IDA cigarette tax remains in force despite Law 6820IVA del IDA sobre cigarrillos se mantiene vigente pese a Ley 6820

RES: 000041-F-2001 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, at sixteen hours and twelve minutes on the tenth of January of the year two thousand one.

Contentious-administrative proceeding -special tax- established in the Court of the matter, Second Section, by TABACALERA COSTARRICENSE S. A., represented by its president Nombre201511, executive and its general manager Ramiro Ceballos Gattorno, Venezuelan citizen, executive; against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, represented by Nombre40247, agricultural engineer. Also appearing, as general judicial representative of the plaintiff, Nombre201512, and of the defendant, Lic.

Ana Victoria Mora Mora, single, attorney, as special judicial representative, and the managerial advisor with powers of a general representative Mr. Nombre60401, agricultural engineer, resident of Heredia. All are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, attorneys, and residents of San José.

**WHEREAS:** **1º.-** Based on the facts set forth and legal provisions cited, the representative of the plaintiff filed a special tax proceeding, the amount of which was set at , so that the judgment declares: "the legality of the challenged acts and that it be consequently recognized that the assessment or fixing of specific consumption taxes charged to my client is illegal and improper because the principle of legislative reservation has been violated. No law authorizes its collection. I also request that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario be ordered to reimburse the amount unduly paid for specific consumption tax to date and the recognition of interest on the respective sum, from the moment of payment to the date of its refund, in accordance with Article 83 of the Law Regulating that Jurisdiction. I request that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario be ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding.” **2º.-** The state representation answered the lawsuit in the negative and raised the defenses of lack of right, expiration (caducidad), lack of active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva), and the generic defense of sine actione agit, and the preliminary defenses of inadmissibility of the action for formal defects, incomplete necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasivo necesario incompleto), and expiration (caducidad).

**3°.-** The Superior Administrative Litigation Court, Second Section, composed of Judges Sonia Ferrero Aymerich, Miriam Anchía Paniagua, and Joaquín Villalobos Soto, in a judgment issued at 10:00 a.m. on April 5, 2000, resolved: "The defense of lack of right is upheld, and the defenses of lack of active and passive standing (legitimatio ad causam activa y pasiva), lack of interest, and expiration (caducidad) are denied. The lawsuit is declared inadmissible, and the plaintiff is ordered to pay both sets of costs." **4º.-** The plaintiff's representative files an appeal on points of law (recurso de casación) on substantive grounds, considering that Articles 121, subsections 1) and 13), the final paragraph of 129, and 45 of the Political Constitution; 6 of Law No. 6820 of November 3, 1982; 10 of the Civil Code; and 98, subsection c) of the Law Regulating the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction No. 3367 have been violated.

**5º.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings. Alternate Judge Ana María Breedy Jalet participates in the decision of this matter, substituting for Judge Zamora Carvajal, due to granted leave.

**Drafted by Alternate Judge Breedy Jalet; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.-** Through Law No. 5792 (Law Creating the Agrarian Stamp Tax and Consumption Tax on Cigarettes and Soft Drinks) of September 1, 1975, amended by Article 35 of Law No. 6735 (Law Creating the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) of March 29, 1982, the specific consumption tax on cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, carbonated soft drinks, mixers, and beer was created. The aforementioned regulation establishes the obligation to fulfill tax duties before the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, for which sworn declarations must be filed and, in the case at hand, the cigarette consumption tax paid. Through Article 6 of Law No. 6820 (Amendment to the Law Consolidating Selective Consumption Taxes) of November 3 of the same year, it was provided, in pertinent part, as follows: “All specific or ad valorem consumption taxes, charged at the first stage of the productive marketing process, that fall on the production, consumption, or sale of goods not included in this law, as well as in any other general or special law that regulates exemptions differently, or that establishes consumption taxes for the Central Government or for any other public or private entity, which are charged at the mentioned stage, are repealed. All benefits received by way of tax by the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal are maintained…”.

**II.-** Law No. 7018 (Law of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic) of December 20, 1985, made an addition in its Article 14, subsection 22, to Article 6 of the aforementioned Law No. 6820. The previous addition was declared unconstitutional through Voto 6486-95, so the cited Article 6 Ibidem maintained its original content.

**III.-** The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, by official communication Placa10666 of June seventeenth, nineteen ninety-six, notified the company Tabacalera Costarricense S.A. that, according to the resolution issued by the Board of Directors in Article VIII, of session 025-96, of June fourth, 1996, it must submit the corresponding sworn declarations for the months of December 1995 and January, February, and March 1996, and pay the tax corresponding to those periods, which amounts to the sum of ¢84,925,656.22, including principal, interest, and fines. The company filed a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against the cited act, alleging an exemption from the tax payment because it was not in force in accordance with the declaration of unconstitutionality issued by the Constitutional Chamber. The Administration treated the filed motion as a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) which was rejected through Article IV, of session 036-96, of July 30, 1996, considering that the regulation on which the tax is based is in force, so its payment is appropriate.

**IV.-** Messrs. Nombre61492 and Ramiro Ceballos Gattorno, in their capacity as unlimited general representatives of the company Tabacalera Costarricense S.A., sued in a Special Tax Administrative Litigation Proceeding, fundamentally, so that the judgment declares the nullity of the administrative acts issued by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario related to agreement IV, adopted by the Board of Directors on July 30, 1996; the illegality and impropriety of the assessment or fixing of specific consumption taxes, as no law authorizes their collection; the defendant institution be ordered to reimburse the amounts unduly paid for specific consumption tax to date and the recognition of interest on the respective sum, from the moment of payment to the date of its refund. Furthermore, it requests that it be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this proceeding.

**V.-** The legal representative of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the preliminary defense of inadmissibility of the action as it suffered from formal defects for not indicating which administrative acts are being challenged and regarding which their illegality is requested. Likewise, it raised the defenses of incomplete necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasivo necesario incompleto), expiration (caducidad), lack of right, lack of active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva), and the generic sine actione agit.

**VI.-** The Administrative Litigation Court, Second Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, through judgment No. 219-97 at 11:30 a.m. on November 20, 1997, rejected the preliminary defenses filed. Subsequently, this same jurisdictional body, through judgment No. 90-2000 at 10:00 a.m. on April 5, 2000, declared the lawsuit inadmissible, upheld the defense of lack of right, and dismissed the remaining defenses. Likewise, it ordered the losing party to pay both sets of costs of the action.

**VII.-** The plaintiff files an appeal on points of law (recurso de casación) on the merits. It cites as violated Article 121, subsection 1, and 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution, as it considers that repealing laws is a power of the Legislative Assembly and that every law is repealed by a subsequent one, thus indicating that Article 6 of Law No. 6820 is a subsequent law that is incompatible with Law No. 5972 (which is prior), since the latter creates a tax and Law No. 6820 eliminates it, so the repeal of the older norm must be admitted, leaving Article 6 of Law 6820 in force, the content of which is the repeal of all specific consumption taxes; likewise, the appellant considers that a violation of Articles 121, subsection 1, and 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution is incurred when judgment No. 90-2000 declares the continuance of specific consumption taxes on cigarettes and other goods after those taxes were repealed by Article 6 Ibidem; violation of Article 6, second paragraph, Ibidem, by the judgment maintaining the validity of the consumption tax in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, since when Law No. 6820 repealed the consumption taxes, through general budget rules (No. 89 of the year 1983 and No. 22 of the year 1986) the validity of those repealed taxes was restored, so the budget law reinstated the specific consumption tax that had been repealed. Subsequently, the cited budget rules were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber. Likewise, the violation of Article six Ibidem is alleged, by the Court's judgment erroneously interpreting and equating the terms "benefits" and "taxes," the Court reaching the conclusion that Article 6 Ibidem maintains the validity of the specific consumption tax levied on cigarettes; violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code, since in interpreting, the Court assigns an erroneous meaning to the terms "benefit" and "tax." Likewise, it ignores the legislative history, the legislator's intention being to repeal the specific consumption taxes, transferring to the State the obligation to deliver to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and other institutions the benefits they received during the validity of the specific tax; violation of Article 45 of the Political Constitution by the Court's ruling imposing the payment of a tax (legally non-existent) that was repealed by Law No. 6820, violating the principle of inviolability of private property; violation of Article 121, subsection 13, of the Political Constitution, as the appellant considers that the ruling ordering the application and payment of the specific tax on cigarettes, already repealed by Law 6820, incurs a violation of the cited article, as it finds no protection in a valid rule issued by the Legislative Assembly and disrespects the principle of legislative reservation. Finally, a violation of Article 98, subsection c, of the Law Regulating the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction is alleged, considering that, due to the complexity of the matter, it is not acceptable that the judges refrained from applying the cost exemption provided for in the aforementioned article, and, on the contrary, imposed the award of both sets of costs.

