Adverse possession of public domain municipal property deniedUsucapión de bien municipal de dominio público denegada

Case No. 03-160155-638-GA No. 346-2008.

SECTION TWO OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea, at nine hours forty minutes on the twenty-fourth of October of two thousand eight.

Ordinary Contentious Process brought by Nombre71020, married, handyman, with identity card number CED52967, Nombre71021, farmer, identity card number CED52968, Nombre71022, single, merchant, identity card CED52969, Nombre71023, housewife, identity card number CED52970, Nombre71024, sign maker, identity card CED52971, Nombre71025, farmer, identity card number CED52972, and Nombre71026, pensioner, with identity card number CED52973; against the MUNICIPALITY OF THE CENTRAL CANTON OF HEREDIA, represented by its Mayor, Nombre4631, divorced, Master in Business Administration, identity card CED52974. Acting as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiffs is Nombre71027, attorney and notary, identity card number CED52975. All are of legal age, residents of Heredia, and with the exceptions noted, married.

WHEREAS:

1.- That the amount in controversy in this matter having been set at the sum of ten million colones (by order of nine hours fourteen minutes on November second, two thousand four), based on the facts set forth and articles 261, 277 to 281, 284, 286, 305, 207, 209, 317, 328, 332, 473, 484, 853 to 856, 860 of the Civil Code, 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and the body of evidence, it is requested that judgment declare as the principal petition: "1. That my clients have possessed the property described in the sketch prepared by Engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, and fulfilled the respective requirements of ten-year possession, in a quiet, public, peaceful, uninterrupted manner, as owners and in good faith, and by virtue thereof, ADVERSE POSSESSION (PRESCRIPCIÓN POSITIVA) or USUCEPTION has operated in their benefit, and STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN NEGATIVA) has operated to the detriment of the Municipality of Heredia, since the latter has never exercised possession over it. 2. That it be ordered to register the property in the name of my grantors in the Public Registry, in equal shares, they afterwards proceeding through the respective channel to segregate and locate the rights pertaining to each one. The Registry shall be ordered to apply the reduction in Dirección7932. 3. That the defendant be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this proceeding." And as a subsidiary claim, it requests "4. ... I request your Authority that, should the foregoing be rejected, we be paid for the necessary and useful improvements made on the real property during the entire term of possession, as determined by an expert, plus the respective interest calculated from the date of determination until the respective payment. All of which shall be done prior to vacating the property. Should this subsidiary petition be admitted, the defendant shall also be ordered to pay costs." (Folios 81 and 82).

2.- That the defendant Municipality answered the action in the negative, opposing for that purpose the preliminary defense of lack of competence by subject matter and territory, resolved interlocutorily (by resolution number 1066-04, of ten hours on the twenty-seventh of August of two thousand four, at folios 96 and 97); and the exceptions of lack of active and passive cause of action, lack of right, and the generic sine actione agit (folios 103 to 114).

3.- That Licenciada Sandra María Quesada Vargas, at that time Judge of the Trial Court for the subject matter, in judgment number 426-2007, of eight hours on the twenty-ninth of March of two thousand seven, resolved: "THEREFORE: The exceptions of lack of standing (legitimación) and lack of interest raised by the Municipality of Heredia are rejected. The defense of lack of right invoked by the defendant Municipality is upheld, and consequently, the present action is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs of the proceeding are charged to the plaintiff side." (Folios 289 and 290.)

4.- Disagreeing with the trial court's decision, the plaintiffs appeal, a recourse which was admitted (by order of eleven hours fourteen minutes on the twelfth of June of two thousand seven, at folio 305); and by virtue of which this Tribunal has jurisdiction on appeal.

5.- The mandatory procedural requirements have been observed in the proceedings, and no grounds for nullity capable of invalidating the actions are noted.

Judge Fernández Brenes writes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- OF THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED AT FIRST INSTANCE.- In view of the fact that the plaintiffs' representative alleges the nullity of the first instance judgment for the supposed infraction of due process, we proceed to its analysis prior to hearing the appeals filed, as provided in article 155, subsection 3), point a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this regard, two important warnings must be made. First, the appellants are advised that this is an ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding, not one of an agrarian nature, in this case, by reason of one of the subjects intervening in it, a municipality, a territorially decentralized entity, which has governmental autonomy, and which is embedded in the organization of our (Costa Rican) State, in accordance with articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, and by reason of the claim, since this lawsuit was precisely filed so that the judgment would declare adverse possession (usucapion) in relation to a property of a local corporation, and failing that, the recognition of improvements; a circumstance that requires applying the rules of Public Law, comprising both Constitutional Law and Administrative Law. The foregoing implies that its processing was done in accordance with the procedural rules governing this type of action, that is, the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (since it was filed on the fifteenth of November of two thousand two) and the pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 103 of the first Law; without the procedural rules of agrarian proceedings being pertinent to this process. On this point, it must be borne in mind that this matter does not meet the assumptions established in the (Agrarian Jurisdiction) Law (number 6734, of the twenty-ninth of March of nineteen eighty-two) for it to be considered of an agrarian nature, inasmuch as it is not a dispute arising from the application of agrarian legislation, nor legal provisions regulating the activities of production, transformation, industrialization, or disposition of agricultural products (as provided in Article 1 of the cited legal body), since the plaintiffs do not have the status of peasants or land workers, as required by subsection a) of Article 2 of the referenced Law. Second, it is undeniable that agrarian proceedings have special connotations that differentiate them from those processed under civil procedural regulations, into which, moreover, orality was introduced. In this regard, in judgment number 3606-94, of fifteen hours twelve minutes on the nineteenth of July of nineteen ninety-four, the Constitutional Chamber stated; "... by breaking with excessive formalism, with the criterion of formal equality of the parties, and the great limits imposed on the Judge and on persons of scarce resources, elements that characterize the civil process. This rejection is based on the idea that such elements lead to a denial of justice to those seeking it, since the process becomes, in a great many cases, a weapon by which the judicial pronouncement is delayed. Therefore, the response of the agrarian process has been to introduce procedural simplifications, to design a faster process aimed at guaranteeing prompt and complete justice, reflected in short deadlines, in simple processing, in the reduction of legal obstacles for the parties involved in the process, in the elimination of fiscal requirements, and in the granting of broad powers to the judge, both for conducting the process up to judgment, and regarding the administration and assessment of evidence. For this reason, the agrarian process becomes a more humane instrument for resolving matters submitted to the judge's knowledge, both in the processing (where there must be closer contact between the parties and the judge) and in the guarantees granted to the parties to be able to resort to justice, even being able to receive free legal assistance when dealing with persons without the means to cover the professional expenses thereof. Thus, the specificity of the agrarian process is constituted by two fundamental factors: on the one hand, the principle of orality in which the process has found institutional and ideological support to conceive its own structure in accordance with the demands of agrarian matters, a principle whose implications are summarized in the dominance of the word as a means of expression—without excluding writing in preparation and documentation—so that the principle of immediacy, the identity of the adjudicator, concentration, and reinforcement of the Judge's powers are also present, to satisfactorily conduct the trial toward the search for truth; and on the other hand, the phenomenon of the publicization or socialization of agrarian law and its process, having three immediate consequences: 1.- the urgent need to conceive a modern process divorced from the traditional—civil process—; 2.- declaring the search for and declaration of the truth to be of public interest, granting the judge sufficient powers in the process so that he is the conductor and administrator, not only of the points discussed before him, but especially, of the investigation to ensure that his judgments manage to closely unite real truth with legal truth; and 3.- socializing justice, so that all procedural subjects can resort to a less formal and less costly process, so that persons of scarce resources may also find answers to their needs.

From the foregoing, it is concluded that there is a general orientation directed towards specific guidelines linked to informality, swiftness, economy, and humanization of the process." But such elements do not govern contentious proceedings, which, according to their procedural rules, are of a written nature. By virtue of the foregoing, that condition alone means there is no infraction of the alleged principle of the immediacy of evidence, since the same has application only with respect to oral proceedings, as indicated by our Constitutional Court in judgment 2007-1555, of fifteen hours thirty-four minutes on the seventh of February of two thousand seven:

"... Finally, it is worth noting that these considerations are based on the model of process designed by the legislators—a matter in which there is legislative discretion—, which, being of a written nature, the principle of immediacy of evidence—typical of oral proceedings—does not apply, in which it is required that the adjudicator who resolves be the one who, in turn, receives—in person—the evidence sustaining the process." Consequently, as in this type of (written) proceedings, the judge who directly receives the evidence (in this case, conducts the judicial inspection) is not obligated to render the final judgment, no irregularity is evident, which requires rejecting the alleged nullity.

II.- OF THE OMISSION OF THE FIRST INSTANCE JUDGE IN RESOLVING AN ALLEGATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY, WITHOUT THIS PRODUCING NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT.- The aforementioned article 155 subsection 3) point a) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in second instance judgments, an analysis must be performed of procedural defects or omissions warranting correction; a requirement that obliges this Tribunal to make a pronouncement regarding a situation that, even though it does not imply the nullity of the judgment, its correction is pertinent. Indeed, in the appealed resolution, the Trial Judge made a pronouncement on all aspects comprising the plaintiffs' claim, that is, the principal and the subsidiary one, rejecting the lawsuit in all its aspects. However, she omitted to make a pronouncement on an allegation of the defendant Municipality, specifically point 4 made in the answer brief, in which it requested the Jurisdictional Authority:

"1. That the exceptions of lack of competence, res judicata, lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing be upheld.

2. The plaintiffs never complied with the possessory agrarian legal requirements as stated by the Constitutional Chamber itself in Voto 2002-08822, thus eliminating the possibility of discussing the eventual application of the legal institute of adverse possession in their favor. Likewise, it is of utmost importance to indicate that the real property under discussion is in the public domain, therefore it is protected by the legal and constitutional privilege (fuero) due to its public nature and cannot be the object of private property, as supported by the Constitutional Chamber itself. For these reasons, the ordinary lawsuit must be declared without merit without there being any duty to pay any improvements or profits to the plaintiffs.

3. That the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of the proceeding for litigating in bad faith.

4. That the cancellation be ordered of the survey plans (planos) registered in the National Cadastre as segregations from municipal-owned property number 4-106304-000.

5. We request that the precautionary measure be rejected, since municipal property, as is demonstrated and supported by the Constitutional Chamber in Voto 2002-08822, has the obligation to act in defense against precarious occupations on municipal public property, as in the instant case." (folios 111 and 112).

In this regard, it is deemed that this is not a problem of inconsistency in the judgment, which consists of "... the lack of relationship between what was requested and what was resolved, relative to the parties, the object, or the cause; the latter is constituted by the facts.- Inconsistency therefore does not arise from contradictions that may result, for example, between proven or unproven facts and the pronouncements, or between these and the substantive assessments; in such a situation, the most that could occur would be a defective reasoning of the ruling, which is a matter of another nature, specifically, of the cassation appeal on the merits, for errors of fact or law in the assessment of evidence.- Stated otherwise, there is no inconsistency between the considerations of the judgment and what is resolved in the operative part. Finally, the judgment may grant everything requested, just as it may deny everything, and if it can do the latter, with equal or greater reason it may grant only a part, and in none of those cases is inconsistency incurred; this would occur if more than what was requested, or something different from what was requested, were granted, which is what is called ultra petita and extra petita" (judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 35-91, of fifteen hours on the twenty-second of March of nineteen ninety-one).

Note that in this case, there was no counterclaim, so the analysis of whether or not to cancel the cadastral survey plans segregated from property Placa11544 registered in the National Cadastre was not the object of the litis, but only whether or not the declaration of usucapion and/or improvements requested by the plaintiffs was appropriate. Furthermore, in the brief where he formulated the concluding arguments, the Mayor of the defendant municipality did not make any mention of this point. Now, the impropriety of what was requested—because it is not part of the litis, and insofar as a pronouncement on this point merits rather a different ordinary proceeding—, even more so when such omission exists, this does not translate into nullity of the ruling, as it causes no harm or infraction of due process and the right of defense. We further clarify that it is not true that the Municipality raised the exception of res judicata as a preliminary defense or as a substantive exception.

III.- OF THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION.- In their appeal brief, the plaintiffs request that an expert evidence be ordered as evidence for better resolution, so that a topographical expert be appointed for the purpose of locating the property owned by the Municipality of Heredia and the one that is the object of this litis (which they seek to acquire by usucapion), considering that no suitable evidence has been provided demonstrating that the one occupying this process belongs to that local entity. On this point, it is important to note that in the briefs filing and formalizing the lawsuit, this evidence was offered, and to that effect, the Court admitted it by order of fourteen hours thirty-one minutes on the seventh of March of two thousand five, appointing the expert Nombre37177. Now, it turned out that he was a mathematical expert, who rendered his report on the third of May of two thousand five (folios 236 to 240), without the plaintiff side objecting to it or making any warning, thereby accepting the expertise and its content. Likewise, in accordance with article 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is a prerogative (power) for the superior judge to request evidence for better resolution, insofar as this will depend on the assessment made of the existing evidentiary items in each case. Therefore, this request is rejected, it being deemed unnecessary, as there are sufficient elements of judgment in the case file to support the decision.

IV.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS.- For a better understanding of the facts deemed proven, those determined by the Trial Judge are replaced, due to the existence of a series of omissions in their notation, so that they are held as follows: 1.) That the property of the district (partido) of Heredia registered in the National Registry in the real folio system, in the District of Heredia, under registration number Placa11545, the nature of which is building lot, located in canton 01 Heredia, Dirección7933, which borders to the North with street, to the South with IMAS, to the East with street and to the West with street, with an area of thirty-four thousand two hundred sixty-four meters with two square decimeters, with cadastral survey plan number Placa11546, is the property of the Municipality of Heredia (literal certification, at folio 05); 2.) That this ownership has been registered in the Public Property Registry since the twenty-fourth of February of nineteen eighty-four (literal certification, at folio 05); 3.) That cadastre survey plan number Placa11546 does not correspond to the current state of property Placa11544, since from the south side of the Pirro river, a lot of ten thousand fifty-eight square meters with eighty-one square decimeters was segregated, which was registered under cadastral survey plan number H-633366-1986, and was transferred to the Joint Institute of Social Assistance (IMAS), to be used for the construction of the Palacios Universitarios housing project (official letter DC-00145-2002, of the fifteenth of July of two thousand two, from the Head of Cadastre of the Municipality of Heredia, Nombre71028, at folio 8 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 4.) That on that property, the Municipality of the Central Canton of Heredia built its new municipal yard (plantel) and it is also used by that locality to deposit and dump garbage and debris (official letter DIM 0969-2002, of the twentieth of August of two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file, and testimonies of Nombre71029 and Nombre71030, folio 232, 233 of the principal file); 5.) That in official letter DC-00145-2002, of the fifteenth of July of two thousand two, the Head of Cadastre of the Municipality of Heredia informs the corporation's Operative Director that since the seventh of May of two thousand two, they have registered in the cadastre the survey plan H-787226-2002, with an area of five hundred eighty-five square meters, in the name of Nombre71022, and on the twelfth of June of the same year, the cadastral survey plan H-796074-2002, in the name of Nombre71031, both as possessors; instruments from which it follows that there are more persons located on property 4-106304-000, since the abutting neighbors are Nombre71032, Nombre71033, Nombre71034, and Nombre71021, reason why steps must be taken for the annulment of the same, due to the municipal ownership over the property (folio 8 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 6.) That over said property, the plaintiffs have exercised an occupation, manifested in the construction of dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets, and other materials, cleaning of the lot, cultivation of some corn, coffee, plantain, and fruit trees, and the erection of two wooden structures (ranchos) with zinc roofs, cement floors, without walls, in a regular state of conservation (judicial inspection, at folios 224 and 225 of the principal file; testimonies of Nombre71029, Nombre71030, and Nombre71035, folio 232, 233, and 234 of the principal file; and official letter DIM 0969-2002, of the twentieth of August of two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file); 7.) That in the year two thousand two, the plaintiffs hired engineer Luis Fernando Araya to produce a sketch of the formal division among the occupants of said property, in which it is clearly recorded that the property belongs to the Municipality of Heredia (fact not disputed by the parties, survey sketch visible at folio 1 of the principal file; and official letter DIM 0969-2002, of the twentieth of August of two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file); 8.) That on the twenty-ninth of July of two thousand two, a group of neighborhood residents filed a complaint before the Municipality of Heredia, alleging that the property indicated supra, owned by the defendant Municipality, had been invaded and was being used by some persons, which threatened the safety and tranquility of the residents of that sector (folios 143 to 41 of volume 1 of the administrative file, 6 to 14 of volume 3 of the administrative file); 9.) That in response to the neighborhood complaint filed, on the ninth of August of two thousand two, the Municipality of Heredia began work to eliminate the dividing fences, without completing the work (official letter DIM 0988-2002, of the twenty-fifth of August of two thousand two, at folio 26 of volume 3 of the administrative file, and first fact of the amparo appeal filed by the plaintiffs, folio 89 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 10.) That on the ninth of August of two thousand two, Nombre71036 and Nombre71021 filed an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which was processed under case file number 02-006638-0007-CO, against the Municipality of Heredia, alleging possession over the property belonging to that municipality since the year nineteen eighty-six (folios 89 to 82 and 110 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 11.) That said amparo appeal was declared without merit through judgment number 2002-08822, of sixteen hours thirty-one minutes on the tenth of September of two thousand two, because said Tribunal deemed that the respondent's action was required, in manifestation of the defense powers held by that local corporation, it being a public domain asset (bien de dominio público) (folios 110 to 107 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 12.) That this proceeding was filed in the court offices, before the Agrarian Court of Heredia, on the fifteenth of November of two thousand two (received stamp and filing brief, at folios 1 to 16 of the principal file); 13.) That by resolution of eight hours on the sixteenth of January of two thousand three, the Mayoress of Heredia warned Nombre71020, Nombre71021, Nombre71037 that, for partially invading the property of that corporation, registered in the real folio under registration number Placa11545, they had to vacate it within the non-extendable period of seventy-two hours from notification of that decision, which was notified to the interested parties on the following seventeenth of January (folio 83 and 85 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 14.) That by brief of the eleventh of February of two thousand three, the Mayor of the Municipality of Heredia requested the Ministry of Public Security to initiate an administrative eviction procedure (desalojo administrativo) against Nombre71020, Nombre71021, Nombre71037, and Nombre71038, all in their capacity as occupants of its property registered under real folio registration number Placa11544 (see folios 118 to 112 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 15.) That said procedure culminated with the issuance of resolution number 1016-2003 D.M., of fourteen hours on the tenth of March of two thousand three, issued by the Office of the Minister of Public Security, in which the filed municipal request was granted and authorization was given to proceed with the respective eviction by the responsible police authority, having first given the occupants a period of forty-eight hours to vacate the property voluntarily (see folios 130 and 129 of volume I of the administrative file); 16.) That by official letter DIM-1108-2004, of the twenty-seventh of July of two thousand four, the surveyor and engineer of the defendant municipality inform the Director of Legal Affairs that, having made a new visit to the property, they verify that it remains invaded and with fences, which is verifiable at a glance, given that the boundaries of the property are well defined (west side the Urbanización Bernardo Benavides and south side the Pirro river), of which photographs are taken (folios 212 to 208 of volume 1 of the administrative file); and, 17.) That on the twenty-ninth of August of two thousand one, Nombre71031, of legal age, married, chef, with identity card number CED52976, resident of Dirección7934, assigns the litigious rights of the ordinary proceeding processed in case file 02-160155-638-AG, which was brought to the Court's attention until the third of March of two thousand five, an assignment which was admitted by the Contentious Administrative Tribunal, Section Three, by resolution number 294-2006, of ten hours ten minutes on the fourth of August of two thousand six (folios 137, 138, 181, and 182 of the principal file).

II.UNPROVEN FACTS. The list of facts deemed unproven that the Trial Judge determined is replaced, with the following being held as such—due to the case file lacking suitable evidentiary material upon which to base them—and which are of significance for the resolution of this matter: 1.) That the plaintiffs are peasants or are engaged in agricultural activities; 2.) That the plaintiffs had occupied part of property 4-106304-000 since nineteen eighty-six; 3.) That the plaintiffs have planted around five thousand coffee plants and various crops on the property of the Municipality of Heredia that they have been occupying; 4.) That the execution of the administrative eviction authorized by resolution No. 1016-2003 of 14:00 hours on March 10, 2003, issued by the Minister of Public Security, was carried out; 5.) That some necessary and useful improvements were made on the property in question by the plaintiffs; 6.) That the plaintiffs had carried out the possessory information proceeding (información posesoría) to register in their name the property they seek to acquire by usucapion; and 7.) That the plaintiffs have a transferable title of ownership (título traslativo de dominio) over the property for which they claim adverse possession of the right of property.

VI.- OF THE APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCES.- The representative of the plaintiffs alleges the nullity of judgment number 426-2007, issued at eight o'clock on March twenty-ninth, two thousand seven, by the Contentious-Administrative Court, on the grounds that due process in agrarian matters has been violated, leaving his clients in "an absolute and total state of defenselessness", by disregarding the principle of immediacy of evidence, which is evidenced by the clear contradictions regarding the testimonial, documentary, and expert evidence presented in the first instance, which has caused the lower court to err; and he files an appeal for the following reasons: a.) that there has been an erroneous interpretation and assessment of the existing evidence, by performing a superficial analysis of the expert evidence, omitting to rely on the testimonies rendered, which are of importance for the resolution of this matter, and downplaying the judicial inspection, from which the agricultural activity carried out and the facts deemed unproven in the appealed decision are derived; b.) failing to assess that farm 106.304-000 does not coincide at all with the area that has been possessed by his clients, since the measurements do not match, insofar as the former has an area of one thousand four hundred five square meters with ten square decimeters, and they have occupied thirty-four thousand two hundred sixty-four square meters with two square decimeters; c.) that the defendant Municipality has not proven that the occupied property is its own, due to a lack of suitable proof, namely a cadastral plan, which makes evident the need for a detailed study in order to clarify this point; d.) that the judgment limited itself to an analysis of the institution of public domain assets, despite this being an ordinary agrarian proceeding, resting on a nuance exclusively of Administrative Law, ignoring the characteristics of adverse possession in Agrarian Law (folios 300 to 304). For this reason, he claims that the appealed judgment be reversed, and that the opposing lawsuit be declared with merit, with costs imposed on the Municipality of the central Canton of Heredia.

VII.- OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT OVER WHICH POSSESSION IS ALLEGED.- The plaintiffs allege that no suitable evidence has been provided to determine that the lot subject to this litigation is the property of the defendant Municipality, because the areas of what they intend to acquire by adverse possession do not correspond with the registered area. However, this Court disagrees with such an assertion, since, from the evidence provided to the case file—the sketch prepared by engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, cadastral plans number H-370888-79 (at folios 1 and 2 of the main file), as well as the registry study carried out by the municipality's engineer (official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file), and the records of the field visits carried out by officials of that corporation (official communication DIM-1108-2004, of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four)—it is denoted with absolute clarity that the plaintiffs invaded part of a property belonging to the defendant. The foregoing is fully known by the petitioners here, since a writ of amparo that they filed (two of the plaintiffs here) against the acts of defense exercised by the owning Municipality was denied, and in the very brief of presentation and formalization of this lawsuit, they expressly request the Jurisdictional Authority, "2- That it be ordered that the property acquired by adverse possession be registered in the name of my principals in the Public Registry, in equal parts, with them subsequently resorting to the respective avenue to segregate and locate the rights corresponding to each one. The Registry will be ordered to apply the reduction of capacity in farm ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR." Furthermore, the officials of the respondent corporation are correct in stating that the boundaries of the farm are easily defined; thus, considering the shape of the lot demarcated in cadastral plan number H-370888-79, it is deduced without a doubt that the sketch with the portions of the occupations, prepared by engineer Nombre71039, and which an attempt was made to register in the cadastre, is part of the farm registered in the indicated plan.

