Limited liability of registered owner in traffic accident: partial dismissal of civil claim upheldResponsabilidad limitada del propietario registral en accidente de tránsito: rechazo parcial de la acción civil

**Resolution: 2025-0276.** **Case File: 19-000743-0497-TR** **SPECIALIZED SENTENCING APPEALS COURT FOR ORGANIZED CRIME. First Judicial Circuit of San José** (Acting as the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court, Third Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, San Ramón), at eleven hours and forty-seven minutes, on the twenty-seventh day of March, two thousand twenty-five.

**CRIMINAL SENTENCING APPEAL** filed in this case against [Name 001], of legal age, Costa Rican, bearer of identity card [Value 001], born on March 9, 1981, 43 years old, daughter of [Name 002] and [Name 003], widow, administrator at a toy store, resident of [...], for the crime of **CULPABLE INJURIES** to the detriment of [Name 004]. Judges María Milagro Granados García, Hannia Soto Arroyo, and Judge Raúl Madrigal Lizano are involved in the decision on the appeal. The public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona, appeared before this court; the Challenge filed by the convicted person [Name 001]; and the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano; and, **WHEREAS:**

**I.-** That by judgment number 660-2024, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October ninth, two thousand twenty-four, the **CRIMINAL COURT OF HEREDIA. Single-Judge Section**, resolved: "**THEREFORE:** In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 5.6. and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 1, 30, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 71, and 128 of the Penal Code; 122 and following of the Rules of Civil Liability of the 1941 Penal Code; 1 through 16, 111 through 118, 142, 182 through 184, 265, 267, 356, 358, 360 through 365, and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code; 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code; 74, 197, and 199 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial; and Fee Decree 41457-JP, the following is resolved: 1) [Name 001] is declared to be a **RESPONSIBLE PERPETRATOR** of a crime of **CULPABLE INJURIES** to the detriment of [Name 004] and in such capacity, the principal penalty of **SIXTY (60) DAY-FINES** is imposed at a rate of **FIVE THOUSAND COLONES (¢5,000) PER DAY**, for a total of **THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (¢300,000)**, which she must pay in favor of the Board for Constructions, Installations, and Acquisitions of Goods of the Ministry of Justice to the Banco Nacional account [Value 002], and must provide the payment receipt to this office, under warning that once this judgment becomes final, a period of fifteen business days is granted to make the corresponding payment. The convicted person is warned that if she lacks the economic resources to pay the imposed fine or to make the payment in installments, she must inform this office before the expiration of the previously referenced period, indicating whether she is interested in performing public utility services for the State or its public welfare institutions, an aspect that will be determined by the competent judge and whose oversight will be the responsibility of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social; on the contrary, if the period of fifteen business days after the judgment becomes final expires without the fine having been paid and without any statement having been made regarding the lack of ability to pay, each day-fine will be converted into one day of imprisonment. 2) The accessory penalty of **DISQUALIFICATION FROM DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLES ON PUBLIC ROADS** for a period of **SIX MONTHS** is imposed on Ms. [Name 001]. 3) The cessation of any personal precautionary measure that may have been imposed against Ms. [Name 001] on the occasion of this process is ordered. 4) The civil action for damages brought by [Name 004] against [Name 001] is declared partially **GRANTED**, therefore Ms. [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following items: a. ¢96,873,925.62 (ninety-six million, eight hundred seventy-three thousand, nine hundred twenty-five colones and sixty-two cents) for permanent disability. b. ¢2,000,000 (two million colones) for moral damages. c. ¢14,837,392.56 (fourteen million, eight hundred thirty-seven thousand, three hundred ninety-two colones and fifty-six cents) for civil costs in favor of the Victim's Civil Defense Office. d. ¢49,381 (forty-nine thousand, three hundred eighty-one colones) in favor of [Name 004] for procedural costs arising from the payment of the actuarial mathematician expert witness. The claim for collection for temporary disability requested in the civil lawsuit is rejected. To the aforementioned monetary amounts, the legal interest generated from their obligation until their effective payment must be added, as well as the corresponding indexation. Since the civil judgment was made based on liquid sums, [Name 001] is granted a period of fifteen business days from the finality of this judgment to make the corresponding payments to the account that must be provided by Mr. [Name 004] and to the account that must be provided by the Victim's Civil Defense Office; otherwise, the interested party is authorized to proceed with collection through the corresponding channels. 5) The civil action for damages brought by [Name 004] against AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA is declared **DISMISSED**, but it is exonerated from the payment of costs due to the existence of plausible grounds for litigating. 6) The lifting of lien number 2021-00785971-002 and the collision annotation with ticket number 20180315300615, which are registered against vehicle with license plates [Value 003], is ordered, once the judgment becomes final. 7) Once the judgment becomes final, the destruction of the material evidence associated with the case file is ordered. 8) This matter is resolved without special condemnation in criminal costs, so the expenses of the process must be borne by the State. 9) Once this judgment becomes final, its registration in the Judicial Registry and Archive is ordered, as well as the submission of the corresponding official copies to the National Institute of Criminology and the Sentence Enforcement Court. Notify the judgment to the Dirección General de Tránsito of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport for its corresponding action. **NOTIFY.** Juan Carlos Morales Jiménez, Trial Judge" (sic).

**II.-** That, against the preceding ruling, the public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona; the Challenge filed by the convicted person [Name 001]; and the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, filed criminal sentencing appeals, which will be resolved by this panel of the Specialized Sentencing Appeals Court for Organized Crime, according to Agreement Number XXVI of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session number 53-2023, of June 23, 2023.

**III.-** That, having verified the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court considered the issues raised in the challenge.

**IV.-** That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Sentencing Appeals Judge Granados García, and; **CONSIDERING** **I.- Admissibility, competence, and evidence. (A) Admissibility examination.** In this case, the Criminal Court of Heredia, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October ninth, two thousand twenty-four, issued judgment number 660-2024, through which it declared [Name 001] a responsible perpetrator of a crime of Culpable Injuries, to the detriment of [Name 004], for which it imposed on Ms. [Name 001] a fine and a disqualification penalty. Additionally, it resolved the civil claims submitted for its consideration. Thus, we are faced with a ruling that can be appealed through this channel (objective taxativity). In accordance with Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights and the resolution by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Mauricio Herrera Ulloa vs. Costa Rica via judgment of July second, two thousand fourteen, few formalities are necessary to hear the appeals against the judgment. However, according to the provisions of Articles 437 to 440, 446, 458, and 460 to 462 of the Criminal Procedure Code, simple requirements must be met regarding form, timeframe, and standing to challenge; therefore, the examination of said requirements is conducted. The comprehensive reading of the verdict took place on October sixteenth, two thousand twenty-four, so the deadline to appeal existed until November sixth, two thousand twenty-four. On November first, two thousand twenty-four, public defender Eduardo Monterrey Carmona, acting as the legal defense counsel for [Name 001], filed an appeal against the indicated judgment, confirming the filing within the legal timeframe and with the proper standing for such purposes. In turn, on November sixth, two thousand twenty-four, the convicted person herself, [Name 001], exercising her material defense, filed an appeal, also having standing to do so and within the legal timeframe. On the same date, and consequently on time, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, in her capacity as attorney for the Victim's Civil Defense Office and representing the civil claimant [Name 004], filed an appeal, specifically regarding civil claims, for which she also has standing. Furthermore, all challenges were filed through reasoned submissions, with express indication of the grievances, before the trial court. Based on the foregoing, the appeals are admissible, and it is appropriate to rule on the merits. **(B) Competence.** This Specialized Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court for Organized Crime is competent to hear this appeal, as stipulated in Articles 93 ter and 101 bis of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, in conjunction with Agreement Number XXVI of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session number 53-2023 of June twenty-third, two thousand twenty-three. **(C) Admissibility examination of the evidence.** In the appeal filed by the convicted person [Name 001], under the section she titled "Evidence to be Gathered and for Better Provision," she textually stated: "With all respect, I offer as evidence for better resolution and to be gathered, that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros be requested through its authority for information on all payments made to the injured party in order to verify what amounts have been paid so that there is no (sic) double payment in this matter or double collection." Additionally, [Name 005], representing the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., upon responding to the appeal filed by the Victim's Civil Defense Office, in the section titled "Offer of Evidence for Better Resolution," stated the following: "The possibility of offering evidence for better resolution, even in the challenge phase, is specially provided for by Article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides for such power, in effect, as a necessary guarantee to ensure and materialize the search for the real truth - a proper and consubstantial purpose of all criminal proceedings. Under the protection of said legal norm, in this act, a series of vouchers from the Ministry of Finance are offered - as evidence for better resolution - which have the character of official documents, and which demonstrate that AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE S.A. is neither a company, nor does it develop economic or lucrative activities, nor does it organize or intervene in the market for the intermediation of goods and services or in the activities organizing the different factors of production, which will allow the theory of the case of this representation of the co-defendant party to be demonstrated, regarding the absence of a profit motive or economic gain in the actions of said corporate consortium." (The underlining belongs to the original). Having evaluated the offers and arguments of the parties, in light of Article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Chamber rejects the evidence offered by both parties, for the following reasons: The referenced article, even cited by one of them, provides: "The appealing party may offer, in the filing of the appeal, new evidence concerning the facts that are the subject of the proceedings or the manner in which an act was carried out, when what is indicated in the proceedings, the record, the trial records, or the judgment itself is contradicted. The court will accept as new only the evidence offered in a timely manner but arbitrarily rejected, that which appears novel after the judgment, and that which, although pre-existing, the interested party was not effectively able to offer at the time." (The highlighting does not belong to the original). Attending to the express provision that regulates the matter, this Chamber is of the opinion that only evidence that was arbitrarily rejected, that which is novel or appears later, or that which the interested party did not have the possibility of offering at the time, can be accepted. In this case, from the study of the case file, it is evident that both the evidence requested by the accused and civil defendant [Name 001] and that offered by the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. do not fall within any of those scenarios. It is not recorded in the case file that it was previously offered and rejected, nor was it so alleged by the parties, and by its very nature, it is ruled out that it is novel or that the parties did not have the possibility of offering it in the earlier procedural stages, if they deemed it pertinent. On the contrary, this is documentation that existed in public entities (Instituto Nacional de Seguros and Ministry of Finance), which the parties could have requested previously, which they did not do. Note that, during the adversarial proceedings, the representation of the civil co-defendant offered an expert mathematical opinion, which was admitted, without it having requested or provided the documentation it now seeks to have evaluated by this Appeals Chamber at that time. Based on the foregoing, in strict application of the cited norm, the evidence offered by both parties is rejected as it is not admissible in the challenge stage.

