Force majeure due to minor's legal representation bars DNA test in paternity caseFuerza mayor por representación legal de menor impide prueba de ADN en filiación

Review of the Document * * * Res: 2015-001194* SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-eighth of October of two thousand fifteen.* * * * * * * * * * * Review appeal (Recurso de revisión) filed by [[Name1] ], [...], against the judgment issued at fifteen hours on the ninth of June of nineteen hundred and ninety-nine, handed down by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, in the paternity investigation summary proceeding (abreviado de investigación de paternidad), filed in the same court by [[Name1] ]* against [[Name2] ]. The public defender for the plaintiff is attorney Ligia Jiménez Zamora, whose qualifications are not indicated. All are of legal age, single, attorneys, and residents of Alajuela, with the exceptions noted.* WHEREAS:* * * * * * * * * * * 1.- The plaintiff, in a document filed on the ninth of July of two thousand thirteen, brought this action so that, in judgment, the defendant be ordered principally to: “Applying the Principle of Procedural Economy and in consideration of the Principle of the Best Interest of the Child, I request that genetic marker testing (prueba de marcadores genéticos) be ordered for Mr. [[Name2] ], who has never undergone this technical test; as well as for the undersigned and my mother [[Name3] ], who already underwent this test at the Forensic Medicine Unit on the second of July of 2009, so that in judgment it be declared: a. That the undersigned [[Name1] ] is the daughter of the defendant [[Name2] ] and that therefore I am entitled to bear his surname. b. The respective MODIFICATION of the undersigned’s birth entries in the Civil Registry and the Birth Registry be ordered, with the surname of my respective father. That is, that she be registered as [[Name4] ]. c. The right of [[Name1] ] to receive child support (alimentos) in relation to [[Name2] ] be declared. d. The right of [[Name1] ] to succeed ab intestato in relation to her father [[Name2] ] be declared.” (Sic); and subsidiarily to: “THE RULING issued at fifteen hours on the ninth of June of nineteen hundred and ninety-nine, by the Family Court of the I Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, in the Paternity Investigation Summary Proceeding 97-401610-292-FA, BE ANNULLED. The effects of the proceeding be rolled back to the moment when the right of defense was violated, this moment being the performance of the genetic marker testing, so that the procedure continues according to law, and in this way it is proven in judgment that I am the daughter of Mr. [[Name2] ].” (Sic).* * * * * * * * * * * 2.- The defendant answered in the terms indicated in the brief presented on the seventeenth of June of two thousand fourteen and raised the defenses of lack of standing to sue and lack of capacity or defective representation.* * * * * * * * * * * 3.- The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.* Judge Olaso Álvarez writes the opinion; and,* WHEREAS:* I.- BACKGROUND: [[Name1] ], in her capacity as plaintiff, files a review appeal against the final and binding judgment (sentencia firme y con autoridad de cosa juzgada) rendered at 3:00 p.m. on the 9th of June of 1999, by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in the paternity investigation proceeding, case file number 97-401610-292-FA, filed by her mother, Mrs. [[Name3] ], who acted on behalf of her daughter because she had not reached the age of majority. As she indicates, in that proceeding, genetic marker testing was ordered, and to that end, the parties were summoned to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial). She points out that she did not attend to undergo said test because her mother did not present her on the required day and time. Likewise, she alleges that Mrs. [[Name3] ] signed a brief indicating she had reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant, claiming it was an agreement favorable to her person. For this reason, she requested to withdraw the claim. She adds that in the aforementioned judgment, the defense of lack of right raised by the defendant was upheld, and the summary paternity investigation claim was declared without merit in all its aspects. She considers that this left her in a complete state of defenselessness (indefensión) since she was one year old and had no knowledge of what was happening, nor of the harm this would cause her. She explains that subsequently, her mother initiated three more paternity investigation proceedings, processed under case file numbers 00-400458-0292-FA; 01-400501-0216-FA; and 08-000949-0292-FA, which did not succeed because in all of them the defense of res judicata (excepción de cosa juzgada) raised by [[Name2] ] was upheld, based on the judgment rendered in proceeding 97-401610-292-FA. She states, as an important fact, that in the last proceeding filed – case file 08-000949-0292-FA –, before the res judicata defense was decided, she attended with her mother to undergo the DNA test – visible on folio 148 of that file –, but the comparison of her DNA with the DNA samples of the defendant could not be performed, as he did not appear for the appointment. The review appeal is filed under the provisions of sections 1) and 7) of Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), alleging she was not well represented, and because of this she sees herself prejudiced by the following: Not knowing her biological origin; not having her father's surname; not having his economic support; not being able to inherit ab intestato. She invokes the fundamental right to know who one's parents are and the principle of responsible parenthood announced in the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Political Constitution, which indicates that parents have obligations towards their children. She elaborated that responsible parenthood has been recognized by the Costa Rican State in international human rights instruments, such as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which provides that every person has the duty to assist, feed, educate, and protect their minor children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, in article 18, points out that States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. For its part, Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador," provided, where relevant, the following: "Right of the child. Every child, regardless of their filiation, has the right to the protective measures required by their condition as a minor on the part of their family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents...". Finally, she based the review appeal on Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, indicating that the child has the right from birth to a name, to acquire a nationality, and, as far as possible, to know his or her parents. She also invokes in her appeal ruling no. 11.158 issued at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (folios 40 to 53).* II.- REGARDING THE REVIEW APPEAL: The review appeal is of an extraordinary and also exceptional nature, because it attacks a final judgment, with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). It is provided not as a normal remedy within the proceeding, but outside of it, with the objective of remedying any injustice derived not from errors of legal technique—which should have been attacked through normal remedies, within the respective proceeding—but from facts that prevented the exercise of the right or from novel, supervening situations that warrant reviewing the previous jurisdictional decision. Precisely because of this nature, it is only admissible in the cases exhaustively established in Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code and must necessarily be initiated within the deadlines indicated in article 620 of the same code - 3 months or 10 years -, depending on the circumstances. However, regarding the aspect of the deadline and the exhaustive nature, what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 11.158, at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, must be taken into account, specifically related to actions to establish paternity or maternity, in which, referring to the alleged collision between the fundamental right of every person to know who their parents are and the principle of legal certainty, seated in the figure of res judicata (article 98 bis, subsection m), Family Code (Código de Familia)), it indicated the following: "Thus, the foregoing means that any interested party in reopening a case in which the paternity of a person has been investigated may appeal to the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, alleging as a ground for the appeal, Article 619, subsection 1°), of the Civil Procedure Code... Under this understanding, if in a previous proceeding the filiation or paternity was discussed, a judgment having been rendered with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker testing or some force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevented it, nothing prevents the possibility of filing an extraordinary review appeal before the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice for the nullity of the final judgment to be decreed... This Constitutional Court considers that the extraordinary review appeal that may be filed by interested litigants, when it was impossible for them, due to the state of development of technique or science, to have the genetic marker testing or any other reason of force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevented it, should not be subject to any expiration period—as indicated in Article 620, paragraph 2°, of the Civil Procedure Code—, since any restriction in this regard empties the fundamental and human right 'to know who one's parents are' enshrined in articles 53, paragraph 2°, of the Political Constitution and 7° of the Convention on the Rights of the Child... Consequently, the extraordinary review appeal may be filed, under the conditions already noted, by the interested party sine die—without time limit—and only once, provided there is no variation in the scientific and technical evidentiary methods—particularly biological tests—to determine with greater precision and accuracy a person's filiation. The latter to prevent the abusive exercise of that extraordinary remedy... By virtue of the foregoing, it is necessary to resolve the judicial consultation of unconstitutionality in the sense that Article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the final judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding with efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary review appeal, sine die—without time limit—and only once—as long as there is no variation in the scientific and technical evidentiary methods that allow filiation to be proven with greater accuracy, particularly biological tests—when it was impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker testing or some force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevented them from offering it or participating in its production." (See rulings of this Chamber number 1148 at 9:35 a.m. on November 21, 2014, and 648 at 9:30 a.m. on July 2, 2014).* III.- ON THE STANDING OF THE APPELLANT: The case file shows that the mother of [[Name1] ] – Mrs. [[Name3] ] –, when she filed the summary paternity investigation claim no. 97-401610-0292-FA before the Family Court of Alajuela, did so not in her personal capacity, but as the representative of the minor person, as she formulated the claim so that the then-child would have paternal filiation and all the effects derived therefrom. Her condition as representative is given by law, as is clear from what is expressly regulated in Article 155 of the Family Code, which—where relevant—states: "The mother, even if she is a minor, shall exercise parental authority (patria potestad) over children born out of wedlock and shall have full legal standing for those purposes...". That is, in her capacity as representative—acting in another's name—she filed the claim on November 20, 1997—folios 2 and 3—. At that time, the minor person—today the appellant—was two months minus one day old—folio 56 of the dossier before this Chamber indicating she was born on September 25, 1997—. Thus, this power-duty correlative to the mother—according to the rule's provision—represents the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers aimed at enabling the effective enjoyment of rights—in this case—of [[Name1] ] through her mother. Such powers-duties constitute parental authority (patria potestad) —now called parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental)—, which are usually classified into three groups, namely: personal content, patrimonial content, and content related to representation. Specifically, in the case of representation, it implies that the mother of the minor person intervenes on her behalf, as long as she has not acquired full capacity to act and provided she does not have an opposing interest; in which case a special guardian must be appointed for them—Article 140 of the Family Code, 36, 37, and 38 of the Civil Code—. On this matter, the following can be consulted in Costa Rican doctrine: "The person is a 'subject of law,' meaning that both rights in themselves and the power to exercise them potentially reside in them. (...). Given that human physical and intellectual development occurs gradually, laws customarily indicate an age from which the person is considered to have the necessary capacity for the direct exercise of contracting and other acts of civil life. That age is designated by the name of majority, which today is generally fixed, as our law does, at eighteen completed years. Before reaching that age, one is in the period of time called minority, which is divided into infant minority and post-infant minority. The first extends from birth to puberty (...). The second minority comprises from fifteen to eighteen years of age." [Name5] , Alberto. Tratado de las Personas. Volumen I: Introducción y Derecho de la Persona. 5th ed. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 1998, p. 168 and 177. Thus, things being as they are, [[Name1] ] —and not her mother— has been a party in the present proceeding since it was established, as she is the holder of the right to paternal filiation that was claimed, since "the representative acts in the name and place of the minor...[Name6] " , ; [Name7] , and [Name8] , . Derecho de la Familia. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2010, p. 606. However, now—past 15 years of age and as cited in the words of jurist Brenes Córdoba—, [[Name1] ] acts in her own name and on her own account by virtue of article 108 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de Niñez y Adolescencia), having sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity to understand the detriment caused by the person who held—in the past—her legal representation by mandate of law. Article 108 Ibid states, where relevant, as follows: "Article 108°- Standing to act as parties. When the interest of a minor person is involved in judicial proceedings, the following shall have standing to act as parties: a) Adolescents over fifteen years of age, personally, when this Code so authorizes, and in other cases, they shall be represented by those who exercise parental authority or by the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia) when appropriate...". Having verified the appellant's standing, it is now necessary to analyze the grounds for review invoked. * IV.-* ON THE GROUND FOR REVIEW ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 619, SUBSECTION 1) OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE: Subsection 1) of Article 619 Ibid. establishes that the appeal is admissible "If the party seeking it demonstrates that, because force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevented it, or through the act of the opposing party, they did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence, or appear at the hearing where evidence of the opposing party was adduced; such that in either case there was defenselessness (indefensión) and it was not possible during the course of the proceeding to request rectification of the defect." In the review appeal, the plaintiff argued she suffered a detriment at the age of one when she did not appear to undergo the scientific DNA evidence in proceeding no. 97-401610-0292-FA of Paternity Investigation "because my mother did not take me to the indicated place to perform it." She added: "I had no knowledge of what was happening, nor of the harm this would cause me" (folio 44). She also pointed out that her mother [[Name3] ] signed a brief in which she requested to withdraw the claim having reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant, claiming it was an agreement favorable to her person. Because of what happened, she perceives a state of defenselessness (indefensión) which, in light of the two objective premises stipulated in the rule, namely, force majeure (fuerza mayor) or the act of the opposing party, must be analyzed. Said normative premises have the purpose of justifying—by operation of law—and in favor of the appellant, the occurrence of the following sub-premises: a) not having recused the judge, b) not having presented some document or other type of evidence, or not having appeared at the hearing where evidence of the opposing party was adduced. Because the appellant has not invoked grounds for review related to the actions of the defendant, but has cited a state of defenselessness (indefensión) originating in the circumstances that prevented her attendance to the performance of the scientific evidence; this Chamber must analyze what [[Name1] ] described from the perspective of the premise of force majeure (fuerza mayor) as an event that may have prevented the presentation of the DNA evidence in proceeding no. 97-401610-0292-FA of Paternity Investigation. The foregoing represents a semantic problem that must be resolved, namely: Our positive law lacks a definition of force majeure (fuerza mayor). This has been conceived "occasionally" as a fact or event that could not have been foreseen or that, even being foreseeable, cannot be avoided (see the rulings of this Chamber, numbers 219, at 9:00 a.m. on May 9, 2003, and 256, at 9:35 a.m. on April 25, 2007). However, from the study of this term in doctrine, it is clear that we are facing a problem of multiple meanings (multivocidad)—a linguistic inconvenience through which it is identified that language formulas lack a single meaning—. This difficulty is well captured in the following excerpt: "Let us begin by recalling that faced with the set of words and phrases are the ideas: the infinite virtuality of possible meanings, a vast surplus of senses compared to the linguistic forms themselves. [Of course, this does not mean that 'ideas' are on one side and 'words' on the other. It is only intended to note that the former do not appear necessarily linked to such or such particular determined linguistic expressions; that is, that there are more ideas than words, however much the former generally present themselves through the latter.]" E. P. Haba, El espejismo de la interpretación literal: Encrucijadas del lenguaje jurídico, Vlamarán S.A., Escuela Judicial: San José, 2003, tomo I, p. 21. Thus, without attempting to exhaust the ideas that have been generated regarding force majeure (fuerza mayor), some legal scholars have said the following: "Force majeure (fuerza mayor) will be unforeseeable (storm, lightning, earthquake, war, act of the prince)" V. Calatayud Ponce de León, Las obligaciones civiles, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 262. It is recognized as having an important identity with fortuitous event (caso fortuito): "Premises of fortuitous event and force majeure (fuerza mayor). (...) a) That such fact is extraordinary, that it is out of the ordinary, that it is not usual and therefore happens independently of the will or action of the debtor... b) That such fact is unforeseen and this lack of foresight must be assessed at the time the obligation is contracted... c) That such fact is insurmountable, which is assessed at the time of non-performance and implies the material impossibility of the debtor to satisfy the creditor's interest" F. Montero Piña, Obligaciones, San José: Premiá Editores, 1999, p. 281. "It is, along with fortuitous event (caso fortuito), another of the factual circumstances that can exonerate the defaulting debtor from guilt. It consists of those facts that, whether foreseeable or not, are always inevitable and correspond to events that bear no necessary relation to the debtor's situation. It involves a fact of origin external to the obligation and whose harmful result was inevitable even with the precautionary measures that could rationally be taken" Ribó cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, Código Civil: con jurisprudencia con descriptores. Tomo I. San José: IJSA, 2014, p. 610. "Any event that could not have been foreseen or that, if foreseen, could not have been resisted." From [Name8] cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, Idem. "The notion of force majeure (fuerza mayor), in its core content, alludes to facts external to the subject's control, regarding whose occurrence the person lacks all power of decision. Anglo-Saxons refer to force majeure (fuerza mayor) with a phrase of great expressive power: Acts of God. The archetypes of force majeure (fuerza mayor) are the facts of Nature—[Name9]., a hurricane, an earthquake, death-. However, there are facts of man that can also qualify as force majeure (fuerza mayor), both illicit acts—a robbery, an assault—and licit ones, such as the so-called 'acts of the prince' or acts of the exercise of state power—a law, a decree, a judicial resolution—. Those phenomena that, from the point of view of the subject, present themselves as ineluctable qualify as force majeure (fuerza mayor). (...) In summary, there are three elements that define force majeure (fuerza mayor) in our case law: -Unforeseeability -Inevitability -[Name10]". F. Torrealba Navas, Responsabilidad Civil, San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2011, p. 571 and 572. Likewise, "Vélez says that '... fortuitous events or force majeure (fuerza mayor) are produced by two main causes: by nature or by the act of man.' Thus, a fact produced by fortuitous event (caso fortuito) would be the impetuosity of a river that overflows its bed, earthquakes or tremors, storms, plagues, fire. In contrast, cases of force majeure (fuerza mayor) are acts of man, such as war, the act of the sovereign, or the force of the [Name11]". Vélez cited by G. Cabanellas de Torres, Diccionario Jurídico Universitario. Tomo 1 A-I. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Heliasta, 2007, p. 172. "The problem of the distinction between fortuitous event (caso) and force majeure (fuerza). (...) The fortuitous event (caso) is an external event alien to the debtor (and to the thing itself: not defects thereof), independent of his will; furthermore, to release the debtor, it must not be foreseeable or inevitable even adopting due diligence. (...) The Civil Code in such cases speaks, according to the tradition of Common Law, of fortuitous event (caso fortuito) (arts. 1.093-3°, 1.136-1°), or force majeure (fuerza mayor) (arts. 457, 1.777, 1.748, 1.905), or of both (arts. 1.602, 1.625). The older doctrine distinguishes between one and the other: the former would be a product of the forces of nature (earthquake) and the latter of the act of a third party (war), or the former unforeseeable and the latter inevitable; or one an obstacle arising within the functioning of the company (fire) and the other external to it (robbery). But in the Civil Code (and, previously, in [Name12] ), commonly, both expressions are interchangeable, and so case law tends to understand it*". J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, and others, Elementos de Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. Volumen I: Parte general, Teoría General del Contrato. 5th ed. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011, p. 174 and 175. "Force majeure (fuerza mayor) is not the vis maxima, but that which a good father of a family cannot overcome. The unforeseeability or inevitability, which are not intrinsic and objective qualities of the event, but relative to a specific situation and a concrete obligation to foresee and avoid, thus depend on the degree of diligence required and the nature of the obligation." J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, Idem. In the words of commentators [Name13] and [Name14], in relation to force majeure (fuerza mayor), it must be considered that "Although the dominant line in case law is not distinguishing the fortuitous event (caso fortuito) from force majeure (fuerza mayor) as to their effects, it has not failed to echo the doctrinal differentiation of both events, which sees the fortuitous event (caso fortuito) as the event that takes place inside the company or circle affected by the obligation, while force majeure (fuerza mayor) would be that which originates outside, with insurmountable violence, and which falls outside what can be foreseen in the ordinary and normal course of life*". L. Díez-Picazo and A. Gullón, Sistema de Derecho Civil: El contrato en general. La relación obligatoria. Volumen II. Tomo 1. 10th ed. Madrid: Tecnos, 2013, p. 205. In our legal system, the Civil Code treats force majeure (fuerza mayor) as one of the forms that produces the release of the debtor in the field of the Law of Obligations: "Article 702.- The debtor who fails to fulfill his obligation, whether in substance or in manner, shall be liable by the mere fact for the damages and losses caused to his creditor, unless the failure arises from an act of the latter, force majeure (fuerza mayor) or fortuitous event (caso fortuito)." Or, as an exemption from liability: "Article 1071.- If the seller does not deliver the thing at the agreed time, the buyer may at his choice request either the rescission of the sale or that he be placed in possession of the thing. If the seller has not effected the transfer, due to fortuitous event (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor), there shall be no grounds for rescission"; "Article 1180.- Carriers are also liable for damages caused by delay in the journey, or for failing in any other way to fulfill their contract, except in cases of fortuitous event (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor)"; and "Article 1267.- (...) It is incumbent upon the agent to prove the force majeure (fuerza mayor) or fortuitous event (caso fortuito) that prevents him from carrying out the orders of the principal." Indeed, —as we have verified through a brief review of doctrine—, reaching an agreement on the definition of force majeure (fuerza mayor) is as complex a task in the vast world of legal discourse that the Spanish commentator Manuel Albaladejo debates other ideas, such as, for example, whether "fortuitous event (caso fortuito) and force majeure (fuerza mayor) are synonymous expressions, or two different concepts." M. Albaladejo. Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. 14th ed. Madrid: Edisofer, S.L., 2011, p. 181. He even comments that "The determination of whether a fact constitutes fortuitous event (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor) implies a legal assessment...". M. Albaladejo. Op. Cit., p.180. A perception that indeed, in the opinion of this Chamber, must be made with the caution that in this specific case, the notion of force majeure (fuerza mayor) must be transferred to a different subject matter than that dealt with by the obligation relationship, to understand it from a new perspective in which the legal bond does not have patrimonial content—although it does entail economic consequences—, as is filiation. "The concept of filiation comes from the Latin filius (son) and refers to the set of legal relationships, determined by paternity and maternity, that bind parents to children. Our legal system provides several ways through which said bond arises, given that it can occur based on a biological nexus or by a legal imposition." Second Chamber, judgment no. 766 at 10:05 a.m. on July 30, 2014. It is case law – the doctrine of adjudicators –, and not the letter of the law, that is responsible for nourishing legal institutes from other perspectives to comply with what the Constitutional Chamber well explained through ruling no. 6120, at 3:05 p.m. on May 8, 2013: "The protection of the best interest of the minor is a duty that Constitutional Law imposes on the State, and which must be reflected in the resolutions and actions of all the judicial and administrative authorities that comprise it. The judges of the Republic are obliged to apply the conventionality control, which… allows integrating the norms and principles contained in international human rights instruments into the resolutions they issue in the matters submitted for their knowledge." (The emphasis is not part of the original).