VIII.- OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN REGIME.- The Trial Judge denied the recognition of adverse possession (usucapión) in relation to the occupation carried out by the plaintiffs on the farm registered in the real folio system, with registration number Placa11544, by reason of its public domain condition, being the property of the Municipality of the central Canton of Heredia. On this point, it is important to clarify the concept, as the one given in the ruling under review is not precise and gives rise to confusion. Indeed, public domain assets (bienes demaniales o dominicales) must be understood as the set of assets—both immovable and movable—that have a legal nature and regime virtually opposite to private ones, insofar as, by the express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are assigned a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and for this reason, they cannot be the object of private property or possession, so they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State—in the strict sense—since the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between public domain assets and private domain assets of the State (fiscal assets), precisely by reason of their purpose, since what defines the legal nature of the former is the destination given to this type of asset, that is, insofar as they are assigned to and are at the service of public use, in the terms provided in Article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this regard, consult judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 of the Constitutional Chamber.) This category includes—without constituting a closed list—the maritime-terrestrial zone, the forest or natural patrimony of the State—protected areas—(comprised of national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protected zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments—Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five—), the hydrographic protection zones—Article 33 of the Forest Law—(contiguous to springs, riverbanks, and lake shores), the border zones (Article 10 of the Vacant Lands Law, number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine), the right-of-way, railway lines, indigenous reserves, historical-architectural patrimony, mining resources, archaeological patrimony, parks and green areas, etc. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code (legal assignment), these are assets whose vocation and purpose, insofar as "they are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those from which everyone can benefit by being delivered to public use," are outside the commerce of men, and are therefore inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable; such that their ownership or possession is not possible, neither gratuitously nor for consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by adverse possession, so they retain their legal validity permanently; and they are not subject to seizure, in the terms of Civil Law; in addition to being subject to police power, concerning their exploitation and use, since their private use is conditioned on the granting of the respective licenses and permits and the control and supervision by the Administration; and the Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery, without the need to resort to judicial channels, nor even to an administrative procedure, as the "occupant" has no subjective right or legitimate interest, so that the administrative action substitutes interdicts for their restitution. Therefore, the legal regime of public domain assets is special and differentiated, precisely in consideration of the type of assets involved. The distinction between private assets or things and public assets and things depends, in the first place, on the "ownership" or "dominion" of the asset, since the differentiated legal nature and regime are defined by this element; and consequently, on the applicable law, since the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain assets places them outside the commerce of men, and for this reason, the permits granted will always be precarious and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, the violation or injury of the property right, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution, is not possible, as it is a completely different legal regime, where the law establishes conditions through which use and enjoyment by private parties is possible. Thus, anyone attempting by unauthorized means to exercise private use of that zone will be barred from the possibility of consummating it, as it has also been acceptable, since time immemorial, that these are assets imprescriptible in favor of private parties and that are outside commerce, principles enshrined in numerals 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, which dates from eighteen eighty-six.

IX.- OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROPERTY OVER WHICH AGRARIAN POSSESSION IS ALLEGED.- The Trial Judge is correct in stating that, when dealing with public domain assets, no type of possession is possible or legitimate, and the possession exercised cannot generate any right in favor of the occupant. However, as indicated by doctrine and jurisprudence—indicated in the preceding Consideration—it is impossible to bestow the condition of public domain solely based on the subjective element of the owner of the asset, that is, when dealing with Public Law entities. Thus, the criterion to be used is that of the purpose or vocation of the asset, that is, for use by the community or for the provision of a public service, an element that is fully met in this case, since the farm over which agrarian possession is alleged, for the purpose of declaring adverse possession (usucapión), is not only the property of the Municipality of Heredia (as determined in Consideration VII.- of this judgment), but also, the depot of that local government is located on it, precisely to fulfill the purposes entrusted by constitutional mandate in its numeral 169, that is, "the administration of local interests and services"; and furthermore, it has been used as a garbage dump, as declared by the testimonies rendered to the case file. Thus, as it is a public domain asset, private parties have no right of possession, such that possession—as an attribute of the right of possession—can only be exercised by the entities holding the right, without any private subject being able to legally claim possessory acts, unless these were carried out before the public institution acquired ownership, and solely for the purposes of eventual compensation, which does not occur in this case, in which it was demonstrated that the Municipality is the owner of the Property Address7935 since February twenty-fourth, nineteen eighty-four, and the alleged possession (occupation or rather invasion) began from nineteen eighty-six.

X.- OF THE ALLEGED AGRARIAN POSSESSION.- As indicated in the preceding Consideration, the public domain nature of the property sought to be acquired by adverse possession would make further analysis regarding the alleged agrarian possession unnecessary, since a requirement for the adverse possession of the property right is the nature of the asset, that is, that it be a "suitable thing," which implies that it must be susceptible to private property, and in such condition, that it is in the commerce of men; a requirement that, as has been stated, is not met in this case. Notwithstanding the foregoing, because it is alleged that there was no greater analysis of this point in the appealed judgment, it is deemed pertinent to make several observations, which lead us to confirm that, even if it were not a public domain asset, it would also not be appropriate—in this case—to recognize the requested adverse possession. Indeed, in the first place, it must be noted that this is not a situation where agrarian legislation must be applied, but rather civil legislation, as the farm—in the registry—does not have an agricultural vocation, and the plaintiffs have not given it that purpose. The lawsuit is filed on the basis that this is an agrarian possession, and by virtue thereof, they have exercised possessory acts of that nature. However, from the evidence provided to the case file, it is possible to conclude that, even though it is true that the occupants (the plaintiffs here) have carried out some cultivation—of yucca, corn, coffee, plantain, and fruit trees—these do not meet the conditions set forth in the regulations to be considered subsistence farming; rather, as the representative of the respondent municipality correctly states on various occasions, it seems to be an extension of the lands of the occupants, who, curiously enough, are all adjacent to the property in dispute, and for this purpose they erected dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets, and other materials, cleared the lot, and, at least, in two of those "fractions", they built wooden structures (shacks) with zinc roofs, cement floors, without walls, in a fair state of repair; assessments that prevent this Court from giving this occupation an agrarian character. On this point, it is important to make several observations of significance. It must be remembered that "X. The special agrarian adverse possession is a typical institution of Agrarian Law, as are also the enterprise, contracts, property, and agrarian possession. Its elements derive from a particular regulatory regime, therefore it acquires differential features from civil adverse possession itself. Its foundation lies in the general principle of Agrarian Law known as the economic and social function of agrarian property. As is known, this divides into two: one subjective, of an economic nature, referring to the owner's obligation to produce, improve, and respect the environment, and another objective, of a social nature, consisting of the State's obligation to endow property to those who, having the capacity and knowledge to produce, do not have it or have it insufficiently. This last aspect is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by expressing 'Everyone has the right to private property corresponding to the essential needs of a decent life, that contributes to maintaining the dignity of the person and the home,' and also in the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José thus: 'Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the social interest.' This concerns the human right to property and not just the right of property. It seeks, as one of the economic and social human rights, to guarantee 'access' to it." (Judgment number 68-94, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes of August sixteenth, nineteen ninety-four.)

Thus, the structure of the agrarian property right is integrated by special duties, and by a particular way of exercising the inherent faculties of property, insofar as its owner is obliged to destine it for agricultural activity, which precisely sustains its existence, as indicated by our Constitutional Court in judgment number 2000-9119, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes of October seventeenth, two thousand:

"III.- On the right.- Agrarian property, determined in this case by its form of acquisition through the mechanisms provided in the Land and Colonization Law, is identified by the obligations on the owner to exercise possessory acts in fulfillment of the social function of their right. Property and possession are thus in such a relationship that the former cannot be conceptualized without the concurrence of the latter, in such a way that, without property becoming denatured as a subjective right, its owner assumes a series of obligations in the exercise of their right. The State, attending not only to that differentiating character of agrarian property, but also framed within the conception of the Social and Democratic State of Law that governs our country, recognized in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, has provided, through the Land and Colonization Law, a specific procedure for the acquisition of this right, with the desire to promote the gradual increase of the productivity of land property, for a just distribution of its product and for the purpose of elevating the social condition of the peasant, making them a participant in the development of the Nation (Article 1 of the cited Law). From this perspective, those who acquire any right through the mechanisms thus provided, contract the obligation, considering the above considerations, of exercising agrarian possessory acts on the acquired land, understood as those aimed at putting the land into production efficiently." With which, within that set of regulatory rules that weigh upon agrarian property, the one relating to the purpose of the allocated land is foreseen—unavoidably—as there is a charge upon it so that it be dedicated to agrarian activity; which, in cases of land titling by the Institute of Agrarian Development, empowers the revocation or extinction of the adjudication—Article 68 subsection 4 point a)—, or the property being subject to expropriation by the State, as authorized by Article 144 of the same Law; and in cases where adverse possession is alleged, the inadmissibility of the petition, as the regulations require "stable and effective" possessory acts for the purpose of putting it into production conditions for personal or family subsistence, on land registered in the name of a third party in the Public Property Registry (Article 92 of the cited Law 2825). Thus, the precarious possessor, when possessing for more than ten years, acquires ownership through an original acquisition, and correlatively, the right of the registered owner in that area is extinguished; a registry principle that is characteristic of both civil law and agrarian law, and corresponds in general to the ways of acquiring real rights; thus, in the case of the precarious possessor, its regulation is found in the cited Law 2825 in the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 92: "Precarious possessors who have ten-year possession under the conditions stated in the preceding paragraph may register their right in accordance with the provisions of this Law through the possessory information procedure." And, in the second place, it does not meet the requirements provided for granting the right by adverse possession, there is no translative title, good faith, ten-year possession as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful. Indeed, the jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (thus, among others, see judgments number 19-93, of fourteen hours of April seventh, nineteen ninety-three, 45-96, of May twenty-second, nineteen ninety-six, 50-98, of fifteen hours twenty minutes of May twentieth, nineteen ninety-eight, 0001-F-99, of fourteen hours of January sixth, nineteen ninety-nine, 978-F-2001, of sixteen hours thirty minutes of December twelfth, two thousand one, and 134-F-2005, of ten hours ten minutes of March tenth, two thousand five), has indicated that, in application of the provisions of Articles 853, 856, and 860 of the Civil Code, the inescapable requirements for acquiring property by adverse possession (usucapión) are the translative title of ownership, good faith, and possession as owner, continuous, public, peaceful, and for ten years; and in the case of precarious possession of land, unlike civil adverse possession, in Articles 92 and 101 of the cited Land and Colonization Law (ITCO-IDA), number 2825, and its amendments, by reason of the express recognition of the social function recognized for property, based on the peasant's need to acquire their means of subsistence, proof of the translative title of ownership is not required, as the title is the possession itself manifested through possessory acts. The foregoing means that in certain cases, the simple fact of possession through time and exercised under the other required conditions, the law converts it into a right of possession, which when held for a short time will be a weak or more or less provisional right, but which as time increases becomes stronger and consolidates, thus configuring a suitable title to possess and acquire ownership, even if the translative title of ownership mentioned does not exist, which conforms to the modern orientation on the rights of property and possession. However, as in this case we are not dealing with agrarian possession, all the requirements indicated for civil adverse possession are required. Regarding the first (translative title of ownership), it must be remembered that "In our legislation the expression 'title' has several meanings: the first, when it serves to express the cause or basis of a patrimonial attribution and in this sense it is used in Articles 853 and 854 of the Civil Code. The second to designate the document containing the attribution, as when Article 459 says that in the Property Registry the titles of ownership over immovables will be registered, and the third to determine the nature or scope of the patrimonial attribution, for example when the Family Code says that assets acquired gratuitously are not community property (Art. 41). When Articles 853 and 854 speak of translative title of ownership or just title, they use the expression as the cause or basis of the acquisition. The notion of just title has its antecedents in the iusta causa possidendi of classical Roman Law, by virtue of which the adverse possessor was required to acquire possession based on a relationship with the preceding possessor, suitable to justify the acquisition of the possession itself, the acquisition of ownership having not followed only due to a lack of formal requirements in the act of transmission or due to a lack of right in the transferor themselves." (Judgment number 113-1981, of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of October twelfth, nineteen eighty-one.)

With which, in a broad sense, title is therefore the legal cause on which a right is based. In ordinary adverse possession (of civil law), a just translative title of ownership is required, which has been understood concretely as a legal transaction with whoever previously had the thing, by virtue of which the current possessor acquires the asset from the previous possessor. For this reason, it is said that the possessor has the thing because it was sold to them, given to them, etc., hence it is also expressed that the sale, donation, and inheritance are, among others, suitable titles to acquire and possess. It is evident that in the case under study, the plaintiffs lack said translative title of ownership, which is why these judges understand that they attempted to base their lawsuit on the alleged agrarian possession. Good faith is a subjective requirement related to the acquirer's belief of being assisted by the right of the exercised possession, an element that is evidently not met in this case, as the plaintiffs are fully aware that the registral property belongs to the Municipality of the central Canton of Heredia, and that it is of a public domain nature, in accordance with what was declared by the Constitutional Chamber itself in its ruling 2002-8822. Moreover, it is confirmed that after that pronouncement, the acts of invasion continued, even up to the date on which the testimonies recorded in the case file were rendered. The characteristics of possession are also not met, since the date of the occupation is not known with absolute certainty, as for this Tribunal the testimonial statements rendered for this purpose in the case file are not convincing, which entails that it is not possible to corroborate that the possession was for ten years. Neither is it possible to maintain that the acts of occupation were as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful, since from the moment the defendant Municipality learned of the invasion, it devoted itself to its recovery, first through material and direct actions, by partially demolishing the dividing fences that the plaintiffs had erected, and initiating the administrative eviction procedure before the Ministry of Governance, once the Constitutional Chamber declared that it was a public domain asset, in the name of the local corporation. It is also important to assess that through a writing from two thousand one, one of the alleged possessors (Nombre71031) assigns his litigious rights in favor of Nombre71026; but nothing is indicated regarding the possession rights, without it being possible to consider it as a translative title of ownership; which is also not evidence that allows proof of either the date on which the occupation of the property began by the assignor, or whether the beneficiary exercised any possessory act; it being important to note that for possession to generate any right and be legitimate, it must be exercised personally by the one alleging it, and only by a valid and legitimate title can it be transferred, which does not occur in this matter. All of the foregoing obliges us to declare the inadmissibility of the petition for adverse possession, for the purpose of acquiring the alleged agrarian possession over the property registered in real folio with registration number Placa11547. Note that this is a public domain asset, which prevents any right of possession and it also does not meet the requirements of possession, neither civil nor agrarian.

XI.- OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RECOGNIZING IMPROVEMENTS.- Regarding the subsidiary claim concerning the recognition of improvements, it is inadmissible, since the alleged acts of agrarian possession are not such, but rather, must be classified as an invasion of a public domain asset, that is, exercised without the consent or tolerance of the owner of the property (the Municipality of the central Canton of Heredia), who, contrary to what the plaintiffs allege, exercised, from the moment it learned of the invasive acts, the powers of defense of the asset. And even though it is true that the petitioners may have erected fences, shacks (two), and even cultivated some fruit trees, plantain, coffee, yucca, and vegetables, these cannot be considered as "improvements" that could give rise to compensation; for which reason it is appropriate to confirm the appealed judgment, insofar as it denied them, but for the reasons indicated in this resolution.

XII.- OF THE COSTS.- Finally, the plaintiffs request the imposition of procedural and personal costs on the defendant; a request that must also be denied, upholding the order imposed by the Trial Judge, since the general rule is to impose costs on the losing party, in accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code, we not being in any of the exemption cases provided for in Article 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.

THEREFORE:

The alleged nullity is rejected. The evidence offered for a better resolution is rejected. For the reasons given, the appealed judgment is confirmed in all its aspects.-- Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre632 Felipe A. Córdoba Ramírez AMV 2 Ordinary Proceeding Nombre71036 , Nombre71021 , Nombre71040 , Nombre71023 , Nombre71024 , Nombre71025 and Nombre71026 Property Address7936/ 346-2008.

**SECOND SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COURT.** Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Goicoechea, at nine hours forty minutes on the twenty-fourth of October of two thousand eight.

Ordinary Contentious Proceeding brought by **Nombre71020** , married, miscellaneous worker, with identity card number CED52967, **Nombre71021** , farmer, identity card number CED52968, **Nombre71022** , single, merchant, identity card CED52969, **Nombre71023** , homemaker, identity card number CED52970, **Nombre71024** , sign maker, identity card CED52971, **Nombre71025** , farmer, identity card number CED52972, and **Nombre71026** , pensioner, with identity card number CED52973; against the **MUNICIPALITY OF THE CENTRAL CANTON OF HEREDIA**, represented by its Mayor, Nombre4631 , divorced, Master in Business Administration, identity card CED52974. Acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiffs is **Nombre71027** , lawyer and notary, identity card number CED52975. All are of legal age, residents of Heredia, and with the exceptions noted, married.

**WHEREAS:** **1.-** That the amount in controversy in this matter was set at the sum of ten million colones (by order issued at nine hours fourteen minutes on the second of November of two thousand four), based on the facts presented and articles 261, 277 to 281, 284, 286, 305, 207, 209, 317, 328, 332, 473, 484, 853 to 856, 860 of the Civil Code, 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction and the body of evidence, so that a judgment may declare, as the **principal claim:** "*1.* That my clients have possessed the property described in the sketch prepared by Engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, and have fulfilled the respective requirements for ten-year possession, in a quiet, public, peaceful, uninterrupted manner, as owners and in good faith, and by virtue of this, **POSITIVE PRESCRIPTION** or **USUCAPTION** has operated in their favor, and **NEGATIVE PRESCRIPTION** has operated to the detriment of the Municipality of Heredia, since it has never exercised possession over it. *2.* That the property be ordered registered in the name of my grantors in the Public Registry, in equal parts, with them subsequently resorting to the respective (sic) channel to segregate and locate the rights corresponding to each one. The Registry will be ordered to apply the reduction in the Dirección7932 . *3.* That the defendant be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this trial." And as a **subsidiary claim**, it requests "*4.* ... I request Your Honor that if the foregoing is denied, we be paid for the necessary and useful improvements made to the property during the entire period of possession, as per (sic) the determination made by an expert, plus the respective interest calculated from the date of determination until the respective payment. All of which shall be done prior (sic) to vacating the property. If this subsidiary petition is admitted, the defendant shall also be ordered to pay costs." (Folios 81 and 82).

**2.-** That the defendant Municipality responded negatively to the action, opposing it with the preliminary defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the territory, resolved interlocutorily (by resolution number 1066-04, at ten hours on the twenty-seventh of August of two thousand four, on folio 96 and 97); and the exceptions of lack of active and passive legal standing to sue, lack of right, and the generic *sine actione agit* (folios 103 to 114).

**3.-** The Licenciada Sandra María Quesada Vargas, at that time Judge of the Court of this matter, in judgment number 426-2007, at eight hours on the twenty-ninth of March of two thousand seven, resolved: "**THEREFORE** The exceptions of lack of standing and lack of interest filed by the Municipality of Heredia are denied. The defense of lack of right invoked by the defendant Municipality is admitted, and consequently, the present action is dismissed on all grounds. Both costs of the proceeding are charged to the plaintiff." (Folios 289 and 290.)

**4.-** Disagreeing with the ruling of the Lower Court, the plaintiffs appeal, a recourse that was admitted (by order at eleven hours fourteen minutes on the twelfth of June of two thousand seven, on folio 305); and by virtue of which this Court hears the case on appeal.

**5.-** In the proceedings, the operative prescriptions have been observed, with no grounds for invalidity that could vitiate the actions taken.

**Drafted by Judge Fernández Brenes; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- CONCERNING THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT ISSUED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.-** Given that the plaintiffs' representative alleges the nullity of the first-instance judgment due to a supposed infringement of due process, its analysis is undertaken prior to reviewing the appeals filed, as provided by article 155, subsection 3), point a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this regard, two important warnings must be made. *Firstly*, the appellants are informed that this is an **ordinary contentious administrative proceeding**, not an agrarian one, in this case, by reason *of one of the parties involved*, a municipality, a territorially decentralized entity with governmental autonomy, which is inserted into the organization of our (Costa Rican) State, pursuant to articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, and *due to the claim*, since this lawsuit was specifically filed so that a judgment would declare positive prescription (usucapión) in relation to a property of a local corporation, and failing that, the recognition of improvements; a circumstance that requires applying the rules of Public Law, encompassing both Constitutional Law and Administrative Law. The foregoing implies that its processing was carried out according to the procedural rules governing these types of actions, that is, the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (having been filed on the fifteenth of November of two thousand two) and the pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in accordance with article 103 of the first Law; *without the procedural rules of agrarian proceedings being pertinent to this process*. On this point, it must be considered that this matter does not meet the requirements established in the Law (of Agrarian Jurisdiction, number 6734, of the twenty-ninth of March of nineteen hundred eighty-two) to be considered of an agrarian nature, since it is not a conflict arising from the application of agrarian legislation, nor legal provisions regulating the production, transformation, industrialization, or disposal of agricultural products (as provided in article 1 of the cited legal body), as the plaintiffs do not have the status of campesinos or workers of the land, as required by subsection a) of article 2 of the referenced Law. *Secondly*, it is undeniable that agrarian proceedings have special connotations that differentiate them from those processed according to civil procedural regulations, in which orality was even introduced. In this regard, in judgment number 3606-94, at fifteen hours twelve minutes on the nineteenth of July of nineteen hundred ninety-four, the Constitutional Chamber indicated; "... *by breaking with excessive formalism, with the criterion of formal equality of the parties, and the great limits imposed on the Judge and on people of limited resources, elements that characterize the civil process. This rejection is based on the idea that such elements lead to the denial of justice to whoever seeks it, since the process becomes, in a great many cases, a weapon by which judicial pronouncement is delayed. Therefore, the response of the agrarian process has been to introduce procedural simplifications to design a faster process that tends to guarantee prompt and complete justice, reflected in short terms, simple processing, reduction of legal obstacles for the parties involved in the process, elimination of fiscal requirements, and the granting of broad powers to the judge, both for the conduct of the process up to judgment and for the administration and evaluation of evidence. Because of the above, the agrarian process becomes a more humane instrument for resolving matters submitted to the judge's knowledge, both in the processing of the case - where closer contact between the parties and the judge must exist - and in the guarantees granted to the parties to be able to resort to justice, even being able to receive free legal counsel when dealing with persons without the means to pay for professional legal fees. Thus, the specificity of the agrarian process is constituted by two fundamental factors: on one hand, the principle of orality in which the process has found institutional and ideological support to conceive its own structure according to the demands of agrarian matters, a principle whose implications are summarized in the dominance of the spoken word as a means of expression, without excluding writing in preparation and documentation, so that the principle of immediacy, the identity of the adjudicator, the concentration, and the reinforcement of the Judge's powers are also present, in order to satisfactorily conduct the trial towards the search for truth; and on the other hand, the phenomenon of the publication or socialization of agrarian law and its process, having three immediate consequences: 1.- the urgent need to conceive a modern process divorced from the traditional one - the civil process; 2.- to declare the search for and declaration of the truth to be of public interest, granting the judge sufficient powers in the process to be its conductor and administrator, not only of the extremes argued against each other, but especially of the investigation to ensure that their judgments closely unite real truth and legal truth; and 3.- to socialize justice, so that all procedural subjects can resort to a less formal and less costly process, so that people of limited resources can also find an answer to their needs.* *From the above, it is concluded that there is a general orientation directed towards specific guidelines linked to informality, celerity, economy, and humanization of the process.*" But such elements do not govern contentious proceedings, which, according to their procedural regulations, are of a written nature. *By virtue of the foregoing*, *that condition alone means that there is no infringement of the alleged principle of immediacy of evidence, since it only applies to oral proceedings*, as indicated by our Constitutional Court in judgment 2007-1555, at fifteen hours thirty-four minutes on the seventh of February of two thousand seven:

"*... Finally, it should be noted that these considerations are based on the process model designed by the legislators –a matter in which there is legislative discretion–, which, being of a written nature, is not governed by the principle of immediacy of evidence –characteristic of oral proceedings–, which requires that the judge who decides be the one who in turn receives –verbally– the evidence supporting the process.*" Consequently, insofar as in this type of proceedings (written), the judge who directly receives the evidence (in this case, conducts the judicial inspection) is not obligated to issue the judgment on the merits, no irregularity is evident, which obliges the rejection of the alleged nullity.

