Nullity of bakery closure due to municipal arbitrarinessNulidad de cierre de panadería por arbitrariedad municipal

Municipal Appeals Municipal Appeals Plaintiff/ Nombre71456 ( Panadería Mi Pan) Notifications/ Lic. Carlos Arturo Meneses Reyes fax 2278-8416 Defendant/ Municipalidad de San José Notifications/ Lic. Juan Manuel Ramírez Cerdas casillero 189 No. 138- 2009 SECOND SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Goicoechea at eight hours twenty-five minutes on the twenty-fourth of April of the year two thousand nine.- Municipal Appeals accumulated by resolution of ten hours twenty minutes on the eighth of February of two thousand eight (folio 1175 to 1180) filed by Nombre71456 in his capacity as owner of (PANADERÍA MI PAN) against the agreements issued by the CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE SAN JOSÉ, No. 21 article IV, ordinary session of June 6, 2006 (folio 361 to 389); Record 20 article IV ordinary session 58 of June 5, 2007 (folio 718), Agreement 22 article IV ordinary session 44, held on February 27, 2007 (folios 932 to 951 and 1014 to 1033).- Drafted by Judge Jiménez Quesada;

WHEREAS:

I.- PROVEN FACTS: Case File No. 06-308-161-CA. For the resolution of this dispute, the following are taken as proven: 1- That through document number 49830, a land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) was granted to Mr. Nombre71456, for commerce and services authorizing the installation of a commercial electrical meter, said document bearing the stamps of the urban and construction permits section dated April 15, 2004 (folio 2); 2- That within the land-use certificate 0001324, dated August 23, 2004, the following data were recorded "Requested Use Commerce and Services Sale of Bread (Bakery), for the purpose "License (Patente)", name of applicant Nombre71456 . In the office use space it was indicated "Land-use regulation (Reglamento de uso de suelo) in its articles No. 22, for zone ZMRC (mixed residential commercial zone). Requested Use Bakery (200m), observations and conditions 1 parking space for every 50 m of construction, map 0097, parcel 0117, resolution Conditional Use (folio 5); 3- That according to the license application processing receipt No. 36428 in the name of Mr. Nombre71456 for Panadería Mi Pan, in the space assigned to the administration it was indicated "land-use 1324 of August 23, 2004 map 97 parcel 117 (folio 12); 4- That through notification record number 30616 at 2 hours 32 minutes on December 15, 2004, the appellant was warned to present a Health Permit and proof of being current in the payment of municipal taxes (folio 15); That on January 25, 2005, through memorandum Placa11627, Mr. Nombre71456 was informed that he must present a Health Permit and proof of being current in tax payments, otherwise the premises would be closed (folio 209 to 215); 5- That on February 16, 2005, the Municipalidad de San José, specifically the Department of Licenses (Departamento de Patentes), issued commercial license number C-0006157-02 in the name of Nombre71456, to authorize the business called PANADERÍA MI PAN, located at Dirección7973, to carry out activity 267 BAKERY/ PASTRY SHOP (see folio 1061 of the record); 6- On November 16, 2005, the Head of the Department of Licenses sent a note to the Head of the Environment Section, indicating that since complaints had been filed regarding the operation of a license at Dirección7974 for the establishment Panadería Mi Pan, she requested to please review the following: a) Determine the type of activity currently being carried out at the establishment; b) due to the activity being carried out, verify if it has the adequate furniture, equipment, and structure to develop said activity; c) determine if, as a result of that activity, adverse effects are triggered for its neighbors (folio 51); 7- That on that same date, a note was also sent to the Head of the Inspection Area, in order to verify, due to the complaints filed against the establishment Panadería Mi Pan, the following: a) Verify the permits that support the operation b) verify the activity currently being carried out in detail; c) measure the area in which the activity is carried out; d) type of equipment and furniture used to develop the activity; e) identify the neighboring businesses; f) any other information in this regard (folio 52); 8- That through official letter No. 72673 notified to Mr. Nombre71456, on November 21, 2005, the Inspector of the Department of Licenses of the Municipalidad de San José, ordered the closure of the premises and proceeded to place seals on Panadería Mi Pan (see recital at folio 91); 9- By brief of November 22, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against the closure ordered through official letter No. 72673 (folio 69); 10- By resolution of nine hours ten minutes on the twentieth of January two thousand six, the Department of Licenses resolved "From the analysis of the administrative file, this office resolves to deny the motion for reversal filed by Mr. Nombre71456 and notification 72673 of November 21, 2005 is confirmed. And the administrative file is forwarded to the office of (sic) the Mayor of San José, for their cognizance of the Appeal, where they must direct their arguments within a period of five peremptory business days" (folio 91 and 92); 11- That on February 8, 2006, the Office of the Municipal Mayor, hearing the appeal, resolved "Based on the foregoing, legal norms and principles, as well as the cited Jurisdictional, Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this Mayor's Office states that, as there is no non-conformity with the legal system, it DENIES the appeal on the merits and confirms the decision of the Department of Licenses (reversal) and maintains in any case the original contested act contained in official letter No. 72673 notified on November 21, 2005, the arguments raised by the appellant Company being inadmissible and the contested act being consequently in accordance with Law. This resolution fully responds to all the petitions filed" the matter is also elevated to the Municipal Council (folio 133 to 156); 12- In a document dated February 27, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 filed a motion for reversal with appeal before the Municipal Council in accordance with article 161 of the Municipal Code against the decision on folio 109 (folio 215 to 222); 13- That by agreement number 21, article IV, ordinary session No. 6 of June 6, 2006, the Municipal Council ordered "Based on the arguments outlined above and as it results from illegality (sic) to deny the appeal filed by Mr. Nombre71456 owner of the business called Panadería Mi Pan, confirming in all its aspects resolution 4141 of the Office of the Municipal Mayor" (folio 301 to 304); 14- In a writ dated August 15, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Hierarchical Superior Contentious-Administrative body against the aforementioned agreement (folio 306); 15- That by Municipal agreement number 41 article IV, of ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006, it was ordered "In view of the foregoing, legal norms and principles, as well as the cited Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this Directorate concludes and so recommends to this Commission and consequently to the Municipal Council that, as there is no substantive non-conformity of the contested administrative act with the legal system, it is proper to deny the motion for reversal on the merits, confirming the resolution issued by the Municipal Council through Municipal Agreement No. 21 article IV of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006, maintaining in any case the original act according to official letter No. 72673 of November 21, 2005, issued by the Department of Licenses, the appellant's arguments consequently being inadmissible nor possible that requested from this Town Hall as it lacks legal basis for such effect, the appeal is admitted and the interested party is summoned" (folio 361 to 389).- II.- Case File No. 07-249-161-CA.- 16.- That through notification 76158 at 15:40 hours on February twenty-fourth, 2006, the closure of the business called "Panadería Mi Pan" was ordered (folio 475); 17- On March 3, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 filed a motion for reversal and appeal against the aforementioned notification (folio 470 to 478); 18- That in a resolution of ten hours thirty-nine minutes on the fourth of September two thousand six, the Department of Licenses ordered "The motions are denied as inadmissible due to their inadmissibility, given that, as indicated, the appealed administrative act is an act of execution and confirmation and ratification of previous ones, already resolved by this Municipality when the appellant filed the motion in due time, and they deal with the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein" (folio 490 to 496); 19- That the Municipal Mayor, by order of 14:00 hours on September 8, 2006, hearing the appeal, resolved "The inadmissibility of the motions filed as manifestly (sic) raised by the Department of Licenses is confirmed, therefore the motions are denied as inadmissible insofar as it was not indicated (sic) the appealed administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation and ratification of previous ones already resolved by this Municipality when the motions were filed in due time by the appellant and which deal with the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein. Therefore, what was resolved by this office in official letter 1570, resolution 4141 and Municipal agreement 21, article iv of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006 is ratified. The appellant shall abide by what was resolved on the merits by this Municipality" (folio 478 to 485); 20- On September 14, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456, presented a motion for reversal and in the alternative an appeal by avocation (apelación por avocación) for cognizance by the superior, against the foregoing ruling (folio 507 to 509 and 518 to 519); 21- That by resolution of 11:00 hours on November 6, 2006, the Municipal Mayor, hearing the appeal of order No. 7975, resolves "In view of the foregoing, legal norms and principles as well as the cited Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this office concludes that, as there is no substantive non-conformity of the contested administrative act with the legal system, it is proper to deny the motion for reversal on the merits, confirming resolution 7975 of 14:00 hours on September 8, 2006, which is also supported by the agreements of the Municipal Council No. 21 article iv of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006 and agreement 41 of Ordinary Session 17 of August 22, 2006, maintaining in any case the original act according to official letter No. 72673 of November 21, 2005, issued by the Department of Licenses, the appellant's arguments consequently being inadmissible nor possible that requested from this Town Hall as it lacks legal basis for such effect. Likewise, the inadmissibility of the motions that gave rise to the motion and resolution issued herein is confirmed, given that, as indicated, the appealed administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation and ratification of previous ones already resolved by this Municipality when the motions were filed in due time by the appellant and which deal with the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein. Therefore, what was resolved by this office in official letter 1570, resolution 4141 and Municipal agreement 21, article IV of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006 and agreement 41 of August 22, 2006, already cited above, is ratified. The resolution is hereby elevated for cognizance by the Municipal Council who will hear it pursuant to criterion DAJ 5498-9-2006 of the Directorate of Legal Affairs" (folio 520 to 546); 22- That by Municipal agreement number 20, article IV, of ordinary session 58 held on June 5, 2006, it was ordered "To deny the appeal against the act contained in official letter 7975, issued both on procedural and substantive grounds, confirming resolution 9676, issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and maintaining in any case the original contested act" (folio 718 to 748); 23- By agreement 27 article IV of ordinary session number 67 of August 7, 2007, the Municipal Council regarding official letter 7975 original act notification 76158 of February 24, 2006, ordered "In order for the Third Section of the Superior Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, improper hierarchical superior, to hear the appeal, the file must be certified chronologically and remitted within a period of 8 business days to said authority in accordance with Article 51 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction consistent with Article 156 of the Municipal Code" (folio 7879).- III.- Case File No. 07-257-161-CA.- 24- On February 10, 2006, at the request of the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre71456, presented an extension of commercial license in the name of PANADERÍA MI PAN, in order to indicate as the specific activity BREAD MAKING (folio 852); 25- On February 10, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 was notified of document No. 31080, in order to provide his residence card and health permit for the processing of the license extension (folio 849); 26- That in land-use certificate number 0000658 in the name of Nombre71456, in the office use space it was recorded "Land-use Regulation in its articles 72, for zone ZR-2, requested use Bread Making, 235 meters, in observations and conditions it was noted "Bakery with more than 25 meters of useful area is not allowed, map 97, parcel 0117100, resolution Use not allowed (folio 854); 27- That through a document dated February 28, 2006 Placa11626, the Department of Licenses communicated to Mr. Nombre71456 the denial of the license extension request, indicating that according to land-use certificate number 0000658 of 02/20/2006, issued by the Construction Permits Section, it was resolved as USE NOT ALLOWED (folio 863); 28- On March 1, 2006, the claimant filed a motion for reversal and appeal against the denial of the extension of the License for PANADERÍA MI PAN (folio 869 to 872); 29- By official letter dated November 22, 2006, the decision of the Mayor's Office was communicated to Mr. Nombre71456, the relevant part being as follows: "In view of the cited legal norms and principles, this Mayor's Office DENIES THE APPEAL on the merits, confirming resolution No. ALDP-1-013-2006 issued by the Department of Licenses (reversal) and maintaining in any case the original contested act contained in official letter No. Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006, the appellant's arguments consequently being inadmissible nor possible that requested from this Town Hall as it lacks legal basis for such effect. The administrative petitions filed are hereby fully answered, namely the appeal (March 1, 2006) and unnumbered writ (October 27, 2006) processing of the appeal for denial of license extension" (folio 874 to 890); 30- That by writ dated November 30, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal against the denial of license extension by the Mayor's Office (folio 892 to 895); 31- That in agreement 22 article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007, the Municipal Council, regarding the filed appeal, ordered "To deny the appeal on the merits, confirming resolution 10215 issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and maintaining in any case the original contested act contained in official letter Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006, the appellant's arguments consequently being inadmissible nor possible that requested from this Town Hall as it lacks legal basis for such effect (folio 932 to 951 and 1014 to 1033); 32- That in ordinary session number 60, held on June 19, 2007, agreement 20 article V, the Municipal Corporation ordered "The appeal before the Hierarchical Superior, Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal is admitted" (folio 1041); 33- That on February 23, 2006, the Ministry of Health granted an operating permit to the business called PANADERÍA MI PAN, to carry out the activity of bread making and sale (folio 1097).- IV.- UNPROVEN FACTS: 1- That the activity carried out by the plaintiff is contrary to the one authorized by license number C-00006157-02 (no proof was provided in this regard); 2- That Panadería Mi Pan, located on map 0097, parcel 01171000, is in a Residential Zone (from the record).- V.- GROUNDS FOR THE APPEAL: The appellant requests that this Tribunal rule on whether, for the specific case of PANADERÍA MI PAN, a request for license extension was required to indicate the term "making", in a bakery where its sale was already authorized. That as the owner of the Bakery, he went to request the license extension at the suggestion of the Department of Licenses in notification 000282 which, in the relevant part, states "on the other hand, the appellant must proceed to request an extension of the commercial activity and include within their registered activity the manufacturing of the product and (sic) in this way correct their commercial activity". He requests a ruling on the scope of the Law on Taxes and Licenses for Profitable Activities and Law number 5694 on municipal tax tariffs of the Central Canton of San José since we are facing a change or extension of the license, from sale of bread to making and sale, the point being that both activities are indissolubly linked. That it cannot be said that the place where the Bakery is located is ZR-2 as the Municipality classifies it, but rather as it was indicated in the first license (ZMRC), that the regulations on which the Municipal Administration relies to qualify and classify urban zones as residential, mixed or industrial must be clear, whether the Urban Regulatory Plan, or the autonomous regulatory decrees, or the classification of activities for licenses and the Land-use Regulation (Reglamento de Uso de Suelo). That the Municipality should be told that the license obtained covers the authorization to make and sell bread, as corresponds to the age-old practice of Bakeries, that the Municipality's actions do not conform to the truth, that all requirements were met. That the urban zone in which the operating license for Panadería Mi Pan was granted at the time of its issuance was indicated as a mixed urban zone, for commerce and residence. That it is not true that the profitable activity carried out is contrary to that stipulated in the commercial license granted by said Municipality, that it holds a subjective right, it is not possible to say that a Bakery is only intended to sell bread and not to make it.

VI- APPEALS IN MUNICIPAL MATTERS. It is necessary, due to the errors found within the resolutions issued by the Council and the Mayor's Office of the Municipal Corporation of San José, to recall the appeal process in this matter, which will be done, of course, without considering the modification introduced by the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, not applicable to this case according to its Transitory IV, since the present conflict must be elucidated with the regulations prior to the enactment of the cited Code, in order for the Council and the Mayor to have a broader vision of the manner in which appeals must be resolved in matters within their knowledge and application. As indicated by the commentator Nombre71457, in the article entitled Administrative appeals in Municipal matters and the function of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal published in the journal Ivstitia. Year 14. No. 162-163 June - July 2002, namely "In municipal matters, the principle of administrative procedure set forth in article 350, paragraph 1 of the General Law of Public Administration is broken, in the sense that there shall be, in any case, a single instance of appeal whatever the origin or provenance of the contested administrative act. That principle, which limits appeals in the administrative procedure, has evident and important justifications such as the pyramidal or vertical structure of the administrative organization, a circumstance that would oblige the administered party, when the act is issued by a lower-ranking body, to have to go through all the steps of the hierarchical line in order to exhaust the administrative channel and, in this way, have the possibility of accessing the jurisdictional channel. Evidently, the principle and the norm that formalizes it have a constitutional rationale that lies in facilitating the administered party's access to effective judicial protection (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since, otherwise, they would be forced to walk the via crucis of the entire, complex, hermetic and chaotic administrative organization of the entity that issued the administrative act that disadvantages them, which, obviously, they are not obliged to know, since it is an internal matter that is the object of autonomous or independent organizational regulations. As we shall see below, in municipal matters, the administered party may, eventually, be exposed to the ordeal of passing through administrative instances when dealing with acts issued by bodies subordinate to the Municipal Mayor. The idea of the ladder of appeals in the municipal sphere is not peaceful, since it has been maintained that with respect to those agreements emanating from bodies that do not directly depend on the Council, the one who hears the appeal -the mayor- is the one who exhausts the administrative channel. This interpretation presents a problem in that matters of transcendental importance could exist that would never be heard by the Council or by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal itself, which has avoided the filing of many ordinary contentious-administrative processes before the Contentious-Administrative Court. The interested parties referred to in article 173, subsection 2), of the Political Constitution may file motions for reversal with a subsidiary appeal. Both motions must be filed in a writ setting forth the grounds and reasons for the disagreement with the contested agreement and must be filed within five days (articles 153 and 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code). In this regard, it is convenient to recall some norms of the General Law of Public Administration that, although located in the Second Book, constitute hermeneutic parameters, even in municipal matters. It is optional for the administered party to use both motions (reversal with subsidiary appeal) or only one of them (appeal); if the first option is chosen, the appeal will be processed once the reversal is denied (article 347 of the General Law of Public Administration). In application or specification of the guiding principle of the administrative procedure called informality in favor of the administered party, the appeals do not require a special wording or claim, it being sufficient for their correct formulation that the petition for challenge or review of the agreement is clearly derived from their content and text (article 224 in accordance with 348 of the General Law of Public Administration). Reversal. Reversal is a horizontal appeal filed before the very body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested party or appellant, so that it reconsiders its content and revokes, modifies, or confirms it. That is, if the one who issued the agreement is the Department of Licenses, Taxes, Engineering, or the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, this means of challenge must be filed before the respective office. Appeal. Appeal is a vertical appeal heard by the superior in rank of the body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested party or appellant, so that it may annul, modify, or confirm the act. Thus, if the one who issued the agreement is the Department of Licenses, the appeal must be heard by the Municipal Mayor. Appeals against agreements directly issued by the Municipal Council. Ordinary appeals. Title VI of the Municipal Code is entitled "Appeals against Municipal acts", nevertheless it is subdivided into two chapters, the first is called "Appeals against Council agreements". In accordance with article 153, interested parties may file ordinary motions for reversal and appeal. Both motions must be filed in a reasoned brief and within a period of five days from notification of the agreement. The motion for reversal may be based on grounds of legality and opportunity, merit, or convenience, and the appeal is admissible solely for reasons of illegality. It is necessary to recall that pursuant to article 351, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration, the administrative appeal -in an administrative procedure- may be resolved by the competent body even to the detriment of the appellant -reformatio in pejus- when it concerns an absolute nullity. The reason for this rule lies in the superior protection of public interest and the objective legality that must exist in this matter. The appeal filed against an agreement of the municipal Council corresponds to be heard, by biphasic improper hierarchy, by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal -a body attached to the Judicial Branch based in the second judicial circuit (sic) of San José, Goicoechea- (articles 156, paragraph 2, of the Municipal Code and 1, subsection b, of Law No. 7274 of December 10, 1991 -Law for the Creation of the Third Section of the Superior Contentious-Administrative Tribunal-), which is the tribunal referred to in article 173 of the Political Constitution. When hearing, the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, as improper hierarch or non-hierarchical controller, is governed by the provisions of articles 180 and 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this regard, the last cited numeral indicates that "The non-hierarchical controller may review only the legality of the act and by virtue of an administrative appeal, and shall decide within the limits of the claims and questions of fact raised by the appellant, but may apply a rule not invoked in the appeal". From this perspective, article 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code is consistent with the provisions of 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. The Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, for its part, has maintained that its competence extends solely to the legality of the agreement (Among others, see Rulings (Votos) Nos. 3328-94 of 7:00 hrs. on November 7, 1994, 4457-95 of 10:45 hrs. on October 9, 1995 and 4655-95 of 10:00 hrs. on December 6, 1995). However, the interpretation of such norms cannot be literal and categorical -review of legality-, since, in our legal system, the limits of discretion are fully formalized. Indeed, article 15 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that discretion is subject, in any case, to the limits imposed, expressly or implicitly, by the legal system so that its exercise is reasonable and efficient. Meanwhile, articles 16 and 17 of that regulatory body set express limits for the exercise of discretionary power such as the unequivocal or exactly applicable rules of science and technique, the elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience, and the fundamental rights of the administered party. Article 16, paragraph 2, itself indicates that the judge must exercise control or supervision of discretion, based on such meta-legal limits, "as if exercising legality control". Finally, there is no doubt that in our legal system the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion established in articles 16 and 17 of the General Law of Public Administration form part of the legality parameter or block for determining the validity or invalidity of an administrative act.

Regarding this matter, Article 158, paragraph 4, of the General Law on Public Administration provides that "Technical and scientific rules of unequivocal meaning and exact application, under the circumstances of the case, shall be understood as incorporated into the legal system for this purpose." In turn, numeral 160 prescribes that "A discretionary act shall also be invalid when it violates elementary rules of logic, justice, or convenience, as indicated by the circumstances of each case." Consequently, since the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion form part of the legality parameter—having been positivized—the non-hierarchical controller must also control their transgression. Thus, according to a systematic interpretation, the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal must review aspects of opportunity, convenience, or merit." The foregoing is because, upon observing the agreements under review, in many of them the Department of Patents, the Mayor, or the Municipal Council initially indicate that the APPEAL IS REJECTED on the merits (folios 130, 156, 503, 715, 748, 915, 1010, 1033) and then proceed to forward the appeal to the immediate Superior when, according to the above, the correct procedure is that if the revocation and appeal are filed before the Patents Section, it must only reject the revocation appeal and admit the appeal for the Mayor, and the Mayor, upon receiving the appeal, rejects the revocation and admits the appeal for the Superior in grade, the Municipal Council, which in turn, upon receiving the revocation with appeal, rejects the revocation and admits the appeal for the hierarchical superior and summons the parties. However, the territorial entity in most cases rejects the appeal and then forwards it to the superior for its knowledge, opening the competence of this collegiate body, and by virtue of this, this Tribunal takes cognizance of the challenged agreements in the following considerandos, but not before making the correct procedure known to the territorial Municipal entity of San José.

VII- REGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY: (principle of juridicity of the administration): It implies that the Public Administration does not act when it wants, but only when there is a written principle or norm that allows it. Its action is not free; it must follow a process already pre-established by the legal system, thereby authorizing its action. The administration's primary subjection is that every act or behavior of the administration that affects the rights of the individual must be authorized by the legal system. The administration can and must do only what is legally established for it. This permissiveness or authorization has constitutional and legal standing as provided by Article 11 of the Magna Carta and developed by the same numeral in our General Law on Public Administration; therefore, it is said that what is not authorized is prohibited. As a consequence of the administration's submission to the legal system, there is the possibility of controlling its conduct, by the jurisdictional sphere (Judge) in pure and simple respect and application of the constitutional maxim of Article 49, so that the breach of this principle is sanctioned by the liability of the State and its officials, set forth in numeral 9 of our Political Constitution. The legality block is composed not only of the law but, in the first place, by the Constitutionality block (constitutional rights and principles), and also by all written norms (regulations, decrees, directives, and others) and unwritten norms (customs or administrative practices, jurisprudence, and principles of law that make up that legal system). This principle cannot be ignored by the Public Administration, since an action carried out outside the legality block becomes illegal and null, with the natural, procedural, and legal consequences of such a declaration.- VIII.- REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: We must understand discretion as the power granted to public entities to adopt decisions based on criteria that are not strictly legal—for example, criteria of a political, social, organizational, technical nature, or of mere opportunity and convenience—depending on the specific case; without this power being in any way estimable as one denoting arbitrary will, insofar as the following parameters constitute true limits to this power: 1.- The purpose of the Administration; 2.- Reasonableness, also called the principle of the interdiction of arbitrariness, which obliges the analysis of the legitimation, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense of the measure or provision adopted by the Administration; 3.- Respect for fundamental rights, by virtue of which it constitutes a true bulwark of the exercise of powers of imperium, precisely considering that one of the essential and own characteristics of the Social and Democratic State of Law (constitutional Articles 1, 9, 50, and 74) is precisely the recognition of fundamental rights; 4.- The general principles of law, such as equity, equality, justice, legal certainty, good administration, non-retroactivity, good faith; which, according to the provisions of Article 7 of the General Law on Public Administration, are a source of law, as unwritten norms, and therefore, conditioning factors for the exercise of the Administration's discretionary power; 5.- The unequivocal rules of science and technique, which oblige the Administration to ensure its actions are duly motivated by the acquired theoretical knowledge from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique, when so warranted—as is the case in environmental, health, and tax matters, without it being possible to claim this is a closed list or numerus clausus—, as well as in cases where it must use criteria proper to administrative technique. In the application of these criteria, it is impossible to claim the existence of discretion unrestrictedly and absolutely, since the will of the Administration does not depend on its free will (or choice), but on the objective assessments obtained in accordance with the technical rules applicable to the case; hence the concepts of administrative discretion and technical discretion behave as absolutely irreconcilable scenarios; because discretionary power belongs to the volitional field, while the technical concept entails a declaration of truth, a judgment, that is, knowledge, on the basis that the content of technical assessments acquires a regulated character of administrative activity, as true legal norms, which reduce the margin of discretion. In the application of indeterminate legal concepts, understood as those referring to a sphere of reality whose limits are not well defined in their statement, despite which it is clear they attempt to delimit a concrete scenario such as public interest, urgency or necessity, good faith, among others. So that the administration has its own scope of decision comparable to discretion, as these are scenarios in which there is no diversity of options for the Administration, because at the moment of its application a concrete precision is required that only admits a single possible legal solution (unity of just solution), charged, first to the Administration, and failing that, to the judge—when reviewing such scenarios, who will determine if the factual scenario is subsumable or not within the indeterminate concept. For this reason, it must be estimated that even though they are called indeterminable legal principles, they are determinable as to their content. By virtue of which, although the Administration has a certain margin of appreciation—not of discretion—in the application of these concepts, in the end its action will be limited to applying the law (which uses criteria of value or experience), since the technique of indeterminate legal concepts deals with "... subsuming into a legal category (configured, despite its impreciseness of limits, with the intention of delimiting a concrete scenario) certain determined real circumstances; precisely for this reason it is a regulated process, which is exhausted in the intellective process of understanding a reality in the sense that no decision of the applicator's will interferes, as is proper for one who exercises a discretionary power." It is in the application of the previous parameters that it can be affirmed that the reduction to zero of administrative discretion occurs, insofar as the Administration's decision is conditioned to a single possible solution. It must be taken into account that "The differences between the two can be summarized as follows: 1) in technical discretion there is never any weighting or choice between interests; 2) in technical discretion the Administration resorts to the use of technical criteria; and 3) while in administrative discretion judgment and will coexist, in technical discretion, an activity of mere judgment is performed in which the will does not intervene in any way." (Desdentado Nombre71458, Nombre50780. The problems of judicial control of technical discretion. (A critical study of jurisprudence). Here it is important to mention the following administrative maxim "«When there is discretion, one can never speak of technique, and when there is technique, one can never speak of discretion», because, «the technical is not valued, but it can be verified. The discretionary is not verified, but rather it is valued»" (Nombre71459 . Treatise on Administrative Law. Volume I. Third edition. p. 453. Cited by Nombre71460 . The Discretion of the Tax Administration: its special incidence in the inspection procedure. Mc.Graw-Hill. Madrid. Spain. 1998). This is to clarify that although it is true that decisions, actions, and administrative omissions are imbued with a great degree of discretion, it is true that when technical evidence exists, it cannot be disregarded; therefore, the administration must not only take into account the legal criteria on which its action is based, but in those data that give rise to Administrative Discretion as a prerogative of the public entity, it must be carried out with the parameters noted above, since discretion outside of these can be seen as arbitrariness; the discretion of public action cannot be taken as a parameter of administrative illegality nor as a per se authorization for the public entity to deviate from the legality block.

