Flooding from artificial lagoon remodeling and wetland protectionInundación por remodelación de laguna artificial y protección del humedal

RES: 0000690-F-02 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten o'clock on the sixth of September of the year two thousand two.

Ordinary agrarian proceeding filed in the Agrarian Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela by Nombre203540 and Nombre203541, farmers; against “INVERSIONES Y PROCESADORA TROPICAL IMPROTSA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA”, represented by its general agent without limit of amount, attorney Ernesto Enriquez Rubio, passport number Placa38042, resident of Mexico, Federal District. Also appearing as special judicial attorneys for the litigating parties are attorneys Ligia María Arias Rodríguez, resident of Heredia, Nombre3440, and Nombre158776, both single, residents of San José and Grecia respectively. All are of legal age and, with the exceptions stated above, married, lawyers, and residents of San Carlos.

WHEREAS:

1º.- Based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, the plaintiffs filed an ordinary agrarian complaint, the amount in controversy was set at two hundred million colones, seeking a judgment declaring: " 1.- That two lagoons were built without legal permission. 2.- That with those lagoons, it caused serious damages (daños y perjuicios) to the properties of the undersigned in the following manner: a) Flooding of our properties over an area of 17,500 square meters, turning them into swamps. b) A great quantity of timber trees such as laurel, cedar, gavilán, and other species are drying up and being uprooted. The pasture is totally destroyed. Such disappearance of the forest. c) The dairy cattle, before these lagoons were built, used to pass from one farm to the other. When passage between the farms was interrupted as a result of the flooding, the cattle had to be taken out along the loose-stone road, and eight dairy cows were injured and had to be sold for meat, for sums of money far below the real value of dairy cows. The crop (cosecha) and the offspring (crías), both present and future, were lost. d) The defendant must pay for the damage to the water spring (naciente) mentioned earlier. 3.- The defendant must pay these damages (daños y perjuicios), as well as lost profits (lucro cesante) and consequential damage (daño emergente), from the moment the lagoons were built until full and effective payment of the sums established in a final judgment. These sums must be established by expert opinion, taking into account the following: loss of value of the properties, loss of timber trees, pasture, and forest damage in general, damage to the water spring (naciente), loss of the cows, their milk crop and offspring, during the entire productive life that these animals and their offspring could have had. 4.- The moral damage (daño moral) caused by the anguish of seeing the tranquility of the undersigned disturbed, in having to face the loss of their property and the concern of filing judicial proceedings to protect and recover their rights. 4) (sic) Payment of both costs to be borne by the defendant. On all the items set forth herein, interest must be paid at the rate for 36-month fixed-term bank deposits. 5.- That the defendant must destroy both lagoons.".

2º.- The defendant answered the complaint in the negative and filed the defenses of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of right (falta de derecho), statute of limitations (prescripción), and failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa). The latter was resolved in an interlocutory manner, and the statute of limitations defense was reserved for judgment.

3º.- Judge Vanessa Fisher González, in judgment number 23-00 of 1:15 p.m. on March 17, 2000, resolved: “In accordance with the foregoing and legal citations, the complaint filed by Nombre203540 and Nombre203541 against Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa Sociedad Anónima, all of stated qualities, is partially granted. Consequently, it is declared: A) The defendant is ordered to pay seven hundred seventy-three thousand eight hundred colones for the value of the flooded land, half of said sum shall be paid to plaintiff Nombre203540 and the remainder to plaintiff Nombre203541. B) The defendant is ordered to pay to each plaintiff on the sums corresponding to them, legal interest calculated based on the rate paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit in colones, to be computed from September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-seven until effective payment of the obligation. C) The claims for moral damage (daño moral) and damage to eight cows are denied. D) The claims for damage to the spring (naciente), damage to pastures, and damage to the forest are denied because they are contained within the claim granted for the value of the flooded land. The defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción) and lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) are denied. As for lack of right (falta de derecho), it is rejected in relation to the claims granted to the plaintiffs and upheld in relation to the claims denied. This matter is resolved without special award of procedural and personal costs (costas). Anything not expressly ruled upon shall be deemed denied.”.

4°.- The special judicial attorneys for the plaintiffs appealed, and the Agrarian Tribunal, composed of Judges Carmen María Escoto Fernández, Ligia Mesén Madrigal, and Damaris Vargas Vásquez, in resolution number 383 of 11:30 a.m. on June 15, 2001, resolved: “The concomitant nullity claimed against the judgment issued at one-fifteen p.m. on March seventeenth, two thousand, is denied. Said resolution is partially reversed insofar as it upholds the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) to deny the claim consisting of the destruction of the lagoons. In its place, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is rejected, and said petition is granted in the following manner: It is ordered that the problem of flooding on the plaintiffs' farm be solved in such a way that the original state prior to the modification of the larger lagoon is restored, through a safe technical procedure to be determined by an expert in execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia), work that must be carried out at the defendant's expense within a period to be granted by the Trial Judge according to the circumstances so that what is ordered is fulfilled. If it is not fulfilled within the granted period, the Judge shall authorize the prevailing party, that is, the plaintiffs, to carry out what is ordered in this judgment at the expense of the losing party, that is, the defendant, who must also pay the resulting damages (daños y perjuicios). If the obligor performs what is indicated in this resolution in a different manner, what has been done shall be destroyed, and what has been ordered shall be fulfilled, in which case all expenses, damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the faulty execution shall be at its charge. In all other matters subject to the appeal, said judgment is confirmed.”.

5º.- The defendant filed an appeal before this Chamber, expressly indicating the reasons relied upon to refute the thesis of the trial court instance.

6º.- The legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

Magistrate Solís Zelaya writes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- Mrs. Nombre203541 is the owner of the farm of the Alajuela Registry, real folio registration number Placa38043, located in the district of Pital of the Canton of San Carlos. Likewise, Mr. Nombre203540 is the owner of the farm of the Alajuela Registry, real folio registration number Placa38044, located in Dirección22887. For its part, the company Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa S.A. is the owner of the farm of the Alajuela Registry, registration number Placa38045, located in Dirección22887. The first two properties are adjacent, along their northern boundary, to the third. Approximately in the year 1975, before the aforementioned company acquired the referenced property, one of its previous owners, Mr. Nombre111361, built, on the southern boundary, two artificial lagoons identified as the larger –the big one– and the smaller –the little one–. Between July and August of 1997, Improtsa S.A. remodeled the larger lagoon, increasing its perimeter by building a kind of dam (represa). In September, due to the increase in the water level of the lagoon, the current backed up towards the yurro or creek (quebrada) that runs along the boundary with Mrs. Nombre203541 and Mr. Nombre203540; this caused the watercourse to grow and flooded an area of 3,869 m2. The waterlogged land is located in equal parts on the farms of Mrs. Nombre203541 and Mr. Nombre203540. With this sub-judice matter, the plaintiffs request that Improtsa S.A. be ordered to pay them the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to their farms. These consist of: the loss of value of the properties, of timber trees, of pasture, the forest damage in general, that of the water spring (naciente), the loss of the cows, as well as their milk crop and their offspring, during the productive life that those animals could have had. The amount will be established by expert opinion. Likewise, they claim the moral damage (daño moral) caused by the anguish of facing the loss of their property and the concern of having to file judicial proceedings to protect and recover their rights. Furthermore, they seek the recognition of interest, at the rate for 36-month fixed-term bank deposits, on the foregoing items from the time the lagoons were built until their effective payment. They also request that the destruction of both lagoons be ordered. The defendant company opposed the complaint. The Trial Court partially granted it. It ordered Improtsa S.A. to pay ¢763,800 for the value of the flooded land. This sum is to be divided equally between the plaintiffs. Likewise, it ordered it to recognize for each of the plaintiffs legal interest, to be calculated based on the rate paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica on six-month certificates of deposit in colones, from September 27, 1997, until its effective payment. It resolved without a special award of costs (costas). The Tribunal partially reversed the ruling regarding the denial of the claim for destruction of the lagoons. Instead, and as relevant, it ordered that the flooding problem be solved, returning the original state prior to the modification of the larger lagoon, through a safe technical procedure to be determined by expert opinion in execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia). In all other matters, it confirmed.

II.- The special judicial attorney for the defendant company files this appeal in cassation (recurso de casación). He alleges violation of Articles 50 of the Political Constitution; 40, 41, 45 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; 2 paragraph 15), 7 subsection h) and 103 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre.

III.- Due to the manner in which the appeal will be resolved, the order of the grievances set forth by the appellant is restated as follows.

IV.- First, it is necessary to analyze the grievances in procedendo alleged by the appellant. Under this reasoning, he alleges the defect of incongruence by extra petita. This is because, as he affirms, the Ad-quem, by ordering the lowering of the lagoon level, grants something different from what the plaintiffs requested, since what they sought is the destruction of both lagoons.

V.- This Tribunal has repeatedly indicated, as a characteristic of the appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) in agrarian matters, its limitation regarding hearing exclusively substantive issues. In this sense, the Chamber is barred from analyzing formal questions or those in procedendo (Articles 61, first paragraph, of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria and 552 of the Labor Code). Consequently, the appeal must be rejected if the appellant only alleges violation of procedural rules, because through agrarian cassation, procedural steps cannot be corrected, replaced, or carried out. Despite this, when the appellant files its appeal alleging formal and substantive reasons, it will only be decided on the substance. It may even be decided on the substance even if it had erroneously classified them as formal, for what matters is the nature of what is alleged, which the Tribunal is responsible for qualifying. But, if the appeal is on form, regardless of how it is identified, it must be rejected. (See, among many others, resolutions numbers 24 of 2:30 p.m. on February 15, 1995; and 8 of 3:45 p.m. on January 5, 2000). In this case, the censure alleged —incongruence by extra petita— constitutes a violation of formal order. Therefore, this Chamber is barred from hearing it. Consequently, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is required.

VI.- Secondly, the appellant affirms the existence of a contradiction in the appealed judgment. This is because, he states, on one hand, it orders lowering the lagoon level to restore things to their original situation, and on the other, it orders his represented party to pay for the flooded or submerged land. In this way, he argues, two mutually exclusive situations are recognized. The Tribunal, he points out, found it appropriate to solve the flooding problem on the plaintiffs' farm and to return to the original state, that is, before the modification made to the larger lagoon. However, it also confirms what was ordered by the A-quo regarding the plaintiffs' compensation, as the essential content of the property right was affected with respect to the canceled or flooded area, making its use impossible. The contradiction, he indicates, lies in the fact that by granting payment for the waterlogged land, compensation awarded, he repeats, because no act of disposition can be exercised over it, it becomes inappropriate to also order the lowering of the lagoon level to return the property to the original state before the flooding. The established compensation, he asserts, was for the total value of said land, not for the supposed temporary harm suffered by the plaintiffs by not being able to dispose of it. In this way, he concludes, if the appealed judgment stands, the plaintiffs will have a) compensation for no longer being able to enjoy the property, and b) the real possibility of disposing of it under the conditions existing before the increase in the lagoon.