In relation to this point, notice must also be taken of what this office indicated in judgment no. 266, at 10:55 a.m. on March 26, 2009: "...it could not be understood that the Constitutional Review Magistrate limited the admissibility of review—under the terms established in that vote—to only two circumstances: 'when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have genetic marker evidence or some force majeure (fuerza mayor) has prevented them from offering it or participating in its production,' since he was clear in holding that '…the original constituent themselves undertook to mitigate the rigor of legal certainty that material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) embodies, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already decided case through the filing of an extraordinary motion for review (recurso extraordinario de revisión) according to the grounds established by the infra-constitutional legal system or the ordinary legislator, in order to thereby modify or annul an inequitable judgment and ensure that material justice prevails' (emphasis added). Furthermore, the concept of force majeure (fuerza mayor) contained in that vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, in accordance with the terms established in doctrine, because the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration as was given to the 'acts of the opposing party' that had left the appellant in a state of defenselessness by making it impossible for them to present evidence during the proceeding... Furthermore, in this matter, courts of justice, when adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural rules, must attend to the best interests of the child (articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code)." (The emphasis is not part of the original).

This means that, given the fact that the studies on force majeure (fuerza mayor) that have been examined have been approached from a single perspective, that of the Law of Civil Obligations—according to the doctrinal review carried out here—for which, moreover, a diversity of definitions of that very notion have emerged, evidencing the absence of agreement on its content; and given the absence of analysis of said term from other legal disciplines, it is appropriate that this conception evolve and adapt to other contexts. For this case, force majeure (fuerza mayor) must be understood in light of the fundamental rights of Childhood and Adolescence. In relation to this, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment no. 3481 at 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, considered the following: "The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done solely and exclusively based on their literal wording, since, in order to unravel, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutical instruments such as the teleological, institutional, systematic, and historical-evolutionary methods. On this particular, the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, in its numeral 10, establishes that 'Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.' Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms that have an area of meaning or field of reference, as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm, it is necessary to investigate its objective (ratio) or proposed and assumed purpose, with respect to which the norm has an instrumental nature—teleological method. The interpreter must also confront, relate, and harmonize it with the rest of the legal norms that make up a particular legal institution—institutional method—and, in general, the legal system—systematic method—since norms are not isolated and watertight compartments but are connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, such that it must be applied to historical junctures in constant mutation—historical-evolutionary method. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, as they are not exclusive in nature; rather, they are diverse essential moments or stages of the entire transcendent act of interpretation." Thus, the definitions noted regarding force majeure (fuerza mayor) are extremely useful, and maxims applicable to Family Law can be extracted from them, such as the fact that "force majeure (fuerza mayor)" represents an event external to the subject from whose perspective said force is analyzed, and the impossibility for that subject to avoid it. The foregoing, above all, to set aside analyses of situations that involve an examination of causes for which the act of doing, not doing, or giving was breached; or, alternatively, that relieve a person from liability upon the occurrence of a damaging event; all characteristic of the Law of Obligations. For, on the other hand, force majeure (fuerza mayor) can be viewed as a situation that, seen from the perspective of a subject of law, presents itself in such a way that they cannot combat it, preventing them from exercising a subjective right even when it stems from or originates in an act protected by law. That is, the genesis and concretization of said event can emerge from a perfectly lawful act, such as the legal imperative that every minor must be subject to the acts of representation by their parents or guardian—as the case may be. Thus, with the requirements of irresistibility ([Nombre10]) and inevitability characteristic of force majeure (fuerza mayor) being present, the minor is subjected by legal mandate to a legal representation that "falls outside the scope of autonomy of will; its existence, survival, and extent neither arise from nor depend on the will of the represented party. It emanates directly from the legal mandate. The law imposes it, indicates the requirements to be its representative, regulates its powers to act and decide; although this must always be in the interest, on behalf of, and at the expense of a person or interests that are deemed to need special protection entrusted to the legal representative." (The highlighted text is not part of the original) [Nombre15], cited by V. Calatayud Ponce de León, Temas de Derecho Privado, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 164 and 165.

Although this representation entrusted to a third party has been the response of the legal system to the real conditions affecting minors precisely because of their status as minors—such as the inability to represent themselves, emotional and economic dependence, limited maturity, and ignorance of their rights—, fathers and mothers dispose "over" the minor and not "for" them, making decisions and implementing them regardless of determining what truly strengthens and consolidates the best interest of the minor, as well as the consequences generated by such decisions. Then, those actions or omissions of those exercising representation negatively and directly affect minors, constituting an insurmountable obstacle for them, that is, a case of force majeure (fuerza mayor) that interferes with the exercise of the subjective rights of Childhood and Adolescence.

The foregoing fully agrees with the appreciation that this event is conceived as an external fact to the person—who in this case is the right holder—, who involuntarily bears a representation emanating from law, and which entails a harmful result for them. Force majeure (fuerza mayor) conceived in this way proves necessary since, as was verified, its concept has been founded and developed based on creditor and debtor persons but not—at least to the knowledge of these judges—from the rights of Childhood and Adolescence.

Definitively, the matter under study merits an analysis in relation to the right of the minor to know who their father and mother are—as is indeed done here. Thus, it is fitting to recall the words that the Constitutional Chamber itself, in judgment no. 11,158, at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, noted regarding these human rights: "The fundamental right to know who one's parents are—especially when exercised together with the right to establish filiation bonds—is connected to the principle of responsible parenthood stated in article 53, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, indicating that parents have obligations toward their children—those born both within and outside of marriage. Those obligations of progenitors or procreators entail a series of rights of a personal and patrimonial nature held by the procreated children for their adequate development and optimal upbringing, which the ordinary legislator must develop and establish. Responsible parenthood is also established by instruments of International Human Rights Law; thus, Article XXX of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides, as relevant, that: 'Every person has the duty to aid, feed, educate, and shelter their minor children (…)', the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in numeral 18, paragraph 1, correctly indicates that '1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal representatives, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their primary concern shall be the best interests of the child.' For its part, numeral 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Protocol of San Salvador,' approved by Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999, provides, as relevant, the following: 'Right of the Child. Every child, regardless of their filiation, has the right to the measures of protection that their condition as a minor requires from their family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow under the protection and responsibility of their parents (…)'. In sum, the fundamental right to know who one's parents are, when exercised concomitantly with the right to establish filiation relationships, and the procedural mechanisms of a legal nature to enforce them, constitute an instrument to make effective the principle of responsible parenthood stated in both the Political Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law and which is also inherent to human dignity and to the constitutional and international imperatives of special protection, care, and assistance for minors due to their intrinsic condition of vulnerability (articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 25, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 24, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)." In the specific case, it has been demonstrated that the mother of [[Nombre1] ], whose paternity was being investigated, did not present the child for the performance of the scientific test. In the appeal before this Chamber, it is argued that she did not do so because she intended to withdraw from the proceeding due to having reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant, supposedly favorable to the minor. Note that when the request for withdrawal of the paternity investigation claim was filed on June 25, 1999 (folio 21 of file no. 97-401610-0292-FA), the Childhood and Adolescence Code, Law no. 7739 of January 6, 1998, published in La Gaceta no. 26 on February 6, 1998, and which entered into force on that same date, was already in effect. That normative body, in article 19—original text of the norm—stated: "In proceedings involving the interest of minors, neither desertion nor withdrawal shall be admissible. It shall be the judge's responsibility to drive the proceeding forward until the judgment is issued." In light of what was developed previously, this Chamber considers that the actions of [[Nombre1] ]'s mother—in her capacity as representative—, coupled with her circumstance of being a minor, justifies the absence of the claimant party at the performance of the DNA test, as it constitutes a situation of force majeure (fuerza mayor) which, although originating in the legal provision by which [[Nombre1] ] was under the representation of Mrs. [[Nombre3] ]; the latter found herself unable to combat the inescapable effects of her mother's actions and omissions within proceeding no. 97-401610-0292-FA—which, although legitimate in light of the representation—, affected her when, on November 19, 1998—date on which the appointment was granted by the Biochemistry Section, Forensic Sciences Laboratory of the Judicial Investigation Agency, folio 25—, she did not attend the test as she was one year and two months old. These judges do not intend to demand that, because of what happened, it would have been possible for [[Nombre1] ], as the holder of the subjective right, to request the rescheduling of the date for the test's performance or to demand that she be presented in time for its practice. It is clear—for this Chamber—that due to her young age, she could not have informed the Court of her circumstances. Even though her mother could have complied with the foregoing, the party to this proceeding—the minor and the principal interested party in having the test performed—has demonstrated that the special circumstances pertaining to minors constituted a matter of force majeure (fuerza mayor) for her person.

The appellant herself invokes in the appeal that she has been left defenseless all this time, without the possibility of rectifying what was done until the moment when—having reached 15 years of age—the regulations referring to the capacity to act allow her to proceed in defense of a fundamental right. The mother—as representative of the child—by having formulated the request for withdrawal of the claim—writing of June 25, 1998, filed during the processing of file no. 97-401610-0292-FA—(folio 21), and subsequently completely absenting herself from the proceeding despite what was requested having been rejected (folio 23), incurred in omissions regarding the duty to safeguard the fundamental rights of Childhood and Adolescence of her daughter—deposited in her person by the State itself—, which came to generate pernicious procedural consequences for the subjective rights of [[Nombre1] ]. The foregoing, to the point that it prevented, at the time, the realization of the right to know her biological origin as a personality right, resulting in the dissatisfaction of other rights such as bearing her father's surname, the possibility of appearing as heir to his estate, and requesting the right to child support—among others.

Consequently, this Chamber considers that the specific case falls within the ground of subsection 1) of article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code, specifically within the situation where force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevents the presentation of some evidence; which, in the species, corresponds to the scientific DNA evidence (article 318, subsection 6) of the Civil Procedure Code), such that it is appropriate to grant the appeal based on that norm.* V.- ON THE GROUND FOR REVIEW PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 619, SUBSECTION 7) OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE: The appellant also based the review on the ground in subsection 7) of the cited numeral. This section establishes another reason giving rise to the claim: "There having been improper representation (indebida representación) throughout the entire proceeding." However, from the very statement of the reasons, it is clear that she is confusing improper representation (indebida representación) with inadequate legal advice, a situation that does not fit within the transcribed norm. Indeed, regarding improper representation (indebida representación), the Chamber has explained that "When the Code speaks of 'improper representation (indebida representación)', it refers to the illegitimate integration of the proceeding in those cases where one of the parties, due to its legal nature or particular situation, must act through another person, so that its right of defense is duly protected, as happens in the case of legal entities, minors, legally incapable persons, and estates. In such cases, the litis must be integrated with the representative having sufficient power to act in court on behalf of those persons, because if the representation is not the proper one, because it does not exist or because the person holding it lacks sufficient faculties to act, an imperfection in procedural standing (legitimación procesal) occurs, to the detriment of the right of defense, and this prevents a valid judgment from being issued" (vote number 646, at 10:20 a.m. on June 30, 2000). In the specific case—as already stated—, the minor acted through representation—article 102, Civil Procedure Code—, without any defect being noted, since the person who exercised it was her mother, in exercise of parental responsibility—canon 140, Family Code—and not another person. Consequently, according to the appellant's words, the improper advice she accuses, in the sense that her mother did not take her to the performance of the scientific test, does not fit within the normative situation of improper representation (indebida representación). * VI.- FINAL PROVISIONS: Thus, it is deemed appropriate to grant the motion for review (recurso de revisión) filed, as the matter falls within the factual situation provided for in subsection 1) of article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code; to annul the judgment at three o'clock in the afternoon on June nine, nineteen ninety-nine, issued by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in proceeding no. 97-401610-0292-FA. Consequently, it is appropriate to order that the file be returned to said Court of origin so that the proceeding may be adapted to the current procedural regulations, Law no. 8101 "Responsible Parenthood Law". Likewise, the processing shall be rolled back to that procedural stage that allows the minor to fully exercise her right of defense and, especially, that allows her to combat the adverse procedural effects caused by her then-legal representative. Given the age of file no. 97-401610-0292-FA, an observation is made to the judicial authority that will be in charge of processing this matter, that it must take the necessary precautions so that this proceeding is not affected by the selection and elimination of old documents, in compliance with the provisions set forth in Circular no. 29-2012 issued by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice, "Table of Conservation Periods for Case Files, Conservation Period for Source Documents, and Guidelines for the Selection and Elimination of Case Files in Family and Child Support Matters."* THEREFORE:* The motion for review (recurso de revisión) filed is declared with merit, and, in that sense, the judgment at three o'clock in the afternoon on June nine, nineteen ninety-nine, issued by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in proceeding number ninety-seven-four hundred one thousand six hundred ten-zero two hundred ninety-two-FA is annulled. It is ordered that the respective file be returned to the Court of origin so that it may adapt the handling of this proceeding as ordered by the "Responsible Parenthood Law", and a new judgment be issued in accordance with the law. Let the Court take note of what was stated in the "Final Considerations" regarding the preservation of the file. * * * * Julia Varela Araya * * * * Eva María Camacho Vargas * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez* * * * Héctor Blanco González * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal* * jbarquero* * * (Sic); and subsidiarily to: "**ANNUL THE VOTE** of three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth of June of nineteen ninety-nine, from the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, in the Abbreviated Paternity Investigation Process 97-401610-292-FA. Let the effects of the process be rolled back to the moment when the right of defense was violated, being that moment, the performance of the genetic marker test, so that the proceeding continues as legally corresponds, and in this way it be demonstrated in the judgment that I am the daughter of Mr. [[Nombre2] ]**.**". (Sic).* * * * * * * * * * * * **2.-** The defendant answered in the terms indicated in the brief filed on the seventeenth of June of two thousand fourteen and raised the defenses of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) and lack of capacity or defective representation.

* * * * * * * * * * * **3.-** The prescribed legal formalities have been observed in the proceedings.

* **Magistrate Olaso Álvarez drafts the opinion; and,** * **WHEREAS:** * **I.- BACKGROUND:** [[Nombre1] ], in her capacity as plaintiff, files a motion for review against the final judgment with res judicata authority (autoridad de cosa juzgada) rendered at 3:00 p.m. on June 9, 1999, by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in the paternity investigation process, case file number 97-401610-292-FA, filed by her mother, Mrs. [[Nombre3] ], who acted in representation of her daughter since she had not reached the age of majority. As stated, in said process, a genetic marker test was ordered, and for that purpose, the parties were summoned to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Judicial Investigation Organization. She points out that she did not attend to undergo said test because her mother did not present her on the required day and time. Likewise, she alleges that Mrs. [[Nombre3] ] signed a brief stating that she had reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant, claiming it was an agreement favorable to her person. Based on that, she requested to withdraw from the claim. She adds that in the referenced judgment, the defense of lack of right invoked by the defendant was upheld, and the abbreviated paternity investigation claim was declared without merit in all its parts. She considers that the foregoing left her in a complete state of defenselessness (indefensión) since she was one year old and had no knowledge of what was happening, nor of the harm this would cause her. She explains that subsequently, her mother initiated three more paternity investigation processes, processed under case file numbers 00-400458-0292-FA; 01-400501-0216-FA; and 08-000949-0292-FA, which did not prosper because in all of them, the res judicata defense raised by [[Nombre2] ] was upheld based on the judgment rendered in process 97-401610-292-FA. She states as an important fact that in the last process filed –case file 08-000949-0292-FA-, prior to the res judicata defense being resolved, she attended with her mother to undergo the DNA test – visible on folio 148 of that case file-, but the comparison of her DNA with the DNA samples of the defendant could not be performed because he did not appear for the appointment. The motion for review is filed under the provisions 1) and 7) of article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), alleging not having been well represented, and because of that, being harmed by the following: Not knowing her biological origin; not having her father's surname; not having his financial support; not being able to inherit ab intestato. She invokes the fundamental right to know who one's parents are and the principle of responsible parenthood (paternidad responsable) announced in article 53, first paragraph of the Political Constitution, indicating that parents have obligations to their children. She argued that responsible parenthood has been recognized by the Costa Rican State in international human rights instruments, such as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which provides that every person has the duty to assist, feed, educate, and protect their minor children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, in numeral 18, indicates that States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. For its part, ordinal 16 of the additional protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, “*Protocol of San Salvador*”, provided relevantly as follows: “*Right of the child. Every child, whatever his or her parentage, has the right to the protection measures that his or her status as a minor requires from his or her family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow under the protection and responsibility of his or her parents...”. *Finally, she based the motion for review on article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, indicating that the child has the right from birth to a name, to acquire a nationality, and, as far as possible, to know his or her parents. She also invokes in her motion resolution No. 11,158 of 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (folios 40 to 53).

* **II.- REGARDING THE MOTION FOR REVIEW:** The motion for review is of an extraordinary and also exceptional nature, since it attacks a final judgment, with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). It is provided not as a normal recourse within the process, but outside of it, with the purpose of remedying any injustice arising not from errors of legal technique -which should have been challenged through normal recourses within the respective process-, but from facts that prevented the exercise of the right or from novel, supervening situations that warrant reviewing the prior jurisdictional decision. Due to that nature, precisely, it is only admissible in the cases exhaustively established in article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code and must necessarily be filed within the deadlines indicated in numeral 620 idem -3 months or 10 years-, depending on the circumstances. However, regarding the aspect of the deadline and the exhaustiveness, what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 11,158, of 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, must be taken into account, specifically related to actions for filiation of paternity or maternity, in which when referring to the alleged collision between the fundamental right of every person to know who their progenitors are and the principle of legal certainty, based on the figure of res judicata (article 98 bis, subsection m), Family Code (Código de Familia), indicated as follows: “*Thus, the foregoing means that any interested party in reopening a case in which the paternity of a person was investigated may come before the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, alleging as grounds for the motion, article 619, subsection 1°), of the Civil Procedure Code... Under this understanding, if in a prior process filiation or paternity was discussed, a judgment having been rendered with authority and efficacy of material res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or some force majeure cause prevented it, nothing prevents the possibility of filing an extraordinary motion for review before the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice to decree the nullity of the final judgment... This Constitutional Court considers that the extraordinary motion for review that can be filed by interested justiciable parties, when it was impossible for them, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or any other force majeure reason prevented it, should not be subject to any expiration period -as indicated in article 620, paragraph 2°, of the Civil Procedure Code-, since any restriction in this regard empties of content the fundamental and human right 'to know who one's parents are' enshrined in ordinals 53, paragraph 2°, of the Political Constitution and 7° of the Convention on the Rights of the Child... Consequently, the extraordinary motion for review may be filed, under the conditions already noted, by the interested party sine die -without time limit- and only once, provided that there is no variation in the scientific and technical means of proof -particularly biological tests- to determine with greater precision and exactness the filiation of a person. The latter to avoid the abusive exercise of that extraordinary means of review... In merit of the foregoing, it is imperative to evacuate the judicial consultation of unconstitutionality in the sense that article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the final judgment rendered in a filiation process with efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary motion for review, sine die -without time limit- and only once -as long as there is no variation in the scientific and technical means of proof that allow accrediting filiation with greater exactness, particularly biological tests- when the interested party found it impossible, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker test or some force majeure cause prevented them from offering it or participating in its production*”. (See resolution of this Chamber number 1148 of 9:35 a.m. on November 21, 2014, and 648 of 9:30 a.m. on July 2, 2014).

* **III.- REGARDING THE STANDING OF THE APPELLANT:** It is on record in the court file that the mother of [[Nombre1] ] –Mrs. [[Nombre3] ]-, when she filed the abbreviated paternity investigation claim No. 97-401610-0292-FA before the Family Court of Alajuela, did so not in her personal character, but as representative of the minor person, since she formulated the claim so that the then-girl would have paternal filiation and all the effects derived from it. Her condition as representative is given by law, as is clear from what is expressly regulated in article 155 of the Family Code, which –conducively- states: “*The mother, even if she is a minor, shall exercise parental authority (patria potestad) over children born out of wedlock and shall have full legal standing (plena personería jurídica) for those effects...”. *That is, in her capacity as representative –acting in the name of another- she filed the claim on November 20, 1997 –folios 2 and 3-. At that time, the minor person –now appellant- was two months minus one day old –folio 56 of the file before this Chamber indicating she was born on September 25, 1997-. Thus, that correlative power-duty of the mother -according to the provision of the norm-, represents the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers aimed at enabling the effective enjoyment of the rights –in this case- of [[Nombre1] ] through her mother. Such powers-duties make up parental authority –today called parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental)-, which are usually classified into three groups, namely: the personal content, the patrimonial content, and that related to representation. Specifically, the case of representation implies that the mother of the minor person intervenes in the name of the latter, while she has not acquired full capacity to act and provided she does not have an opposing interest; in which case a special guardian (curador especial) must be appointed for her -article 140 of the Family Code, 36, 37, and 38 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)-. On this matter, the following can be consulted in Costa Rican doctrine: “*The person is a “subject of law”, meaning that both the rights themselves and the faculty to exercise them potentially reside in them. (...). Given that human physical and intellectual development occurs gradually, laws customarily designate a time from which the person is considered to have the necessary capacity for the direct exercise of contracting and other acts of civil life. That time is designated by the name of majority (mayoridad), which today is generally fixed, as our law does, at eighteen years of age. Before reaching it, one is in the period of time called minority (minoridad), which is divided into infant minority and post-infant minority. The first extends from birth until puberty (...). The second minority comprises from fifteen to eighteen years of age*”. [Nombre5], Alberto. *Treatise on Persons. Volume I: Introduction and Law of the Person*. 5th ed. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 1998, p. 168 and 177. Thus, things being as they are, [[Nombre1] ] –and not her mother- has been a party in the present process since it was initiated, as she is the holder of the right of paternal filiation that was claimed, since “*the representative acts in the name of and on behalf of the minor...*[Nombre6]” , ; [Nombre7], and [Nombre8], . *Family Law*. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2010, p. 606. However, now –over 15 years of age and as cited in the words of jurist Brenes Córdoba-, [[Nombre1] ] acts in her own name and on her own behalf by virtue of numeral 108 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de Niñez y Adolescencia), having sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity to understand the harm caused by the person who held –in the past- her legal representation by legal mandate. The cardinal 108 Ibid states relevantly as follows: “*Article 108°- Standing to act as parties. When the interest of a minor person is involved in judicial processes, the following shall have standing to act as parties: a) Adolescents over fifteen years of age, personally, when so authorized by this Code, and in other cases, they shall be represented by those who exercise parental authority or by the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia) when applicable...”. *Having verified the appellant's standing, it is appropriate to proceed to analyze the invoked grounds for review.