**II.- CONCERNING THE FIRST-INSTANCE JUDGE'S OMISSION TO RESOLVE AN ALLEGATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY, WITHOUT SUCH OMISSION CAUSING THE NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT.-** The cited article 155, subsection 3), point a) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in second-instance judgments, an analysis must be made of procedural defects or omissions meriting correction; a requirement that obliges this Court to rule on a situation which, even though it does not imply the nullity of the judgment, its correction is pertinent. Indeed, in the appealed ruling, the Trial Court Judge ruled on all the extremes comprised in the plaintiffs' claim, that is, the principal and the subsidiary, dismissing the lawsuit on all grounds. However, she omitted to make a pronouncement on an allegation of the defendant Municipality, specifically point 4 made in its statement of defense, in which it requested the Jurisdictional Authority:

"*1. That the exceptions of lack of jurisdiction, res judicata, lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing be admitted.* *2. That the plaintiffs never fulfilled the agrarian possessory legal requirements, as the Constitutional Chamber itself stated in Voto **2002-08822**, thus eliminating the possibility of discussing the eventual application of the legal institution of positive prescription in their favor. Likewise, it is of utmost importance to indicate that the property in dispute is of public domain, and therefore protected by the legal and constitutional jurisdiction due to its public nature and the fact that it cannot be the object of private property, as supported by the Constitutional Chamber itself. For these reasons, **the ordinary lawsuit must be declared without merit, with no duty to pay any** (sic) **improvements and profits to the plaintiffs.** * *3. That the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of the proceeding for litigating in bad faith.* *4. That the cancellation of the plans registered in the National Cadastre office be ordered, as segregations of municipal property number **4-106304-000**.* *5.* We request that the precautionary measure be rejected, since the municipal property, as demonstrated and supported by the Constitutional Chamber in Voto 2002-08822, has the obligation to act in defense against precarious occupations on municipal public property, as in the case at hand." (folios 111 and 112).

In this regard, it is considered that we are not facing a problem of incongruence in the judgment, which consists of "... the lack of relationship between what was requested and what was decided, relative to the parties, the object, or the cause; this is constituted by the facts.- Incongruence does not therefore arise from contradictions that may result, for example, between proven or unproven facts and the pronouncements, or between these and the substantive assessments; in such a situation, the most that could occur would be a defective motivation of the ruling, which is a matter of a different nature, specifically the appeal for cassation on the merits, due to an error of fact or law in the assessment of evidence.- Put another way, there is no incongruence between the considerations of the judgment and what is resolved in the operative part. Finally, the judgment can grant everything requested, just as it can deny everything, and if it can do the latter, with equal or greater reason it can grant only a part, and in none of those cases is incongruence incurred; this would occur if more than what was requested or something outside of what was requested were granted, which is what is called ultra petita and extra petita" (judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 35-91, of fifteen hours on March twenty-second, nineteen ninety-one).

Note that in the case, there was no counterclaim, so it was not the object of the litis (litigation) to analyze the cancellation or not of the segregated cadastral maps (planos catastrados) of the property Placa11544 registered in the National Cadastre, but only whether or not the declaration of adverse possession (usucapión) and/or improvements required by the plaintiffs was appropriate. Moreover, in the brief in which he formulated the closing argument (alegato de conclusiones), the Mayor of the defendant municipality made no mention whatsoever of this point. Now, the impropriety of what was required -because it is not part of the litis, and insofar as a pronouncement on this point rather merits a different ordinary process-, even more so when said omission exists, does not translate into nullity of the ruling, as it does not cause injury or infringement of due process and the right of defense. It is also clarified that it is not true that the Municipality formulated the res judicata (cosa juzgada) exception as a preliminary defense, nor as a substantive exception.

III.- OF THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR PROVEER).- In their appeal brief, the plaintiffs request that an expert evidence be ordered as evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver), so that a topographic surveyor (perito topográfico) be appointed for the purpose of locating the property owned by the Municipality of Heredia and the one that is the object of this litis (which is being sought to be acquired by adverse possession), because they consider that no suitable evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the one occupied in this proceeding belongs to that local entity. On this point, it is important to note that in the briefs for the filing and formalization of the lawsuit, this evidence was offered, and to that effect, by order of fourteen hours and thirty-one minutes on March seventh, two thousand five, the Court admitted it, appointing the expert Nombre37177. Now, this person turned out to be a mathematical expert, who submitted his report on May third, two thousand five (folios 236 to 240), without the plaintiff party objecting to it or making any warning, thereby admitting the expertise and its content. Likewise, according to Article 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), it is a prerogative (discretionary power) for the superior judge to request evidence for better provision, insofar as this will depend on the assessment he makes of the existing evidence in each case. Consequently, this request is rejected, as it is considered unnecessary, given that there are sufficient elements of judgment in the case file to support the decision.

IV.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS).- For a better understanding of the facts deemed proven, those determined by the Trial Judge are substituted, as there are a series of omissions in their recording, so that they are held as follows: 1.) That the property of the Heredia district (Partido de Heredia) registered in the National Registry (Registro Nacional) under the real folio system (sistema de folio real), in the Heredia district, with registration number (matrícula) Placa11545, whose nature is a lot for building (finca para construir), located in canton 01 Heredia, Dirección7933, which borders on the North with a street, on the South with IMAS, on the East with a street and on the West with a street, with an area of thirty-four thousand two hundred sixty-four square meters and two square decimeters, with cadastral map (plano catastrado) number Placa11546, is the property of the Municipality of Heredia (literal certification, at folio 05); 2.) That this ownership appears registered in the Public Property Registry since February twenty-fourth, nineteen eighty-four (literal certification, at folio 05); 3.) That the cadastre map number Placa11546 does not correspond to the current state of the farm Placa11544, since from the south side of the Pirro River, a lot of ten thousand fifty-eight square meters and eighty-one square decimeters was segregated, which was registered in cadastral map number H-633366-1986, which was transferred to the Joint Institute of Social Assistance (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social), to allocate it to the construction of the Palacios Universitarios housing project (official communication DC-00145-2002, of July fifteenth, two thousand two, from the Head of the Cadastre of the Municipality of Heredia, Nombre71028, at folio 8 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 4.) That on that property, the Municipality of the Central canton of Heredia built its new facilities and it is also used by that locality to deposit and dump garbage and debris (official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file, and testimonies of Nombre71029 and Nombre71030, folio 232, 233 of the main file); 5.) That in official communication DC- 00145-2002, of July fifteenth, two thousand two, the Head of Cadastre of the municipality of Heredia informs the Operational Director of the corporation that since May seventh, two thousand two, they registered cadastral map H-787226-2002, with an area of five hundred eighty-five square meters, in the name of Nombre71022, and on June twelfth of the same year, cadastral map H-796074-2002, in the name of Nombre71031, both as possessors; instruments from which it derives that there are more persons located on property 4-106304-000, because the adjoining owners are Nombre71032, Nombre71033, Nombre71034 and Nombre71021, reason for which the annulment of these must be processed, due to the municipal ownership of the farm (folio 8 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 6.) That on said property, the plaintiffs have exercised an occupation, manifested in the construction of dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets and other materials, clearing of the lot, cultivation of some corn, coffee, banana plants and fruit trees and erection of two wooden constructions (ranchos) with zinc roofs, cement floors, without walls, in a regular state of conservation (judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial), at folios 224 and 225 of the main file; testimonies of Nombre71029, Nombre71030 and Nombre71035, folio 232, 233 and 234 of the main file; and official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file); 7.) That in the year two thousand two, the plaintiffs hired engineer Luis Fernando Araya to draw up a sketch of the formal division of the occupants of said property, in which it is clearly recorded that the property belongs to the Municipality of Heredia (fact not disputed by the parties, map visible at folio 1 of the main file; and official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file); 8.) That on July twenty-ninth, two thousand two, a group of neighbors from the locality filed a complaint before the Municipality of Heredia, alleging that the property indicated above, and owned by the defendant Municipality, had been invaded and was being used by some persons, which threatened the security and tranquility of the neighbors of that sector (folios 143 to 41 of volume 1 of the administrative file, 6 to 14 of volume 3 of the administrative file); 9.) That in response to the neighborhood complaint filed, on August ninth, two thousand two, the municipality of Heredia began work to eliminate the dividing fences, without completing the work (official communication DIM 0988-2002, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand two, at folio 26 of volume 3 of the administrative file and first fact of the amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed by the plaintiffs, folio 89 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 10.) That on August ninth, two thousand two, Nombre71036 and Nombre71021 filed an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which was processed under case file number 02-006638-0007-CO, against the Municipality of Heredia, alleging possession over the farm belonging to that municipality, since the year nineteen eighty-six (folios 89 to 82 and 110 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 11.) That said amparo appeal was declared without merit by judgment number 2002-08822, of sixteen hours and thirty-one minutes on September tenth, two thousand two, because said Court considered that the action of the respondent was due, in manifestation of the powers of defense that said local corporation has, when dealing with a public domain property (folios 110 to 107 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 12.) That this process was filed in court, before the Agrarian Court of Heredia, on November fifteenth, two thousand two (receipt stamp and presentation brief, at folios 1 to 16 of the main file); 13.) That by resolution of eight hours on January sixteenth, two thousand three, the Mayoress of Heredia ordered Nombre71020, Nombre71021, Nombre71037, that for partially invading the property of that corporation, registered in the real folio with registration number Placa11545, they must vacate it within the non-extendable period of seventy-two hours from the notification of that decision, which was notified to the interested parties on January seventeenth following (folio 83 and 85 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 14.) That by brief of February eleventh, two thousand three, the Mayor of the Municipality of Heredia, requests the Ministry of Public Security to initiate administrative eviction proceedings against Nombre71020, Nombre71021, Nombre71037 and Nombre71038, all in their capacity as occupants of the property owned by it registered under real folio registration number Placa11544 (see folios 118 to 112 of volume 1 of the administrative file); 15.) That said procedure concluded with the issuance of resolution number 1016-2003 D.M., of fourteen hours on March tenth, two thousand three, issued by the Office of the Minister of Public Security, in which the municipal request was granted and the respective eviction was authorized by the police authority in charge, giving the occupants a prior forty-eight hour period to vacate the property voluntarily (see folios 130 and 129 of volume I of the administrative file); 16.) That by official communication DIM- 1108-2004, of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four, the surveyor (topógrafo) and engineer of the defendant municipality inform the Director of Legal Affairs that, a new visit to the farm confirms that it remains invaded and with fences, which is verifiable at a glance, given that the boundaries (linderos) of the property are well defined (west side the Urbanización Bernardo Benavides and south side the Pirro River), from which photographs are taken (folios 212 to 208 of volume 1 of the administrative file); and, 17.) That on August twenty-ninth, two thousand one, Nombre71031, of legal age, married, chef, with identity document number CED52976, resident of Dirección7934, assigns the litigious rights of the ordinary process processed in case file 02-160155-638-AG, which was brought to the attention of the Court until March third, two thousand five, an assignment that was admitted by the Contentious-Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), Third Section, by resolution number 294-2006, of ten hours and ten minutes on August fourth, two thousand six (folios 137, 138, 181 and 182 of the main file).

II.UNPROVEN FACTS (HECHOS NO PROBADOS). The list of facts deemed unproven determined by the Trial Judge is substituted, with the following being considered as such—because the case file lacks suitable probative material to support them—and which are of significance for the resolution of this matter: 1.) That the plaintiffs are farmers or dedicate themselves to agricultural activities; 2.) That the plaintiffs had occupied part of property 4-106304-000 since nineteen eighty-six; 3.) That the plaintiffs have approximately five thousand coffee plants and various crops planted on the property owned by the Municipality of Heredia that they are occupying; 4.) That the administrative eviction authorized by resolution No.

1016-2003 of 2:00 p.m. on March 10, 2003, issued by the Minister of Public Security; **5.)** That some necessary and useful improvements had been made within the property in question by the plaintiffs; **6.)** That the plaintiffs had completed the possessory information procedure to register in their name the property they are attempting to acquire by usucapion (usucapir); and **7.)** That the plaintiffs have a deed transferring ownership (título traslativo de dominio) over the property for which they claim the positive prescription of the property right.

**VI.- OF THE APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCES.-** The plaintiffs' legal representative *alleges nullity* of judgment number 426-2007, issued at eight o'clock on March twenty-ninth, two thousand seven, by the Administrative Litigation Court, deeming that due process in agrarian matters has been violated, leaving his represented parties in "*an absolute total state of defenselessness*", by ignoring the *principle of immediacy of evidence*, which is evidenced by clear contradictions regarding the evidence—testimonial, documentary, expert—rendered in first instance, and which has caused the lower court to err; and *files an appeal*, for the following reasons: **a.)** that there has been an erroneous interpretation and assessment of the existing probative elements, by conducting a superficial analysis of the expert evidence, by omitting to rely on the testimonies rendered and which are of importance for the resolution of this matter, and by downplaying the judicial inspection, from which the agrarian activity deployed and the facts deemed unproven in the appealed resolution are derived; **b.)** failing to assess that farm 106,304-000 does not coincide at all with the area possessed by his represented parties, since the measurements do not match, whereas the former has an area of one thousand four hundred five square meters and ten square decimeters, and they have occupied thirty-four thousand two hundred sixty-four square meters and two square decimeters; **c.)** that the defendant Municipality has not demonstrated that the occupied property is its own, for lack of suitable evidence, given the absence of a cadastral map, which makes evident the need for a detailed study, in order to elucidate this point; **d.)** that the judgment limited itself to an analysis of the institution of public domain property, despite dealing with an ordinary agrarian proceeding, residing in a nuance exclusive to Administrative Law, ignoring the characteristics of usucapion (usucapión) in Agrarian Law (folios 300 to 304). It therefore demands that the appealed judgment be revoked, and that the opposing lawsuit be granted, with costs awarded against the Municipality of the central Canton of Heredia.

**VII.- OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT OVER WHICH POSSESSION IS CLAIMED.-** The plaintiffs allege that no suitable evidence has been provided to determine that the lot subject to this litigation is the property of the defendant Municipality, because the areas do not correspond to what is intended to be acquired by usucapion (usucapir) with that registered. However, this Court disagrees with such assertion, because, from the probative elements provided to the case file—sketch drawn up by engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, cadastral maps number H-370888-79 (on folios 1 and 2 of the main file), as well as the registral study carried out by the municipality's engineer (official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, on folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file), and the records of field visits made by officials of that corporation (official communication DIM-1108-2004, of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four), *it is noted with absolute clarity that the plaintiffs invaded part of a property belonging to the defendant.* The foregoing is of absolute knowledge to the petitioners herein, given that an amparo appeal they filed (two of the plaintiffs herein) against the defense acts exercised by the titular Municipality was denied, and in the very brief of presentation and formalization of this lawsuit, they expressly request the Jurisdictional Authority, "*2- That the property acquired by usucapion (usucapido) be ordered registered in the name of my mandators in the Public Registry, in equal parts, with them later resorting to the respective route to segregate and locate the rights corresponding to each one. It shall be ordered that the Registry apply the reduction of area on farm ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR.*" Furthermore, the officials of the appellee corporation are correct in stating that the boundaries of the farm are easily defined; thus, in consideration of the shape of the lot demarcated in cadastral map number H-370888-79, it is without doubt deduced that the sketch with the portions of the occupations, prepared by engineer [Nombre71039], and which was attempted to be cadastrally registered, is part of the farm registered on the indicated map.

**VIII.- OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (DEMANIALIDAD) REGIME.-** The Trial Judge denied the recognition of positive prescription (usucapion (usucapión)) in relation to the occupation carried out by the plaintiffs on the farm registered in the real folio system, with registration number [Placa11544], by reason of its public domain (demanialidad) condition, being the property of the Municipality of the central Canton of Heredia. On this point, it is important to clarify the concept, as the one given in the ruling under review is not precise, and leads to confusion. Indeed, *public domain property (demaniales or dominicales)* must be understood as the set of goods—both immovable and movable—that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, *since by the express will of the constituent or legislator, they are affected by a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and for that reason, cannot be subject to private property or possession*, such that they are outside commerce among men, that is, they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State—in the strict sense—since the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, *it is necessary to distinguish between property in the public domain and property in the private domain of the State (fiscal property)*, precisely by reason of their purpose, as *what defines the legal nature of the former is the intended use given to this type of property, that is, insofar as they are affected and are at the service of public use*, under the terms provided in Article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this regard, see judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 of the Constitutional Chamber.) Falling into this category—without constituting a closed list—are the maritime terrestrial zone, the forest or natural heritage of the State—protected areas—(comprising national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments—article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five—), the hydrographic protection zones—article 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal)—(contiguous to springs (nacientes), to the banks of rivers and lakes), the border zones (article 10 of the Law of Vacant Lands (Ley de Terrenos Baldíos), number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine), the right-of-way, the railway lines, the indigenous reserves, the historical-architectural heritage, the mining resources, the archaeological heritage, the parks and green areas, etc. According to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code (legal affectation), these are goods whose *vocation and purpose*, as they "*are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can take advantage by being given over to public use*", are outside commerce among men, for which reason they are *inalienable, imprescriptible, and unseizable*; so that their ownership or possession is not possible, neither by gratuitous nor onerous title; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor can they be gained by usucapion (usucapión), such that they *preserve their legal validity permanently*; and they are not susceptible to seizure, under the terms of Civil Law; in addition to being *subject to police power, regarding their exploitation and use*, since their private use is conditioned on the granting of the respective licenses and permits and on the control and oversight by the Administration; and the *Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery*, without the need to resort to the jurisdictional route, nor even to an administrative procedure, as there exists on the part of the "*occupier*" no subjective right or legitimate interest, so that *administrative action substitutes for the possessory actions (interdictos) for their restitution.* Therefore, the legal regime of public domain property is special and differentiated, precisely in consideration of the type of property in question. The distinction between private property/things and public property/things is made to depend, firstly, on the "*titularity*" or "*dominion*" of the good, since from this element its differentiated nature and legal regime are defined; and consequently, the applicable law, insofar as the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain property places it outside commerce among men, and for this reason, the permits granted will always be on a precarious title and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, *the violation or injury of the property right, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution, is not possible*, as it deals with a totally different legal regime, where the law merely establishes conditions through which use and enjoyment by private parties is possible. Thus, *whoever intends by unauthorized means to exercise a private use of that zone will be barred from consummating it, since it is also acceptable, from time immemorial, that these are goods imprescriptible in favor of private parties and outside commerce*, principles enshrined in numerals 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, dating from eighteen eighty-six.

**IX.- OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROPERTY OVER WHICH AGRARIAN POSSESSION IS CLAIMED.-** The Trial Judge is correct in stating that, in the case of public domain property, no type of possession is possible or legitimate, and that which is exercised cannot generate any right in favor of the occupier. However, as indicated by doctrine and jurisprudence—indicated in the previous Considerando—it is impossible to endow the public domain (demanialidad) condition solely by reason of the subjective element of the titleholder of the good, that is, when dealing with subjects of Public Law. Thus, the criterion that must be used is that of the *intended use or vocation of the good, that is, for the use of the community or for the provision of a public service*, an element that is fully met in this case, since the farm over which agrarian possession is claimed, so that positive prescription (usucapion (usucapión)) may be declared, is not only the property of the Municipality of Heredia (as determined in Considerando VII.- of this judgment), but also, on it is located the works yard of that local government, precisely to fulfill the purposes entrusted by constitutional mandate in its numeral 169, that is, "*the administration of local interests and services*"; and furthermore, it has been used as a garbage dump, as declared by the testimonies provided to the file. Thus, dealing with a public domain property, *there exists no right of possession on the part of private parties*, such that *possession—as an attribute of the right of possession—can only be exercised by the entities holding the right*, without any private subject being able to legally claim possessory acts, unless these had been carried out before the public institution acquired the property, and only for purposes of an eventual indemnification, which does not apply in the present case, where it was demonstrated that the Municipality has been the titleholder of [Dirección7935] since February twenty-fourth, nineteen eighty-four, and the supposed possession (occupation or rather invasion) dates from nineteen eighty-six.

**X.- OF THE ALLEGED AGRARIAN POSSESSION.-** As indicated in the previous Considerando, the public domain (demanial) nature of the property sought to be acquired by usucapion (usucapir) would make further analysis regarding the alleged agrarian possession unnecessary, since the nature of the good is a requirement for the positive prescription of the property right, that is, that it is a "*suitable thing*", which implies that it must be susceptible to private property, and in such condition, that it is within commerce among men; a requirement, it has been said, that is not met in this case. Notwithstanding the foregoing, because it is alleged that there was no greater analysis on this extreme in the appealed judgment, it is deemed pertinent to make several observations, which lead us to verify that, even if it were not a public domain property, recognizing the requested usucapion (usucapión) would also not be appropriate—in this case—. Indeed, *in the first place*, it must be noted that *this is not a case where agrarian legislation must be applied, but rather civil legislation, because the farm—on the registry—does not have an agricultural vocation, and the plaintiffs have not given it that intended use*. The lawsuit is formulated on the basis that this is an agrarian possession, and by virtue thereof, they have exercised possessory acts of that nature. However, from the evidence provided to the file, it is possible to conclude that, although it is true that the occupiers (plaintiffs herein) have carried out some cultivation—of yucca, corn, coffee, plantain, and fruit trees—, the same do not meet the conditions established in the regulations to be considered subsistence farming; rather, as the legal representative of the appellee municipality rightly affirms on several occasions, it appears to be an extension of the occupiers' lands, who curiously are all adjacent to the property under discussion, and for this purpose they erected dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets, and other materials, cleaned the lot, and at least in two of these "*fractions*", raised wooden constructions (ranchos) with zinc roofs, cement floors, without walls, in a regular state of conservation; assessments that prevent this Court from giving this occupation an agrarian character. On this point, it is important to make several important observations. It must be remembered that "*X. Special agrarian usucapion (usucapión) is a typical institute of Agrarian Law, as are the enterprise, contracts, property, and agrarian possession. Its elements derive from a particular normative regime, therefore it acquires differentiating features from the same civil usucapion (usucapión). Its foundation lies in the general principle of Agrarian Law known as the economic and social function of agrarian property. As is known, this unfolds in two: one subjective, of an economic nature, referring to the owner's obligation to produce, improve, and respect the environment, and another objective, of a social nature, consisting of the State's obligation to provide property to those who, having the capacity and knowledge to produce, do not have it or have it insufficiently. This latter aspect is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by expressing 'Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others, corresponding to the essential needs of a decent life, which contributes to maintaining the dignity of the person and the home,' and also in the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José as follows: 'Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.' It concerns the human right to property and not just the right of property. It seeks, as one of the economic and social human rights, to guarantee 'access' to it.*" (Judgment number 68-94, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety-four.)

