 2825, of May 14, 1961, provided in its Article 75 that the, at that time, Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (hereinafter ITCO) *"(...) in accordance with the relevant organisms, shall ensure the conditioning of the indigenous communities or families, in conformity with the spirit of this law. It shall not be declared that the extensive zones where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them, but it shall be sought to bring together all these communities, forming a single agrarian center, in the zone that the Institute considers adequate and for which purpose the necessary area of land shall be used"*. Likewise, Article 76 states that *"(...) Plots that the Institute indicates as the indispensable minimum to satisfy their needs, and exploitable by that group, without the need for salaried workers, shall be delivered free of charge and in ownership to indigenous families. (...)"*. On the other hand, the **Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas** No. 5251, of July 11, 1973, establishes in its Article 4, subsection e) as one of the objectives of CONAI, *"(...) To ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, stimulating State action in order to guarantee the efficient individual and collective ownership of land to the indigenous person; (…)"*. We also have that the **Ley Indígena**, No. 6172 of November 29, 1977, provided in its Article 1 that indigenous persons are those who constitute ethnic groups directly descended from pre-Columbian civilizations and who conserve their own identity, and declared as indigenous reserves those established, among others, in Decretos Ejecutivos No. 5904-G of April 10, 1976, 6036-G of June 12, 1976, 6037-G of June 15, 1976, 7267-G and 7268-G of August 20, 1977, as well as the Guaymi Indigenous Reserve of Conteburica. It further indicated that the limits set for the reserves in those decrees could not be varied by reducing the area thereof, except by means of an express law. Article 2 establishes that the indigenous reserves are the property of those communities and that they must all be registered in the Registro Nacional in their name. For its part, numeral 3 reiterates that these territories are inalienable, imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them, and that non-indigenous persons are not permitted to rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves, and any transfer or negotiation of lands or their improvements in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, is absolutely null with the legal consequences of the case. In reinforcement of all the foregoing, through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, the **Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries**, of the International Labour Organization, was approved, which also regulates the topic of indigenous property. In what is relevant, Article 13 states that *"1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term 'lands' in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use."* Article 14 establishes that *"1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned."* Finally, numeral 16 indicates, as relevant, that *"1. Subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples concerned shall not be removed from the lands which they occupy.* **V.-** From the cited regulations we can arrive at several conclusions relevant to the property right recognized to indigenous peoples. **First**, it is a right that comprises, among others, the rights of the members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal property. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) well Nombre635, *Caso del Pueblo Saramaka. Vs. Surinam. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 172* *"(...)the concepts of property and possession in indigenous communities can have a collective significance, in the sense that ownership of this is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community"(...)"*. Thus, it is a collective right that benefits these peoples, but which exists without prejudice to the substantive rights and procedural actions to which the members of these collectivities are individually entitled by reason of their status as inhabitants of our country. In that sense, it should be noted that although the owners of said territories do not have any special regime of self-protection for those territories, national law does recognize a duty of public entities to provide said territories with *Special Protection*, a concept of univocal content in International Human Rights Law that governs this matter. **Second,** said collective or communal property is not comparable, from any perspective, to the public domain. Even though, based on the express text of Article 3 of the Ley Indígena, indigenous territories are inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-transferable; those characteristics do not give them the quality of public domain assets, given that they do not satisfy the indispensable and common elements of all domanial assets. Thus, the indigenous territories recognized in Costa Rica are private property assets of the indigenous peoples that inhabit the national territory, each with its own legal personality and absolutely autonomous among themselves, by virtue of each one being a cultural, social, ethnic, and historical unit. **Third**, that right of collective or communal property extends to the territories that have traditionally and ancestrally been used or occupied by the indigenous peoples.

The foregoing encompasses not only the referred territories but also the natural resources linked to their culture that are found there and the intangible elements derived therefrom, an aspect that for the indigenous community is fundamental for its physical, cultural, economic, and food survival. From this perspective, the scope of communal private property in relation to the territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands. In this regard, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has indicated in the Judgment of the *Comunidad Indígena Nombre139487 . Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas*. Judgment of August 24, 2010, Series C No. 214, that *"(...) To determine the existence of the relationship of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands, the Court has established that: i) it can be expressed in different ways according to the indigenous people in question and the specific circumstances in which they find themselves, and ii) the relationship with the lands must be possible. Some forms of expression of this relationship could include traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or crops; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing, or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs; and any other element characteristic of their culture. The second element implies that the members of the Community are not prevented, by causes beyond their will, from carrying out those activities that reveal the persistence of the relationship with their traditional lands.(...)".* It should be added, however, that in the opinion of this Court, that special relationship of the indigenous community with the lands traditionally occupied by them must, necessarily, be demonstrated through the means deemed suitable in each specific case. Finally, the right to collective property that indigenous peoples hold over their territories begins with the recognition (not constitution) by law or administrative act. It is from that moment that certain lands are granted the attributes and legal protection described above, all without prejudice to the existence of any other real property right or credit right that the indigenous community or any of its members may have over such properties by reason of ancestral possession. Said recognition is absolutely not constituted as a conduct in which there is discretion in the exercise of the competence element of the respective administrative conduct, by the bodies authorized to make such recognition. Once the existence of an indigenous people in a specific geographic environment of ancestral position is established, it is unavoidable for the respective Public Administrations to exercise their competencies in the terms regulated in Article 60 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP). Once the indigenous territory is recognized, it can only lose such status if two requirements are satisfied. The first, of a formal nature, namely, the issuance of a legal norm in a material and formal sense that so provides. The second, of a material nature, which implies the informed decision of the indigenous people themselves to renounce the collective property system of which they are a part. Therefore, it is clear that both the recognition of the existence of an indigenous territory and its protection imply obligatory conduct for public entities with competencies in the matter.

**VI.- On the delimitation of the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve.** Before examining the legality of the formal conducts challenged, the Court also deems it necessary to refer specifically to the recognition of the territory of the indigenous community of the plaintiff association. Thus, it is noted that through **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5904** of March 11, 1976, the Indigenous Reserves Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca were initially established. The considering part of that normative instrument indicated, among others, *"(...) 5°- That there still exist territories populated exclusively by indigenous people making possible the delimitation of said Reserves; (...) 10.- That it is the duty of the State to watch over the security of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of indigenous minorities currently marginalized. (...)"* (The highlighting is not from the original). Furthermore, its first article ordered that its exact delimitation would be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Of relevance to the object of this process, **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6036-G** of June 12, 1976, reformed the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserves Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca and establishes the Telire Reserve. In its considering part, it is stated that *"(...) Decreto N° 5904-G of March 14, 1976, published in Alcance N° 60 to "La Gaceta" N° 70 of April 10, 1976, left out of the Reserves created by that decree, important nuclei of indigenous population, in zones populated exclusively by them (...)"* (the highlighting does not correspond to the original). With regard to the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve, it was indicated that it was located on the sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, Dirección17224 , Amubri 3644-IV, Sukut Placa27836 , Siola 3544-II, scale 1: 50,000, stating in its fourth article its bearings, distances, and coordinates. Also, an area of 56,829 hectares and 9,275 square meters was established. As an important aspect in what will be resolved here, the norm in question states that the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the "Cocles Indigenous Reserve," corresponding to part of ITCO farms 1,089 and 1,050 and that its exact delimitation will be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Subsequently, through **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267** of August 9, 1977, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was established (currently the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Nombre142238 (Cocles)). It is important to highlight that the considering part of that norm refers to the cited Decreto No. 6036-G, specifically in regards to its mention that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, corresponding to part of ITCO farms 1089 and 1050, and indicated that studies aimed at locating the indigenous population of that region and determining the exact boundaries of that reserve had already been carried out. Thus, Article 3 indicates that the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi is located on the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, scale 1:50,000, Amubri 3644 IV, Sixaola 3644 I, and Cahuita Placa27823 , and proceeds to delimit it according to the coordinates indicated therein. Well then, the land owned by this indigenous community being recognized in the manner indicated, the Indigenous Law, in its Article 1, declared as an indigenous reserve the one established, among others, in the already cited Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6036-G, the Nombre142238 indigenous community. It states, furthermore, that the boundaries set for the reserve in that decree could not be varied by reducing their area, except by express law. Subsequently, pursuant to **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 16568** of September 25, 1985, the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was constituted as a reserve independent of the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca. Finally, mention must be made of the challenged norms. First, **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296** of June 24, 1996, which in its considering part stated, relevantly, *"(...) That the Nombre142249 Indigenous Reserve of Cocles (Keköldi) was delimited by Decreto 7267-G of August 9, 1977, Alcance No 114 to "La Gaceta" No 157 of August 20, 1977, and confirmed by Indigenous Law No 6172 of November 29, 1977, "La Gaceta" No 240 of December 20, 1977. By Decreto 16568-G of September 25, 1985, "La Gaceta" 191 of October 8, 1985, it was established as an Independent Reserve. 2°—That the delimitation of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Cocles Indigenous Reserve, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause (sic) an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been the cause of conflicts and tensions in the last ten years, among the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6°—That the cited Indigenous Law No 6172, in its Article 1, allows the modification of boundaries by executive decree, provided there is no reduction in the surface area of the Reserve. 7°—That the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI, carried out studies aimed at modifying the boundaries of the Cocles Reserve, excluding from it the problematic lands and compensating for them by including forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8°—That this modification allows, on the other hand, to include in the Reserve lands belonging to indigenous people that until now were not protected under the Indigenous Reserve statute. 9°—That in accordance with the Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 of December 4, 1992, the local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project. 10.—That the indigenous population also requests that henceforth, the Reserve be known preferably by its indigenous name of "Nombre142238". (...)"* These factual antecedents give rise to the reform of the boundaries of the Kekoldi de Cocles Indigenous Reserve, establishing the new delimitation starting from Article 2. Subsequently, **Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956** of March 22, 2001, considered that *"(..) in the modification of the boundaries of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, defined by Article 2 of Decreto 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth was not included, located in the northwest sector of the reserve, between the springs (nacientes) of the Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos" Rivers. 4º—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve by provisions of Law Nº 7316, Convention 169 I.L.O., article 14. 5º—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos, and Punta Caliente, which obligates its protection since it is the area that sustains the main source of that mineral for said populations. 6º—That said area geographically unites the indigenous population of Këköldi with the Nombre142249 indigenous population, which demonstrates it to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion likewise favors the social unity of a Nombre142249 indigenous population, which was spatially separated for many years. 7º—That under such considerations, it is necessary to modify the northwest boundary of the Këköldi Indigenous Reserve, in order to include that important area. 8º—That the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas (CONAI), has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the I.L.O., expresses its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)"*, and ordered the modification of Article 2 of Decreto 25296-G, so that the boundaries of the Reserve are understood to be those that are now indicated in the second numeral of this norm.

**VII.- On the prior defense of expiration of the annulment action.** INDER and the State alleged the expiration of the annulment action that is sought against several norms of the challenged decrees, which was supported by the passive coadjuvants and the third party with its own claims. In essence, the respondents who manage it maintain that the questioned norms, namely, Decretos Ejecutivos No. 25296 of June 24, 1996, and No. 29956 of March 22, 2001, are administrative acts, so the annulment action should have been exercised within the one-year period that, for such effects, Articles 175 of the LGAP and numeral 200, subsection 7) of the CPCA indicate, and according to which, the annulment is requested in a completely untimely manner. For its part, the plaintiff association states that, in accordance with ILO Conventions 107 and 169, this involves a human right, and indigenous property is imprescriptible. Therefore, it says, the action is not expired. Having analyzed the arguments of all parties, the Court deems that the prior defense alleged is inadmissible for the following reasons. In the present matter, we are faced with the challenge of administrative acts of a general nature that, in principle, are conditioned upon the lawsuit being filed within one year after the date of their publication *(Articles 175 of the LGAP and numerals 37 subsection 3, 39.1.b, and 200 subsection 7) of the CPCA)*. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be recalled that this type of act of general scope, by its very nature, produces its effects continuously while in force, for which reason it is the criterion of this collegiate body that this possibility cannot expire while they are in effect and the plaintiff party can prove that it has, at least, a legitimate interest for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection 2) of the CPCA *(see in a similar sense, judgment number 262-2011-VI and 052-2012-VI, both issued by the Sixth Section of this Court, at 2:50 p.m. on December 1, 2011, and at 7:30 a.m. on March 22, 2012, respectively)*. At this point, it should be recalled that in accordance with the provisions of numeral 40 of the CPCA, it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope as long as their continued effects persist over time, so the maximum period to file the process will be one year from the day following the cessation of those effects. That said, the action will be solely for the purposes of their annulment and future inapplicability. In addition to the foregoing, we insist that in the cases of norms of automatic application -as in this case-, an act of individual application is not required to challenge them, by virtue of their being immediately obligatory upon their sole promulgation, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the injured party. Thus, we deem that the plaintiff association has, at least, a legitimate interest in the challenge of these decrees insofar as it deems that they are harmful to it and infringe upon its private property.

Furthermore, these are norms that produce their effects and subsist continuously while they are in force. For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal rejects the expiration (caducidad) defense raised by the representation of INDER and the State, and proceeds to the analysis of the claims formulated by the plaintiff.

**VIII.- Regarding the annulment claim that is formulated.** The plaintiff seeks the partial absolute nullity of Executive Decrees No. 25296 and 29956 mentioned in the following terms. Regarding Executive Decree No. 25296, it seeks the annulment of article 2 only insofar as the new delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve excludes a part of the farm registered in the Party of Limón, at the real folio registration number Placa2092. It also seeks the nullity of article 3 in its entirety. Regarding Executive Decree No. 29956, it seeks the annulment of article 1 only insofar as it reiterates the exclusion from the indigenous territory of a part of the farm Placa2092, previously cited, in the same manner as Executive Decree No. 25296. Furthermore, it seeks the nullity of article 3 only insofar as it considers article 3 of Decree 25296 to be in force. The legality review that the Tribunal will carry out is based on two premises: the first of which is that, fundamentally, the nullity is sought in relation to the new delimitation that the challenged general-scope norms carried out and confirmed regarding the territory comprising the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238, which the plaintiff deems illegal and violative of its rights. The second is that the alleged illegality defects (vicios de ilegalidad) are pleaded against both norms; reason for which they will be analyzed jointly. In that sense, there are four defects that the plaintiff claims: 1) That to enact those decrees, the consultation established by article 6 of ILO Convention 169 was omitted. 2) That they violate the Principle of Legal Reserve (Principio de Reserva de Ley). 3) That the challenged norms harm the Principle of Legality in that a series of legal and supra-legal norms are violated. 4) That the challenged norms disregard its right to private property. Regarding the first of the defects, the following must be noted. Article 6 of Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, approved in our country by Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, states, as relevant, that *"(...) 1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall: a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly (...)"*. The plaintiff claims that in the enactment of the challenged decrees, the consultation of the indigenous community, as required by the cited norm, was omitted. However, the analysis of the case file allows the defect alleged to be dismissed. As a starting point, we have that the challenged norms attest to the completion of the consultation. In that sense, we have that the recital section of Decree No. 25296 Nombre635 that *"(...) 9°—That pursuant to the Article of Law 7316 of November 3, 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 of December 4, 1992, the local Indigenous Community was consulted, and that it gave its agreement to the boundary reform project (...)";* while that of Decree No. 29956 indicated that *"(...) 8º—That the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), has already carried out the studies on the area claimed by the indigenous community of Këköldi and that the cited community, under consultation according to Convention 169 of the I.L.O., manifests its agreement with the study presented by CONAI. (...)".* Then, what is indicated in the referred decrees finds support in the documentary evidence that was provided. Note that on page 596 of the judicial file, the certified copy of official letter ALG-577-96, of August 28, 1996, is visible, through which the Director of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Security responded to official letter A-727-96, of August 20, 1996, signed by the advisor to the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports *(page 595 of the judicial folder)*; indicating that *"(....) in the procedures for the reform of the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, the parties were notified. (...)"*. In turn, it forwarded a copy of official letter DE-091-96, of August 23, 1996 *(page 597 of this complaint)*, in which the Executive Director of CONAI stated that *"(...) In reality, for more than 10 years, both CONAI, and the Indigenous Community of Cocles, and other regional groups have requested the signing of this Decree, to put an end to a conflictive situation that benefited no one. (...)"*. In addition to the foregoing, on page 601 of this folder is a certified copy of a missive identified as document 14 dated February 18, 1994, by which the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Cocles stated to CONAI that they had analyzed the boundary modification project and conclude that it meets their expectations, and therefore request its processing. Furthermore, on pages 604 and 605 is the report that, to the amparo appeal processed under file No. 96-005636-007-CO, the President of CONAI gave, in which he mentions the different official letters that demonstrate that such consultation was indeed carried out. Finally, from pages 608 to 611 is a certified copy of a missive, presented in the referred judicial file of the amparo appeal, in which a group of indigenous residents of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 stated to the Constitutional Chamber that they agreed with the content of Decree No. 25296 and that they were consulted, twice, specifically in November 1994 and January 1996. The generic challenge that the plaintiff made to these documents is not acceptable. On one hand, these are documents that form part of judicial file 96-005636-007-CO (specifically pages 131 and 132 of that folder) processed before the Constitutional Chamber and that are duly certified, some of them rendered under oath, as established by the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. On the other, some of the documents bear the seal of the Association in question. The harmonious assessment of these elements allows the Tribunal to conclude that, as the defendants and the third party with its own claims argue, the referred consultation was indeed carried out as, we insist, the questioned norms indicate. Thus, the will of the plaintiff indigenous community was considered prior to the referred delimitation. Finally, the Tribunal notes the fact that, despite the nature of the defect claimed, it is alleged only to justify the partial nullity of the general-scope norm. This is because the plaintiff accuses the omission of this essential formality only regarding the norms that excluded a part of the farm of Limón No. 19056-000, but not regarding the norms that extended the boundaries of the reserve toward the south and west. Strictly speaking, starting from the remote possibility that the consultation had not been carried out (which is not what is concluded in this case), we would be facing a defect that would invalidate the entire decree norms and the delimitation established therein, and not only the articles that exclude portions of the territory, as the plaintiff intends. This argumentation by the plaintiff reinforces the Tribunal's conclusion that the consultation was indeed carried out; for there would be no way to understand that it was carried out for the norms that extend the reserve and not for those that exclude lands. For the reasons stated, the alleged defect is inappropriate and must be so declared.