IX- REGARDING MOTIVATION: Within administrative tutelage is immersed the right of every person, duly legitimated by a violated right, to have their conflict resolved concretely and clearly, which is materialized through administrative acts or actions. Therefore, within administrative tutelage, we can locate the right to obtain a reasoned resolution, so that the intervening or affected parties understand the factual and legal grounds by which their conflict was settled. As part of the principle of due process (rulings 15-90 and 1789-92 of the Constitutional Chamber) and as an essential element of every administrative act, we have motivation, meaning that the party must know concretely the regulations on which the Administration bases its obligations; in such a way that when the aggrieved administered party requests a readjustment of that conduct, they are informed of the legal norms that sustain, approve, and legitimize the contested action. Therefore, all administrative conduct, whatever it may be and regardless of its nature, materialized in an administrative act (resolution) must be duly motivated and reasoned, providing full satisfaction of all claims or allegations made by the parties involved in the process, or as in the present case, the legal reason why a patent application is rejected, the land-use is changed from one application to another, or the respect or non-respect of a right already granted by the territorial entity. It is clear, then, that the resolutions issued within the administrative process, whatever it may be, must be conceived as a clear exposition of the constitutional principle of administrative tutelage derived from Article 41 of the Political Constitution; therefore, administrative conduct insofar as it limits or restricts rights must be duly motivated, without infractions of Constitutional Rights (due process), so that it meets each and every expectation of whoever requests the fulfillment of an administrative conduct, in order to know the set of factual and legal antecedents that justify the decision taken by the public entity, its omission constituting nullity of the proceedings as provided in Articles 133, 158, and 166 of the General Law on Public Administration.- X.- REGARDING THE LAND-USE CERTIFICATE: Local urban plans, according to Article 21, subsection 1) of the Urban Planning Law, perform the ordering and determination of land use, for better distribution and protection of the environment. This means that the use of real property can be conditioned through the delimitation of areas, according to the categorization adopted by the regulatory plan, so a property within the Municipal orbit may have a use different from the owner's desire, according to its zoning. Regulatory plans determine the location where one can build, carry out commercial activities, industry, recreation areas, based not only on criteria of opportunity and convenience, but on technical and objective pronouncements approved by the community. The designation of land use is carried out through its classification, which is the category or type of land (urban, developable, non-developable, and others) according to its basic urban purpose, and its qualification, which is applied to designate the subdivision (fraccionamiento) of those types of land, through urban development uses (residential or industrial zones), whether in total or partial percentages, including according to the population densities of a given community. It is clear, then, that the administrative action tending to carry out zoning within land use is a primordial power of the State, delegated to the Municipalities (Article 169 of the Political Constitution, developed in Article 16 of the Urban Planning Law). A task that does not imply detriment or injury to property rights, as this is a relative attribution, according to urban regulations. Through this administrative manifestation, guidelines can be legally established for the use of property rights, in strict relation to the needs of the community, and with oversight of their rights and the environment, in order to achieve harmonious land planning. This classification, according to Article 24 of the Urban Planning Law, must be carried out by means of a regulation with the normative force of Law (see ruling No. 263-2008 of the Second Section of this Tribunal), which must contain: a) the determination of land uses; b) matters relating to the location, height, and building area of constructions; c) the surface area and dimensions of lots, which has a direct impact on determining land density; d) the size of setbacks, yards, and other open spaces, and lot coverage by buildings and structures; e) the provision of space for parking, loading, and unloading of vehicles off-street; f) size, location, and characteristics of signs or advertisements; and g) any other architectural or urban detail related to land use, whose regulation is of interest to the local community. As indicated, all urban planning regulations translate into limitations and detractions of the owners' uses and powers over the property, insofar as they determine land use and how that utilization should occur. This task is materialized through the administrative act called land-use certification, which due to its importance, is qualified as a declaratory administrative act, in the sense that it is limited to proving a particular fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it, so its content is constitutive, as it does not create or modify previously established legal situations. The Attorney General's Office of the Republic, in opinions No. C-327-2001 and C-357-2003, classifies them as concrete legal acts through which the local Administration certifies the conformity or not of the land use with what is established in the respective zoning; as provided in Article 28 of the Urban Planning Law, which states:

"Article 28.- It is prohibited to use or dedicate land, buildings, or structures to any use that is incompatible with the implemented zoning. Henceforth, interested owners must obtain a municipal certificate that certifies the conformity of use with the zoning requirements. Existing non-conforming uses must also be recorded with a certificate expressing such circumstance. Each zoning regulation shall set the date from which said certificates shall be mandatory." Thus, through the "land-use certificate," it is certified whether the use is permitted or not, relative to what is intended by the applicant. Therefore, its nature is declaratory, and not constitutive; land-use certificates do not, by themselves, give rise to a subjective right nor consolidate, by themselves, any legal situation by reason of a pre-existing right or legal situation." (Nombre70871. . Urban Regulations, 2004). Land-use certification is merely descriptive regarding a determined factual situation in relation to what is provided under legal norm, by reason of which, its issuance does not consolidate a legal situation pre-existing the certifying act. From the foregoing, it is clear that the land-use certificate constitutes a prerequisite required for the granting of a license, without its procurement being exemptible.

XI.- REGARDING MUNICIPAL LICENSES: Municipal Licenses constitute an act that authorizes a person or entity to exercise a right; in other words, it tolerates or permits some activity to be carried out in a specific place circumscribed to the Municipal entity with competence to grant the permit or license. In the case of Municipalities, they are legitimated for such purposes in accordance with Articles 79, 80, and 81 of the Municipal Code; thus, Article 79.- establishes "To exercise any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid for the entire time the lucrative activity was exercised or for the time the license was held, even if the activity was not carried out. Regarding the patent tax, through which activities subject to Municipal license are taxed, the Constitutional Chamber, through Vote number 2197-92 at 14:30 hours on August 11, 1992, has stated "... Our legislation distinguishes between the license proper, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax proper, which is denominated with the name of patent. The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the traditional one in the municipal law environment, which defines it as the imperative need to defray the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality (...)”" In turn, numeral 80 establishes "The municipality must resolve license applications within a maximum period of thirty calendar days, counted from their submission. Once the term has expired and the requirements met without any response from the municipality, the applicant may establish their activity; and Article 81 literally states "The municipal license referred to in the previous article may only be denied when the activity is contrary to the law, morals, or good customs, when the establishment has not fulfilled the legal and regulatory requirements, or when the activity, by reason of its physical location, is not permitted by the laws or, failing that, by the current municipal regulations"." As is easily appreciable, the foregoing regulation does not depart from that developed in Articles 329, 330 subsection 2), and 331 of the General Law on Public Administration. As a first step, the applicant requests the authorization from their jurisdictional municipality to carry out a specific activity, presenting all the requirements that the administration must have previously defined; once presented, an inspection is carried out to determine its location, thus issuing the authorization act, which materializes when the physical patent is delivered to the administered party, on which is recorded the will of the Administration to grant or permit the requested activity, and therefore, the administered party proceeds to begin their lucrative activity. With that authorization, the administered party acquires a subjective right, which does not imply that the authorizing administration (for the simple reason of being before pre-existing subjective rights) ties its hands, so that once the rights are declared, it cannot exercise its powers of tutelage and control over the use and enjoyment of the license or authorization. Its original prerogative, as the Administration, to satisfy and ensure public interests does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implied, of the authorization; it could be said that, in essence, its power to revoke or annul duly authorized licenses or approvals does not disappear, which it could do in accordance with the legality block, through the lesivity process, as provided in numeral 173 of the General Law on Public Administration, or through a declaration in the administrative sphere of an evident and manifest nullity, following the procedure for that purpose.

XII- REGARDING THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACTS: The exercise carried out in the preceding considerandos on the principle of legality, administrative discretion, the nature of the land-use certification, and municipal licenses is not gratuitous, since all these elements are necessary for the understanding of what this Tribunal concludes in the present case. First, it is based on the premise that the land-use permit is a certifying act, meaning it certifies a specific situation, pre-existing in accordance with urban regulations. Here, the Municipality of San José issues land-use certificate No. 1324 (folio 5) in favor of Mr. Nombre71456, where it is indicated that it is for ZMRC, translated into Spanish, Mixed Residential and Commercial Zone, located on map 0097, parcel 01171000, a prerequisite for the issuance of Commercial Patent number C-00006157-02 in favor of his commercial business PANADERÍA MI PAN, which also clearly indicates that the activity to be carried out is No. 276 (Bakery/ Pastry), a declaration that translates as a subjective right in favor of Mr. Nombre71456. Subsequently, a series of complaints are filed against the referenced business, and then the Department of Patents sends several notes to verify the legality of the activity (proven facts 8 and 9, folios 51 and 52), in exercise of the control and supervision powers inherent to its activity, an action that cannot be branded as disproportionate, illegal, or abusive; on the contrary, it is duly authorized and legitimated by the principle of legality. What does not seem real or consistent with legality is the motivation given for making the decision to deny the patent expansion application, the ordered closure, and the de-authorization of the activity carried out. The insistent and repeated support—in apparent legality—of the territorial entity for the closure of the business PANADERÍA MI PAN is that the plaintiff was carrying out an unauthorized activity since the patent was for selling bread and not for making it, an argument that can even be branded as laughable, since as recorded on folio 1061 of the present process, the commercial patent was granted to perform the work of Bakery and Pastry, terms that, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language of the Royal Academy, twentieth edition, mean: "Panadería: Office of Baker, site, house, or place where bread is made or sold, Repostería. Art and office of pastry cook. Person whose office is to make pastries, sweets, and some drinks," Therefore, the work that Mr. Nombre71456 performed in his premises, sale and production of bread, is consistent with the authorized work (Bakery and pastry); this Tribunal reaches this conclusion without needing a great display of intelligence or reasonableness, concluding that the territorial entity's argument violates the limits of discretion and the principle of legality, but further, it does not conform to the legal procedure established for revoking a declaratory act of rights such as the commercial patent legally granted in its time to Mr. Nombre71456. Thus, if we say that the activity carried out by the plaintiff was consistent with the decreed authorization (manufacture and sale of bread), it implies that the act issued and claimed to be of execution (closure and sealing of the commercial business Panadería MI PAN), which it is not, as it causes its own harmful effect and is the consequence of a null act, there being a defect in its adoption (lack of motivation, infraction of the principle of legality and due process), and it is declared as such. Now, despite the fact that the commercial activity that the plaintiff carried out, as stated, was the one granted or permitted by the Municipality of San José acting in good faith and motivated by the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre71456, in order to be allowed to perform the authorized work, as required by the respondent Municipality itself, proceeds to request an expansion of the commercial patent (proven fact 27, folio 852) so that it records, in addition to the sale of bread, its manufacture (bakery action); however, the administration, once again bleeding the limits of discretion and the legality block, rejects such management, indicating that the land-use permit 0000658 (proven fact 29, folio 863) was resolved as USE NOT PERMITTED, contradicting the land-use certification (0001324, folio 5), which, as a declaratory administrative act (in the sense that it is limited to proving a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it), cannot be distorted without the urban regulations having been previously identified, which in this case did not occur. This translates into the fact that, although it is true, as indicated, that land-use certificates only verify a prior situation and also constitute a public document, then the declaration therein cannot be modified except by the legal procedures that permit it (Regulatory Plan or approval of a new Urban Planning Law), which must be duly certified. And, it is that the records were not provided, nor is it deduced from the extensive resolutions of the Mayor and Municipal Council that a change of urban regulations was made that sustained the original land-use certificate (1324), by which it could be considered contrary to the Regional or General Regulatory Plan or the stipulations of the Urban Code, in order to legalize the discrediting of the aforementioned land-use certification, and thus motivate, in accordance with the legality block, the new zoning carried out, which is certified according to the land-use certificate (Placa11628), which indicates that this zone is no longer mixed, but rather changed to residential. But in any case, even if a situation of this nature had occurred or could occur, the territorial entity, which by constitutional power holds the tutelage of the rights of citizens circumscribed to its territory, should have respected the right granted to Mr. Nombre71456 when it validly granted him the commercial patent that is the subject of this litigation; but as stated, the large territorial apparatus, not even remotely manifested or indicated to this authority in administrative functions that a change of this nature had been made, nor did it, failing the principle of legality and due process, give a precise, understandable, and legal explanation to the administered party of said change, an action that harms the principle of discretion of the public administration insofar as discretion cannot serve as a parameter for illegality.

It is clear that the rights previously granted to the administered party must be preserved by the territorial entity, with the caveat that in any case, if its desire is to annul them, it must resort to the corresponding legal means and not to a simple simulation of legality shielded by a pretext of words, which do not even remotely contain any legal standing. On the other hand, the discussion regarding the amounts for taxes or for the business license (patente) that must be paid is not the subject of this proceeding; therefore, this Tribunal cannot rule on matters that have not been discussed by the lower body, such as whether the amounts for taxes paid are applicable, given that this is a point neither debated nor submitted to this Tribunal, and if it were, it could not be heard in this venue pursuant to the provisions of Article 154 of the Código Municipal according to its previous text, prior to the approval of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. As indicated, the discussion of the quantum of the amount to be paid for tax obligations arising from this legal transaction is not proper to this proceeding, whereas the arbitrary and excessive action of the territorial entity against its administered party, Nombre71456, is.

XIII- CONCLUSIONS: The foregoing reasoning brings as an unavoidable consequence that the appeals filed by Mr. Nombre71456 are declared with merit, resulting in the nullity of Municipal agreements numbers 41 article IV, from ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, article IV, from ordinary session 58 held on June 5, 2006; and No. 22 article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007. Consequently, it is proper to grant and preserve the subjective rights acquired with the authorization granted by La Sección de Patentes number C-00006157-02 and the declaration of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) number 1324.

POR TANTO:

The appeals filed by Mr. Nombre71456 against Municipal agreements numbers 41 article IV, from ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, article IV, from ordinary session 58 held on June 5, 2006; and No. 22 article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007, are declared WITH MERIT. In their place, the subjective rights acquired with the authorization granted by La Sección de Patentes number c-00006157-02 and the declaration of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) number 1324 ARE GRANTED AND PRESERVED. The administrative channel is hereby exhausted. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Nombre66641 Sady Jiménez Quesada Nombre37579 Therefore, what was resolved by this office in official communication 1570, resolution 4141, and Municipal agreement 21, article iv of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006, is ratified. The appellant shall abide by what was resolved therein on the merits by this Municipality" (folios 478 to 485); **20-** On September 14, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) and, in the alternative, an appeal by avocation for the superior's knowledge, against the foregoing provision (folios 507 to 509 and 518 to 519); **21-** That by a resolution at 11:00 a.m. on November 6, 2006, the Municipal Mayor, hearing on appeal ruling No. **7975**, resolves: "*By virtue of the foregoing, the cited legal norms and principles, as well as the transcribed Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this office concludes that since there is no substantive discrepancy between the challenged administrative act and the legal system, the proper course is to reject the motion for reconsideration on the merits, confirming resolution **7975 of 2:00 p.m. on September 8, 2006**, which is also supported by the agreements of the Municipal Council No. **21, article iv of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006, and agreement 41 of Ordinary Session 17 of August 22, 2006**, maintaining in any case the original act according to official communication No. 72673 of November 21, 2005, issued by the Department of Patentes, consequently rendering the appellant's allegations inadmissible and what was requested of this City Council impossible, as it lacks legal basis for such effect. Likewise, the inadmissibility of the motions that gave rise to the appeal and the resolution issued here is confirmed, given that, as indicated, the appealed administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation, and ratification of previous acts already resolved by this Municipality, as the motions were filed in due time by the appellant and concern the same subject matter, the same individual, and the same facts and grounds considered therein. Therefore, what was resolved by this office in official communication 1570, resolution 4141, and Municipal agreement 21, article IV of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006, and agreement 41 of August 22, 2006, already cited above, is ratified. The resolution is hereby elevated to the knowledge of the Municipal Council, which will hear it in accordance with criterion DAJ 5498-9-2006 from the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos*" (folios 520 to 546); **22-** That by Municipal agreement number 20, article IV, of ordinary session 58 held on June 5, 2006, it was ordered: "*Reject the appeal against the act contained in official communication 7975, issued both as to form and on the merits, confirming resolution 9676, issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and maintaining in any case the original challenged act*" (folios 718 to 748); **23-** By agreement 27, article IV of ordinary session number 67 of August 7, 2007, the Municipal Council, regarding official communication 7975, original act, notification 76158 of February 24, 2006, ordered: "*So that the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, Section III, as improper hierarchical superior, may hear the appeal, the case file must be certified in chronological order and remitted within a period of 8 business days to said authority, in accordance with Article 51 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa) in concordance with Article 156 of the Municipal Code*" (folio 7879).- **III.- Case File No. 07-257-161-CA.- 24-** On February 10, 2006, at the request of the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre71456 filed for an expansion (ampliación) of his commercial license (patente comercial) under the name PANADERÍA MI PAN, to specify the activity as ELABORACIÓN DE PAN (BREAD MAKING) (folio 852); **25-** On February 10, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 was notified of document No. **31080**, requesting him to provide his residency card and health permit for processing the license expansion (ampliación de patente) (folio 849); **26-** That in land-use certificate (certificado de suelo) number 0000658 in the name of Nombre71456, in the office use space it was recorded: "Land-Use Regulation (Reglamento de Uso de Suelo) in its articles 72, for zone ZR-2, requested use Elaboración de Pan, 235 meters, in observations and conditions it was noted 'Bakery with more than 25 meters of useful area not permitted, map 97, plot 0117100, resolution **Use not permitted**'" (folio 854); **27-** That by a document dated February 28, 2006, Placa11626, the Department of Patentes notified Mr. Nombre71456 of the rejection of the license expansion application, indicating that according to land-use certificate number 0000658 of February 20, 2006, issued by the Construction Permits Section, it was resolved as **USO NO PERMITIDO (USE NOT PERMITTED)** (folio 863); **28-** On March 1, 2006, the claimant filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal against the rejection of the license expansion for PANADERÍA MI PAN (folios 869 to 872); **29-** By official communication dated November 22, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 was notified of the Mayor's office ruling, the relevant part being as follows: "*By virtue of the foregoing, the cited legal norms and principles, this Mayor's Office* ***REJECTS THE APPEAL*** *on the merits, confirming resolution No. ALDP-1-013-2006 issued by the Department of Patentes (reconsideration) and maintaining in any case the original challenged act contained in official communication No. Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006, consequently rendering the appellant's allegations inadmissible and what was requested of this City Council impossible, as it lacks legal basis for such effect. The administrative proceedings initiated are hereby fully answered, namely: appeal (March 1, 2006) and unnumbered writing (October 27, 2006) processing the appeal for denial of license expansion*" (folios 874 to 890); **30-** That by a writing dated November 30, 2006, the actor filed an appeal against the rejection of the license expansion by the Mayor's office (folios 892 to 895); **31-** That in agreement 22, article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007, the Municipal Council, in relation to the appeal filed, ordered: "*Reject the appeal on the merits, confirming resolution 10215 issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and maintaining in any case the original challenged act contained in official communication Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006, consequently rendering the appellant's allegations inadmissible and what was requested of this City Council impossible, as it lacks legal basis for such effect*" (folios 932 to 951 and 1014 to 1033); **32-** That in ordinary session number 60, held on June 19, 2007, agreement 20, article V, the Municipal Corporation ordered: "*The appeal is admitted for hearing before the Hierarchical Superior, Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court*" (folio 1041); **33-** That on February 23, 2006, the Ministry of Health granted an operating permit to the business called PANADERÍA MI PAN to carry out the activity of making and selling bread (folio 1097).- **IV.- FACTS NOT PROVEN:** **1-** That the activity carried out by the actor is contrary to that authorized by means of license number C-00006157-02 (no evidence was provided in this regard); **2-** That the Panadería Mi Pan, located on map 0097, plot 01171000, is in a Residential Zone (the case file records).- **V.- GROUNDS FOR THE APPEAL:** The appellant requests that this Court rule on whether, in the specific case of PANADERÍA MI PAN, it was necessary to file for a license expansion (solicitud de ampliación de patente) to include the term **making**, in a bakery where its sale was already authorized. That as the owner of the Bakery, he applied for the license expansion at the suggestion of the Department of Patentes in notification 000282, which states, in relevant part: "**on the other hand, the appellant must proceed to request an expansion of the commercial activity and include within his registered activity the manufacture of the product and (sic) thus correct his commercial activity**." He requests a ruling on the scope of the Law on Taxes and Licenses for Lucrative Activities and Law number 5694 on the municipal tax tariff of the Central Canton of San José, since we are faced with a change or expansion of license, from bread selling to making and selling; the issue is that both activities are inextricably linked. That it cannot be said that the place where the Bakery is located is ZR-2 as classified by the Municipality, but rather as indicated in the first license (ZMRC); that the regulations on which the Municipal Administration relies to qualify and classify urban zones as residential, mixed, or industrial must be clear, whether it be the Urban Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador Urbano), or the autonomous regulatory decrees, or the activity classification for licenses and the Land-Use Regulation. That the Municipality be told that the license obtained covers the authorization to make and sell bread, as corresponds to the age-old practice of Bakery; that the Municipality's actions do not conform to the truth; that all requirements were met. That the urban zone in which the operating license for Panadería Mi Pan was granted was, at the time of its granting, indicated as a mixed urban zone, for commerce and residence. That it is not true that the lucrative activity carried out is contrary to that stipulated in the commercial license granted by said Municipality; that he holds a subjective right; it is not possible to say that a Bakery is only set up to sell bread and not to make it.

**VI.- APPEALS IN MUNICIPAL MATTERS.** Given the errors found within the resolutions issued by the Council and the Mayor's Office of the Municipal Corporation of San José, it is necessary to recall the appellate process in this matter, which will be done, of course, without considering the modification made by the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, which is not applicable to this case according to its Transitory Provision IV, since the present conflict must be resolved under the regulations prior to the enactment of said Code. This is with the purpose that the Council and the Mayor have a broader vision of how appeals must be resolved in matters within their knowledge and application. As the commentator Nombre71457 indicates, in the article entitled **Administrative Appeals in Municipal Matters and the Function of Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court** published in the journal Ivstitia, Year 14, No. 162-163 June - July 2002, namely: "*In municipal matters, the principle of administrative procedure enshrined in article 350, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública) is broken, in the sense that there shall exist, in any case, a single appellate instance regardless of the provenance or origin of the challenged administrative act. This principle, which limits appeals in the administrative procedure, has evident and important justifications such as the pyramidal or vertical structure of the administrative organization, a circumstance that would oblige the administered party, when the act is issued by a lower-ranking body, to have to go through all the steps of the hierarchical line to be able to exhaust the administrative channel and, in that way, have the possibility of accessing the jurisdictional channel. Evidently, the principle and the norm that positivizes it have a constitutional rationale that lies in facilitating the administered party's access to effective judicial protection (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since, otherwise, he would be forced to traverse the via crucis of the entire, complex, hermetic, and chaotic administrative organization of the entity that issued the administrative act that disfavors him, which he is obviously not obliged to know, as it is an internal matter that is the object of autonomous or independent organizational regulations. As we will see below, in municipal matters, the administered party may be, eventually, exposed to the ordeal of passing through administrative instances when dealing with acts issued by bodies subordinate to the Municipal Mayor. The idea of the ladder of appeals in the municipal sphere is not undisputed, since it has been held that regarding those agreements emanating from bodies that do not depend directly on the Council, the one who exhausts the administrative channel is the one hearing the appeal —the mayor—. This interpretation presents a problem, which is that there could exist matters of transcendental importance that would never come to the knowledge of the Council or of Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court itself, which has avoided the filing of many ordinary contentious-administrative proceedings before the Contentious-Administrative Court. The interested parties referred to in article 173, subsection 2) of the Political Constitution may file motions for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal. Both motions must be filed in a writing setting forth the grounds and reasons for the disagreement with the challenged agreement and must be filed within five days (articles 153 and 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code). In this regard, it is appropriate to recall some norms of the General Law of Public Administration which, although located in Book Two, constitute hermeneutical parameters, even in municipal matters. It is optional for the administered party to use both motions (reconsideration with subsidiary appeal) or only one of them (appeal); if the first option is chosen, the appeal will be processed once the reconsideration has been declared without merit (article 347 of the General Law of Public Administration). In application or specification of the guiding principle of the administrative procedure called informality in favor of the administered party, the motions do not require special wording or claim, it being sufficient for their correct formulation that the petition for challenge or review of the agreement is clearly discernible from their content and text (article 224 in concordance with 348 of the General Law of Public Administration).* ***Motion for Reconsideration (Revocatoria)** The motion for reconsideration is a horizontal appeal filed before the very body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested or appealing party, so that it reconsiders its content and revokes, modifies, or confirms it. That is, if the entity issuing the agreement is the Department of Patentes, de Impuestos, de Ingeniería, or de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, this means of challenge must be filed before the respective office.* ***Appeal (Apelación)** The appeal is a vertical recourse heard by the superior in rank of the body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested or appealing party, so that the superior may annul, modify, or confirm the act. Thus, if the issuing body is the Department of Patentes, the appeal must be heard by the Municipal Mayor.* ***Appeals against agreements directly emanating from the Municipal Council. Ordinary Appeals** Title VI of the Municipal Code is titled 'Appeals against Municipal Acts', however, it is subdivided into two chapters, the first being called 'Appeals against Council Agreements'. In accordance with article 153, interested parties may file the ordinary motions of reconsideration and appeal. Both motions must be filed in a reasoned brief and within a period of five days from the notification of the agreement. The motion for reconsideration may be based on grounds of legality and of opportunity, merit, or convenience, and the appeal is admissible only for reasons of illegality. It is necessary to remember that, pursuant to article 351, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration, the administrative appeal —in an administrative procedure— may be resolved by the competent body even to the detriment of the appellant - reformatio in pejus - when it concerns an absolute nullity. The reason for this norm lies in the superior protection of public interest and of the objective legality that must exist in this matter. The appeal filed against an agreement of the Municipal Council is to be heard, by biphasic improper hierarchy, by Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court —a body attached to the Judicial Branch seated in the second judicial circuit (sic) of San José, Goicoechea— (articles 156, paragraph 2, of the Municipal Code and 1, subsection b, of Law No. 7274 of December 10, 1991 - Law Creating Section Three of the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court), which is the court referred to in article 173 of the Political Constitution. When hearing, Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court, as an improper hierarchical superior or non-hierarchical controller, is governed by the provisions of articles 180 and 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this regard, the latter cited numeral indicates that* ***'The non-hierarchical controller may review only the legality of the act** and by virtue of an administrative appeal, and shall decide within the limit of the claims and factual issues raised by the appellant, but may apply a norm not invoked in the appeal'*. *From this perspective, article 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code is congruent with the provisions of 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. Section Three of the Contentious-Administrative Court, for its part, has held that its competence extends only to the legality of the agreement (Among others, see Rulings Nos. 3328-94 at 7:00 a.m. on November 7, 1994, 4457-95 at 10:45 a.m. on October 9, 1995, and 4655-95 at 10:00 a.m. on December 6, 1995). However, the interpretation of such norms cannot be literal and categorical —review of legality—, since, in our legal system, the limits of discretion are fully positivized.* Indeed, article 15 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides that discretion is subject, in all cases, to the limits imposed, expressly or implicitly, by the legal system so that its exercise is reasonable and efficient. For their part, articles 16 and 17 of that normative body set express limits for the exercise of discretionary power, such as univocal rules or rules of exact application of science and technique, the elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience, and the fundamental rights of the administered party. Article 16, paragraph 2 itself, indicates that the judge must exercise control or oversight of discretion, based on such meta-legal limits, "as if exercising a control of legality." Finally, there is no doubt whatsoever that in our legal system, the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion established in articles 16 and 17 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública form part of the parameter or block of legality for determining the validity or invalidity of an administrative act. On this matter, article 158, paragraph 4, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides that "For this purpose, technical and scientific rules of univocal meaning and exact application, in the circumstances of the case, shall be understood to be incorporated into the legal system." For its part, article 160 prescribes that "The discretionary act shall also be invalid when it violates elementary rules of logic, justice, or convenience, as indicated by the circumstances of each case." Consequently, since the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion form part of the parameter of legality—by being positivized—non-hierarchical oversight must also control their transgression. Thus, according to a systematic interpretation, the Third Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo must proceed to oversee aspects of opportunity, convenience, or merit." The foregoing is due to the fact that when observing the decisions under review, in many of them the Department of Patents (Departamento de Patentes), the Mayor, or the Municipal Council indicate in the first instance that the APPEAL (RECURSO DE APELACIÓN) IS REJECTED on the merits (folios 130, 156, 503, 715, 748, 915, 1010, 1033) and then proceed to forward the appeal to the immediate Superior, when according to what has been stated, the correct procedure, if the motion for reversal (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) is filed before the Patents Section, is for the latter to only reject the motion for reversal and admit the appeal to be heard by the Mayor, and the Mayor, having received the appeal, rejects the motion for reversal and admits the appeal to be heard by the Superior in grade, the Municipal Council, which in turn, when presented with the motion for reversal with appeal, rejects the motion for reversal and admits the appeal to be heard by the hierarchical superior and summons the parties. However, the territorial entity in the majority of cases rejects the appeal and then remits it to the superior for its consideration, thereby opening the competence of this collegiate body, and by virtue of this, this Court is permitted to proceed to hear the challenged decisions in the following recitals (considerandos), but not before informing the territorial entity of the Municipality of San José of the correct procedure to follow.

