Civil court lacks jurisdiction for claims against state-bank pension operatorIncompetencia de la jurisdicción civil para demandar a operadora de pensiones de banco estatal

* * * * ACT: ( * * * * * * * *) * * * * * * * [Name1] .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Fax N° 2225-43-34.- * * DEM: ( * * * * * * ) * * * * * * * BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * San José, [Address1]° * * * * * * * * * * [Address2] Costa Rica, at the address * * * * * * * * * * [Address3] n°3) * * ____________________________________________________* N° 082 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * TRIBUNAL SEGUNDO CIVIL, SECCIÓN PRIMERA.- San José, at nine o'clock on March third, two thousand ten.- * * * * * * * * * * ORDINARY proceeding established in the JUZGADO CIVIL DE MAYOR CUANTÍA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, under case file number 05-001587-164-CI, by [Name1], of legal age, single, executive secretary, identification number CED1, resident of San José; against BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by its unlimited general agent, Mr. [Name2], of legal age, married, holding a Master's in Business Administration, identification number CED2, resident of San José.- Appearing as special judicial attorneys, for the plaintiff, licensed attorney Pablo González González; and for the defendant company, licensed attorney Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora.- * * WHEREAS: * * * * * * * * * * 1.- The present lawsuit, the amount in controversy of which was set at the sum of twenty thousand dollars, legal tender of the United States of America, seeks in judgment: “...that I be paid the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, amounting to the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS, with ninety-seven cents, currency of the United States of America, ($3,051.97) and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE COLONES, (¢43,153), plus daily compound interest at the exchange rate in effect at the time of judgment, from when the losses occurred until their effective payment, recognition of moral damages (daño moral) plus both costs of this ordinary civil proceeding.” (Sic).- At folios 87 and 88, the plaintiff specifies and quantifies the damages (daños y perjuicios) as follows: "...Basically, the damages are materialized in the losses caused to my client, in relation to the fund management contract she has with the defendant entity. As explained in the statement of claim, my client was always a saver and never an investor, therefore the defendant caused her economic harm, specifically concerning the original amount of money she saved and the current amount of money my client has. As explained, Miss [Name1] had two funds with the defendant entity, one in colones and another in dollars, currency of the United States of America, and in this latter currency, she suffered a loss of THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS, ($3,052.00), and of FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO COLONES with sixty-four cents, (¢43,152.64), plus legally compounded interest, running from when the loss occurred until its effective payment. The foregoing was due to negligent and culpable management by the defendant entity, which to date has refused to admit its civil liability for damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to my client. Regarding moral damages (daño moral), I consider that immense psychological harm has been caused, because my client is currently unemployed and the money saved throughout her entire working life was given to the defendant entity for it to manage as a good paterfamilias, a circumstance which in this case and based on the reasons given in the complaint did not happen; quite the contrary, because a significant part of her savings were lost due to the negligence of this Pension operator, which caused a situation of suffering, worry, stress, upon having to see what to do in the face of the catastrophic loss of her savings, upon which she depended to subsist, placing her in a situation of socioeconomic insecurity, which as of today has become uncertain, and which I estimate at the sum of FIVE MILLION COLONES.- I estimate the total damages (daños y perjuicios) at the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS, ($20,000), currency of the United States of America." (Sic).- * * * * * * * * * * * * 2.- The defendant was duly served notice of the lawsuit and answered it negatively. It filed the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), and the generic defense sine actione agit.- * * * * * * * * * * * * 3.- Judge Juan Carlos Meoño Nimo, of the Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, in a judgment delivered at eight hours ten minutes on August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, resolved: “...THEREFORE: The generic exception of sine actione agit is rejected in its forms of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) and lack of interest (falta de interés), but is partially upheld in its form of lack of right (falta de derecho), and in that same sense the autonomous defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), only regarding the item of Moral Damages (Daño Moral) and the start date for computing interest, rejected in all else, all defenses filed by the defendant company. For the reasons and articles cited supra, THE PRESENT Ordinary Lawsuit filed by [Name1] against BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS SOCIEDAD ANONIMA IS DECLARED PARTIALLY UPHELD, declaring the following, warning that anything expressly omitted is equivalent to an express rejection: First. That the latter caused the former a harmful situation, attributable on grounds of fault (culpa). Second. That the latter must pay the former the Damages (Daños) caused by its actions, namely, THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTS, legal tender of the United States of America, and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE COLONES. Third. That the latter must recognize legal interest on the aforementioned amounts, in the abstract from the finality of this judgment, at the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the amount in colones, and at the prime rate for the amount in dollars. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding." (Sic).- * * * * * * * * * * * * 4.- This Tribunal hears the aforementioned ruling by virtue of appeals filed by licensed attorney Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora in his capacity as special judicial attorney for the defendant; and by licensed attorney Pablo González González in his capacity as special attorney for the plaintiff. The corresponding procedural prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings. * * * * * * * * * * * * DRAFTED BY Judge OLASO ÁLVAREZ; and, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * WHEREAS: * * * * * * * * * * * * I.- From a careful study of this matter, it is evident that the plaintiff files this lawsuit against "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS". In said lawsuit, the plaintiff, as a consumer of the pension plan offered by said entity, argues that, at the time of contracting, she did not receive adequate information about the economic risks she was assuming in the event of a bad investment made by the operator. In addition to this, she indicates that she was never informed that the sums contributed to the fund would be invested in stock market operations, which was carried out by the defendant entity by acquiring foreign debt bonds of the government of Costa Rica. She alleges that when the investment fund crisis occurred, the defendant entity did not communicate this situation to her, causing her serious economic harm. She claims that the defendant did not use a correct investment "diversification" strategy, a circumstance that caused excessive losses for her. That in the twelfth clause of the agreement, it was established that the defendant entity was required to apply the necessary expertise and diligence to ensure the investment of the managed sums, and that it would be responsible for any loss, injury, or impairment suffered by its clientele due to recklessness or gross negligence (imprudencia o negligencia grave) in the collection, management, and investment of the funds. Based on that factual framework, she requests that the defendant be ordered to pay three thousand fifty-two dollars for damages (daños y perjuicios), forty-three thousand one hundred fifty-three colones, plus interest from the moment the plaintiff suffered her economic losses until their effective payment, as well as the recognition of moral damages (daño moral) for the psychological suffering caused, which she values at the sum of five million colones. * * * * * * * * * * * * II.- In the majority's opinion, it is a crucial fact that this lawsuit is directed against the complementary pension operator "BN VITAL", especially because of aspects of lack of jurisdiction by reason of subject matter (incompetencia en razón de la materia) that we will now proceed to set forth. Article 97, subsection 1°, of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establishes that the Tribunales de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda have jurisdiction to hear ordinary proceedings processed in accordance with the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In turn, numeral 1°, subsection 1°, of that Code establishes that this jurisdiction is responsible for safeguarding the legal situations of every person, as well as guaranteeing or restoring any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law, and for hearing and resolving the various aspects of the legal-administrative relationship. Subsection 3° of this norm clarifies that the public administration includes decentralized administration, both institutional and territorial, and all other public law entities. In addition to this, in the specific case of complementary pension operators, Law 7523 of July 7, 1995, in its Article 63, establishes that once the administrative avenue has been exhausted, any person intending to file a claim against this type of operator must do so before the courts of justice, in accordance with the jurisdiction established by the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Furthermore, as an element that helps us elucidate the jurisdictional aspect in these cases, said provision points out that the supplementary norm for this type of proceeding shall be the Ley General de la Administración Pública and, particularly, the principles of administrative procedure. On the other hand, Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 27503-H of December 2, 1998, Reglamento para la Constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de fondos y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del INS, amended by decreto number 28485, of February 21, 2000, establishes that the complementary pension plan operators of the banks have the character of public enterprises, even though their activity is governed in accordance with the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores regarding guarantees for volume of activity and assumed risks. Interpreting this norm, the Contraloría General de la República, in its report 327-2000, indicated: “(...) On the other hand, the “Reglamento para la constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de bolsa y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del Instituto Nacional de Seguros”, No. 27503-H of December 2, 1998 and its amendments, establishes in the second paragraph of its Article 2, in relation to the figure of the corporation (sociedad anónima) applicable in these cases, that it shall have the character of a public enterprise. The nature of this type of public enterprise was developed by Dr. Ortiz Ortiz when he indicated: "The company that is owned by a public entity—because the latter is the sole or principal partner—is public for that reason alone, even if the dominant partner is not the State, but any other public entity. The decisive factor for imprinting a public character on an entity—whether or not it is a commercial company—is the existence of purposes for that subject imposed upon it by law or by the Administration. As already stated, the company is public because it becomes an instrument of the legal purposes, and therefore public, of the public entity partner" E. ORTIZ ORTIZ: La empresa pública como ente público” IVSTITIA, No. 52, year 5, p 8. Consequently, it must be considered that complementary pension operators and investment fund management companies are public enterprises owned by the public institution that gave rise to them, whose activities, management, and assets shall be independent of each other (...)”. (emphasis added). Under the protection of these provisions and that administrative pronouncement, the view that this litigation falls under the jurisdiction of the contencioso administrativo and not the civil jurisdiction is reinforced. Another aspect to take into account here is the nature of BN VITAL as a pension operator and its legal relationship with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Said nature has already been previously analyzed by bodies such as the Contraloría and the Procuraduría General de la República. * * * * * * * * * * * * III.- In its opinion 366-2003, the Contraloría General de la República indicated that the resources that public bodies authorized to establish complementary pension operators use to form the minimum capital for the constitution of those entities are public funds. It is for this reason that, as they are financial resources owned by a public entity, they form part of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (Article 9 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría). Said public nature is not modified by the form these entities use for their constitution—for example, corporations (sociedades anónimas)—as this does not modify the nature of the funds they manage. In this regard, the Contraloría points out that the criterion for establishing the public nature of these operators as public enterprises arises because their minimum capital for constitution and operation are public funds. Previously, on the occasion of the creation of a complementary pension operator attached to a state bank, the Procuraduría General de la República—in its opinion N°183-99—stressed that the share capital of that operator was of a public nature, since only in that way could transparent management of the resources be guaranteed. Now, a distinction must be made between the operator's share capital and the funds it administers, which are owned by the workers. This is important here, because the plaintiff precisely seeks to question, on the one hand, the lack of information received when affiliating with the defendant operator, and, on the other, the alleged mismanagement of the contributions made by her. According to numeral 52 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, the managed funds constitute autonomous assets (patrimonios autónomos) that are the property of the affiliated persons; this is why operators are required to maintain separate accounts so that the entity's resources are not confused with those of the affiliated persons (Article 53 ibidem). However, such management must be subject to the Superintendencia de Pensiones, as the entity responsible for supervising the solvency and stability of the corresponding scheme. Regardless of this difference between managed capital and constitutive capital, the important point is that pension operators established by public entities do not cease to be public enterprises. In this regard, the Procuraduría, in opinion 180-03, indicated: "Since the fundamental criteria for determining whether a given enterprise is public are the ownership of the share capital and the control over the company's decisions, it would have to be concluded that the pension operators created by public entities are public enterprises... The corporate purpose of the operators is the management of the benefit plans and funds and the benefits derived from the systems established by the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, the management of individual accounts. This is an economic activity subject to the rules established in said Law. The entities carrying out this activity can be considered enterprises". This same hypothesis was maintained by the Sala Constitucional, through its Voto number 6531-02. In said ruling, referring to the specific case of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the possibility of establishing corporations (sociedades anónimas), pursuant to Article 55 of the Ley del Mercado de Valores, the Sala indicated that the Legislative Branch, through that norm, chose to separate banking activity from the universal scheme to bring it closer to the "system of diverse legal personalities", within the activities of a founding entity. That is, by granting the possibility for a state bank to create "corporations" (sociedades anónimas), an administrative deconcentration (desconcentración administrativa) was authorized, thus allowing a "specialization" of the activity and thereby separating it from the founding entity (state bank). However, according to the Sala, that separation cannot be absolute. This is because the resources required to fulfill the purpose entrusted to the corporation by the founding entity and the use of the trade name of the state banking institution provide an image of integration (for example, in this case "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PENSIONES S.A.", or "BN puesto de Bolsa"). According to the Sala, unlike what occurs with pure and simple "deconcentration" (desconcentración), the creation of this type of diverse legal persons, with the nomenclature "S.A." within the scheme of an autonomous entity, implies separation of the corporation regarding budget control and resource management. This is in principle, because when these entities are called "corporations" (sociedades anónimas), they do not thereby cease to be part of the autonomous institution to which they belong, since through these corporations the entity's purpose of fulfilling the assigned aim by resorting to other legal forms is palpable. It is for this reason that these "corporations" (sociedades anónimas) do not cease to be an "instrument" that the Legislative Branch makes available to autonomous entities so they can achieve their purposes, and thus achieve effective competition within the market system with private banks, which do have the possibility of forming "economic and financial interest groups". Therefore, according to the Sala Constitucional, it is not possible to separate the figure of this type of "corporations" (sociedades anónimas) from the bank or entity from which they derive, since from the organizational scheme they carry out a specialized activity of the entity and, in principle, have full legal personality but are attached to it—through the ownership of shares—. The pension operators created by a state bank or institution share the legal nature of their founder; they are enterprises created by that entity and consequently, according to the Sala Constitucional, belong to the Public Administration. It is for these reasons that, by majority vote, the Tribunal declares itself without jurisdiction (incompetente) and refers this matter to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. * * THEREFORE: * * * * * * * * * * By majority vote, the Tribunal declares itself without jurisdiction and refers this matter to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Juan Carlos Brenes Vargas * * Abel Jiménez Obando * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jorge Olaso Álvarez * * * * * * * * * * * Judge JIMÉNEZ OBANDO dissents and issues his vote as follows, * * WHEREAS: * * * * * * * * * * I.- The special judicial attorney for the defendant company appeals the first-instance judgment; essentially, in his appeal, he points out that the appealed ruling is based on a fundamental premise, indicating that the loss in the value of the investments was due to poor management by the defendant, as it excessively concentrated the managed capital investments in Costa Rican public debt bonds, and this produced an excessive exposure of the fund's resources to risk. This premise is erroneous—the appellant indicates—since the scope of action of the complementary pension fund management companies is under the strict regulation of different regulations, and their activity is supervised by the Superintendencia de Pensiones. He also indicates that the Costa Rican securities market is very particular due to the very limited supply of investment instruments it offers, meaning that what is offered by the securities market is primarily State public debt securities, and if the defendant company has maintained an investment discipline in accordance with the limits established for it, what occurred in 2004 was a price adjustment that affected the entire Costa Rican financial market due to the decrease in the value of all Costa Rican public debt securities. Therefore, the price adjustment mentioned in the months of March and April 2004 affected the entire financial system, and not due to negligent conduct by the defendant; accordingly, the plaintiff did not experience a deterioration in invested capital, but rather a decrease in yield. * * * * * * * * * * * * II.- This subject, novel for forensic practice, is mainly regulated in Law N°7983, which establishes a complementary system to the social security benefits that have been under the purview of the CCSS; a system that is called upon to carry out an economic function regarding the placement of savings and, therefore, to be an instrument for boosting the economy, as a consequence of the development of financial markets. The Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias is an individual capitalization system, designed to complement the benefits of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime of the CCSS (Article 9). A regime for which contributions are made in accordance with the provisions of Article 13. Since it is a capitalization regime, the contributions must generate returns for the benefit of the contributors or beneficiaries. Contributions and returns are managed in a fund, which is an asset (patrimonio) absolutely separate from the assets (patrimonio) of the entity that manages it. Therefore, it is evident from the laws and regulations that the interest in developing the financial system in the country has led to an emphasis on the need for a market where agents operate under a regime of equal conditions. An aspect that arises especially in the securities and pension markets. Indeed, since the approval of the Ley de Régimen Privado de Pensiones Complementarias, N°7523 of July 7, 1995, it is postulated that the participation of public entities in the complementary pension market shall be under equal conditions, so as not to distort competition. To that end, rules are issued aimed at maintaining transparency, management independence, and equality of participation. Similarly, the separation of funds, accounts, and management within the entity establishing the pension plan or fund is contemplated. Furthermore, equal application of criteria on reserves, investments, and risk, and, in general, on regulation, was established. In that sense, it is possible to affirm the existence of a uniform operating regime for both public and private entities. Not only do the legal norms on operation not differentiate the nature of the entity, but the administrative regulation issued seeks uniformity of the regime. For example, the investments that authorized entities can make are governed by a set of principles imposed on those who become "entities authorized and regulated" by the Superintendencia, regardless of the public or private nature of the entity. Thus, regarding fund investment (Article 60 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador), the exclusion from the regulatory provisions of the Banco Central is general, encompassing all entities. The duty to invest funds for the benefit of workers or the imperative of security, profitability, and liquidity of the fund are uniform. Similarly, the liability regime for operators is uniform (Articles 40 and 41 of the cited Law). And obviously, any public or private operator submits to the regulatory function of CONASSIF and the Superintendencia de Pensiones, even though these are deconcentrated bodies of the Banco Central. And this is so because for the market to function effectively and efficiently, any pension operator must be subject to the same provisions, since the existence of a different legal regime can not only affect the realization of the objectives towards which the system tends, but can also cause a difference in treatment that impacts the free development of enterprises in the market and, consequently, the violation of the principle of free competition. There is, therefore, a clear interest on the part of the legislator in free competition through corporations (sociedades anónimas), as established by Article 30 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador; however, as pension operators, they are subject to strict regulation aimed at maintaining the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the financial system as a whole, necessary to uphold the rights of workers. Indeed, the regulation seeks the solvency and profitability of the system, whose funds are managed by the regulated entities. From the study of the regulatory framework applicable to this institution, a clear motivating concern for the protection of workers in this complementary pension fund financial system clearly emerges, one that bets on not putting the entirety of the contributions made at risk. And if we speak of protection, the core theme becomes the liability of those who manage this asset (patrimonio) for the present and future of the workforce. The cited Law contemplates, in effect, the principle of subjective liability of the operators of these funds within the legal fiction of corporations (sociedades anónimas), as is evident in Article 40: "Liability Operators and authorized social organizations shall be jointly and severally liable for the material damages (daños y perjuicios patrimoniales) caused to affiliates by intentional (dolosos) or negligent (culposos) acts of the members of their Board of Directors, managers, employees, and promoting agents. In the case of promoting agents who have an employment or contractual relationship with the operator, liability exists. The debts of operators and authorized social organizations to the Fund shall have payment preference in relation to common creditors, without prejudice to any higher privileges established by other norms. This privilege is applicable in universal proceedings and in any process or procedure conducted against the debtor's assets (patrimonio) (the bold and underline is mine)". Therefore, in my view, the pension operator that causes damages to its client is obligated to repair them in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, whose Article 1045 states: "Anyone who, through intent (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia) or recklessness (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obligated to repair it together with the damages (perjuicios)." That is, the corporation (sociedad anónima) is civilly liable if its conduct was intentional or negligent. * * * * * * * * * * III.- For the reasons stated, this undersigned Superior Court judge considers that this proceeding falls under civil and commercial jurisdiction, since the disputes in this particular case derive from the commercial nature of the business relationship binding the parties. * * THEREFORE: * * * * * * * * * * I dissent and decide that this proceeding falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