**VIII.-** Regarding the appellant's claims that the Court's judgment declares the validity of the specific consumption tax on cigarettes and other goods in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario after those taxes were repealed by Article six of Law No. 6820, violating the principles of inviolability of private property and legislative reservation, and, furthermore, erroneously interpreting and equating the terms "benefits" and "taxes," these grievances are not admissible because what was resolved by the Second Section of the Administrative Litigation Court is in accordance with law, by indicating that although it is true that with the issuance of Law No. 6820 certain tax burdens were abrogated, that rule always kept the cigarette tax in force in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. As a basis for the foregoing, on one hand, the taxes contained in Articles 1 through 14 of Law 5792, amended by Article 35 of Law No. 6735, are in force, since there has been no express repeal by the Legislative Assembly, nor annulment by the Constitutional Chamber, affecting them, so they are currently mandatory for their subjects. On the other hand, the declaration of unconstitutionality regarding the addition of Budget Law No. 7018 to Article six of Law No. 6820 had no major consequence, since the Constitutional Chamber expressly maintained the original content of Article 6 Ibidem, by providing that: “the text of the cited Article 6° is maintained with the content it had prior to the amendment in question…”, so what was provided regarding: “All benefits received by way of tax by the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal are maintained…” remained. For the foregoing, Article six has a broad and express repealing scope and, only those taxes created in favor of the state institutions expressly mentioned in Article 6 Ibidem, and where the obligation to pay them exists for taxpayers, were maintained. Consequently, the rejection of the appeal regarding these grievances is required.

**IX.-** Even though this special tax proceeding began to be processed in 1996, and what was resolved by the Chamber logically refers to the rules applicable at that time, in terms of the grievances formulated, only for the sake of completeness, and to reinforce everything studied, two transcendental legal acts that occurred subsequently will be analyzed, which make clear and reiterate the legal and constitutional basis of what was resolved. In the first place, the thesis of the non-affectability of the rights of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, regarding the income from the cigarette tax, was ratified by Article 8 of Law No. 7972 of December 24, 1999, published in Supplement No. 105 to La Gaceta No.

250, of the same date) which literally states the following: "The tax ordered in Article 1 of this law must be calculated before the general sales tax created by Law No. 6826, of November 8, 1982, and its reforms, and whose taxable base it will form part of. However, it will not be included in the taxable base for calculating taxes in favor of the <span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario</span> and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal" (underlining not in the original). This makes clear the unalterability of the principle over the last 25 years, contrary to what the appellant has argued. Secondly, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber No. 04528-99 of 2:54 p.m. on July 15, 1999, notified in January 2000, within an unconstitutionality action, drafted by Magistrate Solano Carrera, states that when responding to the Legislative Assembly regarding the Optional Consultation of Constitutionality No. 3968 of 1998 concerning Bill No. 12,362 (which later became the aforementioned Law No. 7972), "it was noted that as long as it is understood that these taxes go to the universality of the budget, while maintaining their specific destination, there is no unconstitutionality whatsoever." To maintain this criterion, the judgment on the Unconstitutionality Action reminds the Consultation of the following: "if, in accordance with Article 176 of the Constitution, the national budget must comprise all probable revenues of the public administration, which refers to a forecast or calculation of revenues that allows the legislator to be in a position to know the foreseeable magnitude of the yield of national taxes, such as those created by the bill, the latter must complete the budget cycle, and, for this to be possible, they must necessarily enter the accounting referred to in Article 185 of the Constitution and be added to the revenue forecast mentioned in Article 176." Finally, in the core part of the Unconstitutionality Action, the basis for everything to be decided is stated by indicating the following: "In this sense, it deems it necessary to expressly state that in this judgment, the criterion contained in resolutions 7598-94 (Considering XII), 5754-94, and 4907-95 has been changed, in the following sense: a) The Budget Law has an instrumentality relationship with respect to the pre-existing ordinary law, and is therefore subordinated to it in such a way that it cannot modify it and must instead ensure its operation. In the case of taxes created by ordinary law for the satisfaction of a specific purpose (taxes with a specific destination), the budget legislator cannot change their destination, either by budget law or, even less, by lower-ranking norms, and can only do so by modifying the ordinary law, either to eliminate it because the purpose for which it was created has been satisfied, or to vary its destination. Specific destinations created by a norm of constitutional rank can only be changed by a norm of the same rank. The foregoing is without prejudice to cases of war, internal commotion, and other situations regulated in Article 180 of the Political Constitution. Consequently, variations can be made between items of the same program, through the budget law, provided they involve ordinary revenues that do not have a specific destination predetermined by ordinary law; b) the single-fund principle does have constitutional rank and refers to the existence of a single operational center with the legal capacity to receive and pay on behalf of the State; c) regarding resources collected from taxes with a specific destination, the principles of universality and non-affectation, and other budgetary principles governing revenues received for the satisfaction of general needs, do not apply, because the constituent legislator made the express exception that their existence was permitted without the prevailing doctrine being rigidly applicable to this matter. Any other prior jurisprudence on the matter of taxes with a specific destination must be understood as modified in the sense indicated." <span style="width:7.65pt; text-indent:0pt; font-family:'Courier New'; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">X.-</span><span> Regarding the interpretation and equivalence of the terms "benefits" and "taxes," the appellant is incorrect in arguing, for the present case, that the concept of "benefit" is that of a "utility" or "profit," or in a tax sense that of constituting "tax benefits all those measures adopted by the Public Treasury in favor of certain taxpayers," or legally as "those support or instrumental stimulus measures that operate through a tax reduction mechanism," as a form of exemption. In the statement of purpose of Law No. 6820, called "Reforma a la Ley de Consolidación de Impuestos Selectivos de Consumo" (Reform to the Law for the Consolidation of Selective Consumption Taxes), of November 3, 1982, the legislator's intention at the time of creating the sixth article is clearly verified. Initially, the motions presented in the Legislative Assembly,</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> to Article 6 of the same, were in the sense of "</span><span style="font-weight:bold">maintaining the taxes</span><span> of INFOCOOP, IDA, and IFAM," where the following is recorded: "The taxes are exempted </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">whose revenues are currently received by</span><span> the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal." Subsequently, a pro forma motion was included that states the following: "notwithstanding the foregoing, all benefits </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">that, by way of taxes</span><span>, are received by the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal are maintained," with the legislator indicating that the pro forma motion intends practically the same as the previous motion, but "improves the form one hundred percent" (folio 353 of the legislative file), ultimately concluding that the intention of the motion "is that the meaning is crystal clear, </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">simply not to repeal such and such taxes.</span><span>" (folio 354 of the legislative file). For all of the above, it is the criterion of this Chamber that there is an obligation on the part of the passive subjects of the selective consumption tax to file sworn declarations with the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and to proceed with their respective payment, as required by Article six of Law No. Placa37652. Consequently, the rejection of the appeal on this point is imposed.</span> <span style="width:7.65pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">XI.-</span><span style="line-height:200%; font-size:12pt"> With regard to the grievance concerning the payment of costs, where the appellant on cassation argues that the Court should have exempted him due to the complexity of the matter, this is not appropriate, as this Chamber has repeatedly established that in every judgment, when it definitively decides the issues debated by ruling on the claim formulated in the complaint, or in orders having the character of a judgment, when they decide on exceptions or incidental claims whose effect is to put an end to the proceeding, the losing party shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs. This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In applying this norm, it has been resolved that the ruling on both types of costs must be made even sua sponte, since the order to pay is imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, in other words, for losing the litigation, without being able to infer from such an order the qualification of reckless litigant or bad faith on the party ordered to pay those costs. Exceptionally, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of one or both types of costs. This occurs when the losing party has litigated with evident good faith, or when the claim or counterclaim includes exaggerated claims, or when the ruling only partially grants the fundamental petitions of the claim or counterclaim, if the ruling admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, and even if there is reciprocal losing. The Judge may also exempt the losing party from the payment of procedural costs caused by petitions or proceedings of the opposing party that, in his judgment, must be classified as idle or unnecessary (Article 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Since the exemption from the payment of costs is a power granted to the Judge, the norm is not violated when that power is not used, but, conversely, if the Judge uses the power, misuse or improper use of the power is possible, and, according to the circumstances, in that case a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate.</span> Consequently, the rejection of the appeal regarding this grievance is imposed.