VII- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY: (principle of juridicity of the administration): This implies that the Public Administration does not act whenever it wants, but only when there is a principle or written norm that so permits it. Its action is not free; it must follow a process already pre-established by the legal system, thereby authorizing its action. The primary subjection of the Administration is that every act or conduct of the administration that affects the rights of the individual must be authorized by the legal system. The administration can and must do only what is legally established for it. This permissiveness or authorization holds constitutional and legal rank as provided in article 11 of the Constitution and as developed by the same article of our Ley General de la Administración Pública, which is why it is said that what is not authorized is prohibited. As a consequence of the Administration's submission to the legal system, there is the possibility of controlling its conduct, this being the purview of the jurisdictional sphere (Judge) in respect and pure and simple application also of the constitutional maxim of article 49, such that the breach of this principle has as its sanction the liability of the State and its officials, as set forth in article 9 of our Political Constitution. The block of legality is composed not only of the law, but also, firstly, of the block of Constitutionality (constitutional rights and principles), in addition to all written norms (regulations, decrees, directives, and others) and unwritten norms (customs or administrative practices, jurisprudence, and principles of law that make up that system). This principle cannot be ignored by the Public Administration, since an action carried out outside the block of legality becomes illegal and null, with the natural, procedural, and legal consequences of such a declaration.

VIII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: We must understand discretion as the power vested in public entities to adopt decisions based on criteria that are not strictly legal—for example, of a political, social, organizational, technical nature, or of mere opportunity and convenience—according to the specific case; without it being in any way deemed a power denoting an arbitrary will, insofar as the following parameters constitute true limits to this power: 1.- The purpose of the Administration; 2.- Reasonableness, also called the principle of the interdiction of arbitrariness, which obliges the analysis of the legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense of the measure or provision adopted by the Administration; 3.- Respect for fundamental rights, by virtue of which it constitutes a true barrier to the exercise of powers of empire, precisely in light of the fact that one of the essential and inherent characteristics of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law (articles 1, 9, 50, and 74 of the Constitution) is precisely the recognition of fundamental rights; 4.- The general principles of law, such as equity, equality, justice, legal certainty, good administration, non-retroactivity, good faith; which, pursuant to the provisions of article 7 of the Ley General de Administración Pública, are a source of law, as unwritten norms, and therefore, conditioning factors for the exercise of the Administration's discretionary power; 5.- The univocal rules of science and technique, which oblige the Administration to base its action duly on the theoretical knowledge acquired from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique, when warranted—as is the case in environmental, health, and tax matters, without it being possible to claim this is a closed list or numerus clausus—, as well as in cases where it must use criteria specific to administrative technique. In the application of these criteria, it is impossible to claim the existence of discretion in an unrestricted and absolute manner, because the will of the Administration does not depend on its free will (or choice), but on the objective assessments obtained in accordance with the technical rules applicable to the case; hence the concepts of administrative discretion and technical discretion behave as absolutely irreconcilable scenarios; because discretionary power belongs to the volitional field, while the technical concept entails a declaration of truth, a judgment, that is, knowledge, on the basis that the content of technical assessments takes on a regulated character of administrative activity, as true legal norms, which reduce the margin of discretion. In the application of indeterminate legal concepts, understanding these as those that refer to a sphere of reality whose limits are not clearly specified in their statement, even though it is clear that they attempt to delimit a concrete scenario such as public interest, urgency or necessity, good faith, among others. So that the administration has a scope of decision comparable to discretion, since these are scenarios in which there is no diversity of options for the Administration, because at the time of their application a concrete precision is required that only admits a single possible legal solution (unity of fair solution), in the first place by the Administration, and failing that, by the judge—when exercising control over such scenarios, who shall determine whether or not the factual scenario is subsumable under the indeterminate concept. For this reason, it must be considered that even though they are termed indeterminable legal principles, they are determinable as to their content. By virtue of which, although the Administration has a certain margin of appreciation—not of discretion—in the application of these concepts, in the end its action will be limited to applying the law (which uses criteria of value or experience), since the technique of indeterminate legal concepts deals precisely with "... subsuming certain determined real circumstances under a legal category (configured, despite its imprecision of limits, with the intention of delimiting a concrete scenario); precisely for this reason it is a regulated process, which is exhausted in the intellectual process of comprehending a reality in the sense that no decision of the will of the applicator interferes, as is characteristic of one who exercises a discretionary power." It is in application of the above parameters that it can be affirmed that the reduction to zero of administrative discretion occurs, insofar as the Administration's decision is conditioned by a single possible solution. It must be taken into account that "The differences between the two can be summarized as follows: 1) in technical discretion there is never weighing or choice between interests; 2) in technical discretion the Administration resorts to the use of technical criteria; and 3) while in administrative discretion both judgment and will coexist, in technical discretion an activity of mere judgment is carried out in which the will does not intervene in any way." (Desdentado Nombre71458, Nombre50780. Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia). Here it is important to mention the following administrative maxim "«When there is discretion, one can never speak of technique, and when there is technique, one can never speak of discretion», since «what is technical is not evaluated, but can be verified. What is discretionary is not verified, but is evaluated»" (Nombre71459. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. Tercera edición. p. 453. Cited by Nombre71460. La discrecionalidad de la Administración Tributaria: su especial incidencia en el procedimiento de la inspección. Mc.Graw-Hill. Madrid. Spain. 1998). This is to clarify that while it is true that a large degree of discretion permeates administrative decisions, actions, and omissions, it is also true that when technical evidence exists, it cannot be ignored. Therefore, the administration must not only take into account the legal criteria on which its action is based, but in those data that give room for Administrative discretion as a prerogative of the public entity, it must be exercised with the parameters outlined above, since discretion outside of these can be seen as arbitrariness; the discretion of public action cannot be taken as a parameter of administrative illegality nor as a per se authorization for the public entity to depart from the block of legality.

IX- ON STATEMENT OF REASONS (MOTIVACIÓN): Within administrative protection, the right of every person, duly legitimized by a violated right, to have their conflict resolved in a specific and clear manner is immersed, which is materialized through administrative acts or proceedings. Therefore, within administrative protection, we can locate the right to obtain a reasoned decision, so that the intervening or harmed parties understand the factual and legal grounds by which their conflict was resolved. As part of the principle of due process (sentences 15-90 and 1789-92 of the Sala Constitucional) and as an essential element of every administrative act, we have the statement of reasons (motivación). This means that the party must know concretely the norms on which the Administration bases its obligations; in such a way that when the harmed administered party requests a readjustment of that conduct, they are informed of the legal norms that support, approve, and legitimize the contested action. Therefore, every administrative conduct, whatever it may be and regardless of its nature, concretized in an administrative act (decision) must be duly reasoned and rationalized, fully providing satisfaction of all the claims or allegations made by the participants in the process, or as in the present case, the legal reason why a license application is rejected, the land use (uso de suelo) is changed from one application to another, or whether or not a right already granted by the territorial entity is respected. It is clear, then, that decisions handed down within the administrative process, whatever it may be, must be conceived as a clear exposition of the constitutional principle of administrative protection derived from article 41 of the Political Constitution. Therefore, administrative conduct that limits or restricts rights must be duly reasoned, without infringements of Constitutional Rights (due process), so that it meets each and every expectation of the person requesting the fulfillment of an administrative conduct, in order to know the set of factual and legal background that justify the decision taken by the public entity, its omission constituting nullity of the proceedings as provided in articles 133, 158, and 166 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.- X.- ON THE LAND USE CERTIFICATE (CERTIFICADO DE USO DE SUELO): Local urban plans, pursuant to article 21, subsection 1) of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, carry out the planning and determination of land use, for the better distribution and protection of the environment. This means that the use of real estate property can be conditioned, through the delimitation of areas, according to the categorization adopted by the regulatory plan (plan regulador). Thus, a property that is within the municipal sphere may have a use different from the owner's desire, according to its zoning. Regulatory plans determine the place where one can build, carry out commercial activities, industry, recreational areas, based not only on criteria of opportunity and convenience, but also on technical and objective pronouncements approved by the community. The designation of land use is carried out through its classification, which is the category or type of land (urban, developable, non-developable, and others) according to its basic urban purpose, and the qualification, which is applied to designate the subdivision of those land types, through urban development (residential or industrial zones), whether in total or partial percentages, even according to the population densities of a particular community. It is clear, then, that the administrative action aimed at carrying out zoning within land use is a primordial power of the State, delegated to the Municipalities (article 169 of the Political Constitution, developed in article 16 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana). A task that does not imply detriment or injury to the right of property, as this is a relative attribution, in accordance with urban regulations. Through this administrative manifestation, guidelines can legally be established for the utilization of the right of property, in strict relation to the needs of the community, and with vigilance over its rights and the environment, in order to achieve a harmonious land-use planning. This classification, according to article 24 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, must be carried out through a regulation with the normative rank of Law (see judgment No. 263-2008 of the Second Section of this Court), which must contain: a) the determination of land uses; b) the matters relating to the location, height, and construction area of buildings; c) the surface area and dimensions of lots, which has a direct impact on the determination of land density; d) the size of setbacks, patios, and other open spaces, and the coverage of the lot by buildings and structures; e) the provision of space for parking, loading, and unloading of vehicles off the streets; f) size, location, and characteristics of signs or advertisements; and g) any other architectural or urban detail relating to land use, the regulation of which is of interest to the local community. As has been indicated, all urban regulations translate into limitations and detractions of uses and powers of the owners over the property, insofar as they determine land use and how that use must be carried out. This task is materialized through the administrative act called the land use certificate (certificación de uso de suelo), which, due to its importance, is classified as a declaratory administrative act (acto administrativo declarativo), in the sense that it is limited to accrediting a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it, so that its content is declaratory, as it does not create or modify previously established legal situations. The Procuraduría General de la República, in opinions No. C-327-2001 and C-357-2003, classifies them as concrete legal acts by which the local Administration certifies the conformity or not of the land use with what is established in the respective zoning; as provided in article 28 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which states:

"Artículo 28.- It is prohibited to use or dedicate lands, buildings, structures, to any use that is incompatible with the implemented zoning. Henceforth, interested owners must obtain a municipal certificate that certifies the conformity of use with the requirements of the zoning.

Existing non-conforming uses must also be recorded with a certificate expressing such circumstance. Each zoning regulation (reglamento de zonificación) shall set the date from which said certificates will be mandatory.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">"</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Thus, through the "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">certificate of land use (certificado de uso del suelo)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">", </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">it is certified whether the use is permitted or not, in relation to what is sought by the applicant.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Therefore, its nature is </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">declaratory, and not constitutive; certificates of land use do not, by themselves, give rise to a subjective right nor do they consolidate, by themselves, any legal situation by reason of a pre-existing right or legal situation". </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">(Nombre70871.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. Urban Planning Regulations (Regulaciones Urbanísticas), 2004). The </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">land use</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> certification is merely descriptive regarding a specific factual situation in relation to what is provided under legal norm, by reason of which, through it, a legal situation pre-existing the certifying act is not consolidated. From the foregoing, it is clearly established that the certificate of land use constitutes a prior requirement demanded for the granting of a license, and its obtainment cannot be exempted.</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XI.-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">ON MUNICIPAL LICENSES (LICENCIAS MUNICIPALES)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">: Municipal Licenses constitute an act that authorizes a person or entity</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> to exercise a right; in other words, it tolerates or permits carrying out some activity in a specific place circumscribed to the Municipal entity with competence to grant the permit or license. In the case of Municipalities, they are legitimated for such purposes in accordance with Articles 79, 80, and 81 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal). Thus, Article 79 establishes "To exercise any lucrative activity, the interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid during the entire time the lucrative activity was carried out or for the time the license was held, even if the activity was not carried out. With respect to the patent tax (impuesto de patentes), by which activities subject to a Municipal license are taxed, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through Voto number 2197-92 of 2:30 p.m. on August 11, 1992, has stated "... </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called a patent (patente). The primary theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the traditional one in the field of municipal law, which defines it as the imperative need to cover the cost of public services that the individual receives from the municipality</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> (...)" For its part, numeral</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> 80 establishes "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The municipality must resolve license applications within a maximum period of thirty calendar days, counted from their submission. Once the term has expired and the requirements have been met without any response from the municipality, the applicant may establish their activity;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> and Article 81 literally states "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The municipal license referred to in the previous article may only be denied when the activity is contrary to the law, morality, or good customs, when the establishment has not met the legal and regulatory requirements, or when the activity, by reason of its physical location, is not permitted by laws or, in their absence, by current municipal regulations"</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. As is easily appreciable, the foregoing regulation does not depart from that developed in Articles 329, 330 subsection 2), and 331 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). As a first step, the applicant requests from the municipality of their jurisdiction authorization to carry out a specific activity, submitting all the requirements that the administration must already have defined beforehand. Once submitted, an inspection is carried out to determine its location, thereby issuing</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> the authorization act, which materializes when the physical patent (patente física) is delivered to the individual, reflecting the Administration's will to grant or permit the requested activity, and therefore,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> the individual proceeds to commence their lucrative activity. With that authorization, the individual </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">acquires a subjective right</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, which does not imply that the authorizing administration (for the simple reason of being before pre-existing subjective rights) is bound hand and foot, such that once the rights are declared, it cannot exercise its powers of protection and control over the use and enjoyment of the license or authorization. Its original prerogative, as an Administration, to satisfy and safeguard public interests, does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implicit, of the authorization. It could be said that, in essence, its power to revoke or annul duly authorized licenses or approvals does not disappear, which it could do in accordance with the block of legality (bloque de legalidad), through the lesivity process (proceso de lesividad), as provided by numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, or by means of a declaration in administrative proceedings of an evident and manifest nullity following the appropriate procedure.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XII-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACTS</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The exercise carried out in the preceding recitals (considerandos) regarding the principle of legality, administrative discretion, the nature of the land use certification, and municipal licenses is not gratuitous, since all these elements are necessary for understanding what this Court concludes in the present case. First, it is assumed that the land use permit is a certifying act, that is, it attests to a particular situation, pre-existing in accordance with urban regulations. Here, the Municipality of San José issued certificate of land use (certificado de uso de suelo) No. 1324 (folio 5) in favor of Mr. Nombre71456</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, indicating that it is for ZMRC, translated to Spanish, Mixed Residential and Commercial Zone (Zona Mixta Residencial y Comercial), located on map 0097, parcel 01171000, a prerequisite for the </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">issuance of Commercial Patent No. C-00006157-02</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> in favor of his commercial business PANADERÍA MI PAN, which also clearly indicates that the activity to be carried out is No. 276 (Bakery/Pastry Shop), a declaration that translates as a subjective right in favor of Mr. Nombre71456. Subsequently, a series of complaints were filed against the referenced business, and the Patent Department (Departamento de Patentes) then sent various official communications to verify the legality of the activity (proven facts 8 and 9, folios 51 and 52), this in use of the powers of control and oversight inherent to its activity, an action that cannot be branded as disproportionate, illegal, or abusive; on the contrary, it is duly authorized and legitimized by the principle of legality. What does not appear real or in accordance with legality is the reasoning given for making the decision to deny the application for extension of the patent, the ordered closure, and the de-authorization of the activity carried out. The territorial entity's insistent and repeated support—in appearance of legality—for the closure of the business PANADERÍA MI PAN is that the plaintiff was carrying out an </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">unauthorized activity since the patent was to sell bread and not to make it</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, an argument that could even be branded as laughable, since as stated in folio 1061 of the present proceeding, the commercial patent was granted to perform the task of</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> Bakery and Pastry (Panadería y Repostería),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> terms which, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language of the Royal Academy, Twentieth Edition, mean: "</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Bakery: Trade</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">of a baker, site, house, or place where bread is made or sold. Pastry. Art and trade of a pastry chef. Person whose trade is to make pastries, sweets, and some beverages",</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Therefore, the work carried out by Mr. Nombre71456</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">in his premises, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">sale and production of bread</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, is in accordance with the authorized activity (Bakery and Pastry). This Court reaches this conclusion without having to make a great display of intelligence or reasonableness, concluding that the territorial entity's allegation violates</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> the limits of discretion and the principle of legality, but moreover, it does not conform to the legal procedure established to revoke an act declaring rights, such as the commercial patent legally granted in its time to Mr. Nombre71456. So if we say that the activity carried out by the plaintiff was in accordance with the decreed authorization (</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">manufacture and sale of bread), </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">it implies that the act issued and alleged to be of execution (closure and sealing of the commercial business Panadería MI PAN), which is not so because it causes a specific and harmful effect and is the consequence of a null act, as there is a defect in its adoption (lack of reasoning, infringement of the principle of legality and due process), and it is so declared. Now, despite the fact that the commercial activity carried out by the plaintiff, as stated, was that granted or permitted by the Municipality of San José, acting in good faith and motivated by the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre71456, in order to be allowed to perform the authorized work, as required by the same respondent Municipality, proceeded to request an extension of the commercial patent (proven fact 27, folio 852) so that it would also include, in addition to the sale of bread, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">its manufacture </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">(action of bakery). However, the administration, once again bleeding the limits of discretion and the block of legality, rejects his request, indicating that the </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">land use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) 0000658 (</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">proven fact 29, folio 863) was resolved as </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">USE NOT PERMITTED, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">contradicting the </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">certification of land use</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, (0001324, folio 5) which, as a </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">declaratory administrative act,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> (in the sense that it is limited to attesting to a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it) cannot be distorted without having previously identified the urban regulation, which in the case at hand did not occur.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> This translates to the fact that, although it is true, as indicated, that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">certificates of land use only verify a prior situation and also constitute a public document</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, the declaration contained therein </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">can only be modified by the appropriate</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">legal proceedings that allow it (Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) or approval of a new Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana))</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, which must be duly accredited. And it is that no evidence was submitted to the case file, nor is it deducible from the extensive resolutions of the Mayor (Alcalde) and Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal) that a change in urban regulation had occurred that underpinned the original certificate of land use </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">(1324),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> by which it could be considered contrary to the Regional or General Regulatory Plan or to the stipulations of the Urban Planning Code (Código Urbanístico), in order to legalize the discrediting of the aforementioned land use certification, and thus provide reasoning, in accordance with the block of legality, for the new zoning carried out, which is accredited according to the certificate of land use (</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Placa 11628), </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">indicating that this zone is no longer mixed, but was changed to residential. But in any case, even if a situation of this nature has occurred or could occur, the territorial entity, which by constitutional mandate has the guardianship of the rights of citizens circumscribed to its territory, should have respected the right granted to Mr. Nombre71456 when it validly granted him the commercial patent subject to this litigation. However, as stated, the large territorial apparatus did not even remotely manifest, or indicate to this authority in administrative functions, that a change of this nature had been made, nor, lacking the principle of legality and due process, did it provide a precise, understandable, and legal explanation to the individual of said change, an action that harms the principle of discretion of the public administration insofar as discretion cannot serve as a parameter for illegality. It is clear that rights previously granted to individuals must be conserved by the territorial entity, with the warning that in any case, if its desire is to annul them, it must resort to the</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> corresponding legal means and not a simple simulation of legality sheltered in an excuse of words, which do not even remotely contain any legal status. Furthermore, the discussion of the amounts of taxes or patent fees that must be paid is not the object of this process, so this Court cannot rule on issues that have not been discussed by the lower instance, such as the applicability of amounts of taxes paid, since that is a point neither debated nor proposed to this Court and, if it were, it could not be heard in this venue under the terms of Article 154 of the Municipal Code according to its previous text, prior to the approval of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). As indicated, the discussion of the quantum of the amount to be paid for tax obligations resulting from this legal transaction is not proper to this process, unlike the arbitrary and excessive action of the territorial entity toward</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> its administered individual, Mr. Nombre71456.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">XIII-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">CONCLUSIONS</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The foregoing reasoning brings as an unavoidable consequence that the appeals filed by Mr. Nombre71456 are granted, producing the nullity of Municipal Agreements numbers 41, Article IV, of Ordinary Session 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, Article IV, of Ordinary Session 58, held on June 5, 2006, and</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> No. 22, Article IV, of Ordinary Session 44, of February 27, 2007. Consequently, it is appropriate to </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">grant and conserve</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> the subjective rights acquired with the authorization granted by the Patents Section (Sección de Patentes) number C-00006157-02 and the declaration of the certificate of land use (certificado de uso de suelo) number 1324.</span><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">POR TANTO</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">: </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.65pt; margin-bottom:5.65pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The appeals filed by Mr. Nombre71456 are declared </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">GRANTED</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> against Municipal Agreements numbers 41, Article IV, of Ordinary Session</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, Article IV, of Ordinary Session 58, held on June 5, 2006; and No. 22, Article IV, of Ordinary Session 44, of February 27, 2007, and in their place, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS ARE GRANTED AND CONSERVED</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> acquired with the authorization granted by the Patents Section number C-00006157-02 and the declaration of the certificate of land use number 1324. The administrative venue is hereby exhausted.</span></p> NOTIFY.- *Nombre66641* Sady Jiménez Quesada Nombre37579 Translation of the excerpt:

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**I.- PROVEN FACTS:** **Case File No. 06-308-161-CA.** For the resolution of this dispute, the following are established: **1-** That by document number 49830, a land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) was granted to Mr. Nombre70879 for commerce and services, authorizing the installation of a commercial electric meter; said document bearing the stamps of the urban permits and construction section dated April 15, 2004 (folio 2); **2-** That within land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) 0001324, dated August 23, 2004, the following data was recorded: "Requested use Commerce and Services bread sales (Bakery)," with the purpose "Patent," applicant's name Nombre70879. In the space for office use, it was indicated: "Land-use regulation (Reglamento de uso de suelo) in its Articles No. 22, for ZMRC zone (mixed residential commercial zone). Requested use Bakery (200m), observations and conditions 1 parking space for each 50 m of construction, map 0097, parcel 0117, resolution Conditional Use (folio 5); **3-** That according to the patent application processing receipt No. 36428 in the name of Mr. Nombre70879 for the Panadería Mi Pan, in the space assigned to the administration it was indicated "land use (uso de suelo) 1324 of August 23, 2004 map 97 parcel 117 (folio 12); **4-** That by means of notification record number **30616** at 2 hours 32 minutes on December 15, 2004, the appellant is warned to present a Health Permit and proof of being current on the payment of municipal taxes (folio 15); That on January 25, 2005, by memorandum **Placa11627**, Mr. Nombre70879 is informed that he must present a Health Permit and proof of being current on the payment of taxes, otherwise the premises will be closed (folios 209 to 215); **5-** That on February 16, 2005, the Municipality of San José, specifically the Patents Department, issued commercial license number C-0006157-02 in the name of Nombre70879, to authorize the business called **PANADERÍA MI PAN**, located at Dirección7973, to carry out activity **267 BAKERY/PASTRY SHOP** (see folio 1061 of the record); **6-** On November 16, 2005, the Head of the Patents Department sent a note to the Head of the Environment Section, indicating that since complaints had been filed regarding the operation of a patent at Dirección7974 for the establishment Panadería Mi Pan, she requested to please review the following: a) Determine the type of activity currently being conducted at the establishment; b) Due to the activity being conducted, verify if it has the adequate furniture, equipment, and structure to carry out said activity; c) Determine if, as a result of that activity, adverse effects are triggered for its neighbors (folio 51); **7-** That on that same date, a note is also sent to the Head of the Inspection Area, in order to verify, due to the complaints filed against the establishment Panadería Mi Pan, the following: a) Verify the permits that support the operation; b) Verify the activity currently being conducted in detail; c) Measure the area where the activity is conducted; d) Type of equipment and furniture used to carry out the activity; e) Identify the neighboring properties of the business; f) Any other relevant information (folio 52); **8-** That by official letter No. **72673** notified to Mr. Nombre70879 on November 21, 2005, the Inspector of the Patents Department of the Municipality of San José ordered the closure of the premises and proceeded to place seals on the Panadería Mi Pan (see resultando at folio 91); **9-** By brief of November 22, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against the closure ordered by official letter No. **72673** (folio 69); **10-** By resolution at nine hours and ten minutes on January twentieth, two thousand six, the Patents Department resolved: "From the analysis of the administrative record, this office decides to deny the motion for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) filed by Mr. Nombre70879 and confirms notification 72673 of November 21, 2005. And the administrative record is forwarded to the office of the Mayor of San José, for consideration of the Appeal, where he must direct his arguments within a period of five business and peremptory days" (folios 91 and 92); **11-** That on February 8, 2006, the office of the Municipal Mayor, hearing the appeal, resolved: "By virtue of the foregoing, legal norms and principles, as well as transcribed Jurisdictional, Constitutional, and Administrative jurisprudence, this Mayoralty states that since there is no nonconformity with the legal system, it **REJECTS** the appeal on the merits, confirming the decision of the Patents Department (reversal) and upholding in any case the contested original act contained in official letter No. 72673 notified on November 21, 2005, the arguments raised by the appellant Company being not admissible and the contested act therefore being in accordance with the Law. With this resolution, a response is given to the entirety of the submitted requests" the matter is also elevated to the Municipal Council (folios 133 to 156); **12-** In a document dated February 27, 2006, Mr. Nombre70879 filed a motion for reversal with appeal before the Municipal Council, in accordance with Article 161 of the Municipal Code, against the decision on folio 109 (folios 215 to 222); **13-** That by agreement number 21, article IV, ordinary session No. 6 of June 6, 2006, the Municipal Council ordered: "Based on the arguments outlined above and because it is illegal to reject the appeal filed by Mr. Nombre70879, owner of the business called Panadería Mi Pan, confirming in all its terms the resolution 4141 of the Office of the Municipal Mayor" (folios 301 to 304); **14-** In a writing dated August 15, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the superior Administrative Litigation Hierarchical Authority against the aforementioned agreement (folio 306); **15-** That by Municipal agreement number 41, article IV, of ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006, it was ordered: "By virtue of the foregoing, legal norms and principles, as well as the transcribed Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this Directorate concludes and so recommends to that Commission and consequently to the Municipal Council that since there is no substantive nonconformity of the contested administrative act with the legal system, it is proper to reject the motion for reversal on the merits, confirming the resolution issued by the Municipal Council through Municipal Agreement No. 21, article IV of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006, upholding in any case the original act according to official letter No. 72673 of November 21, 2005, issued by the Patents Department, the appellant's arguments therefore being not admissible nor what was requested from this City Council possible, as it lacks legal basis to that effect; the appeal is admitted and the interested party is summoned" (folios 361 to 389).- **II.- Case File No. 07-249-161-CA.- 16.-** That by means of notification **76158** at 15:40 hours on February twenty-fourth, two thousand six, the closure of the business called "Panadería Mi Pan" was ordered (folio 475); **17-** On March 3, 2006, Mr. Nombre70879 formulated a motion for reversal and appeal against the aforementioned notification (folios 470 to 478); **18-** That in a **resolution at ten hours and thirty-nine minutes on September fourth, two thousand six, the Patents Department** ordered: "The appeals are rejected as inadmissible because, as indicated, the appealed administrative act is an act of execution and confirmation and ratification of previous ones, already resolved by this Municipality, as the appellant having filed an appeal in due time, they concern the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein" (folios 490 to 496); **19-** That the **Municipal Mayor, by order at 14:00 hours on September 8, 2006**, hearing on appeal, resolved: "The inadmissibility of the filed appeals as stated by the Patents Department is confirmed; therefore, the appeals are rejected as inadmissible insofar as it was not indicated that the appealed administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation, and ratification of previous ones already resolved by this Municipality, as the appeals having been filed in due time by the appellant, they concern the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein.