Abel Jiménez Obando * * * * * ORDINARY PROCEEDING N°336-2008.

[Nombre1] .* Against* BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.* acc.-* Judge 1 [Nombre3].* * * * * * * * * 3 ACT: ( * * * * * * * * * * * * *) * * * * * * * * * * * [Nombre1] .

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Fax N° 2225-43-34.- DEM: ( * * * * * * * ) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * San José, [Dirección1]° [Dirección2] Costa Rica, en la Dirección * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * [Dirección3] n°3) ____________________________________________________ N° 082 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * TRIBUNAL SEGUNDO CIVIL, SECCIÓN PRIMERA.- San José, at nine hours on March third, two thousand ten.- * * * * * * * * * * * * * ORDINARY Proceeding filed in the JUZGADO CIVIL DE MAYOR CUANTÍA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, under case file number 05-001587-164-CI, by [Nombre1] , of legal age, single, executive secretary, identification number CED1, resident of San José; against BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, represented by its unlimited general power of attorney holder, Mr. [Nombre2] , of legal age, married, Master of Business Administration, identification number CED2, resident of San José.- The plaintiff's special judicial attorney is Mr. Pablo González González; and the defendant company's is Mr. Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- This lawsuit, the amount of which was set at twenty thousand dollars, legal tender of the United States of America, seeks a judgment: “...awarding me the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused, amounting to the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS and ninety-seven cents, currency of the United States of America, ($3,051.97) and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE COLONES, (¢43,153), plus daily compound interest at the exchange rate in effect at the time of judgment, from the time the losses occurred until their effective payment, recognition of moral damages (daño moral) plus both costs of this ordinary civil proceeding.” (Sic).- On folios 87 and 88, the plaintiff specifies and quantifies the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) as follows: “...Essentially, the damages consist of the losses caused to my client, in relation to the fund management contract it holds with the defendant entity.” as explained in the complaint, my client was always a saver and never an investor; therefore, the defendant caused her economic harm, specifically regarding the amount of money she originally saved and the current amount of money my client has. As explained, Miss [Nombre1] had two funds with the defendant entity, one in colones and another in dollars, currency of the United States of America, and in this latter currency, she suffered a loss of THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS, ($3,052.00), and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO COLONES and sixty-four cents, (¢43,152.64), plus compound legal interest, running from the time the loss occurred until its effective cancellation. The foregoing was due to negligent and culpable administration by the defendant entity, which to date has refused to admit its civil liability for damages caused to my client. Regarding moral damages, I consider that immense psychological harm has been caused, because my client is currently unemployed and the money saved during her entire working life was given to the defendant entity to be managed as a good family man would, a circumstance which, in this case and based on the reasons given in the complaint, did not happen; quite the contrary, because a significant part of her savings was lost due to the negligence of this pension operator, which caused a situation of suffering, worry, stress, at having to see what to do in the face of the catastrophic loss of her savings, on which she depended to subsist, placing her in a situation of socioeconomic insecurity, which as of today remains uncertain, and which I estimate at the sum of FIVE MILLION COLONES.- I estimate the total damages at the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS, ($20,000), currency of the United States of America." (Sic).- 2.- The defendant was duly notified of the complaint and answered it negatively. It raised the defense of lack of right, and the generic defense sine actione agit.- 3.- Judge Juan Carlos Meoño Nimo, of the Civil Court of Greater Amounts of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, in a judgment issued at eight hours and ten minutes on August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, resolved: "...POR TANTO: The generic exception sine actione agit is rejected in its modalities of lack of standing and lack of interest, but it is partially upheld in its modality of lack of right, and in that same sense the autonomous defense of lack of right, only with respect to the item of Moral Damages and the start date for calculating interest, being rejected in all other respects, all raised by the defendant corporation. For the reasons and articles cited supra, THIS ORDINARY CLAIM filed by [Nombre1] against BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS SOCIEDAD ANONIMA is DECLARED PARTIALLY WITH MERIT, declaring the following, warning that anything expressly omitted is equivalent to express rejection: First. That the latter caused a harmful situation to the former, attributable to fault. Second. That the latter must pay the former the damages caused by its actions, namely, THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTS, legal tender of the United States of America, and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE COLONES. Third. That the latter must pay legal interest on the above amounts, in the abstract as of the finality of this judgment, at the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the amount in colones, and at the prime rate for the amount in dollars. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding." (Sic).- 4.- This Court hears this ruling by virtue of an appeal filed by attorney Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora in his capacity as special judicial representative of the defendant; and by attorney Pablo González González in his capacity as special representative of the plaintiff. The corresponding procedural requirements have been observed in these proceedings.