VII.- Regarding the foregoing, the appellant is correct. The plaintiffs seek, as relevant, payment for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the flooding of their land, as a result of the remodeling carried out on the "larger lagoon". Consequently, they request, among other claims, payment for the value of their properties, as well as the recognition of interest at the legal rate. However, they also request the destruction of both lagoons. These claims, as the appellant indicates, are mutually exclusive. One should have been the primary claim and the other the subsidiary claim, but not both pursued primarily, for the reasons set forth below. In this case, the instance judges order the defendant company to pay ¢763,800 as compensation for the value of the waterlogged land, plus interest at the legal rate. With this, the plaintiffs' injured right has been compensated. The damage caused by not being able to use the flooded land, as well as the resulting harm, is recognized. Notwithstanding this, the Ad-quem, because the request for destruction of the lagoons was not appropriate as they had not been built by the defendant company, also orders it to solve the problem of the flooding of the plaintiffs' farms, so as to return to the original state before the modification of the larger lagoon was made. With this decision, besides being incongruent, the Tribunal fosters an illicit enrichment of the plaintiffs. This is because, it is reiterated, on one hand, they obtain the value of the flooded land, which, in accordance with Article 77 of the Ley de Aguas, will continue to be their property, as well as the harm caused, thus compensating their injured right; and, on the other hand, upon restoring the situation to the state prior to the flooding, they will be able to use them as they did before. Therefore, as the appellant indicates, they will have a double benefit: 1) the value of the land, plus legal interest, and 2) the possibility of using them again. It would have been different if the recognized damages were of another nature. For example, the loss of cows, pastures, forests, etc., as a consequence of the flooding. In this scenario, since the litigious farm is exploited for dairy activity, they could lawfully also seek the restoration of things to their previous state, precisely to continue with that agrarian enterprise. Based on the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to uphold this grievance. As unnecessary, a ruling on the remaining grounds of disagreement is omitted.

VIII.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is necessary to point out the following. As correctly noted by the A-quo, and as the appellant argues, in accordance with Article 40 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in relation to numeral 2, paragraph 15) of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and 7 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, the existing lagoons on the litigious land constitute an ecosystem in a habitat corresponding to a wetland (humedal). There is evidence in the case file on this aspect. In this regard, Mr. Nombre203542, in his testimony on folio 317, as relevant, stated: “... In the lagoon observed from this place, there are fish, crocodiles, casino snakes; the crocodiles are about one meter long. ...”. For his part, Mr. Nombre203543, on folio 327 verso, indicated: “ ... The animals that frequented the lagoon between Nombre203540 and Nombre203544 continue to visit it, because the increase in the water level did not affect the fauna at all. ...”. Mr. Nombre111361, on folio 330, stated: “... In these lagoons there are no alligators, but what exists is what is known as “guajipal”, which are some small lagoon alligators. ...”. Even the plaintiffs themselves, in their appeal brief, folio 358, accept the existence of said ecosystem. In this regard, and as relevant, they affirm: “... in this case, the increase in the water level and with it the invasion of species onto the properties of my clients ...”. The importance of the environment, as a fundamental right, has been recognized by our legal system. Thus, by Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994, Article 50 of the Political Constitution was amended to add the current two last paragraphs, which stipulate: “Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are legally entitled to denounce acts that infringe upon that right and to claim reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions.”. Also, by Law number 7607 of May 29, 1996, numeral 46 was modified, adding the last paragraph: “Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.”. For its part, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, within the framework of its competence, has determined that the right to the environment is a prerequisite for the rights to life and health. As relevant, it has stated: “... life is the foundation, the necessary and determining condition for the existence of the human person; it is inherent to the human person. From this derives the principle of the inviolability of human life, so that it is the duty of society and the State to protect it. It is the most elementary and fundamental of human rights and from which all others unfold. The most immediate right linked to the right to life is the right to physical and psychic integrity. The right to life demands conditions of health in its broadest sense, so that the right to health, without losing its autonomy, almost comes to present itself as an aspect of the right to life. Thus, the life-health relationship is in life itself and in the treatment that each society gives to the person, according to the priority it assigns to their protection. The foregoing analysis allows us to conclude that it is necessary for awareness to be raised, at a governmental and collective level, about the importance of the environment for human and animal health in the national, regional, and world economy, through the conservation of nature and of life itself in its broadest meaning. ...” (Voto 4423-93. In the same sense, resolutions of this Tribunal numbers 3705-93, 6240-93, 2485-94, 1394-94, 5527-94, 5654-95, 1154-96, 705-99 can be consulted, among others). It has also established the State's obligation to protect the Environment: “... The principle of environmental protection is not a recommendation or an intention given by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, it is a right of immediate application, so there is an obligation on the part of governmental bodies to ensure that legal provisions tending to protect the environment are complied with ...” (Voto 132-99. In the same sense, ruling number 5906-99 can be consulted). This obligation, said Tribunal has indicated, does not only imply the diligent exercise of all necessary measures to cease activities that harmfully alter the environment, but also an effective precautionary policy: “... in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, because once the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damage caused to the environment ...” (Judgment number 1250-99. In the same sense, number 2219-99, among others, can be consulted). Specifically, regarding wetlands (humedales), the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in its Article 41, declares them to be of public interest. Likewise, in numeral 45, it prohibits all activities tending to interrupt natural cycles. Said rules provide: “Article 41.- Public Interest. Wetlands (humedales) and their conservation are declared of public interest, as they are of multiple use, whether or not they are protected by the laws governing this matter. ... Article 45.- Prohibition. Activities aimed at interrupting the natural cycles of wetland ecosystems (ecosistemas de humedal) are prohibited, such as the construction of dikes that prevent the flow of marine or continental waters, drainage, drying, filling, or any other alteration that causes the deterioration and elimination of such ecosystems.”. For its part, canon 103 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre penalizes anyone who drains wetlands (humedales) without prior authorization from the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre (today Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación S.I.N.A.C. —Article 15 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 30077-MINAE, “Reglamento General del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía of December 21, 2001, as well as numeral 22 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, although this article, along with others of that law, is the subject of an unconstitutionality action—) of MINAE, because this Directorate is, according to Article 7 of that Law, the competent entity to manage, supervise, and protect wetlands (humedales). Both norms provide: “Article 7 The Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas has the following functions in the exercise of its competence: ...h) Manage, supervise, and protect wetlands (humedales). ... Article 103.- Anyone who drains lakes, non-artificial lagoons, and other wetlands (humedales) without the prior authorization of the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas shall be sanctioned with a fine of fifty thousand colones (¢50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (¢100,000), convertible into imprisonment of one to two years. Furthermore, the offender shall be obligated to leave things in the state they were in before starting the drainage work, for which purpose the aforementioned Directorate is empowered to carry out the corresponding work, but at the offender's expense.” (The highlighted text was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through vote number 5857-99). On the other hand, due to the specific objective pursued by Environmental Law, a series of principles emerge that inform it and determine its content and scope; some are novel, others adapted from public law, the branch from which it originates. Among them, and for this sub-judice matter, are: 1) In dubio pro natura: which implies that in case of doubt regarding the interpretation of legal norms, or regarding the impact that an activity may have on the environment, a decision must be made in favor of what best suits its conservation. On this point, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber number 5893-95 can be examined; and, 2) Environmental public interest: highlights the special nature and substantivity of this legal branch. It not only encompasses the object to be protected (health and ecological balance as prerequisites for life and development), but also, and as a derivation of the special nature of these legal interests, it acquires singular importance, which must prevail when used as a criterion for interpreting environmental regulations. For this reason, it is given a universal dimension, as it refers to aspects of concern to humanity as a whole, because the preservation of an adequate environment, in which animal and plant species can live and develop, is essential for its own existence. On this point, rulings of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 353-96, 2816-97, 644-99, 2219-99, 5906-99 can be consulted. In light of the foregoing considerations, this Chamber believes that ordering the drainage of the lagoon to return to the situation existing before its modification, as the Ad-quem does, besides violating the regulations transcribed above, could cause damage to the environment. Therefore, what is advisable in this case is to maintain things as they currently are.

IX.- For the reasons set forth, it is appropriate to grant the appeal filed, revoke the judgment of the Tribunal and, ruling on the merits, confirm that of the trial court.

THEREFORE:

The judgment of the Agrarian Tribunal is revoked and, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court is confirmed.

Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Anabelle León Feoli J** Appeal: 514-01 In all other matters subject to the appeal, said judgment is affirmed.

**5º.-** The respondent filed an appeal before this Chamber with an express indication of the reasons relied upon to refute the thesis of the lower Court.

**6º.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge Solís Zelaya; and, **CONSIDERANDO:** **I.-** Mrs. Nombre203541 is the owner of the property in the Partido de Alajuela, registered under real property folio number Placa38043, located in the district of Pital, Canton of San Carlos. Likewise, Mr. Nombre203540 is the owner of the property in the Partido de Alajuela, registered under real property folio number Placa38044, located at Dirección22887. For its part, the company Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa S.A., is the owner of the property in the Partido de Alajuela, registered number Placa38045, located at Dirección22887. The first two properties border, along their northern boundary, with the third. Approximately in 1975, before the aforementioned company acquired the said property, one of its previous owners, Mr. Nombre111361, constructed, on the southern boundary, two artificial lagoons identified as the larger –the big one– and the smaller –the little one–. Between July and August 1997, Improtsa S.A., remodeled the larger lagoon, increasing its perimeter by building a kind of dam. In September, due to the increase in the water level of the lagoon, the current flowed back towards the stream or brook (yurro o quebrada) that runs along the boundary with Mrs. Nombre203541 and Mr. Nombre203540, causing an enlargement of the channel and the flooding of an area of 3,869m². The flooded land is located in equal parts on the farms of Mrs. Nombre203541 and Mr. Nombre203540. With this sub-judice matter, the plaintiffs seek to have Improtsa S.A. ordered to pay them the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to their farms. These consist of: the loss of the value of the properties, of the timber trees, of the pasture, the general forest damage, the damage to the spring (naciente), the loss of the cows, as well as their milk yield and their offspring, during the productive life that those animals could have had. Their amount shall be established by expert examination. They also claim the non-economic damage (daño moral) caused by the anguish of facing the loss of their assets and the worry of having to initiate judicial proceedings to protect and recover their rights. Furthermore, they seek the recognition of interest, at the rate for 36-month fixed-term bank deposits, on the above items from the moment of the construction of the lagoons until their effective payment. They also request that the destruction of both lagoons be ordered. The respondent company opposed the lawsuit. The Trial Court partially granted it. It ordered Improtsa S.A. to pay the sum of ¢763,800 for the value of the flooded land, an amount to be divided equally between the plaintiffs. Likewise, it ordered it to recognize, for each of the plaintiffs, legal interest, to be calculated based on the rate paid by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica on 6-month certificates of deposit in colones, from September 27, 1997, until their effective payment. It ruled with no special order as to costs. The Court of Appeals partially overturned the decision regarding the denial of the claim for the destruction of the lagoons. Instead, and as relevant, it ordered the flooding problem to be solved by returning to the original state before the modification of the larger lagoon was carried out. This shall be done through a safe technical procedure to be determined by expert examination during the execution of the judgment. In all other matters, it confirmed.

