← Environmental Law Center← Centro de Derecho Ambiental
OutcomeResultado
The Third Chamber denies the appeals and upholds the embezzlement convictions, rejecting the claims of formal defects, violation of due process, and erroneous application of criminal law.La Sala Tercera declara sin lugar los recursos de casación interpuestos y confirma las condenas por peculado, rechazando los alegatos de defectos formales, violación del debido proceso y errónea aplicación de la ley penal.
SummaryResumen
The Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice reviews appeals against a conviction for embezzlement of public funds at the General Directorate of Civil Aviation. The Chamber rejects the defense arguments and upholds the convictions, ruling that embezzlement is not a 'personal-handed' crime and admits co-perpetration when several public officials, acting under a common plan, make essential contributions to the misappropriation of funds under their administration or custody. It holds that signing checks without genuine consideration, as part of a scheme to divert public monies, constitutes perpetration and not mere complicity. The ruling clarifies that the officer authorized to sign checks does not lose legal control over deposited funds, and that misappropriation is completed by breaking public custody through acts such as issuing checks to pay fictitious obligations.La Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia analiza recursos de casación contra una sentencia condenatoria por peculado, en la que varios funcionarios de la Dirección General de Aviación Civil fueron declarados coautores y cómplices. La Sala rechaza los argumentos de las defensas y confirma las condenas, estableciendo que el peculado no es un delito de propia mano y admite la coautoría cuando varios funcionarios, en virtud de un plan común, realizan aportes esenciales para sustraer fondos públicos que tenían bajo su administración o custodia. Determina que la firma de cheques sin contraprestación real, como parte de un concierto para desviar dineros públicos, constituye un acto de autoría y no una mera complicidad. La decisión aclara que la disponibilidad jurídica sobre los fondos depositados en una cuenta bancaria no la pierde el funcionario autorizado para girar cheques, y que la sustracción se perfecciona al quebrantar la tutela pública mediante actos como el libramiento de títulos para pagar obligaciones ficticias.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The defense's argument is based on several postulates that this Chamber does not share, considering them erroneous, which completely undermines the substantive conclusions presented. In this regard, and contrary to the appellant's criterion, we consider that embezzlement does not fall within the classification of 'personal-handed' crimes; that this offense does admit co-perpetration; that Nombre09 was not the only accused whose conduct matched the description of the type provided in Article 354 of the Criminal Code; that the action carried out by Nombre01 cannot be classified as mere 'complicity'; that the depositor continues to have control over the funds deposited in the bank; that, for this reason, the account holder (who has the 'power' to sign the checks) continues to have the administration and custody of those funds; and, finally, that in this case we are not faced with the crime of fraud but with embezzlement. These latter requirements are not present in the embezzlement offense at hand, since the defining verbs of the punishable action (misappropriate or divert) do not refer to a single, specific method of commission, do not appeal to a specific physical activity, nor do they allude to a necessary personal intervention. Therefore, although we are in the presence of a special own offense, where to hold the status of perpetrator two elements are required: i) certain personal qualities constitutive of the offense (not only the condition of a public official but also that he/she has the administration, custody or receipt of the public goods or funds upon which the action falls); and ii) according to the objective material theory, functional control of the act (since in this type of crime it is not ruled out that an intraneus can intervene as a participant), this in no way means that it is a personal-handed crime, because by not describing the criminal type a specific form of commission, nor requiring a determined bodily activity by the subject, the misappropriation or diversion could be carried out in many different ways. That being so, it is clear that in the case at hand the action of Nombre01 was correctly classified as co-perpetration in the crime of embezzlement, since it was committed through a series of complex behaviors, carried out by several subjects, where each one fulfilled a certain role and made a contribution, all acting with the common purpose of misappropriating public funds whose administration and custody were clearly entrusted to the co-defendants Nombre01 and Nombre05... Nor would the argument be admissible that in a checking account contract the depositor loses control over the deposited goods, or that only the bank maintains the administration or custody of them. In this regard, we cannot lose sight of the fact that nowadays, with the complex development that commercial exchange relationships have experienced, cash transactions have practically disappeared, since for security reasons it is normal to opt to make payments through different instruments, and even through electronic fund transfers, so it is not usual for the administrator of a private company or public organ to keep the assets in nominal and effective money under his material and direct care. That being so, it is clear that according to the rules of experience, although such monies are deposited in a bank account, which materially and directly are entrusted to the bank, the depositor (or the subject representing him) does not thereby lose control over them, despite the fact that they are not fungible goods but values. That being so, it is clear that the subject who has the authority to draw checks against such a bank account has a duty of administration and custody over it, not only because with that authority he exercises a control mechanism but also because, in addition, through his drawer signature he can determine an expenditure or impairment of the same.El planteamiento del defensor parte de varios postulados que esta Sala no comparte, por considerarlos erróneos, lo que desmerece por completo las conclusiones de fondo que presenta. En este sentido, y contrario al criterio de quien recurre, los suscritos consideramos que el peculado no entra en la clasificación de los 'delitos de propia mano'; que tal figura sí admite la coautoría; que Nombre09 no fue el único imputado que ajustó su conducta a la descripción del tipo previsto por el artículo 354 del Código Penal; que la acción desarrollada por Nombre01 no podría calificarse como una simple 'complicidad'; que el depositante sigue manteniendo la disponibilidad sobre los dineros depositados en el banco; que, por esto, el cuentacorrentista (quien tiene la 'potestad' de firmar los cheques) sigue manteniendo la administración y custodia de esos dineros; y, por último, que en la especie no nos encontramos ante un delito de estafa sino frente a un peculado. Estas últimas exigencias no se encuentran presentes en el delito de peculado que nos ocupa, pues los verbos definitorios de la acción punible (sustraer o distraer) no aluden a una única y concreta forma de comisión, no apelan a una actividad corporal específica, ni tampoco aluden a una intervención personal necesaria. Debido a ello, si bien nos encontramos en presencia de un delito especial propio, donde para ostentar el grado de autor se requieren dos elementos: i) ciertas calidades personales constitutivas de la infracción (no sólo la condición de funcionario público sino, además, que el mismo tenga la administración, custodia o percepción de los bienes o fondos públicos sobre los cuales recae la acción); y ii) de acuerdo a la teoría material objetiva, dominio funcional del hecho (pues en este tipo de delitos no se descarta que un intraneus pueda intervenir a título de partícipe), ello de ningún modo significa que se trate de un delito de propia mano, pues al no describir el tipo penal una forma de comisión específica, ni requerir una actividad corporal determinada por parte del sujeto, la sustracción o distracción podrían llevarse a cabo de muchas maneras diversas. Siendo ello así, es claro que en el caso que nos ocupa la acción de Nombre01 fue correctamente calificada como una coautoría en el delito de peculado, pues el mismo fue cometido a partir de una serie de conductas complejas, llevadas a cabo por varios sujetos, donde cada uno cumplió un determinado rol e hizo un aporte, siendo que todos actuaron con el fin común de sustraer los fondos públicos cuya administración y custodia le estaba encomendada claramente a los coimputados Nombre01 y Nombre05... Tampoco sería de recibo el planteamiento de que en el contrato de cuenta corriente el depositante pierda la disponibilidad sobre los bienes depositados, o que sólo sea el ente bancario el que mantiene la administración o custodia de éstos. Al respecto no podríamos perder de vista que en la actualidad, con el complicado desarrollo que han experimentado las relaciones comerciales de intercambio, prácticamente han desaparecido las transacciones en efectivo, pues por razones de seguridad, lo normal es que se opte por realizar los pagos a través de diferentes títulos, e incluso a través de transferencias electrónicas de fondos, de donde no resulta usual que el administrador de una empresa privada u órgano público, mantenga bajo su cuidado material y directo los caudales en dinero nominal y efectivo. Siendo ello así, es claro que conforme a las reglas de la experiencia, si bien se depositan en una cuenta bancaria dichos dineros, los que material y directamente quedan confiados al ente bancario, no por ello el depositante (o el sujeto que lo represente) pierde la disponibilidad sobre los mismos, ello a pesar de que no se trate de bienes no fungibles sino de valores. Siendo ello así, es claro que el sujeto que ostenta la atribución de girar los cheques contra tal cuenta bancaria, tiene sobre la misma un deber de administración y custodia, no sólo porque con aquella ejerce un mecanismo de control sino porque, además, a través de su firma giradora puede determinar una erogación o menoscabo de la misma.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"el peculado no entra en la clasificación de los 'delitos de propia mano'; que tal figura sí admite la coautoría"
"embezzlement does not fall within the classification of 'personal-handed' crimes; that this offense does admit co-perpetration"
Considerando VI
"el peculado no entra en la clasificación de los 'delitos de propia mano'; que tal figura sí admite la coautoría"
Considerando VI
"el depositante sigue manteniendo la disponibilidad sobre los dineros depositados en el banco"
"the depositor continues to have control over the funds deposited in the bank"
Considerando VI
"el depositante sigue manteniendo la disponibilidad sobre los dineros depositados en el banco"
Considerando VI
"la sustracción o distracción podrían llevarse a cabo de muchas maneras diversas"
"misappropriation or diversion could be carried out in many different ways"
Considerando VI
"la sustracción o distracción podrían llevarse a cabo de muchas maneras diversas"
Considerando VI
"el garante de la legitimidad del acto es el juez y no el defensor público que facultativamente haya sido llamado a intervenir"
"the guarantor of the act's legality is the judge and not the public defender who optionally may have been called to intervene"
Considerando VII
"el garante de la legitimidad del acto es el juez y no el defensor público que facultativamente haya sido llamado a intervenir"
Considerando VII
Full documentDocumento completo
CASE File: 98-017767-0042-PE Resolution: 2003-00776 THIRD CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours twenty-five minutes on the ninth of September of two thousand three.
Appeal for cassation (Recurso de casación) filed in the present case brought against Nombre01, Costa Rican, of legal age, identity card CED02, resident of Nombre02 in Alajuela, child of Nombre03 and Nombre04, Nombre05, Costa Rican, of legal age, identity card CED03, resident of Coronado, child of Nombre05, Nombre06, Costa Rican, of legal age, identity card CED04, resident of Pavas, child of Nombre07 and Nombre08, and Nombre09, Costa Rican, of legal age, identity card CED05, resident of Pavas, child of Nombre09 and Nombre10, for the crime of EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO), committed to the detriment of THE DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE (LOS DEBERES DE LA FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA). Participating in the decision on the appeal are the Magistrates Daniel González Álvarez, Presiding Judge, Jesús Alberto Ramírez Quirós, Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Rdrigo Castro Monge, and José Manuel Arroyo Gutiérrez. Also appearing at this instance is Doctor Walter Antillón Montealegre, acting as private defense counsel for the accused Nombre11, Attorney Hugo Chavarría Céspedes, public defender for the accused Nombre09, and Attorney Gino Corazzi Aguilar, private defense counsel for the defendant Nombre06.
WHEREAS:
1. That by judgment No. 03302, handed down at nine hours on the sixth of February of two thousand two, the Trial Penal Court of Goicoechea resolved: “THEREFORE (POR TANTO): In accordance with the foregoing, articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution; 1, 30, 31, 36, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 57, subsection 2°, 71 to 74, 103, 354, 356, and 363 of the Penal Code (Código Penal); 122, 124, and 126 of the Current Rules on Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code; 265, 175 to 179, 150, 184, 233, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, and 368 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal); it is resolved unanimously: 1. to declare Nombre01 and Nombre05 CO-PERPETRATORS (COAUTORES), and Nombre06 and Nombre09, ACCOMPLICES (COMPLICES), all of the crime of EMBEZZLEMENT (PECULADO), as thus reclassified, committed to the detriment of THE DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE (LOS DEBERES DE LA FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA); 2. in that capacity, to impose as a sanction, on each of them, the following penalties: Nombre01, the term of EIGHT YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT (OCHO AÑOS DE PRISIÓN); Nombre05, the term of SEVEN YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT (SIETE AÑOS DE PRISIÓN); Nombre06, the term of SIX YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT (SEIS AÑOS DE PRISIÓN); and Nombre09, the term of FIVE YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT (CINCO AÑOS DE PRISIÓN); 3. that said Convicts shall serve these penalties, after credit for any pretrial detention (preventivas) they have undergone, in the place and manner determined by the respective penitentiary regulations, with the corresponding communications being made to the National Institute of Criminology (Instituto Nacional de Criminología), to the Judicial Registry (Registro Judicial), and to the Sentence Enforcement Judge (Juez de Ejecución de La Pena); 4. furthermore, as an accessory sanction, ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT, OR COMMISSIONS (INHABILITACIÓN ABSOLUTA PARA OBTENER CARGOS, EMPLEOS O COMISIONES PÚBLICAS) is imposed on all Convicts, for the entire term of TEN YEARS, and the foregoing must be communicated to the General Directorate of the Civil Service (Dirección General del Servicio Civil) and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio Obras Públicas y Transportes); 5. the Civil Restitution Action (Acción Civil Resarcitoria) brought by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de La República) on behalf of the Costa Rican State is upheld, ordering all its Civil Defendants, here Convicts, to jointly and severally pay the sum of FIVE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND COLONS (CINCO MILLONES OCHOCIENTOS OCHENTA MIL COLONES) for Material Damages (Daño Material), and for Damages (Perjuicio), the legal interest accrued on said principal sum from January 10, 1996 until its effective payment, which shall be fixed in accordance with the passive rate for term savings certificates by the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica); 6. the costs of the criminal proceedings are the responsibility of the sentenced persons. NOTIFY BY READING." (sic). Sheets. ATTORNEY Nombre12. ATTORNEY Nombre13. ATTORNEY Nombre14.
2. That against the preceding ruling, Doctor Walter Antillón Montealegre, private defense counsel for Nombre01, and Attorneys Hugo Chavarría, public defender for Nombre09, Gino Corazzari Aguilar, private defense counsel for Nombre06, and the defendant Nombre05, filed appeals for cassation (recursos de casación). In the grounds of form (motivos por la forma) of the appeal he filed, Dr. Antillón Montealegre alleges: a) lack of reasoning for the penalty (fundamentación de la pena) because it is based on contradictory reasoning, being inconsistent and assessing illegal evidence consisting of: I) violation of the right to defense during the search and seizure (allanamiento y registro) carried out, II) testimony of suspects without the legal warnings, III) evidence ordered for the better provision of justice (prueba para mejor proveer) ordered illegally, and IV) illegal incorporation of the testimony of Nombre15, incomplete reasoning of the judgment (fundamentación incompleta de la sentencia), lack of reasoning regarding the proven facts (falta de fundamentación de los hechos probados), and lack of legal reasoning (falta de fundamentación jurídica), b) violation of the rules of sound critique (sana crítica) and the principle of in dubio pro reo, c) mutation and lack of correlation between the action and the judgment, d) lack of reasoning ad causam and violation of due process, e) violation of the continuity of procedural acts, and f) omission of reasoning in setting the penalty.
Regarding defects on the merits (vicios por el fondo), he alleges violation and erroneous application of articles 45, 354, and 216 all of the Penal Code; he considers articles 9, 70, 71, 81, 82, 142, 175, 178, 184, 334, 336, 347, 348, 361 and 363, subsections b) and c), and 365 all of the Code of Criminal Procedure violated, as well as article 8, subsection 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and articles 24, 33, 36, 37, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution. He requests that the appeal be granted and that a remand (reenvío) be ordered for new proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the law. For his part, Attorney Hugo Chavarría Céspedes alleges in the grounds of his appeal: a) judgment based on decisive evidentiary elements illegally incorporated into the process, b) defective procedural activity due to the illegal participation of the complainant, and c) lack of reasoning of the judgment, violating articles 76, 77, 181, 184, 369 subsections c) and d).
He requests that the contested judgment be annulled and that the remand of the file be ordered for new proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the law. In the appeal filed by Attorney Corazzari Aguilar, he alleges in the grounds of form: a) lack of reasoning of the judgment, b) illegitimate reasoning of the judgment due to the illegal incorporation into the process of illegitimate evidentiary elements, c) illegitimate reasoning due to the principle of correlation between the accusation and the judgment, by illegally modifying Nombre16's accusation during the trial, without proceeding with the process of expanding the new facts so that the right to defense could be exercised, d) lack of reasoning for non-compliance with the rules of rational sound critique in the assessment of decisive evidentiary elements or means, and e) violation of the rules of sound critique. Regarding the grounds on the merits, he alleges: I) non-compliance with or erroneous application of article 36 of the Penal Code, II) erroneous application of articles 47 and 354 of the Penal Code, considering that the foregoing violates articles: 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, 1, 12, 15, 62, 74, 76, 127, 128, 142, 143, 175, to 183, 204, 233, 234, 334 subsection c), 369 subsections b), c), and d) all of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
He requests that the appeal be granted, the judgment annulled, and the remand of the file ordered for new proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the law. Regarding the appeal filed by the defendant Nombre05, he alleges in the grounds thereof: a) lack of reasoning of the judgment, b) contradictory reasoning of the judgment, c) absence of reasoning regarding the imposed sanction, violating articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution and 369 subsections a), b), and c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He requests that the judgment be annulled and the remand of the file ordered for a new procedure in compliance with the law.
3. That after the respective deliberation was verified, the Chamber addressed the issues raised in the appeal.
4. That at eight hours thirty minutes on the first of July, the scheduled oral and public hearing took place.
5. That in the proceedings, the pertinent legal requirements have been observed.
Magistrate González Álvarez reports and, CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO):
Appeal by Dr. Walter Antillón Montealegre, private defense counsel for the co-defendant Nombre01 (cfr. volume II, folios 232 to 383).
Lack of reasoning, as well as violation of the rules of sound criticism and the in dubio pro reo principle. Citing articles 9, 70, 71, 81, 82, 142, 175, 178, 184, 334, 336, 347, 348, 361, and 363 of the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure; 8.2 paragraphs d), e), and f) of the American Convention on Human Rights; and 24, 33, 36, 37, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution (it is noted here that these regulations are cited in support of all claims for errors of form), the private defense counsel for co-defendant Nombre01 alleges the existence of formal defects in the reasoning of the trial court's conviction, namely:
folio 102, lines 12 to 15; and folio 103, lines 4 to 6). For his part, Nombre19 stated: “... in ninety-six, precisely on the fourth of January, he called my workshop and told me that there was a gentleman at the Airport who wanted to give work to two workshops, that he was interested in helping me, that he needed me to tell him who the legal representative of the company was and its legal status, I gave it to him and he said he would let me know about the possible jobs they were going to give us. On January 8, ninety-six, he called and told us that they were doing a job for Civil Aviation and that by mistake, the check that was supposed to be issued in favor of his workshop was issued in the name of our workshop, he told this to my wife, my wife told me when I arrived, Nombre18 at that moment was the one who called and requested if we could give him the invoice so he could be responsible for that check, that he could pay us the taxes ...
When he called me on the morning of January 4, he told me that since he knew my workshop and it was big, he had an invitation from the Airport that they needed some large workshops for some jobs, he told me they were big jobs lasting a long time. He did not tell me how much was going to be charged for the jobs, only the data and information about the workshop, I told him I was the general attorney-in-fact, I gave him my ID number and the legal identification number of the workshop. Then he calls me on January 8, ninety-six, my wife answers because I am in Pérez Zeledón, her name is Nombre29, who did not know Nombre18, he identified himself as Nombre18, he called to tell us that by mistake Civil Aviation had issued a check for our workshop and it was for them, that if I could give him the invoice and he would pay us the taxes, he said he would call when I arrived from Pérez Zeledón, he did not call or visit me ...
(cf. folio 103, lines 21 to 30; and folio 105, lines 12 to 22). Adhering to the content of the judgment, it is noted that, indeed, regarding this matter of the telephone calls, there is a clear difference between the versions provided by both witnesses, since Nombre19 indicated that Nombre18 called on January 4, 1996, to ask him that, since some jobs had come up at the airport, he needed information regarding the workshop, which he (Nombre19) supplied to him at that moment. Also, that on January 8, the former made a second call, where he spoke with his wife, to whom he indicated that they (the Rocaba workshop) were doing a job for Civil Aviation and that by mistake the check that was supposed to be issued in their favor was issued in the name of the Nombre21 del Oeste workshop, for which reason he needed her to provide a stamped invoice for the amount of the cited instrument. On the contrary, Nombre18 never acknowledged the content of the second call, although he confusingly stated that he did call the Nombre21 workshop and on that occasion he spoke with the wife of Nombre19, from whom he requested the workshop data and informed her that some jobs had come up at the airport.
As can be inferred, Nombre18 reversed the conversations, since he only admitted the content of the first call that Nombre19 mentioned, although changing his interlocutor (substituting him with Mrs. Nombre29), while he never acknowledged that he had requested a stamped invoice from her (the content of the second call that Nombre19 mentioned). When evaluating these two accounts, the judges stated the following: “... From the testimonies of Nombre18 and Nombre19, none of the contradictions that the Defense Attorneys so insistently affirmed are extracted; on the contrary, from the confrontation of both, coincidence is extracted in the most relevant informing circumstances. This notwithstanding, it does not prevent us from recognizing, in light of the most elementary common sense, that Nombre18, for the reasons noted above, omitted to refer to some circumstances, which, from the exercise of confronting his testimonies with that of Nombre23, can easily be extracted.
It is evident that Nombre18, motivated either by astonishment or because he was initially attracted by the illegitimate proposal that Nombre15 and Nombre01 were making him to earn six hundred thousand colones so easily, did not reject that obscure negotiation ad portas, and therefore, it is understandable that he omitted to refer to some circumstances that, nonetheless, are easily revealed from the set of declarations examined so far ...” (cf. folio 156, line 30 onwards), to later point out that “... It is then as a result of this first call that Nombre18 calls Nombre19 on the morning of January 4, 1996, an occasion on which the latter gives him information about the Hermo workshop. It is also extracted that Nombre18’s first visit to Nombre01’s office (in which he receives the checks) occurs on January 8, 1996, since it is after already having the checks in his possession that he makes the call to the Nombre21 workshop and is attended to by the wife of Nombre19 (Mrs.
Nombre29) and where he states to her that he needs an invoice for three million. It is also evident that if in that call Nombre18 tells Nombre29 that they are carrying out works at the airport, he does not do it because it is true, but to give some valid explanation to Nombre19 of why (sic), supposedly and by mistake, a check was issued in the name of Nombre21 and that made him need its invoice to support it and cash it ...” (cf. folio 157, lines 17 to 29). As can be seen, although in the first part of this last extract it seems that the judges were inclined to accept the version of Mr. Nombre19, later, as the content of the second call, the version given by Nombre18 was included (insofar as he said that, when speaking with Mrs. Nombre29, he let her know that some jobs had come up at the airport), when according to Nombre19 what he actually said was that they were doing some jobs for Civil Aviation, and that because of that, an erroneous check had been issued.
Despite the fact that a meticulous analysis was not carried out in this regard, but rather only a very specific and laconic reasoning was resorted to, which in any case meets the requirements for substantiation, to justify why they departed in this aspect from Nombre18, the judges indicated that the latter omitted to refer to some circumstances, possibly because he was initially tempted to accept the proposal made to him. Notwithstanding these evident discrepancies between said testimonies, it is the criterion of these magistrates that they could not give rise to the annulment or disqualification that is sought, since they fall on aspects of no greater essentiality, and furthermore, the judgment analyzes them and provides an explanation, although very specific, but valid, of why at this point they departed from the statement of Nombre18.
It should be noted that regarding the main core of this question, it is observed that there is coincidence between the witnesses, since both give an account that Nombre18 was being offered some industrial jobs, for which at least two workshops with legal identification numbers were required. Although it is true that he never accepted that he had requested a stamped invoice from the wife of Nombre19 (he completely omitted referring to that point), the judges indicated that in that respect Mr. Nombre18 did not tell the truth, estimating that it was understandable that he needed some excuse for having requested said document knowing that those jobs had not been carried out. Although from this approach one could initially come to consider that the deponent is not reliable and that he might even have had some participation and responsibility in the illicit act, such a conclusion must be completely dismissed, since one must not lose sight of the fact that according to a global and comprehensive evaluation of the entire factual picture, it is easily inferred that at first he hesitated to reject the improper proposal he was subject to, and then decided not to accept it, flatly refusing to participate in the matter.
If that were so, it is well understood that that second telephone call he made, which he denies, where he spoke with the wife of the owner of the Nombre21 del Oeste workshop, could have been made before he opted to definitively reject said proposal. This conclusion can be extracted from the reasoning set forth in the judgment, where the following was indicated: “... telling the truth implied confessing that, even if initially, he hesitated to reject the illicit offer that Nombre01 and Nombre15 were making him. The rules of psychology and experience prove that it is very difficult for any person to tell the truth when it implies confessing in some way that at some moment they wavered in rejecting an immoral or illegitimate proposal. Nonetheless, the court corroborates the truthfulness of his declaration because it is supported by other evidence, but essentially in the objective circumstance that, despite having initially wavered in rejecting the illicit proposal of Nombre01 (and the deceased Nombre15), he managed to overcome the temptation, expressly refusing before them to participate in those events ...” (cf. folio 149, lines 12 to 20).
A situation very similar to the previous one arises with another aspect of the declaration of Mr. Nombre18, who during the debate insisted that he was sure that the calls he received, as well as the two meetings held in the Civil Aviation offices, occurred in the month of August 1995, which generates even more confusion on the same point. Even the Nombre16 accusation originally indicated that those telephone contacts prior to said meetings, as well as the meetings themselves, occurred at this time (cf. point 11 of said document, where they are placed in the month of January 1995, according to folios 185 and 186), and regarding said point, attorney Wagner Molina Ruiz modified it in the debate, specifying that this first meeting occurred on January 9, 1996 (this point is challenged in the third ground of this appeal as will be seen). It is clear that that affirmation by Nombre17 Nombre18 would be irreconcilable with the account provided by Nombre19, with the literal content of the checks and purchase orders, and also with the factual picture that was considered proven, where – we repeat – those events were temporally located in the first days of January 1996 (the 8th and the 9th).
In this sense, Nombre17 stated: “... I think it was in August of ninety-five or ninety-six I don’t remember well, I go to his office he says he wants to help me with some jobs, while there a man named Nombre15 arrived, tall, he was carrying inside a briefcase and took out some documents, he brought two checks, one that was in the name of Nombre21 and another in the name of Nombre22 ... I don’t remember on what date Nombre17 called me, I imagine I answered that call in the workshop, but I think someone must have given him my telephone number. I remember it was in August because at that time we were with the repairs of coffee processing plants and I was at a coffee Cooperative called Coopejorco making some repairs, I place the month well because of work matters, I know exactly it was in August ... Before that, when Nombre17 told me he needed the data, I contacted her by telephone, that is, the wife of Nombre19 and she supplied them to me, other than that I did not speak with her anymore, everything was in that period, one week, it was in the month of August ...” (cf. folio 97, line 15 onwards).
Based on this affirmation by the cited deponent, who (according to the account transcribed in the section intended for the descriptive substantiation) insisted that he was sure that the telephone calls and the 2 meetings occurred in the month of August 1995, the defense now structures a series of reproaches in which it decisively and emphatically questions the legitimacy of the judgment and the very truthfulness of the former, alleging that the Tribunal extracted the proven facts No. 11 and No. 12 from the declaration of Nombre18, to whom full truthfulness was accorded. However, a true evaluation was not made of the many affirmations that this witness made, and based on his declaration some facts are taken as proven in a contradictory manner to how he stated them, because he himself said that the call he received from Nombre01, as well as the two meetings that both had in the latter’s office about a week later, where he received and then returned the checks, occurred in the month of August.