**XII.**- In light of the foregoing, the violations alleged in the appeal have not been committed, and therefore it must be declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the party that filed it (article 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)).

**POR TANTO:** The appeal is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the appellant.

**Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos** **Hugo Picado Odio** **Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón** **Name191736 .** **Ana María Breedy Jalet** **Magistrada Suplente** **Ns.-** "**VIII.-** Regarding what is alleged by the appellant that the judgment of the Court declares the validity of the specific consumption tax on cigarettes and other goods in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, after those taxes were repealed by Article 6 of Law No.

6820, violating the principles of inviolability of private property and legal reserve (reserva de ley), and, furthermore, erroneously interpreting and equating the terms "benefits" and "taxes," these grievances are not admissible, given that the decision of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Second Section, is in accordance with the law, by indicating that while it is true that the enactment of Law No. 6820 repealed certain tax burdens, that law always maintained the tax on cigarettes in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. As a basis for the foregoing, it is held, on the one hand, that the taxes contained in articles 1 to 14 of Law 5792, as amended by Article 35 of Law No. 6735, are in force, given that there has been no express repeal by the Legislative Assembly, nor any annulment by the Constitutional Chamber affecting them, so they are currently mandatory for their recipients. On the other hand, the declaration of unconstitutionality regarding the addition of budget law No. 7018 to article six of Law No. 6820 had no major consequence, given that the Constitutional Chamber expressly maintained the original content of numeral 6 Ibidem, by ordering that: "the text of the cited Article 6° is maintained with the content it presented prior to the reform under discussion…", thereby maintaining the provision that: "</span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">All benefits received by way of tax are maintained for </span><span>the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, </span><span style=\"text-decoration:underline\">the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario</span><span> and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal…". For the reasons stated above, the sixth numeral has a broad and express repealing scope and only maintained those taxes created in favor of the state institutions expressly indicated in Article 6 Ibidem, and where there is an obligation for taxpayers to pay them. Consequently, the appeal must be rejected regarding these grievances.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> IX.-</span><span> Even though this special tax proceeding began processing in 1996, and the Chamber's decision logically refers to the regulations applicable at that time, based on the grievances formulated, and only for further support and to reinforce everything studied, two transcendental legal acts that occurred subsequently will be analyzed, which clarify and reiterate the legal and constitutional basis of the decision. First, the thesis of the unaffectability of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario's rights regarding revenues from the cigarette tax was ratified by Article 8 of Law No. 7972 of December 24, 1999, published in Supplement No. 105 to La Gaceta No. 250 of the same date, which literally states the following: "The tax ordered in Article 1° of this law must be calculated before the general sales tax created by Law No. 6826 of November 8, 1982, and its amendments, and its taxable base shall form part thereof. However, it shall not be included in the taxable base for calculating the taxes in favor of the </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario</span><span> and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal" (the underlining is not from the original). This makes clear the unalterability of the principle over the last 25 years, in contrast to what the appellant has argued. Second, the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber No. 04528-99 of 14 hours and 54 minutes on July 15, 1999, notified in January 2000, within an action of unconstitutionality, authored by Justice Solano Carrera, maintains that when responding to the Legislative Assembly regarding the Optional Consultation of Constitutionality No. 3968 of 1998 concerning Bill No. 12.362 (which later became the aforementioned Law No. 7972), "it was indicated that as long as it is understood that those taxes go to the universality of the budget, maintaining their specific purpose, no unconstitutionality exists." To maintain the criterion, the judgment of the Action of Unconstitutionality recalls the Consultation in the following terms: "if according to Article 176 of the Constitution, the national budget must comprise all probable revenues of the public administration, which refers to a forecast or calculation of revenues that allows the legislator to be in a position to know the foreseeable magnitude of the yield of national taxes, such as those created by the bill, the latter must complete the budget cycle, and, for this to be possible, they must necessarily enter the accounting referred to in Article 185 of the Constitution and be added to the revenue forecast mentioned in Article 176." Finally, in the core part of the Action of unconstitutionality, the basis for everything to be decided is maintained by pointing out the following: "In this sense, it deems it necessary to expressly state that in this judgment, the criterion contained in resolutions 7598-94 (Recital XII), 5754-94 and 4907-95 has been changed, as follows: a) The Budget Law has an instrumental relationship with respect to the pre-existing ordinary law, therefore, it is subordinate to the former in such a way that it cannot modify it and must instead ensure its operation. In the case of taxes created by ordinary law for the satisfaction of a specific purpose (taxes with a specific purpose), the budget legislator cannot change their purpose, neither by budget law, much less by lower-ranking norms, and may only do so by modifying the ordinary law, either to eliminate it once the purpose for which it was created has been satisfied, or to vary its purpose. Specific purposes created by a constitutional norm can only be varied by a norm of the same rank. The foregoing is subject to what is said regarding cases of war, internal commotion, and other cases regulated in Article 180 of the Political Constitution. Consequently, variations can be made between items of the same program through a budget law, provided they involve ordinary revenues that do not have a specific purpose predetermined by ordinary law; b) the single treasury account principle (principio de caja única) does have constitutional rank, and refers to the existence of a single operations center with legal capacity to receive and pay on behalf of the State; c) with respect to resources collected through taxes with a specific purpose, the principles of universality and non-affectation and other budget principles governing revenues received for the satisfaction of general needs do not apply, because the constituent legislator made the express exception that their existence be allowed without the prevailing doctrine being rigidly applied to this matter... Any prior jurisprudence on the matter of taxes with a specific purpose must be understood as modified in the indicated sense.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\"> X.-</span><span> Regarding the interpretation and equating of the terms "benefits" and "taxes," the appellant is incorrect in indicating, for this particular case, that the concept of "benefit" is that of a "utility" or "profit," or in a tax sense constituting "fiscal benefits all those measures adopted by the Public Treasury in favor of certain taxpayers," or legally as "those support or stimulus instrumental measures that act through a tax relief mechanism," as a modality of exemption. In the statement of legislative intent (exposición de motivos) of Law No. 6820, entitled "Reform to the Law of Consolidation of Selective Consumption Taxes," of November 3, 1982, the legislator's intention at the time of creating the sixth article is clearly verified. Initially, the motions presented in the Legislative Assembly to Article 6° Ibidem were in the sense of "</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">maintaining the taxes</span><span> of INFOCOOP, IDA and IFAM," where the following is recorded: "The taxes </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">whose revenues are currently received by</span><span> the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal are excepted." Subsequently, a procedural motion is included stating the following: "notwithstanding the foregoing, all benefits </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">received by way of taxes</span><span> are maintained for the Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal," with the legislator indicating that the procedural motion practically intends the same as the previous motion, but "improves the form one hundred percent" (folio 353 of the legislative file) and ending by concluding that the motion's intention "is to make it emphatically clear what the meaning was, </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">simply not to repeal such and such taxes.</span><span>" (folio 354 of the legislative file). For all the foregoing, it is the criterion of this Chamber that there is an obligation for the taxable persons (sujetos pasivos) of the selective consumption tax to file the sworn statements with the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and proceed with their respective payment, as required by the sixth numeral of Law No. 6820. Consequently, the appeal must be rejected regarding this charge.</span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">"</span> **4th.-** The plaintiff's legal representative files a cassation appeal on substantive grounds, arguing that Articles 121 subsections 1) and 13), the final paragraph of 129, and 45 of the Political Constitution have been violated; as well as Article 6 of Law No. 6820 of November 3, 1982; Article 10 of the Civil Code; and Article 98 subsection c) of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law No. 3367.