JUDGE OLASO ÁLVAREZ DRAFTS; and,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- From a careful study of this matter, it emerges that the plaintiff files this complaint against "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS". In said complaint, the plaintiff, as a consumer of the pension plan offered by that entity, alleges that, at the time of contracting, she did not receive adequate information about the economic risks she was assuming in the event of a poor investment made by the operator. In addition to this, she indicates that she was never informed that the sums contributed to the fund would be invested in stock market operations, which was done by the defendant entity when it acquired external debt bonds from the government of Costa Rica. That when the investment fund crisis occurred, the defendant entity did not inform her of this situation, which caused her serious economic harm. She alleges that the defendant did not use a correct investment "diversification" strategy, a circumstance that caused excessive losses for her. That in the twelfth clause of the agreement it was established that the defendant entity had to apply the necessary expertise and diligence to ensure the investment of the administered sums, and that it would be responsible for any loss, injury, or impairment suffered by its clients due to recklessness or gross negligence in the collection, administration, and investment of the funds. Based on that factual framework, she requests that the defendant be ordered to pay three thousand fifty-two dollars for damages, forty-three thousand one hundred fifty-three colones, plus interest thereon from the moment the plaintiff suffered her economic losses until their effective cancellation, as well as that she be awarded moral damages for the psychological suffering caused, which she values at the sum of five million colones.

II.- In the opinion of the majority, it is a transcendental fact that this complaint is directed against the complementary pension operator "BN VITAL", especially due to aspects of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction which we will proceed to set forth below. Article 97, subsection 1, of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establishes that the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Courts are competent to hear ordinary proceedings that will be processed in accordance with the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In turn, numeral 1, subsection 1, of that Code establishes that said jurisdiction is responsible for safeguarding the legal situations of every person, as well as guaranteeing or restoring any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the legal-administrative relationship. Subsection 3 of this rule clarifies that the public administration is comprised of the decentralized, institutional, and territorial administration and all other public law entities. In addition to this, in the specific case of complementary pension operators, Law 7523 of July 7, 1995, in its Article 63, establishes that, once the administrative channel has been exhausted, any person intending to file a claim against this type of operator must do so before the courts of justice, in accordance with the jurisdiction established by the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Likewise, as an element that helps us elucidate the aspect of jurisdiction in these cases, said provision indicates that the supplementary rule for this type of process will be the Ley General de la Administración Pública and, particularly, the principles of administrative procedure. On the other hand, Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 27503-H of December 2, 1998, Reglamento para la Constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de fondos y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del INS, amended by Decreto number 28485 of February 21, 2000, establishes that the operators of complementary pension plans of the banks have the character of public enterprises, even though their activity is governed in accordance with the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, regarding guarantees for volume of activity and assumed risks.

Interpreting this rule, the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), in its report 327-2000, stated: "(...) Furthermore, the 'Regulation for the establishment of brokerage houses, stock exchange management companies, and complementary pension operators of Public Banks and the National Insurance Institute' (Reglamento para la constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de bolsa y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del Instituto Nacional de Seguros), No. 27503-H of December 2, 1998, and its amendments, establishes in the second paragraph of its Article 2, regarding the figure of the corporation (sociedad anónima) applicable in these cases, that it shall have the character of a public enterprise (empresa pública). The nature of this type of public enterprise was developed by Dr. Ortiz Ortiz when he stated: 'The company that is owned by a public entity—by reason of the latter being the sole or main partner—is public for that reason alone, even if the dominant partner is not the State, but any other public entity. The decisive factor for imparting public character to an entity—whether or not it is a commercial company—is the existence of purposes of that subject imposed upon it by law or by the Administration. As already stated, the company is public because it becomes an instrument of the legal purposes, and for that very reason public purposes, of the public entity partner.' E. ORTIZ ORTIZ: La empresa pública como ente público” IVSTITIA, No. 52, year 5, p 8. Consequently, it must be considered that the complementary pension operators and the investment fund management companies are public enterprises owned by the public institution that gives rise to them, whose activities, administration, and patrimony shall be independent of each other (...)" (emphasis added). Under the protection of these provisions and this administrative pronouncement, the criterion that this litigation falls under the jurisdiction of the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) and not the civil jurisdiction is strengthened. Another aspect to take into account here is the nature of B N VITAL as a pension operator and its legal relationship with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. This nature has already been previously analyzed by bodies such as the Comptroller General and the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República). * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **III.-** In its opinion 366-2003, the Comptroller General of the Republic indicated that the resources that the authorized public bodies use to form the minimum establishment capital of those entities to constitute complementary pension operators are public funds. It is for this reason that, dealing with financial resources owned by a public entity, they form part of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (Article 9 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General). This public nature is not modified by the form that said entities resort to for their establishment—for example, corporations—since this does not modify the nature of the funds they manage. In this regard, the Comptroller General points out that the criterion for establishing the public nature of those operators as public enterprises arises because their minimum establishment and operating capital are public funds. Previously, on the occasion of the creation of a complementary pension operator attached to a state bank, the Office of the Attorney General—in its opinion No. 183-99—emphasized that the share capital (capital social) of that operator was of a public nature, since only in that way could a transparent management of the resources be guaranteed. However, a distinction must be made between the operator's share capital and the funds it manages that are owned by the workers. This is important here, because precisely the plaintiff seeks to question, on one hand, the lack of information received at the time of joining the defendant operator and, on the other, the alleged poor management of the contributions made by her. According to numeral 52 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador), the managed funds constitute autonomous patrimonies (patrimonios autónomos) that are owned by the affiliated persons; it is for this reason that operators are obliged to keep separate accounting so that the entity's resources are not confused with those of the affiliated persons (Article 53 ibidem). Nevertheless, said management must be subject to the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones), as the entity responsible for supervising the solvency and stability of the corresponding regime. Independently of this difference between managed capital and establishment capital, what is important is that pension operators constituted by public entities do not cease to be public enterprises. In this regard, the Attorney General's Office, in opinion 180-03, indicated:* "**Since the fundamental criteria for determining whether a certain company is public are the ownership of the share capital and control over the company's decisions, one would have to conclude that pension operators created by public entities are public enterprises…** The corporate purpose of the operators is the management of benefit plans and funds and the benefits derived from the systems established by the Worker Protection Law, the management of individual accounts. This is an economic activity subject to the rules established in said Law. The entities that carry out this activity can be considered to be enterprises." This same hypothesis was maintained by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through its Vote number 6531-02. In that pronouncement, referring to the specific case of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the possibility of establishing corporations, in accordance with Article 55 of the Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores), the Chamber indicated that the Legislative Power, through that rule, chose to separate the banking activity from the universal scheme to bring it closer to the "system of diverse legal entities (personalidades jurídicas diversas)", within the activity of a founding entity. That is, by granting the possibility for a state bank to create "corporations", an administrative deconcentration (desconcentración administrativa) was authorized, in order to allow a "specialization" of the activity and thus separate it from the founding entity (state bank). However, according to the Chamber, that separation cannot be absolute. This is because the resources required for the fulfillment of the purpose entrusted to the company by the founding entity and the use of the commercial name of the state banking institution offer an image of integration (for example, in this case "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PENSIONES S.A.", or "BN puesto de Bolsa"). According to the Chamber, unlike what occurs with pure and simple "deconcentration", the creation of this type of diverse legal entities, with the nomenclature "S.A." within the scheme of an autonomous entity, implies a separation of the company regarding budget control and resource management. This in principle, because when these entities are called "corporations", they do not thereby cease to be part of the autonomous institution to which they belong, since, through these companies, the entity's purpose to fulfill the assigned mission by resorting to other legal forms is palpable. It is for this reason that these "corporations" do not cease to be an "instrument" that the Legislative Power makes available to the autonomous entities so that they can achieve their purposes, and thus achieve effective competition within the market system with private banks, which do have the possibility of forming "economic and financial interest groups". Therefore, according to the Constitutional Chamber, it is not possible to separate the figure of this type of "corporation" from the bank or entity from which it derives, since from the organizational scheme they carry out a specialized activity of the entity and, in principle, they have full legal personality but are attached to it—through the ownership of the shares. The pension operators created by a state bank or institution share the legal nature of their founder, they are enterprises created by that entity and consequently, according to the Constitutional Chamber, they belong to the Public Administration. It is for these reasons that, by majority, the Court declares itself incompetent and refers this matter to the Administrative Litigation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José).* * **THEREFORE (POR TANTO):*** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * By majority, the Court declares itself incompetent and refers this matter to the Administrative Litigation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José.* * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **Juan Carlos Brenes Vargas*** * **Abel Jiménez Obando** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **Jorge Olaso Álvarez*** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * The judge **JIMÉNEZ OBANDO** dissents (salva su voto) and votes thusly,* * **CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO):*** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **I.-** The special judicial representative (apoderado especial judicial) of the defendant company appeals the first-instance judgment; essentially, in his appeal he points out that the contested resolution is based on a fundamental premise, by indicating that the loss in the value of the investments was due to poor management by the defendant, since it excessively concentrated the investments of the managed capital in Costa Rican public debt bonds, and this produced an excessive exposure to risk of the fund's resources. This premise is erroneous—indicates the appellant—since the scope of action of the complementary pension fund management companies is under the strict regulation of different regulations, and their activity is supervised by the Superintendency of Pensions.

It further indicates that the Costa Rican securities market is very particular due to the very limited supply of investment instruments it offers, which is why what is offered by the securities market is primarily State public debt securities, and if the defendant company has maintained an investment discipline in accordance with the limits established for it, what occurred in 2004 was a price adjustment that affected the entire Costa Rican financial market due to the decrease in the value of all Costa Rican public debt securities, which is why the price adjustment mentioned in the months of March and April 2004 affected the entire financial system and not due to negligent conduct by the defendant, which is why the plaintiff did not experience a deterioration in the invested capital, but rather a decrease in yield.

II.- This matter, novel for forensic practice, is regulated mainly in Law No. 7983, which establishes a complementary system to the social security benefits that have been administered by the CCSS; a system that is called upon to develop an economic function in terms of the placement of savings and therefore, to be an instrument for boosting the economy, as a consequence of the development of financial markets. The Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime (Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias) is an individual capitalization system, intended to complement the benefits of the CCSS Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (article 9). A regime for which contributions are made in accordance with the provisions of article 13. Since it is a capitalization regime, the contributions must generate returns for the benefit of the contributors or beneficiaries. Contributions and returns are administered in a fund, which is a patrimony absolutely separate from the patrimony of the entity administering it. Due to the foregoing, it is evident from the laws and regulations that the interest in developing the financial system in the country has led to an emphasis on the need for a market in which agents operate under a regime of equal conditions. This aspect is raised especially in the stock market and pension market. Indeed, since the approval of the Law of the Private Complementary Pension Regime (Ley de Régimen Privado de Pensiones Complementarias), No. 7523 of July 7, 1995, it is postulated that the participation of public entities in the complementary pension market be conducted under conditions of equality, so that competition is not distorted. For this purpose, rules are issued aimed at maintaining transparency, independence of management, and equality of participation. Similarly, the separation of funds, accounting records, and administration within the entity that establishes the pension plan or fund is proposed. Additionally, the equal application of criteria regarding reserves, investments, and risk, and, in general, regulation, was provided for. In this regard, it is possible to affirm the existence of a uniform operating regime for both public and private entities. Not only do the legal operating rules not differentiate the nature of the entity, but the administrative regulation issued aims for uniformity of regime. Thus, for example, the investments that authorized entities may make are governed by a set of principles imposed on those constituted as "authorized and regulated entities" by the Superintendence, without the public or private nature of the entity being relevant for this purpose. In this way, regarding the investment of resources (article 60 of the Worker Protection Law, Ley de Protección al Trabajador), the exclusion from the regulatory provisions of the Central Bank is general, encompassing all entities. The duty to invest funds for the benefit of the workers or the imperative of security, profitability, and liquidity of the fund are uniform. Similarly, the liability regime of the operators is uniform (articles 40 and 41 of the cited Law). And obviously, all public or private operators are subject to the regulatory function of CONASSIF and the Superintendence of Pensions, even though these are deconcentrated organs of the Central Bank. And this is so because for the market to function effectively and efficiently, any pension operator must be subject to the same provisions, since the existence of a different legal regime could not only affect the realization of the objectives sought by the system, but could also cause a difference in treatment that impacts the free development of companies in the market and, consequently, the violation of the principle of free competition. There is therefore a clear interest of the legislator in free competition through corporations (sociedades anónimas), as established in article 30 of the Worker Protection Law; however, as pension operators, they are subject to strict regulation aimed at maintaining the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the financial system as a whole, necessary to maintain the rights of workers. Indeed, the regulation seeks the solvency and profitability of the system, whose funds are administered by the regulated entities. From the study of the normative framework applicable in this institute, a clear motivation for the protection of workers in this complementary pension fund financial system is transparently evident, which aims not to put the totality of the contributions made at risk. And if we speak of protection, the responsibility of those who administer this patrimony for the present and future of the labor force enters as a core theme. The cited Law contemplates, in effect, the principle of subjective liability of the operators of these funds in the legal fiction of corporations, as is evident in article 40: "*Liability* The operators and authorized social organizations shall be jointly and severally liable for the pecuniary damages and losses caused to the affiliates **by willful or negligent acts** of the members of their Board of Directors, managers, employees, and promoting agents. In the case of promoting agents who have an employment or contractual relationship with the operator, liability exists. The debts of the operators and authorized social organizations to the Fund shall have priority of payment in relation to common creditors, without prejudice to greater privileges established by other rules. This privilege is applicable in universal proceedings and in any process or procedure processed against the debtor's patrimony." (the bold and underline are mine). Therefore, in my view, the pension operator that causes damages to its client is obligated to repair them in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, whose article 1045 states: "*Anyone who, by intent, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obligated to repair it together with the losses.*" That is, the corporation is civilly liable if its conduct was willful or negligent.