Since these affirmations did not fit, the tribunal decided to overlook them, from which it takes as proven the facts that the witness narrated, but placing them on totally different dates, without explaining why at that point it departed from his statement (cf. point 8 of the first ground). This same aspect is taken up by Dr. Antillón Montealegre in the third ground of his appeal, likewise by attorney Corazzari Aguilar in several points of his challenge.
If the comprehensive content of the judgment is analyzed, it is appreciated that at least in the account transcribed in the section intended for descriptive substantiation, on one hand, indeed Nombre17 insisted and declared himself “sure” that those events occurred in the month of August 1995 (which, as stated, would be irreconcilable with the already corrected accusation; with the proven facts; with the literal content of the checks and purchase orders; and also with the declaration of Nombre19), and on the other hand, that despite the fact that the lower court judges gave credibility to his statement, regarding that aspect it seems that they departed from it without a detailed analysis, since in that regard they simply indicated that Nombre18 was imprecise in locating the facts by dates, and that he himself acknowledged that he was not very good at that: “... This (the defense) detracts from his credibility essentially because he was imprecise regarding the dates on which he said the conversations or meetings with the accused Nombre01 took place, nonetheless Nombre17 himself gave an explanation for this by affirming, in his own words, that he does not have the ability to remember dates, that it is difficult for him.
Contrary to the objections of the Defense, the tribunal concludes that this Nombre17 was truthful in the facts he related ...” (cf. folio 149, lines 5 to 10). Likewise, it draws much attention that in the substantive considerations, when summarizing again and analyzing this declaration, the judges say the following “... For his part, Nombre18 stated that ... one day in January whose date he does not specify, but in the first days of that month, Nombre01 called him again and summoned him to his office to discuss those contracts. That upon attending that office, Nombre01 and Nombre15 were there, and that Nombre15 took out two checks, the same ones he recognizes as those on folios 18 and 23 of the Comptroller's evidence binder, that Nombre01 offered him three hundred thousand colones for each of two stamped invoices from the Nombre22 and Hermo workshops, each of which was to indicate the amount of three million.
That at that moment he chose to take the checks to consult with his partner Nombre31 (sic) Nombre31 Porras, since as co-owner of Nombre22 he also had to decide on that proposal ...” (cf. folio 154, line 26 onwards), from which it seems to be extracted, then, that the deponent did clarify that both the calls and the meetings occurred in the month of January 1996, which would imply that all the dissatisfaction of the defense would lack reason. However, it does seem strange that this specific statement does not appear included in the section intended for the descriptive substantiation, where the content of that declaration was transcribed, because one cannot understand why, if Mr. Nombre18 indeed said such a thing, it was not literally recorded in the section devoted to that point. This situation could not be clarified, since from listening to the tape where that deposition was phonically recorded (cassette No. 9) it is observed that the recording not only begins halfway through the declaration, but also after resuming (it had to be suspended for the purpose of deciding whether to hold a careo) it began recording when it had already restarted, that is, it was not recorded in its entirety, from which it must be concluded that in the part that was not recorded he could well have said what the tribunal indicates, although this could not be confirmed.
On the contrary, from the part that was recorded, it is inferred that the deponent, when asked by the Nombre16 (who wanted him to specify the date on which he received the calls from Nombre01), said “... I don’t remember, I know it is in the month of August, but I don’t remember the exact date ...”. In any case, even assuming that Mr. Nombre18 did not make this specification, it is necessary to point out that the questions that the formulates based on this point, both to the judgment and to the witness’s declaration, are not admissible, because due to their lack of essentiality they would not have the virtue of undermining the foundations of the condemnatory judgment of merit, nor would they allow concluding that the deponent knowingly lied. The fact that Mr. Nombre18 insisted that those calls and meetings occurred in the month of August 1995, despite the fact that it was demonstrated that they necessarily occurred in the first days of January 1996, would in no way allow concluding that he lied, since it is very possible that in that regard he was confused and for that reason he said he was “sure”.
The very possible existence of this confusion is reinforced by verifying the reason he adduced and relied on to justify his conviction that this occurred in August 1995, since he pointed out that at that time they were in the midst of repairs to the coffee processing plants, for which reason his workshop was occupied with some jobs for Cooperjorco: “... I remember it was in August because at that time we were with the repairs of coffee processing plants and I was at a coffee Cooperative called Coopejorco making some repairs, I place the month well because of work matters, I know exactly it was in August ...” (cf. folio 98, line 25 to 28). This “reason” or justification is exactly the same one invoked by his partner Nombre31 to support his conviction that those meetings of Nombre18 at Civil Aviation occurred at the beginning of 1996: “... Nombre18 arrives with the checks around the beginning of ninety-six, because at that moment the coffee harvest is at its peak, we are doing a job in Coopejorco, I also just saw the date on the check.
New Year’s had already passed, I know it was at the beginning of the year ...” (cf. folio 111, lines 21 to 24). An additional element that allows us to rule out that Mr. Nombre18 lied and that, rather, it seems he is confused, consists in that in several extracts of his deposition he indicated that “... Nombre01 told me not to worry that nothing had happened, that they were going to cancel the checks and that I should go home peacefully, that is as far as I know what happened with those events. Months later the Comptroller’s people arrived to verify signatures and other matters, my partner Nombre31 (sic) Nombre31 attended to a short man who later arrived in a Pathfinder to the workshop a month and a half later, he was going to make a gate ... the Comptroller’s people arrived to make the gate about a month after the Comptroller arrived ... The difference between the first meeting with Civil Aviation and the contracting of the gate is about two months ...” (cf. folio 98, lines 1 to 6; and folio 103, line 15).
It is evident that this data he provides would be incorrect, because if we adhere to his statement, that contracting of the gate would be temporally located in the months of September or October 1995, given that it was absolutely clear that it occurred in the month of September 1996 (cf. points 4 and 8 of the list of documentary evidence, visible on folio 98), which allows us to infer that, just as he himself acknowledged, he does not have much capacity to specify or locate events by dates. As observed, although the judges did not carry out an analysis like the one above, it can be extracted from the content of the judgment itself, for which reason the objections in this sense lack reason, whereby it must be understood that the conclusion they establish, in the sense that: “... From the testimonies of Nombre18 and Nombre19, none of the contradictions that the Defenders so insistently affirmed are extracted; on the contrary, from the confrontation of both, coincidence is extracted in the most relevant informing circumstances ...” (cf. folio 156, line 30 onwards, clarifying that the underlining and bold do not appear in the original text), is correct.
A matter similar to the one analyzed previously is noted regarding other internal aspects of the testimony of Nombre18, because if we adhere to the literal content of the judgment, it seems he incurred some inconsistencies within it that are not analyzed in depth by the judges, which has prompted energetic and insistent criticism from the defense attorneys, who have sought to see in it a defect of nullity of the judgment and a supposed mendacity on his part. This position is not shared by this Chamber, because although from the reading of the judgment those contradictions (as well as some errors of the tribunal regarding their analysis) are manifest and undeniable, they would not have the virtue of delegitimizing the condemnatory decision, nor would they allow this Chamber to establish that the deponent lied (which in any case would be barred in this appellate instance of cassation), because they are peripheral aspects lacking any essentiality.
These obscure points in the deposition of Nombre18 are limited to the fact that on one hand he indicated that it was not until the first meeting when he delivered the documents and information relating to the legal statuses of the two workshops to Nombre01 (even the “name” of the same), and that five minutes after having arrived, Nombre15 appeared with the checks already nominally made out in favor of these workshops, which he received and took with him, while at the same time he assured that at the second meeting, held the following day, when he appeared to return said instruments that he had previously taken, Nombre15 appeared with a briefcase and with the checks. In this sense, the judgment indicates that Mr. Nombre18 declared: “... Nombre01 was running for a congressional seat in Nombre02 ... on one occasion I received a call from him, that is, when they appointed him Director of Civil Aviation, he calls me and asks me something and tells me he wants to help us because we helped him a lot in politics, I, interested, tell him yes because I have a workshop and we manufacture machinery and structures ...
I go to his office he says he wants to help me with some jobs, while there a man named Nombre15 arrived, tall, he was carrying inside a briefcase and took out some documents, he brought two checks, one that was in the name of Nombre21 and another in the name of Nombre22 ... It was when he called me to ask for the legal identification numbers of the two workshops, he asked me for that at that moment also when we spoke. I went home and since we are a corporation, I spoke with my partner Nombre31 (sic) Nombre31 and he told me we should talk to the Accountant Nombre28 who told us we couldn’t accept that, that we had to return (the checks) and say no. I appeared again at Civil Aviation and was waiting for about three hours, I entered the office of Nombre01 and by another door Nombre15 also entered again with the briefcase and the checks ... since in the meeting Nombre01 told me they were very big (the jobs), he asked me for the legal identification number of three workshops, I only get him those for two and he told me that was fine.
At that moment when he asks me for the legal identification number is in the meeting, it was before Nombre15 entered. Before that moment I had not provided the name of the workshops. Nombre15 enters about five minutes after I had arrived ... by telephone Nombre17 had asked me for the names of the workshops, already in the meeting was when I took them the documents and legal status ... I mentioned to my partner that since Nombre01 had offered me jobs, they had shown me two checks ... when I left the first time I took the checks on the first visit, I take them to make the invoice, my partner sees them, the accountant tells us to return them, we did not keep any backup of the checks, I keep them and the next day I take them to Civil Aviation and tell him I did not want to participate in that ... The next day I go with the checks and wait for two hours, when he receives me was when I told him I did not want to participate in that, Nombre15 entered again ... when I leave the two of them remain there with the checks ... the fact that he gave me the checks, I was going to return them anyway. Out of the same trust I returned them to him ...” (cf. folio 97, line 9 onwards).
As derives from what was excerpted above, it is undeniable that, internally to his declaration, Nombre18 incurred some inconsistencies, because it is incomprehensible that he says that when he appeared to return the checks he had taken the day before, he observed Nombre15 arriving at the office carrying said instruments. Also, that barely five minutes after he gave the name of the workshops to Nombre01, Nombre15 entered the office with the checks already made out in their favor, without previously indicating that there had been some type of communication between them in any way. Despite the fact that, as indicated and will be taken up again below, the judges did not adequately analyze the aspect we are dealing with, from this it could not be considered that the judgment suffers from nullity or that Mr. Nombre18 lacked truth, since again we would find ourselves before an inconsistency of that testimony that would fall on peripheral aspects lacking essentiality, because regarding the main core of the accusation (above all the illicit proposal of which he was the subject by Nombre01 and Nombre15) there is no major incongruity in his account.
Although these would be the conclusions deriving from the literal content of the judgment as a document, from listening to the audio tape where the debate was phonically recorded (cassette No. 9, beginning in the last part of side A and continuing on side B) one can note that that reference to, in the second meeting, Nombre15 appeared (again) with the briefcase and the checks, Nombre17 made it very quickly, perhaps even carelessly, lightly, or unperceptively, without anyone pointing out the error or inconsistency to him, from which one could even think that it was an aspect to which he did not even pay much attention or consciousness. Moreover, from listening to the aforementioned cassette number 9, it is inferred that, at the end of his declaration and on the occasion of the interrogation to which he was subjected by the prosecutor, the deponent had to reconstruct again what happened in that second meeting, where he made no mention of this objected point, which somehow confirms this Chamber’s appreciation.
On the other hand, it should be noted that, with regard to this deposition, in their substantive analysis the trial judges initially set forth the following: “... The Nombre17 Nombre18 was also deserving of the tribunal’s credibility, although like Nombre24 he was one of the most questioned by the Defense. This detracts from his credibility essentially because he was imprecise regarding the dates on which he said the conversations or meetings with the accused Nombre01 took place, nonetheless Nombre17 himself gave an explanation for this by affirming, in his own words, that he does not have the ability to remember dates, that it is difficult for him. Contrary to the objections of the Defense, the tribunal concludes that this Nombre17 was truthful in the facts he related, essentially because his version was corroborated by other evidence, but also because the notorious difficulty he showed when testifying was not because he was lying, but because telling the truth implied confessing that, even if initially, he hesitated to reject the illicit offer that Nombre01 and Nombre15 were making him.
The rules of psychology and experience prove that it is very difficult for any person to tell the truth when it implies confessing in some way that at some moment they wavered in rejecting an immoral or illegitimate proposal. Nonetheless, the court corroborates the truthfulness of his declaration because it is supported by other evidence, but essentially in the objective circumstance that, despite having initially wavered in rejecting the illicit proposal of Nombre01 (and the deceased Nombre15), he managed to overcome the temptation, expressly refusing before them to participate in those events. As will be stated later, parallel to that illicit proposal, Nombre01 and Nombre15 deliver to this Nombre17 checks 8303 and 8304 already drawn in the name of his workshop and the Nombre21 SA workshop, for amounts of two million nine hundred forty thousand colones each, ready to be endorsed and made effective at the Bank.
Nonetheless, Nombre18 overcomes the temptation to participate in that proposal, despite the fact that it implied not obtaining that money so easily. Overcoming that temptation by refusing to participate in any way in that act and returning the checks prove to the tribunal that he would have no interest in lying in this trial, since he had no typical participation in them. Although not expressly, it is inferred from the Defense’s objections that this is the reproach they make to this witness, and it is in this that they attempt to distort his version.
Nonetheless, as already indicated, the truthfulness of his testimony is verified by evidentiary elements, as will be duly reasoned in due course...” (cf. folio 149, line 3 onwards). As can be observed, the reasoning presented by the judges conforms to the rules of sound human understanding, since it explains that the imprecisions in which the deponent indeed incurred—who even pointed out that he “lacks the ability to remember dates, that it is difficult for him”—could never imply that he lied, nor do they diminish the judgment of reproach established against the accused. And this is because, despite the angry claims of the defense, which (at least regarding the inconsistency that despite having taken the checks, Nombre15 appeared with them the next day) are receivable, his statement (regarding its essential core: the illicit proposition concerning the checks made to him by Nombre01 and Nombre15) was indirectly corroborated by other evidence, such as the depositions of Nombre31 and Nombre19, while recognizing, as he indicated, that those meetings were held “behind closed doors,” that is, without the presence of any third party who could corroborate them directly, whence the objections formulated against him would not have the virtue of causing the nullity of the condemnatory ruling.
Regarding the second internal inconsistency, insofar as Nombre17 stated that he even provided the names of the workshops in the first meeting, with Nombre15 appearing five minutes after he had arrived with the checks already prepared, from listening to the cassette it is possible to understand that in reality everything was due to a deficient transcription of the content of the testimony, since the following emerges from the interrogation conducted by Nombre16: “WITNESS: ‘... in said meeting, in said meeting, that is, when he contacted me by phone, he told me they were large jobs, that, that is, that we had to look for, rather he had asked me for the legal identification number of three workshops, however I only had two, that is, I could only get two at that moment, that was when he told me that two were fine, that three were not necessary.’ PROSECUTOR: ‘Forgive me Nombre18 but, when is it that he tells you to, to look for the legal identification number of three workshops?
When does that happen?’ WITNESS: ‘When we are in the office, that is, when he, before taking out the checks he asks me that we need, that is, that to include us in the list of suppliers for Civil Aviation he needs telephone numbers, uh, legal representatives and who the owners are, the name of, the legal identification number, everything.’ Nombre16: ‘In that, at that moment, when he asks you for the legal identification number and the name of these three workshops is that same moment when, when he is present, or rather, who is present when this is being talked about, about getting the three workshops?’ WITNESS: ‘No, before, before, that is, Nombre15 had not yet entered, that is, it was later, it was, he asked me for all the information on, on, on that he needed all the information on the workshops, so I told him yes, that it was fine, that I would get them for him, because, that is, it was, at the moment, right, when he, that is, a while later was when Nombre15 entered with a yellow portfolio and brought, brought the checks there.’ PROSECUTOR: ‘Before that moment was the name of the workshops not known?’ WITNESS: ‘Before.’ Nombre16: ‘Before that moment had you not provided him with the name of the workshops?’.
Nombre17: ‘No, sir.’ Nombre16: ‘Then the question is, uh, uh, when, well, I will reserve it for a little later. When, when does this, this, this other person whom you know as Nombre15 enter?’. WITNESS: ‘Well, he enters barely five minutes after I am there.’ Nombre16: ‘And what does Nombre15 do?’. Nombre17: ‘He brings a portfolio and brings two checks.’ Nombre16: ‘Do you manage to see those checks?’. Nombre17: ‘Yes, I did manage to see them.’ Nombre16: ‘What was it that you saw on those checks?’. Nombre17: ‘Well the checks, uh, one was in the name of Montajes Industriales Rocaba, another was in the name of the workshop Nombre21 del Oeste. They were checks with the logo of, of Civil Aviation, uh, I don't remember the bank, that I really don't remember, but, uh, I do remember the amount, which was two million nine hundred forty thousand colones each, each check.’ Nombre16: ‘Do you know, uh, where they obtained the names of those workshops to make those checks?’ Nombre17: ‘He had asked me for them by phone, at that moment, only, only the names, that is, just the names.
The next day I had to bring him what were the legal identification number, and telephone numbers, and legal representatives.’ PROSECUTOR: ‘Then that means that before that meeting you had already provided him with the name of the workshops.’ WITNESS: ‘Only the names of workshops, that is, Montajes Industriales Nombre22 and, that is, Taller Nombre21 del Oeste.’” In accordance with this literal transcription of the content of the tape where the declaration that Nombre18 provided in trial was recorded, the obscure elements which, according to the descriptive reasoning of the judgment, derive from it are easily cleared up, which proves that all the vehement claims of the defense are based on an inadequate summary of said evidence. Indeed, as is understood from the foregoing, although initially the deponent seemed to provide an inconsistent account, since he indicated that he gave Nombre01 the information related to the workshops, including their names, in the first meeting, where five minutes after arriving Nombre15 appeared with the checks already prepared (which would be practically impossible and inexplicable), thanks to the detailed interrogation to which he was subjected by the prosecutor, in the end he clarified that in that meeting he delivered the documentation, but that before that, by telephone, he had indeed provided the name of the workshops, which definitively clarifies the situation and causes the defect regarding this aspect that is denounced in the appeal to be completely dismissed.
So clear is this deficient and incomplete transcription of the testimony, that it led the judges to record an analysis based on an erroneous premise, where the deponent is somehow reproached for “not having referred” to that previous conversation with Nombre01: “‘... It is evident that Nombre18, motivated either by astonishment or because the illegitimate proposal that Nombre15 and Nombre01 made to him to so easily earn six hundred thousand colones attracted him at first, did not reject this obscure negotiation at the threshold, and for this reason, it is understandable that he omitted to refer to some circumstances that, nonetheless, are easily revealed from the set of declarations examined up to now. For example, that prior to receiving Nombre01's call to go to his office (and in which he receives the checks) he had already received another call either from Nombre01 or from Nombre15 himself requesting the name of the other workshop that would participate in the work.
Let us remember that Nombre23 explained that in the first days of January 1996, just returning from vacation, Nombre15 told him that he had already contacted the workshop of that boy from Nombre02 that Nombre23 had advised him to look for, and that he also had the name of the other workshop, requesting from him the note already alluded to on folio 321 of expediente 98 17767 ...’ (cf. folio 157, line 5 onwards). As indicated supra, Nombre17 did refer to that call, whence this questioning by the court is without merit. In addition to the above, the conclusion drawn by the jurisdictional body from the “notorious difficulty” that Nombre17 evidenced when testifying orally in trial is also criticized. In this regard, it was reasoned that such an attitude was not because he was lying, but because telling the truth implied confessing that, even if initially, he hesitated to reject the illicit offer made to him by Nombre01 and Nombre15.
The rules of psychology and experience prove that it is very difficult for any person to tell the truth when it implies confessing in some way that at some point they hesitated to reject an immoral or illegitimate proposal. Regarding this point, two clarifications must be made. Firstly, from the wording of the judgment it is clear and evident that this argument by the trial court was set forth, not to support its conviction about the credibility that the witness was given, but rather to somehow provide an explanation for that “notorious difficulty” which, thanks to the richness that orality and immediacy foster, could be perceived in Nombre17 when giving his account, for we cannot lose sight of the fact that the truthfulness granted to him had previously been based on the fact that his statement was corroborated by other evidentiary elements and, furthermore, on the fact that despite his initial hesitation in the face of the illicit proposal made to him, he managed to overcome the temptation to easily earn the money they offered him, rejecting it.
On the other hand, it is notable that this explanation we analyze (especially that a supposed intention to lie was ruled out), according to the grounds of the judgment, had as its antecedent not only the premise that for the reasons noted he was credible, but also the impression that Nombre17 caused during the hearing and the very content of his account, in all of which no logical defect is observed. On the contrary, the conclusion that based on said behavior or attitude the appellant now presents—for whom that notorious difficulty of Nombre17 when testifying “could have been due” to him lying—does not cease to be a speculative and unfounded postulate based solely on his subjective criterion, since throughout his entire challenge he hints at his invariable and systematic position of denying Nombre18 all credibility (the same occurs, although to a lesser extent, with Nombre19), this against the criterion expressed by the trial judges, all of which diminishes the value of the allegation.
This effort by the appellant to discredit Nombre17 Nombre18 and, furthermore, to deny the criminal liability corresponding to the accused (especially that of Nombre01), is based on a series of subjective, unfounded, and moreover speculative affirmations (cf. the allegations identified as 7.b., 8.a., 8.b., 8.d., 8.e., 8.f., and 9, of the first ground; 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the second ground), such that none of them could succeed. Specifically, the main thesis (typical of conclusions in an oral trial, but strange and incompatible in cassation) that Messrs. Nombre18 and Nombre19 are not credible must be rejected, as it would go against the criterion already expressed by the judges, who, protected by the accusatory principles that prevail in the trial (orality, immediacy, continuity, publicity, and concentration), and above all adhering to the rules of sound rational criticism, granted them full value, without this Chamber observing any reasoning contrary to sound human understanding insofar as they considered that in essence, with the exceptions made supra, their accounts proved to be worthy of truthfulness, and in this cassation court this aspect could not be disregarded based solely on the subjective opinion of the challenger, since we are not before a second instance like the one that would be generated by the filing of an appeal in those written, inquisitorial systems, where a re-examination of the evidence produced in the prior phase would indeed be possible, as is proposed, in order to substitute the first-instance judge in determining the value to be assigned to it and even discard or vary the proven facts.
The purpose of cassation is different and focuses on examining the sentence in light of specific and concrete allegations that point out the alleged existence of a defect, substantiate its essentiality, and allow, then, control in this court of whether such defects actually occurred or not, a task that does not permit descending to and questioning aspects inherent in the valuation of evidence that originate from the immediacy and orality of its reception, since of these aspects—in which the Trial Court is irreplaceable—only their reasoning by the judges can be reviewed: what were the variables of immediacy to which they gave importance, for example, the gestures, the attitude, the form of the account, etcetera, and their scope—namely, for example, that fluency and coherence allow them to give credibility, etcetera. In the specific case, with the exceptions already made, the judges set forth what the variables inherent in the immediacy of the evidence were that allowed them to give credence to the declaration of Nombre18 and Nombre19, in whose exposition and grounds the Chamber does not evidence any error, and what the challenger intends is to substitute those conclusions with his own opinions, without this contributing, as it should, to pointing out a defect in reasoning and demonstrating its existence and essentiality.
For these same reasons, it could not be admitted as proven (since this does not emerge from the content of the trial judgment but from the appellant's opinion) that Nombre23, as an official of Civil Aviation, had contacts with the aforementioned workshops; that those “contacts” allow assurance that they presented quotations; that Nombre19, insofar as he denied that aspect, lied on that point and “in everything else,” or that he and Nombre18 had any criminal participation in the events. Likewise, this Chamber does not share the assessment of the defender, who questions the “return of the checks” by Nombre18, considering that it is not corroborated by other evidence. In this regard, it must be clear that, as indicated, the judges recognized full credibility in him insofar as he affirmed that aspect, and although aside from his statement there is no direct evidence of that second meeting (let us remember it was held behind closed doors), the judgment does mention other indirect elements that support it, above all the testimony of Nombre31 (cf. folio 109, line 1 onwards).
Indeed, this witness, who is Nombre18's partner in the Rocaba workshop, stated: “... Nombre18 told me that they had offered us a business deal, if we agreed to deliver some stamped invoices for a check that had been issued in Aviation and they would pay us three hundred thousand colones, we consulted with the accountant and he told us not to do it, so Nombre18 returned the checks ...” (cf. folio 109, lines 7 to 11), and in the substantive recitals, the court reasoned as follows: “... Nombre18 and Nombre31 recognize the cited checks as those that were delivered to the former in Nombre01's office ... it becomes evident that Nombre18's determination not to participate in that ‘business deal’ occurs with the visit he made with his partner Nombre31 to the accountant Nombre32. In any case, irrespective of this, the truth is that we cannot typify his conduct, since there would have been a timely active withdrawal on his part.
That withdrawal of his, that overcoming of temptation, is what makes him worthy of credibility, besides the fact that his version is corroborated by the examined evidence. For greater abundance we can add that Nombre31 fully corroborates the version of Nombre18 ...” (cf. folio 152, lines 1 to 3; and folio 157, line 27 onwards), in all of which no error is observed. Nor would it lack logic that Nombre18, after the meeting held with Nombre15 and Nombre01, took the checks with him in order to prepare the invoices that would support them, since, as the court points out, we could not lose sight of the fact that this was not a typical and normal negotiation (within which such a procedure would indeed be very dubious), but rather a proposition for him to take part in an illicit plan, in which, because his acquiescence and involvement were very important, it had to be carried out in a climate of absolute mutual trust.
In this sense, the judges indicate “... the objection of Licenciado Nombre33 regarding the fact that Nombre18's testimony is suspicious when he affirms that they handed him the checks, since it is not logical, is not receivable. Indeed, it would not be receivable in light of a licit negotiation, but it is understandable if we interpret it in light of an illicit, obscure proposal, since someone proposing something they know to be illicit very reasonably yields to secure the result ...” (cf. folio 170, lines 4 to 9). On the other hand, the conviction that the accountant Nombre28 was more reliable than the witnesses Nombre18 and Nombre31 does not derive from the content of the sentence but from the particular view of the appellant, so the fact that such a declaration had not been offered (which in any case was the responsibility of the parties) would not constitute any defect attributable to the judgment.
Furthermore, no error is observed in the fact that in order to rule out that the endorsing signatures were those of the representatives of the workshops, a handwriting analysis expert opinion was not available, since in accordance with the principle of freedom of proof incorporated in Article 182 of the Procedural Code, nothing prevented such a conclusion from reasonably depending on other elements of conviction, as was done in the judgment, since those persons completely denied having affixed said signatures. Another of the arguments wielded by the appellant in order to have the declarations that most compromise the accused removed from the judgment consists of affirming that Nombre18, Nombre19, Nombre20, and Nombre23 “could” have criminal liability for having somehow participated in the events, whence it was imperative to have advised them of their right to abstain from testifying. Such a proposition could not succeed, since it is based not on the content of the judgment, but on the biased assessment of the appellant himself.
