Failure to Prove Decennial Possession for Titling in Protected ZoneFalta de prueba de posesión decenal para titular en zona protectora

VOTO Nº 238-F-04 AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, at fifteen hours seven minutes on the twenty-eighth of April of two thousand four.- Possessory information, processed before the Agrarian Court of Nicoya (currently based in Santa Cruz), initiated BY [Nombre1], of legal age, married once, farmer, resident of Tambor de Puntarenas, with identity card number CED1 - - . Acting as his special judicial representative is attorney Gerardo Morales Rodríguez, who is of legal age, married, lawyer, with identity card number CED2 - - . The State was considered a party through the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, appearing on behalf of the former is attorney Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes, who is of legal age, married, lawyer, resident of Heredia with identity card number CED3 - - ; and on behalf of the latter is engineer [Nombre1], who is of legal age, married, agronomist, resident of San José, with identity card number CED4 - - .

RESULTANDO:

1. The applicant files possessory information proceedings for the purpose of registering in the Public Property Registry the property described as follows: Wooded land located at [Dirección1], , of the Province of Puntarenas; measuring: six thousand eight hundred eighty-eight meters and seventeen square decimeters, bordered on the north by [Nombre1] with an easement (servidumbre) de paso in between with a frontage of twenty-nine meters and seventy centimeters, on the SOUTH and WEST: With [Nombre2], [Nombre3], [Nombre4] and [Nombre5], On the EAST and WEST with [Nombre1].

2. The representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, attorney Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes, appeared in the process in the terms that run from folios 36 to 38, 89 to 92, opposing it. For its part, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario appeared in the process in the terms that run at folio 39.- 3. The judge, attorney José Piñar Ballestero, in a judgment at thirteen hours thirty minutes on the twenty-eighth of October of two thousand two, resolved: "Reasons stated, articles 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 19 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, it is the criterion of this judge that the present proceedings must be APPROVED for the applicant. Information conducted without any opposition, corresponding to the farm that will be indicated, acquired by [Nombre1], in an original manner. The property is that which corresponds to the cadastral plan number P-590611-99, of the twenty-second of October of nineteen ninety-nine. That it is appropriate to grant approval to the present proceedings, without prejudice to third parties with better rights and subject to the restrictions established in the Ley de Aguas in its articles 72 and 73. Consequently, let the Public Registry proceed to register in the Property Section, District of Puntarenas, in the name of [Nombre1] (), of legal age, married once, farmer, resident of Tambor de Puntarenas, [Dirección2], the property described as follows: land suitable for pasture, corresponding to the cadastral plan number P-590611-99, of the twenty-second of October of nineteen ninety-nine, located at [Dirección3], , of the [Dirección4] first Puntarenas, of the province of Puntarenas. MEASURES: SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT METERS SEVENTEEN SQUARE DECIMETERS. With the following current boundaries. NORTH: [Nombre1], with an easement (servidumbre) de paso in between with a frontage of twenty-nine linear meters [Dirección5], SOUTH and WEST: [Nombre2], [Nombre3], [Nombre4] () and [Nombre6], EAST AND WEST: [Nombre1].- Valued at THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES. It bears no real encumbrances, there are no co-owners. With this, it is not intended to evade the procedures and consequences of any succession proceeding. Ley de Informaciones Posesorias number one hundred thirty-nine of the fourteenth of July of nineteen forty-one and its amendments", (folio 123 to 124).- 4.- Attorney Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes, in his capacity as agrarian prosecutor, files an appeal before this Tribunal against the judgment at thirteen hours thirty minutes on the twenty-eighth of October of two thousand two, folio 129 to 148.- 5. The legal prescriptions have been observed in the substantiation of the process. No defects or omissions that may have been committed are noted.

Authored by Judge ALVARADO PANIAGUA; and,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- In accordance with the provisions of numerals 501 and 502 of the Labor Code, applied supplementarily in this matter based on numeral 79 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, the documentary evidence offered by the Procuraduría General de la República (hereinafter Procuraduría) as evidence for a better resolution is rejected as unnecessary, given the evidence already in the record, referring to the report from the Catastro Nacional dated October 29, 2003 (folios 159 TO 162), as well as the request by the applicant to conduct a judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) of the property and his offering of the document signed by surveyor [Nombre7], dated November 28, 2003 (visible at folio 176).

II.- The list of proven facts is not adopted, except for the fifth, as it refers to procedural matters and not to the factual aspects that must be verified to issue a confirmatory judgment for possessory information. The fifth shall be taken as one. Add of the same nature: 2) The property subject to this proceeding is located in [Dirección6] of the canton of Puntarenas. It measures nine thousand five hundred sixty-two meters and fourteen square decimeters, and borders on all sides with lands of the applicant, with the existence of an easement (servidumbre) de paso on the north and east being indicated according to cadastral plan number P- five hundred eighty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty-six- ninety-nine (see plan: folio 1; initial filing: folio 7).- 3) It is a forested nature land (terreno de naturaleza boscosa), without constructions or crops (see plan: folio 1; judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial): folio 51).- 4) The cited property is located within the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, Sector Buena Vista, created by Decreto Ejecutivo Nº22968-MIRENEM of April 10, 1994 (see certification from the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía: folio 2; plan: folio 1).- 5) The land subject to the process was part of another, which has been cadastrally divided into several parts, for the purposes of proceeding with its titling (see statements of [Nombre8] at folio 78, [Nombre9] at folio 77, [Nombre10] at folio 103 and [Nombre11]: folio 104).

III.- The conclusion reached by the a quo regarding unproven facts is not accepted, with the following important ones being disapproved, as there is no reliable and pertinent evidence for them. It was not proven thus: 1) That [Nombre1] acquired the property subject to the proceedings in an original manner starting in nineteen seventy-one.- 2) That the applicant possessed, as owner, in good faith, publicly, peacefully, and continuously, the property to be titled for at least ten years before the declaration of the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya in nineteen ninety-four.- 3) The constitution of the easement (servidumbre) indicated in cadastral plan number P-five hundred eighty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty-six-ninety-nine and therefore which is the servient estate.- 4) That the property subject to titling, together with other lands being titled by the applicant, located in the same area, exceeds three hundred hectares in measure.

IV.- The a-quo, in a resolution at 1:30 p.m. on October 28, 2002, granted the present possessory information proceeding. It considered the decennial possession prior to the creation of the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya to be well demonstrated. Furthermore, it considered all the requirements demanded by the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias to be fulfilled, rejecting the Procuraduría's arguments for denying the registration.

V.- Said entity requests that the cited judgment be revoked, given the inconsistencies regarding the time, manner of acquiring possession, and possessory acts, which are perceived from the integrated analysis of the evidentiary elements, thus preventing the indispensable requirements for titling to the detriment of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado, which is inalienable and imprescriptible (articles 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 13, 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal Nª7575), from being considered fulfilled. It specifically exposes the following grievances: 1) An attempt is being made to register several properties that previously formed a single one, through different case files processed in the Court of origin under numbers 01-000014-391AG, 01-000015-391AG, 01-000016-391AG, 01-000017-391AG, 01-000018-391AG, 01-000019-391AG, 01-000020-391AG, 01-000021-391AG, 01-000022-391AG,, 01-000023-391AG, 01-000024-391AG, 01-000025-391AG, 01-000027-391AG and 01-000028-391AG. Therefore, for the purposes of analyzing the time and manner of possession required to title lands that form part of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado (Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya- Sector Buena Vista), all of them must be examined as one; 2) There is no coincidence between what was stated by the applicant regarding the possessory acts and what was observed during the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) as well as what was declared by the witnesses. The applicant states in his initial filing, under oath, that he has possessed the properties in an original manner and that his possession basically consists of making firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting plantains and fruit trees like mango, coconut, avocado, etc. In the judicial inspection reports sent in most of the cited cases, dated June 20, 2001, it is indicated that there are NO fences, only delimitation by clean lanes, there are no constructions, livestock, or crops, and that the lands are dedicated to natural conservation. The witnesses, [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] for their part, affirm that the applicant's possessory acts have consisted, according to the first, of clearing to build a dwelling house, and according to the second, of erecting fences on all four sides, as well as keeping the land clean. The Procuraduría highlights that there are no fences nor constructions, despite the witnesses and the applicant referring to them, with what exists being lanes and the land being in natural regeneration according to the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted. They also cite the statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], rendered on February 21, 2002, in other cited possessory information cases (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01), in which they stated: a) The former, contradictorily, said the property was destined for fruit trees, and the possessory acts were making fences, clearing (chapias), and maintenance (14-01 and 20-01). In other processes, the farm was destined for agriculture and had been divided into lots (15-01, 18-01, 24-01. 27-01); b) The latter indicated the land was dedicated to fruit trees and the acts were making and repairing fences, cleaning firebreaks (rondas), lanes, and general care (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01); 3) The Procuraduría does not share the judge's argument that the area is easy to become overgrown after a harvest, which causes it to quickly become part of the natural regeneration landscape. According to this, it explains why the judicial inspection yields current information different from the activity that may have occurred at other times. In this regard, the Prosecutor highlights that the witnesses must refer to the exercise of current possession, not only that previously carried out, besides the fact that in this case they speak in the present tense; 4) With the statements of [Nombre14], [Nombre12] and [Nombre13], rendered on March 8, 2002, in the present matter and others cited (abbreviated their numbers as follows: 16-01, 18-01, 21-01, 22-01, 24-01, 25-01, 27-01, 28-01), the exercise of decennial possession prior to the effective date of the Creating Decree of the cited Zona Protectora is not proven, since Messrs. [Nombre14] and [Nombre12] stated they had known the farm for twelve and ten years respectively; 5) The appellant maintains that discordance is noted regarding the mode of acquisition of the applicant, given that in statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], rendered on February 21, 2002, and in other cited possessory information cases (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01), they stated they had known the property for approximately thirty years, which was acquired from Mr. [Nombre15] about twenty years ago. For their part, witnesses [Nombre10], [Nombre11] and [Nombre16] declare, in practically identical terms, that they have known the property since before 1950 (exactly the time required according to the Agrarian Tribunal jurisprudence cited by the Procuraduría) and that it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family, not specifically to the applicant. These statements do not agree with what was affirmed by Mr. [Nombre1], that his possession is original. Furthermore, the transferor indicated by the first two witnesses cited in this grievance is not part of the mentioned family; 6) An inconvenient practice occurs by the Court of accepting new witness statements until they finally comply with affirming the legally required possession time. The trial judge justifies this because the first statements were taken before the Procuraduría's appearance; it is the normal practice that the applicant was warned to comply with what was required by it, and for that purpose the second statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] were taken on February 21, 2000, who effectively granted the applicant a derived possession of more than thirty years. Regarding the third ones, the appellant indicates that the trial judge relies on numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and the fact that the Procuraduría changed the rules of the game for the applicant by requiring consideration of the Agrarian Tribunal's jurisprudence according to which decennial possession must be demonstrated prior to the promulgation date of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. This should have been known to the judge as such, and it was already on record the certification from the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía indicating the area to be titled forms part of a protected wildlife zone; 7) In the Court of origin, which was opportunely stated, Possessory Information No. 00-100077-417AG is being processed, in which the plan initially provided by the same applicant of these proceedings, CED5, which describes a property donated by [Nombre17] to him, overlaps with the plan subject to these proceedings.

VI.- The appellant's first grievance is not admissible. The fact that different case files are being processed separately regarding lots that the applicant claims as his own, which previously formed part of a single material unit, does not oblige their joint analysis for the purposes of demonstrating the time and manner of possession, unless this is intended to violate the maximum area allowed to be titled by the same person through this means (300 hectares), as established in article 15 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Aside from it not having been demonstrated that all the lands Mr. [Nombre18] intends to title exceed that measure, it is at the applicant's discretion whether to process them all as one unit or separately, despite the inconveniences the latter may entail regarding documentary and testimonial evidence and increased costs. Furthermore, for the analysis of the fulfillment of the time and manner of possession, as will be seen, what is on record must be assessed. If, in the Prosecutor's consideration, there was evidence external to the case that affected or invalidated what was affirmed by the applicant, they should have proceeded to provide it in the proper manner.

VII.- Grievances two, four, and five of the appellant are related to each other, as they challenge what was considered proven by the a quo, and highlight the contradictions between what was affirmed by the applicant and what was said by the witnesses regarding the mode of acquisition, possessory acts exercised, and delimitation of the land. In this regard, and according to what will be explained in the following considerandos, the Procuraduría is correct, clarifying that only what is on record in this process and the evidence effectively received or provided in it is taken into account to analyze the grievances, not the reference to testimonies rendered in other matters, much less if they were not added to the record as documentary evidence. According to what is taken as proven in this instance, the land to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, established in April 1994. Consequently, the applicant had to clearly and forcefully demonstrate having exercised at least decennial possession prior to 1994. The foregoing was not duly accredited. In this regard, apart from what will be said about the form and number of witnesses received, the following points must be highlighted. The statements made in this type of process by the applicants have the character of a sworn statement, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 3 final paragraph of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 15 of the same provide the requirements that must be met when initiating the process, both procedural and substantive. In that sense, the Tribunal has explained that the "…Possessory Information is a non-contentious judicial activity procedure for the formalization of a registrable title over a property right that has been acquired by adverse possession (usucapión), fulfilling the corresponding legal requirements. It is required to demonstrate possession as owner, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner (articles 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 856 of the Civil Code). The applicant, apart from lacking a registered or registrable title in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the farm has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to avoid a double registry inscription over the same good, or to protect third parties with better rights than the applicant, the Law requires notifying certain subjects. It also established an opposition procedure within the Possessory Information, in case any of the interested parties feels harmed by the titling (article 8). The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias orders the Judge to consider as parties and therefore personally notify them from the beginning of the proceedings, the adjoining landowners, as the titling could encompass part of the lands belonging to them. It is also ordered to notify the co-owners or co-tenants. Likewise, to safeguard the State's interests, it is ordered to consider the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario as parties, for the protection of property subject to public domain, and state Agrarian Property (article 5). Finally, the Law mandates summoning all interested parties, through the publication of an Edict in the Boletín Judicial, who may have a legitimate interest in the process (See numeral 5 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) (see voto Nº755 at 9:45 a.m. on November 13, 2003). The existence of well-marked boundaries (fences, lanes, etc.) is also required. The following documents must be provided: livestock brand if the farm is dedicated to livestock; identity card or respective identification document of the applicant; the cadastral plan; updated certification from the Public Registry clarifying whether other farms have been titled by the applicant and their measurements; updated certification from the Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía on whether or not the land is included within any protected area. The current legislation on soils requires demonstrating the use of the land according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obliged, to ensure the protection of water resources for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity (articles 50 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, subsection 14 of numeral 121 of the Constitución Política, 1, 3, and 17 of the Ley de Aguas N°276 of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Ley Forestal Nº7575 of February 5, 1996, and Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997).

VIII.- Apart from what is indicated, the initial filing must contain each of the data required in article 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Name and qualifications of the applicant; nature, location, measurements, and boundaries of the land; names and addresses of the adjoining landowners (if they are legal entities, their updated representation must be accredited); indication of whether there are co-owners and real encumbrances (among them, easements (servidumbres), usufructs, etc.), if so, specify who and which ones (also prove the constitution of the latter); time of possession; description of the possessory acts; extent of crops, forested areas, or pasture; existence of constructions and improvements made; number of implements if the farm is for livestock; cause and date of acquisition; full name of the person who transferred it, in case of a derived mode, as well as their address; estimation of the property and the proceedings; indication of three witnesses residing in the same canton where the property is located, when necessary according to provisions in numerals 4 and 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Furthermore, it must necessarily be declared that: the farm is not already inscribed in the Public Registry, there is no registrable title of ownership, and it is not intended to evade the consequences of a succession proceeding. If decennial possession is not held at the time of initiating the proceeding, the applicant may add that of their transferors, but besides clarifying that in the filing, they must provide the public document in which the transfer of their right is recorded. The documentary and the rest of the evidence that must be provided come to ratify or prove precisely what was informed in the filing. Therefore, it is not appropriate to merely refer to the content of the documentation accompanying the initial filing. Regarding the required testimonial evidence, a minimum of three, the legislator imposed the requirement of being residents of the canton where the property is located. This is to ensure that the persons appearing to testify are truly knowledgeable about the situation. In other words, it is presumed that residents of the area are those who can best attest to the owners of the lands near theirs and what happens on them, by frequenting or living in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what is declared in the initial brief are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Lack of knowledge in this regard cannot therefore be alleged, much less if one has professional legal advice, as happened in the case. The omission regarding them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is the sole responsibility of the applicant, which the judge cannot assume or attempt to resolve.

IX.- In addition to the mentioned requirements, in cases where the land is within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement must be met regarding the exercise and time of possession. "…In accordance with the provisions of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, applicable to the case because the property to be titled is within the Zona Protectora …, to be able to register said good in the Public Registry, the applicant must precisely demonstrate having been in possession of the property for at least ten years before the validity of the Decree that created the cited Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource" (voto Nº170-03 at 4:24 p.m. on March 31, 2003. Also see voto Nº755-03 cited). This is required to protect the State's forest heritage and biodiversity, without thereby affecting the rights that private subjects have effectively consolidated over time (see voto Nº497 at 3:20 p.m. on July 30, 2003, of the Tribunal). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber in Voto N° 4587 at 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, in which it analyzed the constitutionality of article 7 cited, ruled that to title lands located in the protected zones indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the respective Decree came into force. The Chamber basically stated on that occasion: "… given the nature of the good intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for adverse possession (usucapión) must elapse before the good is affected to the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected wildlife area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and prevents fulfilling the requirements of adverse possession if the right has not been acquired by that time, that is, if the ten years of possession suitable for adverse possession with the conditions established by law have not elapsed… it is important to synthesize the basic elements handled at the doctrinal and jurisprudential level regarding these issues, and which oblige the judge – in relation to the challenged norm – to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the property – which becomes part of the protected wildlife area – intended to be titled. The foregoing is so that the judge has a broader criterion – not limited to the effective date of the law or the executive decree defining the limits of a specific wildlife area – to establish more precisely the moment when said goods became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purposes of determining whether possession ad usucapionem was exercised over them during the ten years prior to acquiring that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage, determines that when it is intended to title – through the possessory information procedure – land located within a protected wildlife area, the discussion is not reduced to the simple calculation of the time since entering a property relative to the date on which the protected wildlife area declaration was made, since -on one hand, to accredit possession ad usucapionem during the period established in article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates must be considered, and –on the other hand– the possible existence of norms that long ago declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific affectation to the public domain…". In this case, having evaluated the evidence conscientiously and without strict subjection to the rules of common law (article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), the Tribunal reaches the inescapable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it comprises a good that forms part of the State's Forest Heritage, as the applicant has not demonstrated having acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected zone in question. This Tribunal considers it unnecessary to analyze prior legislation to see if such lands were affected to the public domain previously by some other law, since, according to the foregoing, there are sufficient grounds for the rejection of these proceedings. The reasons of equity and law supporting that conclusion will be given in the subsequent considerandos.