**IX.-** It is also alleged that there is a violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve, fundamentally because it is estimated that pursuant to article 1 of the Indigenous Law, the delimitation carried out in decrees No. 6036-G and No. 7267 cited assumed legal rank and could not be modified by the challenged general-scope norms; especially when the referred article establishes that the boundaries set for the reserves, in the cited decrees, could not be varied by diminishing their area (cabida), except by express law. However, the Tribunal considers that the proper interpretation of article 1 under discussion allows the defect alleged to be dismissed. There is no doubt for the Tribunal that this norm declares indigenous reserves those established, in what concerns this case, in Executive Decrees numbers 5904-G, 6036-G and 7267 cited. Such a declaration entails endorsing, in a norm of legal rank, the delimitation established in those acts of general scope. Precisely for this reason, the referred article 1 immediately provides that the boundaries set for the reserves, in the cited decrees, could not be varied by diminishing their area, except by express law. However, we are of the opinion that, in the specific case, such a provision has not been violated because the challenged decrees did not diminish the area of the indigenous territory Nombre142238. This is clearly evident from the recital section of Decree No. 25296 when it indicates that *"(...) 2°—That the delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Río Cocles, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Reserve of Cocles corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing it follows that, in the eastern half of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of harm to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been a cause of conflicts and tensions over the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. 6°—That the cited Indigenous Law No. 6172, in its Article 1, permits the modification of boundaries by executive decree, provided there is no reduction in the surface area of the Reserve. 7°—That the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, CONAI, carried out studies aimed at modifying the boundaries of the Reserve of Cocles, excluding from it the problematic lands and compensating for them by the inclusion of forested lands to the west and south of the current Reserve. 8°—That this modification permits, on the other hand, the inclusion in the Reserve of indigenous lands that to date were not protected under the Indigenous Reserve statute.(...)"*; and from that of Decree No. 29956 when it states that *"(...) 2º—That the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi were modified by article 2 of Executive Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996. 3º—That in the modification of the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi, defined by article 2º of Decree 25296-G, published in La Gaceta 134 of July 15, 1996, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs (nacientes) of the Ríos Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos", was not included. 4º—That this area comprises a territory traditionally of indigenous occupation, which it is necessary to include within the indigenous reserve by provisions of Law No. 7316, I.L.O. Convention 169, article 14. 5º—That this area holds a water wealth of great benefit, including for the communities of Bribrí, Home (sic) Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos and Punta Caliente, which requires its protection as it is the area that sustains the main source of this mineral for said populations. 6º—That said area geographically unites the indigenous population of Këköldi with the indigenous population Nombre142249, which demonstrates it to be an area traditionally of indigenous occupation, and its inclusion likewise favors the social unity of an indigenous population Nombre142249, that was spatially separated for many years. 7º—That under such considerations, it is necessary to modify the northwestern boundary of the Indigenous Reserve of Këköldi, in order to include that important area.(...)".* The transcribed text allows concluding that although Executive Decree No. 25296 excluded from the reserve the lands corresponding to the coastal zone near the mouth of the Río Cocles and the southeastern part of the Reserve of Cocles, it compensated for it with the inclusion of forested lands to the west and south of the current reserve. Thus, there was no reduction in the area that would give rise to the violation of the Principle of Legal Reserve. The situation is even clearer in Decree No. 29956, considering that this norm reiterates the delimitation carried out in Executive Decree No. 25296 and expands the territory to include, in the northwestern boundary, an important area of protection and conservation of great natural wealth, located in the northwestern sector of the reserve, between the springs (nacientes) of the Ríos Carbón "Uno" and Carbón "Dos". In this regard, it is evident that this general-scope norm also does not diminish the area of the reserve and, therefore, the alleged illegality does not exist. We insist that the limitation imposed by the Indigenous Law is that, via regulatory means, the boundaries be varied in a way that entails a reduction in the area of the indigenous territory, which did not occur in this case since the referred acts of general scope, rather, increased the referred area, as the plaintiff admits in its claims. To assume that pursuant to article 1 of the Indigenous Law, the boundaries of the reserves can only be modified by a legal norm would lead not only to ignoring and inapplicating the very text of the norm (according to which this is not possible only if the area is diminished), but also, to interpreting that modifications that seek the increase of the area must also be ordered by a legal norm. A conclusion of this nature (which the Tribunal does not share) would entail the declaration of illegality of the entire text of the challenged decrees, including that relating to the inclusion of territories and increase in area. Thus, we estimate that quantitatively there is no harm to the indigenous territory Nombre142238 since, we reiterate, although the general-scope norms modified the boundaries of the reserve, they did not diminish its area but rather increased it considerably. But, furthermore, there is also no qualitative reduction considering that, as will be analyzed infra, the excluded territories corresponded to lands that were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by the indigenous community in question; and the included lands were those that, according to the studies carried out at that time, corresponded to lands that had indeed been traditionally occupied by them. For the reasons stated, we estimate that the challenged decrees do not violate the Principle of Legal Reserve.

**X.-** On the other hand, it is claimed that the challenged decrees harm and curtail the property right of the plaintiff indigenous community. A first argument on which the plaintiff bases this defect is the fact that it is the owner of the entirety of the farm of Limón No. 19056-000, the registration of which is recorded in the National Registry. Therefore, it is not possible that this right be curtailed through a decree. In that sense, we must indicate that it has been proven that, by Executive Decree No. 7267, of August 9, 1977, a first delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Cocles was carried out. The recital section of that norm refers to Decree No. 6036-G cited, specifically regarding its mention that the Talamanca Reserve would include as an administrative annex the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, corresponding to part of farms 1089 and 1050 of the ITCO. To fulfill the provisions of this norm, through deed number 85 granted before notary Nombre142257 at 12:00 hours on April 5, 1989, the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca donated to the plaintiff Association the farm registered in the Public Registry, Party of Limón, at volume 2548, page 35, number 19056, entry 1. This deed was submitted to the National Registry on April 19, 1990, under citations 378-18219-001 and to date has not been registered. This is why today, the property in question remains registered in the name of the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca. It is important to highlight at this point that according to the statements of the representatives of the plaintiff and of the Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249, the transfer has not been registered because the property in question does not have a plat map. However, we estimate that this deficiency (the lack of registration of the transfer) does not give rise to concluding that the referred property does not belong to the plaintiff Association, as the State representative seems to question. On one hand, the donation deed is duly annotated as recorded on pages 154 to 156 of the judicial file and there is an express statement from the representative of the registered owner to the effect that the transfer was carried out and that *"(...) if it is necessary to execute another transfer or add to the deed timely granted, when the IDA prepares the respective plat map, we are willing to do so. (...)" (page 286 verso of the judicial file).* The foregoing is reinforced by the fact that, if the registration information for the property in question is reviewed, it is observed that its nature corresponds to the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles. Thus, the Tribunal agrees with what was stated by the representatives of INDER, the coadjuvant defendants, and the company that acts as a third party with its own claims, in the sense that there is no dispute that the referred farm is owned by the plaintiff Association. Strictly speaking, the heart of the matter is another, as will be analyzed. In this sense, it is necessary to highlight that it has been proven that the farm in question (19056-000) lacks a plat map. This is a fact that is proven with the expert report rendered by Nombre142257, General Coordinator of the Executing Unit of the Regularization and Registry Program, who so indicates on pages 357 and 358 of the judicial file. But, furthermore, the plaintiff, the State, and the company that participates as a third party with its own claims admit it. Although the Tribunal estimates that the absence of the cadastral plat map is an element that must be assessed at the time of resolving this litigation, the truth is that it is not the fundamental aspect to consider, but rather secondary, as will be explained.

We share the expert Nombre142257's assessment that "(...) according to cadastral matters, the location of a property can only be derived if there is a cadastral plan that describes it (...)" (folio 358 of the judicial file); however, in the case of indigenous territories, this condition must be evaluated together with the current regulations on this matter and the jurisprudence issued by both national and international Courts; according to which the delimitation made by the States constitutes a recognition of the right to collective property that indigenous peoples have over their territories. However, the right was constituted and will fall upon the territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Therefore, once the existence of an indigenous people in a specific geographical environment of ancestral settlement is established, the Administrations are obliged to recognize it as such, which entails, among other actions, the recovery and return of those lands, even if they are in the hands of non-indigenous subjects. Thus, the fact that the traditional territory of the indigenous community is in private hands would not be, per se, an objective and substantiated reason that prevents its reclamation. In this regard, Article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes the procedure to be followed to compensate or expropriate private property registered in territories that have been ancestrally occupied by indigenous people in order to return them to that community. This has been stated by the IACHR, among others, in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Nombre139487 v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, in which it stated: "(...) 2.1.2. Possession of the lands claimed and its requirement for the recognition of community property 1. Regarding the possession of the claimed lands, the Commission considered that the State is obliged to recognize and respond to the Community’s claim 'even when they do not have full possession thereof and they are in private hands.' The representatives alleged that the Community 'has maintained a form of partial possession over the lands they claim and the surrounding areas regarding access to natural resources.' They added that the members of the Community have carried out their traditional activities on the lands under claim 'since before the transfer of the lands to the company Eaton y Cía., until the beginning of 2008[,] when those activities were prohibited with the establishment of the private [natural] reserve.' The State maintained that 'the petitioners do not have the property duly registered in the Real Estate Registry, nor possession of the intended property.' 2. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding community property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) traditional possession of their lands by indigenous people has effects equivalent to the full ownership title granted by the State; 2) traditional possession grants indigenous people the right to demand official recognition of ownership and its registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title to the lands for the members of indigenous communities; 4) members of indigenous peoples who, for reasons beyond their control, have left or lost possession of their traditional lands, maintain the right of property over them, even in the absence of a legal title, unless the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith; and 5) members of indigenous peoples who have involuntarily lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal size and quality. 3. Additionally, as established in the cases of the indigenous communities of Nombre91182 and Sawhomaxa, Paraguay recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to request the return of their lost traditional lands, even when they are under private ownership and they do not have full possession thereof. Indeed, the Paraguayan Statute of Indigenous Communities enshrines the procedure to be followed for the reclamation of lands under private ownership, which is precisely the situation in the present case. 4. In this case, although the members of the Community do not have possession of the claimed lands, according to the jurisprudence of this Court and Paraguayan domestic law, they have the right to recover them. 2.1.3. Validity of the right to claim traditional lands 5. Regarding the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is mainly sustained by their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so as long as that relationship exists, the right to reclaim said lands will remain valid. If this relationship has ceased to exist, that right would also be extinguished.(...)." According to the foregoing, the core of the discussion lies in determining whether the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve of the plaintiff Association through the contested decrees constituted a territory traditionally occupied by them. If it was, the norms violated their communal private property right; otherwise, such injury would not exist. To that extent, the criticism is directed, fundamentally, at the grounds cited in both decrees.

**XI.-** Well, the assessment of the evidence jointly and under the rules of sound critical reasoning lead to the conclusion that the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 did not constitute a territory that had been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by that indigenous community. Let us see. While the plaintiff party lists in its claim a series of historical antecedents intended to relate to the matter under discussion, we consider that they are not relevant since they refer, in general, to aspects about which there has been no major discussion. That is, no one doubts that upon the arrival of the Spanish, our country was occupied by indigenous peoples and that they occupied Caribbean territories. Certified copies of two books are also provided, intended to demonstrate such occupation. However, we are of the opinion that, given its nature, this element is insufficient to reach such a conclusion. Note, even, that the intervening third-party company provides certified copies of extracts from three different books, from which it asserts, in contradiction to what is said in those provided by the plaintiff, that, according to the testimony of two indigenous persons (Nombre142260 and Nombre142261), it was a territory not occupied by them and that what occurred was an error in the decree that originally included it as part of the indigenous territory, since the delimitation was not the most appropriate. The fact that Nombre142262 (and only her) now states that she did not assert what the books provided by the intervening third party indicate does not provide greater clarity to the matter and rather generates more doubt. Thus, in the evidentiary weighting carried out by the Court, the books in question do not constitute suitable evidence nor are they determining factors in the reasoning for the decision that has been adopted.

On the other hand, we have that the grounds that served as the basis for Decree No. 25296 emerge from that same act, specifically "(...) That the delimitation of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles was not the most appropriate because it includes a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River, which has not been inhabited by indigenous people in the last two hundred years. Furthermore, the southeastern part of the Cocles Reserve corresponds to IDA settlements, occupied exclusively by a non-indigenous peasant population. 3°—That from the foregoing, it follows that, in the eastern half of the Indigenous Reserve of Cocles, there is no indigenous population, and that the recovery of these lands would cause an enormous expense for the State, and great losses and all kinds of damages to the current owners and occupants. 4°—That this boundary problem has been a cause of conflicts and tensions in the last ten years, between the different communities and the institutions involved. 5°—That the most convenient solution in this case is to modify the boundaries of the Indigenous Reserve, without harming the indigenous people. (...)"; aspects for which the modification of the boundaries of the indigenous territory Nombre142238 was ordered, excluding the portion here in dispute. These factual and legal antecedents find, in the Court's judgment, support in the case file.

On the one hand, the first norms regulating the property rights of indigenous people refer to vacant lands (terrenos baldíos) occupied by them (Article 8 of Law No. 13) and, in the specific case of the creation of the Reserve Nombre142238, it was located on lands that were also the property of ITCO, even indicating the property numbers over which it was to be established and which serve as its antecedent. This is clearly stated by Executive Decree No. 6036-G, which establishes "(...) Furthermore, the Talamanca Reserve will include, as an administrative annex, the 'Indigenous Reserve of Cocles,' corresponding to part of properties 1,089 and 1,050 of ITCO. Its exact delimitation will be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. (...)." It is important to highlight that, according to the recitals of that norm, the territorial location made was done taking into account important nuclei of indigenous population, in zones populated exclusively by them. According to the norms referred to, at the time these regulations were issued, the indigenous community of Kekoldi was located in those environments (vacant lands, ITCO lands, and specific properties), but not on real estate registered as the private property of individuals.

On this point, it is worth highlighting that according to the expert report rendered by Nombre142257, in the territory that was excluded from the Indigenous Reserve of Kekoldi through Decree No. 25296, different registered plans have existed since 1946, some of them linked to registry entries and to which reference was made in the list of proven facts. We reiterate that these plans date from 1946 (that is, prior to Decree No. 6036-G) to 2004 (folios 354 to 372 of the judicial file). It is relevant to refer to plan 7-0009380-1946, which was cadastrally surveyed in 1946 by Nombre142248 and which corresponds to a property owned by her, located at the mouth of the Cocles River, measuring 25 hectares and 2750 square meters located in the maritime mile of the Atlantic zone, situated in Puerto Viejo, district one, canton one of the province of Limón, covering an important area of what is now the coastal plain at Cocles beach in Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 to 572 of the judicial file). According to the same expert report, this plan is registrally linked to the property registered in the National Registry under the real folio system No. 7-05365-000 (expert report rendered by Nombre142257 at folios 388 to 392 of the judicial file, cd with cadastral mosaic). Thus, Executive Decree No. 6036-G and the expert evidence allow verification of the grounds that were considered in the contested decrees (that the initial delimitation in 1976 included a coastal zone near the mouth of the Cocles River and the southeastern part of the reserve that has not been inhabited by indigenous people but rather by owners or occupants who were not indigenous, as is the case of Ms. Nombre142248) existed just as they were considered at the time of issuing them.

This conclusion is reinforced, furthermore, by the testimony of Nombre142258 and Nombre142263. Mr. Nombre142258 related to the Court that he grew up in Puerto Viejo and that since he was born he remembers people living in houses on the coasts of Cocles. He stated that he was told that his relatives came from Panama to Puerto Viejo in the 18th century. He stated that for as long as he can remember (when he was five or six years old, since he was born in 1965), there were people living in Cocles, almost all black and some white. The houses were situated on the coast and the farms further back. He mentioned among the oldest families that of Mr. Nombre142264, who was Colombian and was the father of Ms. Nombre142248. He stated that by the time he was a child, Mr. Nombre142264 already lived there and cites the names of other families that also inhabited the area. He explained that the black population would come from Puerto Viejo (where there was a school and grocery stores) to Cocles to harvest cacao, which was the most important commercial activity. He stated that he did not remember seeing indigenous settlements or people in the lower areas or coast of Cocles, but rather that they came from Alta Talamanca to help with the cacao harvest and sometimes stayed to sleep in the houses of those who hired them. He insisted that the indigenous population Nombre142238 was located in the upper parts of the low Talamanca: in the lower part there were coconuts, in the intermediate part the cacao farms, and in the upper part the indigenous people, and each of them always had their own space. Mr. Bernardo, who visited Cocles in his childhood, agreed that there were no indigenous settlements in the coastal zone, but rather that this was occupied by private owners and the indigenous people were located from Nombre142249 inward. He also agreed regarding the main activities (planting of cacao and tubers) and that the Nombre29395 came down to Cocles to work in tasks such as clearing brush (chapia), breaking cacao, and, in general, as laborers. He indicated that sometimes the owners would give them a small piece of land so they could live near the work, but that they never constituted settlements in that zone. It should be noted that even Nombre142262 admits that some Afro-descendants (not many) lived in Cocles and that there were coconuts and almond trees in the area. She also stated that before, many Nombre29395 (not all) lived in the upper parts, that there was a relationship with the Afro-descendants, and that indigenous children went to their school.

Faced with this evidence, the truth is that the plaintiff party did not provide the process with elements to refute them or to demonstrate the physical or material occupation of that indigenous community in that territory. Thus, the assessment of the totality of the evidence allows the Court to conclude that the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 was not inhabited or physically occupied by that indigenous community but rather by private individuals (Afro-descendants and whites) and those who cadastrally surveyed plans and registered private property since 1946, as is the case of Ms. Nombre142248.

**XII.-** However, the fact that it has been proven that the territory excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 through decrees No. Placa27837 and No. 29956 was not inhabited or physically occupied by that indigenous community, but by private individuals, is not sufficient to conclude that there has been no violation of their communal property right. As we explained in a previous recital (Considerando), the scope of indigenous communal private property in relation to territories goes beyond traditional or material possession, involving spiritual aspects based on the special relationship they have with their traditional lands, which must also be analyzed. In that sense, the plaintiff party states that the conception of indigenous peoples' property right is different because it is also based on a spiritual relationship. According to what was set forth in previous recitals (Considerandos), this special relationship manifests in different ways depending on the indigenous people involved in each case. Thus, for example, mention is made of traditional use or presence, through spiritual or ceremonial ties; sporadic settlements or crops; seasonal or nomadic hunting, fishing, or gathering; use of natural resources linked to their customs; and any other element characteristic of their culture. This also derives from Articles 13, 14, and 15 of ILO Convention No. 169.

Now, the Court considers that this special relationship of indigenous people with their territories must necessarily be proven in order for it to be declared as such and proceed with recovery and return, if applicable. The necessary demonstration of this relationship has also been recognized by the IACHR. Thus, for example, in the Judgment of the Indigenous Community Xákmok Kásek v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, it was indicated that "(...) The bond of the members of the Community with said territories is fundamental and inseparable for their food and cultural survival, hence the importance of their return. Contrary to what the State indicates, the lands to be delivered to the members of the Community is not just any property 'within the historical territory of the Enxet Lengua,' but **the territory that the members of the Community** **have demonstrated** in this case to be their specific traditional territory and the most suitable for indigenous settlement (supra para. 107).(...)" (the highlighting and underlining does not correspond to the original). It was also stated that "(...) Regarding the possibility of recovering traditional lands, on previous occasions the Court has established that the spiritual and material basis of the identity of indigenous peoples is mainly sustained by their unique relationship with their traditional lands, so **as long as that relationship exists, the right to reclaim said lands will remain valid. If this relationship has ceased to exist, that right would also be extinguished.**(...)" (the highlighting and underlining does not correspond to the original). Even in the specific case resolved there, the IACHR gave credibility to the report of an anthropologist that served as a demonstrative element to accredit the existence of that special and spiritual relationship. In that sense, the judgment indicates that "(...) In the present case, the Court observes that the relationship of the members of the Community with their traditional territory is manifested, inter alia, in the development of their traditional activities within these lands (supra paras. Placa27824, ). In this regard, the anthropologist Nombre142265 expressed in his report prepared in 1995, that the same continued 'occupying its territory and practicing its traditional economy, despite the conditions [imposed by] private property.' Of particular relevance is that even in the face of the restrictions imposed on the members of the Community, 'they still entered to hunt secretly.'" Likewise, some members of the Community indicated that when they lived in the Estancia Salazar, although with serious limitations, some traditional medicine was still practiced and the shamans sought medicinal plants in the bush, as well as burying their dead according to their customs. (...)". Thus, in the present case, the Tribunal considers that this special and spiritual relationship of the indigenous community of Kekoldi with the territories excluded by the challenged decrees (which, essentially, corresponds to the coast and coastal plain of Cocles) was not demonstrated. The only evidence that the plaintiff provided for such purposes was the testimony of Mrs. Nombre142266 , an indigenous woman from that community. However, we consider that this evidence is insufficient for the following reasons. She related to the Tribunal, at length, the relationship of the Nombre29395 with the sea and that Talamanca was a Bribrí domain, from the top of the mountain range to the coast. She also stated that baptisms of children who lived far from the sea were carried out in the sea and that they also made use of it: they made salt, used the white shells and the coconuts (they ate the nut, used the shell, and stored the salt). However, Mr. Nombre142258 stated that he did not remember having seen sacred ceremonies, religious or ritual ceremonies of the indigenous people in Cocles. He emphasized that, being a small town, if there had been any, they would have known about them. He explained that the indigenous people went down to the coast to look for salt and took crabs. He even related to the Tribunal that in the works and excavations they had done on their lands, they never found any indication that would lead them to presume the presence of indigenous people in that area. The existence of contrary testimonies regarding whether ceremonies, rituals, or spiritual ties took place in that area prevents the Tribunal from considering that relationship as proven. Furthermore, it is striking that when Mrs. Nombre142266 explained that for them, there were sacred places, which were protected and for which one had to ask permission from the gods to enter, Nombre635 among these the wetlands, lagoons, estuaries, and hills, but she never indicated that the sea or the coast was one of them. The foregoing is coupled with the fact that the existence of settlements in that area, or that sporadic cultivation, hunting, fishing, seasonal gathering, or nomadic activities were carried out there, was also not demonstrated. In our opinion, the testimonies given allow, only, to prove that the indigenous people of Kekoldi used and made use of the sea and its resources; but not in a way different from what any person could do. Thus, with the evidence presented, it could not be affirmed that the indigenous community Nombre142238 had a special relationship (physical, material, or spiritual) with the area excluded by the challenged decrees, which could serve as a basis for a property right (derecho de propiedad). It must also be taken into account that some of the excluded territories correspond to registered private property (from before the decrees that originally delimited it) or to the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítima terrestre). Both scenarios have protection under the legal system, a situation that must also be weighed by this Tribunal. Thus, it cannot be concluded that these excluded territories were traditionally and ancestrally occupied by them. To reach that conclusion, we consider that the plaintiff should have brought suitable evidence to the process, such as, for example, an anthropologist who, based on their expertise, could establish that special relationship, mainly in aspects such as movements, use, or spiritual relationship of those peoples with the sea, the coast, and the plains of Cocles. However, it was the representative of the plaintiff association himself who withdrew that evidence which had, at the time, been admitted by the Tribunal. From this perspective, if the burden of proof (carga probatoria) was his responsibility and he did not exercise it, the plaintiff must assume the negative consequences of his neglect. For the reasons stated, the Tribunal considers that the challenged decrees do not curtail or violate the property right of the indigenous community Nombre142238 because the excluded territories were not traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. Rather, their occupants were others, as was demonstrated. Based on the foregoing, no deficiency is found in the reason (motivo) and content of the challenged decrees; as they rather respond, as explained, to the need to correct an error in the location that was originally proposed by Executive Decree No. 7267, already repealed. It is not true, as the plaintiff claims, that its registered property right was curtailed by the challenged decrees. We reiterate that what Executive Decree No. 7267 did, at the time, was a generic location of the indigenous territory of Nombre142238 which, as the challenged decrees point out and has been demonstrated here, mistakenly included lands that had not been occupied or used by that indigenous community. Because property No. 7-19056-000 was registered without a cadastral plan that correctly delimited it, that error extended to properties that have been used, occupied, and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons. Precisely, by virtue of that error (the vague location incurred by Decree No. 7267) and the fact that, in any case, the referred Decree does not have the necessary power to disregard legally registered private property in the name of third parties and in which, and this is fundamental, there has not been traditional or ancestral occupation by that indigenous community; that the State issues the challenged decrees and delimits the Indigenous Reserve (Reserva Indígena) of Nombre142238 in a manner consistent with the substantial content of its collective property right, that is, so that it covers territories that have been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. By the evidence that has been presented here in relation to the applicable rules for the specific case, the Tribunal considers that these formal administrative acts do not injure the property right of the indigenous people. It is not necessary to request the nullity of the title corresponding to the property of the Partido de Limón, number 19056-000. As indicated at the beginning of the examination of this defect, that property is owned by the plaintiff. Of course, in the terms in which their property right is conceived, that is, in the territory traditionally occupied by them, which corresponds, as has been explained, to what is currently described by Decree No. 29956, here challenged.