In this regard, it is noted that, despite having been clearly and expressly ruled out by the judges, the defender insists, based on his own analysis of the evidence and the circumstances surrounding the event, on establishing a “probable” criminal liability of said witnesses in the illicit conduct investigated. Additionally, regarding the declarations of Nombre20 and Nombre23, he does not even specify in what concrete manner the conviction would be affected by a hypothetical suppression of said elements, which further disqualifies the proposition. Indeed, the fact that Nombre18 had in his possession the checks; that Nombre20 showed up at the workshops to request the fabrication of two gates, paying in cash and asking in return for the respective invoice; and that Nombre23 figured as the head of the maintenance section of Civil Aviation, to whose account the questioned checks were drawn, does not make them suspects of having participated in the criminal action being investigated, nor does it generate in their favor the right to abstain from testifying, as the defense argues, whence the criterion of the trial court is accurate insofar as it considered the following: “...
Nombre18 overcomes the temptation to participate in that proposal, despite the fact that this implied not so easily obtaining that money. Overcoming that temptation by refusing to participate in any way in that event and returning the checks prove to the court that he would have no interest in lying in this trial, since he had no typical participation in them. Although not expressly, it is inferred from the Defense's objections that this is the reproach they make to this witness, and it is on this that they attempt to distort his version ... it becomes evident that Nombre18's determination not to participate in that ‘business deal’ occurs with the visit he made with his partner Nombre31 to the accountant Nombre32. In any case, irrespective of this, the truth is that we cannot typify his conduct, since there would have been a timely active withdrawal on his part. That withdrawal of his, that overcoming of temptation, is what makes him worthy of credibility ...” (cf. folio 157, line 27 onwards).
Indeed, regarding the action completed by Nombre17 Nombre18, from the moment the investigation was conducted (not after credibility had been recognized in what he declared in trial, as the appellant attempts to make it seem) it was clearly established that he had no punishable participation in the entire criminal machination set in motion by the accused here, since although at one point he hesitated to reject the proposal made to him in this regard, after consulting along with his partner with the company accountant, he decided not to take part in the matter, to the point that he showed up at Civil Aviation to return the checks that had been delivered to him the previous day, without having incurred in the conduct requested of him: obtaining two stamped invoices to support the issuance of those checks, nor signing the corresponding receipts. This means, then, that no judgment of criminal legal reproach could be formulated against him, whence (adhering to the proven facts of the sentence) the defense's thesis is untenable insofar as it asserts that he, because of his condition as a “suspect,” should have been advised of a right to abstain from testifying, a right that by all indications was nonexistent.
The same must be pointed out regarding Nombre20 (except insofar as he affirmed having seen the co-accused Nombre09 changing Civil Aviation checks several times) and Nombre23, whose actions and declarations in these events, even if suppressed, would in no way affect the condemnatory decision against Nombre01 that is objected to, and this lack of essentiality is so evident that the appellant does not even manage to specify what the grievance generated against the defense from them would be. Moreover, the appellant's proposition becomes even contradictory, since despite criticizing the judgment for having taken into account the statement of Nombre23, he later shows disagreement with the fact that credibility was not given to Nombre26 even though his version was “confirmed” by Nombre23. To close this point, and regarding the supposed “suspect” condition of Mr. Nombre19, it is again noted that the basis for the challenger reaching that conclusion is his own subjective analysis of said testimony, to which he personally denies credibility, which completely disqualifies his complaint.
In another order of ideas, in the claims identified as No. 4 (admitting the testimony of Nombre24 as evidence for better resolution), and No. 5 (using the declaration that Nombre15 gave before the prosecutor's office), the appellant does not specify what the essentiality of those evidentiary elements would be in the structuring of the trial court's judgment, which would render the allegation informal. In any case, from the complete study of the sentence it is determined not only that the declarations of Nombre24 (an official of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic) and Nombre15 (a co-accused who was granted a stay of proceedings due to death) are not of major importance, to the point that even hypothetically suppressing them, the judgment of reproach would in no way be impaired, since it is supported by other elements as explained, but also that no irregularity is observed from the fact that during the trial the former was admitted as evidence for better resolution, even more so when said element was considered useful and necessary for an adequate resolution.
Regarding the interpretation of Article 355 of the Criminal Procedural Code, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has maintained a very broad criterion, understanding that the necessity and essentiality of producing that element found to be missing, arising during the oral hearing, in themselves justify its production even by the court sua sponte, since such power would not only be supported by the cited Article 355, but even by paragraph 2 of numeral 320 ibid, which does not even require that the evidence so ordered has the purpose of accrediting a factual aspect previously unknown: “... The problem raised by the appellants in their first ground of appeal is reduced to establishing whether the reception of the victim's testimony in trial is illegal, even though that evidence was not offered by the Public Ministry and no new circumstance or fact arose that merited its clarification, which is the scenario erected by numeral 355 of the Criminal Procedural Code for evidence for better resolution.
To resolve the issue raised, we must point out, first, that the interpretation of Article 355, like that of any normative text, cannot be fragmentary or isolated. The rule must be examined as part of a whole set of provisions that have a common foundation, besides being part of the legal system ... In this sense, it must be noted that not only numeral 355 grants trial judges the possibility of sua sponte bringing in evidence for better resolution, when new facts or new circumstances that merit clarification arise. The judge of the intermediate phase—a phase in which, in principle, the issue of the admissibility of evidence for trial must be resolved—may sua sponte order that evidence be incorporated into the trial, even if the parties have not proposed it, ‘if it is essential’ or else ‘only when the negligence of any of the parties is manifest and its source resides in the proceedings already conducted,’ according to Article 320 of the Criminal Procedural Code.
This numeral adds that, against what is resolved—that is, on the admission of evidence for trial—a motion for reconsideration may be filed ‘without prejudice to reiterating the request for receipt of inadmitted evidence, as evidence for better resolution, before the trial court.’ The foregoing reflects that our procedural system, although markedly accusatory, nonetheless still recognizes the judge certain powers regarding the production of evidence, oriented, without a doubt, towards the validity of the principle of real truth, which must be fulfilled in strict observance of the rights of the intervening parties—hearing, defense—and the duty of objectivity, Article 6. Furthermore, the Procedural Code itself equates, for purposes of the proposal of evidence for better resolution, the offering of evidence inadmitted in the intermediate phase and has previously allowed the judge of the intermediate phase to order the receipt of evidence in trial, when the negligence of the parties in omitting it has been ‘manifest’ and its source resides in the proceedings of the case, thereby demonstrating that numeral 355 must not have a reading as restricted as that proposed by the appellants, a reading that in any case is inconvenient, since the system is governed by the principle of free appraisal of evidence and freedom of proof—numeral 182, such that whenever it concerns evidence useful to the case, legally obtained, that is made known to all parties, so they can object to it, or that is produced with the participation of all, the objection to its receipt appears disproportionate and unjustified, especially if the source of the evidence already appears in the preliminary investigation, which furthermore removes any ‘surprise factor’ that could favor arbitrariness and defenselessness, elements that the system, on the contrary, aims to eliminate ...” Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Voto 57200, of 9:35 a.m. on June 2, 2000.
In another order of ideas, the challenger is not correct in that, for the purpose of supporting an alleged nullity of the conviction ordered against the accused Nombre01, he criticizes and questions the search (allanamiento) conducted at the house of the co-accused Nombre09. Firstly, it must be clarified that although it is true, based on the evidence produced at trial (among it the evidence collected in said procedure, specifically the copies of the checks and a request for telephone services to ICE), it was determined with certainty that the co-accused Nombre09 was the person who cashed the checks, and that he was in agreement with the rest of the accused in this, including Nombre01, this did not add any additional charge against the latter, nor did it constitute an essential aspect of the judgment of guilt established against him, to the point that even in the event that we were to hypothetically suppress said circumstance, it would in no way modify the decision regarding him.
Indeed, as has been amply explained, the willful participation of the accused Nombre01 in the events (he was the person who contacted Nombre18, to whom, along with Nombre15, he offered ¢600,000.00 for two stamped invoices that, fictitiously, would support the issuance of two checks, despite no work ever being performed to justify said expenditure) was made to derive essentially from the testimonial evidence mentioned, whence even assuming it could not have been determined who was the person who materially cashed the instruments, this would not diminish the guilt of Nombre01, for what is truly essential, at least with regard to him, is that those instruments were indeed cashed, to demonstrate which the questioned evidence was not required. Note that regarding this point, the evidence questioned here (which in any case was not the only one available for this purpose) was cited at the time of justifying the conviction of Nombre09, not that of Nombre01, with the judgment indicating the following: “...
Indeed, all of these evidentiary elements prove that, for the purposes at hand, Mr. Nombre01 acted as Director General of Civil Aviation in the historical context in which the illicit activity attributed to him unfolds. In that capacity, he was responsible for executing the decisions of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation. Now, in accordance with the direct evidence gathered at trial, essentially the testimony of Nombre18, as well as Nombre31 and Nombre19, this accused initially contacted Nombre18 for the execution of works at the Santamaría, and later, knowing that neither his workshop Nombre22 nor Nombre21 had performed any work or service for Civil Aviation, offered Nombre18 six hundred thousand colones for each of two stamped invoices from those workshops, or at least for his signature on the acknowledgment of receipt of the vouchers for both checks. Indeed, the direct evidence proving his criminal responsibility in these events is overwhelming, and this conviction judgment against him is based on it ...
(cf. folio 165, line 24 onwards). In view of the foregoing, and for the purpose of maintaining greater order in the exposition, the specific issue introduced here, that is, the illegitimacy of the evidence collected in the cited search (allanamiento), including the matter regarding the presence of a public defender in said proceeding (which, as we saw, would only affect the co-accused Nombre09), will be addressed when resolving the first ground of the appeal in cassation filed by attorney Hugo Chavarría Céspedes.
On the other hand, this Panel does not share the thesis argued in point 7.c., since according to the content of the judgment, the responsibility held by Nombre01, who was one of the officials authorized to sign on the current account against which the questioned checks were drawn, was not simply nominal or vacuous (as the defense considers), since said function implicitly entailed that duty of custody, verification, and control of the funds deposited therein (in this sense, the term “administration and custody” used by the judgment at folio 172, line 30 onwards must be understood, implying that the defect alleged in the first part of point 11 of the claim has not occurred), so it could not be concluded that this only corresponded to the personnel of the specific department in question. If, as the deponents Nombre26 and Nombre23 indicated, coupled with the fact that the Director General of Civil Aviation was one of those authorized to sign checks, each department of that entity, for its part, was to ensure and be responsible for the proper handling of the money assigned to its budget, this only means that a dual control mechanism existed, and that Nombre01 did have powers of custody and disposition over those public funds, which he used to misappropriate them.
If one were to admit that this added duty of being one of those authorized to sign against the mentioned current account did not entail any responsibility for him, we would reach the conclusion (contrary to the rules of experience) that such a function would be completely devoid of sense and justification. It is clear that the position of Director General of Civil Aviation, as well as the specific function of being one of the joint account holders liable for issuing checks, entails a series of additional responsibilities as head of the institution, among which is obviously that of acting as a controller and custodian of the proper handling and administration of the resources assigned to the public entity, all of which demolishes the allegation that it was a merely formal, vacuous, and aseptic task.
Regarding the claim identified as No. 9, which is revisited in points 13 and 14, focused on the assessment of the testimony provided by Nombre27 (then secretary to the Director General of Civil Aviation), the appellant is also incorrect, as he bases his argument on false premises that completely invalidate his conclusions. Indeed, the thesis presented, to the effect that – if she had been believed, it “could” have been concluded that the check scheme “could” have been planned and carried out by Nombre15 (a co-accused now deceased), is nothing more than mere unfounded speculation by the appellant, which could not be derived from the circumstances he cites. Even if we were to assume as true that during 1995 the accused Nombre18 appeared at the Civil Aviation offices on several occasions, where he spoke with Nombre15, in no way could we conclude from this that Nombre01 did not participate in the event.
On the contrary, from Nombre27’s statement, it could well be considered that she corroborated Nombre18’s account, since among other points she stated that “... What I remember is that there are two workshops and one of the owners is one of the young men who is a very close friend of Mr. Nombre17’s family. I associate it that he was the owner of the workshop until things happened; before, I had not linked the workshop with the young man. I met him because he came to the office several times, about two or three times. His name was Nombre18. He came to the directorate where I worked. The first time he came, he had to wait a long time; Mr. Nombre01 attended to him, then he left and that was it. Later, about a few months later, he came again; Mr. Nombre17 did not attend to him, but Nombre15 did. The last time I remember seeing him was in passing; I did not have any personal contact with him. It was in the office, but since I had just recovered, I went in from time to time to help organize papers; I was not attending to the public but processing documents.
I remember the visit was around mid-year. We talked a lot about my pregnancy because it was very noticeable. Since he was there waiting for a long time, we were then talking. That was in ninety-five. The second time he came, I was already about to go on disability leave; I was about to complete nine months. It was around November. That happened about two months after the first visit. On this second occasion, Mr. Nombre01 was not in the office, but at that moment Mr. Nombre15 arrived. He greeted him and they left together. I deduce they knew each other because Mr. Nombre15 greeted him very kindly and they left together for the office. My son was born in December of ninety-five; that was that year. The third visit must have been the first days of January of ninety-six ... Nombre18 is short, a young man, neither white nor dark-skinned. He measured less than one meter sixty-four; his height was like the prosecutor’s, a tiny bit taller than him.
He dressed normally; I did not see him arrive with a tie; he wore a shirt and denim pants. He commented to me that he was the son of a very close friend of Mr. Nombre17. He was the one who asked me many questions. He did not tell me the reason for his visit. I do not remember him carrying anything that drew my attention in his hand. Nor do I remember him having an appointment with Mr. Nombre01. Mr. Nombre17 attends to him in his office, with the door closed. The door to Mr. Nombre17’s office had another access, which was through the Technical Council hall. Nombre15 had an office in the Technical Council secretariat. To get to his office, you had to go through one door and then another to reach his. When I showed the young man, that is Nombre18, in, Mr. Nombre17 was alone. I do not remember if Nombre15 or Nombre18 carried documents the day they spoke, that is, during the second visit. It was not very frequent for Nombre15 to attend to people who came looking for Nombre01.
My son was born on December 4, ninety-five. The third visit was after that; it was in January of ninety-six ... I asked the young man on whose behalf he came, and he told me to tell him it was Nombre02. The two Nombre17s greeted each other, but as for them meeting for anything specific, I do not remember ...” (cf. folio 121, line 10 onwards). As we can see, with the exception of the dates (she could even be confused regarding the temporal placement of each visit), Ms. Nombre27 rather confirms the most important circumstances contained in Nombre18’s statement, namely: that he visited the Civil Aviation facilities 2 or 3 times; that he had to wait a long time to be attended to; that he interviewed or met with Nombre01 and Nombre15; that those interviews or meetings took place behind closed doors; that Nombre01’s office has another access; that Nombre01 knew about the matter of the workshops; and that when Nombre18 entered the office, Nombre01 was alone.
As can be seen, more coincident points than opposing ones are noted between the two statements, without – for the rest, from Nombre27’s statements could it be concluded, as the appellant subjectively does, that the sole person responsible for these events was the deceased Nombre15. All of the foregoing determines the absolute lack of merit in the specific reproach being analyzed, since by hypothetically introducing the statement being reproached as discarded for lack of credibility, the established judgment of guilt would rather be strengthened.
Regarding the reproach identified as 10, it is necessary to point out that according to a comprehensive view of the judgment, it is easily understood that “the rest of the evidence” that discredited Nombre26’s statement (only inasmuch as he implied that the representatives of the Nombre22 and Nombre21 workshops submitted a request to be included in the supplier list) was precisely the version of those representatives, who denied that point, and to which, as was explained, full value was recognized. Finally, in the allegations identified as 11 (second part) and 12, the appellant presents an argumentation typical of an appeal in cassation on the merits. Notwithstanding this inconsistency in the appeal, by incurring in an improper mixture of challenges, it must be noted that, while it is true that it was proven that the co-defendant Nombre09 was the one who presented himself at the bank and cashed the checks, this does not imply that the other defendants, who intervened in the moments prior to that, do not hold the status of co-perpetrators, since from a comprehensive reading of the judgment, one can conclude with absolute ease that all of them equally made essential contributions to the achievement of the proposed end (misappropriating public funds whose custody or administration had been entrusted to them, which they achieved thanks to their status as public officials), which determines that they had full functional co-dominion over the act.
Furthermore, it is not true that the one who (exclusively) adapted his conduct to the action provided for by the criminal offense of embezzlement (peculado) was Nombre09, because one cannot lose sight that the cashing of the checks was nothing more than the culmination of a whole prior concert of wills, through which and thanks to the execution of a series of acts (where even false documents were created to give an appearance of legitimacy to an economic disbursement supported by fictitious contracts and works), the misappropriation of public funds whose custody was entrusted to them was achieved. In this sense, the judgment refers to the following: “... As was demonstrated at trial, the defendants Nombre01 and Nombre30, public officials, carried out actions through which they misappropriated monies that had been entrusted to them by reason of their positions, monies that were entrusted to them to be administered ...” (cf. folio 172, line 30 onwards).
Likewise, and in accordance with the above, it is clear that all the fraudulent actions undertaken by the accused (including Nombre01) in order to misappropriate the mentioned public funds do not constitute simple preparatory acts as the defense seeks to suggest, but rather material acts that fit within the conduct described by the criminal offense, especially since it was proven that – precisely all of them were essentially necessary and decisive to damage the protected legal interest, which implies that the subjects who carried them out (above all Nombre01, Nombre05, and Nombre06, although the latter was considered a mere participant) would not hold the condition of accomplices but rather co-perpetrators of the crime, and that, furthermore, it was not only Nombre06 and Nombre09 who “executed” the illicit action as the defender understands it.
On the other hand, while it is true that from a partial and incomplete reading of the judgment, it might seem that the alleged contradiction noted in the last part of claim No. 11 does exist, from a comprehensive, complete, and harmonious view of the decision, it is easily understood that it is all just a simple error in the order in which the subjects were placed. In this regard, the judgment points out the following: “... The collaborations provided by Nombre09 and Nombre06 to the accused Nombre01 and Nombre30, all according to the collusion of wills produced between them and Nombre01 and Nombre30 were, in that order, the following. The first, to facilitate the initiation of the administrative procedure for those fictitious contracts in order to give them some semblance of legality and truthfulness; for his part, the second, in the exhaustion phase of the iter criminis, to materially consummate the misappropriation of the money, by placing a second endorsement with his signature and identity card number on the backs of checks CED01, knowing that the first endorsements existing on them, supposedly corresponding to the authorized signatories of those companies, were false, and then proceeding to go to the bank on which they were drawn and cash them, thus consummating the misappropriation of the public monies from the Civil Aviation budget ...” (cf. folio 173, line 18 onwards).
From the content of the judgment, it is seen with crystal clarity that the one who facilitated the initiation of the administrative procedure was Nombre06, so, adhering to the wording of the preceding excerpt that was transcribed, it was “the second” and not the “first” subject who had been previously cited, all of which confirms the non-existence of the supposed defect being claimed. Based on the foregoing, both challenges are rejected.
Mutation of the accusation, and lack of correlation between accusation and judgment. Citing Articles 39 of the Political Constitution; 347, 348, 365, and 369 subsection h) of the Criminal Procedure Code; and 8.c of the American Convention on Human Rights, this section argues that, in the document at folios 632 to 634 and at a very advanced stage of the debate, the Nombre16 presented a notable modification of the accused facts but sought to circumvent the rule of the second paragraph of Article 347 of the Criminal Procedure Code with the argument that it was a mere correction of material errors. The cited “correction” consisted of locating the events in January 1996, despite the accusation fixing them in August 1995. Once the court made this “correction” known to the defense attorneys, and despite their opposition, it was incorporated. With this, the defense strategy was “sensitively affected.” If the accusation had stated that the meeting occurred on January 8, 1996, the defense would have had sufficient time to try to gather evidentiary elements that could have refuted the possibility of that meeting.
It would have been possible, in view of the schedule of the accused Nombre01, or other evidentiary elements, to have proven that on that day he could not have participated in a meeting like the one stated by Nombre18. The complaint must be rejected. Firstly, it must be clarified that the factual modification to the accusation that is questioned and criticized did not consist of locating all “the facts” from August 1995 to January 1996, as the appellant erroneously presents it. If the original content of the Nombre16's charging document is carefully reviewed (cf. folios 182 to 214), it is noted that while point Nº 11 indicated that “The next day, following this last telephone call, the aforementioned Mr. Nombre18 appeared at the reception of the office of the accused Nombre01 ...” (cf. folio 186, lines 12 to 14), with the calls prior to said visit being located in August 1995, in the accusation transcribed in the judgment, where the objected modification is included, it indicates: “...
Following this last telephone call, on January 9, 1996, Mr. Nombre18 appeared at the reception of the office of the accused Nombre01 ...”(cf. folio 41, lines 5 to 7), from which it is understood that the accusation was only varied in that point Nº 11, and tacitly in Nº 14. On the other hand, as indicated supra, that modification regarding the specific date on which those meetings occurred in the office of the accused Nombre34 does not imply an essential change in the accusation, which in turn determines that it is not causing any grievance to the defense, since the main fact around which the debate revolved is the same. The foregoing also allows establishing that, contrary to the appellant's criteria, we are not facing the situation contemplated in Article 347 of the Criminal Procedure Code, since the factual rectification under analysis does not constitute an “extension” of the accused fact, because it did not imply that the legal characterization had been varied or that a continuing offense had been integrated, from which it must be concluded that, as the judges considered, we would instead be facing the situation of Article 348 ibidem, that is, the inclusion during the trial hearing of a circumstance that does not essentially modify the imputation nor cause defenselessness.
So true is this last point that the defense fails to concretize what the grievance suffered through the acts it questions would be, nor how the result of the process would have varied if the hearing provided for in paragraph 2 of the aforementioned numeral 347 had been granted, since in this regard it simply contends that “the defense strategy was sensitively affected,” without, as set forth supra, managing to specify which evidentiary elements could not be gathered, or what activity made it impossible for Nombre01 to have been present at those meetings. Also striking are the arguments that regarding this same topic are put forth by Attorney Gino Corazzari Aguilar, who furthermore incurs in the same inconsistency that has been pointed out in the approach of Dr. Walter Antillón Montealegre, because in his third ground based on form he tries to justify the existence of a “grievance” in that, with the factual modification introduced by the Public Prosecutor's Office (locating the meeting where the checks were handed over from August 1995 to the day January 9, 1996), his defense strategy lost all importance, since adhering to the accusation that said handover had occurred in August 1995, he offered as documentary evidence a certification from the financial department of Civil Aviation stating that as of this latter date the referred titles had not yet been issued.
It is clear that the situation in which the defense was placed with the modification or rectification introduced to the accusation during the trial, that is, that its strategy “collapsed” upon the certification mentioned losing all interest and evidentiary value, could in no way constitute a “grievance” protectable by procedural law, because on one hand and as explained, one could not lose sight of the fact that the Public Prosecutor's Office acted within the legitimate prerogatives that the procedural rules recognize, and furthermore, in this case, it could not claim that the referred evidence (whose offering was based on an obvious error of temporal location of the fact) should maintain its importance despite it having been determined that the fact occurred on a different date. It is notorious that the potential grievance that would be generated around a situation such as the one at hand would be centered on the fact that, due to a rectification of the facts, the defense was denied the material and concrete possibility of refuting them, or of bringing to the process some evidentiary element that disqualifies the accusation, which has not occurred in the instant case.
On the other hand, and regarding points c) and d) of this ground that were already resolved in the previous section, the defense must refer to what was stated there. Based on the foregoing, the claim is declared without merit in all its extremes.
Lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa), and violation of due process. Citing Articles 39 of the Political Constitution; 347, 348, 365, and 369 subsection h) of the Criminal Procedure Code; 8.c of the American Convention on Human Rights, and vote Nº 92799 of this 3rd Chamber, this ground argues that the Dirección General de Aviación Civil is a subject of law distinct from the legal entity “State,” therefore the Procuraduría General de la República is not legitimate to act in representation and defense of the former. The foregoing has implied an essential defect, not only in the formulation of the civil compensatory action and the consequent joint and several condemnation that was ordered, but also due process was violated in the criminal aspect, since from the beginning Aviación Civil should have been given participation in its capacity as a victim. The foregoing has procedural interest for the defense, because with the procurator it was not possible to opt for an alternative solution to the conflict.
The complaint is inadmissible. It is not true that the Dirección General de Aviación Civil is a subject of law distinct from the legal entity State. In reality, and as expressly indicated by numeral 2 of the Ley General de Aviación Civil, Nº 5150, “The regulation of civil aviation shall be exercised by the Executive Branch through the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil, both attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), according to the powers granted by this law. In relation to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil shall enjoy maximum deconcentration (desconcentración máxima) and shall have instrumental legal personality (personalidad jurídica instrumental) to manage the funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated by this law, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill the functions and process the agreements so that they are known by the Executive Branch ...”.
Although it is true this text is the product of a reform introduced by Article 1 of Ley N° 8038 of October 12, 2000, there is an opinion from the Procuraduría General de la República where it was determined that the original text, prior to this reform, was TACITLY reformed by Article 14, subsection 35 of the Budget Law Nº 7018 of December 20, 1985. In this regard, said opinion (C17895) considered that the Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil is a deconcentrated organ of the MOPT, which enjoys an instrumental legal personality referring to the handling of the funds coming from this law Nº 5150, just as it ultimately positivized with the reform. The foregoing means that this instrumental legal personality enjoyed by the Consejo Técnico (hierarchically superior organ within Aviación Civil) is of an instrumental type, that is, it is not a full legal capacity, but limited to a certain type of acts, which the same norm circumscribes to the administration of funds coming from tariffs, rents, or rights regulated by this law, as well as to carry out the acts or contracts necessary to fulfill the functions and process the agreements so that they are known by the Executive Branch.
The foregoing means that although it is a public organ with maximum administrative deconcentration, Aviación Civil remains attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, that is, to the Central Administration, hence it lacks full legal capacity like that which autonomous public institutions do hold. In this sense, national doctrine indicates the following: “... Decentralization is diverse from apparently equal figures, such as deconcentration, delegation, and the legal concession of central competencies ... The deconcentrated organ is subject to hierarchy, which means to the orders of the hierarchical superior. The greater degree of freedom it holds, in relation to a common subordinate, lies in the fact that its acts exhaust the administrative channel, without possibility of appeal to the superior, but the latter can, in any case, issue orders, instructions, and circulars that limit the discretion of the inferior ... the decentralized entity is not subject to orders or instructions in the performance of its exclusive competence ... legal personality implies in itself a sphere of liberty greater than the mere exclusive competence of an organ.