Therefore, the ruling made by this office in official letter 1570 resolution 4141 and Municipal agreement 21, article iv of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006, is ratified. The appellant shall abide by what was resolved therein on the merits by this Municipality" (pages 478 to 485); 20- On September 14, 2006, Mr. Nombre70879 filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) and, in the alternative, an appeal by avocation (apelación por avocación) to be heard by the superior, against the foregoing provision (pages 507 to 509 and 518 to 519); 21- That by resolution at 11:00 a.m. on November 6, 2006, the Municipal Mayor, hearing the appeal of order No. 7975, resolved: "Pursuant to the foregoing, the cited legal rules and principles, as well as the transcribed Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this office concludes that since there is no substantive discrepancy between the challenged administrative act and the legal system, the proper course is to dismiss the motion for revocation on the merits, confirming resolution 7975 of 2:00 p.m. on September 8, 2006, which is also supported by the agreements of the Municipal Council No. 21 article iv of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006, and agreement 41 of Ordinary Session 17 of August 22, 2006, maintaining in any case the original act pursuant to official letter No. 72673 of November 21, 2005, issued by the Department of Patents, and consequently, the appellant's allegations are not admissible, nor is what was requested of this City Council possible, as it lacks legal basis for this purpose. Likewise, the inadmissibility of the motions that gave rise to the appeal and the resolution issued here is confirmed, since, as indicated, the appealed administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation, and ratification of previous acts already resolved by this Municipality, as the motions were filed in due course by the appellant and concern the same subject matter, the same subject, the same facts, and the same grounds considered therein. Therefore, the ruling made by this office in official letter 1570 resolution 4141 and Municipal agreement 21, article IV of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006, and agreement 41 of August 22, 2006, already cited above, is ratified. The resolution is hereby elevated to the knowledge of the Municipal Council, which will hear it pursuant to criterion DAJ 5498-9-2006 of the Directorate of Legal Affairs" (pages 520 to 546); 22- That by Municipal agreement number 20, article IV, of ordinary session 58 held on June 5, 2006, it was ordered: "Dismiss the appeal against the act contained in official letter 7975, issued both on procedural and substantive grounds, confirming resolution 9676, issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and maintaining in any case the challenged original act" (pages 718 to 748); 23- By agreement 27 article IV of ordinary session number 67 of August 7, 2007, the Municipal Council, regarding official letter 7975 original act notification 76158 of February 24, 2006, ordered: "In order for the Superior Contentious Administrative Court, Section III, improper hierarchical superior, to hear the appeal, the case file must be certified chronologically and sent within a period of 8 business days to said authority in accordance with Article 51 of the Law Regulating the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction in concordance with Article 156 of the Municipal Code" (page 7879).- III.- Case File No. 07-257-161-CA.- 24- On February 10, 2006, at the request of the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre70879 filed for a commercial license expansion (ampliación de patente comercial) in the name of PANADERÍA MI PAN, to indicate as a specific activity BREAD MAKING (page 852); 25- On February 10, 2006, Mr. Nombre70879 was notified of document No. 31080, to provide his residency card and health permit for the processing of the license expansion (page 849); 26- That in land use certificate (certificado de suelo) number 0000658 in the name of Nombre70879, in the office use space it was recorded: "Land Use Regulation in its articles 72, for zone ZR-2, requested use Bread Making, 235 meters, in observations and conditions it was noted 'A bakery with more than 25 meters of usable area is not permitted,' map 97, parcel 0117100, resolution Use not permitted (page 854); 27- That by document dated February 28, 2006, Placa11626, the Department of Patents notified Mr. Nombre70879 of the rejection of the license expansion request, indicating that according to land use certificate number 0000658 of February 20, 2006, issued by the Construction Permits Section, it was resolved as USE NOT PERMITTED (page 863); 28- On March 1, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion for revocation and appeal against the rejection of the expansion of the license for PANADERÍA MI PAN (pages 869 to 872); 29- By official letter dated November 22, 2006, Mr. Nombre70879 was notified of the Mayor's office's resolution, which states, in relevant part, the following: "Pursuant to the foregoing cited legal rules and principles, this Mayor's Office DISMISSES THE APPEAL on the merits, confirming resolution No. ALDP-1-013-2006 issued by the Department of Patents (revocation) and maintaining in any case the challenged original act contained in official letter No. Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006. Consequently, the appellant's allegations are not admissible, nor is what was requested of this City Council possible, as it lacks legal basis for this purpose. The administrative proceedings initiated are considered fully answered, namely, the appeal (March 1, 2006) and unnumbered brief (October 27, 2006) processing of the appeal for denial of license expansion" (pages 874 to 890); 30- That by brief dated November 30, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal for the rejection of the license expansion by the Mayor's office (pages 892 to 895); 31- That in agreement 22 article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007, the Municipal Council, in relation to the filed appeal, ordered: "Dismiss the appeal on the merits, confirming resolution 10215 issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and maintaining in any case the challenged original act contained in official letter Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006. Consequently, the appellant's allegations are not admissible, nor is what was requested of this City Council possible, as it lacks legal basis for this purpose" (pages 932 to 951 and 1014 to 1033); 32- That in ordinary session number 60, held on June 19, 2007, agreement 20 article V, the Municipal Corporation ordered: "The appeal is admitted to be heard before the Hierarchical Superior, Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court" (page 1041); 33- That on February 23, 2006, the Ministry of Health granted an operating permit to the business named PANADERÍA MI PAN, to conduct the activity of bread making and sale (page 1097).- IV.- FACTS NOT PROVEN: 1- That the activity carried out by the plaintiff is contrary to that authorized by license number C-00006157-02 (no evidence was provided in this regard); 2- That the Panadería Mi Pan, located on map 0097, parcel 01171000, is in a Residential Zone (the case file).- V.- GROUNDS OF THE APPEAL: The appellant requests that this Court rule on whether, for the specific case of PANADERÍA MI PAN, a request for license expansion was required to indicate the term making, in a bakery where its sale was already authorized. That as the owner of the Bakery, he went to request the license expansion at the suggestion of the Department of Patents in notification 000282, which states, in relevant part: "on the other hand, the appellant must proceed to request an expansion of the commercial activity and include the manufacture of the product within his registered activity and (sic) thereby rectify his commercial activity." He requests a ruling on the scope of the law of Taxes and Patents for lucrative activities and Law number 5694 on the tax tariff of the Municipality of the Central Canton of San José, since we are faced with a change or expansion of license, from sale of bread to making and sale, given that both activities are inextricably linked. That it cannot be said that the place where the Bakery is located is ZR-2 as classified by the Municipality, but rather as indicated in the first license (ZMRC), that the regulations on which the Municipal Administration relies to qualify and classify urban zones as residential, mixed, or industrial must be clear, whether the Urban Regulatory Plan, or in the autonomous regulatory decrees, or in the classification of activities for licenses and the Land Use Regulation. That the Municipality should be ordered to indicate that the obtained license covers the authorization to make and sell bread, as corresponds to the millenary practice of baking, that the Municipality's action does not conform to the truth, that all requirements were fulfilled. That the urban zone in which the operating license for Panadería Mi Pan was granted was indicated at the time of its granting as a mixed urban zone for commerce and residence. That it is not true that the lucrative activity carried out is contrary to that stipulated in the commercial license granted by said Municipality, that it holds a subjective right; it is not possible to say that a Bakery is only established to sell bread and not to make it.

VI- APPEALS IN MUNICIPAL MATTERS. Due to the errors found in the resolutions issued by the Council and the Mayor's Office of the Municipal Corporation of San José, it is necessary to recall the appeal process in this matter, which will be done, of course, without considering the modification made by the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, not applicable to this case according to its transitional provision IV, since this dispute must be resolved under the regulations prior to the enactment of said Code, so that the Council and the Mayor have a broader view of how appeals in matters under their knowledge and application must be resolved. As stated by the scholar Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, in the article entitled Administrative Appeals in Municipal Matters and the Role of the Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court published in the journal Ivstitia. Year 14. No. 162-163 June-July 2002, namely: "In municipal matters, the principle of the administrative procedure set forth in Article 350, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration is broken, in the sense that there will be, in any case, a single appellate instance whatever the origin or source of the challenged administrative act. This principle that limits appeals in the administrative procedure has clear and important justifications, such as the pyramidal or vertical structure of the administrative organization, a circumstance that would force the administrated party, when the act is issued by a lower-ranking body, to have to go through all the steps of the hierarchical line in order to exhaust the administrative channel and, in this way, have the possibility of accessing the jurisdictional channel. Evidently, the principle and the rule that codifies it have a constitutional rationale that lies in facilitating the administrated party's access to effective judicial protection (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), since, otherwise, they would be forced to walk the via crucis of the entire, complex, hermetic, and chaotic administrative organization of the entity that issued the unfavorable administrative act, which, obviously, they are not required to know, since it is an internal matter governed by the autonomous or independent organizational regulations. As we will see below, in municipal matters, the administrated party may, eventually, be exposed to the ordeal of going through administrative instances when dealing with acts issued by bodies subordinate to the Municipal Mayor. The idea of a ladder of appeals in the municipal sphere is not without controversy, since it has been argued that with respect to those agreements emanating from bodies that do not directly depend on the Council, it is the one that hears the appeal—the mayor—that exhausts the administrative channel. This interpretation poses some problem, and that is that there could be matters of transcendental importance that would never be known by the Council and by the Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court itself, which has avoided the filing of many ordinary contentious administrative proceedings before the Contentious Administrative Court. The interested parties referred to in Article 173, subsection 2), of the Political Constitution may file motions for revocation with subsidiary appeal. Both motions must be filed in a brief setting forth the grounds and reasons for disagreement with the challenged agreement and must be filed within five days (Articles 153 and 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code). In this regard, it is appropriate to recall some rules of the General Law of Public Administration that, although located in the Second Book, constitute hermeneutical parameters, even in municipal matters. The administrated party is free to use both motions (revocation with subsidiary appeal) or only one of them (appeal); if the first option is chosen, the appeal will be processed once the revocation has been declared without merit (Article 347 of the General Law of Public Administration). In application or specification of the guiding principle of administrative procedure called informalism in favor of the administrated party, the motions do not require special drafting or claims; it is sufficient for their correct formulation that the request for challenge or review of the agreement is clearly inferred from its content and text (Article 224 in concordance with Article 348 of the General Law of Public Administration). Revocation (Revocatoria) Revocation is a horizontal motion filed before the same body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested party or appellant, to reconsider its content and revoke, modify, or confirm it. That is, if the agreement was issued by the Department of Patents, Taxes, Engineering, or the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, that means of challenge must be filed before the respective office. Appeal (Apelación) Appeal is a vertical motion heard by the superior in rank of the body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested party or appellant, so that it may annul, modify, or confirm the act. Thus, if the agreement was issued by the Department of Patents, the appeal must be heard by the Municipal Mayor. Appeals against agreements directly issued by the Municipal Council. Ordinary appeals Title VI of the Municipal Code is titled 'Appeals against Municipal Acts,' however, it is subdivided into two chapters, the first of which is called 'Appeals against Council Agreements.' Pursuant to Article 153, interested parties may file the ordinary motions for revocation and appeal. Both motions must be filed in a reasoned petition within a period of five days from the notification of the agreement. The motion for revocation may be based on grounds of legality and of opportunity, merit, or convenience, and the appeal may only be based on grounds of illegality. It is necessary to remember that in accordance with Article 351, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration, the administrative appeal—in an administrative procedure—may be resolved by the competent body even to the detriment of the appellant—reformatio in pejus—when it concerns absolute nullity. The reason for this rule lies in the superior protection of the public interest and the objective legality that must exist in this matter. The appeal filed against a Municipal Council agreement is heard, by improper two-phase hierarchy, by the Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court—a body attached to the Judicial Branch located in the second judicial circuit (sic) of San José, Goicoechea—(Articles 156, paragraph 2, of the Municipal Code and 1, subsection b, of Law No. 7274 of December 10, 1991—Law Creating the Third Section of the Superior Contentious Administrative Court—), which is the court referred to in Article 173 of the Political Constitution. When hearing the case, the Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court, as improper hierarch or non-hierarchical controller, is governed by the provisions of Articles 180 and 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. In this regard, the latter cited numeral indicates that 'The non-hierarchical controller may only review the legality of the act by virtue of an administrative appeal, and shall decide within the limits of the claims and questions of fact raised by the appellant, but may apply a rule not invoked in the appeal.' From this perspective, Article 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code is consistent with Article 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. The Third Section of the Contentious Administrative Court, for its part, has held that its jurisdiction extends only to the legality of the agreement (Among others, see Rulings Nos. 3328-94 at 7:00 a.m. on November 7, 1994, 4457-95 at 10:45 a.m. on October 9, 1995, and 4655-95 at 10:00 a.m. on December 6, 1995). However, the interpretation of such rules cannot be literal and categorical—review of legality—since, in our legal system, the limits of discretion are fully codified. Indeed, Article 15 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that discretion is subject, in all cases, to the limits imposed, expressly or implicitly, by the legal system so that its exercise is reasonable and efficient. For their part, Articles 16 and 17 of that normative body establish express limits for the exercise of discretionary power, such as the univocal rules or rules of exact application of science and technique, the elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience, and the fundamental rights of the administrated party.

Article 16, paragraph 2, itself indicates that the judge must exercise control or oversight of discretion, based on such meta-legal limits, "as if exercising a legality review." Finally, there is no doubt whatsoever that in our legal system, the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion established in articles 16 and 17 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública form part of the parameter or legality block for determining the validity or invalidity of an administrative act. In this regard, Article 158, paragraph 4, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides that "Technical and scientific rules of unambiguous meaning and exact application, in the circumstances of the case, shall be deemed incorporated into the legal system for this purpose." In turn, Article 160 stipulates that "A discretionary act shall also be invalid when it violates elementary rules of logic, justice, or convenience, as indicated by the circumstances of each case." Consequently, since the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion—being codified—form part of the legality parameter, the non-hierarchical oversight body must also control their transgression. Thus, according to a systematic interpretation, the Third Section of the Administrative Litigation Tribunal must proceed to review aspects of opportunity, convenience, or merit." The foregoing is due to the fact that when observing the agreements under review, in many of them, the Department of Patents, the Mayor, or the Municipal Council indicates in the first instance that the APPEAL ON THE MERITS IS REJECTED (folio 130, 156, 503, 715, 748, 915, 1010, 1033) and then proceeds to forward the appeal to the immediate Superior when, according to what has been stated, the correct procedure is that if the motion for reversal (revocatoria) and appeal (apelación) is filed before the Patents Section, it must only reject the motion for reversal and admit the appeal to the Mayor; and the Mayor, upon receiving the appeal, rejects the motion for reversal and admits the appeal to the Superior in grade, the Municipal Council, which in turn is presented with the motion for reversal with appeal, rejects the motion for reversal, admits the appeal to the hierarchical superior, and summons the parties. However, the territorial entity in most cases rejects the appeal and then refers it to the superior for its consideration, thereby opening the jurisdiction of this collegiate body, and by virtue of this, this Tribunal proceeds to review the contested agreements in the following recitals (considerandos), but not without first informing the Municipal territorial entity of San José of the correct procedure to follow.

**VII- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY (principio de juridicidad de la administración):** It implies that the Public Administration does not act whenever it wishes, but only when a written principle or norm so permits. Its actions are not free; it must follow a process already pre-established by the legal system, thereby authorizing its conduct. The principal subjection of the Administration is that every act or behavior of the administration that affects the rights of the individual must be authorized by the legal system. The administration can and must do only what is legally established for it. This permissiveness or authorization has constitutional and legal standing as provided in Article 11 of the Carta Magna and as developed in the same article of our Ley General de la Administración Pública; for this reason it is said that **what is not authorized is prohibited.** As a consequence of the Administration's submission to the legal system, there exists the possibility of controlling its conduct, this being done by the jurisdictional sphere (Judge) in respect and pure and simple application also of the constitutional maxim of Article 49, such that the breach of this principle results in the sanction of liability of the State and its officials, provided in Article 9 of our Constitución Política. The legality block is composed not only of the law, but primarily by the Constitutionality block (constitutional rights and principles), in addition to all written norms (regulations, decrees, directives, and others) and unwritten norms (customs or administrative practices, jurisprudence, and principles of law that comprise that legal system). This principle cannot be ignored by the Public Administration, since an action carried out outside the legality block becomes illegal and null, with the natural, procedural, and legal consequences of such a declaration.- **VIII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION (discrecionalidad):** We must understand discretion as the faculty granted to public entities to adopt decisions based on criteria not strictly juridical—such as, for example, those of a political, social, organizational, technical nature, or of mere opportunity and convenience—according to the specific case; without in any way being able to be considered as a power denoting arbitrary will, insofar as the following parameters constitute true limits of this faculty: **1.- The purpose of the Administration; 2.- Reasonableness** or also called the **principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness**, which mandates the analysis of the legitimacy, **suitability, necessity, and proportionality strictly speaking** of the measure or provision adopted by the Administration; **3.- Respect for fundamental rights**, by virtue of which it constitutes a true barrier to the exercise of sovereign powers, precisely in light of the fact that one of the essential and inherent characteristics of the Social and Democratic State of Law (constitutional Articles 1, 9, 50, and 74), is precisely **the recognition of fundamental rights; 4.- The general principles of law**, such as equity, equality, justice, legal certainty, good administration, non-retroactivity, good faith; which, pursuant to the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley General de Administración Pública, are a source of law, as unwritten norms, and therefore, conditions on the exercise of the Administration's discretionary power; **5.- The unambiguous rules of science and technique**, which oblige the Administration to base its actions duly on the **theoretical knowledge acquired from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique**, when the case warrants it—as is the case in environmental, health, and tax matters, without it being possible to claim that this is a closed list or *numerus clausus*—, as well as in cases where it must use **criteria specific to administrative technique.** In the application of these criteria, it is impossible to claim the existence of discretion in an unrestricted and absolute manner, as the will of the Administration does not depend on its free will (or choice), but on the objective assessments obtained according to the technical rules applicable to the case; hence, the concepts of administrative discretion and technical discretion behave as absolutely irreconcilable premises; because discretionary power belongs to the volitional field, whereas the technical concept entails a declaration of truth, a judgment, that is, knowledge, on the basis that the content of technical assessments acquires a regulated character of administrative activity, as true legal norms that reduce the margin of discretion. In the application of indeterminate legal concepts, understood as those that refer to a sphere of reality whose limits are not well defined in their statement, although it is clear that they intend to delimit a concrete premise such as public interest, urgency or necessity, good faith, among others, so that the administration has a sphere of decision equivalent to discretion, since these are premises in which there is no diversity of options for the Administration, because at the moment of their application, a concrete precision is required that **only admits a single possible legal solution (unity of just solution)** , in charge, in the first place, of the Administration, and failing that, of the judge—when carrying out the control of such premises, who will determine whether the factual premise can be subsumed or not under the indeterminate concept. For this reason, it must be considered that **even though they are termed as indeterminable legal principles, they are determinable as to their content.** By virtue of which, although the Administration has a certain margin of appreciation—not of discretion—in the application of these concepts, in the end its action will be limited to applying the law (which uses evaluative or experience-based criteria), because the technique of indeterminate legal concepts deals with "... subsuming certain real circumstances into a legal category (configured, despite the imprecision of its limits, with the intention of delimiting a concrete premise); precisely for this reason it is a regulated process, which is exhausted in the intellectual process of understanding a reality in the sense that no decision of the applicator's will interferes, as is characteristic of one who exercises a discretionary power." It is **in application of the aforementioned parameters that it can be affirmed that administrative discretion is reduced to zero, insofar as the Administration's decision is conditioned to a single possible solution**. It must be borne in mind that "The differences between the two can be summarized as follows: 1) in technical discretion there is never any weighing or choice between interests; 2) in technical discretion the Administration resorts to using technical criteria; and 3) while in administrative discretion judgment and will coexist, in technical discretion, an activity of mere judgment is carried out in which the will does not intervene in any way." (Desdentado Nombre71458, Nombre50780. *Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia)*). Here it is important to mention the following administrative maxim "'When there is discretion one can never speak of technique, and when there is technique one can never speak of discretion,' because, 'the technical is not assessed, but rather it can be verified. The discretionary is not verified, but rather it is assessed'" (Garcia Trevijano José Antonio. *Tratado de Derecho Administrativo*. Tomo I. Tercera edición. p. 453. Cited by Gómez Cabrera Cecilio. *La discrecionalidad de la Administración Tributaria: su especial incidencia en el procedimiento de la inspección*. Mc.Graw-Hill. Madrid. España. 1998). This to clarify that although it is true that administrative decisions, actions, and omissions are imbued with a great degree of discretion, it is also true that when technical evidence exists, it cannot be disregarded; therefore, the administration must not only take into account the legal criteria on which it bases its actions, but also in those data that give rise to Administrative Discretion as a prerogative of the public entity, it must be exercised with the parameters indicated above, since discretion outside of these can be seen as arbitrariness; the discretion of public action cannot be taken as a parameter of administrative illegality nor as an authorization *per se* for the public entity to depart from the legality block.

**IX- ON THE STATEMENT OF REASONS (motivación):** Within administrative protection, the right of every person, duly legitimized by a violated right, to have their conflict resolved in a concrete and clear manner is immersed, which is materialized through administrative acts or procedures. Therefore, within administrative protection, we can locate the right to obtain a reasoned resolution, so that the participating or aggrieved parties understand the factual and legal grounds on which their conflict was resolved. As part of the principle of due process (sentences 15-90 and 1789-92 of the Sala Constitucional) and as an essential element of every administrative act, we have the **statement of reasons**, meaning that the party must know specifically the regulations on which the Administration bases its obligations; in such a way that when the aggrieved party requests a readjustment of that conduct, they are informed of the legal norms that support, approve, and legitimize the challenged action. Therefore, all administrative conduct, whatever it may be and regardless of its nature, materialized in an administrative act (resolution) must be duly reasoned and grounded, fully satisfying all the claims or allegations made by the parties involved in the process, or as in the present case, the legal reason why a patent application is rejected, the land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) is changed from one application to another, or the respect or not for a right already granted by the territorial entity. It is clear, then, that the resolutions issued within the administrative process, whatever it may be, must be conceived as a clear exposition of the constitutional principle **of administrative protection** derived from Article 41 of the Constitución Política; therefore, administrative conduct insofar as it limits or restricts rights must be duly reasoned, without infringements of Constitutional Rights (due process), so that it meets each and every one of the expectations of the person requesting compliance with an administrative conduct, in order to know the set of factual and legal antecedents that justify the decision taken by the public entity, its omission constituting nullity of the proceedings as provided in Articles 133, 158, and 166 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.- **X.- OF THE LAND-USE CERTIFICATE (certificado de uso de suelo):** Local urban plans, in accordance with Article 21, subsection 1) of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, carry out the planning and determination of land use, for the better distribution and protection of the environment. This means that the use of real property can be conditioned through the delimitation of areas, according to the categorization adopted by the regulatory plan, thus a property that is within the Municipal orbit can have a different use than the owner's desire, according to its zoning. Regulatory plans determine the place where one can build, carry out commercial activities, industry, recreational areas, based not only on criteria of opportunity and convenience, but on technical and objective pronouncements approved by the community. The designation of land use is carried out through its classification, which is the category or type of land (urban, developable, non-developable, and others) according to its basic urban purpose, and the qualification, which is applied to designate the subdivision of those types of land, through urban use (residential or industrial zones), whether in total or partial percentages even according to the population densities of a certain community. It is clear, then, that the administrative action aimed at carrying out zoning within land use is a primordial power of the State, delegated to the Municipalities (Article 169 of the Constitución política, developed in Article 16 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana). A task that does not imply detriment or injury to the right of property, this being a relative attribution, in accordance with urban regulations. Through this administrative manifestation, guidelines can legally be established for the use of the right of property, in strict relation to the needs of the community, and with vigilance over its rights and the environment, in order to achieve a harmonious planning of the land. This classification, according to Article 24 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, must be carried out through a regulation with the normative rank of Law (see judgment No. 263-2008 of the Second Section of this Tribunal), which must contain: a) the determination of land uses; b) matters relating to the location, height, and building area of constructions; c) the surface area and dimensions of lots, which has a direct impact on the determination of land density; d) the size of setbacks, yards, and other open spaces, and coverage of the lot by buildings and structures; e) the provision of space for parking, loading, and unloading of vehicles off the streets; f) size, location, and characteristics of signs or advertising notices; and g) any other architectural or urban detail relating to land use, the regulation of which has community interest. As has been indicated, all urban regulations translate into limitations and detractions of uses and powers of the owners over the property, insofar as it determines the land use and how that utilization should occur. This task is materialized through the administrative act called **land-use certificate**, which, due to its importance, is qualified as a **declaratory administrative act**, in the sense that it is limited to attesting to a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it, so its content is constitutive, as it does not create or modify previously established legal situations. The Procuraduría General de la República, in opinions No. C-327-2001 and C-357-2003, classifies them as concrete legal acts through which the local Administration **certifies the compliance or non-compliance of the land use** with what is established in the respective zoning; as provided in Article 28 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which states:

***"Artículo 28.-** The use or dedication of lands, buildings, structures to any use incompatible with the established zoning is prohibited. Henceforth, interested owners must obtain a municipal certificate attesting to the conformity of the use with the zoning requirements.* Existing non-conforming uses must also be recorded with a certificate (certificado) stating that circumstance. Each zoning regulation (reglamento de zonificación) shall set the date from which said certificates will be mandatory." Therefore, through the "land-use certificate (certificado de uso del suelo)", it is certified whether the use is permitted or not, as intended by the applicant. For this reason, its nature is declaratory, and not constitutive; land-use certificates do not, by themselves, give rise to a subjective right nor do they consolidate, by themselves, any legal situation by reason of a pre-existing right or legal situation." (Dr. Silvia Fernández Tesina. Urban Regulations, 2004). The land-use certification is merely descriptive regarding a specific factual situation in relation to what is provided under a legal norm, by reason of which, through it, a pre-existing legal situation is not consolidated prior to the certifying act. From the foregoing, it is clear that the land-use certificate constitutes a prerequisite required for the granting of a license, and its procurement cannot be exempted.