**II.- Summary of the arguments. (A) Appeal filed by the public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona.** In his sole ground of appeal, titled "Disagreement with the determination of the facts, illegitimate basis of the conviction," he cited Articles 1, 9, 62, 142, 184 and subsequent ones of the Criminal Procedure Code as violated norms. According to his presentation, the Trial Court (hereinafter, in this section, the court) omitted factual circumstances that were detailed in the accusation and were never proven, thereby weakening the factual construction of the accusation and erroneously indicating the responsibility of the defendant. He criticized that the court considered the excess speed attributed to his client as proven, but that the rules of logic and experience alluded to by the court were explained based on its subjectivity, without mentioning which logic or experience it referred to. He complained that the court used the police report as a parameter to compare the damage to the vehicles and, from there, through its own logic and experience, imagined the excess speed. He condemned the fact that the police report contained merely referential information, insufficient to assess the quality of the damages. He added that the judge mentioned Newton's third law, but without having the exact speed data to arrive at a measurable result. He criticized that the court referred to the testimony of the injured party regarding the accused having told him that she had pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, since thereby – according to the appellant – it revealed an inclination to consider ideas, occurrences, or mere gossip, which in any case were discredited by his client. He stated that maintaining that the injured party kept the same version in the complaint and in the trial to justify the conviction is a fallacious argument. Furthermore, according to the appellant, the court did not explain why it considered the injured party to be coherent, consistent, and persistent, reflecting that it took as true facts impossible to prove, relying only on the statement of the aggrieved party. He argued that the court did not evaluate that it was never demonstrated that the vehicle [Value 004], driven by [Name 006], stopped and kept its distance from the injured party's vehicle. In this regard, the testimony of [Name 006] was not received, nor was any document available in this respect. However, according to his view, the court took it for granted without anyone having proven it. He requested that the appeal be granted, the judgment annulled, and a retrial ordered. **(B) Challenge filed by the convicted person [Name 001].** (1) First ground: Disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. Violation of the rules of sound criticism that violates the universal principle of *in dubio pro reo*. She claimed the violation of Articles 1, 2, 6, 142, and 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 39 and 41 of the Magna Carta. She argued that the court disqualified evidentiary elements that showed the lack of duty of care was on the part of the other vehicles by not maintaining the required distance. She added that the court did not fully explain the reasons in fact and law that led it to disqualify her version, limiting itself to dismissing it as a mere attempt to evade responsibility. She alleged a logical error in the judge's analysis, as he granted credibility to the injured party while holding onto excluding assessments to diminish the reliability of her version (the appellant's). She cited excerpts from the judgment. She added that the judge did not explain which logical rule and rule of experience allowed him to conclude what the generating fact was, but rather simply opted for the version given by the injured party. According to the appellant, it does not follow from the evidence that her vehicle was the generator of the impact beyond the injured party's version about the alleged excess speed, but there is no braking mark and the traffic officer did not note that the distance of 3.80 meters was due to her being the one who caused the collision. She argued that the court's conclusion is contrary to the rules of logic, considering the weight of the vehicles, that it is a road where one travels at minimum speed, as well as that Ms. [Name 006], despite being pregnant, did not suffer injuries, nor did the injured party, who acknowledged that he exited the vehicle without help and rather helped others to get out. According to the complainant, the judge reflected what the injured party stated and accepted it, without providing further explanation, lacking technical criteria to support his conclusions. Furthermore, in her appeal, she presented two alternatives that explained the final position of her vehicle: 1. That at the moment of the crash, the vehicles ahead had already collided seconds before, thereby forming a single block, so that when her vehicle impacted Ms. [Name 006]'s vehicle, it was stopped by the Toyota Prado. 2. That prior to the crash, the vehicles were traveling so close together, that upon her vehicle impacting, it bounced back due to the cohesion formed at that moment, given the lower mass, density, and size of the vehicle she was driving. She continued arguing that her statements at trial were not analyzed, the judge deeming it sufficient to indicate they lacked evidentiary support. She reproached that her statements were used against her to prove excess speed, but at the same time, she was not believed because they lacked evidentiary support, thus constituting contradictory and excluding assessments. She reiterated that the judge substituted the rules of sound criticism with the phrases of the injured party and the mere compatibility between the accounts of the aggrieved party and the witness. She added that the analysis to rule out concurrence of fault was superficial and light, based exclusively on the 3.80-meter distance of her vehicle, without weighing the position of the rest of the vehicles and that Ms. [Name 006] did not suffer injuries. She concluded by indicating that the judge was more interested in the quantity of prosecution witnesses than in their quality and veracity. (2) Second ground: Disagreement with the determination of the civil facts. Erroneous assessment of the mathematical expert calculation regarding the norm of Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito. She cited as violated Articles 99 and 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 363 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as 74 and subsequent articles of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres (hereinafter, Ley de Tránsito). After a brief indication of the requirements for a judgment, she argued that the judgment omitted to explain with the necessary clarity the cause-effect relationship between the collision and the knee injury, limiting itself to referring to the non-opposition to the medical-legal opinions and treating them as "holy writ." According to her argument, the court omitted to evaluate the discussion about whether it is a long-standing injury, a product of mountain walks, and that it was demonstrated at trial that the injured party walked by his own means, helped others, without issues with his knee or shoulder, and therefore did not require medical attention. She added that the judge accepted the permanent disability and the compensation amounts, without providing further details in this regard. She argued that the compensation calculation should have been based on the net salary, not the gross salary, as the latter does not adjust to the real amount the person receives but includes amounts inherent to social security and the treasury, as is evident from the mathematical expert opinion managed by the defense. She reiterated that the judgment does not extract the imputation criterion that gives rise to the compensation obligation, in the case of injuries appearing months later, whose nexus had to be proven by the civil claimant. She indicated that the judgment did not consider any proven fact that supports the civil judgment. (3) Third ground: Disagreement with the individualization of the penalty. She accused the violation of Articles 1, 2, 12, 142, and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 71 and 128 of the Penal Code. She complained that the disqualification penalty was imposed, which she indicated is not for indiscriminate or automatic application but rather requires analysis of its connection to the profession or occupation of driver and must be justified for each specific case. She cited rulings 865-99 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber and 145-2008 of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of Cartago. She alleged that the judge did not analyze whether it was a habitual activity that generated economic profit, and therefore also did not assess criteria of reasonableness and proportionality before imposing a burdensome sanction such as disqualification. **(C) Appeal filed by the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano.** (1) First ground: Erroneous and omissive application of substantive law, specifically Article 199, subsection b) of the Ley de Tránsito, in relation to the dismissal of the civil action for damages brought against the civil co-defendant company América Ciento Siete S.A. After summarizing the civil action as relevant and citing part of the judgment's reasoning, she argued that the judge made an extensive and arbitrary interpretation of Article 199, subsection b) of the Ley de Tránsito, contravening Article 10 of the Civil Code, which establishes that norms must be interpreted based on the literal meaning of the words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative background, and social reality, adhering to its spirit and purpose. She added that the judge confused joint and several civil liability with pure strict liability derived from the creation of risks (Article 1048 of the Civil Code). Thus, according to her view, the profit requested by the court is not a legal requirement. The only thing the legislator requires for the imperative application of indirect joint and several civil liability, in addition to the driver's fault in producing the damage, is that the natural or legal person operates the vehicle and does so for commercial or industrial purposes. According to the challenger, economic profit is a species of utility or operation, but not the only one, and what is required is that the operation be for commercial or industrial purposes. She argued that it is a notorious fact and, therefore, does not require evidentiary elements, that the civil co-defendant is a sociedad anónima. Consequently, by legal mandate, its nature is commercial and its assets are designated for the fulfillment of that purpose. She added that, with the corporate charter of the company, which was offered as evidence, the corporate purpose and objectives were demonstrated, which are commercial and industrial, and with this, the purpose of the vehicle of the co-defendant company and its joint and several liability were proven. She cited ruling 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber. She added that if the civil co-defendant opposed the civil action or what the corporate charter indicated, according to Article 41.1.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the burden of proof lay with it and not with the civil claimant, as the judge demanded. However, the purposes of the company were not disputed. She insisted that the judge required a condition not contemplated in the law, and it is irrelevant that the accused, at the time of the accident, was not engaged in a profit-making activity. She reiterated that the judge ignored the fact that evidentiary activity is necessary for proving disputed events, not regarding notorious facts or those on which there was no dispute. She cited ruling 1837-2020 of the First Chamber. She concluded that, given that it was proven that [Name 001] failed in her duty of care when driving the vehicle owned by América Ciento Siete S.A., and produced damages to the victim, as well as that it was proven that the company's purposes were commercial and industrial, without the civil co-defendant opposing or offering evidence to the contrary, it was necessary to grant the civil action for damages against América Ciento Siete S.A. as a joint and several civilly liable party, through a proper application of Article 199, subsection b) of the Ley de Tránsito. (2) Second ground: Erroneous application of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, as a case of strict civil liability. The appellant explained that, independently of the subjective liability of [Name 001], given the commercial nature of the company América Ciento Siete S.A., strict civil liability derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code was also claimed. She argued that the judgment implicitly acknowledged all the legal and factual conditions for declaring this type of liability but required a condition not contemplated in the law, namely, that it be proven that, at the time of the collision, the vehicle was being used for a pecuniary activity. She again cited ruling 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber to support her position that the only requirements are: that injuries or death were caused by a moving machine, that the natural or legal person is the owner of the means by which the injuries were caused, and that force majeure or the victim's fault was not proven. She reiterated that, in the case of sociedades anónimas, as they are intended for profit and commercial activity, their vehicles are destined for operational purposes, and given the risk in their activity, strict civil liability is provided for. She cited ruling 903-F-SI-2021 of the First Chamber. She added that the documentary evidence demonstrated that América Ciento Siete is a sociedad anónima and its line of business is evident since its incorporation, so there was no doubt that its vehicle was being used for commercial purposes, a fact not disputed by the civil co-defendant, nor did it offer evidence to the contrary. She concluded that the judge exceeded the legal requirements, in an arbitrary and extensive application of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, ignoring the legal nature of the company that owns the vehicle and, consequently, the purpose of the asset, as established in Articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code. (3) Third ground: Regarding the non-application of Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito. The appellant pointed out that, according to the cited articles, limited joint and several liability was claimed.

However, the judge did not rule on this matter, but merely ordered the lifting of the liens and annotations once the judgment became final. According to the appellant, this constitutes a formal defect in the judgment due to a lack of reasoning, despite forming part of the civil claim and the arguments raised. She added that it also constitutes a substantive defect, due to the non-application of Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, according to which the vehicle must remain encumbered until the damage caused is answered for, given the strict liability. She recalled that the limited joint and several civil liability persists regardless of what was decided regarding the subjective civil liability (Article 199 of the Ley de Tránsito) and joint and several liability (numeral 1048 of the Código Civil). She cited ruling 523-2024 of this Court, partially with a different composition, as well as ruling 212-2018 of the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. (4) Fourth ground: Erroneous application of the principle of congruence. She claimed a violation of Articles 112 and 365 of the Código Procesal Penal and numeral 61.2 of the Código Procesal Penal. She argued that the reasoning contained in the appealed judgment included that it was not alleged “that this car was being exploited by the legal entity or by the driver -a natural person- to generate personal profit from a commercial or industrial standpoint,” nor was it alleged that “América Ciento Siete S.A. or [Name 001], on November 19, 2018, were exploiting the vehicle to carry out a particular pecuniary activity.” However, in the filing of the civil action for damages, according to the appellant, the description of the three criteria of attribution asserted by the civil plaintiff does appear, on folios 4 and 5 verso of the civil action for damages file. Thus, regarding the joint and several civil liability contained in Article 199 of the Ley de Tránsito, it was noted that with respect to the civil co-defendant company, the claim derived from the following: “by being the owner of the vehicle driven by the defendant, given that this vehicle (sic) belongs to a legal entity whose purpose is commerce, industry, among others, according to the same certification of legal status, therefore it falls within the liability detailed in numeral 199 subsection b) of the Ley de Tránsito.” As for the strict civil liability under numeral 1048 of the Código Civil, the filing stated: “it involves a motor machine and by its very nature, the driving of vehicles generates a risk by itself, and the joint and several civil liability generated by means of a motor machine is also specifically indicated.” Regarding the last criterion of attribution, the limited joint and several civil liability, it was outlined that it stemmed from the mere verification that the defendant corporation is the registered owner of the vehicle with license plate [Value 003]. She concluded that this verifies a defect of erroneous application of the aforementioned precepts and a defect of reasoning, according to Article 142 of the Código Procesal Penal. (5) Fifth ground: Erroneous and omitted factual, evidentiary, and legal reasoning of the judgment. Articles 142, 184, and 363 subsection b) of the Código Procesal Penal were considered infringed. It was reproached that the judge considered that the civil plaintiff had not made reference to what the commercial activities of the civil co-defendant company were, nor the use of the vehicle in that sphere. However, according to the appellant, she did indicate the commercial activity in which the company was engaged and proved it through the certification of legal status, which contains its corporate purpose or objectives. Furthermore, the inherent nature of corporations was alleged, according to Articles 5 and 17 of the Código de Comercio, which allows one to deduce that their assets are intended to fulfill the company's for-profit purposes. In her view, the strict civil liability arises from this, given the purpose of exploitation and the risk existing in the activity. She mentioned, again, ruling 187-2013 of the Sala de Casación Penal. She criticized that, despite the foregoing, the civil action for damages was rejected against the civil co-defendant company, without weighing the certification provided, nor the arguments described. According to the appellant, this translates into a defect of lack of reasoning and pretermission of evidence. She maintained that the judge erred in considering that automatic civil liability had been alleged; rather, the criterion of attribution focused on the legal nature of the defendant company, on the purposes it had, and on the commercial exploitation activity it exercised, which follows from an analysis of commercial regulations and the certification of legal status (none of which was contested nor was evidence to the contrary offered). She added that the judge did not explain the reasons for disregarding the commercial purposes that the company had and that the assets were the means of its commercial activity based solely on the statement of [Name 001], or why this statement carried more weight than the evidence offered by the civil plaintiff. According to the appellant, all the foregoing constitutes a defect of lack of reasoning and also a violation of the rules of logic, specifically the principle of sufficient reason, in addition to the pretermission of evidence, both the certification of legal status and the vehicle's registry certification. She added that the judge laconically justified the rejection of the second criterion of attribution, through a mere routine reference, without assessing the documentary evidence offered by the civil plaintiff, which he did not even mention. According to the appellant, the same occurred regarding the decision to lift the liens, since the sole argument was the rejection of the civil action for damages filed against the corporation, without analyzing the cited regulations, by which said lien should have persisted as a model of limited joint and several civil liability. (D) Position of the Ministerio Público: It did not issue a pronouncement, despite having been summoned since November twelve, two thousand twenty-four. (E) Position of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A.: On November eighteenth, two thousand twenty-four, by email addressed to the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de San Ramón, a filing titled "Se solicita rechazo de recurso de apelación de sentencia penal promovido por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima del Ministerio Público" was received, signed by [Name 005], representing América Ciento Siete S.A., through which it rejected some of the grounds of the aforementioned appeal. Regarding the first ground: It argued that it lacks clarity, does not provide direct, precise, and consistent arguments, resorts to jurisprudential citations, and is not self-sufficient. It reiterated that its represented party does not have a for-profit purpose and that they were not obligated to prove this, as the fundamental circumstances of the attribution must be proven by the civil plaintiff, as follows from a correct reading of Article 41.1 of the Código Procesal Civil. It added that the evidence allows the inference of the conclusion reached by the judge, in that its represented party does not carry out economic activity and is a simple family holding company, a common figure in our country, as declared by Mrs. [Name 001]. In its view, it is not enough that it is a corporation for it to have a for-profit purpose, which constitutes a presumption by the civil plaintiff. It cited ruling 304-F-97 of the Tribunal de Casación Penal. Regarding the second ground: It argued that it is a reiteration of the first and stems from an erroneous interpretation of Article 1048 of the Código Civil. As it sees it, the purpose of the rule is to grant strict civil liability when the company exercises a true and authentic commercial activity. It indicated that the jurisprudential citations provided by the appellant are biased and attempt to mislead, and are also old and have been contradicted by more recent rulings. It cited an excerpt from judgment 244-2018 of the Sala de Casación Penal. It reiterated that América Ciento Siete S.A. is not a company, does not develop economic or lucrative activities, does not intervene in the intermediation of goods and services, and the burden of proof was on the civil plaintiff. It added that the vehicle was being used for personal errands of [Name 001]. As for the third ground: It pointed out that it contains novel and surreptitious arguments, which were not directly raised before the Trial Court, making them a violation of the principle of congruence, that is, the conformity between the requests and the judgment that ends the litigation. It cited ruling 20-2018 of the Tribunal Segundo Civil de San José. It criticized that the application of Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito was never formally requested, so the judge was barred from granting such a claim. It added that, even hypothetically including those arguments from the time of the lawsuit, it is not appropriate to keep a vehicle encumbered if its registered owner was exonerated from liability, so the decision was correct in light of Articles 1, 9, and 268 of the Código Procesal Penal and Articles 39 and 42 of the Constitución Política. It pointed out that those norms of the Ley de Tránsito are not binding or applicable to the specific case, given the exoneration from liability. Overall, regarding the appeal filed by the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, it requested that the conformity of the first-instance judgment be declared, and concluded by recalling that nullity for the sake of nullity is not admissible.