Deconcentration is operated by means of a legal norm or rule, not by an administrative act ... all deconcentration supposes a permanent attribution of exclusive competence in favor of the inferior ...”, Nombre35 (Nombre36), “TESIS DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO”, Biblioteca Jurídica Dike, and Stradtmam editorial, San José, 1st edition, September 2002. Volume I, pages 342, 343, and 344. In accordance with the foregoing, the doctrinal differentiation between the figures of decentralization and deconcentration is notorious, since the latter in no way supposes an independence and disassociation of the inferior organ from the hierarchical superior, as does result from the former. This being so, it is clear that in the case at hand both the Consejo Técnico and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil, according to the cited Ley N° 5150, are configured as organs attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, assigning them the exclusive competence to regulate everything relative to civil aviation, but expressly recognizing them only an instrumental legal personality.
This last characteristic is one of those that differentiate the deconcentrated organ from the decentralized entity, to which full legal personality is granted: “... personality supposes by itself the greater degree of liberty and responsibility, which confers functional autonomy to the entity, unless there is an express legal provision to the contrary ...” Ibidem, p. 346. This being so, it is clear that the defense's approach is not correct, because in this case the ownership of the civil action indeed corresponded to the Procuraduría General de la República, hence the alleged defect is nonexistent. Note that numeral 3 of the Ley de la Procuraduría General de la República, N° 6815 of December 27, 1982, when defining its attributions, among others establishes the following: “... a) Exercise the representation of the State in matters of any nature, that are processed or must be processed in the courts of justice ... h) ... denounce and accuse public officials and private persons whose conduct expresses illicit acts linked to the exercise of their position or on the occasion of it, in the matters of the criminal jurisdiction of the Treasury and that of the Public Function ...”.
As noted from the foregoing, the action that in this matter the Procuraduría General de la República has been carrying out in representation of the interests of the State, by filing and maintaining throughout the process the civil compensatory action against the accused, is framed within its legitimate competence, hence there is no irregularity that justifies upholding the challenger's claims. And it is clear that, according to the concept incorporated into Article 2 of the aforementioned Ley Nº 5150, that is, “instrumental legal personality”, it is understood that the legal capacity recognized to Aviación Civil is limited and would not cover the hypothesis the appellant argues, since said public organ does not have the necessary, sufficient, and specific legal faculty to appear directly and independently in this process as a victim, much less to settle any alternative measure. As doctrine has understood it, although legal personality (whether it is a natural or legal person) is one and invariable, understood as the possibility of being a subject of rights and duties, legal capacity, for its part, is indeed gradable, depending on the faculties granted by law to the organ, it being evident that both the Consejo and the Dirección General de Aviación Civil do not hold a full and absolute legal capacity like that argued by the challenger.
Added to the foregoing, there is an additional reason to reject the complaint, because in this subsection the defense seeks to make believe that, contrary to what happened with the Procuraduría General de la República, with the representatives of Aviación an alternative resolution would have been viable. Notwithstanding said affirmation by the appellant, it is noted that it is nothing more than an unfounded speculation, which does not appear supported by any element. Based on the foregoing, the ground is declared without merit.
Violation of the principle of continuity. This section denounces the alleged violation of Articles 178, 326, and 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and 41 of the Political Constitution insofar as the principle of continuity was disregarded. The complaint consists of the fact that on various occasions a hearing was closed without just cause, and the immediately following hearing was not scheduled for its continuation, thereby leaving empty intervals of one or more hearings. A “suspicious person” could hypothesize that during those intermediate hearings the court dedicated itself to drafting the judgment, which would explain that between the reading of the operative part and the full part, only 5 days elapsed. The claim must be rejected. The present argument starts from various unfounded premises, since aside from not concretizing in which specific situations the denounced situation occurred; what the concrete grievance produced thereby to the defense consisted of, or in what way the defense showed its disagreement, thus seeking the amendment of the alleged defect, the challenger fails to accredit his “hypothesis” (which is not even presented as a certain and direct denouncement) that before the definitive closing of the trial hearing the judgment was already being drafted, all of which makes it necessary to reject this ground.
In a case similar to the one at hand, this Chamber had the opportunity to indicate the following: “... Although it is true, just as the appellant notes, the court of merit retired to deliberate at 10:10 hours on October 22, 2002, and as agreed, returned with the judgment drafted, printed, and signed at 15:10 hours on the following day ... which implies that it was prepared in a short time, this in no way would imply that the rules of deliberation were disrespected, since one could not lose sight of the fact that of the 145 folios that the judgment consists of ... only about 35 were dedicated to the analysis of the evidence, the legal characterization, the applicable sanction, the confiscation, and the costs, so it would not be absurd to think that, taking into account that it is a collegial organ, they could have prepared that part of the sentence in a little more than a day. The transcription of the content of the evidence and other pieces (descriptive reasoning), because they do not depend on deliberation, could well be compiled at the same time the debate takes place, or in the spaces that are free when it is suspended, without waiting for the final arguments or the deliberation ... without thereby incurring any defect of arbitrariness as alleged in the claim.
It must be clarified, of course, that the judges could not be drafting on the go those aspects that are conditioned on procedural acts that still remain to be completed, such as the presentation of the parties' conclusions, or those that depend on the deliberation that must necessarily be carried out upon closing the hearing ...” (cf. vote of the Tercera Cámara of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, Nº 25703 of 11:20 hours on April 25, 2003). As pointed out in said jurisprudential precedent, which is also applicable to the case at hand, according to the rules of experience, it would not be impossible that in the period that elapsed between the reading of the operative part and the full reading of the judgment, that is, five days, the three judges that integrated the jurisdictional organ of merit could have drafted the deliberative or intellective part of the decision, which covered 74 folios, without being able to classify it as an irregularity that the other objective elements of the sentence (heading, literal transcription of the accused facts, as well as the material content of the evidence produced in debate) had been being worked on since before the close of the debate, because said elements of the judgment do not depend on the deliberation that must necessarily occur once it is ordered. This being the case, the defense's approach is declared without merit.
Lack of reasoning in determining the amount of the penalty. In this sixth claim, the existence of defects in the reasoning of the penalty amount is argued, citing numeral 71 of the Criminal Code, because alongside the elements that led the court to impose a sanction well above the minimum, certain circumstances that could be considered mitigating are also cited without being assessed. Next, the appellant cites and criticizes some criteria set forth in the judgment to justify this aspect of the decision (for example, that Nombre01 held the position of head of the institution; that he influenced employee appointments; that the amount of money stolen, due to the devaluation process, is more significant than it might be today; that the defendants, due to their work experience, had internalized their duty of probity toward public resources; that the unlawful act weakened many vital areas of the national economy that the Civil Aviation budget was meant to satisfy; that, apart from the public institution, the prestige and credibility of the Nombre21 and Montajes Industriales Rocaba workshops were affected; that no effort has been made to repair the damage; and that, except for Nombre06, all defendants have no prior record), insisting that the judgment does not explain what value was assigned to each of these circumstances.
According to the statements made by the presiding judge of the Court when verbally presenting the grounds for the judgment (she said she hoped the judgment would serve as an example for public servants and help eradicate corruption, to demonstrate which the clipping from La Nación newspaper at folio 386 is attached), the true purpose in imposing 8 years of prison was to seek negative general deterrence (prevención general negativa). In the event that the Third Chamber deems it appropriate to determine the penalty in this same venue, the appellant offers the evidence indicated at folio 365 of volume II). The ground must be dismissed. By adhering to the literal content of the trial judgment, it can be verified that among the express reasonings set forth and captured in writing by the Trial Court to justify the amount of 8 years of prison imposed on the accused Nombre01, no reference was made to the purpose of negative general deterrence that some sector of the doctrine has assigned to criminal sanctions.
Regarding this last point, one may consult, among many others, the work by Ziffer (Patricia S.), “LINEAMIENTOS DE LA DETERMINACIÓN DE LA PENA”, editorial AdHoc, Buenos Aires, 1st edition, June 1996, page 45 and following. As to this point, the judges indicated the following: “... Based on the provisions of Article 354 of the Criminal Code, which punishes the crime of Peculation (Peculado) with a prison sentence of three to twelve years, and Article 71 of that same substantive body, the court deems that, as the principal penalty, Mr. Nombre01 should be sentenced to a term of eight years of prison, Nombre05 to a term of seven years of prison, Nombre06 to a term of six years of prison, and Nombre09 to a term of five years of prison ... For the determination of said penalty, quantitative and qualitative aspects of the acts proven throughout this judgment were considered first, insofar as the defendants here colluded in community accord and will to, from their strategic positions of leadership, and of trust with regard to Nombre09, make the public institution in which they served more vulnerable and thereby facilitate the theft of the mentioned sum of money, in order to later unlawfully appropriate and take advantage of it.
Account has also been taken, in determining the penalty to impose, of the confirmation that Nombre01, at the time of committing the crime, held a higher rank than the other defendants, thereby earning greater reproach by virtue of his greater responsibility for oversight and direction of this public institution, but also, as he explained with the greatest nonchalance in his investigative statement (declaración indagatoria), that he used his position to have this employer institution hire several servants, thereby demonstrating total disregard for the legal regulations for this type of labor access. In addition to this, he spontaneously admitted that he violated internal regulations corresponding to the preparation of the supplier list, since, even knowing that it was essential for those interested in joining it to submit their applications in writing (stated Nombre17 Nombre26), he plainly and simply verbally asked Nombre23 (maintenance manager, who in his testimony confirmed what Nombre01 said) to consider the Nombre18 workshop.
This acceptance on his part in this regard denotes, in our opinion, no discomfiture in trafficking his influence for appointments and contracts, and that inevitably, because he was the one administratively heading that institution at that time, fostered a culture or environment of corruption, which, without a doubt, harmed and did harm, in the specific case, this institution. On the other hand, the notorious circumstance is assessed that this sum of money stolen at that time is, by virtue of the currency devaluation processes, more important than it might be today. Also that the defendants, at the time of the commission of the crime, were already public officials with years of experience and performance in public administration, so they had to a greater extent internalized that legal duty of probity toward public resources. Account is also taken that, because everything related to the infrastructure and modernization of national air ports, especially the Santamaría, had been declared a government priority, all with a view to improving our national economy, a large part of the country's budget had been allocated to the Civil Aviation budget, a situation widely known by all the defendants, as they were expressly made aware of it (state the defendants) by the Executive Branch in the person of President Figueres Olsen, so that necessarily many vital areas it was meant to satisfy were weakened; all the more reason to consider the crime of the defendants reprehensible.
It is further assessed that, parallel to the serious harm to the prestige of the employer institution, to the credibility that the Costa Rican citizenry had in it, as well as to the proper use of public resources, with this crime the defendants seriously harmed the prestige and credibility of the workshops Nombre21 SA and Montajes Industriales Rocaba, which were unfairly branded as corrupt. It is further assessed that after the crime, none of the defendants have made efforts to repair the damage they caused with it, neither to Civil Aviation nor to those workshops. It has also been considered that the danger to which the protected legal interest (bien jurídico tutelado), probity, was exposed was very significant, due to the loss of credibility of the Costa Rican citizenry in the proper use of public resources and in the honorability and honesty of its officials, which is proven by the notorious fact of the great questioning and criticism that the reporting of these events sparked in our population.
In this sense, it is public and notorious that criminal actions such as the one now being tried irremediably undermine the credibility of our citizenry in everything related to public function and its servants, to the detriment of the necessary stability that the country's development requires in that regard. For the tailoring of the penalty, account is also taken, in accordance with what has already been set forth throughout the judgment, that there effectively was harm to patrimonial legal interests (bienes jurídicos patrimoniales) to the detriment of Civil Aviation, consisting of five million eight hundred eighty thousand colones of the year nineteen ninety-six, that the events occurred with checks from the same checking account of the Civil Aviation Technical Council, which leads to the conclusion that the defendants pursued the same purpose, that of stealing a certain amount of money whose administration had been entrusted to Nombre01 and Nombre30 by reason of their positions and in their capacities as public officials.
When imposing the penalty in accordance with numeral 71 of the Criminal Code, the Court takes into account that the accused Nombre30 and Nombre09 have no prior criminal convictions, that as experienced professionals in their respective fields they used their knowledge to steal money from a fund that was destined to help national aeronautical activities at a very difficult time for our country due to the weaknesses of our aeronautical ports, to such a degree that, as already indicated, it was declared a priority of the Figueres Olsen administration, that the judgment of reproach must be greater in the case of the accused Nombre01 taking into account that he is an official who held the position of head of a dependency attached to the MOPT, and far from responding to the trust placed in him by the Public Administration, he used his position to steal money on those two occasions according to the proven facts of this judgment, that he has never tried to compensate the damage caused, therefore, attending to the seriousness of the act and his personality, and within the penalty limits established for the crime, his conduct must be more severely reproached. ...
Finally, it is also assessed that, with the exception of Nombre06 who has previous prosecutions, the other defendants have no prior record, are heads of family and obligated to their support ...” (cf. folio 205, line 25 onwards). As can be inferred from the transcribed text, when establishing the amount of the penalty imposed on each of the accused, the judges referred to a series of objective and subjective aspects of the act, even assessing their personal and particular circumstances, all of which falls within the parameters that Article 71 of the Criminal Code contemplates for such purposes. Moreover, without setting this aside, it is noted that the appellant's argument stems from a fragmented analysis of the aspects that were taken into account to support and justify the quantum of the imposed penalty, as he only criticizes some of the court's reasonings in isolation. If we start from an integral view, it is easily verifiable that all the circumstances mentioned in the judgment, the very ones that place the defendants in diverse situations and positions, led the jurisdictional body to establish judgments of reproach of different levels or severity, it being very clear that with respect to the accused Nombre01, for whom a greater penalty was set than for the other accused, his greater responsibility as administrative head of the body was, among other points, taken into account. Based on the foregoing, the claim is dismissed.
Erroneous application of articles 45 and 354, and failure to apply article 216, all of the Criminal Code. The sole objection on the merits alleges the violation of the substantive rules cited above, based on the following:
Appeal in cassation filed by Licenciado Hugo Chavarría Céspedes, public defender of co-defendant Nombre09 (cfr. folios 402 to 406).
First Ground (Form): Defects in the reasoning. In arguing that Articles 181, 184, and 369(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were violated in this case, the appellant argues as follows: a) Photocopies of the search and seizure (allanamiento) operation ordered and conducted at the home of co-defendant Nombre09 on October 16, 1996, were introduced as a replacement of documents, which is illegal. The surprising offer of this evidence for better resolution was made by the Prosecutor (Nombre16) on the very day he would begin his closing arguments, without meeting the requirements of Article 355 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (that a new circumstance arise during the hearing requiring clarification). Furthermore, these questioned documents correspond to an investigation related to other facts, unrelated to this proceeding. The ground must be declared without merit. Regarding the first aspect of the claim, that is, the surprising nature of the offer of the challenged evidence, it must be noted that the defense counsel is incorrect, because as the Prosecutor (Nombre16) noted in his oral presentation during the trial hearing, the documents he objects to were indeed offered when the charges were filed, meaning the right of defense was not impaired as proposed.
Indeed, in the section of the charges dedicated to describing the documentary evidence offered for the debate (point No. 12), reference was made to an envelope containing various documents seized during the search and seizure (allanamiento) carried out at the home of the accused Nombre09. While it is true that only "some of them" were described subsequently (cf. folio 210, line 26 onwards), this in no way implied that the rest were excluded, as the entire contents of that envelope were clearly and formally offered. Moreover, during the trial hearing, and in the face of the defense's strong opposition to the offer made by the prosecutor, the representative of the Contraloría General de la República noted that "... what the defense indicates, that the proceedings are not in the case file, is incorrect; on the contrary, they are indeed present; this is not an offer of new evidence, but rather, it had already been offered by the Fiscalía" (cf. folio 29 of the second volume, lines 44 to 48).
As can be inferred from the foregoing, it is not true that the challenged action, carried out by the Prosecutor (Nombre16) during the trial hearing, was surprising and, therefore, harmful to the defense's interests, which in any case fails to even specify any grievance, as it does not specify how things would have differed if the offer had not been made until that procedural stage. Regarding the second aspect of the objection, that is, the alleged illegitimacy of the evidence because it derives from a search and seizure (allanamiento) operation conducted in connection with another investigation, it must be noted that Article 3 of the Law on the Recording, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Intervention of Communications, No. 7425, expressly establishes that "The order for seizure, recording, or examination shall be carried out, under penalty of nullity, by a reasoned order in which the documents upon which the measure of recording, seizure, or examination will be executed are individualized, if possible ...
If other documents not included in the order are seized, they must be immediately returned to the person from whom they were seized, unless the judge considers them crucial for that or another investigation; if so, the judge must extend the order to include them and justify the reason for their inclusion." From the wording of this rule, it is clearly inferred that the scenario regulated in the second paragraph, referring to the extension of the seizure order, depends on other documents being seized that were not originally included in the respective order, and furthermore, this last requirement would only operate in those cases where such prior inclusion was possible. Applying these principles to the case at hand, we verify that both the request from the Public Ministry and the search and seizure (allanamiento) order around which the reproach revolves (the legitimacy of which is not even questioned by the defense) do not specify which specific documents or evidence the operation conducted on October 16, 1996, at the home of co-defendant Nombre09 was to target (cf. folio 694, lines 6 to 15; and folio 696, line 35 onwards), from which it must be understood, then, that the extension procedure whose absence is lamented was not applicable in this instance.
Indeed, the requirement that the order be extended makes sense only in those scenarios where, the scope (object) of the operation to be carried out having been previously defined—that is, when the documents intended to be seized have been determined concretely and specifically in advance—the need is perceived to extend said action to other documents not initially included. Otherwise, if it was not possible to know exactly and precisely beforehand which elements would be seized, and upon carrying out the operation, evidence was found that corresponded to and was essential for another investigation, there was no obstacle to seizing them as was done, especially considering this was a very complex investigation. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the extension now missed (which, as stated, was not actually mandatory) was omitted in this case, we would still have to conclude that part of the documentary evidence seized there, which corresponded to another investigation, was lawful, as was its legitimate use in the proceeding at hand.
Regarding the topic of illegal evidence, which was developed by U.S. jurisprudence under the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Theory," certain hypotheses came to be implemented in which the effects derived from an irregular action during the investigation involving an infringement of fundamental rights were limited; that is, some exceptions to the traditional exclusionary rule were devised, among which, in relation to the case at hand, the "plain view" doctrine stands out: "... The search and seizure (allanamiento) order must be specific. This requirement ... has been recognized by doctrine. The issue of the specificity of the search and seizure (allanamiento) order is also expressly enshrined in fundamental U.S. law. The Fourth Amendment grants the people the right to be secure in their houses, persons, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring for the corresponding warrant probable cause supported by oath or affirmation 'particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized' ...
Specificity applies both to the place and to the purpose pursued by the measure, which is related to the criminal proceeding in which the order was issued. Frequently in practice, a search and seizure (allanamiento) order is issued for a specific purpose, authorizing the police to execute it. Once the commissioned officer has entered the domicile, it is common to encounter unexpected evidence, whether related to the fact being investigated in the case that originated the order, to another different case, or even linked to an illicit act of which there was never any prior knowledge ... The minority position considers any activity carried out in the search and seizure (allanamiento) that was not foreseen in the order or was not admitted by a subsequent order to be a violation of the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of the domicile ... The majority position in jurisprudence adopts the contrary thesis, as it validates acts performed in excess of what was foreseen in the order.
That is, it allows for the evaluation, principally, of seizures carried out by the police within enclosed places without a prior search and seizure (allanamiento) order that had authorized entry for that particular seizure. Jurisprudence is prolific on the issue ... The plain view doctrine, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, has been a direct source of pronouncements on the matter in our country ... The plain view doctrine, as adopted by the pronouncement, legitimizes seizures carried out without the corresponding order, if the effects were in plain view, in an evident manner; that is, when the need to proceed with their seizure is manifest. When the commissioned officer 'stumbles upon them and there are reasonable grounds to seize them, he must do so' ... since in such a case 'he need not look away and ignore what he evidently has before him' ...", Nombre44 (Nombre45), "EFICACIA DE LA PRUEBA ILÍCITA Y SUS DERIVADAS EN EL PROCESO PENAL", AdHoc Publishing, Buenos Aires. 1st ed., September 2002, pages 113 to 118.
As can be inferred from the preceding doctrinal citation, the finding of evidence not previously included in the search and seizure (allanamiento) order, even when it is not related to the investigation that gave rise to conducting said operation, is legitimate if it was obtained through transparent police action that we could call "in good faith," that is, when the unexpected elements were in plain sight or, during the search, were stumbled upon, to the point that it would be absurd to require the authorities to "close their eyes" to what is evident. Because of this, the same author already cited explains the clarifications that have been made to this plain view doctrine, let us see: "... A sector of the doctrine also accepts seizures in excess of what was foreseen in the order, only if a series of specific circumstances are present ... if the police have already found what they were looking for or are searching places where they clearly will not find what they were specifically instructed to look for, it is clear that any subsequent procedure will constitute an attack on the privacy of individuals, going beyond what the judge who issued the search and seizure (allanamiento) order has authorized ..." Ibidem, page 118.
As can be seen, the thesis at hand is not unrestricted or unlimited, as its basis maintains that good faith action by the authorities conducting the operation, and when that is not present, we will obviously be in the presence of an abusive and arbitrary action that would violate the fundamental right to privacy and inviolability of the domicile. This would happen, for example (and as the same author exemplifies), in those situations where a search and seizure (allanamiento) order has been issued to find and seize a vehicle, and the police searched closets, drawers, rooms, clothing (that is, in places where the item targeted by the operation could not reasonably be found), and thanks to this other evidence is located, or when the order is centered on the detention of an individual, and once this is achieved, the search of the place continues with the same result as before. It is clear that in such scenarios, such a finding could not be validated or legitimized, as it would evidence a malicious and abusive action that would impair the constitutional guarantees recognized in favor of the citizenry.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the circumstances involved in the case at hand, that is, the manner in which the search and seizure (allanamiento) operation that led to the finding and seizure of a copy of the checks in favor of the workshops Nombre22 and Nombre21 del Oeste, as well as the telephone service application, were carried out, would not in any way even allow for suggesting any dark or disloyal police action (an extreme not even alleged by the defense), which would allow establishing the legitimacy of such evidence in this case. In any event, and regarding that telephone service application (from which it was possible to establish that the telephone numbers appearing on the checks indeed correspond to those assigned to the accused Nombre09), it is clear that they would fall under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, already accepted by the jurisprudence of this Chamber (among others, see Judgment No. 1252001, at 10:36 a.m. on 02/02/2001), because even if that information had not been available, it could easily have been lawfully obtained from the records kept by the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, in its telecommunications area.
Likewise, in relation to this specific topic at hand, in somewhat similar cases the jurisprudence of this Chamber has had the opportunity to state the following: "... counsel ... states in the first section of the sole ground of her appeal ... that the judgment on the merits is based on illegitimate evidence. She maintains that the lower court (tribunal a quo) admitted part of the data obtained through telephone interceptions conducted in this matter, thereby violating due process and the principle of legality, as it used them to reach conclusions regarding the crime of homicide, when at the time they were executed, the law did not authorize them for investigating that type of crime ... It is true, as the defense counsels point out, that when the interceptions of communications were carried out in this matter, the law on the recording, seizure, and examination of private documents did not yet contemplate the possibility that interception measures could have the purpose of investigating crimes such as homicide or others different from those the legislator exhaustively listed (extortion kidnapping and those described in the narcotics law) ...
This point must be resolved, as the lower court did, in accordance with the existing constitutional jurisprudence on the subject and, in particular, Judgment Number 157196 at 12:36 p.m. on March 29, 1996 –also cited by the trial judges– which ordered: “II. The study of the specific case must begin with an analysis of the possibility of using, for disciplinary purposes, the knowledge obtained through the telephone interception conducted for the purpose of investigating a drug trafficking crime. Firstly, it is necessary to indicate that the authority to authorize a telephone interception is limited to the investigation of certain types of crimes previously selected by the legislator, which in our country are exhaustively indicated in Article 9 of Law No. 7425 of August 9, 1994 ... This delimitation made by the legislator constitutes, without a doubt, an objective criterion of proportionality between the act intended to be investigated, versus the infringement that, with the authorization, is produced regarding the fundamental right of individuals to the secrecy of communications contained in Article 24 of the Political Constitution, which must necessarily be so, since it is not possible to infringe upon that fundamental right under any pretext.
However, it must indeed be indicated that the fact that such an objective criterion of proportionality exists and that the intention is only to record conversations useful for the criminal case being investigated does not mean that what doctrine has called 'chance discoveries' will not occur, which refer precisely to the encounter, through the interception, of various situations such as:
VIII.SECOND GROUND on procedural grounds: Defective procedural activity due to the complainant’s illegal participation. This section alleges a violation of Articles 76, 77, and 443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because a complaint was filed without a power of attorney from the Comptroller or Deputy Comptroller of the Republic, and without any court or the prosecutorial authority ever demanding from “whoever claimed” to represent the Comptroller’s Office the special power of attorney that would accredit them as legitimated under Article 76 of the cited Code, rendering that action illegitimate. Due to the foregoing, the court granted a term within which the mentioned omission was corrected; however, according to the defense’s opinion, this did not cure the initial defect. The cited complainant’s intervention was so prejudicial that the court imposed the exact penalty that the complainant requested.
The claim is untenable. The appellant’s thesis, insofar as it asserts that the cure applied to the procedural irregularity being challenged did not correct the initial defect, is based on an erroneous premise that completely invalidates it. The rules of cure provided for in Article 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to ensure that any defective submission presented by a party is not rejected and excluded from the process if the defect has not first been brought to their attention, also giving them the opportunity to rectify it. Underlying this procedural mechanism is the principle of loyalty required of all interacting subjects within the litigation, also codified (Article 127 of the 1996 Code of Criminal Procedure), according to which, correspondingly, the opposing party cannot claim that, without even having timely and expressly challenged the existing inaccuracies in the said irregular submission—which is in some way directed against their interests—it should simply and surprisingly be eliminated for failing to comply with a formality.
This being the case, it is obvious that in a scenario like the one we are analyzing, where, having resorted to the cure procedure, the party corrected within the granted period the defects pointed out in their submission, the submission was definitively and “retroactively” corrected for all purposes. Admitting the opposing thesis, i.e., that this correction of errors would only have effect “going forward,” as the defense attorney seems to understand it, would be entirely nonsensical, since it would mean that no submission filed without meeting formal requirements could ever be “cured,” that is, able to produce its effects from the outset as if it had been made without those already corrected defects. In the case at hand, we have the omission attributed to the act of filing the complaint, which, as the appellant indicates, was challenged by the defense at the moment the trial hearing was about to begin, and which, as he also explains, had never been “demanded” of the complaining party, i.e., the presentation of the missing power of attorney, from which it is inferred that prior to that, the attorney of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic had not been advised of anything regarding this, and therefore had not been given an opportunity to remedy it.
Thus, very judiciously, the trial court granted him a term to correct that aspect, which he indeed did, from which it must be concluded that the matter was cured for all purposes. In any event, and despite his efforts in that direction, the appellant cannot even specify the existence of harm arising from the intervention of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in this process, because the fact that the penalty amount requested by the latter coincided with the one ultimately imposed does not imply that such a request was essential or determinative in setting that penalty, not only because it was in no way binding on the trial court, but also because the court adequately stated the reasoning for that quantum it chose, from which it cannot be sustained that an alleged procedural irregularity by a party (which, it is held, must be dismissed) undermines the legitimacy of the imposed penalty. Based on the foregoing, the objection is dismissed.