* **IV.-** **REGARDING THE GROUND FOR REVIEW PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 619, SUBSECTION 1) OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE:** Subsection 1), of article 619 Ibid. establishes that the motion is admissible “*If the party requesting it demonstrates that, prevented by force majeure (fuerza mayor), or by act of the opposing party, they did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence, or appear at the proceeding where some evidence of the opposing party was produced; so that in either case defenselessness (indefensión) occurred and it was not possible during the course of the process to request rectification of the defect*”. In the motion for review, the plaintiff argued having suffered harm at the age of one year when she did not appear to perform the scientific DNA test in process No. 97-401610-0292-FA of Paternity Investigation “*due to the fact that my mother did not take me to the indicated place to perform it*”. She added that “*I had no knowledge of what was happening, nor of the harm this would cause me*” (folio 44). She likewise indicated that her mother, [[Nombre3] ], signed a brief in which she requested to withdraw from the claim having reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant, alleging it was an agreement favorable to her person. As a result of what happened, she perceives a state of defenselessness that, in light of the two objective prerequisites stipulated in the norm, namely, force majeure or act of the opposing party, must be analyzed. These normative prerequisites have the purpose of justifying –by provision of law- and in favor of the appellant, the occurrence of the following sub-prerequisites: a) not having recused the judge, b) not having presented some document or other type of evidence, or not having appeared at the proceeding where some evidence of the opposing party was produced. Given that the appellant has not invoked reasons for review related to the actions of the defendant, but has cited a state of defenselessness originating from the circumstances that prevented her attendance to the performance of the scientific test; this Chamber must analyze what was described by [[Nombre1] ] from the perspective of the prerequisite of force majeure as an event that may have prevented the presentation of the DNA test in process No. 97-401610-0292-FA of Paternity Investigation. The foregoing represents a semantic problem that must be resolved, namely: Our positive law lacks a definition of force majeure. It has been conceived “*occasionally*” as a fact or event that could not have been foreseen or that, even if foreseeable, cannot be avoided (see the pronouncements of this Chamber, numbers 219, of 9:00 a.m. on May 9, 2003, and 256, of 9:35 a.m. on April 25, 2007). However, from the study of this term in doctrine, it is clear that we are facing a problem of multivocity –a linguistic inconvenience by which it is identified that language formulas lack a single meaning-. This difficulty is well captured in the following excerpt: “*Let us begin by recalling that facing the set of words and phrases are ideas: the infinite virtuality of possible meanings, a vast surplus of senses in relation to the linguistic forms themselves. [Of course, this does not mean that «ideas» are on one side and «words» on the other. It is only intended to note that the former do not appear necessarily linked to such or which specific linguistic expressions; that is, there are more ideas than words, even though the former generally present themselves through the latter.]*” E. P. Haba, *The Mirage of Literal Interpretation: Crossroads of Legal Language*, Vlamarán S.A., Judicial School: San José, 2003, volume I, p. 21. Thus, without intending to exhaust the ideas that have been generated in relation to force majeure, some legal scholars have said the following: “*Force majeure shall be unforeseeable (storm, lightning, earthquake, war, act of the prince)*” V. Calatayud Ponce de León, *Civil Obligations*, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 262.

A significant affinity with the fortuitous event (caso fortuito) is recognized: "</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Presuppositions of the fortuitous event and of force majeure (fuerza mayor). (...) a) That such an event is extraordinary, out of the ordinary, not usual, and for that reason occurs independently of the will or actions of the debtor... b) That such an event is unforeseeable, and this unforeseeability must be assessed at the time the obligation is contracted... c) That such an event is insurmountable, which is assessed at the time of the breach and implies the material impossibility for the debtor to satisfy the creditor's interest</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">” F. Montero Piña, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Obligaciones</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, San José: Premiá Editores, 1999, p. 281. “ </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">It is, along with the fortuitous event, another of the factual circumstances that can exonerate the breaching debtor from culpability. It consists of those events that, whether or not foreseeable, are always inevitable and correspond to occurrences that bear no necessary relation to the debtor's situation. It is an event of external origin to the obligation, whose damaging result was inevitable even with the precautionary measures that could rationally have been taken</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">” Ribó cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Código Civil: con jurisprudencia con descriptores. </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">Tomo I. San José: IJSA, 2014, p. 610. “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Any event that could not have been foreseen or that, if foreseen, could not have been resisted</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. De [Nombre8] cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, Ídem. “ </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The notion of </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">force majeure</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">, in its central core of content, refers to events external to the subject's control, regarding whose occurrence the person lacks all decision-making power. Anglo-Saxons refer to force majeure with a highly expressive phrase: Acts of God. The archetypes of force majeure are acts of Nature –[Nombre9]., a hurricane, an earthquake, death-. However, there are acts of man that can also qualify as force majeure, both unlawful acts –a robbery, an assault-, and lawful ones, such as the so-called "acts of the prince" (hechos del príncipe) or acts of the exercise of state power –a law, a decree, a judicial resolution-. Those phenomena that, from the subject's point of view, appear as ineluctable qualify as force majeure. (...) In summary, there are three elements that define force majeure in our case law: -Unforeseeability (Imprevisibilidad) -Inevitability (Inevitabilidad) -[Nombre10]”.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> F. Torrealba Navas, Responsabilidad Civil, San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2011, p. 571 and 572. Likewise “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Vélez states that “... fortuitous events or force majeure are produced by two great causes: by nature or by the act of man”. Thus, an event produced by a fortuitous event would be the impetuosity of a river overflowing its banks, earthquakes or earth tremors, storms, plagues, fire. On the other hand, cases of force majeure are acts of man, such as war, the act of the sovereign, or the force of the [Nombre11]”. </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">Vélez cited by G. Cabanellas de Torres, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Diccionario Jurídico Universitario</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">. Tomo 1 A-I. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Heliasta, 2007, p. 172. “ </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The problem of the distinction between fortuitous event and force majeure. </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">(...) The fortuitous event is an external occurrence alien to the debtor (and to the thing: not defects thereof), independent of his will; furthermore, to release the debtor, it must not have been foreseeable or inevitable by adopting due diligence. (...) The Civil Code in such cases speaks, according to the tradition of Common Law, of fortuitous event (caso fortuito) (Arts. 1.093-3°, 1.136-1°), or force majeure (Arts. 457, 1.777, 1.748, 1.905), or both (Arts. 1.602, 1.625). The older doctrine distinguishes between one and the other: the former would be a product of the forces of nature (earthquake) and the latter of the act of a third party (war), or the former unforeseeable and the latter inevitable; or one an obstacle arising within the operation of the enterprise (fire) and the other external to it (robbery). However, in the Civil Code (and, previously, in [Nombre12] ), both expressions are generally interchangeable, and case law usually understands them as such</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">*”. J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, and others, Elementos de Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. Volumen I: Parte general, Teoría General del Contrato. 5th ed. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011, p. 174 and 175. “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Force majeure is not vis maxima, but rather that which a good father of a family cannot overcome. The unforeseeability or inevitability, which are not intrinsic, objective qualities of the event but rather relative to a specific situation and a concrete duty to prevent and avoid, thus depend on the degree of diligence required and the nature of the obligation”. </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, Ídem. In the words of the commentators [Nombre13]</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">and [Nombre14] , regarding force majeure, it must be considered that “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Although the dominant line in case law is to not distinguish fortuitous event from force majeure in terms of effects, it has echoed the doctrinal differentiation of both events, viewing the fortuitous event as the event that takes place within the enterprise or the circle affected by the obligation, while force majeure would be that which originates externally, with insurmountable violence, and which falls outside what can be foreseen in the ordinary and normal course of life</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">*”. L. Díez-Picazo and A. Gullón, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Sistema de Derecho Civil: El contrato en general. La relación obligatoria</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">. Volumen II. Tomo 1. 10th ed. Madrid: Tecnos, 2013, p. 205. In our legal system, the Civil Code treats force majeure as one of the ways that produces the release of the debtor in the area of the Law of Obligations: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Article 702.- The debtor who fails to fulfill his obligation, whether in substance or in manner, shall be responsible for the very fact of the damages and losses caused to his creditor, unless the failure arises from an act of the latter, force majeure, or a fortuitous event</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. Or, as an exemption from liability: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Article 1071.- If the seller does not deliver the thing at the agreed time, the buyer may, at his choice, request either the termination of the sale or to be placed in possession of the thing. If the seller has not made the transfer (tradición), due to a fortuitous event or force majeure, there shall be no grounds for termination</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”; “ </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Article 1180.- Carriers shall also be liable for damages caused by delay in the trip, or for failing to fulfill their contract in any other way, save for a fortuitous event or force majeure</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”; and “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Article 1267.- (...) It is incumbent upon the agent to prove the force majeure or fortuitous event that prevents him from carrying out the orders of the principal</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. Indeed, -as we have confirmed through a brief doctrinal review-, achieving a consensus on the definition of force majeure is a task as complex in the vast world of legal discourse that the Spanish commentator Manuel Albaladejo debates other ideas, such as whether “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">fortuitous event and force majeure are synonymous expressions, or two different concepts</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. M. Albaladejo. </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">. 14th ed. Madrid: Edisofer, S.L., 2011, p. 181. He even comments that “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Determining whether an event constitutes a fortuitous event or force majeure involves a legal assessment...”.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> M. Albaladejo. Op. Cit., p.180. A perception that indeed, in the consideration of this Chamber, must be made with the caveat that in this specific case, the notion of force majeure must be transferred to a subject matter different from that addressed by the obligatory relationship, in order to understand it from a new perspective in which the legal bond is not of a patrimonial nature –though it entails economic consequences-, such as filiation (filiación). “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The concept of filiation comes from the Latin filius (son) and refers to the set of legal relations, determined by paternity and maternity, which bind the parents to the children. Our legal system provides for several ways through which this bond arises, given that it can occur by reason of a biological nexus or by a legal imposition</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. Sala Segunda, judgment n.° 766 at 10:05 a.m. on July 30, 2014. It is case law - the doctrine of the judges-, and not the letter of the law, that is responsible for nurturing legal institutes from other perspectives to comply with what the Sala Constitucional well explained through vote n.° 6120, at 3:05 p.m. on May 8, 2013: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The protection of the best interest of the minor is a duty that Constitutional Law imposes upon the State, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">and which must be reflected in the rulings and actions of all judicial and administrative authorities that comprise it. The judges of the Republic are obligated to apply the control of conventionality (control de convencionalidad)</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">which… allows for integrating the norms and principles contained in international human rights instruments into the rulings they issue in matters submitted to their knowledge</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. (The emphasis is not part of the original). In relation to this point, the following indicated by this office in judgment n.° 266, at 10:55 a.m. on March 26, 2009, must also be taken into account: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">...it could not be understood that the Controller of Constitutionality (Contralor de Constitucionalidad) limited the admissibility of the revision -under the terms established in said vote- to only two circumstances 'when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have genetic marker testing or some cause of force majeure prevented them from offering it or participating in its production', since it was clear in holding that '…the original constituent power itself took care to attenuate the rigor of legal certainty embodied in substantive res judicata, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already adjudicated proceeding through the filing of an extraordinary motion for review according to the grounds established by the infra-constitutional legal system or the ordinary legislator, in order to thereby modify or annul an unjust sentence and achieve that material justice prevails' (emphasis added).</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> Furthermore, the concept of force majeure contained in said vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">according to the terms established in doctrine, since the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration, as that granted to the 'acts of the opposing party' that would have left the appellant party in a state of defenselessness by making it impossible for them to present evidence during the proceeding... </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Furthermore, in this matter, the courts of justice, upon adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural rules, must attend to the best interest of the child (Articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 1 and 112 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">)</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. (The emphasis is not part of the original). This means that, given the fact that the studies of force majeure examined have been approached from a single perspective, that of the Law of Civil Obligations –in accordance with the doctrinal review conducted here-, for which, furthermore, a diversity of definitions of the same notion has emerged, demonstrating the absence of agreement on its content; and given the absence of analysis of said term from other legal disciplines, it is appropriate for that conception to evolve and adapt to other contexts. For this specific case, force majeure must be understood in light of the fundamental rights of Children and Adolescents. In relation to this, the Sala Constitucional in judgment n.° 3481 at 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, considered the following: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done solely and exclusively on the basis of their literal wording, since, to unravel, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutic instruments such as the teleological, institutional, systematic, and historical-evolutionary approaches. On this matter, the Título Preliminar of the Civil Code in its numeral 10 establishes that 'Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose'. Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms which have an area of meaning or field of reference as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm, it is necessary to inquire into its objective (ratio) or proposed and supposed end, with respect to which the norm has an instrumental nature –teleological method-. The interpreter must also confront, relate, and harmonize it with the rest of the legal norms that make up a particular legal institution –institutional method- and, in general, the legal system –systematic method-,</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> since norms are not watertight and isolated compartments but are connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, such that it must be applied to historical junctures in constant mutation –historical-evolutionary method-. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, as they are not exclusionary in nature, but rather they are diverse, indispensable moments or stages of the entire and transcendent interpretive act</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. Thus, the definitions noted regarding force majeure are extremely useful and from them maxims applicable to Family Law can be extracted, such as the fact that “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">force majeure</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">” represents an event external to the subject from whom said force is analyzed, and the impossibility for the subject to avoid it. The foregoing, especially to set aside analyses of situations that involve an examination of the causes for which an act of doing, refraining from doing, or giving was breached; or, a person is relieved of liability upon the occurrence of a harmful event; all characteristic of the Law of Obligations. Because, on the other hand, force majeure can be focused on as a situation that, viewed from a legal subject, presents itself in a way that they cannot combat it, preventing them from exercising a subjective right even when it stems from or originates in an act protected by law. That is, the genesis and realization of said event can emerge from a perfectly lawful act, such as the legal imperative that every minor person must be subject to the acts of representation of their parents or guardian –as the case may be-. Thus, when the requirements of [Nombre10] and inevitability characteristic of force majeure are present, the minor person is subjected by legal mandate to a legal representation that “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">falls outside the scope of the autonomy of the will</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">; its existence, survival, and extent </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">does not arise from or depend on the will of the person represented. It emanates directly from the legal mandate.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> The law imposes it, indicates the requirements to be its representative, regulates its powers to act and decide; </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">although this must always be in the interest, on behalf of, and on the account of a person or interests</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">, which are considered to require special protection that is entrusted to the legal representative</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. (The emphasis is not part of the original) [Nombre15].</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">cited by V. Calatayud Ponce de León, </span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Temas de Derecho Privado</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 164 and 165.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> Although, said representation entrusted to a third party has been the legal system's response to the real conditions affecting minor persons precisely because of their status as minors, -such as not being able to represent themselves, emotional and economic dependence, limited maturity, and lack of knowledge of their rights-; fathers and mothers have power \"</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">over</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">\" the minor person and not \"</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">for</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">\" them, since they make decisions and put them into practice regardless of determining what truly strengthens and consolidates the best interest of the minor person, and regardless of the consequences that such decisions generate.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">Therefore, those actions or omissions of those who exercise representation negatively and directly affect minor persons, constituting an insurmountable obstacle for them, i.e., a case of force majeure that interferes with the exercise of the subjective rights of Children and Adolescents. The foregoing fully agrees with the appreciation whereby it is conceived that this event is an external fact to the person -who in this case is the holder of the right-, who involuntarily bears a representation emanating from law, and which entails a harmful result for that person. Force majeure thus conceived is necessary since, as was confirmed, its concept has been built and developed based on creditor and debtor persons but not, -at least to the knowledge of these judges-, based on the rights of Children and Adolescents. Ultimately, the matter under study deserves an analysis in relation to the right of the minor person to know who their father and mother are –as is indeed done here-. Thus, it is fitting to recall the words that the Sala Constitucional itself, in judgment n.° 11.158, at 2:52 p.m. on August 1, 2007, noted regarding these human rights: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The fundamental right to know who one's parents are –especially when exercised together with the right to establish filiation bonds-, is connected to the principle of responsible parenthood enunciated by Article 53, paragraph 1°, of the Constitución Política by indicating that parents have obligations to their children –both those born within and outside of marriage-. These obligations of the parents or procreators imply a series of personal and patrimonial rights on the part of the procreated children for their proper development and optimal upbringing, which the ordinary legislator must develop and establish. Responsible parenthood is also established by the instruments of International Human Rights Law, thus Article XXX of the Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre provides, as relevant, that: 'Every person has the duty to assist, feed, educate, and protect their minor children (…)', the Convention on the Rights of the Child in numeral 18, paragraph 1, correctly states that '1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their primary concern shall be the best interest of the child'. For its part, numeral 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Protocol of San Salvador' approved by Ley No.7907 of September 3, 1999, provides, as relevant, the following: 'Right of Children. Every child, regardless of their filiation, has the right to the protection measures that their condition as a minor requires from their family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents (…)'. In short, the fundamental right to know who one's parents are, when exercised concurrently with the right to establish filiation relationships, and the procedural mechanisms of a legal nature to put them into action, constitute an instrument to make effective the principle of responsible parenthood enunciated by both the Constitución Política and the instruments of International Human Rights Law and which is also inherent to human dignity and the constitutional and international imperatives of special protection, care, and assistance for minors due to their intrinsic condition of vulnerability (Articles 51 of the Constitución Política, 25, paragraph 2, of the Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 19 of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 24, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. In the specific case, it is proven that the mother of [[Nombre1] ] whose paternity was being investigated did not present the girl for the performance of the scientific test. In the appeal before this Chamber, it is argued that she did not do so because she intended to withdraw from the proceeding on the grounds of having reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant allegedly favorable to the minor person. Note that by the time the petition for withdrawal of the paternity investigation lawsuit was filed on June 25, 1999 (page 21 of file n.° 97-401610-0292-FA), the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Ley n.° 7739 of January 6, 1998, published in La Gaceta n.° 26 on February 6, 1998, and which came into force on that same date, was already in effect.

