Review in paternity cases admissible due to opposing party's action where defendant's deception prevented DNA testingRecurso de revisión en filiación procede por obra de la contraria si el engaño del demandado impidió presentar prueba de marcadores genéticos

*980005840364FA* *980005840364FA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2009-000266 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten fifty-five on March twenty-sixth, two thousand nine.

Having reviewed the appeal for review (recurso de revisión) filed by [Nombre1] , against the judgments issued by the Juzgado de Familia de Heredia, at eleven o'clock on March thirty-first, two thousand, and at four-oh-seven p.m. on November thirtieth, two thousand seven, in the special filiation proceeding (proceso especial de filiación) (paternity investigation (investigación de paternidad)), filed before that same court, by [Nombre1] , single, homemaker, against [Nombre2] , divorced, construction worker. Attorney Alberto Soto Víquez appears as special judicial representative of the appellant. The Patronato Nacional de la Infancia intervenes. Both residents of Heredia.

WHEREAS:

1.- The appellant, in a brief dated February fifteenth, two thousand eight, filed the present action so that the judgment would annul, “1)- ...the first-instance judgments issued by the JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, within case file N° 98-00584-0364-FA, as well as those at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, within case file N° 05-002035-364-FA, which correspond to the PATERNITY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS (PROCESOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE PATERNIDAD) filed by the undersigned against [Nombre2] ./ 2)- That the JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA be ordered to proceed to issue a new judgment in accordance with the law”.

2.- The defendant answered this appeal for review (recurso de revisión) in the terms indicated in the brief dated June ninth, two thousand eight.

Judge Aguirre Gómez writes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- In a brief filed on February 18, 2008, Ms. [Nombre1] filed an appeal for review (recurso de revisión) against judgments No. 271, issued at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, and No. 1785, issued at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, by the Juzgado de Familia de Heredia, in special filiation proceedings (procesos especiales de filiación) filed by the appellant against [Nombre2] . She relates that between 1995 and 1996, she maintained a romantic relationship with the defendant during which they had sexual relations on many occasions, and she became pregnant with her son [Nombre3], who was born on March 10, 1997. When the child was a few months old, the defendant promised to help her with his support, but as he did not, in 1998 she filed a paternity investigation proceeding (proceso de investigación de paternidad), to which he reacted by asking her to desist in exchange for eight thousand colones per month to cover the minor's expenses. In that way, she neglected the processing of the proceeding, she never again appeared at the Legal Clinics office (Consultorios Jurídicos) and, therefore, never learned of the appointment to perform the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos), and consequently, her claim was dismissed. She maintains that when she became aware of the unscrupulous maneuvers, she filed another claim against Mr. [Nombre2], a proceeding in which, by resolution issued at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, the res judicata (cosa juzgada) exception was upheld, establishing that the only remedy to resolve the predicament was the appeal for review (recurso de revisión). For the reasons stated, she requests “That the first-instance judgments issued by the JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, within case file N° 98-00584-364-FA, and at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, within case file N° 05-002035-0364-FA, which correspond to the PATERNITY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS (PROCESOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE PATERNIDAD) filed by the undersigned against [Nombre2] , BE ANNULLED ./ 2) That the JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA be ordered to proceed to issue a new judgment in accordance with the law” (folios 30 to 39).

II.- Mr. [Nombre2] argues that the appellant is prone to falsifying reality. In this regard, he explains that on folio 3 of case file No. 98-000584-364-FA, the plaintiff indicated that the courtship relationship began on August 15, 1991, but in case file No. 05-2035-364-FA, she maintained that this relationship had begun in early 1995 and had lasted for two and a half years. Furthermore, he states that a stable relationship never existed, as due to his condition as a construction worker, he was obliged to work in different parts of the country. He denies having promised financial assistance to the plaintiff when he was notified of the claim in the first proceeding, stating that the plaintiff's statement is merely a calculation to request the application of subsection 1) of Article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). In that sense, he adds that it is not true that he prevented the plaintiff from attending with her son the appointment where the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos) was to be performed. He maintains, even while denying that what the plaintiff referred to is correct, that the promise of assistance did not constitute an impediment to the plaintiff's presence at the said test, besides questioning “How many years does one have to fail the plaintiff before she realizes she is being deceived?”. He argues that Ms. Esquivel did not demonstrate what the defenselessness (indefensión) consisted of, nor did she give the reasons she had for not requesting the correction of that defect, but rather what she demonstrated was her lack of interest in the proceeding when, in the third fact of the appeal, she stated: “she no longer worried about the processing of proceeding 98-000584-364, nor did she appear at the Court where it was being processed”. He reproaches the plaintiff for blaming him for not appearing at the forensic sciences laboratory, when she herself affirmed that her non-appearance “…was negligence on the part of the Judicial Office, because…she was not notified of the appointment and her testimonial evidence was also not taken due to negligence…on the part of that same Judicial Office” (folio 55 of case file 05-002035-364-FA). However, the defendant maintains, the plaintiff did not show total lack of concern, as it is evident that she did appear at the conciliation hearing (folios 15 and 16 ibid.), as well as that the inability to take the witness statements occurred because she did not comply with the order regarding the submission of copies of the claim issued by the lower court (A quo). For the stated reasons, he raised the exception of lack of right, seeking that the appeal be dismissed and the plaintiff be ordered to pay both sets of costs, or failing that, that the appeal be rejected outright.

III.- The Chamber deems it opportune to recount the case's background for its better understanding and resolution: a) On March 23, 1998, Ms. [Nombre1] filed a claim against Mr. [Nombre2] so that it could be determined in the judgment that he was the father of her son, and consequently, the child be assigned his father's surname and thereby his responsibility for the care and upbringing of the minor be established, as well as the payment of the corresponding alimony (special paternity investigation proceeding (proceso especial de investigación de paternidad) processed in case file No. 98-000584-364-FA, at folios 3 and 4). b) By resolution issued at 8:00 a.m. on March 26, 1998, the Juzgado de Familia ordered the plaintiff to indicate the facts on which the witnesses would testify (folio 5 of case file No. 98-000584-364-FA), which were provided on April 20 of that year (folio 6 ibid.). c) The defendant was notified of the claim on May 21, 1998, at his home (folio 9 ibid.). d) The Juzgado de Familia declared the defendant in default, deemed the claim as affirmatively answered, indicating that the proceeding would continue without the defendant's intervention but that he could appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state in which it was found, and it also designated a place for him to receive notifications (resolution issued at 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 1998, at folio 10 ibid.). e) The parties were summoned to the conciliation hearing to be held on September 17, 1998, or failing that, to the presentation of the offered evidence, and the Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de San Rafael de Heredia was commissioned to receive the testimony of the witnesses offered by the plaintiff, with said party being ordered to provide the corresponding set of copies (resolution issued at 3:15 p.m. on [Nombre2] 9, 1998, at folio 12 ibid.), which was not complied with, a circumstance that led to that evidence being dispensed with (see resolution issued at 9:00 a.m. on December 3, 1999, at folio 20 ibid.). f) The defendant requested the testimony of [Nombre4] as evidence for a better resolution, but the court resolved that this type of evidence is discretionary, so he could request it at the opportune procedural moment (resolution issued at 4:00 p.m. on [Nombre2] 28, 1998, at folio 15 ibid.). g) In a resolution issued at 9:30 a.m. on October 27, 1998, the parties were informed that the genetic marker examination (examen de marcadores genéticos) would take place at 9:00 a.m. on May 11, 1999 (folio 17 ibid.). Said genetic marker comparison (comparación de marcadores genéticos) could not be performed due to the absence of the plaintiff and the child [Nombre3] (official communication No. 98-3422 BQM of May 12, 1999, at folio 18 ibid. In this regard, see also the resolution issued at 3:15 p.m. on May 26, 1999, at folio 19 ibid.). h) By means of judgment No. 271-2000, issued at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, it was established that there was no proof that a constant and stable courtship relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant from August 15, 1991, lasting two and a half years, nor that from that relationship the plaintiff became pregnant by the defendant. In this regard, it was stated: “…the plaintiff did not worry about presenting the testimonial evidence she was requesting, and as the party did not provide the copies that were ordered, the offered testimonial evidence was dispensed with (Folio 20 of the case file). On the other hand, although neither party was notified personally or at their home of the scheduling for the expert evidence, it being done only at the place designated by the parties, the truth of the matter is that neither of them appeared in order for it to be carried out, and had the respective communication been made, if the defendant had not appeared, the only thing that such action would eventually provide would be an indication of truthfulness, which is not reaffirming any positive evidence, since the plaintiff herself did not worry about evacuating, by virtue of the total lack of interest she has had in the present proceeding and which means her filed claim cannot prosper” (folios 21 to 28 ibid.). i) On October 28, 2005, the plaintiff again filed a claim against the defendant so that the minor [Nombre3] would appear, in the civil registry, as his son and thus enforce all his rights (special filiation proceeding (proceso especial de filiación) processed in case file No. 05-002035-364-FA at folios 1 to 4). That claim was answered on January 18, 2006, raising the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) (folio 13 of case file No. 05-002035-364-FA). j) The parties were summoned to an oral hearing (Article 98 bis, subsection g) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)) on May 9, 2006, in which the offered confessionary and testimonial evidence would be presented (resolution issued at 2:32 p.m. on January 31, 2006, at folio 48 ibid.), therefore, at that time, the defendant's deposition was taken and the testimonies of [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , and [Nombre7] were received (in this regard, see the record on folios 59 to 66 ibid.). k) By resolution issued at 1:49 p.m. on [Nombre2] 5, 2006, the parties were informed that the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos) would take place at 8:30 a.m. on August 1, 2006 (folio 70 ibid.), which, once performed, established that the defendant could not be excluded as the father of the minor [Nombre3], since “taking into account the genotypic structure of the alleged father (Value X) and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population (Value Y), it has yielded a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548% which corresponds, according to Hummel's predicates, to a practically proven paternity” (in this regard, see official communication No. 1897-PAT-BQM-2006 at folios 74 to 77 as well as folios 78 to 80 ibid.). l) By resolution issued at 9:00 a.m. on November 29, 2006, a query was raised to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), regarding whether or not it was contrary to Constitutional Law that, by provision of subsection m) of Article 98 bis of the Family Code (Código de Familia), a judgment rendered in filiation declaration proceedings (procesos de emplazamiento de la filiación) in which the scientific test (prueba científica) was not performed, produces material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Said query was resolved by vote No. 11158-07, issued at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, which resolved: “The judicial query is resolved in the sense that Article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code (Código de Familia), added by Ley No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that a judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding (proceso de filiación) with the efficacy and authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) admits the extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión) under the terms indicated in the whereas part. Publish fully in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta” (folios 83 to 102 and 105 ibid.). m) In judgment No. 1785, issued at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, the lower court (A quo) determined that there was identity of parties, object, and cause in the proceedings filed, and that a firm judgment already existed regarding the proposed claim, so there was an impossibility to change what was resolved in that first proceeding (folios 174 to 178 ibid.).

IV.- Article 42, second paragraph of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) establishes: “... Reopening concluded criminal cases and lawsuits decided with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) is prohibited, except when the appeal for review (recurso de revisión) is applicable”. That constitutional principle was developed by the ordinary legislator through Article 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), which establishes: “Firm judgments rendered in ordinary or summary proceedings produce the authority and efficacy of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Those resolutions to which the law expressly confers that effect will also produce it. The effects of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) are limited to the operative part of the judgment and not to its grounds, which makes the existence or non-existence of the legal relationship it declares indisputable in another proceeding. A pronouncement on alimony, parental authority (patria potestad), custody (guarda), upbringing, and education of minor children shall not produce res judicata (cosa juzgada)...”; and 98 bis, subsection m) by providing: “What is firmly resolved in proceedings in which filiation (filiación) is debated, produces the effects of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material)”. Thus, in application of the principle of legal certainty, it is impossible to reopen proceedings such as the one under analysis, where the firm judgment produces material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), unless it is a review proceeding (proceso de revisión) filed by the interested party, (in which case they must do so before this Chamber) which is permitted under the terms of Article 98 bis, subsection m) of the Family Code (Código de Familia) in relation to 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) (see vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), number 11158, issued at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007). In the case under examination, it is observed that Ms. [Nombre1] filed two proceedings aimed at declaring that Mr. [Nombre2] was the father of the child [Nombre3], the plaintiff's son (see claims at folios 3 and 4 of case file No. 98-000584-364-FA and 1 to 4 of No. 05-002035-364-FA). Hence, as was ordered in the ruling of the second proceeding filed, that judgment rendered in the first produced material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) with respect to the other (folios 174 to 178 of the second case file. See point m) of the preceding whereas clause). In this way, to debate the issue again in the judicial venue, the plaintiff had, as analyzed, to file the appeal for review (recurso de revisión) at hand. Review is an exceptional appeal, which proceeds against firm judgments only in the exhaustive and specific cases of Article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), besides the fact that for this specific matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) considered in the cited vote that “a judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding (proceso de filiación) with the efficacy and authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) admits the extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión) under the terms indicated in the whereas part”, that is, that “if in a previous proceeding the filiation (filiación) or paternity was discussed, a judgment having been rendered with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos) or some force majeure cause (causa de fuerza mayor) prevented it, nothing prevents the possibility of filing an extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión) before the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia to declare the nullity of the firm judgment”. To this effect, the plaintiff argued in her appeal that she neglected that first proceeding (case file No. 98-000584-364-FA) due to the defendant's promise to give her eight thousand colones in exchange for abandoning it. Thus, she stated: “… under the belief that the defendant [Nombre2] would keep his word, I no longer worried about the processing of said proceeding, nor did I appear again at that office -referring to the Legal Clinics of the Universidad de Costa Rica in Heredia (Consultorios Jurídicos de la Universidad de Costa Rica en Heredia)-, so that I never learned that, by resolution issued at 3:15 p.m. on [Nombre2] 9, 1998, the said judicial office had ordered the performance of the GENETIC MARKER test (MARCADORES GENÉTICOS) and that, to this effect, all parties were to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories on May 11, 1999…” -uppercase removed- (folios 31 and 32). The analysis of the records allows inferring that what the plaintiff stated is valid, since in circumstances such as those concerning us, people may consider an amicable resolution favorable, especially when a minor whose paternity is to be elucidated in the proceeding is involved. Consequently, it is feasible that the plaintiff was deceived and that her will regarding the proceeding was vitiated under the belief that the defendant was going to assume his responsibilities. It is thus noted that the last procedural action filed by the plaintiff in that first proceeding was the one in which she referred to the facts on which the witnesses offered in the claim would testify, according to the order issued by way of the resolution at 8:00 a.m. on March 26, 1998, with the warning to declare the claim inadmissible and order its filing if she failed to do so (folios 5 and 6 ibid. See point b) of the preceding whereas clause). Therefore, once the claim was answered by the defendant, the plaintiff's procedural activity disappeared, according to her statement, and thus, although the resolutions -among them the appointment to the Forensic Sciences Laboratory to perform the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos), see folio 17 ibid. and point g) of the preceding whereas clause)- continued arriving at the designated place -the Office of the Legal Clinics of the Universidad de Costa Rica in Heredia (Consultorios Jurídicos de la Universidad de Costa Rica en Heredia)-, the procedural activity of this party did not reappear, except when she appeared at the conciliation hearing, an aspect that constitutes a sign of interest in reaching a voluntary agreement. In any case, a different conclusion could not be reached in this matter, as there was no reason, except for what was stated by the plaintiff, for not appearing at the said genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos), as well as for the omission that led to the declaration of the inability to take the testimonial evidence, given that it can be verified how, in the second proceeding, she appeared with her son at the Biochemistry Section of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial for the corresponding examination, besides the fact that it can be noted that the majority of the witnesses offered in the first matter were also offered in the second and appeared in it (see claims at folio 3 of case file No. 98-000584-364-FA and 3 of case file No. 05-002035-364-FA). As support for the foregoing, there is the deposition of Ms. [Nombre1]'s sister, [Nombre1] , who on folio 87 of the appeal narrated: " [Nombre2] … has never helped the child financially, she was pursuing a process for a pension, but he spoke with her, that they should leave things as they were, that he would help her amicably, I imagine financial help, that because she told me that he was going to help her financially, that was weekly, but I don't remember for [Nombre8].- she believed him and never took any other [Nombre9] was not summoned to any type of blood test, I think she had some place where they notified her but since she abandoned the process, she did nothing.-…". Furthermore, she added: “I know that she never did anything else regarding the process because she told me she was going to leave things as they were to arrange them amicably" (emphasis added), without being able to diminish the merit of what was stated by the witness, in her capacity as the plaintiff's sister, since on this point, this Chamber has emphasized the importance that the testimony of close relatives has in family litigation, as they are the ones who are in a position to know firsthand the intimate details that are normally aired in this type of proceeding (in this regard, see our rulings Nos. 177 issued at 2:40 p.m. on June 30, 1999; 929 issued at 9:30 a.m. on November 3, 2000; 94 issued at 10:40 a.m. on February 2, 2001; 449 issued at 8:30 a.m. on [Nombre2] 18, 2007, and 647 issued at 9:55 a.m. on August 6, 2008). Thus, the truth is that we find ourselves before the case of “non-presentation of evidence” due to the act of the opposing party, contemplated in subsection 1) of Article 619 ibid., since from the analysis carried out, it is evident that the plaintiff, by virtue of the defendant's deception -“under the belief that the defendant would keep his word,” as she stated- did not carry out all the pertinent procedural actions to present the testimonial evidence she offered in the brief of her first claim, besides the fact that for that same “force majeure” cause, she did not appear at that first appointment where the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos) was to be performed. In relation to the latter, it is necessary to understand that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in vote No. 11158-07, gave content to the cases provided for in Article 619, subsection 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), establishing, regarding the specific matter, some propositions that would give rise to the filing of an appeal for review (recurso de revisión) in proceedings of this nature in which a firm judgment had been issued with the efficacy and authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada). Thus, it cannot be understood that the Controller of Constitutionality limited the admissibility of review -under the terms established in said vote- to only two circumstances “when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test (prueba de marcadores genéticos) or some force majeure cause (causa de fuerza mayor) has prevented them from offering it or participating in its production”, as it was clear in maintaining that “…the original constituent power itself was responsible for attenuating the rigor of the legal certainty embodied by material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), contemplating the possibility of reopening a proceeding already adjudicated through the filing of an extraordinary appeal for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión) according to the grounds established by the infraconstitutional legal system or the ordinary legislator, in order to thereby modify or annul an iniquitous judgment and ensure that material justice prevails" (emphasis added). Moreover, the concept of force majeure contained in said vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, according to the terms established in doctrine, as the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration as the “acts of the opposing party” that would have left the appellant in a state of defenselessness (indefensión) by making it impossible for them to present evidence during the proceeding, just as happened in the case that concerns us (Article 619, subsection 1) ibid.). The text of that norm is clear when it establishes: “If the party requesting it proves that because they were prevented by force majeure, or by the act of the opposing party, they did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence,…; such that in either case there was defenselessness (indefensión) and it was not possible during the course of the proceeding to request the rectification of the defect" (emphasis added) from which it follows that “defenselessness (indefensión)” is what is intended to be overcome by way of review in the cases provided for in this subsection 1). Furthermore, in this matter, the courts of justice, in adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural norms, must attend to the best interests of the child (Articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)). Thus, it is appropriate to grant the appeal for review (recurso de revisión) filed, as it falls within the factual cases provided for in Article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil); to annul judgments No. 271-2000, issued at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, and No. 1785-07, issued at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, of the Juzgado de Familia de Heredia; and to issue a new one in accordance with the provisions of Article 625 ibid.