Insufficient reasoning. The appellant accuses a violation of Articles 184 and 369, subsection d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because no basis was given for how the conclusion was reached that the endorsements on the two questioned checks were not made by the representatives of the workshops in whose favor they were drawn, and no graphological expert opinion exists to support that conclusion. Next, the defense attorney asks why, with respect to the second endorsement, for which there is also no such expert evidence, it was indeed established that it was made by Nombre09. This ground is also not admissible. Regarding this specific point, the trial judges reasoned as follows: “... All these official communications prove that Nombre09 truly functioned as a trusted employee in Civil Aviation, even with the authority to attend high-level meetings on aeronautical policies, such as those of the FAA, and furthermore, to issue orders for the preparation of equipment purchase orders.
It is important to highlight from the official communication at folio 121 that Nombre06 acknowledged during the debate having prepared the purchase order that Nombre09 requested of him there, which demonstrates that it was not abnormal or unusual for the direct contracting procedure to be inverted in that institution, since, contrary to what Nombre06 stated in his preliminary statement, in this case Nombre09, acting with great discretion, first acquires the good, and then Nombre06 prepares the purchase order based on the attached invoice. In this case, no prior quotation was made to verify that the good to be acquired was of the quality and price that would grant the greatest benefit to this institution. According to the rules of sound human understanding, enjoying that trust and the benefits of such a high-level advisor evidently enabled Nombre09 to have a close relationship with Nombre01, Nombre05, and Nombre06, which in turn factually enabled him to act in tasks of cashing checks corresponding to irregular contracts.
Indeed, Nombre20 stated that, like him, Nombre09 frequently went to banks to cash checks of this nature. This circumstance, for the purposes of this judgment, demonstrates that Nombre09 provided collaboration for cashing checks. Another relevant circumstance is that on the reverse sides of checks 8303 and 8304, the signatures of Nombre09 appear, as well as his cell phone number. This is important for the following reasons. While it is true the summary lacks a graphological expert opinion to establish that the signatures corresponding to the second endorsements on the reverse sides of those checks belong to him, the circumstance that the existing signatures there (the questioned ones) perfectly match those on his written preliminary statements rendered in case file number 96 001728, for example those on folios 1850, constitutes a serious and corroborating indicio. On the other hand, another serious and revealing indicio is the fact that, as the Prosecutor rightly points out, the cell phone numbers appearing immediately after such endorsements on the reverse sides of those checks fully coincide with his assigned numbers.
Indeed, note that on those checks, the numbers Telf01, Telf02 and Telf03 appear in his endorsement, while among the personal documents seized at his home (see the manila envelope containing them) appears an ICE document titled “Cellular Service Application” dated December 16, 1994, appearing in his name as client, indicating Telf02 as his home number and the numbers Telf04 and Telf02 as his phones for inquiries; likewise, on the special money receipt number 1488085 the assigned cell phone Telf05 3267 appears. Clearly, there is a complete coincidence between the telephone numbers printed there and those corresponding to his residence and assigned cell phone number. That coincidence constitutes, as Mr. Nombre16 expresses, one more signature of Nombre09 on those endorsements. Another circumstance that incriminates him regarding the cashing of those checks 8303 and 8304 are the copies of them that were seized, among others, at his residence during the raid conducted by Judge Porter Aguilar.
Indeed, those copies of checks were found at his home, as proven by the seizure report at 1045 hours on October 16, as expressly described on lines 23 and 24, and ratified by the receipt report at folios 1226 and 1227 of file 96 1728, fronts and backs, from the Examining Magistrate's Court of Tibás and La Uruca, where specific reference is made to these checks as evidence received on occasion of such raids (folios 699 and following of file 98 17767). The possession of those copies of those checks proves that the originals were in Nombre09's power after being issued and before being cashed at the Bank, as there is no other reasonable explanation for how he could have obtained those copies. Note that, by reason of his function in Civil Aviation, Nombre09 was not required to perform any step or chapter of the procedure regarding the issuance of those checks, much less cash them, which could justify their coming into his hands and his being able to photocopy them.
At that time, as corroborated by the gathered evidence, there was no other official with the surname Nombre09 in Civil Aviation. All these indiciary circumstances, assessed as a whole, lead necessarily to the conclusion that the accused Nombre09, on January 10 and 12, 1996, cashed checks 8303 and 8304 at the Bank, and after that, with the sums of money in his possession, proceeded to deliver them to the rest of the accused here, according to a previously established plan, thereby collaborating in the consummation and exhaustion of the iter criminis in which he participated. Indeed, the rules of logic explain that so many incriminating indicios cannot coincide at a single historical moment pointing to Nombre09 in these acts, unless he effectively participated in them. While it is true that the debate did not establish from whose hands he received those checks, this is not determinative for establishing his collaboration in the crime, since it is reasonably probable that he received them from Nombre01 or Nombre15, for Nombre18 left them in their hands, as was proven.
Of transcendental importance for what matters here is that, after Nombre09 cashed those checks, the sums of money they involved left the sphere of custody of Civil Aviation, thus consummating the accused economic harm ...” (cf. folio 167, line 16 onward). As is evident from the foregoing, while it is true, as the defense attorney notes, that in this case there was no technical graphological study to scientifically determine who were the persons who endorsed the questioned checks, the judgment did determine that the representatives of the beneficiary workshops did not stamp their signatures there and that, on the contrary, Nombre09 did do so, based on indiciary elements that, summed up and assessed as a whole, necessarily led to such a conclusion. Note that regarding this last aspect (the authorship of Nombre09 concerning the endorsements), the ruling mentions five circumstances that, according to an integral view, validly support that factual conclusion that the defense criticizes, namely: i) The collected official communications prove that Nombre09 truly functioned as a trusted employee in Civil Aviation; ii) Enjoying that trust and the benefits of such a high-level advisor evidently enabled Nombre09 to have a close relationship with Nombre01, Nombre05, and Nombre06, which in turn also permitted him to factually act in tasks of cashing checks corresponding to irregular contracts (Nombre20 stated that, like him, Nombre09 frequently went to banks to cash checks of this nature); iii) On the reverse sides of checks 8303 and 8304, the signatures of Nombre09 appear.
This statement is supported by the following: iii.a.) The signatures of the second endorsement on the checks “perfectly match” (are perceived as similar) those that the accused signed on his written statements rendered in case file number 96001728, for example those on folio 1850; iii.b.) The three telephone numbers appearing immediately after such endorsements on the reverse sides of those checks (Telf01, Telf02 and Telf03) fully coincide with those assigned to him by ICE, since among the personal documents seized at his home, which are found in a manila envelope in the possession of the court, appears an ICE document titled “Cellular Service Application” dated December 16, 1994, appearing in his name as client, indicating Telf02 as his home number and the numbers Telf04 and Telf02 as his phones for inquiries; likewise, on the special money receipt number 1488085, the assigned cell phone Telf01.
In the opinion of the judges and accepting the prosecutor’s argument, that “coincidence” constituted “one more signature” of Nombre09 on those endorsements (from the context, it is understood that this allusion is a simple phrase used in a metaphorical sense to convey that said element, i.e., that coincidence in the telephone numbers, constitutes—just like the signatures—one more piece of incriminating evidence against the accused); iv) When a raid was conducted at his residence by Judge Porter Aguilar, copies of the referred checks were found and seized (cf. folios 699 and following of file 9817767). From the possession of the copies of those checks, the judges held it as proven that, after being issued and before being cashed at the bank, their originals were in the power of Nombre09. It was reasonably considered that there is no other explanation for this, since by reason of his function in Civil Aviation, he was not required to perform any step of the procedure concerning the issuance of those particular checks, much less cash them, which could justify them coming into his hands and his being able to photocopy them.
Suffice it to add that in the process, it was also not determined that he maintained any relationship with the representatives of the workshops, who moreover flatly denied having endorsed, signed, or cashed said instruments (cf. folio 98, line 15 onward; 105, line 6 onward; and 109, line 10 onward), in which they were afforded full credibility (cf. folio 148, line 15 onward; and folio 149, line 3 onward). As can be deduced from the above, while in this specific case the technical evidence that the appellant attorney finds missing was not available, that did not prevent the judges, in accordance with the cited indiciary elements, from being able to reasonably and with complete certainty determine not only that Nombre09 was the author of the second endorsements on the checks (which proves that he was the one who cashed them), but also that the first endorsements were not made by the representatives of the workshops Nombre22 and Nombre21 del Oeste.
In any event, it must also be clearly understood that in our criminal process, of a markedly accusatory nature, the principle of freedom of evidence governs, according to which “facts and circumstances of interest for the correct solution of the case may be proven by any permitted means of evidence, unless expressly prohibited by law” (Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), from which it could not be demanded, as the appellant suggests, that the only means to establish or rule out the authorship of a signature is the technical expert opinion in graphology, because this would imply that regarding that issue, we are in the presence of a legally prescribed form of evidence, which is foreign to the current criminal procedural system, as it would rather be characteristic of those written, inquisitorial systems. In any event, and without setting aside the foregoing, it must be noted that the defense does not mention having requested the expert evidence it now misses, with which it seeks to discredit the conclusions of the court, from which it would lack standing in its argument. Based on the foregoing, the ground is rejected.
Cassation appeal of the co-defendant Nombre05 (cf. folios 407 to 429).
X.FIRST GROUND (procedural): Lack of a detailed determination of the fact held as proven. Based on Articles 369, subsection a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1996, and 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, it is argued that considering the principle of legality, the judgment should have determined, based on the laws, decrees, and regulations, what the functions of the co-defendant Nombre05 were, who held the status of Financial Director of the Civil Aviation Directorate. This discredits “the statements” of the court and, more than that, demonstrates that the proven fact is not duly detailed. The complaint is not admissible. At the base of this argument, one seems to perceive the thesis that for the configuration of the crime of embezzlement (the figure for which the 4 defendants were convicted), the active subject must have their function of custody or administration of the public funds upon which the illicit act of misappropriation or unlawful diversion (sustracción o distracción) falls established by law, decree, or regulation, i.e., by a formal norm, which in this Chamber’s opinion is not admissible.
In reality, that relationship of the subject (who must hold the status of public official) with the money towards which they direct their conduct, while it could be pre-established in a norm like those mentioned, that being the most common case, could also arise circumstantially, i.e., as a spontaneous, informal, and de facto matter, where thanks to the public office they hold, they manage to come into contact with and receive the charge of such goods, which they remove from the State's sphere of custody. In this sense, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has indicated: “... The criminal type contained in Article 352 of the Penal Code does not require that the subject have the abstract competence to guard or administer the goods; that is, it does not require that such contact with the goods be within their usual powers. This, although the most frequent hypothesis giving rise to embezzlement, is not the only one.
It can also be configured when, without being within their functional faculties, the goods are entrusted to them ‘by reason of their office’ ...” Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, opinion N° 65900 of 9:50 a.m. on May 28, 1999. Starting from the above, in the case at hand, we have that as indicated in the ruling, the co-defendant Nombre05 himself admitted that he worked as the head of the financial department of Civil Aviation, and it was precisely he who was responsible for processing and issuing the checks covering the entity’s payment obligations. Regarding this point, the ruling stated the following: “... As was demonstrated in the debate, the defendants Nombre01 and Nombre30, public officials, performed actions through which they misappropriated funds that had been entrusted to them by reason of their offices, funds that were entrusted to them to be administered. To carry out the misappropriation of those funds, the defendants Nombre01 and Nombre30, on respective occasions, had the collaboration of the co-defendants Nombre09 and Nombre06 ...
It has been demonstrated that Nombre01 and Nombre30 acted intentionally in misappropriating funds entrusted to their custody by reason of their offices as public officials to be administered. In that sense, both knew their conditions as public officials, and knew that they were misappropriating funds entrusted to them by reason of their offices as public officials to be administered, the former as the General Director of Civil Aviation, and the latter as Chief of its Financial Department, since they knew they administered funds that made up the budget of said public institution. Their knowledge in that sense is evident when, upon testifying in the debate, they admitted knowing they worked in those offices in that decentralized body, and furthermore that the issuing of checks from the checking account number 205 9242 8 of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation was within their functions ...
In addition to the aforementioned mechanism, it was proven that the defendants Nombre01 and Nombre30, acting in common accord, grossly violated the existing administrative procedure in Civil Aviation and in any public institution regarding the controls and oversight that, on matters of issuing public funds of that employer institution, were entrusted to them by reason of their offices. Indeed, each of them, by reason of their offices, had the legal duty to exercise all sufficient controls to guarantee the ‘proper use of public resources’; however, as was proven, both defendants proceeded to issue those checks knowing they corresponded to fictitious contracts, and moreover, for work that Civil Aviation had not received and would never receive. Nombre01 and Nombre30 issued respective checks in payment for services not rendered to the administration, funds which, by the conditions under which they were issued, were issued to be misappropriated for the purpose of unlawful appropriation, just as is evident from the overall analysis made in the first whereas clause of the ruling of all the conduct attributed to said defendants ...” (cf. folios 172, line 30 onward; 173, line 28 onward; 195, line 18 onward).
As is deduced from the transcribed text, from the evidence presented at trial it was amply proven that the co-defendants Nombre01 and Nombre05 not only held the status of public officials, as they provided their services to Civil Aviation (a decentralized public body, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport), but also that their respective offices as General Director and Chief of the Financial Department imposed upon them the duty to guard the misappropriated public funds, to such an extent that they themselves were (and in fact did so) those in charge of issuing the institution’s checks, since it was their joint responsibility to sign them. This being the case, it is clear that even though the ruling does not specify which concrete legal norm imposed this task on them, the very daily dynamic of their functions established it as such, as determined by the testimonial evidence, for example Nombre27, who as secretary of the General Directorate stated that Nombre01 was one of those in charge of signing the checks that already came prepared and signed by the Financial Department (cf. folio 122, lines 20 to 31); and Nombre26, who explained that after a purchase order was prepared, it was passed to the procurement office for review, signature, and subsequently, depending on the amount, there were two paths to follow: if it was under one million colones it went to Budget for economic content review; if it was over one million colones (as happened in the case at hand) it went to the General Directorate for approval by the Director, and that mandatory control procedure was implemented by Nombre05 himself, through a memorandum, as Chief of the Financial Department (cf. folio 113, line 8 onward).
He likewise explained that this very Financial Department, to which all the documentation was sent, was responsible for determining whether the purchase had economic content, that is, whether the budget line item that would absorb that expense had the money to pay for it. In addition to this, the judges reasoned that “... it is absurd that Nombre05 throughout his preliminary statement affirmed so emphatically that he was unaware of his legal duty of oversight, to then immediately deny any responsibility in the processing of the issuance of these checks or any checks that came out of there, when he simultaneously affirmed that he was diligent in implementing internal controls in his Department ... It has been demonstrated that Nombre01 and Nombre30 acted intentionally in misappropriating funds entrusted to their custody by reason of their offices as public officials to be administered. In that sense, both knew their conditions as public officials, and knew that they were misappropriating funds entrusted to them by reason of their offices as public officials to be administered, the former as the General Director of Civil Aviation, and the latter as Chief of its Financial Department, since they knew they administered funds that made up the budget of said public institution.
Their knowledge in that sense is evident when, upon testifying in the debate, they admitted knowing they worked in those offices in that decentralized body, and furthermore that the issuing of checks from the checking account number 205 9242 8 of the Technical Council of Civil Aviation was within their functions ...” (cf. folio 170, lines 24 to 28), from which it is clear that the same defendant was well aware of his responsibility, as head of the Financial Department, to ensure the custody and proper handling of the funds he administered, to such a point that, as indicated, he was, together with Nombre01, the one in charge of jointly signing the checks that left the institution. Based on the foregoing, the complaint is declared without merit.
Contradictory reasoning. This second ground alleges a violation of the same provisions cited in the previous section, because on one hand it is said that the accused Nombre05 acted with direct intent (dolo directo), but later it is said that it was with eventual intent (dolo eventual), these being two value judgments that are mutually exclusive. The objection is also not admissible. Regarding this aspect argued by the appellant, the judges stated the following: “... in the case of Nombre30, the court finds, in light of the evidence examined, that he committed the crime of embezzlement with eventual intent (dolo eventual). The eventual intent (dolo eventual) defined by article 39 of the Penal Code is present in the agent who does not care that the harm materializes and accepts it as an integral part of his conduct, that is, he knows and understands (within the possibilities or risks glimpsed) the harm he may cause and accepts it, which can often be derived even from certain objective elements demonstrating contempt, coldness, etc., in the actions.
Essential for eventual intent (dolo eventual), therefore, is both the representation of the harm that may be caused and the acceptance that it will occur by virtue of the conduct carried out by the agent. In eventual intent (dolo eventual), the agent's voluntariness and awareness in carrying out the prohibited conduct must concur, without caring about the harmful consequence his action causes. The agent's action with full knowledge and voluntariness in the execution of conduct he knows is criminal, and his absolute indifference to the causation of the harmful result, that is, whether it occurs as a possible consequence of his conduct, is conceptualized by our Penal Code as eventual intent (dolo eventual). It is evident then that the difference between eventual intent (dolo eventual) and conscious negligence, for example, consists in the former of the agent's rejection of the causation of the result, that is, upon representing it to himself he does not admit it, does not want it to happen.
The knowledge and voluntariness that converge in the agent that he is carrying out the conduct prohibited by criminal law, and his indifference to whether the harmful result occurs, that is, even foreseeing it as a consequence of his action, and although he does not directly seek it, he admits it in its materialization, configures eventual intent (dolo eventual), and is precisely what concurred in the accused Nombre05 in this case. The eventual intent (dolo eventual) with which he acted is evidenced and proven from the following objective circumstances. The issuance he made of the questioned checks in favor of third persons knowing that they had provided no service whatsoever to Civil Aviation, especially knowing they involved works or services that had already been awarded to another company, and that in any case it was not the responsibility of the Maintenance Department at that time to carry them out (since this department would assume their maintenance only after the departure of the awarded company providing services at that cargo terminal, as asserted by Nombre17 Nombre23, then and to date the Head of Maintenance at Santamaría), as well as the fact that the public bidding procedure had been maliciously circumvented by the subdivision (fraccionamiento) of those contracts into two despite referring to works of a similar nature, the marked speed with which, internally within his finance department, he processed and issued those checks, in addition to issuing them knowing that the workshops the checks were made out to had not contracted with Civil Aviation (since there was no supporting documentation demonstrating so) nor had they performed any work at that Santamaría Cargo Terminal, since there was no "received in conformity" for the completed service by any official at Civil Aviation, added to this the circumstance that those checks left Finance immediately through irregular mechanisms, to fall into the hands of Nombre01, turn out to be, among others, serious and concordant elements which, assessed together, allow reaching the unequivocal conclusion that the accused here, Nombre05, when issuing those checks, knew he was carrying out the conduct prohibited by the crime of embezzlement, nonetheless had (sic) the will to carry it out with total contempt for his knowledge and foreseeability that he would cause the harmful result now attributed to him, given that the actions he engaged in cannot be conceived, much less repeated, unless done voluntarily ...” (cf. folio 196, line 14 onwards).
As is verified from the preceding excerpt, and despite the fact that, in this Chamber's opinion, from the circumstances mentioned a direct intent (dolo directo) in the actions performed by the co-accused Nombre05 might seem to be inferred, the judgment does not incorporate the contradiction alleged and sought to be demonstrated by the appellant, because at no time was it established that he acted with direct intent (dolo directo) but rather, coherently with its own approach, an eventual intent (dolo eventual) was affirmed, that is, that knowing that his illicit conduct would cause pecuniary harm to the public body for which he rendered services as head of the finance department, he accepted said result. This being the case, the ground is declared without merit.
Lack of reasoning for the quantum of the penalty. Again based on the provisions cited in the previous grounds, this one complains of an inadequate reasoning for the amount of the sanction imposed, because:
Appeal of Attorney Gino Corazzari Aguilar, private counsel for the co-accused Nombre06 (cf. folios 430 to 631).
Lack of proper reasoning. In this section, citing Articles 142, 143, 363, 369, and 443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 39 of the Political Constitution, it is argued that the judgment lacked proper reasoning, which made it impossible for the defense to know the reasons that led to the conviction. This is based on the following:
Incorporation of illegitimate evidentiary elements. In this motion, citing Articles 15, 74, 76, 142, 175 to 183, 204, 233, 234, 334, and 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 38 and 39 of the Political Constitution, it is alleged that the condemnatory judgment is essentially based on illegitimate evidence, for the following reasons:
Illegal modification of the accusation during trial. In this third reproach, citing Articles 1, 12, 62, 127, 128, 175, 178, 233, 303, 306, 316, 336, 343, 345, 347, 348, 363, 365, and 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 39 of the Political Constitution, it is reported:
Violation of the rules of sound criticism. In this fourth reproach, it is argued that the judgment violates the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) regarding elements of decisive value, thereby violating Articles 1, 142, 183, 184, 204, 361, and 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 39 of the Political Constitution. The disagreement consists of the following:
Violation of the rules of sound criticism. In his fifth ground of appeal on procedural grounds, the defense counsel for the accused Nombre06 argues that Articles 142, 184, 204, 361, and 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 39 of the Political Constitution, have been violated. In support of his complaint, he states the following:
Erroneous application of Article 36 of the Penal Code, and Articles 101, 102 subsection a), 107, and 108 subsections 1º and 2º of the General Law of Public Administration. In this first objection on the merits, the defense counsel reports the violation of the aforementioned substantive rules, since when invoking the exculpatory ground, he referred to obedience due between Nombre06 and Nombre01, and not between the former and Nombre15 as the tribunal confused it. The appellant then argues the following:
Violation of Articles 47, 354, 1, 30, 31, and 48 of the Penal Code. In this second objection on the merits, and based on an extensive and detailed re-examination of the evidence and the circumstances surrounding the case, it is argued that the accused Nombre06 was convicted even though no evidentiary element demonstrated with a degree of certainty that he was an accomplice to the embezzlement of public funds (peculado); that said crime was committed by the supposed convicted principals; that there was a causal relationship between the preparation and signing of the purchase orders and the misappropriation and cashing of the checks; and that the fictitious contracts were prepared in common. In addition, and always based on the analysis of the evidence, it is asserted that it was proven that a directive of urgency existed; that the issuance of the checks took place in the finance department and not in procurement; that, upon signing the purchase orders, Nombre06 did not approve the execution of the works or services; that the “received in conformity” is what authorizes and is responsible for payment (which was ignored by the tribunal); that the statement of facts from the Contraloría, No. 30696, was nothing more than the enunciation of suppositions and possibilities, which Nombre24 reiterated; that from the latter's statement it was proven that the audit reports were disregarded; that Nombre24 began by lying and contradicted himself; that Nombre06's willful intent was not demonstrated, since he only followed orders, and he was convicted solely for signing the purchase orders (which did not mean misappropriation of funds); that it was not demonstrated that Nombre06 had a prior agreement with the other convicted individuals; that the urgency in the administrative contracting does not imply willful complicity; that the organizational-functional structure of Civil Aviation was disregarded; that it was not demonstrated that the co-defendants Nombre05 and Nombre01 planned to issue checks, much less the willful collaboration of Nombre06; and that it was not demonstrated that Nombre06 participated in any crime, as the crime itself was also not proven.
The complaint is inadmissible. The substantive argument put forward is inconsistent, since far from adhering to the factual framework that was deemed proven and, based on it, demonstrating an erroneous application of the substantive law, it improperly descends into a subjective and detailed analysis of the evidence produced at trial, from which it criticizes, disregards, and goes beyond the factual framework established by the judges, seeking for this Chamber to assume as correct the one now presented after such an exercise. Such argumentation cannot prosper, since an appeal in cassation for errors in iudicando presupposes respect for and the intangibility of the facts contained in the decision (in that sense, see, among many others, the ruling of this Chamber No. 650F95, at 10:25 hrs. on November 3, 1995; and No. 292F96, at 9:20 hrs. on June 14, 1996). Thus, the complaint is declared without merit.
THEREFORE:
The appeals in cassation filed are declared without merit in all their respects. LET THIS BE NOTIFIED.
Daniel González A.
Jesús A. Ramírez Q. Rodrigo Castro M.
Alfonso Chaves R. José Manuel Arroyo G.
Dig/imp: jlav Exp: 5403/302
PROYECTO Res: 2003-00776 SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas veinticinco minutos del nueve de setiembre de dos mil tres.
Recurso de casación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra Nombre01, costarricense, mayor de edad, cédula de identidad CED02, vecino de Nombre02 de Alajuela, hijo de Nombre03 y Nombre04, Nombre05, costarricense, mayor de edad, cédula de identidad CED03, vecino de Coronado, hijo de Nombre05, Nombre06, costarricense, mayor de edad, cédula de identidad CED04, vecino de Pavas, hijo de Nombre07 y de Nombre08 y Nombre09, costarricense, mayor de edad, cédula de identidad CED05, vecino de Pavas, hijo de Nombre09 y Nombre10, por el delito de PECULADO, cometido en perjuicio de LOS DEBERES DE LA FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso los Magistrados Daniel González Álvarez, Presidente, Jesús Alberto Ramírez Quirós, Alfonso Chaves Ramírez, Rdrigo Castro Monge y José Manuel Arroyo Gutiérrez. También interviene en esta instancia el Doctor Walter Antillón Montealegre, quien figura como defensor particular del encartado Nombre11, el Licenciado Hugo Chavarría Céspedes, defensor público del encartado Nombre09 y el Licenciado Gino Corazzi Aguilar, defensor particular del imputado Nombre06.
RESULTANDO:
1. Que mediante sentencia N° 03302, dictada a las nueve horas del seis de febrero de dos mil dos, el Tribunal Penal de Juicio de Goicoechea, resolvió: “POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39 y 41 Constitucionales; 1, 30, 31, 36, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 57, inciso 2°, 71 a 74, 103, 354, 356 y 363 del Código Penal; 122, 124 y 126 de las Reglas Vigentes Sobre Responsabilidad Civil del Código Penal de 1941; 265, 175 a 179, 150, 184, 233, 358, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367 y 368 del Código Procesal Penal; por unanimidad se resuelve: 1. declarar a Nombre01 y a Nombre05 COAUTORES, y a Nombre06 y Nombre09, COMPLICES, todos del delito de PECULADO, así recalificado, cometido en perjuicio de LOS DEBERES DE LA FUNCION PUBLICA; 2. en ese carácter imponerle como sanción, a cada uno de ellos, las siguientes penas, a : Nombre01 el tanto de OCHO AÑOS DE PRISIÓN, a Nombre05 el tanto de SIETE AÑOS DE PRISIÓN, a Nombre06 el tanto de SEIS AÑOS DE PRISIÓN, y a Nombre09 el tanto de CINCO AÑOS DE PRISIÓN; 3. que esas penas las descontarán los Condenados dichos, previo abono de las preventivas que hayan sufrido, en el lugar y forma que determinen los respectivos reglamentos penitenciarios, haciéndose las comunicaciones respectivas al Instituto Nacional de Criminología, al Registro Judicial y al Juez de Ejecución de La Pena; 4. se impone además como sanción accesoria a todos los Condenados la de INHABILITACIÓN ABSOLUTA PARA OBTENER CARGOS, EMPLEOS O COMISIONES PÚBLICAS, todo durante el término de DIEZ AÑOS, debiéndose comunicar de lo anterior a La Dirección General del Servicio Civil y al Ministerio Obras Públicas y Transportes; 5. se declara con lugar la Acción Civil Resarcitoria interpuesta por La Procuraduría General de La República en representación del Estado Costarricense, condenándose a todos sus Demandados Civiles, aquí Condenados, a cancelarle solidariamente el tanto de CINCO MILLONES OCHOCIENTOS OCHENTA MIL COLONES por concepto de Daño Material, y en concepto de Perjuicio, los intereses legales erogados por la suma de capital dicha desde el 10 de enero de 1996 y hasta su efectiva cancelación, mismos que se fijarán de conformidad con la tasa pasiva de los certificados de ahorro a plazo por el Banco Central de Costa Rica; 6. son las costas del proceso penal a cargo de los sentenciados. POR LECTURA NOTIFIQUESE." (sic). Fs. LICDA. Nombre12. LICDA. Nombre13. LIC. Nombre14.