X.- Regarding the mode of acquisition, time of possession, and possessory acts, there is no coherence among the witnesses, and between these and what was stated by the applicant in his initial filing. Mr. [Nombre1] indicated having possessed the land since 1971 in an original manner and his possessory acts being making firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting plantains, fruit trees like mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The former was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified at different times: [Nombre12], [Nombre14], [Nombre13], [Nombre9], [Nombre8], [Nombre16], [Nombre10] and [Nombre11] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105). In fact, the last three cited, identically indicated, having known the farm since before 1950, and that it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family (folios 103, 104, and 105). For their part, Messrs. [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] affirmed the land that Mr. [Nombre1] intends to title was acquired by him from [Nombre15], about twenty years ago according to the former, which corresponds approximately to the year 1982 (folio 77). The applicant, in a manner contradictory to his interests, as it is assumed he offers truthful witnesses, knowledgeable about the farm's situation, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses in order to prove his affirmations, files the brief dated April 19, 2002, visible at folio 88, with which he intends to "clarify" what was said by those two witnesses, asserting that Mr. [Nombre15] many years ago had neighboring farms to the one intended to be titled, but not that one, and reiterates his mode of acquisition is original.

The foregoing is neither convincing nor acceptable, [Nombre19] in this case, in which, unjustifiably, different witnesses were allowed to testify on more than one occasion. Were their justification to be admitted, it would have to be taken as true that those witnesses did not then testify about the property that is the subject of the proceeding, or else did not know it, and therefore, should not have been offered as such. But apart from this highly questionable conduct, and from the contradictions regarding the mode and date of acquisition, which prevent the exercise of ten-year possession in the manner required by law from being deemed effectively demonstrated by the title applicant, there are other discrepancies that likewise undermine what he has asserted, and which lead to the rejection of this petition.

XI.- Regarding the time of possession, [Nombre12] and [Nombre14] (folios 28 and 26) stated they had known the property for 10 and 12 years respectively (approximately 1991 and 1989, according to the date of the statement). In addition to these witnesses not being useful for proving possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the property as it is part of a protected zone, it is striking that, despite asserting they had known the property for so many years, they did not know who its adjoining landowners were. [Nombre13], [Nombre8], [Nombre9] (folios 27, 78, 77) stated they had known the property for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their statement dates). However, like the first ones cited, Mrs. [Nombre13] did not know who the adjoining landowners were, nor did she refer to how [Nombre1] came to be the owner of the land. [Nombre9] also did not know about the property boundaries or what the measurement of the land was. But furthermore, together with [Nombre8], they asserted the property was acquired from [Nombre15]. The former said this was about 20 years ago, giving an approximate date of 1982. The latter did not mention the acquisition date (folios 77 and 78). This contradicts not only the mode of acquisition asserted by Mr. [Nombre1], but also the time he declared having possessed the land. Which is even more questionable, if one considers that, given the date of creation of the protected zone in question, he should have demonstrated possession of the property for at least the ten years prior to 1994, in the manner legally required. [Nombre16], [Nombre10] and [Nombre11] (folios 103, 104, and 105), declared they had known the property since before 1950, and that it previously formed part of another. They asserted it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family. The foregoing contradicts not only what was asserted by previous witnesses, but also the title applicant's own statement, who asserts under oath to be the owner of the real estate since 1971 and to have acquired it in an original manner.

XII.- Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] stated that these consisted of the property having been fenced along all its boundaries. The latter added that the land was “very clean” (folios 77 and 27); [Nombre14] stated they had been the clearing of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 26). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and asserted they knew the land but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification that they knew the land as part of another, they stated: [Nombre9], the real estate has been dedicated to agriculture (folio 77). [Nombre8], it is a land dedicated mostly to fruit trees, fences have been built and repaired, firebreak (rondas) clearing and general care (folio 78). The third group of witnesses, who likewise know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and they declared: [Nombre16] and [Nombre10] state the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care that a property of that nature requires (folios 103 and 105). [Nombre11], unlike all the witnesses cited, states some parts of the property have been dedicated to livestock, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care that a property of such nature requires (folio 104). Apart from the evident inconsistencies regarding what was asserted by the witnesses among themselves, in the judicial inspection conducted on June 20, 2001, it is derived from what is recorded therein that the land has a rugged topography, there were no fences but there were tracks (carriles), there were no buildings, livestock, or crops. It was recorded that it was dedicated to natural conservation. Added to the foregoing, the cadastral map (plano) that is the object of the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to “trees” (folio 1), which is also corroborated by indicating the nature of the real estate in the initial filing (folio 7). Consequently, in the face of so many contradictions, it can in no way be clear what the possessory acts have been and to what the land that is the object of the title proceeding has been dedicated, and therefore that aspect cannot be deemed demonstrated in the manner required by law, much less if one takes as a basis that the title applicant asserted they were fences, firebreaks (rondas), and planting of plantains and fruit trees, while according to his last three witnesses, supposedly provided to “clarify or prove” what the previous ones had not been able to say, the land “has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those required by a property of such nature”.

XIII.-- Regarding the delimitation of the real estate, this Tribunal takes into account that it formed part of a material unit, to which several of the received witnesses refer. However, when the petitioner decided to propose its registration in parts, specifically in this case a land measuring 9562.14 square meters, he is obliged to delimit it clearly. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form and be able to explain what they know about it, because otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, as to whether what was declared refers to the land that is the object of the title proceeding. In that regard, of the first witnesses who declared in the case file: [Nombre12] and [Nombre13], indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Nombre12] even specified that the erection of the fences was, for him, the possessory acts exercised. [Nombre14] did not refer to how the land was delimited, and did not know its property boundaries (folio 26). [Nombre9] states that because the property is very rugged, he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: “The real estate is dedicated to agriculture. This property was formerly one single property but they have been subdividing it, I don't know with what intention. I don't know if it is firebroken (rondeada) or fenced since those are fences that are very difficult to walk” (folio 77). [Nombre8] (folio 78), asserted the “lot belongs to a large property of approximately eighty or more hectares, whose property boundaries to the west are with [Dirección7], to the east with [Dirección8], to the north with a gringo whose name I don't know and to the south I don't remember whose”. Apart from the problems involved in knowing the lot as part of another land for its location purposes, this witness is then not useful to demonstrate the specific and current boundaries of the one sought to be titled, for it is inferred from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part that was intended to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Nombre16], [Nombre10] and [Nombre11], do not refer to the property boundaries (folios 103 to 105.- But in addition to what has been stated, the title applicant in his initial pleading asserts having carried out as possessory acts the making of fences (folio 8). That assertion and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above is undermined by what was observed in the judicial inspection carried out in June 2001, for it was clearly indicated that the real estate was not fenced, with tracks (carriles) existing as delimitation (see record on folio 51).

XIV.- That analyzed is sufficient to deem the basic prerequisites for granting this petition as not demonstrated. But independently of that, it is important to indicate the following regarding the remaining grievances. What was alleged in the third grievance regarding the lower court's (a quo) argument that the area is easy to become overgrown and therefore, after a harvest is past, it quickly returns to natural regeneration, not being true, is inadmissible, apart from being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific area. But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of easy regeneration, that does not change the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the non-fulfillment of the requirements necessary to approve this title proceeding.

XV.- Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that the Tribunal cannot generally limit the powers of the trial judge regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, [Nombre19] if numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides: “The judge may, when he deems it convenient, order all those proceedings he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Information refers. He shall reject the same if he comes to verify that it is intended to improperly title national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) or lands belonging to any State institution, the same as forest reserves, national parks or biological reserves”. However, on this occasion, given what has occurred and demonstrated in the case file, the Procurador is correct in complaining that the extension of testimonial evidence was improperly admitted, not just on one, but on two occasions. The foregoing because in March 2001 the first three witnesses offered by the title applicant were received, just as required by Article 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. On that first occasion, the Tribunal must highlight that the evidence was received by a commissioned Judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its purposes, which promote respect, except for qualified exceptions, for the principle of immediacy. [Nombre19] in cases such as the present one, where the protection of a protected zone is at stake, and the commissioned action being the taking of evidence fundamental to the merits of what must be resolved, such as the testimonial evidence. After that, it is recorded that the Procuraduría appeared, recalling that the ten-year exercise of possession prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected zone in question had to be demonstrated. Unacceptably, the lower court uses as an argument to justify the extension of testimonial evidence, that the said entity appeared after those first statements. Regardless of what was alleged by the Procurador, the Judge, by principle, knows the law and is obliged to ensure compliance with the said requirement. The title applicant party, moreover, had to, from the moment it offered testimonial evidence, corroborate that the witnesses knew the land for sufficient time to be able to prove the facts asserted by it. If an error or ignorance, on its part or on that of its legal advisor, does not accredit them in the appropriate manner at the appropriate time, it is a burden that must only be attributed against it at its own responsibility. It is not the judge's role to remedy that situation, unless, without violating his functions and in protection of the party's rights and with respect for the current legal system, he considers, on a well-founded basis, that it is strictly necessary to receive some additional evidence. Subsequent to that, a judicial inspection is carried out, in which this Tribunal cannot fail to point out that a record is drawn up with a rather limited description of the land (see folio 51). In a pleading dated December 7, 2001, the title applicant requests to be allowed to offer another two witnesses, because Messrs. [Nombre14] and José Pérez had known the property for a short time, to which the trial Judge accedes. Thus, in February 2002, the statements of [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] were received (folios 77 and 78). Due to contradictions between what was declared by them and what was asserted by the title applicant, the latter submits two pleadings. In the first, he intends to “clarify” what was stated by them regarding the mode of acquisition of the real estate being derivative, which contradicts what the title applicant asserted. In the second, the title applicant's judicial attorney requests that three more witnesses be received, “…in order to demonstrate that the lands my client intends to title have always been in his and/or his family's hands and that the transmission from parents to children has occurred verbally; that likewise the exercised possession has been for much more than ten (sic) prior to the publication of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización…”. Despite the fact that with this statement what was initially asserted by the petitioner is changed, and despite five testimonies having already been admitted, the trial judge agrees to receive them in June 2002 (folios 99). These, apart from asserting they have known the property since 1950, do not provide much information about the land, and even make the total evidence received more contradictory. The Tribunal clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, because as already explained, it is the trial Judge's power to determine the number of witnesses he needs to rule, and regarding the provisions of cited Article 6 on the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, provided it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that the effective fulfillment of the goals of the current legislation is not thereby altered. What is unacceptable is to allow the petitioner to go about “correcting” or altering, at his convenience, what he has asserted or what has been gradually demonstrated, as the process unfolds. [Nombre19] if the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a large number of pronouncements by the Tribunals that have resolved and explained how each of them is interpreted and must be fulfilled. In this case, in view of the statements of the first two witnesses received, [Nombre12] and [Nombre14] (folios 28 and 26), regarding knowing the land for only 10 or 12 years, it can be understood that the reception of two more witnesses was ordered, who supposedly should have had knowledge of the same from many more years prior, and additionally, logically, be sufficiently knowledgeable to be able to inform the judge about all the details that he might require regarding time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even when the judge omitted to ask a question of special interest to corroborate what was reported by the title applicant, the latter and his legal advisor could be present at the statement and request that the relevant questions that the judge failed to ask be put to the declarant. But after the second witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received.

XVI.- The seventh grievance is rejected because the overlap of the real estate intended to be titled in case file No. 00-100077-417AG of the Juzgado Agrario de Nicoya with the one that is the object of this proceeding has not been demonstrated. In the report requested from the Catastro Nacional, it is even indicated that cadastral map P-54225-1963 cited in the respective report from the Juzgado de Nicoya, does not overlap with cadastral map P-589856-1999. Neither do, documents-wise, the rest of the maps referred to in the possessory information proceedings handled by the petitioner, according to what was indicated by the Catastro Nacional, overlap (folios 159 to 162). In this regard, it clearly indicates that the portion described in cadastral map P-590611-99, which corresponds to this matter, does not overlap with the cited 1963 map. Therefore, the Procuraduría's allegations in this regard are inadmissible.

XVII.- Finally, the Tribunal must also note that in the recitals (considerandos) of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and the fulfillment of the procedural and substantive prerequisites required to grant the proceeding, the Procuraduría's position is contested, considering it incurs in an “inconvenient” practice of changing the “rules of the game”. Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was asserted in the initial pleading that there are no encumbrances (cargas reales) on the real estate and what is recorded on the base cadastral map of the proceedings, marking the existence of a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso), which evidently serves as access to it. This is not only a discrepancy that should have been noticed by the lower court, so that, if relevant, it could order its establishment to be demonstrated in the proper manner and clarify what the servient estate was, whether or not it was registered, the measurements of the easement (width and length), and its purpose. But also, in this case, given that the real estate forms part of a protected zone, had the title applicant not consolidated his right according to the foregoing, the establishment of an encumbrance such as the one cited would have been inadmissible. In this regard, it must be remembered that state-protected wild areas form part of the State's natural heritage (Articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 and 14 of the Ley Forestal; 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, ruling of the Sala Constitucional No. 2988 at 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, and No. 755-03 cited by the Tribunal Agrario). The latter, for its part, is made up of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in the name of the State, properties of the municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except real estate that guarantees credit operations of the National Banking System and forms part of its assets (Articles 13 and 15 Ley Forestal). The forest lands and forests comprised within the State's natural heritage are unseizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrances under the terms of Civil Law (see in this regard rulings No. 1092 at 16:09 hours on February 7, 2001, and No. 421 at 15:20 hours on January 16, 2001. In the same sense, No. 2988 at 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, all from the Sala Constitucional).

XVIII.- By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be reversed, insofar as it approved the present possessory information proceedings. In its place, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings established by [Nombre1] are rejected.

POR TANTO:

The evidence offered by both parties for a better provision is rejected. The appealed resolution is reversed. In its place, the possessory information proceeding established by [Nombre1] is rejected.- ALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA C.B.M ORDINARIO TIT:// [Nombre1] Law of Possessory Information number one hundred thirty-nine of July fourteenth, nineteen hundred forty-one and its amendments," (folios 123 to 124).- 4.- Licenciado Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes, in his capacity as agrarian prosecutor, files an appeal before this Court against the judgment issued at thirteen hours thirty minutes on October twenty-eight, two thousand two, folios 129 to 148.- 5. The legal requirements in the substantiation of the proceeding have been observed. No defects or omissions that may have been committed are noted.

Judge ALVARADO PANIAGUA writes the opinion; and,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- In accordance with the provisions of numerals 501 and 502 of the Labor Code, applied supplementarily in this matter based on numeral 79 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, the documentary evidence offered as proof for better resolution by the Procuraduría General de la República (hereinafter Procuraduría), referring to the report from the Catastro Nacional dated October 29, 2003 (folios 159 to 162), is rejected as unnecessary, given the evidence already in the record, as is the petitioner’s request for a judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) of the property and his offer of the document signed by the surveyor [Nombre7], dated November 28, 2003 (visible at folio 176).

II.- The list of proven facts is not endorsed, except for the fifth, as it refers to procedural matters and not to the factual aspects that must be verified to issue a confirmatory judgment of a possessory information. The fifth shall be taken as one. Add a fact of the same nature: 2) The property subject to these proceedings is located at [Dirección6] in the canton of Puntarenas. It measures nine thousand five hundred sixty-two square meters and fourteen square decimeters, and borders on all sides with lands of the title applicant, noting, according to cadastral map number P-five hundred eighty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty-six-ninety-nine, the existence of a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) to the north and east (see map: folio 1; initial filing: folio 7).- 3) It is land of a forested nature, with no buildings or crops (see map: folio 1; judicial inspection: folio 51).- 4) The cited property is located within the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, Sector Buena Vista, created by Decreto Ejecutivo Nº22968-MIRENEM of April 10, 1994 (see certification from the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía: folio 2; map: folio 1).- 5) The land subject to the proceeding was part of another, which has been cadastrally divided into several parts for the purpose of proceeding with its titling (see statements of [Nombre8] at folio 78, [Nombre9] at folio 77, [Nombre10] at folio 103 and [Nombre11]: folio 104).

III.- The conclusion reached by the lower court on unproven facts is not accepted, as the following important facts are disproven, lacking reliable and pertinent proof thereof. The following were thus not proven: 1) [Nombre1] originally acquired the property subject to the proceedings starting in nineteen hundred seventy-one.- 2) The petitioner possessed, as owner, in good faith, publicly, peacefully, and continuously, the property to be titled for at least ten years prior to the declaration of the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya in nineteen hundred ninety-four.- 3) The constitution of the easement (servidumbre) indicated in cadastral map number P-five hundred eighty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty-six-ninety-nine, and therefore which is the servient estate.- 4) The property subject to titling, together with other lands the petitioner is titling in the same zone, exceeds three hundred hectares in total measure.

IV.- The lower court, in a resolution issued at 13:30 hours on October 28, 2002, granted this possessory information proceeding. It considered the ten-year possession prior to the creation of the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya to be well demonstrated. Furthermore, it deemed all requirements demanded by the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias to be fulfilled, rejecting the Procuraduría's arguments seeking denial of the registration.