**II.-** The special judicial representative of the respondent company files this appeal in cassation. He alleges the violation of Articles 50 of the Political Constitution; 40, 41, 45 of the Organic Law of the Environment; 2 paragraph 15), 7 subsection h) and 103 of the Wildlife Conservation Law.

**III.-** Due to the manner in which the appeal will be resolved, the order of the grievances set forth by the appellant is reformulated as follows.

**IV.-** Firstly, it is necessary to analyze the in procedendo grievances put forth by the appellant. Under this reasoning, he alleges the defect of incongruity due to extra petita. This is because, as he states, the Ad-quem, by ordering the reduction of the lagoon's level, grants something different from what was requested by the plaintiffs, since what they sought is the destruction of both lagoons.

**V.-** This Court has repeatedly pointed out, as a characteristic of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters, its limitation to exclusively hear issues of substance. In this sense, the Chamber is barred from analyzing formal or in procedendo questions (Articles 61, first paragraph, of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law and 552 of the Labor Code). Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed if the appellant only alleges a violation of procedural rules, since agrarian cassation cannot be used to correct, replace, or carry out procedural steps. Despite this, when the appellant files their appeal alleging reasons of form and substance, only the substance shall be ruled upon. It may even be ruled upon the substance when they have mistakenly deemed them as formal, for what matters is the nature of what is alleged, which is up to the Court to qualify. However, if the appeal is based on form, regardless of how it is identified, it must be dismissed. (See, among many others, Resolutions number 24 of 2:30 p.m. of February 15, 1995; and, 8 of 3:45 p.m.

of January 5, 2000). In the instant case, the alleged censure—incongruence due to extra petita—constitutes a breach of a formal nature. Therefore, this Chamber is barred from hearing it. Consequently, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is imperative.

VI.- Secondly, the appellant claims the existence of a contradiction in the appealed judgment. This is because, he states, on one hand it orders the lagoon level to be lowered to restore things to their original state and, on the other, it orders his represented party to pay for the flooded or submerged lands. In this way, he argues, two mutually exclusive situations are recognized. The Court, he points out, deemed it appropriate to solve the flooding problem on the plaintiff's property and return to the original state, that is, before the modification made to the larger lagoon. However, it also confirms the lower court's ruling regarding the plaintiffs' compensation for the impairment of the essential content of the right to property, with respect to the annulled or flooded area, as its use is impossible. The contradiction, he indicates, lies in the fact that by granting payment for the flooded land—compensation awarded, he repeats, because no act of disposition can be exercised over it—it is inappropriate to also order the reduction of the lagoon level to return the property to its original state before the flooding. The compensation set, he asserts, was for the total value of said land, not for the supposed temporary harm suffered by the plaintiffs by not being able to use it. Thus, he concludes, if the appealed ruling is upheld, the plaintiffs will have a) compensation for no longer being able to enjoy the property and, b) the real possibility of using it under the conditions prior to the lagoon's enlargement.

VII.- On this matter, the appellant is correct. The plaintiffs seek, pertinently, payment for the damages caused by the flooding of their property, as a result of the remodeling carried out on the “larger lagoon.” Consequently, they request, among other claims, payment of the value of their properties, as well as the recognition of interest at the legal rate. However, they also request the destruction of both lagoons. These claims, as the appellant indicates, are mutually exclusive. One should have been the primary claim and the other the subsidiary one, but not both asserted as primary claims, for the reasons set forth below. In the instant case, the instance judges condemn the defendant company to pay ¢763,800 as compensation for the value of the flooded land, plus interest at the legal rate. With this, the injured right of the plaintiffs has been compensated. The damage caused by not being able to use the flooded land is recognized, as well as the damages caused. Nevertheless, the Ad-quem, because the request for destruction of the lagoons was not appropriate since they were not built by the defendant company, also condemns it to solve the flooding problem on the plaintiffs' properties, thereby returning to the original state before the modification of the larger lagoon was carried out. With this decision, besides being inconsistent, the Court fosters the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment. This is because, it is reiterated, on one hand they obtain the value of the flooded lands—which, in accordance with Article 77 of the Ley de Aguas, will continue to be their property—as well as the damages caused, thus compensating their injured right; and, on the other, once the situation is restored to the state before the flooding, they will be able to use them as they did previously. Therefore, as the appellant indicates, they will have a double benefit: 1) the value of the land, plus legal interest, and 2) the possibility of using them again. It would have been different if the damages recognized were of another nature. E.g., the loss of cows, pastures, forests, etc., as a consequence of the flooding. In that scenario, since the litigious property is exploited for dairy activity, they could lawfully also seek the restoration of things to their prior state, precisely to continue with that agricultural enterprise. Based on the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to sustain this grievance. As it is unnecessary, any pronouncement on the remaining grounds of disagreement is omitted.

VIII.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is necessary to point out the following. As the lower court correctly noted, and the appellant argues, in accordance with Article 40 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in relation with numeral 2, paragraph 15) of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and 7 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, the lagoons existing on the litigious land constitute an ecosystem in a habitat corresponding to a wetland. There is evidence in the case file on this aspect. In relation to this, Mr. Nombre203542, in his testimony on page 317, stated pertinently: “... In the lagoon that can be seen from this place live fish, crocodiles, casino snakes; the crocodiles are about a meter long. ...”. For his part, Mr. Nombre203543, on page 327 reverse, indicated: “ ... The animals that frequented the lagoon between Nombre203540 and Nombre203544 continue to visit it, because the increase in the water level did not affect the fauna at all. ...”. Mr. Nombre111361, on page 330, stated: “... There are no alligators in these lagoons; what exists is what is known as 'guajipal', which are small lagoon lizards. ...”. Even the plaintiff party, in their appeal brief, page 358, accepts the existence of said ecosystem. In this regard, and pertinently, they state: “... in this case the increase in the water level and with it the invasion of species onto the properties of my clients ...”. The importance of the environment, as a fundamental right, has been recognized by our legal system. Thus, by Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994, Article 50 of the Constitución Política was reformed to add the current final two paragraphs, which provide: “Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are entitled to denounce acts that infringe upon that right and to claim reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions.” Likewise, by Law number 7607 of May 29, 1996, numeral 46 was modified, adding the final paragraph: “Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they constitute for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.” For its part, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), within the framework of its competence, has determined that the right to the environment is a prerequisite for the rights to life and health. Pertinently, it has stated: “... life is the foundation, the necessary and determining condition for the existence of the human person; it is inherent to the human person. From this derives the principle of the inviolability of human life, such that it is the duty of society and the State to protect it. It is the most elementary and fundamental of human rights, from which all others unfold. The most immediate right linked to the right to life is the right to physical and psychological integrity. The right to life demands health conditions in their broadest sense, such that the right to health, without losing its autonomy, almost comes to be presented as an aspect of the right to life. Thus, the life-health relationship exists in life itself and in the treatment each society gives to the person, according to the priority it assigns to their protection. The foregoing analysis allows us to conclude that it is necessary to raise awareness, at the governmental and collective level, about the importance of the environment for human and animal health in the national, regional, and global economy, through the conservation of nature and of life itself in its broadest sense. ...”(Voto 4423-93. In the same sense, among others, the resolutions of this Court numbers 3705-93, 6240-93, 2485-94, 1394-94, 5527-94, 5654-95, 1154-96, 705-99 may be consulted). It has also established the State's obligation to protect the Environment: “... The principle of environmental protection is not a recommendation or an intention given by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, it is a right of immediate application, therefore there exists an obligation on the part of governmental bodies to ensure compliance with the legal provisions aimed at protecting the environment ...”(Voto 132-99. In the same sense, ruling number 5906-99 may be consulted). This obligation, said Court has indicated, does not imply merely the diligent exercise of all necessary measures to cease activities that harmfully alter the environment, but also an effective policy of precaution: “... in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, because if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damage caused to the environment ...”(Ruling number 1250-99. In the same sense, among others, number 2219-99 may be consulted). Specifically, regarding wetlands, the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in its Article 41, declares them to be of public interest. Likewise, in numeral 45, it prohibits all activities tending to interrupt natural cycles. Said norms provide: “Article 41.- Public Interest. Wetlands and their conservation are declared of public interest, for being of multiple use, whether or not they are protected by the laws governing this matter. ... Article 45.- Prohibition. Activities aimed at interrupting the natural cycles of wetland ecosystems are prohibited, such as the construction of dikes that prevent the flow of marine or continental waters, drainage, drying out, fill, or any other alteration that causes the deterioration and elimination of such ecosystems.” For its part, canon 103 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre sanctions anyone who drains wetlands without prior authorization from the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre (today the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación S.I.N.A.C. -Article 15 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 30077-MINAE, “Reglamento General del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía of December 21, 2001, as well as numeral 22 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, although this article, along with others of that law, is subject to an action of unconstitutionality-) of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, because this Directorate, according to Article 7 of that Law, is the competent entity to administer, supervise, and protect wetlands. Both norms provide: “Article 7 The Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas has the following functions in the exercise of its competence: ...h) Administer, supervise, and protect wetlands. ...

Article 103.- Whoever drains lakes, non-artificial lagoons (lagunas no artificiales), and other wetlands, without the prior authorization of the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, shall be sanctioned with a fine of fifty thousand colones (¢50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (¢100,000), convertible into a prison sentence of one to two years. Furthermore, the offender shall be obliged to return things to the state they were in before beginning the drainage works, for which purpose the aforementioned Directorate is empowered to carry out the corresponding works, but at the offender’s expense.” (The highlighted text was declared unconstitutional by the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, through vote number 5857-99). On the other hand, due to the specific object pursued by Environmental Law, a series of principles arise that inform it and determine its content and scope; some are novel, others adapted from public law, the branch from which it originates. Among them, and for the sub-júdice, are: 1) In dubio pro natura (Indubio pro natura): which implies that in case of doubt, regarding the interpretation of legal norms, or regarding the affectation that an activity may have on the environment, a decision must be made in favor of what is most convenient for its conservation. On this point, one may examine the ruling of the Sala Constitucional number 5893-95; and, 2) Environmental public interest (Interés público ambiental): highlights the specialty and substantivity of this legal branch. It not only encompasses the object to be protected (health and ecological balance as presuppositions for life and development), but also, and as a derivation of the special nature of those legal assets, acquires singular importance, which must prevail when used as a criterion for interpreting environmental regulations. For this reason, a universal dimension is granted to it, since it refers to aspects of concern to humanity as a whole, for its own existence depends upon the preservation of an adequate environment, in which animal and plant species can live and develop. On this point, one may consult the decisions of the Sala Constitucional numbers 353-96, 2816-97, 644-99, 2219-99, 5906-99.