**5th.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings. Substitute Magistrate Ana María Breedy Jalet participates in the decision of this matter, replacing Magistrate Zamora Carvajal, who is on approved leave.

Drafted by Substitute Magistrate Breedy Jalet; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.-** By means of Law No. 5792 (Law Creating the Agrarian Stamp and Consumption Tax on Cigarettes and Carbonated Beverages) of September 1, 1975, amended by Article 35 of Law No. 6735 (Law Creating the Institute of Agrarian Development) of March 29, 1982, the specific consumption tax on cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, carbonated soft drinks, mixers, and beer was created. The aforementioned regulations establish the obligation to comply with tax duties before the Institute of Agrarian Development, for which sworn declarations must be filed and, in the case at hand, the cigarette consumption tax must be paid. Through Article 6 of Law No. 6820 (Amendment to the Law on the Consolidation of Selective Consumption Taxes) of November 3 of the same year, it was provided, in what is relevant, the following: "All specific consumption or *ad valorem* taxes, collected at the first stage of the production and commercialization process, which are levied on the production, consumption, or sale of goods not covered by this law, as well as in any other general or special law that regulates exemptions differently, or that establishes consumption taxes for the Central Government or for any other public or private entity, collected at the mentioned stage, are hereby repealed. All benefits received by the Cooperative Development Institute, the Institute of Agrarian Development, and the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory Services as tax revenue are maintained...".

**II.-** Law No. 7018 (Law of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget of the Republic) of December 20, 1985, made an addition in its Article 14, subsection 22, to Article 6 of the aforementioned Law No. 6820. The previous addition was declared unconstitutional by means of resolution 6486-95, therefore the cited numeral six Ibidem maintained its original content.

**III.-** The Institute of Agrarian Development, by official communication Placa10666 of June seventeenth, nineteen ninety-six, notified the company Tabacalera Costarricense S.A. that, according to the resolution issued by the Board of Directors in Article VIII of session 025-96 of June fourth, 1996, it must render the sworn declarations corresponding to the months of December 1995 and January, February, and March 1996 and pay the tax corresponding to those periods, which amounts to the sum of ₡84,925,656.22, including principal, interest, and penalties. The company filed a motion for revocation with a subsidiary appeal against the cited act, alleging exemption from paying the tax because it was not in force according to the declaration of unconstitutionality issued by the Constitutional Chamber. The Administration processed the filed motion as a motion for reconsideration or review, which was rejected by means of Article IV of session 036-96 of July 30, 1996, considering that the regulation on which the tax is based is in force and therefore its payment is appropriate.

**IV.-** Messrs. Nombre61492 and Ramiro Ceballos Gattorno, in their capacity as unlimited general attorneys-in-fact for the company Tabacalera Costarricense S.A., filed a lawsuit in a Special Tax Contentious-Administrative Proceeding, fundamentally, seeking a judgment declaring the nullity of the administrative acts issued by the Institute of Agrarian Development related to agreement IV, adopted by the Board of Directors on July 30, 1996; the illegality and impropriety of the liquidation or assessment of specific consumption taxes, as there is no law authorizing their collection; ordering the defendant institution to reimburse what has been unduly paid for the specific consumption tax up to the present date and the recognition of interest on the respective sum, from the moment of payment to the date of its refund. It also requests that the defendant be ordered to pay the costs of both phases of this proceeding.

**V.-** The legal representative of the Institute of Agrarian Development answered the lawsuit in the negative and raised the preliminary defense of inadmissibility of the action because it suffers from formal defects by not indicating which administrative acts are being challenged and regarding which illegality is requested. It also raised the exceptions of incomplete necessary passive joinder of parties, expiration, lack of right, lack of active and passive standing to sue, and the generic *sine actione agit*.

**VI.-** The Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Second Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by means of judgment No. 219-97 of 11:30 a.m. on November 20, 1997, rejected the preliminary defenses raised. Subsequently, this same jurisdictional body, by means of judgment No. 90-2000 at 10:00 a.m. on April 5, 2000, declared the lawsuit inadmissible, upheld the defense of lack of right, and dismissed the remaining exceptions. It also ordered the losing party to pay the costs of both phases of the action.

**VII.-** The plaintiff party files a cassation appeal on substantive grounds. It cites as violated Article 121, subsection 1, and Article 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution, as it considers that it is the power of the Legislative Assembly to repeal laws and that any law is repealed by a subsequent one, therefore indicating that Article 6 of Law No. 6820 is a later law that is incompatible with Law No. 5972 (which is earlier), since the latter creates a tax and Law No. 6820 eliminates it, so the repeal of the older norm must be admitted, leaving Article 6 of Law 6820 in force, the content of which is the repeal of all specific consumption taxes; likewise, the appellant considers that a violation of Articles 121, subsection 1, and 129, final paragraph, of the Political Constitution is incurred when judgment No. 90-2000 declares the permanence of the specific consumption taxes on cigarettes and other goods, after those taxes were repealed by Article 6 Ibidem; violation of Article 6, second paragraph, Ibidem, because the judgment maintained the validity of the consumption tax for the benefit of the Institute of Agrarian Development, given that when Law No. 6820 repealed the consumption taxes, through general budget norms (No. 89 of the year 1983 and No. 22 of the year 1986) the validity of those repealed taxes was restored, so the budget law reestablished the specific consumption tax that had been repealed. Subsequently, the cited budget norms were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber. Furthermore, a violation of numeral six Ibidem is alleged, by erroneously interpreting and equating, in the Tribunal's judgment, the terms "benefits" and "taxes," with the Tribunal reaching the conclusion that Article 6 Ibidem maintains the validity of the specific consumption tax levied on cigarettes; violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code, since when interpreting, the Tribunal assigns an erroneous meaning to the terms "benefit" and "tax." Likewise, it ignores the legislative history, since the legislator's intention was to repeal specific consumption taxes, transferring to the State the obligation to deliver to the Institute of Agrarian Development and other institutions the benefits they received during the validity of the specific tax; violation of Article 45 of the Political Constitution by the Tribunal's ruling imposing the payment of a (legally non-existent) tax that was repealed by Law No. 6820, thereby violating the principle of the inviolability of private property; violation of Article 121, subsection 13, of the Political Constitution, as the appellant considers that the ruling ordering the application and payment of the specific tax on cigarettes, already repealed by Law 6820, incurs a violation of the cited numeral, by not finding protection in a valid norm issued by the Legislative Assembly and by disrespecting the principle of legal reserve. Finally, a breach of Article 98, subsection c, of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction Regulatory Law is alleged, considering that, given the complexity of the matter, it is not acceptable for the judges to have refrained from applying the exemption from costs provided for in the aforementioned numeral, and, on the contrary, to have imposed a condemnation to pay both phases of costs.