V.- Ms. [Nombre1] sued Mr. [Nombre2], seeking that the judgment order the Civil Registry to correct the registration entry of her son, so that the minor would be registered as his son. For this purpose, she maintained that in early 1995 and for approximately two and a half years, she maintained a romantic relationship with the defendant, from which she became pregnant with her son [Nombre3], who was born on March 10, 1997. She mentioned that the defendant, despite having committed to recognize him and to ensure the minor's support, never did so, a circumstance that forced her to resort to the jurisdictional route so that her son “…appears registered as the son of the defendant and…he assumes the duties inherent to paternity”. In the analysis of the merits of the question, it is necessary to resort to the content of Articles 92 and 98, both of the Family Code (Código de Familia). The first paragraph of Article 92 provides: “The status of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of the status of the child (posesión notoria de estado del hijo) by the alleged father or by any other means of proof …”. The legislator, considering that this type of situation is usually intended to be kept anonymous, chose to allow the interested party to use any means of proof (such as documentary, testimonial, scientific evidence, among others) to prove the fact of interest; which can even be established based on serious, precise, and concordant indicia. The above is so, in order not to render nugatory the fundamental right enshrined in Article 53 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), according to which every person has the right to know who their parents are. In harmony with those provisions, Article 98, in turn and for what is of interest, establishes: “In every proceeding for the investigation or challenge of paternity or maternity, scientific evidence (prueba científica) is admissible for the purpose of verifying the existence or non-existence of the kinship relationship. This evidence may be processed by the Organismo de Investigación Judicial of the Corte Suprema de Justicia or by laboratories duly accredited and recognized by the Corte Suprema de Justicia, after a determination by the Organismo de Investigación Judicial that the opinion is conclusive, reasonably, in one sense or the other ...”. In the specific case, the medical-legal opinion (dictamen médico legal), issued by the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, and on which the rigorous hearing was granted to the parties (folio 79 of case file No. 05-002035-364-FA), concluded that the defendant was not excluded as the biological father of the minor whose paternity was being investigated. While it is true that such declaration is not conclusive in the sense that the defendant is the father of [Nombre3], as it only does not exclude him as such, it performs a statistical analysis of the probability of paternity, taking into account the genotypic structure of the defendant and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population, which gives a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548%; which according to the opinion itself, corresponds to a practically proven paternity (76 ibid. In this sense, see the resolutions of this Chamber Nos. 647 of 9:55 a.m. on August 6; 234 of 10:00 a.m. on March 14, both of 2008, 267 of 9:30 a.m. on April 22, 2005; 200 of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, and 487 of 9:40 a.m. on October 2, 2002). Furthermore, the defendant's own confession ratifies the existence of the romantic relationship that the plaintiff and defendant maintained, and within which they had intimate encounters.

Regarding this, when answering the interrogatory, the defendant stated: “It is true, but clarifying that not every time I visited her did I have sexual relations with her, and when I did, I ejaculated outside” (folio 64). Later, he also admitted: “It is true that on some occasions we had sexual relations, but I cannot attest that she became pregnant because of that” (folio 87 of the appeal). On the other hand, the witnesses [Name5] and [Name6], friends of the plaintiff, gave account of the loving relationship maintained between the parties and from which, they made known, [Name3] was born (on March 10, 1997, as recorded in the certification from the Civil Registry at folios 5 and 16 of file 05-002035-364-FA). Thus, the first stated: “I have known [Name2] for about ten and a half years, and it was at that time that he and [Name1] began the relationship. That relationship lasted two and a half or three years. During that time I almost always went to [Name1]'s house, many times I saw him arrive at her house, and other times I knew he arrived because I saw his bicycle there and also because [Name1] told me, I knew everything that happened to her; since she began to have sexual relations with him, I found out about it because she told us, my mother, my sister and me, she also told us when she became pregnant with xxxx, she told us she was pregnant by [Name2], at that moment she was very distressed because she said that when he found out he told her she could not be pregnant by him because when he was going to ejaculate he did it outside... During that time she did not have any other romantic relationship with any man. Since she became pregnant and [Name2] verified it was true, three months later, he left and never returned,... They began the dating relationship in 1995. I found out that [Name2] left at three months of pregnancy because [Name1] herself told me and because I never saw him at her house again,...” -sic- (folios 60 to 61 idem). For her part, at folios 62 to 63 idem, [Name6] explained: “I know they had sexual relations because she herself told me and because more than once she would drop me off at the bus stop because he would come to sleep with her at her house. Since the minor was born she was alone, because [Name2] from three months of pregnancy, as far as I remember when she was three months along was when [Name2] left. During that time [Name1] did not have any other romantic relationship with any other man, to my knowledge [Name2] has never had any contact with the minor [Name3] I knew he came to sleep at her house because I spent all day with her and around five he would arrive and the next day when I arrived he was there, because she would tell us she didn't open the door because he was there. For about a year and a half, during the time I was going to [Name1]'s house, I observed that [Name2] came to [Name1]'s house to stay every two days or day by [Name10] lived alone...” (sic). Likewise, [Name7] expressed: “During the time when she became pregnant she had a dating relationship with [Name2], she told us that [Name2] was her boyfriend and whenever we, my two daughters and I, went to her house he was there. She told us that he sometimes stayed to sleep there... From the beginning of the pregnancy when she told him about her pregnancy, [Name2] left and never returned, I know this because I never saw him at her house again and because [Name1] herself told me... The dating relationship between [Name1] and [Name2] lasted about a year and a half. During the time when [Name1] became pregnant she did not have any other romantic relationship with anyone else...” -sic- (folios 63 to 64 idem). As can be observed, from the testimonial and confessional evidence gathered, it is possible to extract grave, precise, and concordant indications, which lead to establishing the existence of a loving or dating relationship between Mr. [Name2] and Mrs. [Name1] around the approximate date of conception; it also being a non-contested fact, but rather, peacefully admitted, that the plaintiff and the defendant had intimate relations. All of the above, added to the mentioned scientific evidence, allows one to reach the conviction that the defendant is indeed the father of the child. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the lawsuit filed by [Name1] against [Name2] with merit and, consequently, to declare that the minor [Name3], is the son of the defendant, and therefore from now on he shall be named [Name3], and shall have all the rights derived from this new status. Both costs are to be borne by the defendant (Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code). The defenses of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the defendant must be denied. Regarding the defense of res judicata, it must be remembered that the ruling produced in the process conducted under file no. 98- 000584-364-FA, does not validly generate effects in relation to this new process (file no. 05-002035-364-FA). Once this resolution is final, this judgment must be registered in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four (234), folio two hundred fifteen (215), [Address1] (), Province of Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry.

POR TANTO:

The petition for review (recurso de revisión) filed is granted, and in that sense, the judgments of the Family Court of Heredia, numbers two hundred seventy-one of eleven hours, of March thirty-first, two thousand, and one thousand seven hundred eighty-five of sixteen hours and seven minutes of November thirtieth, two thousand seven, are annulled. In their place, the defenses of lack of right and res judicata raised by the defendant are denied, and the lawsuit filed by [Name1] against [Name2] is upheld, and consequently it is declared that the minor [Name3], is the son of the defendant, and therefore from now on he shall be named [Name3], and shall have all the rights derived from this new status. Both costs are to be borne by the defendant. Once this resolution is final, let this judgment be registered in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four, folio two hundred fifteen, entry four hundred [Address2], Province of Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Fernando Bolaños Céspedes Res: 2009-000266 [Name11].- 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. and [...]

271-2000 of 11:00 a.m., of March 31, 2000, it was established that there was no proof that a constant and stable courtship relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant from August 15, 1991, lasting two and a half years, nor that from that relationship the plaintiff became pregnant by the defendant. In this regard, it was stated: **“** *…the plaintiff did not take care to produce the testimonial evidence she requested, and since the party did not provide the copies that were requested of her, the offered testimonial evidence was dispensed with (Folio 20 of the case file). On the other hand, although both parties were not notified, personally or at their place of residence, of the scheduling for the expert evidence, it being done only at the place indicated by the parties, the truth of the matter is that neither of them appeared so that it could be carried out, and if the respective communication had been made, had the defendant not appeared, the only thing such an act would give us would eventually be an indication of truthfulness, which is not reaffirming any positive evidence, since the plaintiff herself did not take care to produce it, by virtue of the total disinterest she has had in the present process and which means her filed claim cannot succeed* (folios 21 to 28 idem)*.* **i)** On October 28, 2005, the plaintiff again filed a claim against the defendant so that the minor [Name3] would appear, in the registry, as his son and thus assert all his rights (special filiation process processed in case file no. 05-002035-364-FA at folios 1 to 4). That claim was answered on January 18, 2006, opposing the exception of res judicata (folio 13 of case file no. 05-002035-364-FA). **j)** The parties were summoned to an oral hearing (article 98 bis subsection g) of the Labor Code) on May 9, 2006, in which the offered confessional and testimonial evidence would be produced (resolution of 2:32 p.m., of January 31, 2006 at folio 48 idem), for which reason at that time the defendant's confessional evidence was carried out and the testimonies of [Name5], [Name6], and [Name7] were received (in this regard, see the record found at folios 59 to 66 idem). **k)** By resolution of 1:49 p.m., of June 5, 2006, the parties were informed that the genetic marker testing would take place at 8:30 a.m., on August 1, 2006 (folio 70 idem), which, once carried out, established that the defendant could not be excluded as the father of the minor [Name3], since “ *considering the genotypic structure of the alleged father (Value of X) and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population (Value of Y), has yielded a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548% which corresponds, according to Hummel's predicates, to a paternity practically proven*” (in this regard, see official communication no. 1897-PAT-BQM-2006 at folios 74 to 77 as well as folios 78 to 80 idem). **l)** By resolution of 9:00 a.m., of November 29, 2006, a query was raised to the Constitutional Chamber, regarding whether or not it was contrary to Constitutional Law that, by provision of subsection m) of article 98 bis of the Family Code, the judgment issued in filiation proceedings in which the scientific test was not performed produces substantive res judicata. Said query was addressed through vote no. 11158-07 of 2:52 p.m., of August 1, 2007, in which it was resolved: “ *The judicial query is addressed in the sense that article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the judgment rendered in a filiation process with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary review appeal under the terms indicated in the recitals section. Publish in full in the Judicial Bulletin and summarize in the Official Gazette La Gaceta*” (folios 83 to 102 and 105 idem). **m)** In judgment no. 1785 of 4:07 p.m., of November 30, 2007, the lower court determined that there was identity of parties, object, and cause in the processes filed, as a final judgment already existed regarding the proposed claim, meaning it was impossible to change what was decided in that first process (folios 174 to 178 idem).