V.- Said entity requests that the cited judgment be revoked, given the inconsistencies in terms of the time, manner of acquiring possession, and possessory acts perceived from the integrated analysis of the evidentiary elements. This prevents the fulfillment of the essential requirements to title land to the detriment of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado, which is inalienable and imprescriptible (articles 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Forestal Nª7575). It specifically presents the following grievances: 1) It is attempting to register several properties that previously formed a single one, through different case files processed in the originating Court under numbers 01-000014-391AG, 01-000015-391AG, 01-000016-391AG, 01-000017-391AG, 01-000018-391AG, 01-000019-391AG, 01-000020-391AG, 01-000021-391AG, 01-000022-391AG, 01-000023-391AG, 01-000024-391AG, 01-000025-391AG, 01-000027-391AG and 01-000028-391AG. Therefore, for purposes of analyzing the time and manner of possession required to title lands that form part of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado (Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya- Sector Buena Vista), all must be examined as one; 2) There is no consistency between what the title applicant stated regarding the possessory acts, and what was observed in the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) as well as what the witnesses declared. The applicant affirms in his initial filing, under oath, having possessed the properties originally and that his possession basically consisted of making firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting plantains and fruit trees like mango, coconut, avocado, etc. In the inspection reports submitted in the majority of the cited cases, dated June 20, 2001, it is noted that NO fences exist, but rather delimitation by cleared lanes, there are no buildings, livestock, or crops, and that the lands are dedicated to natural conservation. The witnesses, [Nombre12] and [Nombre13], for their part, affirm that the applicant's possessory acts have consisted, according to the first, of clearing to build a dwelling house, and according to the second, of erecting fences on all four sides, as well as keeping the land clean. The Procuraduría highlights that there are neither fences nor buildings, despite the witnesses and the petitioner referring to them, with the existing features being lanes and the land being in natural regeneration according to the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted. They equally cite the statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], rendered on February 21, 2002, in other cited possessory information cases (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01), in which they stated: a) The first, discordantly, indicated the property was intended for fruit trees, and the acts of possession were building fences, clearing brush (chapias), and maintenance (14-01 and 20-01). In other cases, the farm was intended for agriculture and had been divided into lots (15-01, 18-01, 24-01. 27-01); b) The second indicated the land was dedicated to fruit trees and the acts were building and repairing fences, cleaning firebreaks (rondas), lanes, and general care (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01); 3) The Procuraduría does not share the judge's argument that the area is easy to become overgrown after a harvest, which causes it to quickly return to being part of a naturally regenerating landscape. According to the judge, this explains why the inspection yields current information different from the activity that may have occurred in other periods. In this regard, the Prosecutor highlights that witnesses must refer to the exercise of current possession, not only that carried out previously, besides the fact that in this case they speak in the present tense; 4) With the statements of [Nombre14], [Nombre12], and [Nombre13], rendered on March 8, 2002, in this matter and others of those cited (abbreviated their numbers as follows: 16-01, 18-01, 21-01, 22-01, 24-01, 25-01, 27-01, 28-01), the exercise of ten-year possession prior to the effective date of the Decreto Creador of the cited Zona Protectora is not proven, since [Nombre14] and [Nombre12] stated they had known the farm for twelve and ten years respectively; 5) The appellant maintains that there is discordance regarding the title applicant's mode of acquisition, given that in statements by [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], rendered on February 21, 2002, and in others of the cited possessory information cases (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01), they stated they had known the property for approximately thirty years, having been acquired from [Nombre15] about twenty years prior. For their part, witnesses [Nombre10], [Nombre11], and [Nombre16] declare, in practically identical terms, knowing the property since before 1950 (precisely the time required according to the Tribunal Agrario's jurisprudence cited by the Procuraduría) and that it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family, not specifically to the title applicant. These statements do not match what [Nombre1] affirmed about his possession being original. Furthermore, the transferor identified by the first two witnesses cited in this grievance is not a member of the mentioned family; 6) An inconvenient practice is occurring at the Court of accepting new witness statements until they finally comply with affirming the legally required possession time. The lower court judge justifies this by stating it occurred because the first statements were taken before the Procuraduría appeared, as is standard practice, the title applicant was warned to comply with its requirements, and it was for this purpose that the second statements from [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] were taken on February 21, 2000, who indeed granted the title applicant a derived possession of more than thirty years. Regarding the third statements, the appellant indicates the lower court judge relies on numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and the fact that the Procuraduría changed the rules of the game for the petitioner when requiring the jurisprudence of the Tribunal Agrario to be considered, according to which ten-year possession must be demonstrated prior to the enactment date of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. This should have been known by the judge as such, and furthermore, the certification from the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía was already in the record, indicating the area to be titled forms part of a protected wild area; 7) In the originating Court, which was stated in due course, Possessory Information No. 00-100077-417AG is being processed, in which the map initially provided by the same petitioner of these proceedings, CED5, which describes a property donated by [Nombre17] to him, overlaps with the map subject to these proceedings.

VI.- The first grievance of the appellant is not admissible. The fact that different case files are being processed separately regarding lots that the petitioner claims as his own, which formed part of a single material unit, does not require their joint analysis for purposes of demonstrating time and manner of possession, unless it is intended thereby to violate the maximum permissible area to be titled by a single person through this route (300 hectares), as established in article 15 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Apart from the fact that it has not been proven that the totality of lands [Nombre18] seeks to title exceeds that measure, it remains at the petitioner's discretion whether to process them all as one unit or separately, despite the inconveniences the latter may imply regarding documentary and testimonial evidence and increased costs. Furthermore, for the analysis of compliance with the time and manner of possession, as will be seen, what is in the record must be assessed. If in the Prosecutor's opinion, evidence external to the case existed that affected or refuted what was affirmed by the title applicant, he should have proceeded to submit it in the proper manner.

VII.- The second, fourth, and fifth grievances of the appellant are related to each other, as they contest what the lower court considered proven and highlight the contradictions between what the petitioner stated and what the witnesses said regarding the mode of acquisition, exercised possessory acts, and delimitation of the land. In this regard, and in accordance with what will be explained in the following considerandos, the Procuraduría is correct, clarifying that only what is in this proceeding and the evidence actually received or submitted in it is considered to analyze the grievances, not the reference to testimonies rendered in other matters, much less if they were not added to the record as documentary evidence. According to what has been considered proven in this instance, the land to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, established in April 1994. Therefore, the petitioner had to clearly and convincingly demonstrate having exercised a ten-year possession at least prior to 1994. This was not duly accredited. In this regard, apart from what will be said about the form and number of witnesses received, the following points must be highlighted. The statements made in this type of proceeding by the applicant have the character of a sworn statement, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 3, final paragraph, of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 15 thereof establish the requirements that must be met when initiating the process, both procedural and substantive. In that sense, the Tribunal has explained, the "... Possessory Information is a non-contentious judicial activity procedure for the formalization of a registrable title over a property right that has been acquired by usucapion (usucapión), complying for that purpose with the corresponding legal requirements. It is required to demonstrate possession as owner, quietly, publicly, peacefully, and uninterruptedly (articles 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 856 of the Civil Code). The title applicant, besides lacking a title registered or registrable in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the farm has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to avoid a double registration entry for the same property, or to protect third parties with a better right than the title applicant, the Law requires notifying certain subjects. It also established an opposition procedure within the Possessory Information, in case any of the interested parties feels harmed by the titling (article 8). The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias orders the Judge to consider the adjoining landowners as parties and therefore to personally notify them from the beginning of the proceedings, this because the titling could cover part of the lands belonging to them. It also orders notification of co-owners or co-tenants. Likewise, to safeguard the interests of the State, it orders that the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario be considered parties, for the protection of property subject to public domain and state Agrarian Property (article 5). Finally, the Law commands to summon all interested parties, by publishing an Edict in the Boletín Judicial, who may have a legitimate interest in the process.(See numeral 5 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) (see vote No. 755 of 9:45 hours on November 13, 2003). It also requires the existence of well-defined boundaries (fences, lanes, etc.). The following documents must be provided: livestock brand if the farm is dedicated to cattle raising; identification card or respective identification document of the title applicant; the cadastral map; updated certification from the Public Registry clarifying whether other farms have been titled by the petitioner and their measurement; updated certification from the Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía on whether or not the land is included within any protected area. The current legislation on soils requires demonstrating land use according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obliged, to protect water resources for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity for this (articles 50 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, subsection 14 of numeral 121 of the Constitución Política, 1, 3, and 17 of the Ley de Aguas No. 276 of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Ley Forestal Nº7575 of February 5, 1996, and Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997).

VIII.- Apart from what is indicated, the initial filing must contain each of the data required in article 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Name and qualifications of the petitioner; nature, location, measurement, and boundaries of the land; names and addresses of the adjoining landowners (if they are legal entities, their updated legal status must be accredited); indication of whether co-owners and real encumbrances exist (among them, easements (servidumbres), usufructs, etc.), and if so, specifying who and which (also proving the constitution of the latter); duration of possession; description of the possessory acts; extent of crops, forested or pasture areas; existence of buildings and improvements made; quantity of livestock units if the farm is livestock; cause and date of acquisition; name and surname of the person who transferred it, in case of a derivative mode, as well as their address; estimation of the property and the proceedings; indication of three witnesses who are residents of the same canton where the property is located, when necessary in accordance with the provisions of numerals 4 and 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. It must also necessarily declare that: the farm is not already registered in the Public Registry, there is no registrable deed of ownership, and it is not intended to evade the consequences of a probate proceeding. If the ten-year possession is not held at the time of initiating the proceeding, the petitioner may add that of his transferors, but in addition to clarifying this in the filing, he must provide the public document in which the transfer of his right is recorded. The documentation and the rest of the evidence that must be provided serve to ratify or prove precisely what was reported in the filing. Therefore, it is not appropriate to merely refer to the content of the documentation accompanying the initial filing. Regarding the required testimonial evidence, a minimum of three, the legislator imposed the requirement that they be residents of the canton where the property is located. This is for the purpose of allowing persons truly knowledgeable about the situation to appear to testify. In other words, residents of the area are presumed to be those who can best attest to the owners of the lands near theirs and what happens on them, as they frequent or live in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what was stated in the initial motion are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Thus, ignorance in this regard cannot be alleged, much less if professional legal advice is available, as happened in this case. The omission regarding them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is solely the responsibility of the petitioner, which the judge cannot assume or attempt to remedy.

IX.- In addition to the mentioned requirements, in cases where the land is included within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement regarding the exercise and duration of possession must be met. "...In accordance with the provisions of article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, applicable to this case because the property to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora ..., in order to register said property in the Public Registry, the applicant must demonstrate having been in possession of the property for at least ten years before the effective date of the Decree that created the cited Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource" (vote No. 170-03 of 16:24 hours on March 31, 2003. See also in this regard the cited vote No. 755-03).

The foregoing is required for the protection of the State's forest heritage and biodiversity, without affecting the rights that private subjects may have effectively consolidated through the passage of time (see in this regard vote No. 497 of 3:20 p.m. on July 30, 2003, of the Tribunal). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 4587 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, in which it analyzed the constitutionality of the cited Article 7, determined that to be able to title lands located in the protected areas indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the respective Decree came into effect. Basically, the Chamber stated on that occasion: "... given the nature of the property sought to be titled (public domain thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the property's affectation to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wilderness area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and prevents the requirements of usucapion from being met if the right has not been acquired by that time, that is, if the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion under the conditions established by law have not elapsed... it is important to synthesize the basic elements handled at the doctrinal and jurisprudential level with these issues, and which oblige the judge – in relation to the challenged norm – to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the property – which becomes part of the protected wilderness area – that is sought to be titled. The foregoing so that the judge has a broader criterion – not limited to the effective date of the law or the executive decree defining the boundaries of a specific wilderness area – to establish more precisely the moment in which said properties became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purposes of determining whether ad usucapionem possession was exercised over them during ten years prior to their acquiring that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage, establishes that when it is sought to title – through the possessory information procedure – a land located within a protected wilderness area, the discussion is not reduced to the simple calculation of the time of having entered a property in relation to the date on which the declaration of a protected wilderness area occurred, since – on one hand, the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates must be considered for the purposes of accrediting ad usucapionem possession during the period established in Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, and – on the other hand – the possible existence of norms that of old declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific affectation to the public domain...".

In the case, having assessed the evidence conscientiously and without strict adherence to common law norms (Article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), the Tribunal reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it comprises a property that forms part of the State's Forest Heritage, as the title applicant has not demonstrated having acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected area in question. This Tribunal considers it unnecessary to analyze the prior legislation to see if such lands were affected to the public domain previously by some other law, since according to the foregoing, there are sufficient reasons for the rejection of these proceedings. The considerations of equity and law that support this conclusion will be given in the subsequent considerandos.

X.- Regarding the method of acquisition, time of possession, and possessory acts, there is no coincidence among the witnesses, nor between these and what was stated by the title applicant in his initial brief. Mr. [Nombre1] indicated he possessed the land since 1971 in an original manner and that his possessory acts were the making of firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting of bananas, and fruit trees such as mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The former was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified on different occasions: [Nombre12], [Nombre14], [Nombre13], [Nombre9], [Nombre8], [Nombre16], [Nombre10], and [Nombre11] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105). In fact, the last three cited, identically indicated they knew the farm since before 1950, and that it had always belonged to the [Nombre1] family (folios 103, 104, and 105). For their part, Messrs. [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] affirmed that the land Mr. [Nombre1] seeks to title was acquired by him from [Nombre15], about twenty years ago according to the former, which corresponds approximately to the year 1982 (folio 77). The petitioner, in a manner contradictory to his interests, since it is assumed he offers truthful witnesses, knowledgeable of the farm's situation, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses in order to prove his affirmations, provides the brief dated April 19, 2002, visible at folio 88, with which he seeks to “clarify” what was stated by those two witnesses, alleging Mr. [Nombre15] had adjacent farms many years ago to the one sought to be titled, but not that one, and reiterates his method of acquisition is original. The foregoing is neither convincing nor acceptable, [Nombre19] in this case, in which the testimony of different witnesses was unjustifiably accepted on more than one occasion. If his justification were to be admitted, it would have to be taken as true that those witnesses did not testify then about the farm that is the object of the process, or else they did not know it, and therefore, they should not have been offered as such. But apart from this highly questionable conduct, and the contradictions regarding the method and date of acquisition, which prevent the exercise of the ten-year possession in the manner required by law from being considered effectively demonstrated by the title applicant, there are other discrepancies that likewise invalidate what he affirmed, and which lead to the rejection of this action.

XI.- Regarding the time of possession, [Nombre12] and [Nombre14] (folios 28 and 26) stated they knew the farm for 10 and 12 years respectively (approximately 1991 and 1989, according to the date of the declaration). In addition to these witnesses not being useful to demonstrate possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the farm as it forms part of a protected zone, it is notable that despite affirming they knew the farm for so many years, they did not know who its adjoining owners (colindantes) were. [Nombre13], [Nombre8], [Nombre9] (folios 27, 78, 77) stated they knew the farm for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their dates of declaration). However, like the first cited, Mrs. [Nombre13] did not know who the adjoining owners were, nor did she refer to how [Nombre1] came to be the owner of the land. [Nombre9] also did not know about the adjoining properties nor what the measurement of the land was. Moreover, along with [Nombre8], they affirmed the farm was acquired from [Nombre15]. The former said that was about 20 years ago, which gives an approximate date of the year 1982. The latter did not mention the date of acquisition (folios 77 and 78). This contradicts not only the method of acquisition affirmed by Mr. [Nombre1], but also the time he declared having possessed the land. Which is even more questionable, if it is taken into account that, given the creation date of the protected area in question, he should have demonstrated possessing the farm for at least the ten years prior to 1994, in the legally required manner. [Nombre16], [Nombre10], and [Nombre11] (folios 103, 104, and 105), declared they knew the farm since before 1950, which previously formed part of another. They affirmed it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family. The foregoing contradicts not only what was affirmed by previous witnesses, but also the title applicant's own statement, who affirms as a sworn statement being the owner of the property since 1971 and having acquired it in an original manner.

XII.- Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] said these consisted of the farm having been fenced along all its boundaries (linderos). The latter added that the land was “very clean” (folios 77 and 27); [Nombre14] stated they had been the clearing of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 26). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and they affirmed knowing the land but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification of knowing the land as part of another, they stated: [Nombre9], the property had been dedicated to agriculture (folio 77). [Nombre8], it is a land mostly dedicated to fruit trees, fences have been made and repaired, firebreaks (rondas) cleaned, and general care (folio 78). The third group of witnesses, who likewise know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and they declared: [Nombre16] and [Nombre10] say the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care that a farm of that nature requires (folios 103 and 105). [Nombre11], unlike all the cited witnesses, affirms some parts of the farm have been dedicated to livestock farming, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care that a farm of such nature requires (folio 104). Apart from the evident inconsistencies regarding what was affirmed by the witnesses among themselves, from the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) carried out on June 20, 2001, it follows from what is recorded therein, the land has a rugged topography, there were no fences but there were tracks (carriles), there were no buildings, cattle (semovientes), or crops. It was recorded it was dedicated to natural conservation. Adding to the foregoing, the survey plan (plano) that is the subject of the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to “trees” (folio 1), which is also corroborated by indicating the nature of the property in the initial brief (folio 7). Consequently, given so many contradictions, it is in no way possible to be clear as to what the possessory acts have been and to what the land subject to titling has been dedicated, and therefore said aspect cannot be considered demonstrated in the manner required by law, even less if taking as a basis that the title applicant affirmed they were fences, firebreaks (rondas), and the planting of bananas and fruit trees, and according to his last three witnesses, supposedly provided to “clarify or prove” what the previous ones had not been able to say, the land “has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those required by a farm of such nature.” XIII.-- Regarding the delimitation of the property, this Tribunal takes into account that it formed part of a material unit, to which several of the witnesses received refer. However, by deciding the petitioner to submit his registration in parts, specifically in this case a land with a measurement of 9562.14 square meters, he is obliged to delimit it clearly. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form, and be able to explain what it is they know about it, since otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, as to whether what was declared refers to the land subject to titling. In that sense, of the first witnesses who testified in the record (autos): [Nombre12] and [Nombre13], indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Nombre12] even specified the erection of the fences were for him the possessory acts exercised. [Nombre14] did not refer to the way in which the land was delimited, and did not know its adjoining properties (colindancias) either (folio 26). [Nombre9] says that because the farm is very rugged he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: “The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property before was a single farm but they have been subdividing (loteando) it, I don't know with what intention. I don't know if it has firebreaks (rondeada) or is fenced since those are fences that are very difficult to walk” (folio 77). [Nombre8] (folio 78), affirmed the “lot (lote) belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty or more hectares, whose adjoining properties on the west side is with [Dirección7], on the east with [Dirección8], on the north with a gringo whose name I don't know and on the south I don't remember whose.” Apart from the problems involved in knowing the lot as part of another land for purposes of its location, this witness is not useful then to demonstrate the specific and current boundaries of the one sought to be titled, since it follows from his statement he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part that was sought to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Nombre16], [Nombre10], and [Nombre11], do not refer to the adjoining properties of the land (folios 103 to 105). But in addition to the foregoing, the title applicant in his initial brief affirms having carried out as acts of possession the making of fences (folio 8). That affirmation and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above, is contradicted by what was observed in the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) carried out in June 2001, since it was clearly indicated the property was not fenced, with tracks (carriles) existing as delimitation (see record at folio 51).

XIV.- What has been analyzed is sufficient to consider the basic prerequisites to accept this action as not demonstrated. But independently of that, it is important to indicate regarding the remaining grievances the following. What is alleged in the third regarding the a quo's argument not being true that the area is easy to become overgrown (enmontar) and therefore, after a harvest passes, it quickly returns to natural regeneration, is unfounded, besides being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific area. But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of easy regeneration, that does not change the conclusion that the Tribunal reaches regarding the non-fulfillment of the necessary requirements to approve this titling.