Thus, the structure of the agrarian property right is composed of special duties, and a particular way of exercising the inherent faculties of property, insofar as *its titleholder is obligated to destine it to agricultural activity*, which precisely sustains its existence, as indicated by our Constitutional Court in judgment number 2000-9119, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes on October seventeenth, two thousand:

"*III.- On the right.- Agrarian property, determined in this case by its form of acquisition through the mechanisms established in the Land and Colonization Law, is identified by the obligations on the owner to exercise possessory acts in fulfillment of the social function of their right. Property and possession are then found in such a relationship that the former cannot be conceptualized without the concurrence of the latter, in such a way that, without property being denaturalized as a subjective right, its titleholder assumes a series of obligations in the exercise of their right.*" The State, addressing not only that differentiating character of agrarian property, but also framed within the conception of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law that governs our country, recognized in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, has provided, through the Land and Colonization Law, a specific procedure for acquiring this right with the aim of promoting the gradual increase in the productivity of land ownership, for a just distribution of its product, and for the purpose of elevating the social condition of the farmer, making them a participant in the Nation's development (Article 1 of the cited Law). From this perspective, those who acquire any right through the mechanisms thus established, contract the obligation, in view of the foregoing considerations, to exercise, over the acquired farm, agrarian possessory acts (actos posesorios agrarios), understood as those directed at putting the farm into production efficiently." Thus, within that set of regulatory norms that weigh on agrarian property, it is inescapably provided for - the rule regarding the destination of the farm that is adjudicated, given that there is a charge on it so that it be dedicated to agrarian activity; which in cases of land titling by the Instituto de Desarrolo Agrario empowers the revocation or extinction of the adjudication –Article 68, subsection 4, point a)–, or being subject to expropriation by the State, as empowered by Article 144 of the same Law; and in the cases where adverse possession (usucapión) is alleged, the inadmissibility of the action, given that the regulations require "stable and effective" possessory acts with the purpose of putting it into conditions of production for personal or family subsistence, over land registered in the name of a third party in the Public Registry of Property (Article 92 of the cited Law 2825). Thus, the precarious possessor, when having more than ten years of possession, acquires their property through an original acquisition, and correlatively, the right of the registered owner in that area is extinguished; a registry principle that is inherent to both civil law and agrarian law, and corresponds generally to the forms of acquiring real rights; thus, concerning the precarious possessor, its regulation is found in the cited Law 2825 in the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 92: "Precarious possessors who have ten-year possession under the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph may register their right in accordance with the provisions established in this Law through the possessory information procedure." And, secondly, does not meet the requirements established to grant the right of adverse possession, there is no translative title, good faith, ten-year possession as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful. Indeed, the jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (thus, among others, one can consult judgments number 19-93, of fourteen hours on April seventh, nineteen ninety-three, 451996, of May twenty-second, nineteen ninety-six, 50-98, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twentieth, nineteen ninety-eight, 0001-F-99, of fourteen hours on January sixth, nineteen ninety-nine, 978-F-2001, of sixteen hours thirty minutes on December twelfth, two thousand one, and, 134-F-2005, of ten hours ten minutes on March tenth, two thousand five), has indicated that in application of the provisions in Articles 853, 856, and 860 of the Civil Code, the inescapable requirements to acquire ownership by positive prescription (adverse possession, usucapión) are: the translative title of ownership, good faith, and possession as owner, continuous, public, peaceful, and for ten years; and in the case of precarious possession of land, unlike civil adverse possession, in Articles 92 and 101 of the cited Land and Colonization Law (ITCO-IDA), number 2825, and its reforms, by reason of the express recognition of the social function recognized for ownership, based on the farmer's need to acquire their means of subsistence, the accreditation of a translative title of ownership is not required, because the title is the possession itself manifested through possessory acts. The foregoing means that in certain cases, the mere fact of possession over time and exercised under the other required conditions is converted by law into a right of possession, which when of short duration will be a weak or somewhat provisional right, but as time increases it becomes stronger and consolidates, thus configuring a valid title to possess and acquire ownership, even if the translative title of ownership previously discussed does not exist, which aligns with the modern orientation regarding ownership and possession rights, as the tendency also exists. That said, as in the instant case we are not facing agrarian possession, all the requirements indicated for civil adverse possession are demanded. Regarding the first (translative title of ownership), it must be recalled that:

"In our legislation the expression 'title' has several meanings: the first, when it serves to express the cause or basis of a patrimonial attribution and in this sense it is used in Articles 853 and 854 of the Civil Code. The second to designate the document containing the attribution, as when Article 459 states that ownership titles over real estate shall be registered in the Property Registry, and the third to determine the nature or scope of the patrimonial attribution, for example, when the Family Code states that assets acquired by gratuitous title are not community property (Art. 41). When Articles 853 and 854 speak of translative title of ownership or just title, they use the expression as the cause or basis of the acquisition. The notion of just title has its antecedents in the iusta causa possidendi of classical Roman Law, by virtue of which it was required that the adverse possessor acquire possession based on a relationship with the preceding possessor, suitable for justifying the acquisition of the possession itself, the acquisition of ownership not having followed only due to a lack of formal requirements in the act of transfer or due to a lack of right in the transferor himself." (Judgment number 113-1981, of fifteen hours fifteen minutes on October twelfth, nineteen eighty-one.)

Consequently, in a broad sense, title is therefore the juridical cause on which a right is founded. In ordinary adverse possession (of civil law), a just translative title of ownership is required, which has been understood concretely as a juridical transaction with whoever previously had the thing, by virtue of which the current possessor acquires the property from the previous possessor. For this reason, it is said that the possessor has the thing because it was sold to them, given to them, etc., hence it is also stated that the sale, the donation, and inheritance are, among others, valid titles to acquire and possess. It is evident that in the case under study, the plaintiffs lack said translative title of ownership, a reason for which these judges understand that they attempted to base their claim on the alleged agrarian possession. Good faith is a subjective requirement related to the belief of the acquirer of being assisted by the right of the possession exercised, an element that is evidently not met in the instant case, because the plaintiffs are fully aware that the property belongs registrally to the Municipality of the central canton of Heredia, and that it is of a public domain (demanial) nature, according to what was declared by the Constitutional Chamber itself in its ruling 2002-8822. Moreover, it is verified that after that pronouncement, the acts of invasion continue, including, up to the date on which the testimonies in the record were given. Nor does it meet the characteristics of possession, since the date of occupation is not known with absolute certainty, as for this Tribunal, the testimonial statements rendered for that purpose in the case file are not convincing, which entails that it is not possible to corroborate that the possession was of ten years. Nor is it possible to maintain that the acts of occupation were as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful, since from the moment the defendant Municipality became aware of the invasion, it undertook its recovery, first through material and direct actions, by partially demolishing the dividing fences that the plaintiffs had erected, and initiating the administrative eviction procedure before the Ministry of Governance, once the Constitutional Chamber declared that it was a public domain asset, in the name of the local corporation. It is also important to assess that through a writing of two thousand one, one of the supposed possessors (Name71031) assigns their litigious rights in favor of Name71026; but nothing is indicated regarding the rights of possession, without it being possible to consider it as a translative title of ownership; which also is not proof that allows accrediting either the date on which the occupation of the property by the assignor began, or if the beneficiary exercised any possessory act whatsoever; it being important to note that for possession to generate any right and be legitimate, it must be exercised personally by the person alleging it, and only through a valid and legitimate title can it be transferred, which in this matter does not occur. All of the foregoing obliges us to declare the inadmissibility of the action of positive prescription, for the purpose of acquiring the alleged agrarian possession over the property registered under real folio with registration number Placa11547. It should be noted that we are facing a public domain asset, which prevents any right of possession and also fails to meet the presuppositions of possession, neither civil nor agrarian.

XI.- THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RECOGNITION OF THE IMPROVEMENTS.- Regarding the subsidiary claim, concerning the recognition of improvements (mejoras), it is inadmissible, given that the supposed acts of agrarian possession are not such, but rather, must be categorized as an invasion of a public domain asset, that is, exercised without the consent or tolerance of the owner of the property (the Municipality of the central canton of Heredia), who, contrary to what was alleged by the plaintiffs, exercised, since learning of the invasive acts, the powers of defense of the asset. And even though it is true that the petitioners may have erected fences, shacks (ranchos) (two) and even cultivated some fruit trees, bananas, coffee, yucca, and vegetables, the same cannot be considered as "improvements (mejoras)" that may give rise to compensation; for which reason it is proper to confirm the appealed judgment, insofar as it denied them, but for the reasons indicated in this resolution.

XI.- OF THE COSTS.- Finally, the plaintiffs request the condemnation for procedural and personal costs against the defendant; a request that must also be denied, maintaining the condemnation ordered by the Trial Judge, since the general rule is to condemn the losing party, according to the provisions of Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and we are not in any of the exemption scenarios provided for in Article 98 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.

POR TANTO:

The alleged nullity is rejected. The evidence offered for a better decision is rejected. For the reasons given, the appealed judgment is confirmed in all its aspects.-- Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre632 Felipe A. Córdoba Ramírez AMV 2 No. 160155-638-AG Ordinary Proceeding Name71036, Name71021, Name71040, Name71023, Name71024, Name71025, and Name71026 Address7936/ **“I.- OF THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT ISSUED AT FIRST INSTANCE.-** In light of the plaintiffs’ representative alleging the nullity of the first-instance judgment, for a supposed violation of due process, its analysis proceeds, prior to hearing the appeals filed, as provided in Article 155, subsection 3), point a) of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). In this regard, two important warnings must be made. **First**, the appellants are informed that this is an **ordinary administrative contentious proceeding (proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo)**, not an agrarian one, in this case, by reason **of one of the parties that intervenes in it**, a municipality, a territorially decentralized entity, which has governmental autonomy, which is embedded in the organization of our (Costa Rican) State, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and **for the claim**, since this lawsuit was precisely filed so that the judgment would declare positive prescription (adverse possession or usucapion, *usucapión*) in relation to a property of a local corporation, and failing that, the recognition of improvements; a circumstance that requires applying the rules of Public Law, encompassing both Constitutional Law and Administrative Law.

This implies that its processing was carried out in accordance with the procedural rules governing this type of action, namely, the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) (because it was filed on November fifteenth, two thousand two) and the pertinent provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, pursuant to the provisions of article 103 of the former Law; ***without the procedural rules of agrarian proceedings being pertinent to this process***. On this point, it must be considered that this matter does not meet the requirements set forth in the Law (of Agrarian Jurisdiction, number 6734, of March twenty-ninth, nineteen eighty-two) for it to be considered of an agrarian nature, because it is not a conflict arising from the application of agrarian legislation, nor legal provisions regulating the production, transformation, industrialization, or disposal of agricultural products (as provided in article 1 of the cited body of law), since the plaintiffs do not have the status of peasants or land workers, as required by subsection a) of article 2 of the aforementioned Law. ***Secondly***, it is undeniable that agrarian proceedings have special connotations that differentiate them from those processed under civil procedural regulations, in which orality was even introduced. In this regard, in judgment number 3606-94, at fifteen hours and twelve minutes on July nineteenth, nineteen ninety-four, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated; "... *by breaking with excessive formalism, with the criterion of formal equality of the parties, and the great limits imposed on the Judge and on people of scarce resources, elements that characterize civil proceedings. This rejection is based on the idea that such elements lead to the denial of justice to those who seek it, since the proceeding becomes, in a large number of cases, a weapon by which the judicial pronouncement is delayed. Therefore, the response of the agrarian proceeding has been to introduce procedural simplifications, to design a faster proceeding that tends to guarantee prompt and complete justice, reflected in short terms, in simple processing, in the reduction of legal obstacles for the parties involved in the proceeding, in the elimination of fiscal requirements, and in the granting of broad powers to the judge, both for the conduct of the proceeding until judgment, as well as regarding the administration and assessment of the evidence. For this reason, the agrarian proceeding becomes a more humane instrument for resolving matters submitted to the judge's knowledge, both in the processing of the proceeding—where there must be closer contact between the parties and the judge—and in the guarantees granted to the parties to be able to resort to justice, even being able to receive free legal sponsorship when dealing with people without the means to pay for the professional expenses thereof. Thus, the specificity of the agrarian proceeding is constituted by two fundamental factors: on the one hand, the principle of orality in which the proceeding has found institutional and ideological support to conceive its own structure according to the demands of agrarian matters, a principle whose implications are summarized in the dominance of the word as a means of expression, without excluding writing in the preparation and documentation, so that the principle of immediacy, the identity of the judge, the concentration, and the reinforcement of the Judge's powers are also present, in order to satisfactorily conduct the trial towards the search for truth; and on the other hand, the phenomenon of the publicization or socialization of agrarian law and its process, having three immediate consequences: 1.- the urgent need to conceive a modern proceeding divorced from the traditional one—civil proceeding—; 2.- to declare the search for and declaration of the truth to be of public interest, granting the judge sufficient powers in the proceeding to be its conductor and administrator, not only regarding the points discussed against each other, but especially, of the investigation to ensure that its judgments manage to closely unite real truth and legal truth; and 3.- to socialize justice, so that all procedural subjects can resort in a less formal and less costly proceeding, so that people of scarce resources may also find an answer to their needs.* From the foregoing, it is concluded that there is a general orientation directed towards specific guidelines linked to informality, speed, economy, and humanization of the proceeding." But such elements do not govern contentious proceedings, which, according to their procedural rules, are of a written nature. ***By virtue of the foregoing***, ***this sole condition means there is no infringement of the alleged principle of immediacy of evidence, because it applies only with respect to oral proceedings***, as indicated by our Constitutional Court, in judgment 2007-1555, at fifteen hours thirty-four minutes on February seventh, two thousand seven: "*... Finally, it is worth noting that these considerations are based on the proceeding model designed by the legislators—a matter in which there is legislative discretion—which, being of a written nature, is not governed by the principle of immediacy of evidence—typical of oral proceedings—, in which it is required that the judge who resolves the case must also be the one who receives—orally—the evidence that supports the proceeding.*" Consequently, as long as in this type of proceeding (written), the judge who directly receives the evidence (in this case, conducts the judicial inspection) is not obligated to issue the judgment on the merits, no irregularity is evident, which compels the rejection of the alleged nullity. [...] **I.- OF THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT ISSUED IN FIRST INSTANCE.-** Given that the plaintiffs' representative alleges the nullity of the first instance judgment for supposed infringement of due process, its analysis proceeds, prior to the review of the appeals filed, as provided in article 155, subsection 3), point a) of the Civil Procedure Code. In this regard, two important warnings must be made. ***Firstly***, the appellants are told that this is an ***ordinary contentious-administrative proceeding***, not of an agrarian nature, in this case, by reason of ***one of the subjects involved in it***, a municipality, an entity decentralized by territory, which has governmental autonomy, which is inserted in the organization of our (Costa Rican) State, according to the provisions of articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, and ***by reason of the claim***, since precisely this lawsuit was filed so that the judgment would declare positive prescription (usucapion) in relation to a property of a local corporation, and failing that, the recognition of improvements; a circumstance that compels the application of the rules of Public Law, comprising both Constitutional Law and Administrative Law.

Consequently, as long as in this type of proceeding (written), the judge who directly receives the evidence (in this case, conducts the judicial inspection) is not obligated to issue the judgment on the merits, no irregularity is evident, which compels the rejection of the alleged nullity. [...] **VII.- OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT ON WHICH POSSESSION IS ALLEGED.-** The plaintiffs allege that no suitable evidence has been provided to determine that the lot subject to this litigation is the property of the defendant Municipality, because the areas do not correspond, between that which is intended to be acquired by usucapion and the registered area. However, this Court disagrees with such assertion, because from the evidence provided to the case file—the sketch prepared by engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, cadastral maps number H-370888-79 (on folios 1 and 2 of the main file), as well as the registry study conducted by the municipality's engineer (official letter DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, on folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file), and the records of the field visits conducted by officials of that corporation (official letter DIM-1108-2004, of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four), ***it is absolutely clear that the plaintiffs invaded part of a property belonging to the defendant. The foregoing is absolutely known to the petitioners herein, because a writ of amparo they filed (two of the plaintiffs herein) against the defensive acts exercised by the owner Municipality was denied, and in the initial brief and the formalization of this lawsuit itself, they expressly request the Jurisdictional Authority, "***2- That it be ordered to register the usucapted property in the name of my principals in the Public Registry, in equal parts, with them subsequently resorting to the respective avenue to segregate and locate the rights corresponding to each one. The Registry shall be ordered to apply the reduction of area in farm ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR." Furthermore, the officials of the appealed corporation are correct in affirming that the boundaries of the farm are easily defined; thus, considering the shape of the lot delineated in cadastral map number H-370888-79, it is undoubtedly deduced that the sketch with the portions of the occupations, prepared by engineer Arroyo Rodríguez, and which was attempted to be cadastrally registered, is part of the farm that is registered on the indicated map. **VIII.- OF THE REGIME OF PUBLIC DOMAIN (DEMANIALIDAD).-** The Lower Court Judge denied the recognition of positive prescription (usucapion) in relation to the occupation carried out by the plaintiffs on the farm registered in the real folio system, with registration number 4-106304-000, by reason of its public domain condition (demanialidad), being property of the Municipality of the central canton of Heredia. On this point, it is important to clarify the concept, as the one given in the judgment under review is not precise and gives rise to confusion. Indeed, by ***public domain assets (demaniales o dominicales)***, one must understand the set of goods—both real and personal property—that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, ***insofar as by the express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are affected to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and that therefore, cannot be the object of private property or possession***, such that they are outside the commerce of men, that is, they cannot belong individually to private individuals, nor to the State—in the strict sense—, because the State is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, it is necessary to ***distinguish between public domain assets and private domain assets of the State (fiscal)***, precisely by reason of their purpose, insofar as ***what defines the legal nature of the former is the purpose given to this type of goods, that is, insofar as they are affected and are at the service of public use***, in the terms provided in article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this sense, consult judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).) Falling into this category—without it constituting a closed list—are the maritime-terrestrial zone, the forest or natural heritage of the State—protected areas—(comprising national parks, forest reserves, biological reserves, protected zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments—article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five—), watershed protection zones—article 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal)—(contiguous to springs, riverbanks, and lake shores), border zones (article 10 of the Law of Vacant Lands, number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine), the right-of-way, railway lines, indigenous reserves, historical-architectural heritage, mining resources, archaeological heritage, parks and green areas, etc. According to the provisions of article 261 of the Civil Code (legal affectation), these are goods whose ***vocation and purpose***, insofar as "*are permanently destined to any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can avail themselves by being given over to public use*", are outside the commerce of men, and therefore are ***inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable***; so that their ownership or possession is not possible, neither gratuitously nor for consideration; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor acquired by usucapion, so that they ***permanently retain their legal validity***; and they are not subject to seizure, in terms of Civil Law; in addition to being ***subject to police power, concerning their utilization and use***, since their exclusive use is conditional upon the granting of the respective licenses and permits and to the control and oversight by the Administration; and the ***Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery***, without the need to resort to the courts, nor even to an administrative procedure, as the "*occupant*" does not possess any subjective right or legitimate interest, so that the ***administrative action substitutes for the possessory actions for their restitution.*** Therefore, the legal regime of public domain assets is special and differentiated, precisely in view of the type of goods in question. The distinction between private goods or things and public goods or things depends, in the first place, on the "*ownership*" or "*domain*" of the good, since this element defines its differentiated nature and legal regime; and consequently, on the applicable law, insofar as the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain assets places them outside the commerce of men, and therefore the permits that are granted will always be precarious and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, ***it is not possible to infringe upon or harm the property right, enshrined in article 45 of the Political Constitution***, because it is a completely different legal regime, where the law establishes the conditions through which use and enjoyment by private individuals is possible. Thus, ***anyone who attempts by unauthorized means to exercise exclusive use of that area will be barred from consummating it, because it is also acceptable, since time immemorial, that these are imprescriptible goods in favor of private individuals and are outside of commerce***, principles enshrined in articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, which dates from eighteen eighty-six. **IX.- OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROPERTY OVER WHICH AGRARIAN POSSESSION IS ALLEGED.-** The Lower Court Judge is correct in affirming that when dealing with public domain assets, no type of possession is possible or legitimate, and that which is exercised cannot generate any right in favor of the occupant. However, according to the doctrine and jurisprudence indicated in the preceding Considerando, it is impossible to confer the condition of public domain (demanialidad) solely by reason of the subjective element of the owner of the good, that is, when dealing with subjects of Public Law.

Thus, the criterion to be used is that of the <b><i>purpose or vocation of the property, that is, for use by the community or for the provision of a public service</i></b>, an element that is fully met in this case, since the farm over which agrarian possession is alleged, in order for positive prescription (acquisitive prescription (usucapión)) to be declared, is not only the property of the Municipality of Heredia (as determined in Considerando VII of this judgment), but also, the depot of that local government is located on it, precisely to fulfill the purposes entrusted by constitutional mandate in its article 169, that is, "<b><i>the administration of local interests and services</i></b>"; and furthermore, it has been used as a garbage dump, as declared by the testimonies given in the case file. Thus, as it is a public domain property, <b><i>there is no right of possession on the part of private individuals</i></b>, such that <b><i>possession—as an attribute of the right of possession—can only be exercised by the entities holding the right</i></b>, and no private subject can legally claim possessory acts, unless these were carried out before the public institution acquired ownership, and only for the purposes of eventual compensation, which does not happen in the present case, in which it was demonstrated that the Municipality has been the owner of farm 4-106304 since February twenty-fourth, nineteen eighty-four, and the alleged possession (occupation or rather invasion), dates from nineteen eighty-six. <b>X.- ON THE ALLEGED AGRARIAN POSSESSION.-</b> As indicated in the previous Considerando, the public domain nature of the property sought to be acquired by adverse possession would make further analysis regarding the alleged agrarian possession unnecessary, since a requirement for the positive prescription of the property right is the nature of the property, that is, that it be "<i>a suitable thing</i>", which implies that it must be susceptible to private property, and in such condition, that it be in the stream of commerce; a requirement, it has been said, that is not met in this case. Notwithstanding the foregoing, because it is alleged that there was no greater analysis on this point in the appealed judgment, it is deemed pertinent to make several observations, which lead us to verify that, even if it were not a public domain property, it would also be inappropriate—in this case—to recognize the requested usucapión. Indeed, <b>firstly</b>, it must be noted that <b><i><u>this is not a situation where agrarian legislation should be applied, but rather civil legislation</u></i></b><u>, <b><i>because the farm—in the registry—does not have an agricultural vocation, and the plaintiffs have not given it that purpose</i></b></u>. The claim is formulated on the basis that it concerns an agrarian possession, and by virtue thereof, they have exercised possessory acts of that nature. However, from the evidence provided in the case file, it is possible to conclude that, although it is true that the occupants (plaintiffs here) have cultivated some crops—yucca, corn, coffee, plantain, and fruit trees—these do not meet the conditions set forth in the regulations to be considered subsistence crops; rather, as the legal representative of the defendant municipality rightly states on various occasions, it appears to be an extension of the occupants' lands, who are curiously all adjoining the property in dispute, and for this purpose they erected dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets and other materials, cleaned the lot, and, at least on two of these "<i>fractions</i>", built wooden structures (ranchos) with zinc roofs, cement floors, without walls, in a fair state of repair; assessments that prevent this Court from giving this occupation an agrarian character. On this point, it is important to make several significant observations. It must be remembered that "<b><i>X. </i></b><i>Special agrarian usucapión is a typical institution of Agrarian Law, as are the agrarian enterprise, contracts, property, and possession. Its elements derive from a particular regulatory regime, and therefore it acquires differentiating features from civil usucapión itself. Its foundation lies in the general principle of Agrarian Law known as the economic and social function of agrarian property. As is known, this unfolds into two: a subjective one, of an economic nature, referring to the owner's obligation to produce, improve, and respect the environment, and an objective one, of a social nature, consisting of the State's obligation to provide property to those who, having the capacity and knowledge to produce, do not have it or have it insufficiently. This latter aspect is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating "Everyone has the right to private property corresponding to the essential needs of a decent life, which helps to maintain the dignity of the person and the home," and also in the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José as follows: "Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the social interest." This concerns the human right to property and not only the right of property. The aim is, as one of the economic and social human rights, to guarantee "access" to it.</i>" (Judgment number 68-94, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on August sixteenth, nineteen ninety-four.) <span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Thus, the structure of the agrarian property right is composed of special duties and a particular way of exercising the inherent faculties of property, since <b><i>its owner is obliged to dedicate it to agricultural activity</i></b>, which precisely sustains its existence, as indicated by our Constitutional Court in judgment number 2000-9119, of fifteen hours fourteen minutes on October seventeenth, two thousand:</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>"<b>III.- On the right</b>.- Agrarian property, determined in this case by its form of acquisition through the mechanisms established in the Land and Colonization Law, <b>is identified by the obligations of the owner to exercise possessory acts in fulfillment of the social function of his right</b>. Property and possession are thus in a relationship such that the former cannot be conceptualized without the concurrence of the latter, in such a way that, without property being denatured as a subjective right, its owner assumes a series of obligations in the exercise of his right. <b>The State, attending not only to this differentiating character of agrarian property, but also framed within the conception of the Social and Democratic State of Law that governs our country, recognized in article 50 of the Political Constitution</b>, has established through the Land and Colonization Law a specific procedure for the acquisition of this right in an effort to promote the gradual increase in the productivity of land ownership, for a just distribution of its product, and for the purpose of elevating the social condition of the peasant, making him a participant in the Nation's development (article 1 of the cited Law). <b>From this perspective, those who acquire any right through the mechanisms thus established, contract the obligation, given the foregoing considerations, to exercise agrarian possessory acts on the acquired farm, these being understood as those aimed at putting the farm into production efficiently.</b></span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>"</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Whereby, within that set of regulatory rules that weigh on agrarian property, the one relating to the purpose of the allocated farm is provided for—in an unavoidable manner—since <b><i>there is a charge on it so that it be dedicated to agrarian activity</i></b>; which, in cases of land titling by the Institute of Agrarian Development, empowers the revocation or extinction of the adjudication—article 68, subsection 4, point a)—, or to be subject to expropriation by the State, as empowered by article 144 of the same Law; and in cases where usucapión is alleged, the inadmissibility of the proceedings, as the regulations require "stable and effective" possessory acts for the purpose of putting it into production conditions for personal or family subsistence, on land registered in the name of a third party in the Public Property Registry (article 92 of the cited Law 2825). Thus, the precarious possessor, when they have been in possession for more than ten years, acquires their property through an original acquisition, and correlatively, the right of the registered owner in that area is extinguished; a registry principle that is characteristic of both civil law and agrarian law, and corresponds generally to the ways of acquiring real rights; thus, in the case of the precarious possessor, it is regulated in the cited Law 2825, as provided in the third paragraph of article 92: "<i>Precarious possessors who have ten-year possession under the conditions stated in the preceding paragraph may register their right in accordance with the provisions of this Law through the possessory information procedure.</i>" And, <b>secondly</b>, <b><i><u>the requirements established to grant the right of usucapión are not met; there is no transferable title, good faith, ten-year possession as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful</u></i></b>. Indeed, the jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (thus, among others, judgments number 19-93, of fourteen hours on April seventh, nineteen ninety-three, 451996, of May twenty-second, nineteen ninety-six, 50-98, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twentieth, nineteen ninety-eight, 0001-F-99, of fourteen hours on January sixth, nineteen ninety-nine, 978-F-2001, of sixteen hours thirty minutes on December twelfth, two thousand one, and, 134-F-2005, of ten hours ten minutes on March tenth, two thousand five) has indicated that, in application of the provisions of articles 853, 856, and 860 of the Civil Code, the unavoidable requirements to acquire property by positive prescription (usucapión) are the transferable title of ownership, good faith, and possession as owner, continuous, public, peaceful, and for ten years; and regarding the precarious possession of land, unlike civil usucapión, in articles 92 and 101 of the cited Land and Colonization Law (ITCO-IDA), number 2825, and its reforms, due to the express recognition of the social function recognized for property, based on the peasant's need to acquire their means of subsistence, <b>the proof of a transferable title of ownership is not required</b>, <i>since the title is the same possession manifested through possessory acts</i>. The foregoing means that in certain cases, the simple fact of possession over time, exercised under the other required conditions, is converted by law into a right of possession, which, when it has been for a short time, will be a weak or somewhat provisional right, but as time increases it becomes stronger and consolidates, thus configuring a suitable title to possess and acquire ownership, even if the aforementioned transferable title of ownership does not exist, which conforms to the modern orientation regarding property and possession rights, just as the tendency exists. <b><i>Now, since in the present case we are not dealing with an agrarian possession, all the requirements indicated for civil usucapión are demanded</i></b>. Regarding the first (<b><i><u>transferable title of ownership</u></i></b>), it must be remembered that "<i>In our legislation, the expression 'title' has several meanings: the first, when it serves to express the cause or foundation of a proprietary attribution, and in this sense it is used in articles 853 and 854 of the Civil Code. The second, to designate the document containing the attribution, as when article 459 says that ownership titles over real estate shall be registered in the Property Registry, and the third, to determine the nature or scope of the proprietary attribution, for example, when the Family Code says that assets acquired gratuitously are not community property (art. 41). <b>When articles 853 and 854 speak of transferable title of ownership or just title, they use the expression as a cause or foundation of the acquisition. The notion of just title has its antecedents in the iusta causa possidendi of classical Roman Law, by virtue of which it was required that the usucapient acquire possession based on a relationship with the preceding possessor, suitable to justify the acquisition of possession itself, the acquisition of ownership not having followed only due to a lack of formal requirements in the act of transfer or due to a lack of right in the transferor themselves</b></i>". (Judgment number 113-1981, of fifteen hours fifteen minutes on October twelfth, nineteen eighty-one.) </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> <span style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span></span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Whereby, in a broad sense, <b><i>title is therefore the legal cause upon which a right is founded</i></b>. In ordinary usucapión (of civil law), a just transferable title of ownership is required, which has been understood specifically as a legal transaction with someone who previously had the thing, by virtue of which the current possessor acquires the property from the previous possessor. Therefore, it is said that the possessor has the thing because it was sold to them, given to them, etc., hence it is also expressed that a sale, a donation, and inheritance are, among others, suitable titles to acquire and possess. It is evident that in the case under study, the plaintiffs lack such a transferable title of ownership, which is why these judges understand that they tried to base their claim on the alleged agrarian possession. <b><i><u>Good faith</u></i></b> is a subjective requirement related to the acquirer's belief of being assisted by the right of the exercised possession, an element that is evidently not met in the present case, since the plaintiffs are fully aware that the property registrationally belongs to the Municipality of the Central Canton of Heredia, and that it is of a public domain nature, according to what was declared by the Constitutional Chamber itself in its ruling 2002-8822. Moreover, it is verified that after that pronouncement, the acts of invasion continue, even as of the date the testimonies contained in the case file were given. It also does not meet the characteristics of <b><i>possession</i></b>, since the date of occupation is not known with absolute certainty, as for this Court the testimonial statements given to that effect in the case file are not convincing, which means it is not possible to corroborate that the possession was ten-year. Nor is it possible to maintain that the acts of occupation were as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful, since from the moment the defendant Municipality became aware of the invasion, it sought its recovery, first through material and direct actions, by partially demolishing the dividing fences that the plaintiffs had erected, and initiating the administrative eviction procedure before the Ministry of Governance, once the Constitutional Chamber declared that it was a public domain property, in the name of the local corporation. It is also important to assess that through a document of two thousand one, one of the alleged possessors (Freddy Umaña Rodríguez) cedes his litigious rights in favor of Aida Felicia Briceño Bustos; but nothing is indicated regarding the possessory rights, without it being possible to consider it as a transferable title of ownership; which, neither is evidence that allows proof of the date on which the occupation of the property by the transferor began, nor if the beneficiary exercised any possessory act; it being important to note that for possession to generate any right and be legitimate, it must be exercised personally by the one alleging it, and only through a valid and legitimate title can it be transferred, which does not occur in this matter. All the foregoing obliges us to declare the inadmissibility of the positive prescription (usucapión) proceedings, in order to acquire the alleged agrarian possession over the property registered in folio real under registration number 4-106304. Note that we are dealing with a public domain property, which prevents any right of possession, and it also does not meet the requirements of possession, neither civil nor agrarian." All are of legal age, residents of Heredia, and, with the indicated exceptions, married.