**IV.-** Article 42, second paragraph of the Political Constitution establishes: *“... It is prohibited to reopen concluded criminal cases and judgments decided with the authority of res judicata, except when the review appeal is appropriate*”. That constitutional principle was developed by the ordinary legislator through numeral 162 of the Civil Procedure Code, which establishes: “ *Final judgments issued in ordinary or summary proceedings produce the authority and efficacy of substantive res judicata. Those resolutions to which the law expressly confers that effect shall also produce them. The effects of substantive res judicata are limited to the operative part of the judgment and not to its reasoning, which makes the existence or non-existence of the legal relationship it declares indisputable in another process. A pronouncement on child support, parental authority (patria potestad), custody, upbringing, and education of minor children shall not produce res judicata...”;* and 98 bis, subsection m) by providing: *“What is finally resolved in processes in which filiation is discussed produces the effects of substantive res judicata”.* Thus, in application of the principle of legal certainty, it is impossible to reopen processes such as the one under analysis, where the final judgment produces substantive res judicata, unless it is a review process filed by the interested party (in which case they must do so before this Chamber), which is permitted under the terms of article 98 bis, subsection m) of the Family Code in relation to 619 of the Civil Procedure Code (see vote of the Constitutional Chamber, number 11158 of 2:52 p.m., of August 1, 2007). In the case under examination, it is observed that Ms. [Name1] filed two processes aimed at having it declared that Mr. [Name2] was the father of the child [Name3], son of the plaintiff (see claims at folios 3 and 4 of case file no. 98-000584-364-FA and 1 to 4 of no. 05-002035-364-FA). Hence, as was ordered in the ruling of the second process filed, that judgment issued in the first one produced substantive res judicata with respect to the other (folios 174 to 178 of the second case file. See point m) of the preceding recital). In this way, to discuss the matter again in the judicial venue, the plaintiff had, as analyzed, to file the review appeal being heard. Review is an exceptional appeal, which proceeds against final judgments only under the exhaustive and specific circumstances of article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code, besides the fact that for this specific matter, the Constitutional Chamber considered in the cited vote that “ *the judgment rendered in a filiation process with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary review appeal under the terms indicated in the recitals section”,* that is, that “ *if filiation or paternity was discussed in a prior process, a judgment having been issued with the authority and efficacy of substantive res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker testing or some cause of force majeure prevented it, nothing prevents the possibility of filing an extraordinary review appeal before the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice so that the nullity of the final judgment is declared*”. To this effect, the plaintiff argued in her appeal that she neglected that first process (case file no. 98-000584-364-FA) due to the promise made to her by the defendant to give her eight thousand colones in exchange for abandoning it. In this manner, she stated: *“… under the belief that the defendant [Name2] would keep his word, I stopped worrying about the processing of said process, and never appeared again at that office -* in reference to the Legal Clinics of the University of Costa Rica in Heredia -, *so I never found out that, by resolution of 3:15 p.m., of June 9, 1998, the cited judicial office had ordered the performance of the GENETIC MARKER testing and that, for this purpose, all parties had to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories on May 11, 1999…”* -capital letters removed- (folios 31 and 32). The analysis of the case file allows us to deduce that what the plaintiff stated is valid, since in circumstances such as those before us, people may consider an amicable resolution favorable, especially when a minor whose paternity is what is sought to be elucidated in the process is involved. Consequently, it is feasible that the plaintiff was deceived and that her will regarding the process was vitiated by the belief that the defendant would assume his responsibilities. Thus, it is noted that the last action filed by the plaintiff in that first process was the one in which she referred to the facts about which the witnesses offered in the claim would testify, in accordance with the request made to her through resolution of 8:00 a.m., of March 26, 1998, with the warning of declaring the claim inadmissible and ordering its archiving in case of not doing so (folios 5 and 6 idem. See point b) of the preceding recital). Therefore, once the claim was answered by the defendant, the plaintiff's procedural activity disappeared, according to her statement, and thus although the resolutions - among these the summons to the Forensic Science Laboratory, to perform the genetic marker testing, see folio 17 idem and point g) of the preceding recital -, continued arriving at the designated place - the Office of the Legal Clinics of the University of Costa Rica in Heredia -, this party's procedural activity did not reappear, except when she appeared at the conciliation proceeding, an aspect that constitutes a sign of interest in reaching a voluntary arrangement. In any case, a different conclusion could not be reached in this matter, since there was no reason, except what the plaintiff stated, for not appearing for the aforementioned genetic marker testing, as well as for the omission that led to the declaration of unfeasibility of the testimonial evidence, given that it can be verified how in the second process she appeared together with her son at the Biochemistry Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency for the corresponding examination, besides the fact that it can be observed that the majority of the witnesses offered in the first matter were also offered in the second and appeared in the latter (see claims at folio 3 of case file no. 98-000584-364-FA and 3 of case file no. 05-002035-364-FA). As support for the aforementioned, there is the deposition of Ms. [Name1]'s sister, [Name1], who at folio 87 of the appeal recounted: [Name2] *“… has never helped the child financially, she was carrying out a process for a pension, but he spoke with her, to leave things as they were, that he would help her **informally (por bien)**, I imagine that financial help, that because she told me he was going to help her financially, that per week, but I don't remember for [Name8].- she believed him and never did anything else any [Name9] was not summoned to any type of blood test, I think she had some place where they notified her but as she abandoned the process, she did nothing.-…”.* Furthermore, she added: “ *It is clear to me that she did nothing else regarding the process because she told me she was going to leave things as they were to **settle them informally (por bien)**”* (emphasis added)*,* without being able to detract from the merit of what the witness stated, in her capacity as the plaintiff's sister, since in this regard, this Chamber has emphasized the importance that the testimony of close relatives has in family litigation, as they are the ones who are in a position to know first-hand the intimate details that are normally aired in this type of process (in this regard, see our judgments nos. 177 of 2:40 p.m., of June 30, 1999; 929 of 9:30 a.m., of November 3, 2000; 94 of 10:40 a.m., of February 2, 2001; 449 of 8:30 a.m., of June 18, 2007 and 647 of 9:55 a.m., of August 6, 2008). Thus, the truth is that we are facing the circumstance of “ *non-presentation of evidence*” due to the act of the opposing party, contemplated in subsection 1) of article 619 idem, given that from the analysis carried out, it is evident that the plaintiff, by virtue of the defendant's deception - “ *under the belief that the defendant would keep his word”, as she stated* - did not carry out all the pertinent procedural actions to produce the testimonial evidence she offered in the writing of her first claim, besides the fact that for that same cause of “ *force majeure*” she did not appear at that first appointment where the genetic marker testing would be carried out. In relation to this last point, it is necessary to understand that the Constitutional Chamber in vote no. 11158-07 gave content to the circumstances provided for in numeral 619 subsection 1) of the Civil Procedure Code, establishing, regarding the specific matter, some statements that would give rise to the filing of a review appeal in processes of this nature in which a final judgment had been issued with the efficacy and authority of res judicata. Thus, it could not be understood that the Controller of Constitutionality limited the appropriateness of the review - under the terms established in said vote - to only two circumstances “ *when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker testing or some cause of force majeure has prevented them from offering it or participating in its production*”, as it was clear in holding that “ *…the original constituent itself was responsible for mitigating the rigor of the legal certainty embodied by substantive res judicata, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already decided process through the filing of an extraordinary review appeal **according to the grounds established by the infra-constitutional legal system or the ordinary legislator**, in order to thereby modify or annul an iniquitous judgment and achieve that material justice prevails*” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the concept of force majeure contained in said vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, according to the terms established in doctrine, since the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration, as that given to the “acts of the opposing party” that would have left the appealing party in a state of defenselessness by making it impossible for them to present evidence during the process, just as happened in the case before us (article 619 subsection 1) idem). The text of that norm is clear when it establishes: “ *If the party requesting it demonstrates that because **force majeure prevented them, or by act of the opposing party**, they did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence,…; so that in either case there was defenselessness and it was not possible during the course of the process to request rectification of the defect*” (emphasis added) from which it results that “ *defenselessness*” is what is intended to be overcome with the review under the circumstances provided for in this subsection 1). Furthermore, in this matter, the courts of justice, when adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural norms, must attend to the best interest of the child (articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code). Thus, it is appropriate to grant the review appeal filed for being within the factual circumstances provided for in article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code; to annul the judgments of the Family Court of Heredia, nos. 271-2000 of 11:00 a.m., of March 31, 2000 and 1785-07 of 4:07 p.m., of November 30, 2007 and to issue a new one in accordance with the provisions of article 625 idem.

**V.-** Ms. [Name1] sued Mr. [Name2], seeking that the judgment order the Civil Registry to correct the registry entry of her son, so that the minor would appear registered as his son. For this, she maintained that at the beginning of 1995 and for approximately two and a half years, she maintained a romantic relationship with the defendant, from which she became pregnant with her son [Name3], who was born on March 10, 1997. She mentioned that the defendant, despite having committed to recognizing him and ensuring the minor's maintenance, never did so, a circumstance by which she was forced to resort to the jurisdictional route so that her son “ *…appears registered as the defendant's son and…he assumes the duties inherent to paternity”.* In the analysis of the merits of the issue, it is necessary to resort to the content of numerals 92 and 98, both of the Family Code. The first paragraph of numeral 92 provides: “ *The quality of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of the status of child by the alleged father or by any other means of proof …*”. The legislator, considering that, generally, these types of situations are intended to be kept anonymous, chose to allow the interested party to use any evidentiary means (such as documentary, testimonial, scientific evidence, among others) to prove the fact of interest to them; which can even be established based on serious, precise, and concordant indications. The foregoing is so, in an effort not to make nugatory the fundamental right enshrined in article 53 of the Political Constitution, according to which every person has the right to know who their parents are. In harmony with those provisions, numeral 98, in turn and as relevant, establishes: “ *In any process of investigation or challenge of paternity or maternity, scientific evidence is admissible for the purpose of verifying the existence or non-existence of the kinship relationship.* This evidence may be evaluated by the Judicial Investigation Organism (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) of the Supreme Court of Justice or by laboratories duly accredited and recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice, following a finding by the Judicial Investigation Organism that the expert opinion is conclusive, reasonably, in one sense or another...". In the specific case, the medical-legal opinion, issued by the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories of the Judicial Investigation Organism, regarding which the parties were granted the requisite hearing (folio 79 of expediente No. 05-002035-364-FA), concluded that the defendant is not excluded as the biological father of the minor whose paternity is being investigated.

While it is true that such a finding is not conclusive in the sense that the defendant is the father of [Nombre3], since it only does not exclude him as such, it performs a statistical analysis of the probability of paternity, taking into account the genotypic structure of the defendant and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population, which grants a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548%; which, according to the opinion itself, corresponds to a paternity that is practically proven (76 idem. In this regard, see the resolutions of this Chamber Nos. 647 of 9:55 a.m., on August 6; 234 of 10:00 a.m., on March 14, both from 2008; 267 of 9:30 a.m., on April 22, 2005; 200 of 10:00 a.m., on March 24, 2004; and 487 of 9:40 a.m., on October 2, 2002). Furthermore, the defendant's own confession ratifies the existence of the romantic relationship that the plaintiff and defendant maintained, and within which they had intimate encounters. See in this regard that when responding to the interrogation, the defendant stated: *"It is true, but clarifying that not all the time I visited her did I have sexual relations with her, and when I did, I ejaculated outside"* (folio 64). Subsequently, he also admitted: *"It is true that on some occasions we had sexual relations, but I cannot attest that she became pregnant because of it"* (folio 87 of the appeal). Moreover, the witnesses [Nombre5] and [Nombre6], friends of the plaintiff, gave an account of the amorous relationship maintained between the parties and from which, they made known, [Nombre3] was born (on March 10, 1997, as recorded in the certification from the Civil Registry on folio 5 and 16 of expediente 05-002035-364-FA).

Thus, the first stated: *"I have known [Nombre2] for about ten and a half years, and it was at that time that he and [Nombre1] started the relationship. That relationship lasted two and a half or three years. During that time, I went to [Nombre1]'s house almost all the time, I saw him arrive at her house many times, and other times I knew he had arrived because I saw his bicycle there and also because [Nombre1] would tell me, I knew everything that was happening to her; from when she started having sexual relations with him, I found out about that because she told us, my mom, my sister, and me, she also told us when she became pregnant with xxxx, she told us she was pregnant by [Nombre2], at that moment she was very distressed because she said that when he found out, he told her she couldn't be pregnant by him because when he was going to ejaculate he did it outside... During that time, she did not maintain any other romantic relationship with any man. From when she became pregnant and [Nombre2] confirmed it was true, at three months, he left and did not return,... They started the courtship relationship in 1995. I found out that [Nombre2] left at three months of pregnancy because [Nombre1] herself told me and because I also never saw him at her house again,..."* -sic- (folios 60 to 61 idem).

For her part, on folios 62 to 63 idem, [Nombre6] explained: *"I know they maintained sexual relations because she herself told me and because more than once she would drop me off at the bus stop because he would come to sleep with her at her house. Since the minor was born, she was alone, because [Nombre2] from three months of pregnancy, as I recall when she was three months was when [Nombre2] left. During that time, [Nombre1] did not maintain any other romantic relationship with any other man, to my knowledge [Nombre2] has never maintained any contact with the minor [Nombre3]. I knew that he came to sleep at her house because I spent the whole day with her and then around five he would arrive and the next day when I arrived he was there, so she would tell us that she wouldn't open the door because he was there. For about a year and a half, during the time I was going to [Nombre1]'s house, I observed that [Nombre2] came to [Nombre1]'s house to stay every other day or day about... [Nombre10] lived alone..."* (sic). In the same way, [Nombre7] expressed: *"During the time when she became pregnant, she maintained a courtship relationship with [Nombre2], she would tell us that [Nombre2] was her boyfriend and whenever we, my two daughters and I, went to her house he was there. She told us that he sometimes stayed to sleep there... From the beginning of the pregnancy when she told him about her pregnancy, [Nombre2] left and never came back, I know that because I never saw him at her house again and because [Nombre1] herself told me... The courtship relationship between [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] lasted about a year and a half. During the time when [Nombre1] became pregnant, she did not maintain any other romantic relationship with anyone else..."* -sic- (folios 63 to 64 idem). As can be seen, from the testimonial and confession evidence gathered, serious, precise, and concordant indicia (indicios) can be extracted, which lead to establishing the existence of a love or courtship relationship between Mr. [Nombre2] and Mrs. [Nombre1] around the approximate date of conception; furthermore, it is a non-controversial fact, but rather, peacefully admitted, that the plaintiff and the defendant had intimate relations. All of the foregoing, added to the mentioned scientific evidence, allows one to reach the conviction that the defendant is indeed the father of the child. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against [Nombre2] with merit and, consequently, to declare that the minor [Nombre3] is the son of the defendant, and therefore, from now on he shall be called [Nombre3], and shall have all the rights derived from this new condition. Both sets of costs are to be borne by the defendant (Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The exceptions of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the defendant must be denied.

Regarding the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada), it must be remembered that the judgment produced in the process tramited under expediente No. 98-000584-364-FA does not validly generate effects in relation to this new process (expediente No. 05-002035-364-FA). Once this resolution is final, this judgment must be inscribed in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four (234), folio two hundred fifteen (215), [Dirección1] (), Province of Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry.