III.- Given their affinity, in order to avoid reiterations, the sole ground of the appeal filed by the public defender Monterrey Carmona and the first ground contained in the challenge presented by the convicted [Name 001] are resolved jointly, both being declared without merit. As stated in the previous recital, the appellants reproached the determination of the criminal facts, considering that the judge incurred errors in the assessment of the evidence, by granting full credibility to the aggrieved party, while rejecting the defense version, without adequately setting forth the factual and legal reasons that led him to do so. Furthermore, according to the appellants, the rules of sound criticism were violated, as the judge did not explain the rules of logic and experience that allowed him to establish the dynamics of the facts and, consequently, the responsibility of the accused, evidencing that the decision was based on subjectivities and on the absolute credibility granted to the victim. In the view of both appellants, the evidence that was submitted to the judge's knowledge, assessed objectively and in accordance with the rules of rational sound criticism, did not allow for the dynamics of the facts that were charged to be deemed proven, nor to detract from that which was proposed by [Name 001] in the exercise of her material defense. Upon examining the reasoning that the a quo set forth in the appealed judgment, this Cámara de Apelación concludes that the claims in question are due to a fragmented and incomplete reading of the intellectual analysis on which the conviction was based. Contrary to what was alleged by the convicted person and her public defender, it is corroborated that the Trial Judge carried out an objective, exhaustive, and comprehensive analysis of the evidence incorporated into the trial, which allowed him to deem the following facts as proven: “1. On November 19, 2018, at approximately 9:20 a.m., in Heredia, Ulloa, route 1, heading from Alajuela towards San José, 300 meters before the Alfredo González Flores bridge, [Name 004] was driving the vehicle with license plate [Value 005] in the left lane, with the right-of-way, and was traveling in the company of his minor son [Name 009], who was in the front passenger seat. 2. That same day, time, and place, [Name 001], was driving the vehicle with license plate [Value 003], in the same direction as the victim [Name 004]. 3. In the dynamics of the road traffic occurring on the described roadway, the vehicle traveling ahead of the victim's motor vehicle, driven by [Name 010] and with license plate [Value 006], stopped due to traffic congestion, therefore the victim [Name 004] also stopped, maintaining the proper distance. Behind the victim came the vehicle with license plate [Value 004] driven by [Name 006], who also stopped. Behind [Name 006] was driving the defendant [Name 001], who, failing in the objective duty of care in the driving of motor vehicles, because she was driving at excess speed for the road conditions and the traffic congestion in the area, did not stop and strongly collided with the vehicle driven by [Name 006] and, with the force exerted on this vehicle, [Name 001] propelled the motor vehicle driven by [Name 006] against the vehicle of the victim [Name 004] and, in this way, caused it to collide with the victim's vehicle at the rear, and in turn, caused the vehicle driven by [Name 004] to impact the car in front of him, driven by [Name 010]. In this way, Mrs. [Name 001] caused the victim [Name 004] to also impact against the dash and the lower interior part of his vehicle, suffering blows to the right knee, while the seatbelt produced a blow to the victim, due to the whiplash effect, in the neck, shoulder, and right arm; injuries that required medical attention hours after the event. 4. As a consequence of the failure in the objective duty of care in driving vehicles by [Name 001], [Name 004] was injured and, according to medical-legal reports 2019-0551 (of January 21, 2019) and 2020-7387 (of October 1, 2020), suffered trauma to the neck, back, right shoulder, and right knee, evidencing bicipital tenosynovitis, subacromial-subdeltoid bursitis, heterogeneous thickening of the supraspinatus tendon fibers of post-traumatic inflammatory nature, of conservative treatment and through infiltrations; and edema of the prepatellar and infrapatellar subcutaneous fatty tissue, grade I sprain of the medial collateral ligament and chondral lesion, which required arthroscopic surgery of the right knee. Currently, the described injuries cause pain in the victim [Name 004]'s shoulder, arm, and forearm, making it difficult for him to lift weight, and pain in the right knee. These injuries caused by the defendant [Name 001] caused physical damage to the victim and required a temporary disability for the performance of his usual occupations of two (2) months, from the date of the events, and a permanent disability of ten percent (10%) for loss of general organic capacity.” (Verbatim quote). It is necessary to clarify that there were facts that were not controverted by the technical or material defense; rather, the defense theory, regarding the criminal perspective, during the trial, rested on two arguments, the first concerning the dynamics of the accident and the second regarding the cause of the injuries to the victim [Name 004] (the second of the grounds of appeal by the convicted [Name 001] partially addresses this last argument, so it will be expanded upon later). Regarding the dynamics of the accident, according to [Name 001], the vehicles preceding the one driven by her did not keep the proper distance and, indeed, had already collided before she impacted the motor vehicle driven by [Name 006]. In this sense, she stated at trial: “(…) I want to declare myself not guilty, I want to explain the characteristics of the cars, his is a large, tall, strong car, with a chassis, my car is a small one, it is a car that has no front end, it's old, made of soft metal, it's a small car, I feel that in all this the responsibility is shared, I feel there was no distance between the vehicles, I was coming slowly, on repeated occasions the man indicated there was a traffic jam, so it was impossible to be going at another speed. I will tell you how things happened, I was coming from Alajuela to San José when I saw that the man suddenly braked, the car in front hit him and I hit her, at that moment everything happened fast, I was super scared, …”. (Quote taken verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). As is easily verified, this is the same position held in the challenge under review. Now, from the transcribed facts, it is clear that, indeed, the a quo discarded the defense version and, on the contrary, deemed the dynamics of the facts that were charged as proven, according to which the convicted [Name 001] failed in the duty of care in driving the motor vehicle with license plate [Value 003], by driving at excess speed, without taking into consideration the traffic congestion, not stopping in a timely manner, and colliding with the vehicle driven by Mrs. [Name 006] (license plate [Value 004]), which caused it to collide with the car driven by the victim [Name 004] (license plate [Value 005]) and the latter with the motor vehicle driven by Mr. [Name 010] (license plate [Value 006]). As will be analyzed later, the foregoing caused the injuries suffered by [Name 004]. Having examined the judge's arguments contained in the judgment, as well as the evidence that was submitted to his knowledge, this Chamber does not detect any defect in the assessment of the evidentiary elements, nor any violation of the rules of sound criticism, it being appreciated that the a quo carried out a clear and precise reasoning of the points submitted for discussion in the debate, which led him to the conviction decision. It is true that the court granted full credibility to the statement of the victim [Name 004]; however, this does not translate into a defect, insofar as the judge amply explained the reasons that allowed him to reach that conclusion, complying with the provisions of Article 142 of the Código Procesal Penal, while conducting a concatenated analysis of the evidence and correctly applying the rules of sound criticism, as established in Article 184 of the same normative body. In response to the arguments raised by the appellants, summarized in the previous recital, it is necessary to recall that our criminal procedural system is governed by the principle of freedom of evidence, according to which any fact can be proven by any means, provided it is legal. Thus, arguments are not acceptable according to which the dynamics of the event could not be deemed proven because there was no statement from Mrs. [Name 006], no technical evidence was available, there is no skid mark, or because the tickets and traffic report did not record who the person responsible for the collision was or the magnitude of the damages. Such arguments attempt to apply a type of fixed-rate evidence, which cannot be admitted by this Chamber, as it would openly contravene the aforementioned principle and the system of free evaluation of evidence that governs us, contemplated in Article 184 of the Código Procesal Penal, which provides: “Assessment. The court shall assign the corresponding value to each piece of evidence, with strict application of the rules of sound criticism. It must adequately justify and substantiate the reasons why it grants a determined value, based on the joint and harmonious appreciation of all essential evidence.” In the appealed judgment, the reasons were clearly explained why, through the examination of the testimonies that were indeed received during the debate, together with the duly incorporated documentary evidence, it was possible for the judge to deem the charged facts as proven, namely that on the date, time, and place described in the factual account (circumstances about which there was no contention), three of the four vehicles involved in the accident stopped in a timely manner, given the traffic congestion, and it was the motor vehicle driven by the convicted [Name 001] that did not stop and caused the multiple collision in question. Having examined the appealed ruling, this Chamber has verified the correct application of the rules of logic, specifically derivation and sufficient reason, as the judge intertwined the documentary and expert evidence (complaint, sketch, official report, traffic tickets, medical reports) with the testimonies provided by the victim [Name 004], the witness [Name 009], and the traffic officer [Name 011], which reasonably allowed him to opt for proving the version of the aggrieved party and excluding that of the accused. In this sense, the judge - throughout his intellectual reasoning - assessed: “(…) this Court must explain how it reached that conclusion and for this, it is appropriate to begin the corresponding dissertation by pointing out that at trial, the statement of Mr. [Name 004] was received, who clearly, spontaneously, and without major hesitation explained, roughly, that on the day in question he was traveling in the company of his minor son in his Toyota Prado vehicle heading towards San José and that, before reaching the Alfredo González Flores bridge –popularly known as «la platina»– he stopped because there was traffic congestion and the vehicle in front –which was red– had braked; likewise, he indicated that once stopped he looked in the rearview mirror and saw that behind them there was a vehicle he categorized as a white Rav-4 and that in a matter of seconds he heard a bang, like a screech, that he reacted by looking again in the rearview mirror and they already had the vehicle from behind «on top» of them, so what he did was try to hold the brake and at the same time, hold the steering wheel tightly, but the impact was inevitable and so fast that he did not even have time to warn his son to prepare himself. Mr. [Name 004] continued saying that after the hit he got out of the car and observed that practically nothing happened to the vehicle in front, that in the vehicle behind there was a pregnant lady very close to the steering wheel and that, about 3 meters from the pregnant woman's vehicle, there was another car and that this one was indeed very damaged, so he helped the driver out and transferred her to his vehicle, to which he added that this person indicated to him that she could not stop because when she saw the line of cars she pressed the accelerator instead of the brake. Without intending to repeat everything that Mr. [Name 004] narrated regarding the dynamics of the accident, these were the most important points and, from there, the victim drew a sketch during his trial testimony and graphically depicted the final disposition of the motor vehicles, detailing that the ones most damaged from a material standpoint were those driven by [Name 006] (the pregnant person) and by the defendant herein [Name 001], since Mrs. [Name 006]'s vehicle had practically been wedged under the car he was driving –which as stated was a Toyota Prado and therefore was taller than the others– and similarly, that Rav-4 had considerable damage to the rear part, since indentations were observed there on the rear door and bumper, while Mrs. [Name 001]'s car had been left very battered in its front part, that is, in the front end, to the point that he even thought there might be some risk from the smoke and liquids coming out of that car at the time, although he later realized that the smoke was steam from the radiator. (…) As can be derived from the previous image, what was drawn by Mr. [Name 004] responds coherently with what he verbally narrated during the trial, but, if the sketch made by traffic officer [Name 011] and contained in folio 225 of the file is added to this sketch, important similarities can be appreciated that evoke truthfulness in what was narrated by the victim for the Court (…) Note, furthermore, that the version offered by the victim [Name 004] adequately matches the one he had already given before the Ministerio Público in the complaint he filed at that office on October 1, 2020, so the argumentative position he maintained during the trial must be categorized as coherent, consistent, and persistent, all of which contributes to the definition of his credibility. (...) Thus, the undersigned judge must grant credibility to what was narrated by Mr. [Name 004] regarding the circumstances that permeated the accident under analysis, especially considering that the version he gave at trial was confirmed as to the dynamics of the facts by the young [Name 009] –his son– who, although he was honest in clarifying that the event had happened about six years prior and therefore he did not remember it as vividly, what he remembered was that they were on their way to San José, that there was traffic congestion, that they stopped because the car in front had stopped, that he heard a bang and almost immediately felt a strong blow that made them impact the vehicle in front. An important aspect of the testimony of Messrs. [Name 004] and [Name 009] was that both were in agreement in asserting that before feeling the blow to their motor vehicle, they heard another blow, which inevitably leads the Court to conclude that before the vehicle of [Name 006] impacted the Toyota Prado of [Name 004], this Rav-4 had already been hit from behind by the Toyota Yaris car driven by Mrs. [Name 001], that is, the logical derivation of all this is that the first person who crashed and who, therefore, caused the subsequent multiple collision, was the accused herein [Name 001], ergo, the efficient cause of the result was a rear-end collision generated by the defendant, it was that and not some other circumstance that triggered the multiple crash; even during her testimony in the debate, Mrs. [Name 001] acknowledged not once, but twice, that she had accepted responsibility when the matter was still in the Juzgado de Tránsito, which is a further indication of her responsibility, because although the defendant tried to explain that she was «set up» by [Name 004] at all times, she did accept the facts before the traffic court to be able to use her policy and repair all the vehicles, which is in itself an important element for the Court, since according to the rules of logic and experience it would be odd to say the least if a person who is not at fault for a crash –as the accused alleged– agreed to admit the facts in the administrative sphere to activate her insurance policy and repair the vehicles of all the other involved parties; conversely, what this judge has managed to infer from the trial and the review of the file, is that Mrs. [Name 001] accepted the facts and repaired the damaged vehicles with her policy because she was indeed the one who caused the accident that now concerns us.” (Verbatim quote). The previous excerpts from the judgment allow this Chamber to notice that the judge amply assessed the statements given by the victim [Name 004] and the witness [Name 009] during the adversarial proceeding, contrasting them with the documentary evidence; an examination that allowed him to reasonably derive that the dynamics of the accident occurred in the manner in which it was charged and, therefore, that the convicted [Name 001], when the cars preceding her stopped in a timely manner due to traffic congestion in the area, did not interrupt her course but rather collided the vehicle she was driving with the rear part of the motor vehicle of Mrs. [Name 006], which propelled it to collide with the victim's car and this in turn with the vehicle of Mr. [Name 010]. Such a conclusion did not stem from the judge's subjectivities nor is it arbitrary, as the appellants have alleged, but was the consequence of the joint examination of the evidence. The victim was emphatic in pointing out that when he stopped, as a result of the traffic congestion, he observed that the vehicle following him also stopped, and it was afterward that he heard a bang, a screech, and then received the impact. In this sense, [Name 004] argued: “the vehicle in front of me brakes, I brake with it, we were coming relatively slowly, but I am in the vehicle, driving, I stop, I look through the rearview mirror, I see that the vehicle behind, white, I think it was a Rav-4, I think an SUV, I see that the one coming behind stops, we were in a jam, almost close to that I keep looking ahead but in seconds, when we are stopped, I hear a loud bang, like a screech and I react by looking through the rearview mirror but I see the vehicle from behind on top, so I have the reaction to hold the brake and hold the steering wheel tightly, it was so fast that I didn't have time to warn my 14-year-old son who was in front, to hold on or something, it was fast.” (Quote taken verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment).