That regulatory body, in Article 19 – original text of the rule – stated: “<span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">In proceedings involving the interests of minors, neither dismissal for abandonment nor voluntary withdrawal shall be admitted. It shall be the judge’s responsibility to advance the proceeding until judgment is rendered</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. In light of what has been developed above, this Chamber considers that the actions of [Name1]’s mother – in her capacity as legal representative (representante) –, coupled with [Name1]’s circumstance as a minor, justify the plaintiff’s absence from the DNA evidentiary proceeding because it constitutes a situation of force majeure (fuerza mayor) which, although originating in the legal provision by which [Name1] was under the legal representation of Mrs. [Name3], rendered [Name1] unable to counteract the unavoidable effects of her mother’s actions and omissions within proceeding No. 97-401610-0292-FA – which, although legitimate in light of the legal representation – affected [Name1] when, on November 19, 1998 – the date on which the appointment was granted by the Biochemistry Section, Forensic Sciences Laboratory of the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), folio 25 –, she did not attend the evidentiary proceeding because she was one year and two months old. These judges do not intend to demand that, by reason of what occurred, it would have been possible for [Name1], as the holder of the subjective right, to request the rescheduling of the date for the evidentiary proceeding or to demand that she be presented in time for it to be conducted. It is clear to this Chamber that, due to her young age, she could not have informed the Court of her circumstances. Even though her mother could have fulfilled the foregoing, the minor, who is a party to this proceeding and the principal person interested in having the evidentiary proceeding conducted, has demonstrated that the special circumstances concerning minors constituted a matter of force majeure (fuerza mayor) for [Name1]. The appellant herself invokes in the appeal that she has been left defenseless this entire time, without the possibility of rectifying what was done until the moment when – having reached 15 years of age – the regulations referring to the capacity to act allow her to proceed in defense of a fundamental right. The mother – as the legal representative (representante) of the child – by having filed the request for voluntary withdrawal (desistimiento) of the claim – written submission of June 25, 1998, presented during the processing of case file No. 97-401610-0292-FA – (folio 21), and subsequently having completely absented herself from the proceeding despite the request having been denied (folio 23), incurred in omissions of the duty to safeguard the fundamental rights of Children and Adolescents of her daughter – deposited in her person by the State itself –, which came to generate harmful procedural consequences for the subjective rights of [Name1]. The foregoing, to the point that it prevented, at the time, the realization of the right to know one’s biological origin as a personality right, resulting in the lack of satisfaction of other rights such as bearing the surname of her father, the possibility of appearing as an heir to his estate, and requesting the right to child support – among others. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the specific case falls under the circumstance of subsection 1), of Article 619, of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), specifically the circumstance by which force majeure (fuerza mayor) prevents the presentation of some evidence; which in this case corresponds to the scientific DNA evidence (subsection 6 of Article 318 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)), so that it is appropriate to grant the appeal based on that rule.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">*</span> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%; font-size:18pt"><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">V.- REGARDING THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ESTABLISHED IN SUBSECTION 7 OF ARTICLE 619 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">:</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> The appellant also based the review on the circumstance of subsection 7) of the cited provision. This section establishes another reason giving rise to the claim: “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">There having been improper representation (indebida representación) throughout the entire proceeding</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. However, from the very statement of the grounds, it is evident that improper representation (indebida representación) is being confused with inadequate legal advice, a circumstance that does not fit within the transcribed rule. Indeed, regarding improper representation (indebida representación), the Chamber has explained that “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">When the Code speaks of ‘improper representation’ it refers to the illegitimate integration of the proceeding in those cases where one of the parties, by reason of its legal nature or particular situation, must act through another person so that its right of defense is properly safeguarded, as occurs in the case of legal entities, minors, legal incompetents, and estates. In such cases, the litigation must be integrated with the legal representative (representante) having sufficient power to act in court on behalf of those persons, because if the representation is not proper, either because it does not exist or because the person holding it lacks sufficient authority to act, an imperfection in procedural standing (legitimación procesal) occurs, to the detriment of the right of defense, and this prevents rendering a valid judgment</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">” (vote number 646, at 10:20 hours on June 30, 2000). In the specific case – as already stated –, the minor acted through legal representation (representante) – Article 102, Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) –, without any defect being observed, since the person who exercised it was her mother, in the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) – Canon 140, Family Code (Código de Familia) – and not another person. Consequently, in the appellant’s words, the improper legal advice she alleges, in the sense that her mother did not take her to the scientific evidentiary proceeding, does not fit the normative circumstance of improper representation (indebida representación).</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">*</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%; font-size:18pt"><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">VI.- FINAL PROVISIONS:</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt"> Thus, it is deemed appropriate to grant the petition for review (recurso de revisión) filed because the matter falls within the factual circumstance set forth in subsection 1) of Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil); to annul the judgment rendered at three o’clock in the afternoon on June ninth, nineteen ninety-nine, by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in proceeding No. 97-401610-0292-FA. Consequently, it is appropriate to order the return of the case file to said Court of origin so that the proceeding may be brought into conformity with the current procedural regulations, Law No. 8101 “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Ley de Paternidad Responsable</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">”. Likewise, the processing must be returned to that procedural stage that allows the minor to fully exercise her right of defense and, especially, to allow her to counteract the adverse procedural effects caused by her then legal representative (representante legal). Given the age of case file No. 97-401610-0292-FA, the observation is made to the judicial authority that will have charge of processing this matter that it must take the necessary precautions so that this proceeding is not affected by the selection and elimination of old documents so that the provisions set forth in Circular No. 29-2012 issued by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Tabla de plazos de conservación de expedientes, plazo de conservación de documentos base y directrices para la selección y eliminación de expedientes en materia de familia y pensiones alimentarias</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">” are complied with.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">*</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; font-size:18pt"><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">POR TANTO:</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">*</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%; font-size:18pt"><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">The petition for review (recurso de revisión) filed is granted and, in that sense, the judgment rendered at three o’clock in the afternoon on June ninth, nineteen ninety-nine, by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in proceeding number ninety-seven-four hundred one thousand six hundred ten- zero two hundred ninety-two-FA is annulled. It is ordered that the respective case file be returned to the Court of origin so that it may bring the processing of this proceeding into conformity as ordered by the “</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Ley de Paternidad Responsable</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt">” and that a new judgment be rendered according to law. Let the Court take note of what is stated in the “Final Considerations” with respect to the preservation of the case file.</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; vertical-align:sub; background-color:#ffffff">*</span></p> * * * * **Julia Varela Araya** * * * **Eva María Camacho Vargas** * * * **Héctor Blanco González** * **Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal** * ***jbarquero*** * * * **II.- REGARDING THE REVIEW RECOURSE:** The review recourse is extraordinary in nature and also exceptional, in that it attacks a final judgment, with the authority and efficacy of substantive res judicata. It is provided for not as a normal recourse within the process, but outside of it, with the aim of remedying any injustice deriving not from errors of legal technique—which should have been challenged through normal recourses, within the respective process—but rather from facts that prevented the exercise of the right or from novel, supervening situations that warrant reviewing the prior jurisdictional decision. By that very nature, precisely, it is only admissible in the cases exhaustively established in article 619 of the Código Procesal Civil and must necessarily be filed within the time limits indicated in numeral 620 idem—3 months or 10 years—depending on the circumstances. However, regarding the aspect of the time limit and exhaustiveness, account must be taken of what was resolved by the Sala Constitucional in judgment number 11.158, of 14:52 hours on August 1, 2007, specifically related to actions for the determination of paternity or maternity, in which, referring to the alleged collision between the fundamental right of every person to know who their parents are and the principle of legal certainty, grounded in the figure of res judicata (article 98 bis, subsection m), Código de Familia), it stated the following: “*Thus, the foregoing means that any interested party in reopening a case in which the paternity of a person has been investigated may appeal to the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, alleging as grounds for the recourse article 619, subsection 1°), of the Código Procesal Civil... Under this reasoning, if in a previous process filiation or paternity was discussed, a judgment having been handed down with the authority and efficacy of substantive res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have genetic marker testing or some force majeure prevented it, nothing impedes the possibility of filing an extraordinary review recourse before the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia so that the nullity of the final judgment is decreed... This Tribunal Constitucional considers that the extraordinary review recourse that may be filed by interested litigants, when it was impossible for them, due to the state of development of technique or science, to have genetic marker testing or any other force majeure reason prevented it, should not be subject to any statute of limitations—as indicated by article 620, paragraph 2°, of the Código Procesal Civil—since any restriction in this regard empties the fundamental and human right 'to know who one's parents are' enshrined in articles 53, paragraph 2°, of the Constitución Política and 7° of the Convention on the Rights of the Child... Consequently, the extraordinary review recourse may be filed, under the conditions already noted, by the interested party sine die—without time limit—and only once, provided that there is no change in the scientific and technical evidentiary means—particularly biological tests—to determine with greater precision and accuracy the filiation of a person. The latter to prevent the abusive exercise of that extraordinary means of recourse... In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to resolve the judicial consultation of unconstitutionality in the sense that article 98, subsection m), of the Código de Familia, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the final judgment rendered in a filiation process with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary review recourse, sine die—without time limit—and only once—as long as there is no change in the scientific and technical evidentiary means that allow filiation to be accredited with greater accuracy, particularly biological tests—when it was impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have genetic marker testing or some force majeure prevented them from offering it or participating in its production*”. (See resolution of this Sala number 1148 of 9:35 hours on November 21, 2014, and 648 of 9:30 hours on July 2, 2014).* **III.- REGARDING THE STANDING OF THE RECURRENT PARTY:** The case file records that the mother of [Nombre1]—Mrs. [Nombre2]—when she filed the abbreviated lawsuit for investigation of paternity No. 97-401610-0292-FA before the Juzgado de Familia de Alajuela, did so not in her personal capacity, but as the representative of the minor person, since she formulated the lawsuit so that the then-child would have paternal filiation and all the effects deriving therefrom. Her condition as representative is given by law, as is evident from what is expressly regulated in article 155 of the Código de Familia which—pertinently—states: “*The mother, even if she is a minor, shall exercise parental authority (patria potestad) over children born out of wedlock and shall have full legal standing for those purposes...”. *That is, in her capacity as representative—acting in another's name—she filed the lawsuit on November 20, 1997—folios 2 and 3—. At that time, the minor person—now the recurrent party—was two months minus one day old—folio 56 of the file before this Sala indicating she was born on September 25, 1997—. Thus, that correlative power-duty for the mother—as the rule provides—represents the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers aimed at enabling the effective enjoyment of rights—in this case—of [Nombre1] through her mother. Such powers-duties comprise parental authority (patria potestad)—now called parental responsibility—which are usually classified into three groups, namely: personal content, patrimonial content, and content related to representation. Specifically, the case of representation implies that the mother of the minor person intervenes in the latter's name, while the minor has not acquired full capacity to act and provided she does not have an opposing interest; in which case a special guardian must be appointed for them—article 140 of the Código de Familia, 36, 37 and 38 of the Código Civil—. On this matter, the following can be consulted in Costa Rican doctrine: “*The person is a 'subject of rights', meaning that both the rights themselves and the power to exercise them potentially reside in the person. (...). Given that human physical and intellectual development occurs gradually, laws customarily designate an age from which the person is considered to have the necessary capacity for the direct exercise of contracting and other acts of civil life. That age is designated by the name of majority, which is now generally fixed, as our law does, at eighteen completed years. Before reaching it, one is in the span of time called minority, which is divided into infant minority and post-infant minority. The first extends from birth until puberty (...). The second minority comprises from fifteen to eighteen years*”. [Nombre3], Alberto. *Tratado de las Personas. Volumen I: Introducción y Derecho de la Persona*. 5th ed. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 1998, p. 168 and 177. As matters stand, [Nombre1]—and not her mother—has been a party in the present process since it was instituted, because she is the holder of the right of paternal filiation that was claimed, since “*the representative acts in the name and place of the minor...* ” [Nombre4], ; [Nombre5], and [Nombre6], . *Derecho de la Familia*. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2010, p. 606. However, now—past 15 years of life and as cited in the words of jurist Brenes Córdoba—[Nombre1] acts in her own name and on her own account by virtue of numeral 108 of the Código de Niñez y Adolescencia, having sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity to understand the harm caused by whoever held—in the past—her legal representation by mandate of law. Article 108 Ibid reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “*Article 108°- Standing to act as parties. When the interest of a minor person is involved in judicial processes, the following shall have standing to act as parties: a) Adolescents over fifteen years of age, personally, when so authorized by this Code, and in other cases, they shall be represented by those exercising parental authority or by the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia when applicable...”. *Having verified the recurrent party's standing, it is appropriate to proceed to analyze the grounds for review invoked. * **IV.-*** REGARDING THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 619, SUBSECTION 1) OF THE CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL:* Subsection 1), of article 619 Ibid. establishes that the recourse is admissible “*If the party requesting it demonstrates that, because they were prevented by force majeure, or by the act of the opposing party, they did not challenge the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence, or appear at the proceeding in which evidence from the opposing party was produced; such that in either case there was defenselessness (indefensión) and it was not possible in the course of the process to request rectification of the defect*”. In the review recourse, the plaintiff argued having suffered harm at the age of one year when she did not appear to undergo the scientific DNA test in process No. 97-401610-0292-FA of Investigation of Paternity “*because my mother did not take me to the place indicated to perform it*”. She added that “ *I had no knowledge of what was happening, nor of the harm this would cause me*” (folio 44). She also indicated that her mother [Nombre2] signed a brief requesting to withdraw the lawsuit due to having reached an out-of-court settlement with the defendant, alleging it was an agreement favorable to her person. As a result of what occurred, she perceives a state of defenselessness (indefensión) that, in light of the two objective presuppositions stipulated in the rule, namely, force majeure or the act of the opposing party, must be analyzed. These normative presuppositions have the purpose of justifying—by provision of law—and in favor of the recurrent party, the occurrence of the following sub-presuppositions: a) not having challenged the judge, b) not having presented some document or other type of evidence, or not having appeared at the proceeding in which evidence from the opposing party was produced. Because the recurrent party has not invoked reasons for review related to the acts of the defendant, but has cited a state of defenselessness (indefensión) originating in circumstances that prevented her attendance at the scientific test; this Sala must analyze what was described by [Nombre1] from the perspective of the presupposition of force majeure as an event that may have prevented the presentation of the DNA evidence in process No. 97-401610-0292-FA of Investigation of Paternity. The foregoing represents a semantic problem that must be resolved, namely: Our positive law lacks a definition of force majeure. It has been conceived “*occasionally*” as a fact or event that could not have been foreseen or that, even being foreseeable, cannot be avoided (see the pronouncements of this Sala, numbers 219, of 9:00 hours on May 9, 2003, and 256, of 9:35 hours on April 25, 2007). However, from the study of this term in legal doctrine, it is clear that we are facing a problem of multivocity—a linguistic drawback by which it is identified that language formulas lack a single meaning—. This difficulty is well captured in the following excerpt: “*Let us begin by recalling that, opposite the set of words and phrases, are the ideas: the infinite virtuality of possible meanings, a vast surplus of senses relative to the linguistic forms themselves. [Of course, this does not mean that «ideas» are on one side and «words» on the other. It only aims to note that the former do not appear linked in a necessary way to such or such determined linguistic expressions; that is, there are more ideas than words, however much the former are generally presented through these.]*” E. P. Haba, *El espejismo de la interpretación literal: Encrucijadas del lenguaje jurídico*, Vlamarán* S.A., Escuela Judicial: San José, 2003, volume I, p. 21. Thus, without attempting to exhaust the ideas that have been generated in relation to force majeure, some legal scholars have stated the following: “*Force majeure will be unforeseeable (storm, lightning, earthquake, war, act of the prince)” *V. Calatayud Ponce de León, *Las obligaciones civiles*, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 262. An important identity is recognized with the fortuitous event (caso fortuito): “*Presuppositions of the fortuitous event and force majeure. (...) a) That such fact be extraordinary, out of the ordinary, not usual, and therefore occurs independently of the debtor's will or action... b) That such fact be unforeseen, and this unforeseeability must be assessed at the time the obligation is contracted... c) That such fact be insuperable, which is assessed at the time of non-performance and entails the material impossibility of the debtor to satisfy the creditor's interest*” F. Montero Piña, *Obligaciones*, San José: Premiá Editores, 1999, p. 281. “ *It is, with the fortuitous event, another of the factual circumstances that can exonerate the non-performing debtor from culpability. It is constituted by those facts that, whether or not foreseeable, are always inevitable and correspond to events that bear no necessary relation to the debtor's situation. It is a fact of origin external to the obligation and whose harmful result was inevitable even with the precautionary measures that could rationally have been taken*” Ribó cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, *Código Civil: con jurisprudencia con descriptores*. Volume I. San José: IJSA, 2014, p. 610. “*Any event that could not have been foreseen or that, if foreseen, could not have been resisted*”. From [Nombre6] cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, Idem. “ *The notion of* ***force majeure*** *, in its core content, refers to facts external to the subject's control, regarding whose occurrence the person lacks all decision-making power. Anglo-Saxons refer to force majeure with a highly expressive phrase: Acts* of* God. The archetypes of force majeure are acts of Nature –[Nombre7]., a hurricane, an earthquake, death–. However, there are acts of man that can also qualify as force majeure, both illicit acts –a robbery, an assault–, and licit ones, such as the so-called 'acts of the prince' or acts of the exercise of state power –a law, a decree, a judicial resolution–. Those phenomena that from the subject's point of view appear as ineluctable qualify as force majeure. (...) In summary, three elements define force majeure in our jurisprudence: -Unforeseeability -Inevitability -[Nombre8]*”. F. Torrealba Navas, Responsabilidad Civil, San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2011, p. 571 and 572. Likewise “*Vélez says that '... fortuitous events or force majeure are produced by two great causes: by nature or by the act of man.' Thus, a fact produced by fortuitous event would be the impetuosity of a river bursting its banks, earthquakes or earth tremors, tempests, plagues, fire. In contrast, cases of force majeure are acts of man, such as war, the act of the sovereign, or the force of the [Nombre9]*”. Vélez cited by G. Cabanellas de Torres, *Diccionario Jurídico Universitario*. Volume 1 A-I. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Heliasta, 2007, p. 172. “ ***The problem of the distinction between fortuitous event and force.** *(...) The fortuitous event is an external occurrence alien to the debtor (and to the thing: not defects thereof), independent of their will; furthermore, to release the debtor, it must not have been foreseeable or avoidable through the exercise of due diligence. (...) The Civil Code in such cases speaks, in accordance with the tradition of Common Law, of fortuitous event (arts. 1.093-3°, 1.136-1°), or force majeure (arts. 457, 1.777, 1.748, 1.905), or of both (arts. 1.602, 1.625). Older doctrine distinguishes between one and the other: the former would be the product of forces of nature (earthquake) and the latter of the act of a third party (war), or the former unforeseeable and the latter inevitable; or one an obstacle arising within the functioning of the enterprise (fire) and the other external to it (robbery). But in the Civil Code (and, previously, in [Nombre10]), both expressions are commonly interchangeable, and this is how jurisprudence usually understands them*”. J.L. Lacruz* Berdejo, et al., Elementos de Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. Volumen I: Parte general, Teoría General del Contrato. 5th ed. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011, p. 174 and 175. “*Force majeure is not vis* maxima, but that which a good father of a family cannot overcome. Unforeseeability or inevitability, which are not intrinsic and objective qualities of the event, but rather relative to a determined situation and a specific obligation to foresee and prevent, thus depend on the degree of diligence required and the nature of the obligation*”. J.L. Lacruz* Berdejo, Idem. In the words of the commentators [Nombre11] and [Nombre12], in relation to force majeure, it must be considered that “*Although the dominant line in jurisprudence is the non-distinction of the fortuitous event from force majeure in terms of effects, it has echoed the doctrinal differentiation of both events, which sees the fortuitous event as the occurrence that takes place within the enterprise or circle affected by the obligation, while force majeure would be that which originates outside, with insuperable violence, and which falls outside what can be foreseen in the ordinary and normal course of life*”. L. Díez-Picazo and A. Gullón, *Sistema de Derecho Civil: El contrato en general. La relación obligatoria*. Volume II. Book 1. 10th ed. Madrid: Tecnos, 2013, p. 205. In our legal system, the Código Civil treats force majeure as one of the forms that produces the release of the debtor in the case of the Law of Obligations: “*Article 702.- The debtor who fails to fulfill their obligation, whether in substance or in manner, shall be liable by that very fact for the damages and losses caused to their creditor, unless the failure stems from an act of the latter, force majeure, or fortuitous event*”. Or, as an exemption from liability: “*Article 1071.- If the seller does not deliver the thing within the agreed time, the buyer may at their choice request either the resolution of the sale or that they be placed in possession of the thing. If the seller has not effected delivery due to a fortuitous event or force majeure, there shall be no grounds for resolution*”; “ *Article 1180.- Carriers are also liable for the damages caused by delay in the journey, or for failing to comply with their contract in any other way, save for a fortuitous event or force majeure*”; and “*Article 1267.- (...) It is incumbent upon the agent to prove the force majeure or fortuitous event that prevents them from carrying out the principal's instructions*”. Indeed—as we have verified through a brief doctrinal review—, reaching an agreement on the definition of force majeure is as complex a task in the vast world of legal discourse that the Spanish commentator Manuel Albaladejo debates other ideas such as, for example, whether “*fortuitous event and force majeure are synonymous expressions, or two different concepts*”. M. Albaladejo. *Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones*. 14th ed. Madrid: Edisofer, S.L., 2011, p. 181. He even comments that “*Determining whether a fact constitutes a fortuitous event or force majeure involves a legal assessment...*”. M. Albaladejo. Op. Cit., p. 180. A perception that indeed, in this Sala's opinion, must be made with the consideration that in this specific case, the notion of force majeure must be transferred to a subject matter different from that of the obligatory relationship, to understand it from a new perspective in which the legal bond is not of a patrimonial content—though it does entail economic consequences—, as is filiation. “*The concept of filiation comes from the Latin filius (son) and refers to the set of legal relationships, determined by paternity and maternity, that link parents to children. Our legal system provides several forms through which this linkage arises, given that it can occur due to a biological nexus or by legal imposition*”. Sala Segunda, judgment no. 766 of 10:05 hours on July 30, 2014.