**XI.- ON MUNICIPAL LICENSES (LICENCIAS MUNICIPALES):** Municipal Licenses constitute an act that authorizes a person or entity to exercise a right; in other words, it tolerates or permits the performance of some activity in a specific place circumscribed to the Municipal entity with the competence to grant the permission or license. In the case of Municipal ones, these are legitimized for such purposes in accordance with Articles 79, 80, and 81 of the Municipal Code (Código municipal). Thus, Article 79 establishes: "To exercise any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained by paying a tax. Said tax shall be paid throughout the entire time the lucrative activity has been exercised or for the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out. With respect to the patent tax (impuesto de patentes), by which activities subject to a Municipal license are taxed, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through Vote number 2197-92 at 14:30 hours on August 11, 1992, has stated '... Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called a patent (patente). The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is traditional in the municipal law environment, which defines it as the imperative need to cover the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality' (...)." For its part, numeral 80 establishes: "The municipality must resolve license applications within a maximum period of thirty calendar days, counted from their submission. Once the term has expired and the requirements are met without any response from the municipality, the applicant may establish their activity;" and Article 81 literally states: "The municipal license referred to in the previous article may only be denied when the activity is contrary to the law, morality, or good customs, when the establishment has not fulfilled the legal and regulatory requirements, or when the activity, by reason of its physical location, is not permitted by the laws or, failing that, by the current municipal regulations." As can be easily appreciated, the foregoing regulations do not depart from those developed in Articles 329, 330 subsection 2), and 331 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). As a first step, the applicant requests from the municipality of their jurisdiction authorization to exercise a specific activity, presenting all the requirements that the administration must have previously defined; once presented, an inspection is carried out to determine its location, thus extending the authorization act, which materializes when the physical patent (patente) is delivered to the administrated party, where the Administration's will to grant or permit the requested activity is contained, and therefore, the administrated party proceeds to begin their lucrative activity. With that authorization, the administrated party acquires a subjective right, which does not imply that the authorizing administration (for the simple reason of being before pre-existing subjective rights) ties its hands, so that once the rights are declared, it cannot exercise its powers of tutelage and control over the use and enjoyment of the license or authorization. Its original prerogative, as an Administration to satisfy and ensure public interests, does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implied, of the authorization; it could be said that in essence, its power to revoke or annul duly authorized licenses or approvals does not disappear, which it could do in accordance with the block of legality (bloque de legalidad), through the lesivity process (proceso de lesividad), as provided in numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, or by means of a declaration in administrative proceedings of an evident and manifest nullity (nulidad evidente y manifiesta), following the appropriate procedure.

**XII- OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACTS:** The exercise carried out in the preceding whereas clauses on the principle of legality, administrative discretion, the nature of the land-use certification, and OF municipal licenses is not gratuitous, since all these elements are necessary for understanding what this Court concludes in the present case. First, it is based on the premise that the land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) is a certifying act, that is, it certifies a particular, pre-existing situation in accordance with urban regulations. Here, the Municipality of San José issued land-use certificate No. 1324 (folio 5) in favor of Mr. Nombre70879, which indicates it is for ZMRC, translated into Spanish, Mixed Residential and Commercial Zone (Zona Mixta Residencia y Comercial), located on map 0097, parcel 01171000, a prerequisite for the issuance of Commercial Patent number C-00006157-02 in favor of their commercial business PANADERÍA MI PAN, which also clearly indicates that the activity to be carried out is No. 276 (Bakery/Pastry Shop), a declaration that translates into a subjective right in favor of Mr. Nombre70879. Subsequently, a series of complaints were filed against the referenced business, and then the Patent Department sent several notes to verify the legality of the activity (proven facts 8 and 9, folios 51 and 52), in use of the control and oversight powers inherent to its activity, an action that cannot be branded as disproportionate, illegal, or abusive; on the contrary, it is duly authorized and legitimized by the principle of legality. What does not seem real or in accordance with legality is the reasoning given to make the decision to deny the application for patent expansion (ampliación de la patente), the ordered closure, and the deauthorization of the activity carried out. The insistent and repeated basis—in the appearance of legality—of the territorial entity for the closure of the PANADERÍA MI PAN business is that the actor was carrying out an unauthorized activity since the patent was for selling bread and not for making it, an argument that can even be described as ludicrous, since as recorded on folio 1061 of the present process, the commercial patent was granted to carry out the work of Bakery and Pastry Shop, terms that according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language of the Royal Academy, twentieth edition, mean: "Bakery: The trade of a baker, site, house, or place where bread is made or sold; Pastry Shop. Art and trade of a pastry chef. Person whose trade is making pastries, sweets, and some beverages." Therefore, the work carried out by Mr. Nombre70879 in his premises, sale and production of bread, is in accordance with the authorized activity (Bakery and Pastry Shop). This Court reaches this conclusion without having to make a great display of intelligence or reasonableness, concluding that the territorial entity's claim violates the limits of discretion and the principle of legality, but even more so, it does not conform to the legal procedure established to revoke an act declaring rights, such as the commercial patent legally granted at the time to Mr. Nombre70879. So, if we say that the activity carried out by the actor was in accordance with the decreed authorization (production and sale of bread), it implies that the dictated act claimed to be an act of execution (closure and sealing of the commercial business Bakery MI PAN), which it is not, because it causes its own harmful effect and is a consequence of a null act, due to a defect in its adoption (lack of reasoning, violation of the principle of legality and due process), and it is so declared.

Now, despite the fact that the commercial activity carried out by the actor, as stated, was that granted or permitted by the Municipality of San José, acting in good faith and motivated by the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre70879, for the sake of being permitted to carry out the authorized work, as required by the same appealed Municipality, proceeded to request an expansion of the commercial patent (proven fact 27, folio 852), so that it would also record, in addition to the sale of bread, its production (the action of a bakery). However, the administration, once again bleeding the limits of discretion and the block of legality, rejected such a request, indicating that the land-use permit 0000658 (proven fact 29, folio 863) was resolved as USE NOT PERMITTED, contradicting the land-use certificate (0001324, folio 5), which as a declaratory administrative act (acto administrativo declarativo) (in the sense that it is limited to certifying a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it) cannot be distorted without the urban regulation having been previously identified, which in this case did not occur. This translates into the fact that, although it is true, as indicated, land-use certificates only verify a previous situation and also constitute a public document, the declaration contained therein cannot be modified except by the pertinent legal means that permit it (a Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) or the approval of a new Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)), which must be duly accredited. And, it is the case that the records did not reflect, nor do the extensive resolutions of the Mayor and Municipal Council indicate, that a change in the urban regulation supporting the original land-use certificate (1324) had been made, by which it could be considered contrary to the Regional or General Regulatory Plan or the stipulations of the Urban Code (Código Urbanístico), in order to legalize the discrediting of the aforementioned land-use certification and thus motivate, in accordance with the block of legality, the new zoning carried out, which is certified according to land-use certificate (0000658), indicating that this zone is no longer mixed but changed to residential. But in any case, even if a situation of this nature had occurred or could occur, the territorial entity, which by constitutional power has the tutelage of the rights of citizens circumscribed to its territory, should have respected the right granted to Mr. Nombre70879 when it validly granted him the commercial patent subject of this dispute. However, as stated, the large territorial apparatus did not even remotely state or indicate to this authority in administrative functions that a change of this nature had been made, nor did it, failing the principle of legality and due process, give a certain, understandable, and legal explanation to the administered party of said change, an action that injures the principle of discretion of the public administration insofar as discretion cannot serve as a parameter for illegality. It is clear that the rights previously granted to the administered parties must be preserved by the territorial entity, with the warning that in any case, if its desire is to annul them, it must resort to the corresponding legal means and not to a simple simulation of legality protected by an excuse of words, which do not even remotely contain any legal standing.

On the other hand, the discussion of the amounts for taxes or patent fees that must be paid is not the subject of this process. Therefore, this Court cannot rule on matters that have not been discussed by the lower court, such as whether the application of the amounts of taxes paid would be applicable, since that is a point neither debated nor proposed to this Court, and if it were, it could not be heard in this venue under the terms of the provisions of Article 154 of the Municipal Code according to its previous text, prior to the approval of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as indicated. The discussion of the quantum of the amount to be paid for the tax obligations resulting from this legal transaction is not proper to this process, unlike the arbitrary and excessive action of the territorial entity towards its administered party, Mr. Nombre70879.

**XIII- CONCLUSIONS:** The foregoing reasoning leads to the inescapable consequence that the appeals filed by Mr. Nombre70879 are upheld, resulting in the nullity of Municipal agreements numbers 41 Article IV, of ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, Article IV, of ordinary session 58, held on June 5, 2006, and No. 22 Article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007. Consequently, it is appropriate to grant and preserve the subjective rights acquired with the authorization granted by the Patent Section (Sección de Patentes) number C-00006157-02 and the declaration of land-use certificate number 1324." Juan Manuel Ramírez Cerdas box 189 Nº 138- 2009 SECOND SECTION ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION TRIBUNAL II JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Goicoechea at eight hours twenty-five minutes on the twenty-fourth of April of the year two thousand nine.- Accumulated Municipal Appeals are heard, consolidated by resolution at *ten hours twenty minutes on the eighth of February two thousand eight* (folio 1175 to 1180), filed by **Nombre71456** in his capacity as owner of (**PANADERÍA MI PAN**) against the agreements issued by the **MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN JOSÉ**, No. 21 article IV, ordinary session of June 6, 2006 (folio 361 to 389); Minute 20 article IV ordinary session 58 of June 5, 2007 (folio 718), Agreement 22 article IV ordinary session 44, held on February 27, 2007 (folios 932 to 951 and 1014 to 1033).- Drafted by Judge **Jiménez Quesada;** **WHEREAS:** **I.- PROVEN FACTS:** **Case File No. 06-308-161-CA.** For the resolution of this dispute, the following are considered: **1-** That through document number 49830, a certificate of land use (certificado de uso de suelo) was granted to Mr. Nombre71456, for commerce and services authorizing the installation of a commercial electrical meter, said document bearing the seals of the urban permits and construction section dated April 15, 2004 (folio 2); **2-** That within the certificate of land use 0001324, dated August 23, 2004, the following data was recorded "Requested Use *Commerce and Services sale of Bread (Bakery),* for the purpose of "*License (Patente)*", name of applicant *Nombre71456*. In the space for office use, it was indicated "Land Use Regulation (Reglamento de uso de suelo) in its articles No. 22, for zone ZMRC (mixed residential commercial zone). Requested use Bakery (200m), observations and conditions 1 parking space for every 50 m of construction, map 0097, parcel 0117, resolution **Conditioned Use** (folio 5); **3-** That according to the license application processing receipt No. 36428 in the name of Mr. Nombre71456 for Panadería Mi Pan, in the space assigned to the administration it was indicated "land use 1324 of August 23, 2004 map 97 parcel 117 (folio 12); **4-** That through notification record number **30616** at 2 hours 32 minutes on December 15, 2004, the appellant is warned to present a Health Permit and proof of being up to date in the payment of municipal taxes (folio 15); That on January 25, 2005, through memorandum **Placa11627**, Mr. Nombre71456 is informed that he must present a Health Permit and proof of being up to date in the payment of taxes, otherwise the premises will be closed (folio 209 to 215); **5-** That on February 16, 2005, the Municipality of San José, specifically the Department of Licenses (Departamento de Patentes), issued commercial license number C-0006157-02 in the name of Nombre71456, to authorize in the business named **PANADERÍA MI PAN**, located at Dirección7973, to carry out the activity **267 BAKERY/PASTRY SHOP** (see folio 1061 of the case file); **6-** On November 16, 2005, the Head of the Department of Licenses sends a note to the Head of the Environment Section, indicating that given that complaints have been filed regarding the operation of a license at Dirección7974 for the establishment Panadería Mi Pan, she requested that the following be reviewed: a) Determine the type of activity currently carried out at the establishment; b) due to the activity being carried out, verify if it has the adequate furniture, equipment, and structure to develop said activity; c) determine if as a result of that activity, adverse effects are triggered for its neighbors (folio 51); **7-** That on that same date, a note is also sent to the Head of the Inspection Area, in order to verify, due to the complaints filed against the establishment Panadería Mi Pan, the following: a) Verify the permits that support the operation b) verify the activity currently carried out in detail; c) measure the area in which the activity is carried out; d) type of equipment and furniture used to carry out the activity; e) identify the business's adjoining neighbors; f) any other information in this regard (folio 52); **8-** That through official communication No. **72673** notified to Mr. Nombre71456, on November 21, 2005, the Inspector of the Department of Licenses of the Municipality of San José ordered the closure of the premises and proceeded to place seals on Panadería Mi Pan (see recital at folio 91); **9-** By brief of November 22, 2005, the plaintiff files a motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal against the closure ordered through official communication No. **72673** (folio 69); **10-** By resolution at *nine hours ten minutes on the twentieth of January two thousand six*, the Department of Licenses resolved "*From the analysis of the administrative file, this office resolves to reject the motion for reconsideration filed by Mr. Nombre71456 and confirms notification 72673 of November 21, 2005. And the administrative file is transferred to the office of (sic) Mr. Mayor of San José, for knowledge of the Appeal where he must direct his arguments within a period of five business and peremptory days*" (folio 91 and 92); **11-** That on February 8, 2006, the Office of the Municipal Mayor, hearing on appeal, resolved "*Based on the foregoing, the transcribed legal norms and principles as well as the Jurisdictional, Constitutional, and Administrative jurisprudence, this Mayor's Office points out that as there is no non-conformity with the legal system, it* ***REJECTS*** *the appeal on the merits and confirms the decision of the Department of Licenses (reconsideration) and maintains in any case the original contested act contained in official communication No. 72673 notified on November 21, 2005, the arguments raised by the appealing Company not being admissible and the contested act consequently being in accordance with Law. With this resolution, a response is given to all of the submitted proceedings*" the matter is also elevated to the Municipal Council (folio 133 to 156); **12-** In a document dated February 27, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 files a motion for reconsideration with appeal before the Municipal Council in accordance with article 161 of the Municipal Code against what was resolved at folio 109 (folio 215 to 222); **13-** That by agreement number 21, article IV, ordinary session No. 6 of June 6, 2006, the Municipal Council ordered "*Based on the arguments outlined above and due to becoming illegal (sic) to reject the appeal filed by Mr. Nombre71456 owner of the business called Panadería Mi Pan, confirming in all its aspects resolution 4141 of the Office of the Municipal Mayor*" (folio 301 to 304); **14-** In a writing dated August 15, 2006, the plaintiff files an appeal before the Superior Administrative Litigation Hierarchical Authority against the aforementioned agreement (folio 306); **15-** That by Municipal agreement number 41 article IV, of ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006, it was ordered "*Based on the foregoing, norms and legal principles, as well as the transcribed Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence, this Directorate concludes and thus recommends to that Commission and consequently to the Municipal Council that as there is no substantive non-conformity of the contested administrative act with the legal system, the proper course is to reject the motion for reconsideration on the merits, confirming the resolution issued by the Municipal Council through Municipal Agreement No. 21 article IV of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006, maintaining in any case the original act according to official communication No. 72673 of November 21, 2005, issued by the Department of Licenses, the appellant's arguments consequently not being admissible nor possible what is petitioned to this City Council as it lacks legal basis for that purpose, the motion is admitted and the interested party is summoned*" (folio 361 to 389).- **II.- Case File No. 07-249-161-CA.- 16.-** That through notification **76158** at 15:40 hours on February twenty-fourth, two thousand six, the closure of the business called "Panadería Mi Pan" was ordered (folio 475); **17-** On March 3, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 formulates a motion for reconsideration and appeal against the previously indicated notification (folio 470 to 478); **18-** That in a **resolution at ten hours thirty-nine minutes on the fourth of September two thousand six, the Department of Licenses** ordered "*The motions are rejected as inadmissible because, as indicated, the contested administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation, and ratification of previous ones, already resolved by this Municipality, the appellant having filed motions in due time that deal with the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein*" (folio 490 to 496); **19-** That the **Municipal Mayor by ruling at 14:00 hours on September 8, 2006**, hearing on appeal, resolved "*The inadmissibility of the motions filed is confirmed as manifested (sic) by the Department of Licenses, therefore the motions are rejected as inadmissible insofar as it was not indicated (sic) that the contested administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation, and ratification of previous ones already resolved by this Municipality, the motions having been filed in due time by the appellant that deal with the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein. Therefore, what was resolved by this* ***office, official communication 1570, resolution 4141 and Municipal agreement 21, article IV of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006 is ratified.*** *Abide by what was resolved there on the merits by this Municipality*" (folio 478 to 485); **20-** On September 14, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 filed a motion for reconsideration and in subsidium appeal by avocation (avocación) for knowledge by the superior, against the previously ordered decision (folio 507 to 509 and 518 to 519); **21-** That by resolution at 11:00 hours on November 6, 2006, Mr. Municipal Mayor, hearing on appeal of ruling No. **7975**, resolves "*Based on the foregoing, norms and legal principles as well as the transcribed Constitutional and Administrative jurisprudence,* ***this office concludes*** *that as there is no substantive non-conformity of the contested administrative act with the legal system,* ***the proper course is to reject the motion for reconsideration on the merits***, *confirming the resolution* ***7975 of 14:00 hours on September 8, 2006, which is also supported by the agreements of the Municipal Council*** *No.* ***21 article IV of the ordinary session of June 6, 2006 and agreement 41 of Ordinary Session 17 of August 22, 2006, maintaining in any case the original act according to official communication No. 72673 of November 21, 2005,*** ***issued by the Department of Licenses,*** *the appellant's arguments consequently not being admissible nor possible what is petitioned to this City Council as it lacks legal basis for that purpose. Likewise, the inadmissibility of the motions that gave rise to the motion and resolution issued herein is confirmed because, as indicated, the contested administrative act is an act of execution, confirmation, and ratification of previous ones already resolved by this Municipality, the motions having been filed in due time by the appellant that deal with the same matter, the same subject, the same facts and grounds considered therein. Therefore, what was resolved by this office, official communication 1570, resolution 4141 and Municipal agreement 21, article IV of the Ordinary Session of June 6, 2006 and agreement 41 of August 22, 2006, cited above, is ratified.* The matter is then elevated to the Municipal Council for its consideration, which shall hear it in accordance with legal opinion DAJ 5498-9-2006 from the Office of Legal Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos)" (folios 520 to 546); 22- That by Municipal Agreement number 20, article IV, of regular session 58 held on June 5, 2006, it was ordered "to Reject the appeal (recurso de apelación) against the act contained in official letter 7975, issued both on procedural and substantive grounds, confirming resolution 9676, issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and upholding in any case the original act challenged" (folios 718 to 748); 23- By Agreement 27, article IV of regular session number 67 of August 7, 2007, the Municipal Council, regarding official letter 7975, original act, notification 76158 of February 24, 2006, resolved "In order for the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, Section III, Improper Hierarchical Superior, to hear the appeal, the file must be certified in chronological order and remitted within 8 business days to said authority in accordance with Article 51 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction in concordance with Article 156 of the Municipal Code" (folio 7879).- III.- File Nº 07-257-161-CA.- 24- On February 10, 2006, at the request of the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre71456, filed for an expansion of a business license (ampliación de patente comercial) in the name of PANADERÍA MI PAN, so that the specific activity indicated would be ELABORATION OF BREAD (ELABORACIÓN DE PAN) (folio 852); 25- On February 10, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 was notified of document Nº 31080, requesting him to provide his residence card and health permit for the processing of the license expansion (folio 849); 26- That in land use certificate (certificado de suelo) number 0000658 in the name of Nombre71456, in the office use space it was recorded "Land Use Regulation (Reglamento de Uso de Suelo) in its articles 72, for zone ZR-2, requested use Elaboration of Bread, 235 meters, in observations and conditions it was noted 'Bakery not permitted with more than 25 meters of usable area, map 97, parcel 0117100, resolution Use not permitted' (Uso no permitido) (folio 854); 27- That by a document dated February 28, 2006, Placa11626, the Licensing Department (Departamento de Patentes) notified Mr. Nombre71456 of the rejection of the license expansion application, indicating that according to land use certificate number 0000658 of 02/20/2006, issued by the Construction Permits Section, it was resolved as USE NOT PERMITTED (USO NO PERMITIDO) (folio 863); 28- On March 1, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) and appeal (recurso de apelación) against the rejection of the license expansion for PANADERÍA MI PAN (folios 869 to 872); 29- By official letter dated November 22, 2006, Mr. Nombre71456 was notified of the decision of the Mayor's Office, which in the pertinent part states the following: "By virtue of the foregoing, cited legal norms and principles, this Mayor's Office REJECTS THE APPEAL (RECHAZA EL RECURSO DE APELACIÓN) on the merits, confirming resolution Nº ALDP-1-013-2006 issued by the Licensing Department (reconsideration) and upholding in any case the original act challenged contained in official letter Nº Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006, consequently the appellant's arguments are not admissible, nor is the petition made to this City Council possible, as it lacks legal basis for this purpose. The administrative proceedings filed are hereby deemed fully answered, namely, appeal (March 1, 2006) and unnumbered brief (October 27, 2006), processing of the appeal for denial of license expansion" (folios 874 to 890); 30- That by a brief dated November 30, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal against the rejection of the license expansion by the Mayor's Office (folios 892 to 895); 31- That in Agreement 22, article IV, regular session 44, of February 27, 2007, the Municipal Council, regarding the appeal filed, resolved "Reject the appeal on the merits, confirming resolution 10215 issued by the Municipal Mayor's Office and upholding in any case the original act challenged contained in official letter Placa11626 notified on February 23, 2006, consequently the appellant's arguments are not admissible, nor is the petition made to this City Council possible, as it lacks legal basis for this purpose" (folios 932 to 951 and 1014 to 1033); 32- That in regular session number 60, held on June 19, 2007, Agreement 20, article V, the Municipal Corporation resolved "The appeal is admitted for the Hierarchical Superior, Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court" (folio 1041); 33- That on February 23, 2006, the Ministry of Health granted an operating permit to the business called PANADERÍA MI PAN to carry out the activity of bread-making and sale (Elaboración en venta de Pan) (folio 1097).- IV.- FACTS NOT PROVEN (HECHOS NO PROBADOS): 1- That the activity carried out by the plaintiff is contrary to the one authorized by license number C-00006157-02 (no evidence was provided in this regard); 2- That Panadería Mi Pan, located on map 0097, parcel 0117100, is in a Residential Zone (the case records).- V.- GROUNDS FOR THE APPEAL (FUNDAMENTOS DEL RECURSO): The appellant requests that this Court rule on whether, for the specific case of PANADERÍA MI PAN, an application for a license expansion was required to indicate the term "to elaborate" (elaborar), in a bakery where its sale was already authorized. That as the owner of the Bakery, he applied for the license expansion at the suggestion of the Licensing Department in notification 000282, which in the pertinent part states "on the other hand, the appellant must proceed to apply for an expansion of the commercial activity and include within its registered activity the manufacture of the product and (sic) thus remedy its commercial activity." He requests a ruling on the scope of the Tax and Licensing Law for Lucrative Activities (Ley de Impuestos y Patentes de Actividades Lucrativas) and Law number 5694 on Municipal Tax Tariffs of the Central Canton of San José, given that we are faced with a change or expansion of a license, from the sale of bread to its elaboration and sale, the thing is that both activities are inextricably linked. That it cannot be said that the place where the Bakery is located is ZR-2 as classified by the Municipality, but rather as indicated in the first license (ZMRC), that the regulations on which the Municipal Administration relies to classify urban zones as residential, mixed, or industrial must be clear, whether it is the Urban Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador Urbano), or the autonomous regulatory decrees, or the classification of activities for licenses and the Land Use Regulation. That the Municipality be told that the license obtained covers the authorization to elaborate and sell bread, as corresponds to the age-old practice of Bakeries, that the Municipality's action does not conform to the truth, that all requirements were met. That the urban zone in which the operating license for Panadería Mi Pan was granted at the time of its concession was indicated as a mixed urban zone, for commerce and residence. That it is not true that the lucrative activity carried out is contrary to that stated in the commercial license granted by said Municipality, that he has a subjective right, it is not possible to say that a Bakery is only set up to sell bread and not to make it.