As the lower court properly assessed, this version was consistent with that provided by witness [Name 009], who stated: "Well, we were stuck in traffic, we were just before the Platina bridge, we stopped, I heard a bang and almost immediately felt a strong impact, after the impact we hit the car in front, later I realized it was a four-car collision." (Quote extracted verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). In turn, the judge contrasted the noted statements with the documentary evidence, corroborating their congruence, since the description of the location of the vehicles and their damage, contained in the police report and the sketch prepared by the traffic officer, proved consistent with the dynamics of the facts that, from the beginning of the process, the aggrieved party maintained. It is worth reiterating that nothing prevents, in a case such as this one, even without technical evidence (for example, an expert report from the Forensic Engineering Section to determine the speed of the vehicles) or additional testimonies (such as that of Mrs. [Name 006]), granting credibility to the victim's statement and, through it, deeming the accused event as proven. In this regard, the Criminal Cassation Chamber has maintained a uniform criterion that: "(...) the conviction of the lower court in validating or not witness, expert, or documentary evidence is the exclusive domain of its jurisdictional independence, the exercise of reason, and respect for the legitimacy of the body of evidence, both in its obtaining and its incorporation into the process. For the foregoing, the victim's deposition is sufficient to base a conviction, and that credibility granted by the Court cannot be substituted in cassation, unless an infringement in the logical path or an anomaly in the probity of the judges is demonstrated. Under the privilege of the principle of immediacy, the victim was believed." (Resolution 1098-2001 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). In this case, it has been possible to verify that the judge did not arbitrarily or groundlessly assume the credibility of the offended party [Name 004], but rather sustained it through assessments that are consistent with the principle of immediacy of evidence, as well as the system of free evaluation of evidence and a comprehensive analysis of the body of evidence. In this sense, the judge considered the manner in which the offended party gave his statement (fluidly and forcefully), the verisimilitude of his account (consistent with the description of the damage and final position of the vehicles, according to the police report and sketch), the consistency and incriminatory persistence (given the congruence with the complaint and, it can be added, also with his accounts before the different medical instances) and, of special importance, the corroboration of his statement through the testimony of witness [Name 009], who confirmed a fundamental detail to accredit the accusatory version and discard the defense's version, which was that a bang was first heard, and then the impact on the vehicle in which they were traveling occurred. Furthermore, none of the declarants related that another bang was heard afterward; rather, once the impact was received, the aggrieved party proceeded to exit the vehicle and, from that moment on, they related the subsequent events of interaction with the other people involved in the automobile accident and the procedures they carried out. Thus, it is evident that the evaluation of the evidence made by the judge is consistent with the rules of logic, specifically of derivation, since this detail is not minor and is precisely what allows discarding the convicted person's version that she collided with [Name 006]'s vehicle after the latter had collided with that of the offended party. The judge carried out a concatenated analysis of the body of evidence and, based on it, deemed the facts as proven in accordance with how they were accused and related by the offended party [Name 004]. To the contrary, it is clear that the judge discarded the defense theory, but did so in a reasoned manner, without incurring contradictions, and in accordance with a logical derivation of the information yielded by the evidence, as already mentioned. Thus, having analyzed the judgment comprehensively, as the logical unit that it is, the previously noted assessments, which this Chamber endorses, allowed the judge to discard the version of the event's dynamics that was related by the convicted person and to accept the accusatory theory. It would seem that the appellants intend that, by the mere existence of two opposing versions, it should not be possible to accredit one of them, which is not admissible. In addition to the foregoing, the lower court expressly referred to the defense version and set forth additional assessments—applying the rules of experience—regarding the distance at which the aggrieved party's vehicle ended up in relation to the other three automobiles, which validly allowed it to conclude that the dynamics that were consistent with that final position were those provided by the offended party and not by the accused. Along these lines, the judge stated: "Having said the above, this judge must refer to the statement of Mrs. [Name 001], since with regard to the dynamics of the accident, what she indicated was that the responsibility was shared among all, first because the cars were not keeping a prudent distance between them, second because she was driving slowly precisely due to the traffic congestion, third because [Name 004] was the one who braked suddenly and, fourth, because the one who hit the offended party first was [Name 006] and she –[Name 001]– crashed into Mrs. [Name 006]'s car at a later instant; consequently, what Mrs. [Name 001] stated was that she only felt responsible for having collided from behind with [Name 006]'s vehicle. However, the accused lady's statements do not bear any relationship with the true dynamics of the accident, in the understanding that beyond whether someone braked suddenly or whether distances were not being kept –which is the duty of every vehicle according to the Traffic Law– what she indicated regarding the fact that the first crash was that of [Name 006] against [Name 004] because the latter braked suddenly and that it was afterwards that she collided with [Name 006], bears no relation to the way in which the vehicles ended up as recorded on the traffic diagram, precisely because as she herself said at trial, the car she was driving was small; in fact, what is extracted from the file is that it was a Toyota Yaris from 2006 with a weight of 1305 kilograms, while [Name 004]'s car was a Toyota Prado from 2018 with a weight of 2990 kilograms and the one driven by [Name 006] was a Toyota Rav-4 from 2003 with a weight of 1355 kilograms. That is, it makes no sense that there is a separation of 3.80 meters between the car driven by [Name 001] and the one driven by [Name 006] if it is the case that –as the accused alleged– she was the one who crashed after Mrs. [Name 006] had already done so. In other words, to understand and validate the dynamics narrated by the accused, one would have to suppose that the lightest car of those described above, the Toyota Yaris, which supposedly was going slowly according to her account, crashed into the Toyota Rav-4 when the latter had already collided with the Toyota Prado and propelled these two cars together forward by those 3.80 meters to cause the separation that was recorded on the official sketch prepared by the traffic police. That is, to try to give validity to the accused [Name 001]'s account, one would have to suppose that her Yaris, which was going slowly, that is, without much kinetic energy, had the capacity to transfer that energy to the other vehicles to manage to displace the other two cars, which had supposedly already crashed, by 3.80 meters, something that departs from the most basic postulates of logic and experience, since sound criticism instead suggests that the initial crash was between [Name 001] and [Name 006] –with vehicles of similar weight– and based on that impact caused by the recklessness of the accused lady, the Rav-4 driven by Mrs. [Name 006] was projected into [Name 004]'s Prado, and this, in turn, into [Name 010]'s Hyundai. Therefore, it must be established, although it was already indicated supra, that the efficient cause of the result was the conduct of the accused [Name 001], who, at a reckless speed given the context of traffic congestion, without applying the foresight judgment that at the bottom of the "subibaja" there could be a traffic jam, and without keeping a safe distance from the vehicle preceding her, collided with it from behind, which caused it to move forward into the car of the offended party herein, and the latter also moved until it hit the vehicle preceding it, with the distance that existed between the vehicles of [Name 006], [Name 004], and [Name 010] being irrelevant from the point of view of foreseeability, avoidability, and determination of the result, insofar as none of them were the ones who breached the duty of care such that one could speak of other causal contributions to the event that triggered the entire multiple collision. So, by way of summary, it must be emphasized that this accident dynamic exclusively confirms the causal link between the careless and reckless behavior of the accused [Name 001] and the final result of material damages and physical injuries to [Name 004]. That is, through the verification of the strong impact caused by the vehicle driven by the accused –at excessive speed given the congestion circumstances and without keeping the required distance– on the rear part of the vehicle driven by [Name 006], and that the latter was propelled into [Name 004]'s car, also causing the aggrieved party's car to impact the one preceding it (occupied by [Name 010]), the link between the conduct and the result (cause-effect) was corroborated, which is a basic requirement for the attribution of criminal liability." (Textual quote). The preceding extract from the judgment, although extensive, allows verifying not only the breadth of the reasoning put forth by the judge, who –as previously noted– fully complied with the duty of reasoning, but also that the judge's assessments were always based on the rules of logic and experience, which, although not given a specific name, as the appellants would have desired, were described in detail, allowing his arguments to be fully understood and the corresponding control of legality and reasonableness to be exercised. It is necessary to recall what the Criminal Cassation Chamber has indicated regarding the rules of experience, as quoted below: "The rule of experience arises as a generalization constructed from a series of singular perceptions about facts or phenomena that, under certain assumptions, always or most of the time behave in a certain way. Given the coincidence of a series of facts in similar situations, it is concluded that a new fact in similar situations will happen in the same way." (Resolution number 1408-2004 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, reiterated in resolution 1092-2023). In addition to this Chamber sharing the assessments made by the judge regarding the credibility of the victim's account, which by themselves allow the defense theory to be discarded, it is worth mentioning that there are two additional arguments contained in the foregoing quote that are also shared by this Chamber, as they are indeed consistent with the rules of sound criticism and in accordance with the law. The first of these is that the defense theory regarding the concurrence of fault must be rejected because [Name 006]'s vehicle did not keep the required distance from [Name 004]'s vehicle, and the latter, in turn, from [Name 010]'s automobile. There is no doubt for this appellate court that the reasoning issued by the judge is correct, since it was not the distance between those vehicles that caused the collision or the injuries to the aggrieved party, but rather it was the negligent conduct of the convicted [Name 001], as she was the one who did not stop the automobile she was driving in time, collided with [Name 006]'s automobile, and thereby caused the displacement of the other cars and the subsequent collisions. Article 101 of the Traffic Law, even cited by the appellant herself, stipulates: "ARTICLE 101.- Maintain distance. The driver of a vehicle traveling on a public road must maintain a reasonable and prudent distance that guarantees timely stopping, in case the vehicle preceding them brakes suddenly. To do so, the driver must consider their speed, the road conditions, the weather conditions, and those of their own vehicle." As can be deduced from the letter of the law, the duty to maintain a reasonable and prudent distance while driving automobiles has the purpose of guaranteeing timely stopping when the preceding vehicle brakes. In the case at hand, it was verified –through the evidentiary analysis already detailed– that [Name 004] and [Name 006] fulfilled that duty, since the distance they kept from the vehicle preceding them allowed them to stop their automobiles in a timely manner when the one ahead did so, regardless of the distance they preserved between them once stopped. Thus, there was no concurrent fault, as was sufficiently analyzed by the judge. It is necessary to add that not any infraction of traffic regulations has a cause-effect relationship with the harmful result, and that criminal fault is not configured by the simple omission of the duty of care, but rather it must have a direct relationship with the result produced. Thus, even assuming that [Name 006] and [Name 004] had infringed the rules of driving automobiles, because they did not keep a proper distance from the vehicle preceding them, once they stopped in a timely manner, the truth is that this infraction was not what caused the harmful result, so the defense theory must be discarded. This conclusion is reached by conducting an ex post examination regarding the occurred event, through a hypothetical suppression exercise. Thus, if the action of the convicted person is eliminated (if [Name 001] had stopped her vehicle in a timely manner and had not collided with [Name 006]), it is clear that the accident would not have occurred and the offended party would not have suffered injuries, since the other vehicles had already stopped in a timely manner. From that perspective, there is no doubt for this appellate court, just as the lower court reasonably supported, that the legally relevant cause that caused the mentioned traffic accident and produced injuries to the victim was solely the negligent action of [Name 001]. The other point that deserves to be highlighted is that, as the lower court resolved, the defense version is not consistent with the evidence. This theory is based on the convicted [Name 001] driving at low speed and colliding with [Name 006]'s vehicle when the latter had already crashed into that of the offended party. As can be inferred from the reasoning put forth by the judge, if the convicted person had driven "slowly" (to use her words), or rather at a speed consistent with the traffic congestion existing in the area, when the collision with [Name 006]'s vehicle occurred, which she never denied, the final position of the vehicles (about which there has also been no dispute) would not have been a distance of 3.80 meters between the vehicle of the convicted [Name 001] and the others. That is, if the collision between the convicted person's vehicle and that of [Name 006] had occurred under the circumstances adduced by [Name 001], namely driving at low speed and after the latter had already impacted [Name 004]'s vehicle, there would be no explanation for the aforementioned distance, because traveling at a low speed, as the accused alleged, [Name 001]'s vehicle, given its weight and size, could not have displaced the other vehicles, nor would there have been a "rebound effect" of that magnitude. In this way, the judge's reasoning was not only set out in the judgment, but –unlike what the appellants alleged– is consistent with the maxims of sound criticism. Regarding the rules for reasoning judgments, the Criminal Cassation Chamber has indicated: "The supervision of the application of the rules of sound criticism consists of determining that the reasonings carried out by the lower court when evaluating the evidentiary elements submitted to its scrutiny are consistent with the conclusions derived from them. CAFFERATA NORES points out: '... Sound rational criticism as a method for evaluating evidence places as the only limit on the free conviction of judges, respect for the rules that govern the connection of human thought: those of logic, those of psychology, and those of common experience...' (CAFFERATA NORES, José I. Temas de Derecho Procesal Penal. Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1988. p. 288). In other words, these rules allow controlling the logical path that the judge has followed to form his criterion about what is true and what is false according to the evaluation of the evidence presented. It is clear from the challenged judgment that the reasonings set forth by the lower court meet the requirements of legality and objectivity for their validity, in a comprehensive analysis of the existing body of evidence." (Resolution number 542-2009 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). It is reiterated that the judge granted credibility to the victim and the witness [Name 009], in that there was no prior collision, which in itself already allowed discarding the defense theory, but also intertwined the witness evidence with the documentary evidence (which allowed verifying the final position of the vehicles, the distance between them, and the damage they suffered), concluding –with a logical reasoning and applying the rules of experience– that the events occurred in the manner in which they were accused and that the dynamics alleged by [Name 001] were untenable. It is necessary to emphasize that, to discard the defense theory, the judge started from the accused's own statement, who at the hearing affirmed that she was driving "slowly," which was not given any credibility, not only because the offended party had affirmed so, but because of the description of the damage to the vehicles and their final position. Moreover, the considerable damage exhibited by the vehicle in which the convicted person was traveling becomes another element that cannot be dismissed, simply because it is not detailed extensively in the traffic report, as intended by the appellant Monterrey Carmona. This is so in application of the principle of freedom of evidence, which has already been outlined. In this sense, it is worth pointing out that the damage exhibited by the vehicle with license plate [Value 003] (driven by the convicted person) was mentioned in the official report, but was also amply described by the victim during his deposition, without any inconsistency being detected with said documentary evidence. In this regard, [Name 004] stated: "(...) and I look back and see the white vehicle embedded in my vehicle and a lady, let's say at that moment I see she is pregnant, very close to her steering wheel, I quickly ask her if she feels well, she is a bit distressed, I try to open the door and I look back and see that there is a space of about 3 meters, very short, and I see a vehicle that has a damaged front, a very strong impact, evident damage, it has smoke in the engine, the hood raised, I think the vehicle is going to catch fire and I run to the driver, I see she is a young woman, I move her to my vehicle, open the door and sit her there, tell her to calm down because I feared for the vehicle, later I realized it was issues with the radiator and fluids (...) The vehicle has like a cover on a wheel at the back, it has like a cover and it's dented, also the bumper, the lower part, looks very pushed in, and the vehicle behind had significant damage; if you observe the collision, you saw minor damage to the one in front, to mine, more or less to the Rav-4, but the one behind had serious damage, the front end crumpled, steam or smoke, liquids on the road, and if I'm not mistaken, the airbags of that vehicle were deployed. When I removed the person, we managed to get her out of there, plus many people from other lanes came out to help." (Quote extracted verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). In turn, witness [Name 009] confirmed the foregoing, as follows: "Yes, I saw that the vehicle behind, well, all three were damaged, but especially the vehicle furthest back, I remember it was black, a Hatchback, the front end was compressed, liquid was coming out, and dad told me to keep my distance." (Quote extracted verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). It is thus, through the joint analysis of witness and documentary evidence, that it can be verified that the damage was considerable, which constitutes another element that supports the judge's reasoning for rejecting the defense theory that the convicted person was traveling at a low speed. In addition to the foregoing, as the defense counsel pointed out in his appeal arguments, the judge considered that the aggrieved party testified that the convicted person told him that she had pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, which is consistent with the magnitude of the damage caused. However, in no way can the criterion outlined by the appellants be shared, that this means the lower court gave value to mere speculation or gossip, or that it contradictorily gave weight to statements made by her to the offended party, but not to those she made at trial. The extra-procedural spontaneous statements of accused persons are a valid indicium that must be evaluated in conjunction with the rest of the body of evidence, as the trial court correctly did, and as has been uniformly and long accepted, even by the Constitutional Chamber (see resolution 154-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber and resolutions 100-2002 and 282-2010 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). In any case, this was not the only evidentiary basis analyzed in the challenged judgment. Another allegation contained in the judgment that was subject to reproach consisted of the judge including within his multiple arguments that [Name 001] had admitted full responsibility for the events in other instances and, for this reason, all the vehicles involved in the collision were repaired using the insurance policy of the automobile driven by [Name 001]. The lower court explained that the assertion of [Name 001] at trial, in the sense that this was due to manipulation on the part of the offended party [Name 004], was not credible, because it is contrary to the rules of experience that a person who knows they only collided with one vehicle and that the latter had previously caused another collision would opt to assume full responsibility. The argument in question is valid and reasonable, but, as already indicated, it was just one additional element evaluated by the trial court. Furthermore, this Chamber, from the comprehensive examination it must carry out of the judgment, the hearing, and the evidence on record, has also not noted any reason why [Name 004] would have any intention to harm [Name 001], whom he met on the day of the events, to the point of manipulating her –without it being clear in what way– so that she would unjustly assume full responsibility for the material damages and, later, physical and moral damages, despite the fact that –according to the defense theory– another person ([Name 006]), whom the aggrieved party also did not know and therefore had no reason to favor, had previously collided with him. Finally, it is necessary to respond to the questioning issued by the technical defense in that the proven facts are not absolutely coincident with those charged. It must be emphasized that the appellant did not allege a violation of the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment as such, nor of the right to defense, but rather limited himself to mentioning that the trial court omitted factual circumstances that were detailed in the accusation and that were never proven, without specifying them, which –according to him– weakened the prosecuting theory. By virtue of the comprehensive examination that this Chamber must carry out, the charged facts were contrasted with the proven facts, verifying that there is no divergence whatsoever with regard to the core of the charge. It should be remembered that the accusation is not a rigid piece, and although it constitutes the factual framework upon which the judge must rule, what is sought thereby is that no surprising circumstances are established in the judgment to the detriment of the accused person. Thus, the lack of absolute identity between the charged facts and what is proven at the hearing does not translate into any defect as long as the right to defense is not violated. In the case at hand, having analyzed the judgment and even the arguments put forth during the adversarial process by the technical and material defense, it is evident that no such violation existed, but rather that the defense theory was simply not accepted by the lower court, for the reasons already analyzed. In conclusion, the appealed ruling does not present defects in the evaluation of the evidence, nor a violation of the rules of sound criticism capable of invalidating it, nor a violation of the principle of correlation between accusation and judgment. The errors alleged are based on a biased and incomplete reading of the evidence gathered at the hearing and the intellectual analyses in the judgment, thereby seeking to support the defense theory that was sustained during the hearing, but which the comprehensive and concatenated analysis of the body of evidence, duly and amply outlined by the judge, validly allowed discarding, so both grounds of challenge are declared without merit.