**VIII.-** Regarding what is alleged by the appellant concerning the judgment of the Tribunal declaring the validity of the specific consumption tax on cigarettes and other goods for the benefit of the Institute of Agrarian Development, after those taxes were repealed by Article six of Law No. 6820, thereby violating the principles of inviolability of private property and legal reserve, and, furthermore, erroneously interpreting and equating the terms "benefits" and "taxes," these grievances are not admissible since the decision of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Second Section, conforms to law, in stating that while it is true that with the enactment of Law No. 6820 certain fiscal charges were abolished, that norm always maintained the tax on cigarettes for the benefit of the Institute of Agrarian Development in force. In support of the foregoing, it must be noted on the one hand that the taxes contained in Articles 1 through 14 of Law 5792, amended by Article 35 of Law No. 6735, are in force, since there has been no express repeal by the Legislative Assembly, nor annulment by the Constitutional Chamber, that affects them, and therefore they are currently mandatory for their recipients. On the other hand, the declaration of unconstitutionality regarding the addition made by budget law No. 7018 to Article six of Law No. 6820 had no greater consequence, since the Constitutional Chamber expressly maintained the original content of numeral 6 Ibidem, by providing that: "the text of the cited Article 6° is maintained with the content it had prior to the amendment under consideration...", therefore what was provided was maintained, namely that: "All benefits received by the Cooperative Development Institute, the Institute of Agrarian Development, and the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory Services as tax revenue are maintained...". Based on the foregoing, numeral six has a broad and express derogatory scope and only those taxes created in favor of the state institutions expressly indicated in Article 6 Ibidem were maintained, where the obligation for taxpayers to proceed with their payment exists. Consequently, the dismissal of the appeal regarding these grievances is required.

**IX.-** Even though this special tax proceeding began to be processed in 1996, and what is decided by the Chamber logically refers to the regulations applicable at that time, in view of the grievances raised, and only for further clarification and to reinforce everything studied, two transcendental legal acts that occurred subsequently will be analyzed, which make clear and reiterate the legal and constitutional basis of the decision. In the first place, the thesis of the inaffectability of the rights of the Institute of Agrarian Development, regarding the income from the cigarette tax, was ratified by Article 8 of Law No. 7972 of December 24, 1999, published in Supplement No. 105 to La Gaceta No. 250 of the same date, which literally states the following: "The tax ordered in Article 1° of this law must be calculated before the general sales tax created by Law No. 6826 of November 8, 1982, and its amendments, and its taxable base will form a part thereof. However, it will not be included in the taxable base for calculating the taxes for the benefit of the **Institute of Agrarian Development** and the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory Services" (underlining is not from the original). This makes clear the inalterability of the principle over the last 25 years, contrary to what the appellant has argued. In the second place, Constitutional Chamber judgment No. 04528-99 at 2:54 p.m. on July 15, 1999, notified in January of the year 2000, within an unconstitutionality action, drafted by Magistrate Solano Carrera, maintains that when responding to the Legislative Assembly's Optional Consultation of Constitutionality No. 3968 of 1998 referring to Project No. 12.362 (which later became the aforementioned Law No. 7972) "it was pointed out that as long as it is understood that those taxes go to the universality of the budget, maintaining their specific destination, there is no unconstitutionality whatsoever." To maintain this criterion, the judgment in the Unconstitutionality Action reminds the Consultation of the following: "if, according to Article 176 of the Constitution, the national budget must comprise all probable revenues of the public administration, which refers to a forecast or calculation of revenues that allows the legislator to be in a position to know the foreseeable magnitude of the yield of national taxes, such as those created by the project, the latter must complete the budget cycle, and, for this to be possible, they must necessarily enter the accounting referred to in Article 185 of the Constitution and be added to the revenue forecast mentioned in Article 176." Finally, in the core part of the Unconstitutionality Action, the basis for everything to be decided is maintained by stating the following: "In this regard, it deems it necessary to expressly state on the record that in this judgment, the criterion contained in resolutions 7598-94 (whereas clause XII), 5754-94, and 4907-95 has been changed, in the following sense: a) The Budget Law has an instrumentality relationship with respect to the pre-existing ordinary law, and therefore is subordinated to it in such a way that it cannot modify it and must rather ensure its operation. In the case of taxes created by ordinary law for the satisfaction of a determined purpose (earmarked taxes), the budget legislator cannot change their destination, neither by budget law nor much less by lower-ranking norms, and can only do so by modifying the ordinary law, either to eliminate it because the purpose for which it was created has been satisfied, or to vary its destination. Specific destinations created by a norm of constitutional rank can only be varied by a norm of the same rank. What has been said regarding cases of war, internal commotion, and other cases regulated in Article 180 of the Political Constitution is hereby preserved. Consequently, variations can be made between line items of the same program, through the budget law, provided they involve ordinary revenues that do not have a specific destination predetermined by ordinary law; b) The single treasury account principle does have constitutional rank, and refers to the existence of a single operations center with the legal capacity to receive and pay on behalf of the State; c) Regarding resources collected through earmarked taxes, the principles of universality and non-earmarking and other budget principles that govern revenues collected for the satisfaction of general needs do not apply, because the constituent legislator made the express exception that their existence would be permitted without the prevailing doctrine being able to be rigidly applied to that matter. Any other prior jurisprudence on the matter of earmarked taxes must be understood as modified in the indicated sense.

**X.-** Regarding the interpretation and equation of the terms "benefits" and "taxes," the appellant is incorrect in indicating, in the case at hand, that the concept "benefit" is that of a "gain" or "profit," or in a tax sense that of constituting "tax benefits, all those measures adopted by the Public Treasury in favor of certain taxpayers," or legally as "those support or instrumental stimulus measures that operate through a tax relief mechanism," as a form of exemption. In the statement of purpose of Law No. 6820, called "Amendment to the Law on the Consolidation of Selective Consumption Taxes," of November 3, 1982, the legislator's intention at the time of creating Article six is clearly proven. Initially, the motions presented in the Legislative Assembly to Article 6° Ibidem were in the sense of "**maintaining the taxes** of INFOCOOP, IDA, and IFAM," where the following is recorded: "The taxes **whose revenues are currently received by** the Cooperative Development Institute, the Institute of Agrarian Development, and the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory Services are excepted." Subsequently, a motion on form was included stating the following: "notwithstanding the foregoing, all benefits **received as tax revenue** by the Cooperative Development Institute, the Institute of Agrarian Development, and the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory Services are maintained," with the legislator indicating that the motion on form practically seeks the same as the previous motion, but "improves the form one hundred percent" (folio 353 of the legislative file) concluding that the intention of the motion "is that it be crystal clear what the meaning was, **simply not to repeal such and such taxes.**" (folio 354 of the legislative file). For all the foregoing, it is the criterion of this Chamber that there is an obligation for the taxable persons of the selective consumption tax to file sworn declarations before the Institute of Agrarian Development and proceed with their respective payment, as required by numeral six of Law No. Placa37652. Consequently, the dismissal of the appeal regarding this charge is required.