III.- For the reasons stated, this higher-ranking judge considers that this process falls under civil and commercial jurisdiction, since the controversies in this particular case derive from the commercial nature of the business relationship that binds the parties.

THEREFORE:

I resolve by casting my vote and decide that this process falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

Abel Jiménez Obando ORDINARY PROCEEDING No. 336-2008.

[Nombre1] Against BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.

acc.- Judge 1 [Nombre3].

3 **II.-** For the majority’s criterion, a transcendental fact is that this lawsuit is directed against the complementary pension operator "BN VITAL," above all for aspects of lack of jurisdiction by reason of subject matter (incompetencia en razón de la materia) that we will proceed to set forth below. Article 97, subsection 1°, of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establishes that the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Tribunals are competent to hear ordinary proceedings that will be processed in accordance with the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In turn, numeral 1°, subsection 1°, of that Code establishes that this jurisdiction is responsible for protecting the legal situations of every person, as well as **guaranteeing or restoring any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the legal-administrative relationship.** Subsection 3° of this rule clarifies that the public administration comprises the decentralized, institutional, and territorial administration and all other public law entities. In addition to this, in the specific case of complementary pension operators, Law 7523 of July 7, 1995, in its Article 63, establishes that, once the administrative channel is exhausted, any person seeking to file a claim before this type of operator must do so before the courts of justice, in accordance with the jurisdiction established by the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Likewise, as an element that helps us elucidate the aspect of jurisdiction in these cases, said provision indicates that the supplementary rule for this type of proceeding will be the **Ley General de la Administración Pública and, particularly, the principles of administrative procedure.** On the other hand, Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 27503-H of December 2, 1998, Reglamento para la Constitución de los Puestos de Bolsa, Sociedades Administradoras de Fondos y Operadoras de Pensiones Complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del INS, reformed by decree number 28485, of February 21, 2000, establishes that the complementary pension plan operators of the banks have the character of **public enterprises (empresas públicas),** even though their activity is governed according to the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, regarding guarantees for volume of activity and assumed risks. Interpreting this norm, the Contraloría General de la República, in its report 327-2000, indicated: *“(...) On the other hand, the “Reglamento para la constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de bolsa y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del Instituto Nacional de Seguros”, No. 27503-H of December 2, 1998 and its reforms, establishes in the second paragraph of its article 2, in relation to the figure of the corporation (sociedad anónima) applicable in these cases, that it shall have the character of a public enterprise. The nature of this type of public enterprise was developed by Dr. Ortiz Ortiz in stating: “The company that is the property of a public entity—by reason of the latter being the sole or principal partner—is public for that sole reason, even if the dominant partner is not the State, but any other public entity whatsoever. The decisive factor for imprinting a public character on an entity—whether or not it is a commercial company—is the existence of ends of that subject imposed upon it by law or by the Administration. As already stated, the company is public because it becomes an instrument of the legal, and therefore public, ends of the public entity partner.” E. ORTIZ ORTIZ: La empresa pública como ente público” IVSTITIA, No. 52, año 5, p 8. Consequently, it must be considered that the complementary pension operators and the investment fund management companies are public enterprises owned by the public institution that gives them origin, whose activities, administration, and assets shall be independent from each other (...)”* **(the highlighting has been added).** Under the protection of these provisions and of this administrative pronouncement, the criterion that this litigation corresponds to the administrative litigation jurisdiction and not to the civil one is strengthened. Another aspect to take into account here is the nature of B N VITAL as a pension operator and its legal relationship with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Said nature has already been previously analyzed by organs such as the Contraloría and the Procuraduría General de la República.

**III.-** In its opinion 366-2003, the Contraloría General de la República indicated that the resources that public organisms authorized to constitute complementary pension operators use to form the minimum constitution capital of those entities are public funds. It is for this reason that, since they are financial resources owned by a public entity, they form part of the Public Treasury (Article 9 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría). Said public nature is not modified by the form to which said entities resort for constitution—for example, corporations (sociedades anónimas)—since that does not modify the nature of the funds they administer. In this regard, the Contraloría points out that the criterion for establishing the public nature of those operators as public enterprises arises because their minimum constitution and operating capital are public funds. Previously, on the occasion of the creation of a complementary pension operator attached to a state bank, the Procuraduría General de la República—in its opinion N°183-99—emphasized that the corporate capital (capital social) of that operator was of a public nature, since only in that way could transparent management of the resources be guaranteed. Now then, a distinction must be made between the corporate capital of the operator and the funds it administers that are the property of the working persons. This is important here, since precisely the plaintiff seeks to question, on the one hand, the lack of information received upon joining the respondent operator and, on the other, the alleged poor administration of the contributions made by her. According to numeral 52 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, the administered funds constitute autonomous estates that are the property of the affiliated persons. It is for this reason that operators are obligated to have separate accounting so that the entity's resources are not confused with those of the affiliated persons (Article 53 ibidem). Nevertheless, said administration must be subject to the Superintendencia de Pensiones, as the entity responsible for supervising the solvency and stability of the corresponding regime. Regardless of this difference between administered capital and constitutive capital, the important thing is that the pension operators constituted by public entities do not cease to be public enterprises. In this regard, the Procuraduría, in opinion 180-03, indicated: *“Since the fundamental criteria for determining whether a specific enterprise is public are the ownership of the corporate capital and control over the enterprise's decisions, one would have to conclude that the pension operators created by public entities are public enterprises… The corporate purpose of the operators is the administration of the plans and benefit funds and of the benefits derived from the systems established by the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, the administration of the individual accounts. It is an economic activity subject to the rules established in said Law. The entities that develop that activity can be considered enterprises.”* This same hypothesis was maintained by the Sala Constitucional, through its Voto number 6531-02. In said pronouncement, referring to the specific case of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the possibility of constituting corporations, in accordance with Article 55 of the Ley del Mercado de Valores, the Sala indicated that the Legislative Power, through that norm, chose to separate the banking activity from the universal scheme in order to bring it closer to the "system of diverse legal persons," within the operations of a founding entity. That is, by granting the possibility for a state bank to create "corporations," an administrative deconcentration (desconcentración administrativa) was authorized, in order to allow a "specialization" of the activity and thus separate it from the founding entity (state bank). However, according to the Sala, that separation cannot be absolute. This is because the resources required for the fulfillment of the purpose entrusted to the company by the founding entity and the use of the commercial name of the state banking institution offer an image of integration (for example, in this case "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PENSIONES S.A.", or "BN puesto de Bolsa"). According to the Sala, unlike what occurs with pure and simple "deconcentration," the creation of this type of diverse legal persons, with the nomenclature "S.A." within the scheme of an autonomous entity, presupposes separation of the company regarding budget control and resource management. This is in principle, because when these entities are called "corporations," they do not thereby cease to be part of the autonomous institution to which they belong, since, through those companies, the entity's purpose of fulfilling the assigned task by resorting to other legal forms is palpable. It is for this reason that these "corporations" do not cease to be an "instrument" that the Legislative Power places at the disposal of the autonomous entities so that they can achieve their ends, and thus achieve effective competition within the market system with private banks, which do have the possibility of forming "economic and financial interest groups." Therefore, according to the Sala Constitucional, it is not possible to separate the figure of this type of "corporations" from the bank or entity from which they derive, since from the organizational scheme they carry out a specialized activity of the entity and, in principle, have full legal personhood but are attached to it—through the ownership of the shares. The pension operators created by a state bank or institution share the legal nature of their founder; they are enterprises created by that entity and, consequently, according to the Sala Constitucional, they belong to the Public Administration. It is for these reasons that, by majority, the Tribunal declares itself incompetent and refers this matter to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José.” Judge **JIMÉNEZ OBANDO** dissents and votes as follows, **CONSIDERANDO:** **I.-** The special judicial representative of the defendant company appeals the first instance judgment; in essence, his appeal states that the contested resolution is based on a fundamental premise, by indicating that the loss in the value of investments was due to mismanagement by the respondent, because it excessively concentrated the investments of the administered capital in bonds of the Costa Rican public debt and the foregoing produced an excessive exposure to risk for the fund's resources. This premise is erroneous—states the appellant—since the scope of action of the complementary pension fund management companies is under the strict regulation of different regulations and their activity is supervised by the Superintendencia de Pensiones. Furthermore, he indicates that the Costa Rican securities market is very particular due to the very limited supply of investment instruments it offers; therefore, what is offered by the securities market is primarily public debt securities of the State, and if the defendant company has maintained an investment discipline in accordance with the limits established for it, what occurred in 2004 was a price adjustment that affected the entirety of the Costa Rican financial market due to the decrease in the value of all Costa Rican public debt securities. Therefore, the price adjustment mentioned in the months of March and April 2004 affected the entire financial system and was not due to negligent conduct by the defendant; consequently, the plaintiff did not suffer a detriment in the invested capital, but rather a decrease in the yield.

**II.-** This topic, novel for forensic practice, is regulated principally in Ley N°7983, which establishes a complementary system to the social security benefits that have been in charge of the CCSS; a system that is called upon to develop an economic function in terms of the placement of savings and, therefore, to be an instrument for boosting the economy, as a consequence of the development of financial markets. The Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias is an individual capitalization system, destined to complement the benefits of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime of the CCSS (article 9). A regime for which contributions are made as provided in article 13. Since it is a capitalization regime, the contributions must generate earnings for the contributors or beneficiaries. Contributions and earnings are administered in a fund, which is an estate absolutely separate from the estate of the party administering it. Due to the foregoing, it is inferred from the laws and regulations that the interest in developing the financial system in the country has led to emphasizing the need for a market where agents develop under a regime of equal conditions. An aspect that arises above all in the stock exchange and pension market. Indeed, since the approval of the Ley de Régimen Privado de Pensiones Complementarias, N°7523 of July 7, 1995, it is postulated that the participation of public entities in the complementary pensions market be done under conditions of equality, so as not to distort competition. For that purpose, rules are dictated aimed at maintaining transparency, independence of management, and equality of participation. In the same manner, the separation of funds, accounting, and administration within the entity constituting the pension plan or fund is proposed. Furthermore, the equal application of criteria on reserves, investments, and risk and, in general, of regulation was ordered. In that sense, it is fitting to affirm the existence of a uniform operational regime for both public and private entities. Not only do the legal rules on operation not differentiate the nature of the entity, but the administrative regulation that is issued intends a uniformity of regime. Thus, for example, the investments that authorized entities can make are governed by a set of principles imposed on those constituted as "entities authorized and regulated" by the Superintendencia, without the public or private nature of the entity mattering for that purpose. In this way, regarding the investment of resources (article 60 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador), the exclusion from the regulatory provisions of the Banco Central is general, encompassing all entities. The duty to invest the funds for the benefit of the workers or the imperative of security, profitability, and liquidity of the fund are uniform. In the same manner, the liability regime of the operators is uniform (articles 40 and 41 of the cited Law).