IV.- The second ground of appeal by the convicted [Name 001] is declared without merit for the following reasons. As indicated in the preceding recital, there were two defense theories sustained during the adversarial process, one regarding the dynamics of the facts (already analyzed) and another regarding the injuries suffered by the offended party [Name 004]. It was alleged that the injuries were not the product of the collision of November nineteenth, two thousand eighteen, because on that day the aggrieved party exited the vehicle by his own means and assisted the other people involved, so the injuries were old, the product of recreational activities carried out by the offended party. Now, the reproach contained in the appeal ground under study consisted of the fact that the judge omitted to explain the cause-effect relationship between the collision and the injuries to the aggrieved party [Name 004] and overlooked the discussion on whether they were old injuries. According to the appellant, to determine the existence of the injuries and the causal link between them and the negligent action of the convicted [Name 001], the judge limited himself to evaluating the medical expert reports 2019-551 and 2020-7387, and exclusively based on them deemed the injuries, the permanent incapacity (incapacidad permanente) that arose from them, and the amount to be compensated as proven. However, upon examining the challenged judgment, it is possible to verify that what the appellant adduced is not true. The lower court carried out a broad analysis of the evidence and of the arguments raised by all parties regarding the causal link between the facts and the injuries suffered by the aggrieved party. It is important to clarify that the judgment is a logical unit, structured in various recitals and, in this case, the judge, in turn, subdivided them into sections. Thus, when evaluating the intellectual reasoning reflected in the judgment, sections or divisions cannot be ignored, limiting oneself to one of them as the appellant has intended. Indeed, in recital 8.2.2. called "Regarding the permanent incapacity (Sobre la incapacidad permanente)," the judge did not include an analysis regarding the arguments of the technical and material defense that the offended party's injuries were old and not the product of the facts, limiting himself to reiterating the aforementioned medical reports and, subsequently, focusing on another point that was discussed, regarding the actuarial mathematical expert reports. However, this does not mean that the judge omitted to evaluate the defense arguments or to weigh the evidence regarding the cause-effect relationship between the collision caused by the negligent act of the convicted person and the injuries suffered by [Name 004], described in the aforementioned reports. This evaluation was carried out in the third recital of the judgment, called "Intellectual evidentiary reasoning (Fundamentación probatoria intelectiva)," in which –after explaining the dynamics of the facts that were deemed accredited and the reasons for it– the judge continued with the analysis of the causal link with the injuries suffered by [Name 004].