XV.- Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said, the Tribunal cannot limit the powers of the trial judge (juzgador de instancia) in a general manner, [Nombre19] if numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides: “The judge may, when he deems it convenient, order all those proceedings he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Information refers. He shall reject the same if he comes to verify that it is sought to improperly title national vacant lands (baldíos nacionales) or lands belonging to any State institution, as well as forest reserves, national parks, or biological reserves.” However, on this occasion, given what occurred and was demonstrated in the record (autos), the Procurador is right in claiming that the extension of testimonial evidence was improperly admitted, not just on one, but on two occasions. The foregoing because in March 2001, the first three witnesses offered by the title applicant were received, just as required by Article 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. On that first occasion, the Tribunal must highlight, the evidence was received by a commissioned Judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its purposes, which promote respect, save for qualified exceptions, of the principle of immediacy. [Nombre19] in cases like the present one, where the protection of a protected area is at stake, and the commissioned action being the taking of evidence fundamental to the substance of what is to be decided, such as testimonial evidence. Following that, the Procuraduría appeared in the record, which recalled that the ten-year exercise of possession prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected area in question had to be demonstrated. Unacceptably, the a quo uses as an argument to justify the extension of testimonial evidence, that said entity appeared after those first declarations. Independently of what was alleged by the Procurador, the Judge by principle knows the law and is obliged to ensure compliance with the said requirement. The title-applicant party also, from the moment it offered testimonial evidence, had to corroborate that the witnesses knew the land for sufficient time to be able to prove the facts affirmed by it. If its error or ignorance, or that of its legal advisor, does not accredit them in the proper manner at the opportune moment, it is a burden that must only be imputed against it under its responsibility. It is not for the judge to correct that situation, unless, without violating his functions and in protection of the party's rights and with respect for the current legal system, he considers on a founded basis that it is strictly necessary to receive some additional evidence. After that, a judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) is carried out, in which this Tribunal cannot fail to point out, a record is drawn up with a rather limited description of the land (see folio 51). In a brief dated December 7, 2001, the title applicant requests to be allowed to offer two other witnesses, since Messrs. [Nombre14] and José Pérez had known the farm for a short time, to which the trial Judge agrees. Thus, the declarations of [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] were received in February 2002 (folios 77 and 78). Due to contradictions between what was declared by them and what was affirmed by the title applicant, the latter presents two briefs. In the first, he seeks to “clarify” what was stated by them regarding the form of acquisition of the property being derivative, which contradicts what was affirmed by the title applicant. In the second, the title applicant's legal representative requests that three more witnesses be heard, “... in order to demonstrate that the lands my client seeks to title have always been in the hands of him and/or his family and that the transmission from parents to children has occurred verbally; that likewise the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización...”. Despite the fact that with this statement what was initially affirmed by the petitioner is changed, and that five testimonies had already been admitted, the trial judge agrees to receive them in June 2002 (folio 99). These, apart from affirming they knew the farm since 1950, do not provide much information about the land, and even make the evidence received in its entirety even more contradictory. The Tribunal clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, since as already explained, it is the trial Judge's power to determine the number of witnesses he needs to rule, and regarding what is established in the cited Article 6 on the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, provided it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that the effective fulfillment of the purposes of the current legislation is not altered thereby. What is unacceptable is to allow the petitioner to be “correcting” or altering what he has affirmed or what has been gradually demonstrated, as the process progresses. [Nombre19] if the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a large number of pronouncements by the Tribunals that have resolved and explained how each of them is to be interpreted and must be fulfilled. In this case, in view of the affirmations of the first two witnesses received, [Nombre12] and [Nombre14] (folios 28 and 26), about having known the land for barely 10 or 12 years, it can be understood that the reception of two more witnesses was ordered, who were supposedly to have knowledge of the same for many more years prior, and also, logically, to be sufficiently informed to be able to tell the judge about all the details he might require regarding time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even when the judge might omit to ask some question of special interest to corroborate the information provided by the title applicant, the latter and his legal advisor can be present at the declaration and request that the declarant be asked the pertinent questions the judge may have failed to ask. But after the second set of witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received.

**XVI.-** The seventh grievance is rejected because it has not been demonstrated that the property sought to be titled in case file Nº00-100077-417AG of the Agrarian Court of Nicoya overlaps with the one that is the object of this proceeding. In the report requested from the National Registry (Catastro Nacional), it is even indicated that survey plan P-54225-1963, cited in the respective report of the Court of Nicoya, does not overlap with survey plan P-589856-1999. Nor do the rest of the plans referring to the possessory information proceedings (informaciones posesorias) processed by the applicant, according to what was indicated by the National Registry, documentarily overlap (folios 159 to 162). In this regard, it is clearly indicated that the portion described in plan P-590611-99, which corresponds to this matter, does not overlap with the cited 1963 plan. Therefore, the allegations of the Attorney General's Office in this regard are unfounded.

**XVII.-** Finally, the Tribunal must also note that in the whereas clauses of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and the fulfillment of the procedural and substantive requirements necessary to grant the proceeding, the position of the Attorney General's Office is contested, considering it engages in an "inconvenient" practice of changing the "rules of the game." Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was stated in the initial pleading regarding the absence of real encumbrances on the property and what is recorded on the base plan of the proceedings, which marks the existence of an easement (servidumbre) of passage, which evidently serves as access to it. This is not only a discrepancy that should have been noted by the lower court (a quo), so that, if pertinent, it could order proof of its constitution in the proper manner and clarify which was the servient tenement, whether or not it was registered, the measurements of the easement (width and length), and its purpose. But furthermore, in this case, given that the property is part of a protected area, if the applicant had not consolidated their right according to what was previously set forth, the constitution of an encumbrance such as the one cited was unfounded. In this regard, it should be remembered that state-owned protected wild areas form part of the natural heritage of the State (articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Organic Law of the Environment, 13 and 14 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal); 58 of the Biodiversity Law, vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) N°2988 at 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, and Nº755-03 cited from the Agrarian Tribunal). This, for its part, is comprised of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in the name of the State, properties of the municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its assets (articles 13 and 15 Forestry Law). The forest lands and forests comprised within the natural heritage of the State are unseizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Forestry Law, and cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law (see in this regard votes N°1092 at 16:09 hours on February 7, 2001, and N°421 at 15:20 hours on January 16, 2001. In the same sense, N°2988 at 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, all from the Constitutional Chamber).

**XVIII.-** By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked, insofar as it approved these possessory information proceedings (diligencias de información posesoria). In its place, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Law of Possessory Information (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings established by [Name1] are rejected.

**POR TANTO**:

The evidence offered by both parties for better provision is rejected. The appealed resolution is revoked. In its place, the possessory information proceeding (información posesoria) established by [Name1] is rejected.

**ALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA** **ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN** **ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA** **C.B.M** **ORDINARIO** **EXP.** **VII.-** The **second, fourth, and fifth grievances** of the appellant are interrelated, as they challenge what was deemed proven by the lower court (a quo), and highlight the contradictions between what was stated by the petitioner and what was said by the witnesses regarding the mode of acquisition, possessory acts exercised, and delimitation of the land. In this regard, and in accordance with what will be explained in the following recitals (considerandos), the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) is correct, clarifying that, for the purpose of analyzing the grievances, only what is contained in this proceeding and the evidence actually received or contributed in it is taken into account, not the reference to testimonies given in other matters, especially if they were not added to the case file as documentary evidence. According to what was deemed proven in this instance, the land to be titled is located within the Península de Nicoya Protective Zone (Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya), established in April 1994. Consequently, the petitioner had to demonstrate clearly and conclusively that he had exercised ten-year possession (posesión decenal) at least prior to 1994. This was not duly accredited. In this regard, aside from what will be said about the form and number of witnesses received, the following points must be highlighted. The statements made in this type of proceeding by the petitioner have the character of a sworn declaration, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 3, final paragraph, of the Law of Possessory Information (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias). Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 15 of the same law establish the requirements that must be met when filing the proceeding, both procedural and substantive. In that sense, the Tribunal has explained, the "…Possessory Information (Información Posesoria) is a non-contentious judicial activity procedure for the formalization of a registrable title over a property right that has been acquired through adverse possession (usucapión), thereby complying with the corresponding legal requirements. It is required to demonstrate possession as owner, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner (articles 1 of the Law of Possessory Information and 856 of the Civil Code). The title applicant, apart from lacking an inscribed or inscribable title in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the property has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to avoid a double registry inscription over the same property, or to protect third parties with a better right than the title applicant, the Law requires notifying certain subjects. It also established an opposition procedure within the Possessory Information, in case any of the interested parties feels harmed by the titling (article 8). The Law of Possessory Information orders the Judge to consider the adjoining landowners as parties, and therefore to personally notify them from the beginning of the proceedings, this because the titling could encompass part of the lands that belong to them. It also orders the notification of co-owners or condominium owners. Likewise, in safeguarding the interests of the State, it is ordered to consider the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) as parties, for the protection of property subject to public domain and State Agrarian Property (article 5). Finally, the Law mandates the summoning of all interested parties, through the publication of an Edict in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), who may have a legitimate interest in the proceeding. (See numeral 5 of the Law of Possessory Information) (see ruling Nº755 of 9:45 a.m. on November 13, 2003). The existence of well-defined boundaries (fences, lanes, etc.) is also required. The following documents must be provided: livestock brand if the property is dedicated to livestock; identity card or respective identification document of the title applicant; the cadastral plan; updated certification from the Public Registry clarifying whether other properties have been titled by the petitioner and what their size is; updated certification from the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía) on whether or not the land is included within any protected area. Current legislation on soils requires demonstrating the use of the land according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obliged, to ensure the protection of the water resource for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity for this purpose (articles 50 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), section 14 of numeral 121 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), 1, 3, and 17 of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas) No. 276 of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7575 of February 5, 1996, and Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997).

**VIII.**- Apart from the foregoing, the initial pleading must contain each of the data required in Article 1 of the Law of Possessory Informations: Name and qualifications of the applicant; nature, situation, size and boundaries of the land; names and address of the adjoining landowners (if they are legal entities, their updated legal capacity must be accredited); indication of whether there are co-owners and real charges (among them, easements (servidumbres), usufructs, etc.), if they exist, specifying who and which ones (in addition, proving the constitution of the latter); time of possession; description of the possessory acts; extension of crops, forested zones (zonas boscosas) or pasture; existence of constructions and improvements made; quantity of livestock units if the farm is for cattle; cause and date of acquisition; name and surnames of the person who transferred it, in case of a derivative mode, as well as their domicile; estimation of the property and the proceedings; indication of three witnesses who are neighbors of the same canton where the property is located, when necessary according to the provisions in numerals 4 and 6 of the Law of Possessory Informations. It must also necessarily be declared that: the farm is not already registered in the Public Registry, there is no registrable title of ownership, and there is no intent to evade the consequences of a succession proceeding. If the ten-year possession is not held at the moment of initiating the proceeding, the applicant may add the possession of their transferors, but in addition to clarifying that in the pleading, they must provide the public document in which the transfer of their right is recorded. The documentary evidence and the rest of the evidence that must be provided serve to ratify or prove precisely what was reported in the pleading. It is therefore not appropriate to refer to the content of the documentary evidence accompanying the initial pleading. Regarding the required testimonial evidence, in a minimum of three, the legislator imposed the requirement of being neighbors of the canton where the property is located. This is for the purpose of allowing people truly knowledgeable of the situation to appear to testify. In other words, it is presumed that the neighbors of the zone are those who can best attest to the owners of the lands near their own and what happens on them, by frequenting or living in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what was declared in the initial brief are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Therefore, ignorance in this regard cannot be alleged, much less if one has professional legal advice, as happened in the case. The omission regarding them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is solely the responsibility of the applicant, which the judge cannot assume or attempt to resolve.

**IX.-** In addition to the mentioned requirements, in cases where the land is comprised within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement must be met regarding the exercise and time of possession. *"…In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, applicable to the case because the property to be titled is within the … Protected Zone (Zona Protectora), in order to register said property in the Public Registry, it is necessary for the petitioner to demonstrate having been in possession of the property for at least ten years prior to the validity of the Decree that created the cited Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource"* (vote No. 170-03 of 4:24 p.m. on March 31, 2003. See also on this matter the cited vote No. 755-03). The foregoing is required in protection of the State's forest heritage and biodiversity, without affecting the rights that private subjects had effectively consolidated through the passage of time (see on this matter vote No. 497 of 3:20 p.m. on July 30, 2003, of the Tribunal). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in Vote No. 4587 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, in which the constitutionality of the cited Article 7 was analyzed, ordered that in order to title lands located in the protected zones indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the validity of the respective Decree. Basically, the Chamber said on that occasion: *"… given the nature of the asset intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the affectation of the asset to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents the possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and impedes consolidating the requirements of usucapion if at that moment the right has not been acquired, that is, the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion with the conditions established by law have not elapsed… it is important to synthesize the basic elements that at the doctrinal and jurisprudential level are handled with these issues, and that oblige the judge – in relation to the challenged norm – to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the land – that becomes part of the protected wild area – that is intended to be titled. The foregoing so that the judge has a broader criterion – that is not limited to the date of entry into force of the law or the executive decree that defines the limits of a specific wild area – to establish with greater precision the moment in which said assets became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purposes of determining if possession ad usucapionem was exercised on them during ten years prior to their acquiring that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage, determines that when it is intended to title – through the possessory informations procedure – a land located within a protected wild area, the discussion is not reduced to the simple calculation of the time since someone entered a property in relation to the date on which the declaration of a protected wild area was made, since - on the one hand it must be contemplated for the purposes of accrediting possession ad usucapionem during the term established in Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations, the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates, and – on the other hand – the possible existence of norms that of old declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific affectation to the public domain…".* In the case, having conscientiously assessed the evidence and without strict subjection to the rules of common law (Article 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction), the Tribunal reaches the inescapable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it comprises an asset that forms part of the State's Forest Heritage, given that the title applicant did not demonstrate having acquired and consolidated a property right over the same prior to the creation of the protected zone in question. This Tribunal considers it unnecessary to analyze prior legislation to see if such lands were affected to the public domain earlier by some other law, since according to what has been stated, there are sufficient grounds for the rejection of these proceedings. The reasons of equity and law that support this conclusion will be given in the subsequent recitals (considerandos).

**X.-** Regarding the mode of acquisition, time of possession, and possessory acts, there is no coincidence between the witnesses, and between them and what was stated by the title applicant in his initial pleading. Mr. [Name1] indicated possessing the land since 1971 in an original manner and that his possessory acts were the making of firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting of plantains, fruit trees such as mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The first point was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified on different occasions: [Name2], [Name3], [Name4], [Name5], [Name6], [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105). In fact, the last three cited, in identical form, indicated knowing the farm since before 1950, and that it had always belonged to the [Name1] family (folios 103, 104, and 105). For their part, Messrs. [Name5] and [Name6] affirmed that the land Mr. [Name1] intends to title was acquired by him from [Name10], about twenty years ago according to the first, which corresponds approximately to the year 1982 (folio 77). The applicant, in a manner contradictory to his interests, since he is supposed to offer truthful witnesses, knowledgeable of the situation of the farm, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses for the purpose of proving his affirmations, filed a brief on April 19, 2002, visible on folio 88, with which he attempts to "clarify" what was said by those two witnesses, alleging that Mr. [Name10] had farms adjacent to the one intended to be titled many years ago, but not that one, and reiterates his mode of acquisition is original. The foregoing is neither convincing nor acceptable, [Name11] in this case, in which, in an unjustified manner, different witnesses were accepted to testify on more than one occasion. If his justification were to be admitted, one would have to take it as certain that those witnesses did not declare, then, about the farm subject to the process, or else they did not know it, and therefore, should not have been offered as such. But apart from this highly questionable conduct, and from the contradictions regarding the mode and date of acquisition, which prevent considering as effectively demonstrated the exercise of the ten-year possession in the manner required by law, by the title applicant, there are other discrepancies that equally distort what was affirmed by him, and that lead to the rejection of this petition.

**XI.-** Regarding the time of possession, [Name2] and [Name3] (folios 28 and 26) said they had known the farm for 10 and 12 years respectively (approximately 1991 and 1989, according to the date of the statement). In addition to these witnesses not being useful to demonstrate possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the farm forming part of a protected zone, it is striking that despite affirming they had known the farm for so many years, they did not know who its adjoining landowners were. [Name4], [Name6], [Name5] (folios 27, 78, 77) said they had known the farm for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their dates of statement). However, like the first ones cited, Mrs. [Name4] did not know who the adjoining landowners were, nor did she refer to how [Name1] came to be the owner of the land. [Name5] did not know about the boundaries either, nor what the size of the land was. But in addition, together with [Name6], they affirmed the farm was acquired from [Name10]. The former said that was about 20 years ago, which gives an approximate date of the year 1982. The latter did not mention the date of acquisition (folios 77 and 78). This contradicts not only the mode of acquisition affirmed by Mr. [Name1], but also the time he declared possessing the land. Which is even more questionable, if one takes into account that, given the date of creation of the protected zone in question, he should have demonstrated possessing the farm for at least ten years before 1994, in the manner legally required. [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9] (folios 103, 104, and 105), declared they knew the farm since before 1950, and that it previously formed part of another. They affirmed it has always belonged to the [Name1] family. The foregoing contradicts not only what was affirmed by previous witnesses, but also the title applicant's own statement, who affirms under oath being the owner of the property since 1971 and having acquired it in an original manner.

**XII.-** Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Name2] and [Name4] that such acts consisted of having fenced the farm along all its boundaries. The latter added that the land was "very clean" (folios 77 and 27); [Name3] said they had been the cleaning of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 26). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and affirmed knowing the land, but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification of knowing the land as part of another, they said: [Name5], that the property had been dedicated to agriculture (folio 77). [Name6], that it was a land dedicated mostly to fruit trees, and that fences had been made and repaired, firebreaks (rondas) cleaned and general care taken (folio 78). The third group of witnesses, who likewise know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and declared: [Name7] and [Name8] say the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care that a farm of that nature requires (folios 103 and 105). [Name9], unlike all the cited witnesses, affirms some parts of the farm have been dedicated to cattle raising, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care that a farm of such nature requires (folio 104). Apart from the evident inconsistencies in what was affirmed by the witnesses among themselves, from the judicial inspection conducted on June 20, 2001, it is derived from what was recorded therein, that the land has broken topography, there were no fences but there were tracks, there were no constructions, livestock or crops. It was recorded as being dedicated to natural conservation. Added to the foregoing, the survey map subject of the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to "trees" (folio 1), which is corroborated also when the nature of the property is indicated in the initial pleading (folio 7). Consequently, in the face of so many contradictions, it cannot in any way be considered clear what the possessory acts have been and what the land subject to titling has been dedicated to, and therefore that aspect cannot be considered demonstrated in the manner required by law, even less if one takes as a basis that the title applicant affirmed it was fences, firebreaks and planting of plantain and fruit trees, and according to his last three witnesses, supposedly provided to "clarify or prove" what the previous ones had not been able to say, the land "has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those that a farm of such nature requires." **XIII.--** Regarding the delimitation of the property, this Tribunal takes into account that it formed part of a material unit, to which several of the witnesses received make reference. However, when the applicant decided to propose its registration in parts, specifically in this case a land with a size of 9562.14 square meters, he is obligated to delimit it clearly. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form, and be able to explain what they know about it, because otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, as to whether what was declared refers to the land subject to titling. In that sense, of the first witnesses who testified in the case file: [Name2] and [Name4], indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Name2] even specified that the erection of the fences were, for him, the possessory acts exercised. [Name3] did not refer to the way the land was delimited, nor did he know its boundaries (folio 26). [Name5] says that because the farm is very broken, he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: *"The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property previously was a single farm but they have been subdividing (loteando) it I don't know with what intention. I don't know if it is firebreak-cut (rondeada) or fenced since those are fences that are very hard to walk" (folio 77).* [Name6] (folio 78), affirmed the *"lot belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty or more hectares, whose boundaries to the west are with [Address1], to the east with [Address2], to the north with a gringo whose name I don't know and to the south I don't remember whose it is"* . Apart from the problems implied by knowing the lot as part of another land for purposes of its location, this witness is not useful then to demonstrate the specific and current boundaries of the one intended to be titled, for it is inferred from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part that was intended to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9], do not refer to the boundaries of the land (folios 103 to 105). But in addition to the foregoing, the title applicant in his initial brief affirms having carried out the making of fences as possessory acts (folio 8). That affirmation and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above is distorted by what was verified in the judicial inspection carried out in June 2001, for it was clearly indicated the property was not fenced, tracks existing as delimitation (see report on folio 51).