**POR TANTO:** The revision appeal filed is declared with merit, and in that sense, the judgments of the Family Court of Heredia, number two hundred seventy-one of eleven o'clock, on March thirty-first, two thousand, and number one thousand seven hundred eighty-five of sixteen hours seven minutes, on November thirtieth, two thousand seven, are annulled. In their place, the exceptions of lack of right (falta de derecho) and res judicata (cosa juzgada) raised by the defendant are denied, and the lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against [Nombre2] is upheld, and consequently, it is declared that the minor [Nombre3] is the son of the defendant, and therefore, from now on he shall be called [Nombre3], and shall have all the rights derived from this new condition. Both sets of costs are to be borne by the defendant. Once this resolution is final, inscribe this judgment in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four, folio two hundred fifteen, entry four hundred [Dirección2], Province of Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez*** ***Fernando Bolaños Céspedes*** **Res: 2009-000266** [Nombre11].- 2 y</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:'Bookman Old Style'\"> [...]</span></p></div></body></html>" **III.-** This Chamber deems it appropriate to recount the background of the case, for its better understanding and resolution: **a)** On March 23, 1998, Ms. [Name1] filed a lawsuit against Mr. [Name2] in order for a judgment to determine that he was the father of her son and, consequently, for the child to be given his father's surname, thereby establishing his responsibility in the care and upbringing of the minor, as well as the payment of the corresponding child support (special paternity investigation proceeding (proceso especial de investigación de paternidad) processed under case file no. 98-000584-364-FA, at folios 3 and 4). **b)** By resolution issued at 8:00 a.m. on March 26, 1998, the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) ordered the plaintiff to indicate the facts about which the witnesses would testify (folio 5 of case file no. 98-000584-364-FA), which were provided on April 20 of that year (folio 6 idem). **c)** The defendant was served notice of the lawsuit on May 21, 1998, at his place of residence (folio 9 idem). **d)** The Family Court declared the defendant in default (rebeldía), deemed the lawsuit to be answered affirmatively, indicating that the proceeding would continue without the defendant's intervention but that he could appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state in which it was found, and also designated a place for receiving notifications (resolution issued at 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 1998, at folio 10 idem). **e)** The parties were summoned to the conciliation hearing to be held on September 17, 1998, or failing that, to the evacuation of the offered evidence, and the Minor Claims Court of San Rafael de Heredia (Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de San Rafael de Heredia) was commissioned to receive the statements of the witnesses offered by the plaintiff, with said party being ordered to provide the corresponding set of copies (resolution issued at 3:15 p.m. on [Name2] 9, 1998, at folio 12 idem), which was not fulfilled, a circumstance that led to that evidence being dispensed with (see resolution issued at 9:00 a.m. on December 3, 1999, at folio 20 idem). **f)** The defendant requested the testimony of [Name3] as evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver), but the court resolved that this type of evidence is discretionary, and therefore he could request it at the appropriate procedural moment (resolution issued at 4:00 p.m. on [Name2] 28, 1998, at folio 15 idem). **g)** In a resolution issued at 9:30 a.m. on October 27, 1998, the parties were informed that the genetic marker test would be conducted at 9:00 a.m. on May 11, 1999 (folio 17 idem). Said genetic marker comparison could not be performed due to the absence of the plaintiff and the child [Name4] (official letter no. 98-3422 BQM of May 12, 1999, at folio 18 idem. In that regard, see also the resolution issued at 3:15 p.m. on May 26, 1999, at folio 19 idem). **h)** By means of judgment no. 271-2000, issued at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, it was established that there was no evidence that a constant and stable courtship relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant since August 15, 1991, lasting two and a half years, nor that the plaintiff became pregnant by the defendant from that relationship. In this regard, it was stated: **“**…the plaintiff did not take care to evacuate the testimonial evidence she requested, and since the party did not provide the copies that were ordered, the offered testimonial evidence was dispensed with (Folio 20 of the case file). On the other hand, although both parties were not notified, personally or at their place of residence, of the scheduling for the expert evidence, being done only at the place designated by the parties, the truth of the matter is that neither of them appeared for it to be carried out, and had the respective communication been made, if the defendant had not appeared, the only thing such an act would give us would eventually be an indication of veracity, which is not coming to reaffirm any positive evidence, since the plaintiff herself did not take care to evacuate it, by virtue of the total lack of interest she has had in the present proceeding and which means her filed lawsuit cannot succeed”** (folios 21 to 28 idem). **i)** On October 28, 2005, the plaintiff again filed a lawsuit against the defendant so that the minor [Name4] would appear, in the registry, as his son and thus enforce all his rights (special filiation proceeding (proceso especial de filiación) processed under case file no. 05-002035-364-FA, at folios 1 to 4). That lawsuit was answered on January 18, 2006, opposing the exception of res judicata (cosa juzgada) (folio 13 of case file no. 05-002035-364-FA). **j)** The parties were summoned to an oral hearing (article 98 bis, subsection g) of the Labor Code) on May 9, 2006, in which the offered confessional and testimonial evidence would be evacuated (resolution issued at 2:32 p.m. on January 31, 2006, at folio 48 idem), which is why at that time the defendant's confessional evidence was taken and the testimonies of [Name5], [Name6], and [Name7] were received (in this regard, see the record at folios 59 to 66 idem). **k)** By resolution issued at 1:49 p.m. on [Name2] 5, 2006, the parties were informed that the genetic marker test would take place at 8:30 a.m. on August 1, 2006 (folio 70 idem), which, once performed, established that the defendant could not be excluded as the father of the minor [Name4], since “taking into account the genotypic structure of the alleged father (Value of X) and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population (Value of Y), it has yielded a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548% which corresponds, according to the predicates of [Name8], to a practically proven paternity” (in this regard, see official letter no. 1897-PAT-BQM-2006 at folios 74 to 77 as well as folios 78 to 80 idem). **l)** By resolution issued at 9:00 a.m. on November 29, 2006, a consultation was submitted to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), regarding whether or not it was contrary to Constitutional Law that, by provision of subsection m) of article 98 bis of the Family Code, the judgment rendered in filiation proceedings where the scientific test was not performed produces material res judicata. Said consultation was addressed through vote no. 11158-07, issued at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, in which it was resolved: “The judicial consultation is evacuated in the sense that article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary review appeal (recurso extraordinario de revisión) under the terms indicated in the recitals section. Publish in full in the Judicial Bulletin and summarize in the Official Gazette La Gaceta” (folios 83 to 102 and 105 idem). **m)** In judgment no. 1785, issued at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, the lower court (A quo) determined that there was identity of parties, object, and cause in the proceedings filed, and that a final judgment already existed regarding the proposed claim, making it impossible to change what was resolved in that first proceeding (folios 174 to 178 idem).

**IV.-** Article 42, second paragraph of the Political Constitution establishes: “…It is forbidden to reopen concluded criminal cases and adjudicated trials with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada), except when the review appeal (recurso de revisión) is appropriate.” That constitutional principle was developed by the ordinary legislature through Article 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which establishes: “*Final judgments rendered in ordinary or abbreviated proceedings produce the authority and efficacy of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Those resolutions to which the law expressly confers that effect shall also produce it. The effects of material res judicata are limited to the operative part of the judgment and not to its grounds, which makes the existence or non-existence of the legal relationship it declares indisputable in another proceeding. A pronouncement on alimony, parental authority (patria potestad), custody, upbringing, and education of minor children shall not produce res judicata…*”; and Article 98 bis, subsection m) by providing: “*What is finally resolved in proceedings in which filiation (filiación) is discussed produces the effects of material res judicata*”. Thus, in application of the principle of legal certainty, it is impossible to reopen proceedings such as the one under analysis, where the final judgment produces material res judicata, unless it concerns a review proceeding filed by the interested party (in which case it must be filed before this Chamber), which is indeed permitted under Article 98 bis, subsection m) of the Family Code in relation to Article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see decision of the Constitutional Chamber, number 11158 at 2:52 p.m., on August 1, 2007). In the case under examination, it is observed that Mrs. [Nombre1] filed two proceedings aimed at having it declared that Mr. [Nombre2] was the father of the child [Nombre4], son of the plaintiff (see lawsuits on folios 3 and 4 of file no. 98-000584-364-FA and 1 to 4 of file no. 05-002035-364-FA). Thus, as ordered in the decision of the second proceeding filed, that judgment rendered in the first produced material res judicata with respect to the other (folios 174 to 178 of the second file. See point m) of the preceding recital). Therefore, to discuss the matter again in the judicial venue, the plaintiff had, as analyzed, to file the appeal for review that is being heard. The review is an exceptional appeal, which proceeds against final judgments only under the exhaustive and specific circumstances of Article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in addition to which, for this specific matter, the Constitutional Chamber held in the cited decision that “*the judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary appeal for review under the terms indicated in the recital section*”, that is, “*if in a prior proceeding filiation or paternity was discussed, and a judgment was rendered with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or if some force majeure cause prevented it, nothing prevents the possibility of filing an extraordinary appeal for review before the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice to have the final judgment declared null*”. In this regard, the plaintiff argued in her appeal that she abandoned that first proceeding (file no. 98-000584-364-FA) due to the promise made by the defendant to give her eight thousand colones in exchange for dropping it. Thus, she stated: “… *under the belief that the defendant [Nombre2] would keep his word, I stopped worrying about the processing of that proceeding, nor did I appear again at that office* -in reference to the Legal Clinics of the University of Costa Rica in Heredia-, *so I never found out that, by resolution at 3:15 p.m., on the 9th of [Nombre2], 1998, the aforementioned judicial office had ordered the performance of the GENETIC MARKERS test and that, for this purpose, all parties had to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories on May 11, 1999…*” -capital letters suppressed- (folios 31 and 32). The analysis of the records allows us to infer that what was stated by the plaintiff is valid, since in circumstances such as those at hand, people may deem an amicable resolution favorable, especially when a minor whose paternity is intended to be elucidated in the proceeding is involved. Consequently, it is feasible that the plaintiff was deceived and that her will regarding the proceeding was vitiated under the belief that the defendant would assume his responsibilities. It is thus noted that the last action filed by the plaintiff in that first proceeding was one in which she referred to the facts about which the witnesses offered in the lawsuit would testify, in accordance with the prevention made to her by resolution at 8:00 a.m., on March 26, 1998, with the warning of declaring the lawsuit inadmissible and ordering its archiving in case of non-compliance (folios 5 and 6 of the same file. See point b) of the preceding recital). Therefore, once the lawsuit was answered by the defendant, the procedural activity of the plaintiff disappeared, according to her statement, and thus, although the resolutions -among them the summons to the Forensic Science Laboratory to perform the genetic marker test, see folio 17 of the same file and point g) of the preceding recital-, continued to arrive at the indicated place -the Office of the Legal Clinics of the University of Costa Rica in Heredia-, the procedural activity of this party did not appear again, except when she appeared at the conciliation hearing, an aspect that constitutes evidence of the interest in reaching a voluntary agreement. In any case, a different conclusion could not be reached in this matter, since there was no reason, except for what the plaintiff stated, for not appearing at the referred genetic marker test, as well as for the omission that led to the declaration of unavoidability of the witness evidence, given that it can be verified how in the second proceeding she appeared with her son at the Biochemistry Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency for the corresponding examination, in addition to the fact that it can be observed that the majority of the witnesses offered in the first case were also offered in the second and appeared in it (see lawsuits on folio 3 of file no. 98-000584-364-FA and folio 3 of file no. 05-002035-364-FA). In support of the foregoing, there is the testimony of Mrs. [Nombre1]’s sister, [Nombre1] , who on folio 87 of the appeal stated: “… *[Nombre2] has never helped the child financially, she was pursuing a proceeding for a pension, but he spoke with her, that they should leave things as they were, that he would help her *amicably* (por bien), I imagine financial help, that because she told me he was going to help her financially, that per week, but I don't remember for [Nombre9].- she believed him and never did any other [Nombre10].-… she was not summoned to any blood test, I think she had some place where they notified her but because she abandoned the proceeding, she did nothing.-…*”. Furthermore, she added: “*It is known to me that she never did anything else regarding the proceeding because she told me she was going to leave things as they were to *settle them amicably**” (emphasis added), without the testimony given by the witness, in her capacity as the plaintiff's sister, being able to be discredited, since on this matter, this Chamber has emphasized the importance that the testimony of close relatives has in family litigation, as they are the ones who are in a position to know firsthand the intimate details normally ventilated in this type of proceeding (in this regard, see our judgments nos. 177 at 2:40 p.m., on June 30, 1999; 929 at 9:30 a.m., on November 3, 2000; 94 at 10:40 a.m., on February 2, 2001; 449 at 8:30 a.m., on the 18th of [Nombre2], 2007 and 647 at 9:55 a.m., on August 6, 2008). Thus, the truth is that we are facing the circumstance of “*failure to present evidence*” by the act of the opposing party, contemplated in subsection 1) of Article 619 of the same code, given that from the analysis performed, it is evident that the plaintiff, by virtue of the defendant's deception -“*under the belief that the defendant would keep his word*”, as she stated- did not carry out all the pertinent procedural actions to evacuate the witness evidence she offered in the writ of her first lawsuit, in addition to the fact that for this same “*force majeure*” cause she did not appear at that first appointment where the genetic marker test was to be performed. Regarding the latter, it is necessary to understand that the Constitutional Chamber in decision no. 11158-07 gave content to the circumstances provided for in Article 619, subsection 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing, regarding the specific matter, some statements that would give rise to the filing of an appeal for review in proceedings of this nature in which a final judgment has been rendered with the efficacy and authority of res judicata. Thus, it could not be understood that the Controller of Constitutionality limited the admissibility of the review -under the terms established in said decision- to only two circumstances “*when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or some force majeure cause has prevented them from offering or participating in its production*”, since it was clear in holding that “*…the original constituent power itself took charge of mitigating the rigor of the legal certainty that material res judicata embodies, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already adjudicated proceeding through the filing of an extraordinary appeal for review *according to the grounds established by the infra-constitutional legal system or the ordinary legislature*, in order to thereby modify or annul an iniquitous judgment and achieve that material justice prevails*” (emphasis added). Moreover, the concept of force majeure contained in said decision cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, according to the terms established in doctrine, since the legislature treated it, giving it the same value and consideration, as it granted to the “*acts of the opposing party*” that would have left the appealing party defenseless by making it impossible to present evidence during the proceeding, just as happened in the case at hand (Article 619, subsection 1) of the same code). The text of that norm is clear when it establishes: “*If the party requesting it demonstrates that because *force majeure, or by the act of the opposing party* prevented them, they did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other class of evidence,…; so that in either case there has been defenselessness and it was not possible during the course of the proceeding to request the rectification of the defect*” (emphasis added), from which it follows that “*defenselessness*” is what is intended to be overcome with the review in the circumstances provided for in this subsection 1). Furthermore, in this matter, the courts of justice, when adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural rules, must attend to the best interest of the child (Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Articles 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code). Thus, it is appropriate to grant the appeal for review filed since it falls within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure; to annul the judgments of the Family Court of Heredia, nos. 271-2000 at 11:00 a.m., on March 31, 2000 and 1785-07 at 4:07 p.m., on November 30, 2007 and to render a new one in accordance with Article 625 of the same code.

**V.-** Mrs. [Nombre1] sued Mr. [Nombre2], seeking that the judgment order the Civil Registry to correct the registry entry of her son, so that the minor would appear registered as the son of the latter. For this, she maintained that at the beginning of 1995 and for approximately two and a half years, she maintained a romantic relationship with the defendant, from which she became pregnant with her son [Nombre4], who was born on March 10, 1997. She mentioned that the defendant, despite committing to recognize him and ensure the minor's support, never did so, a circumstance that forced her to resort to the judicial venue so that her son “…*appears registered as the son of the defendant and…that he assume the duties inherent to paternity*”. In analyzing the merits of the matter, it is necessary to resort to the content of Articles 92 and 98, both of the Family Code. The first paragraph of Article 92 provides: “*The quality of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of the status of child by the alleged parent or by any other means of proof …*”. The legislature, considering that these types of situations are generally intended to be kept anonymous, opted to allow the interested party to use any means of proof (such as documentary evidence, witness evidence, scientific evidence, among others) to accredit the fact that is of interest; which can even be established based on serious, precise, and concordant inferences. The foregoing is so in an effort to not nullify the fundamental right enshrined in Article 53 of the Political Constitution, according to which every person has the right to know who their parents are. In harmony with those provisions, Article 98, in turn and insofar as relevant, establishes: “*In every proceeding for investigation or challenge of paternity or maternity, scientific evidence is admissible for the purpose of verifying the existence or non-existence of the kinship relationship. This evidence may be evaluated by the Judicial Investigation Agency of the Supreme Court of Justice or by laboratories duly accredited and recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice, upon prior opinion from the Judicial Investigation Agency that the result is conclusive, reasonably, in one sense or the other* ...”. In the specific case, the medical-legal opinion, issued by the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories of the Judicial Investigation Agency and on which the mandatory hearing was granted to the parties (folio 79 of file no. 05-002035-364-FA), concluded that the defendant is not excluded as the biological father of the minor whose paternity is being investigated. While this declaration is not conclusive in the sense that the defendant is the father of [Nombre4], since it only does not exclude him as such, it performs a statistical analysis of the probability of paternity, considering the genotypic structure of the defendant and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population, which yields a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548%; which according to the opinion itself, corresponds to a practically proven paternity (folio 76 of the same file. In this sense, see the resolutions of this Chamber nos. 647 at 9:55 a.m., on August 6; 234 at 10:00 a.m., on March 14, both of 2008, 267 at 9:30 a.m., on April 22, 2005; 200 at 10:00 a.m., on March 24, 2004 and 487 at 9:40 a.m., on October 2, 2002). Furthermore, the defendant's own confession ratifies the existence of the romantic relationship that the plaintiff and defendant maintained, and within which they had intimate encounters. See in this regard that when answering the interrogatory the defendant stated: “*It is true, but clarifying that I did not maintain sexual relations with her the entire time I visited her, and when I did so I ejaculated outside*” (folio 64). Subsequently, he also admitted: “*It is true that on some occasions we maintained sexual relations, but it is not known to me that she became pregnant because of it*” (folio 87 of the appeal). On the other hand, the witnesses [Nombre5] and [Nombre6] , friends of the plaintiff, gave an account of the romantic relationship maintained between the parties from which, they disclosed, [Nombre4] was born (on March 10, 1997, according to the certification from the Civil Registry on folio 5 and 16 of file 05-002035-364-FA). Thus, the first one maintained: “*I have known [Nombre2] for about ten and a half years, and it was on that date that he and [Nombre1] started the relationship. That relationship lasted two and a half or three years. During that time, almost all the time I went to [Nombre1]'s house, I many times saw him arrive at her house, and other times I knew he had arrived because I saw his bicycle there and also because [Nombre1] told me, I knew everything that happened to her; from when she started having sexual relations with him, I found out about that because she told us, my mother, my sister, and me, she also told us when she became pregnant with [Nombre4], she told us she was pregnant by [Nombre2] , at that moment she was very distressed because she said that he, when he found out, told her she could not be pregnant by him because when he was going to ejaculate he did it outside… She did not maintain any other romantic relationship with any man during that time. Since she became pregnant and [Nombre2] confirmed it was true, at three months, he left and never returned,…They started the courtship relationship in 1995. I found out that [Nombre2] left at three months of pregnancy because [Nombre1] herself told me and because, moreover, I never saw him at her house again,…*”-sic- (folios 60 to 61 of the same file). For her part, on folios 62 to 63 of the same file, [Nombre6] explained: “*I know they maintained sexual relations because she herself told me and because more than once she would drop me off at the bus stop because he would come to sleep with her at her house. Since the minor was born she was alone, because [Nombre2], from three months of pregnancy, as I recall when she was three months was when [Nombre2] left. During that time [Nombre1] did not maintain any other romantic relationship with any other man, to my knowledge [Nombre2] has never had any contact with the minor [Nombre4]… [Nombre11] I knew that he came to sleep at her house because I spent all day with her and around five he would arrive, and the next day when I arrived he was there, as she would tell us she didn't open the door because he was there. For more or less a year and a half, during the time I was going to [Nombre1]'s house, I observed that [Nombre2] came to [Nombre1]'s house to stay every two days or every other day…[Nombre1] lived alone…*” (sic). Likewise, [Nombre7] stated: “*During the time when she became pregnant she maintained a courtship relationship with [Nombre2], she would tell us that [Nombre2] was her boyfriend and every time we, my two daughters and I, went to her house he was there. She told us that he sometimes stayed to sleep there…. From the beginning of the pregnancy when she told him about her pregnancy, [Nombre2] left and never returned, I know this because I did not see him again at her house and because [Nombre1] herself told me…The courtship relationship between [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] lasted about a year and a half. During the time [Nombre1] became pregnant she did not maintain any other romantic relationship with anyone else…*” -sic- (folios 63 to 64 of the same file). As observed, from the witness and confession evidence collected, it is possible to extract serious, precise, and concordant inferences, which lead to establishing the existence of a romantic relationship or courtship between Mr. [Nombre2] and Mrs. [Nombre1] at the approximate date of conception; also resulting in an uncontroversial fact, but rather, peacefully admitted, that the plaintiff and defendant had intimate relations. All the foregoing, added to the mentioned scientific evidence, allows reaching the conviction that the defendant is indeed the father of the child. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant the lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against [Nombre2] and, consequently, declare that the minor [Nombre4] is the son of the defendant, and therefore, from now on he shall be called [Nombre4], and shall have all the rights deriving from that new status. Both costs are to be borne by the defendant (Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The exceptions of res judicata and lack of standing filed by the defendant must be denied. Regarding the exception of res judicata, it must be remembered that the judgment produced in the proceeding processed under file no. 98-000584-364-FA, does not validly generate effects in relation to this new proceeding (file no. 05-002035-364-FA).