It is the jurisprudence—doctrine of the adjudicators—and not the letter of the law, that is responsible for nourishing legal institutions from other perspectives to fulfill what the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) well explained through Voto n.° 6120, at 15:05 hours on May 8, 2013: “The protection of the best interest of the minor is a duty that Constitutional Law imposes on the State, and it must be reflected in the resolutions and actions of all judicial and administrative authorities that comprise it. The judges of the Republic are obligated to apply the control of conventionality, which… allows the integration of the norms and principles contained in international human rights instruments into the resolutions they issue in matters submitted to their knowledge”. (The highlighting is not part of the original). In relation to this point, what was indicated by this office in judgment n.° 266, at 10:55 hours on March 26, 2009, must also be considered: “...it could not be understood that the Controller of Constitutionality limited the admissibility of the review—in the terms established in said vote—to only two circumstances 'when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to have the genetic marker evidence or some cause of force majeure has prevented them from offering it or participating in its production', because it was clear in maintaining that '…the original constituent power itself took care to attenuate the rigor of legal certainty that material res judicata embodies, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already adjudicated process through the filing of an extraordinary review appeal according to the grounds established by the infra-constitutional legal system or the ordinary legislator, in order to thus modify or annul an unjust judgment and ensure that material justice prevails' (emphasis added). Furthermore, the concept of force majeure contained in said vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, according to the terms established in doctrine, because the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration, as that granted to the 'acts of the opposing party' that had left the appellant party in a state of defenselessness by making it impossible for them to present evidence during the process... Furthermore, in this matter, courts of justice, when adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural norms, must attend to the best interest of the child (articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code)”. (The emphasis is not part of the original). This means that, faced with the fact that the studies on force majeure examined have been approached from a single perspective, that of Civil Obligations Law—according to the doctrinal review carried out here—for which, moreover, a diversity of definitions of the same notion have surfaced, evidencing the absence of agreement on its content; and faced with the absence of analysis of said term from other legal disciplines, it is appropriate that said conception evolve and adapt to other contexts. Specifically, force majeure must be understood in light of the fundamental rights of Childhood and Adolescence. In relation to this, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment n.° 3481 at 14:03 hours on May 2, 2003, considered the following: “The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done solely and exclusively based on their literal wording, since, to unravel, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutic instruments such as the finalist, the institutional, the systematic, and the historical-evolutionary. On this particular, the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code in its numeral 10 establishes that ‘Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper sense of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose’. Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms which have an area of meaning or field of reference as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm it is necessary to investigate its objective (ratio) or proposed and assumed purpose, regarding which the norm has an instrumental nature –teleological method–. The interpreter must, likewise, confront it, relate it, and harmonize it with the rest of the legal norms that make up, in particular, a legal institution –institutional method– and, in general, the legal system –systematic method–, since norms are not watertight and isolated compartments but are connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, in such a way that it must be applied to constantly changing historical junctures –historical-evolutionary method–. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, as they do not have an exclusive character, but rather they are diverse, essential moments or stages of the entire and transcendent interpretive act”. Thus, the definitions noted on force majeure are extremely useful and from them maxims applicable to Family Law can be extracted, such as the fact that “force majeure” represents an event external to the subject from whom said force is analyzed and the impossibility for them to avoid it. The foregoing, above all, to set aside the analyses of situations that imply an examination of causes for which an act of doing, not doing, or giving was breached; or else, a person is relieved of liability upon the occurrence of a harmful event; all characteristic of Obligations Law. For, on the other hand, force majeure can be focused on as a situation that, viewed from a legal subject, presents itself in a way that they cannot combat it, preventing them from exercising a subjective right even when it comes from or originates in an act protected by a law. That is to say, the genesis and concretization of said event can emerge from a perfectly lawful act such as the legal imperative that every minor must be subject to the acts of representation of their parents or guardian –as the case may be–. Thus, with the requirements of [Name8] and inevitability characteristic of force majeure being present, the minor is subjected by legal mandate to a legal representation that “falls outside the scope of autonomy of will; its existence, subsistence, and extent is neither born of nor depends on the will of the represented person. It emanates directly from the legal mandate. The law imposes it, indicates the requirements to be its representative, regulates its powers to act and decide; although this must always be in the interest, on behalf of, and at the account of a person or some interests, which are estimated to need special protection entrusted to the legal representative”. (The highlighting is not part of the original) [Name13]. cited by V. Calatayud Ponce de León, Temas de Derecho Privado, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 164 and 165. Although, said representation entrusted to a third party has been the response of the legal system to the real conditions affecting minors precisely because of their condition as minors—such as the inability to represent themselves, emotional and economic dependence, scarce maturity, and ignorance of their rights—; fathers and mothers, have “disposition over” the minor and not “disposition for” them, as they make decisions and implement them regardless of determining what truly strengthens and consolidates the best interest of the minor, as well as the consequences generated by such decisions. So, those actions or omissions of those who exercise the representation negatively and directly affect minors, constituting an insurmountable obstacle for them, that is, a case of force majeure that interferes with the exercise of the subjective rights of Childhood and Adolescence. The foregoing fully agrees with the appreciation by which it is conceived that this event is an external fact to the person—who in this case is the right holder—, who involuntarily bears a representation emanating from law, and which entails a harmful result for them. Force majeure thus conceived becomes necessary since, as it was verified, its concept has been grounded and developed based on creditor and debtor persons but not—at least to the knowledge of these adjudicators—, from the rights of Childhood and Adolescence. Ultimately, the matter under study deserves an analysis in relation to the right of the minor to know who their father and mother are—as is indeed done here—. Thus, it is appropriate to recall the words that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself, in judgment n.° 11.158, at 14:52 hours on August 1, 2007, pointed out regarding these human rights: “The fundamental right to know who one's parents are—especially when it is exercised together with the right to establish filiation ties—, is connected to the principle of responsible parenthood stated in article 53, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution by indicating that parents have obligations to their children—both those born within or outside of marriage—. Those obligations of the progenitors or procreators entail a series of personal and patrimonial rights vested in the procreated children for their adequate development and optimal upbringing, which the ordinary legislator must develop and establish. Responsible parenthood is also established by the instruments of International Human Rights Law, thus article XXX, of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides, as relevant, that: ‘Every person has the duty to aid, feed, educate, and shelter their minor children (…)’, the Convention on the Rights of the Child in numeral 18, paragraph 1, rightly states that ‘1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their basic concern shall be the best interest of the child’. For its part, numeral 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Protocol of San Salvador’ approved by Law No.7907 of September 3, 1999, provides, as relevant, the following: ‘Right of the child. Every child, whatever their filiation, has the right to the protection measures that their condition as a minor requires from their family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow under the protection and responsibility of their parents (…)’. In sum, the fundamental right to know who one's parents are, when exercised concomitantly with the right to establish filiation relationships, and the procedural mechanisms of a legal nature to enforce them constitute an instrument to make effective the principle of responsible parenthood that is enunciated both by the Political Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law and that is also consubstantial to human dignity and to the constitutional and international imperatives of special protection, care, and assistance of minors due to their intrinsic condition of vulnerability (articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 25, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 24, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)”. In the specific case, it is proven that the mother of [[Nombre1] ], whose paternity was being investigated, did not present the girl for the performance of the scientific test. In the appeal before this Chamber, it is argued that she did not do so because she intended to withdraw from the process (desistir del proceso) due to having reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant party supposedly favorable for the minor. Note that when the request for withdrawal from the paternity investigation lawsuit (desistimiento de la demanda de investigación de paternidad) was filed on June 25, 1999 (folio 21 of expediente n.° 97-401610-0292-FA), the Childhood and Adolescence Code, Law n.° 7739 of January 6, 1998, published in La Gaceta n.° 26 on February 6, 1998 and which came into effect on that same date, was already in force. That normative body in article 19—original text of the norm—stated: “In processes that involve the interest of minors, neither abandonment (deserción) nor withdrawal (desistimiento) shall be admissible. It shall correspond to the judge to propel the process forward until the issuance of the judgment”. In light of what was previously developed, this Chamber considers that the actions of the mother of [[Nombre1] ]—in her capacity as representative—, coupled with her circumstance as a minor, justifies the absence of the plaintiff party from the practice of the DNA test because it constitutes a situation of force majeure that, although originating from the legal provision by which [[Nombre1] ] was under the representation of Mrs. [[Nombre2] ]; she was unable to combat the inescapable effects of her mother's actions and omissions within process n.° 97-401610-0292-FA—which, although legitimate in light of the representation—, affected her when on November 19, 1998—the date on which the appointment was granted by the Biochemistry Section, Forensic Sciences Laboratory of the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), folio 25—, she did not attend the test because she was one year and two months old. These adjudicators do not intend to demand that, by reason of what happened, it would have been possible for [[Nombre1] ], as the holder of the subjective right, to request the rescheduling of the date for the test performance or else, to demand that she be presented on time for its practice. It is clear—for this Chamber—that by reason of her young age, she could not have informed the Court of her circumstances. Even though her mother could have fulfilled the foregoing, the party to this process—the minor and main interested party in having the test performed—, has demonstrated that the special circumstances that pertain to minors constituted a question of force majeure for her person. The appellant herself invokes in the appeal that she has been left defenseless all this time, without the possibility of rectifying what was done until the moment when—having reached 15 years of age—, the regulations referring to the capacity to act allow her to proceed in defense of a fundamental right. The mother—as representative of the girl—, having formulated the request for withdrawal from the lawsuit (desistimiento de la demanda)—writing of June 25, 1998 filed during the processing of expediente n.° 97-401610-0292-FA— (folio 21), and subsequently completely absenting herself from the process despite the request having been rejected (folio 23), incurred in omissions of the duty to safeguard the fundamental rights of Childhood and Adolescence of her daughter—entrusted to her by the State itself—, which came to generate pernicious procedural consequences for the subjective rights of [[Nombre1] ]. The foregoing, to the point that it prevented, at the time, the realization of the right to know her biological origin as a right of personality, resulting in the non-satisfaction of other rights such as bearing the surname of her father, the possibility of appearing as heir to his estate, and requesting the right to support (derecho alimentario)—among others—. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the specific case fits within the assumption of subsection 1), of article 619, of the Civil Procedure Code, specifically in the assumption whereby, because force majeure prevents it, the presentation of some evidence is not possible; which in this instance corresponds to the scientific DNA test (article 318 subsection 6) of the Civil Procedure Code), such that it is appropriate to grant the appeal based on that norm.*</p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">V.- REGARDING THE GROUND FOR REVIEW PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 619 SUBSECTION 7) OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">:</span> The appellant also based the review on the assumption of subsection 7) of the cited numeral. This section establishes another reason giving rise to the claim: “There having been improper representation (indebida representación) throughout the entire process”. However, from the very enunciation of the grounds, it is clear that improper representation is being confused with inadequate legal counsel, an assumption that does not fit within the transcribed norm. Indeed, regarding improper representation, the Chamber has explained that “When the Code speaks of 'improper representation' it refers to the illegitimate integration of the process in those cases where one of the parties, due to their legal nature or particular situation, must act through another person, so that their right of defense is duly protected, as occurs in the case of legal entities, minors, legally incapacitated persons, and estates. In such cases, the litis must be integrated with the representative having sufficient power to act in court on behalf of those persons, because if the representation is not the proper one, because it does not exist or because the one who holds it lacks sufficient faculties to act, an imperfection occurs in the procedural standing, to the detriment of the right of defense, and that prevents issuing a valid judgment” (Voto number 646, at 10:20 hours on June 30, 2000). In the specific case—as has already been set out—, the minor acted through representation—article 102, Civil Procedure Code—, without any defect being observed, since the one who exercised it was her mother, in the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental)—canon 140, Family Code—and not another person. Consequently, according to the appellant's words, the improper counsel she accuses, in the sense that her mother did not take her to the practice of the scientific test, does not fit within the normative assumption of improper representation.” *</p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>*</span><span> </span></p></div></body></html>" All of legal age, single, attorneys, and residents of Alajuela, with the indicated exceptions.

**WHEREAS:**

1.- The plaintiff, in a brief filed on July ninth, two thousand thirteen, brought this action so that the defendant would be principally condemned in judgment to: “In application of the Principle of Procedural Economy and in consideration of the Principle of the Best Interest of the Child, I request that a genetic marker test be ordered for Mr. [[Nombre2]], who has never undergone this technical test; as well as for the undersigned and my mother [[Nombre3]], who already underwent this test at the Forensic Medical Service on July second, 2009, so that the judgment may declare: a. That the undersigned [[Nombre1]] is the daughter of the defendant [[Nombre2]] and that I therefore have the right to bear his surname. b. That the respective AMENDMENT of the undersigned's birth records at the Civil Registry and the Birth Registry be ordered, with the surname of my respective father. That is, to be registered as [[Nombre4]]. c. That the right to receive child support held by [[Nombre1]] in relation to [[Nombre2]] be declared. d. That the right to intestate succession held by [[Nombre1]] in relation to her father [[Nombre2]] be declared.” (Sic); and subsidiarily to: “THAT THE JUDGMENT of three o'clock in the afternoon of June ninth, nineteen ninety-nine, from the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, in the Summary Paternity Investigation Proceeding 97-401610-292-FA, BE ANNULLED. That the effects of the proceeding be rolled back to the moment when the right to defense was violated, this moment being the execution of the genetic marker test, so that the procedure continues as legally appropriate, and in this way it is demonstrated in the judgment that I am the daughter of Mr. [[Nombre2]].” (Sic).

2.- The defendant answered in the terms indicated in the brief filed on June seventeenth, two thousand fourteen, and raised the defenses of lack of standing and lack of capacity or defective representation.

3.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

**Magistrate Olaso Álvarez writes for the Court; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- BACKGROUND:** [[Nombre1]], in her capacity as the plaintiff, files a petition for review against the final judgment with the authority of res judicata (cosa juzgada) rendered at 3:00 PM on June 9, 1999, by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in the paternity investigation proceeding, case file number 97-401610-292-FA, filed by her mother, Mrs. [[Nombre3]], who acted on behalf of her daughter since she had not reached the age of majority. As indicated, the genetic marker test was ordered in said proceeding, and for this purpose, the parties were summoned to appear at the Biochemistry Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency. She states that she did not attend to undergo said test because her mother did not present her on the required day and time. Likewise, she alleges that Mrs. [[Nombre3]] signed a brief indicating that an extrajudicial settlement had been reached with the defendant, claiming it was a favorable agreement for her person. On these grounds, she requested to withdraw the complaint. She adds that in the referenced judgment, the defense of lack of right invoked by the defendant was upheld, and the summary paternity investigation complaint was declared without merit on all its counts. She considers that the foregoing left her in a complete state of defenselessness since she was one year old and had no knowledge of what was happening, nor of the harm this would cause her. She explains that subsequently, her mother initiated three more paternity investigation proceedings, processed under case file numbers 00-400458-0292-FA; 01-400501-0216-FA; and 08-000949-0292-FA, which did not prosper because in all of them the res judicata defense raised by [[Nombre2]] was upheld, based on the judgment rendered in proceeding 97-401610-292-FA. She states as an important fact that in the last proceeding filed—case file 08-000949-0292-FA—before the res judicata defense was resolved, she attended with her mother to undergo the DNA test—visible on folio 148 of that case file—but the comparison of her DNA with the DNA samples of the defendant could not be performed because he did not attend the appointment. The petition for review is filed under the provisions of sections 1) and 7) of Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code, alleging not having been well represented, and because of this, being harmed by the following: Not knowing her biological origin; not having her father's surname; not having his financial support; not being able to inherit intestate. She invokes the fundamental right to know who one's parents are and the principle of responsible parenthood stated in the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Political Constitution, which indicates that parents have obligations toward their children. She argued that responsible parenthood has been recognized by the Costa Rican State in international human rights instruments, such as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which provides that every person has the duty to assist, feed, educate, and shelter his minor children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Article 18, indicates that States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. For its part, Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador", provided in relevant part the following: "Right of the child. Every child, whatever his parentage, has the right to the protection that his condition as a minor requires from his family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow under the protection and responsibility of his parents...". Finally, she based the petition for review on Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, indicating that the child has the right from birth to a name, to acquire a nationality, and, as far as possible, to know his or her parents. She also invokes in her appeal Resolution No. 11,158 of 2:52 PM on August 1, 2007, issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (folios 40 to 53).

**II.- REGARDING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW:** The petition for review is of an extraordinary and also exceptional nature, because it attacks a final judgment, possessing the authority and efficacy of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). It is provided not as a normal remedy within the proceeding, but outside of it, with the purpose of remedying any injustice derived not from errors of legal technique—which should have been attacked through normal remedies, within the respective proceeding—but rather from facts that prevented the exercise of the right or from novel, supervening situations that warrant reviewing the prior jurisdictional decision. Due to that very nature, it is only applicable in the cases exhaustively established in Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code and must necessarily be filed within the time limits indicated in Article 620 thereof—3 months or 10 years—depending on the circumstances. However, regarding the aspect of the time limit and exhaustiveness, the decision of the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 11,158, of 2:52 PM on August 1, 2007, must be considered, specifically related to actions for determining paternity or maternity, in which, when referring to the alleged collision between the fundamental right of every person to know who their parents are and the principle of legal certainty, grounded in the figure of res judicata (Article 98 bis, subsection m) of the Family Code), it indicated the following: "In this way, the foregoing means that any interested party seeking to reopen a case in which a person's paternity has been investigated may resort to the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, alleging as grounds for the appeal, Article 619, subsection 1), of the Civil Procedure Code... Under this understanding, if filiation or paternity was discussed in a prior proceeding, with a judgment having been rendered with the authority and efficacy of material res judicata, and it was impossible for the plaintiff, due to the state of development of technique and science, to count on the genetic marker test or some force majeure prevented it, nothing bars the possibility of filing an extraordinary petition for review before the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice for the nullity of the final judgment to be decreed... This Constitutional Court deems that the extraordinary petition for review that may be filed by interested litigants, when it was impossible for them, due to the state of development of technique or science, to count on the genetic marker test or any other reason of force majeure prevented it, must not be subject to any statute of limitations—as indicated by Article 620, paragraph 2, of the Civil Procedure Code—since any restriction in this regard empties the fundamental and human right 'to know who one's parents are,' enshrined in Articles 53, paragraph 2, of the Political Constitution and 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child... Consequently, the extraordinary petition for review may be filed, under the conditions already noted, by the interested party sine die—without a time limit—and on a single occasion, provided that there is no variation in the scientific and technical evidentiary means—particularly biological tests—to determine a person's filiation with greater precision and accuracy. The latter to avoid the abusive exercise of this extraordinary remedy... By virtue of the foregoing, it is imperative to resolve the judicial consultation of unconstitutionality in the sense that Article 98, subsection m), of the Family Code, added by Law No. 8101 of April 16, 2001, is not unconstitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the final judgment rendered in a filiation proceeding with the efficacy and authority of res judicata admits the extraordinary petition for review, sine die—without a time limit—and on a single occasion—as long as there is no variation in the scientific and technical evidentiary means that allow filiation to be proven with greater accuracy, particularly biological tests—when it was impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to count on the genetic marker test or some cause of force majeure prevented its offer or participation in its production." (See Resolution of this Chamber number 1148 of 9:35 AM on November 21, 2014, and 648 of 9:30 AM on July 2, 2014).

**III.- REGARDING THE STANDING OF THE APPELLANT:** The case file shows that the mother of [[Nombre1]] – Mrs. [[Nombre3]] –, when she filed the summary paternity investigation complaint No. 97-401610-0292-FA before the Family Court of Alajuela, did so not in her personal capacity, but as the representative of the minor, because she filed the complaint so that the then-girl would have paternal filiation and all the effects derived therefrom. Her status as representative is given by law, as can be deduced from what is expressly regulated in Article 155 of the Family Code, which –pertinently– states: "The mother, even if she is a minor, shall exercise parental authority (patria potestad) over children born out of wedlock and shall have full legal standing for those purposes...". That is, in her capacity as representative –acting in the name of another– she filed the complaint on November 20, 1997 –folios 2 and 3–. At that time, the minor –now appellant– was two months minus one day old –folio 56 of the file before this Chamber, indicating she was born on September 25, 1997–. Thus, that power-duty correlative to the mother –as the norm provides– represents the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers oriented toward enabling the effective enjoyment of the rights –in this case– of [[Nombre1]] through her mother. Such powers-duties constitute parental authority (patria potestad) –now called parental responsibility– which are usually classified into three groups, namely: the personal content, the patrimonial content, and that related to representation. Specifically, the case of representation implies that the mother of the minor intervenes on her behalf, while she has not acquired full capacity to act and as long as she does not have an opposing interest; in which case a special guardian must be appointed for them –Article 140 of the Family Code, 36, 37, and 38 of the Civil Code–. On this matter, the following can be consulted in Costa Rican doctrine: "The person is a 'subject of law,' meaning that both the rights themselves and the power to exercise them potentially reside in the person. (...). Given that physical and intellectual human development occur gradually, laws customarily indicate a time from which the person is considered to have the necessary capacity for the direct exercise of contracting and other acts of civil life. This time is designated as majority, which today is generally set, as our law does, at eighteen completed years of age. Before reaching it, one is in the period called minority, which is divided into infant minority and post-infant minority. The first extends from birth to puberty (...). The second minority comprises from fifteen to eighteen years of age." [Nombre5], Alberto. Tratado de las Personas. Volumen I: Introducción y Derecho de la Persona. 5th ed. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 1998, pp. 168 and 177. Such being the case, [[Nombre1]] –and not her mother– has been a party to this proceeding since it was initiated, because she is the holder of the right to paternal filiation being claimed, since "the representative acts in the name and on behalf of the minor..." [Nombre6] , ; [Nombre7] , and [Nombre8] , . Derecho de la Familia. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2010, p. 606. However, now –having passed 15 years of age and as cited in the words of jurist Brenes Córdoba– [[Nombre1]] acts in her own name and on her own behalf by virtue of Article 108 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code, having sufficient volitional and cognitive capacity to understand the harm caused by the person who held –in the past– her legal representation by mandate of law. Article 108 Ibid states in relevant part the following: "Article 108- Standing to act as parties. When the interest of a minor is involved in judicial proceedings, the following shall have standing to act as parties: a) Adolescents over fifteen years of age, personally, when this Code so authorizes, and in other cases, they shall be represented by those who exercise parental authority or by the National Children's Trust when appropriate...". Having verified the appellant's standing, it is appropriate to analyze the grounds for review invoked.