In this regard, it reasoned: “A final aspect that must be addressed is the effective determination of the victim's injuries; that is, the dynamics of the accident have been defined and what remains is to analyze whether there is a nexus between the accident and the injuries that [Name 004] presented, even though there was a period of time between the accident (November 19, 2018) and his appearance at the Traffic Court for a medical evaluation (January 17, 2019). This must be answered affirmatively, since both from what he declared at trial and from his medical care records, it is clear that he had no previous injuries in the anatomical areas in question (right shoulder and knee), and there are also medical-legal opinions that confirm this, namely opinions 2019-551 (dated January 21, 2019) and 2020-7387 (dated October 1, 2020), which confirmed the physical problems of the victim in his shoulder and knee, his treatment, and consequences, ultimately establishing a temporary incapacity of two months and a permanent incapacity of 10% of his general capacity. Regarding these medical-legal opinions, the Court must emphasize that they were never debated or countered at the corresponding procedural moments, since they were not appealed nor refuted with contrary evidence when they were made known to the defense, neither at the preliminary hearing nor at trial. Consequently, the only logical conclusion this judge can reach is that Mr. [Name 004]'s injuries can indeed be linked to the accident caused by the negligent act of Mrs. [Name 001], who, it is worth noting now, declared that she believed [Name 004] wanted to blame her for the accident, citing old injuries probably derived from cycling or hiking that the victim practiced and which are sports par excellence that cause such injuries. However, this was an assertion with no evidentiary basis and contrary to logic, because as the victim rightly pointed out, if that were the case, he would have been waiting to have a traffic accident in order to treat his injuries, something alien to logic and experience. But just as this was not substantiated by the defendant, there was also no evidence of what Mrs. [Name 001] said about the victim [Name 004] having influence 'everywhere' and that he could have exercised that influence illegitimately over medical, actuarial, and legal decisions. Therefore, the argument made by the accused must be deemed abstract, unjustified, and reckless, as it is based on nothing more than her personal assumption. Still regarding the causal nexus between the accident and the injuries, this Court, based on the rules of logic and experience, understands that injuries do not necessarily manifest immediately after an accident in the body of the person who suffers it, in this case [Name 004]. In such events, it is possible and common that the adrenaline response can mask pain and symptoms after the fact. However, this judge also understands that in a traffic accident, there are two types of injuries: those that appear immediately and those that can be classified as delayed or late-onset, whose symptoms may arise or worsen days, weeks, or even months after the accident. Therefore, there is nothing strange, suspicious, or illicit about Mr. [Name 004] having requested an evaluation by the Forensic Medicine Unit a couple of months after the accident, on the understanding that these were not spontaneously arising injuries, but rather, as the victim himself narrated, they were pains that gradually led him to need medical attention. That is why, in this aspect, the victim's declaration must be validated, and consequently, it must be recognized that he effectively suffered physical harm to his right shoulder and right knee, which had to be treated by various doctors. Thus, for this Court, both the accident and the injuries derived from it were adequately proven, and therefore, criminal liability must be attributed to Mrs. [Name 001].” As is evident from the extensive reasoning outlined by the judge, he did not simply accept the opinions' findings as true without justification. Nor did he ignore the defense's theory, but rather addressed each of the arguments. In turn, the trial court analyzed the expert evidence together with the statement given by [Name 004] (which, it should be noted, was also corroborated in this regard by his son) and applied the rules of experience to explain that the fact that the victim did not perceive pain or was not immobilized immediately after the traffic accident does not constitute sufficient reason to deny that the injuries were a consequence of the events. This appellate court shares the opinion set forth in the judgment, since—effectively—the rules of experience allow the conclusion that injuries are not necessarily perceived immediately, especially under circumstances such as those surrounding the events in question. It cannot be ignored that the victim was with his minor son at the time, so it is logical that he would first be concerned about the child's physical integrity. It is also a common reaction to exit the vehicle and check on the condition of other people, and in this case, the victim [Name 004] realized that the driver of the vehicle that directly impacted his was a pregnant woman and that the vehicle of the sentenced person [Name 001] was emitting smoke. Therefore—reasonably—[Name 004] rendered assistance under those circumstances, without it being inferred from this that he suffered no blow whatsoever, much less that the injuries confirmed through the medical opinions were old. In turn, the arguments maintained during the adversarial proceedings, mainly by the material defense, to establish that the injuries were long-standing and that the information contained in the documentary and expert evidence was a product of manipulation or influence by the victim, were soundly rejected by the trial court, as they were indeed presumptions without any basis. In this sense, it bears repeating that the judge was profuse in explaining the reasons why he granted credibility to [Name 004]'s declaration, without any flaw being detected in the judge's reasoning or in the evaluation of the evidence, a matter this Court already addressed in the preceding whereas clause. As for the allegation that [Name 006] did not suffer injuries, and therefore it is not reasonable that [Name 004] did, this cannot be admitted, as it is contrary to the rules of sound criticism. Experience and common sense allow us to assert that the injuries a person suffers after a traffic accident depend on numerous factors, such as the position and tension of the body at the moment of impact, as well as the person’s age, among others. It should be added that the condition of the victim's vehicle, which suffered impact to the rear and front, makes it reasonable that the aggrieved party indeed suffered the blows he claimed, which were furthermore confirmed by the aforementioned expert evidence. Thus, the comprehensive analysis of the entire body of evidence only confirms the position adopted by the judge. Therefore, contrary to what was alleged in the appeal, the contested judgment contains a thorough assessment of the causal nexus that gave rise to not only criminal liability but also civil liability, showing that the complaint is merely a disagreement arising from the fact that the judge did not accept the defense theory, and not from the alleged flaw in the reasoning. Furthermore, specifically regarding the monetary amount granted as compensation for permanent incapacity, the appellant questioned the reasoning used by the judge in employing the mathematical actuarial appraisal issued by Jesús Josué Pacheco Brizuela as a parameter, granting the sum of ninety-six million eight hundred seventy-three thousand nine hundred twenty-five colones and sixty-two céntimos (¢96,873,925.62), as claimed by the civil plaintiff. She questioned why the appraisal prepared by Edwin Castro Jiménez was not used, as it established a lower monetary amount because it used [Name 004]'s net salary rather than gross salary as the basis for mathematical calculations. For a better understanding and to resolve the allegation, it is pertinent to clarify that the contested judgment partially granted the civil action for damages filed against [Name 001]. The civil plaintiff claimed compensation for temporary incapacity, permanent incapacity, and moral damages. However, the judge rejected ordering compensation for temporary incapacity and, regarding moral damages, imposed a considerably lower compensation amount than claimed. These aspects of the jurisdictional decision were not challenged by the civil plaintiff or any other party, so they remain unaltered. Regarding permanent incapacity, during the trial, the technical defense and the sentenced person herself, exercising her material defense, alleged that the amount claimed was excessive, and specifically, the technical defense of the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., emphatically questioned the use of gross salary rather than net salary as the basis for the mathematical calculations. In this sense, the representation of the aforementioned civil co-defendant offered as evidence for a better decision an appraisal prepared by Edwin Castro Jiménez, which was admitted and weighed by the judge. From this appraisal, it was clear that the sum to be compensated for permanent incapacity was fifty-five million nine hundred nine thousand one hundred ninety-two colones and sixty-eight céntimos (¢55,909,192.68). The only difference between the two appraisals stemmed from the fact that expert witness Castro Jiménez performed the mathematical calculations considering the victim [Name 004]'s net salary, while the appraisal by Pacheco Brizuela, offered by the civil plaintiff, considered the gross salary. The complaint now made by the appellant, although not raised at the time by the technical or material defense of [Name 001], was indeed a topic addressed by the judge in the contested judgment, given that—as indicated—it formed part of the closing arguments of the civil co-defendant's representation. In this vein, the trial court stated: “Well then, the fundamental inference that must be made is that both appraisals established that compensation was due for the victim's permanent incapacity, although they differed on the amounts. Therefore, the undersigned must point out that from the standpoint of what is established by section 74 of the Traffic Law, the calculation of amounts for permanent incapacity must take into account the salaries reported to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social). In the opinion of the undersigned judge, the reported salaries are, precisely, the gross salaries. Therefore, faced with the different sums presented by the parties, the one derived from the appraisal prepared by Pacheco Brizuela must be chosen. It is not omitted to mention on this point that during the trial, the exact amount of [Name 004]'s salary was questioned by the third-party civil defendant. However, this argument cannot succeed because that same party requested the preparation of the appraisal by Castro Jiménez based on the same salary that Pacheco Brizuela previously considered, making this a circular argument. Now, reference is made at this point to the various arguments of the third-party civil defendant because, in their own way, they affected the interests of Mrs. [Name 001], especially as it involved evidence common to the parties. However, it is worth noting here that the technical defense of Mrs. [Name 001] did not provide any technical argument or make any submission about these appraisals other than abstractly questioning the proportionality of the amounts established by Pacheco Brizuela. Therefore, given such lack of action by the defense of the criminal defendant and civil defendant, the Court must rely on the evidence in the case file and declare that [Name 001] must compensate [Name 004] for the permanent incapacity derived from the accident, which is set at the sum of ¢96,873,925.62.” This Chamber shares the reasoning of the judge and considers that the decision was made in accordance with law by using the appraisal prepared by Pacheco Brizuela, since the mathematical calculations contemplated in that appraisal were those that conformed to what is established in the rule cited by the judge, i.e., section 74 of the Traffic Law. Furthermore, the decision is consistent with the provisions of the Labor Code, specifically Title IV and especially what is established in section 235, and the interpretation that the courts have been applying in this matter. In this regard, decisions 821-2004, 325-2009, and 707-2014 of the Second Chamber can be mentioned, as well as decision 145-2024 of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Enforcement Section, in which—when questioning the calculations made for compensation, both for temporary and permanent incapacity—the gross reported salary is precisely used as a parameter. The appellant's allegation is based on a presumed unjust enrichment, by using the gross salary which includes amounts that—she says—will never accrue to the aggrieved party, as they are destined to cover social and tax burdens. This was the same argument sustained by the civil co-defendant's representation. However, as the trial court correctly pointed out, section 74 of the Traffic Law is clear that the salary reported to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund must be used, which consists of the gross salary. In addition to this, it is necessary to clarify that compensation for permanent incapacity does not consist of granting unearned salaries, but rather seeks to compensate the damages and after-effects that the civil plaintiff has had to endure as a consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct. Thus, there is no unjust enrichment because it is not the granting of a salary from which deductions must be made. The amount granted, while high, is reasonable and proportional, considering those damages and after-effects that were proven through the joint assessment of the statement of the victim [Name 004], ratified by witness [Name 009], as well as the medical opinions that verified and detailed the injuries for which a loss of 10% of general capacity was established. This loss will limit him not only in his paid work but in all his usual occupations. Moreover, the judge did not grant that monetary amount arbitrarily or capriciously, but rather based it on an objective expert opinion whose only challenged aspect was its use of gross salary as a basis, and not the other considerations and mathematical calculations contained therein. Thus, the judge clearly explained the reasons why he considered the appraisal of expert witness Pacheco Brizuela to be suitable and in accordance with the law, and not that of Castro Jiménez, according to the letter of the law. The trial court's reasoning on this specific point was concrete but sufficient and was justified by the evidentiary elements weighed objectively and in accordance with the applicable regulations, so the alleged grievance does not exist. Finally, it is worth mentioning that it was alleged, without further detail, that the judgment did not find any fact proven to support the civil judgment. The criticism is dismissed. In the eighth whereas clause of the judgment, subsection 8.1. called “Proven Civil Facts,” the following was expressly stated: “The civil facts that were considered proven were the following: 1. On November 19, 2018, at approximately 9:20 a.m., the victim and civil plaintiff [Name 004] was driving vehicle with license plate [Value 005] accompanied by his minor son [Name 009], who was in the front passenger seat, in Heredia, Ulloa, route 1, in the direction from Alajuela towards San José, 300 meters before the Alfredo González Flores bridge, in the left lane, with the right-of-way. 2. That same day, time, and place, the civil defendant [Name 001] was driving vehicle with license plate [Value 003], registered property of América Ciento Siete Sociedad Anónima, in the same direction as the civil plaintiff [Name 004]. 3. The vehicle traveling ahead of the victim's vehicle, license plate [Value 006], driven by [Name 010], stopped due to a traffic jam, so the civil plaintiff [Name 004] also stopped, maintaining his distance. Also, behind the plaintiff came vehicle with license plate [Value 004] driven by [Name 006], who likewise stopped maintaining the distance. Behind [Name 006], the defendant [Name 001] was driving, and she failed in the duty of care in the operation of vehicles, as she did not stop nor maintain the distance required by our regulations, thus heavily striking the vehicle driven by [Name 006]. Due to the force exerted on Mrs. [Name 006]'s vehicle, it was projected against the vehicle of the civil plaintiff [Name 004], thus striking the vehicle in the rear, and simultaneously, the vehicle driven by the victim was thrown against the vehicle in front driven by [Name 010]. For this reason, the victim [Name 004] hit the dash and the interior of his vehicle, hit his right knee, and the seatbelt caused a blow from the whiplash effect to his neck, right shoulder, and arm; injuries that required medical attention. 4. As a consequence of the foregoing, the victim and civil plaintiff [Name 004] suffered injuries and, according to medical-legal opinions number 2019-551, dated January 21, 2019, and number 2020-7387, dated October 1, 2020, suffered a chondral injury in his right knee, having a rupture of the rotator cuff tendon that was treated conservatively, for which he required a shaver procedure, and he underwent infiltrations in his right shoulder. He currently suffers pain in his shoulder, arm, and forearm, making it difficult to lift weight, and in his right knee, which is exacerbated when climbing stairs and squatting. These injuries caused physical damage to the plaintiff that required a temporary incapacity of two months (2 months), from the date of the events, and a permanent incapacity of ten percent (10%), due to loss of general organic capacity. 5. In addition to the physical damage, [Name 004] also suffered moral damage as a result of these events, which refers to the actual injury to his feelings, as well as the anguish and anxiety derived from the physical ailments described above, the discomfort caused by the various injuries to his body, which manifest in episodes of anger and pain, coupled with the long medical process he has had to undergo.” (Textual quote). In this way, the judge specified the civil facts he considered proven in an independent subsection for those purposes, in addition to all the factual and evidentiary analysis that he set forth throughout the judgment, which allows the control of which facts he considered proven and the reasons that led him to that conclusion. Thus, for all the foregoing, the second ground of the appeal filed by [Name 001] must be rejected in all its aspects.

V.- In the third ground of appeal, the appellant [Name 001] questioned the imposition of the accessory penalty of disqualification and considered that the judge imposed it automatically and indiscriminately, without assessing that the driving of motor vehicles in her case was not a habitual activity that generated economic profit. The complaint must be dismissed. For clarity, it is detailed that in the case at hand, the judge imposed, as the principal penalty, sixty days-fine, at a rate of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) per day, for a total of three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) and, as an accessory penalty, disqualification from driving motor vehicles on public land roads for a period of six months. Now, the reasoning for the principal penalty has not been the subject of appeal; rather, the appellant's complaint focused solely on the application of the disqualification penalty. In this Chamber's opinion, that decision is fully in accordance with law, pursuant to sections 50, 71, and 128 of the Penal Code. Section 50 of that regulatory body regulates the different types of penalties contemplated by our legislation. Expressly, said section states: “Section 50- The penalties. The penalties that this Code establishes are: 1) Principal: imprisonment, banishment, fine and disqualification. 2) Accessory: special disqualification. 3) Community service. 4) House arrest with electronic monitoring. 5) Drug treatment under restorative judicial supervision.” In accordance with the principle of legality, each criminal offense must specify the type or types of penalty to be applied, also setting the minimum and maximum limits. Within those margins, the judge must determine the quantum, using the parameters contemplated in section 71 of the Penal Code and criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Then, in the specific case, it is appropriate to analyze the provisions of section 128 of the Penal Code, which is the one that penalizes the conduct attributed to the sentenced person [Name 001]. The relevant section, insofar as it is relevant, stipulates: “Section 128.- Negligent injuries. Imprisonment of up to one year, or up to one hundred days-fine, shall be imposed on whoever, through negligence, causes another injuries as defined in sections 123, 124 and 125. To adjust the penalty to the responsible party, the court must take into account the degree of negligence, the number of victims, and the magnitude of the damages caused. In any case, the perpetrator of negligent injuries shall also be subject to disqualification of six months to two years for the practice of the profession, trade, art, or activity in which the event occurred…”. (The highlighting and underlining are not original). As is easily appreciable, the rule—as assessed by the trial court—establishes the obligation, not the power, to impose an accessory penalty of disqualification not only for someone who practices a profession, trade, or art, as the appellant seems to interpret it, but also for the activity in which the event occurred, without—regarding this last case—requiring habitualness or remuneration. In other words, the cited section simply and plainly establishes that “in any case,” the perpetrator of the injuries shall be subject to disqualification from the activity in which the event occurred, without conditioning such sanction on the person engaging in that activity professionally or habitually; it is not appropriate to make a distinction where the rule does not. It was proven that the sentenced person [Name 001], while engaging in the activity of driving a motor vehicle, caused injuries to the aggrieved party [Name 004]. Hence, the judge unavoidably had to impose not only the principal penalty but also the accessory one, in accordance with the letter of the law. To support her argument, the appellant cited pronouncements from the Criminal Cassation Chamber that are old, whose legal criterion is not only not shared by this Court of Appeals but has even been reversed by the same Criminal Cassation Chamber. As affirmed by the trial court in the contested judgment and endorsed by this Chamber, the criterion currently held as a uniform jurisprudential line is that, in negligent acts committed in traffic matters, the accessory penalty of disqualification from driving vehicles must be imposed in all cases, since the injuries are precisely generated as a result of that activity. It is reiterated that it is not necessary for the perpetrator of the negligent act to obtain a profit from that activity or to engage in it habitually, only that it was executed and gave rise to the criminal act, as was proven in the case under examination. As is clear from the commented rule and the dominant and unifying criterion of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, contained in decision 209-2014 of that jurisdictional body, the legislature alluded to the generic concept of “activity” in which the event occurred, from which it is extracted that disqualification must be imposed mandatorily when negligent injuries are generated in any regulated human activity, as is the case with driving motor vehicles on land roads, for which compliance with certain requirements established by the Traffic Law is required, and whose license is granted and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, MOPT). Consequently, the judge has not committed any error in the application of substantive law, and the imposition of the accessory penalty of disqualification is in accordance with section 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Now, the aforementioned accessory penalty—by imperative of law—must be imposed within the margins established by the legislator, which are from six months to two years. The judge opted to impose the minimum period of disqualification, so—although there was no extensive reasoning regarding the reasons for choosing that period—the decision did not cause any grievance to the defendant, since the accessory penalty is mandatory and the minimum period contemplated by the legislator was imposed. Consequently, it is appropriate to reject this ground of appeal.