**WHEREAS:** **1.-** That the amount in controversy in this matter was set at the sum of ten million colones (by order issued at nine hours fourteen minutes on November second, two thousand four), based on the facts presented and articles 261, 277 to 281, 284, 286, 305, 207, 209, 317, 328, 332, 473, 484, 853 to 856, 860 of the Civil Code, 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and the evidentiary list, so that in judgment it be declared, as **primary claim:** "***1.*** *That my clients have possessed the property described in the sketch prepared by Engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, and have fulfilled the respective requirements of a ten-year possession, in a quiet, public, peaceful, uninterrupted manner, as owners and in good faith, by virtue of which **ADVERSE POSSESSION (PRESCRIPCIÓN POSITIVA)**, or **USUCAPION (USUCAPIÓN)** has operated in their benefit and **EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION (PRESCRIPCIÓN NEGATIVA)** has operated to the detriment of the Municipality of Heredia, since it has never exercised possession over the same. **2.** That the inscription of the property in the name of my principals be ordered in the Public Registry, in equal parts, with them subsequently resorting to the respective [sic] channel, to segregate and locate the rights corresponding to each one. The Registry shall be ordered to apply the reduction in the Dirección7932*. **3.** That the defendant be ordered to pay both costs of this lawsuit.*" And as a **subsidiary claim**, they require "***4.** ... I request Your Honor that, should the contrary to what was previously requested occur, we be paid the necessary and useful improvements made to the real property during the entire period of possession, according* [sic] *to the determination made by an expert, plus the respective interest calculated from the date of determination until the respective payment. All of which shall be done prior* [sic] *to vacating the property. If this subsidiary petition is admitted, the defendant must also be ordered to pay costs.*" (Folios 81 and 82).

**2.-** That the defendant Municipality denied the action, opposing for that purpose the preliminary defense of lack of competence by subject matter and territory, resolved interlocutorily (by resolution number 1066-04, at ten hours on August twenty-seventh, two thousand four, on folios 96 and 97); and the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing to sue (falta de acción ad causam activa y pasiva), lack of right, and the generic *sine actione agit* (folios 103 to 114).

**3.-** Attorney Sandra María Quesada Vargas, at that time Judge of the Trial Court for this matter, in judgment number 426-2007, at eight hours on March twenty-ninth, two thousand seven, resolved: "***THEREFORE** The exceptions of lack of standing and lack of interest filed by the Municipality of Heredia are rejected. The defense of lack of right invoked by the defendant Municipality is upheld and consequently the present action is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs of the proceedings are borne by the plaintiff party.*" (Folios 289 and 290.)

**4.-** Disagreeing with the resolution of the lower court (A-quo), the plaintiffs appeal, a recourse that was admitted (by order issued at eleven hours fourteen minutes on June twelfth, two thousand seven, on folio 305); and by virtue of which this Court hears the case on appeal.

**5.-** In the proceedings, the prescribed formalities have been observed, without noting any grounds for nullity susceptible of invalidating the actions taken.

**Drafted by Judge Fernández Brenes; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- OF THE ALLEGED NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN FIRST INSTANCE.-** In response to the plaintiffs' representative alleging the nullity of the first instance judgment, for supposed violation of due process, its analysis proceeds, prior to hearing the appeals filed, as provided in article 155 subsection 3) point a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this regard, two important warnings must be made. **In the first place**, the appellants are informed that this is an **ordinary administrative litigation proceeding (proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo)**, not an agrarian one, in this case, by reason **of one of the subjects intervening in it**, a municipality, a decentralized entity by territory, which has governmental autonomy, which is inserted in the organization of our (Costa Rican) State, according to the provisions of articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution, and **due to the claim**, since precisely this lawsuit was filed so that the judgment would declare the adverse possession (usucapion) in relation to a property of a local corporation, and failing that, the recognition of improvements; a circumstance that requires the application of the rules of Public Law, comprising both Constitutional Law and Administrative Law. The foregoing implies that its processing was conducted according to the procedural rules governing this type of actions, namely, the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (as it was filed on November fifteenth, two thousand two) and the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 103 of the first Law; **without the procedural rules of agrarian proceedings being pertinent to this process**. On this point, it must be considered that this matter does not meet the prerequisites established in the Law (of Agrarian Jurisdiction, number 6734, of March twenty-ninth, nineteen eighty-two) for it to be considered of an agrarian nature, since it is not a conflict arising from the application of agrarian legislation, nor legal provisions regulating the activities of production, transformation, industrialization, or disposal of agricultural products (as provided in article 1 of the cited legal body), since the plaintiffs do not have the status of peasants or land workers, as required by subsection a) of article 2 of the referenced Law. **In the second place**, it is undeniable that agrarian proceedings have special connotations, which differentiate them from those processed according to civil procedural regulations, in which orality was even introduced. In this regard, in judgment number 3606-94, at fifteen hours twelve minutes on July nineteenth, nineteen ninety-four, the Constitutional Chamber indicated; "*... by breaking with excessive formalism, with the criterion of formal equality of the parties and the great limits imposed on the Judge and on people of scarce resources, elements that characterize civil proceedings. This rejection is based on the idea that such elements lead to the denial of justice to those who seek it, since the proceeding becomes, in a great number of cases, a weapon by means of which the judicial pronouncement is delayed. Therefore, the response of the agrarian proceeding has been to introduce procedural simplifications, to design a faster proceeding aimed at guaranteeing prompt and complete justice, reflected in short terms, in simple processing, in the reduction of legal obstacles for the parties intervening in the proceeding, in the elimination of fiscal requirements, and in the granting of broad powers to the judge, both for the conduct of the proceeding up to judgment, and regarding the administration and evaluation of evidence. By reason of the foregoing, the agrarian proceeding becomes a more humane instrument for resolving the matters submitted to the judge's knowledge, both in the processing of the proceeding—where a closer contact between the parties and the judge must exist—and in the guarantees granted to the parties to be able to resort to justice, even being able to receive free legal representation when dealing with persons without the means to cover the professional expenses thereof. Thus, the specificity of the agrarian proceeding is constituted by two fundamental factors: on the one hand, the principle of orality in which the proceeding has found institutional and ideological support to conceive its own structure in accordance with the demands of agrarian matters, a principle whose implications are summarized in the dominance of the word as a means of expression, without excluding writing in the preparation and documentation, so that the principle of immediacy, the identity of the judge, the concentration and reinforcement of the Judge's powers are also present, to be able to satisfactorily lead the trial towards the search for truth; and on the other hand, the phenomenon of the publicization or socialization of agrarian law and its process, having three immediate consequences: 1.- the urgent need to conceive a modern proceeding divorced from the traditional—civil proceeding—; 2.- to declare of public interest the search for and declaration of the truth, granting the judge sufficient powers in the proceeding to be the conductor and administrator, not only of the extremes being discussed against each other, but especially, of the investigation to ensure that their judgments closely unite real truth and legal truth; and 3.- to socialize justice, so that all procedural subjects can resort to a less formal and less costly proceeding, so that people of scarce resources can also find a response to their needs.*" "*From the foregoing, it is concluded that there is a general orientation directed toward specific guidelines linked to informality, speed, economy, and humanization of the proceeding.*" But such elements do not govern administrative litigation proceedings, which, according to their procedural regulations, are of a written nature. **By virtue of the foregoing**, **that sole condition means there is no violation of the alleged principle of immediacy of evidence, since it is applicable only with respect to oral proceedings**, as indicated by our Constitutional Court, in judgment 2007-1555, at fifteen hours thirty-four minutes on February seventh, two thousand seven:

"*... Finally, it should be noted that these considerations are based on the model of proceeding designed by the legislators—a matter in which there is legislative discretion—which, being of a written nature, is not governed by the principle of immediacy of evidence—typical of oral proceedings—in which it is required that the judge who resolves the case be the one who in turn receives—in person—the evidence supporting the proceeding.*" Consequently, insofar as in this type of proceedings (written), the judge who directly receives the evidence (in this case, conducts the judicial inspection) is not obligated to issue the judgment on the merits, no irregularity is evident, which obliges the rejection of the alleged nullity.

**II.- OF THE OMISSION OF THE FIRST INSTANCE JUDGE IN RESOLVING AN ALLEGATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY, WITHOUT THIS CAUSING NULLITY OF THE JUDGMENT.-** The cited article 155 subsection 3) point a) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that, in second instance judgments, an analysis of the procedural defects or omissions that merit correction must be carried out; a requirement that obliges this Court to make a pronouncement regarding a situation that, even though it does not imply the nullity of the judgment, its correction is pertinent. In effect, in the appealed resolution, the Trial Court Judge made a pronouncement on all the aspects comprising the plaintiffs' claim, that is, the primary and the subsidiary, rejecting the lawsuit in all its aspects. However, she omitted to make a pronouncement on an allegation by the defendant Municipality, specifically point 4 made in the statement of defense, in which it requested the Jurisdictional Authority:

"*1. That the exceptions of lack of jurisdiction, res judicata, lack of right, and active and passive standing be upheld.*" "*2. The plaintiffs never fulfilled the agrarian possessory legal requirements as stated by the Constitutional Chamber itself in Ruling* ***2002-08822***, thus *eliminating the possibility of discussing the eventual application of the legal institute of adverse possession in their favor. Likewise, it is of utmost importance to indicate that the real property under discussion is of public domain, which is why it is protected by legal and constitutional privilege due to its public nature and because it cannot be the object of private property, as the Constitutional Chamber itself supports. For these reasons,**the ordinary lawsuit must be declared without merit without any duty to pay any improvements* [sic] *and profits to the plaintiffs.*" "*3. That the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs of the proceeding for litigating in bad faith.*" "*4. The cancellation of the survey plans registered in the National Cadastre be ordered, as segregations of municipal property number ***4-106304-000**.* " "*5. We request that the precautionary measure be rejected, since municipal property, as demonstrated and supported by the Constitutional Chamber in Ruling 2002-08822, has the obligation to act in defense against precarious occupations on municipal public goods as in the case at hand.*" (folios 111 and 112).

In this regard, it is deemed that we are not facing a problem of incongruence of the judgment, which consists of...

"*... the lack of relationship between what was requested and what was resolved, relative to the parties, the object, or the cause; this is constituted by the facts.- Incongruence does not occur, therefore, due to contradictions that may result, for example, between proven or unproven facts and the pronouncements, or between these and the substantive assessments; in such a situation, the most that could occur would be a defective motivation of the judgment, which is a matter of another nature, specifically the cassation appeal on the merits, for error of fact or law in the assessment of evidence.- Put another way, there is no incongruence between the considerations of the judgment and what is resolved in the operative part. Finally, the judgment can grant everything requested, just as it can deny everything, and if it can do the latter, with equal or greater reason it can grant only a part, and in none of those cases is incongruence incurred;* this would occur if more than requested or outside of what was requested were granted, which is what is called ultra petita and extra petita" (judgment of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 35-91, at fifteen hours on March twenty-second, nineteen ninety-one).

Note that in the case, there was no counterclaim, so **the analysis of the cancellation or not of the cadastral plans segregated from property Placa11544 registered in the National Cadastre was not the object of the litis, but only whether or not the declaration of usucapion and/or improvements requested by the plaintiffs was appropriate**. Moreover, in the brief where he formulated the conclusions argument, the Mayor of the defendant municipality made no mention whatsoever of this aspect. Now then, the inadmissibility of what was requested—for not being part of the litis, and insofar as a pronouncement on this aspect rather merits a different ordinary proceeding—, even more so when said omission exists, this does not translate into nullity of the judgment, as it does not cause injury or violation of due process and the right to defense. It is further clarified that it is not true that the Municipality filed the exception of res judicata as a preliminary defense, nor as an exception on the merits.

**III.- OF THE EVIDENCE OFFERED FOR BETTER PROVISION.-** In their appeal brief, the plaintiffs request that expert evidence be ordered as evidence for better resolution, so that a topographical expert is appointed for the purpose of locating the property owned by the Municipality of Heredia and the one that is the object of this litis (which is sought to be acquired by usucapion), considering that suitable evidence has not been provided demonstrating that the one concerning this proceeding belongs to that local entity. On this point, it is important to note that in the briefs for filing and formalizing the lawsuit, this evidence was offered, and for this purpose, by order issued at fourteen hours thirty-one minutes on March seventh, two thousand five, the Court admitted it, appointing expert Nombre37177 as the expert. Now then, he turned out to be a mathematical expert, who rendered his report on May third, two thousand five (folios 236 to 240), without the plaintiff party objecting to it or making any warning, thereby admitting the expert opinion and its content.

Likewise, in accordance with Article 331 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is a prerogative (power) for the superior judge to request evidence for better resolution, as this will depend on the assessment made of the existing evidence in each case. Accordingly, the request is denied, as it is deemed unnecessary, since sufficient elements for judgment exist in the case file to support the decision.

**IV.- PROVEN FACTS.-** For a better understanding of the facts held as proven, those determined by the Trial Judge are substituted, as a series of omissions exist in their consignment, so that they are held as follows: **1.)** That the property in the district of Heredia registered in the National Registry under the real folio system, in the District of Heredia, with registration number Placa11545, whose nature is a building lot, located in canton 01 Heredia, Address7933, which borders to the North with street, to the South with IMAS, to the East with street and to the West with street, with an area of thirty-four thousand two hundred sixty-four square meters and two square decimeters, with cadastral plan number Placa11546, is owned by the Municipality of Heredia (literal certification, at folio 05); **2.)** That this ownership has been recorded in the Public Property Registry since February twenty-fourth, nineteen eighty-four (literal certification, at folio 05); **3.)** That cadastral plan number Placa11546 does not reflect the current state of property Placa11544, since from the south side of the Pirro River, a lot of ten thousand fifty-eight square meters and eighty-one square decimeters was segregated, which was registered in cadastral plan number H-633366-1986, and was transferred to the Joint Institute for Social Assistance (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social), for the construction of the Palacios Universitarios housing project (official communication DC-00145-2002, of July fifteenth, two thousand two, from the Head of Cadastre of the Municipality of Heredia, Nombre71028, at folio 8 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **4.)** That on that property, the Municipality of the Central canton of Heredia built its new facility and it is also used by that locality for dumping garbage and debris (official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file, and testimonies of Nombre71029 and Nombre71030, folio 232, 233 of the main file); **5.)** That in official communication DC- 00145-2002, of July fifteenth, two thousand two, the Head of Cadastre of the municipality of Heredia informs the Operating Director of the corporation that, as of May seventh, two thousand two, they cadastrally registered plan H-787226-2002, with an area of five hundred eighty-five square meters, in the name of Nombre71022, and on June twelfth of the same year, cadastral plan H-796074-2002, in the name of Nombre71031, both in the capacity of possessor; instruments from which it derives that there are more persons located on property 4-106304-000, because the adjoining owners are Nombre71032, Nombre71033, Nombre71034 and Nombre71021, reason for which the annulment of the same must be pursued, due to the municipal ownership of the property (folio 8 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **6.)** That on said property, the plaintiffs have exercised an occupation, manifested in the construction of dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets and other materials, cleaning of the lot, cultivation of some corn plants, coffee, plantain and fruit trees, and the erection of two wooden constructions (ranchos) with zinc roof, cement floor, without walls, in a regular state of conservation (judicial inspection, at folios 224 and 225 of the main file; testimonies of Nombre71029, Nombre71030 and Nombre71035, folio 232, 233 and 234 of the main file; and official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file); **7.)** That in the year two thousand two, the plaintiffs hired engineer Luis Fernando Araya to prepare a sketch of the formal division of the occupants of said property, in which it is clearly recorded that the property belongs to the Municipality of Heredia (fact not contested by the parties, plan visible at folio 1 of the main file; and official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file); **8.)** That on July twenty-ninth, two thousand two, a group of residents from the locality filed a complaint before the Municipality of Heredia, alleging that the property indicated supra, and owned by the defendant Municipality, had been invaded and was being used by some persons, which was detrimental to the safety and tranquility of the residents of that sector (folios 143 to 41 of volume 1 of the administrative file, 6 to 14 of volume 3 of the administrative file); **9.)** That in response to the neighborhood complaint filed, on August ninth, two thousand two, the municipality of Heredia began work to eliminate the dividing fences, without completing the work (official communication DIM 0988-2002, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand two, at folio 26 of volume 3 of the administrative file and fact one of the writ of amparo filed by the plaintiffs, folio 89 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **10.)** That on August ninth, two thousand two, Nombre71036 and Nombre71021 filed a writ of amparo before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which was processed under file number 02-006638-0007-CO, against the Municipality of Heredia, alleging possession of the property belonging to that municipality, since the year nineteen eighty-six (folios 89 to 82 and 110 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **11.)** That said writ of amparo was declared without merit by judgment number 2002-08822, at sixteen hours thirty-one minutes on September tenth, two thousand two, as the Court deemed the action of the respondent to be proper, in exercise of the defense powers that local corporation holds, as it involved a public domain asset (folios 110 to 107 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **12.)** That this process was filed in court, before the Agrarian Court of Heredia, on November fifteenth, two thousand two (receipt stamp and filing brief, at folios 1 to 16 of the main file); **13.)** That by resolution at eight hours on January sixteenth, two thousand three, the Mayoress of Heredia ordered Nombre71020, Nombre71021, Nombre71037, that for partially invading the property of that corporation, registered under real folio number Placa11545, they must vacate it within the non-extendable period of seventy-two hours from the notification of that decision, which was notified to the interested parties on January seventeenth following (folio 83 and 85 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **14.)** That by brief of February eleventh, two thousand three, the Mayor of the Municipality of Heredia, requests the Ministry of Public Security to initiate an administrative eviction (desalojo administrativo) procedure against Nombre71020, Nombre71021, Nombre71037 and Nombre71038, all in their condition as occupants of the property owned by it, registered under real folio number Placa11544 (see folios 118 to 112 of volume 1 of the administrative file); **15.)** That said procedure concluded with the issuance of resolution number 1016-2003 D.M., at fourteen hours on March tenth, two thousand three, issued by the Office of the Minister of Public Security, in which the municipal petition filed was granted and proceeding with the respective eviction was authorized by the police authority in charge, giving the occupants a prior period of forty-eight hours to vacate the property voluntarily (see folios 130 and 129 of volume I of the administrative file); **16.)** That by official communication DIM- 1108-2004, of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four, the surveyor and engineer of the defendant municipality inform the Director of Legal Affairs that, upon conducting a new visit to the property, they confirm that it remains invaded and with fences, which is observable at a glance, considering that the property boundaries are well defined (west side the Bernardo Benavides Urbanization and south side the Pirro River), from which photographs are taken (folios 212 to 208 of volume 1 of the administrative file); and, **17.)** That on August twenty-ninth, two thousand one, Nombre71031, of legal age, married, chef, with identity card number CED52976, resident of Address7934, assigns the litigious rights of the ordinary process processed in file 02-160155-638-AG, which was made known to the Court as of March third, two thousand five, an assignment that was admitted by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Third Section, by resolution number 294-2006, at ten hours ten minutes on August fourth, two thousand six (folios 137, 138, 181 and 182 of the main file).