**IV.- REGARDING THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 619 SUBSECTION 1) OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE:** Subsection 1) of Article 619 Ibid establishes that the appeal is applicable "If the party requesting it demonstrates that, due to force majeure preventing it, or by the act of the opposing party, he/she did not recuse the judge or could not present some document or other type of evidence, or appear at the act where any evidence from the opposing party was taken; such that in either case there was defenselessness and it was not possible during the course of the proceeding to request rectification of the defect." In the petition for review, the plaintiff argued having suffered harm at the age of one when she did not appear to undergo the scientific DNA test in proceeding No. 97-401610-0292-FA for Paternity Investigation "because my mother did not take me to the place indicated to perform it." She added that “ </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">she was not aware of what was happening, nor of the prejudice this would cause her</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">” (folio 44). She also indicated that her mother, [[Nombre3]], filed a brief requesting to withdraw from the lawsuit due to having reached an extrajudicial settlement with the defendant, claiming it was an agreement favorable to her person. As a result of what occurred, she perceives a state of defenselessness (estado de indefensión) which, in light of the two objective conditions stipulated in the rule, namely, force majeure (fuerza mayor) or act of the opposing party, must be analyzed. These regulatory conditions are intended to justify –by provision of law– and in favor of the appellant, the occurrence of the following sub-conditions: a) not having recused the judge, b) not having presented any document or other type of evidence, or not having appeared at the proceeding where opposing evidence was presented. Given that the appellant has not invoked grounds for review related to the conduct of the defendant, but has cited a state of defenselessness originating from the circumstances that prevented her attendance at the scientific evidentiary proceeding; this Chamber must analyze what has been described by [[Nombre1]] from the perspective of the condition of force majeure as an event that may have prevented the presentation of DNA evidence in proceeding No. 97-401610-0292-FA for Investigation of Paternity. The foregoing represents a semantic problem that must be resolved, namely: Our positive law lacks a definition of force majeure. It has been conceived “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">occasionally</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">” as a fact or event that could not have been foreseen or that, even if foreseeable, cannot be avoided (see the pronouncements of this Chamber, numbers 219, at 9:00 a.m. on May 9, 2003, and 256, at 9:35 a.m. on April 25, 2007). However, from the study of this term in doctrine, it can be seen that we are faced with a problem of multivocity –a linguistic difficulty by which it is identified that language formulas lack a single meaning–. This difficulty is well captured in the following excerpt: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Let us begin by recalling that facing the set of words and phrases are ideas: the infinite virtuality of possible meanings, a vast surplus of senses relative to the linguistic forms themselves. [Of course, this does not mean that «ideas» are on one side and «words» on the other. It is only intended to note that the former are not necessarily linked to such determined linguistic expressions; that is, there are more ideas than words, even though the former generally appear through the latter.]”</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> E. P. Haba, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">El espejismo de la interpretación literal: Encrucijadas del lenguaje jurídico</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">, Vlamarán S.A., Escuela Judicial: San José, 2003, volume I, p. 21. Thus, without intending to exhaust the ideas generated regarding force majeure, some legal scholars have stated the following: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Force majeure will be unforeseeable (storm, lightning, earthquake, war, act of the prince)” </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">V. Calatayud Ponce de León, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Las obligaciones civiles</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 262. A significant identity with the fortuitous event (caso fortuito) is recognized: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Conditions of the fortuitous event and of force majeure. (...) a) That such an event is extraordinary, out of the ordinary, not usual, and therefore occurs independently of the will or action of the debtor... b) That such an event is unforeseen, and this unforeseeability must be assessed at the time the obligation is contracted... c) That such an event is insurmountable, which is assessed at the time of non-compliance and presupposes the material impossibility of the debtor to satisfy the creditor's interest</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">” F. Montero Piña, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Obligaciones</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">, San José: Premiá Editores, 1999, p. 281. “ </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">It is, along with the fortuitous event, another of the factual circumstances that can exonerate the defaulting debtor from liability. It consists of those events that, whether foreseeable or not, are always unavoidable and correspond to occurrences that bear no necessary relationship to the debtor's situation. It is an event of external origin to the obligation whose harmful result was unavoidable even with the precautionary measures that could reasonably be taken</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">” Ribó cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Código Civil: con jurisprudencia con descriptores. </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">Volume I. San José: IJSA, 2014, p. 610. “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Any event that could not have been foreseen or that, even if foreseen, could not have been resisted</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. From [Nombre8] cited by C. A. Picado Vargas, Ibid. “ </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">The notion of </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">force majeure</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">, in its core content, alludes to events external to the subject's control, regarding whose occurrence the person lacks all power of decision. Anglo-Saxons refer to force majeure with a highly expressive phrase: Acts of God. The archetypes of force majeure are acts of Nature –e.g., a hurricane, an earthquake, death–. However, there are acts of man that can also qualify as force majeure, both illegal acts –a robbery, an assault– and lawful ones, such as the so-called “acts of the prince” or acts of the exercise of state power –a law, a decree, a judicial resolution–. Those phenomena that from the subject's point of view are presented as ineluctable qualify as force majeure. (...) In summary, there are three elements that define force majeure in our jurisprudence: -Unforeseeability (Imprevisibilidad) -Unavoidability (Inevitabilidad) -[Nombre10]”.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> F. Torrealba Navas, Responsabilidad Civil, San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2011, p. 571 and 572. Likewise “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Vélez says that “... fortuitous events or force majeure are produced by two great causes: by nature or by the act of man.” Thus, an event produced by a fortuitous event would be the impetuosity of a river overflowing its bed, earthquakes or earth tremors, storms, plagues, fire. In contrast, cases of force majeure are acts of man, like war, the act of the sovereign, or the force of the [Nombre11]”. </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">Vélez cited by G. Cabanellas de Torres, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Diccionario Jurídico Universitario</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">. Volume 1 A-I. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires: Heliasta, 2007, p. 172. “ </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The problem of the distinction between fortuitous event and force. </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">(...) The fortuitous event is an external event alien to the debtor (and to the thing: no defects thereof), independent of his will; moreover, to release the debtor, it must not be foreseeable or avoidable by adopting due diligence. (...) The Civil Code in such cases speaks, according to the tradition of Common Law, of fortuitous event (arts. 1.093-3°, 1.136-1°), or force majeure (arts. 457, 1.777, 1.748, 1.905), or both (arts. 1.602, 1.625). The old doctrine distinguishes between one and the other: the former would be the product of forces of nature (earthquake) and the latter the act of a third party (war), or the former unforeseeable and the latter unavoidable; or the one an obstacle arising within the operation of the enterprise (fire) and the other external to it (robbery). But in the Civil Code (and, previously, in [Nombre12] ), commonly, both expressions are interchangeable, and jurisprudence usually understands it this way</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">*”. J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, and others, Elementos de Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. Volume I: Parte general, Teoría General del Contrato. 5th ed. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011, p. 174 and 175. “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Force majeure is not the vis maxima, but that which a good family man cannot overcome. Unforeseeability or unavoidability, which are not intrinsic and objective qualities of the event, but relative to a specific situation and a concrete obligation to prevent and avoid, thus depend on the degree of diligence required and the nature of the obligation”. </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, Ibid. In the words of the treatise writers [Nombre13]</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">and [Nombre14] , in relation to force majeure, it must be considered that “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Although the dominant line in jurisprudence is the non-distinction between the fortuitous event and force majeure regarding their effects, it has echoed the doctrinal differentiation of both events, viewing the fortuitous event as the event that takes place inside the enterprise or sphere affected by the obligation, while force majeure would be that which originates outside, with insurmountable violence, and which falls outside what can be foreseen in the ordinary and normal course of life</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">*”. L. Díez-Picazo and A. Gullón, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Sistema de Derecho Civil: El contrato en general. La relación obligatoria</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">. Volume II. Book 1. 10th ed. Madrid: Tecnos, 2013, p. 205. In our legal system, the Civil Code treats force majeure as one of the forms that produces the release of the debtor in the context of the Law of Obligations: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Article 702.- The debtor who fails to fulfill his obligation, whether in substance or in manner, shall be responsible for the same fact for the damages and losses caused to his creditor, unless the failure arises from the act of the latter, force majeure, or fortuitous event</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. Or, as an exemption from liability: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Article 1071.- If the seller does not deliver the thing at the agreed time, the buyer may at his election request either the resolution of the sale or to be placed in possession of the thing. If the seller has not effected delivery, due to fortuitous event or force majeure, there shall be no grounds for resolution</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”; “ </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Article 1180.- Carriers are also liable for damages caused by delay in the journey, or for failing to fulfill their contract in any other way, except in case of fortuitous event or force majeure</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”; and “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Article 1267.- (...) It is incumbent upon the agent to prove the force majeure or fortuitous event that prevents him from carrying out the orders of the principal</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. Indeed, –as we have verified through a brief doctrinal review–, achieving a consensus on the definition of force majeure is a task so complex in the vast world of legal discourse, that the Spanish treatise writer Manuel Albaladejo debates other ideas, such as whether “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">fortuitous event and force majeure are synonymous expressions, or two different concepts</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. M. Albaladejo. </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">. 14th ed. Madrid: Edisofer, S.L., 2011, p. 181. He even comments that “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Determining whether an event constitutes a fortuitous event or force majeure involves a legal assessment...”.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> M. Albaladejo. Op. Cit., p.180. A perception that, in the consideration of this Chamber, must be made bearing in mind that in the instant case, the notion of force majeure must be transferred to a subject matter different from that dealt with in the obligatory relationship, to understand it from a new perspective in which the legal bond does not have a purely economic content –although it does entail economic consequences–, such as filiation (filiación). “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">The concept of filiation comes from the Latin filius (son) and refers to the set of legal relations, determined by paternity and maternity, that bind the progenitors with the children. Our legal system provides several forms through which this bond arises, given that it can occur by reason of a biological link or by legal imposition</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. Second Chamber, judgment No. 766 at 10:05 a.m. on July 30, 2014. It is the jurisprudence –doctrine of judicial persons–, and not the letter of the law, that is responsible for nurturing legal institutes from other perspectives to fulfill what the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) well explained through vote No. 6120, at 3:05 p.m. on May 8, 2013: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">The protection of the best interest of the minor is a duty that Constitutional Law imposes on the State, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">and which must be reflected in the resolutions and actions of all judicial and administrative authorities that comprise it. The judges of the Republic are obliged to apply the control of conventionality</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">which… allows integrating the norms and principles contained in international human rights instruments into the resolutions they issue in the matters submitted to their knowledge</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. (The highlighting is not part of the original). In relation to this point, the indication made by this office in judgment No. 266, at 10:55 a.m. on March 26, 2009, must also be taken into account: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">...it could not be understood that the Controller of Constitutionality limited the admissibility of the review –in the terms established in said vote– to two unique circumstances 'when it has been impossible for the interested party, due to the state of development of technique and science, to count on genetic marker evidence, or some cause of force majeure has prevented them from offering it or participating in its production', since it was clear in holding that '…the original constituent itself took it upon itself to mitigate the rigor of legal certainty embodied by res judicata, contemplating the possibility of reopening an already decided proceeding through the filing of an extraordinary review petition (recurso extraordinario de revisión) according to the grounds established by infra-constitutional law or the ordinary legislator, in order to thereby modify or annul an iniquitous judgment and ensure that material justice prevails' (emphasis added).</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> Furthermore, the concept of force majeure contained in said vote cannot be interpreted in a strict sense, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">according to the terms established in doctrine, because the legislator treated it, giving it the same value and consideration, as was granted to the 'acts of the opposing party' that had left the appellant in a state of defenselessness by making it impossible for them to present evidence during the proceeding... </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Furthermore, in this matter, courts of justice, when adopting their judgments, as well as in the interpretation of procedural norms, must attend to the best interest of the child (articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and, 1 and 112 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">)</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. (The emphasis is not part of the original). This means that, given the fact that the studies of force majeure examined have been posed from a single perspective, that of the Law of Civil Obligations –in accordance with the doctrinal review carried out here–, for which, moreover, a diversity of definitions on the same notion have emerged, evidencing the absence of consensus on its content; and given the absence of analysis of said term from other legal disciplines, the appropriate course is for said conception to evolve and adapt to other contexts. For the specific case, force majeure must be understood in light of the fundamental rights of Children and Adolescents. In relation to this, the Constitutional Chamber, in judgment No. 3481 at 2:03 p.m. on May 2, 2003, considered the following: “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">The interpretation of legal norms by legal operators for the purpose of applying them cannot be done uniquely and exclusively based on their literal wording, since, to unravel, understand, and comprehend their true sense, meaning, and scope, it is necessary to resort to various hermeneutic instruments such as the teleological, institutional, systematic, and historical-evolutionary methods. On this particular matter, the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code in its section 10 establishes that ‘Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose’. Normative propositions are composed of linguistic terms which have an area of meaning or field of reference as well as a zone of uncertainty or indeterminacy, which can cause serious misunderstandings in their interpretation and eventual application. By virtue of the foregoing, when interpreting a norm, it is necessary to investigate its objective (ratio) or proposed and supposed end, regarding which the norm has an instrumental nature –teleological method–. The interpreter must also confront, relate, and reconcile it with the rest of the legal norms that make up, in particular, a legal institution –institutional method– and, in general, the legal system –systematic method–,</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\"> since norms are not watertight and isolated compartments but are connected and coordinated with others, explicitly or implicitly. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration the socio-economic and historical reality to which a legal norm is applied, which is variable and mutable due to its enormous dynamism, in such a way that it must be applied to historical conjunctures in constant mutation –historical-evolutionary method–. When it comes to interpreting a legal norm, the interpreter cannot use only one of the indicated instruments, as they are not exclusive, but rather they are different indispensable moments or stages of the entire and transcendent interpretive act</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. Thus, the definitions noted regarding force majeure are extremely useful, and from them, maxims applicable to Family Law can be extracted, such as the fact that “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">force majeure</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">” represents an event external to the subject from whom said force is analyzed and the impossibility of that subject to avoid it. The foregoing, above all, to set aside analyses of situations involving an examination of causes for which the act of doing, not doing, or giving was breached; or, where a person is exempted from liability upon the occurrence of a harmful event; all typical of the Law of Obligations. For, on the other hand, force majeure can be approached as a situation that, viewed from a legal subject, is presented in a way that they cannot combat it, preventing them from exercising a subjective right even when it originates from or stems from an act protected by a law. That is, the genesis and concretization of said event can emerge from a perfectly lawful act, such as the legal imperative that every minor must be subject to the acts of representation of their parents or guardian –as the case may be–. Thus, with the requirements of [Nombre10] and unavoidability characteristic of force majeure being present, the minor is subjected by legal mandate to a legal representation (representación legal) that “</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">falls outside the scope of autonomy of will</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">; its existence, survival, and extension </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">are neither born of nor depend on the will of the represented party. It emanates directly from the legal mandate.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\"> The law imposes it, indicates the requirements to be its representative, regulates its powers to act and decide; </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">although this must always be in the interest, on behalf of, and at the expense of a person or interests</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">, which are considered in need of special protection entrusted to the legal representative</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">”. (The highlighting is not part of the original) [Nombre15].</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">cited by V. Calatayud Ponce de León, </span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">Temas de Derecho Privado</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 164 and 165.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\"> Although said representation entrusted to a third party has been the legal system's response to the real conditions affecting minors precisely because of their status as minors –such as the inability to represent themselves, emotional and economic dependence, scant maturity, and ignorance of their rights–; fathers and mothers dispose \"</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">over</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">\" the minor and not \"</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic\">for</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">\" them, since they make decisions and implement them apart from the determination of what truly strengthens and consolidates the best interest of the minor, as well as from the consequences that such decisions generate.</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"line-height:200%; font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-size:12pt\">Therefore, those actions or omissions of those who exercise legal representation negatively and directly affect minors, constituting an insurmountable obstacle for them, that is, a case of force majeure that interferes with the exercise of the subjective rights of Children and Adolescents. The foregoing fully agrees with the assessment by which it is conceived that this event is an external fact to the person –who in this case is the holder of the right–, who involuntarily endures a representation emanating from the law, and which entails a harmful result for them. Force majeure thus conceived is necessary given that, as verified, its concept has been founded and developed in the context of creditor and debtor persons, but not –at least to the knowledge of these judges– from the rights of Children and Adolescents.</span> Ultimately, the matter under review merits an analysis in relation to the right of the minor to know who their father and mother are —as is indeed done here—. Thus, it is fitting to recall the words that the Constitutional Chamber itself, in Judgment No. 11.158, of 14:52 hours on August 1, 2007, noted regarding these human rights: “The fundamental right to know who one’s parents are —especially when exercised together with the right to establish filiation ties (vínculos de filiación)— is connected to the principle of responsible parenthood (paternidad responsable) set forth in Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, which states that parents have obligations toward their children —both those born within and outside of marriage—. These obligations of the parents or procreators entail a series of personal and property rights vested in the procreated children for their adequate development and optimal upbringing, which the ordinary legislator must develop and establish. Responsible parenthood is also established by International Human Rights Law instruments; thus, Article XXX of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides, as relevant, that: ‘Every person has the duty to aid, feed, educate, and shelter their minor children (…)’, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Article 18, paragraph 1, correctly states that ‘1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their primary concern shall be the best interests of the child.’ For its part, Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Protocol of San Salvador,’ approved by Law No. 7907 of September 3, 1999, provides, as relevant, the following: ‘Right of the Child. Every child, regardless of their filiation, has the right to the protective measures that their status as a minor requires from their family, society, and the State. Every child has the right to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents (…).’ In short, the fundamental right to know who one’s parents are, when exercised concomitantly with the right to establish filiation relationships, and the legal procedural mechanisms to enforce them, constitute an instrument to give effect to the principle of responsible parenthood set forth both in the Political Constitution and in International Human Rights Law instruments, and which is also inherent to human dignity and to the constitutional and international imperatives for the special protection, care, and assistance of minors due to their intrinsic condition of vulnerability (articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 25, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 24, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).” In the specific case, it is proven that the mother of [Name1], whose paternity was being investigated, did not present the child for the performance of the scientific test. In the appeal before this Chamber, it is argued that she did not do so because she intended to withdraw from the process (desistir del proceso) due to having reached an out-of-court settlement with the defendant party, supposedly favorable for the minor. It should be noted that when the request for withdrawal of the paternity investigation claim was filed on June 25, 1999 (folio 21 of expediente No. 97-401610-0292-FA), the Code of Childhood and Adolescence (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), Law No. 7739 of January 6, 1998, published in La Gaceta No. 26 on February 6, 1998, and which came into force on that same date, was already in effect. That normative body, in Article 19 —original text of the provision— stated: “In proceedings involving the interests of minors, neither dismissal for failure to prosecute (deserción) nor withdrawal (desistimiento) shall be admissible. It shall be incumbent upon the judge to propel the proceedings forward until the issuance of a judgment.” In light of what has been developed above, this Chamber considers that the actions of the mother of [Name1] —in her capacity as legal representative (representante)—, coupled with her condition as a minor, justifies the plaintiff’s absence from the DNA test because it constitutes a force majeure (fuerza mayor) situation; even though it originated in the legal provision by which [Name1] was under the representation of Mrs. [Name3], the latter found herself unable to combat the inescapable effects of her mother’s actions and omissions within proceeding No. 97-401610-0292-FA —which, although legitimate in light of the representation—, affected her when on November 19, 1998 —the date on which the appointment was granted by the Biochemistry Section, Forensic Sciences Laboratory of the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), folio 25—, she did not attend the test since she was one year and two months old. These judges do not seek to demand that, by reason of what happened, it would have been possible for [Name1], as the holder of the subjective right, to request the rescheduling of the date for the test, or to demand that she be presented on time for its performance. It is clear —to this Chamber— that due to her youth, she could not have informed the Court of her circumstances. Even though her mother could have fulfilled the foregoing, the party to this proceeding —the minor and the primary party interested in having the test performed— has demonstrated that the special circumstances pertaining to minors constituted a force majeure matter for her person. The appellant herself argues in the appeal that she has been left defenseless all this time, without the possibility of rectifying what was done until the moment when —having reached 15 years of age— the regulations regarding the capacity to act allow her to proceed in defense of a fundamental right. The mother —as the child’s representative— by having filed the request for withdrawal of the claim —filing dated June 25, 1998, presented during the processing of expediente No. 97-401610-0292-FA— (folio 21), and later totally abandoning the proceeding despite the requested action having been rejected (folio 23), incurred in omissions in her duty to safeguard the fundamental rights of Childhood and Adolescence of her daughter —entrusted to her person by the State itself—, which came to generate pernicious procedural consequences for the subjective rights of [Name1]. The foregoing, to the point that it prevented, at the time, the realization of the right to know her biological origin as a personality right, resulting in the dissatisfaction of other rights such as bearing her father's surname, the possibility of appearing as an heir to his estate, and requesting the right to support (derecho alimentario) —among others—. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the specific case falls within the assumption of subsection 1), of Article 619, of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), specifically the assumption by which force majeure prevents the presentation of some evidence; which in this instance corresponds to the scientific DNA evidence (Article 318 subsection 6) of the Civil Procedure Code), in such a way that it is appropriate to grant the appeal based on that provision.* **V.- ON THE GROUND FOR REVIEW ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 619 SUBSECTION 7) OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE:** The appellant also based the review on the assumption in subsection 7) of the cited article. This section establishes another ground for the claim: “There having been undue representation (indebida representación) throughout the entire proceeding.” However, it is evident from the very statement of the grounds that undue representation is being confused with inadequate legal advice, an assumption that does not fit the transcribed provision. Indeed, regarding undue representation, the Chamber has explained that “When the Code speaks of ‘undue representation’ it refers to the illegitimate integration of the proceeding in those cases where one of the parties, by reason of their legal nature or particular situation, must act through another person so that their right of defense is properly protected, as occurs in the case of legal persons, minors, legally incapacitated persons, and estates. In such cases, the proceeding must be integrated with the representative having sufficient authority to act in court on behalf of those persons, because if the representation is not the proper one, either because it does not exist or because the person holding it lacks sufficient faculties to act, an imperfection in procedural standing (legitimación procesal) occurs, to the detriment of the right of defense, and this prevents a valid judgment from being rendered” (Judgment Number 646, of 10:20 hours on June 30, 2000). In the specific case —as has already been set forth—, the minor acted through representation —Article 102, Civil Procedure Code—, without any defect being observed, since the person exercising it was her mother, in exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) —canon 140, Family Code (Código de Familia)— and not another person. Consequently, according to the appellant’s own words, the inadequate advice she alleges, in the sense that her mother did not take her for the scientific test, does not fit the normative assumption of undue representation. * **VI.- FINAL PROVISIONS:** Thus, it is deemed appropriate to grant the petition for review (recurso de revisión) filed because the matter falls within the factual assumption provided in subsection 1) of Article 619 of the Civil Procedure Code; to annul the judgment of fifteen hours on June nine, nineteen ninety-nine, issued by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in proceeding No. 97-401610-0292-FA. Consequently, it is appropriate to order the return of the expediente to said Court of origin so that the proceeding may be adapted to the current procedural rules, Law No. 8101 “Law on Responsible Parenthood (Ley de Paternidad Responsable).” Likewise, the proceedings must be reinstated to that procedural stage allowing the minor to fully exercise her right of defense and, especially, allowing her to combat the adverse procedural effects caused by her then legal representative. Given the age of expediente No. 97-401610-0292-FA, the observation is made to the judicial authority who will be in charge of processing this matter that it must take the necessary precautions so that this proceeding is not affected by the selection and elimination of old documents, so as to comply with the provisions established in Circular No. 29-2012 issued by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice "Table of retention periods for expedientes, retention period for source documents, and guidelines for the selection and elimination of expedientes in family and child support matters." * **THEREFORE:** The petition for review filed is declared granted and, in that sense, the judgment of fifteen hours on June nine, nineteen ninety-nine, issued by the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela in proceeding number ninety-seven-four hundred one thousand six hundred ten-zero two hundred ninety-two-FA is annulled. It is ordered that the respective expediente be returned to the Court of origin so that it may adapt the processing of the present proceeding as ordered by the "Law on Responsible Parenthood" and that a new judgment be issued in accordance with the law. Let the Court take note of what is set forth in the "Final Considerations" with respect to the preservation of the expediente.