Once this resolution becomes final, this judgment must be registered in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four (234), folio two hundred fifteen (215), entry [Dirección1], Province of Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry." Res: 2009-000266 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten hours fifty-five minutes on the twenty-sixth of March, two thousand nine.

The petition for review (recurso de revisión) filed by [Nombre1], against the judgments issued by the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of Heredia, at eleven hours on the thirty-first of March, two thousand, and at sixteen hours seven minutes on the thirtieth of November, two thousand seven, in a special filiation proceeding (investigation of paternity), filed before that same court by [Nombre1], single, homemaker, against [Nombre2], divorced, construction worker, is hereby reviewed. Appearing as the petitioner's special judicial representative is attorney Alberto Soto Víquez. The National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia) is intervening. Both are residents of Heredia.

WHEREAS:

1.- The petitioner, in a document dated February fifteenth, two thousand eight, filed this action so that, in judgment, the following be annulled: "1)- ...the first instance judgments issued by the FAMILY COURT OF HEREDIA at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, within case file No. 98-00584-0364-FA, as well as those at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, within case file No. 05-002035-364-FA, which correspond to the PATERNITY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS filed by the undersigned against [Nombre2]. / 2)- That the FAMILY COURT OF HEREDIA be ordered to proceed to issue a new judgment in accordance with the law." 2.- The defendant (demandado) responded to this petition for review in the terms indicated in the brief dated June ninth, two thousand eight.

Drafted by Judge Aguirre Gómez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- In a document filed on February 18, 2008, Ms. [Nombre1] filed a petition for review against the judgments issued by the Family Court of Heredia, Nos. 271 at 11:00 hours on March 31, 2000, and 1785 at 16:07 hours on November 30, 2007, in special filiation proceedings filed by the petitioner against [Nombre2]. She states that between 1995 and 1996, she had a romantic relationship with the defendant during which they had – on many occasions – sexual relations, and she became pregnant with her son [Nombre3], who was born on March 10, 1997. When the child was a few months old, the defendant promised to help her with his support, but since he did not, in 1998 she filed a paternity investigation proceeding, to which he reacted by requesting that she desist in exchange for eight thousand colones monthly to cover the minor's expenses. Thus, she neglected the processing of the proceeding, she never again appeared at the Legal Clinics (Consultorios Jurídicos) office, and, therefore, she never learned of the appointment to carry out the genetic markers test and, consequently, her claim was dismissed. She maintains that when she realized the unscrupulous maneuvers, she filed another claim against Mr. [Nombre2], a proceeding in which, by resolution at 16:07 hours on November 30, 2007, the res judicata (cosa juzgada) exception was upheld, establishing that the only remedy to resolve the predicament was the petition for review. For the reasons stated, she requests "That the first instance judgments issued by the FAMILY COURT OF HEREDIA at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000, within case file No. 98-00584-364-FA, as well as those at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, within case file No. 05-002035-0364-FA, which correspond to the PATERNITY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS filed by the undersigned against [Nombre2], BE ANNULLED. / 2) That the FAMILY COURT OF HEREDIA be ordered to proceed to issue a new judgment in accordance with the law." (folios 30 to 39).

II.- Mr. [Nombre2] argues that the petitioner is prone to falsifying reality. In this regard, he explains that on folio 3 of case file No. 98-000584-364-FA, the plaintiff indicated that the courtship relationship began on August 15, 1991, but in case file No. 05-2035-364-FA, she maintained that said relationship had begun at the beginning of 1995 and had extended for 2 and a half years. Furthermore, he states that there was never a stable relationship, since due to his condition as a construction worker, he was obliged to work in different parts of the country. He denies having promised financial help to the plaintiff when he was notified of the claim in the first proceeding, expressing that what the plaintiff stated is merely a calculation to request the application of subsection 1) of Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). In this sense, he adds that it is not true that he prevented the plaintiff from attending with her son the appointment where the genetic markers test would be carried out. He maintains, even while denying that what the plaintiff stated is correct, that the promise of help did not constitute an impediment to the plaintiff's presence at said test, in addition to asking, "How many years must one fail to comply with the plaintiff for her to realize that she is being deceived?" He argues that Ms. Esquivel did not demonstrate what the defenselessness (indefensión) consisted of, nor did she give her reasons for not requesting the correction of that defect, but rather what she demonstrated was her disinterest in the proceeding, when in the third fact of the petition she indicated: "she did not concern herself again with the processing of proceeding 98-000584-364, nor did she appear at the Court where it was being processed." He reproaches the plaintiff for blaming him for not appearing at the forensic sciences laboratory, when she herself affirmed that her non-appearance "...was negligence of the Judicial Office, because,... she was not notified of the appointment and also did not present her testimonial evidence, likewise due to negligence,... of the same Judicial Office" (folio 55 of case file 05- 002035-364-FA). However, the defendant maintains, the plaintiff did not show a total lack of concern, since it is recorded that she did appear at the conciliation proceeding (folios 15 and 16 idem), as well as that the inability to present the testimonies occurred because she did not comply with the requirement regarding the presentation of copies of the claim made by the Court of first instance (A quo). For the cited reasons, he raised the exception of lack of right, intending that the petition be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both legal costs or, failing that, that the petition be dismissed outright.

III.- The Chamber deems it appropriate to make a recount of the case's background, for its better understanding and resolution: a) On March 23, 1998, Ms. [Nombre1] filed a claim against Mr. [Nombre2] so that it would be determined in judgment that he was the father of her son and, consequently, that the child be assigned his father's surname and thereby establish his responsibility for the care and upbringing of the minor, as well as the payment of the corresponding child support (alimony) (special paternity investigation proceeding processed in case file No. 98-000584-364-FA, on folios 3 and 4). b) By resolution at 8:00 hours on March 26, 1998, the Family Court required the plaintiff to indicate the facts on which the witnesses would testify (folio 5 of case file No. 98- 000584-364-FA), which were provided on April 20 of that year (folio 6 idem). c) The defendant was notified of the claim on May 21, 1998, at his home (folio 9 idem). d) The Family Court declared the defendant in default (rebeldía), considered the claim as answered affirmatively, indicating that the proceeding would continue without the defendant's intervention but that he could appear at any time, taking the proceeding in the state it was in, and also that a place for receiving notifications was designated (resolution at 15:00 hours on June 12, 1998, on folio 10 idem). e) The parties were summoned to the conciliation hearing to be held on September 17, 1998, or failing that, to the submission of the offered evidence, and the Misdemeanor Court of San Rafael de Heredia (Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de San Rafael de Heredia) was commissioned to receive the statement of the witnesses offered by the plaintiff, requiring said party to provide the corresponding set of copies (resolution at 15:15 hours on [Nombre2] 9, 1998, on folio 12 idem), which was not complied with, a circumstance that led to dispensing with that evidence (see resolution at 9:00 hours on December 3, 1999, on folio 20 idem). f) The defendant requested, as evidence for a better resolution, the testimony of [Nombre4], but the court resolved that this type of evidence is discretionary, so he could request it at the appropriate procedural stage (resolution at 16:00 hours on [Nombre2] 28, 1998, on folio 15 idem). g) In resolution at 9:30 hours on October 27, 1998, the parties were informed that the genetic markers test would be carried out at 9:00 hours on May 11, 1999 (folio 17 idem). Said genetic marker comparison could not be performed due to the absence of the plaintiff and the child [Nombre3] (official letter No. 98-3422 BQM of May 12, 1999, on folio 18 idem. In this regard, see also the resolution at 15:15 hours on May 26, 1999, on folio 19 idem). h) Through judgment No. 271-2000 at 11:00 hours on March 31, 2000, it was established that there was no proof that between the plaintiff and the defendant there existed a constant and stable courtship relationship since August 15, 1991, lasting two and a half years, or that from that relationship the plaintiff became pregnant by the defendant. In this regard, it was stated: "...the plaintiff did not bother to submit the testimonial evidence she requested, and since the party did not provide the copies that were required, the offered testimonial evidence was dispensed with (Folio 20 of the case file). On the other hand, although both parties were not notified, personally or at their home, of the appointment for the expert evidence, it being done only at the place designated by the parties, the truth of the matter is that neither of them appeared so that it could be carried out, and had the respective communication been made, if the defendant did not appear, the only thing such action would eventually give us would be an indication of truthfulness, which is not reaffirming any positive evidence, since the plaintiff herself did not bother to present it, by virtue of the total disinterest she has had in the present proceeding and which means her filed claim cannot prosper" (folios 21 to 28 idem). i) On October 28, 2005, the plaintiff again filed a claim against the defendant so that the minor [Nombre3] would appear, registration-wise, as his son and thus assert all his rights (special filiation proceeding processed in case file No. 05-002035-364-FA on folios 1 to 4). That claim was answered on January 18, 2006, raising the res judicata exception (folio 13 of case file No. 05-002035-364-FA). j) The parties were summoned to an oral hearing (Article 98 bis subsection g) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)) on May 9, 2006, in which the offered confessional and testimonial evidence would be presented (resolution at 14:32 hours on January 31, 2006, on folio 48 idem), whereby at that time the defendant's confession was carried out and the testimonies of [Nombre5], [Nombre6], and [Nombre7] were received (in this regard, see the record on folios 59 to 66 idem). k) By resolution at 13:49 hours on [Nombre2] 5, 2006, the parties were informed that the genetic markers test would take place at 8:30 hours on August 1, 2006 (folio 70 idem), which, once carried out, established that the defendant could not be excluded as the father of the minor [Nombre3], since "taking into account the genotypic structure of the alleged father (X Value) and the distribution of the distinct markers analyzed in the population (Y Value), has granted a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548% which corresponds, according to Hummel's predicates, to paternity that is practically proven" 1897-PAT-BQM-2006 at folios 74 to 77 as well as folios 78 to 80 idem). l) By resolution at 9:00 a.m. on November 29, 2006, a consultation was posed to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) regarding whether or not it was contrary to Constitutional Law that, by provision of subsection m) of article 98 bis of the Family Code (Código de Familia), the judgment rendered in filiation proceedings (procesos de emplazamiento de la filiación) in which the scientific test was not performed produces material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Said consultation was resolved through vote no. 11158-07 at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, which resolved: “The judicial consultation is resolved in the sense that article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary motion for revision (recurso extraordinario de revisión) under the terms indicated in the recitals (parte considerativa). Publish it in full in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarize it in the Official Gazette La Gaceta” (folios 83 to 102 and 105 idem). m) In judgment no. 1785 at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007, the lower court (A quo) determined that there was identity of parties, object, and cause in the filed proceedings, given that a final judgment (sentencia firme) already existed regarding the proposed claim, rendering it impossible to change what was resolved in that first proceeding (folios 174 to 178 idem).