**XIV.-** What has been analyzed is sufficient to consider the basic prerequisites for granting the present petition as not demonstrated. But independently of that, it is important to indicate in relation to the remaining grievances the following. What is alleged in the **third** grievance regarding the argument of the lower court (a quo) not being true that the zone is easy to become overgrown and therefore after a harvest is past, it quickly returns to natural regeneration, is improper, apart from it being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific zone. But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of easy regeneration, this does not vary the conclusion reached by the Tribunal regarding the non-fulfillment of the necessary requirements to approve this titling.

**XV.-** Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that this Tribunal cannot limit, in a general way, the powers of the trial judge regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, [Name11] if numeral 11 of the Law of Possessory Informations provides: *"The judge may, when he deems it convenient, order all those proceedings that he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Information refers. He shall reject the same if he comes to verify that it is unduly intended to title national vacant lands or lands belonging to any institution of the State, as well as forest reserves (reservas forestales), national parks or biological reserves."* However, on this occasion, given what has occurred and been demonstrated in the case file, the Attorney General's Office (Procurador) is correct in claiming that the extension of testimonial evidence was unduly admitted, not only on one, but on two occasions. The foregoing because in March 2001, the first three witnesses offered by the title applicant were received, just as required by Article 6 of the Law of Possessory Informations. On that first occasion, the Tribunal must highlight that the evidence was received by a commissioned Judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its purposes, which promote respect, except for qualified exceptions, of the principle of immediacy. [Name11] in cases like the present one, where the protection of a protected zone is at stake, and when the commissioned action is the taking of a fundamental piece of evidence for the substance of what must be resolved, as is the testimonial evidence. After that, it is recorded that the Attorney General's Office appeared, who recalled that the ten-year exercise of possession had to be demonstrated prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected zone in question. Unacceptably, the lower court uses as an argument to justify the extension of testimonial evidence the fact that said entity appeared after those first statements. Regardless of what was alleged by the Attorney General's Office, the Judge in principle knows the law and is obligated to ensure compliance with said requirement. The titling party, moreover, from the moment they offered testimonial evidence, had to corroborate that the witnesses knew the land for sufficient time to be able to prove the facts affirmed by them. If an error or ignorance, on their part or their legal advisor's part, fails to accredit them in the proper manner at the opportune moment, it is a burden that must only be imputed against them under their responsibility. It is not for the judge to rectify that situation, unless, without violating their functions and in protection of the rights of the party and respecting the current legal system, they consider, on a grounded basis, that it is strictly necessary to receive some additional evidence. Subsequent to that, a judicial inspection is conducted, regarding which this Tribunal cannot fail to point out that a report is drawn up with a quite limited description of the land (see folio 51). In a brief dated December 7, 2001, the title applicant asks for permission to offer two other witnesses, because Messrs. Ricardo Azofeifa and José Pérez had only known the farm for a short time, to which the trial Judge agrees. In this way, in February 2002 the statements of [Name6] and [Name5] were received (folios 77 and 78). Due to contradictions between what they declared and what was affirmed by the title applicant, he presented two briefs. In the first, he attempts to "clarify" what they said regarding the mode of acquisition of the property being derivative, which contradicts what was affirmed by the title applicant. In the second, the judicial representative of the title applicant requests that three more witnesses be received, *"…in order to demonstrate that the lands my principal intends to title have always been in his hands and or his family's and that the transmission from parents to children has occurred verbally; that likewise the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Law of Lands and Colonization…"*. Despite the fact that with that statement what was initially affirmed by the applicant is altered, and that five testimonies had already been admitted, the trial judge agrees to receive them in June 2002 (folios 99).

These, apart from affirming they have known the farm since 1950, do not provide much information about the land, and even make the information received as a whole more contradictory. The Court clarifies this grievance is admitted in this specific case, because as already explained, it is the authority of the trial judge to determine the number of witnesses needed to rule, and regarding the provisions of Article 6 cited on the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, as long as it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that this does not alter the effective fulfillment of the purposes of the current legislation. What is unacceptable is to allow the petitioner to go about "correcting" or altering, at his convenience, what he has affirmed or what has been demonstrated, as the process unfolds. [Nombre11] if the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a large number of rulings by the Courts that have resolved and explained how each of them is interpreted and must be fulfilled. In this case, in view of the statements of the first two witnesses received [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] (folios 28 and 26), about having known the land for only 10 or 12 years, it is understandable that the receipt of two more witnesses was ordered, who were supposed to have knowledge of the land from many more years prior, and also, logically, be sufficiently informed to be able to inform the judge about all the details that he might require regarding time of possession (posesión), acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even if the judge omitted to ask any question of special interest to corroborate the information provided by the title applicant, the applicant and his legal advisor can be present at the declaration and request that the relevant questions that the judge may have stopped asking be put to the declarant. But after the second group of witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received. XVI.- The seventh grievance is rejected because it was not demonstrated that the property intended to be titled in expediente Nº00-100077-417AG of the Juzgado Agrario of Nicoya overlaps with the one that is the object of this proceeding. In the report requested from the Catastro Nacional, it is indicated that even the plan P-54225-1963 cited in the respective report from the Juzgado of Nicoya does not overlap with plan P-589856-1999. Neither do the rest of the plans referring to the possessory information proceedings (informaciones posesorias) filed by the promoter, according to what was indicated by the Catastro Nacional, documentarily overlap (folios 159 to 162). In this regard, it is clearly indicated that the portion described in plan P-590611-99, which corresponds to this matter, does not overlap with the cited 1963 plan. Therefore, the Procuraduría's allegations in this regard are unfounded. XVII.- Finally, the Court must also note, in the considerandos of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and the fulfillment of the procedural and substantive requirements demanded to grant the proceeding, it combats the Procuraduría's position, considering that it engages in an "inconvenient" practice of changing the "rules of the game." Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was affirmed in the initial document about there being no liens (cargas reales) on the property and what is recorded on the base plan of the proceedings, where the existence of a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) is marked, which evidently serves as access to it. This is not only a discordance that should have been noticed by the a quo, so that if pertinent, he would order its constitution to be demonstrated in the proper form and clarify which was the servient tenement (fundo sirviente), whether or not it was registered, the measurements of the easement (width and length), and its purpose. But in addition, in this case, given that the property is part of a protected area, if the title applicant had not consolidated his right according to what was previously stated, the constitution of an encumbrance (gravamen) like the one cited was unfounded. In this regard, it should be remembered that state protected wilderness areas form part of the natural patrimony of the State (articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 and 14 of the Ley Forestal; 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, voto of the Sala Constitucional N°2988 at 11:57 a.m. on April 23, 1999, and Nº755-03 cited from the Tribunal Agrario). This, for its part, is made up of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, farms registered in the name of the State, farms of the municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its patrimony (articles 13 and 15 Ley Forestal). The forest lands and forests comprised within the natural patrimony of the State are unseizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance in terms of Civil Law (see in this regard votes N°1092 at 4:09 p.m. on February 7, 2001, and N°421 at 3:20 p.m. on January 16, 2001. In the same sense N°2988 at 11:57 a.m. on April 23, 1999, all from the Sala Constitucional). XVIII.- By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked, insofar as it approved these possessory information proceedings. In its place, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings (diligencias de información posesoria) established by [Nombre1] are rejected." They also cite the statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], given on February 21, 2002, in other cited proceedings (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01), in which they stated: a) The first, in a discordant manner, indicated the property was used for fruit trees, and the acts of possession were the building of fences, clearing, and maintenance (14-01 and 20-01). In other proceedings, the farm was used for agriculture and had been divided into lots (15-01, 18-01, 24-01. 27-01); b) The second indicated the land was used for fruit trees and the acts were building and repairing fences, clearing firebreaks (rondas), lanes, and general care (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01); 3) The Attorney General's Office does not share the judge's argument that the area easily becomes overgrown after a harvest, which causes it to quickly become part of the natural regeneration landscape. According to this, it explains why the judicial inspection yields current information different from the activity that may have occurred in other periods. In this regard, the Attorney General highlights that the witnesses must refer to the exercise of current possession, not only that carried out previously, apart from the fact that in this case they speak in the present tense; 4) With the statements of [Nombre14], [Nombre12], and [Nombre13], given on March 8, 2002, in this matter and other cited ones (their numbers abbreviated as follows: 16-01, 18-01, 21-01, 22-01, 24-01, 25-01, 27-01, 28-01), the exercise of ten-year possession prior to the effective date of the Decree Creating the cited Protective Zone is not proven, because Mr. [Nombre14] and Mr. [Nombre12] stated they had known the farm for twelve and ten years, respectively; 5) The appellant maintains that discord is noted regarding the mode of acquisition of the title applicant, given that in the statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8], given on February 21, 2002, and in other of the cited proceedings (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 and 27-01), they stated they had known the property for approximately thirty years, and that it was acquired from Mr. [Nombre15] about twenty years ago. For their part, the witnesses [Nombre10], [Nombre11], and [Nombre16] declare, in practically identical terms, that they have known the property since before 1950 (precisely the time required according to the Agrarian Court jurisprudence cited by the Attorney General's Office) and that it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family, not specifically to the title applicant. These statements do not agree with what was affirmed by Mr. [Nombre1], that his possession was original. Furthermore, the transferor indicated by the first two witnesses cited in this grievance is not part of the aforementioned family; 6) An inconvenient practice occurs by the Court of accepting new witness statements until they finally comply with affirming the legally required time of possession. The lower court judge justifies this because the first statements were taken before the appearance of the Attorney General's Office, and as is normal practice, the title applicant was warned to comply with what was required by it, and it was for this purpose that the second statements of [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] were taken on February 21, 2000, who indeed granted the title applicant a derived possession of more than thirty years. Regarding the third statements, the appellant indicates the lower court judge relies on numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and the fact that the Attorney General's Office changed the rules of the game for the petitioner, by requiring that the Agrarian Court jurisprudence be taken into account, according to which ten-year possession must be demonstrated prior to the date of enactment of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. This should have been known by the judge as such, and furthermore, the certification from the Ministry of Environment and Energy was already in the record, indicating the area to be titled forms part of a protected wildlife area; 7) In the court of origin, which was stated in a timely manner, Proceeding for Declaratory Judgment of Possession (Información Posesoria) No. 00-100077-417AG is being processed, in which the survey plan initially provided by the same petitioner of these proceedings, CED5, which describes a property donated by [Nombre17] to him, overlaps with the survey plan that is the subject of these proceedings.

**VI.-** The **first grievance** of the appellant is not admissible. The fact that different case files referring to lots that the petitioner claims as his own, which formed part of the same material unit, are being processed separately does not oblige their joint analysis for the purposes of demonstrating the time and mode of possession, unless it is intended thereby to violate the maximum area permitted to be titled by a single person through this means (300 hectares), as established in Article 15 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Apart from it not having been demonstrated that the totality of lands Mr. [Nombre18] intends to title exceeds that measure, it is at the petitioner's discretion whether he processed them all as a unit or separately, despite the inconveniences the latter may imply regarding documentary evidence, witness testimony, and increased costs. Furthermore, for the analysis of compliance with the time and mode of possession, as will be seen, what is recorded in the record must be assessed. If, in the Attorney General's consideration, there was evidence external to the case that affected or detracted from what the title applicant affirmed in it, he should have proceeded to provide it in the proper form.

**VII.-** The **second, fourth, and fifth grievances** of the appellant are related to each other, as they challenge what was considered proven by the lower court, and highlight the contradictions between what was affirmed by the petitioner and what was said by the witnesses regarding the mode of acquisition, acts of possession exercised, and delimitation of the land. In this regard, and in accordance with what will be explained in the following recitals, the Attorney General's Office is correct, clarifying that only what is recorded in this process and the evidence actually received or provided in it is taken into account for analyzing the grievances, not the reference to testimony given in other matters, much less if they were not added to the record as documentary evidence. According to what is considered proven in this instance, the land to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, established in April 1994. Consequently, the petitioner had to demonstrate clearly and forcefully that he had exercised ten-year possession at least prior to 1994. The foregoing was not duly accredited. In this regard, apart from what will be said about the form and number of witnesses received, the following points must be highlighted. The statements made in this type of process by the petitioner have the character of a sworn declaration, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 3, final paragraph, of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 15 of the same law provide the requirements that must be met when initiating the process, both procedural and substantive. In that sense, the Court has explained, the "…Proceeding for Declaratory Judgment of Possession (Información Posesoria) is a non-contentious judicial activity procedure for the formalization of a registrable title to a property right that has been acquired through adverse possession (usucapión), complying for this purpose with the corresponding legal requirements. It is required to demonstrate possession as owner, in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner (Articles 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 856 of the Civil Code). The title applicant, apart from lacking a registered or registrable title in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the farm has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to prevent double registration of the same property, or to protect third parties with a better right than the title applicant, the Law requires notifying certain parties. It also established an opposition procedure within the Proceeding for Declaratory Judgment of Possession (Información Posesoria), in case any of the interested parties feels harmed by the titling (Article 8). The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias orders the Judge to consider boundary owners as parties and therefore to notify them personally from the start of the proceedings, as the titling could encompass part of the lands belonging to them. It is also ordered to notify co-owners or co-owners in common. Likewise, to safeguard the State's interests, it is ordered to consider the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario as parties, for the protection of property subject to the public domain, and State Agrarian Property (Article 5). Finally, the Law mandates to summon all interested parties, through the publication of an Edict in the Boletín Judicial, who may have a legitimate interest in the process. (See numeral 5 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) (see ruling No. 755 of 9:45 a.m. on November 13, 2003). It also requires the existence of well-defined boundaries (fences, lanes, etc.). The following documents must be provided: livestock brand if the farm is dedicated to livestock; identity card or respective identification document of the title applicant; the cadastral survey plan; updated certification from the Public Registry clarifying whether other farms have been titled by the petitioner and their measurement; updated certification from the Ministry of Environment and Energy on whether or not the land is included within any protected area. The current legislation on soils requires demonstrating the land use according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obliged, to ensure the protection of water resources for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity for this (Articles 50 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, subsection 14 of numeral 121 of the Constitución Política, 1, 3, and 17 of the Ley de Aguas No. 276 of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Ley Forestal No. 7575 of February 5, 1996, and Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997).

**VIII**.- Apart from the foregoing, the initial petition must contain each and every one of the data required in Article 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Name and qualifications of the petitioner; nature, situation, measurement, and boundaries of the land; names and addresses of the boundary owners (if they are legal entities, their current legal representation must be accredited); indication of whether there are co-owners and encumbrances (among them, easements (servidumbres), usufructs, etc.), and if there are, specify who and which ones (also prove the constitution of the latter); time of possession; description of the acts of possession; extension of crops, forested or pasture areas; existence of constructions and improvements made; number of livestock units if the farm is for livestock; cause and date of acquisition; name and surnames of the person who transferred it, in case of a derived mode, as well as their domicile; estimation of the property and the proceedings; indication of three neighboring witnesses from the same canton where the property is located, when necessary in accordance with the provisions of numerals 4 and 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. It must also be necessarily declared that: the farm is not already registered in the Public Registry, there is no registrable title of ownership, and it is not intended to evade the consequences of probate proceedings. If ten-year possession is not held at the time of commencing the proceeding, the petitioner may add that of his transferors, but in addition to clarifying this in the petition, he must provide the public document in which the transfer of his right is recorded. The documentary and the rest of the evidence that must be provided serve to ratify or prove precisely what was reported in the petition. Therefore, it is not appropriate to refer to the content of the documentary evidence accompanying the initial petition. Regarding the required witness testimony, in a minimum of three, the legislator imposed the requirement of being neighbors of the canton where the property is located. This is in order to allow people truly knowledgeable about the situation to appear to testify. In other words, it is presumed that the neighbors of the area are those best able to attest to the owners of the lands near their own and what happens on them, by frequenting or living in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what was declared in the initial brief are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Therefore, ignorance in this regard cannot be alleged, much less if professional legal counsel is available, as happened in the case. The omission regarding them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is solely the responsibility of the petitioner, which the judge cannot assume or attempt to resolve.

**IX.-** In addition to the mentioned requirements, in cases where the land is included within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement must be met regarding the exercise and time of possession. *“…In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, applicable to the case because the property to be titled is located within the Protective Zone …, in order to register said property in the Public Registry, the petitioner must demonstrate having been in possession of the property for at least ten years before the effective date of the Decree that created the cited Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource” (ruling No. 170-03 of 4:24 p.m. on March 31, 2003. See also in this regard the cited ruling No. 755-03)*. The foregoing is required to protect the forest heritage of the State and biodiversity, without thereby affecting the rights that private subjects had effectively consolidated through the passage of time (see in this regard ruling No. 497 of 3:20 p.m. on July 30, 2003, of the Court). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber, in Ruling (Voto) No. 4587 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, in which it analyzed the constitutionality of the cited Article 7, ruled that in order to title lands located in the protected zones indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the effective date of the respective Decree. The Chamber basically said on that occasion*: "… given the nature of the property intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for adverse possession (usucapión) must elapse before the property is affected to the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected wildlife area prevents possession after the affectation from counting, and prevents the requirements for adverse possession (usucapión) from being fulfilled if the right has not been acquired at that moment, that is, the ten years of possession suitable for adverse possession (usucapión) under the conditions established by law have not elapsed… it is important to synthesize the basic elements that, at the level of doctrine and jurisprudence, are handled with these issues, and which oblige the judge – in relation to the challenged norm – to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the property – which becomes part of the protected wildlife area – that is intended to be titled. The foregoing is so that the judge has a broader criterion – not limited to the date of entry into force of the law or the Decreto Ejecutivo defining the limits of a specific wildlife area – to establish with greater precision the moment in which said properties became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purpose of determining whether possession ad usucapionem was exercised over them for ten years before they acquired that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage, and determines that when it is intended to title – through the procedure of Proceeding for Declaratory Judgment of Possession (informaciones posesorias) – land located within a protected wildlife area, the discussion is not reduced to the simple calculation of the time since entering a property in relation to the date on which the declaration of the protected wildlife area was made, since – on the one hand, for the purpose of accrediting possession ad usucapionem during the period established in Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, the elements that each specific type of possession contemplates must be considered, and – on the other hand – the possible existence of norms that long ago declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific affectation to the public domain… ". In this case, having assessed the evidence conscientiously and without strict adherence to the norms of common law (Article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), the Court reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it includes a property that forms part of the State's Forest Heritage, as the title applicant has not demonstrated having acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected zone in question. This Court considers it unnecessary to analyze the previous legislation to see if such lands were previously affected to the public domain by some other law, since according to the foregoing, there are sufficient grounds for the rejection of these proceedings. The reasons of equity and law that support this conclusion will be given in the subsequent recitals.