2. Que contra el anterior pronunciamiento el Doctor Walter Antillón Montealegre, defensor particular de Nombre01 y los Licenciados, Hugo Chavarría, defensor público de Nombre09, Gino Corazzari Aguilar, defensor particular de Nombre06 y el imputado Nombre05, presentan recursos de casación. Alega el Dr. Antillón Montealegre en los motivos por la forma del recurso por él planteado: a) falta de fundamentación de la pena por basarse en fundamentación contradictoria, por ser inconsistente y valorar prueba ilícita que consiste: I) en violación al derecho de defensa en el allanamiento y registro practicados, II) testimonio de sospechosos sin las advertencias legales, III) prueba para mejor proveer ordenada ilícitamente y IV) incorporación ilícita del testimonio de Nombre15, fundamentación incompleta de la sentencia, falta de fundamentación de los hechos probados y falta de fundamentación jurídica, b) violación de las reglas de la sana crítica y el principio in dubio pro reo, c) mutación y falta de correlación entre acción y sentencia, d) falta de fundamentación ad causam y violación del debido proceso, e) violación de la continuidad de los actos procesales y f) omisa fundamentación en la fijación de la pena.
En cuanto a los vicios por el fondo alega violación y errónea aplicación de los artículos 45, 354 y 216 todos del Código Penal, considera violentados los artículos 9, 70, 71, 81, 82, 142, 175, 178, 184, 334, 336, 347, 348, 361 y 363, incisos b) y c), 365 todos del Código Procesal Penal, artículo 8 inciso 2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y los artículos 24, 33, 36, 37, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política. Solicita que se acoja el recurso y se ordene el reenvío para que realice nueva sustanciación conforme a derecho. Por su parte el Licenciado Hugo Chavarría Céspedes alega en los motivos de su recurso: a) sentencia basada en elementos probatorios de valor decisivo incorporados ilegalmente al proceso, b) actividad procesal defectuosa por participación ilegal del querellante y c) falta de fundamentación de la sentencia, violentando los artículos 76, 77, 181, 184, 369 incisos c) y d).
Solicita que se anule la sentencia impugnada y se ordene el reenvío del expediente para nueva sustanciación conforme a derecho. En el recurso presentado por parte del Licenciado Corazzari Aguilar se alega en los motivos por la forma: a) falta de fundamentación de la sentencia, b) fundamentación ilegítima de la sentencia por incorporación ilegal al proceso de elementos probatorios ilegítimos, c) fundamentación ilegítima por principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia, al modificarse ilegalmente la acusación del Nombre16 en el debate, sin proceder con el trámite de la ampliación de los nuevos hechos para que se ejercitara el derecho de defensa, d) falta de fundamentación por inobservancia de las reglas de la sana crítica racional en la valoración de elementos o medios probatorios de carácter decisivo, y e) violación a las reglas de la sana crítica. En cuanto a los motivos por el fondo alega: I) inobservancia o errónea aplicación del artículo 36 del Código Penal, II) errónea aplicación de los artículos 47 y 354 del Código Penal, considera que lo anterior quebranta los artículos: 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 1, 12, 15, 62, 74, 76, 127, 128, 142, 143, 175, a 183, 204, 233, 234, 334 inciso c) 369 incisos b), c) y d) todos del Código Procesal Penal.
Solicita que se acoja el recurso, se anule la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío del expediente para nueva sustanciación conforme a derecho. En cuanto al recurso presentado por parte del imputado Nombre05, este alega en el motivos del mismo: a) falta de fundamentación de la sentencia, b) fundamentación contradictoria de la sentencia, c) ausencia de motivación respecto a la sanción impuesta, violentándose los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política y 369 incisos a), b) y c) del Código Procesal Penal. Solicita que se anule la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío del expediente para una nueva tramitación apegada a derecho.
3. Que verificada la deliberación respectiva, la Sala se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.
4. Que al ser las ocho horas treinta minutos de primero de julio se realizó audiencia oral y pública programada.
5. Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.
Informa el Magistrado González Álvarez y,
CONSIDERANDO:
Recurso del Dr. Walter Antillón Montealegre, defensor particular del coimputado Nombre01 (cfr. tomo II, folios 232 a 383).
Falta de fundamentación, así como violación de las reglas de la sana crítica y del in dubio pro reo. Con cita de los artículos 9, 70, 71, 81, 82, 142, 175, 178, 184, 334, 336, 347, 348, 361 y 363 del Código Procesal Penal de 1996; 8.2 párrafos d), e) y f) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; y 24, 33, 36, 37, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política (de una vez se hace notar que esta normativa se cita en apoyo de todos los reclamos por yerros de forma), el defensor particular del coimputado Nombre01 aduce la existencia de defectos formales en la motivación del fallo condenatorio de instancia, a saber:
Mutación de la acusación, y falta de correlación entre acusación y sentencia. Con cita de los artículos 39 de la Constitución Política; 347, 348, 365 y 369 inciso h) del Código Procesal Penal; y 8.c de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, en este apartado se argumenta que, en escrito de folios 632 a 634 y ya muy avanzado el debate, el Nombre16 presentó una notable modificación de los hechos acusados, pero pretendió eludir la regla del segundo párrafo del artículo 347 del Código Procesal Penal con el argumento de que se trataba de una mera corrección de errores materiales. La citada “corrección” consistió en ubicar los hechos en enero de 1996, a pesar de que la acusación los fijaba en agosto de 1995. Una vez que el tribunal puso en conocimiento de los defensores esta “corrección”, y no obstante la oposición de éstos, la misma se incorporó. Con esto, se “afectó sensiblemente” la estrategia defensiva.
Si en la acusación se hubiera afirmado que la reunión sucedió el 8 de enero de 1996, la defensa hubiera tenido tiempo suficiente para tratar de reunir elementos probatorios que pudieran haber desvirtuado la posibilidad de esa reunión. Hubiera sido posible, con vista en la agenda del imputado Nombre01, u otros elementos probatorios, haber comprobado que ese día él no pudo haber participado en una reunión como la que afirma Nombre18. La queja debe rechazarse. En primer término, debe aclararse que la modificación fáctica a la acusación que se cuestiona y critica, no consistió en ubicar todos “los hechos” de agosto de 1995 a enero de 1996, como erróneamente lo hace ver el recurrente. Si se revisa cuidadosamente el contenido original de la requisitoria Nombre16 (cfr. folios 182 a 214), se advierte que mientras en el punto Nº 11 se indicaba que “Al día siguiente, atendiendo esta última llamada telefónica, el mencionado señor Nombre18 se hizo presente en la recepción de la oficina del encartado Nombre01 ...” (cfr. folio 186, líneas 12 a 14), siendo que las llamadas previas a dicha visita se ubican en agosto de 1995, en la acusación transcrita en el fallo, donde se incluye la modificación que se objeta, se indica: “...
Atendiendo esta última llamada telefónica, el 9 de enero de 1996, el señor Nombre18 se hizo presente en la recepción de la oficina del encartado Nombre01 ...”(cfr. folio 41, líneas 5 a 7), de donde se comprende que la acusación sólo se varió en ese punto Nº 11, y tácitamente en el Nº 14. Por otra parte, tal y como se indicó supra, esa modificación en cuanto a la fecha concreta en que se dieron esas reuniones en la oficina del imputado Nombre34, no implica un cambio esencial en la acusación, lo que a su vez determina que con ella no se le está causando ningún agravio a la defensa, pues el hecho principal en torno al cual giró el debate es el mismo. Lo anterior también permite establecer que, contrario al criterio del recurrente, no nos encontramos ante el supuesto que contempla el artículo 347 del Código Procesal Penal, ya que la rectificación fáctica que se analiza no constituye una “ampliación” del hecho acusado, pues la misma no implicó que se haya variado la calificación jurídica ni que se integrara un delito continuado, de donde se debe concluir que tal y como lo estimaron los juzgadores más bien nos encontraríamos ante el supuesto del artículo 348 ibidem, esto es, la inclusión durante la audiencia de juicio de una circunstancia que no modifica esencialmente la imputación ni provoca indefensión.
Tan cierto es esto último, que la defensa no logra concretar cuál sería el agravio sufrido con los actos que cuestiona, ni de qué manera hubiera variado el resultado del proceso si se hubiese otorgado la audiencia que prevé el párrafo 2º del numeral 347 ya citado, pues al respecto simplemente aduce que “se afectó sensiblemente la estrategia defensiva”, sin que conforme se expuso supra logre precisar cuáles elementos probatorios no pudieron reunirse, o cuál actividad hacía imposible que Nombre01 pudiera haber estado presente en esas reuniones. Llaman la atención también los argumentos que en cuanto a este mismo tema esgrime el licenciado Gino Corazzari Aguilar, quien por lo demás incurre en la misma inconsistencia que se le ha hecho notar al planteamiento del doctor Walter Antillón Montealegre, pues en su tercer motivo por la forma trata de justificar la existencia de un “agravio” en que, con la modificación fáctica introducida por el Ministerio Público (ubicando la reunión en la que fueron entregados los cheques de agosto de 1995 al día 9 de enero de 1996), perdió toda importancia su estrategia defensiva, pues atenido a que según la acusación esa entrega se había dado en agosto de 1995, ofreció como prueba documental una certificación del departamento financiero de Aviación Civil donde se hacía constar que para ésta última fecha los referidos títulos aún no habían sido emitidos.
Es claro que la situación en que fue colocada la defensa con la modificación o rectificación que durante el juicio se le introdujo a la acusación, esto es, que su estrategia “se cayó” al perder todo interés y valor probatorio la certificación a la que se hace mención, de ningún modo podría constituir un “agravio” tutelable por el derecho procesal, pues por un lado y conforme se explicó no podría perderse de vista que el Ministerio Público actuó dentro de las prerrogativas legítimas que le reconoce la normativa procesal, sino que, además, en este caso aquella no podría pretender que la referida prueba (cuyo ofrecimiento se sustentaba en un evidente error de ubicación temporal del hecho) mantuviera su importancia a pesar de que se haya determinado que éste ocurrió en una fecha distinta. Resulta notorio que el eventual agravio que se generaría en torno a una situación como la que nos ocupa, estaría centrado en que, debido a una rectificación de los hechos, se le llegue a negar a la defensa la posibilidad material y concreta de refutarlos, o de traer al proceso algún elemento probatorio que descalifique la acusación, lo cual no ha ocurrido en la especie.
Por otra parte, y en lo que a los puntos c) y d) de este motivo ya fueron resueltos en el anterior apartado, la defensa deberá remitirse a lo que ahí se expuso. Con base en lo antes dicho, se declara sin lugar el alegato en todos sus extremos.
Falta de legitimación ad causam activa, y violación al debido proceso. Con cita de los artículos 39 de la Constitución Política; 347, 348, 365 y 369 inciso h) del Código Procesal Penal; 8.c de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, y del voto de esta Sala 3ª Nº 92799, en este motivo se aduce que la Dirección General de Aviación Civil es un sujeto de derecho distinto de la persona jurídica “Estado”, por lo que la Procuraduría General de la República no está legitimada para actuar en representación y defensa de aquella. Lo anterior ha implicado un vicio esencial, no sólo en la formulación de la acción civil resarcitoria y la consiguiente condenatoria solidaria que se ordenó, sino que se violó el debido proceso en el aspecto penal, pues desde un principio debió dársele participación a Aviación Civil en su condición de víctima. Lo anterior tiene interés procesal para la defensa, pues con el procurador no fue posible optar por una solución alternativa al conflicto.
La queja resulta inatendible. No es cierto que la Dirección General de Aviación Civil sea un sujeto de Derecho distinto de la persona jurídica Estado. En realidad, y conforme lo señala expresamente el numeral 2 de la Ley General de Aviación Civil, Nº 5150, “La regulación de la aviación civil será ejercida por el Poder Ejecutivo por medio del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil y la Dirección General de Aviación Civil, ambos adscritos al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, según las potestades otorgadas por esta ley. En relación con el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil gozará de desconcentración máxima y tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental para administrar los fondos provenientes de tarifas, rentas o derechos regulados por esta ley, así como para realizar los actos o contratos necesarios para cumplir las funciones y tramitar los convenios a fin de que sean conocidos por el Poder Ejecutivo ...”.
Si bien es cierto este texto es producto de una reforma introducida por el artículo 1º de la Ley N° 8038 del 12 de octubre del 2000, existe un dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República donde se determinó que el texto original, anterior a la presente reforma, estaba TACITAMENTE reformado por el artículo 14, inc. 35 de la Ley de Presupuesto Nº 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985. Al respecto, dicho dictamen (C17895) consideró que el Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil es un órgano desconcentrado del MOPT, que goza de una personalidad jurídica instrumental referida al manejo de los fondos provenientes de esta ley Nº 5150, tal y como al final de cuentas positivizó con la reforma. Lo anterior significa que esa personalidad jurídica instrumental de que goza el Consejo Técnico (órgano jerárquicamente superior dentro de Aviación Civil), es de tipo instrumental, es decir, no se trata de una capacidad jurídica plena, sino limitada a cierto tipo de actos, que la misma norma circunscribe a la administración de los fondos provenientes de tarifas, rentas o derechos regulados por esta ley, así como para realizar los actos o contratos necesarios para cumplir las funciones y tramitar los convenios a fin de que sean conocidos por el Poder Ejecutivo.
Lo anterior significa que si bien se trata de un órgano público con desconcentración administrativa máxima, Aviación Civil se mantiene adscrita al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, es decir, a la Administración Central, de donde carece de una capacidad jurídica plena como la que sí ostentan las instituciones públicas autónomas. En este sentido, la doctrina nacional señala lo siguiente: “... La descentralización es diversa de figuras aparentemente iguales, como la desconcentración, la delegación y la concesión legal de competencias centrales ... El órgano desconcentrado está sometido a jerarquía, lo que quiere decir a órdenes del superior jerárquico. El mayor grado de libertad que ostenta, en relación con un subordinado común, radica en que sus actos agotan la vía administrativa, sin posibilidad de recurso al superior, pero éste puede, en todo caso, cursar órdenes, instrucciones y circulares que limiten la discrecionalidad del inferior ... el ente descentralizado no está sometido a órdenes ni instrucciones en el desempeño de su competencia exclusiva ... la personalidad jurídica implica por sí una esfera de libertad mayor que la mera competencia exclusiva de un órgano.
La desconcentración se opera mediante norma o regla jurídica, no mediante acto administrativo ... toda desconcentración supone una atribución permanente de competencia exclusiva a favor del inferior ...”, Nombre35 (Nombre36), “TESIS DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO”, Biblioteca Jurídica Dike, y Stradtmam editorial, San José, 1ª edición, setiembre del 2002. Tomo I, páginas 342, 343 y 344. Conforme a lo anterior, es notoria la diferenciación doctrinaria entre las figuras de la descentración y de la desconcentración, pues la segunda no supone de ningún modo una independencia y desvinculación del órgano inferior al superior jerárquico, como sí resulta de la primera. Siendo ello, así, es claro que en el caso que nos ocupa tanto el Consejo Técnico como la Dirección General de Aviación Civil, de acuerdo a la Ley N° 5150 que se citó, se configuran como órganos adscritos al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, asignándoles la competencia exclusiva de regular todo lo relativo a la aviación civil, pero expresamente reconociéndoseles sólo una personalidad jurídica instrumental.
Esta última característica es una de las que diferencian al órgano desconcentrado del ente descentralizado, a quien sí se le otorga una personalidad jurídica plena: “... la personalidad supone por sí el grado mayor de libertad y de responsabilidad, que confiere autonomía funcional al ente, salvo expresa disposición legal en contrario ...” Ibidem, pág. 346. Siendo ello así, resulta claro que el planteamiento de la defensa no lleva razón, pues en este caso la titularidad de la acción civil en efecto correspondía a la Procuraduría General de la República, de donde el supuesto vicio alegado resulta inexistente. Nótese que el numeral 3 de la Ley de la Procuraduría General de la República, N° 6815 del 27 de diciembre de 1982, al definir las atribuciones de ésta, entre otras establece las siguientes: “... a) Ejercer la representación del Estado en los negocios de cualquier naturaleza, que se tramiten o deban tramitarse en los tribunales de justicia ... h) ... denunciar y acusar a los funcionarios públicos y las personas privadas cuyo proceder exprese actos ilícitos vinculados con el ejercicio de su cargo o con ocasión de éste, en las materias de la jurisdicción penal de Hacienda y la de Función Pública ...”.
Como se advierte de lo antes dicho, la actuación que en este asunto ha venido cumpliendo la Procuraduría General de la República en representación de los intereses del Estado, al interponer y mantener a lo largo del proceso la acción civil resarcitoria en contra de los imputados, se encuentra enmarcada dentro de su legítima competencia, de donde no existe ninguna irregularidad que justifique acoger las pretensiones del impugnante. Y es que resulta claro que, de acuerdo al concepto que incorpora el artículo 2 de la Ley Nº 5150 ya citado, es decir, “personalidad jurídica instrumental”, se comprende que la capacidad jurídica que se le reconoce a Aviación Civil resulta limitada y no cobijaría la hipótesis que aduce el recurrente, ya que dicho órgano público no cuenta con la facultad jurídica necesaria, suficiente y específica, para figurar directa e independientemente en este proceso como víctima, ni muchos menos para transar alguna medida alternativa.
Según lo ha entendido la doctrina, si bien la personalidad jurídica (ya se trate de una persona física o jurídica) es una sola e invariable, entendiéndose por tal posibilidad de ser sujeto de derechos y deberes, la capacidad jurídica por su parte sí resulta graduable, dependiendo de las facultades que se le otorguen por ley al órgano, siendo evidente la tanto el Consejo como la Dirección General de Aviación Civil, no ostentan una capacidad jurídica plena y absoluta como la que aduce el impugnante. Aunado a lo anterior, existe una razón adicional para rechazar la queja, pues en este acápite la defensa pretende hacer creer que, contrario a lo que sucedió con la Procuraduría General de la República, con los personeros de Aviación sí hubiese sido viable una salida alterna. No obstante dicha afirmación del recurrente, se advierte que la misma no pasa de ser una especulación infundada, que no aparece respaldada en ningún elemento. Con base en lo anterior, se declara sin lugar el motivo.
Violación al principio de continuidad. En este apartado se denuncia la supuesta violación de los artículos 178, 326 y 337 del Código Procesal Penal, y 41 de la Constitución Política por cuanto se inobservó el principio de continuidad. La queja se hace consistir en que en varias oportunidades se cerró una audiencia sin justo motivo, y no se señaló para su continuación la audiencia inmediata siguiente, con lo que se dejaron intervalos vacíos de una o más audiencias. Un “malpensado” podría hipotizar que durante esas audiencias intermedias el tribunal se dedicó a ir redactando el fallo, lo que explicaría que entre la lectura de la parte dispositiva y la de la parte integral, mediaran apenas 5 días. El reclamo debe rechazarse. El presente alegato parte de varias premisas infundadas, pues a parte de que no se concreta en qué supuestos específicos se dio la situación denunciada; en qué consistió el agravio concreto que con ello se le produjo a la defensa, o de qué modo ésta mostró su inconformidad, procurando así la enmienda del supuesto vicio, el impugnante no logra acreditar su “hipótesis” (que ni siquiera presenta como una denuncia cierta y directa) de que antes del cierre definitivo de la audiencia del debate ya se estaba redactando el fallo, todo lo cual hace necesario rechazar el motivo.
En un caso semejante al que nos ocupa, esta Sala tuvo la oportunidad de señalar lo siguiente: “... Si bien es cierto, tal y como lo hace notar la recurrente, el tribunal de mérito se retiró a deliberar a las 10:10 horas del 22 de octubre de 2002, siendo que conforme se acordó regresó con la sentencia redactada, impresa y firmada a las 15:10 horas del día siguiente ... lo que implica que aquella estuvo confeccionada en poco tiempo, ello de ningún modo implicaría que se hayan irrespetado las reglas de la deliberación, pues no podría perderse de vista que de los 145 folios de que consta el fallo ... sólo unos 35 fueron dedicados al análisis de la prueba, de la calificación legal, de la sanción aplicable, del comiso, y de las costas, por lo que no resultaría absurdo pensar que, tomando en cuenta que se trata de un órgano colegiado, se haya podido confeccionar esa parte de la sentencia en un poco más de un día.
La transcripción del contenido de la prueba y de otras piezas (fundamentación descriptiva), por no depender de la deliberación, bien podría estarse recopilando al mismo tiempo en que se desarrolla el debate, o en los espacios que quedan libres cuando éste se suspende, sin esperar las conclusiones finales ni la deliberación ... sin que con ello se esté incurriendo en ningún vicio de arbitrariedad conforme se alega en el reclamo. Debe aclararse, eso sí, que los juzgadores no podrían ir redactando sobre la marcha aquellos aspectos que estén condicionados a actuaciones que aún falten por cumplir, como por ejemplo la exposición de conclusiones de las partes, o aquellos que dependan de la deliberación que necesariamente deberá llevarse a cabo al cierre de la audiencia ...” (cfr. voto de la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Nº 25703 de las 11:20 horas del 25 de abril del 2003). Como se hizo notar en dicho antecedente jurisprudencial, lo cual resulta aplicable también al caso que nos ocupa, de acuerdo con las reglas de la experiencia no resultaría imposible que en el plazo que medió entre la lectura de la parte dispositiva y la lectura integral del fallo, esto es, cinco días, los tres jueces que integraron el órgano jurisdiccional de mérito hayan podido redactar la parte deliberativa o intelectiva de la decisión, que abarcó 74 folios, sin que pueda calificarse como una irregularidad que los demás elementos objetivos de la sentencia (encabezado, transcripción literal de los hechos acusados, así como el contenido material de la prueba evacuada en debate) vinieran trabajándose desde antes del cierre del debate, pues dichos elementos del fallo no dependen de la deliberación que necesariamente debe darse una vez ordenado éste. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar el planteamiento de la defensa.
Falta de fundamentación al determinarse el monto de la pena. En este sexto reclamo se argumenta la existencia de defectos en la motivación del monto de la pena, con cita de los numerales 71 del Código Penal, pues junto a los elementos que llevaron al tribunal a imponer una sanción muy por encima del mínimo, también se citan sin valorar algunas circunstancias que se podrían considerar como atenuantes. De seguido, el impugnante cita y critica algunos criterios que se expusieron en el fallo para motivar este aspecto de la decisión (por ejemplo que Nombre01 ostentaba el cargo de jerarca de la institución; que el mismo influyó en nombramientos de empleados; que la cantidad de dinero que se sustrajo, por el proceso de devaluación, es más importante de lo que podría ser hoy en día; que los imputados, por su experiencia laboral, tenían interiorizado su deber de probidad hacia los recursos públicos; que con el hecho ilícito se debilitaron muchas áreas vitales de la economía nacional que el presupuesto de Aviación Civil estaba llamado a satisfacer; que, a parte de la institución pública, se vio afectado el prestigio y la credibilidad de los talleres Nombre21 y Montajes Industriales Rocaba; que no se ha hecho ningún esfuerzo por enmendar el daño; y que, salvo Nombre06, todos los imputados son primarios), insistiendo en que el fallo no explica qué valor se le ha asignado a cada una de dichas circunstancias.
Según las manifestaciones que hiciera la presidenta del Tribunal al exponer verbalmente los fundamentos del fallo (dijo que esperaba que el fallo sirviera de ejemplo para los servidores público, y contribuyera a erradicar la corrupción, para demostrar lo cual se adjunta el recorte del Periódico La Nación de folio 386) la verdadera finalidad al imponer 8 años de prisión fue buscar una prevención general negativa. En caso de que la Sala Tercera estimara procedente hacer en esta misma sede la fijación de la pena, el recurrente ofrece la prueba que se indica a folio 365 del tomo II). El motivo debe declararse sin lugar. Atenidos al contenido literal del fallo de instancia, se logra comprobar que entre los razonamientos expresos que por escrito esgrimió y plasmó el Tribunal de Juicio para justificar el monto de 8 años de prisión que le impuso al encartado Nombre01, no se hizo ninguna referencia al fin de prevención general negativa que algún sector de la doctrina le ha asignado a la sanción penal.
En cuanto a esto último puede consultarse, entre otras muchas, la obra de Ziffer (Patricia S.), “LINEAMIENTOS DE LA DETERMINACIÓN DE LA PENA”, editorial AdHoc, Buenos Aires, 1ª edición, junio de 1996, página 45 y siguientes. En cuanto a este punto, los juzgadores indicaron lo siguiente: “... Con fundamento en lo establecido en el artículo 354 del Código Penal que sanciona con pena de prisión de tres a doce años el delito de Peculado, y el artículo 71 de ese mismo cuerpo sustantivo, estima el tribunal que en carácter de pena principal, al señor Nombre01 se le debe imponer el tanto de ocho años de prisión, a Nombre05 el tanto de siete años de prisión, a Nombre06 el tanto de seis años de prisión, y a Nombre09 el tanto de cinco años de prisión ... Para la determinación de dicha pena se ha (sic) considerado en primer lugar, aspectos cuantitativos y cualitativos de los hechos comprobados a lo largo de esta sentencia, en el tanto los aquí imputados colusionaron en comunidad acuerdo y voluntad para, desde sus puestos estratégicos de jefatura, y de confianza en lo que atañe a Nombre09, hacer más vulnerable la institución pública en que prestaron funciones, y de esta manera facilitarse la sustracción de la suma de dinero mencionada, para luego apoderarse y aprovecharse ilegítimamente de ella.
Se ha tomado en cuenta además para determinar la pena a imponerles, la comprobación de que Nombre01 al momento de realizar el delito ostentaba un rango superior al de los otros imputados, resultándole por ello mayor reproche en virtud de ser mayor la responsabilidad de vigilancia y dirección de esta institución pública, pero además, como él con el mayor desenfado explicó en su declaración indagatoria, que se valió de su puesto para que esta institución patronal contratara a varios servidores, demostrando con ello total menosprecio a las regulaciones legales para este tipo de acceso laboral. Sumado a ello espontáneamente admitió que violentó las reglamentaciones internas correspondientes a la elaboración de la lista de proveedores, puesto que, aún sabiendo que era indispensable que los interesados en integrarla presentaren sus solicitudes por escrito (afirmó el Nombre17 Nombre26), lisa y llanamente solicitó en forma verbal a Nombre23 (jefe de mantenimiento que en su testimonio confirmó lo dicho por Nombre01), que tomara en cuenta al taller de Nombre18.