IV.- Article 42, second paragraph of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) establishes: “...Reopening concluded criminal cases and adjudicated suits with the authority of res judicata is prohibited, except when the motion for revision is appropriate.” This constitutional principle was developed by the ordinary legislator through numeral 162 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), which establishes: “Final judgments rendered in ordinary or abbreviated proceedings produce the authority and efficacy of material res judicata. Those resolutions to which the law expressly confers that effect shall also produce it. The effects of material res judicata are limited to the operative part of the judgment and not to its grounds, which makes the existence or non-existence of the legal relationship it declares indisputable in another proceeding. The pronouncement on alimony, parental authority (patria potestad), custody, upbringing, and education of minor children shall not produce res judicata...”; and 98 bis, subsection m) by providing: “What is definitively resolved in proceedings where filiation is discussed produces the effects of material res judicata.” Thus, in application of the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), it is impossible to reopen proceedings such as the one under analysis, where the final judgment produces material res judicata, unless it involves a revision proceeding filed by the interested party (in which case it must do so before this Chamber), which is permitted under the terms of article 98 bis, subsection m) of the Family Code in relation to 619 of the Civil Procedure Code (see vote of the Constitutional Chamber, number 11158 at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007). In the case under examination, it is observed that Ms. [Nombre1] filed two proceedings aimed at declaring that Mr. [Nombre2] was the father of the child [Nombre3], son of the plaintiff (see complaints at folios 3 and 4 of file no. 98-000584-364-FA and 1 to 4 of file no. 05-002035-364-FA). Hence, as ordered in the ruling of the second proceeding filed, that judgment rendered in the first produced material res judicata with respect to the other (folios 174 to 178 of the second file. See point m) of the preceding recital). Therefore, to re-discuss the matter in the judicial venue, the plaintiff had, as analyzed, to file the motion for revision that is being heard. Revision is an exceptional motion, which proceeds against final judgments solely under the exhaustive and specific circumstances of article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code, besides the fact that for this specific matter, the Constitutional Chamber considered in the cited vote that “the judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary motion for revision under the terms indicated in the recitals,” that is, that “if in a prior proceeding filiation or paternity was discussed, having issued a judgment with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or if some force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevented it, nothing precludes the possibility of filing an extraordinary motion for revision before the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) to declare the final judgment null.” To this effect, the plaintiff argued in her motion that she neglected that first proceeding (file no. 98-000584-364-FA) given the promise made to her by the defendant to give her eight thousand colones in exchange for abandoning it. Thus, she stated: “…under the belief that the defendant [Nombre2] would keep his word, I no longer worried about the processing of said proceeding, nor did I appear again at that office -in reference to the Legal Clinics (Consultorios Jurídicos) of the Universidad de Costa Rica in Heredia-, so I never learned that, by resolution at 3:15 p.m. on the 9th of [Nombre2] of 1998, the cited judicial office had ordered the carrying out of the GENETIC MARKERS test and that, to that effect, all parties had to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories on May 11, 1999…” -uppercase removed- (folios 31 and 32). The analysis of the case records allows us to deduce that what was stated by the plaintiff is valid, since in circumstances such as those before us, people may consider an amicable solution favorable, especially when a minor is involved whose paternity is what is sought to be elucidated in the proceeding. Consequently, it is feasible that the plaintiff was deceived and that her will regarding the proceeding was vitiated by the belief that the defendant was going to assume his responsibilities. It is thus noted that the last procedural action filed by the plaintiff in that first proceeding was the one in which she referred to the facts about which the witnesses offered in the complaint would testify, in accordance with the prevention made to her through resolution at 8:00 a.m. on March 26, 1998, with the warning of declaring the complaint inadmissible and ordering its filing should she fail to do so (folios 5 and 6 idem. See point b) of the preceding recital). Therefore, once the complaint was answered by the defendant, the plaintiff's procedural activity disappeared, according to her statement, and even though the resolutions -including the summons to the Forensic Science Laboratory to carry out the genetic marker test, see folio 17 idem and point g) of the preceding recital- continued arriving at the designated place -the Office of the Legal Clinics of the Universidad de Costa Rica in Heredia-, this party's procedural activity was not presented again, except when she appeared at the conciliation hearing, an aspect that constitutes a sign of interest in reaching a voluntary agreement. In any case, a different conclusion could not be reached in this matter, as there was no reason, except what was stated by the plaintiff, for not appearing at the referenced genetic marker test, as well as for the omission that gave rise to the declaration of inevacuability of the witness testimony, given that it can be verified how in the second proceeding she appeared with her son at the Biochemistry Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) for the corresponding examination, besides the fact that it can be noted that most of the witnesses offered in the first matter were also offered in the second and appeared in the latter (see complaints at folio 3 of file no. 98-000584-364-FA and 3 of file no. 05-002035-364-FA). In support of the foregoing, there is the testimony of Ms. [Nombre1]'s sister, [Nombre1], who at folio 87 of the motion recounted: [Nombre2]“…never helped the child financially, she was processing a [child] support claim, but he spoke with her, to leave things as they were, that he would help her amicably (por bien), I imagine financial help, because she told me that he was going to help her financially, weekly, but I don't remember for [Nombre8].- she believed him and did not do any other thing [Nombre9] was not summoned to any type of blood test, I think she had some place where they notified her but since she abandoned the proceeding, she did nothing.-…”. Additionally, she added: “I can attest that she did not do anything else regarding the proceeding because she told me that she was going to leave things as they were to settle them amicably (arreglarlas por bien)” (emphasis added), without being able to disregard the merit of what was stated by the witness, in her capacity as the plaintiff's sister, since on this subject, this Chamber has emphasized the importance that the testimony of close relatives has in family litigation, as they are the ones in a position to know firsthand the intimate details normally disclosed in this type of proceeding (in this regard, see our judgments nos. 177 at 2:40 p.m. on June 30, 1999; 929 at 9:30 a.m. on November 3, 2000; 94 at 10:40 a.m. on February 2, 2001; 449 at 8:30 a.m. on [Nombre2] 18, 2007 and 647 at 9:55 a.m. on August 6, 2008). Thus, the truth is that we are faced with the scenario of “non-presentation of evidence” caused by the opposing party, contemplated in subsection 1) of article 619 idem, given that from the analysis carried out, it is evident that the plaintiff, by virtue of the defendant's deceit -“under the belief that the defendant would keep his word,” as she stated- did not perform all pertinent procedural actions to evaluate the witness testimony she offered in her first complaint, besides the fact that for this same cause of “force majeure” she did not appear at that first appointment where the genetic marker test was to be carried out. Regarding the latter, it is necessary to understand that the Constitutional Chamber in vote no. 11158-07 gave content to the scenarios provided in numeral 619 subsection 1) of the Civil Procedure Code, establishing, regarding the specific matter, some statements that would give rise to the filing of a motion for revision in proceedings of this nature where a final judgment with efficacy and authority of res judicata had been issued. Thus, it could not be understood that the Constitutional Arbiter limited the admissibility of the revision -under the terms established in said vote- to only two circumstances “when it was impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or some force majeure prevented them from offering it or participating in its production,” because it was clear in asserting that “…the original constituent body itself was responsible for mitigating the rigor of the legal certainty embodied by material res judicata, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already adjudicated proceeding through the filing of an extraordinary motion for revision according to the grounds established by the infra-constitutional legal system or the ordinary legislator, in order to thereby modify or annul an unjust judgment and ensure that material justice prevails” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the concept of force majeure contained in said vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, according to the terms established in legal doctrine, because the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration, as it gave to the “acts of the opposing party” that had left the appealing party in a state of defenselessness by making it impossible to present evidence during the proceeding, just as happened in the case before us (article 619 subsection 1) idem). The text of this rule is clear when it establishes: “If the party requesting it demonstrates that due to force majeure preventing it, or by act of the opposing party, they did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence,…; so that in either case there was defenselessness and it was not possible in the course of the proceeding to request the rectification of the defect” (emphasis added), from which it results that “defenselessness” is what is sought to be overcome with the revision under the scenarios provided in this subsection 1). Moreover, in this matter, the courts of justice, when adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural rules, must attend to the best interest of the child (articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)). Thus, it is appropriate to grant the motion for revision filed because the factual scenarios provided in article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code are met; annul the judgments of the Family Court of Heredia (Juzgado de Familia de Heredia), nos. 271-2000 at 11:00 a.m. on March 31, 2000 and 1785-07 at 4:07 p.m. on November 30, 2007 and issue a new one in accordance with the provisions of article 625 idem.

V.- Ms. [Nombre1] sued Mr. [Nombre2], seeking that the judgment order the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) to correct the registration entry of her son, so that the minor would appear registered as his son. To this end, she asserted that at the beginning of 1995 and for approximately two and a half years, she maintained a romantic relationship with the defendant, from which she became pregnant with her son [Nombre3], who was born on March 10, 1997. She mentioned that the defendant, despite committing to acknowledge him and ensure the minor's support, never did so, a circumstance that forced her to resort to the jurisdictional avenue so that her son “…appears registered as the defendant's son and…he assumes the proper duties of paternity.” In the analysis of the merits of the matter, it is necessary to resort to the content of numerals 92 and 98, both of the Family Code. The first paragraph of numeral 92 provides: “The status of father or mother can be established through the notorious possession of status of child by the presumed father or by any other means of proof…”. The legislator, considering that, generally, these types of situations are sought to be kept anonymous, opted to allow the interested party to use any probative means (such as documentary, testimonial, scientific evidence, among others) to prove the fact that interests them; which can even be established based on serious, precise, and concordant indicia. The foregoing is so in order not to render nugatory the fundamental right enshrined in article 53 of the Political Constitution, according to which every person has the right to know who their parents are. In harmony with those provisions, numeral 98, in turn and for what is relevant, establishes: “In every investigation or challenge of paternity or maternity proceeding, scientific evidence is admissible in order to verify the existence or non-existence of the kinship relationship. This evidence may be evaluated by the Judicial Investigation Agency of the Supreme Court of Justice or by laboratories duly accredited and recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice, prior to an opinion from the Judicial Investigation Agency that the expert report is conclusive, reasonably, in one sense or the other...”. In the specific case, the medical-legal expert report, issued by the Biochemistry Section of the Department of Forensic Science Laboratories of the Judicial Investigation Agency, for which a hearing period was granted to the parties (folio 79 of file no. 05-002035-364-FA), concluded that the defendant is not excluded as the biological father of the minor whose paternity is being investigated. Although this declaration is not conclusive in the sense that the defendant is the father of [Nombre3], since it only does not exclude him as such, it performs a statistical analysis of the probability of paternity, considering the genotypic structure of the defendant and the distribution of the different markers analyzed in the population, which grants a probability of paternity of 99.999893602548%; which, according to the report itself, corresponds to practically proven paternity (76 idem. In this sense, see resolutions of this Chamber nos. 647 at 9:55 a.m. on August 6; 234 at 10:00 a.m. on March 14, both of 2008, 267 at 9:30 a.m. on April 22, 2005; 200 at 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004 and 487 at 9:40 a.m. on October 2, 2002). Furthermore, the defendant's own confession confirms the existence of the romantic relationship maintained by the plaintiff and defendant, and within which they had intimate encounters. See in this regard that when answering the interrogatory, the defendant indicated: “It's true, but clarifying that I did not have sexual relations with her the entire time I visited her, and when I did, I ejaculated outside” (folio 64). Later, he also admitted: “It is true that on some occasions we had sexual relations, but I have no proof that because of that she became pregnant” (folio 87 of the motion). On the other hand, the witnesses [Nombre5] and [Nombre6], friends of the plaintiff, reported on the amorous relationship maintained between the parties and from which they made known [Nombre3] was born (on March 10, 1997, as evidenced in the certification from the Civil Registry at folios 5 and 16 of file 05-002035-364-FA). Thus, the first stated: “I have known [Nombre2] for about ten and a half years, and it was at that time that he and [Nombre1] started the relationship. That relationship lasted two and a half or three years. During that time, I went to [Nombre1]'s house almost all the time, many times I saw him arrive at her house, and other times I knew he arrived because I saw his bicycle there and also because [Nombre1] told me, I knew everything that was happening to her; from when she began to have sexual relations with him, I found out about that because she told us, my mother, my sister, and me, she also told us when she became pregnant with xxxx, she told us that she was pregnant by [Nombre2], at that moment she was very distressed because she said that he, when he found out, stated that she could not be pregnant by him because when he was going to ejaculate he did it outside… She did not maintain any other romantic relationship with any man during that time. Since she became pregnant and [Nombre2] proved it was true, at three months, he left and did not return,…They started the courtship relationship in 1995.

I found out that [Name2] left at three months of pregnancy because [Name1] herself told me and because I never saw him at her house again,…” -sic- (folios 60 to 61 idem). For her part, at folios 62 to 63 idem, [Name6] explained: “I know they maintained sexual relations because she told me herself and because more than once she would drop me off at the bus stop because he would come to sleep with her at her house. Since the minor child was born she was alone, because [Name2] from three months of pregnancy, as I recall when she was three months was when [Name2] left. During that time [Name1] did not maintain any other romantic relationship with any other man, to my knowledge [Name2] has never maintained any contact with the minor child [Name3] I knew that he would come to sleep at her house because I spent all day with her and around five he would arrive and the next day when I arrived he was there, and she would tell us she didn't open the door because he was there. For about a year and a half, during the time I was going to [Name1]'s house, I observed that [Name2] would come to [Name1]'s house to stay every other day or day for [Name10] lived alone…” (sic). Similarly, [Name7] stated: “During the time in which she became pregnant she was in a courtship relationship with [Name2], she told us that [Name2] was her boyfriend and whenever we, my two daughters and I, went to her house he was there. She told us that he sometimes stayed to sleep there…. From the beginning of the pregnancy when she told him about her pregnancy, [Name2] left and never returned, I know this because I never saw him at her house again and because [Name1] herself told me… The courtship relationship between [Name1] and [Name2] lasted about a year and a half. During the time in which [Name1] became pregnant she did not maintain any other romantic relationship with anyone else…” -sic- (folios 63 to 64 idem). As can be seen, from the testimonial and confession evidence gathered, it is possible to extract serious, precise, and concordant indications that lead to establishing the existence of a romantic or courtship relationship between Mr. [Name2] and Mrs. [Name1] around the approximate date of conception; it also being an uncontested fact, but rather, one peacefully admitted, that the plaintiff and the defendant had intimate relations. All of the above, added to the aforementioned scientific evidence, allows reaching the conviction that the defendant is indeed the father of the child. As a corollary of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare the claim filed by [Name1] against [Name2] with merit and, consequently, to declare that the minor child [Name3] is the son of the defendant, and therefore henceforth he shall be called [Name3], and shall have all the rights deriving from that new status. Both costs shall be borne by the defendant (Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)). The defenses of res judicata (cosa juzgada) and lack of right interposed by the defendant must be denied.

Regarding the defense of res judicata, it must be remembered that the judgment rendered in the proceeding processed under expediente no. 98-000584-364-FA does not validly produce effects in relation to this new proceeding (expediente no. 05-002035-364-FA). Once this ruling becomes final, this judgment shall be registered in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four (234), folio two hundred fifteen (215), [Address1] (), Provincia de Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry (Sección de Nacimientos del Registro Civil).

**POR TANTO:** The motion for review (recurso de revisión) filed is declared with merit, and in that sense, the judgments of the Family Court of Heredia (Juzgado de Familia de Heredia), numbers two hundred seventy-one at eleven hours, of March thirty-first two thousand and one thousand seven hundred eighty-five at sixteen hours seven minutes of November thirtieth two thousand seven, are annulled. In their place, the defenses of lack of right and res judicata raised by the defendant are denied and the claim filed by [Name1] against [Name2] is upheld and consequently it is declared that the minor child [Name3] is the son of the defendant, and therefore henceforth he shall be called [Name3], and shall have all the rights deriving from that new status. Both costs shall be borne by the defendant. Once this ruling becomes final, register this judgment in the margin of volume two hundred thirty-four, folio two hundred fifteen, entry four hundred, [Address2], Provincia de Heredia, of the Births Section of the Civil Registry.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez*** ***Fernando Bolaños Céspedes*** **Res: 2009-000266** [Name11].- 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. and [...]

*980005840364FA* *980005840364FA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2009-000266 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del veintiséis de marzo de dos mil nueve.

Visto el recurso de revisión promovido por [Nombre1] , contra las sentencias dictadas por el Juzgado de Familia de Heredia, a las once horas del treinta y uno de marzo de dos mil y dieciséis horas siete minutos del treinta de noviembre de dos mil siete, en proceso especial de filiación (investigación de paternidad), establecido ante ese mismo juzgado, por [Nombre1] , soltera, ama de casa, contra [Nombre2] , divorciado, operario de construcción. Figura como apoderado especial judicial de la promovente el licenciado Alberto Soto Víquez. Interviene el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia. Ambos vecinos de Heredia.

RESULTANDO:

1.- La promovente, en escrito fechado quince de febrero de dos mil ocho, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se anularan, “1)- ...las sentencias de primera instancia dictadas por el JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA a las 11 hs. del 31 de marzo de 2000 dentro del expediente N° 98-00584-0364-FA, así como las de 16:07 hs. del 30 de noviembre de 2007 dentro del expediente N° 05-002035-364-FA, las cuales corresponden a los PROCESOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE PATERNIDAD promovidos por la suscrita contra [Nombre2] ./ 2)- Que se ordene al JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA que proceda a dictar una nueva sentencia con arreglo a derecho”.

2.- El demandado contestó el presente recurso de revisión en los términos que indicó en el memorial de fecha nueve de junio de dos mil ocho.