**X.-** Regarding the mode of acquisition, time of possession, and acts of possession, there is no coincidence among the witnesses, and between these and what the title applicant stated in his initial petition. Mr. [Nombre1] indicated he possessed the land since 1971 in an original manner and that his acts of possession were making firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting plantains, and fruit trees like mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The first was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified on different occasions: [Nombre12], [Nombre14], [Nombre13], [Nombre9], [Nombre8], [Nombre16], [Nombre10], and [Nombre11] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105). In fact, the latter three, in an identical manner, indicated they had known the farm since before 1950, and that it had always belonged to the [Nombre1] family (folios 103, 104, and 105). For their part, Messrs. [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] affirmed that the land Mr. [Nombre1] intends to title was acquired by him from [Nombre15], about twenty years ago according to the first, which corresponds approximately to the year 1982 (folio 77). The petitioner, in a manner contradictory to his interests, since it is assumed he offers truthful witnesses, knowledgeable about the situation of the farm, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses in order to prove his affirmations, provides the brief dated April 19, 2002, visible at folio 88, with which he intends to “clarify” what was said by those two witnesses, alleging that Mr. [Nombre15] many years ago had farms adjacent to the one intended to be titled, but not that one, and reiterates his mode of acquisition is original. The foregoing is neither convincing nor acceptable, [Nombre19] in this case, in which different witnesses were unjustifiably allowed to testify on more than one occasion. If his justification were to be admitted, it would have to be taken as true that those witnesses did not then testify about the farm that is the subject of the process, or did not know it, and therefore, they should not have been offered as such. But apart from this highly questionable procedure, and the contradictions regarding the mode and date of acquisition, which prevent having effectively demonstrated the exercise of ten-year possession in the manner required by law, by the title applicant, there are other discrepancies that equally detract from what he affirmed, and which lead to the rejection of this petition.

**XI.-** Regarding the time of possession, [Nombre12] and [Nombre14] (folios 28 and 26) stated they had known the farm for 10 and 12 years, respectively (approximately 1991 and 1989, according to the date of the statement). Besides these witnesses not being useful to demonstrate possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the farm as it forms part of a protective zone, it is striking that despite affirming they had known the farm for so many years, they did not know who its boundary owners were. [Nombre13], [Nombre8], [Nombre9] (folios 27, 78, 77) stated they had known the farm for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their statement dates). However, like the first ones cited, Mrs. [Nombre13] did not know who the boundary owners were, nor did she refer to how [Nombre1] came to be the owner of the land. [Nombre9] also did not know about the boundaries or the measurement of the land. But furthermore, together with [Nombre8], they affirmed the farm was acquired from [Nombre15]. The first said this was about 20 years ago, giving the year 1982 as the approximate date. The second did not mention the date of acquisition (folios 77 and 78). This contradicts not only the mode of acquisition affirmed by Mr. [Nombre1], but also the time he declared he possessed the land.

Which is even more questionable, if one considers that, given the date of creation of the protective zone in question, he should have demonstrated ownership of the farm for at least the ten years prior to 1994, in the legally required form. [Nombre16], [Nombre10], and [Nombre11] (folios 103, 104, and 105), declared they had known the farm since before 1950, and that it formerly formed part of another. They affirmed it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family. This contradicts not only what was stated by previous witnesses, but also the title applicant's own statement, who affirms under oath that he has been the owner of the property since 1971 and acquired it originally.

**XII.-** Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Nombre12] and [Nombre13] that these consisted of the farm having been fenced on all its boundaries. The latter added that the land was "very clean" (folios 77 and 27); [Nombre14] said they had been the clearing of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 26). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and they affirmed they knew the land but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification that they knew the land as part of another, they said: [Nombre9], that the property had been dedicated to agriculture (folio 77). [Nombre8], that it was land mostly dedicated to fruit trees, that fences had been made and repaired, firebreaks cleaned, and general care taken (folio 78). The third group of witnesses, who likewise know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and they declared: [Nombre16] and [Nombre10] say the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care that a farm of that nature requires (folios 103 and 105). [Nombre11], unlike all the cited witnesses, affirms some parts of the farm have been dedicated to cattle ranching, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care that a farm of such nature requires (folio 104). Apart from the evident inconsistencies in what the witnesses affirmed among themselves, in the judicial inspection carried out on June 20, 2001, it is derived from what is recorded therein that the land has broken topography, there were no fences but there were tracks, and there were no buildings, livestock, or crops. It was recorded that it was dedicated to natural conservation. Added to the above, the plan subject to the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to "trees" (folio 1), which is also corroborated when indicating the nature of the property in the initial brief (folio 7). Consequently, given so many contradictions, it cannot in any way be clearly established what the possessory acts have been and what the land subject to title proceedings has been dedicated to, and therefore this aspect cannot be considered proven in the manner required by law, even less so if one takes as a basis that the title applicant affirmed they were fences, firebreaks, and the planting of plantain and fruit trees, and according to his last three witnesses, supposedly provided to "clarify or prove" what the previous ones had not been able to say, the land "has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those that a farm of such nature requires." **XIII.--** Regarding the delimitation of the property, this Court considers that it formed part of a material unit, to which several of the witnesses received refer. However, when the petitioner decided to file his registration in parts, specifically in this case a plot of land measuring 9562.14 square meters, he is obligated to delimit it clearly. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form, and be able to explain what they know about it, because otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, as to whether what is declared refers to the land subject to title proceedings. In that sense, from the first witnesses who testified in the proceedings: [Nombre12] and [Nombre13], they indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Nombre12] even specified that the erection of the fences were, for him, the possessory acts exercised. [Nombre14] did not refer to the way the land was delimited, and also did not know its boundaries (folio 26). [Nombre9] says that because the farm is very broken, he has never been interested in knowing them. He adds: *"The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property was formerly a single farm but they have been subdividing it, I do not know with what intention. I do not know if it is boundary-cleared or fenced since those are fences that are very difficult to walk"* (folio 77). [Nombre8] (folio 78), affirmed the "*lot belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty or more hectares, whose boundaries on the west are with [Dirección7], on the east with [Dirección8], on the north with a gringo whose name I do not know and on the south I do not remember whose*". Apart from the problems involved in knowing the lot as part of another land for the purposes of its location, this witness is therefore not useful to demonstrate the specific and current boundaries of the one intended to be titled, since it is clear from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part intended to be titled. The last three witnesses, [Nombre16], [Nombre10], and [Nombre11], do not refer to the boundaries of the land (folios 103 to 105). But in addition to the above, the title applicant in his initial brief affirms having carried out, as acts of possession, the making of fences (folio 8). That affirmation and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above, is disproved by what was observed in the judicial inspection carried out in June 2001, since it was clearly indicated that the property was not fenced, with tracks existing as delimitation (see record of folio 51).

**XIV.-** The foregoing analysis is sufficient to consider the basic requirements for granting this petition as not proven. But regardless of that, it is important to indicate regarding the remaining grievances the following. What is alleged in the **third** grievance, regarding the a quo's argument not being true that the area is easy to become overgrown and therefore after a harvest it quickly returns to natural regeneration, is unfounded, apart from it being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific area. But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of easy regeneration, that does not change the conclusion reached by the Court regarding the non-fulfillment of the necessary requirements to approve this title proceeding.

**XV.-** Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that the Court cannot limit the powers of the trial judge in a general manner regarding the admission and assessment of evidence, [Nombre19] if numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides: "*The judge may, when he deems it convenient, order all those proceedings he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Information refers. He shall reject the same if he comes to verify that there is an attempt to improperly title state-owned vacant lands or lands belonging to any State institution, as well as forest reserves, national parks, or biological reserves*". However, on this occasion, given what has occurred and been demonstrated in the proceedings, the Procuraduría is correct in claiming that the extension of testimonial evidence was improperly admitted, not just on one, but on two occasions. This is because in March 2001, the first three witnesses offered by the title applicant were received, just as required by Article 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. On that first occasion, the Court must emphasize, the evidence was received by a commissioned Judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its purposes, which promote respect for, except for qualified exceptions, the principle of immediacy. [Nombre19] in cases like the present one, where the protection of a protected zone is at stake, and when the commissioned action is the taking of evidence fundamental to the substance of what must be decided, such as testimonial evidence. After that, the Procuraduría appeared, recalling that the ten-year exercise of possession prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected zone in question had to be demonstrated. Unacceptably, the a quo uses as an argument to justify the extension of testimonial evidence, that said entity appeared after those first statements. Regardless of what the Procurador alleged, the Judge, by principle, knows the law and is obligated to ensure compliance with that requirement. The title applicant party, moreover, had to, from the moment they offered testimonial evidence, corroborate that the witnesses knew the land for a sufficient time to be able to prove the facts affirmed by them. If due to error or ignorance, their own or that of their legal advisor, they do not accredit them in the proper manner at the opportune moment, it is a burden that must only be imputed against them under their responsibility. It is not for the judge to remedy that situation, unless, without violating his functions and in protection of the party's rights and with respect for the legal system in force, he considers, with justification, that it is strictly necessary to receive some additional evidence. After that, a judicial inspection is carried out, in which this Court cannot fail to point out, a record is drawn up with a fairly limited description of the land (see folio 51). In a brief dated December 7, 2001, the title applicant requests permission to offer two other witnesses, because the men [Nombre14] and José Pérez, had known the farm for only a short time, to which the trial Judge agrees. Thus, in February 2002, the statements of [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] were received (folios 77 and 78). Due to contradictions between what they declared and what the title applicant affirmed, the latter filed two briefs. In the first, he intends to "clarify" what they said regarding the form of acquisition of the property being derived, which contradicts what the title applicant affirmed. In the second, the judicial representative of the title applicant requests that three more witnesses be received, "*...with the purpose of demonstrating that the lands my client intends to title have always been in his hands and/or his family's and that the transmission from parents to children has been given verbally; that likewise the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización…*". Despite the fact that with that statement, what was initially affirmed by the petitioner is varied, and that five testimonies had already been admitted, the trial judge agrees to receive them in June 2002 (folios 99). These, apart from affirming they knew the farm since 1950, do not provide much information about the land, and even make the testimony received as a whole even more contradictory. The Court clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, because as already explained, it is the power of the trial Judge to determine the number of witnesses he needs to decide, and regarding what is established in Article 6 cited about the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, provided it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that the effective fulfillment of the purposes of the current legislation is not altered thereby. What is unacceptable is allowing the petitioner to go about "correcting" or altering, at his convenience, what he has affirmed or what has been gradually demonstrated, as the process unfolds. [Nombre19] if the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a large number of pronouncements by the Courts that have resolved and explained how each of them is interpreted and must be fulfilled. In the case, in view of the affirmations of the first two witnesses received, [Nombre12] and [Nombre14] (folios 28 and 26), about having known the land for only 10 or 12 years, it is understandable that two more witnesses were ordered to be received, who were supposed to have knowledge about it from many more years prior, and furthermore, logically, be sufficiently informed to be able to tell the judge about all the details he might require regarding time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even when the judge omits asking a question of special interest to corroborate the information provided by the title applicant, the latter and his legal advisor can be present at the statement and request that the pertinent questions the judge may have failed to ask be put to the declarant. But after the second witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received.

**XVI.-** The seventh grievance is rejected because it is not demonstrated that the property intended to be titled in file Nº00-100077-417AG of the Juzgado Agrario de Nicoya overlaps with the one that is the subject of this proceeding. In the report requested from the Catastro Nacional, it is even indicated that plan P-54225-1963 cited in the respective report of the Juzgado de Nicoya, does not overlap with plan P-589856-1999. Nor do the rest of the plans related to the possessory information proceedings processed by the petitioner, as indicated by the Catastro Nacional, documentarily overlap (folios 159 to 162). In this regard, it clearly indicates that the portion described in plan P-590611-99, which corresponds to the present matter, does not overlap with the cited 1963 plan. Therefore, the Procuraduría's allegations in this respect are unfounded.

**XVII.-** Finally, the Court must also note that in the recitals of the appealed judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements demanded to grant the proceeding, the position of the Procuraduría is opposed, considering it engages in an "inconvenient" practice of changing the "rules of the game". Likewise, there is a contradiction between what was affirmed in the initial brief about there being no encumbrances (cargas reales) on the property and what is recorded on the base plan of the proceedings, by marking the existence of a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso), which evidently serves as access to it. This is not only a discrepancy that should have been noticed by the a quo, so that, if pertinent, he would order its constitution to be demonstrated in the proper form and clarify which was the servient tenement, whether or not it was registered, the measurements of the easement (servidumbre) (width and length), and its purpose. But also, in this case, given that the property forms part of a protected zone, if the title applicant had not consolidated his right according to the foregoing, the constitution of an encumbrance like the one cited was unfounded. In this regard, it is recalled that state protected wilderness areas form part of the State's natural patrimony (articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 and 14 of the Ley Forestal; 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, vote of the Sala Constitucional N°2988 at 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999 and Nº755-03 cited from the Tribunal Agrario). This, for its part, is formed by the forests and forest lands of national reserves, areas declared inalienable, farms registered in the name of the State, farms of the municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other organisms of the Public Administration, except properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its patrimony (articles 13 and 15 Ley Forestal). The forest lands and forests included within the State's natural patrimony are non-seizable, inalienable, and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Ley Forestal, and cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law (see in this regard votes N°1092 at 16:09 hours on February 7, 2001 and N°421 at 15:20 hours on January 16, 2001. In the same sense N°2988 at 11:57 hours on April 23, 1999, all of the Sala Constitucional).

**XVIII.-** By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked, insofar as it approved these possessory information proceedings. In its place, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1, 7, and 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and other cited regulations, the possessory information proceedings established by [Nombre1] are rejected.

**POR TANTO**:

The evidence offered by both parties for a better provision is rejected. The appealed resolution is revoked. In its place, the possessory information proceeding established by [Nombre1] is rejected.- **ALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA** **ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN** **ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA** **C.B.M** **ORDINARIO** **EXP. Nº EXPN1** **TIT:// [Nombre1]**

VOTO Nº 238-F-04 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, a las quince horas siete minutos del veintiocho de abril del dos mil cuatro.- Información posesoria, tramitado ante el Juzgado Agrario de Nicoya (actualmente con sede en Santa Cruz), promovido POR [Nombre1] , mayor, casado una vez, agricultor, vecino de Tambor de Puntarenas, con cédula de identidad número CED1 - - . Actúa como su apoderado especial judicial el licenciado Gerardo Morales Rodríguez, quien es mayor, casado, abogado, con cédula de identidad número CED2 - - . Se tuvo como parte al Estado a través de la Procuraduría General de la República y al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, apersonándose en representación del primero el licenciado Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes, quien es mayor, casado, abogado, vecino de Heredia con cédula de identidad número CED3 - - ; y del segundo el ingeniero [Nombre1] , quien es mayor, casado, ingeniero agrónomo vecino de San José, con cédula de identidad número CED4 - - .

RESULTANDO:

1. El titulante plantea diligencias de información posesoria con el fin de inscribir en el Registro Público de la Propiedad el inmueble que se describe así: Terreno de árboles situado en [Dirección1] , , de la Provincia de Puntarenas; mide: seis mil ochocientos ochenta y ocho metros con diecisiete decímetros cuadrados, linda al norte [Nombre1] en medio servidumbre de paso con frente de veintinueve metros con setenta centímetros, al SUR y OESTE: Con [Nombre2] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] , Al ESTE y OESTE con [Nombre1] .

2. El representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, licenciado Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes, se apersonó al proceso en los términos que corren de folio 36 a 38, 89 a 92, oponiéndose al mismo. Por su parte el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario se apersonó al proceso en los términos que corren a folio 39.- 3. El juez, licenciado José Piñar Ballestero, en sentencia de las trece horas treinta minutos del veintiocho de octubre del dos mil dos, resolvió: “Razones expuestas, artículos 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 19 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, es el criterio de este juzgador que se le debe APROBAR al promovente las presentes diligencias. Información practicada sin oposición alguna, correspondiente a las (sic) finca que se indicará, adquirida por [Nombre1] , en forma originaria. El inmueble es el que corresponde al plano catastrado número P-590611-99, del veintidós de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve. Que es del caso impartirle su aprobación a las presentes diligencias, sin perjuicio de terceros de mejor derecho y sujeta a las restricciones establecidas en la Ley de Aguas en sus artículos 72 y 73. En consecuencia, proceda el Registro Público a inscribir en la Sección Propiedad, Partido de Puntarenas, a nombre de [Nombre1] (), mayor, casado una vez, agricultor, vecino de Tambor de Puntarenas, [Dirección2] , el inmueble que se describe así: terreno apto para potrero, correspondiente al plano catastrado número P-590611-99, del veintidós de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, sito en [Dirección3] , , del [Dirección4] primero Puntarenas, de la provincia de Puntarenas. MIDE: SEIS MIL OCHOCIENTOS OCHENTA Y OCHO METROS DIECISIETE DECIMETROS CUADRADOS. Con los siguientes linderos actuales. NORTE: [Nombre1] , en medio de servidumbre de paso con frente de veintinueve metros [Dirección5] lineales, SUR y OESTE: [Nombre2] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre4] () y [Nombre6] , ESTE Y OESTE: [Nombre1] .- Estimado en TRESCIENTOS MIL COLONES. No soporta cargas reales, no existen condueños. Con la presente no trata de evadir los trámites y consecuencias de juicio sucesorio alguno. Ley de Informaciones Posesorias número ciento treinta y nueve del catorce de julio de mil novecientos cuarenta y uno y sus reformas", ( folio 123 a 124).- 4.- El licenciado Víctor Bulgarelli Céspedes en su condición de procurador agrario, interpone recurso de apelación para ante este Tribunal, contra la sentencia de las trece horas treinta minutos del veintiocho de octubre de dos mil dos, folio 129 a 148.- 5. Se han observado las prescripciones legales en la substanciación del proceso. No se notan defectos u omisiones que se hubieren cometido.

Redacta la jueza ALVARADO PANIAGUA; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- De conformidad con lo regulado en los numerales 501 y 502 del Código de Trabajo, aplicados supletoriamente en esta materia con base en el numeral 79 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, se rechaza por innecesario, dada la prueba que consta en autos, la documental ofrecida con el carácter de prueba para mejor resolver por la Procuraduría General de la República (en adelante Procuraduría), referida al informe del Catastro Nacional fechado 29 de octubre del 2003 (folios 159 A 162), así como la solicitud de la parte promovente de realizarse un reconocimiento judicial sobre el inmueble y su ofrecimiento del documento suscrito por el topógrafo [Nombre7] , de fecha 28 de noviembre del 2003 (visible a folio176).