**XI.-** Regarding the grievance about the payment of costs where the appellant argues that the Tribunal should have exempted it due to the complexity of the matter, the same is not admissible since this Chamber has repeatedly established that in every judgment that definitively decides on the debated issues, by means of a ruling on the claim formulated in the lawsuit, or in rulings having the character of a judgment that decide on exceptions or incidental claims whose effect is to terminate the proceeding, the losing party shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs. This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Civil Procedure Code. In applying this norm, it has been resolved that the ruling on both types of costs must be made even on its own motion, since the order to pay is imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, in other words, for losing the litigation, without being able to deduce from such condemnation the qualification of reckless litigant or bad faith on the part of the one ordered to pay those costs. Exceptionally, the losing party may be exempted from paying one or both types of costs. This occurs when the losing party has litigated in evident good faith, or when the claim or counterclaim comprises exaggerated claims, or when the ruling only upholds part of the fundamental petitions of the claim or counterclaim, or if the ruling admits important defenses invoked by the losing party, or even if there is mutual loss. The Judge may also exempt the losing party from the payment of procedural costs incurred with petitions or proceedings of the opposing party that, in their opinion, should be qualified as superfluous or unnecessary (Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code). Since the exemption from paying costs is a power granted to the Judge, the norm is not violated when this power is not used, but, conversely, if the Judge does use the power, a misuse or improper use of the power is possible, and, according to the circumstances, in that case a cassation appeal may be admissible.

Consequently, the rejection of the appeal with respect to this grievance is required.

XII.- Pursuant to the foregoing, the violations alleged in the appeal have not been committed, and therefore it must be declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the party that filed it (article 611 of the Código Procesal Civil).

THEREFORE:

The appeal is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the appellant.

Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos Hugo Picado Odio Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón Nombre191736 . Ana María Breedy Jalet Substitute Magistrate (Magistrada Suplente) Ns.-

RES: 000041-F-2001 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las dieciséis horas doce minutos del diez de enero del año dos mil uno.

Proceso contencioso administrativo -especial tributario- establecido en el Tribunal de la materia, Sección Segunda, por TABACALERA COSTARRICENSE S. A., representado por su presidente Nombre201511 , ejecutivo y su gerente general Ramiro Ceballos Gattorno, ciudadano venezolano, ejecutivo; contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO, representado por Nombre40247 , ingeniero agrónomo. Figuran, además, como apoderado general judicial de la actora Nombre201512 , y del accionado la Lic. Ana Victoria Mora Mora, soltera, abogada, como apoderada especial judicial y el asesor gerencial con facultades de apoderado generalísimo señor Nombre60401 , ingeniero agrónomo, vecino de Heredia. Todos son mayores, y con las salvedades hechas casados, abogados y vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO:

1º.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó el apoderado de la parte actora planteo proceso especial tributario, cuya cuantía se fijó en , a fin de que en sentencia se declare: "la legalidad de los actos impugnados y que se reconozcan en consecuencia, que la liquidación o fijación de impuestos específicos de consumo cobrados a mi representada es ilegal e improcedente por cuanto se ha violado el principio de reserva de ley. No existe ley que autorice su cobro. Pido asimismo, que se ordene al Instituto de Desarrollo Agraria a reintegrar lo pagado indebidamente por concepto de impuesto específico de consumo a la fecha y el reconocimiento de intereses sobre la suma respectiva, desde el momento del pago a la fecha de su devolución, de conformidad con el artículo 83 de la Ley reguladora de esa Jurisdicción . Pido que se condene al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario al pago de las costas de este proceso.”.

2º.- La representación estatal contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, caducidad, falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva y la genérica de sine actione agit, y las defensas previas de inadmisibilidad de la acción por defectos formales, litis consorcio pasivo necesario incompleto, caducidad.

3°.- El Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Segunda, integrada por los Jueces Sonia Ferrero Aymerich, Miriam Anchía Paniagua y Joaquín Villalobos Soto, en sentencia dictada a las 10:00 horas del 5 de abril de 2000, resolvió: “Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho y se deniegan las de falta de legitimatio ad causam activa y pasiva, falta de interés y caducidad. Se declara improcedente la demanda e impone a la actora el pago de ambas costas.

4º.- El apoderado de la actora formula recurso de casación por razones de fondo estima que se han violado los artículos 121 inciso 1) y 13), párrafo final del 129, 45 de la Constitución Política; 6 de la Ley N° 6820 de 3 de noviembre de 1982; 10 del Código Civil; 98 inciso c) de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso – Administrativa N° 3367.

5º.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales. Interviene en la decisión de este asunto la Magistrada Suplente Ana María Breedy Jalet en sustitución del Magistrado Zamora Carvajal, por licencia concedida.

Redacta la Magistrada Suplente Breedy Jalet; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Por medio de la Ley No. 5792 (Ley de Creación del Timbre Agrario e Impuesto de Consumo de Cigarrillos y Bebidas Gaseosas) del 1 de setiembre de 1975, reformado por el artículo 35 de la Ley No. 6735 (Ley de Creación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) del 29 de marzo de 1982, se creó el impuesto específico de consumo sobre cigarrillos, bebidas alcohólicas, refrescos gaseosos, mezcladores y cerveza. La normativa supra indicada establece la obligación de cumplir con los deberes tributarios frente al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, para lo cual se deben presentar las declaraciones juradas y cancelar, para el caso de marras, el impuesto de consumo de cigarrillos. A través del artículo 6 de la Ley No. 6820 (Reforma a la Ley de Consolidación de Impuestos Selectivos de Consumo) del 3 de noviembre del mismo año, se dispuso, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: “Deróganse todos los impuestos específicos de consumo o ad valórem, cobrados en la primera etapa del proceso productivo de comercialización, que recaigan sobre la producción, el consumo o la venta de mercancías no comprendidas en esta ley, así como en cualquier otra ley general o especial que regule exenciones en forma diferente, o que establezca impuestos de consumo para el Gobierno Central o para cualquier otra entidad pública o privada, que se cobren en la etapa mencionada. Se mantienen todos los beneficios que por concepto de impuesto perciban el Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal…”.

II.- La Ley No. 7018 (Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República) del 20 de diciembre de 1985, hizo una adición en su artículo 14, inciso 22, al artículo 6 de Ley No. 6820 supra citada. La anterior adición fue declarada inconstitucional mediante el voto 6486-95, por lo que mantuvo el citado numeral sexto Ibídem, su contenido originario.

III.- El Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, por oficio Placa10666 del diecisiete de junio de mil novecientos noventa y seis, comunicó a la empresa Tabacalera Costarricense S.A. que de acuerdo a la resolución dictada por la Junta Directiva en el artículo VIII, de la sesión 025-96, del cuatro de junio de 1996, debe rendir las declaraciones juradas correspondientes a los meses de diciembre de 1995 y enero, febrero y marzo de 1996 y pagar el impuesto correspondiente a esos períodos, el cual asciende a la suma ¢84.925.656.22, que incluye el capital, intereses y multas. La empresa interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra el citado acto, alegando la exención al pago del impuesto por no estar vigente de conformidad con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad emitida por la Sala Constitucional. La Administración conoció el recurso interpuesto como un recurso de reposición o reconsideración el cual fue rechazado mediante el artículo IV, de la sesión 036-96, del 30 de julio de 1996, al considerar que la normativa que fundamenta el impuesto se encuentra vigente por lo que procede su cancelación.

IV.- Los señores Nombre61492 y Ramiro Ceballos Gattorno, en su carácter de apoderados generalísimos sin límite de suma de la empresa Tabacalera Costarricense S.A., demandaron en Proceso Contencioso Administrativo Especial Tributario, fundamentalmente, para que se declare en sentencia la nulidad de los actos administrativos emitidos por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario que llevan relación con el acuerdo IV, tomado por la Junta Directiva el día 30 de julio de 1996; la ilegalidad e improcedencia de la liquidación o fijación de impuestos específicos de consumo, al no existir ley que autorice su cobro; se ordene a la institución demandada a reintegrar lo pagado indebidamente por concepto de impuesto específico de consumo a la fecha y el reconocimiento de intereses sobre la suma respectiva, desde el momento del pago a la fecha de su devolución. Además, solicita se condene al pago de ambas costas de este proceso.