Redacta el Magistrado Aguirre Gómez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- En escrito presentado el 18 de febrero de 2008, doña [Nombre1] formuló recurso de revisión contra las sentencias dictadas por el Juzgado de Familia de Heredia, nºs. 271 de las 11:00 horas del 31 de marzo de 2000 y 1785 de las 16:07 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2007, en procesos especiales de filiación promovidos por la recurrente contra [Nombre2] . Refiere que entre 1995 y 1996, sostuvo con el demandado un vínculo amoroso durante el que mantuvieron -en muchas ocasiones- relaciones sexuales, quedando embarazada de su hijo [Nombre3], quien nació el 10 de marzo de 1997. Cuando el niño tenía algunos meses de nacido, el accionado prometió ayudarle con su manutención, pero como no lo hizo, en 1998 planteó un proceso de investigación de paternidad, a lo que éste reaccionó solicitándole que desistiera a cambio de ocho mil colones mensuales para cubrir los gastos del menor. De esa forma, desatendió la tramitación del proceso, no se volvió a presentar a la oficina de Consultorios Jurídicos y, por ende, nunca se enteró de la cita para realizar la prueba de marcadores genéticos y, en consecuencia, su demanda fue declarada sin lugar. Sostiene que cuando se dio cuenta de las maniobras inescrupulosas planteó otra demanda contra don [Nombre2], proceso en el cual, por resolución de las 16:07 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2007 se acogió la excepción de cosa juzgada, estableciéndose que el único remedio para resolver el entuerto era el recurso de revisión. Por las razones expuestas, solicita “Que se ANULEN las sentencias de primera instancia dictadas por el JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA a las 11 hs. del 31 de marzo de 2000 dentro del expediente N° 98-00584-364-FA, así como las de 16:07 hs. del 30 de noviembre de 2007 dentro del expediente N° 05-002035-0364-FA, las cuales corresponden a los PROCESOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE PATERNIDAD promovidos por la suscrita contra [Nombre2] ./ 2) Que se ordene al JUZGADO DE FAMILIA DE HEREDIA que proceda a dictar una nueva sentencia con arreglo a derecho” (folios 30 a 39).

II.- Aduce don [Nombre2] que la recurrente es proclive a falsear la realidad. Al respecto, explica que en el folio 3 del expediente n°. 98- 000584-364-FA la actora indicó que la relación de noviazgo inició el 15 de agosto de 1991, pero en el expediente n°. 05-2035-364-FA sostuvo que esa relación había iniciado a principios de 1995, y se había extendido por 2 años y medio. Además, expone que nunca existió una relación estable, pues por su condición de operario de la construcción se encontraba obligado a trabajar en diferentes lugares del país. Niega que le prometiera ayuda económica a la actora cuando se le notificó la demanda del primer proceso, expresando que lo manifestado por la actora es tan solo un cálculo para pedir la aplicación del inciso 1) del artículo 619 del Código Procesal Civil. En ese sentido, agrega que no es cierto que él le haya impedido a la accionante acudir con su hijo a la cita en que se realizaría la prueba de marcadores genéticos. Sostiene, aún cuando niega que lo referido por la actora sea correcto, que la promesa de una ayuda no constituía un impedimento para la presencia de la actora en la citada prueba, amén de que se pregunta “¿Cuántos años hay que incumplirle a la actora para que se de cuenta que se le está engañando?”. Aduce que la señora Esquivel no demostró en que consistió la indefensión y tampoco dio las razones que tuvo para no pedir la subsanación de ese vicio, sino que más bien lo que dejó acreditado fue su desinterés en el proceso, cuando en el hecho tercero del recurso señaló: “no se volvió a preocupar por la tramitación del proceso 98-000584-364, ni se presentó al Juzgado en la que este se tramitaba”. Reprocha que la actora lo culpe por no presentarse al laboratorio de ciencias forenses, cuando ella misma afirmó que su no presentación “…fue negligencia del Despacho Judicial, porque,…no se le notificó de la cita y tampoco evacuó su prueba testimonial igualmente por negligencia,…del mismo Despacho Judicial” (folio 55 del expediente 05- 002035-364-FA). Sin embargo, sostiene el accionado, la actora no mostró una total despreocupación, pues consta que sí se presentó a la diligencia de conciliación (folios 15 y 16 ídem), así como que la inevacuabilidad de los testimonios se dio porque no cumplió con la prevención sobre la presentación de las copias de la demanda realizada por el A quo. Por las citadas razones, opuso la excepción de falta de derecho, pretendiendo que se declare sin lugar el recurso y se condene a la actora al pago de ambas costas o en su defecto, se rechace de plano el recurso.

III.- La Sala estima oportuno hacer un recuento de antecedentes del caso, para su mejor comprensión y resolución: a) El 23 de marzo de 1998 doña [Nombre1] planteó demanda contra don [Nombre2] a efecto de que se determinara en sentencia que era el padre de su hijo y en consecuencia se le asignara el apellido de su padre y con ello se dejara establecida su responsabilidad en el cuido y crianza del menor, así como el pago de la correspondiente pensión alimentaria (proceso especial de investigación de paternidad tramitado en expediente n°. 98-000584-364- FA, a folios 3 y 4). b) Mediante resolución de las 8:00 horas, del 26 de marzo de 1998, el Juzgado de Familia le previno a la actora indicara los hechos sobre los que declararían los testigos (folio 5 del expediente n°. 98- 000584-364-FA), los cuales fueron suministrados el día 20 de abril de ese año (folio 6 ídem). c) El accionado fue notificado de la demanda el 21 de mayo de 1998 en su casa de habitación (folio 9 ídem). d) El Juzgado de Familia declaró al accionado en rebeldía, tuvo por contestada afirmativamente la demanda, indicándose que el proceso se seguiría sin la intervención del accionado pero que éste podría apersonarse en cualquier tiempo tomando el proceso en el estado en que se encontrara, además de que tuvo por señalado lugar para recibir notificaciones (resolución de las 15:00 horas, del 12 de junio de 1998 a folio 10 ídem). e) Las partes fueron convocadas a la audiencia de conciliación que se celebraría el 17 de setiembre de 1998 o en su defecto, a la evacuación de la prueba ofrecida, y se comisionó al Juzgado Contravencional de Menor Cuantía de San Rafael de Heredia para que recibiera la declaración de los testigos ofrecidos por la parte actora, previniéndosele a dicha parte para que aportara el correspondiente juego de copias (resolución de las 15:15 horas, del 9 de [Nombre2] de 1998 a folio 12 ídem), lo cual no fue cumplido, circunstancia que motivó que se prescindiera de esa prueba (ver resolución de las 9:00 horas, del 3 de diciembre de 1999 a folio 20 ídem). f) El accionado solicitó como prueba para mejor resolver el testimonio de [Nombre4] , pero el despacho resolvió que ese tipo de prueba es facultativa, por lo que podría solicitarla en el momento procesal oportuno (resolución de las 16:00 horas, del 28 de [Nombre2] de 1998 a folio 15 ídem). g) En resolución de las 9:30 horas, del 27 de octubre de 1998 se puso en conocimiento de las partes que el examen de marcadores genéticos se realizaría a las 9:00 horas, del 11 de mayo de 1999 (folio 17 ídem). Dicha comparación de marcadores genéticos no pudo ser realizada por la ausencia de la actora y del niño [Nombre3] (oficio n°. 98-3422 BQM del 12 de mayo de 1999 a folio 18 ídem. En ese sentido, ver también la resolución de las 15:15 horas, del 26 de mayo de 1999 a folio 19 ídem). h) Por medio de la sentencia n°. 271-2000 de las 11:00 horas, del 31 de marzo de 2000 se estableció que no había prueba de que entre la actora y el demandado existiera una relación de noviazgo constante y estable desde el 15 de agosto de 1991, con una duración de dos años y medio, así como que de esa relación la actora quedara embarazada del demandado. Al respecto se dijo: “…la parte actora no se preocupó por evacuar la prueba testimonial que solicitaba, siendo que como la parte no aportó las copias que se le prevenían, se prescindió de la prueba testimonial ofrecida (Folio 20 del expediente). Por otra parte, aunque no se les notificó a ambas partes, personalmente o en su casa de habitación del señalamiento para la prueba pericial, haciéndose únicamente en el lugar señalado por las partes, lo cierto del caso es que ninguna de ellas se presentó a fin de que se efectuara la misma, siendo que de haberse hecho la comunicación respectiva, de no presentarse el demandado, lo único que nos vendría a dar tal actuar sería eventualmente un indicio de veracidad, que no está viniendo a reafirmar prueba positiva alguna, pues la misma parte actora no se preocupó por evacuar, en virtud del desinterés total que ha tenido en el presente proceso y que hace que no pueda prosperar su demanda planteada” (folios 21 a 28 ídem). i) El 28 de octubre de 2005, la actora volvió a plantear una demanda contra el accionado a efecto de que el menor [Nombre3] apareciera, registralmente, como hijo de éste y así hacer valer todos sus derechos (proceso especial de filiación tramitado en expediente n°. 05-002035-364-FA a folios 1 a 4). Esa demanda fue contestada el día 18 de enero de 2006, oponiéndose la excepción de cosa juzgada (folio 13 del expediente n°. 05-002035-364-FA). j) Se convocó a las partes a una audiencia oral (artículo 98 bis inciso g) del Código de Trabajo) el 9 de mayo de 2006, en la cual se evacuaría, la prueba confesional y testimonial ofrecida (resolución de las 14:32 horas, del 31 de enero de 2006 a folio 48 ídem), por lo cual en ese momento se llevó a cabo la confesional del demandado y se recibieron los testimonios de [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] (al respecto, véase el acta que consta a folios 59 a 66 ídem). k) Mediante resolución de las 13:49 horas, del 5 de [Nombre2] de 2006 se puso en conocimiento de las partes que la prueba de marcadores genéticos tendría lugar a las 8:30 horas, del 1 de agosto de 2006 (folio 70 ídem), la cual, una vez realizada, estableció que al demandado no se le podía excluir como padre del menor [Nombre3], pues “teniendo en cuenta la estructura genotípica del presunto padre (Valor de X) y la distribución de los distintos marcadores analizados en la población (Valor de Y), ha concedido una probabilidad de paternidad del 99.999893602548% que corresponde, según los predicados de Hummel, a una paternidad prácticamente probada” (al respecto, véase el oficio n°. 1897-PAT-BQM-2006 a folios 74 a 77 así como los folios 78 a 80 ídem). l) Por resolución de las 9:00 horas, del 29 de noviembre de 2006 se planteó consulta a la Sala Constitucional, acerca de si resultaba o no contrario al Derecho de la Constitución el hecho de que por disposición del inciso m) del artículo 98 bis del Código de Familia, la sentencia dictada en procesos de emplazamiento de la filiación en los que no se realizó la prueba científica, produzca cosa juzgada material. Dicha consulta fue evacuada mediante el voto n°. 11158-07 de las 14:52 horas, del 1 de agosto de 2007, en el que se resolvió: “Se evacua la consulta judicial en el sentido que el artículo 98, inciso m), del Código de Familia, adicionado por la Ley No. 8101 del 16 de abril del 2001, no resulta inconstitucional en el tanto se interprete que la sentencia vertida en un proceso de filiación con eficacia y autoridad de cosa juzgada admite el recurso extraordinario de revisión en los términos que se indican en la parte considerativa. Publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta” (folios 83 a 102 y 105 ídem). m) En sentencia n°. 1785 de las 16:07 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2007, el A quo determinó que había identidad de partes, objeto y causa en los procesos planteados, siendo que ya existía una sentencia firme en cuanto a la pretensión propuesta, por lo que había imposibilidad para cambiar lo resuelto en aquel primer proceso (folios 174 a 178 ídem).