In light of the foregoing considerations, this Chamber (Sala) believes that ordering the drainage of the lagoon (laguna) to return to the situation existing before its modification, as the Ad-quem does, besides breaching the regulations transcribed above, could cause damage to the environment. Therefore, the advisable course in this case is to keep things as they currently stand.

IX.- For the reasons stated, the filed appeal must be granted, the lower court's (Tribunal) ruling reversed and, deciding on the merits, that of the trial court (juzgado) confirmed.

POR TANTO:

The ruling of the Tribunal Agrario is reversed and, deciding on the merits, that of the Juzgado is confirmed.

Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Anabelle León Feoli J** Recurso: 514-01 of January 5, 2000). In the case at hand, the alleged objection—incongruence due to extra petita—constitutes a breach of a formal nature. Ergo, this Chamber is barred from hearing it. Consequently, the dismissal of this ground of disagreement is imposed." VI.- Secondly, the appellant asserts the existence of a contradiction in the appealed judgment. This is because, they state, on one hand, it is ordered to lower the level of the lagoon to restore things to their original situation and, on the other, their represented party is ordered to pay for the flooded or submerged lands. In this way, they argue, two mutually exclusive situations are recognized. The Court, they note, found it appropriate to solve the flooding problem on the plaintiff's farm, and to return to the original state, that is, before the modification made to the larger lagoon. However, it also confirms what was ordered by the lower court (A-quo) regarding the compensation of the plaintiffs for the impairment of the essential content of the right to property, with respect to the annulled or flooded area, its use being impossible. The contradiction, they indicate, lies in the fact that by granting payment for the flooded land—compensation awarded, they repeat, since no act of disposal can be exercised over it—ordering also the reduction of the lagoon's level, to return the property to the original state before the flooding, becomes inappropriate. The compensation set, they assert, was for the total value of said land, not for the supposed temporary damage suffered by the plaintiffs by not being able to use it. In such a manner, they conclude, if the appealed judgment stands, the plaintiffs will have a) compensation for no longer being able to enjoy the property and, b) the real possibility of disposing of it under the conditions prior to the lagoon's enlargement.

VII.- Regarding the foregoing, the appellant is correct. The plaintiffs seek, in the pertinent part, payment for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the flooding of the land on their property, as a result of the remodeling carried out on the "laguna mayor." Consequently, they request, among other items, payment for the value of their properties, as well as the recognition of interest at the legal rate. However, they also request the destruction of both lagoons. Said claims, as the appellant indicates, are mutually exclusive. One should have been the main claim and the other the subsidiary one, but not both raised as main claims, for the reasons set forth below. In this case, the trial-level judges ordered the defendant company to pay ¢763,800 as compensation for the value of the flooded land, plus interest at the legal rate. With that, the violated right of the plaintiffs has been compensated. The damage caused by not being able to use the flooded land is acknowledged, as well as the losses caused. Notwithstanding this, the appellate court (Ad-quem), because the request for destruction of the lagoons was not appropriate since they were not built by the defendant company, also orders it to solve the problem of the flooding of the plaintiffs' farms, in order to thus return to the original state before the modification of the larger lagoon was carried out. With this decision, in addition to being incongruent, the Court fosters illicit enrichment of the plaintiffs. This is because, it is reiterated, on one hand they obtain the value of the flooded lands, which, in accordance with Article 77 of the Ley de Aguas, will continue to be their property, as well as for the losses caused, thus compensating their violated right; and, on the other, by reestablishing the situation to the state prior to the flooding, they will be able to use them as they did before. Ergo, as the appellant indicates, they will have a double benefit: 1) the value of the land, plus legal interest and 2) the possibility of using them again. It would have been different if the damages recognized were of another nature. For instance, the loss of cows, pastures, forests, etc., as a consequence of the flooding. In this scenario, since the litigious farm is exploited for dairy activity, they could, lawfully, also seek the restoration of things to their prior state, precisely, to continue with that agricultural enterprise. Based on the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to uphold this grievance. As it is unnecessary, ruling on the remaining grounds of disagreement is omitted.

VIII.- Without prejudice to what was previously noted, it is necessary to point out the following. As the lower court (A-quo) correctly stated, and as the appellant argues, in accordance with Article 40 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in relation to Article 2, paragraph 15) of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre and Article 7 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, the lagoons existing on the litigious land form an ecosystem in a habitat corresponding to a wetland. Evidence on this aspect is in the case file. In relation to this, Mr. Nombre10721, in his testimony on folio 317, in the pertinent part, stated: "... In the lagoon that can be seen from this place, fish, crocodiles, casino snakes live; the crocodiles are about a meter long. ...". For his part, Mr. Nombre10722, on folio 327 vto., indicated: "... The animals that frequented the lagoon between Nombre10724 and Nombre10725 continue to visit it, because the increase in the water level did not affect the fauna at all. ...". Mr. Nombre10723, on folio 330, stated: "... In these lagoons there are no large alligators, but what exists is what is known as 'guajipal,' which are small lagoon lizards. ...". Even the plaintiff party itself, in its appeal brief, folio 358, accepts the existence of said ecosystem. In this regard, and in what is of interest, it states: "... in this case the increase in the water level and with it the invasion of species into the properties of my represented parties ...". The importance of the environment, as a fundamental right, has been recognized by our legal system. Thus, by Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994, Article 50 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) was reformed, to add the current last two paragraphs, which prescribe: "Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are empowered to report acts that violate this right and to demand reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve this right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions.". Likewise, by law number 7607 of May 29, 1996, Article 46 was modified, adding the last paragraph: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters.". For its part, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, within the framework of its jurisdiction, has determined that the right to the environment is a prerequisite for the rights to life and health. In the pertinent part, it has stated: "... life is the foundation, the necessary and determining condition for the existence of the human person; it is inherent to the human person. From this derives the principle of the inviolability of human life, so that its protection is the duty of society and the State. It is the most basic and fundamental of human rights from which all others unfold. The most immediate right linked to the right to life is the right to physical and mental integrity. The right to life demands conditions of health in its broadest sense, so that the right to health, without losing its autonomy, almost comes to be presented as an aspect of the right to life. Thus, the life-health relationship lies in life itself and in the treatment each society gives to the person, according to the priority it assigns to their protection. The foregoing analysis allows us to conclude that it is necessary to become aware, at a governmental and collective level, about the importance of the environment for human and animal health in the national, regional, and world economy, through the conservation of nature and of life itself in its broadest sense. ..."(Voto 4423-93. In the same vein, one can consult, among others, the resolutions of this Court numbers 3705-93, 6240-93, 2485-94, 1394-94, 5527-94, 5654-95, 1154-96, 705-99). It has also established the State's obligation to protect the Environment: "... The principle of protection of the environment is not a recommendation or an intention given by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, it is a right of immediate application, so there is an obligation on the part of governmental bodies to ensure that the legal provisions tending to protect the environment are complied with ..."(Voto 132-99. In the same vein, one can consult judgment number 5906-99). This obligation, said Court has stated, does not only imply the diligent exercise of all necessary measures to cease activities that harmfully alter the environment, but also an effective policy of precaution: "... in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, since if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, the repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment ..."(Judgment number 1250-99. In the same vein, one can consult, among others, number 2219-99). Specifically, regarding wetlands, the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in its Article 41, declares them to be of public interest. Likewise, in Article 45, it prohibits all activities tending to interrupt natural cycles. Said norms provide: "Article 41.- Public interest. Wetlands and their conservation are declared to be of public interest, because they are of multiple use, whether or not they are protected by the laws governing this matter. ... Article 45.- Prohibition. Activities aimed at interrupting the natural cycles of wetland ecosystems are prohibited, such as the construction of dikes that prevent the flow of marine or continental waters, drainage, drying out, filling, or any other alteration that causes the deterioration and elimination of such ecosystems.". For its part, Article 103 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre penalizes whoever drains wetlands without the prior authorization of the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre (today the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación S.I.N.A.C. -Article 15 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 30077-MINAE, “Reglamento General del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía of December 21, 2001, as well as Article 22 of the Ley de Biodiversidad, although this article, along with others of that law, is subject to a constitutional challenge-) of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, this Directorate being, according to Article 7 of that Law, the competent entity to manage, supervise, and protect wetlands. Both norms provide: "Article 7 The Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas has the following functions in the exercise of its jurisdiction: ...h) Manage, supervise, and protect wetlands. ... Article 103.- Whoever drains lakes, non-artificial lagoons, and other wetlands, without the prior authorization of the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, shall be penalized with a fine of fifty thousand colones (¢50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (¢100,000) convertible into a prison sentence of one to two years. In addition, the offender shall be obliged to leave things in the state they were in before starting the drainage work, for which purpose the aforementioned Directorate is empowered, in order to carry out the corresponding work, but at the expense of the offender."(The highlighted text was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through voto number 5857-99). On the other hand, due to the specific object pursued by Environmental Law, a series of principles arise that inform it and determine its content and scope; some are novel, others, adapted from public law, the branch from which it originates. Among them, and for the case at hand (sub-júdice), are: 1) In dubio pro natura: which implies that in case of doubt, regarding the interpretation of legal norms, or regarding the impact an activity may have on the environment, a decision must be made in favor of its conservation. On this subject, one can examine the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber number 5893-95; and, 2) Environmental public interest: highlights the speciality and substantivity of this legal branch. It not only encompasses the object to be protected (health and ecological balance as prerequisites for life and development), but also, and as a derivation of the special nature of these legal assets, acquires singular importance, which must prevail when used as a criterion for interpreting environmental regulations. Therefore, it is granted a universal dimension, as it refers to aspects of concern to humanity as a whole, since its own existence depends on the preservation of an adequate environment, in which animal and plant species can live and develop. On this subject, one can consult the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 353-96, 2816-97, 644-99, 2219-99, 5906-99. In light of the foregoing considerations, this Chamber deems that ordering the drainage of the lagoon to return to the situation existing before its modification, as the appellate court (Ad-quem) does, in addition to violating the norms transcribed above, could cause damage to the environment.

Therefore, the advisable course in this case is to maintain things as they currently stand." RES: 0000690-F-02 **SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at ten o'clock on the sixth of September of the year two thousand two.

Ordinary agrarian proceeding established in the Agrarian Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, by **Nombre203540** and **Nombre203541**, farmers; against **“INVERSIONES Y PROCESADORA TROPICAL IMPROTSA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA”**, represented by its general agent without limit of sum, attorney Ernesto Enriquez Rubio, passport number Placa38042, resident of Mexico, Federal District. Also intervening as special judicial agents of the litigating parties are attorneys Ligia María Arias Rodríguez, resident of Heredia, Nombre3440 and Nombre158776, both single, residents of San José and Grecia respectively. All are of legal age and, with the exceptions previously stated, married, lawyers, and residents of San Carlos.