VI- APPEALS IN MUNICIPAL MATTERS (LOS RECURSOS EN MATERIA MUNICIPAL). Given the errors found in the resolutions issued by the Council and the Mayor's Office of the Municipal Corporation of San José, it is necessary to recall the appeals process in this matter, which will be done, it should be clear, without considering the modification made by the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), not applicable to this case according to its Transitional Provision IV, since the present conflict must be resolved under the regulations prior to the enactment of said Code, so that the Council and the Mayor have a broader view of how appeals in matters within their knowledge and application must be resolved. As indicated by the legal scholar Nombre71457, in the article titled "Administrative Appeals in Municipal Matters and the Function of the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court" published in Ivstitia magazine, Year 14, No. 162-163 June-July 2002, namely: "In municipal matters, the principle of administrative procedure set forth in Article 350, paragraph 1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública) is broken, in the sense that there shall exist, in any case, a single appellate instance whatever the origin or source of the challenged administrative act. That principle, which limits appeals in administrative procedure, has obvious and important justifications such as the pyramidal or vertical structure of administrative organization, a circumstance that would force the administered party, when the act is issued by a lower-ranking body, to have to go through all the echelons of the hierarchical line to be able to exhaust the administrative route and, in that way, have the possibility of accessing the jurisdictional route. Evidently, the principle and the norm that gives it positive form have a constitutional rationale that lies in facilitating the administered party's access to effective judicial protection (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), since, otherwise, he would be forced to tread the via crucis of the entire, complex, hermetic, and chaotic administrative organization of the entity that issued the administrative act that is unfavorable to him, which, obviously, he is not obliged to know, since it is an internal matter that is the subject of autonomous or independent organizational regulations. As we shall see below, in municipal matters, the administered party may be, eventually, exposed to the ordeal of passing through administrative instances when it involves acts issued by bodies subordinate to the Municipal Mayor. The idea of the ladder of appeals in the municipal sphere is not uncontroversial, since it has been maintained that regarding those agreements emanating from bodies that do not depend directly on the Council, the body that exhausts the administrative route is the one hearing the appeal—the Mayor. This interpretation presents a problem, which is that there could be matters of crucial importance that would never be known by the Council and by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court itself, which has avoided the filing of many ordinary contentious-administrative proceedings before the Contentious-Administrative Court. The interested parties referred to in Article 173, subsection 2), of the Political Constitution may file motions for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal (revocatoria con apelación en subsidio). Both motions must be filed in a brief setting forth the grounds and reasons for disagreement with the challenged agreement and must be filed within five days (Articles 153 and 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code). In this regard, it is convenient to recall some norms of the General Law of Public Administration that, although placed in Book Two, constitute hermeneutical parameters, even in municipal matters. For the administered party, it is optional to use both remedies (reconsideration with subsidiary appeal) or only one of them (appeal); if the first option is chosen, the appeal will be processed once the reconsideration has been denied (Article 347 of the General Law of Public Administration). In application or specification of the guiding principle of administrative procedure called informality in favor of the administered party, appeals do not require special wording or claims; for their correct formulation, it is sufficient that the petition for challenge or review of the agreement clearly emerges from their content and text (Article 224 in concordance with 348 of the General Law of Public Administration). Reconsideration (Revocatoria) Reconsideration is a horizontal appeal filed before the very body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested party or appellant, so that it reconsiders its content and revokes, modifies, or confirms it. That is, if the body that issued the agreement is the Licensing Department, Tax Department, Engineering Department, or the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone Department, that means of challenge must be filed before the respective office. Appeal (Apelación) The appeal is a vertical appeal heard by the hierarchical superior of the body that issued the municipal agreement affecting the interested party or appellant, so that said superior annuls, modifies, or confirms the act. Thus, if the body that issued the agreement is the Licensing Department, the appeal must be heard by the Municipal Mayor. Appeals against agreements directly emanating from the Municipal Council. Ordinary appeals Title VI of the Municipal Code is titled 'Appeals against Municipal Acts', however, it is subdivided into two chapters, the first is called 'Appeals against Council Agreements'. In accordance with Article 153, interested parties may file the ordinary appeals of reconsideration and appeal. Both appeals must be filed in a reasoned memorial and within five days from the notification of the agreement. The reconsideration appeal may be based on grounds of legality and of opportunity, merit or convenience, and the appeal is permissible solely on grounds of illegality. It is necessary to recall that pursuant to Article 351, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration, the administrative appeal—in an administrative procedure—may be resolved by the competent body even to the detriment of the appellant—reformatio in pejus—when it involves absolute nullity. The reason for this rule lies in the superior protection of public interest and the objective legality that must exist in this matter. The appeal filed against an agreement of the municipal Council is to be heard, by biphasic improper hierarchy, by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court—a body attached to the Judicial Branch having its seat in the second judicial circuit (sic) of San José, Goicoechea— (Articles 156, paragraph 2, of the Municipal Code and 1, subsection b, of Law No. 7274 of December 10, 1991—Law Creating the Third Section of the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court—), which is the court referred to in Article 173 of the Political Constitution. When hearing, the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, as an improper hierarch or non-hierarchical controller, the provisions of Articles 180 and 181 of the General Law of Public Administration apply. In this regard, the last numeral cited indicates that 'The non-hierarchical controller may only review the legality of the act and by virtue of an administrative appeal, and shall decide within the limit of the claims and questions of fact raised by the appellant, but may apply a rule not invoked in the appeal.' From this perspective, Article 156, paragraph 1, of the Municipal Code is congruent with the provisions of Article 181 of the General Law of Public Administration. The Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, for its part, has maintained that its jurisdiction extends solely to the legality of the agreement (Among others, see Votes Nos. 3328-94 of 7:00 hrs. on November 7, 1994, 4457-95 of 10:45 hrs. on October 9, 1995, and 4655-95 of 10:00 hrs. on December 6, 1995). However, the interpretation of such rules cannot be literal and categorical—review of legality—since, in our legal system, the limits of discretion are fully positivized. Indeed, Article 15 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that discretion is subject, in any case, to the limits imposed, expressly or implicitly, by the legal system for its exercise to be reasonable and efficient. For their part, Articles 16 and 17 of that regulatory body set express limits for the exercise of discretionary power such as univocal rules or rules of exact application of science and technique, elementary principles of justice, logic or convenience, and the fundamental rights of the administered party. Article 16, paragraph 2, itself indicates that the judge must exercise control or oversight of discretion, based on such meta-legal limits, 'as if exercising control of legality.' Lastly, there is no doubt that in our legal system the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion established in articles 16 and 17 of the General Law of Public Administration form part of the parameter or block of legality for determining the validity or invalidity of an administrative act. On this matter, Article 158, paragraph 4, of the General Law of Public Administration provides that 'Technical and scientific rules of univocal meaning and exact application, in the circumstances of the case, shall be deemed incorporated into the legal system for this purpose.' For its part, article 160 prescribes that 'The discretionary act shall be invalid, also, when it violates elementary rules of logic, justice, or convenience, as indicated by the circumstances of each case.' Consequently, since the legal and meta-legal limits of discretion—being positivized—form part of the parameter of legality, the non-hierarchical controller must also control their transgression. Thus, according to a systematic interpretation, the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court must examine aspects of opportunity, convenience, or merit." The foregoing is because, upon observing the agreements to be reviewed, in many of them the Licensing Department, the Mayor, or the Municipal Council state in the first instance that THE APPEAL IS REJECTED on the merits (folio 130, 156, 503, 715, 748, 915, 1010, 1033) and then proceed to forward the appeal to the immediate Superior when, according to what has been stated, the correct procedure is that if the reconsideration and appeal are filed before the Licensing Section, it must only reject the reconsideration and admit the appeal for the Mayor, and the Mayor, upon receiving the appeal, rejects the reconsideration and admits the appeal for the Superior in rank, the Municipal Council, to whom in turn is presented the reconsideration with appeal, rejects the reconsideration and admits the appeal for the hierarchical superior and summons the parties.

However, the territorial entity in the majority of cases rejects the appeal (recurso de apelación) and then refers it to the superior for its consideration, opening the competence to this collegiate body, and by virtue of this, this Court is permitted to hear the challenged agreements in the following considerandos, not without first informing the territorial entity Municipal de San José of the correct procedure to follow.

**VII- ON THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY (principio de juridicidad de la administración):** It implies that the Public Administration does not act when it wants, but only when there is a written principle or norm that allows it to do so. Its action is not free; it must follow a process already pre-established by the legal system, thereby authorizing its actions. The main subjection of the Administration is that every act or behavior of the administration that affects the rights of the individual must be authorized by the legal system. The administration can and must do only what is legally established for it. This permissiveness or authorization has constitutional and legal standing as provided in Article 11 of the Magna Carta and developed in the same numeral of our General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which is why it is said that **what is not authorized, is prohibited.** As a consequence of the Administration's submission to the legal system, there is the possibility of controlling its conduct, by the jurisdictional sphere (Judge) in respect and pure and simple application also of the constitutional maxim of Article 49, so that the breach of this principle carries as a sanction the responsibility of the State and its officials, set forth in numeral 9 of our Political Constitution. The legality framework (bloque de legalidad) is composed not only of the law, but firstly by the Constitutionality framework (bloque de Constitucionalidad) (constitutional rights and principles), in addition to all written norms (regulations, decrees, guidelines, and others) and unwritten norms (customs or administrative practices, jurisprudence, and principles of law that integrate that system). This principle cannot be ignored by the Public administration, since an action carried out outside the legality framework becomes illegal and null, with the natural, procedural, and legal consequences of such a declaration.- **VIII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION (DISCRECIONALIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA):** We must understand discretion as the faculty granted to public entities to adopt decisions based on criteria that are not strictly legal – for example, of a political, social, organizational, technical, or mere opportunity and convenience nature – according to the specific case; without in any way being able to be considered as a power denoting an arbitrary will, as the following parameters constitute true limits of this faculty: **1.-** ***The purpose of the Administration;*** **2.-** ***Reasonableness*** or also called the ***principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness***, which obliges the analysis of the legitimacy, *suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense of the measure or provision adopted by the Administration;* **3.-** ***Respect for fundamental rights***, by virtue of which, it constitutes a true barrier to the exercise of powers of authority, precisely in consideration that one of the essential and inherent characteristics of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law (constitutional articles 1, 9, 50, and 74), is precisely ***the recognition of fundamental rights; 4.- The general principles of law*** *, such as equity, equality, justice, legal certainty, good administration, non-retroactivity, good faith; which, according to the provisions of Article 7 of the General Law of Public Administration, are a source of law, as unwritten norms, and therefore, conditions for the exercise of the discretionary power of the Administration;* **5.-** ***The univocal rules of science and technique***, which obliges the Administration to base its action duly on ***the theoretical knowledge acquired from the different methodologies and disciplines of science and technique***, when warranted – as is the case in environmental, health, and tax matters, without it being possible to claim that it is a closed list or *numerus clausus* –, as well as in cases where it must use ***criteria specific to administrative technique.*** In the application of these criteria, it is impossible to claim the existence of discretion in an unrestricted and absolute manner, as the will of the Administration does not depend on its free will (or choice), but on objective assessments obtained according to the technical rules applicable to the case; hence, the concepts of administrative discretion and technical discretion behave as absolutely irreconcilable assumptions; because discretionary power belongs to the volitional field, while the technical concept entails a declaration of truth, a judgment, that is, knowledge, on the basis that the content of technical assessments acquires a regulated nature of administrative activity, akin to true legal norms, which reduce the margin of discretion. In the application of undefined legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados), understood as those that refer to a sphere of reality whose limits do not appear well-defined in their statement, despite which it is clear that they attempt to delimit a concrete assumption such as public interest, urgency or necessity, good faith, among others. For the administration to have its own scope of decision comparable to discretion, because these are assumptions in which there is no diversity of options for the Administration, since at the moment of their application a concrete precision is required that **only admits a single possible legal solution (unity of just solution)**, entrusted, firstly to the Administration, and failing that, to the judge – when carrying out the control of such assumptions, who will determine whether the factual assumption is subsumable or not in the undefined concept. For this reason, it must be considered that **even though they are called indeterminable legal principles, they are determinable as to their content.** By virtue of which, although the Administration has a certain margin of appreciation – not of discretion – in the application of these concepts, in the end its action will be limited to applying the law (which uses criteria of value or experience), since the technique of undefined legal concepts deals with "*... subsuming certain real circumstances into a legal category (configured, despite its imprecision of limits, with the intention of delimiting a concrete assumption); precisely for this reason it is a regulated process, which is exhausted in the intellective process of understanding a reality in the sense that no decision of the will of the applicator interferes, as is characteristic of one who exercises a discretionary power.*" It is in **application of the above parameters that it can be affirmed that the reduction to zero of administrative discretion occurs, insofar as the Administration's decision is conditioned to a single possible solution**. It must be considered that "The differences between the two can be summarized as follows: 1) in technical discretion there is never any weighing or choice between interests; 2) in technical discretion the Administration resorts to the use of technical criteria; and 3) while in administrative discretion judgment and will coexist, in technical discretion, an activity of mere judgment is carried out in which the will does not intervene in any way." (Desdentado Nombre71458, Nombre50780. Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia). Here it is important to mention the following administrative maxim "«When there is discretion, one can never speak of technique, and when there is technique, one can never speak of discretion», for, «the technical is not evaluated, but can be verified. The discretionary is not verified, but is evaluated»" (Nombre71459 . Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. Tercera edición. p. 453. Cited by Nombre71460 . La discrecionalidad de la Administración Tributaria: su especial incidencia en el procedimiento de la inspección. Mc.Graw-Hill. Madrid. España. 1998). This to clarify that although it is true that administrative decisions, actions, and omissions are imbued with a great degree of discretion, it is also true that when technical evidence exists, it cannot be ignored; therefore, the administration must not only take into account the legal criteria on which it bases its actions, but in those data that give rise to Administrative Discretion as a prerogative of the public entity, it must be carried out with the parameters noted above, since discretion outside of these can be seen as arbitrariness. The discretion of public action cannot be taken as a parameter of administrative illegality nor as a per se authorization for the public entity to depart from the legality framework.

**IX- ON MOTIVATION (MOTIVACIÓN):** Within the administrative protection (tutela administrativa), the right of every person, duly legitimized by a violated right, to have their conflict resolved in a concrete and clear manner is immersed, which is materialized through administrative acts or actions. Therefore, within the administrative protection, we can locate the right to obtain a reasoned resolution (resolución motivada), so that the intervening or injured parties understand the factual and legal reasons through which their conflict was settled. As part of the principle of due process (sentences 15-90 and 1789-92 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)) and as an essential element of every administrative act, we have **motivation**, this means that the party must know concretely the regulations on which the Administration bases its obligations; in such a way that when the injured administrated party requests a re-adaptation of that conduct, they are informed of the legal norms that support, approve, and legitimize the contested action. For this reason, every administrative conduct, whatever it may be and regardless of its nature, concretized in an administrative act (resolution) must be duly motivated and reasoned, fully satisfying all the claims or allegations made by the participants in the process, or as in the present case, the legal reason for which a patent application is rejected, the land use is changed from one application to another, or the respect or not for a right already granted by the territorial entity. It is clear then that the resolutions issued within the administrative process, whatever it may be, must be conceived as a clear exposition of the constitutional principle ***of administrative protection*** derived from Article 41 of the Political Constitution; therefore, administrative conduct, insofar as it limits or restricts rights, must be duly motivated, without violations of Constitutional Rights (due process), so that it meets each and every one of the expectations of whoever requests the fulfillment of an administrative conduct, this in order to know the set of factual and legal antecedents that justify the decision taken by the public entity, its omission constituting nullity of the proceedings as provided in Articles 133, 158, and 166 of the General Law of Public Administration.- **X.- ON THE LAND-USE CERTIFICATE (CERTIFICADO DE USO DE SUELO):** Local urban plans, according to Article 21, subsection 1) of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), carry out the organization and determination of land use, for the better distribution and protection of the environment. This means that the use of real estate property can be conditioned by the delimitation of areas, according to the categorization adopted by the regulatory plan (plan regulador); thus, a property that is within the Municipal scope can have a use different from the owner's desire, according to its zoning. Regulatory plans determine the place where one can build, carry out commercial, industrial, and recreational activities, based not only on criteria of opportunity and convenience but on technical and objective pronouncements approved by the community. The designation of land use is carried out through its classification, which is the category or type of land (urban, developable, undevelopable, and others) according to its basic urban destination, and the qualification, which is applied to designate the subdivision of those types of soil, through urban development (residential or industrial zones), whether in total or partial percentages according even to the population densities of a given community. It is clear then that the administrative action tending to carry out zoning within land use is a primordial power of the State, delegated to the Municipalities (Article 169 of the Political Constitution, developed in Article 16 of the Urban Planning Law). A task that does not imply detriment or injuries to property rights, as this being a relative attribution, according to urban regulations. Through this administrative manifestation, guidelines can legally be established for the use of property rights, in strict relation to the needs of the community, and with vigilance of their rights and the environment, in order to achieve a harmonious organization of the land. This classification, according to Article 24 of the Urban Planning Law, must be carried out through a regulation with the normative rank of Law (see judgment No. 263-2008 of the Second Section of this Court), which must contain: a) the determination of land uses; b) matters relating to the location, height, and building area of constructions; c) the surface area and dimensions of lots, which has a direct impact on the determination of land density; d) the size of setbacks, yards, and other open spaces, and lot coverage by buildings and structures; e) the provision of space for parking, loading, and unloading of vehicles off the streets; f) size, location, and characteristics of signs or advertisements; and g) any other architectural or urban detail relating to land use, whose regulation is of interest to the local community. As indicated, all urban planning regulations translate into limitations and detractions of uses and powers of the owners over the property, insofar as they determine land use and how that utilization must occur. This work is materialized through the administrative act called ***certification of land use*** (***certificación de uso de suelo***), which, due to its importance, is qualified as a ***declaratory administrative act*** (***acto administrativo declarativo***), in the sense that it is limited to accrediting a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it, so its content is constitutive, as it does not create or modify previously established legal situations. The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), in opinions No. C-327-2001 and C-357-2003, classifies them as concrete legal acts through which the local Administration **certifies the conformity or not of the land use** with what is established in the respective zoning; as provided in Article 28 of the Urban Planning Law, which states:

"*Article 28.- It is prohibited to use or dedicate land, buildings, structures, to any use that is incompatible with the implemented zoning. Henceforth, interested owners must obtain a municipal certificate that certifies the conformity of the use to the requirements of the zoning. Existing non-conforming uses must also be recorded with a certificate that expresses such circumstance. Each zoning regulation shall set the date from which said certificates shall be mandatory.*" Therefore, through the "***certificate of land use***" (***certificado de uso del suelo***), **it is certified whether the use is or is not permitted, to what is intended by the applicant.** For this reason, its nature is ***declaratory, and not constitutive; land-use certificates do not give rise, by themselves, to a subjective right nor consolidate, by themselves, any legal situation due to a pre-existing right or legal situation***". (Nombre70871. . Regulaciones Urbanísticas, 2004). The ***land-use*** (***uso de suelo***) certification is merely descriptive regarding a determined factual situation in relation to what is provided under legal norm, for which reason, through it, a legal situation pre-existing to the certifying act is not consolidated.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) constitutes a prior requirement demanded for the granting of a license, and its procurement cannot be waived.

**XI.- ON MUNICIPAL LICENSES (LICENCIAS MUNICIPALES):** Municipal licenses constitute an act that authorizes a person or entity to exercise a right; in other words, it tolerates or permits carrying out some activity in a specific location circumscribed to the Municipal entity with the competence to grant the permit or license. In the case of Municipalities, they are legitimized for such purposes in accordance with Articles 79, 80, and 81 of the Municipal Code. Thus, Article 79 establishes: "To engage in any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid during the entire time the lucrative activity has been carried out or for the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been performed. Regarding the business license tax (impuesto de patentes), which levies activities subject to a municipal license, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through Voto number 2197-92 at 2:30 p.m. on August 11, 1992, has stated: '... *Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act enabling the individual to carry out the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called a patent (patente). The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the traditional one in the municipal law environment, which defines it as the imperative need to defray the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the municipality* (...)” For its part, numeral 80 establishes: “*The municipality must resolve license applications within a maximum period of thirty calendar days, counted from their submission. Once the term has expired and the requirements have been met without any response from the municipality, the applicant may establish their activity;*” and Article 81 literally states: “*The municipal license referred to in the previous article may only be denied when the activity is contrary to the law, morality, or good customs, when the establishment has not fulfilled the legal and regulatory requirements, or when the activity, by reason of its physical location, is not permitted by the laws or, in their absence, by the current municipal regulations*”. As is easily appreciable, the foregoing regulation does not depart from that developed in Articles 329, 330 subsection 2), and 331 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). As a first step, the applicant requests authorization from the municipality of their jurisdiction to carry out a specific activity, submitting all the requirements that the administration must have previously defined. Once submitted, an inspection is carried out to determine its location, thus extending the authorization act, which materializes when the physical patent (patente) is delivered to the administered party, where the Administration's will to grant or permit the requested activity is embodied, and therefore, the administered party proceeds to commence their lucrative activity. With that authorization, the administered party **acquires a subjective right**, which does not imply that the authorizing administration (for the simple reason of being before pre-existing subjective rights) ties its hands, so that once the rights are declared, it cannot exercise its powers of tutelage and control over the use and enjoyment of the license or authorization. Its original prerogative, as an Administration, to satisfy and safeguard public interests, does not disappear with the simple declaration, express or implicit, of the authorization. It could be said that, in essence, its power to revoke or annul duly authorized licenses or approvals does not disappear, which it could do in accordance with the block of legality, through the lesivity process (proceso de lesividad), as provided in numeral 173 of the General Law of Public Administration, or through a declaration in an administrative venue of an evident and manifest nullity (nulidad evidente y manifiesta) following the appropriate procedure.

**XII- ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CHALLENGED ACTS:** The analysis conducted in the preceding recitals (considerandos) regarding the principle of legality, administrative discretion, the nature of land-use certification, and municipal licenses is not gratuitous, as all these elements are necessary for understanding what this Tribunal concludes in the present case. First, it is established that the land-use permit is a certifying act, meaning it accredits a particular, pre-existing situation in accordance with urban regulations. Here, the Municipality of San José issued land-use certificate No. 1324 (folio 5) in favor of Mr. Nombre71456, which indicates it is for ZMRC, translated into Spanish as Mixed Residential and Commercial Zone, located on map 0097, parcel 01171000, a prior requirement for the **issuance of Commercial Patent number C-00006157-02** in favor of his commercial business PANADERÍA MI PAN, which further clearly indicates that the activity to be carried out is No. 276 (Bakery/Confectionery), a declaration that translates to a subjective right in favor of Mr. Nombre71456. Subsequently, a series of complaints were filed against the referenced business, and the Department of Patents then sent several notes to verify the legality of the activity (proven facts 8 and 9, folios 51 and 52), in use of the control and oversight powers inherent to its activity, an action that cannot be branded as disproportionate, illegal, or abusive; on the contrary, it is duly authorized and legitimized by the principle of legality. What does not seem real or in accordance with legality is the motivation given for making the decision to deny the application for expansion of the patent, the ordered closure, and the disauthorization of the activity carried out. The insistent and repeated basis—in appearance of legality—of the territorial entity for the closure of the business PANADERÍA MI PAN is that the plaintiff was carrying out an activity ***not authorized, since the patent was for selling bread and not for making it***, an argument that can even be branded as laughable, since according to folio 1061 of this proceeding, the commercial patent was granted to perform the work of **Bakery and Confectionery (Panadería y Repostería),** terms that according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language of the Royal Academy, twentieth edition, mean: “***Bakery (Panadería): Trade of a Baker, site, house, or place where bread is made or sold. Confectionery (Repostería): Art and trade of a confectioner. Person whose trade is to make pastries, sweets, and some beverages***”. Therefore, the work performed by Mr. Nombre71456 in his premises, **sale and production of bread**, conforms to the authorized activity (Bakery and Confectionery). This Tribunal reaches this conclusion without having to make any great display of intelligence or reasonableness, concluding that the allegation of the territorial entity violates the limits of discretion and the principle of legality, but even more so, it does not conform to the legal procedure established to revoke an act declaring rights, such as the commercial patent legally granted in its moment to Mr. Nombre71456. So, if we say that the activity performed by the plaintiff conformed to the decreed authorization (**production and sale of bread**), it implies that the act issued and alleged to be one of execution (closure and placing of seals on the commercial business PANADERÍA MI PAN), which it is not, as it causes a proper and harmful effect and is a consequence of a null act, there being a defect in its adoption (lack of motivation, infringement of the principle of legality and due process), and it is so declared. Now, despite the commercial activity that the plaintiff performed conforming, as has been stated, to that granted or permitted by the Municipality of San José, acting in good faith and motivated by the same territorial entity, Mr. Nombre71456, in order to be permitted to carry out the authorized work, as required by the same appellant Municipality, proceeded to request an expansion of the commercial patent (proven fact 27, folio 852), so that it would include, in addition to the sale of bread, **its production** (the action of a bakery). However, the administration, bleeding the limits of discretion and the block of legality again, rejected his request, indicating that the **land-use permit 0000658** (proven fact 29, folio 863) was resolved as **USE NOT PERMITTED**, contradicting the ***land-use certificate*** (0001324, folio 5), which as a ***declaratory administrative act*** (in the sense that it is limited to accrediting a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it) cannot be distorted without having previously identified the urban regulation, which in this case did not occur. This translates to the fact that, while it is true, as indicated, that **land-use certificates only verify a pre-existing situation and additionally constitute a public document**, the declaration made in it **cannot be modified except by the pertinent legal means that allow it (Regulatory Plan or approval of a new Urban Planning Law)**, which must be duly accredited. And, it is that no evidence was brought to the case file, nor does it emerge from the extensive resolutions of the Mayor and the Municipal Council that a change in the urban regulation that supported the original land-use certificate **(1324)** had been made, by which it could be considered contrary to the Regional or General Regulatory Plan, or to the stipulations of the Urbanistic Code, in order to legalize the discrediting of the aforementioned land-use certification, and thus motivate, in accordance with the block of legality, the new zoning carried out, which is accredited according to the land-use certificate **(Placa11628)**, which indicates that said zone is no longer mixed, but was changed to residential. But in any case, even if a situation of this nature had occurred or could occur, the territorial entity, which by constitutional power holds the tutelage of the rights of the citizens circumscribed to its territory, should have respected the right granted to Mr. Nombre71456 when it validly granted him the commercial patent subject of this litigation. However, as stated, the large territorial apparatus did not even remotely state or indicate to this authority in administrative functions that such a change had been made, nor, breaching the principle of legality and due process, did it give a certain, comprehensible, and legal explanation to the administered party of said change, an action that injures the principle of discretion of the public administration, insofar as discretion cannot serve as a parameter for illegality. It is clear that the rights previously granted to the administered party must be preserved by the territorial entity, with the warning that, in any case, if its desire is to annul them, it must resort to the corresponding legal means and not to a simple simulation of legality sheltered in an excuse of words, which do not remotely contain any legal standing. On the other hand, the discussion of the amounts for taxes or patent fees that must be paid is not an object of this process, so this Tribunal cannot rule on extremes that have not been discussed by the lower body, such as whether the application of the amounts for taxes paid is applicable, since that is a point neither debated nor proposed to this Tribunal, and if it were, it could not be heard in this venue in accordance with the provisions of Article 154 of the Municipal Code in its prior text, before the approval of the Contencioso-Administrative Procedure Code. As indicated, the discussion of the quantum of the amount to be paid for tax obligations arising from this legal transaction is not proper to this process, unlike the arbitrary and excessive action of the territorial entity towards its administered party, Mr. Nombre71456.

**XIII- CONCLUSIONS:** The foregoing reasoning brings as an unavoidable consequence that the appeals filed by Mr. Nombre71456 be granted, producing the nullity of Municipal agreements numbers 41, article IV, of the ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, article IV, of the ordinary session 58, held on June 5, 2006; and No. 22, article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007. Consequently, it is appropriate to **grant and preserve** the subjective rights acquired with the authorization granted by the Patents Section, number C-00006157-02, and the declaration of land-use certificate number 1324.