IV.- El artículo 42, párrafo segundo de la Constitución Política establece: “... Se prohíbe reabrir causas penales fenecidas y juicios fallados con autoridad de cosa juzgada, salvo cuando proceda el recurso de revisión”. Ese principio constitucional fue desarrollado por el legislador ordinario mediante el numeral 162 del Código Procesal Civil, que establece: “Las sentencias firmes dictadas en procesos ordinarios o abreviados, producen la autoridad y la eficacia de la cosa juzgada material. También producirán aquellas resoluciones a las cuales la ley les confiere expresamente ese efecto. Los efectos de la cosa juzgada material se limitan a lo resolutivo de la sentencia y no a sus fundamentos, lo cual hace indiscutible, en otro proceso, la existencia o la no existencia de la relación jurídica que ella declara. No producirá cosa juzgada el pronunciamiento sobre alimentos, patria potestad, guarda, crianza y educación de los hijos menores...”; y el 98 bis, inciso m) al disponer: “Lo resuelto en firme en los procesos en los que se discuta la filiación, produce los efectos de cosa juzgada material”. Así las cosas, en aplicación del principio de seguridad jurídica se imposibilita reabrir procesos como el que se analiza, donde la sentencia firme produce cosa juzgada material, salvo que se trate de un proceso de revisión planteado por el interesado, (en cuya hipótesis debe hacerlo ante esta Sala) lo que si es permitido al tenor del artículo 98 bis, inciso m) del Código de Familia en relación con el 619 del Código Procesal Civil (ver voto de la Sala Constitucional, número 11158 de las 14:52 horas, del 1° de agosto de 2007). En el subexámine, se aprecia que doña [Nombre1] interpuso dos procesos tendientes a que se declarara que el señor [Nombre2] era el padre del niño [Nombre3], hijo de la demandante (ver demandas a folios 3 y 4 del expediente n°. 98-000584-364-FA y 1 a 4 del n°. 05-002035-364-FA). De ahí que como se dispuso en el fallo del segundo proceso entablado, aquella sentencia dictada en el primero, produjo cosa juzgada material respecto del otro (folios 174 a 178 del segundo expediente. Ver punto m) del considerando anterior). De este modo, para volver a discutir el tema en la sede judicial, la actora tuvo, conforme se analizó, que plantear el recurso de revisión que se conoce. La revisión es un recurso excepcional, que procede contra fallos firmes únicamente en los taxativos y específicos supuestos del artículo 619 del Código Procesal Civil, amén de que para esta materia específica, la Sala Constitucional estimó en el citado voto que “la sentencia vertida en un proceso de filiación con eficacia y autoridad de cosa juzgada admite el recurso extraordinario de revisión en los términos que se indican en la parte considerativa”, esto es que “si en un proceso anterior se discutió la filiación o paternidad, habiéndose dictado sentencia con autoridad y eficacia de cosa juzgada material, y le fue imposible a la parte actora, por el estado de desarrollo de la técnica y de la ciencia, contar con la prueba de marcadores genéticos o se lo impidió alguna causa de fuerza mayor, nada le enerva la posibilidad de interponer un recurso extraordinario de revisión ante la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia para que se declare la nulidad de la sentencia firme”. Al efecto, la actora argumentó en su recurso que desatendió aquel primer proceso (expediente n°. 98-000584-364-FA) ante la promesa que le hiciera el demandado de darle ocho mil colones a cambio de que lo abandonara. De esta forma, expresó: “… bajo la creencia de que el demandado [Nombre2] cumpliría con su palabra, no me volví a preocupar por la tramitación de dicho proceso, ni me presenté más a aquella oficina -en referencia a los Consultorios Jurídicos de la Universidad de Costa Rica en Heredia-, de modo que nunca me enteré que, por resolución de las 15:15 horas, del 9 de [Nombre2] de 1998, el citado despacho judicial había ordenado la realización de la prueba de MARCADORES GENÉTICOS y que, a ese efecto, todas las partes debíamos presentarnos a la Sección de Bioquímica del Departamento de Laboratorios de Ciencias Forenses el día 11 de mayo de 1999…” -mayúsculas suprimidas- (folios 31 y 32). El análisis de los autos permite desprender que lo expresado por la actora resulta válido, pues en circunstancias como las que nos ocupan, las personas pueden estimar favorable una salida amigable, sobretodo cuando está de por medio un menor cuya paternidad es la que se pretende dilucidar en el proceso. En consecuencia, es factible que la actora haya sido engañada y que su voluntad respecto del proceso haya sido viciada ante la creencia de que el demandado iba a asumir sus responsabilidades. Así se advierte que la última gestión planteada por la actora en aquel primer proceso lo fue aquella en la que se refirió a los hechos sobre los que declararían los testigos ofrecidos en la demanda, conforme a la prevención que se le hizo mediante resolución de las 8:00 horas, del 26 de marzo de 1998, con el apercibimiento de declarar inadmisible la demanda y ordenar su archivo en caso de no hacerlo (folios 5 y 6 ídem. Ver punto b) del considerando anterior). Por ende, una vez que la demanda fue contestada por el accionado, la actuación procesal de la actora desapareció, conforme a su dicho y así aunque las resoluciones -entre éstas la cita al Laboratorio de Ciencias Forenses, para realizar la prueba de marcadores genéticos, ver folio 17 ídem y punto g) del considerando precedente-, continuaron llegando al lugar señalado -la Oficina de los Consultorios Jurídicos de la Universidad de Costa Rica en Heredia-, la actividad procesal de esta parte no volvió a presentarse, salvo cuando compareció a la diligencia de conciliación, aspecto que constituye una muestra del interés por llegar a un arreglo voluntario. En todo caso, no podría arribarse a una conclusión distinta en este asunto, pues no existía ninguna razón, salvo lo expresado por la actora, para no presentarse a la referida prueba de marcadores genéticos, así como para la omisión que dio lugar a la declaratoria de inevacuabilidad de la testimonial, dado que puede constatarse como en el segundo proceso se hizo presente junto a su hijo a la Sección de Bioquímica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial para el examen correspondiente, amén de que puede advertirse que la mayoría de los testigos ofrecidos en el primer asunto fueron ofrecidos también en el segundo y comparecieron en éste (ver demandas a folio 3 del expediente n°. 98-000584-364-FA y 3 del expediente n°. 05-002035-364-FA). Como sustento de lo anteriormente expuesto, se cuenta con la deposición de la hermana de doña [Nombre1], [Nombre1] , quien a folio 87 del recurso narró: [Nombre2]“… nunca le ha ayudado económicamente al niño, ella estaba llevando un proceso para una pensión, pero él habló con ella, que dejaran las cosas así, que él le ayudaba por bien, me imagino que una ayuda económica, eso porque ella me dijo que él la iba a ayudar económicamente, eso por semana, pero no recuerdo por [Nombre8].- le creyó a él y no volvió a hacer ninguna otra [Nombre9] no fue citada a algún tipo de prueba de sangre, pienso que ella tenía algún lugar donde le avisaban pero como dejó abandonado el proceso, ella no hizo nada.-…”. Además, agregó: “Me consta que ella no volvió a hacer nada con relación al proceso porque ella me dijo que iba a dejar las cosas así para arreglarlas por bien” (énfasis agregado), sin que pueda restarse mérito a lo expresado por la testigo, en su carácter de hermana de la actora, toda vez que sobre el particular, esta Cámara ha subrayado la importancia que en los litigios de familia tiene el testimonio de los parientes cercanos, pues son ellos los que están en posibilidad de conocer de primera mano los detalles íntimos que normalmente se ventilan en esta clase de procesos (al respecto, pueden verse nuestros fallos n°s. 177 de las 14:40 horas, del 30 de junio de 1999; 929 de las 9:30 horas, del 3 de noviembre de 2000; 94 de las 10:40 horas, del 2 de febrero de 2001; 449 de las 8:30 horas, del 18 de [Nombre2] de 2007 y 647 de las 9:55 horas, del 6 de agosto de 2008). Así las cosas, es lo cierto que nos encontramos ante el supuesto de “no presentación de pruebas” por obra de la contraria, contemplado en el inciso 1) del artículo 619 ídem, dado que a partir del análisis efectuado, resulta evidente que la actora en virtud del engaño del accionado -“bajo la creencia de que el demandado cumpliría con su palabra”, según lo expresó- no realizó todas las actuaciones procesales atinentes para evacuar la testimonial que ofreció en el escrito de su primera demanda, amén de que por esa misma causa de “fuerza mayor” no se presentó a aquella primera cita en la que se efectuaría la prueba de marcadores genéticos. En relación con esto último, es necesario comprender que la Sala Constitucional en el voto n°. 11158-07 le dio contenido a los supuestos previstos en el numeral 619 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Civil, estableciendo en lo atinente a la materia específica, algunos enunciados que darían pie a la interposición de un recurso de revisión en procesos de esta naturaleza en los que se hubiera dictado sentencia firme con eficacia y autoridad de cosa juzgada. Así, no podría entenderse que el Contralor de Constitucionalidad limitara la procedencia de la revisión -en los términos establecidos en dicho voto- a dos únicas circunstancias “cuando a la parte interesada le haya sido imposible, por el estado de desarrollo de la técnica y la ciencia contar con la prueba de marcadores genéticos o alguna causa de fuerza mayor le haya impedido ofrecerla o participar en su producción”, pues éste fue claro en sostener que “…el propio constituyente originario se encargó de atenuar el rigor de la seguridad jurídica que encarna la cosa juzgada material, contemplando la posibilidad de reabrir un proceso ya fallado a través de la interposición de un recurso extraordinario de revisión según las causales que establece el ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional o el legislador ordinario, para de ese modo modificar o anular una sentencia inicua y lograr que impere la justicia material” (énfasis agregado). Además, el concepto de fuerza mayor contenido en dicho voto no puede interpretarse en sentido estricto, conforme a los términos establecidos en doctrina, pues el legislador lo trató, dándole el mismo valor y consideración, al que le otorgó a las “obras de la contraria” que hubieran dejado a la parte recurrente en estado de indefensión por imposibilitarle la presentación de prueba durante el proceso, tal y como aconteció en el caso que nos ocupa (artículo 619 inciso 1) ídem). El texto de esa norma es claro cuando establece: “Si la parte que la pide demostrare que por impedírselo fuerza mayor, o por obra de la contraria, no recusó al juez o no pudo presentar algún documento u otra clase de prueba,…; de modo que en uno y otro caso haya habido indefensión y no haya sido posible en el curso del proceso pedir a rectificación del vicio” (énfasis agregado) de donde resulta que la “indefensión” es lo que se pretende superar con la revisión en los supuestos previstos en este inciso 1). Además, en esta materia los tribunales de justicia, al adoptar sus sentencias, así como en la interpretación de las normas procesales, deben atender al interés superior del niño (artículos 3 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y, 1 y 112 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia). Así las cosas, procede acoger el recurso de revisión interpuesto por encontrarse en los supuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 619 del Código Procesal Civil; anular las sentencias del Juzgado de Familia de Heredia, n°s. 271-2000 de las 11:00 horas, del 31 de marzo de 2000 y 1785-07 de las 16:07 horas, del 30 de noviembre de 2007 y dictar una nueva conforme a lo dispuesto por el artículo 625 ídem.

V.- La señora [Nombre1] demandó a don [Nombre2], pretendiendo que en sentencia se ordenara al Registro Civil corregir el asiento registral de su hijo, a efecto de que el menor apareciera inscrito como hijo de éste. Para ello sostuvo que a principios de 1995 y por aproximadamente dos años y medio, mantuvo una relación amorosa con el accionado, de la cual quedó embarazada de su hijo [Nombre3], quien nació el día 10 de marzo de 1997. Mencionó que el demandado, pese a que se comprometió a reconocerlo y a velar por la manutención del menor, nunca lo hizo, circunstancia por la que se vio obligada a acudir a la vía jurisdiccional a efecto de que su hijo “…aparezca inscrito como hijo del demandado y…éste asuma los deberes propios de la paternidad”. En el análisis del fondo de la cuestión, se hace necesario recurrir al contenido de los numerales 92 y 98, ambos del Código de Familia. El primer párrafo del numeral 92 dispone: “La calidad de padre o madre se puede establecer mediante la posesión notoria de estado del hijo por parte del presunto padre o por cualquier otro medio de prueba …”. El legislador, en atención a que, por lo general, este tipo de situaciones se pretenden mantener en el anonimato, optó por permitir que la parte interesada utilizara cualquier medio probatorio (como sería la prueba documental, testimonial, científica, entre otras) para acreditar el hecho que le interesa; el cual, incluso puede ser fijado con base en indicios graves, precisos y concordantes. Lo anterior es así, en procura de no hacer nugatorio el derecho fundamental consagrado en el artículo 53 de la Constitución Política, según el cual toda persona tiene derecho a saber quiénes son sus padres. En armonía con esas disposiciones, el numeral 98, a su vez y en lo que interesa, establece: “En todo proceso de investigación o impugnación de paternidad o maternidad, es admisible la prueba científica con el objeto de verificar la existencia o inexistencia de la relación de parentesco. Esta prueba podrá ser evacuada por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial de la Corte Suprema de Justicia o por laboratorios debidamente acreditados y reconocidos por la Corte Suprema de Justicia, previo dictamen del Organismo de Investigación Judicial de que el dictamen es concluyente, razonablemente, en uno u otro sentido ...”. En el caso concreto, el dictamen médico legal, emitido por la Sección de Bioquímica del Departamento de Laboratorios de Ciencias Forenses del Organismo de Investigación Judicial y del cual se otorgó la audiencia de rigor a las partes (folio 79 del expediente n°. 05-002035-364- FA), concluyó que el demandado no se excluye como padre biológico del menor cuya paternidad se investiga. Si bien es cierto, tal declaratoria no es concluyente en el sentido de que el demandado es el padre de [Nombre3], pues solo no lo excluye como tal, realiza un análisis estadístico de probabilidad de paternidad, teniendo en cuenta la estructura genotípica del demandado y la distribución de los distintos marcadores analizados en la población, que otorga una probabilidad de paternidad del 99.999893602548%; lo que según el propio dictamen, corresponde a una paternidad prácticamente probada (76 ídem. En este sentido, véase las resoluciones de esta Sala n°s. 647 de las 9:55 horas, del 6 de agosto; 234 de las 10:00 horas, del 14 de marzo, ambas de 2008, 267 de las 9:30 horas, del 22 de abril de 2005; 200 de las 10:00 horas, del 24 de marzo de 2004 y 487 de las 9:40 horas, del 2 octubre de 2002). Además, la propia confesión del accionado ratifica la existencia de la relación sentimental que mantuvieron actora y demandado, y dentro de la cual sostuvieron encuentros íntimos. Véase al respecto que al responder al interrogatorio el demandado señaló: “Es cierto, pero aclarando que no todo el tiempo que la visité mantuve relaciones sexuales con ella, y cuando lo hice yo eyaculaba afuera” (folio 64). Posteriormente, también admitió: “Sí es cierto que en algunas ocasiones mantuvimos relaciones sexuales, pero no me consta que por ello quedara embarazada” (folio 87 del recurso). Por otra parte, las testigos [Nombre5] y [Nombre6] , amigas de la demandante, dieron cuenta de la relación amorosa mantenida entre las partes y de la que dieron a conocer nació [Nombre3] (el 10 de marzo de 1997, según consta en certificación del Registro Civil a folio 5 y 16 del expediente 05-002035-364-FA). Así, la primera sostuvo: “Yo conozco a [Nombre2] desde hace unos diez años y medio, y fue en esa fecha que él y [Nombre1] comenzaron la relación. Esa relación duró dos años y medio o tres. En ese tiempo yo casí todo el tiempo iba a la casa de [Nombre1], yo muchas veces lo ví a él llegar a la casa de ella, y otras veces sabía que llegaba porque yo veía su bicicleta ahí y también porque [Nombre1] me contaba, yo sabía todo lo que a ella le pasaba; desde que ella comenzó a tener relaciones sexuales con él, yo me enteré de que eso porque ella nos los contó a nosotros, a mi mamá mi hermana y a mi, también nos contó cuando quedó embarazada de xxxx, ella nos contó que estaba embarazada de [Nombre2] , en ese momento ella estaba muy afligida porque decía que él cuando se enteró le manifestó que ella no podía estar embarazada de él porque el cuando iba a eyacular lo hacía afuera… Ella ese tiempo no mantuvo ninguna otra relación sentimental con algún hombre. Desde que ella quedó embarazada y [Nombre2] comprobó que era cierto, a los tres meses, él se fue y no regresó más,…Ellos iniciaron la relación de noviazgo desde 1995. Yo me enteré que [Nombre2] se fue a los tres meses de embarazo porque la misma [Nombre1] me lo contó y porque además yo nunca más lo volví a ver en su casa,…” -sic- (folios 60 a 61 ídem). Por su parte, a folios 62 a 63 ídem, [Nombre6] explicó: “Yo sé que ellos mantenía relaciones sexuales porque ella misma me lo contó y porque más de una vez ella me iba a dejar a la parada de buses porque él llegaba a dormir con ella a su casa. Desde que nació el menor ella estubo sola, pues [Nombre2] desde lo tres meses de embarazo, que yo recuerde cuando ella tenía tres meses fue cuando [Nombre2] se fue. Durante ese tiempo [Nombre1] no mantuvo ninguna otra relación sentimental con ningún otro hombre, hasta donde tengo conocimiento [Nombre2] nunca ha mantenido ningún contacto con el menor [Nombre3] sabía que él llegaba a dormir a la casa de ella porque yo pasaba todo el día con ella y ya como a las cinco él llegaba y al día siguiente cuando yo llegaba él estaba ahí, pues ella nos decía que no nos abría porque él estaba ahí. Durante más o menos un año y medio, durante el tiempo que yo estuve llendo a la casa de [Nombre1], observé que [Nombre2] llegaba a la casa de [Nombre1] a quedarse cada dos días o día por [Nombre10] vivía sola…” (sic). Del mismo modo, [Nombre7] expresó: “Durante el tiempo en que ella quedó embarazada ella mantenía una relación de noviazgo con [Nombre2], ella nos decia que [Nombre2] era su novio y siempre que nosotros, mis dos hijas y yo, ibamos a la casa de ella él estaba ahí. Ella nos contaba que él a veces se quedaba a dormir ahí…. Desde el inicio del embarazo cuando ella le dijo a él lo de su embarazo, [Nombre2] se fue y no regresó nunca más, eso lo sé porque no lo volví a ver en la casa de ella y porque la misma [Nombre1] me lo contó…La relación de noviazgo entre [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] duró como año y medio. Durante el tiempo en que [Nombre1] quedó embarazada ella no mantuvo ninguna otra relación sentimental con nadie más…” -sic- (folios 63 a 64 ídem). Como se advierte, de la prueba testimonial y confesional recabada se logran extraer indicios graves, precisos y concordantes, que llevan a establecer la existencia de una relación amorosa o de noviazgo entre el señor [Nombre2] y la señora [Nombre1] para la fecha aproximada de la concepción; resultando además un hecho no controvertido, sino más bien, pacíficamente admitido, el que la actora y el demandado tuviesen relaciones íntimas. Todo lo anterior, sumado a la probanza científica mencionada, permite llegar al convencimiento de que efectivamente el accionado es el padre del niño. Corolario de lo expuesto, procede declarar con lugar la demanda incoada por [Nombre1] contra [Nombre2] y, en consecuencia, declarar que el menor [Nombre3], es hijo del accionado, por lo que de ahora en adelante deberá llamarse [Nombre3], y tendrá todos los derechos que se derivan de esa nueva condición. Son ambas costas a cargo del demandado (artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil). Las excepciones de cosa juzgada y de falta de derecho interpuestas por el accionado deben denegarse. Sobre la excepción de cosa juzgada, debe recordarse que el fallo producido en el proceso tramitado mediante expediente n°. 98- 000584-364-FA, no genera validamente efectos en relación con este nuevo proceso (expediente n°. 05-002035-364-FA). Una vez firme la presente resolución, esta sentencia se debe inscribir al margen del tomo doscientos treinta y cuatro (234), folio doscientos quince (215), [Dirección1] (), Provincia de Heredia, de la Sección de Nacimientos del Registro Civil.

POR TANTO:

Se declara con lugar el recurso de revisión promovido, y en ese sentido, se anulan las sentencias del Juzgado de Familia de Heredia, números doscientos setenta y uno de las once horas, del treinta y uno de marzo de dos mil y mil setecientos ochenta y cinco de las dieciséis horas con siete minutos del treinta de noviembre de dos mil siete. En su lugar, se deniegan las excepciones de falta de derecho y cosa juzgada opuestas por el demandado y se acoge la demanda incoada por [Nombre1] contra [Nombre2] y en consecuencia se declara que el menor [Nombre3], es hijo del accionado, por lo que de ahora en adelante deberá llamarse [Nombre3], y tendrá todos los derechos que se derivan de esa nueva condición. Son ambas costas a cargo del demandado. Una vez firme la presente resolución, inscríbase esta sentencia al margen del tomo doscientos treinta y cuatro, folio doscientos quince, asiento cuatrocientos [Dirección2], Provincia de Heredia, de la Sección de Nacimientos del Registro Civil.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Fernando Bolaños Céspedes Res: 2009-000266 [Nombre11].- 2