**RESULTANDO:** **1º.-** Based on the facts they set forth and legal provisions they cited, the plaintiffs established an ordinary agrarian lawsuit, the amount of which was fixed at the sum of two hundred million colones, so that the judgment declares: " 1.- Having built two lagoons without legal permission. 2.- With these lagoons, caused serious damages and losses to the properties of the undersigned in the following manner: a) Flooding of our properties in an area of 17,500 square meters, turning them into swamps (suampos). b) A large number of timber trees such as laurel, cedar, gavilán, and other species are drying up and being uprooted. The pasture is completely destroyed. Such disappearance of the forest. c) The dairy cattle, before these lagoons were built, passed from one farm to the other. Upon the passage between the farms being interrupted as a result of the flooding, the cattle had to be taken out along the loose stone road, and eight dairy cows were injured and had to be sold for meat, for sums of money much lower than the real value of dairy cows. The harvest and the offspring, both present and future, were lost. d) The defendant must pay for the damage to the water spring (naciente) previously indicated. 3.- The defendant must pay for these damages and losses, as well as for lost profits (lucro cesante) and actual damages (daño emergente), from the moment the lagoons were built until there is total and effective payment of the sums established in the final judgment. These sums must be established by expert assessment, taking into account the following: loss of value of the properties, loss of timber trees, pasture, and forest damage in general, damage to the water spring (naciente), loss of the cows, their milk harvest and offspring, throughout the entire productive time that these animals and their offspring could have had. 4.- The moral damages (daño moral) caused by the anguish of seeing the tranquility of the undersigned disturbed, having to face the loss of their property and the worry of initiating judicial proceedings to protect and recover their rights. 4) (sic) Payment of both costs borne by the defendant. On all the items established here, interest must be paid at the rate for 36-month fixed-term bank deposits. 5.- That the defendant must destroy both lagoons.".

**2º.-** The defendant party answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of standing (falta de legitimación ad causam) passive, lack of right, statute of limitations (prescripción), and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The latter resolved in an interlocutory manner and the statute of limitations defense reserved for judgment.

**3º.-** Judge Vanesa Fisher González, in judgment number 23-00 at 13:15 on March 17, 2000, **resolved:** "In accordance with the foregoing and legal citations, the lawsuit filed by Nombre203540 and Nombre203541 against Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa Sociedad Anónima, all of stated qualities, is granted partially. Consequently, it is declared: A) The defendant party is ordered to pay seven hundred seventy-three thousand eight hundred colones for the value of the flooded land; half of said sum shall be paid to plaintiff Nombre203540 and the rest to plaintiff Nombre203541. B) The defendant party is ordered to pay each plaintiff, on the sums corresponding to them, legal interest calculated based on the rate paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit in colones, to be computed from September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-seven until the effective payment of the obligation. C) The claims for moral damages (daño moral) and damage to eight cows are rejected. D) The claims for damage to the spring (naciente), damage to pastures, and damage to the forest are rejected as they are contained (sic) within the granted claim for the value of the flooded land. The defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción) and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) are rejected. As for the lack of right, it is denied in relation to the claims granted to the plaintiffs and granted in relation to the rejected claims. This matter is resolved without special award of procedural and personal costs. Any matter not expressly ruled upon shall be deemed denied.”.

**4°.-** The special judicial agents of the plaintiffs appealed, and the Agrarian Tribunal, composed of Judges Carmen María Escoto Fernández, Ligia Mesén Madrigal, and Damaris Vargas Vásquez, in resolution number 383 at 11:30 on June 15, 2001, **resolved:** "The concomitant nullity alleged against the ruling issued at thirteen-fifteen on March seventeenth, two thousand, is rejected. Said resolution is partially reversed insofar as it grants the defense of lack of right for the rejection of the claim consisting of the destruction of the lagoons. In its place, the defense of lack of right is rejected and said petition is granted as follows: It is ordered that the problem of the flooding of the plaintiffs' farm be solved in such a way that it returns to the original state before the modification of the larger lagoon was carried out, through a safe technical procedure that an expert shall determine in the execution of the judgment, works that must be performed at the expense of the defendant party within a period that the Trial Judge must grant according to the circumstances so that what is ordered is complied with. If it is not complied with within the granted period, the Judge shall authorize the prevailing party, that is, the plaintiff, to have what is ordered in this ruling done at the expense of the losing party, that is, the defendant, who must also pay the damages and losses caused. If the obligor performs what is indicated in this resolution in a different manner, what was done shall be destroyed and what was ordered shall be complied with, in which case all expenses, damages, and losses caused by the poor execution shall be borne by him.

In all other matters subject to the appeal, said judgment is affirmed.

**5º.-** The defendant filed an appeal before this Chamber with an express indication of the reasons relied upon to refute the lower court's thesis.

**6º.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Judge Solís Zelaya writes; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.-** Mrs. Nombre203541 is the owner of the property of the Alajuela Registry, folio real number Placa38043, located in the district of Pital, Canton of San Carlos. Likewise, Mr. Nombre203540 is the owner of the property of the Alajuela Registry, folio real number Placa38044, located at Dirección22887. For its part, the company Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa S.A. is the owner of the property of the Alajuela Registry, folio number Placa38045, located at Dirección22887. The first two properties border, along their northern boundary, the third. Approximately in 1975, before the aforementioned company acquired said property, one of its previous owners, Mr. Nombre111361, built two artificial lagoons on the southern boundary, identified as major – the large one – and minor – the small one. Between the months of July and August 1997, Improtsa S.A. remodeled the major lagoon, increasing its perimeter by building a type of dam. In September, due to the increase in the water level of the lagoon, the current flowed back towards the stream or creek (yurro o quebrada) that runs along the boundary with Mrs. Nombre203541 and Mr. Nombre203540, causing the channel to grow and flooding an area of 3,869m². The flooded land is located in equal parts on the properties of Mrs. Nombre203541 and Mr. Nombre203540. In this sub-júdice, the plaintiffs seek to have Improtsa S.A. ordered to pay them the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to their properties. These consist of: the loss of value of the properties, of the timber trees, of the pasture, the general forest damage, the damage to the water spring (naciente de agua), the loss of the cows, as well as their milk production and their calves, during the productive lifespan that those animals could have had. The amount will be established by expert appraisal. They also claim the non-material damage (daño moral) caused by the anguish of facing the loss of their assets and the worry of having to initiate judicial proceedings to protect and recover their rights. Additionally, they seek the recognition of interest, at the rate for 36-month fixed-term bank deposits, on the foregoing items from the time of the construction of the lagoons until their effective payment. They also request that the destruction of both lagoons be ordered. The defendant corporation opposed the claim. The Court partially granted it. It ordered Improtsa S.A. to pay ¢763,800 for the value of the flooded land. An amount to be divided in equal parts between the plaintiffs. Likewise, to award each of the plaintiffs legal interest, to be calculated based on the rate paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica on six-month certificates of deposit in colones, starting from September 27, 1997, and until effective payment. It ruled without special award of costs. The lower court partially overturned the ruling regarding the denial of the claim for destruction of the lagoons. In its place, and as pertinent, it ordered that the flooding problem be solved by returning to the original state before the modification of the major lagoon was carried out. This, through a safe technical procedure to be determined by expert appraisal during the execution of the judgment. In all other respects, it affirmed.

**II.-** The special judicial representative of the defendant corporation files this cassation appeal. He alleges violation of Articles 50 of the Political Constitution; 40, 41, 45 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente); 2 paragraph 15), 7 subsection h) and 103 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre).

**III.-** Due to the manner in which the appeal will be resolved, the order of the grievances set forth by the appellant is reformulated as follows.

**IV.-** First, it is necessary to analyze the in procedendo grievances adduced by the appellant. Under this approach, he alleges the defect of incongruence due to extra petita. This is because, according to him, the Ad-quem, by ordering the reduction of the lagoon level, grants something different from what was requested by the plaintiffs, since what they sought is the destruction of both lagoons.

**V.-** This Court has repeatedly indicated, as a characteristic of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters, its limitation to hearing exclusively substantive aspects. In this sense, the Chamber is precluded from analyzing formal or in procedendo questions (Articles 61, first paragraph, of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria) and 552 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)). Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed if the appellant only alleges violation of procedural rules, as procedural steps cannot be corrected, replaced, or performed through agrarian cassation. Despite this, when the appellant files the appeal alleging procedural and substantive grounds, it will only be decided on the substantive grounds. Even a ruling on the substantive grounds may be issued when they were erroneously deemed to be procedural, as what is important is the nature of what is alleged, which falls to the Court to qualify. But if the appeal is on procedural grounds, regardless of how it is identified, it must be dismissed. (See, among many others, rulings number 24 at 2:30 p.m. on February 15, 1995; and 8 at 3:45 p.m.

of January 5, 2000). In the present case, the alleged grievance—incongruence due to *extra petita*—constitutes a defect of procedural order. Therefore, this Chamber is barred from hearing it. Consequently, the rejection of this ground of disagreement is warranted.

VI.- Secondly, the appellant claims there is a contradiction in the appealed judgment. This is because, he states, on the one hand, it orders lowering the lagoon's water level to restore matters to their original state and, on the other hand, it orders his client to pay for the flooded or submerged lands. He argues that, in this way, two mutually exclusive situations are recognized. The Court, he points out, determined it was proper to solve the flooding problem on the plaintiff's property and return it to its original state, that is, before the modification made to the larger lagoon. However, it also confirms what was ordered by the lower court regarding the compensation to the plaintiffs for the impairment of the essential content of the right to property, concerning the area that was flooded or inundated, given the impossibility of its use. The contradiction, he indicates, lies in the fact that when payment for the flooded land is granted—compensation awarded, he repeats, because no act of disposal could be exercised over it—it is improper to also order the reduction of the lagoon's level to return the property to its original state before the flooding. The established compensation, he asserts, was for the total value of said land, not for a supposed temporary harm suffered by the plaintiffs due to being unable to use it. Thus, he concludes, if the appealed judgment stands, the plaintiffs will have a) compensation for being no longer able to enjoy the property and b) the real possibility of using it under the conditions existing before the lagoon's water level increased.