**II. FACTS NOT PROVEN.** The list of facts held as not proven that the Trial Judge determined is substituted, the following being held as such—as the case file lacks suitable evidentiary material on which to support them—and which are of importance for the resolution of this matter: **1.)** That the plaintiffs are peasants or are dedicated to agricultural activities; **2.)** That the plaintiffs have occupied part of property 4-106304-000 since nineteen eighty-six; **3.)** That the plaintiffs have around five thousand coffee plants and various crops planted on the property owned by the Municipality of Heredia they are occupying; **4.)** That the execution of the administrative eviction authorized by Resolution No. 1016-2003 at 2:00 p.m. on March 10, 2003, issued by the Minister of Public Security, proceeded; **5.)** That some necessary and useful improvements were made within the property in question by the plaintiffs; **6.)** That the plaintiffs completed the possessory information procedure to register the property they attempt to acquire by adverse possession (usucapir) in their name; and **7.)** That the plaintiffs hold a transfer of title (título traslativo de dominio) for the property on which they claim the positive prescription of the right of ownership.

**VI.- OF THE PLAINTIFF'S GRIEVANCES.-** The plaintiffs' representative *alleges the nullity* of judgment number 426-2007, at eight hours on March twenty-ninth, two thousand seven, issued by the Contentious-Administrative Court, deeming that due process in agrarian matters has been violated, by leaving his clients in " *an absolute total state of defenselessness* ," by disregarding the *principle of immediacy of evidence*, which is evidenced by the clear contradictions regarding the evidence—testimonial, documentary, expert—produced in first instance, and which has caused the A-quo to incur in error; and *files an appeal*, for the following reasons: **a.)** that there has been an erroneous interpretation and assessment of the existing evidence, by conducting a superficial analysis of the expert evidence, by omitting to rely on the testimonies rendered that are of importance for the resolution of this matter, and downplaying the judicial inspection, from which the agrarian activity deployed and the facts held as not proven in the appealed resolution are evident; **b.)** failing to assess that property 106.304-000 in no way coincides with the area that has been possessed by his clients, as the measurements do not match, while the former has an area of one thousand four hundred five square meters and ten square decimeters, and they have occupied thirty-four thousand two hundred sixty-four square meters and two square decimeters; **c.)** that the defendant Municipality has not demonstrated that the occupied property belongs to it, for lack of suitable evidence, lacking a cadastral plan, which makes evident the need for a detailed study, to elucidate this point; **d.)** that the judgment limited itself to an analysis of the institution of public domain assets, despite this being an ordinary agrarian process, focusing on a nuance exclusively from Administrative Law, obviating the characteristics of adverse possession (usucapión) in Agrarian Law (folios 300 to 304). For this reason, it claims that the appealed judgment be revoked, and the filed lawsuit be declared with merit, with costs imposed on the Municipality of the Central canton of Heredia.

**VII.- OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT OVER WHICH POSSESSION IS ALLEGED.-** The plaintiffs allege that suitable evidence has not been provided to determine that the lot subject to this litigation is the property of the defendant Municipality, as the areas of what is sought to be acquired by adverse possession do not correspond with that registered. However, this Tribunal disagrees with such affirmation, given that, from the evidence provided to the case file—the sketch produced by engineer Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, cadastral plans number H-370888-79 (at folios 1 and 2 of the main file), as well as a registry study carried out by the municipality's engineer (official communication DIM 0969-2002, of August twentieth, two thousand two, issued by the municipal engineer, José René Mayorga Angulo, at folios 53 and 52 of volume 3 of the administrative file), and the records of field visits conducted by officials of that corporation (official communication DIM-1108-2004, of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four), *it is denoted with absolute clarity that the plaintiffs invaded part of a property belonging to the defendant*. The foregoing is of absolute knowledge to the petitioners here, given that a writ of amparo they filed (two of the plaintiffs here) against the defensive acts exercised by the owner Municipality was denied, and in the very filing brief and formalization of this lawsuit, they expressly request the Jurisdictional Authority to:

" *2- That the property acquired by adverse possession (usucapido) be ordered registered in the name of my clients in the Public Registry, in equal parts, with them later resorting to the respective route to segregate and allocate the rights corresponding to each one. The Registry shall be ordered to apply the area reduction to property ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR.* " Moreover, the officials of the respondent corporation are correct in affirming that the boundaries of the property are easily defined; thus, considering the shape of the lot that is demarcated in cadastral plan number H-370888-79, it is deduced without a doubt that the sketch with the portions of the occupations, prepared by engineer Nombre71039, and which was attempted to be cadastrally registered, is part of the property recorded in the indicated plan.

**VIII.- ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN REGIME.-** The Trial Judge denied the recognition of positive prescription (usucapion) regarding the occupation carried out by the plaintiffs on the property registered in the real folio system, with registration number Placa 11544, due to its public domain status (demanialidad), as it is property of the Municipality of the Central Canton of Heredia. On this point, it is important to clarify the concept, as the one given in the judgment under review is not precise and leads to confusion. Indeed, **demanial or dominical assets** must be understood as the set of assets—both immovable and movable—that have a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private ones, *as by the express will of the constituent or the legislator, they are dedicated to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and therefore, cannot be the object of private property or possession*, such that they are outside the commerce of men, meaning they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State—in a strict sense—since the State is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, **assets of the public domain and assets of the private domain of the State (fiscal assets) must necessarily be distinguished**, precisely by reason of their purpose, as *what defines the legal nature of the former is the purpose given to this type of assets, that is, as they are dedicated to and are at the service of public use*, under the terms provided in Article 261 of the Civil Code. (In this regard, consult judgments number 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 of the Constitutional Chamber.) Falling into this category—without constituting a closed list—are the maritime-terrestrial zone, the forest or natural heritage of the State—protected areas—(comprising national parks, forest reserves (reservas forestales), biological reserves, protective zones (zonas protectoras), wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments—Article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment, number 7554, of September eighteenth, nineteen ninety-five), the hydrographic protection zones (zonas de protección hidrográfica)—Article 33 of the Ley Forestal—(contiguous to springs (nacientes), to the banks of rivers and lakes), the border zones (Article 10 of the Law of Vacant Lands, number 13, of January tenth, nineteen thirty-nine), the right-of-way, railway lines, indigenous reserves, the historical-architectural heritage, mineral resources, the archaeological heritage, parks and green zones, etc. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 261 of the Civil Code (legal dedication), these are assets whose **vocation and purpose**, as they "are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those from which everyone can benefit by being delivered to public use", are outside the commerce of men, meaning they are **inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable**; thus, their dominion or possession is not possible, whether by gratuitous or onerous title; they cannot be lost by prescription, nor gained by usucapion, so **they permanently maintain their legal validity**; and they are not susceptible to seizure, under the terms of Civil Law; in addition, they **are subject to police power, concerning their utilization and use**, as their private use is conditioned on the granting of respective licenses and permits and the control and oversight by the Administration; and the **Administration holds sufficient powers for their recovery**, without needing to resort to judicial channels, nor even to an administrative procedure, as there is no subjective right or legitimate interest on the part of the "occupant," meaning that the **administrative action substitutes for the possessory interdicts for their restitution.** Therefore, the legal regime of public domain assets is special and differentiated, precisely in consideration of the type of asset involved. The distinction between private assets or things and public assets and things depends, first of all, on the "ownership" or "dominion" of the asset, as its differentiated nature and legal regime are defined by this element; and consequently, on the applicable law, as the former is subject to private law, and the latter to public law. Thus, the national regime of public domain assets places them outside the commerce of men, and therefore, the permits granted will always be on a precarious basis and revocable by the Administration, unilaterally, when reasons of necessity or general interest so require, for the preservation of the natural use of the public thing. By virtue of which, **the infraction or infringement of the right of property, enshrined in Article 45 of the Political Constitution, is not possible**, as this is a totally different legal regime, where the law merely establishes conditions under which use and enjoyment by private parties is possible. Thus, **whoever attempts by unauthorized means to exercise private use of that zone will be barred from the possibility of consummating it, as it is also acceptable, since time immemorial, that these are assets imprescriptible in favor of private parties and are outside commerce**, principles collected in numerals 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, dating from eighteen eighty-six.

**IX.- ON THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE REAL ESTATE OVER WHICH AGRARIAN POSSESSION IS ALLEGED.-** The Trial Judge is correct in stating that regarding public domain assets, no type of possession is possible or legitimate, and any possession exercised cannot generate any right in favor of the occupant. However, as indicated by the doctrine and jurisprudence—indicated in the preceding Considering—it is impossible to bestow the condition of public domain status (demanialidad) based solely on the subjective element of the asset's titleholder, that is, when dealing with subjects of Public Law. Thus, the criterion that must be used is that of the **purpose or vocation of the asset, that is, for use by the community or for the provision of a public service**, an element that is fully met in this case, as the property over which the agrarian possession is alleged, in order for positive prescription (usucapion) to be declared, is, not only property of the Municipality of Heredia (as determined in Considering VII.- of this judgment), but also, the yard and facilities of that local government are located on it, precisely to fulfill the purposes entrusted by constitutional mandate in its numeral 169, that is, "*the administration of local interests and services*"; and furthermore, it has been used as a garbage dump, as declared by the testimonies rendered in the case file. Thus, as it is a public domain asset, **private parties do not have a right of possession**, meaning that **possession—as an attribute of the right of possession—can only be exercised by the entities holding the right**, without any private subject being able to legally claim possessory acts, unless these were carried out before the public institution acquired the property, and only for purposes of a potential indemnity, which does not happen in the present case, where it was demonstrated that the Municipality is the titleholder of Title 7935 since February twenty-four, nineteen eighty-four, and the alleged possession (occupation or rather invasion), dates from nineteen eighty-six.

**X.- ON THE ALLEGED AGRARIAN POSSESSION.-** As indicated in the preceding Considering, the public domain nature (naturaleza demanial) of the real estate sought to be acquired by usucapion would make a more extensive analysis of the alleged agrarian possession unnecessary, as one of the requirements for the positive prescription of the right of property is the nature of the asset, that is, that it be a "*suitable thing*", which implies that it must be susceptible to private property, and in such condition, that it is within the commerce of men; a requirement that, as stated, is not met in this case. Notwithstanding, because it is alleged that there was no extensive analysis on this point in the appealed judgment, it is deemed pertinent to make several observations that lead us to verify that, even if it were not a public domain asset, recognizing the requested usucapion would also not be appropriate—in this case—. Indeed, **firstly**, it must be noted that **this is not a scenario where agrarian legislation must be applied, but rather civil legislation**, **because the farm—in the registry—does not have an agricultural vocation, and the plaintiffs did not give it that purpose**. The lawsuit is formulated on the basis that it concerns an agrarian possession, and by virtue thereof, they have exercised possessory acts of that nature. However, from the evidence presented in the case file, it is possible to conclude that, even though it is true that the occupants (herein plaintiffs) have carried out some crops—such as yucca, corn, coffee, plantains, and fruit trees—these do not meet the conditions set forth in the regulations to be considered as subsistence farming; rather, as the representative of the respondent municipality rightly states on various occasions, it appears to be an extension of the occupants' lands, who are curiously all adjoining the real estate in discussion, and to that effect, they erected dividing fences of barbed wire, zinc sheets, and other materials, cleaned the lot, and, at least, in two of those "*fractions*", they built wooden structures (ranchos) with zinc roofing, cement floors, without walls, in a regular state of conservation; assessments that prevent this Tribunal from giving this occupation an agrarian character. On this point, it is important to make several important observations. It must be remembered that "**X.** *The special agrarian usucapion is a typical institution of Agrarian Law, as are the agrarian enterprise, contracts, property, and possession. Its elements derive from a particular regulatory regime, which is why it acquires differential features from the same civil usucapion. Its foundation lies in the general principle of Agrarian law known as the economic and social function of agrarian property. As known, this is divided into two: a subjective one, of an economic nature, referring to the owner's obligation to produce, improve, and respect the environment, and an objective one, of a social nature, consisting of the State's obligation to provide property to those who, having the capacity and knowledge to produce, do not have it or have it insufficiently. This latter aspect is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by expressing 'Everyone has the right to private property corresponding to the essential needs of a decent life, which contributes to maintaining the dignity of the person and the home', and also in the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José as follows: 'Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the social interest.' This concerns the human right to property and not just the right of property. It seeks, as one of the economic and social human rights, to guarantee 'access' to it.*" (Judgment number 68-94, at fourteen hours fifty-five minutes of August sixteenth, nineteen ninety-four.)

Thus, the structure of the agrarian property right is composed of special duties and a particular way of exercising the inherent faculties of property, as **its owner is obliged to dedicate it to agricultural activity**, which precisely sustains its existence, as indicated by our Constitutional Tribunal in judgment number 2000-9119, at fifteen hours fourteen minutes of October seventeenth, two thousand:

"**III.- On the right**.- *Agrarian property, determined in this case by its form of acquisition through the mechanisms provided in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, **is identified by the obligations on the owner to exercise possessory acts in fulfillment of the social function of their right.** Property and possession are thus in a relationship such that the former cannot be conceptualized without the concurrence of the latter, in such a way that, without property being denatured as a subjective right, its owner assumes a series of obligations in the exercise of their right. **The State, attending not only to that differentiating character of agrarian property, but also framed within the conception of the Social and Democratic Rule of Law that governs our country, recognized in Article 50 of the Political Constitution**, has provided through the Ley de Tierras y Colonización a specific procedure for the acquisition of this right with the aim of promoting the gradual increase in land property productivity, for a just distribution of its product and for the purpose of elevating the social condition of the peasant, making them a participant in the Nation's development (Article 1 of the cited Law). **From this perspective, those who acquire any right through the mechanisms thus provided, contract the obligation, given the above considerations, to exercise agrarian possessory acts over the acquired farm, understood as those aimed at putting the farm into production efficiently.**"* Whereby, within that set of regulatory norms that weigh on agrarian property, **that relating to the purpose of the farm that is adjudicated is provided—ineluctably—, as there exists a charge on it so that it be dedicated to agrarian activity**; which in cases of land titling by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (INDER) empowers the revocation or extinction of the adjudication—Article 68 subsection 4 point a)—, or to be subject to expropriation by the State, as authorized by Article 144 of the same Law; and in the cases where usucapion is alleged, the inadmissibility of the petition, as the regulations require "*stable and effective*" possessory acts with the purpose of putting it in conditions of production for personal or family subsistence, on land registered in the name of a third party in the Public Property Registry (Article 92 of the cited Law 2825). Thus, the precarious possessor, when possessing for more than ten years, acquires their property through an original acquisition, and correlatively, the right of the registered owner in that area is extinguished; a registral principle that is typical of both civil law and agrarian law, and corresponds generally to the ways of acquiring real rights; thus, in the case of the precarious possessor, it finds its regulation in the cited Law 2825 in the third paragraph of Article 92: "*Pecarious possessors who have decennial possession under the conditions stated in the preceding paragraph may register their right in accordance with the provisions of this Law through the possessory information procedure.*" And, **secondly**, **it does not meet the requirements provided to grant the right of usucapion, there is no translative title, good faith, decennial possession as owner, quiet, public, and peaceful**. Indeed, jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (thus, among others, judgments number 19-93, at fourteen hours of April seventh, nineteen ninety-three; 45-1996, of May twenty-second, nineteen ninety-six; 50-98, at fifteen hours twenty minutes of May twentieth, nineteen ninety-eight; 0001-F-99, at fourteen hours of January sixth, nineteen ninety-nine; 978-F-2001, at sixteen hours thirty minutes of December twelfth, two thousand one; and, 134-F-2005, at ten hours ten minutes of March tenth, two thousand five) has indicated that in application of the provisions of Articles 853, 856, and 860 of the Civil Code, the ineluctable requirements to acquire property by positive prescription (usucapion) are the translative title of domain, good faith, and possession as owner, continuous, public, peaceful, and for ten years; and in the case of precarious possession of land, unlike civil usucapion, in Articles 92 and 101 of the cited Ley de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO-IDA), number 2825, and its reforms, by reason of the express recognition of the social function recognized for property, based on the peasant's need to acquire their means of subsistence, **accreditation of the translative title of domain is not required**, *as the title is the possession itself manifested through the possessory acts*. The foregoing means that in certain cases, by the simple fact of possession over time and exercised under the other required conditions, the law converts it into a right of possession, which when held for a short time will be a weak or more or less provisional right, but that as time increases becomes stronger and consolidates, thus configuring a suitable title to possess and acquire ownership, even if the translative title of domain discussed does not exist, which aligns with the modern orientation on property and possession rights, as the trend also exists. **Now, as in the present case we are not facing an agrarian possession, all the requirements indicated for civil usucapion are required**. Regarding the first (**translative title of domain**), it must be remembered that "*In our legislation the expression 'title' has several meanings: the first, when it serves to express the cause or foundation of a patrimonial attribution and in that sense it is used in Articles 853 and 854 of the Civil Code. The second to designate the document containing the attribution, as when Article 459 says that titles of domain over real estate will be registered in the Property Registry, and the third to determine the nature or scope of the patrimonial attribution, for example, when the Family Code says that assets acquired gratuitously are not community property (art. 41). **When Articles 853 and 854 speak of translative title of domain or just title, they use the expression as the cause or foundation of the acquisition.*** The notion of just title (justo título) has its antecedents in the *iusta causa possidendi* of classical Roman Law, by virtue of which the usucapient was required to acquire possession based on a relationship with the preceding possessor, suitable for justifying the acquisition of the possession itself, the acquisition of ownership not having followed only due to the lack of formal requirements in the act of transfer or due to the lack of right in the transferor himself". (Sentencia número 113- 1981, de las quince horas quince minutos del doce de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno.)

Thus, in a broad sense, ***title (título)* is therefore the legal cause upon which a right is founded**. In ordinary usucapion (under civil law), a just title translative of ownership (título traslativo de dominio) is required, which has been understood specifically as a legal transaction with whoever previously had the thing, by virtue of which the current possessor acquires the asset from the previous possessor. For this reason, it is said that the possessor has the thing because it was sold to them, given to them as a gift, etc., hence it is also expressed that a sale, a donation, and an inheritance are, among others, titles suitable for acquiring and possessing. It is evident that in the case under study, the plaintiffs lack said title translative of ownership, which is why these judges understand that they attempted to base their claim on the alleged agrarian possession. **Good faith (buena fe)** is a subjective requirement related to the acquirer's belief that they are assisted by the right of the exercised possession, an element that is evidently not met in this instance, since the plaintiffs have full knowledge that, according to the registry, the property belongs to the Municipality of the Central Canton of Heredia (Municipalidad del cantón Central de Heredia), and that it is of a public domain (demanial) nature, pursuant to what was declared by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself in its ruling 2002- 8822. Furthermore, it is verified that subsequent to that pronouncement, the acts of invasion have continued, even as of the date the testimonies recorded in the case file were given. It also does not meet the characteristics of **possession (posesión)**, since the date of the occupation is not known with absolute certainty, as for this Court the witness statements rendered for this purpose in the case file are not convincing, which means it is not possible to corroborate that the possession was decennial. Nor is it possible to maintain that the acts of occupation were in the capacity of owner, uninterrupted, public, and peaceful, since from the moment the respondent Municipality became aware of the invasion, it turned its attention to its recovery, first through material and direct actions, by partially tearing down the dividing fences that the plaintiffs had erected, and initiating the administrative eviction procedure (desalojo administrativo) before the Ministry of Governance (Ministerio de Gobernación), once the Constitutional Chamber declared that it was a public domain asset, in the name of the local corporation. It is also important to assess that through a brief of two thousand one, one of the supposed possessors (Nombre71031) assigned their litigious rights to Nombre71026; but nothing is indicated regarding the possession rights, nor can it be taken as a title translative of ownership; which is also not a test that allows for crediting either the date on which the occupation of the property by the assignor began, or whether the beneficiary exercised any possessory act; it being important to note that for possession to generate any right and be legitimate, it must be exercised personally by the one alleging it, and only through a valid and legitimate title can it be transferred, which does not occur in this matter. All of the foregoing obliges us to declare the inadmissibility of the action for positive prescription (prescripción positiva), for the purpose of acquiring the alleged agrarian possession over the property registered under the real folio system with the registration number Placa11547. It should be noted that this is a public domain asset, which precludes any right of possession and also does not meet the requirements of possession, neither civil nor agrarian.

**XI.- OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RECOGNITION OF IMPROVEMENTS (MEJORAS).-** Regarding the subsidiary claim, concerning the recognition of improvements, it is inadmissible, since the supposed acts of agrarian possession are not such, but rather, must be classified as an invasion of a public domain asset, that is, exercised without the consent or tolerance of the titleholder of the property (the Municipality of the Central Canton of Heredia), who, contrary to what was argued by the plaintiffs, exercised, since learning of the invasive acts, the powers of defense of the asset. And even though it is true that the petitioners may have erected fences, huts (ranches) (two) and even cultivated some fruit trees, plantain, coffee, cassava, and vegetables, these cannot be considered as "*improvements*" that could give rise to compensation; which is why it is appropriate to uphold the appealed judgment, insofar as it denied them, but for the reasons indicated in this ruling.

**XI.- OF COSTS (COSTAS).-** Finally, the plaintiffs request the award of procedural and personal costs against the respondent; a request that must also be denied, maintaining the award ordered by the Trial Judge, since the general rule is to award costs against the losing party, pursuant to the provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), as we are not in any of the exemption scenarios provided for in Article 98 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa).

**POR TANTO:** The alleged nullity is denied. The evidentiary offer for better resolution is denied. For the reasons given, the appealed judgment is upheld in all its extremes.-- ***Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes*** ***Nombre632*** ***Felipe A. Córdoba Ramírez*** *AMV* 2 Proceso Ordinario Nombre71036 , Nombre71021 , Nombre71040 , Nombre71023 , Nombre71024 , Nombre71025 y Nombre71026 Dirección7936/

No. 346-2008.

SECCIÓN SEGUNDA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Goicoechea, a las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del veinticuatro de octubre del dos mil ocho.

Proceso Ordinario Contencioso promovido por Nombre71020 , casado, misceláneo, con cédula de identidad número CED52967, Nombre71021 , agricultor, cédula número CED52968, Nombre71022 , soltero, comerciante, cédula CED52969, Nombre71023 , ama de casa, cédula de identidad número CED52970, Nombre71024 , rotulista, cédula CED52971, Nombre71025 , agricultor, cédula número CED52972 y Nombre71026 , pensionada, con cédula de identidad número CED52973; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DEL CANTÓN CENTRAL DE HEREDIA, representado por su Alcalde, Nombre4631 , divorciado, Magister en Administración de Negocios, cédula CED52974. Actúa como apoderado especial judicial de los actores Nombre71027 , abogado y notario, cédula número CED52975. Todos son mayores, vecinos de Heredia, y con las salvedades indicadas, casados.

RESULTANDO:

1.- Que fijada la cuantía de este asunto en la suma de diez millones de colones (por auto de las nueve horas catorce minutos del dos de noviembre del dos mil cuatro), con fundamento en los hechos expuestos y artículos 261, 277 a 281, 284, 286, 305, 207, 209, 317, 328, 332, 473, 484, 853 a 856, 860 del Código Civil, 287 del Código Procesal Civil y Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria y elenco probatario, es para que en sentencia se declare, como petitoria principal: "1. Que mis patrocinados ha poseido el inmueble que describe el croquis elaborado por el Ingeniero Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, y cumplido con los requisitos respectivos de una posesión decenal, en forma quieta, pública, pacífica ininterrumpida, a título de dueños y de buena fe, en esa virtud a operado la PRESCRIPCIÓN POSITIVA, o USUCAPION en su beneficio y operado la PRESCRIPCIÓN NEGATIVA en perjuicio de la Municipalidad de Heredia, pues esta nunca ha ejercido la posesión sobre el mismo. 2. Que se ordene inscribir el inmueble a nombre de mis poderdantes en el Registro Público, en partes iguales, acudiendo ellos después a la via (sic) respectiva, a segregar y localizar los derechos que a cada uno corresponde. Se ordenará al Registro aplicar la disminución en la Dirección7932 . 3. Se condene a la demandada al pago de ambas costas de este juicio." Y como pretensión subsidiaria, requiere "4. ... solicito a su Autoridad que de ser lo contrario a lo solicitado anteriormente se nos pague las mejoras necesarias y útiles efectuadas en el bien inmueble durante todo el plazo de posesión, según (sic) por la determinación hecha por un perito, más los respectivos intereses calculados a partir de la fecha de fijación hasta el respectivo pago. Todo lo cuál se hará de tal manera a previa (sic) a desalojar el inmueble. De admitirse esta petición subsidiaria también deberá condenarse en costas a la demandada." (Folios 81 y 82).