And obviously, every public or private operator is subject to the regulatory function of CONASSIF and the Superintendencia de Pensiones, even though these are deconcentrated bodies of the Banco Central. And this is so because for the market to function effectively and efficiently, any pension operator must be subject to the same provisions, since the existence of a different legal regime can not only affect the realization of the objectives the system aims for, but can also cause a difference in treatment that impacts the free development of companies in the market and, therefore, violates the principle of free competition. There is, therefore, a clear interest on the part of the legislator in free competition through corporations (sociedades anónimas), as established in Article 30 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador; however, as pension operators, they are subject to strict regulation aimed at maintaining the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the financial system as a whole, necessary to preserve the rights of workers. Indeed, the regulation seeks the solvency and profitability of the system, whose funds are managed by the regulated entities. From the study of the regulatory framework applicable to this institute, a clear motivation to protect workers in this financial system of supplementary pension funds emerges transparently, one that aims not to put the totality of the contributions made at risk. And if we speak of protection, the responsibility of those who administer this patrimony for the present and future of the workforce becomes a core issue. The cited Law contemplates, in effect, the principle of subjective liability of the operators of these funds within the legal fiction of corporations, as set forth in Article 40: *"Liability* * The operators and authorized social organizations shall be jointly and severally liable for the pecuniary damages and losses caused to the affiliates **by willful or negligent acts** of the members of their Board of Directors, managers, employees, and promoting agents. In the case of promoting agents who have an employment or contractual relationship with the operator, liability exists.* * The debts of the operators and authorized social organizations to the Fund shall have payment priority in relation to common creditors, without prejudice to greater priorities established by other norms. This priority is applicable in universal proceedings and in any process or procedure brought against the debtor's patrimony* (the bold and underlining are mine)." Therefore, in my opinion, the pension operator that causes damages to its client is obligated to repair them pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, whose Article 1045 states: "*Anyone who, by deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obligated to repair it together with the consequential damages*." That is to say, the corporation is civilly liable if its conduct was willful or negligent.

* **Expediente** * **N°** * **05-001587-164-CI** **ACT: (** * * * * * * * * **) * * * * * * * * * **[Nombre1]** **.** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **Fax N° 2225-43-34.-** **DEM: (** * * * * * * **) * * * * * * * * * **BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **San José, [Dirección1]°** *** * * * * * * * * * * * * * **[Dirección2]** **Costa Rica, en la Dirección ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** [Dirección3] n°3)** **____________________________________________________** **N° 082** * * * * * * * * * * * **TRIBUNAL SEGUNDO CIVIL, SECCIÓN PRIMERA.-** San José, at nine o'clock on March third, two thousand ten.- * * * * * * * * * * * **ORDINARIO** proceeding established in the **JUZGADO CIVIL DE MAYOR CUANTÍA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ**, under case file number 05-001587-164-CI, initiated by **[Nombre1]**, of legal age, single, executive secretary, identification number CED1, resident of San José; against **BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA,** represented by its unlimited general attorney-in-fact, Mr. [Nombre2], of legal age, married, Master of Business Administration, identification number CED2, resident of San José.- Acting as special judicial attorneys, for the plaintiff, attorney Pablo González González; and for the defendant company, attorney Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora.- * * * * * * * * * * * * * **III.-** For the reasons set forth, the undersigned superior judge considers that this proceeding falls under civil and commercial jurisdiction, since the disputes in this particular case arise from the commercial nature of the business relationship binding the parties.” **WHEREAS:** **1.-** The present claim, the amount of which was set at the sum of twenty thousand dollars, legal tender of the United States of America, is for a judgment: “...ordering the cancellation of the damages and losses caused to me, which amount to the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS and ninety-seven cents, currency of the United States of America, ($3,051.97) and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE COLONES, (¢43,153), plus daily compound interest at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the judgment, from when the losses occurred until their effective cancellation, recognition of moral damages plus both costs of this ordinary civil proceeding.” (Sic).- On pages 87 and 88, the plaintiff specifies and quantifies the damages and losses as follows: “...Basically, the damages are specifically the losses caused to my client, in relation to the fund management contract it has with the defendant entity.

as explained in the complaint, my client was always a saver and never an investor; therefore, the defendant caused her economic harm, specifically in relation to the amount of money she originally saved and the current amount of money my client has. As explained, Miss [Name1] had two funds with the defendant entity, one in colones and another in dollars, currency of the United States of America, and in this latter currency, she suffered a loss of THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS ($3,052.00), and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO COLONES and sixty-four cents (¢43,152.64), plus compound legal interest, accruing from the time the loss occurred until its effective cancellation. The foregoing was due to negligent and culpable administration by the defendant entity, which to date has refused to admit its civil liability for damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to my client. Regarding moral damages (daño moral), I consider that immense psychological harm has been caused, because my client is currently unemployed and the money saved throughout her entire working life was given to the defendant entity to be administered as a good father of a family, a circumstance that in this case, and based on the reasons given in the complaint, did not happen; quite the contrary, because a significant part of her savings was lost due to the negligence of this Pension Operator, which caused a situation of suffering, worry, and stress, upon having to see what to do in the face of the catastrophic loss of her savings, on which she depended for her subsistence, placing her in a situation of socioeconomic insecurity, which as of today has become uncertain, and which I estimate in the sum of FIVE MILLION COLONES.- I estimate the total damages (daños y perjuicios) at the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($20,000), currency of the United States of America." (Sic).-* * * * * * * * * 2.- The defendant was duly notified of the complaint and answered it in the negative. It raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho) and the generic defense of sine actione agit.- * * * * * * * * * 3.- Judge Juan Carlos Meoño Nimo, of the Civil Court of Greater Amounts (Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, in a judgment issued at eight hours ten minutes on August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, resolved: "...POR TANTO: The generic defense of sine actione agit, in its forms of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) and lack of interest (falta de interés), is rejected, but it is partially upheld in its form of lack of right (falta de derecho), and in that same sense the autonomous defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is also partially upheld, solely regarding the item of Moral Damages (Daño Moral) and the start date for calculating interest, and rejected in all other respects, all defenses raised by the defendant company. For the reasons and articles referred to above, THE PRESENT ORDINARY LAWSUIT (Demanda Ordinaria) brought by [Name1] against BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS SOCIEDAD ANONIMA IS DECLARED PARTIALLY WITH MERITS (PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR), declaring the following, it being warned that what is expressly omitted is equivalent to an express rejection: First. That the latter caused the former a harmful situation, attributable on the grounds of fault (culpa). Second. That the latter must pay the former the Damages (Daños) caused by her actions, namely, THREE THOUSAND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTS, legal tender of the United States of America, and FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE COLONES. Third. That the latter must recognize legal interest on the above amounts, in the abstract as from the finality of this judgment, at the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the colones amount, and at the prime rate for the dollar amount. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding." (Sic).- * * * * * * * * * 4.- This Court hears this judgment by virtue of an appeal (apelación) filed by attorney Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora in his capacity as special judicial representative (apoderado especial judicial) of the defendant; and by attorney Pablo González González in his capacity as special representative (apoderado especial) of the plaintiff. The corresponding prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

* * * * * * * * * DRAFTED by Judge OLASO ÁLVAREZ; and, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CONSIDERANDO:

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I.- From a detailed study of this matter, it appears that the plaintiff brings this lawsuit against "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS". In said complaint, the plaintiff, as a consumer of the pension plan offered by that entity, alleges that, at the time of contracting, she did not receive adequate information about the economic risks she was assuming in the event of a bad investment made by the operator. In addition to this, she indicates that she was never informed that the sums contributed to the fund would be invested in stock market operations, which was carried out by the defendant entity by acquiring Costa Rican government external debt bonds. That when the investment fund crisis occurred, the defendant entity did not communicate this situation to her, which caused her serious economic harm. She alleges that the defendant did not use a correct investment "diversification" strategy, a circumstance that caused excessive losses for her. That in the twelfth clause of the agreement, it was established that the defendant entity had to apply the necessary expertise and diligence to ensure the investment of the administered sums, and that it would be responsible for any loss, injury, or impairment suffered by its clientele due to imprudence or gross negligence in the collection, administration, and investment of the funds. Based on this factual framework, she requests that the defendant be ordered to pay three thousand fifty-two dollars for damages (daños y perjuicios), forty-three thousand one hundred fifty-three colones, plus interest from the moment the plaintiff suffered her economic losses until its effective cancellation, and that she be awarded moral damages (daño moral) for the psychological suffering caused, valued in the sum of five million colones.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * II.- In the opinion of the majority, it is a transcendental fact that this lawsuit is directed against the complementary pension operator "BN VITAL," above all for issues of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (incompetencia en razón de la materia) which we will now proceed to set forth. Article 97, subsection 1, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) establishes that the Administrative and Civil Treasury Courts (Tribunales de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) are competent to hear ordinary proceedings that will be processed according to the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). In turn, numeral 1, subsection 1, of said Code establishes that said jurisdiction is responsible for protecting the legal situations of every person, as well as guaranteeing or restoring any conduct of the Public Administration subject to Administrative Law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the administrative-legal relationship. Subsection 3 of this norm clarifies that the public administration is comprised of the decentralized, institutional, and territorial administration and all other public law entities. In addition to this, in the specific case of complementary pension operators, Law 7523 of July 7, 1995, in its article 63, establishes that, once the administrative route (vía administrativa) has been exhausted, any person seeking to file a claim against this type of operator must do so before the courts of justice, in accordance with the jurisdiction established by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Likewise, as an element that helps us elucidate the aspect of jurisdiction in these cases, said provision indicates that the supplementary norm for this type of proceeding will be the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and, particularly, the principles of administrative procedure. Furthermore, article 2 of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 27503-H of December 2, 1998, Regulation for the Constitution of Brokerage Houses, Fund Management Companies and Complementary Pension Operators of Public Banks and INS, amended by decree number 28485 of February 21, 2000, establishes that the complementary pension plan operators of banks have the character of public enterprises (empresas públicas), despite the fact that their activity is governed according to the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), regarding guarantees for volume of activity and assumed risks.