VII.- Regarding the related matter, the appellant is correct. The plaintiffs seek, as relevant, payment for the damages caused by the flooding of their property, resulting from the remodeling carried out on the "larger lagoon." Consequently, they request, among other things, payment for the value of their properties, as well as the recognition of interest at the legal rate. However, they also request the destruction of both lagoons. These claims, as the appellant indicates, are mutually exclusive. One should have been the principal claim and the other the subsidiary one, but not both raised as principal claims, for the reasons set forth below. In the present case, the instance judges ordered the defendant company to pay ¢763,800 as compensation for the value of the flooded land, plus interest at the legal rate. With this, the plaintiffs' injured right has been compensated. The damage caused by being unable to use the flooded land, as well as the resulting losses, is recognized. Despite this, the Ad-quem, because the request for the destruction of the lagoons was not proper since they were not built by the defendant company, also ordered it to solve the problem of the flooding of the plaintiffs' properties, in order to return them to their original state before the modification of the larger lagoon was carried out. With this decision, besides being incongruent, the Court fosters unlawful enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito) of the plaintiffs. This is because, it is reiterated, on the one hand, they obtain the value of the flooded lands—which, in accordance with Article 77 of the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), will continue to be their property—as well as compensation for the damages caused, thus compensating their injured right; and, on the other hand, when the situation is restored to the state before the flooding, they will be able to use them as they did previously. Ergo, as the appellant indicates, they will receive a double benefit: 1) the value of the land, plus legal interest, and 2) the possibility of using them again. The situation would have been different if the damages recognized were of another nature. For example, the loss of cows, pastures, forests, etc., as a consequence of the flooding. In that case, since the disputed property is exploited for dairy activity, they could, lawfully, also seek the restoration of matters to their previous state, precisely to continue with that agricultural enterprise. Based on the foregoing considerations, the present grievance must be upheld. As it is unnecessary, a ruling on the remaining grounds of disagreement is omitted.

VIII.- Notwithstanding the above, it is necessary to point out the following. As the lower court correctly noted, and the appellant argues, in accordance with Article 40 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), in relation to numeral 2, paragraph 15) of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre) and Article 7 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), the lagoons existing on the disputed land constitute an ecosystem in a habitat corresponding to a wetland (humedal). The case file contains evidence on this aspect. In relation to this, Mr. Nombre203542, in his testimony on page 317, stated, as relevant: "... In the lagoon that can be seen from this place, there are fish, crocodiles, casino snakes; the crocodiles are about a meter long. ...". For his part, Mr. Nombre203543, on the reverse of page 327, indicated: "... The animals that frequented the lagoon between Nombre203540 and Nombre203544 continue to visit it, because the increase in the water level did not affect the fauna at all. ...". Mr. Nombre111361, on page 330, stated: "... In these lagoons there are no alligators, but what exists is what is known as 'guajipal,' which are small lagoon alligators. ...". Even the plaintiff party themselves, in their appeal brief on page 358, accepts the existence of said ecosystem. In that regard, and as relevant, they state: "... in this case, the increase in the water level and with it the invasion of species onto my clients' properties ...". The importance of the environment, as a fundamental right, has been recognized by our legal system. Thus, through Law number 7412 of June 3, 1994, Article 50 of the Political Constitution was amended to add the current last two paragraphs, which stipulate: "Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, they are entitled to report acts that infringe upon that right and to demand reparation for the damage caused. The State shall guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. The law shall determine the corresponding responsibilities and sanctions." Likewise, through Law number 7607 of May 29, 1996, numeral 46 was amended, adding its final paragraph: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters." For its part, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, within the framework of its jurisdiction, has determined that the right to the environment is a prerequisite for the rights to life and health. As relevant, it has stated: "... life is the foundation, the necessary and determining condition for the existence of the human person; it is inherent to the human person. From this derives the principle of the inviolability of human life, so it is the duty of society and the State to protect it. It is the most elementary and fundamental of human rights, from which all others unfold. The most immediate right linked to the right to life is the right to physical and psychological integrity. The right to life demands health conditions in their broadest sense, such that the right to health, without losing its autonomy, almost comes to present itself as an aspect of the right to life. Thus, the life-health relationship is in life itself and in the treatment that each society gives to the person, according to the priority it assigns to its protection. The foregoing analysis allows us to conclude that it is necessary to raise awareness, at the governmental and collective level, about the importance of the environment for human and animal health in the national, regional, and world economy, through the conservation of nature and life itself in its broadest sense. ..." (Voto 4423-93. In the same vein, see, among others, resolutions of this Court numbers 3705-93, 6240-93, 2485-94, 1394-94, 5527-94, 5654-95, 1154-96, 705-99). It has also established the State's obligation to protect the Environment: "... The principle of environmental protection is not a recommendation or an intention given by the Constitution, but rather, on the contrary, it is a right of immediate application, so there is an obligation on the part of governmental bodies to ensure compliance with legal provisions aimed at protecting the environment ..." (Voto 132-99. In the same vein, see ruling number 5906-99). This obligation, said Court has indicated, does not only imply the diligent exercise of all necessary measures to cease activities that harmfully alter the environment, but also an effective precautionary policy: "... in environmental matters, a posteriori coercion is ineffective, because if the biologically and socially harmful consequences have already occurred, the repression may have moral significance, but it will hardly compensate for the damages caused to the environment ..." (Judgment number 1250-99. In the same vein, see, among others, number 2219-99). Specifically, concerning wetlands (humedales), the Organic Environmental Law, in its Article 41, declares them to be of public interest. Likewise, in numeral 45, it prohibits all activities aimed at interrupting natural cycles. Said norms state: "Article 41.- Public Interest. Wetlands (humedales) and their conservation are declared to be of public interest, as they are of multiple use, whether or not they are protected by the laws governing this matter. ... Article 45.- Prohibition. Activities aimed at interrupting the natural cycles of wetland ecosystems are prohibited, such as the construction of dikes that prevent the flow of marine or continental waters, drainage, drying out, filling, or any other alteration that causes the deterioration and elimination of such ecosystems." For its part, canon 103 of the Wildlife Conservation Law punishes anyone who drains wetlands without prior authorization from the General Directorate of Wildlife (today the National System of Conservation Areas, SINAC—Article 15 of Executive Decree number 30077-MINAE, "General Regulation of the Ministry of Environment and Energy" of December 21, 2001, as well as numeral 22 of the Biodiversity Law, although this article, along with others from that law, is subject to an unconstitutionality action) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, as this Directorate is, according to Article 7 of that Law, the competent authority to manage, supervise, and protect wetlands (humedales). Both norms state: "Article 7 The General Directorate of Wildlife of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines has the following functions in the exercise of its jurisdiction: ...h) To manage, supervise, and protect wetlands (humedales). ...

Article 103.- Whoever drains lakes, non-artificial lagoons, and other wetlands, without prior authorization from the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, shall be sanctioned with a fine of fifty thousand colones (¢50,000) to one hundred thousand colones (¢100,000) convertible into imprisonment of one to two years. Furthermore, the offender shall be obliged to return things to the state they were in before beginning the drainage works, for which purpose the aforementioned Directorate is empowered to carry out the corresponding works, but at the offender’s expense." (The highlighted portion was declared unconstitutional by the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, through Voto 5857-99). On the other hand, due to the specific object pursued by Environmental Law, a series of principles arise that inform it and determine its content and scope; some are novel, others, adapted from public law, the branch from which it originates. Among them, and for the sub judice, are: 1) In dubio pro natura: which implies that in case of doubt, regarding the interpretation of legal norms, or with respect to the impact that an activity may have on the environment, what is decided must be that which is most conducive to its conservation. On this matter, the ruling of the Sala Constitucional number 5893-95 can be examined; and, 2) Environmental public interest: highlights the specialty and substantivity of this legal branch. It not only encompasses the object to be protected (health and ecological balance as prerequisites for life and development), but also, and as a derivation of the special nature of these legal assets, acquires singular importance, which must prevail when used as a criterion for interpreting environmental regulations. Therefore, it is granted a universal dimension, as it refers to aspects of concern to humanity as a whole, since its very existence depends on the preservation of an adequate environment, in which animal and plant species can live and develop. On this matter, the rulings of the Sala Constitucional numbers 353-96, 2816-97, 644-99, 2219-99, 5906-99 may be consulted.

In light of the foregoing considerations, this Chamber believes that ordering the drainage of the lagoon to return to the situation existing before its modification, as the Ad-quem does, besides violating the aforementioned regulations, may cause damage to the environment. Therefore, what is advisable in this case is to maintain things as they currently stand.

IX.- For the reasons stated, it is appropriate to grant the appeal filed, reverse the judgment of the Tribunal, and, ruling on the merits, confirm that of the lower court.

POR TANTO:

The judgment of the Tribunal Agrario is reversed and, ruling on the merits, that of the Juzgado is confirmed.

Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Anabelle León Feoli J** Recurso: 514-01

RES: 0000690-F-02 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas del seis de setiembre del año dos mil dos.

Proceso ordinario agrario establecido en el Juzgado Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, por Nombre203540 y Nombre203541 , agricultores; contra “INVERSIONES Y PROCESADORA TROPICAL IMPROTSA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA”, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, licenciado Ernesto Enriquez Rubio, pasaporte número Placa38042, vecino de México, Distrito Federal. Interviene, además, como apoderados especiales judiciales de las partes litigiosas, los licenciados Ligia María Arias Rodríguez, vecina de Heredia, Nombre3440 y Nombre158776 , ambos solteros, vecinos de San José y Grecia respectivamente. Todos son mayores de edad y con las salvedades antes dichas, casados, abogados y vecinos de San Carlos.

RESULTANDO:

1º.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que cito, los actores establecieron demanda ordinaria agraria, cuya cuantía se fijó en la suma de doscientos millones de colones, a fin de que en sentencia se declare: " 1.- Haber construido dos lagunas sin permiso legal. 2.- Con esas lagunas causó graves daños y perjuicios a las propiedades de los suscritos de la siguiente forma: a) Inundación de nuestras propiedades en un área de 17500 metros cuadrados, hasta convertirlas en suampos. b) Gran cantidad de árboles maderables como laurel, cedro, gavilán y otras especies más se están secando y desraizando. El pasto está totalmente destruido. Tal desaparición del bosque. c) El ganado de leche antes de construirse estas lagunas pasaba de una finca a la otra. Al interrumpirse el paso entre las fincas a raíz de la inundación, hubo que sacar el ganado por la calle de piedra suelta y ocho vacas de leche se dañaron y se tuvo que venderlas para carne, en sumas de dinero muy inferiores al valor real de las vacas de leche. La cosecha y las crías tanto presentes como futuras se perdieron. d) la demandada tiene que pagar el daño a la naciente de aguas antes de indicada. 3.- La demandada tiene que pagar estos daños y perjuicios, lo mismo que el lucro cesante y el daño emergente, desde el momento en que se construyen las lagunas hasta que haya total y efectivo pago de las sumas establecidas en sentencia firme. Estas sumas tienen que establecerse pericialmente, tomando en cuenta lo siguiente: pérdida de valor de las propiedades, pérdida de árboles maderables, pasto y daño forestal en general, daño a la naciente de agua, pérdida de la vacas, su cosecha de leche y crías, durante todo el tiempo productivo que estos animales y sus crías podrían tener. 4.- El daño moral causado por la angustia de ver perturbada la tranquilidad de los suscritos, al tener que enfrentarse a la pérdida de sus bienes y la preocupación de entablar procesos judiciales para proteger y recuperar sus derechos. 4) (sic) Pago de ambas costas a cargo de la demandada. Sobre todo los rubros aquí establecidos se tienen que pagar intereses al tipo de los depósitos bancarios a plazo fijo de 36 meses. 5.- Que la demandada tiene que destruir ambas lagunas.".