**THEREFORE:** The appeals filed by Mr. Nombre71456 against Municipal agreements numbers 41, article IV, of ordinary session 17, held on August 22, 2006; number 20, article IV, of ordinary session 58, held on June 5, 2006; and No. 22, article IV, ordinary session 44, of February 27, 2007, are hereby **GRANTED**, and in their place, the subjective rights acquired with the authorization granted by the Patents Section, number c-00006157-02, and the declaration of land-use certificate number 1324, are **GRANTED AND PRESERVED**. The administrative venue is deemed exhausted. **NOTIFY.-** *Nombre66641* *Sady Jiménez Quesada* *Nombre37579*

Apelaciones Municipales Apelaciones Municipales Actor/ Nombre71456 ( Panadería Mi Pan) Notificaciones/ Lic. Carlos Arturo Meneses Reyes fax 2278-8416 Demandado/ Municipalidad de San José Notificaciones/ Lic. Juan Manuel Ramírez Cerdas casillero 189 Nº 138- 2009 SECCIÓN SEGUNDA TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, Goicoechea a las ocho horas veinticinco minutos del veinticuatro de Abril del año dos mil nueve.- Se conocen Apelaciones Municipales acumuladas mediante resolución de las diez horas con veinte minutos del ocho de febrero del dos mil ocho ( folio 1175 a 1180) formuladas por Nombre71456 en su calidad de propietario de (PANADERÍA MI PAN) contra los acuerdos dictados por el CONCEJO MUNICIPAL DE SAN JOSÉ, Nº 21 artículo IV, sesión ordinaria del 6 de junio del 2006 (folio 361 a 389); Acta 20 artículo IV sesión ordinaria 58 del 05 de Junio del 2007 (folio 718), Acuerdo 22 artículo IV sesión ordinaria 44, celebrada el 27 de febrero del 2007 (folios 932 a 951 y 1014 a 1033).- Redacta la Jueza Jiménez Quesada;

CONSIDERANDO:

I.-HECHOS PROBADOS: Expediente Nº 06-308-161-CA. Para la resolución de la presente litis se tienen: 1- Que mediante documento número 49830 se otorgó certificado de uso de suelo al señor Nombre71456 , para comercio y servicios donde se autoriza la instalación de un medidor eléctrico comercial contando dicho documento con los sellos de la sección de permisos urbanos y de construcción con fecha 15 de abril del 2004 (folio 2); 2- Que dentro del certificado de uso de suelo 0001324, con fecha 23 de agosto del 2004 se consignaron los siguientes datos " Uso solicitado Comercio y Servicios venta de Pan (Panadería), con el fin "Patente", nombre del solicitante Nombre71456 . En el espacio para uso de oficina se indicó "Reglamento de uso de suelo en su artículos Nº 22, para zona ZMRC (zona mixta residencial comercial). Uso solicitado Panadería (200m), observaciones y condiciones 1 estacionamiento para cada 50 m de construcción, mapa 0097, parcela 0117, resolución Uso condicionado (folio 5); 3- Que según el comprobante de trámite de solicitud de patente Nº 36428 a nombre del señor Nombre71456 para la Panadería Mi Pan, en el espacio asignado a la administración se indico "uso de suelo 1324 del 23 de agosto del 2004 mapa 97 parcela 117 (folio 12); 4- Que mediante acta de notificación número 30616 de las 2 horas 32 minutos del 15 de Diciembre del 2004, se le previene al apelante para que presente Permiso de Salud y constancia de estar al día en el pago de los impuestos municipales ( folio 15); Que con fecha 25 de enero del 2005, mediante el memorándum Placa11627 se le indica al señor Nombre71456 que debe presentar permiso de Salud y constancia de estar al día en el pago de los impuestos, caso contrario se procederá al cierre del local (folio 209 a 215); 5- Que el 16 de febrero del 2005 la Municipalidad de San José, propiamente el Departamento de Patentes, extendió licencia comercial número C-0006157-02 a nombre de Nombre71456 , para autorizar en el negocio denominado PANADERÍA MI PAN, situado en Dirección7973 , a realizar la actividad 267 PANADERÍA/ REPOSTERÍA (ver folio 1061 de los autos); 6- Con fecha 16 de noviembre del 2005, la Jefa del Departamento de Patentes, remite nota al Jefe de la Sección de Ambiente, indicando que siendo que se han presentado denuncias sobre el funcionamiento de una patente en Dirección7974 para el establecimiento Panadería Mi Pan, le solicitó favor revisar lo siguiente: a) Determinar el tipo de actividad que actualmente se realiza en el establecimiento; b) debido a la actividad que se realiza, verificar si cuenta con el mobiliario, equipo estructura adecuada para desarrollar dicha actividad; c) determinar si producto de esa actividad, se desencadenan efectos adversos para sus vecinos (folio 51);7- Que en esa misma fecha, se remite nota también al Jefe del Area de Inspección, a fin de verificar por las denuncias interpuesta contra establecimiento Panadería Mi Pan, lo siguiente: a) Verificar los permisos que fundamentan la operación b) verificar la actividad que actualmente se realiza en forma detallada; c) medir el área en la cual se realiza la actividad; d) tipo de equipo y mobiliario que se utiliza para desarrollar la actividad; e) identificar los vecinos colindantes del negocio; f) cualquier otra información al respecto (folio 52); 8- Que mediante oficio Nº 72673 notificado al señor Nombre71456 , el día 21 de noviembre del 2005, el Inspector del Departamento de Patentes de la Municipalidad de San José, ordenó el cierre del local y procedió a la colocación de sellos en la Panadería Mi Pan (ver resultando a folio 91); 9- Por memorial de 22 de noviembre del 2005, el actor presenta recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra el cierre dispuesto mediante el oficio Nº72673 (folio 69); 10- Por resolución de las nueve horas con diez minutos del día veinte de enero del dos mil seis el Departamento de Patentes resolvió "Del análisis del expediente administrativo, este despacho resuelve rechazar el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto por el señor Nombre71456 y se confirma la notificación 72673 del 21 de noviembre del 2005. Y se da traslado del expediente administrativo ante el despacho de (sic) señor Alcalde de San José, para conocimiento del Recurso de Apelación lugar donde deberá dirigir sus alegatos dentro del plazo de cinco días hábiles y perentorios " ( folio 91 y 92); 11- Que con fecha 08 de febrero del 2006 el despacho del Alcalde Municipal conociendo en apelación resolvió "En merito de expuesto, normas y principios jurídicos así como de la jurisprudencia Jurisdiccional y Constitucional y Administrativo transcrita, esta Alcaldía señala que al no existir ninguna disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico, RECHAZA el recurso de apelación por el fondo y confirmando lo resuelto por el Departamento de Patentes (revocatoria) y manteniendo en todo caso el acto originario impugnado contenido en el oficio Nº 72673 notificado el día 21 de noviembre del 2005, no resultando procedentes los alegatos planteados por la Sociedad recurrente y estar en consecuencia ajustado a Derecho el acto impugnado. Con la presente resolución se da por respuesta a la totalidad de las gestiones presentadas " también se eleva el asunto al Consejo Municipal (folio 133 a 156); 12- En documento fechado 27 de febrero del 2006, el señor Nombre71456 presenta recurso de revocatoria con apelación ante el Concejo Municipal de conformidad con el articulo 161 del Código Municipal de lo resuelto a folio 109 (folio 215 a 222); 13- Que por acuerdo número 21, articulo IV, sesión ordinaria Nº 6 del 6 de junio del 2006, el Concejo Municipal dispusó "Con fundamento en los argumentos arriba esbozados y por devenir de ilegal (sic) rechazar el recurso de apelación incoado por el señor Nombre71456 propietario del negocio denominado Panadería Mi Pan, confirmando en todos sus extremos la resolución 4141 del Despacho del Alcalde Municipal " (folio 301 a 304); 14- En escrito de fecha 15 de agosto del 2006, el actor presenta recurso de apelación ante el superior Jerárquico Contencioso Administrativo contra el acuerdo antes citado (folio 306); 15- Que por acuerdo Municipal número 41 artículo IV, de la sesión ordinaria 17, celebrada el 22 de agosto del 2006 se dispusó "En merito de lo expuesto, normas y principios jurídicos, así como la jurisprudencia Constitucional y Administrativa transcrita esta Dirección concluye y así lo recomienda a esa Comisión y consecuentemente al Concejo Municipal que al no existir ninguna disconformidad sustantiva del acto administrativo impugnado con el ordenamiento jurídico, lo propio es rechazar el recurso de revocatoria por el fondo, confirmando la resolución emitida por el Concejo Municipal a través del Acuerdo Municipal Nº 21 articulo IV de la sesión ordinaria del 6 del 6 de junio del 2006 manteniendo en todo caso el acto originario según oficio Nº 72673 del 21 de noviembre del 2005, emitido por el Departamento de Patentes, no resultando en consecuencia procedente los alegatos del recurrente ni posible lo peticionado a este Ayuntamiento al no gozar de asidero jurídico al efecto, se admite el recurso y se emplaza al interesado " (folio 361 a 389).- II.- Expediente Nº 07-249-161-CA.- 16.- Que por medio de la notificación 76158 de las 15: 40 horas del veinticuatro de febrero del 2006 se ordenó el cierre del comercio denominado "Panadería Mi Pan" (folio 475); 17- Con fecha 03 de marzo del 2006, el señor Nombre71456, formula recurso de revocatoria y apelación contra la notificación antes indicada (folio 470 a 478); 18- Que en resolución de las diez horas con treinta y nueve minutos del día cuatro de setiembre del dos mil seis, el Departamento de Patentes dispusó "Se rechazan por improcedentes los recursos en razón de su inadmisibilidad por cuanto como se indico el acto administrativo recurrido es un acto de ejecución y confirmación y ratificación de otros anteriores, ya resueltos por esta Municipalidad al haberse interpuesto recurso en su oportunidad el recurrente y versan sobre la misma materia el mismo sujeto, los mismos hechos y causales allí considerados" (folio 490 a 496); 19- Que el Alcalde Municipal por auto de las 14:00 horas del 8 de setiembre del 2006 conociendo en alzada resolvió "Se confirma la inadmisibilidad de los recursos interpuesto manifiesta (sic) por el Departamento de Patentes, por ende se rechazan por improcedente los recursos en cuanto no se indico (sic) el acto administrativo recurrido es un acto de ejecución confirmación y ratificación de otros anteriores ya resueltos por esta Municipalidad al haberse interpuesto los recursos en su oportunidad por el recurrente y que versan sobre la misma materia, el mismo sujeto los mismos hechos y causales allí considerados. Se ratifica por ende lo resuelto por este despacho oficio 1570 resolución 4141 y el acuerdo Municipal 21, articulo iv de la Sesión Ordinaria del 06 de junio del 2006. Atengase el recurrente a lo allí resuelto sobre el fondo por este Municipio" (folio 478 a 485); 20- Con fecha 14 de septiembre del 2006 el señor Nombre71456, presentó recurso de revocatoria y en subsidio apelación por avocación en conocimiento del superior, contra lo dispuesto anteriormente (folio 507 a 509 y 518 a 519); 21- Que por resolución de las 11:00 horas del 06 de noviembre del 2006, el señor Alcalde Municipal conociendo en apelación del auto Nº 7975 resuelve "En merito de lo expuesto, normas y principios jurídicos así como de la jurisprudencia Constitucional y Administrativa transcrita este despacho concluye que al no existir ninguna disconformidad sustantiva del acto administrativo impugnado con el ordenamiento jurídico, lo propio es rechazar el recurso de revocatoria por el fondo, confirmando la resolución 7975 de las 14 horas del 08 de setiembre del 2006, lo cual se sustenta ademas en los acuerdos del Consejo Municipal Nº 21 articulo iv de la sesión ordinaria del 6 del 6 de junio del 2006 y acuerdo 41 de la Sesión Ordinaria 17 del 22 de agosto del 2006, manteniendo en todo caso el acto originario según oficio Nº 72673 del 21 de noviembre del 2005, emitido por el Departamento de Patentes, no resultando en consecuencia procedente los alegatos del recurrente ni posible lo peticionado a este Ayuntamiento al no gozar de asidero jurídico al efecto. Asimismo se confirma la inadmisibilidad de los recursos que motivaron el recurso y resolución aquí emitida por cuanto como se indicó el acto administrativo recurrido es un acto,de ejecución confirmación y ratificación de otros anteriores ya resueltos por esta Municipalidad al haberse interpuesto los recursos en su oportunidad por el recurrente y que versan sobre la misma materia, el mismo sujeto, los mismos hechos y causales allí considerados. Se ratifica por ende lo resuelto por este despacho oficio 1570 resolución 4141 y el acuerdo Municipal 21, articulo IV de la Sesión Ordinaria del 06 de junio del 2006 y acuerdo 41 del 22 de agosto del 2006 ya supra citado. Se procede a elevar la resolución a conocimiento del Consejo Municipal quién conocerá al tenor del criterio DAJ 5498-9-2006 de la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos" (folio 520 a 546); 22- Que por acuerdo Municipal número 20, artículo IV, de la sesión ordinaria 58 celebrada el 05 de junio del 2006, se ordenó "Rechazar el recurso de apelación en contra del acto contenido en el oficio 7975, emitida tanto por la forma como por el fondo, confirmando la resolución 9676, emitida por la Alcaldía Municipal y manteniendo en todo caso el acto originario impugnado" (folio 718 a 748); 23- Por acuerdo 27 articulo IV de sesión ordinaria número 67 del 07 de agosto del 2007, el Concejo Municipal referente al oficio 7975 acto originario notificación 76158 del 24 de febrero del 2006, dispuso " A efecto de que conozca el Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección III, Superior Jerárquico impropio, el recurso de apelación debe certificarse el expediente en forma cronológica y remitirse dentro del plazo de 8 días hábiles a dicha autoridad de conformidad con el Artículo 51 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contenciosa Administrativa concorde con el Articulo 156 del Código Municipal " (folio 7879).- III.- Expediente Nº 07-257-161-CA.- 24- Con fecha 10 de febrero del 2006, a solicitud del mismo ente territorial, el señor Nombre71456 , presenta ampliación de patente comercial a nombre de PANADERÍA MI PAN, a fin de que se indique como actividad especifica ELABORACIÓN DE PAN (folio 852); 25- En fecha 10 de febrero del 2006, se le notifica al señor Nombre71456, el documento Nº 31080, a fin de que aporte, cédula de residencia, permiso de salud para el tramite de la ampliación de patente (folio 849); 26- Que en certificado de suelo número 0000658 a nombre de Nombre71456 , en el espacio de uso de oficina se consigno " Reglamento de Uso de Suelo en sus artículos 72, para zona ZR-2, uso solicitado Elaboración de Pan, 235 metros, en observaciones y condiciones se apuntó "No se permite Panadería con mas de 25 metros de área útil, mapa 97, parcela 0117100, resolución Uso no permitido (folio 854); 27- Que mediante documento fechado 28 de febrero del 2006 Placa11626 el Departamento de Patentes comunicó al señor Nombre71456, el rechazo de la solicitud de ampliación de patente, indicando que de acuerdo al certificado de uso de suelo número 0000658 del 20 del 02 del 2006, dado por la Sección de Permisos de construcción fue resuelto como USO NO PERMITIDO (folio 863); 28- En fecha 01 de marzo del 2006, el accionante formuló recurso de revocatoria y apelación contra el rechazo de la ampliación de la Patente para la PANADERÍA MI PAN (folio 869 a 872);29- Por oficio fechado 22 de noviembre del 2006, se le comunica al señor Nombre71456 lo resuelto por el despacho del Alcalde, en lo que interesa lo siguiente: "En merito de lo expuesto normas y principios jurídicos de cita, esta Alcaldía RECHAZA EL RECURSO DE APELACIÓN por el fondo, confirmando la resolución Nº ALDP-1- 013-2006 emitida por el Departamento de Patentes (revocatoria) y manteniendo en todo caso el acto originario impugnado contenido en el oficio Nº Placa11626 notificado el día 23 de febrero del 2006 no resultando en consecuencia procedente los alegatos del recurrente ni posible lo peticionado a este Ayuntamiento al no gozar de asidero jurídico al efecto. Se tienen por contestadas plenamente las gestiones administrativas incoadas a saber recurso de apelación (1 de marzo del 2006) y escrito sin número ( 27 de octubre del 2006) tramite del recurso de apelación por negación de ampliación de patente " ( folio 874 a 890); 30- Que por escrito de fecha 30 de noviembre del 2006, el actor, presentó recurso de apelación por rechazo de ampliación de patente por despacho del Alcalde (folio 892 a 895); 31- Que en acuerdo 22 artículo IV, sesión ordinaria 44, del 27 de febrero del 2007 el Consejo Municipal en relación con la apelación presentada dispuso "Rechazar el recurso de apelación por el fondo, confirmando la resolución 10215 emitida por la Alcaldía Municipal y manteniendo en todo caso el acto originario impugnado contenido en el oficio Placa11626 notificado el 23 de febrero del 2006, no resultando en consecuencia procedente los alegatos del recurrente ni posible lo peticionado a este Ayuntamiento al no gozar de asidero jurídico al efecto (folio 932 a 951 y 1014 a 1033); 32- Que en la sesión ordinaria número 60, celebrada el 19 de Junio del 2007, acuerdo 20 artículo V, dispuso la Corporación Municipal " Se admite el recurso de apelación para ante el Superior Jerárquico, Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo ( folio 1041); 33- Que con fecha 23 de febrero del 2006 el Ministerio de Salud, otorgó permiso de funcionamiento al negocio denominado PANADERÍA MI PAN, para realizar la actividad de elaboración en venta de Pan (folio 1097).- IV.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: 1- Que la actividad realizada por el actor sea contraria a la autorizada por medio del la patente número C-00006157-02 (no se procuró prueba al respecto); 2- Que la Panadería Mi Pan, ubicada en el mapa 0097, parcela 01171000 se encuentre en Zona Residencial ( los autos).- V.- FUNDAMENTOS DEL RECURSO: Solicita el apelante, que este Tribunal se pronuncie, si para el caso concreto de PANADERÍA MI PAN, se requería de una solicitud de ampliación de patente para indicar el termino elaborar, en una panadería en donde ya estaba autorizada su venta. Que como propietario de la Panadería acudió a solicitar la ampliación de la patente a sugerencia el Departamento de Patentes en notificación 000282 que en lo que interesa manifiesta "por otro lado el recurrente debe proceder a solicitar una ampliación de la actividad comercial he incluir dentro de su actividad registrada la fabricación del producto y (sic) de este modo subsanar su actividad comercial". Solicita se resuelva sobre los alcances de la ley de Impuestos y Patentes de actividades lucrativas y la Ley número 5694 de tarifa de impuestos Municipales del Cantón Central de San José ya que nos encontramos ante un cambio o ampliación de patente, de venta de pan a elaboración y venta, lo que pasa es que ambas actividades están indisolublemente ligadas. Que no puede decirse que el lugar en donde esta ubicada la Panadería es ZR-2 como lo califica la Municipal sino como lo indicó en la primera patente (ZMRC), que debe tenerse claro la normativa en la que se respalda la Administración Municipal para calificar y clasificar las zonas urbanas en residenciales, mixtas o industriales, ya sea el Plan Regulador Urbano, o en los decretos reglamentarios autónomos o en la clasificación de actividades para las patentes y el Reglamento de Uso de Suelo. Que se le indique a la Municipalidad que la patente obtenida cobija la autorización para elaborar y vender pan, conforme corresponde a la milenaria práctica de la Panadería, que la actuación de la Municipalidad no se ajusta a la verdad, que fueron cumplidos todos los requisitos. Que la zona urbana en la que esta concedida la patente de funcionamiento de la Panadería Mi Pan al momento de su concesión era indicada como zona urbana mixta, para comercio y residencia. Que no es cierto que la actividad lucrativa que se realiza es contraria a la dispuesta en la patente comercial concedida por dicha Municipalidad, que cuenta con un derecho subjetivo, no es posible decir que una Panadería solo esta dispuesta para vender pan y no para hacerlo.

VI- LOS RECURSOS EN MATERIA MUNICIPAL. Se hace necesario por los yerros encontrados dentro de las resoluciones dictadas por el Concejo y la Alcaldía de la Corporación Municipal de San José, recordar el proceso recursivo en esta materia, el cual se hará claro está, sin contar con la modificación que realiza el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, no aplicable a la especie conforme a su transitorio IV, ya que el presente conflicto, debe dilucidarse con la normativa anterior a la promulgación del citado Código, ello con el fin de que el Concejo y el Alcalde tengan una visión mas amplia de la forma en que deben ser resueltos los recursos en la materia de su conocimiento y aplicación. Tal y como lo indica el tratadista Nombre71457. , en el artículo denominado Los recursos administrativos en materia Municipal y la función de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo publicado en la revista Ivstitia. Año 14. Nº 162- 163 junio - julio 2002 a saber" En materia municipal se rompe con el principio del procedimiento administrativo recogido en el artículo 350, párrafo 1 de la Ley General de Administración Pública en el sentido de que existirá, en todo caso, una única instancia de alzada cualquiera que sea la procedencia u origen del acto administrativo impugnado. Ese principio que limita los recursos en el procedimiento administrativo tiene justificaciones evidentes y de importancia tales como la estructura piramidal o vertical de la organización administrativa, circunstancia que obligaría al administrado, cuando el acto es dictado por un órgano de inferior grado, a tener que pasar por todos los escalones de la línea jerárquica para poder agotar la vía administrativa y, de esa forma, tener la posibilidad de acceder a la vía jurisdiccional. Evidentemente, el principio y la norma que lo positiviza tienen una ratio constitucional que radica en facilitarle al administrado el acceso a la tutela judicial efectiva (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), puesto que, de lo contrario se le obligaría a transitar el vía crucis de la entera, compleja, hermética y caótica organización administrativa del ente que dictó el acto administrativo que le desfavorece, la que, obviamente, no está en la obligación de conocer, puesto que, se trata de un asunto interno que es objeto de los reglamentos autónomos o independientes de organización. Como veremos de seguido, en materia municipal, el administrado puede estar, eventualmente, expuesto al calvario de pasar por instancias administrativas cuando se trata de actos dictados por órganos subordinados al Alcalde Municipal. La idea de la escalerilla de recursos en el ámbito municipal no es pacífica, puesto que, se ha sostenido que respecto de aquellos acuerdos emanados de los órganos que no dependen directamente del Concejo quien agota la vía administrativa es el que conoce la alzada -el alcalde-. Esta interpretación ofrece algún problema y es que podrían existir asuntos de trascendental importancia que nunca serían del conocimiento del Concejo y de la propia Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, la que ha evitado el planteamiento de muchos procesos ordinarios contencioso administrativos ante el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo. Los interesados a que se refiere el artículo 173, inciso 2), de la Constitución Política pueden plantear los recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio. Sendos recursos deben plantearse en un escrito que exponga los fundamentos y razones de la disconformidad con el acuerdo impugnado y deben plantearse dentro de quinto día (artículos 153 y 156, párrafo 1, del Código Municipal). Al respecto, es conveniente recordar algunas normas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública que, aunque emplazadas en el Libro Segundo, constituyen parámetros hermenéuticos, incluso, en materia municipal. Para el administrado es potestativo usar ambos recursos (revocatoria con apelación subsidiaria) o uno solo de ellos (apelación), si se elige la primera opción la apelación se tramitará una vez declarada sin lugar la revocatoria (artículo 347 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). En aplicación o especificación del principio rector del procedimiento administrativo denominado informalismo en favor del administrado, los recursos no requieren de una redacción o pretensión especial, bastando para su correcta formulación que de su contenido y texto se desprenda, claramente, la petición de impugnación o revisión del acuerdo (artículo 224 en concordancia con el 348 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Revocatoria La revocatoria es un recurso horizontal que se interpone ante el propio órgano que dictó el acuerdo municipal que afecta al interesado o recurrente, para que reconsidere su contenido y lo revoque, modifique o confirme. Esto es, si quien dictó el acuerdo es el Departamento de Patentes, de Impuestos, de Ingeniería o de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre, ese medio de impugnación debe interponerse ante la respectiva oficina. Apelación La apelación es un recurso vertical que conoce el superior en grado del órgano que dictó el acuerdo municipal que afecta al interesado o recurrente, para que el mismo anule, modifique o confirme el acto. Así, si quien dictó el acuerdo es el Departamento de Patentes la apelación debe ser conocida por el Alcalde Municipal. Recursos contra los acuerdos directamente emanados del Consejo Municipal. Recursos ordinarios El Título VI del Código Municipal se titula "Recursos contra los actos Municipales", no obstante se subdivide en dos capítulos, el primero es denominado "Recursos contra los acuerdos del Concejo". De conformidad con el artículo 153 los interesados pueden plantear los recursos ordinarios de revocatoria y de apelación. Sendos recursos deben interponerse en memorial razonado y dentro del plazo de cinco días a partir de la notificación del acuerdo. El recurso de revocatoria puede fundarse en motivos de legalidad y de oportunidad, mérito o conveniencia y el de apelación cabe, únicamente, por razones de ilegalidad. Es preciso recordar que a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 351, párrafo 2, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública la apelación administrativa -en un procedimiento administrativo-puede ser resuelta por el órgano competente aún en perjuicio del recurrente-reformatio in pejus- cuando se trata de una nulidad absoluta. La razón de esta norma se encuentra en la protección superior del interés público y de la legalidad objetiva que debe existir en esta materia. El recurso de apelación planteado contra un acuerdo del Concejo municipal le corresponde conocerlo, por jerarquía impropia bifásica, a la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo -órgano adscrito al Poder Judicial que tiene su asiento en el segundo circuito judicial (sic) de San José, Goicoechea- (artículos 156, párrafo 2, del Código Municipal y 1, inciso b, de la Ley No. 7274 del 10 de diciembre de 1991 -Ley de Creación de la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo-), que es el tribunal a que se refiere el artículo 173 de la Constitución Política. Al conocer, la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, como jerarca impropio o contralor no jerárquico rige lo dispuesto por los artículos 180 y 1 81 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Al respecto, el último numeral citado indica que "El contralor no jerárquico podrá revisar sólo la legalidad del acto y en virtud de recurso administrativo, y decidirá dentro del límite de las pretensiones y cuestiones de hecho planteadas por el recurrente, pero podrá aplicar una norma no invocada en el recurso". Desde esta perspectiva, el artículo 156, párrafo 1, del Código Municipal resulta congruente con lo establecido en el 181 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. La Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, por su parte, ha sostenido que su competencia se extiende, únicamente, a la legalidad del acuerdo (Entre otros, ver Votos Nos. 3328-94 de las 7:00 hrs. del 7 de noviembre de 1994, 4457-95 de las 10:45 hrs. del 9 de octubre de 1995 y 4655-95 de las 10:00 hrs. del 6 de diciembre de 1995). Sin embargo, la interpretación de tales normas no puede ser literal y tajante-revisión de la legalidad-, puesto que, en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico los límites de la discrecionalidad se encuentran plenamente positivizados. En efecto, el artículo 15 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que la discrecionalidad está sometida, en todo caso, a los límites impuestos, expresa o implícitamente por el ordenamiento para que su ejercicio sea razonable y eficiente. Por su parte, los artículos 16 y 17 de ese cuerpo normativo fijan límites expresos para el ejercicio de la potestad discrecional tales como las reglas unívocas o de aplicación exacta de la ciencia y de la técnica, los principios elementales de la justicia, la lógica o la conveniencia y los derechos fundamentales del administrado. El propio artículo 16, párrafo 2, indica que el juez debe ejercer control o fiscalización de la discrecionalidad, con fundamento en tales límites meta jurídicos, "como si ejerciera contralor de legalidad"Por último, no cabe la menor duda que en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico los límites jurídicos y metajurídicos de la discrecionalidad establecidos en los ordinales 16 y 17 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública forman parte del parámetro o bloque de legalidad para determinar la validez o invalidez de un acto administrativo. Sobre el particular, el artículo 158, párrafo 4, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que "Se entenderán incorporadas al ordenamiento, para este efecto, las reglas técnicas y científicas de sentido unívoco y la aplicación exacta, en las circunstancias del caso". Por su parte, el numeral 160 preceptúa que "El acto discrecional será inválido, además, cuando viole reglas elementales de lógica, de justicia o de conveniencia, según lo indiquen las circunstancias de cada caso". Por consiguiente, al formar parte del parámetro de legalidad los límites jurídicos y metajurídicos de la discrecionalidad -por encontrarse positivizados- el contralor no jerárquico debe, también, controlar su trasgresión. Es así como, según una interpretación sistemática, la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo debe entrar a fiscalizar los aspectos de oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito." Lo anterior debido que al observar los acuerdos a revisar en muchos de ellos el Departamento de Patentes, el Alcalde o el Consejo Municipal indican en primera instancia que se RECHAZA EL RECURSO DE APELACIÓN por el fondo (folio 130, 156, 503, 715, 748, 915, 1010, 1033) y luego proceden a pasar al Superior inmediato el recurso cuando según lo expuesto, lo correcto, es si la revocatoria y apelación se presenta ante la Sección de Patentes, ésta debe únicamente rechazar el recurso de revocatoria y admitir la apelación para ante el Alcalde, y el Alcalde recibido el recurso rechaza la revocatoria y admite la apelación para ante el Superior en grado, el Concejo Municipal, a quién a su vez se le presenta la revocatoria con apelación, rechaza la revocatoria y admite el recurso de apelación para ante el superior jerárquico y emplaza a las partes. Sin embargo el ente territorial en la mayoría de los casos rechaza el recurso de apelación y luego remite al superior para su conocimiento abriendo la competencia a este órgano colegiado y en virtud de ello es que este Tribunal se permite entrar a conocer los acuerdos impugnados en los considerandos siguientes, no sin antes hacer del conocimiento del ente territorial Municipal de San José, el procedimiento correcto a seguir. VII- SOBRE EL PRINCIPIO DE LEGALIDAD: (principio de juridicidad de la administración): Implica que la Administración Pública no actúa cuando quiere, sino cuando exista un principio o norma escrita que así se lo permita. No es libre su actuación, debe de seguir un proceso ya preestablecido por el ordenamiento jurídico, autorizando con ello su actuar. La sujeción principal de la Administración, es que todo acto o comportamiento de la administración que afecte los derechos del particular debe estar autorizado por el ordenamiento jurídico. La administración puede y debe hacer sólo lo que legalmente le está establecido. Permisividad u autorización que tiene rango constitucional y legal conforme lo dispone el artículo 11 de la Carta Magna y desarrolla el mismo numeral de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública, por ello se dice que lo que no está autorizado, está prohibido. Como consecuencia de la sumisión de la Administración al ordenamiento jurídico, esta la posibilidad de controlar su conducta, ello por parte del orbe jurisdiccional (Juez) en respeto y aplicación pura y simple también de la máxima constitucional del artículo 49, de manera que el rompimiento de este principio tiene como sanción la responsabilidad del Estado y sus funcionarios, dispuesta en el numeral 9 de nuestra Constitución Política. El bloque de legalidad está compuesto no solo por la ley, sino que en primer lugar por el bloque de Constitucionalidad, (derechos y principios constitucionales), además por todas las normas escritas (reglamentos, decretos, directrices y otros ) y no escritas ( costumbres o prácticas administrativas, jurisprudencia y principios del derecho que integran aquel ordenamiento). Este principio no puede ser obviado por la administración Pública, ya que una actuación realizada fuera del bloque de legalidad deviene de ilegal y nula, con las consecuencias naturales, procesales y legales de tal declaratoria.- VIII.-SOBRE LA DISCRECIONALIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA: Debemos entender la discrecionalidad como la facultad de que se dota a los entes públicos de adoptar decisiones sobre la base de criterios no estrictamente jurídicos –así por ejemplo, de índole política, social, organizativa, técnica o de mera oportunidad y conveniencia– según el caso concreto; sin que en modo alguno pueda estimarse como una potestad que denote una voluntad arbitraria, en tanto se constituyen en verdaderos límites de esta facultad los siguientes parámetros: 1.- La finalidad de la Administración; 2.- La razonabilidad o también denominado principio de la interdicción de la arbitrariedad, que obliga a hacer el análisis de la legitimación, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto de la medida o disposición adoptada por la Administración; 3.- El respeto de los derechos fundamentales, en virtud del cual, se constituye en un verdadero valladar del ejercicio de las potestades de imperio, precisamente en atención a que una de las características esenciales y propias del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho (artículos 1, 9, 50 y 74 constitucionales), es precisamente el reconocimiento de los derechos fundamentales; 4.- Los principios generales del derecho, tales como el de equidad, igualdad, justicia, seguridad jurídica, de la buena administración, irretroactividad, buena fe; que al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, son fuente de derecho, como normas no escritas, y por ello, condicionantes del ejercicio de la potestad discrecional de la Administración; 5.- Las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y la técnica, que obliga a la Administración a que su actuación esté debidamente motivada en el conocimiento teórico adquirido de las distintas metodologías y disciplinas de la ciencia y la técnica, cuando ello lo amerite –como es el caso de la materia ambiental, de salud y tributaria, sin que pueda pretenderse que se trate de una lista cerrada o numerus clausus–, así como en los casos en que deba utilizar criterios propios de la técnica administrativa. En la aplicación de estos criterios es imposible pretender la existencia de discrecionalidad, de manera irrestricta y absoluta por cuanto la voluntad de la Administración no depende de su libre arbitrio (o escogencia), sino de las valoraciones objetivas obtenidas conforme a las reglas técnicas aplicables al caso; de donde los conceptos de discrecionalidad administrativa y discrecionalidad técnica se comportan como supuestos absolutamente inconciliables; por cuanto el poder discrecional pertenece al campo volitivo, mientras que el concepto técnico conlleva a una declaración de la verdad, un juicio, esto es, al conocimiento, sobre la base de que el contenido de las valoraciones técnicas adquieren un carácter reglado de la actividad administrativa, a modo de verdaderas normas jurídicas, que reducen el margen de la discrecionalidad. En la aplicación de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, entendiendo por tales aquellos que hacen referencia a una esfera de realidad cuyos límites no aparecen bien precisados en su enunciado, no obstante lo cual es claro que intenta delimitar un supuesto concreto como el interés público, la urgencia o necesidad, la buena fe, entre otros. Para que la administración disponga de un ámbito propio de la decisión equiparable a la discrecionalidad, por cuanto se trata de supuestos en los cuales no hay diversidad de opciones para la Administración, por cuanto en el momento de su aplicación se requiere de una precisión concreta que sólo admite una única solución jurídica posible (unidad de solución justa), a cargo, en primer lugar de la Administración, y en su defecto, del juez –al efectuar el control de tales supuestos, quien determinará si el supuesto de hecho es subsumible o no en el concepto indeterminado. Por esto debe de estimarse que aún cuando se denominan como principios jurídicos indeterminables, son determinables en cuanto a su contenido. En virtud de lo cual, aunque la Administración tenga un cierto margen de apreciación –no de discrecionalidad– en la aplicación de estos conceptos, al final en su actuación se limitará a aplicar la ley (que utiliza criterios de valor o de la experiencia), pues la técnica de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, de lo que trata, es "... de subsumir en una categoría legal (configurada, no obstante su imprecisión de límites, con la intención de acotar un supuesto concreto) unas circunstancias reales determinadas; justamente por ello es un proceso reglado, que se agota en el proceso intelectivo de comprensión de una realidad en el sentido que no interfiere ninguna decisión de la voluntad del aplicador, como es lo propio de quien ejercita una potestad discrecional." Es en aplicación de los anteriores parámetros que puede llegar a afirmarse que se produce la reducción a cero de la discrecionalidad administrativa, en tanto la decisión de la Administración está condicionada a una única solución posible. Debe tenerse en cuenta que "Las diferencias entre ambas pueden resumirse de la siguiente forma: 1) en la discrecionalidad técnica no hay nunca ponderación ni elección entre intereses; 2) en la discrecionalidad técnica la Administración recurre a la utilización de criterios técnicos; y 3) mientras que en la discrecionalidad administrativa conviven juicio y voluntad, en la discrecionalidad técnica, se realiza una actividad de mero juicio en la que no interviene en modo alguno la voluntad." (Desdentado Nombre71458, Nombre50780. Los problemas del control judicial de la discrecionalidad técnica. (Un estudio crítico de la jurisprudencia). Aquí es importante mencionar la siguiente máxima administrativa "«Cuando hay discrecionalidad no puede hablarse nunca de técnica, y cuando hay técnica no puede hablarse nunca de discrecionalidad», pues, «lo técnico no se valora, sin que se puede comprobar. Lo discrecional no se comprueba, sino que se valora»" (Nombre71459 . Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. Tercera edición. p. 453. Citado por Nombre71460 . La discrecionalidad de la Administración Tributaria: su especial incidencia en el procedimiento de la inspección. Mc.Graw-Hill. Madrid. España. 1998). Esto para aclarar que si bien es cierto, en las decisiones, acciones y omisiones admninistrativas se encuentra impregnadas de un gran grado de discrecionalidad, es lo que cierto que cuanto existen pruebas técnicas estas no pueden ser desatendidas, por ello la administración no solo debe tomar en cuenta los criterios legales en que basa su accionar, sino que en aquellos datos que den cabida a la discrecionalidad Administrativa como prerrogativa del ente público debe realizarse con los parámetros antes apuntadas, ya que la discrecionalidad fuera de estos pueden verse como arbitrariedad, la discrecionalidad del accionar público no puede tenerse como parámetro de la ilegalidad administrativa ni como una autorización perse del ente público para apartarse del bloque de legalidad.