**XIII.-** The foregoing does not imply, by any stretch, a violation of the Principle of Legality (Principio de Legalidad) or a disregard for rules that regulate indigenous property rights. Article 11 of ILO Convention 107 states that the right of ownership, collective or individual, shall be recognized in favor of the members of the populations concerned **over the lands traditionally occupied by them.** In the specific case, the Tribunal has established that the territories excluded by the challenged decrees do not meet that condition because they do not correspond to lands that have traditionally been or are occupied by the indigenous community Nombre142238 . Therefore, they do not form part of their property right and cause them no injury, while rather recognizing that right in its proper dimension. Articles 13 to 18 of ILO Convention No. 169 generally refer to the duty of the State to respect the special importance that the relationship of the interested peoples with the lands or territories, or both, as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, represents for their cultures and spiritual values, and in particular the collective aspects of that relationship (Article 13); which is not violated in the specific case because that relationship has not been proven. Article 14 generally refers to the duty to recognize the right of ownership and possession of the interested peoples over the lands they traditionally occupy; a rule that is not violated because, we reiterate, the excluded territories do not hold such a condition. Then, that same rule states that *"(...) Furthermore, in appropriate cases, measures shall be taken to safeguard the right of the interested peoples to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. In this respect, particular attention shall be given to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators. (...)"*. We consider that the provision is also not violated in the specific case because it was not proven that the State had denied the access of the indigenous population of Nombre142238 to the coast or coastal plain of Cocles. In addition to the public domain character of the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo terrestre), the witnesses stated that members of that indigenous community came down from the high parts of Talamanca to the coast, which speaks of their use and exploitation. Clauses 15, 16, 17, and 18 are also not injured because what they provide applies under the assumption that the lands are territories traditionally occupied by indigenous people, which in this instance was not proven. For the same reason and according to what was stated in the preceding Recital (Considerando), Article 45 of our Political Constitution is also not injured. In relation to numeral 2 of the Indigenous Law since the territory that is the property (as lands that have been traditionally occupied by indigenous people) of the plaintiff indigenous community (and which corresponds to what is located by the challenged decrees) is duly registered in the National Registry (Registro Nacional), under registration number Placa2092, of the Partido de Limón. Article 3 is not violated because the territory excluded by the questioned decrees is not the property of the plaintiff indigenous community and, therefore, does not enjoy the special protection that rule establishes. Nor is numeral 5 applicable: if it is not indigenous private property because it has not been traditionally occupied by them, the State has no reason whatsoever to justify the relocation, indemnification, or expropriation of non-indigenous persons who occupy or are owners of those lands excluded from the originally established delimitation. Rather, we insist that the rights of those who have been occupying or are owners of properties in that area must be protected. Finally, no injury is observed to Article 267 of the Civil Code. As we explained, the property right of the plaintiff is for those territories that have been traditionally occupied by them. Therefore, the registry inscription of property No. 19056-000 of the Partido de Limón only covers that territory, which in the case before us was located by the referred Decree No. 29956. To understand, as the representative of the plaintiff claims, that No. 19056-000 includes the lands located by Decree No. 7267 would lead to an abuse of right for the following reasons. That administrative act was repealed because it included lands that were not and are not traditionally occupied by the community Nombre142238 (and therefore do not form part of their communal property right) but were also, registered (with their corresponding cadastral plan) in the name of non-indigenous persons and dedicated to other activities since before that community was originally located. Rather, numeral 267 referred to would be violated if this Tribunal disregarded the registered title held by those persons, among them, the company acting as a third party with claims of its own and some of the passive coadjutants.

**XIV.-** In conclusion, the Tribunal considers that the challenged Decrees No. 25296 and No. 29956 were issued by the competent body (the Executive Branch) in compliance with the required substantial formalities of the procedure. They also have a legitimate and certain reason (motivo) (in essence, that the delimitation provided in Decree No. 7267 was inappropriate because it included territories that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people represented by the plaintiff association and that were rather occupied by or belonged to other persons, which is why they had to be excluded from the Reserve) which existed as it was taken into account at the time of its issuance (numeral 133 of the LGAP). The ordered content, that is, the new delimitation that excludes territories not traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, is lawful, clear, possible, and covers all factual and legal issues arising from the reason (motivo) (Article 132 of the LGAP). Note even that Decree No. 25296 does not decrease the size of the Indigenous Reserve because it compensates for the excluded portion by granting lands that do have indigenous occupation, and Decree No. 29956 comes to confirm the provisions of Decree No. 25296 and includes other lands that had not been recognized and that have been traditionally occupied by those indigenous people. That content is, moreover, correspondent to the reason (motivo) and proportional to the purpose, which translates into the public interest behind, on the one hand, the State recognizing the indigenous people of Kekoldi the communal private property (propiedad privada comunal) over the territories that have been traditionally occupied by them and, on the other, protecting the private property right of non-indigenous persons in lands that have been occupied by them and registered in their name and in which no type of physical, material, or spiritual occupation by the plaintiff indigenous community was proven. Furthermore, the act is motivated in the terms required by numeral 136 of the LGAP as it explicitly refers to the reasons that give rise to the new delimitation, which, moreover, have been verified in this judicial venue. Considering that the claimed defects are unfounded for the reasons that have been set forth, we consider that the challenged formal acts substantially conform to the legal system and must be so declared.

**XV.- Regarding the other claims made by the plaintiff.** The plaintiff association also requests that it be declared that its represented party is the owner of the Property (Finca) registered in the Real Property Registry (Registro Inmobiliario), Partido de Limón, under Real Folio Registration Number Placa2092, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within our indigenous territory, specifically the sector of the property of Limón, real folio registration number Placa2092, which is not recognized as ours in Executive Decree No. 25296-G of June 24, 1996, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to begin those studies and procedures when the judgment becomes final and conclude them two months later, that INDER and CONAI be ordered to carry out the steps to relocate those persons if they so desire, or if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept, to initiate the procedures to expropriate and indemnify them in accordance with the procedures established in the Expropriations Law (Ley de Expropiaciones), that INDER be ordered to immediately begin the relocation or expropriation steps and procedures after the studies and procedures referred to in the claim have been completed, respecting the deadlines designated for this, that the Executive Branch be ordered to provide the necessary financial resources to INDER and CONAI to proceed with the mentioned expropriations and indemnifications, and that the Executive Branch be ordered to begin the steps to provide those institutions with the resources, when the judgment becomes final, preparing, if necessary, an extraordinary budget that must be submitted to the Legislative Assembly no more than two months after that finality. Given the accessory nature of these requests, as they depend on the annulment claim having been granted, which has not happened here, all of them are unfounded. If it has been established that the challenged decrees are valid, the delimitation established there is legitimate because it corresponds to the territories that have been traditionally occupied by the indigenous community of Kekoldi. Therefore, and as indicated in previous Recitals (Considerandos), the plaintiff is the owner of the property registered in the Real Property Registry, Partido de Limón, under Real Folio Registration Number Placa2092, but only regarding the territory located and delimited in the challenged decrees. Consequently, it is not the owner of the lands that were excluded in those rules precisely because they were not ancestrally occupied by them and that, moreover, are registered in the name of private individuals. From this perspective, the obligations established for the State in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, such as studies, appraisals, relocations, and recovery of territories, are not applicable to those excluded territories because those duties have the condition that we are dealing with indigenous communal property, meaning by this territories that have been traditionally occupied by them, which in this instance was not proven. Thus, the rejection of these requests must also be ordered, as is hereby done.

**XVI.- Regarding the subsidiary claims.** The plaintiff association requests as such that it be declared that CONAI, INDER, and the State (Executive Branch) must jointly and severally pay it the sum of twelve billion colones as compensation for the de facto expropriation (expropiación de hecho) that occurred (material value of the land, material value of the natural-forest resources and others of common use of the indigenous communities- and spiritual value of the territory). What is requested is also unfounded. Compensation for de facto expropriation is based on the existence of private property upon which a series of limitations have been imposed, by virtue of which the owner is prevented from exercising the attributes of ownership (dominio). In the specific case, and for the reasons that have been extensively set forth, this condition does not arise because the lands excluded from the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142238 by the challenged decrees are not the private property of that indigenous community. This is because they are territories that have not been traditionally or ancestrally occupied by them. If we are not dealing with the private property of the plaintiff, evidently there is no limitation or de facto expropriation of that fundamental right because, we insist, she does not have it, and any compensation requested is unfounded.

**XVII.- Regarding the exceptions raised by the defendants.** The state representative raised the exceptions of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of right (falta de derecho), the latter also opposed by the representatives of INDER. The Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre142249 of Talamanca raised no exceptions, and CONAI was declared in default for not having answered the complaint. The lack of passive standing alleged by the State must be rejected. In this case, administrative acts of general scope issued by the Executive Branch are being challenged. Therefore, the State has passive standing in accordance with the provisions of Article 12, subsections 1) and 8) of the CPCA. However, the exception of lack of right raised by the State and INDER, and which is appreciated ex officio in relation to the other defendants, must be upheld. The foregoing is because, as set forth in the previous Recitals (Considerandos), the challenged formal acts substantially conform to the legal system, and the delimitation ordered in them is legitimate because it excluded lands that had not been traditionally occupied by the indigenous people of Nombre142238 . Therefore, they do not form part of the collective private property right of that indigenous community. In addition to the foregoing, it was demonstrated in this litigation that the excluded territory has been occupied and registered in the name of non-indigenous persons who have developed their activities there since before the Reserve was originally delimited. If the excluded lands are not the property of that indigenous community, the State has no duty to conduct studies, appraisals, relocations, or expropriations because all those duties are based on the conditioning premise that it has been demonstrated that they were territories traditionally occupied by that indigenous community, which in this instance has not been demonstrated. For the same reasons, there is no duty to compensate the plaintiff for any de facto expropriation because it has not arisen. The foregoing implies the rejection of the complaint in all its aspects, both main and subsidiary.

XVIII.- On the third-party claim (tercería) filed by the company Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. This entity was admitted to this proceeding as a third party with its own claims. In light of the manner in which the lawsuit in this proceeding has been resolved, its first petition must be granted since all of the plaintiff's claims have already been rejected. It also requests a declaration that the plaintiff Association has no right over the properties located in the Partido Limón registered under the real folio registration (matrícula de folio real) numbers Placa1768, Placa27827, and Placa27828, which are the property of the petitioning company. If it has been established that these properties belong to the third-party claimant company, the logical consequence of that registry inscription is that the plaintiff association has no right of ownership over them. Furthermore, it was also established that these properties form part of the lands excluded (legitimately, as demonstrated) by the challenged decrees, precisely because the plaintiff association did not demonstrate having traditionally occupied them. Regarding the claims seeking a declaration that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has a right of ownership or possession over properties No. 0122172-000 and Placa27828 registered in its name, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain currently and in the future from any form of de facto or de jure disturbance of the indicated properties, and that they waive any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them; the following must be noted. In accordance with Article 264 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), the dominion or absolute ownership of a thing includes the rights of possession, usufruct, transformation, alienation, defense, exclusion, restitution, and indemnification. Possession is one of the attributes of the right of ownership, the exercise of which is protected in the legal system, which establishes a series of instruments, both substantive and procedural, for the legitimate owner to protect them. From that perspective, it is not for the Court to make a generic and abstract declaration on those aspects. Rather, it is for the holder of the dominion, in this case, the company Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A., to make use of those legitimate instruments to repel any act of illegitimate possession, de facto or de jure disturbance of its properties. Nor could the Court order the plaintiff to waive any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. The right of action is a guarantee enjoyed by any subject and which this Court could not limit. In that sense, the plaintiff must abide by the use of the instruments that the legal system regulates in order to protect its right of ownership. Thus, the third and fourth claims of the third-party claim must be rejected, in the terms stated.

XIX.- On the exceptions (excepciones) raised by the plaintiff association against the third-party claim. The representative of the plaintiff party raised the exceptions of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of current interest (falta de interés), and lack of right (falta de derecho). The first must be rejected. The claims decided in the third-party claim are linked to the plaintiff association insofar as it is requested, among other things, that it be ordered not to exercise acts of possession or disturb the property registered in the name of the party filing the third-party claim. The lack of current interest must also be rejected since it exists from the moment there is a conflict regarding the ownership of the territories that were excluded from the Nombre142238 Indigenous Reserve by the challenged decrees. In that respect, a judicial resolution is required to settle them. The lack of right must be accepted only insofar as the rejection of the third and fourth claims. In all other respects it is rejected, since all of the claims in the lawsuit were dismissed. Consequently, the claims of the third-party claim are partially granted, in the terms that have been set forth.

XX.- On costs (costas). Article 193 of the CPCA provides that procedural and personal costs constitute a charge imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. Waiver of this sanction is only viable when there is, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, we consider that, in both the lawsuit and the third-party claim, there has been sufficient reason to litigate. The foregoing, insofar as the plaintiff indigenous association challenges delimitations made by the State, in pursuit of the protection of its communal private property right. This right also involves elements distinct from those of the right of non-indigenous persons, which adds technical complexity to the matter under discussion. Therefore, we consider that the proceeding (both the lawsuit and the third-party claim) must be resolved without a special sanction of costs.

POR TANTO

The exception of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by the State is rejected. The exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the State and INDER is accepted; a lack of right that is also declared ex officio with respect to CONAI and the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca. Consequently, the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Regarding the third-party claim (tercería) filed, the exceptions of lack of passive standing and lack of current interest raised by the plaintiff association are rejected. The exception of lack of right is accepted only insofar as it is improper for this Court to declare that no other private or state entity, including CONAI and the IDA, has a right of possession over properties No. Placa27827 and Placa27828 registered in the name of the third-party claimant company, and that the plaintiff Association be ordered to refrain currently and in the future from any form of de facto or de jure disturbance of the indicated properties, and that they waive any proceeding aimed at obtaining a declaration of real rights over them. In all other respects it is rejected. Consequently, the third-party claim filed by the third-party claimant company is accepted insofar as the claims of the plaintiff association are without merit and the third-party claimant company is the owner of the properties located in the Partido Limón registered under the real folio registration (matrícula de folio real) numbers Placa27827 and Placa27828. This proceeding is resolved, both with regard to the lawsuit and the third-party claim, without a special sanction of costs.

Cynthia Abarca Gómez José Roberto Garita Navarro Rosa María Cortés Morales PROCESO DE TRÁMITE PREFERENTE ACTORA: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, El INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS y ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA DE TALAMANCA TERCERO INTERESADO: TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A. COADYUVANTES PASIVOS: LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, JUMGLEBUNGALO LIMITADA, Nombre105706 , TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A., LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A., Nombre142239 , Nombre142240 , Nombre142241 , Nombre242 , Nombre243 , Nombre244 , Nombre245 , Nombre246 , Nombre247 , LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA, OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL Y LA SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 ________________________________________________________________________ PROCESO DE TRÁMITE PREFERENTE ACTORA: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, El INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS y LA ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA DE TALAMANCA TERCERO INTERESADO: TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A.

COADYUVANTES PASIVOS: LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, JUMGLEBUNGALO LIMITADA, Nombre105706 , TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A., LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A.,Nombre142239 , Nombre142240 , Nombre142241 , Nombre142242 , Nombre142243 , Nombre142244 , Nombre142245 , Nombre142246 , Nombre142247 , LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA,OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL Y LA SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .

No. 138-2013-VI TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN SEXTA. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, a las diez horas del diecinueve de noviembre del dos mil trece.

Proceso de conocimiento declarado de trámite preferente interpuesto por la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 , cédula jurídica CED8667, representada por su apoderado especial judicial Danilo Chaverri Barrantes, abogado, cédula de identidad CED104828 contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (en adelante INDER), representado por su apoderado general judicial Carlos Enrique García Anchía, casado, abogado, cédula de identidad CED27295 y vecino de San Ramón; el ESTADO representado por el procurador Bernardo Lara Flores, casado, abogado, cédula de identidad CED10238 y vecino de San José; la COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS (en adelante CONAI), representada por su Presidente Nombre136655 , casado, agricultor, cédula de identidad CED89170, vecino de la Comunidad Indígena de Nairí Awari y la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142249 , representada por su presidente Nombre142250 , casado, agricultor, cédula de identidad CED111803 y vecino de Amubri de Talamanca. Participa la empresa TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A., representada por su presidente Nombre142251 , casado, empresario, cédula de identidad CED30530 y vecino de San José, en condición de tercero interesado con pretensiones propias. Participan como coadyuvantes pasivos LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, representada por su gerente Nombre142252 , casada, de ocupaciones en el hogar, cédula de identidad CED111804 y vecina de Montes de Oca; JUMGLE BUNGALO LIMITADA, representada por gerente Nombre142253 , casado, abogado, cédula de identidad CED111805 y vecino de Montes de Oca; Nombre105706 , casado, abogado, cédula de identidad CED111806 y vecino de San José; las empresas TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A. y LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A., representadas por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma Nombre142254 , de único apellido en virtud de su nacionalidad canadiense, casado, empresario, con pasaporte de su país número CED111801 y vecino de Dirección17222, ;Nombre142239 , viuda, ama de casa, cédula de identidad CED111807 y vecina de Dirección17223 , ; Nombre142240 , divorciado, ingeniero agrónomo, cédula de identidad Placa27825 y vecino de Dirección17222, ; CARIBIANA GS LIMITADA, representada por su apoderado generalísimo Emilio de Gómez-Selléz Antoranz, en unión libre, empresario, ciudadano español con cédula de residencia CED111808 y vecino de Dirección17222, ; Nombre142242 , de un único apellido por su nacionalidad italiana, casada, psicóloga, pasaporte de su país CED111809 y vecina de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142243 , de un único apellido en virtud de su nacionalidad italiana, casado, asistente administrativo, cédula de residencia CED111810 y vecino de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142244 , de un único apellido por su nacionalidad italiana, casada dos veces, administradora, cédula de residencia CED111811 y vecina de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142245 , soltero, agricultor, cédula de identidad CED111812 y vecino de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; Nombre142246 , divorciado, constructor, pasaporte CED111813 y vecino de Cocles de Talamanca; Nombre142247 , de un único apellido por su nacionalidad estadounidense, divorciado, escritor, pasaporte Placa27826, vecino de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca; LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA, representada por su subgerente Nombre142255 , de un único apellido en virtud de su nacionalidad canadiense, divorciada, empresaria, pasaporte CED111802 y vecina de Cocles; OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL, representada por su gerente Encarnación García Vila, soltera, bióloga, pasaporte CED111814 vecina de Dirección17222, y la SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 ., representada por su albacea Nombre142256 , casado, taxista, cédula de identidad CED111815 y vecino de Puerto Viejo de Talamanca. Intervienen, además, los (as) abogados (a) Shirley Campos García y Maribel Aguilar Cedeño, en su condición de apoderadas general judicial y especial judicial del INDER, respectivamente; María Teresa Fernández Chinchilla como apoderada especial judicial de la CONAI; Luis Manuel Castro Ventura, Mauricio Salas Villalobos, Luis Ortiz Zamora y Esteban Alfaro Calderón como apoderados especiales judiciales del tercero interesado con pretensiones propias; Nombre98251 como apoderado especial judicial de la coadyuvante pasiva La Cherokeana Tres Limitada y Nombre105706 como apoderado especial judicial de los demás coadyuvantes pasivos.