II.- No se prohija el elenco de hechos probados, salvo el quinto, por referirse a cuestiones de trámite del proceso y no a los aspectos fácticos que deben comprobarse para dictar una sentencia confirmatoria de una información posesoria. El quinto se tendrá por uno. Agréguese de igual naturaleza: 2) El inmueble objeto de esta diligencia se ubica en [Dirección6] del cantón de Puntarenas. Mide nueve mil quinientos sesenta y dos metros con catorce decímetros cuadrados, y colinda por todos sus rumbos con terrenos del titulante, señalándose según el plano catastrado número P- quinientos ochenta y nueve mil ochocientos cincuenta y seis- noventa y nueve, la existencia de una servidumbre de paso por el norte y este (ver plano: folio 1; escrito inicial: folio 7).- 3) Es terreno de naturaleza boscosa, sin construcciones ni cultivos (ver plano: folio 1; reconocimiento judicial: folio 51).- 4) El inmueble citado se encuentra dentro de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, Sector Buena Vista, creada mediante Decreto Ejecutivo Nº22968-MIRENEM de 10 de abril de 1994 (ver certificación del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía: folio 2; plano: folio 1).- 5) El terreno objeto del proceso formaba parte de otro, el cual ha sido dividido catastralmente en varias partes, para efectos de proceder a su titulación (ver declaraciones de [Nombre8] a folio 78, [Nombre9] a folio 77, [Nombre10] a folio 103 y [Nombre11] : folio 104).

III.- No se acepta la conclusión a la que llega el a quo sobre hechos indemostrados, al improbarse los siguientes de importancia, por no constar prueba fehaciente y pertinente de los mismos. No se probó así: 1) [Nombre1] haya adquirido el inmueble objeto de las diligencias en forma originaria a partir de mil novecientos setenta y uno.- 2) El promovente haya poseído a título de dueño, de buena fe, en forma pública, pacífica y continua, el inmueble a titular al menos diez años antes de la declaratoria de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, en mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.- 3) La constitución de la servidumbre señalada en el plano catastrado número P-quinientos ochenta y nueve mil ochocientos cincuenta y seis-noventa y nueve y por ende cual es el fundo sirviente.- 4) El inmueble objeto de titulación, junto con otros terrenos que está titulando el promovente, ubicados en la misma zona, superen en medida, trescientas hectáreas.

IV.- El a-quo, en resolución de las 13:30 horas del 28 de octubre del 2002 acogió la presente diligencia de información posesoria. Consideró bien demostrada la posesión decenal anterior a la creación de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya. Además, tuvo por cumplidos todos los requisitos exigidos por la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, rechazando los argumentos de la Procuraduría, para que se denegara la inscripción.

V.- Dicho ente solicita se revoque la sentencia citada, dadas las incongruencias en cuanto al tiempo, modo de adquirir la posesión y actos posesorios, que se perciben del análisis integrado de los elementos probatorios, lo cual impide tener por cumplidos los requisitos indispensables para titular en perjuicio del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, inalienable e imprescriptible (artículos 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal Nª7575). Expone específicamente como agravios los siguientes agravios: 1) Se está tratando de inscribir varios inmuebles que anteriormente conformaban uno solo, a través de diferentes expedientes tramitado en el Despacho de origen bajo los números 01-000014-391AG, 01-000015-391AG, 01-000016-391AG, 01-000017-391AG, 01-000018-391AG, 01-000019-391AG, 01-000020-391AG, 01-000021-391AG, 01-000022-391AG,, 01-000023-391AG, 01-000024-391AG, 01-000025-391AG, 01-000027-391AG y 01-000028-391AG. Debe entonces, para efectos del análisis en el tiempo y modo de posesión requeridos para titular terrenos que forman parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado (Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya- Sector Buena Vista), examinarse todos ellos como uno; 2) No hay coincidencia entre lo manifestado por el titulante sobre los actos posesorios, y lo observado en el reconocimiento judicial así como con lo declarado por los testigos. El gestionante afirma en su escrito inicial, con carácter de declaración jurada, haber poseído los inmuebles en forma originaria y consistir su posesión básicamente en la hechura de rondas, cercas, siembra de plátanos y arboles frutales como mango, coco, aguacate, etc. En las actas de reconocimiento remitidas en la mayoría de los casos citados, fechadas 20 de junio del 2001, se señala NO existen cercas, sino delimitación por carriles limpios, no hay construcciones, semovientes ni cultivos, y que se dedican los terrenos a conservación natural. Los testigos, [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] por su parte, afirman los actos posesorios del gestionante han consistido, según el primero, en limpieza para construir una casa de habitación, y de acuerdo con la segunda, en el levantamiento de cercas por los cuatro costados, así como mantener el terreno limpio. Resalta la Procuraduría no existen cercas ni tampoco construcciones, a pesar de que los testigos y el promovente se refieren a ello, siendo lo existente carriles y estar el terreno en regeneración natural de acuerdo con el reconocimiento judicial efectuado. Igualmente citan las declaraciones de [Nombre9] y [Nombre8] , rendidas el 21 de febrero del 2002 en otras informaciones citadas (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 y 27-01), en las cuales manifestaron: a) El primero en forma discordante, estaba el inmueble destinado a frutales, y ser los actos de posesión la hechura de cercas, chapias y mantenimiento (14-01 y 20-01). En otros procesos estar destinada la finca a la agricultura y haber sido divido en lotes (15-01, 18-01, 24-01. 27-01); b) El segundo indicó el terreno estaba dedicado a frutales y ser los actos hechura y arreglo de cercas, limpieza de rondas, carriles y cuido en general (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 y 27-01); 3) No comparte la Procuraduría el argumento del juez de ser fácil de enmontar la zona, luego de pasada una cosecha, lo cual hace se vuelva rápidamente parte del paisaje de regeneración natural. Según tal, ello explica el porque el reconocimiento arroja una información actual diferente a la actividad que se haya dado en otras épocas. Al respecto, resalta el Procurador los testigos deben referirse al ejercicio de la posesión actual, no solo la efectuada con anterioridad, aparte de que en el caso hablan en tiempo presente; 4) Con las declaraciones de [Nombre14] , [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] , rendidas el 8 de marzo del 2002 en el presente asunto y otros de los citados (abreviados su número como sigue: 16-01, 18-01, 21-01, 22-01, 24-01, 25-01, 27-01, 28-01), no se prueba el ejercicio de la posesión decenal con anterioridad a la fecha de entrada en vigencia del Decreto Creador de la Zona Protectora citada, pues los señores [Nombre14] y [Nombre12] manifestaron conocer la finca desde hace doce y diez años respectivamente; 5) Sostiene la apelante, se denota discordia en cuanto al modo de adquisición del titulante, dado que en declaraciones de [Nombre9] y [Nombre8] , rendidas el 21 de febrero del 2002 y en otras de las informaciones citadas (14-01, 15-01, 18-01, 20-01, 24-01 y 27-01), manifestaron conocer el inmueble desde hace treinta años aproximadamente, el cual fue adquirido del señor [Nombre15] hacía como veinte años. Por su parte, los testigos [Nombre10] , [Nombre11] e [Nombre16] declaran, en términos prácticamente idénticos, conocer la propiedad desde antes de 1950 (justo el tiempo requerido según la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Agrario citada por la Procuraduría) y que siempre ha pertenecido a la familia [Nombre1] , no en específico al titulante. Esas manifestaciones no concuerdan con lo afirmado por el señor [Nombre1], de ser su posesión originaria. Además, el transmitente señalado por los dos testigos primeros citados en este agravio, no forma parte de la familia mencionada; 6) Se da una práctica inconveniente por el Juzgado de aceptar nuevas declaraciones de testigos hasta que finalmente cumplen con afirmar el tiempo de posesión requerido legalmente. El juzgador de instancia justifica ello se dio porque las primeras declaraciones fueron tomadas antes del apersonamiento de la Procuraduría, como es la práctica normal se le previno al titulante cumpliese con lo requerido por tal, y con ese fin fue se tomaron las segundas declaraciones de [Nombre9] y [Nombre8] el 21 de febrero del 2000, quienes efectivamente otorgaron al titulante una posesión derivada de más de treinta años. En cuanto a las terceras indica el apelante el juzgador de instancia se basa en el numeral 11 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y el haber la Procuraduría cambiado las reglas del juego del promovente, al requerir se tomara en cuenta la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Agrario según la cual debe demostrarse la posesión decenal con antelación a la fecha de promulgación de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Ello debía ser de conocimiento del juez como tal y además ya constaba en autos la certificación del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía en la cual se indicaba el área a titular forma parte de una zona silvestre protegida; 7) En el Juzgado de origen, lo cual fue manifestado oportunamente, se tramita la Información Posesoria Nº00-100077-417AG, en la cual el plano aportado inicialmente por el mismo promovente de estas diligencias, CED5, que describe un inmueble donado por [Nombre17] a él, traslapa con el plano objeto de estas diligencias.

VI.- El agravio primero de la apelante no es de recibo. El hecho de estarse tramitando por separado diferentes expedientes referidos a lotes que el promovente reclama como suyos, los cuales conformaban parte de una misma unidad material, no obliga a su análisis conjunto para efectos de demostrarse tiempo y modo de posesión, salvo que se pretenda con ello violentar el máximo de área permitida sea titulada por una misma persona a través de esta vía (300 hectáreas), según lo establecido en el artículo 15 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Aparte de no haber sido demostrado la totalidad de terrenos que pretende titular el señor [Nombre18] superen esa medida, queda a criterio del promovente si los gestionaba todos como una unidad o en forma separada, pese a los inconvenientes que pueda implicar lo último respecto de la prueba documental, testimonial y el aumento de costos. Además, para el análisis del cumplimiento del tiempo y modo de posesión, como se verá, debe valorarse lo que conste en autos. Si en consideración del Procurador existía prueba externa al caso que lo afectase o desvirtuase lo en él afirmado por el titulante, debió proceder a aportarla en la forma debida.

VII.- Los agravios dos, cuatro y cinco de la parte apelante se relacionan entre sí, pues combaten lo tenido por demostrado por el a quo, y resaltan las contradicciones entre lo afirmado por el promovente y lo dicho por los testigos en cuanto a modo de adquisición, actos posesorios ejercidos y delimitación del terreno. Al respecto, y de acuerdo con lo que se explicará en los considerandos siguientes, lleva razón la Procuraduría, aclarándose se toma en cuenta únicamente para analizar los agravios, lo que conste en este proceso y la prueba efectivamente recibida o aportada en él, no así la referencia a los testimonios rendidos en otros asuntos, mucho menos si no fueron agregados a los autos como prueba documental. Según lo tenido por probado en esta instancia, el terreno a titular se encuentra ubicado dentro de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, establecida en abril de 1994. Por consiguiente, debió el promovente demostrar en forma clara y contundente, haber ejercido una posesión decenal al menos anterior a 1994. Lo anterior no fue debidamente acreditado. Al respecto, aparte de lo que se dirá sobre la forma y cantidad de testigos recibidos, deben resaltarse los siguiente puntos. Las declaraciones hechas en este tipo de proceso por los gestionante, tienen el carácter de declaración jurada, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 3 párrafo final de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Los artículos 1, 2, 4, 5 6, 7, 9 y 15 de la misma disponen los requisitos que deben cumplirse al plantearse el proceso, como de trámite y de fondo. En ese sentido, el Tribunal ha explicado, la “…Información Posesoria es un trámite de actividad judicial no contenciosa para la formalización de un título registrable sobre un derecho de propiedad que se ha llegado a adquirir por la usucapión, cumpliendo para ello con los requisitos legales correspondientes. Se exige demostrar la posesión a título de dueño, en forma quieta, pública, pacífica e ininterrumpida (artículos 1 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y 856 del Código Civil). El titulante, aparte de carecer de título inscrito o inscribible en el Registro Público, debe manifestar expresamente que la finca no ha sido inscrita en el Registro Público anteriormente. Por razones de interés público, y para evitar una doble inscripción registral sobre un mismo bien, o bien, para tutelar a terceros de mejor derecho que el titulante, la Ley exige notificar a ciertos sujetos. También estableció un trámite de oposición dentro de la Información Posesoria, en caso de que alguno de los interesados se sienta perjudicado por la titulación (artículo 8). La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias ordena al Juez tener como partes y por tanto notificarles personalmente desde el inicio de las diligencias, a los colindantes, ello por cuanto la titulación podría abarcar parte de las tierras que les pertenecen. También se ordena notificar a los condueños o condóminos. Igualmente, en resguardo de los intereses del Estado, se ordena tener como parte a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, para el resguardo de la propiedad sujeta al dominio público, y de la Propiedad Agraria estatal (artículo 5). Finalmente, la Ley manda a citar a todos los interesados, mediante la publicación de un Edicto en el Boletín Judicial, que puedan tener un interés legítimo en el proceso.(Ver numeral 5 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) ( ver voto Nº755 de las 9:45 horas del 13 de noviembre del 2003). Se exige también la existencia de linderos bien señalados (cercas, carriles, etc.). Deben aportarse los siguientes documentos: marca de ganado si la finca se dedica a ganadería; cédula de identidad o documento de identificación respectivo del titulante; el plano catastrado; certificación actualizada del Registro Público que aclare si se han titulado otras fincas por el promovente y cual es su medida; certificación actualizada del Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía sobre si está o no comprendido el terreno dentro de alguna área protegida. La legislación vigente sobre suelos exige se demuestre el uso del terreno conforme a su aptitud (estudio de suelo). También está obligado el juez, para velar por la protección del recurso hídrico con fines de utilidad pública, de existir nacientes o fuentes de agua, a solicitar el informe respectivo del ente competente para ello (artículos 50 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, inciso 14 del numeral 121 de la Constitución Política, 1, 3 y 17 de la Ley de Aguas N°276 de 27 de agosto de 1942, 33 de la Ley Forestal vigente Nº7575 de 5 de febrero de 1996 y Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE de 19 de junio de 1997).

VIII.- Aparte de lo indicado, el escrito inicial debe contener cada uno de los datos requeridos en el artículo 1º de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Nombre y calidades del promovente; naturaleza, situación, medida y linderos del terreno; nombres y dirección de los colindantes (si son personas jurídicas debe acreditarse su personería actualizada); indicación de sí existen condueños y cargas reales (entre ellas, servidumbres, usufructos, etc.), de haberlos especificar quiénes y cuáles (probar además la constitución de las últimas); tiempo de posesión; descripción de los actos posesorios; extensión de cultivos, zonas boscosas o de pasto; existencia de construcciones y mejoras realizadas; cantidad de apartos de ser ganadera la finca; causa y fecha de adquisición; nombre y apellidos de la persona que transmitió, en caso de tratarse de un modo derivado, así como su domicilio; estimación del inmueble y las diligencias; indicación de tres testigos vecinos del mismo cantón donde se ubique el inmueble, cuando sea necesario de acuerdo con lo indicado en el numerales 4 y 6 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Debe además necesariamente declararse que: la finca no se encuentra ya inscrita en el Registro Público, se carece de título de dominio inscribible y no se pretende evadir las consecuencias de un juicio sucesorio. De no tenerse la posesión decenal al momento de iniciar la diligencia, puede el promovente sumar la de sus transmitentes, pero además de aclarar eso en el escrito, debe aportar el documento público en el cual conste el traspaso de su derecho. La documental y el resto de la prueba que se debe aportar, vienen a ratificar o probar precisamente lo informado en el escrito. Por ello no resulta procedente se remita al contenido de la documental que acompañe al escrito inicial. En cuanto a la prueba testimonial exigida, en un mínimo de tres, el legislador impuso el requisito de ser vecinos del cantón donde se ubica el inmueble. Ello con el fin de permitir fuesen realmente personas conocedoras de la situación las que se presentaran a declarar. En otras palabras, se presume los vecinos de la zona son quienes mejor pueden dar fe de los dueños de los terrenos cercanos a los suyos y que sucede en ellos, por frecuentar o vivir en el mismo lugar. Todos estos requisitos y la prueba pertinente para corroborar lo declarado en el memorial inicial están claramente especificados en la normativa citada. No puede entonces alegarse desconocimiento al respecto, mucho menos si se cuenta con asesoría legal profesional, como sucedió en el caso. La omisión en cuanto a ellos, o el ofrecimiento de prueba no pertinente, es responsabilidad únicamente del promovente, que el juzgador no puede asumir ni intentar solventar.

IX.- Además de los requisitos mencionados, en los casos en los cuales el terreno esté comprendido dentro de una zona protegida, debe cumplirse con un requisito más calificado en cuanto al ejercicio y tiempo de la posesión. “…De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, de aplicación al caso por encontrarse el inmueble a titular dentro de la Zona Protectora …, para poder inscribir dicho bien en el Registro Público, es preciso el gestionante demuestre haber estado en posesión del inmueble por lo menos diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto que creó la citada Reserva, así como haber protegido el recurso forestal”(voto Nº170-03 de las 16:24 horas del 31 de marzo del 2003. Ver también al respecto el voto Nº755-03 citado). Lo anterior se exige en protección del patrimonio forestal del Estado y la biodiversidad, sin afectarse por ello los derechos que efectivamente los sujetos privados hubiesen consolidado por el transcurso del tiempo (ver al respecto el voto Nº497 de las 15:20 horas del 30 de julio del 2003 del Tribunal). En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional en Voto N° 4587 de las 15:45 horas del 5 de agosto de 1997, en el cual analizó la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 citado, dispuso para poder titular los terrenos ubicados en las zonas protegidas que ahí se señalan, debía el interesado demostrar la posesión diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto respectivo. Básicamente dijo la Sala en esa oportunidad: "… dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público. Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley… resulta importante sintetizar los elementos básicos que a nivel de doctrina y jurisprudencia se maejan con estos temas, y que obligan al juez – en relación con la norma impugnada- a determinar en cada caso el tipo específico de acto posesorio que se ha ejercido en el fundo – que entra a formar parte del área silvestre protegida- que se pretende titular. Lo anterior con el objeto de que el juez tenga un criterio más amplio – que no se limite a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de la ley o el decreto ejecutivo que defina los límites de un área silvestre determinada- para establecer con mayor precisión el momento en que dichos bienes se convirtieron en inalienables e imprescriptibles, a los efectos de determinar si sobre ellos se ejerció la posesión ad usucapionem durante diez años anteriores a que adquirieron esa condición. Esta perspectiva de mayor amplitud favorece la protección del patrimonio ambiental de la Nación, determina que cuando se pretenda titular – mediante el procedimiento de informaciones posesorias- un terreno ubicado dentro de un área silvestre protegida, la discusión no se reduzca al simple cálculo del tiempo que tiene de haber ingresado a un inmueble en relación con la fecha en que se haya producido la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida, ya que -por un lado deberá contemplarse a los efectos de acreditar la posesión ad usucapionem durante el plazo establecido en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, los elementos que cada tipo específico de posesión contempla, y –por otro lado- la posible existencia de normas que de antaño declaraban inalienables esos terrenos, aún antes de su afectación específica al dominio público… ". En el caso, valorada la prueba a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas de derecho común (artículo 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), el Tribunal llega a la ineludible conclusión de que esta diligencia debe ser rechazada por comprender un bien que forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, al no haber sido demostrado por el titulante haber adquirido y consolidado un derecho de propiedad sobre el mismo con anterioridad a la creación de la zona protegida de marras. Considera este Tribunal innecesario entrar a analizar la legislación anterior para ver si tales terrenos fueron afectados al dominio publico anteriormente por alguna otra ley, pues conforme a lo expuesto existen motivos suficientes para el rechazo de estas diligencias. En los considerandos posteriores se darán las razones de equidad y derecho que fundamentan dicha conclusión.