2º.- La parte accionada contestó en forma negativa la demanda e interpuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, falta de derecho, prescripción y falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. Esta última resuelta en forma interlocutoria y reservándose la de prescripción para sentencia.

3º.- .La Jueza, Licda. Vanesa Fisher González, en sentencia número 23-00 de las 13:15 horas del 17 de marzo del año 2000, resolvió: “De acuerdo a lo expuesto y citas de ley se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda interpuesta por Nombre203540 y Nombre203541 contra Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa Sociedad Anónima, todos de calidades citadas. Consecuentemente se declara: A) Se condena a la parte demandada al pago de setecientos setenta y tres mil ochocientos colones por concepto del valor del terreno inundado, la mitad de dicha suma deberá cancelarla al actor Nombre203540 y la restante a la actora Nombre203541 . B) Se condena a la parte demandada a pagar a cada actor sobre las sumas que les corresponde, intereses legales que se calculan con base en la tasa que paga el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por los certificados de depósito a seis meses plazo en colones, que deben computarse desde el veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y siete y hasta el efectivo pago de la obligación. C) Se rechazan los extremos por concepto de daño moral y daño a ocho vacas. D) Se rechazan los extremos por concepto de daño a la naciente, daño a repastos, daño al bosque por estar conenidas (sic) dentro del extremo concedido por valor del terreno inundado. Se rechazan la (sic) excepciones de prescripción y falta de legitimación pasiva. En cuento a la falta de derecho se deniega en relación a los extremos concedidos a los actores y se acoge en relación a los extremos rechazados. Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas procesales y personales. En todo lo que no verse pronunciamiento expreso debe de tenerse por denegado.”.

4°.- Los apoderados especiales judiciales de los actores apelaron, y el Tribunal Agrario, integrado por los Jueces Carmen María Escoto Fernández, Ligia Mesén Madrigal y Damaris Vargas Vásquez, en resolución número 383 de las 11:30 horas del 15 de junio del año 2001, resolvió: “Se rechaza la aducida nulidad concomitante del fallo dictado a las trece horas quince minutos del diecisiete de marzo de dos mil. Se revoca parcialmente dicha resolución en cuanto acoge la excepción de falta de derecho para el rechazo de la pretensión consistente en la destrucción de las lagunas. En su lugar, se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho y se acoge dicha petición de la siguiente manera: Se ordena solucionar el problema de la inundación de la finca de la parte actora de tal forma que se vuelva al estado original antes de la realización de la modificación de la laguna mayor mediante un procedimiento técnico seguro que un perito determine en ejecución de sentencia, trabajos que deben ser realizados a costa de la parte demanda en un plazo que ha de otorgar la Juzgadora de Instancia de acuerdo con las circunstancias para que se cumpla con lo dispuesto. Sino se cumpliere en el plazo otorgado, el Juez ha de autorizar a la victoriosa, sea la actora para que lo que se ordena en este fallo por cuenta de la parte vencida sea, la demandada, quien deberá pagar además los daños y perjuicios ocasionados. Si el obligado hiciere de modo distinto lo indicado en esta resolución, se destruirá lo hecho y se cumplirá lo ordenado en cuyo caso estarán a su cargo todos los gastos, daños y perjuicios ocasionados por la mala ejecución. En lo demás objeto del recurso de apelación se confirma dicho fallo.”.

5º.- La parte accionada formuló recurso para ante esta Sala con indicación expresa de las razones en que se apoyaron para refutar la tesis del Tribunal de instancia.

6º.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales.

Redacta el Magistrado Solís Zelaya; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- La señora Nombre203541 es propietaria de la finca del Partido de Alajuela matrícula de folio real número Placa38043, sita en el distrito de Pital del Cantón de San Carlos. Asimismo, el señor Nombre203540 es dueño de la finca del Partido de Alajuela matrícula de folio real número Placa38044, sita en el Dirección22887 , . Por su parte, la empresa Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical Improtsa S.A., es propietaria de la finca del Partido de Alajuela matrícula número Placa38045, sita en el Dirección22887 . Los dos primeros inmuebles colindan, por su lindero norte, con el tercero. Aproximadamente en el año 1975, antes que la susodicha empresa adquiriera la referida propiedad, uno de sus anteriores propietarios, don Nombre111361 , construyó, en el lindero sur, dos lagunas artificiales identificadas como mayor –la grande- y menor –la pequeña-. Entre los meses de julio y agosto de 1997, Improtsa S.A., remodeló la laguna mayor, incrementando su perímetro al construir una especie de represa. En setiembre, debido al aumento en el nivel del agua de la laguna, la corriente se devolvió hacia el yurro o quebrada que discurre por la colindancia con la señora Nombre203541 y el señor Nombre203540 , esto provocó un crecimiento del cauce e inundación de un área de 3.869m2. El terreno anegado se ubica por partes iguales en las fincas de doña Nombre203541 y don Nombre203540. Con el sub-júdice, los actores piden se condene a Improtsa S.A., a pagarles los daños y perjuicios ocasionados en sus fincas. Consisten éstos en: la pérdida del valor de las propiedades, de los árboles maderables, del pasto, el daño forestal en general, el de la naciente de agua, la pérdida de las vacas, así como su cosecha de leche y sus crías, durante el tiempo productivo que esos animales podrían tener. Su monto será establecido pericialmente. Asimismo, reclaman el daño moral causado por la angustia de enfrentarse a la pérdida de sus bienes y la preocupación de tener que entablar procesos judiciales para proteger y recuperar sus derechos. Además, pretenden el reconocimiento de los intereses, al tipo de los depósitos bancarios a plazo fijo de 36 meses, sobre los rubros anteriores desde el momento de la construcción de las lagunas y hasta su efectivo pago. También solicitan se ordene la destrucción de ambas lagunas. La sociedad accionada se opuso a la demanda. El Juzgado la acogió parcialmente. Condenó a Improtsa S.A., al pago de ¢763.800 por concepto del valor del terreno inundado. Suma a dividirse en partes iguales entre los actores. Asimismo, a reconocerle a cada uno de los actores intereses legales, a calcularse con base en la tasa que paga el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica sobre los certificados de depósito a 6 meses plazo en colones, a partir del 27 de setiembre de 1997 y hasta su efectivo pago. Resolvió sin especial condenatoria en costas. El Tribunal revocó parcialmente lo resuelto tocante a la denegatoria de la pretensión de destrucción de las lagunas. En su lugar, y en lo conducente, ordenó solucionar el problema de la inundación, volviéndose al estado original antes de la realización de la modificación de la laguna mayor. Ello, mediante un procedimiento técnico seguro a determinarse pericialmente en ejecución de sentencia. En lo demás, confirmó.

II.- El apoderado especial judicial de la sociedad demandada formula el presente recurso de casación. Alega conculcados los artículos 50 de la Constitución Política; 40, 41, 45 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; 2 párrafo 15), 7 inciso h) y 103 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre.

III.- Por la forma como se resolverá el recurso, se reformula el orden de los agravios expuestos por el casacionista de la siguiente manera.

IV.- En primer lugar, precisa analizar los agravios in procedendo aducidos por el casacionista. Bajo esta inteligencia, alega el vicio de incongruencia por extra petita. Ello por cuanto, según afirma, el Ad-quem, al ordenar la disminución del nivel de la laguna, otorga cosa diferente a lo pedido por los actores, pues lo pretendido por ellos es la destrucción de ambas lagunas.

V.- Reiteradamente ha señalado este Tribunal, como característica del recurso de casación en materia agraria, su limitación en torno a conocer exclusivamente aspectos de fondo. En este sentido la Sala se encuentra vedada para analizar cuestiones formales o in procedendo (artículos 61, párrafo primero, de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria y 552 del Código de Trabajo). Consecuentemente, el recurso ha de ser rechazado si el recurrente sólo alega violación de las normas del procedimiento, pues por medio de la casación agraria no se pueden corregir, reponer o practicar trámites procesales. Pese a ello, cuando el recurrente formule su recurso alegando razones de forma y fondo sólo se fallará por el fondo. Incluso, podrá fallarse por el fondo aún cuando las hubiere reputado erróneamente como de forma, pues lo importante es la naturaleza de lo alegado, lo cual corresponde cali­ficar al Tribunal. Pero, si el recurso es por la forma, indistintamente como sea identificado, deberá ser rechazado. (Ver, entre muchas otras, las resoluciones números 24 de las 14:30 Hrs. del 15 de febrero de 1995; y, 8 de las 15:45 hrs. del 5 de enero del 2000). En la especie, la censura alegada -incongruencia por extra petita- configura un quebranto de orden formal. Ergo, esta Sala tiene vedado su conocimiento. En consecuencia, se impone el rechazo del presente motivo de disconformidad.

VI.- En segundo término, afirma el casacionista la existencia de una contradicción en el fallo recurrido. Ello por cuanto, manifiesta, por un lado se ordena bajar el nivel de la laguna para restaurar las cosas a su situación original y, por el otro, se condena a su representada al pago de los terrenos inundados o sumergidos. De esta forma, arguye, se reconocen dos situaciones excluyentes entre sí. El Tribunal, apunta, determinó procedente solucionar el problema de inundación en la finca de la parte actora, y volver al estado original, sea, antes de la modificación efectuada a la laguna mayor. Empero, también confirma lo dispuesto por la A-quo, tocante a las indemnizaciones de los actores al afectarse el contenido esencial del derecho de propiedad, respecto al área anulada o inundada, al ser imposible su utilización. La contradicción, indica, estriba en que al otorgarse el pago del terreno anegado, indemnización concedida, repite, al no poder ejercerse ningún acto de disposición sobre él, resulta improcedente ordenar también la disminución del nivel de la laguna, para retornar la propiedad al estado original antes de la inundación. La indemnización fijada, asevera, lo fue por el valor total de dicho terreno, no por el supuesto perjuicio temporal sufrido por los accionantes al no poder disponer de él. De tal manera, concluye, de mantenerse el fallo recurrido, los actores tendrán a) una indemnización por no poder disfrutar más del bien y, b) la posibilidad real de disponer del él en las condiciones anteriores al incremento de la laguna.