RESULTANDO

1.- La parte actora formula este proceso para que, en lo medular, en sentencia: 1) Se declare que mi representada es la propietaria de la finca inscrita en el Registro Inmobiliario, Partido de Limón, al folio real matrícula Placa2092. 2) Se declare la nulidad -en los términos que aclaro de seguido- de los artículos 2 y 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 de 1996: a) El artículo 2 anúlese únicamente en cuanto la nueva delimitación de la Reserva Indígena excluye una parte de la finca inscrita en el Registro Inmobiliario, Partido de Limón, al folio real matrícula Placa2092. No estamos pidiendo la nulidad del decreto en cuanto amplía los límites de esa Reserva hacia el sur y el oeste. b) El artículos (sic) 3 anúlese en su totalidad. 3) Se declare la nulidad -en los términos que aclaro de seguido- de los artículos 1 y 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956 del año 2001: a) El artículo 1 anúlese únicamente en cuanto reitera la exclusión del territorio indígena de una parte de la finca Placa2092, antes citada, de la misma forma que lo hace el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 de 1996. No estamos pidiendo la nulidad del decreto en cuanto amplía los límites de esa Reserva hacia el sur y el oeste. b) El artículo 3 anúlese únicamente en cuanto considera vigente el artículo 3 del Decreto 25296, publicado en La Gaceta 134 de 15 de julio de 1996. 4)Se ordene al INDER y a la CONAI que realicen los estudios y trámites para identificar a las personas no indígenas que sean propietarias o poseedoras de buena fe dentro de nuestro territorio indígena, propiamente el sector de la finca de Limón, folio real matrícula Placa2092, que no es reconocido como nuestro en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296-G del 24 de junio de 1996. 5) Que se ordene al INDER y a la CONAI que esos estudios y trámites los inicien cuando la sentencia quede firme y los concluyan dos meses después. 6) Que se ordene al INDER y a la CONAI realizar las gestiones para reubicar a esas personas si ellas lo desearen, o si no fuera posible reubicarlas o ellas no lo aceptaran, se inicien los trámites para expropiarlas e indemnizarlas conforme a los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Expropiaciones. 7) Que se ordene al INDER que las gestiones y trámites de reubicación o expropiación los inicie inmediatamente después de hechos los estudios y trámites a que se refiere la pretensión, respetando los plazos designados para ello. 8) Que se ordene al Poder Ejecutivo dotar de los recursos financieros necesarios al INDER y a la CONAI para que procedan a las expropiaciones e indemnizaciones mencionadas. 9) Que se ordene al Poder Ejecutivo que inicie las gestiones para dotar a esas instituciones de los recursos, cuando quede firme la sentencia, preparando, si fuere necesario un presupuesto extraordinario que debe presentarse a la Asamblea Legislativa no más de dos meses después de esa firmeza. 10) Se condene a los demandados al pago solidario de ambas costas de esta acción. Como pretensión subsidiaria pide lo siguiente: 1) Declárese que la CONAI, el INDER y el Estado (Poder Ejecutivo), deben pagar solidariamente a la asociación actora la suma de doce mil millones de colones como indemnización por la expropiación de hecho que produjo (valor material de la tierra, valor material de los recursos naturales-forestales y otros de uso común de las comunidades indígenas- y valor espiritual del territorio). 2) Condénese a los demandados al pago solidario de esta acción (pedimentos visibles a folio 164, ajustados a folio 456, reformulados a folios 815, todos del expediente judicial y así fijado s durante la audiencia única).

2.- Este proceso fue declarado de trámite preferente mediante resolución dictada por este Tribunal a las 8 horas 15 minutos del 21 de mayo de 2010 (folios 177 y 178 de este libelo).

3.- El Estado c ontestó la demanda y formuló las defensas previas de indebida integración de la litis y caducidad, así como las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y de derecho (folios 188 a 193, 470 a 474, 881 y 882 del expediente judicial).

4.- El INDER contestó la demanda y formuló las defensas previas de indebida integración de la litis y caducidad, así como la excepción de falta de derecho. En lo que interesa, solicitó que se declare sin lugar la demanda y se condene a la actora al pago de ambas costas (folios 215 a 235, 718 a 730 y 885 a 891 del expediente judicial).

5.- De conformidad con el artículo 65 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (en adelante CPCA), la CONAI fue declarada rebelde por no haber contestado la demanda en el plazo conferido. En consecuencia, se tuvo por contestada afirmativamente la demanda en cuanto a los hechos, sin perjuicio de que pudiera apersonarse en cualquier tiempo, tomando el proceso en el estado que se encuentre (ver grabación de audiencia única que está agregada al expediente ).

6.- La Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca contestó la demanda en forma afirmativa y no formuló excepciones (folio 286 del expediente judicial).

7.- En resolución dictada a las 8 horas del 28 de enero de 2013, este Tribunal admitió la participación de la entidad Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. en este proceso, como tercero con pretensiones propias. Los pedimentos que formuló dicha sociedad son los siguientes: 1) Que se declaren sin lugar todas las pretensiones de la demandante. 2) Que se declare que la Asociación actora no tiene ningún derecho sobre las fincas del Partido Limón inscritas con la matrícula de folio real No. Placa27827 y Placa27828, que son propiedad de la sociedad gestionante. 3) Que se declare que ninguna otra entidad privada o estatal, incluyendo a la CONAI y al INDER, tiene derecho de propiedad o posesión sobre las fincas No. Placa27827 y Placa27828 inscritas a su nombre. 4) Que se ordene a la Asociación actora abstenerse actualmente y a futuro de cualquier forma de perturbación de hecho o de derecho sobre los fundos indicados y que renuncien a cualquier proceso tendiente a obtener una declaratoria de derechos reales sobre ellos. 5) Que se condene al contrademandado (la accionante) al pago de las costas. Asimismo, alegó una indebida integración de la litis (folios 526 al 550 del expediente judicial y así fijadas en la audiencia única) 8.- El INDER y el Estado contest aron la tercería y no formularon excepciones (folios 823 al 829, 883 y 884 del expediente judicial).

9.- La asociación demandante contestó la tercería y opuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, falta de interés y falta de derecho (folios 830 a 836 del expediente judicial).

10.- Mediante resolución dictada a las 13 horas del 4 de julio de 2013, se determinó que la CONAI y la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca no habían contestado la tercería en el plazo concedido, Por ello, de conformidad con el artículo 65 del CPCA fueron declaradas rebeldes y se tuvo por contestada afirmativamente la tercería en cuanto a los hechos, sin perjuicio de que pudieran apersonarse en cualquier tiempo, tomando el proceso en el estado que se encuentre (folios 961 y 962 de este expediente).

11.- En resolución No. 058-2013-VI, dictada a las 14 horas 10 minutos del 10 de abril de 2013, este Tribunal rechazó la defensa previa de indebida integración de la litis que fuera interpuesta por el Estado, el INDER y el tercero con pretensiones propias (folios 829 a 849 de este expediente).

12.- Mediante resolución No. 315-2013, dictada a las 16 horas del 29 de mayo de 2013, el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda rechazó de plano el recurso de apelación que fuera formulado contra la resolución No. 058-2013-VI citada (folios 947 y 948 de esta carpeta).

13.- De conformidad con los artículos 60 inciso 3) y 70 inciso 2) del CPCA, la audiencia única fue celebrada los días 29 y 30 de octubre de 2013, con la presencia de todas las partes, el tercero con pretensiones propias y los coadyuvantes pasivos. En ella, se fijaron las pretensiones según lo descrito en el Resultando primero y se admitieron las solicitudes de coadyuvancia pasiva solicitadas. Asimismo, en resolución No. 129-2013-VI, se rechazó la defensa previa de indebida integración de la litis que, ahora en relación con el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, planteara el INDER. Luego, se fijaron los hechos controvertidos, se admitió la prueba documental pertinente y se evacuó la declaración de los testigos y el perito admitidos. Finalmente, las partes rindieron conclusiones y al finalizar éstas el Tribunal declaró este proceso como uno complejo, para los efectos de lo dispuesto en el artículo 111 inciso 1) del citado Código Procesal, en relación al numeral 82, inciso 1), del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda.

14.- En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que subsanar o que generen indefensión. De conformidad con los artículos 111 del CPCA en relación con los numerales 79 y 82 de su Reglamento, previa deliberación, se procede con el dictado, redacción y comunicación de la presente sentencia dentro del término de ley, con redacción de la jueza ponente Abarca Gómez y el voto afirmativo del juez Garita Navarro y la jueza Cortés Morales.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Hechos probados. De importancia para lo que se resuelve, se tiene por demostrado lo siguiente: 1) En julio de 1946, Nombre142248 catastró el plano Placa27829, correspondiente a un terreno de su propiedad, situado en la desembocadura del Río Cocles. La propiedad medía 25 hectáreas 2750 metros cuadrados ubicados en la milla marítima de la zona atlántica, sito en Puerto Viejo, distrito uno, cantón uno de la provincia de Limón cubría un área importante de lo que hoy es la llanura costera en playa Cocles de Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 al 572 del expediente judicial). 2) La propiedad descrita en el plano Placa27829 fue inscrita en el Registro Nacional bajo el sistema folio real No. 7-05365-000 (peritaje rendido por Nombre142257 a folios 388 al 392 del expediente judicial, cd con mosaico catastral). 3) La entidad Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. es propietaria de las fincas inscritas en el Registro Nacional, Partido de Limón bajo las matrículas Placa27830 y Placa27831, las cuales tienen como antecedente y derivan de la finca inscrita bajo el sistema folio real No. 7-05365-000 (certificaciones visibles a folios 559 a 568 del expediente judicial, cd con mosaico catastral aportado por el perito) 4) Mediante Decreto No. 6036-G, de 26 de mayo de 1976, se reforman los límites de la Reserva Indígena de Talamanca, entre otros. Dicha norma estableció que "(...) la Reserva de Talamanca incluirá, como anexo administrativo, la "Reserva Indígena de Cocles", correspondiente a parte de las fincas 1.089 y 1.050 del ITCO. Su delimitación exacta será efectuada por el ITCO, en coordinación con la CONAI. (...)" (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 5) Mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267, del 09 de agosto de 1977 se localizó la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles. Esa delimitación fue confirmada mediante la Ley Indígena, No. 6172 del 29 de noviembre de 1977 (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 6) En el año 1979, el Estado procedió con la inscripción del territorio indígena delimitado en los Decretos Ejecutivos No. 6036-G y No. Placa26323, que correspondió a la finca inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula Placa27618 (se infiere del informe pericial rendido por Nombre142257 , consulta efectuada a la página en internet del Registro Nacional). 7) La finca inscrita en el partido de Limón, matrícula Placa2092 carece de plano catastrado (hecho aceptado por la actora, el Estado y la sociedad que participa como tercero con pretensiones propias durante sus conclusiones e informe pericial rendido por Nombre142257 , Coordinador General de la Unidad Ejecutora del Programa de Regularización y Registro, folios 357 y 358 del expediente judicial). 8) Mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 16568-G, del 25 de setiembre de 1985, se dispuso que la Reserva Indígena de Cocles constituía una reserva independiente de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ). 9) Mediante escritura número 85 otorgada ante el notario Nombre142257 a las 12 horas del 5 de abril de 1989, la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca donó a la Asociación accionante la finca inscrita en el Registro Público, Partido de Limón, al tomo 2548, folio 35, número Placa27618, asiento 1; para dar cumplimiento a lo dispuesto por el Decreto No. Placa27832 citado. Esa escritura fue presentada al Registro Nacional el 19 de abril de 1990 bajo las citas 378-18219-001 y a la fecha no ha sido inscrita (folios 154 a 156 del expediente judicial, manifestación expresa de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca al contestar la demanda y consulta efectuada a la página en internet del Registro Nacional). 10) Mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 del 24 de junio de 1996, se derogó el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267 citado, se estableció que la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles se denominaría en adelante "Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles) y se modificó su delimitación (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ) . 11) La comunidad indígena Nombre142238 fue consultada sobre la modificación de los límites de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 planteada en los decretos impugnados (así se infiere de la parte considerativa de ambas normas de alcance general y los folios que van del 594 al 602, 604, 605 y 608 al 611 del expediente judicial). 12) La delimitación establecida en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 citado no disminuyó la cabida de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 (así se infiere de la parte considerativa de esa norma y de la manifestación de la parte actora en cuanto admite la inclusión de terrenos). 13) Mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956, de 22 de marzo de 2001, se reformó el artículo 2 del Decreto 25296 citado y se fijaron los límites actuales de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles) (Sistema de Consulta e Información Jurídica CSIJ)". 14) En el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 por los Decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956, se encuentran inscritos los siguientes planos catastrados: Placa27833, inscrito el 8 de junio de 1995, que se vincula con la propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real No. Placa27819; , inscrito el 27 de mayo de 1994, que se vincula con la propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real No. Placa27820; , inscrito el 13 de octubre de 2004, que se vincula con la propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real No. Placa27821; , inscrito el 20 de diciembre de 1996, que se vincula con la propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real No. Placa27822; , inscrito el primero de marzo de 1975 y sin finca asociada; 7-0030961-1977, inscrito el 9 de febrero de 1977, que se vincula con la propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real No. Placa27834; 7-0009398-1971, inscrito el 21 de setiembre de 1971 y sin finca asociada; 7-0009380-1946, inscrito en julio de 1946, que se vincula con la propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real No. Placa27835 (informe pericial rendido por Nombre142257 visible a folios 354 a 372, 385, 386, 838 y cd de mosaico catastral). 15) El territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 por los Decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956, ha sido habitado por personas no indígenas, principalmente afrodescendientes y blancos, los que catrastraron planos e inscribieron propiedad privada desde 1946 y se quienes se dedicaban a actividades como la pesca, la siembra de cacao y otros tubérculos (testimonios de Nombre142258 , Nombre142259 y Nombre142260 ). 16) No existían asentamientos indígenas en la costa de Cocles ni en el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 por los Decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956. Ellos vivían en las partes altas de Talamanca y bajaban a la llanura y la costa de Cocles a trabajar en labores como la chapia (testimonios de Nombre142258 , Nombre142259 ). 17) La comunidad indígena de Nombre142249 ha usado y se ha aprovechado del mar y la costa de Cocles (testimonios de Nombre142258 y Nombre142260 ).

II.- Hechos no probados. De importancia para los efectos de esta contienda se por indemostrados los siguientes: 1) Que la comunidad indígena Nombre142238 tuviera una relación especial (física, material o espiritual) con los territorios excluidos por los decretos impugnados, de modo tal que de ello pudiera derivarse un derecho de propiedad privada indígena (hay ayuno de prueba) . 2) Q ue el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 mediante los Decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956, constituya un territorio que tradicional o ancestralmente hubiese sido ocupado por esa comunidad indígena (no se aportan probanzas idóneas que permitan llegar a esa conclusión). 3) Que el Estado hubiese negado el acceso de la población indígena de Nombre142238 a la costa o llanura costera de Cocles (no se prueba).

III .- Objeto del proceso. De las pretensiones y alegatos de las partes , estima el Tribunal que el presente proceso versa, en lo medular, sobre el examen de legalidad de los artículos 2 y 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 y los numerales 1 y 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956. En lo fundamental, se impugna la delimitación efectuada respecto de la Reserva Indígena Bribri de Kekoldi, en cuanto la accionante estima que se excluyó, ilegítimamente, una parte de la finca de su propiedad inscrita en el Partido de Limón, al folio real matrícula Placa2092. Lo anterior por cuanto, en realidad, la parte excluida constituye una tierra tradicionalmente ocupada por ellos y a la cual tienen derecho. En lo fundamental, la parte actora acusa que las conductas formales son inválidas porque violentan el Principio de Legalidad y Reserva de Ley, y desconocen su derecho de propiedad privada. A partir de la declaratoria de nulidad se formulan una serie de pretensiones accesorias, en tanto dependen de que se declare la invalidez acusada. En ese sentido, se pide que se declare que son propietarios de la totalidad de la referida finca 19056-000, esto es, incluyendo la porción que les fue ilegítimamente excluida por los decretos impugnados. Además, se declare la presunta inactividad del INDER, la CONAI y el Estado, al no cumplir con la obligación impuesta por la normativa vigente, en especial el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, de realizar los estudios y avalúos necesarios para que se apruebe un presupuesto extraordinario que permita expropiar e indemnizar a todas las personas no indígenas que ocupen el territorio Indígena Nombre142238 (en la parte que les fue ilegítimamente excluida) para proceder a su efectivo desalojo y a la recuperación efectiva de esos terrenos por parte de ese pueblo indígena. En este último tema (la omisión) se pide que el Tribunal ordene el cumplimiento de las actuaciones referidas para hacer cesar la inactividad ilegítima en la que se ha incurrido a lo largo de los años. Ahora bien, el Tribunal admitió la participación de la entidad Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. en este proceso, como tercero con pretensiones propias. La referida sociedad alega ser la propietaria de dos inmuebles que se ubican en la zona que, según la asociación demandante, les fue ilegítimamente excluida de su territorio y que ahora pretenden recuperar. Por ello, el tercero pide que se declaren sin lugar todas las pretensiones formuladas por actora y que ésta no tiene ningún derecho sobre las fincas del Partido Limón inscritas con la matrícula de folio real No. Placa27827 y Placa27828, que son de su propiedad. Además, que se declare que ninguna otra entidad privada o estatal, incluyendo a CONAI y al IDA, tiene derecho de propiedad o posesión sobre las referidas fincas y se ordene a la Asociación actora abstenerse actualmente y a futuro de cualquier forma de perturbación de hecho o de derecho sobre los fundos indicados y que renuncien a cualquier proceso tendiente a obtener una declaratoria de derechos reales sobre ellos. Dadas las diversas manifestaciones que en abono a las posiciones en controversia aportan las partes litigantes, para lo que se considera un mejor orden, en los siguientes apartes se abordará cada uno de los ejes temáticos que en sus agravios plantea la asociación demandante así como las argumentaciones de los accionados, los coadyuvantes pasivos y el tercero con pretensiones propias, a fin de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias, con el debido análisis, claro está, de todo lo argüido.