Interpreting this rule, the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), in its report 327-2000, stated: "(...) Furthermore, the 'Reglamento para la constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de bolsa y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del Instituto Nacional de Seguros' [Regulation for the constitution of brokerage positions, stock exchange management companies, and supplementary pension operators of the Public Banks and the National Insurance Institute], No. 27503-H of December 2, 1998, and its amendments, establishes in the second paragraph of its Article 2, regarding the corporate form of the corporation (sociedad anónima) applicable in these cases, that it will have the character of a public enterprise (empresa pública). The nature of this type of public enterprise was developed by Dr. Ortiz Ortiz when he stated: 'A company that is the property of a public entity—by reason of the latter being the sole or principal shareholder—is public for that reason alone, even if the dominant shareholder is not the State, but rather any other public entity. The decisive factor for conferring a public character on an entity—whether or not it is a commercial company—is the existence of purposes of that subject imposed upon it by law or by the Administration. As already stated, the company is public because it becomes an instrument of the legal, and therefore public, purposes of the public entity shareholder.' E. ORTIZ ORTIZ: La empresa pública como ente público [The Public Enterprise as a Public Entity], IVSTITIA, No. 52, year 5, p. 8. Consequently, it must be considered that the supplementary pension operators (operadoras de pensiones complementarias) and the investment fund management companies (sociedades administradoras de fondos de inversión) are public enterprises (empresas públicas) owned by the public institution that gives them origin, whose activities, administration, and assets will be independent from each other (...)" (emphasis added). Under these provisions and this administrative pronouncement, the criterion that this litigation falls under the jurisdiction (competencia) of the administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) and not civil jurisdiction is strengthened. Another aspect to consider here is the nature of B N VITAL as a pension operator and its legal relationship with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. This nature has already been previously analyzed by bodies such as the Comptroller General and the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * **III.-** In its opinion (dictamen) 366-2003, the Comptroller General of the Republic indicated that the resources that authorized public bodies use to form the minimum founding capital (capital mínimo de constitución) of supplementary pension operators are public funds. This is why, as they are financial resources owned by a public entity, they form part of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (Article 9 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General). This public nature is not modified by the form these entities resort to for their constitution—for example, corporations (sociedades anónimas)—as this does not modify the nature of the funds they administer. In this regard, the Comptroller General points out that the criterion for establishing the public nature of these operators as public enterprises arises because their minimum founding capital and operating capital are public funds. Previously, on the occasion of the creation of a supplementary pension operator attached to a state bank, the Attorney General's Office—in its opinion No. 183-99—emphasized that the corporate capital (capital social) of that operator was of a public nature, since only in that way could transparent management of the resources be guaranteed. Now, a distinction must be made between the corporate capital of the operator and the funds it administers, which are the property of the workers. This is important here, because precisely the plaintiff seeks to question, on one hand, the lack of information received at the time of affiliating with the defendant operator, and on the other, the supposed mismanagement of the contributions made by her. According to Article 52 of the Ley de Protección al Trabajador [Worker Protection Law], the administered funds constitute autonomous assets (patrimonios autónomos) that are the property of the affiliated persons, which is why operators are required to keep separate accountings so that the entity's resources are not confused with those of the affiliated persons (Article 53 ibidem). However, such administration must be subject to the Superintendencia de Pensiones [Pension Superintendency], as the entity responsible for supervising the solvency and stability of the corresponding system. Regardless of this distinction between administered capital and constitutive capital, what is important is that the pension operators constituted by public entities do not cease to be public enterprises. In this regard, the Attorney General's Office, in opinion 180-03, stated:

"*Since the fundamental criteria for determining whether a particular company is public are the ownership of the corporate capital and control over the company's decisions, one would have to conclude that the pension operators created by public entities are public enterprises… * The corporate purpose (objeto social) of the operators is the administration of pension plans and funds and the benefits derived from the systems established by the Ley de Protección al Trabajador, the administration of individual accounts. It is an economic activity subject to the rules established in said Law. The entities that carry out this activity can be considered companies*". This same hypothesis was maintained by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through its Voto [Decision] number 6531-02. In said pronouncement, referring to the specific case of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the possibility of constituting corporations (sociedades anónimas), in accordance with Article 55 of the Securities Market Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores), the Chamber indicated that the Legislative Branch, through that rule, chose to separate banking activity from the universal scheme to bring it closer to the "system of diverse legal personalities," within the actions of a founding entity. That is, by granting the possibility for a state bank to create "corporations," an administrative deconcentration (desconcentración administrativa) was authorized, in order to allow a "specialization" of the activity and thus separate it from the founding entity (state bank). However, according to the Chamber, that separation cannot be absolute. This is because the resources required for the fulfillment of the purpose entrusted to the company by the founding entity and the use of the trade name of the state banking institution offer an image of integration (for example, in this case "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PENSIONES S.A.", or "BN puesto de Bolsa"). According to the Chamber, unlike what occurs with pure and simple "deconcentration," the creation of this type of diverse legal persons, with the nomenclature "S.A." within the scheme of an autonomous entity, implies separation of the company regarding budget control and the management of resources. This is in principle, because when these entities are called "corporations," they do not thereby cease to be part of the autonomous institution to which they belong, since, through these companies, the entity's purpose of fulfilling its assigned task by resorting to other legal forms is evident. It is for this reason that these "corporations" do not cease to be an "instrument" that the Legislative Branch makes available to autonomous entities so that they can achieve their goals, and thus achieve effective competition within the market system with private banks, which do have the possibility of forming "economic and financial interest groups." Therefore, according to the Constitutional Chamber, it is not possible to disconnect the figure of this type of "corporation" from the bank or entity from which they derive, since from the organizational scheme they carry out a specialized activity of the entity and, in principle, have full legal personality (persona jurídica plena) but are attached to it—through the ownership of the shares. The pension operators created by a state bank or institution share the legal nature of their founder; they are companies created by that entity and consequently, according to the Constitutional Chamber, belong to the Public Administration. It is for these reasons that, by majority, the Court declares itself without jurisdiction (incompetente) and remits this matter to the Administrative Litigation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José).

* * * **POR TANTO:** * * * * * * * * * * * * By majority, the Court declares itself without jurisdiction and remits this matter to the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Juan Carlos Brenes Vargas * * * **Abel Jiménez Obando** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jorge Olaso Álvarez * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * The judge **JIMÉNEZ OBANDO** saves his vote and casts it as follows, * * * **CONSIDERANDO:** * * * * * * * * * * * * **I.-** The special judicial representative (apoderado especial judicial) of the defendant company appeals the first instance judgment; essentially, in his appeal, he points out that the appealed resolution is based on a fundamental premise, by indicating that the loss in the value of the investments was due to poor management by the defendant, because it excessively concentrated the investments of the administered capital in bonds of the Costa Rican public debt and this produced an excessive exposure to the risk of the fund's resources. This premise is erroneous—the appellant indicates—since the scope of action of the supplementary pension fund management companies is under the strict regulation of different regulations and its activity is supervised by the Superintendencia de Pensiones.

It further indicates that the Costa Rican securities market is very particular due to the very limited supply of investment instruments it offers, and therefore, what is offered by the securities market is primarily State public debt securities, and if the defendant company has maintained an investment discipline in accordance with the limits established for it, what occurred in 2004 was a price adjustment that affected the entire Costa Rican financial market due to the decrease in value of all Costa Rican public debt securities. Consequently, the price adjustment mentioned in the months of March and April 2004 affected the entire financial system and was not due to negligent conduct by the defendant, and therefore, the plaintiff did not suffer a deterioration in the invested capital, but rather a decrease in yield.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * II.- This matter, novel for forensic practice, is regulated mainly in Law No. 7983, which establishes a complementary system to the social security benefits that has been administered by the CCSS; a system that is intended to develop an economic function concerning the placement of savings and, therefore, to be an instrument to boost the economy, as a consequence of the development of financial markets. The Mandatory Complementary Pension Regime (Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias) is an individual capitalization system, designed to complement the benefits of the CCSS Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime (Article 9). A regime for which contributions are made as provided in Article 13. Since it is a capitalization regime, the contributions must generate returns for the benefit of the contributors or beneficiaries. Contributions and returns are managed in a fund, which is an estate (patrimonio) absolutely separate from the estate of the entity that manages it. Due to the above, it is evident from the laws and regulations that the interest in developing the financial system in the country has led to emphasizing the need for a market in which agents operate under a regime of equal conditions. An aspect that arises especially in the stock market and the pension market. Indeed, since the approval of the Law on the Private Regime of Complementary Pensions, No. 7523 of July 7, 1995, it is posited that the participation of public entities in the complementary pension market shall take place under equal conditions, so that competition is not distorted. To that end, rules are issued aimed at maintaining transparency, management independence, and equality of participation. Similarly, the separation of funds, accounting, and administration within the entity that creates the pension plan or fund is proposed. Furthermore, the equal application of criteria regarding reserves, investments, and risk, and, in general, regulation, was ordered. In that sense, it is possible to affirm the existence of a uniform operating regime for both public and private entities. Not only do the legal rules on operation not differentiate the nature of the entity, but the administrative regulation issued seeks a uniformity of regime. Thus, for example, the investments that authorized entities can make are governed by a set of principles imposed on those constituted as “entities authorized and regulated” by the Superintendency, without the public or private nature of the entity being relevant for that purpose. In this way, concerning the investment of resources (Article 60 of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador)), the exclusion from the regulatory provisions of the Central Bank is general, encompassing all entities. The duty to invest funds for the benefit of the workers, or the imperative of security, profitability, and liquidity of the fund, are uniform. Similarly, the liability regime of the operators is uniform (Articles 40 and 41 of the aforementioned Law). And obviously, every public or private operator is subject to the regulatory function of CONASSIF and the Superintendency of Pensions, even though these are deconcentrated bodies of the Central Bank. And this is so because for the market to function effectively and efficiently, any pension operator must be subject to the same provisions, since the existence of a different legal regime can not only affect the achievement of the system's objectives but can also cause a difference in treatment that impacts the free development of companies in the market and, therefore, the violation of the principle of free competition. There is, therefore, a clear interest of the legislator in free competition through corporations (sociedades anónimas), as established in Article 30 of the Worker Protection Law; however, as pension operators, they are subject to strict regulation aimed at maintaining the solvency, stability, and liquidity of the financial system as a whole, necessary to maintain the rights of workers. Indeed, the regulation seeks the solvency and profitability of the system, whose funds are managed by the regulated entities. From the study of the regulatory framework applicable to this institute, a clear motivation to protect workers in this complementary pension fund financial system, which bets on not putting the totality of the contributions made at risk, is transparently evident. And if we speak of protection, the liability of those who manage this estate for the present and future of the workforce enters as a core theme. The cited Law contemplates, in effect, the principle of subjective liability of the operators of these funds in the legal fiction of corporations, as is evident in Article 40: "Liability The authorized operators and social organizations shall be jointly and severally liable for the patrimonial damages caused to the members by intentional or negligent acts of the members of their Board of Directors, managers, employees, and promoting agents. In the case of promoting agents who have an employment or contractual relationship with the operator, liability exists. The debts of the operators and authorized social organizations to the Fund shall have payment privilege in relation to common creditors, without prejudice to any greater privileges established by other rules. This privilege is applicable in universal proceedings and in any process or procedure brought against the debtor's estate (the bold and underline are mine)." Therefore, in my opinion, the pension operator that causes damages to its client is obliged to repair them as provided in the Civil Code, whose Article 1045 provides: "Anyone who, by intent (dolo), fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses (perjuicios)." That is, the corporation is civilly liable if its conduct was intentional or negligent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * III.- For the reasons set forth, the undersigned superior judge considers that this proceeding falls under civil and commercial jurisdiction, since the disputes in this particular case derive from the commercial nature of the business relationship that binds the parties.* * *

POR TANTO:

* * * * * * * * * * * * * I dissent and decide that this proceeding falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.* Abel Jiménez Obando * * * ORDINARIO N°336-2008. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * [Nombre1] .

Contra BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.

acc.- Juez 1 [Nombre3].