2.- Que la Municipalidad demandada contestó en forma negativa la acción, oponiendo para ello, la defensa previa de falta de competencia por la materia y el territorio, resuelta interlocutoriamente (por resolución número 1066-04, de las diez horas del veintisiete de agosto del dos mil cuatro, a folio 96 y 97); y las excepciones de falta de acción ad causam activa y pasiva, la falta de derecho y la genérica sine actione agit (folios 103 a 114).

3.- La Licenciada Sandra María Quesada Vargas, en aquél momento Juez del Juzgado de la materia, en sentencia número 426-2007, de las ocho horas del veintinueve de marzo del dos mil siete, resolvió: "POR TANTO Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de legitimación y falta de interés interpuestas por la Municipalidad de Heredia. Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho invocada por la Municipalidad demandada y consecuentemente se declara sin lugar en todos los extremos la presente acción. Son ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la parte actora." (Folios 289 y 290.)

4.- Inconforme con lo resuelto por el A-quo, los actores apelan, recurso que fue admitido (por auto de las once horas catorce minutos del doce de junio del dos mil siete, a folio 305); y en virtud del cual conoce este Tribunal en alzada.

5.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de rigor, sin que se noten causales de nulidad susceptibles de invalidar lo actuado.

Redacta la Juez Fernández Brenes; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- DE LA ALEGADA NULIDAD DE LA SENTENCIA DICTADA EN PRIMERA INSTANCIA.- En atención a que el personero de los actores alega la nulidad de la sentencia de primera instancia, por supuesta infracción del debido proceso, se procede a su análisis, previo al conocimiento de las apelaciones formuladas, como lo prevé el artículo 155 inciso 3) punto a) del Código Procesal Civil. Al respecto, cabe hacer dos advertencias de importancia. En primer lugar, se le indica a los apelantes que se está ante un proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo, no de orden agrario, en este caso, en razón de uno de los sujetos que intervienen en él, una municipalidad, ente descentralizado por el territorio, que tiene autonomía de gobierno, que está inserto en la organización de nuestro Estado (costarricense), al tenor de lo dispuesto en los artículos 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política, y por la pretensión, ya que precisamente se formuló esta demanda para que en sentencia se declarase la prescripción positiva (usucapión) en relación a un inmueble de una corporación local, y en su defecto, el reconocimiento de mejoras; circunstancia que obliga a aplicar las reglas del Derecho Público, comprendiendo tanto el Derecho de la Constitución como el Derecho Administrativo. Lo anterior implica que su tramitación se hizo conforme a las reglas procesales que rigen este tipo de acciones, sea, la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (por haberse interpuesto el quince de noviembre del dos mil dos) y las disposiciones pertinentes del Código Procesal Civil, conforme a lo dispuesto en el numeral 103 de la primera Ley; sin que resulten de pertinentes a este proceso, las reglas procesales de los procesos agrarios. Sobre este punto debe tenerse en cuenta que este asunto no cumple los presupuestos dispuestos en la Ley (de Jurisdicción Agraria, número 6734, del veintinueve de marzo de mil novecientos ochenta y dos) para que se se considere como de naturaleza agraria, por cuanto, no es un conflicto que se suscite con motivo de la aplicación de la legislación agraria, ni disposiciones jurídicas que regulan las actividades de producción, transformación, industrialización o enajenación de productos agrícolas (como lo prevé el artículo 1 del citado cuerpo legal), ya que los actores no tienen la condición de campesinos o trabajadores de la tierra, como lo exige el inciso a) del artículo 2 de la Ley de referencia. En segundo lugar, es innegable que los procesos agrarios tienen especiales connotaciones, que lo diferencian de los que se tramitan conforme a las regulaciones procesales civiles, en los que inclusive, se introdujo la oralidad. Al respecto, en sentencia número 3606-94, de las quince horas doce minutos del diecinueve de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, la Sala Constitucional indicó; "... al romper con el formalismo excesivo, con el criterio de igualdad formal de las partes y los grandes límites impuestos al Juez y a las personas de escasos recursos, elementos que caracterizan al proceso civil. Se parte, para este rechazo, de la idea de que tales elementos conllevan a la denegación de la justicia a quien la busca, ya que el proceso se convierte, en gran cantidad de casos, en un arma por medio de la cual se haga retardar el pronunciamiento judicial. Por ello, la respuesta del proceso agrario ha sido la de introducir simplificaciones procesales, para diseñar un proceso más rápido que tienda a garantizar una justicia pronta y cumplida, reflejada en términos cortos, en tramitación simple, en reducción de obstáculos legales para las partes que intervienen en el proceso, en eliminación de requisitos fiscales, y en el otorgamiento de amplios poderes al juez, tanto para la conducción del proceso hasta sentencia, como la referida a la administración y valoración de la prueba. En razón de lo anterior, el proceso agrario se convierte en un instrumento más humano para resolver los asuntos sometidos a conocimiento del juzgador, tanto en la tramitación del proceso - donde debe existir un contacto más estrecho entre las partes y el juez-, como en las garantías otorgadas a las partes para poder recurrir a la justicia, pudiendo recibir incluso el patrocinio legal gratuito cuando se trate de personas sin posibilidades de sufragar los gastos profesionales del mismo. Así, la especificidad del proceso agrario se encuentra constituida por dos factores fundamentales: por una parte el principio de oralidad en el que el proceso ha encontrado soporte institucional e ideológico para concebir su propia estructura conforme a las exigencias de la materia agraria, principio cuyas implicaciones se resumen en el dominio de la palabra como medio de expresión, sin excluir la escritura en la preparación y documentación, para que también se encuentre presente el principio de la inmediatez, la identidad del juzgador, la concentración y reforzamiento de los poderes del Juez, para poder conducir satisfactoriamente el juicio hacia la búsqueda de la verdad; y por otra parte el fenómeno de la publicización o socialización del derecho agrario y de su proceso, teniendo tres consecuencias inmediatas: 1.- la urgente necesidad de concebir un proceso moderno divorciado del tradicional -proceso civil-; 2.- declarar de interés público la búsqueda y declaración de la verdad, otorgándole al juez poderes suficientes en el proceso para que sea conductor y administrador, no sólo de los extremos que se discuten frente a sí, sino en modo especial, de la investigación para lograr que sus sentencias logren unir en forma estrecha la verdad real y la verdad legal; y 3.- socializar la justicia, para que todos los sujetos procesales puedan recurrir en un proceso menos formal y menos costoso, para que también las personas de escasos recursos puedan encontrar respuesta a sus necesidades.

De lo anterior se concluye que existe una orientación general dirigida hacia lineamientos específicos vinculados con la informalidad, la celeridad, la economia y humanización del proceso." Pero tales elementos no rigen los procesos contenciosos, los que, conforme a su normativa procesal, son de orden escrito. En virtud de lo anterior, esa sóla condición, hace que no haya infracción del alegado principio de inmediatez de la prueba, por cuanto el mismo tiene aplicación, únicamente respecto de los procesos orales, tal y como lo indicó nuestro Tribunal Constitucional, en sentencia 2007-1555, de las quince horas treinta y cuatro minutos del siete de febrero del dos mil siete:

"... Por último cabe advertir, que estas consideraciones se sustentan en el modelo de proceso diseñado por los legisladores –materia en la que hay discrecionalidad legislativa–, que por ser de carácter escrito, no rige el principio de inmediatez de la prueba –propio de los procesos orales–, en los que se exige que el juzgador que resuelve, sea el que a su vez reciba –a viva voz– la prueba que sustenta el proceso." En consecuencia, en tanto en este tipo de procesos (escrito), el juez que recibe directamente la prueba (en este caso, realiza el reconocimiento judicial) no está obligado a dictar la sentencia de fondo, no se evidencia ninguna irregularidad, lo que obliga a rechazar la nulidad alegada.

II.- DE LA OMISIÓN DE LA JUZGADORA DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA EN RESOLVER UN ALEGATO DE LA MUNICIPALIDAD, SIN QUE ELLO PRODUZCA NULIDAD DE LA SENTENCIA.- Dispone el citado artículo 155 inciso 3) punto a) del Código Procesal Civil, que en las sentencias de segunda instancia, debe realizarse un análisis de los defectos u omisiones procesales que merezcan corrección; exigencia que obliga a este Tribunal a hacer pronunciamiento respecto de una situación que, aún cuando no implica la nulidad de la sentencia, resulta pertinente su corrección. En efecto, en la resolución apelada, la Juez de Instancia hizo pronunciamiento de todos los extremos que comprendía la pretensión de los actores, es decir, la principal y la subsidiaria, rechanzando la demanda en todos los extremos. Sin embargo, omitió hacer pronunciamiento sobre un alegato de la Municipalidad demandada, concretamente el punto 4 que hiciera en el escrito de contestación, en el que requirió a la Autoridad Jurisdiccional:

"1. Se declaren con lugar las excepciones de falta de competencia, cosa juzgada, falta de derecho y de la legitimación activa y pasiva.

2. Los actores nunca cumplieron con los requirimientos legales posesorios agrarios como lo manifestó la misma Sala Constitucional en Voto 2002- 08822, eliminando así la posiblidad de discutir la eventual aplicación del instituto jurídico de la prescripción positiva a su favor. Asimismo, es de suma importancia indicar que el bien inmueble en discusión es de dominio público, por lo que está protegido por el fuero legal y constitucional por su naturaleza pública y que no puede ser objeto de propiedad privada, como lo respalda la misma Sala Constitucional. Por estas razones, debe declararse sin lugar la demanda ordinaria sin que exista deber de cancelarle ninguna mejoras (sic) y utilidades a los actores.

3. Se condene a los actores a las costas personales y procesales del proceso por litigar de mala fe.

4. Se ordene la cancelación de los planos inscritos en el Catastro Nacional, como segregaciones de finca propiedad municopal número 4-106304-000.

5. Solicitamos se rechace la medida precautoria, toda vez que la propiedad municipal como está demostrado y respaldado por la Sala Constitucional en el Voto 2002-08822, tiene la obligación de actuar en defensa de ocupaciones precarias sobre bienes públicos municipales como el caso en marras." (folios 111 y 112).

Al respecto, se estima que no se está frente a un problema de incongruencia de la sentencia, que consiste "... en la falta de relación entre lo pedido y lo resuelto, relativamente a las partes, al objeto o a la causa; ésta la constituyen los hechos.- No se da entonces la incongruencia por las contradicciones que puedan resultar por ejemplo entre los hechos probados o no probados y los pronunciamientos, o entre éstos y las apreciaciones de fondo; en tal situación lo más que podría hacer sería una defectuosa motivación del fallo, que es cuestión de otra índole, concretamente del recurso de casación por el fondo, por error de hecho o de derecho en la apreciación de la prueba.- Dicho de otro modo, no hay incongruencia entre las consideraciones de la sentencia y lo resuelto en la parte dispositiva. Finalmente, la sentencia puede otorgar todo lo pedido, como denegarlo todo, y si puede esto último, con igual o mayor razón puede conceder sólo una parte, y en ninguno de esos casos se incurre en incongruencia; ésta se daría si se otorgara más de lo pedido o fuera de lo pedido, que es lo que se denomina ultra petita y extra petita" (sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia número 35-91, de las quince horas del veintidós de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y uno).

Nótese que en el caso, no hubo contrademanda, de manera que no era objeto de la litis el análisis de la cancelación o no de los planos catastrados segregados de la propiedad Placa11544 inscritos en el Castrasto Nacional, sino únicamente si procedía o no la declaratoria de la usucapión y/o mejoras requeridas por los actores. Es más, en el libelo en que formuló el alegato de conclusiones, el Alcalde de la municipalidad demandada no hizo mención alguna a este extremo. Ahora bien, la improcedencia de lo requerido -por no ser parte de la litis, y en tanto, un pronunciamiento sobre este extremo amerita más bien un proceso ordinario diferente-, más aún y cuando exista dicha omisión, ello no se traduce en nulidad del fallo, al no causar lesión o infracción del debido proceso y derecho de defensa. Se aclara además, que no resulta cierto que la Municipalidad haya formulado la excepción de cosa juzgada como defensa previa, ni como excepción de fondo.

III.- DE LA PRUEBA OFRECIDA PARA MEJOR PROVEER.- En su escrito de apelación, requieren los actores que se ordene como prueba para mejor resolver una de orden pericial, de manera que se nombre un perito topográfico con la finalidad de situar el inmueble propiedad de la Municipalidad de Heredia y el que es objeto de esta litis (que se pretende usucapir), por estimar que no se ha aportado prueba idónea que demuestre que el que ocupa este proceso pertenece a esa entidad local. Sobre este punto, es importante anotar que en los libelos de interposición y formalización de la demanda, se ofreció esta prueba, y a tal efecto, mediante auto de las catorce horas treinta y un minutos del siete de marzo del dos mil cinco, el Juzgado la admitió, nombrándose al perito Nombre37177 . Ahora bien, el mismo resultó ser un perito matemático, quien rindió su informe el tres de mayo del dos mil cinco (folios 236 a 240), sin que la parte actora lo objetara ni hiciera advertencia alguna, con lo cual, admitió la pericia y su contenido. Asimismo, al tenor del artículo 331 del Código Procesal Civil, se constituye en una prerrogativa (facultad) para el juez superior, el requerir prueba para mejor resolver, en tanto ello dependerá de la valoración que haga de las probanzas existentes, en cada caso. Con lo cual, se rechaza la misma, por estimarse que no es necesaria, ya que existen suficientes elementos de juicio en el expediente para sustentar la decisión.

IV.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- Para una mejor comprensión de los hechos tenidos por probados, se sustituyen los que la Juez de Instancia determinó, por existir una serie de omisiones en su consignación, para que se tengan de la siguiente manera: 1.) Que el inmueble del partido de Heredia inscrito en el Registro Nacional en el sistema de folio real, en el Partido de Heredia, con la matrícula Placa11545, cuya naturaleza es finca para construir, situado en el cantón 01 Heredia, Dirección7933 , que linda al Norte con calle, al Sur con el IMAS, al Este con calle y al Oeste con calle, con una cabida de treinta y cuatro mil doscientos sesenta y cuatro metros con dos decímetros cuadrados, con plano catastrado número Placa11546, es propiedad de la Municipalidad de Heredia (certificación literal, a folio 05); 2.) Que esa titularidad aparece inscrita en el Registro Público de la propiedad desde el veinticuatro de febrero de mil novecientos ochenta y cuatro (certificación literal, a folio 05); 3.) Que el plano de catasto número Placa11546 no responde al estado en que se encuentra actualmente la finca Placa11544, ya que del costado sur del río Pirro, se segregó un lote de diez mil cincuenta y ocho metros cuadrados con ochenta y un decímetros cuadrados, que se registró en plano castrado número H-633366-1986, el cual se traspasó al Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, para destinarlo a la construcción del proyecto habitacional Palacios Universitarios (oficio DC-00145-2002, del quince de julio del dos mil dos, del Jefe de Catrastro de la Municipalidad de Heredia, Nombre71028 , a folio 8 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 4.) Que en ese inmueble la Municipalidad del cantón Central de Heredia construyó su nuevo plantel y además es utilizado por esa localidad para depositar para botar basura y escombros (oficio DIM 0969-2002, del veinte de agosto del dos mil dos, emitido por el ingeniero municipal, José René Mayorga Angulo, a folios 53 y 52 del tomo 3 del expediente administrativo, y testimonios de Nombre71029 y Nombre71030 , folio 232, 233 del principal); 5.) Que en oficio DC- 00145-2002, del quince de julio del dos mil dos, el Jefe de Catastro de la municipalidad de Heredia comunica al Director Operativo de la corporación, que desde el siete de mayo del dos mil dos, catrastan el plano H-787226-2002, con un área de quinientos ochenta y cinco metros cuadrados, a nombre de Nombre71022 , y el doce de junio del mismo año, el plano catastrado H-796074-2002, a nombre de Nombre71031 , ambos en calidad de poseedor; instrumentos de los que deriva que existen más personas ubicadas en el inmueble 4-106304-000, en razón de que los colindantes son Nombre71032 , Nombre71033 , Nombre71034 y Nombre71021 , motivo por el que debe gestionarse la anulación de los mismo, en razón de la titularidad municipal sobre la finca (folio 8 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 6.) Que sobre dicho inmueble, los actores han ejercido una ocupación, manifestada en la construcción de cercas divisorias de alambre de púas, latas de zinc y otros materiales, limpieza del lote, cultiva de algunas matas de maíz, café, plátano y árboles frutales y levantado dos construcciones de madera (ranchos) con techo de zin, piso de cemento, sin paredes, en regular estado de conservación (reconocimiento judicial, a folios 224 y 225 del principal; testimonios de Nombre71029 , Nombre71030 y Nombre71035 , folio 232, 233 y 234 del principal; y oficio DIM 0969-2002, del veinte de agosto del dos mil dos, emitido por el ingeniero municipal, José René Mayorga Angulo, a folios 53 y 52 del tomo 3 del expediente administrativo); 7.) Que en el año dos mil dos, los actores contrataron al ingeniero Luis Fernando Araya para que levantara un croquis de la división formal de los ocupantes de dicho inmueble, en el que claramente se registra que la propiedad es de la Municipalidad de Heredia (hecho no controvertido por las partes, plano visible a folio 1 del principal; y oficio DIM 0969-2002, del veinte de agosto del dos mil dos, emitido por el ingeniero municipal, José René Mayorga Angulo, a folios 53 y 52 del tomo 3 del expediente administrativo); 8.) Que el veintinueve de julio del dos mil dos, un grupo de vecinos de la localidad plantearon una queja ante la Municipalidad de Heredia, alegando que la propiedad indicada supra, y propiedad de la Municipalidad demandada, había sido invadida y estaba siendo utilizada por algunas personas, lo cual atentaba contra la seguridad y tranquilidad de los vecinos de ese sector (folios 143 a 41 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo, 6 a 14 del tomo 3 del expediente administrativo); 9.) Que en respuesta a la queja vecinal formulada, el nueve de agosto del dos mil dos, la municipalidad de Heredia inició labores de eliminación de las cercas divisorias, sin completar el trabajo (pficio DIM 0988-2002, del veinticinco de agosto del dos mil dos, a folio 26 del tomo 3 del expediente administrativo y hecho primero del recurso de amparo formulado por los actores, folio 89 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 10.) Que el nueve de agosto del dos mil dos, Nombre71036 y Nombre71021 , interpusieron recurso de amparo ante la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el cual se tramitó bajo expediente número 02-006638-0007-CO, en contra de la Municipalidad de Heredia, alegando posesión sobre la finca perteneciente a ese municipio, desde el año de mil novecientos ochenta y seis (folios 89 a 82 y 110 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 11.) Que dicho recurso de amparo fue declarado sin lugar mediante sentencia número 2002-08822, de las dieciséis horas treinta y un minutos del diez de setiembre del dos mil dos, por estimar dicho Tribunal que la actuación de la recurrida era debida, en manifestación de las potestadas de defensa que tiene esa corporación local, tratándose de un bien de dominio público (folios 110 a 107 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 12.) Que este proceso fue interpuesto en estrados, ante el Juzgado Agrario de Heredia, el quince de noviembre del dos mil dos(sello de recibido y escrito de presentación, a folios 1 a 16 del principal); 13.) Que mediante resolución de las ocho horas del dieciséis de enero del dos mil tres, la Alcaldesa de Heredia le previno a Nombre71020 , Nombre71021 , Nombre71037 , que por invadir parcialmente el inmueble de esa corporación, inscrito a folio real con matrícula número Placa11545, debían desalojarlo en el plazo improrrogable de setenta y dos horas el desalojo a partir de la notificación de esa decisión, la cual les fue notificada a los interesados el diecisiete de enero siguiente (folio 83 y 85 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 14.) Que mediante escrito once de febrero del dos mil tres, el Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Heredia, solicita al Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, iniciar procedimiento de desalojo administrativo contra Nombre71020 , Nombre71021 , Nombre71037 y Nombre71038 , todos en su condición de ocupantes del inmueble de su propiedad inscrito bajo matrícula de folio real número Placa11544 (ver folios 118 a 112 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); 15.) Que dicho procedimiento culminó con el dictado de la resolución número 1016-2003 D.M., de las catorce horas del diez de marzo del dos mil tres, dictada por el Despacho del señor Ministro de Seguridad Pública, en la cual se acogió la gestión municipal presentada y se autorizó proceder al respectivo desalojo por parte de la autoridad policial encargada, dando de previo a los ocupantes un plazo de cuarenta y ocho horas para desocupar el inmueble voluntariamente (ver folios 130 y 129 del tomo I del expediente administrativo); 16.) Que mediante oficio DIM- 1108-2004, del veintisiete de julio del dos mil cuatro, el topógrafo e ingeniero de la municipalidad demandada informan a la Directora de Asuntos Jurídicos que, realizada una nueva visita a la finca constantan que la misma se mantiene invadida y con cercas, lo que es constatable a simple vista, en atención a que los linderos del inmueble se encuentran bien definidos (costado oeste la Urbanización Bernardo Benavides y costado sur el río Pirro), de lo que se sacan fotografías (folios 212 a 208 del tomo 1 del expediente administrativo); y, 17.) Que el veintinueve de agosto del dos mil uno, Nombre71031 , mayor, casado, chef de cocina, con cédula de identidad número CED52976, vecino de Dirección7934 , cede los derechos litigiosos del proceso ordinario tramitado en expediente 02-160155-638-AG, lo cual se puso en conocimiento al Despacho hasta el tres de marzo del dos mil cinco, cesión que fue admitida por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera, por resolución número 294-2006, de las diez horas diez minutos del cuatro de agosto del dos mil seis (folios 137, 138, 181 y 182 del principal).

II.HECHOS NO PROBADOS. Se sustituye el elenco de hechos tenidos por no probados que la Juez de Instancia determinó, teniéndose como tales -por carecer los autos de material probatorio idóneo en el cual sustentarlos-, y que resultan de trascendencia para la resolución de este asunto, los siguiente: 1.) Que los accionantes sean campesinos o se dediquen a actividades agrícolas; 2.) Que los actores hubiesen ocupado parte del inmueble 4-106304-000 desde mil novecientos ochenta y seis; 3.) Que los actores tengan sembradas alrededor de cinco mil matas de café y cultivos varios en el inmueble propiedad de la Municipalidad de Heredia que vienen ocupando; 4.) Que se procediera a la ejecución del desalojo administrativo autorizado mediante resolución No. 1016-2003 de las 14:00 horas del 10 de marzo del 2003 emitida por parte del Ministro de Seguridad Pública; 5.) Que dentro del inmueble en cuestión se hubieran realizado algunas mejoras necesarias y útiles por parte de los actores; 6.) Que los actores hubieran realizado el trámite de información posesoría para inscribir a su nombre el inmueble que intentan usucapir; y 7.) Que los actores tengan título traslativo de dominio sobre el inmueble que reclaman la prescripción positiva del derecho de propiedad.

VI.- DE LOS AGRAVIOS DE LA ACTORA.- El personero de los actores alega la nulidad de la sentencia número número 426-2007, de las ocho horas del veintinueve de marzo del dos mil siete, dictada por el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, por estimar que se ha infringido del debido proceso en materia agraria, al dejarse a sus representados en "un absoluto total estado de indefensión", al desconocer el principio de inmediatez de la prueba, lo que se evidencia con las contradicciones claras respecto de la prueba -testimonial, documental- pericial- rendida en primera instancia, y que ha hecho incurrir al A-quo en error; y formula recurso de apelación, por las siguientes razones: a.) que ha habido errónea interpretación y valoración de las probanzas existententes, al realizar un análisis superficial de la prueba pericial, al omitir sustentarse en los testimonios rendidos y de trascendencia para la resolución de este asunto y restarle importancia al reconocimiento judicial, de la que se desprende la actividad agraria desplegada y los hechos tenidos por no prabdos en la resolución recurrida; b.) no valorar que la finca 106.304-000 en nada coincide con el área que ha sido poseída por sus representados, ya que las medidas no coinciden, en tanto la primera tiene una extensión de mil cuatrocientos cinco metros cuadrados con diez decímetros cuadrados, y ellos han ocupado treinta y cuatro mil doscientos sesenta y cuatro metros cuadrados con dos decímetros cuadrados; c.) que la Municipalidad demandada no ha demostrado que el inmueble ocupado sea de su propiedad, por falta de prueba idónea, a falta de plano catastrado, lo que hace evidente la necesidad de un estudio pormenorizado, a efecto de dilucidar este punto; d.) que la sentencia se limitó a hacer un análisis de la institución de los bienes de dominio público, no obstante tratarse de un proceso ordinario agrario, residenciándose en un matiz exclusivamente del Derecho Administrativo, obviando las características de la usucapión en el Derecho Agrario (folios 300 a 304). Por ello reclama que se revoque la sentencia apelada, y se declare con lugar la demanda opuesta, condenándose en costas a la Municipalidad del cantón Central de Heredia.