IV.- Sobre el reconocimiento de la propiedad indígena en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense. Por el tema que se debate, el Tribunal estima necesario esbozar unas breves consideraciones sobre la normativa que regula, en nuestro país, la propiedad indígena y la interpretación que, a juicio de este Tribunal, cabe darle a esos preceptos normativos. Así, tenemos que la primera disposición legislativa que reconoce expresamente el derecho de propiedad de las comunidades indígenas es la Ley Sobre Terrenos Baldíos , No. 13, del 10 de enero de 1939, que en su artículo 8 disponía, en lo que interesa, "(...) se declara inalienable y de propiedad exclusiva de los indígenas, una zona prudencial a juicio del Poder Ejecutivo en los lugares en donde existan tribus de éstos , a fin de conservar nuestra raza autóctona y de librarlos de futuras injusticias.(...)" (el resaltado no es del original). Esa norma fue desarrollada por el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 45, del 3 de diciembre de 1945, que en su artículo primero indicó “(...) Declárense inalienables y de propiedad exclusiva de las tribus indígenas autóctonas, los terrenos baldíos por ellas ocupados ; con excepción de las fajas destinadas a Carretera Interamericana .(...)"(el resaltado no es del original). Con la promulgación, en 1949, de la Constitución Política que actualmente nos rige, en su artículo 45, se reconoce y tutela el derecho a la propiedad, lo que implica un reconocimiento del dominio con todos sus atributos inherentes (concepción individualista de la propiedad en términos del Derecho Romano). De ahí se desprende una protección del derecho a la propiedad colectiva de los pueblos indígenas, preexistentes a la Constitución, primero de la Colonia Española, después de las Provincias Unidas de Centroamérica y más tarde, de la República de Costa Rica como Estado Independiente. Posteriormente, mediante Ley No. 2330, de 9 de abril 1959, nuestro país aprueba el Convenio No. 107 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (en adelante OIT), denominado "Convenio Relativo a la Protección e Integración de las Poblaciones Indígenas y de otras Poblaciones Tribales y Semitribales en los Países Independientes". En relación con lo que nos ocupa, el artículo 11 estableció que en los Estados vinculados: “Se deberá reconocer el derecho de propiedad, colectivo o individual, a favor de los miembros de las poblaciones en cuestión sobre las tierras tradicionalmente ocupadas por ellas”. (El resaltado no es del original). Luego, la Ley de Tierras y Colonización No. 2825, del 14 de mayo de 1961 dispuso en su artículo 75 que el, en ese entonces, Instituto de Tierras y Colonización (en adelante ITCO) “(...) de acuerdo con los organismos pertinentes, velará por el acondicionamiento de las comunidades o familias indígenas, de conformidad con el espíritu de esta ley. No se declarará que las extensas zonas donde estas comunidades viven aisladamente, pertenecen exclusivamente a ellas, pero sí se tratará de reunir a todas estas comunidades, formando un solo centro agrario, en la zona que el Instituto considere adecuada y para lo cual se hará uso del área de terreno que sea necesaria”. Asimismo, el artículo 76 señala que "(...) A título gratuito y en propiedad, se entregarán a las familias indígenas parcelas que el Instituto señale como mínimo indispensable para satisfacer las necesidades de las mismas, y explotables por ese grupo, sin necesidad de trabajadores asalariados. (...)". Por otra parte, la Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas No. 5251, del 11 de julio de 1973, establece en su artículo 4 inciso e) como uno de los objetivos de la CONAI, "(...) Velar por el respeto a los derechos de las minorías indígenas, estimulando la acción del Estado a fin de garantizar al indio la propiedad individual y colectiva de la tierra eficiente; (…)". Tenemos, también, que la Ley Indígena, No. 6172 del 29 de noviembre de 1977 dispuso en su artículo 1 que son indígenas las personas que constituyen grupos étnicos descendientes directos de las civilizaciones precolombinas y que conservan su propia identidad, y declaró reservas indígenas, las establecidas, entre otras, en los Decretos Ejecutivos No. 5904-G del 10 de abril de 1976, 6036-G del 12 de junio de 1976, 6037-G del 15 de junio de 1976, 7267-G y 7268-G del 20 de agosto de 1977, así como la Reserva Indígena Guaymi de Conteburica. Señaló, además, que límites fijados a las reservas, en esos decretos, no podrían ser variados disminuyendo la cabida de aquéllas, sino mediante ley expresa. El artículo 2 establece que las reservas indígenas son propiedad de esas comunidades y que se habrían de encontrar todas inscritas en el Registro Nacional a su nombre. Por su parte, el numeral 3 reitera que se trata de territorios inalienables e imprescriptibles, no transferibles y exclusivos de las comunidades indígenas que los habitan, no encontrándose permitido a los no indígenas, alquilar, arrendar, comprar o de cualquier otra manera adquirir terrenos o fincas comprendidas dentro de estas reservas, siendo todo traspaso o negociación de tierras o las mejoras de éstas en las reservas indígenas, entre indígenas y no indígenas, absolutamente nulo con las consecuencias legales del caso. En refuerzo de todo lo anterior, mediante Ley No. 7316, de 3 de noviembre de 1992, se aprobó el Convenio 169 sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes”, de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, el cual regula, también, el tema de la propiedad indígena. En lo que interesa, el artículo 13 señala que "1. Al aplicar las disposiciones de esta parte del Convenio, los gobiernos deberán respetar la importancia especial que para las culturas y valores espirituales de los pueblos interesados reviste su relación con las tierras o territorios, o con ambos, según los casos, que ocupan o utilizan de alguna otra manera, y en particular los aspectos colectivos de esa relación. 2. La utilización del término "tierras" en los artículos 15 y 16 deberá incluir el concepto de territorios, lo que cubre la totalidad del hábitat de las regiones que los pueblos interesados ocupan o utilizan de alguna otra manera." El artículo 14 establece que "1. Deberá reconocerse a los pueblos interesados el derecho de propiedad y de posesión sobre las tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan. Además, en los casos apropiados, deberán tomarse medidas para salvaguardar el derecho de los pueblos interesados a utilizar tierras que no estén exclusivamente ocupadas por ellos, pero a las que hayan tenido tradicionalmente acceso para sus actividades tradicionales y de subsistencia. A este respecto, deberá prestarse particular atención a la situación de los pueblos nómadas y de los agricultores itinerantes. 2. Los gobiernos deberán tomar las medidas que sean necesarias para determinar las tierras que los pueblos interesados ocupan tradicionalmente y garantizar la protección efectiva de sus derechos de propiedad y posesión. 3. Deberán instituirse procedimientos adecuados en el marco del sistema jurídico nacional para solucionar las reivindicaciones de tierras formuladas por los pueblos interesados." Finalmente, el numeral 16 indica, en lo que interesa, que "1. A reserva de lo dispuesto en los párrafos siguientes de este artículo, los pueblos interesados no deberán ser trasladados de las tierras que ocupan.

V.- De la normativa citada podemos arribar a varias conclusiones relevantes en cuanto al derecho de propiedad reconocido a los pueblos indígenas. Primero , se trata de un derecho que comprende entre otros, los derechos de los miembros de las comunidades indígenas en el marco de la propiedad comunal. Como bien Nombre635 la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (en adelante CIDH), caso del Pueblo Saramaka. Vs. Surinam. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 28 de noviembre de 2007. Serie C No. 172 "(...)los conceptos de propiedad y posesión en las comunidades indígenas pueden tener una significación colectiva, en el sentido de que la pertenencia de ésta no se centra en un individuo sino en el grupo y su comunidad" (...)" . Así, se trata de un derecho colectivo que beneficia a estos pueblos, pero que existe sin perjuicio de los derechos sustantivos y de las acciones procedimentales a las que individualmente tienen derecho las personas miembros de estas colectividades en razón de su condición de habitantes de nuestro país. En ese sentido, cabe destacar que aunque los propietarios de dichos territorios, no cuentan con ningún régimen especial de autotutela de dichos territorios, el derecho patrio sí reconoce un deber de los entes públicos de brindar a dichos territorios una Protección Especial, concepto de contenido unívoco en el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos que rige esta materia. Segundo, dicha propiedad colectiva o comunal no es equiparable, desde ninguna perspectiva, al demanio público. Pese a que a partir del texto expreso del artículo 3 de la Ley Indígena los territorios indígenas, son inalienables e imprescriptibles e intransferibles; esas características no les brindan la calidad de bienes de dominio público, dado que éstos no satisfacen los elementos indispensables y comunes de todos los bienes dominicales. Así, los territorios indígenas reconocidos en Costa Rica, son bienes propiedad privada de los pueblos indígenas que habitan el territorio nacional, cada uno con personalidad jurídica propia y absolutamente autónomos entre sí, en virtud de que cada uno es una unidad cultural, social, étnica e histórica. Tercero, ese derecho de propiedad colectiva o comunal se extiende a los territorios que tradicional y ancestralmente han sido usados o ocupados por los pueblos indígenas. Lo anterior, abarca no solo los referidos territorios sino además los recursos naturales ligados a su cultura que ahí se encuentren y los elementos incorporales que se desprendan de ello, aspecto que para la comunidad indígena resulta fundamental para su supervivencia física, cultural, económica y alimentaria. Desde esta perspectiva, el alcance de la propiedad privada comunal en relación con los territorios va más allá de la posesión tradicional o material, involucrando aspectos espirituales basados en la relación especial que tienen con sus tierras tradicionales. En ese sentido, ha señalado la CIDH en la Sentencia Comunidad Indígena Nombre139487 . Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de agosto de 2010 Serie C No. 214 , que "(...) Para determinar la existencia de la relación de los indígenas con sus tierras tradicionales, la Corte ha establecido que: i) ella puede expresarse de distintas maneras según el pueblo indígena del que se trate y las circunstancias concretas en que se encuentre, y ii) la relación con las tierras debe ser posible. Algunas formas de expresión de esta relación podrían incluir el uso o presencia tradicional, a través de lazos espirituales o ceremoniales; asentamientos o cultivos esporádicos; caza, pesca o recolección estacional o nómada; uso de recursos naturales ligados a sus costumbres, y cualquier otro elemento característico de su cultura. El segundo elemento implica que los miembros de la Comunidad no se vean impedidos, por causas ajenas a su voluntad, a realizar aquellas actividades que revelan la persistencia de la relación con sus tierras tradicionales.(...)". Cabe agregar, eso sí, que en criterio de este Tribunal, esa relación especial de la comunidad indígena con las tierras tradicionalmente ocupadas por ellos debe, necesariamente, ser demostrada a través de los medios que se estimen idóneos en cada caso concreto. Finalmente, que el derecho a la propiedad colectiva que respecto de sus territorios tienen los pueblos indígenas, inicia con el reconocimiento (que no constitución) mediante ley o acto administrativo. Es a partir de ese instante que se le otorga a determinados fundos los atributos y tutela jurídica antes descrita, todo lo cual sin menoscabo de la existencia de algún otro tipo de derecho real o de crédito que pueda tener la comunidad indígena o alguno de sus miembros sobre tales inmuebles en razón de la posesión ancestral. Dicho reconocimiento en lo absoluto se constituye como una conducta en la que exista discrecionalidad en el ejercicio del elemento competencia de la respectiva conducta administrativa, por parte de los órganos habilitados para hacer tal reconocimiento. Establecida la existencia de un pueblo indígena en un entorno geográfico determinado de posición ancestral, resulta indefectible para las Administraciones Públicas respectivas, el ejercicio de sus competencias en los términos regulados en el artículos 60 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en adelante LGAP). Reconocido el territorio indígena, éste únicamente puede perder tal condición en tanto se satisfagan dos requerimientos. El primero, de naturaleza formal, a saber, la emisión de una norma legal en sentido material y formal que así lo disponga. El segundo, de naturaleza material, que implica la decisión informada del propio pueblo indígena de renunciar al sistema de propiedad colectiva del que son partícipes. Por lo anterior, es claro que tanto el reconocimiento de la existencia de un territorio indígena, como su protección, implican conductas obligatorias para los entes públicos con competencias en la materia.

VI.- Sobre la delimitación de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 . Previo a examinar la legalidad de las conductas formales impugnadas, el Tribunal estima, también, necesario referirse puntualmente al reconocimiento del territorio de la comunidad indígena de la asociación accionante. Así, se tiene que mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 5904, del 11 de marzo de 1976, se e stablecieron inicialmente las Reservas Indígenas Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella y Talamanca. En la parte considerativa de ese instrumento normativo se indicó, entre otros, "(...) 5°- Que aún existen territorios poblados exclusivamente por indígenas haciendo posible la delimitación de dichas Reservas; (…) 10.- Que es deber del Estado vigilar la seguridad de sus ciudadanos, e impedir las injusticias y malos tratos, especialmente en el caso de minorías indígenas actualmente marginadas. (...)" (El resaltado no es del original) . Además, en su artículo primero se ordenó que su delimitación exacta sería efectuada por el ITCO, en coordinación con la CONAI. De relevancia para lo que es objeto de este proceso, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6036-G, del 12 de junio de 1976, reformó los límites de las Reservas Indígenas Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella y Talamanca y establece la Reserva de Telire. En su parte considerativa se Nombre635 que "(...) el Decreto N° 5904-G del 14 de marzo de 1976, publicado en el Alcance N° 60 a "La Gaceta" N ° 70 del día 10 de abril de 1976, dejó fuera de las Reservas creadas por dicho decreto, importantes núcleos de población indígena, en zonas pobladas exclusivamente por ellos (...)" (el resaltado no corresponde al original). En lo que a la Reserva Indígena de Talamanca se refiere, se indicó que se localizaba en las hojas del Instituto Geográfico Nacional, Dirección17224 , Amubri 3644-IV, Sukut Placa27836, Siola 3544-II, escala 1: 50.000, señalando en su artículo cuarto, sus rumbos, distancias y coordenadas. También, se establece un área de 56,829 hectáreas con 9.275 metros cuadrados. Como un aspecto importante en lo que aquí se resolverá, la norma en cuestión señala que la Reserva de Talamanca incluirá, como anexo administrativo, la "Reserva Indígena de Cocles", correspondiente a parte de las fincas 1.089 y 1.050 del ITCO y que su delimitación exacta será efectuada por el ITCO, en coordinación con la CONAI. Luego, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267, de 9 de agosto de 1977, se estableció la Reserva Indígena de Cocles (actualmente Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Nombre142238 (Cocles)). Interesa destacar que la parte considerativa de esa norma refiere al Decreto No. 6036-G citado, específicamente en cuanto menciona que la Reserva de Talamanca incluiría como anexo administrativo la Reserva Indígena de Cocles, correspondiente a parte de las finca 1089 y 1050 del ITCO e indicó que ya se habían hecho los estudios tendientes a localizar la población indígena de esa región y a determinar los límites exactos de esa reserva. Así, en el artículo 3 se indica que la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Këköldi se localiza en las hojas cartográficas del Instituto Geográfico Nacional, escala 1:50.000, Amubri 3644 IV, Sixaola 3644 I y Cahuita Placa27823, y procede a delimitarla según las coordenadas que ahí se indican. Pues bien, encontrándose reconocido el terreno propiedad de esta comunidad indígena de la forma que se indicó, la Ley Indígena, en su artículo 1, declaró reserva indígena la establecida, entre otras, en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6036-G, ya citado, la comunidad indígena Nombre142238 . Nombre635, además, que los límites fijados a la reserva, en ese decreto, no podrían ser variados disminuyendo la cabida de aquéllas, sino mediante ley expresa. Posteriormente, conforme al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 16568, del 25 de setiembre de 1985, se constituyó la Reserva Indígena de Cocles como una reserva independiente de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca. Finalmente, cabe hacer mención a las normas impugnadas. Primero, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296, del 24 de junio de 1996, el cual en su parte considerativa indicó, en lo que interesa, "(...) Que la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles (Keköldi) fue delimitada por el Decreto 7267-G del 9 de agosto de 1977, Alcance No 114 a "La Gaceta" No 157 del 20 de agosto de 1977 y confirmada por la Ley Indígena No 6172 del 29 de noviembre de 1977, "La Gaceta" No 240 del 20 de diciembre de 1977. Por Decreto 16568-G del 25 de setiembre de 1985, "La Gaceta" 191 del 8 de octubre de 1985, se estableció como Reserva Independiente. 2°—Que la delimitación de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles no fue la más apropiada porque incluye una zona costera cerca de la desembocadura del Río Cocles, que no ha sido habitada por indígenas en los últimos doscientos años. Además, la parte sureste de la Reserva de Cocles corresponde a asentamientos del IDA, ocupada exclusivamente por una población campesina no indígena.3°—Que de lo anterior resulta que, en la mitad oriental de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles, no hay población indígena, y que la recuperación de estos terrenos causara (sic) un gasto enorme para el Estado, y grandes pérdidas y toda clase de perjuicios a los actuales propietarios y ocupantes. 4°—Que este problema de límites ha sido causa de conflictos y tensiones en los últimos diez años, entre las diferentes comunidades y las instituciones involucradas. 5°—Que la solución más conveniente en este caso es modificar los límites de la Reserva Indígena, sin perjudicar a los indígenas. 6°—Que la citada Ley Indígena No 6172, en su Artículo 1. permite la modificación de límites por decreto ejecutivo, con tal que no haya reducción de la superficie de la Reserva. 7°—Que la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI, realizó estudios tendientes a modificar los límites de la Reserva de Cocles, excluyendo de esta los terrenos problemáticos y compensándolos por la inclusión de terrenos boscosos al oeste y al sur de la actual Reserva. 8°—Que esta modificación permitir por otra parte incluir en la Reserva tierras de indígenas que hasta la fecha no estaban amparadas al estatuto de Reserva Indígena. 9°—Que conforme al Artículo de la Ley 7316 del 3 de noviembre de 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 del 4 de diciembre de 1992, se consultó a la Comunidad Indígena local, y que esta dio su acuerdo al proyecto de reforma de límites. 10.—Que la población indígena solicita también que en adelante, la Reserva sea conocida preferentemente por su nombre indígena de "Nombre142238".(...)". Esos antecedentes fácticos dan lugar a que se reformen los límites de la Reserva Indígena Kekoldi de Cocles, estableciéndose la nueva delimitación a partir del artículo 2. Luego, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956, de 22 de marzo del 2001, consideró que "(..) en la modificación de los límites de la Reserva Indígena de Këköldi, definidos por el artículo 2º del Decreto 25296-G, publicado en La Gaceta 134 de 15 de julio de 1996, no se incluyó un área importante de protección y conservación de gran riqueza natural, ubicada en el sector noroeste de la reserva, entre las nacientes de los Ríos Carbón "Uno" y Carbón "Dos".4º—Que esa área comprende un territorio tradicionalmente de ocupación indígena, que es necesario incluirlo dentro de la reserva indígena por disposiciones de la Ley Nº 7316, Convenio 169 O.I.T., artículo 14. 5º—Que esa área guarda una riqueza hídrica de gran beneficio, inclusive para las comunidades de Bribrí, Home Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos y Punta Caliente, que obliga a su protección ya que es el área que sostiene la fuente principal de ese mineral para dichas poblaciones.6º—Que dicha área une geográficamente a la población indígena de Këköldi con la población indígena Nombre142249 , lo que demuestra ser un área tradicionalmente de ocupación indígena, y su inclusión favorece así mismo la unidad social de una población indígena Nombre142249, que estuvo espacialmente separada por muchos años. 7º—Que bajo tales consideraciones, se hace necesario modificar el límite noroeste de la Reserva Indígena de Këköldi, a fin de incluir esa importante área.8º—Que la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas (CONAI), ya realizó los estudios sobre el área que reclama la comunidad indígena de Këköldi y que la comunidad citada, bajo consulta según Convenio 169 de la O.I.T., manifiesta su acuerdo con el estudio presentado por CONAI. (...)", y dispuso modificar el artículo 2 del Decreto 25296-G, para que se entiendan como límites de la Reserva los que, ahora, se señalan en el numeral segundo de esta norma.