* * * * * 3

* * * * ACT: ( * * * * * * * *) * * * * * * * [Nombre1] .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Fax N° 2225-43-34.-* * * DEM: ( * * * * * * ) * * * * * * * BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * San José, [Dirección1]° * * * * * * * * * * [Dirección2] Costa Rica, en la Dirección * * * * * * * * * * [Dirección3] n°3) * * ____________________________________________________* N° 082* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * TRIBUNAL SEGUNDO CIVIL, SECCIÓN PRIMERA.- San José, a las nueve horas del tres de marzo de dos mil diez.-* * * * * * * * * * * Proceso ORDINARIO establecido en el JUZGADO CIVIL DE MAYOR CUANTÍA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, bajo el número de expediente 05-001587-164-CI, por [Nombre1] , mayor, soltera, secretaria ejecutiva, cédula número CED1, vecino de San José; contra BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, señor [Nombre2] , mayor, casado, máster en administración de empresas, cédula número CED2, vecino de San José.- Intervienen como apoderados especiales judiciales, de la actora el licenciado Pablo González González; y de la sociedad demandada, el licenciado Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora.-* * * RESULTANDO:* * * * * * * * * * * 1.- La presente demanda, cuya cuantía se fijó en la suma de veinte mil dólares, moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América; es para que en sentencia: “...se me cancelen los daños y perjuicios, ocasionados, y que ascienden a la suma de TRES MIL CINCUENTA Y UN DOLARES, con noventa y siete centavos moneda de los Estados Unidos de América, ($3.051.97) y CUARENTA Y TRES MIL CIENTO CINCUENTA Y TRES COLONES, (¢43.153), más los intereses compuestos diarios al tipo de cambio vigente al momento de la sentencia, desde que se produjeron las pérdidas hasta su efectiva cancelación, reconocimiento de daño moral más ambas costas del presente juicio ordinario civil.”(Sic).- A folios 87 y 88, la parte actora especifica y cuantifica los daños y perjuicios de la siguiente manera: "...Básicamente los daños se concretan en las pérdidas ocasionadas a mi representada, en relación al contrato de administración de fondos que tiene con la entidad demandada. como se explicó en el libelo de demanda, mi representada siempre fue ahorrante y nunca inversionista, por lo tanto la demandada le produjo un daño económico, en relación en concreto con la cantidad de dinero que originalmente ahorró y la cantidad actual de dinero, con que cuenta mi representada, Como se explicó la señorita [Nombre1] tenía dos fondos, en la entidad demandada, uno en colones y otro en dólares, moneda de los Estados Unidos de América, y en esta última moneda, se le produjo una pérdida de TRES MIL CINCUENTA Y DOS DOLARES, ($3.052.00), y de CUARENTA Y TRES MIL CIENTO CINCUENTA Y DOS COLONES con sesenta y cuatro céntimos, (¢43.152.64), más los intereses legales compuestos, que corren desde que se produjo la pérdida hasta su efectiva cancelación, lo anterior se debió a una administración negligente y culposa, por parte de la entidad demandada, que a la fecha no ha querido admitir su responsabilidad civil por daños y perjuicios ocasionados a mi representada. Con relación al daño moral, considero que se ha causado un inmenso daño psicológico, por que mi representada en estos momentos está desempleada y los dineros ahorrados durante toda su vida laboral se le entregaron a la entidad demandada para lo que lo administre como un buen padre de familia, circunstancia que en la especie y en base a las razones dadas en la demanda no sucedió, todo lo contrario, por que parte importante de sus ahorros se perdieron debido a la negligencia de esta operados de Pensiones, lo que ocasionó una situación de sufrimiento, preocupación, stress, al tener que ver que hacía, ante la pérdida catastrófica de sus ahorros, y de los cuales dependía para subsistir, poniéndose en una situación de inseguridad socioeconómica, tornándose a la fecha de hoy incierta, y que estimo en la suma de CINCO MILLONES DE COLONES.- Los daños y perjuicios totales los estimó en la cantidad de VEINTE MIL DOLARES, ($20.000), moneda de los Estados Unidos de América." (Sic).-* * * * * * * * * * * * * 2.- La accionada fue debidamente notificada de la demanda y la contestó negativamente. Interpuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, y la genérica sine actione agit.-* * * * * * * * * * * * * 3.- El juez Juan Carlos Meoño Nimo, del Juzgado Civil de Mayor Cuantía del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, en sentencia dictada a las ocho horas diez minutos del veinticinco de agosto de dos mil ocho, resolvió: “...POR TANTO: Se rechaza la excepción genérica de sine actione agit en sus modalidades de falta de legitimación y falta de interés, pero se acoge parcialmente en su modalidad de falta de derecho, y en ese mismo sentido la autónoma de falta de derecho,, únicamente en cuanto al rubro de Daño Moral y fecha de inicio del cómputo de los intereses, rechazándose en todo lo demás, opuestas todas por la sociedad demandada. Razones y artículos referidos supra, SE DECLARA PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR la presente Demanda Ordinaria promovida por [Nombre1] contra BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, declarándose lo siguiente, advirtiéndose que lo omitido expresamente equivale a rechazo expreso: Primero. Que la segunda le generó a la primera una situación dañosa, atribuible a título de culpa. Segundo. Que la segunda debe pagar a la primera los Daños causados con su actuar, a saber, TRES MIL CINCUENTA Y UN DOLARES Y NOVENTA Y SIETE CENTAVOS moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América, y CUARENTA Y TRES MIL CIENTO CINCUENTA Y TRES COLONES. Tercero. Que la segunda debe reconocer intereses legales sobre los anteriores montos, en abstracto a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia, sobre la tasa básica pasiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica para el monto en colones, y sobre la tasa prime rate para el monto en dólares. Se condena a la demandada al pago de ambas costas de este proceso." (Sic).-* * * * * * * * * * * * * 4.- De dicho fallo conoce este Tribunal en virtud de apelación interpuesta por el licenciado Mario Alberto Rodríguez Zamora en su calidad de apoderado especial judicial de la demandada; y por el licenciado Pablo González González en su calidad de apoderado especial de la actora. En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones correspondientes.* * * * * * * * * * * * * REDACTA el Juez OLASO ÁLVAREZ; y,* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CONSIDERANDO:* * * * * * * * * * * * * I.- De un estudio detenido de este asunto, se desprende que la actora formula esta demanda contra "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLAN DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS". En dicha demanda, la accionante, como consumidora del plan de pensiones que ofrece dicha entidad, aduce que, al momento de la contratación, no recibió una información adecuada acerca de los riesgos económicos que estaba asumiendo, en caso de una mala inversión efectuada por la operadora. Aunado a esto, indica que, nunca se le informó que las sumas aportadas al fondo iban a ser invertidas en operaciones bursátiles, lo cual fue efectuado por la entidad demandada, al adquirir bonos de deuda externa del gobierno de Costa Rica. Que al darse la crisis de los fondos de inversión, la entidad demandada, no le comunicó esta situación, lo que le generó graves perjuicios económicos. Alega que la accionada no utilizó una correcta estrategia de "diversificación" de las inversiones, circunstancia que provocó pérdidas excesivas para ella. Que en la cláusula duodécima del convenio se estableció que la entidad accionada debía aplicar, la pericia y esmero necesarios, para asegurar la inversión de las sumas administradas, y que sería responsable por cualquier pérdida, lesión o menoscabo que sufra su clientela por imprudencia o negligencia grave en la recaudación, administración e inversión de los fondos. Con base a ese cuadro fáctico, pide que se condene a la demandada al pago de tres mil cincuenta y un dos dólares, por concepto de daños y perjuicios, cuarenta y tres mil ciento cincuenta y tres colones, más sus intereses desde el momento en que la actora sufrió sus pérdidas económicas hasta su efectiva cancelación, así como se le reconozca un daño moral por el sufrimiento sicológico causado que valora en la suma de cinco millones de colones.* * * * * * * * * * * * * II.- Para el criterio de la mayoría, resulta un hecho trascendental que esta demanda sea dirigida contra la operadora de pensiones complementarias "BN VITAL", sobre todo por aspectos de incompetencia en razón de la materia que a continuación procederemos a exponer. El artículo 97, inciso 1°, de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establece que, los Tribunales de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda son los competentes para conocer los procesos ordinarios que se tramitarán de acuerdo al Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. A su vez, el numeral 1°, inciso 1°, de ese Código establece que esa jurisdicción es la encargada de tutelar las situaciones jurídicas de toda persona, así como garantizar o restablecer cualquier conducta de la Administración Pública sujeta al Derecho Administrativo, así como conocer y resolver los diversos aspectos de la relación jurídico-administrativa. El inciso 3° de esta norma nos aclara que, la administración pública, está conformada por la administración descentralizada, institucional y territorial y todas las demás entidades de derecho público. Aunado a esto, en el caso específico de las operadoras de pensiones complementarias, la ley 7523 del 7 de julio de 1995, en su artículo 63, establece que, una vez agotada la vía administrativa, toda persona que pretenda presentar un reclamo ante este tipo de operadoras, deberá hacerlo ante los tribunales de justicia, de acuerdo con la competencia que establece la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Asimismo, como elemento que nos sirve para dilucidar el aspecto de la competencia en estos casos, tal disposición, señala que, la norma supletoria a este tipo de procesos será la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, particularmente, los principios del procedimiento administrativo. Por otra parte, el artículo 2° del Decreto Ejecutivo número 27503-H del 2 de diciembre de 1998, Reglamento para la Constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de fondos y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del INS, reformado por decreto número 28485, del 21 de febrero del 2000, establece que las operadoras de planes de pensión complementaria de los bancos, tienen el carácter de empresas públicas, a pesar de que su actividad se rija de acuerdo a la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, en cuanto a garantías por volumen de actividad y riesgos asumidos. Interpretando esta norma, la Contraloría General de la República, en su informe 327-2000, indicó: “(...) Por otra parte, el “Reglamento para la constitución de los puestos de bolsa, sociedades administradoras de bolsa y operadoras de pensiones complementarias de los Bancos Públicos y del Instituto Nacional de Seguros”, No. 27503-H del 02 de diciembre de 1998 y sus reformas, establece en el párrafo segundo de su artículo 2, en relación con la figura de la sociedad anónima aplicable en estos casos, que ésta tendrá un carácter de empresa pública. La naturaleza de este tipo de empresa pública fue desarrollada por el Dr. Ortiz Ortiz al indicar: "La sociedad que es propiedad de un ente público -en razón de ser éste el socio único o principal- es pública por esa sola razón, aunque el socio dominante no sea el Estado, sino otro ente público cualquiera. Lo decisivo para imprimir carácter público a un ente -sea o no sociedad mercantil- es la existencia de fines de ese sujeto impuestos a él por la ley o por la Administración. Como ya se dijo, la sociedad es pública porque se convierte en un instrumento de los fines legales, por ello mismo públicos, del ente público socio” E. ORTIZ ORTIZ: La empresa pública como ente público” IVSTITIA, No. 52, año 5, p 8. En consecuencia, debe considerarse que las operadoras de pensiones complementarias y las sociedades administradoras de fondos de inversión son empresas públicas propiedad de la institución pública que les dé origen, cuyas actividades, administración y patrimonio, serán independientes entre sí (...)”.(se agregó el destacado). Al amparo de estas disposiciones y de ese pronunciamiento administrativo se viene a acrecentar el criterio de que este litigio corresponde a la competencia contencioso administrativa y no a la civil. Otro aspecto a tomar en cuenta acá, es la naturaleza de B N VITAL como operadora de pensiones y su relación jurídica con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Dicha naturaleza ya ha sido analizada con anterioridad por parte de órganos como la Contraloría y la Procuraduría General de la República. * * * * * * * * * * * * * III.