V.- El representante legal del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario contestó, negativamente, la demanda e interpuso la defensa previa de inadmisibilidad de la acción al adolecer de defectos formales por no indicar cuales son los actos administrativos que se impugnan, y sobre los que se solicita la ilegalidad. Asimismo, opuso las excepciones de litis consorcio pasivo necesario incompleto, caducidad, falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva y la genérica sine actione agit.

VI.- El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Segunda, del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, mediante la sentencia No. 219-97 de las 11:30 horas del 20 de noviembre de 1997 rechazó las defensas previas interpuestas. Posteriormente, este mismo órgano jurisdiccional, mediante sentencia No. 90-2000 de las 10 horas del 5 de abril del 2000 declaró improcedente la demanda, acogió la defensa de falta de derecho y declaró sin lugar las restantes excepciones. Asimismo, condenó al vencido al pago de ambas costas de la acción.

VII.- La parte actora interpone recurso de casación por el fondo. Cita como violado el artículo 121, inciso 1, y 129, párrafo final, de la Constitución Política, pues considera que es potestad de la Asamblea Legislativa derogar las leyes y que toda ley queda derogada por otra posterior, por lo que indica que el artículo 6 de la Ley No. 6820 es una ley posterior que resulta incompatible con la Ley No. 5972 (que es anterior), puesto que la última crea un tributo y la Ley No. 6820 lo elimina, por lo que se debe admitir la derogatoria de la norma más antigua, quedando vigente el artículo 6 de la Ley 6820 cuyo contenido es la derogatoria de todos los impuestos específicos de consumo; igualmente, considera el casacionista que se incurre en violación a los artículos 121, inciso 1, y 129, párrafo final, de la Constitución Política al declarar la sentencia No. 90-2000 la permanencia de los impuestos específicos de consumo sobre los cigarrillos y otras mercaderías, luego de que esos tributos fueron derogados por el artículo 6 Ibídem; violación del artículo 6, párrafo segundo, Ibídem, por mantener la sentencia la vigencia del impuesto de consumo a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, siendo que cuando la Ley No. 6820 derogó los impuestos de consumo, a través de normas generales de presupuesto (No. 89 del año de 1983 y No. 22 del año 1986) se restituyó la vigencia de esos impuestos derogados, por lo que la ley presupuestaria hizo restablecer el impuesto específico de consumo que había sido derogado. Posteriormente, las citadas normas presupuestarias fueron declaradas inconstitucionales por la Sala Constitucional. Asimismo, se alega la violación del numeral sexto Ibídem, al interpretar, erróneamente, y equiparar, la sentencia del Tribunal, los términos “beneficios” e “impuestos”, llegando el Tribunal a la conclusión de que el artículo 6 Ibídem, mantiene la vigencia del impuesto específico de consumo, que grava los cigarrillos; violación del artículo 10 del Código Civil, toda vez que al interpretar el Tribunal, asigna un erróneo significado a los términos “beneficio” e “impuesto”. Asimismo, ignora los antecedentes legislativos al ser la intención del legislador el derogar los impuestos específicos de consumo, trasladándose al Estado la obligación de entregar al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a otras instituciones, los beneficios que durante la vigencia del impuesto específico percibieron; violación al artículo 45 de la Constitución Política al imponer el fallo del Tribunal el pago de un impuesto (legalmente inexistente) que fue derogado por la Ley No. 6820, atentando contra el principio de inviolabilidad de la propiedad privada; violación al artículo 121, inciso 13, de la Constitución Política al considerar el casacionista que el fallo que ordena la aplicación y pago del impuesto específico sobre los cigarrillos, ya derogado por la ley 6820, incurre en violación del citado numeral, al no encontrar amparo en una norma vigente emitida por la Asamblea Legislativa e irrespetando el principio de reserva de ley. Finalmente, se alega quebranto del artículo 98, inciso c, de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso – Administrativa, al estimar que, por la complejidad del asunto, no resulta aceptable que los juzgadores se hayan abstenido de aplicar la exoneración de costas previstas en el numeral supra citado, y, por el contrario, hayan impuesto la condenatoria en ambas costas.

VIII.- Tocante a lo alegado por el casacionista respecto a que la sentencia del Tribunal declara la vigencia del impuesto específico de consumo sobre cigarrillos y otras mercaderías a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, luego de que esos tributos fueron derogados por el artículo sexto de la Ley No. 6820, atentando contra los principios de inviolabilidad de la propiedad privada y de reserva de ley, y, además, de interpretar y equiparar, erróneamente, los términos “beneficios” e “impuestos”, estos agravios no son procedentes toda vez que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Segunda, se ajusta a derecho, al indicar que si bien es cierto, con la emisión de la Ley No.6820 se abrogaron ciertas cargas fiscales, esa norma siempre mantuvo vigente el impuesto sobre cigarrillos a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Como fundamento de lo anterior, se tiene por un lado que los impuestos contenidos en los artículos 1 al 14 de la Ley 5792, reformado por el artículo 35 de la Ley No. 6735 se encuentran vigentes, toda vez que no ha existido ninguna derogación expresa por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, ni anulación de la Sala Constitucional, que los afecte, por lo que en la actualidad son de acatamiento obligatorio para sus destinatarios. Por otro lado, la declaración de inconstitucionalidad respecto a la adición de la ley presupuestaria No. 7018 al artículo sexto de la Ley No. 6820 no tuvo mayor consecuencia, toda vez que, expresamente, la Sala Constitucional mantuvo el contenido original del numeral 6 Ibídem, al disponer que: “el texto del citado artículo 6° se mantiene con el contenido que presentaba con anterioridad a la reforma en comentario…”, por lo que se mantuvo lo dispuesto respecto a que: “Se mantienen todos los beneficios que por concepto de impuesto perciban el Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal…”. Por lo dicho supra, el numeral sexto tiene un alcance derogatorio amplio y expreso y, únicamente, se mantuvieron aquellos impuestos creados a favor de las instituciones estatales, expresamente, señaladas en el artículo 6 Ibídem y donde existe la obligación de proceder a su cancelación por parte de los contribuyentes. Consecuentemente, se impone el rechazo del recurso en cuanto a estos agravios.