VII.- Sobre la defensa previa de caducidad de la acción anulatoria. El INDER y el Estado alegaron la caducidad de la acción anulatoria que se pretende contra varias normas de los decretos impugnados, lo cual fue apoyado por los coadyuvantes pasivos y el tercero con pretensiones propias. En lo medular, los accionados que la gestionan sostienen que las normas cuestionadas, a saber, los Decretos Ejecutivos No. 25296 del 24 de junio de 1996 y el No. 29956, de 22 de marzo de 2001, son actos administrativos, por lo que la acción anulatoria debió de ser ejercida dentro del plazo del año que, para tales efectos, señalan los artículos 175 de la LGAP y el numeral 200 inciso 7) del CPCA, y conforme a los cuales, la anulación se pide de forma sobradamente extemporánea. Por su parte, la asociación demandante manifiesta que, de conformidad con los Convenios 107 y 169 de la OIT, se está frente a un derecho humano y la propiedad indígena es imprescriptible. Por ende, dice, la acción no está caduca. Una vez analizados los argumentos de todas las partes, el Tribunal estima que la defensa previa alegada es improcedente por las siguientes razones. En el presente asunto, estamos frente a la impugnación de actos administrativos de carácter general que , en principio, está condicionada a que la demanda se presente dentro del año posterior a la fecha de su publicación (artículos 175 de la LGAP y numerales 37 inciso 3, 39.1.b y 200 inciso 7) del CPCA). No obstante lo anterior, cabe recordar que este tipo de actos de alcance general, por su propia naturaleza, surten sus efectos de manera continua mientras estén en vigencia, motivo por el cual, es criterio de este órgano colegiado que esa posibilidad no puede caducar mientras ellas estén en vigor y la parte accionante pueda acreditar que cuenta, al menos, con interés legítimo para tales efectos, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 inciso 2) del CPCA (ver en sentido similar, la sentencia número 262-2011-VI y 052-2012-VI, ambas dictadas por la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal, a las 14 horas 50 minutos del primero de diciembre del 2011 y de las 7 horas 30 minutos del 22 de marzo del 2012, respectivamente) . En este punto, cabe recordar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 40 del CPCA, es posible impugnar los actos administrativos de alcance general, mientras subsistan en el tiempo sus efectos continuados, por lo que, el plazo máximo para interponer el proceso será de un año a partir del día siguiente al cese de aquellos. Eso sí, la acción será únicamente para efectos de su anulación e inaplicabilidad futura. Aunado a lo anterior, insistimos que en los supuestos de normas de aplicación automática -como en este caso-, no se requiere de un acto de aplicación individual para impugnarlas, en virtud de que resultan obligatorias inmediatamente por su sola promulgación, sin necesidad de otras normas o actos que los desarrollen o los hagan aplicables al perjudicado. Pues bien, estimamos que la asociación demandante tiene, al menos, un interés legítimo, en la impugnación de estos decretos en tanto, estima, que le son lesivos y conculcan su propiedad privada. Además, se trata de normas que surten sus efectos perviven de manera continuada mientras estén en vigencia. Por lo expuesto, el Tribunal rechaza la defensa de caducidad planteada por la representación del INDER y el Estado , e ingresa al análisis de las pretensiones formuladas por la demandante.

VIII.- Sobre la pretensión anulatoria que se formula. La parte actora pide la nulidad absoluta parcial de los Decretos Ejecutivos No. 25296 y 29956 mencionados en los siguientes términos. Del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 pide se anule el artículo 2 únicamente en cuanto que la nueva delimitación de la Reserva Indígena excluye una parte de la finca inscrita en el Partido de Limón, al folio real matrícula Placa2092. También, solicita la nulidad del artículo 3 en su totalidad. Respecto del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29956 pide que se anule el artículo 1 únicamente en cuanto reitera la exclusión del territorio indígena de una parte de la finca Placa2092, antes citada, de la misma forma que lo hace el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296. Además, solicita la nulidad del artículo 3 únicamente en cuanto considera vigente el artículo 3 del Decreto 25296. El examen de legalidad que efectuará el Tribunal parte de dos premisas: la primera de ellas que, en lo fundamental, la nulidad se pide en relación con la nueva delimitación que efectuaron y confirmaron las normas de alcance general impugnadas respecto del territorio que comprende la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 , que la parte actora estima ilegal y violatoria de sus derechos. La segunda, que los vicios de ilegalidad que se acusan lo son para ambas normas; razón por la cual se analizarán en forma conjunta. En ese sentido, son cuatro los vicios que la accionante reclama: 1) Que para promulgar esos decretos se haya omitido la consulta que establece el artículo 6 del Convenio 169 de la OIT. 2) Que violentan el Principio de Reserva de Ley. 3) Que las normas impugnadas lesionan el Principio de Legalidad en cuanto se conculcan una serie de normas legales y de carácter supralegal. 4) Que las normas impugnadas desconocen su derecho de propiedad privada. En cuanto al primero de los vicios ha de señalarse lo siguiente. El artículo 6 del convenio No. 169 Sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes, aprobado en nuestro país mediante Ley No. 7316, de 3 de noviembre de 1992, señala, en lo que interesa que "(...) 1. Al aplicar las disposiciones del presente Convenio, los gobiernos deberán: a) Consultar a los pueblos interesados, mediante procedimientos apropiados y en particular a través de sus instituciones representativas, cada vez que se prevean medidas legislativas o administrativas susceptibles de afectarles directamente (...)". La demandante reclama que en la promulgación de los decretos impugnados se omitió la consulta a la comunidad indígena, como lo exige la norma citada. No obstante, el análisis de los autos permite descartar el vicio que se acusa. Como punto de partida, tenemos que las normas impugnadas dan fe de la realización de la consulta. En ese sentido, tenemos que la parte considerativa del Decreto No. 25296 Nombre635 que "(...) 9°—Que conforme al Artículo de la Ley 7316 del 3 de noviembre de 1992, "La Gaceta" 234 del 4 de diciembre de 1992, se consultó a la Comunidad Indígena local, y que esta dio su acuerdo al proyecto de reforma de límites (...)"; mientras que la del Decreto No. 29956 indicó que "(...) 8º—Que la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas (CONAI), ya realizó los estudios sobre el área que reclama la comunidad indígena de Këköldi y que la comunidad citada, bajo consulta según Convenio 169 de la O.I.T., manifiesta su acuerdo con el estudio presentado por CONAI. (...)". Luego, lo indicado en los referidos decretos encuentra respaldo en la prueba documental que se aportó. Nótese que a folio 596 del expediente judicial está visible la copia certificada del oficio ALG-577-96, de 28 de agosto de 1996, mediante el cual el Director de Asuntos Legales del Ministerio de Seguridad respondió el oficio A-727-96, de 20 de agosto de 1996, suscrito por la asesora del Ministro de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes (folio 595 de la carpeta judicial); indicando que "(....) en los trámites de reforma de los límites de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles se dio conocimiento a las partes. (...)". A su vez, remitió copia del oficio DE-091-96, de 23 de agosto de 1996 (folio 597 de este libelo), en el cual el Director Ejecutivo de la CONAI manifestó que "(...) En realidad hace más de 10 años, que tanto la CONAI, como la Comunidad Indígena de Cocles, y otros grupos regionales han solicitado la firma de este Decreto, para poner fin a una situación conflictiva que no beneficiaba a nadie. (...)". Aunado a lo anterior, a folio 601 de esta carpeta consta copia certificada de una misiva identificada como documento 14 de fecha 18 de febrero de 1994, mediante el cual la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles le manifestó a la CONAI que habían analizado el proyecto de modificación de límites y concluyen que llenan sus expectativas, por lo que solicitan tramitarlo. Además, a folios 604 y 605 consta el informe que, al recurso de amparo tramitado bajo el expediente No. 96-005636-007-CO, diera el Presidente de la CONAI en el que menciona los diferentes oficios que demuestran que tal consulta sí fue efectuada. Finalmente, de folios 608 al 611 consta copia certificada de una misiva, presentada en el referido expediente judicial del recurso de amparo, en la que un grupo de indígenas vecinos de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 manifestaron a la Sala Constitucional que estaban de acuerdo con el contenido del Decreto No. 25296 y que fueron consultados, dos veces, específicamente en noviembre de 1994 y el enero de 1996. No resultan de recibo el cuestionamiento genérico que la parte actora hizo a estos documentos. Por una parte, se trata de documentos que forman parte del expediente judicial 96-005636-007-CO (específicamente los folios 131 y 132 de aquella carpeta) tramitado ante la Sala Constitucional y que se aportan debidamente certificados, algunos de ellos rendidos bajo la fe de juramento, conforme lo establece la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional. Por otra, en algunos de los documentos viene estampada el sello de la Asociación en cuestión. La valoración armónica de esos elementos permite al Tribunal concluir que, como argumentan los demandados y el tercero con pretensiones propias, la referida consulta sí fue efectuada como, insistimos, indican las normas cuestionadas. Así, la voluntad de la comunidad indígena accionante sí fue considerada previo a la referida delimitación. Finalmente, llama la atención del Tribunal el hecho de que, pese al carácter del vicio que se reclama, se acuse únicamente para justificar la nulidad parcial de la norma de alcance general. Ello porque la actora acusa la omisión de esta formalidad esencial solo en cuanto a las normas que excluyeron una parte de la finca de Limón No. 19056-000, mas no respecto de las normas que ampliaron los límites de la reserva hacia el sur y el oeste. En rigor, partiendo de la posibilidad remota de que la consulta no se hubiese sido efectuada (que no es lo que se concluye en este caso), estaríamos frente a un vicio que invalidaría todo el decreto normas y la delimitación que en ellas se establece, y no solo los artículos que excluyen porciones del territorio, como pretende la accionante. Esta argumentación de la accionante refuerza la conclusión del Tribunal respecto de que la consulta sí fue efectuada; pues no habría forma de entender que sí lo fue para las normas que amplían la reserva y no para las que excluyen terrenos. Por las razones expuestas, el vicio acusado resulta improcedente y así debe declararse.

IX.- Se acusa, también, violación al Principio de Reserva de Ley fundamentalmente porque se estima que conforme al artículo 1 de la Ley Indígena la delimitación efectuada en los decretos No. 6036-G y No. 7267 citados asumió rango de ley y no podrían ser modificados mediante las normas de alcance general impugnadas; máxime cuando el referido artículo establece que los límites fijados a las reservas, en los citados decretos, no podrían ser variados disminuyendo la cabida de aquéllas, sino mediante ley expresa. No obstante, el Tribunal considera que la debida interpretación del artículo 1 en comentario permite descartar el vicio que se acusa. No existe duda para el Tribunal de que esa norma declara reservas indígenas las establecidas, en lo que viene al caso, en los Decretos Ejecutivos números 5904-G, 6036-G y 7267 citadas. Tal declaratoria supone avalar, en norma de rango legal, la delimitación establecida en aquellos actos de alcance general. Precisamente por ello, el referido artículo 1 dispone de seguido que los límites fijados a las reservas, en los citados decretos, no podrían ser variados disminuyendo la cabida de aquéllas, sino mediante ley expresa. No obstante, somos del criterio de que, en el caso concreto, tal disposición no ha sido violentada porque los decretos impugnados no disminuyeron la cabida del territorio indígena Nombre142238 . Así se desprende, con claridad, de la parte considerativa del Decreto No. 25296 cuando indica que "(...) 2°—Que la delimitación de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles no fue la más apropiada porque incluye una zona costera cerca de la desembocadura del Río Cocles, que no ha sido habitada por indígenas en los últimos doscientos años. Además, la parte sureste de la Reserva de Cocles corresponde a asentamientos del IDA, ocupada exclusivamente por una población campesina no indígena. 3°—Que de lo anterior resulta que, en la mitad oriental de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles, no hay población indígena, y que la recuperación de estos terrenos causara (sic) un gasto enorme para el Estado, y grandes pérdidas y toda clase de perjuicios a los actuales propietarios y ocupantes. 4°—Que este problema de límites ha sido causa de conflictos y tensiones en los últimos diez años, entre las diferentes comunidades y las instituciones involucradas. 5°—Que la solución más conveniente en este caso es modificar los límites de la Reserva Indígena, sin perjudicar a los indígenas. 6°—Que la citada Ley Indígena N o 6172, en su Artículo 1. permite la modificación de límites por decreto ejecutivo, con tal que no haya reducción de la superficie de la Reserva. 7°—Que la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI, realizó estudios tendientes a modificar los límites de la Reserva de Cocles, excluyendo de esta los terrenos problemáticos y compensándolos por la inclusión de terrenos boscosos al oeste y al sur de la actual Reserva. 8°—Que esta modificación permitir por otra parte incluir en la Reserva tierras de indígenas que hasta la fecha no estaban amparadas al estatuto de Reserva Indígena.(...)"; y de la del Decreto No. 29956 cuando señala que "(...) 2º—Que los límites de la Reserva Indígena de Këköldi fueron modificados por el artículo 2 del Decreto Ejecutivo 25296-G, publicado en La Gaceta 134 de 15 de julio 1996. 3º—Que en la modificación de los límites de la Reserva Indígena de Këköldi, definidos por el artículo 2º del Decreto 25296-G, publicado en La Gaceta 134 de 15 de julio de 1996, no se incluyó un área importante de protección y conservación de gran riqueza natural, ubicada en el sector noroeste de la reserva, entre las nacientes de los Ríos Carbón "Uno" y Carbón "Dos". 4º—Que esa área comprende un territorio tradicionalmente de ocupación indígena, que es necesario incluirlo dentro de la reserva indígena por disposiciones de la Ley Nº 7316, Convenio 169 O.I.T., artículo 14. 5º—Que esa área guarda una riqueza hídrica de gran beneficio, inclusive para las comunidades de Bribrí, Home (sic) Creek, Patiño, Carbón Dos y Punta Caliente, que obliga a su protección ya que es el área que sostiene la fuente principal de ese mineral para dichas poblaciones. 6º—Que dicha área une geográficamente a la población indígena de Këköldi con la población indígena Nombre142249 , lo que demuestra ser un área tradicionalmente de ocupación indígena, y su inclusión favorece así mismo la unidad social de una población indígena Nombre142249, que estuvo espacialmente separada por muchos años. 7º—Que bajo tales consideraciones, se hace necesario modificar el límite noroeste de la Reserva Indígena de Këköldi, a fin de incluir esa importante área.(...)". Lo transcrito permite concluir que si bien el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 excluyó de la reserva los terrenos correspondientes a la zona costera cercana a la desembocadura del Río Cocles y la parte sureste de la Reserva de Cocles, lo compensó con la inclusión de terrenos boscosos al oeste y al sur de la actual reserva. Así, no hubo una disminución de la cabida que de pie a la violación del Principio de Reserva de Ley. La situación es todavía más clara en el Decreto No. 29956, toda vez que esa norma reitera la delimitación efectuada en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296 y amplía el territorio para incluir, en el límite noroeste un área importante de protección y conservación de gran riqueza natural, ubicada en el sector noroeste de la reserva, entre las nacientes de los Ríos Carbón "Uno" y Carbón "Dos". En ese tanto, es evidente que esta norma de alcance general tampoco disminuye la cabida de la reserva y, por ende, no existe la ilegalidad acusada. Insistimos que la limitación que impone la Ley Indígena es que, vía reglamentaria, se varíen los límites de modo que supongan una disminución de la cabida del territorio indígena, lo que no sucedió en este caso ya que los referidos actos de alcance general, más bien, aumentaron la referida cabida, tal y como lo admite la parte actora en sus pretensiones. Suponer que conforme a al artículo 1 de la Ley Indígena los límites de las reservas solo pueden ser modificados por norma legal llevaría no solo a desconocer y desaplicar el propio texto de la norma (conforme a la cual eso no es posible únicamente sí se disminuye la cabida), sino además, a interpretar que las modificaciones que pretendan el aumento de la cabida deben ser, también, dispuestas por norma legal. Una conclusión de esta naturaleza (que el Tribunal no comparte) supondría la declaratoria de ilegalidad de todo el texto de los decretos impugnados, incluido lo relativo a la inclusión de territorios y aumento de la cabida. Así, estimamos que cuantitativamente no existe una lesión al territorio indígena Nombre142238 ya que, reiteramos, las normas de alcance general si bien modificaron los límites de la reserva, no disminuyeron su cabida sino que más bien la aumentaron considerablemente. Pero, además, tampoco existe una disminución cualitativa toda vez que, conforme se analizará infra, los territorios excluidos correspondían a tierras que no fueron tradicional o ancestralmente ocupadas por la comunidad indígena en cuestión; y los terrenos incluidos fueron aquellos que, conforme a los estudios realizados en aquel entonces, correspondían a tierras que sí habían sido tradicionalmente ocupados por ello. Por las razones expuestas, estimamos que los decretos impugnados no violentan el Principio de Reserva de Ley.

X.- Por otra parte, se reclama que los decretos impugnados lesionan y cercenan el derecho de propiedad de la comunidad indígena accionante. Un primer argumento en que la parte actora fundamenta este vicio es en el hecho de que ella es propietaria de la totalidad de la finca de Limón No. 19056-000, cuya inscripción consta en el Registro Nacional. Por ende, no es posible que a través de un decreto se cercene ese derecho. En ese sentido, debemos indicar que se ha tenido por acreditado que, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267, del 09 de agosto de 1977 se efectuó una primera delimitación de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Cocles. La parte considerativa de esa norma refiere al Decreto No. 6036-G citado, específicamente en cuanto menciona que la Reserva de Talamanca incluiría como anexo administrativo la Reserva Indígena de Cocles, correspondiente a parte de las fincas 1089 y 1050 del ITCO. Para dar cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en esta norma, mediante escritura número 85 otorgada ante el notario Nombre142257 a las 12 horas del 5 de abril de 1989, la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca donó a la Asociación accionante la finca inscrita en el Registro Público, Partido de Limón, al tomo 2548, folio 35, número 19056, asiento 1. Esa escritura fue presentada al Registro Nacional el 19 de abril de 1990 bajo las citas 378-18219-001 y a la fecha no ha sido inscrita. Es por ello que al día de hoy, la propiedad en cuestión permanece inscrita registralmente a nombre de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca. Interesa destacar en este punto que conforme a las manifestaciones de los representantes de la parte actora y de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 , el traspaso no se ha inscrito porque el inmueble en cuestión no cuenta con plano. No obstante, estimamos que esa deficiencia (la falta de inscripción del traspaso) no da pie a concluir que el referido inmueble no pertenezca a la Asociación accionante, como parece cuestionar el representante estatal. Por una parte, la escritura de donación se encuentra debidamente anotada según consta del folio 154 al 156 del expediente judicial y existe una manifestación expresa del representante de la propietaria registral en el sentido que el traspaso se efectuó y que "(...) si es necesario hacer otro traspaso o adicionar la escritura otorgada oportunamente, cuando el IDA confeccione el plano respectivo, estamos dispuestos a hacerlo. (...)" (folio 286 vuelto del expediente judicial). Lo anterior se refuerza con el hecho de que, si se revisa la información registral del inmueble en cuestión, se observa que su naturaleza corresponde a la Reserva Indígena de Cocles. Así, el Tribunal comparte lo señalado por los representantes del INDER, de los coadyuvantes pasivos y de la sociedad que actúa como tercero con pretensiones propias, en el sentido que no existe cuestionamiento respecto de que la referida finca es titularidad de la Asociación actora. En rigor, el meollo del asunto es otro, según se analizará. En este sentido, es necesario resaltar que se ha tenido por acreditado que la finca en cuestión (19056-000) carece de plano. Se trata de un hecho que se acredita con el informe pericial rendido por Nombre142257 , Coordinador General de la Unidad Ejecutora del Programa de Regularización y Registro, quien así lo indica a folios 357 y 358 del expediente judicial. Pero, además, la actora, el Estado y la sociedad que participa como tercero con pretensiones propias así lo admiten. Si bien el Tribunal estima que la ausencia del plano catastrado es un elemento que debe ser valorado al momento de resolver esta litis, lo cierto es que no es el aspecto fundamental a considerar, sino más bien secundario, según se explicará. Compartimos la apreciación del perito Nombre142257 en el sentido de que "(...) según la materia catastral, la localización de una finca solo puede derivarse si existe un plano catastrado que la que la describa (...)" (folio 358 del expediente judicial); sin embargo, tratándose de territorios indígenas, esa condición debe valorarse en conjunto con la normativa vigente en esta materia y la jurisprudencia emitida tanto los Tribunales nacionales e internacionales; conforme a la cual la delimitación que hagan los Estados constituye un reconocimiento del derecho a la propiedad colectiva que respecto de sus territorios tienen los pueblos indígenas. Sin embargo, el derecho se constituyó y recaerá sobre los territorios que tradicionalmente o ancestralmente han sido ocupados por ellos. Por ende, establecida la existencia de un pueblo indígena en un entorno geográfico determinado de posición ancestral, las Administraciones están en la obligación de reconocerlo como tal, lo que supone entre otras acciones, la recuperación y devolución de esas tierras, aunque se encuentren en manos de sujetos no indígenas. Así, el hecho de que el territorio tradicional de la comunidad indígena se encuentre en manos privadas, no sería per ser un motivo objetivo y fundamentado que impida su reivindicación. En este sentido, el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena establece el procedimiento a seguir para indemnizar o expropiar la propiedad privada inscrita en territorios que han sido ancestralmente ocupados por indígenas para devolverlos a esa comunidad. Así lo señalado la CIDH, entre otras, en la Sentencia Comunidad Indígena Nombre139487 . Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de agosto de 2010 Serie C No. 214 , en la que señaló: "(...) 2.1.2. Posesión de las tierras reclamadas y su exigencia para el reconocimiento de la propiedad comunitaria1. En relación a la posesión de las tierras reclamadas, la Comisión consideró que el Estado está obligado a reconocer y responder el reclamo de la Comunidad “aún cuando no tengan plena posesión de las mismas y se encuentren en manos privadas”. Los representantes alegaron que la Comunidad “ha mantenido una forma de posesión parcial sobre las tierras que reclaman y los alrededores en cuanto al acceso a los recursos naturales”. Agregaron que los miembros de la Comunidad han desarrollado sus actividades tradicionales en las tierras bajo reclamación “desde antes de la transferencia de las tierras a la empresa Eaton y Cía., hasta el comienzo del 2008 [,] cuando aquellas actividades les fueron prohibidas con el establecimiento de la reserva [natural] privada”. El Estado sostuvo que “los peticionarios no tienen la propiedad debidamente inscri[ta] en el Registro de Inmuebles, ni la posesión del inmueble pretendido”. 2. El Tribunal recuerda su jurisprudencia respecto a la propiedad comunitaria de las tierras indígenas, según la cual: 1) la posesión tradicional de los indígenas sobre sus tierras tiene efectos equivalentes al título de pleno dominio que otorga el Estado; 2) la posesión tradicional otorga a los indígenas el derecho a exigir el reconocimiento oficial de propiedad y su registro; 3) el Estado debe delimitar, demarcar y otorgar título colectivo de las tierras a los miembros de las comunidades indígenas; 4) los miembros de los pueblos indígenas que por causas ajenas a su voluntad han salido o perdido la posesión de sus tierras tradicionales mantienen el derecho de propiedad sobre las mismas, aún a falta de título legal, salvo cuando las tierras hayan sido legítimamente trasladadas a terceros de buena fe, y 5) los miembros de los pueblos indígenas que involuntariamente han perdido la posesión de sus tierras, y éstas han sido trasladadas legítimamente a terceros inocentes, tienen el derecho de recuperarlas o a obtener otras tierras de igual extensión y calidad. 3. Adicionalmente, tal como se estableció en los casos de las comunidades indígenas de Nombre91182 y Sawhomaxa, Paraguay reconoce el derecho de los pueblos indígenas a solicitar la devolución de sus tierras tradicionales perdidas, inclusive cuando se encuentren bajo dominio privado y no tengan plena posesión de las mismas. En efecto, el Estatuto de Comunidades Indígenas paraguayo consagra el procedimiento a seguirse para la reivindicación de tierras bajo dominio privado, el cual es precisamente el supuesto del presente caso. 4. En este caso, si bien los miembros de la Comunidad no tienen la posesión de las tierras reclamadas, conforme a la jurisprudencia de esta Corte y al derecho interno paraguayo tienen el derecho de recuperarlas. 2.1.3. Vigencia del derecho a reclamar las tierras tradicionales 5. Con respecto a la posibilidad de recuperar las tierras tradicionales, en anteriores oportunidades la Corte ha establecido que la base espiritual y material de la identidad de los pueblos indígenas se sustenta principalmente en su relación única con sus tierras tradicionales, por lo que mientras esa relación exista, el derecho a la reivindicación de dichas tierras permanecerá vigente. Si esta relación hubiera dejado de existir, también se extinguiría ese derecho.(...)". Conforme a lo expuesto, el eje de la discusión está en determinar si el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena de la Asociación accionante mediante los decretos impugnados constituía un territorio tradicionalmente ocupado por ellos. Si lo era, las normas violentaron su derecho de propiedad privada comunal; de lo contrario tal lesión no existiría. En ese tanto, el reproche se direcciona, en lo fundamental, al elemento motivo de ambos decretos.