VI.- Due to their affinity, the first two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Civil Defense Office of the Victim are resolved jointly, as well as the fourth and fifth grounds of said appeal, declaring them without merit. As extracted from what was noted above, in the case before us, the judge declared [Name 001] criminally liable for the offense of Negligent Injuries to the detriment of [Name 004], imposed the alleged penalties (principal and accessory), and likewise, partially granted the civil action for damages filed against her. Regarding the civil action against the defendant [Name 001], he ordered compensation in favor of [Name 004] for permanent incapacity and moral damages, but not for temporary incapacity, aspects which were not appealed by the civil plaintiff's representation. The latter merely questioned that the judge dismissed the civil action for damages filed against América Ciento Siete S.A., who appeared as a civil co-defendant. In this regard, the judge supported his decision with the following arguments: “The joint and several civil liability of the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident where the person driving the vehicle is known is not automatic; rather, it is limited to the grounds set forth in section 199 of the Law on Traffic on Public Land Roads and Road Safety, (…) Still regarding the aforementioned, it must be emphasized that for the joint and several liability of the legal entity to arise, it is required, on the one hand, that the vehicle is in the possession of a person under any title of acquisition, but also that this person is engaged in the exploitation of the motor vehicle for a commercial or industrial purpose; that is, that their conduct is generating profit or economic utility, because what generates objective civil liability is the profit obtained through the exploitation of a risky activity, such as the use of vehicles for commerce or industry. Consequently, simply alleging that there is automatic joint and several liability due to the fact that the motor vehicle license plate [Value 003] was registered in the name of América Ciento Siete S.A. constitutes an error on the part of the Civil Defense Office of the Victim.