IX- SOBRE LA MOTIVACIÓN: Dentro de la tutela administrativa, se encuentra inmerso el derecho que tiene toda persona, debidamente legitimada por un derecho vulnerado a que su conflicto sea resuelto en forma concreta y clara, lo que es materializado por medio de los actos u actuaciones administrativas. Por ello dentro de la tutela administrativa, podemos ubicar el derecho a la obtención de una resolución motivada, con el fin de que las partes intervinientes o lesionados entiendan los motivos de hecho y de derecho por medio de los cuales fue dirimido su conflicto. Como parte del principio del debido proceso (sentencias 15-90 y 1789-92 de la Sala Constitucional) y como elemento esencial de todo acto administrativo, tenemos la motivación, esto quiere decir que la parte debe saber concretamente la normativa en que la Administración sustenta sus obligaciones; de forma tal, que cuando el administrado lesionado, solicita una readecuación de esa conducta, se le indiquen las normas legales que sustentan, aprueban y legitiman la actuación combatida. Por ello toda conducta administrativa, cualquiera que sea e independientemente de su naturaleza, concretada en un acto administrativo (resolución) debe estar debidamente motivada y razonada, dándose a plenitud la satisfacción de todas las pretensiones o alegaciones que realizan los intervinientes del proceso, o como en el presente caso, el motivo legal por el cual es rechazada una solicitud de patente, es cambiado el uso de suelo de una solicitud a otra, o el respeto o no a un derecho otorgado ya por el ente territorial. Es claro entonces, que las resoluciones dictadas dentro del proceso administrativa, cualquiera que sea, deben concebirse como una exposición clara del principio constitucional de tutela administrativa derivadas del artículo 41 de la Constitución Política, por ello, la conducta administrativa en cuanto limite o restringe derechos, debe estar debidamente motivada, sin infracciones a los Derechos Constitucionales (debido proceso), para que cumpla con todas y cada una de las expectativas de quién solicita el cumplimiento de una conducta administrativa, ello con el fin de conocer el conjunto de antecedentes fácticos y jurídicos que justifican la decisión tomada por la entidad pública, constituyendo su omisión nulidad de lo actuado conforme lo disponen los artículos 133, 158 y 166 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.- X.- DEL CERTIFICADO DE USO DE SUELO: Los planes urbanísticos locales, conforme al artículo 21 inciso 1) de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, realizan la ordenación y determinación del uso del suelo, para la mejor distribución y protección del medio ambiente. Esto quiere decir que se puede condicionar el uso de la propiedad inmobiliaria, por medio de la delimitación de áreas, según la categorización adoptada por el plan regulador, así una propiedad que está dentro del orbe Municipal puede tener un uso diferente al deseo del propietario, según su zonificación. Los planes reguladores determinan, el lugar donde se puede construir, realizar actividades de comercio, industria, áreas de recreo, basándose no sólo en criterios de oportunidad y conveniencia, sino en pronunciamientos técnicos y objetivos aprobados por la comunidad. La denominación del uso del suelo, se realiza por medio de su clasificación que es la categoría o tipo de suelo (urbano, urbanizable, no urbanizable y otros) según sea su destino urbanístico básico y la calificación, que se aplica para designar la subdivisión de esos tipos de suelo, por medio del aprovechamiento urbanísticos (zonas residenciales o industriales), sea en porcentajes totales o parciales de acuerdo incluso a las densidades de población de una determinada comunidad. Es claro entonces, que la actuación administrativa, tendiente a realizar la zonificación dentro del uso del suelo, es una potestad primigenia del Estado, delegada a las Municipales (articulo 169 de la Constitución política, desarrollado en el 16 de la ley de Planificación Urbana). Labor que no implica menoscabo o lesiones al derecho de propiedad, al ser esta una atribución relativa, conforme a la normativa urbana. Por medio de esta manifestación administrativa legalmente pueden establecerse lineamientos para el aprovechamiento del derecho de propiedad, en estricta relación con las necesidades de la comunidad, y con vigilancia de sus derechos y el medio ambiente, a fin de realizar una ordenación armónica del suelo. Esta clasificación según el artículo 24 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, se debe realizar por medio de una reglamentación con rango normativa de Ley (ver sentencia Nº 263-2008 de la Sección Segunda de este Tribunal), que debe contener: a) la determinación de los usos de la tierra; b) lo relativo a la localización, altura y área de construcción de las edificaciones; c) la superficie y dimensiones de los lotes, lo cual tiene directa incidencia en la determinación de la densidad de la tierra; d) el tamaño de los retiros, patios y demás espacios abiertos, y cobertura del lote por edificios y estructuras; e) la provisión de espacio para estacionamientos, carga y descarga de los vehículos fuera de las calles; f) tamaño, ubicación y características de los rótulos o anuncios publicitarios; y g) cualquier otro detalle arquitectónico o urbanístico relativo al uso del suelo, cuya regulación tenga interés para la comunidad local. Como se ha indicado, toda la normativa urbanística se traduce en limitaciones y detracciones de usos y potestades del propietarios sobre el inmueble, en tanto determina el uso del suelo y cómo debe de darse esa utilización. Esta labor se materializa por medio del acto administrativo denominado certificación de uso de suelo, el cual por su importancia, se califica como acto administrativo declarativo, en el sentido de que se limita a acreditar un hecho o situación jurídica sin crearla, modificarla o extinguirla, de manera que su contenido es constitutivo, al no crean ni modifican situaciones jurídicas previamente establecidas. La Procuraduría General de la República en los dictámenes Nº C-327-2001 y C-357-2003, los clasifica como actos jurídicos concretos por medio del cual la Administración local acredita la conformidad o no del uso del suelo con lo establecido en la zonificación respectiva; conforme lo dispone el artículo 28 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, el cual señala:

"Artículo 28.- Prohíbese aprovechar o dedicar terrenos, edificios, estructuras, a cualquier uso que sea incompatible con la zonificación implantada. En adelante, los propietarios interesados deberán obtener un certificado municipal que acredite la conformidad de uso a los requerimientos de la zonificación. Los usos ya existentes no conformes, deberán hacerse constar también con certificado que exprese tal circunstancia.Cada reglamento de zonificación fijará la fecha a partir de la cual dichos certificados serán obligatorios." Entonces, por medio del “certificado de uso del suelo", se acredita sí el uso es o no permitido, a lo pretendido por el gestionante. Por ello su naturaleza es declarativa, y no constitutiva, los certificados de uso del suelo no dan lugar por sí, a un derecho subjetivo ni consolidan, por sí mismos, situación jurídica alguna en razón de un derecho o situación jurídica preexistente". (Nombre70871. . Regulaciones Urbanísticas, 2004). La certificación de uso de suelo es meramente descriptiva respecto de una situación fáctica determinada en relación con lo dispuesto bajo norma legal, en razón de lo cual, por su medio, no se consolida una situación jurídica preexistente al acto certificante. De lo dicho, se tiene claramente que el certificado de uso de suelo se constituye un requisito previo exigido para el otorgamiento de una licencia sin que pueda eximirse su obtención.

XI.- SOBRE LAS LICENCIAS MUNICIPALES: Las licencias Municipales constituyen un acto que autoriza a una persona o entidad el ejercicio de un derecho, en otras palabras se tolera o permite realizar alguna actividad en determinado lugar circunscrito al ente Municipal con competencia para otorgar el permiso o licencia. En el caso de las Municipales éstas se encuentran legitimadas para tales efectos conforme a los artículos 79, 80 y 81 del Código municipal, así el Artículo 79.- establece " Para ejercer cualquier actividad lucrativa, los interesados deberán contar con licencia municipal respectiva, la cual se obtendrá mediante el pago de un impuesto. Dicho impuesto se pagará durante todo el tiempo en que se haya ejercido la actividad lucrativa o por el tiempo que se haya poseído la licencia, aunque la actividad no se haya realizado. En lo que respecta al impuesto de patentes, por el cual se gravan actividades sujetas a Licencia municipal, la Sala Constitucional, mediante Voto número 2197-92 de las 14:30 horas del día 11 de agosto de 1992, ha dicho " ... Distingue nuestra legislación entre licencia propiamente dicha, que es el acto administrativo que habilita al particular para ejercer la respectiva actividad y el pago de impuesto propiamente dicho que se denomina con el nombre de patente. La principal justificación teórica para imponer este tipo de tributo es la tradicional en el ambiente del derecho municipal, que lo define como la imperiosa necesidad de sufragar el costo de los servicios públicos que el particular recibe de la municipalidad (...)” Por su parte el numeral 80 establece " La municipalidad deberá resolver las solicitudes de licencia en un plazo máximo de treinta días naturales, contados a partir de su presentación. Vencido el término y cumplidos los requisitos sin respuesta alguna de la municipalidad, el solicitante podrá establecer su actividad; y el Artículo 81 literalmente manifiesta " La licencia municipal referida en el artículo anterior solo podrá ser denegada cuando la actividad sea contraria a la ley, la moral o las buenas costumbres, cuando el establecimiento no haya llenado los requisitos legales y reglamentarios o cuando la actividad, en razón de su ubicación física, no esté permitida por las leyes o, en su defecto, por los reglamentos municipales vigentes". Como es fácilmente apreciable, la anterior normativa no se aparta de la desarrollada en los artículos 329, 330 inciso 2) y 331 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Como primer paso, el gestionante solicita a la municipalidad de su jurisdicción, la autorización para ejercer una actividad determinada, presentando todos los requisitos que ya previamente debe de tener definidos la administración, presentada ésta, se procede a realizar la inspección para determinar su ubicación, extendiendo así el acto de autorización el cual se materializa cuando es entregada al administrativo la patente física donde se encuentra plasmada la voluntad de la Administración de otorgar o permitir la actividad solicitada y por ende, procede el administrado, a iniciar su actividad lucrativa. Con esa autorización el administrado adquiere un derecho subjetivo, lo cual no implica que la administración autorizante ( por la simple razón de encontrarse ante derechos subjetivos preexistentes) se ate de manos, para que una vez declarados los derechos, no pueda ejercitar sus potestades de tutela y control en el uso y disfrute de la licencia o autorización. Su prerrogativa originaria, como Administración de satisfacer y velar por los intereses públicos, no desaparece con la simple declaratoria, expresa o implícita de la autorización, podría decirse que en esencia, no desaparece su potestad de revocar o anular licencias o aprobaciones debidamente autorizadas, lo cual podría hacer conforme al bloque de legalidad, mediante el proceso de levisidad, tal y como lo dispone el numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, o por medio de una declaratoria en sede administrativa de una nulidad evidente y manifiesta previo procedimiento al efecto.

XII-DE LA ILEGALIDAD DE LOS ACTOS IMPUGNADOS: El ejercicio realizado en los considerandos anteriores sobre el principio de legalidad, la discrecionalidad administrativa, la naturaleza de la certificación de uso de suelo y DE las licencias municipales no es gratuita, ya que todos estos elementos son necesarios para la comprensión de lo que este Tribunal concluye en el presente caso. Primero se parte de que el permiso de uso de suelo es un acto certificante o sea que acredita una situación en particular, preexistente conforme a la normativa urbana. Aquí la Municipalidad de San José emite el certificado de uso de suelo Nº 1324 (folio 5) a favor del señor Nombre71456 , en donde se indica que es para ZMRC, traducido al español, Zona Mixta Residencia y Comercial, ubicada en el mapa 0097, parcela 01171000, requisito previo para la emisión de la Patente Comercial número C-00006157-02 a favor de su negocio comercial PANADERÍA MI PAN, que además indica claramente que la actividad a realizar es la Nº 276 (Panadería/ Repostería), declaratoria que se traduce como un derecho subjetivo a favor del señor Nombre71456 . Con posterioridad a ello, se realizan una serie de denuncias en contra del comercio de referencia y entonces el Departamento de Patentes remite sendas notas para verificar la legalidad de la actividad (hechos probados 8 y 9 folios 51 y 52), ello en uso de las potestades de control fiscalización propias de su actividad, actuación que no puede tacharse de desproporcionada, ilegal o abusiva por el contrario se encuentra debidamente autorizada y legitimada por el principio de legalidad. Lo que no parece ser real ni acorde con la legalidad es la motivación dada para tomar la decisión denegatoria de la solicitud de ampliación de la patente, del cierre ordenado y la desautorización de la actividad realizada. El insistente y repetido sustento -en apariencia de legalidad- del ente territorial para el cierre del negocio PANADERÍA MI PAN es que el actor se encontraba realizando una actividad no autorizada ya que la patente era para vender pan y no para hacerlo, argumento que hasta puede tacharse de irrisorio, ya que según consta a folio 1061 del presente proceso, la patente comercial fue otorgada para realizar la labor de Panadería y Repostería, términos que según el Diccionario de la Lengua Española de Real Academia vigésima edición significa: "Panadería: Oficio de Panadero, sitio casa o lugar donde se hace o vende pan, Repostería. Arte y oficio de repostero. Persona que tiene por oficio hacer pastas, dulces y algunas bebidas " , Por tanto la labor que realizaba el señor Nombre71456 en su local, venta y elaboración de pan es conforme a la autorizada (Panadería y repostería), a esta conclusión llega este Tribunal sin tener que hacer un gran despliegue de inteligencia ni razonabilidad, concluyendo que el alegato del ente territorial violenta los limites de la discrecionalidad y el principio de legalidad, pero mas aún no se adecua al procedimiento legal establecido para revocar un acto declaratoria de derechos como lo es la patente comercial legalmente otorgada en su momento al señor Nombre71456. Entonces si decimos que la actividad realizada por el actor era conforme a la autorización decretada (fabricación y venta de pan), implica que el acto dictado y que se alega de ejecución (cierre y puesta de sellos del negocio comercial Panadería MI PAN), que no lo es por cuanto causa un efecto propio y lesivo y es consecuencia de un acto nulo, al existir un vicio en su adopción (falta de motivación, infracción al principio de legalidad y debido proceso) y así se declara. Ahora bien pese a que la actividad comercial que realizaba el actor conforme se ha dicho era la concedida o permitida por la Municipalidad de San José actuando de buena fe y motivado por el mismo ente territorial, el señor Nombre71456 , en aras de que se le permitiría realizar la labor autorizada, según lo requirió la misma Municipalidad recurrida, procede a solicitar ampliación de la patente comercial, (hecho probado 27 folio 852) a fin de que en ella se consigne ademas de la venta de pan, su fabricación (acción de panadería), sin embargo la administración desangrando nuevamente los límites de la discrecionalidad y el bloque de legalidad le rechaza tal gestión indicando que el permiso de uso de suelo 0000658 (hecho probado 29 folio 863), fue resuelto como USO NO PERMITIDO, contrariando la certificación de uso de suelo, (0001324 folio 5) el cual como acto administrativo declarativo, (en el sentido de que se limita a acreditar un hecho o situación jurídica sin crearla, modificarla o extinguirla) no puede ser desvirtuado sin que se halla identificado previamente la normativa urbana, lo que en la especie no se dio. Esto se traduce, en que si bien es cierto como se indicó, los certificados de uso de suelo solo constatan una situación previa y además constituyen documento público, entonces la declaratoria en él dicha, no puede ser modificada más que por los procedentes legales que lo permitan ( Plan Regulador o aprobación de una nueva Ley de Planificación Urbana), que deben ser debidamente acreditadas. Y, es que a los autos no se hizo llegar, ni de las extensas resoluciones del señor Alcalde y Concejo Municipal se desprende que se haya realizado un cambio de normativa urbana que sustento el certificado de uso de suelo originario (1324), por el que pudiera considerarse contrario al Plan Regulador Regional o General o a las estipulaciones del Código Urbanístico, con el fin de legalizar la desacreditación de la certificación de uso de suelo antes citada, y motivar así conforme al bloque de legalidad la nueva zonificación realizada, la cual se acredita según el certificado de uso de suelo (Placa11628), que indica que esa zona ya no es mixta, sino se cambio a residencial. Pero en todo caso, aunque se haya o pudiera darse una situación de esta índole, el ente territorial, que por potestad constitucional tiene la tutela de los derechos de los ciudadanos circunscritos a su territorio, debió respetar el derecho otorgado al señor Nombre71456 cuando le concedió validamente la patente comercial objeto de esta litis, pero como se dijo el gran aparato territorial, ni por asomo manifestó, o indicó a esta autoridad en funciones administrativas, que se había realizado un cambio de esta naturaleza, ni tampoco, faltando al principio de legalidad y al debido proceso, dio una explicación certera, comprensible y legal al administrativo del cambio dicho, actuación que lesiona el principio de discrecionalidad de la administración pública en el tanto, la discrecionalidad no puede servir de parámetro para la ilegalidad. Es claro que los derechos concedidos con anterioridad al administrados deben ser conservados por el ente territorial, con la advertencia de que en todo caso si su deseo es anularlos, debe acudir a los medios legales correspondientes y no ha una simple simulación de legalidad resguardada en una excusa de palabras, que ni por asomo contienen rango legal alguno. Por otra parte no es objeto de este proceso la discusión sobre los montos por impuestos o por patente que deben pagarse, por lo que este Tribunal no puede pronunciarse sobre extremos que no han sido discutidos por el inferior, como lo seria si es de aplicación los montos por impuestos pagados, ya que ese es un punto no debatido ni propuesto a este Tribunal y de serlo no podría ser conocido en esta vía al tenor de los dispuesto en el artículo 154 del Código Municipal según su texto anterior, previo a la aprobación del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, como se indicó, no es propio de este proceso la discusión del quantum del monto a cancelar por las obligaciones tributarias, producto del presente negocio jurídico, como si lo es la actuación arbitraria y desmedida del ente territorial hacia su administrado Nombre71456 .

XIII- CONCLUSIONES: El anterior razonamiento trae como consecuencia ineludible, que se declaren con lugar las apelaciones presentadas por el señor Nombre71456 , produciendo la nulidad de los acuerdos Municipales números 41 artículo IV, de la sesión ordinaria 17, celebrada el 22 de agosto del 2006; número 20, artículo IV, de la sesión ordinaria 58 celebrada el 05 de junio del 2006, y el Nº 22 artículo IV, sesión ordinaria 44, del 27 de febrero del 2007, en consecuencia procede conceder y conservar los derechos subjetivos adquiridos con la autorización otorgada por La Sección de Patentes número C-00006157-02 y la declatoria del certificado de uso de suelo número 1324.

POR TANTO:

Se declaran CON LUGAR las apelaciones presentada por el señor Nombre71456 , contra los acuerdos Municipales números 41 artículo IV, de la sesión ordinaria 17, celebrada el 22 de agosto del 2006; número 20, artículo IV, de la sesión ordinaria 58 celebrada el 05 de junio del 2006, y el Nº 22 artículo IV, sesión ordinaria 44, del 27 de febrero del 2007, y en su lugar SE CONCEDEN Y CONSERVAN los derechos subjetivos adquiridos con la autorización otorgada por La Sección de Patentes número c-00006157-02 y la declatoria del certificado de uso de suelo número 1324. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa. NOTIFÍQUESE.- Nombre66641 Sady Jiménez Quesada Nombre37579