Julia Varela Araya * * * Eva María Camacho Vargas * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez* * * Héctor Blanco González * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal* * *jbarquero* * * * * * *

Revisión del Documento * * Res: 2015-001194* SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de octubre de dos mil quince.* * * * * * * * * * * Recurso de revisión interpuesto por [[Nombre1] ], [...], contra la sentencia de las quince horas del nueve de junio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, dictada por el Juzgado de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, dentro del abreviado de investigación de paternidad, establecido en el mismo juzgado por [[Nombre1] ]* contra [[Nombre2] ]. Figura como defensora pública de la parte actora la licenciada Ligia Jiménez Zamora, de calidades no indicadas. Todos mayores, solteros, abogados y vecinos de Alajuela, con las excepciones indicadas.* RESULTANDO:* * * * * * * * * * * 1.- La actora, en escrito presentado en fecha nueve de julio de dos mil trece, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condenara al demandado en forma principal a: "En aplicación del Principio de Economía Procesal y en atención al Principio Interés Superior del Niño y la Niña, solicito se ordene la prueba de marcadores genéticos al señor [[Nombre2] ], quien nunca se ha realizado esta prueba técnica; así como a la suscrita y a mi madre [[Nombre3] ], quienes ya realizamos esta prueba en Medicatura Forense el dos de julio de 2009, para que en sentencia se declare: a. Que la suscrita [[Nombre1] ] es hija del demandado [[Nombre2] ] y que por lo tanto tengo derecho a llevar su apellido. b. Se ordene la MODIFICACIÓN respectiva de los asientos de nacimiento de la suscrita en el Registro Civil y Registro de Nacimientos, con el apellido de mi respectivo padre. Es decir que se inscriba como [[Nombre4] ]. c. Se declare el derecho a recibir alimentos que tiene [[Nombre1] ] en relación con [[Nombre2] ]. d. Se declare el derecho a suceder ab intestato que tiene [[Nombre1] ] en relación con su padre [[Nombre2] ].". (Sic); y en forma subsidiaria a: "SE ANULE EL VOTO de las quince horas del nueve de junio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, del Juzgado de Familia del I Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, en el proceso Abreviado de Investigación de Paternidad 97-401610-292-FA. Se retrotraigan los efectos del proceso hasta el momento en que se vulneró el derecho defensa, siendo este momento, la realización de la prueba de marcadores genéticos, para que se continúe con el trámite como en derecho corresponde, y que de esta forma se demuestre en sentencia que soy hija del señor [[Nombre2] ].". (Sic).* * * * * * * * * * * 2.- El demandado contestó en los términos que indicó en el memorial presentado en fecha diecisiete de junio de dos mil catorce y opuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y falta de capacidad o defectuosa representación.* * * * * * * * * * * 3.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.* Redacta el Magistrado Olaso Álvarez; y,* CONSIDERANDO:* I.- ANTECEDENTES: [[Nombre1] ] en su condición de parte actora, plantea recurso de revisión contra la sentencia firme y con autoridad de cosa juzgada de las 15:00 horas del 09 de junio de 1999, dictada por el Juzgado de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela en el proceso de investigación de paternidad expediente número 97-401610-292-FA, interpuesto por su madre la señora [[Nombre3] ] quien actuó en representación de su hija por cuanto no alcanzaba la mayoría de edad. Según lo indica, en dicho proceso se ordenó la prueba de marcadores genéticos y con ese fin se convocó a las partes a comparecer a la Sección de Bioquímica del Organismo de Investigación Judicial. Señala que, no concurrió a realizarse dicha prueba, debido a que su madre, no la presentó en el día y la hora requerida. Asimismo, aduce que la señora [[Nombre3] ] suscribió un memorial en el cual indicó haber llegado a un arreglo extrajudicial con la parte demandada, alegando ser un convenio favorable para su persona. En razón de ello solicitó desistir de la demanda. Agrega que en la referida sentencia se acogió la excepción de falta de derecho invocada por el accionado, y se declaró sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda abreviada de investigación de paternidad. Considera que lo anterior la dejó en completo estado de indefensión ya que contaba con un año de edad y no tenía conocimiento de lo que estaba sucediendo, ni del perjuicio que eso le causaría. Explica que ulteriormente, su madre inició tres procesos más de investigación de paternidad, tramitados bajo los expedientes número 00-400458-0292-FA; 01-400501-0216-FA; y 08-000949-0292-FA, los cuales no prosperaron pues en todos se declaró con lugar la excepción de cosa juzgada planteada por [[Nombre2] ], en razón de la sentencia dictada en el proceso 97-401610-292-FA. Manifiesta como un hecho de importancia, que en el último proceso entablado –expediente 08-000949-0292-FA-, de previo a que se resolviera la excepción de cosa juzgada, asistió con su madre a realizarse la prueba de ADN –visible al folio 148 de ese expediente-, pero no pudo realizarse la comparación de su ADN con las muestras de ADN de la parte demandada, pues éste no se presentó a la cita. El recurso de revisión se presenta amparándose en los presupuestos 1) y 7) del artículo 619 del Código Procesal Civil, alegando no haber estado bien representada, y a causa de eso verse perjudicada por lo siguiente: No conocer su origen biológico; no tener el apellido de su padre; no contar con el apoyo económico del mismo; no poder heredar ab intestato. Invoca el derecho fundamental a saber quiénes son los padres y el principio de paternidad responsable que anuncia el artículo 53 párrafo primero de la Constitución Política al indicar que los padres tienen obligaciones para con sus hijos. Desarrolló que la paternidad responsable ha sido reconocida por el Estado costarricense en instrumentos de derecho internacional sobre derechos humanos, como lo es la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre que dispone que toda persona tiene el deber de asistir, alimentar, educar y amparar a sus hijos menores de edad. La Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño en el numeral 18, señala que los Estados parte pondrán el máximo empeño en garantizar el reconocimiento del principio de que ambos padres tienen obligaciones comunes en lo que respecta a la crianza y el desarrollo del niño. Por su parte, el ordinal 16 del protocolo adicional a la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, “Protocolo de San Salvador”, dispuso en lo conducente lo siguiente: “Derecho de la niñez. Todo niño sea cual fuere su filiación tiene derecho a las medidas de protección que su condición de menor requieren por parte de su familia, de la sociedad y del Estado. Todo niño tiene el derecho a crecer al amparo y bajo la responsabilidad de sus padres...”. Finalmente, fundamentó el recurso de revisión, en el artículo 7 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño indicando que el niño tiene derecho desde que nace a un nombre, a adquirir una nacionalidad y en la medida de lo posible a conocer a sus padres. Además invoca en su recurso la resolución n.° 11.158 de las 14:52 horas del 1° de agosto de 2007, dictada por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (folios 40 a 53).* II.- SOBRE EL RECURSO DE REVISIÓN: El recurso de revisión es de naturaleza extraordinaria y también excepcional, por cuanto con él se ataca una sentencia firme, con la autoridad y la eficacia de la cosa juzgada material. Está previsto no como un recurso normal dentro del proceso, sino fuera de él, con el objeto de remediar cualquier injusticia derivada no de errores de técnica jurídica -que debieron haberse atacado a través de los recursos normales, dentro del respectivo proceso-, sino por hechos que impidieron el ejercicio del derecho o por situaciones novedosas, sobrevinientes, que ameriten revisar la anterior decisión jurisdiccional. Por esa naturaleza, precisamente, solo es procedente en los casos taxativamente establecidos en el artículo 619 del Código Procesal Civil y debe necesariamente incoarse dentro de los plazos indicados en el numeral 620 ídem -3 meses o 10 años-, según sean las circunstancias. Sin embargo, en cuanto al aspecto del plazo y la taxatividad, debe tenerse en cuenta lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia número 11.158, de las 14:52 horas del 1° de agosto de 2007, relacionada concretamente con las acciones de emplazamiento de la paternidad o maternidad, en la que al referirse a la supuesta colisión entre el derecho fundamental de toda persona a saber quiénes son sus progenitores y el principio de seguridad jurídica, asentado en la figura de la cosa juzgada (artículo 98 bis, inciso m), Código de Familia), indicó cuanto sigue: “De este modo, lo anterior significa que, cualquier parte interesada en reabrir una causa en la que se haya investigado la paternidad de una persona, podrá acudir ante la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia aduciendo como causal del recurso, el artículo 619, inciso 1°), del Código Procesal Civil... Bajo esta inteligencia, si en un proceso anterior se discutió la filiación o paternidad, habiéndose dictado sentencia con autoridad y eficacia de cosa juzgada material, y le fue imposible a la parte actora, por el estado de desarrollo de la técnica y de la ciencia, contar con la prueba de marcadores genéticos o se lo impidió alguna causa de fuerza mayor, nada le enerva la posibilidad de interponer un recurso extraordinario de revisión ante la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia para que se decrete la nulidad de la sentencia firme... Este Tribunal Constitucional estima que el recurso extraordinario de revisión que puede ser interpuesto por los justiciables interesados, cuando les fue imposible, por el estado de desarrollo de la técnica o de la ciencia contar con la prueba de marcadores genéticos o se lo impidió cualquier otra razón de fuerza mayor, no debe estar sujeto a ningún plazo de caducidad -tal y como lo señala el artículo 620, párrafo 2°, del Código Procesal Civil-, puesto que, cualquier restricción al respecto vacía de contenido el derecho fundamental y humano 'a saber quiénes son sus padres' consagrado en los ordinales 53, párrafo 2°, de la Constitución Política y 7° de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño... Consecuentemente, el recurso extraordinario de revisión podrá ser interpuesto, bajo las condiciones ya apuntadas, por la parte interesada sine die -sin límite de tiempo- y por una única vez, siempre y cuando, no haya variación en los medios probatorios científicos y técnicos -particularmente las pruebas biológicas- para determinar con mayor precisión y exactitud la filiación de una persona. Lo último para evitar el ejercicio abusivo de ese medio recursivo extraordinario... En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone evacuar la consulta judicial de inconstitucionalidad en el sentido que el artículo 98, inciso m), del Código de Familia, adicionado por la Ley No. 8101 de 16 de abril de 2001, no resulta inconstitucional en el tanto se interprete que la sentencia firme vertida en un proceso de filiación con eficacia y autoridad de cosa juzgada admite el recurso extraordinario de revisión, sine die -sin límite de tiempo- y por una única vez -en tanto no haya variación en los medios probatorios científicos y técnicos que permitan acreditar con mayor exactitud la filiación, particularmente las pruebas biológicas- cuando a la parte interesada le haya sido imposible, por el estado de desarrollo de la técnica y la ciencia, contar con la prueba de marcadores genéticos o alguna causa de fuerza mayor le haya impedido ofrecerla o participar en su producción”. (Ver resolución de esta Sala número 1148 de las 9:35 horas del 21 de noviembre de 2014 y 648 de las 9:30 del 02 de julio de 2014).* III.- SOBRE LA LEGITIMACIÓN DE LA PARTE RECURRENTE: Consta en el expediente que la madre de [[Nombre1] ] –la señora [[Nombre3] ]-, cuando planteó la demanda abreviada de investigación de paternidad n.° 97-401610-0292-FA ante el Juzgado de Familia de Alajuela, lo hizo no en su carácter personal, sino como representante de la persona menor de edad pues formuló la demanda para que la entonces niña tuviera filiación paterna y todos los efectos que de ello se derivan. Su condición de representante está dada por ley, tal y como se desprende de lo expresamente regulado en el artículo 155 del Código de Familia que –conducentemente- dice: “La madre, aún cuando fuere menor, ejercerá la patria potestad sobre los hijos habidos fuera del matrimonio y tendrá plena personería jurídica para esos efectos...”. Es decir, en su calidad de representante –actuando en nombre ajeno- planteó la demanda el 20 de noviembre de 1997 –folios 2 y 3-. Para entonces la persona menor de edad –hoy recurrente- contaba con dos meses menos un día de edad –folio 56 del legajo ante esta Sala que indica que nació el 25 de setiembre de 1997-. Así ese poder-deber correlativo a la madre -según dispone la norma-, representa el reconocimiento legislativo de un conjunto de potestades instrumentales orientadas a posibilitar el efectivo disfrute de los derechos –en este caso- de [[Nombre1] ] por medio de su madre. Tales poderes-deberes conforman la patria potestad –hoy llamada responsabilidad parental-, que suelen clasificarse en tres grupos, a saber: el contenido personal, el patrimonial y el relacionado con la representación. En específico, el caso de la representación, implica que la madre de la persona menor de edad interviene a nombre de esta, mientras no haya adquirido plena capacidad de actuar y siempre que no tenga un interés opuesto; caso en el cual ha de nombrárseles un curador especial -artículo 140 del Código de Familia, 36, 37 y 38 del Código Civil-. Sobre el particular puede consultarse en doctrina costarricense lo siguiente: “La persona es “sujeto de derecho”, quiere decir que en ella residen potencialmente tanto los derechos en sí, cuanto la facultad de ejercitarlos. (...). En vista de que el desarrollo físico e intelectual humanos se verifican paulatinamente, las leyes acostumbran señalar una época a partir de la cual la persona es considerada con la necesaria capacidad para el ejercicio directo de la contratación y demás actos de la vida civil. Esa época se designa con el nombre de mayoridad, que hoy se fija generalmente, como lo hace nuestro derecho, en los dieciocho años cumplidos. Antes de llegar a ella se está en el espacio de tiempo llamado minoridad, que se divide en minoridad infantil y minoridad postinfantil. La primera se extiende desde el nacimiento hasta la pubertad (...). La segunda minoridad comprende de los quince a los dieciocho años”. [Nombre5] , Alberto. Tratado de las Personas. Volumen I: Introducción y Derecho de la Persona. 5ª ed. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 1998, p. 168 y 177. Así las cosas, [[Nombre1] ] –y no su madre- ha sido parte en el presente proceso desde que el mismo fue instaurado, por ser ella la titular del derecho de filiación paterna que se reclamó, pues “el representante actúa en nombre y en lugar del menor...[Nombre6] ” , ; [Nombre7] , y [Nombre8] , . Derecho de la Familia. San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2010, p. 606. Sin embargo, ahora –pasados los 15 años de vida y según se citó en palabras del jurista Brenes Córdoba-, [[Nombre1] ] actúa en nombre y por cuenta propia en virtud del numeral 108 del Código de Niñez y Adolescencia, teniendo suficiente capacidad volitiva y cognoscitiva para comprender el menoscabo causado por quien ostentó –en el pasado- su representación legal por mandato de ley. El cardinal 108 Ibíd reza en lo conducente lo siguiente: “Artículo 108°- Legitimación para actuar como partes. Cuando en los procesos judiciales esté involucrado el interés de una persona menor de edad, estarán legitimados para actuar como partes: a) Los adolescentes mayores de quince años, personalmente, cuando así lo autorice este Código y en los demás casos, serán representados por quienes ejerzan la autoridad parental o por el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia cuando corresponda...”. Habiéndose comprobado la legitimación de la recurrente, corresponde pasar a analizar las causales de revisión invocadas. * IV.-* SOBRE LA CAUSAL DE REVISIÓN DISPUESTA EN EL NUMERAL 619 INCISO 1) DEL CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL: El inciso 1), del artículo 619 Ibíd. establece que el recurso es procedente “Si la parte que la pide demostrare que por impedírselo fuerza mayor, o por obra de la contraria, no recusó al juez o no pudo presentar algún documento u otra clase de prueba, o comparecer al acto en que se evacuó alguna de la contraria; de modo que en uno y otro caso haya habido indefensión y no haya sido posible en el curso del proceso pedir rectificación del vicio”. En el recurso de revisión la parte actora argumentó haber sufrido un menoscabo a la edad de un año cuando no se presentó a realizar la práctica de la prueba científica de ADN en el proceso n.° 97-401610-0292-FA de Investigación de Paternidad “debido a que mi madre no me llevó al lugar indicado para realizarla”. Agregó que “ no tenía conocimiento de lo que estaba sucediendo, ni del perjuicio que esto me causaría” (folio 44). Asimismo señaló que su madre [[Nombre3] ] suscribió un memorial en el cual solicitó desistir de la demanda por haber llegado a un arreglo extrajudicial con la parte demandada, alegando ser un convenio favorable para su persona. A raíz de lo acontecido percibe un estado de indefensión que a la luz de los dos presupuestos objetivos estipulados en la norma, a saber, fuerza mayor u obra de la parte contraria, deben ser analizados. Dichos presupuestos normativos tienen la finalidad de justificar –por disposición de ley- y en favor de la persona recurrente, el acaecimiento de los siguientes sub-presupuestos: a) no haber recusado al juez, b) no haber presentado algún documento u otra clase de prueba, o no haber comparecido al acto en que se evacuó alguna de la contraria. En razón de que la parte recurrente no ha invocado motivos de revisión relacionados al actuar de la parte demandada, mas sí ha citado un estado de indefensión originado en las circunstancias que impidieron su asistencia a la práctica de la prueba científica; debe esta Sala analizar lo descrito por [[Nombre1] ] desde la óptica del presupuesto de la fuerza mayor como evento que pueda haber impedido la presentación de la prueba de ADN al proceso n.° 97-401610-0292-FA de Investigación de Paternidad. Lo anterior representa un problema semántico que debe ser resuelto, a saber: Carece nuestro derecho positivo de un significado de fuerza mayor. Esta ha sido concebida “ocasionalmente” como un hecho o evento que no ha podido preverse o que aún siendo previsible no puede evitarse (véanse los pronunciamientos de esta Sala, números 219, de las 9:00 horas del 9 de mayo de 2003 y 256, de las 9:35 horas del 25 de abril de 2007). Sin embargo, del estudio de este vocablo en la doctrina se desprende que nos encontramos ante un problema de multivocidad –inconveniente lingüístico por el cual se identifica que las fórmulas del lenguaje carecen de un sentido único-. Dicha dificultad es bien plasmada en el siguiente extracto: “Comencemos por recordar que frente al conjunto de las palabras y frases están las ideas: la virtualidad infinita de los significados posibles, un vasto excedente de sentidos frente a las formas lingüísticas mismas. [Desde luego, esto no significa que las «ideas» estén por un lado y las «palabras» por el otro. Solo se pretende hacer notar que aquellas no aparecen ligadas de un modo necesario a tales o cuales expresiones lingüísticas determinadas; o sea, que hay más ideas que palabras, por más que aquellas se presenten generalmente a través de estas.]” E. P. Haba, El espejismo de la interpretación literal: Encrucijadas del lenguaje jurídico, Vlamarán S.A., Escuela Judicial: San José, 2003, tomo I, p. 21. Así, sin pretender agotar las ideas que se han generado en relación a la fuerza mayor, algunos estudiosos del derecho han dicho lo siguiente: “La fuerza mayor será imprevisible (tempestad, rayo, terremoto, guerra, acto del príncipe)” V. Calatayud Ponce de León, Las obligaciones civiles, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 262. Se le reconoce una importante identidad con el caso fortuito: “Presupuestos del caso fortuito y de la fuerza mayor. (...) a) Que tal hecho sea extraordinario, que se salga de lo común, que no sea usual y por eso sucede con independencia de la voluntad o actuación del deudor... b) Que tal hecho sea imprevisto y esta imprevisión debe valorarse al tiempo de contraerse la obligación... c) Que tal hecho sea insuperable, lo cual se valora en el momento del incumplimiento y supone la imposibilidad material del deudor en satisfacer el interés del acreedor” F. Montero Piña, Obligaciones, San José: Premiá Editores, 1999, p. 281. “ Es, con el caso fortuito, otra de las circunstancias de hecho que pueden exonerar de culpabilidad al deudor incumplidor. La constituyen aquellos hechos que, pudiendo o no preverse, son siempre inevitables y corresponden a acontecimientos que no guardan ninguna relación necesaria con la situación del deudor. Se trata de un hecho de procedencia exterior a la obligación y cuyo resultado dañoso era inevitable aun con las medidas precautorias que racionalmente cabía tomar” Ribó citado por C. A. Picado Vargas, Código Civil: con jurisprudencia con descriptores. Tomo I. San José: IJSA, 2014, p. 610. “Todo acontecimiento que no ha podido preverse o que, previsto, no ha podido resistirse”. De [Nombre8] citado por C. A. Picado Vargas, Ídem. “ La noción de fuerza mayor, en su núcleo central de contenidos, alude a hechos externos al control del sujeto, respecto de cuyo acaecimiento la persona carece de todo poder de decisión. Los anglosajones aluden a la fuerza mayor con una locución de gran fuerza expresiva: Acts of God (actos de Dios). Los arquetipos de la fuerza mayor son los hechos de la Naturaleza –[Nombre9]., un huracán, un terremoto, la muerte-. Sin embargo, hay hechos del hombre que también pueden calificar como fuerza mayor, tanto hechos ilícitos –un robo, un asalto-, como lícitos, como los llamados “hechos del príncipe” o actos del ejercicio del poder estatal –una ley, un decreto, una resolución judicial-. Califican como fuerza mayor aquellos fenómenos que desde el punto de vista del sujeto se presentan como ineluctables. (...) En síntesis, son tres los elementos que definen, en nuestra jurisprudencia, a la fuerza mayor: -Imprevisibilidad -Inevitabilidad -[Nombre10]”. F. Torrealba Navas, Responsabilidad Civil, San José: Editorial Juricentro, 2011, p. 571 y 572. Asimismo “Vélez dice que “... los casos fortuitos o de fuerza mayor son producidos por dos grandes causas: por la naturaleza o por el hecho del hombre”. Así, hecho producido por caso fortuito sería la impetuosidad de un río que sale de su lecho, los terremotos o temblores de tierra, las tempestades, las pestes, el incendio. En cambio, los casos de fuerza mayor son hechos del hombre, como la guerra, el acto del soberano o la fuerza del [Nombre11]”. Vélez citado por G. Cabanellas de Torres, Diccionario Jurídico Universitario. Tomo 1 A-I. 3ª ed. Buenos Aires: Heliasta, 2007, p. 172. “ El problema de la distinción entre caso y fuerza. (...) El caso es un suceso externo y ajeno al deudor (y a la cosa: no vicios de la misma), independiente de su voluntad; además, para liberar al deudor, no ha de ser previsible o inevitable adoptando la diligencia debida. (...) El Cc. en tales supuestos habla, conforme a la tradición del Derecho común, de caso fortuito (arts. 1.093-3°, 1.136-1°), o fuerza mayor (arts. 457, 1.777, 1.748, 1.905), o de ambos (arts. 1.602, 1.625). La doctrina antigua distingue entre uno y otra: aquél sería producto de fuerzas de la naturaleza (terremoto) y ésta del hecho de un tercero (guerra), o aquél imprevisible y ésta inevitable; o el uno obstáculo surgido dentro del funcionamiento de la empresa (incendio) y la otra externa a él (robo). Mas en el Cc. (y, antes, en [Nombre12] ), por lo común, ambas expresiones son intercambiables, y así suele entenderlo la jurisprudencia*”. J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, y otros, Elementos de Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. Volumen I: Parte general, Teoría General del Contrato. 