VII.- Sobre lo relacionado, lleva razón el casacionista. Los actores pretenden, en lo conducente, el pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por la inundación del terreno de su propiedad, a raíz de las remodelaciones efectuadas en la “laguna mayor”. En consecuencia, solicitan, entre otros extremos, el pago del valor de sus propiedades, así como el reconocimiento de los réditos al tipo legal. Sin embargo, también piden la destrucción de ambas lagunas. Dichas pretensiones, como lo indica el casacionista, son excluyentes entre sí. Una debió haber sido la principal y la otra la subsidiaria, mas no las dos esgrimidas en forma principal, por las razones que de seguido se exponen. En la especie, los juzgadores de instancia condenan a la sociedad demandada al pago de ¢763.800 como indemnización por el valor del terreno anegado, más los réditos al tipo legal. Con ello, el derecho lesionado de los actores ha sido compensado. Se les reconoce el daño causado al no poder utilizar el terreno inundado, así como los perjuicios causados. No obstante ello, el Ad-quem, por no resultar procedente la solicitud de destrucción de las lagunas al no haber sido construidas por la sociedad demandada, también la condena a solucionar el problema de la inundación de las fincas de los actores, para así retornar al estado original antes de la realización de la modificación de la laguna mayor. Con esta decisión, además de incongruente, el Tribunal prohija un enriquecimiento ilícito de los accionantes. Ello por cuanto, se reitera, por un lado obtienen el valor de los terrenos inundados, los cuales, de conformidad con el artículo 77 de la Ley de Aguas, seguirán siendo de su propiedad, así como los perjuicios causados, compensándose de esta manera su derecho lesionado; y, por el otro, al restablecerse la situación al estado anterior a la inundación, podrán utilizarlos como lo hacían anteriormente. Ergo, como lo indica el casacionista, tendrán doble beneficio: 1) el valor del terreno, más los intereses legales y 2) la posibilidad de utilizarlos de nuevo. Distinto hubiera sido si los daños reconocidos fueran de otra naturaleza. V.gr. La pérdida de vacas, pastos, bosques, etc., como consecuencia de la inundación. En este supuesto, como la finca litigiosa es explotada para la actividad lechera, podrían, lícitamente, pretender además el restablecimiento de las cosas a su estado anterior, precisamente, para continuar con esa empresa agraria. Con fundamento en las anteriores consideraciones, procede acoger el presente agravio. Por innecesario, se omite pronunciamiento sobre los restantes motivos de disconformidad.

VIII­.- Sin perjuicio de lo anteriormente apuntado, es menester señalar lo siguiente. Como bien lo señaló la A-quo, y lo arguye el casacionista, de conformidad con el artículo 40 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, en relación con el numeral 2, párrafo 15) de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y 7 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, las lagunas existentes en el terreno litigioso conforman un ecosistema en un hábitat correspondiente a un humedal. En autos obra prueba sobre este aspecto. En relación, el señor Nombre203542 , en su testimonio a folio 317, en lo conducente, señaló: “... En la laguna que se observa desde éste lugar habitan peces, cocodrilos, culebras casino, los cocodrilos son como de un metro de largo. ...”. Por su parte, don Nombre203543 , a folio 327 vto., indicó: “ ... Los animales que frecuentaban la laguna entre Nombre203540 y Nombre203544 continúan visitándola, ello porque el aumento del nivel del agua no afectó en nada la fauna. ...”. El señor Nombre111361 , a folio 330, manifestó: “... En estas lagunas no hay lagartos sino lo que existe es lo que se conoce como “guajipal” que son unos lagartillos de laguna. ...”. Incluso, la propia parte actora en su libelo de apelación, folio 358, acepta la existencia de dicho ecosistema. Al respecto, y en lo que interesa, afirma: “... en este caso el aumento del nivel del agua y con ello la invasión de especies a las propiedades de mis representados ...”. La importancia del medio ambiente, como derecho fundamental, ha sido reconocida por nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Es así como, por Ley número 7412 de 3 de junio de 1994, se reforma el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, para agregarle los actuales dos últimos párrafos, los cuales preceptúan: “Toda persona tiene derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Por ello, está legitimada para denunciar los actos que infrinjan ese derecho y para reclamar la reparación del daño causado. El Estado garantizará, defenderá y preservará ese derecho. La ley determinará las responsabilidades y las sanciones correspondientes.”. Asimismo, por ley número 7607 del 29 de mayo de 1996, se modifica el numeral 46, adicionándosele el último párrafo: “Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección y a un trato equitativo. El Estado apoyará los organismos que ellos constituyan para la defensa de sus derechos. La ley regulará esas materias.”. Por su parte, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dentro del marco de su competencia, ha determinado que el derecho al ambiente es un presupuesto de los derechos a la vida y salud. En lo conducente, ha señalado: “... la vida es el fundamento, la condición necesaria y determinante de la existencia de la persona humana; es inherente a la persona humana. De ello se deriva el principio de la inviolabilidad de la vida humana, de modo que es deber de la sociedad y el Estado su protección. Es el más elemental y fundamental de los derechos humanos y del cual se despliegan todos los demás. El más inmediato derecho vinculado al derecho a la vida es el derecho a la integridad física y psíquica. El derecho a la vida demanda condiciones de salud en su más amplio sentido, de forma que el derecho a la salud, sin perder su autonomía, casi viene a presentarse como un aspecto del derecho a la vida. Así, la relación vida-salud está en la vida misma y en el tratamiento que cada sociedad dé a la persona, según la prioridad que asigne a su protección. El anterior análisis nos permite concluir que es necesario que se tome conciencia, a nivel gubernamental y colectivo, acerca de la importancia del ambiente para la salud humana y animal en la economía nacional, regional y mundial, por medio de la conservación de la naturaleza y de la vida misma en su más amplia acepción. ...”(Voto 4423-93. En igual sentido, pueden consultarse, entre otras, las resoluciones de este Tribunal números 3705-93, 6240-93, 2485-94, 1394-94, 5527-94, 5654-95, 1154-96, 705-99). También, ha establecido la obligación del Estado de proteger el Medio Ambiente: “... El principio de protección al medio ambiente no es una recomendación o una intención que da la Constitución, sino que, por le contrario, es un derecho de aplicación inmediata, por lo que existe una obligación por parte de los organismos gubernamentales de vigilar porque se cumplan las disposiciones legales que tiendan a proteger el medio ambiente ...”(Voto 132-99. En igual sentido, puede consultarse el fallo número 5906-99). Esta obligación, ha señalado dicho Tribunal, no implica únicamente el ejercicio diligente de todas las medidas necesarias para hacer cesar actividades que alteren perjudicialmente el medio ambiente, sino en una efectiva política de precaución: “... en materia ambiental la coacción a posteriori resulta ineficaz, por cuanto de haberse producido ya las consecuencias biológicas y socialmente nocivas, la represión podrá tener una trascendencia moral, pero difícilmente compensará los daños ocasionados al ambiente ...”(Sentencia número 1250-99. En igual sentido, puede consultarse, entre otras, la número 2219-99). Específicamente, tocante a los humedales, la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, en su artículo 41, los declara de interés público. Asimismo, en el numeral 45, prohíbe todas aquellas actividades tendentes a interrumpir los ciclos naturales. Disponen dichas normas: “Artículo 41.- Interés público. Se declaran de interés público los humedales y su conservación, por ser de uso múltiple, estén o no estén protegidos por las leyes que rijan esta materia. ... Artículo 45.- Prohibición. Se prohíben las actividades orientadas a interrumpir los ciclos naturales de los ecosistemas de humedal, como la construcción de diques que eviten el flujo de aguas marinas o continentales, drenajes, desecamiento, relleno cualquier otra alteración que provoque el deterioro y la eliminación de tales ecosistemas.”. Por su parte, el canon 103 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre sanciona a quien drene humedales sin la previa autorización de la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre (hoy Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación S.I.N.A.C. -artículo 15 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 30077-MINAE, “Reglamento General del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía de 21 de diciembre del 2001, así como el numeral 22 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, aunque este artículo, junto con otros de esa ley, es objeto de una acción de inconstitucionalidad-) del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, por ser esta Dirección, según el artículo 7 de esa Ley, la competente para administrar, supervisar y proteger los humedales. Disponen ambas normas: “Artículo 7 La Dirección General de Vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas tiene las siguientes funciones en el ejercicio de su competencia: ...h) Administrar, supervisar y proteger los humedales. ... Artículo 103.- Será sancionado con multa de cincuenta mil colones (¢50.000) a cien mil colones (¢100.000) convertible en pena de prisión de uno a dos años, quien drene lagos, lagunas no artificiales y demás humedales, sin la previa autorización de la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas. Además, el infractor será obligado a dejar las cosas en el estado en que se encontraban antes de iniciar los trabajos de drenaje, para lo cual se faculta a la Dirección precitada, a fin de efectuar los trabajos correspondientes, pero a costa del infractor.”(Lo resaltado fue declarado inconstitucional por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante voto número 5857-99). Por otro lado, debido al objeto específico perseguido por el Derecho Ambiental, surgen una serie de principios que lo informan y determinan su contenido y alcances, algunos son novedosos, otros, adaptados del derecho público, rama de la cual se origina. Entre ellos, y para el sub-júdice, están: 1) Indubio pro natura: el cual implica que en caso de duda, en cuanto a la interpretación de normas jurídicas, o respecto a la afectación que pueda tener una actividad sobre el ambiente, debe decidirse lo que más convenga a la conservación de éste. Sobre el particular, puede examinarse la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional número 5893-95; y, 2) Interés público ambiental: pone de manifiesto la especialidad y sustantividad de esta rama jurídica. No sólo engloba el objeto a tutelar (salud y equilibrio ecológico como presupuestos de la vida y el desarrollo), sino además, y como derivación de la especial naturaleza de esos bienes jurídicos, adquiere importancia singular, la cual debe prevalecer al utilizársele como criterio de interpretación de la normativa ambiental. Por ello, se le otorga una dimensión universal, pues se refiere a aspectos de incumbencia de la humanidad en su conjunto, pues, de la preservación de un entorno adecuado, en el cual puedan vivir y desarrollarse las especies animales y vegetales depende su propia existencia. Sobre el particular, pueden consultarse los fallos de la Sala Constitucional números 353-96, 2816-97 , 644-99, 2219-99, 5906-99. A la luz de las anteriores consideraciones, esta Sala estima que ordenar el drenaje de la laguna para volver a la situación existente antes de su modificación, como lo hace el Ad-quem, amén de quebrantar la normativa antes trascrita, puede causársele un daño al medio ambiente. Por ello, lo aconsejable en este caso es mantener las cosas conforme se encuentran en la actualidad.

IX.- Por las razones expuestas, procede acoger el recurso interpuesto, revocar la sentencia del Tribunal y, resolviendo sobre el fondo, confirmar la del juzgado.

POR TANTO:

Se revoca la sentencia del Tribunal Agrario y, resolviendo sobre el fondo, se confirma la del Juzgado.

Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Anabelle León Feoli J** Recurso: 514-01