Esta aceptación suya en este sentido denota, en nuestro criterio, ningún enfado en traficar con su influencia nombramientos y contrataciones, y que irremediablemente por ser él en ese momento quien jefeaba administrativamente esa institución, propiciaba una cultura o ambiente de corrupción, que, sin lugar a dudas, perjudicaba y perjudicó, en el caso concreto, a esta institución. Por otra parte se valora la circunstancia notoria de que esa suma de dinero en esa época sustraída, es, en virtud de los procesos de devaluación de la moneda, más importante que lo que pueda ser hoy. También que los imputados para esa época de comisión del delito eran ya funcionarios públicos con años de experiencia y desempeño en la administración pública, por lo que mayormente tenían interiorizado ese deber legal de probidad hacia a los recursos públicos. Se toma en cuenta además que por haberse declarado prioridad de gobierno todo lo relacionado a la infraestructura y modernización de los puertos aéreos nacionales, especialmente el Santamaría, todo con miras a mejorar nuestra economía nacional, al presupuesto de Aviación Civil se había destinado gran parte del presupuesto del país, situación harto conocida por todos los imputados, pues así se los hizo de expreso conocimiento (afirman los imputados) el Poder Ejecutivo en cabeza del Señor Presidente Figueres Olsen, por lo que necesariamente muchas áreas vitales que estaba llamado a satisfacer, se debilitaron; razón de más para estimar repudiable el delito de los imputados.
Se valora además que paralelamente a la grave afectación al prestigio de la institución patronal, a la credibilidad que en ella tenía la ciudadanía costarricense, así como al buen uso de los recursos públicos, con este delito los imputados lesionaron gravemente el prestigio y credibilidad de los talleres Nombre21 SA y Montajes Industriales Rocaba, quienes fueron tildados injustamente de corruptos. Se valora además que posterior al delito ninguno de los imputados ha hecho esfuerzos para enmendar el daño que causaron con el mismo, ni a Aviación Civil, ni a esos talleres. Se ha considerado también que el peligro en que fue puesto el bien jurídico tutelado, la probidad, fue muy importante, por la pérdida de credibilidad de la ciudadanía costarricense en el buen uso de los recursos públicos y en la honorabilidad y honradez de sus funcionarios, lo que se comprueba por el hecho notorio del gran cuestionamiento y crítica que suscitó en nuestra población la denuncia de estos hechos.
En ese sentido es público y notorio que acciones delictivas como la que ahora se juzga menoscaban irremediablemente la credibilidad de nuestra ciudadanía en todo lo relacionado a la función pública y a sus servidores, en detrimento de la necesaria estabilidad que en ese sentido requiere el desarrollo del país. Para la adecuación de la pena se toma en cuenta, además, conforme a lo ya expuesto a través de toda la sentencia que efectivamente existió una afectación a bienes jurídicos patrimoniales en perjuicio de Aviación Civil, consistente en cinco millones ochocientos ochenta mil colones del año de mil novecientos noventa y seis, que los hechos se sucedieron con cheques de una misma cuenta corriente del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil, por lo que se concluye que los imputados perseguían una misma finalidad, la de sustraer una determinada cantidad de dinero cuya administración le había sido confiada a Nombre01 y a Nombre30 en razón de sus cargos y en sus condiciones de funcionarios públicos.
A la hora de imponer la pena de acuerdo con el numeral 71 del Código Penal, el Tribunal toma en cuenta que los acusados Nombre30 y Nombre09 no tienen condenatorias penales anteriores, que como profesionales experimentados en sus respectivos campos se valieron de sus conocimientos para sustraer dineros de un fondo que estaba destinado a ayudar a las actividades aeronáuticas nacionales en un momento muy difícil para nuestro país por las flaquencias de nuestros puertos aeronáuticos, a tal grado que, como ya de indicó, fue declarado prioridad de la administración Figueres Olsen, que el juicio de reproche debe ser mayor en el caso del imputado Nombre01 tomando en cuenta que es un funcionario que desempeñó el cargo de jerarca de una dependencia adscrita al MOPT, y lejos de responder a la confianza depositada en él por parte de la Administración Pública, se valió de su cargo para sustraer dinero en esas dos ocasiones según los hechos probados de esta sentencia, que nunca ha tratado de resarcir el daño causado, por eso atendiendo a la gravedad del hecho y a la personalidad de éste, y dentro de los límites de pena señalados para el delito, debe reprochársele más severamente su conducta. ...
Por último, se valora también que, a excepción de Nombre06 que acusa juzgamientos anteriores, los demás imputados son primarios, cabezas de familia y obligados a sus manutenciones ...” (cfr. folio 205, línea 25 en adelante). Como se colige de lo transcrito, a la hora de establecer el monto de la pena que se impuso a cada uno de los acusados, los juzgadores hicieron referencia a una serie de aspectos objetivos y del sujetivos del hecho, valorando incluso las circunstancias personales y particulares de ellos, todo lo cual se enmarca dentro de los parámetros que a dichos efectos contempla el artículo 71 del Código Penal. Por otra parte, sin dejar esto de lado, se advierte que el planteamiento del recurrente parte de un análisis fragmentado, de los aspectos que se tomaron en cuenta para respaldar y justificar el quantum de la pena impuesta, pues sólo critica aisladamente algunos de los razonamientos del tribunal.
Si partimos de una visión integral, fácilmente se logra constatar que todas las circunstancias que se mencionan en el fallo, mismas que colocan a los imputados en situaciones y posiciones diversas, llevaron al órgano jurisdiccional a establecer juicios de reproche de distinto nivel o gravedad, siendo muy claro que con respecto al encartado Nombre01, a quien se le fijó una pena mayor que a los demás encartados, entre otros extremos se tomó en cuenta su mayor responsabilidad como jerarca administrativo del órgano. Con base en lo anterior, se declara sin lugar el reclamo.
Errónea aplicación de los artículos 45 y 354, y falta de aplicación del 216, todos del Código Penal. En el único reparo de fondo se denuncia la violación de las normas sustantivas arriba citadas, ello con base en lo siguiente:
Recurso de casación del licenciado Hugo Chavarría Céspedes, defensor público del coencartado Nombre09 (cfr. folios 402 a 406).
Primer motivo (forma): Vicios en la fundamentación. Al estimar que en la especie se han violado los artículos 181, 184 y 369 inciso c) del Código Procesal Penal, el recurrente argumenta lo siguiente: a) Se incorporaron, como reposición de piezas, las fotocopias de la diligencia de allanamiento ordenada y practicada en la casa del coimputado Nombre09 el 16 de octubre de 1996, lo que resulta ilegal. El sorpresivo ofrecimiento de esta prueba para mejor resolver lo hace el Nombre16 justo el día en que iniciaría sus conclusiones, sin que se cumplan los requisitos del numeral 355 del Código Procesal Penal (que surja en la audiencia una circunstancia nueva que requiera su esclarecimiento). Además, estas piezas cuestionadas corresponden a una investigación relacionada con otros hechos, ajenos a este proceso. El motivo debe ser declarado sin lugar. En lo que se refiere al primer aspecto del reclamo, esto es, lo sorpresivo del ofrecimiento de la prueba que se objeta, es necesario señalar que no le asiste razón al defensor, por cuanto conforme lo hizo notar el Nombre16 en su exposición verbal durante la audiencia de vista las piezas que objeta sí fueron ofrecidas al formularse la acusación, de donde no se ha menoscabado el derecho de defensa en los términos propuestos.
En efecto, en el acápite de la acusación destinado a describir la prueba documental que se ofrecía para el debate (punto Nº 12), se hizo referencia a un sobre con documentos varios decomisados durante el allanamiento efectuado en la casa del encartado Nombre09. Si bien es cierto de seguido sólo se describieron “algunos de ellos” (cfr. folio 210, línea 26 en adelante), ello de ningún modo implicó que los demás quedaran excluidos, por cuanto quedó clara y formalmente ofrecido todo el contenido de dicho sobre. Es más, durante la audiencia del debate, y ante la férrea oposición de la defensa por el ofrecimiento que hizo el fiscal, el representante de la Contraloría General de la República hizo notar que “... es incorrecto lo que indica la defensa que en el expediente no constan las actuaciones, por el contrario sí constan las mismas, esto no es un ofrecimiento de prueba nueva, por el contrario la misma ya había sido ofrecida por la Fiscalía” (cfr. folio 29 del segundo tomo, líneas 44 a 48).
Conforme se colige de lo anterior, no es cierto que la actuación que se critica, verificada por el Nombre16 durante la audiencia del debate, resultare sorpresiva y, por ello, lesiva a los intereses de la defensa, la que en todo caso ni siquiera logra concretar al respecto un agravio, pues no especifica cómo hubieran variado las cosas si el ofrecimiento no se hubiese llevado a cabo hasta en ese estadio procesal. En lo que respecta al segundo aspecto del reparo, esto es, la supuesta ilegitimidad de la prueba por derivarse de una diligencia de allanamiento practicada con motivo de otra investigación, debe señalarse que el artículo 3 de la Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones, Nº 7425, expresamente establece que “La orden de secuestro, registro o examen deberá efectuarse, so pena de nulidad, mediante auto fundado en el que se individualicen, de ser posible, los documentos sobre los que se ejecutará la medida de registro, secuestro o examen ...
De ser secuestrados otros documentos que no se incluyan en la orden, deberán restituirse inmediatamente a quien se le secuestraron, salvo que el juez los estime trascendentales para esa u otra investigación; si así fuera, el juez deberá ampliar la orden para incluirlos y justificar el motivo por el cual se incluyeron”. De la redacción de esta norma se colige con toda claridad que el supuesto que se regula en el segundo párrafo, referido a la ampliación de la orden de secuestro, depende de que hayan sido secuestrados otros documentos que originalmente no habían sido incluidos en la orden respectiva, siendo que además esta última exigencia sólo operaría en aquellos casos en los que esa inclusión previa fuere posible. Aplicando estos principios al caso que nos ocupa, comprobamos que tanto la solicitud del Ministerio Público, como la orden de allanamiento en torno a la cual gira el reproche (cuya legitimidad ni siquiera es cuestionada por la defensa) no especifican sobre qué documentos o evidencias en concreto recaería la diligencia que se practicó ese 16 de octubre de 1996 en la casa del coimputado Nombre09 (cfr. folio 694, líneas 6 a 15; y folio 696, línea 35 en adelante), de donde debe entenderse, entonces, que en la especie no resultaba aplicable el trámite de ampliación que se echa de menos.
En efecto, el requisito de que la orden se amplíe adquiere sentido sólo en aquellos supuestos en los que, previamente definido el alcance (objeto) de la diligencia a practicar, es decir, cuando de antemano se ha determinado de manera concreta y específica cuáles serán los documentos que se pretenden incautar, se advierta la necesidad de extender dicha actuación a otros documentos que no estaban ahí comprendidos. De lo contrario, si a priori no era posible saber con exactitud y precisión qué elementos serían decomisados, y al practicarse la diligencia se encontraron evidencias que correspondían y resultaban esenciales para otra investigación, nada obstaba para que conforme se hizo también se las secuestrara, máxime al considerar que se trató de una investigación muy compleja. Es más, si asumiéramos que en este caso se omitió esa ampliación que se echa de menos (la que en realidad, según se dijo, no era obligatoria), aún así deberíamos concluir que parte de la prueba documental que ahí se incautó, y que correspondía a otra investigación, resultaba lícita, como legítima su utilización en el proceso que nos ocupa.
En lo que a la tema de la prueba ilícita se refiere, el que fue desarrollado por la jurisprudencia estadounidense bajo la “Teoría del Fruto del Árbol Envenenado”, se llegaron a implementar algunas hipótesis en las cuales se limitaron los efectos derivados de una actuación irregular durante la investigación que implicaba una afectación de derechos fundamentales, es decir, se idearon algunas excepciones a la tradicional regla de exclusión, entre las cuales, atendiendo al caso que nos ocupa, destaca la doctrina “plain view”: “... La orden de allanamiento debe ser determinada. Este requisito ... ha sido reconocido por la doctrina. El tema de la determinación de la orden de allanamiento también está expresamente consagrado en el derecho fundamental norteamericano. La cuarta enmienda otorga a la población el derecho a la seguridad en sus casas, personas, documentos y efectos contra registros y secuestros arbitrarios, exigiendo para la orden correspondiente una causa probable apoyada por juramento declaración solemne “que describa en particular el lugar que habrá de ser inspeccionado y las personas o cosas que serán objeto de detención o decomiso” ...
La determinación recae tanto sobre el lugar como sobre el fin que se persigue con la medida, el que se encuentra relacionado al proceso penal en el cual se ha librado la orden. Frecuentemente en la práctica se libra una orden de allanamiento con determinado fin, autorizando su diligenciamiento a la policía. Una vez que el comisionado ha ingresado al domicilio, es común que se encuentre ante evidencias inesperadas, ya sea relacionadas al hecho que se investiga en la causa que dio origen a la orden, a otra distinta, o incluso vinculadas a un ilícito del que nunca se había tomado conocimiento ... La posición minoritaria considera violatoria de la garantía constitucional de la inviolabilidad del domicilio, a toda actividad llevada a cabo en el allanamiento que no haya estado prevista en la orden o no haya sido admitida por una orden posterior ... Mayoritariamente, en la jurisprudencia se da la tesis contraria, ya que convalida los actos realizados en exceso de lo previsto en la orden.
Es decir, que permite valorar principalmente secuestros efectuados por la policía dentro de lugares cerrados, sin una orden de allanamiento previa que haya autorizado el ingreso para esa incautación en particular. La jurisprudencia es prolíficas en la cuestión ... La doctrina de la plain view, elaborada por la Corte Suprema Norteamericana, ha sido fuente directa de pronunciamientos en la materia de nuestro país ... La plain view doctrine que acoge el pronunciamiento legitima secuestros practicados sin la orden correspondiente, si los efectos se encontraren a plena vista, de manera evidente; es decir, cuando sea manifiesta la necesidad de proceder a su incautación. Cuando el comisionado “tropiece con ellos y existan causas razonables para secuestrarlos, debe hacerlo” ... ya que en tal caso “no necesita desviar la mirada e ignorar lo que evidentemente tiene frente a él” ...”, Nombre44 (Nombre45), “EFICACIA DE LA PRUEBA ILÍCITA Y SUS DERIVADAS EN EL PROCESO PENAL”, editorial AdHoc, Buenos Aires. 1ª edición, setiembre del 2002, páginas 113 a 118.
Como se colige de la anterior cita doctrinaria, el hallazgo de evidencias que no estaban incluidas previamente en la orden de allanamiento, aún y cuando ni siquiera se relacionen con la investigación que dio origen a la práctica de dicha diligencia, resulta legítimo si en ello medió una actuación policial transparente que podríamos llamar “de buena fe”, es decir, cuando los elementos inesperados estuvieren a simple vista o, durante el registro, se haya tropezado con ellos, a tal punto que resulte absurdo exigirle a las autoridades “cerrar los ojos” ante lo evidente. Debido a esto, el mismo autor ya citado explica las precisiones que se le han hecho a esta doctrina del plain view, veamos: “... También un sector de la doctrina acepta los secuestros en exceso de lo previsto en la orden, sólo si median (sic) una serie de específicas circunstancias ... si la policía ya encontró lo que buscaba o revisa lugares donde claramente no va a encontrar lo que claramente se le indicó que buscara, es claro que todo procedimiento que se siga a partir de allí significará un ataque a la privacidad de los individuos, que va más allá de lo que el juez que libró la orden de allanamiento ha autorizado ...” Ibidem, página 118.
Como se ve, la tesis que nos ocupa no es irrestricta o ilimitada, pues en su base se mantiene esa actuación de buena fe de las autoridades que practican la diligencia, siendo que cuando aquella no está presente, obviamente estaremos en presencia de una actuación abusiva y arbitraria que atentaría contra el derecho fundamental a la privacidad e inviolabilidad del domicilio. Ello sucedería, por ejemplo (y conforme lo ejemplifica el mismo autor) en aquellas situaciones en las que se haya librado una orden de registro y secuestro para hallar e incautar un vehículo, y la policía buscara en armarios, gavetas, habitaciones, prendas (es decir, en sitios donde razonablemente no podría encontrarse el bien objeto de la diligencia), y gracias a ello se localicen otras evidencias, o cuando la orden se centra en la detención de un individuo, conseguida la cual se sigue registrando el lugar con igual resultado al anterior.
Es claro que en tales supuestos no podría convalidarse ni legitimarse un hallazgo tal, pues se evidenciaría una actuación malintencionada y abusiva que vendría a menoscabar las garantías constitucionales reconocidas a favor de la ciudadanía. Con base en lo anterior, es claro que de las circunstancias que mediaron en el caso que nos ocupan, es decir, de la forma en que se llevó a cabo la diligencia de allanamiento que determinó el hallazgo e incautación de una copia de los cheques en favor de los talleres Nombre22 y Nombre21 del Oeste, así como la solicitud de servicio telefónico, no permitirían de ningún modo siquiera sugerir una actuación oscura y desleal de la policía (extremo que ni siquiera denuncia la defensa), lo que permitiría establecer la legitimidad de tales evidencias en la presente causa. En todo caso, y en lo que a esa solicitud de servicio telefónico se refiere (a partir de la cual se logró establecer que esos números de teléfono que aparecen en los cheques efectivamente corresponden a los que le fueron asignados al encartado Nombre09), es claro que estarían ante la doctrina del hallazgo necesario o inevitable, ya receptada por la jurisprudencia de esta Sala (entre otros véase el voto Nº 1252001, de las 10:36 horas del 02/02/2001), pues si no se hubiese contado con esa información la misma fácilmente se hubiese obtenido lícitamente a partir de los registros que maneja el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, en su área de telecomunicaciones.
Asimismo, en relación a este tema concreto que nos ocupa, en casos con alguna semejanza la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha tenido la oportunidad de señalar lo siguiente: “... la licenciada ... expresa en el primer aparte del único motivo de su recurso ... que la sentencia de mérito se funda en prueba ilegítima. Sostiene que el tribunal a quo admitió parte de los datos obtenidos a través de las intervenciones telefónicas practicadas en este asunto, violando con ello el debido proceso y el principio de legalidad, ya que las utilizó para asentar conclusiones respecto del delito de homicidio, cuando en la fecha en que se ejecutaron la ley no las autorizaba para investigar ese tipo de delincuencias ... Es cierto, como lo apuntan los defensores, que al realizarse las intervenciones de las comunicaciones en este asunto, la ley de registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados no contemplaba aún la posibilidad de que las medidas interceptoras tuviesen como propósito investigar delitos como el homicidio u otros distintos de los que, taxativamente, señaló el legislador (secuestro extorsivo y los que describe la ley sobre estupefacientes) ...
El extremo debe resolverse, cual lo hizo el a quo, con arreglo a la jurisprudencia constitucional que ya existe sobre el tema y, en particular, el fallo Número 157196 de 12:36 horas de 29 de marzo de 1996 –también citado por los jueces de mérito que dispuso: “II. Debe iniciarse el estudio del caso concreto con un análisis respecto de la posibilidad de utilizar, para efectos disciplinarios, los conocimientos obtenidos por medio de la intervención telefónica que se realizara con la finalidad de investigar un delito de tráfico de drogas. En primer lugar, es necesario indicar que la facultad de autorizar una intervención telefónica está limitada a la investigación de cierto tipo de delitos previamente seleccionados por el legislador, los que en nuestro país están indicados en forma taxativa en el artículo 9 de la Ley No.7425 de 9 de agosto de 1994 ... Esta delimitación realizada por el legislador constituye, sin lugar a dudas, un criterio objetivo de proporcionalidad entre el hecho que se pretende investigar, frente a la lesión que, con la autorización, se produce respecto del derecho fundamental que tienen las personas, al secreto de las comunicaciones contenido en el numeral 24 de la Constitución Política, lo que, necesariamente debe ser así, puesto que no es posible que se lesione ese derecho fundamental bajo cualquier pretexto.
Sin embargo, sí debe indicarse que, el hecho de que exista tal criterio objetivo de proporcionalidad y que sólo se pretendan registrar las conversaciones de utilidad para la causa delictiva que se investiga, no significa que no se vayan a dar lo que, en doctrina, se han llamado “descubrimientos casuales”, que se refieren precisamente al encuentro a partir de la intervención de diversas situaciones como serían:
VIII.SEGUNDO MOTIVO por la forma: Actividad procesal defectuosa por participación ilegal del querellante. En este apartado se denuncia la violación de los artículos 76, 77 y 443 del Código Procesal Penal, pues se interpuso una querella sin que se contara con un poder del Contralor o Subcontralor de la República, y sin que ningún tribunal ni la fiscalía le exigieran a “quien decía” representar a la Contraloría, el poder especial que lo acreditara como legitimado según el artículo 76 del Código citado, por lo que dicha acción carecería de legitimidad. Debido a lo anterior, el tribunal concedió un término dentro del cual se subsanó la aludida omisión, no obstante según criterio de la defensa ello no corrigió el vicio inicial. Tan perjudicial fue la intervención del citado querellante, que el tribunal impuso la pena que el mismo solicitó. El reclamo no es atendible. La tesis de quien recurre, en cuanto asegura que el saneamiento que se aplicó a la irregularidad procesal que objeta, no corrigió el vicio inicial, parte de una premisa errónea que la invalida por completo.
Las reglas del saneamiento que prevé el artículo 15 del Código Procesal Penal tienen como propósito que cualquier gestión defectuosa que presente alguna de las partes, no sea rechazada y excluida del proceso si antes no se le ha hecho notar el vicio, dándosele además la oportunidad de que lo enmiende. En la base de este instituto procesal se encuentra el principio de lealtad que se le exige a todos los sujetos interactuantes dentro de la litis, también positivizado (artículo 127 del Código Procesal Penal de 1996), según el cual correlativamente a lo anterior la parte contraria no podría pretender que, sin haber siquiera reclamado de manera oportuna y expresa las incorrecciones existentes en la aludida gestión irregular, que de algún modo se dirige en contra de sus intereses, simple y sorpresivamente sea eliminada por incumplir con alguna formalidad. Así las cosas, es obvio que ante una hipótesis como la que analizamos, donde, habiéndose recurrido al trámite del saneamiento, la parte subsanó en el plazo concedido los defectos que se le apuntaban a su gestión, la misma quedó definitiva y “retroactivamente” corregida para todos sus efectos.
Admitir la tesis contraria, es decir, que esa corrección de errores sólo regiría “hacia futuro”, como pareciera entenderlo el abogado defensor, carecería por completo de sentido, pues implicaría que en realidad ninguna actuación presentada con incumplimiento de requisitos formales podría llegar a “sanearse”, es decir, a desplegar sus efectos desde un inicio como si hubiese sido formulada sin esos defectos que ya se corrigieron. En el caso que nos ocupa tenemos que la omisión que se le atribuye al acto de interposición de la querella, que según lo indica el recurrente fue objetada por la defensa al momento en que se iba a dar inicio a la audiencia del debate, y que asimismo según él también lo explica en relación a la misma nunca se le había “exigido” a la parte querellante la presentación del poder que se echaba de menos, de donde se colige que antes de ello no se le había indicado al abogado de la Contraloría General de la República nada al respecto, debido a lo cual tampoco se le había dado oportunidad de suplirla.
Es así como, con muy buen tino, el tribunal de mérito le concedió a aquel un término para corregir dicho aspecto, lo que en efecto hizo, de donde debe concluirse que la cuestión fue subsanada para todos sus efectos. En todo caso, y pese a su esfuerzo en tal dirección, el recurrente ni siquiera logra concretar la existencia de un agravio derivado de la intervención de la Contraloría General de la República en este proceso, pues el hecho de que hayan coincidido el monto de la pena solicitada por ésta con la que al final de cuentas se impuso, no implica que tal pedido haya sido esencial o determinante en dicha fijación, no sólo porque el mismo no resultaba de ningún modo vinculante para el tribunal de instancia, sino además porque éste motivó adecuadamente ese quantum por el que optó, de donde no podría sostenerse que una supuesta irregularidad de la parte (que, según, debe descartarse) atente contra la legitimidad de la pena impuesta. Con base en lo anterior, se desestima el reproche.
Fundamentación insuficiente. El impugnante acusa la vulneración de los artículos 184 y 369 inciso d) del Código Procesal Penal, por cuanto no se fundamenta por qué se llegó a la conclusión de que los endosos de los dos cheques cuestionados no fueron hechos por los representantes de los talleres a favor de los cuales aquellos iban girados, sin que exista un dictamen grafoscópico que sustente tal conclusión. De seguido, el defensor se pregunta por qué si, en lo que respecta al segundo endoso, tampoco existe esa prueba pericial, sí se llegó a establecer que fue hecho por Nombre09. El motivo tampoco es de recibo. En lo que a este punto concreto se refiere, los jueces de mérito razonaron lo siguiente: “...“... Todos estos oficios comprueban que Nombre09 se desempeñaba realmente como un empleado de confianza en Aviación Civil, e incluso con atribuciones de asistir a reuniones de alto nivel en políticas aeronáuticas, como lo son las de la FAA; pero además, de girar órdenes para la confección de órdenes de compra de equipos.
Es importante rescatar del oficio de folio 121 que Nombre06 en el debate reconoce haber confeccionado la orden de compra que allí le solicita Nombre09, con lo que se evidencia que no era anormal o inusual que se invirtiera el procedimiento de contratación directa en esa institución, puesto que contrariamente a lo afirmado por Nombre06 en su indagatoria, en este caso primero Nombre09 actuando con mucha discrecionalidad, adquiere el bien, y luego Nombre06 confecciona la orden de compra contra factura que se le adjunta. En este caso ninguna cotización previa se hizo que comprobare que el bien a adquirir fuere de calidad y precio que mejor beneficio le concediere a esta institución. De conformidad con las reglas del correcto entendimiento humano, gozar de esa confianza y de los beneficios de un asesor de tan alto rango, evidentemente posibilitaba a Nombre09 una relación estrecha con Nombre01, con Nombre05 y con Nombre06, lo que posibilitaba de hecho que fungiera en labores de cambios de cheques correspondientes a contrataciones irregulares.
En efecto, Nombre20 afirmó que al igual que él Nombre09 frecuentemente iba a los Bancos a cambiar cheques de esta naturaleza. Esta circunstancia en lo que interesa a esta sentencia demuestra que Nombre09 prestaba colaboración para cambios de cheques. Otra circunstancia relevante resulta ser que en los reversos de los cheques 8303 y 8304 aparecen las firmas de Nombre09, así como su numero de teléfono celular. Esto es importante por las siguientes razones. Si bien es cierto carece el sumario de dictamen de grafoscopía que establezca que las firmas correspondientes a segundos endosos en los reversos de esos cheques le pertenezcan, resulta un indicio grave y concordante la circunstancia de que las allí existentes (las cuestionadas) calquen perfectamente con las que suscriben sus indagatorias rendidas en el expediente número 96 001728, por ejemplo las de folios 1850. Por otra parte, resulta ser otro indicio grave y revelador el hecho de que, como bien lo señala el Señor Fiscal, coincidan plenamente los números de teléfono celular que aparece inmediatamente después de tales endosos en los reversos de esos cheques, con los suyos asignados.