5ª ed. Madrid: Dykinson, 2011, p. 174 y 175. “La fuerza mayor no es la vis maxima, sino la que no puede superar un buen padre de familia. La imprevisibilidad o inevitabilidad, que no son cualidades intrínsecas y objetivas del evento, sino relativas a determinada situación y a una concreta obligación de prevenir y evitar, dependen, así, del grado de diligencia exigible y la naturaleza de la obligación”. J.L. Lacruz Berdejo, Ídem. En palabras de los tratadistas [Nombre13] y [Nombre14] , en relación a la fuerza mayor debe considerarse que “Aunque la línea dominante en la jurisprudencia es la no distinción del caso fortuito con la fuerza mayor en cuanto a los efectos, no ha dejado de hacerse eco de la diferenciación doctrinal de ambos eventos, y que ve el caso fortuito como el acontecimiento que tiene lugar en el interior de la empresa o círculo afectado por la obligación, mientras que la fuerza mayor sería el que se origina fuera, con violencia insuperable, y que cae fuera de lo que puede preverse en el curso ordinario y normal de la vida*”. L. Díez-Picazo y A. Gullón, Sistema de Derecho Civil: El contrato en general. La relación obligatoria. Volumen II. Tomo 1. 10ª ed. Madrid: Tecnos, 2013, p. 205. En nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, el Código Civil trata la fuerza mayor como una de las formas que produce la liberación de la persona deudora en el caso del Derecho de las Obligaciones: “Artículo 702.- El deudor que falte al cumplimiento de su obligación, sea en la sustancia, sea en el modo, será responsable por el mismo hecho de los daños y perjuicios que ocasione a su acreedor, a no ser que la falta provenga de hecho de éste, fuerza mayor o caso fortuito”. O bien, como un eximente de responsabilidad: “Artículo 1071.- Si el vendedor no entrega la cosa en el tiempo convenido, el comprador podrá a su elección pedir, o la resolución de la venta o que se le ponga en posesión de la cosa. Si el vendedor no hubiere efectuado la tradición, por caso fortuito o fuerza mayor, no habrá lugar a la resolución”; “ Artículo 1180.- Responden también los conductores de los daños causados por retardo en el viaje, o por no cumplir de cualquier otro modo su contrato, salvo caso fortuito o de fuerza mayor”; y “Artículo 1267.- (...) Compete al mandatario probar la fuerza mayor o caso fortuito que le impida llevar a efecto las órdenes del mandante”. En efecto, -como hemos constatado a través de una breve revisión doctrinaria-, lograr una convención sobre la definición de fuerza mayor resulta una tarea tan compleja en el basto mundo del discurso jurídico, que el tratadista español Manuel Albaladejo debate sobre otras ideas como por ejemplo, si “caso fortuito y fuerza mayor son expresiones sinónimas, o dos conceptos diferentes”. M. Albaladejo. Derecho Civil II: Derecho de Obligaciones. 14ª ed. Madrid: Edisofer, S.L., 2011, p. 181. He incluso comenta que “La determinación de si un hecho constituye caso fortuito o fuerza mayor, supone una apreciación jurídica...”. M. Albaladejo. Op. Cit., p.180. Percepción que en efecto, a consideración de esta Sala, debe hacerse teniendo el reparo de que en la especie, deberá trasladarse la noción de fuerza mayor a una materia diversa de la que trata la relación obligacional, para entenderla desde una nueva óptica en la que el vínculo jurídico no es de contenido patrimonial –mas sí comporta consecuencias económicas-, como lo es la filiación. “El concepto filiación proviene del latín filius (hijo) y hace referencia al conjunto de relaciones jurídicas, determinadas por la paternidad y la maternidad, que vinculan a los progenitores con los hijos. Nuestro ordenamiento jurídico prevé varias formas a través de las cuales surge dicha vinculación en vista de que puede darse en razón de un nexo biológico o bien por una imposición legal”. Sala Segunda, sentencia n.° 766 de las 10:05 horas del 30 de julio de 2014. Es la jurisprudencia - doctrina de las personas juzgadoras-, y no la letra de ley, la responsable de nutrir los institutos jurídicos desde otras perspectivas para cumplir con lo que bien explicó la Sala Constitucional mediante el voto n.° 6120, de las 15:05 horas del 08 de mayo de 2013: “La protección del interés superior del menor es un deber que el Derecho de la Constitución le impone al Estado, y que debe verse reflejado en las resoluciones y actuaciones de todas las autoridades judiciales y administrativas, que lo conforman. Los jueces de la República están en la obligación de aplicar el control de convencionalidad, el cual… permite integrar las normas y principios contenidos en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos a las resoluciones que dicten en los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento”. (Lo resaltado no es parte del original). En relación con este punto, también debe tenerse en cuenta lo indicado por este despacho en la sentencia n.° 266, de las 10:55 horas del 26 de marzo de 2009: “...no podría entenderse que el Contralor de Constitucionalidad limitara la procedencia de la revisión -en los términos establecidos en dicho voto- a dos únicas circunstancias 'cuando a la parte interesada le haya sido imposible, por el estado de desarrollo de la técnica y la ciencia contar con la prueba de marcadores genéticos o alguna causa de fuerza mayor le haya impedido ofrecerla o participar en su producción', pues éste fue claro en sostener que '…el propio constituyente originario se encargó de atenuar el rigor de la seguridad jurídica que encarna la cosa juzgada material, contemplando la posibilidad de reabrir un proceso ya fallado a través de la interposición de un recurso extraordinario de revisión según las causales que establece el ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional o el legislador ordinario, para de ese modo modificar o anular una sentencia inicua y lograr que impere la justicia material' (énfasis agregado). Además, el concepto de fuerza mayor contenido en dicho voto no puede interpretarse en sentido estricto, conforme a los términos establecidos en doctrina, pues el legislador lo trató, dándole el mismo valor y consideración, al que le otorgó a las 'obras de la contraria' que hubieran dejado a la parte recurrente en estado de indefensión por imposibilitarle la presentación de prueba durante el proceso... Además, en esta materia los tribunales de justicia, al adoptar sus sentencias, así como en la interpretación de las normas procesales, deben atender al interés superior del niño (artículos 3 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y, 1 y 112 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)”. (El énfasis no es parte del original). Significa que, ante el hecho de que los estudios de la fuerza mayor examinados se han planteado a partir de una sola óptica, la del Derecho de las Obligaciones Civiles –de conformidad con la revisión doctrinaria aquí realizada-, para la cual, además, han aflorado una diversidad de definiciones sobre la misma noción evidenciando la ausencia de convenio sobre su contenido; y ante la ausencia de análisis de dicho vocablo desde otras disciplinas jurídicas, lo procedente es que dicha concepción evolucione y se adapte a otros contextos. Para el particular, la fuerza mayor deberá ser comprendida a luz de los derechos fundamentales de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. En relación a esto, la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia n.° 3481 de las 14:03 horas del 02 de mayo de 2003, estimó lo siguiente: “La interpretación de las normas jurídicas por los operadores jurídicos con el propósito de aplicarlas no puede hacerse, única y exclusivamente, con fundamento en su tenor literal, puesto que, para desentrañar, entender y comprender su verdadero sentido, significado y alcances es preciso acudir a diversos instrumentos hermenéuticos tales como el finalista, el institucional, el sistemático y el histórico-evolutivo. Sobre este particular, el Título Preliminar del Código Civil en su numeral 10 establece que ‘Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas’. Las proposiciones normativas se componen de términos lingüísticos los que tienen un área de significado o campo de referencia así como, también, una zona de incertidumbre o indeterminación, que puede provocar serios equívocos en su interpretación y eventual aplicación. En virtud de lo anterior, al interpretar una norma es preciso indagar su objetivo (ratio) o fin propuesto y supuesto, respecto del cual la norma tiene naturaleza instrumental –método teleológico-. El interprete debe, asimismo, confrontarla, relacionarla y concordarla con el resto de las normas jurídicas que conforman en particular una institución jurídica –método institucional- y, en general, el ordenamiento jurídico –método sistemático-, puesto que, las normas no son compartimentos estancos y aislados sino que se encuentran conexas y coordinadas con otras, de forma explícita o implícita. Finalmente, es preciso tomar en consideración la realidad socio-económica e histórica a la cual se aplica una norma jurídica, la cual es variable y mutable por su enorme dinamismo, de tal forma que debe ser aplicada para coyunturas históricas en constante mutación –método histórico-evolutivo-. Cuando de interpretar una norma jurídica se trata el intérprete no puede utilizar uno solo de los instrumentos indicados, por no tener un carácter excluyente, sino que los mismos son diversos momentos o estadios imprescindibles del entero y trascendente acto interpretativo”. Así, las definiciones apuntadas sobre fuerza mayor resultan sumamente útiles y de ellas pueden extraerse máximas aplicables al Derecho de Familia, como lo es el hecho de que “fuerza mayor” representa un evento externo al sujeto desde el cual se analiza dicha fuerza y la imposibilidad de este para evitarlo. Lo anterior, sobretodo para dejar de lado los análisis de situaciones que implican un examen de causas por las cuales se incumplió el acto de hacer, no hacer o dar; o bien, se releva a una persona de responsabilidad ante el acontecimiento de un hecho dañoso; todas propias del Derecho Obligacional. Pues, por otro lado, la fuerza mayor puede enfocarse como una situación que vista desde un sujeto de derecho, se le presenta de manera que no puede combatirla, impidiéndole el ejercicio de un derecho subjetivo aún cuando esta provenga o se origine en un acto amparado por una ley. Es decir, que la génesis y concretización de dicho evento puede emerger de un acto perfectamente lícito como lo es el imperativo legal de que toda persona menor de edad deba estar sujeta a los actos de representación de sus progenitores o persona tutora –según sea el caso-. Así, estando presentes los requisitos de [Nombre10] e inevitabilidad característicos de la fuerza mayor, la persona menor de edad se ve sometida por mandato legal a una representación legal que “queda fuera del ámbito de la autonomía de la voluntad; su existencia, pervivencia y extensión no nace ni depende de la voluntad del representado. Emana directamente del mandato legal. La ley la impone, señala los requisitos para ser su representante, regula sus poderes para actuar y decidir; aunque ello haya siempre de ser en interés, por cuenta y a cuenta de una persona o de unos intereses, que se estiman necesitados de una especial protección que se confía al representante legal”. (Lo resaltado no es parte del original) [Nombre15]. citado por V. Calatayud Ponce de León, Temas de Derecho Privado, San José: V. Calatayud P.L., 2009, p. 164 y 165. Si bien, dicha representación confiada a un tercero ha sido la respuesta del ordenamiento jurídico a las condiciones reales que afectan a las personas menores de edad precisamente por su condición de menores de edad, -como el no poder representarse a sí mismas, la dependencia emocional y económica, la escasa madurez y el desconocimiento de sus derechos-; los padres y las madres, disponen "sobre" la persona menor de edad y no "para" ella, pues toman decisiones y las llevan a la práctica al margen de la determinación de lo que realmente fortalece y consolida el mejor interés de la persona menor de edad, así como, de las consecuencias que generan tales decisiones. Entonces, esas acciones u omisiones de quienes ejercen la representación afectan negativa y directamente a las personas menores de edad constituyendo un obstáculo insuperable para estas, es decir, un caso de fuerza mayor que interfiere con el ejercicio de los derechos subjetivos de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia. Lo anterior concuerda a cabalidad con la apreciación por la cual se concibe que este evento es un hecho externo a la persona -que en este caso es el titular del derecho-, quien soporta involuntariamente una representación emanada por ley, y que, conlleva un resultado dañoso para esta. La fuerza mayor así concebida resulta necesaria toda vez que según se constató- su concepto ha sido cimentado y desarrollado en función de personas acreedoras y deudoras pero no, -al menos para conocimiento de estos juzgadores y juzgadoras-, desde los derechos de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. En definitiva, el asunto bajo estudio merece un análisis en relación con el derecho de la persona menor de edad de saber quiénes son su padre y su madre –como en efecto aquí se hace-. Así, es acertado recordar las palabras que la misma Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia n.° 11.158, de las 14:52 horas del 1° de agosto de 2007, apuntó sobre estos derechos humanos: “El derecho fundamental a saber quienes son los padres –sobre todo cuando se ejerce junto con el derecho a establecer vínculos de filiación-, se encuentra conexo al principio de la paternidad responsable que enuncia el artículo 53, párrafo 1°, de la Constitución Política al indicar que los padres tienen obligaciones para con sus hijos –tanto los habidos dentro o fuera del matrimonio-. Esas obligaciones de los progenitores o procreadores suponen una serie de derechos de carácter personal y patrimonial en cabeza de los hijos procreados para su adecuado desarrollo y crianza óptima, los cuales debe desarrollar y establecer el legislador ordinario. La paternidad responsable, también es establecida por los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, así el artículo XXX, de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre dispone, en lo conducente, que: ‘Toda persona tiene el deber de asistir, alimentar, educar y amparar a sus hijos menores de edad (…)’, la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño en el numeral 18, párrafo 1°, señala, acertadamente, que ‘1. Los Estados Partes pondrán el máximo empeño en garantizar el reconocimiento del principio de que ambos padres tienen obligaciones comunes en lo que respecta a la crianza y el desarrollo del niño. Incumbirá a los padres o, en su caso, a los representantes legales la responsabilidad primordial de la crianza y el desarrollo del niño. Su preocupación fundamental será el interés superior del niño’. Por su parte, el numeral 16 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, ‘Protocolo de San Salvador’ aprobado por Ley No.7907 de 3 de septiembre de 1999, dispone en lo conducente, lo siguiente: ‘Derecho de la niñez. Todo niño sea cual fuere su filiación tiene derecho a las medidas de protección que su condición de menor requieren por parte de su familia, de la sociedad y del Estado. Todo niño tiene el derecho a crecer al amparo y bajo la responsabilidad de sus padres (…)’. En suma, el derecho fundamental a saber quienes son los padres, cuando es ejercido concomitantemente con el derecho a establecer relaciones de filiación, y los mecanismos procesales de carácter legal para actuarlos constituyen un instrumento para hacer efectivo el principio de la paternidad responsable que enuncia tanto la Constitución Política como los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y que, también, es consustancial a la dignidad humana y a los imperativos constitucionales e internacionales de protección, cuido y asistencia especiales de los menores por su intrínseca condición de vulnerabilidad (artículos 51 de la Constitución Política, 25, párrafo 2°, de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 19 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 24, párrafo 1°, del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 10, párrafos 1° y 3°, del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales)”. En el caso concreto, está demostrado que la madre de [[Nombre1] ] cuya paternidad se investigaba no presentó a la niña para la práctica de la prueba científica. En el recurso ante esta Sala se argumenta que no lo hizo dado que pretendió desistir del proceso en razón de haber llegado a un arreglo extrajudicial con la parte demandada supuestamente favorable para la persona menor de edad. Nótese que para cuando se presentó la solicitud de desistimiento de la demanda de investigación de paternidad el día 25 de junio de 1999 (folio 21 del expediente n.° 97-401610-0292-FA), ya estaba vigente el Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, Ley n.° 7739 del 06 de enero de 1998, publicada en La Gaceta n.° 26 el 06 de febrero de 1998 y que entró a regir en esa misma fecha. Ese cuerpo normativo en el artículo 19 -texto original de la norma- rezó: “En los procesos que involucren el interés de las personas menores de edad no cabrán la deserción ni el desistimiento. Corresponderá al juez impulsar el proceso hasta el dictado de la sentencia”. A la luz de lo desarrollado anteriormente, considera esta Sala que lo actuado por la madre de [[Nombre1] ] -en condición de representante-, aparejado a su circunstancia de persona menor de edad, justifica la ausencia de la parte actora a la práctica de la prueba de ADN por constituir una situación de fuerza mayor que, aunque originada en la disposición legal por la que [[Nombre1] ] se encontraba bajo la representación de la señora [[Nombre3] ]; ésta se vio imposibilitada a combatir los efectos ineludibles de las actuaciones y omisiones de su madre dentro del proceso n.° 97-401610-0292-FA -que aunque legítimas a luz de la representación-, la afectaron cuando el día 19 de noviembre de 1998 –data en la que fue concedida la cita por la Sección de Bioquímica, Laboratorio de Ciencias Forenses del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, folio 25-, no asistió a la prueba pues contaba con un año y dos meses de edad. No pretenden estos juzgadores y juzgadoras exigir que en razón de lo acontecido, hubiese sido posible para [[Nombre1] ] como titular del derecho subjetivo, pedir la reprogramación de la fecha para la realización de la prueba o bien, exigir que fuera presentada en tiempo para su práctica. Está claro -para esta Sala- que en razón de su longevidad no podría haber informado al Juzgado de sus circunstancias. Aún cuando su madre sí pudo haber cumplido lo anterior, quien es parte de este proceso -la persona menor de edad y principal interesada de realizarse la prueba-, ha demostrado que las especiales circunstancias que atañen a las personas menores de edad, constituyeron una cuestión de fuerza mayor para su persona. La misma recurrente invoca en el recurso que ha quedado en indefensión todo este tiempo, sin posibilidad de rectificar lo actuado hasta el momento en que, -por haber cumplido los 15 años de edad-, la normativa referida a la capacidad de actuar le permite proceder en defensa de un derecho fundamental. La madre -como representante de la niña- al haber formulado la solicitud de desistimiento de la demanda -escrito del 25 de junio de 1998 presentado durante la tramitación del expediente n.° 97-401610-0292-FA- (folio 21), y posteriormente ausentarse por completo del proceso a pesar de haber sido rechazado lo pedido (folio 23), incurrió en omisiones al deber de resguardo de los derechos fundamentales de la Niñez y la Adolescencia de su hija –depositado en su persona por el propio Estado-, que llegaron a generar consecuencias procesales perniciosas para los derechos subjetivos de [[Nombre1] ]. Lo anterior, al punto de que impidió en su momento, concretar el derecho a conocer su origen biológico como derecho de la personalidad, acarreando como consecuencia la insatisfacción de otros derechos como el de portar el apellido de su padre, la posibilidad de figurar como heredera de su patrimonio, y solicitar el derecho alimentario –entre otros-. Por consiguiente, considera esta Sala, que el caso concreto se enmarca en el supuesto del inciso 1), del artículo 619, del Código Procesal Civil, específicamente en el supuesto por el cual por impedirlo fuerza mayor no es posible la presentación de alguna prueba; que en la especie corresponde a la prueba científica de ADN (artículo 318 inciso 6) del Código Procesal Civil), de modo tal que resulta procedente acoger el recurso con base en esa norma.* V.- SOBRE LA CAUSAL DE REVISIÓN DISPUESTA EN EL NUMERAL 619 INCISO 7) DEL CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL: La recurrente también basó la revisión en el supuesto del inciso 7) del citado numeral. Este apartado establece otra razón que da lugar al reclamo: el “Haber existido indebida representación durante todo el proceso”. No obstante, ya desde la misma enunciación de los motivos se desprende que se está confundiendo la indebida representación con una asesoría legal inadecuada, supuesto que no calza en la norma transcrita. En efecto, en lo tocante a la representación indebida, la Sala ha explicado que “Cuando el Código habla de 'indebida representación' se refiere a la ilegítima integración del proceso en aquellos casos en que, alguna de las partes, en razón de su naturaleza jurídica o de su situación particular, debe actuar a través de otra persona, a efecto de que su derecho de defensa sea debidamente tutelado, cual sucede en el caso de las personas jurídicas, los menores de edad, los incapaces legales y las sucesiones. En tales casos, la litis debe quedar integrada con el representante con poder suficiente para actuar en juicio a nombre de esas personas, porque si la representación no es la debida, porque no existe o porque quien la ostenta no tiene facultades suficientes para actuar, se produce una imperfección en la legitimación procesal, en perjuicio del derecho de defensa y ello impide dictar una sentencia válida” (voto número 646, de las 10:20 horas del 30 de junio de 2000). En el caso concreto –según ya se ha expuesto-, la menor de edad actuó mediante representación -artículo 102, Código Procesal Civil-, sin que se advierta vicio alguno, pues quien la ejerció fue su madre, en ejercicio de la responsabilidad parental -canon 140, Código de Familia- y no otra persona. En consecuencia, según las palabras de la recurrente, la indebida asesoría que acusa, en el sentido de que su madre no la llevó a la práctica de la prueba científica, no encaja en el supuesto normativo de la indebida representación. * VI.- DISPOSICIONES FINALES: Así las cosas, se estima procedente acoger el recurso de revisión interpuesto por encontrarse el asunto en el supuesto de hecho previsto en el inciso 1) del artículo 619 del Código Procesal Civil; anular la sentencia de las quince horas del nueve de junio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, dictada por el Juzgado de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela en el proceso n.° 97-401610-0292-FA. En consecuencia, procede ordenar la devolución del expediente a dicho Juzgado de origen para que el proceso sea adecuado a la normativa procesal vigente, Ley n.° 8101 “Ley de Paternidad Responsable”. Asimismo, la tramitación deberá retrotraerse a aquella etapa procesal que permita a la persona menor de edad ejercer plenamente su derecho de defensa y especialmente, que le permita combatir los efectos procesales adversos ocasionados por su entonces representante legal. Dada la antigüedad del expediente n.° 97-401610-0292-FA, se hace la observación a la autoridad judicial que tendrá a su cargo la tramitación de este asunto, que deberá tomar las previsiones necesarias para que este proceso no se vea afectado por la selección y eliminación de documentos de vieja data de manera que se cumplan las disposiciones previstas en la Circular n.° 29-2012 emitida por la Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia “Tabla de plazos de conservación de expedientes, plazo de conservación de documentos base y directrices para la selección y eliminación de expedientes en materia de familia y pensiones alimentarias”.* POR TANTO:* Se declara con lugar el recurso de revisión promovido y, en ese sentido, se anula la sentencia de las quince horas del nueve de junio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, dictada por el Juzgado de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela en el proceso número noventa y siete-cuatrocientos un mil seiscientos diez-cero doscientos noventa y dos-FA. Se ordena devolver el respectivo expediente al Juzgado de origen para que adecue el trámite del presente proceso según lo ordena la “Ley de Paternidad Responsable” y, se dicte una nueva sentencia con arreglo a derecho. Tome nota el Juzgado de lo expuesto en las “Consideraciones Finales” con respecto a la conservación del expediente. * * * * * * * Julia Varela Araya * * * * * * * Eva María Camacho Vargas * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez* * * * * * * Héctor Blanco González * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Maureen Roxana Solís Madrigal* * * jbarquero* * * * * * *