IX.- Aún cuando este especial tributario comenzó a tramitarse en 1996, y lo resuelto por la Sala lógicamente refiere a la normativa aplicable en ese momento, en función de los agravios formulados, solo a mayor abundamiento, y para reforzar todo lo estudiado, se analizarán dos actos jurídicos trascendentales ocurridos con posterioridad, los cuales dejan claro y reiteran el fundamento legal y constitucional de lo resuelto. En primer lugar la tesis de la inafectabilidad de los derechos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, en torno a los ingresos provenientes del impuesto a los cigarrillos, fue ratificado por el artículo 8 de la Ley No. 7972 del 24 de diciembre de 1999 publicada en el Alcance No. 105 a la La Gaceta No. 250, de la misma fecha) el cual literalmente dice lo siguiente: “El impuesto ordenado en el artículo 1° de esta ley deberá calcularse antes del impuesto general sobre las ventas creado por la Ley N° 6826, de 8 de noviembre de 1982 y sus reformas, y cuya base imponible formará parte. Sin embargo, no estará incluido en la base imponible para calcular los impuestos a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal” (el subrayado no es del original). Con ello queda clara la inalterabilidad del principio, en los últimos 25 años, a diferencia de cuanto ha esgrimido la recurrente. En segundo lugar la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional N° 04528-99 de las 14 horas y 54 minutos del 15 de julio de 1999, notificada en enero del año 2000, dentro de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, con redacción del Magistrado Solano Carrera, se sostiene que al responderle a la Asamblea Legislativa la Consulta Facultativa de Constitucionalidad N° 3968 de 1998 referida al Proyecto N° 12.362 (el cual posteriormente fue la ya mencionada Ley N° 7972) “se señaló que siempre y cuando se entienda que esos impuestos van a la universalidad del presupuesto, manteniendo su destino específico, no existe inconstitucionalidad alguna”. Para mantener el criterio la sentencia de la Acción de Inconstitucionalidad recuerda a la Consulta lo siguiente: “si de acuerdo con el artículo 176 de la Constitución el presupuesto nacional ha de comprender todos los ingresos probables de la administración pública, lo que hace referencia a una previsión o cálculo de ingresos que permite al legislador estar en situación de conocer la magnitud previsible del rendimiento de impuestos nacionales, como los que crea el proyecto, esto último deben cumplir el ciclo presupuestario, y, para que esto sea posible, necesariamente han de ingresar a la contabilidad a que el artículo 185 de la Constitución se refiere y sumarse a la previsión de ingresos que menciona el artículo 176”. Finalmente en la parte medular de la Acción de inconstitucionalidad se sostiene el fundamento de todo cuanto se va a resolver al señalar lo siguiente: “En este sentido, estima necesario dejar constancia expresa de que en esta sentencia, se ha cambiado el criterio contenido en las resoluciones 7598-94 (considerando XII), 5754-94 y 4907-95, en el sentido siguiente: a) La Ley de Presupuesto tiene una relación de instrumentalidad con respecto a la ley ordinaria preexistente, por lo que, se encuentra subordinada a aquella de tal forma que no puede modificarla y debe más bien asegurar su actuación. En tratándose de impuestos nacidos por ley ordinaria para la satisfacción de un fin determinado (impuestos con destino específico), el legislador presupuestario no puede cambiar su destino, ni por ley de presupuesto y mucho menos por normas de rango inferior, y únicamente puede hacerlo modificando la ley ordinaria ya sea para eliminarlo por ya haberse satisfecho el fin para el cual nació, o bien para variar su destino. Los destinos específicos creados por norma de rango constitucional, sólo pueden ser variados por norma del mismo rango. Queda a salvo lo dicho en cuanto a los casos de guerra, conmoción interna y demás supuestos regulados en el artículo 180 de la Constitución Política. En consecuencia, se pueden hacer variaciones entre partidas de un mismo programa, mediante ley de presupuesto, siempre y cuando se traten de ingresos ordinarios que no tienen un destino específico predeterminado por ley ordinaria; b) el principio de caja única, sí tiene rango constitucional, y se refiere a la existencia de un solo centro de operaciones con capacidad legal para recibir y pagar en nombre del Estado; c) en cuanto a los recursos captados por impuestos con destino específico, no se aplican los principios de universalidad y no afectación y demás principios presupuestarios que rigen los ingresos percibidos para la satisfacción de necesidades generales, porque el legislador constituyente hizo la salvedad expresa de que si se permitiera su existencia sin que la doctrina imperante se le pudiera aplicar con rigidez a esa materia.. Cualquier otra jurisprudencia anterior a esta sobre la materia de impuestos con destino específico debe entenderse modificada en el sentido señalado.

X.- Respecto a la interpretación y equiparación de los términos “beneficios” e “impuestos”, no lleva razón el recurrente al indicar, para el caso de marras, que el concepto “beneficio” sea el de una “utilidad” o “provecho”, o en sentido tributario el de constituir “beneficios fiscales todas aquellas medidas que adopta la Hacienda Pública a favor de ciertos contribuyentes”, o jurídicamente como “aquellas medidas de apoyo o estímulo instrumental que actúan a través de un mecanismo desgravatorio del tributo”, como modalidad de exención. En la exposición de motivos de la Ley No. 6820 denominada “Reforma a la Ley de Consolidación de Impuestos Selectivos de Consumo”, del 3 de noviembre de 1982, se comprueba, claramente, cuál fue la intención del legislador al momento de crear el artículo sexto. En un principio, las mociones presentadas, en la Asamblea Legislativa, al artículo 6° Ibídem, eran en el sentido de “mantener los impuestos del INFOCOOP, IDA e IFAM”, donde se consigna lo siguiente: “Se exceptúan los impuestos cuyos ingresos actualmente perciben el Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal”. Posteriormente, se incluye una moción de forma que dice lo siguiente: “no obstante lo anterior se mantienen todos los beneficios que por concepto de impuestos, perciben el Instituto de Fomento Cooperativo, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal.”, indicando el legislador que la moción de forma pretende, prácticamente, lo mismo que la anterior moción, pero que “mejora en un ciento por ciento la forma” (folio 353 del expediente legislativo) para terminar concluyendo que la intención de la moción “es que quede meridianamente claro cuál era el sentido, simplemente no derogar tales y tales impuestos.” (folio 354 del expediente legislativo). Por todo lo dicho, es criterio de esta Sala que existe la obligación de los sujetos pasivos del impuesto selectivo de consumo de presentar las declaraciones juradas al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y proceder a su respectivo pago, por así exigirlo el numeral sexto de la Ley No. Placa37652. Consecuentemente, se impone el rechazo del recurso en cuanto a este cargo.

XI.- En lo tocante al agravio sobre el pago de costas donde el casacionista alega que el Tribunal debió haberlo eximido por la complejidad del asunto, el mismo no es procedente toda vez que esta Sala, en forma reiterada, ha establecido que en toda sentencia, cuando decida definitivamente las cuestiones debatidas, mediante pronunciamiento sobre la pretensión formulada en la demanda, o en los autos con carácter de sentencia, cuando decidan sobre excepciones o pretensiones incidentales, cuyo efecto es poner fin al proceso, se condenará al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales. Este principio se encuentra consagrado en el artículo 221 del Código Procesal Civil. En aplicación de esta norma se ha resuelto que el pronunciamiento sobre ambas costas debe hacerse aún de oficio, pues la condenatoria se impone al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, en otras palabras, por perder el litigio, sin poder deducir de tal condenatoria el calificativo de litigante temerario o de mala fe en el condenado al pago de esas costas. Excepcionalmente puede eximirse al vencido al pago de una o ambas costas. Esto acontece cuando el vencido ha litigado con evidente buena fe, o cuando la demanda o contrademanda comprendan pretensiones exageradas, o bien cuando el fallo acoja, solamente, parte de las peticiones fundamentales de la demanda o reconvención, si el fallo admite defensas importantes invocadas por el vencido, e incluso si hay vencimiento recíproco. También el Juez puede eximir a la vencida del pago de las costas procesales causadas con peticiones o en diligencias de la contraria que, a su juicio, deban ser calificadas de ociosas o innecesarias (artículo 222 del Código Procesal Civil). Como la exención del pago de costas es una facultad concedida al Juez la norma no se infringe cuando no se hace uso de esa facultad, pero, a la inversa, si el Juez hace uso de la facultad sí es posible un mal uso, o un uso indebido de la facultad, y, de acuerdo a las circunstancias, en ese caso sí puede resultar procedente un recurso de casación. Consecuentemente, se impone el rechazo del recurso en cuanto a este agravio.

XII.- En mérito de lo expuesto, no se han cometido las violaciones que se invocan en el recurso, por lo que se debe declarar sin lugar, con sus costas a cargo de la parte que lo interpuso (artículo 611 del Código Procesal Civil).

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso, con sus costas a cargo del recurrente.

Rodrigo Montenegro Trejos Hugo Picado Odio Ricardo Zeledón Zeledón Nombre191736 . Ana María Breedy Jalet Magistrada Suplente Ns.-