En efecto nótese que en esos cheques aparecen en el endoso a su nombre los números Telf01, Telf02 y Telf03, mientras que entre los documentos personales que fueron decomisados en su casa (ver sobre de manila que los contiene) aparece un documento del ICE que dice “Solicitud de Servicio Celular” de fecha 16 diciembre de 1994, que aparece a su nombre como cliente, indicándose como el número de su casa el Telf02 y como teléfonos suyos para informes los números Telf04 y el Telf02; asimismo en el recibo especial de dinero número 1488085 el teléfono celular asignado Telf05 3267. Evidentemente existe una plena coincidencia entre los números telefónicos allí impresos a los que corresponden a su vivienda y número celular asignado. Esa coincidencia constituye como lo expresa el Señor Nombre16 una firma más de Nombre09 en esos endosos. Otra circunstancia que le incrimina con el cambio de esos cheques 8303 y 8304 resultan las copias de los mismos que le fueron decomisadas, entre otras, en su casa de habitación en el allanamiento practicado por el Juez Porter Aguilar.
En efecto, esas copias de cheques fueron encontradas en su casa según comprueba el acta de secuestro de las 1045 horas del 16 de octubre, según se describe expresamente en renglones 23 y 24, y lo ratifica el acta de recibido de folios 1226 y 1227 expediente 96 1728 frentes y vueltos del Juzgado de Instrucción de Tibás y La Uruca, donde concretamente se hace alusión a estos cheques como evidencia recibida con ocasión de tales allanamientos (folios 699 y siguientes expediente 98 17767). La posesión de esas copias de esos cheques acredita que estuvieron en poder de Nombre09 sus originales luego de emitidos y previo a ser cambiados en el Banco, puesto que no hay otra explicación razonable para que obtuviera dichas copias. Nótese que en razón de su función en Aviación Civil, Nombre09 no debía cumplir ningún trámite o capitulo del procedimiento referente a la emisión de esos cheques, mucho menos hacerlos efectivo, que pudiere justificar que llegaren a sus manos y así pudiere fotocopiarlos.
Para esa época como corrobora la prueba recaudada no existe otro funcionario de apellido Nombre09 en Aviación Civil. Todas estas circunstancias indiciantes, valoradas en conjunto, hacen concluir de manera necesaria que el imputado Nombre09 en fechas 10 y 12 de enero de 1996, cambió en el Banco los cheques 8303 y 8304, y que luego de ello, con las sumas de dinero en su poder, procedió a entregarlas al resto de aquí imputados, según plan previamente establecido, colaborando con ello a la consumación y agotamiento del iter criminis en que prestó concurso. En efecto, las reglas de la lógica explican que no pueden concurrir tantos indicios incriminantes en un mismo momento histórico que sindiquen a Nombre09 en estos hechos, a no ser porque efectivamente él participó en los mismos. Si bien es cierto no logró establecer el debate de manos de quién recibió esos cheques, ello no es determinante para establecer su colaboración al delito, puesto que es razonablemente probable que los recibiera de Nombre01 o de Nombre15, pues en manos de éstos los dejó Nombre18, según quedó acreditado.
Trascendental para lo que aquí interesa que, luego de hacerlos efectivos Nombre09 esos cheques, las sumas de dinero que involucraban salieron de la esfera de custodia de Aviación Civil, consumándose así el perjuicio económico acusado ...” (cfr. folio 167, línea 16 en adelante). Como se advierte de lo antes expuesto, si bien es cierto conforme lo hace notar el abogado defensor en este caso no se contó con un estudio técnico de grafoscopía que viniera a determinar científicamente quiénes fueron las personas que endosaron los cheques cuestionados, en la sentencia se llegó a determinar que los representantes de los talleres beneficiarios no estamparon ahí su firma y que, por el contrario, Nombre09 sí lo hizo, ello a partir de elementos indiciarios que sumados y valorados en su conjunto necesariamente hicieron llegar a tal conclusión. Nótese que en cuanto a este último aspecto (autoría de Nombre09 en cuanto a los endosos), en el fallo se mencionan cinco circunstancias que, de acuerdo a visión integral, sustentan válidamente tal conclusión fáctica que el defensor critica, a saber: i) Los oficios recolectados comprueban que Nombre09 se desempeñaba realmente como un empleado de confianza en Aviación Civil; ii) Gozar de esa confianza y de los beneficios de un asesor de tan alto rango, evidentemente posibilitaban a Nombre09 una relación estrecha con Nombre01, con Nombre05 y con Nombre06, lo que a su vez también le permitía que de hecho fungiera en labores de cambios de cheques correspondientes a contrataciones irregulares (Nombre20 afirmó que al igual que él, Nombre09 frecuentemente iba a los bancos a cambiar cheques de esta naturaleza); iii) En los reversos de los cheques 8303 y 8304 aparecen las firmas de Nombre09.
Esta afirmación se sustenta en lo siguiente: iii.a.) Las firmas del segundo endoso de los cheques “calcan” perfectamente (se aprecian como semejantes) con las que el imputado suscribió en sus declaraciones rendidas por escrito en el expediente número 96001728, por ejemplo las de folio 1850; iii.b.) Coinciden plenamente los tres números de teléfono que aparecen inmediatamente después de tales endosos en los reversos de esos cheques (Telf01, Telf02 y Telf03), con los que le fueran asignados por el ICE, ya que entre los documentos personales que fueron decomisados en su casa, y que se encuentran en un sobre de manila en poder del despacho, aparece un documento del ICE que dice “Solicitud de Servicio Celular” de fecha 16 diciembre de 1994, que aparece a su nombre como cliente, indicándose como el número de su casa el Telf02 y como teléfonos suyos para informes los números Telf04 y el Telf02; asimismo en el recibo especial de dinero número 1488085, el teléfono celular asignado Telf01.
En criterio de los juzgadores y acogiendo el planteamiento del fiscal, esa “coincidencia” constituyó “una firma más” de Nombre09 en esos endosos (del contexto se entiende que esta alusión es una simple frase utilizada en sentido metafórico con la cual se da a entender que dicho elemento, es decir, esa coincidencia en cuanto a los números telefónicos, constituye –al igual que las firmas una prueba incriminante más en contra del acusado); iv) Al practicarse en su casa de habitación un allanamiento por el Juez Porter Aguilar, se encontraron y decomisaron las copias de los referidos cheques (cfr. folios 699 y siguientes del expediente 9817767). A partir de la posesión de las copias de esos cheques, los jueces tuvieron por acreditado que, luego de emitidos y previo a ser cambiados en el banco, sus originales estuvieron en poder de Nombre09. Se estimó razonablemente que al respecto no existe otra explicación, pues en razón de su función en Aviación Civil, éste no debía cumplir ningún trámite del procedimiento referente a la emisión de esos cheques en particular, mucho menos hacerlos efectivos, que pudiere justificar que llegaren a sus manos y así pudiere fotocopiarlos.
Baste agregar que en el proceso tampoco se llegó a determinar que él mantuviere alguna relación con los personeros de los talleres, quienes por lo demás negaron rotundamente haberse dejado, firmado o cambiado dichos títulos (cfr. folios 98, línea 15 en adelante; 105, línea 6 en adelante; y 109, línea 10 en adelante), en lo cual se les reconoció plena credibilidad (cfr. folio 148, línea 15 en adelante; y folio 149, línea 3 en adelante). Como se colige de lo anterior, si bien en la especie no se contó con la prueba técnica que echa de menos el abogado recurrente, ello no impidió que, conforme a los elementos indiciarios que se han citado, los juzgadores hayan podido establecer razonablemente y con toda certeza, no sólo que Nombre09 fue el autor de los segundos endosos en los cheques (lo que comprueba que él fue quien los hizo efectivos), sino que los primeros endosos no fueron hechos por los representantes de los talleres Nombre22 y Nombre21 del Oeste.
En todo caso, también debe tenerse claro que en nuestro proceso penal, de corte marcadamente acusatorio, rige en principio de libertad probatoria, según el cual “podrán probarse los hechos y las circunstancias de interés para la solución correcta del caso, por cualquier medio de prueba permitido, salvo prohibición expresa de ley” (artículo 182 del Código Procesal Penal), de donde no podría exigirse, conforme lo plantea el recurrente, que el único medio para establecer o descartar la autoría de una firma, sea el dictamen técnico de grafoscopía, pues ello implicaría que en cuanto a dicha cuestión se estaría en presencia de una prueba tasada, la que resulta extraña al sistema procesal penal vigente, pues la misma más bien sería propia de aquellos sistemas escritos de corte inquisitivo. En todo caso, y sin dejar de lado lo antes expuesto, debe hacerse notar que la defensa no menciona el haber gestionado la prueba pericial que ahora viene a echar de menos, con la que pretende desacreditar las conclusiones del órgano jurisdiccional, de donde carecería de interés en su alegato. Con base en lo anterior, se rechaza el motivo.
Recurso de casación del coimputado Nombre05 (cfr. folios 407 a 429).
Falta de una determinación circunstanciada del hecho que se tuvo por probado. Con sustento en los artículos 369 inciso a) del Código Procesal Penal de 1996, y 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, se aduce que tomando en cuenta el principio de legalidad en la sentencia debió determinarse con base en las leyes, decretos y reglamentos, cuáles eran las funciones del coimputado Nombre05, quien ostentaba la condición de Director Financiero de la Dirección de Aviación Civil. Esto desacredita “las afirmaciones” del tribunal y, más que eso, demuestra que el hecho acreditado no está debidamente circunstanciado. La queja no es de recibo. En la base de esta argumentación pareciera advertirse la tesis de que para la configuración del delito de peculado (figura por la cual se condenó a los 4 imputados) el sujeto activo debe tener fijada por ley, decreto o reglamento, es decir, por una norma formal, la función de custodia o administración de los fondos públicos sobre los cuales recae la acción ilícita de sustracción o distracción, lo que en criterio de esta Sala no es admisible.
En realidad, esa relación del sujeto (quien debe ostentar la condición de funcionario público) con los dineros en torno a los cuales dirige su conducta, si bien podría estar preestablecida en una norma como las mencionadas, siendo ese el caso más común, también podría surgir de manera circunstancial, es decir, como una cuestión espontánea, informal y de hecho, donde gracias al cargo público que aquel desempeña, logra tomar contacto y recibe el encargo de dichos bienes, los que saca de la esfera de custodia del Estado. En este sentido, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha indicado: “... El tipo contenido en el artículo 352 del Código Penal no exige que el sujeto tenga la competencia abstracta para custodiar o administrar los bienes; esto es, no exige que esté dentro de sus potestades usuales tal contacto con los bienes. Esta, si bien la hipótesis más frecuente que da lugar al peculado, no es la única.
También puede configurarse cuando, sin estar dentro de sus facultades funcionales, los bienes le son confiados "en razón de su cargo" ...” Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto N° 65900 de las 9:50 hrs. del 28 de mayo de 1999. Partiendo de lo anterior, en el caso que nos ocupa tenemos que conforme se indica en el fallo el propio coencartado Nombre05 aceptó que se desempeñaba como titular del departamento financiero de Aviación Civil, siendo precisamente a éste a quien correspondía tramitar y emitir los cheques con los que se cubrían las obligaciones de pago del órgano. En cuanto a este extremo, el fallo señaló lo siguiente: “... Según se demostró en el debate, los imputados Nombre01 y Nombre30, funcionarios públicos, realizaron acciones mediante las cuales sustrajeron dineros que les habían sido confiados en razón de sus cargos, dineros que les fueron confiados para ser administrados.
Para realizar la sustracción de esos dineros, los imputados Nombre01 y Nombre30, en sendas ocasiones, contaron con la colaboración de los coimputados Nombre09 y Nombre06 ... Ha quedado demostrado que Nombre01 y Nombre30 actuaron dolosamente al sustraer dineros confiados a sus custodias en razón de sus cargos de funcionarios públicos para ser administrados. En ese sentido ambos conocían sus condiciones de funcionarios públicos, y sabían que sustraían dineros confiados a ellos en razón de sus cargos de funcionarios públicos para ser administrados, el primero como Director General de Aviación Civil, y el segundo como Jefe de su Departamento Financiero, puesto que conocían que administraban dineros que conformaban el presupuesto de dicha institución pública. Sus conocimientos en ese sentido se advierten cuando al declarar en el debate admitieron saber que se desempeñaban en esos cargos en ese órgano desconcentrado, y además que estaban dentro de sus funciones los giros de cheques de la cuenta corriente número 205 9242 8 del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil ...
Además del mecanismo dicho, se acreditó que los imputados Nombre01 y Nombre30, en comunidad de acuerdo, violentaron groseramente el procedimiento administrativo existente en Aviación Civil y en cualquier institución pública referente a los controles y fiscalización que, en materia de giro de dineros públicos de esa institución patronal, les estaban encomendados en razón de sus cargos. En efecto, cada uno de ellos en razón de sus cargos tenía el deber legal de ejercer todos los controles suficientes para garantizar el “buen uso de los recursos públicos”; no obstante ello, según se acreditó, ambos imputados procedieron a girar esos cheques a sabiendas de que correspondían a contrataciones ficticias, y más aún, a trabajos que no había recibido ni recibiría Aviación Civil. Nombre01 y Nombre30 giraron sendos cheques en pago de servicios no prestados a la administración, dineros que por las condiciones en que fueron girados, lo eran para ser sustraídos con la finalidad de apoderamiento, tal y como se evidencia del análisis global que hace el primer considerando del fallo de todas las conductas atribuidas a dichos imputados ...” (cfr. folios 172, línea 30 en adelante; 173, línea 28 en adelante; 195, línea 18 en adelante).
Conforme se colige de lo transcrito, de la prueba evacuada en juicio quedó plenamente acreditado que los coencartados Nombre01 y Nombre05 no sólo ostentaban la condición de funcionarios públicos, pues prestaban sus servicios para Aviación Civil (órgano público desconcentrado, adscrito al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), sino que además de ello sus respectivos cargos como director general y jefe del Departamento Financiero, les imponían el deber de custodia de los dineros públicos sustraídos, a tal punto que ellos mismos eran (y de hecho lo hicieron) los encargados de girar los cheques de la institución, pues les correspondía firmarlos de forma mancomunada. Así las cosas, es claro que aún y cuando en el fallo no se puntualiza cuál norma jurídica concreta les imponía esta labor, la misma dinámica cotidiana de sus funciones así lo establecía, según lo determinó la prueba testimonial, por ejemplo Nombre27, quien como secretaria de la Dirección General señaló que Nombre01 era uno de los encargados de firmar los cheques que ya venían confeccionados y firmados por el Departamento Financiero (cfr. folio 122, líneas 20 a 31); y Nombre26, quien explicó que luego de confeccionada una orden de compra, se pasaba a la proveeduría para la revisión, firma y posteriormente dependiendo del monto habían dos caminos a seguir, si era de menos de un millón de colones pasaba a Presupuesto para contenido económico, si era superior al millón de colones (como sucedió en el caso que nos ocupa) pasaba a la Dirección General para la aprobación por parte del Director, siendo que ese procedimiento obligatorio de control lo implementó el mismo Nombre05 mediante memorando, como Jefe del Departamento Financiero (cfr. folio 113, línea 8 en adelante).
De igual modo explicó que este mismo Departamento Financiero al que le era enviada toda la documentación era el responsable de determinar si la compra tenía contenido económico, o sea, que la partida que absorbería ese gasto tuviera dinero para pagarlo. Aunado a esto, los juzgadores razonaron que “... es absurdo que Nombre05 a lo largo de su indagatoria afirmare tan puntualmente que desconocía su deber legal de fiscalización, para acto seguido negar cualquier responsabilidad en el trámite de los giros de estos cheques o cualesquiera cheques que de allí salieren, cuando paralelamente afirmara que fue diligente en la implantación de controles internos en su Departamento ... Ha quedado demostrado que Nombre01 y Nombre30 actuaron dolosamente al sustraer dineros confiados a sus custodias en razón de sus cargos de funcionarios públicos para ser administrados. En ese sentido ambos conocían sus condiciones de funcionarios públicos, y sabían que sustraían dineros confiados a ellos en razón de sus cargos de funcionarios públicos para ser administrados, el primero como Director General de Aviación Civil, y el segundo como Jefe de su Departamento Financiero, puesto que conocían que administraban dineros que conformaban el presupuesto de dicha institución pública.
Sus conocimientos en ese sentido se advierten cuando al declarar en el debate admitieron saber que se desempeñaban en esos cargos en ese órgano desconcentrado, y además que estaban dentro de sus funciones los giros de cheques de la cuenta corriente número 205 9242 8 del Consejo Técnico de Aviación Civil ...” (cfr. folio 170, líneas 24 a 28), de donde es claro que el mismo tenía muy presente su responsabilidad, como encargado del Departamento Financiero, de velar por la custodia y adecuado manejo de los fondos que administraba, a tal punto que conforme se indicó era, junto con Nombre01, el encargado de firmar mancomunadamente los cheques que salían de la institución. Con base en lo anterior, se declara sin lugar la queja.
Fundamentación contradictoria. En este segundo motivo se denuncia el quebranto de la misma normativa que se citó en el anterior acápite, pues por una parte se dice que el encartado Nombre05 actuó con dolo directo, pero más adelante se dice que fue con dolo eventual, siendo dos juicios de valor que se excluyen entre sí. El reparo tampoco es atendible. En lo que atañe a este aspecto que discute el recurrente, los jueces indicaron lo siguiente: “... tratándose de Nombre30, el tribunal comprueba a la luz de las pruebas examinadas que realizó el delito de peculado con dolo eventual . El dolo eventual tipificado por el numeral 39 del Código Penal concurre en el agente a quien no le importa que el daño se materialice y lo asume como parte integrante de su conducta, esto es que sabe y comprende (dentro de las posibilidades o riesgos vislumbrados), el mal que puede producir y lo acepta, lo que puede derivarse muchas veces incluso de ciertos elementos objetivos que demuestran desprecio, frialdad, etc., en la actuación.
Es esencial para el dolo eventual entonces tanto la representación del daño que se puede causar, como la aceptación de que éste se produzca virtud de la conducta que se realiza por el agente. En el dolo eventual debe concurrir la voluntariedad y conciencia del agente en la realización de la conducta prohibida, sin importarle la consecuencia lesiva que con su acción provoca. La actuación del agente con pleno conocimiento y voluntariedad en la ejecución de la conducta que conoce típica, y su absoluta indiferencia a la causación del resultado dañoso, sea a que éste se produzca como consecuencia posible de su conducta, es conceptualizado por nuestro Código Penal como dolo eventual. Es evidente entonces que la diferencia existente entre el dolo eventual y la culpa con representación, por ejemplo, consiste en la primera en el rechazo que tiene el agente de la causación del resultado, sea que al representárselo no lo admite, no quiere que acontezca.
El conocimiento y la voluntariedad que convergen en el agente de que está realizando la conducta prohibida por la norma penal, y su indiferencia a que se dé el resultado dañoso, es decir, aún previéndolo como consecuencia de su acción, y aunque no lo pretenda directamente, lo admite en su materialidad, configura el dolo eventual, y es, precisamente el que concurrió en el imputado Nombre05 en este caso. El dolo eventual con que actuó se evidencia y comprueba a partir de las siguientes circunstancias objetivas. El giro que realizó de los cheques cuestionados a favor de terceras personas a sabiendas de que no habían prestado servicio alguno a Aviación Civil, máxime conocer que involucraban obras o servicios que ya habían sido adjudicados a otra empresa, y que en cualquier caso no competía a ese momento efectuarlos al Departamento de Mantenimiento (pues este departamento asumiría su mantenimiento sólo a partir de la salida de la empresa adjudicada que en esa terminal de carga prestaba servicios, según aseveró el Nombre17 Nombre23, para entonces y hasta la fecha actual Jefe de Mantenimiento del Santamaría), así como que maliciosamente se había burlado el trámite de licitación pública al fraccionarse esas contrataciones en dos no obstante se referían a obras de similar naturaleza, la marcada rapidez con que a lo interno de su departamento financiero tramitó y giró esos cheques, además de girarlos a sabiendas de que los talleres girados no habían contratado con Aviación Civil (puesto que no existía documentación de respaldo que así lo demostrara) ni tampoco habían efectuado trabajo alguno en esa Terminal de Carga del Santamaría, puesto que no existía el “recibido conforme” del servicio terminado por parte de funcionario alguno en Aviación Civil, sumado a ello la circunstancia de que esos cheques salieron inmediatamente de Financiero por mecanismos irregulares, a dar a manos de Nombre01, resultan ser, entre otros, elementos graves y concordantes que, valorados entre sí, permiten arribar a la inequívoca conclusión de que el aquí imputado Nombre05, al girar esos cheques, conocía que realizaba la conducta prohibida por el delito de peculado, no obstante tubo (sic) voluntad en realizarla con total menosprecio a su conocimiento y previsibilidad de que con ella causaría el resultado perjuicioso que ahora se le reprocha, habida cuenta que las acciones en que incurrió, no puede ser concebida y menos reiterada si no lo es voluntariamente ...” (cfr. folio 196, línea 14 en adelante).
Conforme se constata del anterior extracto, y a pesar de que en criterio de esta Sala de las circunstancias que se mencionan pareciera deducirse más bien un dolo directo en la actuación cumplida por el coimputado Nombre05, el fallo no incorpora la contradicción que denuncia y pretende demostrar el impugnante, pues en ningún momento se llegó a establecer que éste haya actuado con dolo directo sino más bien, de forma coherente con su mismo planteamiento, se afirmó un dolo eventual, es decir, que a sabiendas de que con su conducta ilícita se le produciría un perjuicio patrimonial al órgano público para el cual prestaba sus servicios como jefe del departamento financiero, aceptó dicho resultado. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar el motivo.
Falta de fundamentación del quantum de la pena. De nuevo con base en las normas citadas en los anteriores motivos, en este se reclama una inadecuada motivación del monto de la sanción impuesta, por cuanto:
Recurso del licenciado Gino Corazzari Aguilar, defensor particular del coimputado Nombre06 (cfr. folios 430 a 631).
Falta de fundamentación. En este apartado, con sustento en los artículos 142, 143, 363, 369 y 443 del Código Procesal Penal; 39 de la Constitución Política, se argumenta que el fallo incurrió en falta de fundamentación, lo que imposibilitó a la defensa para conocer las razones que mediaron para dictar la condenatoria, ello con base en lo siguiente:
Incorporación de elementos probatorios ilegítimos. En este motivo, con cita de los artículos 15, 74, 76, 142, 175 a 183, 204, 233, 234, 334 y 369 del Código Procesal Penal; y 38 y 39 de la Constitución Política, se acusa que el fallo condenatorio se sustenta de manera esencial en prueba ilegítima, por lo siguiente:
XV. tercer MOTIVO POR LA FORMA: Modificación ilegal de la acusación durante el juicio. En este tercer reproche, con cita de los artículos 1, 12, 62, 127, 128, 175, 178, 233, 303, 306, 316, 336, 343, 345, 347, 348, 363, 365 y 369 del Código Procesal Penal; y 39 de la Constitución Política, se denuncia:
Violación de las reglas de la sana crítica. En el este cuarto reparo se aduce que el fallo quebranta las reglas de la sana crítica en cuanto a elementos de valor decisivo, con lo que se violan los artículos 1, 142, 183, 184, 204, 361 y 369 del Código Procesal Penal; y 39 de la Constitución Política. La inconformidad se hace consistir en lo siguiente:
Violación de las reglas de la sana crítica. En su quinto motivo por la forma, el defensor del acusado Nombre06 argumenta que se han violado los artículos 142, 184, 204, 361 y 369 del Código Procesal Penal, y 39 de la Constitución Política. En sustento de su queja señala lo siguiente:
Errónea aplicación del artículo 36 del Código Penal, y 101, 102 inciso a), 107, y 108 incisos 1º y 2º de la Ley General de Administración Pública. En este primer reparo por el fondo el defensor denuncia el quebranto de las anteriores normas sustantivas, pues al invocar la causal de exculpación refirió una obediencia debida entre Nombre06 y Nombre01, y no entre aquel y Nombre15 como lo confundió el tribunal. De seguido el recurrente aduce lo siguiente:
Violación de los artículos 47, 354, 1, 30, 31 y 48 del Código Penal. En este segundo reparo por razones de fondo, y con base en un amplio y minucioso reexamen de la prueba y de las circunstancias que rodearon el caso, se argumenta que se condenó al encartado Nombre06 a pesar de que ningún elemento probatorio demostró con grado de certeza que fuese cómplice del peculado; que ese delito fuese cometido por los supuestos autores condenados; que existiera una relación causal entre la confección y firma de las órdenes de compra, y la sustracción y cambio de los cheques; y que las contrataciones ficticias fuesen elaboradas en común. Además, y siempre a partir del análisis de la prueba, se asegura que quedó demostrado que existió una directriz de urgencia; que la emisión de los cheques se verificó en el departamento financiero y no en el de proveeduría; que, al firmar las órdenes de compra, Nombre06 no aprobó la realización de los trabajos o servicios; que el “recibido conforme” es el que autoriza y el que se responsabiliza del pago (lo que fue obviado por el tribunal); que la relación de hechos de la Contraloría, Nº 30696, no pasó de ser la enunciación de suposiciones y posibilidades, lo que reiteró Nombre24; que a partir de la declaración de éste se demostró que los informes de auditoría fueron irrespetados; que Nombre24 comenzó mintiendo y se contradijo; que el dolo de Nombre06 no fue demostrado, pues sólo cumplió ordenes, y se le condenó sólo por firmar las órdenes de compra (lo que no significaba sustracción de dineros); que no se demostró que Nombre06 tuviera un acuerdo previo con los demás condenados; que la urgencia en la contratación administrativa no implica una complicidad dolosa; que se desconoció la estructura organizativafuncional de Aviación Civil; que no se demostró que los coimputados Nombre05 y Nombre01 idearan girar cheques, y menos la colaboración dolosa de Nombre06; y que no se demostró que Nombre06 haya participado en ningún delito, pues éste tampoco se acreditó.
La queja resulta inatendible. El planteamiento sustantivo que se esgrime resulta inconsistente, pues lejos de atenerse al cuadro fáctico que se tuvo por demostrado y, a partir del mismo, demostrar una errónea aplicación de la ley de fondo, de manera impropia se desciende al análisis subjetivo y minucioso de la prueba evacuada en juicio, a partir de lo cual se critica, desconoce y desborda el cuadro fáctico que fijaron los juzgadores, pretendiendo que esta Sala asuma como tal el que luego de tal ejercicio ahora se presenta. Tal argumentación no podría prosperar, pues en recurso de casación por vicios in iudicando supone el respeto y la intangibilidad de los hechos que contiene la decisión (en ese sentido véase, entre muchos otros, el voto de esta Sala Nº 650F95, de las 10:25 hrs. del 03 de noviembre de 1995; y el Nº 292F96, de las 9:20 hrs. del 14 de junio de 1996). Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar la queja.
POR TANTO:
Se declaran sin lugar en todos sus extremos los recursos de casación que se interponen. NOTIFÍQUESE.
Daniel González A.
Jesús A. Ramírez Q. Rodrigo Castro M.
Alfonso Chaves R. José Manuel Arroyo G.
Dig/imp: jlav Exp: 5403/302
Document not found. Documento no encontrado.