XI.- Pues bien, la valoración de las probanzas en forma conjunta y bajo las reglas de la sana crítica racional, llevan a concluir que el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 mediante los Decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956, no constituía un territorio que tradicional o ancestralmente hubiese sido ocupado por esa comunidad indígena. Veamos. Si bien la parte actora enuncia en su demanda una serie de antecedentes históricos que pretende relacionar al tema que se discute, estimamos que no resultan pertinentes toda vez que refieren, en general, a aspectos sobre los cuales no ha existido mayor discusión. Es decir, nadie duda que a la llegada de los españoles nuestro país estaba ocupado por pueblos indígenas y que éstos ocupaban territorios del Caribe. Se aportan, también, copias certificadas de dos libros con los que se pretende demostrar tal ocupación. Sin embargo, somos del criterio que, dada su naturaleza, ese elemento es insuficiente para llegar a tal conclusión. Nótese, incluso, que la sociedad tercerista aporta copias certificadas de extractos de tres libros diferentes, de los que afirma, en contradicción con lo que dicen los aportados por la demandante que, según el testimonio de dos indígenas (Nombre142260 y Nombre142261 ), se trataba de un territorio no ocupado por ellos y que lo que se presentó fue un error en el decreto que originalmente lo incluyó como parte del territorio indígena, toda vez que la delimitación no fue la más apropiada. El hecho de que Nombre142262 (y únicamente ella) manifieste, ahora, que ella no afirmó lo que los libros aportados por la tercerista señalan, no aportan mayor claridad al asunto y más bien, generan más dudas. Así, en la ponderación probatoria que efectúa el Tribunal, los libros en cuestión no constituyen prueba idónea ni son determinantes en la fundamentación de la decisión que se ha adoptado. Por otra parte, tenemos que los motivos que sirvieron de base al Decreto No. 25296, se desprenden de ese mismo acto, específicamente "(...) Que la delimitación de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles no fue la más apropiada porque incluye una zona costera cerca de la desembocadura del Río Cocles, que no ha sido habitada por indígenas en los últimos doscientos años. Además, la parte sureste de la Reserva de Cocles corresponde a asentamientos del IDA, ocupada exclusivamente por una población campesina no indígena. 3°—Que de lo anterior resulta que, en la mitad oriental de la Reserva Indígena de Cocles, no hay población indígena, y que la recuperación de estos terrenos causara un gasto enorme para el Estado, y grandes pérdidas y toda clase de perjuicios a los actuales propietarios y ocupantes. 4°—Que este problema de límites ha sido causa de conflictos y tensiones en los últimos diez años, entre las diferentes comunidades y las instituciones involucradas. 5°—Que la solución más conveniente en este caso es modificar los límites de la Reserva Indígena, sin perjudicar a los indígenas. (...)"; aspectos por los cuales se dispuso la modificación de los límites del territorio indígena Nombre142238 , excluyendo la porción aquí en disputa. Esos antecedentes fácticos y jurídicos encuentran, a juicio del Tribunal, respaldo en los autos. Por una parte, las primeras normas que regulan el derecho de propiedad de los indígenas refieren a terrenos baldíos por ellos ocupados (artículo 8 de la Ley No. 13) y, en el caso específico de la creación de la Reserva Nombre142238 , se localizó ésta en terrenos que además eran propiedad del ITCO, indicando incluso los números de finca sobre los cuales debía establecerse y que le sirven de antecedente. Así lo señala, claramente, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6036-G, que establece "(...) Además, la Reserva de Talamanca incluirá, como anexo administrativo, la "Reserva Indígena de Cocles", correspondiente a parte de las fincas 1.089 y 1.050 del ITCO. Su delimitación exacta será efectuada por el ITCO, en coordinación con la CONAI. (...)". Es importante destacar que conforme a la parte considerativa de esa norma, la localización territorial que se efectúa fue tomando en cuenta importantes núcleos de población indígena, en zonas pobladas exclusivamente por ellos. De conformidad con las normas referidas, para la época en la que se emitieron estas regulaciones, la comunidad indígena de Kekoldi se ubicaba en esos entornos (terrenos baldíos, del ITCO y fincas determinadas), más no en inmuebles inscritas como propiedad privada de particulares. Sobre este punto, merece destacarse que conforme al peritaje rendido por Nombre142257 , en el territorio que fue excluido de la Reserva Indígena de Kekoldi mediante Decreto No. 25296, han existido diferentes planos inscritos desde 1946, algunos de ellos vinculados a asientos registrales y a los cuáles se hizo referencia en el elenco de hechos probados. Insistimos que esos planos datan de 1946 (sea, con anterioridad al Decreto No. 6036-G) al 2004 (folios 354 a 372 del expediente judicial). Interesa referirnos al plano 7-0009380-1946, el cual fue catastrado en 1946 por Nombre142248 y que correspondiente a un terreno de su propiedad, situado en la desembocadura del Río Cocles, que medía 25 hectáreas 2750 metros cuadrados ubicados en la milla marítima de la zona atlántica, sito en Puerto Viejo, distrito uno, cantón uno de la provincia de Limón cubría un área importante de lo que hoy es la llanura costera en playa Cocles de Limón (folios 390, 391, 570 al 572 del expediente judicial). Conforme al mismo dictamen pericial, ese plano se vincula registralmente con la finca inscrita en el Registro Nacional bajo el sistema folio real No. 7-05365-000 (peritaje rendido por Nombre142257 a folios 388 al 392 del expediente judicial, cd con mosaico catastral). Así, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6036-G y la prueba pericial permite constatar los motivos que fueron considerados en los decretos impugnados (que la delimitación inicial en 1976, incluyó una zona costera cerca de la desembocadura del Río Cocles y la parte sureste de la reserva que no ha sido habitada por indígenas sino más bien por propietarios u ocupantes que no lo eran, como es el caso de doña Nombre142248 ) existían tal y como fueron considerados al momento de dictarlos. Esa conclusión se refuerza, además, con el testimonio de Nombre142258 y Nombre142263 . Don Nombre142258 relató al Tribunal que él creció en Puerto Viejo y que desde que nació recuerda que había gente viviendo en casas en las costas de Cocles. Manifestó que le contaron que sus parientes vinieron de Panamá a Puerto Viejo en el siglo XVIII. Nombre635 que, desde que tiene uso de razón (cuando tenía cinco o seis años, ya que nació en 1965), había gente viviendo en Cocles, casi todos negros y algunos blancos. Las casas se situaban en la costa y las fincas atrás. Mencionó entre las familias más antiguas a la de don Nombre142264 , quien era colombiano y era el padre de doña Nombre142248 . Nombre635 que ya para cuando él era niño don Nombre142264 vivía ahí y cita los nombres de otras familias que también habitaba la zona. Explicó que la población negra llegaban de Puerto Viejo (en donde había escuela y pulperías) a Cocles a recolectar cacao, que era la actividad comercial más importante. Manifestó que no recordaba haber visto asentamientos o personas indígenas en las zonas bajas o costa de Cocles, sino que más bien llegaban de la Alta Talamanca a ayudar en la cosecha de cacao y algunas veces se quedaban a dormir en las casas de quienes los contrataban. Insistió en que la población indígena Nombre142238 se ubicaba en las partes altas de la baja Talamanca: en la baja había coco, en la intermedia las fincas de cacao y en la parte de arriba los indígenas y cada uno siempre tuvo su espacio. Don Bernardo, quien visitaba Cocles en su niñez, coincidió en cuanto a que no existían asentamientos indígenas en la zona costera, sino que más bien ésta era ocupada por propietarios privados y los indígenas se ubicaban de Nombre142249 para adentro. También coincidió en cuanto a las actividades principales (siembra de cacao y tubérculos) y que los Nombre29395 bajaban a Cocles a trabajar en labores como la chapia, quebrar cacao y, en general, de peones. Indicó que algunas veces los propietarios les regalaban un pedacito de tierra para que vivieran cerca del trabajo pero que nunca constituyeron asentamientos en esa zona. Cabe destacar que, incluso, Nombre142262 admite que en Cocles vivían algunos afrodescendientes (no tantos) y que en la zona habían cocos y árboles de almendros. Nombre635, también, que antes muchos Nombre29395 (no todos) vivían en las partes altas, que existía relación con los afrodescendientes y que los niños indígenas iban a la escuela de éstos. Frente a estas probanzas, lo cierto es que la parte actora no allegó al proceso elementos que las rebatieran o que demostraran la ocupación física o material de esa comunidad indígena en ese territorio. Así, la valoración de la comuna probatoria en su conjunto permite concluir al Tribunal que el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 mediante los decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956, no fue habitado ni ocupado físicamente por esa comunidad indígena sino más bien por personas particulares (afrodescendientes y blancos) y los que catrastraron planos e inscribieron propiedad privada desde 1946, como es el caso de Doña Nombre142248 .

XII.- No obstante, el hecho de que se tenga por demostrado que el territorio excluido de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 mediante los decretos No. Placa27837 y No. 29956, no fue habitado ni ocupado físicamente por esa comunidad indígena, sino por sujetos particulares, no es suficiente para concluir que no haya existido violación a su derecho de propiedad comunal. Como explicamos en un Considerando anterior, el alcance de la propiedad privada comunal indígena en relación con los territorios va más allá de la posesión tradicional o material, involucrando aspectos espirituales basados en la relación especial que tienen con sus tierras tradicionales y que también han de ser analizados. En ese sentido, la parte actora manifiesta que la concepción del derecho de propiedad de los indígenas es diferente porque se funda, además, en una relación espiritual. Conforme lo expuesto en Considerandos anteriores esa relación especial se manifiesta de diferentes maneras dependiendo del pueblo indígena que, en cada caso corresponda. Así, por ejemplo, se menciona el uso o presencia tradicional, a través de lazos espirituales o ceremoniales; asentamientos o cultivos esporádicos; caza, pesca o recolección estacional o nómada; uso de recursos naturales ligados a sus costumbres, y cualquier otro elemento característico de su cultura. Así se deriva, también de los artículos 13, 14 y 15 del Convenio No. 169 de la OIT. Ahora, el Tribunal estima que esa relación especial de los indígenas con sus territorios debe, necesariamente, ser probada a efectos de que se así se declare y proceda con la recuperación y devolución, si así corresponde. La necesaria demostración de esa relación ha sido reconocida, también por la CIDH. Así, por ejemplo, en la Sentencia Comunidad Indígena Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de agosto de 2010 Serie C No. 214 , se indicó que "(...) El vínculo de los miembros de la Comunidad con dichos territorios es fundamental e inescindible para su supervivencia alimentaria y cultural, por ello la importancia de su devolución. Contrario a lo que señala el Estado, las tierras a entregarse a los miembros de la Comunidad no es cualquier inmueble “dentro del territorio histórico de los Enxet Lengua”, sino el territorio que los miembros de la Comunidad han demostrado en este caso que es su territorio tradicional específico y más apto para el asentamiento indígena (supra párr. 107).(...)"(el resaltado y subrayado no corresponde al original). También, se Nombre635 que "(...) Con respecto a la posibilidad de recuperar las tierras tradicionales, en anteriores oportunidades la Corte ha establecido que la base espiritual y material de la identidad de los pueblos indígenas se sustenta principalmente en su relación única con sus tierras tradicionales, por lo que mientras esa relación exista, el derecho a la reivindicación de dichas tierras permanecerá vigente. Si esta relación hubiera dejado de existir, también se extinguiría ese derecho.(...)"(el resaltado y subrayado no corresponde al original). Incluso, en el caso concreto que ahí se resolvió, la CIDH dio credibilidad al informe de un antropólogo que sirvió como elemento demostrativo para acreditar la existencia de esa relación especial y espiritual. En ese sentido, el fallo indica que "(...) En el presente caso, la Corte observa que la relación de los miembros de la Comunidad con su territorio tradicional se manifiesta, inter alia, en el desarrollo de sus actividades tradicionales dentro de dichas tierras (supra párrs. Placa27824, , ). Al respecto, el antropólogo Nombre142265 expresó en su informe elaborado en 1995, que la misma seguía “ocupando su territorio y practicando su economía tradicional, no obstante los condicionamientos [que imponía] la propiedad privada”. De particular relevancia resulta que inclusive ante las restricciones impuestas a los miembros de la Comunidad, “igual entrab[an] a cazar a escondidas”. Asimismo, algunos miembros de la Comunidad indicaron que cuando vivían en la Estancia Salazar, aunque con serias limitaciones, todavía se practicaba algo de medicina tradicional y los chamanes buscaban plantas medicinales en el monte, así como enterraban a sus muertos de acuerdo a sus costumbres. (...)". Pues bien, en el presente caso el Tribunal estima que esa relación especial y espiritual de la comunidad indígena de Kekoldi con los territorios excluidos por los decretos impugnados (que, en lo medular, corresponde a la costa y llanura costera de Cocles) no fue demostrada. La única prueba que el accionante aportó para tales efectos fue el testimonio de doña Nombre142266 , indígena de esa comunidad. Sin embargo, estimamos que esa probanza resulta insuficiente por las siguientes razones. Ella relató al Tribunal, con amplitud, la relación de los Nombre29395 con el mar y que Talamanca era dominio bribrí, desde lo alto de la cordillera hasta la costa. También que en el mar se llevaban a cabo bautizos de niños que vivían lejos del mar y que también se aprovechaban de él: hacían sal, utilizaban las conchas blancas y los cocos (comían la nuez, usaban la concha y guardaban la sal). Sin embargo, don Nombre142258 manifestó que no recordaba haber visto ceremonias sagradas, religiosas o rituales de los indígenas en Cocles. Recalcó que, al ser un pueblo chico, si hubieran habido lo hubiesen sabido. Explicó que los indígenas bajaban a la costa a buscar sal y se llevaban cangrejos. Incluso, relató al Tribunal que en los trabajos y excavaciones que habían hecho en sus tierras nunca hallaron algún indicio que les hiciera presumir la presencia de indígenas en esa zona. La existencia de testimonios contrarios respecto a que en esa zona se efectuaran ceremonias, rituales o lazos espirituales impide al Tribunal tener por demostrado esa relación. Luego, llama la atención que cuando doña Nombre142266 explicó que para ellos, existían lugares sagrados, que se protegían y a los cuales había que pedir permiso a los dioses para entrar, Nombre635 entre estos los los humedales, las lagunas, los esteros y los cerros, pero nunca indicó que el mar o la costa fuera uno de ellos. Lo anterior aunado a que tampoco se demostró la existencia de asentamientos en esa zona o que en ella se efectuaran cultivos, caza, pesca en forma esporádica recolección estacional o nómada. En nuestro criterio, los testimonios evacuados permiten, únicamente, acreditar que los indígenas de Kekoldi usaban y se aprovechaban del mar y sus recursos; pero no en modo distinto de lo que cualquier persona podría hacerlo. Así, con la prueba evacuada no podría afirmarse que la comunidad indígena Nombre142238 tuviera una relación especial (física, material o espiritual) con la zona excluida por los decretos impugnados, que pudiera servir de base a un derecho de propiedad. Tómese en cuenta, además, que algunos de los territorios excluidos corresponden a propiedad privada inscrita (desde antes de los decretos que originalmente la delimitaron) o a la zona marítima terrestre. Ambos supuestos, cuentan con protección por parte del ordenamiento jurídico, situación que debe, también, ser ponderada por este Tribunal. Así, tampoco puede concluirse que esos territorios excluidos hayan sido tradicional y ancestralmente ocupados por ellos. Para llegar a esa conclusión, estimamos que la parte actora debió allegar al proceso probanzas idóneas, como por ejemplo, un antropólogo quien, con base en su experticia, permitiera establecer esa relación especial, principalmente en aspectos como desplazamientos, uso o relación espiritual de esos pueblos con el mar, la costa y las llanuras de Cocles. Sin embargo, fue el propio representante de la asociación accionante quien desistió de esa probanza que fuera, en su momento, admitida por el Tribunal. Desde esta perspectiva, si la carga probatoria le correspondía y no la ejerció, deberá la accionante asumir las consecuencias negativas de su desatención. Por las razones expuestas, el Tribunal estima que los decretos impugnados no cercenan ni violentan el derecho de propiedad de la comunidad indígena Nombre142238 porque los territorios excluidos no fueron ocupados tradicional o ancestralmente por ellos. Más bien, fueron otros sus ocupantes, como se demostró. Con base en lo expuesto, no se encuentra deficiencia alguna en el motivo y contenido de los decretos impugnados; pues más bien responden, según se explicó, a la necesidad de corregir un error en la localización que, originalmente, planteara el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267, ya derogado. No es cierto, como afirma la actora, que su derecho de propiedad inscrito fuera cercenado por los decretos impugnados. Reiteramos que el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267 lo que hizo, en su momento, fue una localización genérica del territorio indígena de Nombre142238 que, como señalan los decretos impugnados y aquí se ha demostrado, por error incluyó tierras que no habían sido ocupadas ni usadas por esa comunidad indígena. Al haberse inscrito la finca No. 7-19056-000 sin que hubiese un plano catastrado que delimitara correctamente, ese error se extendió a propiedades que han sido usadas, ocupadas e inscritas a nombre de personas no indígenas. Precisamente, en virtud de ese error (la difusa localización en la que incurre el Decreto No. 7267) y en el hecho de que, en todo caso, el referido Decreto no tiene la potencia necesaria para desconocer propiedad privada inscrita legalmente a nombre de terceros y en la que, y esto es fundamental, no ha existido tradicional o ancestralmente ocupación de esa comunidad indígena; que el Estado emite los decretos impugnados y delimita la Reserva Indígena de Nombre142238 de una forma acorde al contenido sustancial de su derecho de propiedad colectiva, esto es, para que cubra territorios que han sido tradicional o ancestralmente ocupados por ellos. Por la prueba que aquí se ha evacuado en relación con las normas aplicables al caso concreto, el Tribunal estima que esas conductas formales administrativas no lesionan el derecho de propiedad de los indígenas. No es necesario que se pida la nulidad del título correspondiente a la finca del Partido de Limón, número 19056-000. Tal y como se indicó al inicio del examen de este vicio, ese inmueble es propiedad de la accionante. Claro está, en los términos en que se concibe su derecho de propiedad, esto es, en el territorio tradicionalmente ocupado por ellos, el cual se corresponde, según se ha explicado, al que describe, a la fecha, el Decreto No. 29956 aquí impugnado.