VII.- DE LA TITULARIDAD DEL LOTE SOBRE EL QUE SE ALEGA LA POSESIÓN.- Alegan los actores que no se ha aportado prueba idónea para determinar que el lote objeto de esta litis es propiedad de la Municipalidad demanda, por no corresponder las áreas, de lo que se pretende usucapir con la registrada. Sin embargo, discrepa este Tribunal de tal afirmación, por cuanto, de las probanzas aportadas al expediente -croquis levantado por el ingeniero Luis Fernando Araya Rodríguez, planos catastratos número H-370888-79 (a folios 1 y 2 del principal), así como de estudio registral realizados por el ingeniero de la municipalidad (oficio DIM 0969-2002, del veinte de agosto del dos mil dos, emitido por el ingeniero municipal, José René Mayorga Angulo, a folios 53 y 52 del tomo 3 del expediente administrativo), y las constancias de las visitas de campo realizadas por personeros de esa corporación (oficio DIM-1108- 2004, del veintisiete de julio del dos mil cuatro), se denota con absoluta claridad que los actores invadieron parte de una propiedad de la demandada. Lo anterior es de absoluto conocimiento de los aquí gestionantes, por cuanto les fue denegado un recurso de amparo que formularon (dos de los aquí actores) contra los actos de defensa ejercidos por la Municipalidad titular, y en el propio libelo de presentación y de formalización de esta demanda, expresamente requieren a la Autoridad Jurisdiccional, "2- Que se ordene inscribir el inmueble usucapido a nombre de mis ponderdantes en el Registro Público, en partes iguales, acudiendo ellos después a la vía respectiva a segregar y localizar los derechos que a cada uno corresponde. Se ordenará al Registro aplicar la disminución de cabida en la finca CIENTO SEIS MIL TRESCIENTOS CUATRO." Además, llevan razón los funcionarios de la corporación recurrida en afirmar que los linderos de la finca son fácilmente definidos; así, en atención a la forma del lote que se demarca en el plano catastrado número H-370888-79 sin lugar a dudas se deduce que el croquis con las porciones de las ocupaciones, elaborado por el ingeniero Nombre71039 , y que se intentó catastrar, es parte de la finca que se registra en el plano indicado.

VIII.- DEL RÉGIMEN DE DEMANIALIDAD.- La Juez de Instancia denegó el reconocimiento de la prescripción positiva (usucapión) en relación con la ocupación que efectuaran los actores sobre la finca inscrita en el sistema de folio real, con la matrícula número Placa11544, en razón de su condición de demanialidad, al ser propiedad de la Municipalidad del cantón Central de Heredia. Sobre este punto resulta importante clarificar el concepto, por no ser puntual el dado en el fallo que se revisa, y da lugar a confusión. En efecto, por demaniales o dominicales deben de entenderse el conjunto de bienes –tanto inmuebles como muebles– que tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico virtualmente opuesto a los privados, en tanto por expresa voluntad del constituyente o el legislador, se encuentran afectos a un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, sea al interés público, y que por ello, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada ni de posesión, de modo que están fuera del comercio de los hombres, es decir, no pueden pertenecer individualmente a los particulares, ni al Estado –en sentido estricto–, por cuanto éste se limita a su administración y tutela. Así, necesariamente deben distinguirse los bienes de dominio público y los de dominio privado del Estado (fiscales), precisamente en razón de su finalidad, en tanto lo que define la naturaleza jurídica de los primeros es el destino que se da a este tipo de bienes, sea, en tanto se afectan y están al servicio del uso público, en los términos previstos en el artículo 261 del Código Civil. (En este sentido, consultar las sentencias número 5399-93, 3145-96, 5027-97, 2988-99, 2000-10466, 2002-8321; 2003-3480; 2005-7158 de la Sala Constitucional.) Entran en esta categoría –sin que se constituya en una lista cerrada– la zona marítimo terrestre, el patrimonio forestal o natural del Estado –áreas protegidas– (conformado por parques nacionales, reservas forestales, reservas biológicas, zonas protectoras, refugios de vida silvestre, humedales y monumentos naturales –artículo 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, número 7554, de dieciocho de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco–), las zonas de protección hidrográfica –artículo 33 de la Ley Forestal– (contíguas a los manantiales, a las riveras de los ríos y lagos), las zonas limítrofes (artículo 10 de la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos, número 13, de diez de enero de mil novecientos treinta y nueve), el derecho de vía, las líneas ferroviarias, las reservas indígenas, el patrimonio histórico-arquitectónico, los recursos mineros, el patrimonio arqueológico, los parques y zonas verdes, etc. Al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 261 del Código Civil (afectación legal), se trata de bienes que su vocación y destino, en tanto "están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregas al uso público", están fuera del comercio de los hombres, por lo que son inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables; de manera que no es posible su dominio o posesión, ni a título gratuito ni oneroso; no pueden perderse por prescripción, así como tampoco, ganarse por usucapión, de modo que conservan su vigencia jurídica permanentemente; y no son susceptibles de embargo, en los términos del Derecho Civil; además de que están sujetos al poder de policía, en lo atinente a su aprovechamiento y uso, ya que su uso privativo está condicionado al otorgamiento de las respectivas licencias y permisos y al control y fiscalización de parte la Administración; y la Administración ostenta poderes suficientes para su recuperación, sin necesidad de acudir a la vía jurisdiccional, ni siquiera a un procedimiento administrativo, por no existir de parte del "ocupante" ningún derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo, de manera que la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para su restitución. Por ello, el régimen jurídico de los bienes de dominio público es especial y diferenciado, precisamente en atención al tipo de bienes de que se trata. La distinción entre bienes o cosas privadas y bienes y cosas públicas se hace depender, en primer lugar, en la "titularidad" o "dominio" del bien, por cuanto de este elemento se define su naturaleza y régimen jurídico diferenciados; y en consecuencia, del derecho aplicable, en tanto el primero se sujeta al derecho privado, y el segundo al derecho público. Así, el régimen patrio de los bienes de dominio público, los coloca fuera del comercio de los hombres y por ello los permisos que se otorguen serán siempre a título precario y revocables por la Administración, unilateralmente, cuando razones de necesidad o de interés general así lo requieran, para la preservación del uso natural de la cosa pública. En virtud de lo cual, no resulta posible la infracción o lesión del derecho de propiedad, consagrado en el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política, por tratarse de un régimen jurídico totalmente diverso, donde la ley lo que hace es establecer condiciones mediante las que es posible el uso y disfrute por parte de los particulares. Así, quien pretenda por medios no autorizados ejercer un uso privativo de esa zona tendrá vedada la posibilidad de consumarlo, pues es aceptable también, desde tiempo inmemorial, que se trata de bienes imprescriptibles en favor de particulares y que están fuera del comercio, principios recogidos en el numeral 261 y 262 del Código Civil, que data de mil ochocientos ochenta y seis.

IX.- DE LA NATURALEZA JURÍDICA DEL INMUEBLE DEL INMUEBLE SOBRE EL QUE SE ALEGA LA POSESIÓN AGRARIA.- Lleva razón la Juez de Instancia en afirmar que tratándose de bienes de dominio público no resulta posible ni legítima ningún tipo de posesión, y la que se ejerza, no puede generar derecho alguno en favor del ocupante. Sin embargo, según lo indicado por la doctrina y la jurisprudencia -indicada en el Considerando anterior- resulta imposible dotar de la condición de demanialidad únicamente en razón del elemento subjetivo del titular del bien, sea, cuando se trate de sujetos del Derecho Público. Así, el criterio que debe usarse es el del destino o vocación del bien, esto es, para uso de la colectividad o para la prestación de un servicio público, elemento que se cumple a cabalidad en este caso, ya que la finca sobre la que se alega la posesión agraria, a efecto de que se declare la prescripción positiva (usucapión), es, no sólo propiedad de la Municipalidad de Heredia (según se determinó en el Considerando VII.- de esta sentencia), sino además, en él está ubicado el plantel de ese gobierno local, precisamente para cumplir los fines encomendados por mandato constitucional en su numeral 169, sea, "la administración de los intereses y servicios locales"; y además, el mismo ha sido utilizado como botadero de basura, según lo declararon los testimonios rendidos al expediente. Así, por tratarse de un bien de dominio público, no existe por parte de los particulares un derecho de posesión, de manera que la posesión -como atributo del derecho de posesión- sólo puede ser ejercida por los entes titulares del derecho, sin que ningún sujeto privado pueda legalmente reclamar actos posesorios, salvo que éstos se hayan efectuado antes de que la institución pública adquieriera la propiedad, y únicamente para efectos de una eventual indemnización, lo que no sucede en la especie, en que se demostró que la Municipalidad es titular de la Dirección7935 desde el veinticuatro de febrero de mil novecientos ochenta y cuatro, y la supuesta posesión (ocupación o mejor dicho invasión), es a partir de mil novecientos ochenta y seis.

X.- DE LA ALEGADA POSESIÓN AGRARIA.- Tal y como se indicó en el Considerando anterior, la naturaleza demanial del inmueble que se pretende usucapir, haría innecesario mayor análisis en torno a la alegada posesión agraria, por cuanto figura como requisito para la prescripción positiva del derecho de propiedad, la naturaleza del bien,es decir, que sea "cosa hábil", lo que implica que debe ser susceptible de propiedad privada, y en tal condición, que esté en el comercio de los hombres; exigencia, que se ha dicho, no se cumple en este caso. No obstante lo anterior, en razón de que se alega que no hubo mayor análisis sobre este extremo en la sentencia recurrida, se estima pertinente hacer varias observaciones, que nos llevan a constatar que, aún y cuando no se tratarare de un bien de dominio público, tampoco sería procedente -en este caso-, reconocer la usucapión pedida. En efecto, en primer lugar, debe hacerse la advertencia que no se está ante un presupuesto en que deba aplicarse la legislación agraria, sino más bien la de orden civil, por no tener vocación agrícola la finca -en el registro-, y no haberle dado ese destino los actores. La demanda es formulada sobre la base de que se trata de una posesión agraria, y en tal virtud, han ejercido actos de posesión de esa naturaleza. Sin embargo, de las pruebas aportadas al expediente, es dable concluir, que aún cuando es lo cierto que los ocupantes (aquí actores) han realizado algunos cultivos -de yuca, maíz, café, plátano y árboles frutales, pero los mismos no cumplen las condiciones dispuestas en la normativa para considerarlas como de subsistencia, más bien, como bien lo afirma en sus diversas oportunidades el personero de la municipalidad recurrida, parece que se trata de la extensión de los terrenos de los ocupantes, que curiosamente son todos colindantes con el inmueble en discusión, y a tal efecto levantaron cercas divisorias de alambre de púas, latas de zinc y otros materiales, hicieron limpieza del lote, y al menos, en dos de esas "fracciones", levantaron construcciones de madera (ranchos) con techo de zin, piso de cemento, sin paredes, en regular estado de conservación; valoraciones que impiden a este Tribunal darle a esta ocupación, el carácter de agrario. Sobre este punto, es importante hacer varias observaciones de importancia. Debe recordarse que "X. La usucapión especial agraria es un instituto típico del Derecho Agrario, como también lo son la empresa, los contratos, la propiedad y la posesión agraria. Sus elementos devienen de un particular régimen normativo, por ello adquiere rasgos diferenciales de la misma usucapión civil. Su fundamento está en el principio general del Derecho agrario conocido como la función económico y social de la propiedad agraria. Como se sabe éste se desdobla en dos: uno subjetivo, de orden económico, referido a la obligación del propietario de producir, mejorar y respetar el ambiente, y otro objetivo, de orden social, consistente en la obligación del Estado de dotar de propiedad a quienes, teniendo capacidad y conocimiento para producir, no la tengan o la tengan insuficientemente. Este último aspecto se encuentra consagrado en la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos al expresar "Toda persona tiene derecho a la propiedad privada correspondiente a las necesidades esenciales de una vida decorosa, que contribuya a mantener la dignidad de la persona y del hogar", y también en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José así: "Toda persona tiene derecho al uso y goce de sus bienes. La ley puede subordinar tal uso y goce al interés social". Se trata del derecho humano a la propiedad y no solo el derecho de propiedad. Se procura, como uno de los derechos humanos económicos y sociales, garantizar el "acceso" a ella." (Sentencia número 68-94, de las de las catorce horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del dieciséis de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.)

Así, la estructura del derecho de propiedad agraria se encuentra integrado por deberes especiales, y en un modo particular de ejercer las facultades inherentes de la propiedad, en tanto su titular está obligado a destinarlo a la actividad agrícola, que precisamente sustenta su existencia, tal y como lo indicó nuestro Tribunal Constitucional en sentencia número 2000-9119, de las quince horas catorce minutos del diecisiete de octubre del dos mil:

"III.- Sobre el derecho.- La propiedad agraria, determinada en este caso por su forma de adquisición a través de los mecanismos dispuestos en la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, se identifica por las obligaciones a cargo del propietario de ejercer actos de posesión en cumplimiento de la función social de su derecho. Propiedad y posesión se encuentran entonces en una relación tal que la primera no puede ser conceptualizada sin la concurrencia de la segunda, de formal tal que, sin que la propiedad se desnaturalice como derecho subjetivo, su titular asume una serie de obligaciones en el ejercicio de su derecho. El Estado, atendiendo no sólo a ese carácter diferenciante de la propiedad agraria, sino enmarcado además dentro de la concepción de Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho que rige a nuestro país, reconocido en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, ha dispuesto a través de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización un procedimiento específicos de adquisición de este derecho con el afán de promover el aumento gradual de la productividad de la propiedad de la tierra, para una justa distribución de su producto y a efectos de elevar la condición social del campesino, haciéndolo partícipe del desarrollo de la Nación (artículo 1 de la citada Ley). Desde esta perspectiva, quienes adquieran algún derecho a través de los mecanismos así dispuestos, contraen la obligación, vistas las anteriores consideraciones, de ejercer sobre el fundo adquirido actos posesorios agrarios, entendidos estos aquellos dirigidos a poner en producción el fundo en forma eficiente." Con lo cual, dentro de ese conjunto de normas regulatorias que pesan sobre la propiedad agraria, está prevista -de manera ineludible- la relativa al destino del fundo que se adjudica, en tanto exite una carga sobre ella para que la misma se dedique a la actividad agraria; que en los casos de titulación de tierras a cargo del Instituto de Desarrolo Agrario faculta para la revocatoria o extinción de la adjudicación –artículo 68 inciso 4 punto a)–, o ser objeto de expropiación por el Estado, como lo faculta el artículo 144 de la misma Ley; y en los supuestos en que se alegue la usucapión, la improcedencia de la gestión, en tanto la normativa exige actos posesorios "estables y efectivos" con la finalidad de ponerlo en condiciones de producción para la subsistencia personal o familiar, sobre un terreno inscrito a nombre de un tercero en el Registro Público de la Propiedad (artículo 92 de la citada Ley 2825). Así, el poseedor en precario, cuando tiene más de diez años de poseer, adquiere su propiedad a través de una adquisición originaria, y correlativamente, se extingue el derecho del propietario registral en esa área; principio registral que es propio tanto del derecho civil como del derecho agrario, y corresponde en general a las formas de adquirir los derechos reales; así, tratándose del poseedor en precario, encuentra su regulación en la citada Ley 2825 en lo dispuesto en el tercer párrafo del artículo 92: "Los poseedores en precario que tengan posesión decenal en las condiciones enunciadas en el párrafo anterior, podrán inscribir su derecho de acuerdo con lo establecido en esta Ley por el procedimiento de información posesoria." Y, en segundo lugar, no cumple los requisitos dispuestos para conceder el derecho de la usucapión, no hay título traslativo, buena fe, posesión decenal en calidad de dueño, quieta, pública y pacífica. En efecto, ya la jurisprudencia emanada de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (así, entre otras, se pueden consultar las sentencias número 19-93, de las catorce horas del siete de abril de mil novecientos noventa y tres, 451996, del veintidós de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y seis, 50-98, de las quince horas veinte minutos del veinte de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, 0001-F-99, de las catorce horas del seis de enero de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, 978-F-2001, de las dieciséis horas treinta minutos del doce de diciembre del dos mil uno, y, 134-F-2005, de las diez horas diez minutos del diez de marzoo del dos mil cinco), ha señalado que en aplicación de lo dispuesto en los artículos 853, 856 y 860 del Código Civil, son requisitos ineludibles para adquirir la propiedad por prescripción positiva (usucapión), el título traslativo de dominio, la buena fe, y la posesión a título de dueño, contínua, pública, pacífica y decenal; y tratándose de la posesión en precario de la tierra, a diferencia de la usucapión civil, en los artículos 92 y 101 de la citada Ley de Tierras y Colonización (ITCO-IDA), número 2825, y sus reformas, en razón del reconocimiento expreso de la función social que se le reconoce a la propiedad, sustentada en la necesidad del campesino de adquirir su medio de subsistencia, no se exige la acreditación del título traslativo de dominio, pues el título es la misma posesión manifestada a traves de los actos posesorios. Lo anterior significa que en determinados casos, al simple hecho de la posesión a través del tiempo y ejercido en las demás condiciones requeridas, la ley lo convierte en derecho de posesión, que cuando se tiene poco tiempo será un derecho débil o más o menos provisional, pero que a medida que el tiempo aumenta se hace más fuerte y se consolida, configurando así un título hábil para poseer y adquirir la propiedad, aunque no exista el título traslativo de dominio de que se ha hablado, lo que se ajusta a la moderna orientación sobre los derechos de propiedad y posesión, a igual que existe la tendencia. Ahora bien, como en la especie no se está frente a una posesión agraria, se exigen todos los requisitos señalados para la usucapión civil. En cuanto al primero (título traslativo de dominio), debe recordarse que "En nuestra legislación la expresión "título" tiene varias acepciones: la primera, cuando sirve para expresar la causa o fundamento de una atribución patrimonial y en tal sentido se usa en los artículos 853 y 854 del Código Civil. La segunda para designar el documento en que se contiene la atribución, como cuando el artículo 459 dice que en el Registro de la Propiedad se inscribirán los títulos de dominio sobre inmuebles, y la tercera para determinar la naturaleza o alcance de la atribución patrimonial, por ejemplo al decir el Código de Familia que no son gananciales los bienes adquiridos a título gratuito (art. 41). Cuando los artículos 853 y 854 hablan de título traslativo de dominio o de justo título usan la expresión como causa o fundamento de la adquisición. La noción de justo título tiene sus antecedentes en la iusta causa possidendi del Derecho Romano clásico, en virtud de la cual se requirió que el usucapiente adquiera la posesión a base de una relación con el poseedor precedente, apta para justificar la adquisición de la posesión misma, no habiendo seguido la adquisición de la propiedad sólo por falta de requisitos formales en el acto de la transmisión o por falta del derecho en el propio transferente". (Sentencia número 113- 1981, de las quince horas quince minutos del doce de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y uno.)

Con lo cual, en sentido amplio, título es pues la causa jurídica en que se funda un derecho. En la usucapión ordinaria (del derecho civil), se exige justo título traslativo de dominio, el que se ha entendido como concretamente como un negocio jurídico con quien anteriormente tenía la cosa, en virtud del cual el poseedor actual adquiere el bien del poseedor anterior. Por ello se dice que el poseedor tiene la cosa porque se la vendieron, se la regalaron, etc., de ahí que también se expresa que la compraventa, la donación y la herencia, son entre otros, títulos hábiles para adquirir y poseer. Es evidente que en el caso en estudio, los actores carecen de dicho título traslativo de dominio, motivo por el que entienden estos juzgadores que intentaron sustentar su demanda en la alegada posesión agraria. La buena fe es un requisito subjetivo relacionado con la creencia del adquirente de estar asistido por el derecho de la posesión ejercida, elemento que evidentemente no se cumple en la especie, por cuanto los accionantes tienen pleno conocimiento que registralmente la propiedad pertenece a la Municipalidad del cantón Central de Heredia, y que la misma es de naturaleza demanial, al tenor de lo declarado por la propia Sala Constitucional en su fallo 2002- 8822. Es más, se constata que con posterioridad de ese pronunciamiento, que los actos de invasión se mantienen, inclusive, a la fecha en que se rindieron los testimonios que constan en autos. No cumple tampoco las características de la posesión, ya que no se sabe con certeza absoluta la fecha de la ocupación, ya que para este Tribunal no son convicentes las declaraciones testimoniales rendidas al efecto en el expediente, lo que conlleva que no es posible corroborar que la posesión fuese decenal. Tampoco es posible sostener que los actos de ocupación hayan sido en calidad de dueño, quieta, pública y pacífica, por cuanto desde el momento en que la Municipalidad demandada tuvo conocimiento de la invasión, se avocó a su recuperación, primero mediante actuaciones materiales y directas, al derribar parcialmente las cercas divisorias que habían levantado los actores, e iniciar el procedimiento de desalojo administrativo ante el Ministerio de Gobernación, una vez que la Sala Constitucional declaró que se trataba de un bien de dominio público, a nombre de la corporación local. Resulta también importante valorar que mediante escrito del dos mil uno, uno de los supuestos poseedores (Nombre71031 ) cede sus derechos litigiosos a favor de Nombre71026 ; más no se indica nada en torno a los derechos de posesión, sin que sea posible tenerle como título traslativo de dominio; lo cual, tampoco es prueba que permita acreditar ni la fecha en que se inició la ocupación del inmueble por parte del cedente, ni si la beneficada ejerció acto posesorio alguno; siendo importante anotar que para que la posesión genere algún derecho y sea legítima, debe ser ejercida en forma personal por quien la alega, y sólo mediante título válido y legítimo, la misma puede ser traspasada, lo que en este asunto no ocurre. Todo lo anterior nos obliga a declarar la improcedencia de la gestión de prescripción positiva, a efecto de adquirir la alegada posesión agraria sobre el inmueble inscrito a folio real con la matrícula Placa11547. Nótese que se está frente a un bien de dominio público, lo que impide cualquier derecho de posesión y tampoco cumple los presupuestos de la posesión, ni civil ni agraria.

XI.- DE LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DEL RECONOCIMIENTO DE LAS MEJORAS.- En cuanto a la pretensión subsidiara, concerniente al reconocimiento de las mejoras, la misma es improcedente, toda vez que los supuestos actos de posesión agraria no son tal, sino más bien, se deden catalagar como invasión de un bien de dominio público, es decir, ejercido sin el consentimiento o tolerancia del titular del inmueble (la Municipalidad del cantón de Central de Heredia), quién, al contrario de lo alegado por los actores, ejerció, desde que conoció de los actos invasivos, las potestades de defensa del bien. Y aún cuando es lo cierto que los gestionantes puedan haber levantado cercas, ranchos (dos) y hasta cultivado algunos árboles frutales, de plátano, café, yuca y verduras, los mismos no pueden considerarse como "mejoras" que puedan dar lugar a la indemnización; motivo por el cual procede confirmar la sentencia apelada, en cuanto las denegó, pero por los motivos indicados en esta resolución.

XI.- DE LAS COSTAS.- Por último, requieren los actores, la condenatoria en costas procesales y personales a la demandada; requerimiento que también debe ser denegado, manteniéndose la condenatoria ordenada por la Juez de Instancia, por cuanto la regla general es condenar al vencido, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil, no encontrándonos en ninguno de los supuestos de exoneración que prevé el artículo 98 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa.

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza la nulidad alegada. Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver. Por las razones dadas, se confirma en todos los extremos la sentencia apelada.-- Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre632 Felipe A. Córdoba Ramírez AMV 2 Proceso Ordinario Nombre71036 , Nombre71021 , Nombre71040 , Nombre71023 , Nombre71024 , Nombre71025 y Nombre71026 Dirección7936/