- En su dictamen 366-2003, la Contraloría General de la República, indicó que los recursos que los organismos públicos autorizados para constituir operadoras de pensiones complementarias utilizan para formar el capital mínimo de constitución de esos entes, son fondos públicos. Es por esto que, al tratarse de recursos financieros propiedad de un ente público, forman parte de la Hacienda Pública (artículo 9 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría). Dicha naturaleza pública no viene a ser modificada por la forma a las que dichas entidades recurren para constitución -por ejemplo, sociedades anónimas-, pues ello no modifica la naturaleza de los fondos que administran. Al respecto, la Contraloría señala que, el criterio para establecer la naturaleza pública de esas operadoras como empresas públicas, surge porque su capital mínimo de constitución y de funcionamiento son fondos públicos. Ya con anterioridad, con ocasión de la creación de una operadora de pensiones complementarias adscrita a un banco estatal, la Procuraduría General de la República -en su dictamen N°183-99-, remarcó que el capital social de esa operadora era de naturaleza pública, ya que solo de esa forma se podía garantizar una gestión transparente de los recursos. Ahora bien, se debe hacer una diferencia entre el capital social de la operadora y los fondos que ella administra que son propiedad de las personas trabajadoras. Ello es importante aquí, pues precisamente la actora pretende cuestionar, por un lado, la falta de información recibida al momento de afiliarse a la operadora accionada y, por otro, la supuesta mala administración de los aportes realizados por ella. De acuerdo, al numeral 52 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, los fondos administrados constituyen patrimonios autónomos que son propiedad de las personas afiliadas, es por esto que a las operadoras se les obliga a tener contabilidades separadas para que los recursos de la entidad no se confunda con los de las personas afiliadas (artículo 53 ibídem). No obstante, dicha administración debe estar sujeta a la Superintendencia de Pensiones, como entidad encargada de supervisar la solvencia y la estabilidad del regímen correspondiente. Independientemente de esta diferencia entre capital administrado y capital constitutivo, lo importante es que, las operadoras de pensiones constituidas por entes públicos no dejan de ser empresas públicas. Al respecto, la Procuraduría, en el dictamen 180-03, indicó:* "Puesto que los criterios fundamentales para determinar si una determinada empresa es pública son la titularidad del capital social y el control sobre las decisiones de la empresa, habría que concluir que las operadoras de pensiones creadas por los entes públicos son empresas públicas…* El objeto social de las operadoras es la administración de los planes y fondos de beneficios y de los beneficios derivados de los sistemas que establece la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, la administración de las cuentas individuales. Se trata de una actividad económica sujeta a las reglas establecidas en dicha Ley. Puede considerarse que las entidades que desarrollan esa actividad constituyen empresas". Esta misma hipótesis fue mantenida por la Sala Constitucional, a través de su Voto número 6531-02. En dicho pronunciamiento, refiriéndose al caso específico del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica y a la posibilidad de constituir sociedades anónimas, conforme al artículo 55 de la Ley del Mercado de Valores, la Sala indicó que, el Poder Legislativo, a través de esa norma, eligió separar la actividad bancaria del esquema universal para acercarlo al "sistema de personalidades jurídicas diversas", dentro del accionar de un ente fundador. O sea, al otorgar la posibilidad de que un banco estatal creara "sociedades anónimas" se autorizó una desconcentración administrativa, para así permitir una "especialización" de la actividad y así separarla del ente fundador (banco estatal). Sin embargo, de acuerdo con la Sala, esa separación no puede ser absoluta. Ello, porque los recursos requeridos para el cumplimiento del fin encomendado a la sociedad por ente fundador y la utilización del nombre comercial de la institución bancaria estatal ofrecen una imagen de integración (por ejemplo, en este caso "BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PENSIONES S.A.", o "BN puesto de Bolsa"). Según la Sala, a diferencia con lo que ocurre con la "desconcentración" pura y simple, la creación de este tipo de personas jurídicas diversas, con la nomenclatura "S.A." dentro del esquema de un ente autónomo, supone separación de la sociedad en cuanto al control del presupuesto y al manejo de los recursos. Ello en principio, porque cuando a estos entes se les denomina "sociedades anónimas" no por ello dejen de ser parte de la institución autónoma a la que pertenecen, ya que, a través de esas sociedades es palpable la finalidad de la entidad cumplir el cometido asignado recurriendo a otras formas jurídicas. Es por ello que esas "sociedades anónimas" no dejan de ser un "instrumento" que el Poder Legislativo pone a disposición de los entes autónomos para que puedan lograr sus fines, y así lograr una competencia eficaz dentro del sistema de mercado con los bancos privados, los cuales sí cuentan con la posibilidad de conformar "grupos de interés económico y financieros". Por ende, de acuerdo a la Sala Constitucional, no es posible desligar la figura de este tipo de "sociedades anónimas" del banco o ente del cual derivan, pues desde el esquema organizativo realizan una actividad especializada del ente y, en principio cuenta con una persona jurídica plena pero se encuentra adscritas a éste -a través de la titularidad de las acciones-. Las operadoras de pensiones creadas por un banco o institución estatal comparten la naturaleza jurídica de su fundador, son empresas creadas por ese ente y en consecuencia, de acuerdo a la Sala Constitucional, pertenecen a la Administración Pública. Es por esas razones que, por mayoría, el Tribunal se declara incompetente y remite este asunto al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José.* * * POR TANTO:* * * * * * * * * * * Por mayoría, el Tribunal se declara incompetente y remite este asunto al Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Juan Carlos Brenes Vargas* * * Abel Jiménez Obando * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jorge Olaso Álvarez* * * * * * * * * * * * El juez JIMÉNEZ OBANDO salva su voto y lo emite así,* * * CONSIDERANDO:* * * * * * * * * * * I.- El apoderado especial judicial de la sociedad demandada apela la sentencia de primera instancia, en lo esencial en su recurso señala que, la resolución recurrida se basa en una premisa fundamental, al indicar que la pérdida en el valor de las inversiones fue por una mala gestión de la accionada, pues en forma excesiva concentró las inversiones del capital administrado en bonos de la deuda pública costarricense y lo anterior produjo una desmedida exposición al riesgo de los recursos del fondo. Esta premisa es errónea- indica el recurrente- ya que el ámbito de actuación de las sociedades administradoras de fondos de pensiones complementarias se encuentra bajo la estricta regulación de diferente normativa y su actividad se encuentra supervisada por la Superintendencia de Pensiones. Además indica que el mercado de valores costarricense es muy particular por la muy reducida oferta de instrumentos de inversiones que ofrece, por lo cual, lo ofrecido por el mercado de valores es prioritariamente valores de la deuda pública del Estado y si la sociedad demandada ha mantenido una disciplina de inversión conforme con los límites que se le establecen, lo que se produjo en el año 2004 fue un ajuste de precios que afectó a la totalidad del mercado financiero costarricense por la disminución del valor de la totalidad de los títulos de la deuda pública costarricense, por lo cual, el ajuste de precios mencionados en los meses de marzo y abril del 2004 afectó a todo el sistema financiero y no por una conducta negligente de la demandada, por lo cual, a la parte actora no tuvo una desmejora en el capital invertido, sino una disminución en el rendimiento.* * * * * * * * * * * * * II.- Este tema, novedoso para la práctica forense, está regulado principalmente en la Ley N°7983, que establece un sistema complementario de las prestaciones de seguridad social que ha estado a cargo de la CCSS; sistema que está llamado a desarrollar una función económica en orden a la colocación del ahorro y por ende, a ser un instrumento para potenciar la economía, como consecuencia del desarrollo de los mercados financieros. El Régimen Obligatorio de Pensiones Complementarias es un sistema de capitalización individual, destinado a complementar los beneficios del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte de la CCSS (artículo 9). Régimen para el cual se hacen aportes conforme lo dispuesto en el artículo 13. Puesto que se trata de un régimen de capitalización, los aportes deben generar rendimientos a favor de los cotizantes o beneficiarios. Aportes y rendimientos son administrados en un fondo, que es un patrimonio absolutamente separado del patrimonio de quien lo administra. Por lo anterior, se desprende de las leyes y reglamentos el interés por desarrollar el sistema financiero, en el país ha llevado a enfatizar en la necesidad de un mercado en que los agentes se desarrollen en un régimen de igualdad de condiciones. Aspecto que se plantea sobre todo en el mercado bursátil y de las pensiones. En efecto, desde la aprobación de la Ley de Régimen Privado de Pensiones Complementarias, N°7523 de 7 de julio de 1995, se postula que la participación de los entes públicos en el mercado de las pensiones complementarias se haga en condiciones de igualdad, de manera que no se falsee la concurrencia. Para ese efecto, se dictan normas dirigidas a mantener la transparencia, la independencia de gestión y la igualdad de participación. En igual forma, se plantea la separación de fondos, de contabilidades y de administración al interno del ente que constituya el plan o fondo de pensión. Además, se dispuso la igual aplicación de criterios sobre reservas, inversiones y riesgo y, en general, de regulación. En ese sentido, cabe afirmar la existencia de un régimen uniforme de funcionamiento tanto para las entidades públicas como privadas. No sólo las normas legales sobre funcionamiento no diferencian la naturaleza de la entidad, sino que la regulación administrativa que se emite pretende una uniformidad de régimen. Así, por ejemplo, las inversiones que pueden realizar las entidades autorizadas están regidas por un conjunto de principios que se imponen a quienes se constituyan en “entidades autorizadas y reguladas” por la Superintendencia, sin que para ese efecto interese la naturaleza pública o privada de la entidad. De ese modo, en materia de inversión de los recursos (artículo 60 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador) la exclusión de las disposiciones de regulación del Banco Central es general, comprensiva de todas las entidades. El deber de invertir los fondos para el beneficio de los trabajadores o el imperativo de seguridad, rentabilidad y liquidez del fondo son uniformes. En igual forma, el régimen de responsabilidad de las operadoras es uniforme (artículos 40 y 41 de la citada Ley). Y obviamente, toda operadora pública o privada se somete a la función reguladora del CONASSIF y de la Superintendencia de Pensiones, aún cuando estos sean órganos desconcentrados del Banco Central. Y ello es así porque para que el mercado funcione eficaz y eficientemente, cualquier operadora de pensiones debe estar sujeta a las mismas disposiciones, ya que la existencia de un régimen jurídico diferente no sólo puede afectar la concreción de los objetivos a que tiende el sistema, sino que puede provocar una diferencia de trato que incida sobre el libre desenvolvimiento de las empresas en el mercado y, por ende, la violación del principio de libre concurrencia. Hay por lo tanto un claro interés del legislador y la legisladora en la libre competencia por medio de sociedades anónimas, según lo establece el artículo 30 de la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, sin embargo, como operadoras de pensiones están sujetas a una estricta regulación dirigida a mantener la solvencia, estabilidad y liquidez del sistema financiero en su conjunto, necesaria para mantener los derechos de las trabajadoras y los trabajadores. En efecto, la regulación busca la solvencia y rentabilidad del sistema, cuyos fondos administran las entidades reguladas. Del estudio del marco normativo, aplicable en este instituto se desprende de manera diáfana una clara motivación de protección a las y los trabajadores en este sistema financiero de fondo complementario de pensiones, que apuesta a no poner en riesgo la totalidad de los aportes que se realizan. Y si hablamos de protección, entra como tema medular la responsabilidad de quienes administran este patrimonio para el presente y futuro de la masa laboral. La Ley citada contempla, en efecto, el principio de responsabilidad subjetiva de las operadoras de estos fondos en la ficción legal de sociedades anónimas, conforme se desprende en el artículo 40: "Responsabilidad Las operadoras y las organizaciones sociales autorizadas responderán solidariamente por los daños y perjuicios patrimoniales causados a los afiliados por actos dolosos o culposos de los miembros de su Junta Directiva, gerentes, empleados y agentes promotores. En el caso de los agentes promotores que tengan una relación laboral o contractual con la operadora, la responsabilidad existe. Las deudas de las operadoras y de las organizaciones sociales autorizadas con el Fondo tendrán privilegio de pago en relación con los acreedores comunes, sin perjuicio de los mayores privilegios que establezcan otras normas. Este privilegio es aplicable en los juicios universales y en todo proceso o procedimiento que se tramite contra el patrimonio del deudor (la negrita y el subrayado es mío)". Por lo anterior, a mí criterio, la operadora de pensiones que causa daños a su cliente está obligada a repararlos conforme lo dispuesto en el Código Civil, cuyo artículo 1045 dispone: "Todo aquél que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios". Es decir, la sociedad anonimato responde civilmente si su conducta fue dolosa o negligente. * * * * * * * * * * * III.- Por las razones expuestas, es que considera el suscrito juez superior que este proceso es de competencia civil y mercantil, ya que las controversias en este caso en particular deriva de la naturaleza mercantil de la relación comercial que une a las partes.* * * POR TANTO:* * * * * * * * * * * Salvo el voto y decido que este proceso es de competencia de los Tribunales Civiles.* Abel Jiménez Obando* * * * * * ORDINARIO N°336-2008. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * [Nombre1] .* Contra* BN VITAL OPERADORA DE PLANES DE PENSIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS, S.A.* acc.-* Juez 1 [Nombre3].* * * * * * * * * 3