XIII.- Lo expuesto no supone, ni por asomo, violación al Principio de Legalidad o desconocimiento de normas que regulan el derecho de propiedad indígena. El artículo 11 del Convenio 107 de la OIT señala que se deberá reconocer el derecho de propiedad, colectivo o individual, a favor de los miembros de las poblaciones en cuestión sobre las tierras tradicionalmente ocupadas por ellas. En el caso concreto, el Tribunal ha establecido que los territorios excluidos por los decretos impugnados no cumplen ese presupuesto porque no corresponden a tierras que tradicionalmente hubiesen sido o sean ocupadas por la comunidad indígena Nombre142238 . En ese tanto, no forman parte de su derecho de propiedad y ninguna lesión les ocasiona, siendo que más bien les reconocen ese derecho en su justa dimensión. Los artículos 13 al 18 del Convenio No. 169 de la OIT refieren, en general, al deber del Estado de respetar la importancia especial que para las culturas y valores espirituales de los pueblos interesados reviste su relación con las tierras o territorios, o con ambos, según los casos, que ocupan o utilizan de alguna otra manera, y en particular los aspectos colectivos de esa relación (artículo 13); que en el caso concreto no se violenta porque esa relación no ha sido acreditada. El artículo 14 refiere, en general, al deber de reconocer a los pueblos interesados el derecho de propiedad y de posesión sobre las tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan; norma que no se violenta porque, reiteramos, los territorios excluidos no ostentan tal condición. Luego, esa misma norma señala que "(...) Además, en los casos apropiados, deberán tomarse medidas para salvaguardar el derecho de los pueblos interesados a utilizar tierras que no estén exclusivamente ocupadas por ellos, pero a las que hayan tenido tradicionalmente acceso para sus actividades tradicionales y de subsistencia. A este respecto, deberá prestarse particular atención a la situación de los pueblos nómadas y de los agricultores itinerantes. (...)". Estimamos que la disposición tampoco se violenta en el caso concreto porque no se acreditó que el Estado hubiese negado el acceso de la población indígena de Nombre142238 a la costa o llanura costera de Cocles. Aunado al carácter demanial de la zona marítimo terrestre, los testigos manifestaron los integrantes de esa comunidad indígena bajaban de las partes altas de Talamanca a la costa, lo que dice de su uso y aprovechamiento. El ordinales 15, 16, 17 y 18 tampoco se lesionan porque lo que se dispone aplica bajo el supuesto de que se trata de territorios tradicionalmente ocupados por indígenas, lo que en la especie no se acreditó. Por la misma razón y conforme lo expuesto en el Considerando anterior tampoco se lesiona el artículo 45 de nuestra Constitución Política. En relación con el numeral 2 de la Ley Indígena ya que el territorio propiedad (en tanto tierras que han sido tradicionalmente ocupadas por indígenas) de la comunidad indígena accionante (y que corresponde al que localizan los decretos impugnados) se encuentra debidamente inscrito en el Registro Nacional, bajo la matrícula Placa2092, del Partido de Limón. El artículo 3 no se violenta porque el territorio excluido por los decretos cuestionados no es propiedad de la comunidad indígena demandante y, en ese tanto, no goza de la protección especial que esa norma establece. Tampoco resulta aplicable el numeral 5: si no es propiedad privada indígena porque no ha sido tradicionalmente ocupada por ellos, el Estado no tiene motivo alguno que justifique la reubicación, indemnización o expropiación de las personas no indígenas que ocupan o son propietarios de esos terrenos excluidos de la delimitación originalmente establecida. Más bien, insistimos que deben tutelarse los derechos de quienes han venido ocupando o son propietarios de inmuebles en esa zona. Finalmente, no se observa lesión alguna al artículo 267 del Código Civil. Como explicamos, el derecho de propiedad de la actora lo es para aquellos territorios que han sido tradicionalmente ocupados por ellos. En ese tanto la inscripción registral de la finca No. 19056-000 del Partido de Limón abarca únicamente ese territorio, que para el caso que nos ocupa fue localizado mediante el Decreto No. 29956 referido. Entender, como pretende el representante de la parte actora, que la No. 19056-000 incluye las tierras localizadas por el Decreto No. 7267 llevaría a un abuso de derecho por las siguientes razones. Ese acto administrativo fue derogado porque incluía terrenos que no fueron ni son tradicionalmente ocupados por la comunidad Nombre142238 (y en ese tanto no forman parte de su derecho de propiedad comunal) sino que además, estaban inscritos (con su correspondiente plano catastrado) a nombre de personas no indígenas y dedicado a otras actividades desde antes de que se localizara originalmente esa comunidad. Más bien, se violentaría el numeral 267 referido si este Tribunal desconociera el título inscrito que poseen esas personas, entre ellas, la sociedad que actúa como tercero con pretensiones propias y algunos de los coadyuvantes pasivos.

XIV.- En conclusión, el Tribunal estima que los Decretos No. 25296 y No. 29956 impugnados fueron dictados por el órgano competente (Poder Ejecutivo) cumpliendo con las formalidades sustanciales del procedimiento requeridas. Cuentan, también, con un motivo legítimo y cierto (en lo medular, que la delimitación dispuesta en el Decreto No. 7267 fue inapropiada porque incluyó territorios que no habían sido tradicionalmente ocupados por los indígenas que representa la asociación accionante y que más bien eran ocupados o pertenecían a otras personas, razón por la cual debían ser excluidos de la Reserva) que existía tal y como fue tomando en cuenta al momento de su dictado (numeral 133 de la LGAP). El contenido ordenado, esto es, la nueva delimitación que excluye los territorios no ocupados tradicionalmente por esa comunidad indígena, es lícito, claro, posible y abarca todas las cuestiones de hecho y derecho del surgidas del motivo (artículo 132 de la LGAP). Nótese incluso que el Decreto No.25296 no disminuye la cabida de la Reserva Indígena porque compensa lo excluido con el otorgamiento de tierras que sí tienen ocupación indígena, y Decreto No. 29956 lo viene es a confirmar lo dispuesto en el Decreto No.25296 e incluye otras tierras que, no habían sido reconocidas y que han sido tradicionalmente ocupadas por esos indígenas. Ese contenido es, además, correspondiente al motivo y proporcional al fin que se traduce en el interés público que hay detrás de que, por un lado, el Estado reconozca a los indígenas de Kekoldi la propiedad privada comunal sobre los territorios que han sido tradicionalmente ocupados por ellos y, por otro, proteja el derecho de propiedad privada de las personas no indígenas en tierras que han sido ocupadas por ellos e inscritas a su nombre y en las que no se probó que ningún tipo de ocupación física, material o espiritual de la comunidad indígena accionante. Por demás, el acto se encuentra motivado en los términos que exige el numeral 136 de la LGAP en tanto refiere explícitamente a los motivos que dan cabida a la nueva delimitación, los que, además, han sido constatados en esta sede judicial. Tomando en cuenta que los vicios reclamados son improcedentes por las razones que se han venido exponiendo, estimamos que las conductas formales impugnadas se conforman sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico y así debe declararse.

XV.- Sobre las otras pretensiones que formula la actora. La asociación demandante pide, también, que se declare que su representada es la propietaria de la Finca inscrita en el Registro Inmobiliario, Partido de Limón, al Folio Real Matrícula Placa2092, que se ordene al INDER y a la CONAI que realicen los estudios y trámites para identificar a las personas no indígenas que sean propietarias o poseedoras de buena fe dentro de nuestro territorio indígena, propiamente el sector de la finca de Limón, folio real matrícula Placa2092, que no es reconocido como nuestro en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25296-G del 24 de junio de 1996, que se ordene al INDER y a la CONAI que esos estudios y trámites los inicie cuando la sentencia queda firme y los concluya dos meses después, que se ordene al INDER y a la CONAI realizar las gestiones para reubicar a esas personas si ellas lo desearen, o si no fuera posible reubicarlas o ellas no la aceptaran, se inicien los trámites para expropiarlas e indemnizarlas conforme a los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Expropiaciones, que se ordene al INDER que las gestiones y trámites de reubicación o expropiación los inicie inmediatamente después de hechos los estudios y trámites a que se refiere la pretensión, respetando los plazos designados para ello, que se ordene al Poder Ejecutivo dotar de los recursos financieros necesarios al INDER y a la CONAI para que procedan a las expropiaciones e indemnizaciones mencionadas y que se ordene al Poder Ejecutivo que inicie las gestiones para dotar a esas instituciones de los recursos, cuando quede firme la sentencia, preparando, si fuere necesario un presupuesto extraordinario que debe presentarse a la Asamblea Legislativa no más de dos meses después de esa firmeza. Dado el carácter accesorio de esos pedimentos, en tanto dependen de que se hubiere acogido la pretensión anulatoria lo que aquí no ha sucedido, todas ellas resultan improcedentes. Si se ha establecido que los decretos impugnados son válidos, la delimitación ahí establecida resulta legítima porque se corresponde con los territorios que han sido tradicionalmente ocupados por la comunidad indígena de Kekoldi. En ese tanto, y como se indicó en Considerandos anteriores, la accionante es propietaria de la finca inscrita en el Registro Inmobiliario, Partido de Limón, al Folio Real Matrícula Placa2092, pero solo respecto del territorio localizado y delimitado en los decretos impugnados. Por ende, no lo es de las tierras que fueron en esas normas excluidas precisamente por no haber sido ocupadas ancestralmente por ellos y que, además, se encuentran inscritas a nombre de particulares. Bajo esa perspectiva, no resultan aplicables a esos territorios excluidos las obligaciones que para el Estado establece el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena como lo son los estudios, avalúos, reubicaciones y recuperación de territorios porque esos deberes tienen como condición que estemos frente a propiedad indígena comunal, entendiendo por esta territorios que han sido tradicionalmente ocupados por ellos, lo que en la especie no fue acreditado. Así las cosas, debe ordenarse también el rechazo de esos pedimentos, como en efecto se hace.

XVI.- Sobre las pretensiones subsidiarias. La asociación demandante pide como tales que se declare que la CONAI, el INDER y el Estado (Poder Ejecutivo), deben pagarle solidariamente la suma de doce mil millones de colones como indemnización por la expropiación de hecho que produjo (valor material de la tierra, valor material de los recursos naturales-forestales y otros de uso común de las comunidades indígenas- y valor espiritual del territorio). Lo pedido resulta, también improcedente. La indemnización por expropiación de hecho parte de la base de la existencia de propiedad privada a la que le han sido impuestas una serie de limitaciones en virtud de las cuales, se impide al propietario el ejercicio de los atributos del dominio. En el caso concreto, y por las razones que han sido ampliamente expuestas esa condición no se presenta porque las tierras excluidas de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 mediante los decretos impugnados no son propiedad privada de esa comunidad indígena. Lo anterior por cuanto se trata de territorios que no han sido tradicional o ancestralmente ocupados por ellos. Si no estamos frente a propiedad privada de la accionante, evidente no hay limitación o expropiación de hecho de ese derecho fundamental porque, insistimos, no lo tiene, y resulta improcedente cualquier indemnización que se solicite.

XVII.- Sobre las excepciones formuladas por los demandados. El representante estatal formuló las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de derecho, esta última opuesta, también, por los representantes del INDER. La Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca no opuso excepciones y la CONAI fue declarada rebelde por no haber contestado la demanda. La falta de legitimación pasiva que alega el Estado debe ser rechazada. En la especie se impugnan actos administrativos de alcance general que fueron dictados por el Poder Ejecutivo. En ese tanto, el Estado resulta legitimado pasivamente de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 12 incisos 1) y 8) del CPCA. No obstante, debe acogerse la excepción de falta de derecho formulada por el Estado y el INDER, y que se aprecia de oficio con relación a los otros demandados. Lo anterior toda vez que, conforme lo expuesto en los Considerandos previos, las conductas formales impugnadas se conforma sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico y la delimitación en ellas ordenadas es legítima por cuanto excluyó tierras que no habían sido ocupadas tradicionalmente por los indígenas de Nombre142238 . En ese tanto, no forman parte del derecho de propiedad privada colectivo de esa comunidad indígena. Aunado a lo anterior, se demostró en esta litis que el territorio excluido ha sido ocupado e inscrito a nombre de personas no indígenas quienes han desarrollado ahí sus actividades desde antes de que se delimitara originalmente la Reserva. Si los terrenos excluidos no son propiedad de esa comunidad indígena, el Estado no tiene el deber de hacer estudios, avalúos, reubicaciones o expropiaciones porque todos esos deberes parten del presupuesto condicionante de que se haya demostrado que se trataba de territorios tradicionalmente ocupados por esa comunidad indígena, lo que en la especie no ha sido demostrado. Por las mismas, razones, no hay deber de indemnizar a la demandante ninguna expropiación de hecho porque ésta no ha surgido. Lo anterior supone el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos, tanto principales como subsidiarios.

XVIII.- Sobre tercería que formula la sociedad Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A. Esta entidad fue admitida en este proceso, como tercero con pretensiones propias. En atención a la forma en que ha sido resuelto la demanda en este proceso, el primero de sus pedimentos debe ser acogido en tanto ya fueron rechazadas todas las pretensiones de la demandante. Pide, también, que se declare que la Asociación actora no tiene ningún derecho sobre las fincas del Partido Limón inscritas con la matrícula de folio real Placa1768. Placa27827 y Placa27828, que son propiedad de la sociedad gestionante. Si se ha tenido por acreditado que esos inmuebles pertenecen a la sociedad tercerista, la consecuencia lógica de esa inscripción registral es que la asociación actora no tiene derecho de propiedad sobre ellas. Además, también se acreditó que esas fincas forman parte de los terrenos excluidos (legítimamente, según se demostró) por los decretos impugnados, precisamente porque la asociación actora no demostró haberlos ocupado tradicionalmente. En relación con las pretensiones referidas a que se declare que ninguna otra entidad privada o estatal, incluyendo a CONAI y al IDA, tiene derecho de propiedad o posesión sobre las fincas No. 0122172-000 y Placa27828 inscritas a su nombre y que se ordene a la Asociación actora abstenerse actualmente y a futuro de cualquier forma de perturbación de hecho o de derecho sobre los fundos indicados y que renuncien a cualquier proceso tendiente a obtener una declaratoria de derechos reales sobre ellos; debe señalarse lo siguiente. De conformidad con el artículo 264 del Código Civil, el dominio o propiedad absoluta de una cosa comprende los derechos de posesión, usufructo, transformación, enajenación, defensa, exclusión, restitución e indemnización. La posesión constituye uno de los atributos del derecho de propiedad; cuyo ejercicio se encuentra tutelado en el ordenamiento jurídico que establece una serie de instrumentos, sustantivos y procesales, para que el legítimo propietario los tutele. Desde esa perspectiva, no corresponde al Tribunal efectuar una declaratoria genérica y abstracta sobre esos aspectos. Más bien, corresponde al titular del dominio, en este caso, la sociedad Tres-ciento uno-quinientos treinta mil quinientos cincuenta y seis S.A., hacer uso de esos instrumentos legítimos para repeler cualquier acto de posesión ilegítima, perturbación de hecho o derecho sobre sus propiedades. Tampoco podría el Tribunal ordenar a la actora que renuncie a cualquier proceso tendiente a obtener una declaratoria de derechos reales sobre ellos. El derecho de acción es una garantía de la que goza cualquier sujeto y que este Tribunal no podría limitar. En ese sentido, deberá la accionante estarse al uso de los instrumentos que el ordenamiento jurídico regula en aras de proteger su derecho de propiedad. Así, deben rechazarse las pretensiones tercera y cuarta de la tercería, en los términos expuestos.

XIX.- Sobre las excepciones formuladas por la asociación accionante en la tercería. El representante de la parte actora formuló las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, falta de interés y falta de derecho. La primera debe ser rechazada. Las pretensiones que se dirimen en la tercería se vinculan con la asociación accionante en tanto se pide, entre otros que se le ordene que no puede ejercer actos de posesión o perturbar la propiedad inscrita a nombre de quien formula la tercería. Debe también rechazarse la falta de interés actual ya que éste existe desde el momento en que existe algún conflicto respecto de la propiedad de los territorios que fueron excluidos mediante los decretos impugnados de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142238 . En ese tanto, se requiere de una resolución judicial que los resuelva. La falta de derecho debe ser acogida únicamente en cuanto al rechazo de las pretensiones tercera y cuarta. En lo demás se rechaza, toda vez que se declararon sin lugar todas las pretensiones de la demanda. En consecuencias, las pretensiones de la tercería se acogen parcialmente y en los términos que han sido expuestos.

XX.- Sobre las costas. El numeral 193 del CPCA dispone que las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el solo hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, estimamos que, tanto en la demanda como en la tercería ha existido motivo suficiente para litigar. Lo anterior en tanto la asociación indígena demandante impugna delimitaciones efectuadas por el Estado, en procura de la tutela de su derecho de propiedad privada comunal. Este derecho, además, involucra elementos distintos a los del derecho de quienes no son indígenas, lo que da complejidad técnica al asunto en discusión. Por ende, estimamos que el proceso (tanto la demanda como la tercería) deben ser resueltos sin especial condena en costas.

POR TANTO

Se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva formulada por el Estado. Se acoge la de falta de derecho opuesta por el Estado y el INDER; ausencia de derecho que también se declara de oficio respecto del CONAI y de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre142249 de Talamanca. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Respecto de la tercería gestionada, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de interés actual formuladas por la asociación demandante. Se acoge la de falta de derecho únicamente en cuanto es improcedente que este Tribunal declare que ninguna otra entidad privada o estatal, incluyendo a CONAI y al IDA, tiene derecho de posesión sobre las fincas No. Placa27827 y Placa27828 inscritas a nombre de la sociedad tercerista y que se ordene a la Asociación actora abstenerse actualmente y a futuro de cualquier forma de perturbación de hecho o de derecho sobre los fundos indicados y que renuncien a cualquier proceso tendiente a obtener una declaratoria de derechos reales sobre ellos. En lo demás se rechaza. En consecuencia, se acoge la tercería formulada por la sociedad tercerista en cuanto a que las pretensiones de la asociación actora son improcedentes y que la sociedad tercerista es la propietaria de las fincas del Partido Limón inscritas con la matrícula de folio real No. Placa27827 y Placa27828. Se resuelve este proceso, tanto en la demanda como en la tercería, sin especial condena en costas.

Cynthia Abarca Gómez José Roberto Garita Navarro Rosa María Cortés Morales PROCESO DE TRÁMITE PREFERENTE ACTORA: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA Nombre142238 DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, El INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS y ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA DE TALAMANCA TERCERO INTERESADO: TRES-CIENTO UNO-QUINIENTOS TREINTA MIL QUINIENTOS CINCUENTA Y SEIS S.A.

COADYUVANTES PASIVOS: LA CHEROKEANA TRES LIMITADA, JUMGLEBUNGALO LIMITADA, Nombre105706 , TRES-CIENTO UNO-CUATROCIENTOS CINCUENTA Y CINCO MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y UNO S.A., LOCO BRAVO DE COCLES S.A.,Nombre142239 , Nombre142240 , Nombre142241 , Nombre142242 , Nombre142243 , Nombre142244 , Nombre142245 , Nombre142246 , Nombre142247 , LORAXX PARTNERS SOCIEDAD LIMITADA,OROPEL EXPOSICIONES INTERNACIONALES SRL Y LA SUCESIÓN DE Nombre142248 .