X.- Respecto del modo de adquisición, tiempo de posesión y actos posesorios, no existe coincidencia entre los testigos, y entre estos y lo dicho por el titulante en su escrito inicial. Indicó el señor [Nombre1] poseer el terreno desde 1971 en forma originaria y ser sus actos posesorios la hechura de rondas, cercas, siembra de plátanos, árboles frutales como mango, coco, aguacate y teca (folios 7 y 8). Lo primero no fue corroborado por ninguno de los testigos que declararon en diferentes oportunidades: [Nombre12] , [Nombre14] , [Nombre13] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre8] , [Nombre16] , [Nombre10] y [Nombre11] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105). De hecho, los tres últimos citados, en forma idéntica indicaron, conocer la finca desde antes de 1950, y haber sido siempre de la familia [Nombre1] (folios 103, 104, y 105). Por su parte, los señores [Nombre9] y [Nombre8] afirmaron el terreno que el señor [Nombre1] pretende titular lo adquirió éste de [Nombre15] , hacía como veinte años según el primero, lo cual corresponde aproximadamente al año de 1982 (folio 77). El promovente, en forma contradictoria a sus intereses, por cuanto se supone que ofrece testigos veraces, conocedores de la situación de la finca, que VOLUNTARIAMENTE elige con el fin de probar sus afirmaciones, aporta el memorial en fecha 19 de abril del 2002, visible a folio 88, con el cual pretende “aclarar” lo dicho por esos dos testigos, aduciendo el señor [Nombre15] hace muchos años tuvo fincas aledañas a la que se pretende titular, pero no esa, y reitera su modo de adquisición es originario. Lo anterior no es convincente ni aceptable, [Nombre19] en este caso, en el cual en forma injustificada se aceptó en más de una oportunidad declararan diferentes testigos. De ser admitida su justificación, tendría que tenerse por cierto esos testigos no declararon entonces sobre la finca objeto del proceso, o bien no la conocían, y por ende, no debieron ser ofrecidos como tal. Pero aparte de este proceder tan cuestionable, y de las contradicciones en cuanto al modo y fecha de adquisición, que impiden tener por efectivamente demostrada el ejercicio de la posesión decenal en la forma requerida por la ley, por parte del titulante, existen otras discordancias que igualmente desvirtúan lo afirmado por él, y que conllevan el rechazo de esta gestión.

XI.- En cuanto al tiempo de posesión, [Nombre12] y [Nombre14] (folios 28 y 26) dijeron conocer la finca desde hacía 10 y 12 años respectivamente (aproximadamente 1991 y 1989, de acuerdo con la fecha de la declaración). Además de no ser útiles esos testigos para demostrar una posesión anterior a esas fechas, lo cual era necesario dada la situación especial de la finca al formar parte de una zona protectora, llama la atención pese a afirmar que conocían la finca desde hace tantos años, no sabían quienes eran sus colindantes. [Nombre13] , [Nombre8] , [Nombre9] (folios 27, 78, 77) dijeron conocer la finca desde hace como 30 años (lo cual corresponde a 1971 y 1972 respectivamente, según sus fechas de declaración). Sin embargo, al igual que los primeros citados, la señora [Nombre13] no sabía quienes eran los colindantes, ni tampoco se refirió a como llegó a ser el dueño del terreno [Nombre1] . [Nombre9] no sabía tampoco sobre las colindancias ni cual era la medida del terreno. Pero además, junto con [Nombre8] , afirmaron la finca fue adquirida de [Nombre15] . El primero dijo eso fue hacía como 20 años, lo cual da como fecha aproximada el año de 1982. El segundo no mencionó la fecha de adquisición (folios 77 y78). Esto contradice no solo el modo de adquisición afirmado por el señor [Nombre1], sino además el tiempo que declaró poseer el terreno. Lo cual es aún más cuestionable, si se toma en cuenta, dada la fecha de creación de la zona protectora de marras, debió haber demostrado poseer la finca al menos los diez años anteriores a 1994, en la forma legalmente exigida. [Nombre16] , [Nombre10] y [Nombre11] (folios 103, 104, y 105), declararon conocer la finca desde antes de 1950, la cual antes formaba parte de otra. Afirmaron siempre ha pertenecido a la familia [Nombre1] . Lo anterior desdice no solo lo afirmado por testigos anteriores, sino además el propio dicho del titulante, quien afirma con carácter de declaración jurada ser el dueño del inmueble desde 1971 y haberlo adquirido en forma originaria.

XII.- Sobre los actos posesorios, los primeros testigos recibidos en marzo del 2001 manifestaron: [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] consistían tales en haberse cercado la finca por todos sus linderos. La segunda agregó sobre el terreno era “muy limpio” (folios 77 y 27); [Nombre14] dijo habían sido la limpieza del terreno con el fin de construir una casa (folio 26). El segundo grupo de testigos fue recibido en febrero del 2002, y afirmaron conocer el terreno pero como parte de uno más grande. Específicamente sobre los actos posesorios, con la aclaración de conocer el terreno como parte de otro, dijeron: [Nombre9] , haberse dedicado el inmueble a agricultura (folio 77). [Nombre8] , ser un terreno dedicado a árboles frutales en su mayoría, haberse hecho y arreglado cercos, limpieza de rondas y cuido en general (folio 78). El tercer grupo de testigos, que igualmente conoce el terreno como parte de otro, se recibió en junio del 2002, y declararon: [Nombre16] y [Nombre10] dicen la propiedad se ha dedicado a conservación o regeneración natural y los actos posesorios han sido el cuido general que requiere una finca de esa naturaleza (folios 103 y 105). [Nombre11] , a diferencia de todos los testigos citados, afirma algunas partes de la finca se han dedicado a ganadería, y otras a agricultura, pero en su mayoría a conservación o regeneración natural, y los actos posesorios son el cuido general que requiere una finca de tal naturaleza (folio 104). Aparte de las evidentes inconsistencias en cuanto a lo afirmado por los testigos entre sí, en el reconocimiento judicial efectuado el 20 de junio del 2001, se deriva de lo consignado en ella, el terreno es de topografía quebrada, no existían cercas pero sí carriles, no había construcciones, semovientes ni cultivos. Se consignó estaba dedicado a conservación natural. Aunado a lo anterior, el plano objeto de las diligencias indica el terreno se dedica a “árboles” (folio1), lo cual es corroborado también al indicarse la naturaleza del inmueble en el escrito inicial (folio 7). Por consiguiente, ante tantas contradicciones, en forma alguna se puede tener por claro cuáles han sido los actos posesorios y a qué se ha dedicado el terreno objeto de titulación, y por ende no se puede tener por demostrado dicho aspecto en la forma requerida por la ley, menos si se toma como base el titulante afirmó fueron cercas, rondas y siembra de plátano y frutales, y según sus tres últimos testigos, aportados supuestamente para “aclarar o probar” lo que los anteriores no habían podido decir, el terreno “siempre se ha dedicado a conservación y los actos posesorios han sido los que requiere una finca de tal naturaleza”.

XIII.-- En cuanto a la delimitación del inmueble, este Tribunal toma en cuenta el mismo formaba parte de una unidad material, a la cual hacen referencia varios de los testigos recibidos . Sin embargo, al decidir el promovente plantear su inscripción por partes, en concreto en este caso un terreno con una medida de 9562.14 metros cuadrados, está obligado a delimitarlo en forma clara. Igualmente los testigos que ofrece deben conocerlo de esa forma, y poder explicar que es lo que saben al respecto, pues de otra manera no se podría aceptar, ni se tendría certeza, sobre si lo declarado se refiere al terreno objeto de titulación. En ese sentido, de los primeros testigos que declararon en autos: [Nombre12] y [Nombre13] , indicaron el terreno estaba cercado por los cuatros costados. [Nombre12] incluso especificó el levantamiento de las cercas eran para él los actos posesorios ejercidos. [Nombre14] no se refirió a la forma como estaba delimitado el terreno, y tampoco conocía sus colindancias (folio 26). [Nombre9] dice que por ser la finca muy quebrada nunca se ha interesado en saberlas. Agrega: “El inmueble está dedicado a la agricultura. Esta propiedad antes era una sola finca pero la han venido loteando no sé con que intención. No sé si está rondeada o cercada ya que esos son unos cercos que cuesta mucho andarlos” (folio 77). [Nombre8] (folio 78), afirmó el “lote pertenece a una finca grande de aproximadamente ochenta y más hectáreas, cuyas colindancias por el rumbo oeste es con [Dirección7] , al este con [Dirección8] , al norte con un gringo cuyo nombre no sé y al sur no recuerdo de quien”. Aparte de los problemas que implican el conocer el lote como parte de otro terreno para efectos de ubicación del mismo, éste testigo no es útil entonces para demostrar los linderos específicos y actuales del que se pretende titular, pues se desprende de su dicho se refiere al terreno como un todo y no a la parte que se pretendía titular. Los últimos tres testigos, [Nombre16] , [Nombre10] y [Nombre11] , no se refieren a las colindancias del terreno (folios 103 al 105.- Pero además de lo dicho, el titulante en su memorial inicial afirma haber realizado como actos de posesión la hechura de cercas (folio 8). Esa afirmación y lo indicado por los primeros testigos citados anteriormente, se ve desvirtuada con lo constatado en el reconocimiento judicial realizado en junio del 2001, pues claramente se indicó no estaba cercado el inmueble, existiendo como delimitación carriles (ver acta de folio 51).

XIV.- Lo analizado es suficiente para tener por no demostrados los presupuestos básicos para acoger la presente gestión. Pero independientemente de ello, es importante indicar en cuanto a los agravios restantes lo siguiente. Lo alegado en el tercero respecto de no ser cierto el argumento del a quo de ser fácil de enmontar la zona y por ende luego de pasada una cosecha se vuelva rápidamente de regeneración natural, es improcedente, aparte de tratarse de una situación que debe ser analizada y demostrada en cada caso en concreto, dependiendo del tipo de vegetación y condiciones naturales de la zona específica. Pero, en este asunto, aunque fuese cierto pudiese ser un área de fácil regeneración, ello no varía la conclusión a la que llega el Tribunal en cuanto al no cumplimiento de los requisitos necesarios para aprobar esta titulación.

XV.- Del sexto agravio debe decirse, no puede el Tribunal limitar las facultades del juzgador de instancia en forma general,, en cuanto a la admisión y valoración de la prueba, [Nombre19] si el numeral 11 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias dispone: “El juez podrá cuando lo crea conveniente, ordenar todas aquellas diligencias que estime necesarias para comprobar la veracidad de los hechos a que se refiere la Información. Rechazará la misma si llegare a constatar que se pretende titular indebidamente baldíos nacionales o terrenos pertenecientes a cualquier institución del Estado, lo mismo que reservas forestales, parques nacionales o reservas biológicas”. Sin embargo, en esta oportunidad, dado lo acontecido y demostrado en autos, lleva razón el Procurador al reclamar se admitió en forma indebida la ampliación de prueba testimonial, no solo en una, sino en dos oportunidades. Lo anterior por cuanto en marzo del 2001 se recibieron los tres primeros testigos ofrecidos por el titulante, tal y como lo exige el artículo 6 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. En esa primera ocasión debe resaltar el Tribunal, la prueba la recibió un Juez comisionado, lo cual no es una práctica admisible en materia agraria, por sus fines, que propician el respeto, salvo excepciones calificadas, del principio de inmediatez. [Nombre19] en casos como el presente, donde está de por medio la protección de una zona protegida, y al ser la actuación comisionada la evacuación de una prueba fundamental para el fondo de lo llamado a resolver, como lo es la testimonial. Luego de ello consta se apersonó la Procuraduría, quien recordó debía demostrarse el ejercicio decenal de la posesión con anterioridad a la fecha de vigencia del decreto que creó la zona protegida de marras. Inaceptablemente, el a quo utiliza como argumento para justificar la ampliación de prueba testimonial, haberse apersonado dicho ente en forma posterior a esas primeras declaraciones. Independientemente de lo alegado por el Procurador, el Juez por principio conoce el derecho y está obligado a velar por el cumplimiento del requisito dicho. La parte titulante además, debía desde el momento en que ofreció prueba testimonial, corroborar los testigos conociesen el terreno durante el tiempo suficiente para poder probar los hechos por ella afirmados. Si error o ignorancia, suya o de su asesor legal, no los acredita en la forma debida en el momento oportuno, es una carga que solo debe imputarse en su contra bajo su responsabilidad. No corresponde al juez subsanar dicha situación, salvo que, sin violentar sus funciones y en tutela de los derechos de la parte y con respecto del ordenamiento vigente, considere en forma fundada, sea estrictamente necesario recibir alguna prueba adicional. Posterior a ello, se realiza un reconocimiento judicial, en el cual no puede este Tribunal dejar de señalar, se levanta un acta con descripción bastante limitada del terreno (ver folio 51). En memorial de fecha 7 de diciembre del 2001, el titulante pide se le permita ofrecer otros dos testigos, por cuanto los señores [Nombre14] y José Pérez, tenían poco tiempo de conocer la finca, a lo cual accede el Juzgador de instancia. Se recibieron así en febrero del 2002 las declaraciones de [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] (folios 77 y 78). Debido a contradicciones entre lo declarado por ellos y lo afirmado por el titulante, éste presenta dos memoriales. En el primero pretende “aclarar” lo dicho por ellos en cuanto a ser derivada la forma de adquisición del inmueble, lo cual contradice lo afirmado por el titulante. En el segundo, el apoderado judicial del titulante solicita se reciban tres testigos más, “…con el fin de demostrar que las tierras que pretende titular mi representado siempre han estado en manos de él y o su familia y que la transmisión de padres a hijos se ha dado en forma verbal; que a si mismo la posesión ejercida lo ha sido con mucho mas de diez (sic) de antelación a la publicación de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización…”. Pese a que con esa manifestación se varía lo afirmado inicialmente por el promovente, y a haberse admitido ya cinco testimonios, el juez de instancia accede a recibirlos en junio del 2002 (folios 99). Estos, aparte de afirmar conocer la finca desde 1950, no aportan mucha información sobre el terreno, e incluso hacen aún más contradictoria la recibida en su totalidad. Aclara el Tribunal este agravio se admite en este caso en concreto, por cuanto como ya se explicó, es facultad del Juez de instancia determinar el número de testigos que necesita para fallar, y en cuanto a lo establecido en el artículo 6 citado sobre el número de testigos, su extensión no es ilegal, siempre y cuando sea estrictamente necesario y se corrobore no se altera con ello el cumplimiento efectivo de los fines de la legislación vigente. Lo inaceptable es permitir el gestionante vaya “subsanando” o alterando a su conveniencia, lo que ha afirmado o bien ha ido quedando demostrado, conforme va transcurriendo el proceso. [Nombre19] si la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias es clara en cuanto a requisitos, y existe una gran cantidad de pronunciamientos por parte de los Tribunales que han resuelto y explicado como se interpretan y deben cumplir cada uno de ellos. En el caso, en vista de las afirmaciones de los dos primeros testigos recibidos [Nombre12] y [Nombre14] (folios 28 y 26), sobre conocer el terreno desde hacía apenas 10 o 12 años, se puede entender se haya ordenado recibir dos testigos más, los cuales se suponen debían tener conocimiento sobre el mismo con muchos años más de antelación, y además, lógicamente, estar lo suficientemente enterados para poder informar al juez sobre todos los detalles que éste requiriese en cuanto a tiempo de posesión, actos ejercidos, delimitación y demás datos fundamentales. Incluso, aún cuando el juez omitiese hacer alguna pregunta de especial interés para corroborar lo informado por el titulante, éste y su asesor legal pueden estar presentes en la declaración y solicitar se hagan al declarante las preguntas pertinentes que el juzgador haya dejado de hacer. Pero luego de los segundos testigos, injustificadamente a la luz de lo alegado, como se explicó, se recibieron tres más.

XVI.- El sétimo agravio se rechaza por no demostrarse el inmueble que se pretende titular en el expediente Nº00-100077-417AG del Juzgado Agrario de Nicoya, traslape con el que es objeto de la presente diligencia. En el informe solicitado al Catastro Nacional, se indica incluso el plano P-54225-1963 citado en el informe respectivo del Juzgado de Nicoya, no traslapa con el plano P-589856-1999. Tampoco el resto de planos referidos a las informaciones posesorias que tramita el promovente, según lo indicado por el Catastro Nacional traslapan documentalmente (folios 159 a 162). Al respecto, claramente indica la porción descrita en el plano P-590611-99, que corresponde al presente asunto, no se traslapa con el citado plano de 1963. Por ende, las alegaciones de la Procuraduría al respecto resultan improcedentes.

XVII.- Finalmente, debe además hacer notar el Tribunal, en los considerandos de la sentencia impugnada, más que analizarse la prueba y el cumplimiento de los presupuestos procesales y de fondo exigidos para acoger la diligencia, se combate la posición de la Procuraduría, al considerar ésta incurre en una práctica “inconveniente” de cambiar las “reglas del juego”. Asimismo, existe una contradicción entre lo afirmado en el escrito inicial sobre no existir cargas reales sobre el inmueble y lo consignado en el plano base de las diligencias, al marcarse la existencia de una servidumbre de paso, que evidentemente sirve de acceso al mismo. Ello no solo es una discordancia que debió ser advertida por el a quo, para que en caso de ser pertinente, ordenase demostrar su constitución en la forma debida y se aclarase cual era el fundo sirviente, si estaba o no inscrito, medidas de la servidumbre (ancho y largo) y fin de la misma. Pero además, en este caso, dado que el inmueble forma parte de una zona protegida, de no haber consolidado el titulante su derecho según lo anteriormente expuesto, resultaba improcedente la constitución de un gravamen como el citado. Al respecto, recuérdese las áreas silvestre protegidas estatales forman parte del patrimonio natural del Estado (artículos 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 13 y 14 de La Ley Forestal; 58 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, voto de la Sala Constitucional N°2988 de las 11:57 horas del 23 de abril de 1999 y Nº755-03 citado del Tribunal Agrario). Este por su parte, está conformado por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, áreas declaradas inalienables, fincas inscritas a nombre del Estado, fincas de las municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, excepto inmuebles que garanticen operaciones crediticias del Sistema Bancario Nacional y formen parte de su patrimonio (artículos 13 y 15 Ley Forestal). Los terrenos forestales y bosques comprendidos dentro del patrimonio natural del Estado son inembargables, inalienables e imprescriptibles, de conformidad con los numerales 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal, y no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil (ver al respecto los votos N°1092 de las 16:09 horas del 7 de febrero del 2001 y N°421 de las 15:20 horas del 16 de enero del 2001. En igual sentido el N°2988 de las 11:57 horas del 23 de abril de 1999, todos de la Sala Constitucional).

XVIII.- En razón de todo lo expuesto, deberá revocarse la resolución recurrida, en cuanto aprobó las presentes diligencias de información posesoria. En su lugar, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 1, 7 y 11 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y demás normativa citada, se rechazan las diligencias de información posesoria establecidas por [Nombre1] .

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida por ambas partes para mejor proveer. Se revoca la resolución recurrida. En su lugar, se rechaza la diligencia de información posesoria establecida por [Nombre1] .- ALEXANDRA ALVARADO PANIAGUA ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA C.B.M ORDINARIO TIT:// [Nombre1]