By way of corollary to this argument, although from the conjunction of numerals 197 and 199 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) it follows that the vehicle owner could have joint and several civil liability with the driver, this is contingent on demonstrating one of the scenarios provided for therein, and in the case sub iudici it was not proven that the defendant company exploited the motor vehicle under any title for commercial or industrial purposes, nor that Ms. [Nombre 001] was an employee of said company or was earning money with that car at the time of the accident; on the contrary, the injured party [Nombre 004] himself, during his statement, was clear in establishing that when he spoke with the defendant [Nombre 001] immediately after the crash, she told him that she had had a family situation and was heading to San José to do something at an institution regarding that matter, which excludes the commercial or industrial purpose normatively required. But not only that, the defendant [Nombre 001] herself said that this vehicle was “hers” and that she used it as her sole means of transportation and to take her minor daughter to medical therapies, so from both sides it follows that the motor vehicle did not serve a commercial or industrial objective for América Ciento Siete S.A. It should also be noted that the situation does not change if the present case is examined from the perspective of Article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which, where pertinent, states that if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, a railway vehicle, tram, or other analogous mode of transport, the company or person exploiting the activity is obligated to repair the resulting damage, since, as has been explained, it was never alleged in the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), nor proven during the trial, that América Ciento Siete S.A., the registered owner of the motor vehicle, or that [Nombre 001], its driver on November 19, 2018, were exploiting it to carry out a particular pecuniary activity, that is, that they were profiting from it, at the time of the accident.” The position of the appellant, presented through four grounds of her challenge and detailed in the second recital (considerando) of this resolution, can be reduced to the following three criticisms: (1) Failure to apply substantive law, both Article 199 of the Traffic Law and Article 1048 of the Civil Code (first and second grounds of appeal). The criterion held by the civil plaintiff’s representation is that both norms fit the specific case and were erroneously not applied by the judge, because the judge considered it necessary to demonstrate circumstances that those norms do not contemplate, such as the purpose of profit or pecuniary exploitation. According to the appellant, the civil liability of the co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., derives from the fact that the car driven by the accused [Nombre 001], at the time of the events, was registered in the name of said corporation (sociedad anónima), and therefore it must be inferred that the vehicle (like all its assets) is exploited for commercial or industrial purposes. This is given the mercantile nature of the corporation and its corporate purpose, which was described since its incorporation and is recorded in the certification of legal capacity (personería jurídica) that was offered and admitted as evidence. According to the position argued by the civil plaintiff’s representation, described in the first two grounds of her challenge, this is sufficient to consider the scenarios contained in both mentioned norms fulfilled, and therefore the judge should have declared the civil action for damages filed against América Ciento Siete S.A. admissible, and it should respond jointly and severally, with all its assets, for the damages (daños y perjuicios) suffered by [Nombre 004]. Having analyzed the appellant's arguments, as well as the judge's reasoning cited above and the norms whose application the civil plaintiff seeks, this Court of Appeals (Cámara de Apelación) concludes that the decision, regarding the liability derived from Article 199 of the Traffic Law and that arising from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, is in accordance with the law. In this regard, subsection b) of Article 199 of the Traffic Law provides: “ARTICLE 199.- Joint and several liability. The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: (…) b) Natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. (…)”. (The highlighting is not part of the original). The judge precisely considered that the cited scenario was not met, because the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate that the vehicle that caused the collision was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, which—in his view—could not be presumed merely because it is a corporation, but rather had to be proven by the civil plaintiff. In turn, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, where pertinent, stipulates: “ARTICLE 1048.- (…) And if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, or a vehicle of a railway, tram, or other analogous mode of transport, the exploiting company or person is obligated to repair the resulting damage, if it does not prove that the accident was caused by force majeure (fuerza mayor) or by the fault of the dead or injured person themselves.”. (The highlighting is not part of the original). Regarding the liability contained in said norm, the judge considered that it contemplated the same requirement, regarding the exploitation of the vehicle, which—as he had already argued—was not proven. The civil plaintiff’s representation, not only in the challenge under review, but also in the filing of the civil action for damages, as well as through its arguments in the adversarial proceedings, has maintained that it is sufficient that it involves a corporation, along with the certification of legal capacity and the purpose described therein, to consider the provisions of both norms satisfied. However, its position is based on a presumption, which cannot be admitted by this Court of Appeals, just as it was not admitted by the lower court (a quo). It is true that América Ciento Siete S.A. is a corporation; there was no controversy regarding this, and it is a notorious fact that requires no proof—in that sense, the appellant is correct. It is also true that the provisions of Articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) establish that corporations are mercantile entities. However, it cannot therefore be presumed, for the purposes of the joint and several liability contained in the cited norms, that all assets registered in its name (in this case, a vehicle) are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, because the same regulations of the Commercial Code, as well as the majority doctrine, recognize the possibility that not all acts carried out by these entities are acts of commerce per se, just as there are acts of commerce carried out by persons other than those listed in the mentioned Article 17. In this sense, see “Temas de Derecho Comercial” by the scholar Gastón Certad Maroto, as well as “Curso de Derecho Mercantil” by Boris Kozolchyk and Octavio Torrealba. Thus, the mercantile nature of all corporations (and of the other entities contained in Article 17 in question) has the consequence that they are subject to a special legal regime, namely that contained in the Commercial Code (and not in the Civil Code), but this does not permit the deduction, as the appellant intends, that América Ciento Siete S.A. exploited the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003] for commercial or industrial purposes; this had to be proven by the party, since it forms an integral part of the norms whose application was sought and from which it considered its right derived. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite resolution number 866-2002 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), in which the term “exploit” was defined as follows: “It suffices to note that Article 187 of the Traffic Law provides for the joint and several liability of legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial purposes. The term ‘exploit’ (exploten), as a verb form, is the third-person plural conjugation of the verb ‘explotar,’ which—among its various meanings—signifies: ‘...2.- To derive utility from a business or industry for one's own benefit...’ (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua, nineteenth edition, p. 598, 1970 Madrid).” (Textual quote). Although reference is made to numeral 187 of the Traffic Law, it is the same provision now contained in Article 199 of that law, so what is indicated is fully applicable and congruent with the judge's arguments set forth in the challenged ruling. Precisely, the lower court based its decision on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate the scenario contained in Article 199 of the Traffic Law, as it did not prove that the vehicle was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, limiting itself to asserting that, being a corporation, such a purpose was implicit. Thus, it is not true that the lower court made an extensive or arbitrary interpretation, or added requirements or scenarios not contained in the norm, because the main reason the judge did not apply Article 199 of the Traffic Law (nor numeral 1048 of the Civil Code) was that it was not demonstrated that the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003] was exploited by América Ciento Siete S.A. This is regardless of whether it involves a pecuniary utility or could be understood to be of another type; ultimately, what matters is that this circumstance cannot be considered proven by the mere fact that the civil co-defendant is a corporation, as the civil plaintiff intended and continues to intend. This criterion has also been upheld by the civil courts of our country in recent resolutions, among them resolution number 243-2020 of the Second Civil Appeals Court of San José (Tribunal Segundo de Apelación Civil de San José), which—where pertinent—states: “(…) Various Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice have analyzed this issue and the verb ‘exploit’ (explotar), contained in the subsection under comment (vote #963-A-2006 of 14:10 hours of 12/11/2006 of the First Chamber and #866 of 10:30 hours of 08/30/2002 of the Third Chamber). Whoever obtains commercial profit through the thing that was used to cause harm, for reasons of equity and the creation of risk, must face, together with their less solvent dependents, the consequences of the activity they foster. The personal authorship, elaborated by the lower court authority, is not addressed here, as it is not required by subsection b) indicated, which attends to other valuations of the legal system. The underlying idea is that, in the specific scenarios of Article 199 of the Traffic Law, the victim broadens the possibilities of seeing their interest satisfied through someone of greater solvency. Particularly, the vehicle owner must face that duty to answer for what remains unpaid, with all their assets and not just with the value of the truck.”. (The quote is textual, and the highlighting is not part of the original). Note that it is the same interpretation made by the lower court regarding the term “exploit,” a requirement contained in both norms, which cannot be overlooked, as the appellant tacitly intends by maintaining that the mercantile nature of the corporation is sufficient to consider joint and several civil liability proven. As already noted, the mercantile nature of the entities contemplated in Article 17 of the Commercial Code is relevant for determining which legal regime they are subject to, but it does not constitute an irrefutable presumption (presunción iuris et de iure) that permits affirming that all their assets are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes. In the same vein, it is also appropriate to mention resolution number 117-2019 of Section IV of the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), in which joint and several liability was indeed established, under the scenario of interest, for which not only the corporate purpose of the sued legal entity was assessed, as the appellant intends, but also multiple documentary and testimonial evidence, such as a communication from the Tax Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), photographs of the vehicle, and the statement of the driver himself, all of which allowed proving that: “the company did indeed use the vehicle involved in the accident for heavy load transport commercial activities, and therefore, in principle, it would be subject to the legal framework of joint and several liability in traffic matters.” In this sense, said resolution stated: “(…) we are facing a legal norm of equity that seeks to guarantee fair compensation for injuries caused as a result of the introduction of a risk into society—the motor vehicle—the objective of which has been to obtain a commercial or industrial benefit from its use, which in turn corresponds to the fundamental principle of civil liability for created risk, that by which whoever benefits from the generation of a risk must assume the consequences derived from it: “ubi est emolumentum, ibi debet esse onus” (“where the benefit is, there the burden must be”).”. (The highlighting is not part of the original). Consistent with the foregoing, clearly and for greater clarity, Section I of the Second Civil Court (Tribunal Segundo Civil), through resolution number 351-2003, considered: “On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing that, pursuant to subsection ‘b)’ of Article 187 of the same Law, ‘The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ...b) Natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. ...’ among others, which must be understood to mean that persons who use vehicles for their business activities will be jointly and severally liable to third parties only when it concerns liability derived from an accident attributable to the driver due to fault or intent (dolo).”. (The underlining is not part of the original). Again, it is worth recalling that the civil plaintiff, as the trial judge correctly pointed out, did not demonstrate that the vehicle involved in the collision that caused the injuries to civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] was used by América Ciento Siete S.A. for business activities, acts of commerce, or industrial activities; therefore, the decision is in accordance with the content of the norm in question. Now then, as the lower court correctly assessed, for the application of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, the legislator also included the exploitation requirement, as is evident from reading the norm already cited. It is the criterion of this appellate court that both norms foresee that requirement, since the difference between them lies in other elements. Specifically, the liability established in Article 199 of the Traffic Law requires proof of the driver's fault, whereas that contained in Article 1048 of the Civil Code does not. Moreover, the liability derived from Article 199 of the special law includes not only that arising from injuries or death, but also material damages, whereas that derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code does not contemplate the latter. That being the case, the reasoning argued by the judge for rejecting the application of both norms is correct, as it is based on the fact that the necessary exploitation of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003] by América Ciento Siete S.A. was not demonstrated, a matter incumbent upon the civil plaintiff, which will be delved into further below. Now, to support her position, the appellant repeatedly mentioned and quoted excerpts from resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, so this Court of Appeals proceeds to cite it more extensively, so that the issue under discussion, as well as all the arguments made therein, can be understood. In this sense, said resolution states: “The jurisprudence of this Chamber, regarding objective liability, has indicated the following: ‘…The fifth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code provides: “And if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, or a vehicle of a railway, tram, or other analogous mode of transport, the exploiting company or person is obligated to repair the resulting damage, if it does not prove that the accident was caused by force majeure or by the fault of the dead or injured person themselves.” The basis of this form of objective liability is, as stated, the existence of lawful activities (there is no room here, then, to refer to unlawfulness), characteristic of man's technological development, which should not be obstructed, but which, in turn, generate a risk—as entities with the potential to produce damages—which must not be assumed by the victim or their successors and close relatives, but rather by the one who benefits from the risky activity or from the possession of a dangerous object. It responds, then, not to the breach of a specific bond, but to the violation of the general rule of not harming others (in this latter sense, see judgment 354 of the First Chamber, cited). One of the most important practical conclusions, in these cases, consists of the reversal of the burden of proof, as already noted, so that it will be the person designated by law as responsible who must demonstrate that the damage occurred due to force majeure or the fault of the victim themselves (see: judgments No. 61, of 14:50 hrs., of June 19, 1996, of the First Chamber of the Court; 1396, of 9:30 hrs. of May 7, 1975, of the Superior Administrative Litigation Court; 481 of 10:05 hrs. of July 20, 1992, of the Second Superior Civil Court, Second Section); no discussion will occur here as to whether the agent was at fault, since, in this latter scenario, the matter would boil down to a case of subjective liability (civil or criminal wrongful act), applying what is established in Article 1045 already transcribed. It is extracted from this that, in its objective form, the duty to compensate does not arise from a civil (or criminal) wrongful act—or, in general, from something unlawful—but from the exercise of an activity or the possession of an object that generates risks, but which constitute completely lawful acts; the liability: “...consists of attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element for producing it... it disregards the agent's subjectivity, and focuses the problem of reparation and its limits around material causality, investigating only which fact was, materially, the cause of the effect, to attribute it to them without more. The production of the damaging result is sufficient; it does not require the configuration of a wrongful act through traditional elements...” (ALTERINI, Atilio, Responsabilidad civil, 3rd ed., Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). On the other hand, the legislator has set certain limits on this type of objective liability, the first of which is determined by the nature of the damage, which must consist of injuries or death, thus excluding damage to property….’ (Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Res. No. 1262-97, of 11:30 hours, of November 14, 1997). This position of the Chamber has not changed. Article 1048 of the Civil Code clearly determines that the owner of the motor vehicle is liable for the damages, even when the activity in which the damage was caused is lawful. When it involves vehicles owned by corporations, since these entities are intended for profit, this numeral determines that there is objective civil liability, given the purpose of exploiting the motor vehicle, in the interest of the risk existing in the activity. For this reason, we are not facing a scenario of liability for intent or fault, but rather criteria of risk distribution. Thus, indeed, the accused [Nombre 300] was acquitted, given the impossibility of proving that he was driving the motor vehicle. This, however, does not exempt from objective civil liability, since whoever exploits the motor vehicle, as already stated, bears the risk that this activity entails and must answer for the damage caused, that is, in the case, the death of the victim. It must be clarified that the Traffic Law cited by the appellant is not applicable to the case, because we are not in a situation where indirect subjective civil liability for the victim’s death is being discussed, but rather a case where the objective civil liability contemplated by the civil regulations already cited operates.’ (Textual quote. The highlighting is not part of the original). Thus, it is highlighted that in said resolution what was discussed was the possibility of declaring the civil liability of the company that owned the motor vehicle, even though the criminal liability of the driver was not proven. As is easily appreciated, this issue is not relevant to the specific point under discussion here, because in this case the criminal and subjective civil liability of [Nombre 001] was proven, as the driver of the vehicle that caused the collision and, consequently, the damages suffered by [Nombre 004]. In addition to the above, note that—although the issue was not delved into, because it was not the object of the challenge—the truth is that it was established that, to be faced with the scenario contained in said norm, exploitation of the motor vehicle must exist. This was precisely what, in the case at hand, could not be proven, since in the judgment of the lower court and this Court of Appeals, it is not sufficient to allege that, because it is a corporation, such exploitation necessarily existed, which constitutes a mere presumption. This position has been upheld by the same Criminal Cassation Chamber in resolutions subsequent to the one cited by the appellant, among them number 244-2018, in which it was expressly argued: “Although the claimant has been pointing out that the joint and several civil liability of the vehicle owner applies, because it was proven that the company has commercial, industrial, and tourism service provision purposes, according to the certification of legal capacity of the company, and claims the erroneous application of Articles 1048 of the Civil Code, 106 subsection 1) of the Penal Code, Articles 7 and 199 subsection b) of the Traffic Law, it is necessary to establish that the regulations cited are not fully applicable to the case as analyzed supra, and that based on the evidence received in the debate, it was determined only that the vehicle is registered in the name of the company and not, in any way, that said asset, property of the civil co-defendant company Knoxvil del Sur Sociedad Anónima, was being used for commercial or industrial purposes (Article 188 subsection b) of Law 7331), a circumstance that, as the appellate court correctly points out, was neither described nor proven in the civil actions filed by the victim (cf. pages 360-361), since only reference is made to the ownership of the asset, but not to the use of the vehicle for lucrative purposes, which is what would allow access to joint and several civil liability. Given this situation, it is not possible in any way, for the purpose of establishing patrimonial liabilities, to base a finding that ownership of the asset is equivalent to its exploitation for said purposes, and with that understanding, not being in the presence of the scenarios that allow establishing joint and several civil liability, it is impossible to order the company Knoxvil del Sur Sociedad Anónima to pay, jointly and severally with the accused, the totality of the civil compensation.” (The highlighting is not part of the original). Note how this resolution did expressly discuss the point of interest here and reached the same conclusion as the lower court, which this Court of Appeals endorses, in the sense that it is not sufficient to allege the nature of corporations, nor the corporate purpose stated in their incorporation, but rather what matters is the exploitation of the asset or the use and purposes given to that asset. By virtue of the foregoing, the jurisprudential precedent cited by the appellant is not only inapplicable to the specific case, but also there are other precedents, later ones, such as the one just cited, that do expressly refer to the issue under discussion and, precisely, coincide with what was decided by the lower court. Likewise, the appellant cited resolution 903-F-SI-2021 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) to support the argument that Article 1048 of the Civil Code was applicable to the specific case. However, upon carefully analyzing the cited resolution, it is easily extracted that the factual scenario is not compatible with the one at hand, because in that case, as recorded in the second recital of the resolution, it was held as proven: “The defendant El Angel SA is held as jointly and severally liable for the damages caused in the accident that gave rise to this dispute, as a result of objective civil liability, being the registered owner of the heavy vehicle [Valor 007], which was used to transport raw materials for the commercial activity it carries out.” The appellant cited an excerpt from said resolution without pausing to analyze the context in which it was issued, within which not only the fact already mentioned that was held as proven in that case is relevant, but even the paragraph prior to the one cited by the appellant states: “Based on the requirements of the citation noted, the fact is the death of Mr. [Nombre 015]; the damage is the harm suffered by Ms. [Nombre 016] and Ms. [Nombre 017] due to the death of Mr. [Nombre 015]; the risky activity is the benefit obtained by the defendant company from the use of the truck to transport raw materials or products, which is an asset that generates danger due to its functional nature (since, according to the rules of human knowledge, every vehicle is prone to cause damage) and the situation that unites all the above is the mishap between the truck with license plate [Valor 007] (property of the defendant) and the motorcycle with license plate [Valor 008], in which the former invaded the lane along which the latter was traveling, the collision occurred, and as a result, Mr. [Nombre 015] died. In addition to the above, the corporation accepts (in its response to the tenth fact of the complaint) that it exploits the mentioned motor vehicle for the transport of products or raw materials, meaning it thus obtains a benefit from this potentially damaging object. In this way, since the elements of objective liability by the theory of damage are present, the Tribunal’s determination is correct, which is made by verifying the requirements and not merely because El Ángel S.A. is the owner of the truck.” (The highlighting is not part of the original). Thus, this jurisprudential precedent cited by the appellant, which is recent, does nothing more than reaffirm the lower court's position and demonstrate that the defect alleged by the appellant did not exist. Now, the appellant has argued that the judge incorrectly assessed the regulations regarding the burden of proof, by virtue of the fact that it was a notorious and undisputed fact that América Ciento Siete S.A. is a corporation, as well as the commercial and industrial purpose described since its incorporation. This Court of Appeals considers that the judge did not commit any error in considering that it was incumbent upon the civil plaintiff to demonstrate that the vehicle was exploited by the civil co-defendant, for which the certification of legal capacity of América Ciento Siete S.A. is not sufficient. The appellant's criterion on this issue is based on the same premise, namely that the mercantile nature of the corporation is sufficient to consider it proven that the vehicle in question was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, which—as already indicated and as the judge adequately assessed—is not correct. In accordance with the dynamic burden of proof system that governs civil procedural matters and is contemplated in Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), the civil plaintiff has the burden of proof regarding the facts on which they base their claim, while the civil defendant has the burden of proving the preclusive, modifying, or extintive facts they allege. In the case at hand, the judge assessed that the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate that the vehicle used to cause the injuries to [Nombre 004] was exploited by the civil co-defendant corporation. This circumstance, without a doubt, had to be proven by the plaintiff, since it is a factual scenario contained in the two norms whose application was sought. In this sense, it is appropriate to cite the Argentine scholars Roberto Loutayf and Luis Félix Costas, who, in their book “La acción civil en sede penal,” stated: “Finally, the civil party's evidence must also refer to the defendant's liability for the damages caused by the wrongful act (which is of primary importance when it involves third-party defendants, where the cause of their liability must be proven).” (Cited in turn by Rafael Ángel Sanabria Rojas in “Reparación civil en el proceso penal,” Editorial Jurídica Continental, fourth updated edition, p. 481). Along the same lines, see resolution 963-2006 of the First Chamber, which establishes: “(…) These are exhaustive and restricted grounds, a condition deriving from the fact that they aggravate the compensatory obligation.

In this regard, precept 187 of the same body of law lists the following: “a) The owner of a vehicle who allows it to be driven by a person lacking the respective license or under the effects of liquor or enervating drugs./ b) Individuals or legal entities that, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport./ c) The owner who allows the license plates of their vehicle to be used by another vehicle to which they have not been assigned, or does not deliver them to the Dirección General de Transporte Público for custody, if the vehicle to which they were assigned is permanently unable to circulate./ d) Any individual or legal entity that imports, assembles, produces, or commercializes motor vehicles, in the event that the traffic accident is caused by the omission, in the vehicle or vehicles involved in the traffic incident, of the respective safety measures, as set forth in Article 31 of this Law.” In such situations, it is reiterated, the owner of the asset jointly and severally assumes the obligation to repair the damage, thereby granting the victim the possibility of making their claim against only one of them or both at the same time. The application of this joint and several liability (solidario) regime depends on the demonstration, which falls upon the plaintiff (canon 317, subsection 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure), of the occurrence of any of these referred scenarios, such that if not proven, said joint and several liability regime would be inapplicable." For all the foregoing reasons, this appellate court finds that the decision challenged by the appellant is in accordance with law, since in the case under review, the civil plaintiff did not convincingly demonstrate, as was their duty, that América Ciento Siete S.A. exploited the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], driven by [Name 001] at the time of the events, and therefore it was not possible to attribute full joint and several liability to it, based on either of the two norms claimed.

(2) Insufficient reasoning and pretermission of evidence (fifth ground of the appeal). According to the appellant, by rejecting the civil plaintiff's thesis regarding the civil liability of América Ciento Siete S.A., the judge did not assess evidentiary elements that were duly offered and incorporated during the trial, such as the certification of corporate legal status of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. and the registry certification of the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], which were not even mentioned, and greater probative value was granted to the statement of the sentenced defendant. Regarding the reasoning contained in the appealed judgment and cited above, this Court of Appeals finds that it is brief but sufficient, as it allows for an understanding of the reasoning that led the judge to reject the civil liability that the civil plaintiff sought to attribute to América Ciento Siete S.A., complying with the provisions of Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, based on legal assessments, which in turn have been challenged by the appellant in the first two grounds of appeal and upon which this Court has already ruled. Regarding the alleged defect of pretermission of evidence, it is true that the trial court is obliged to assess all lawful, duly incorporated evidence that may serve to clarify the facts. However, not any omission would justify the nullity of a ruling. For such non-observance or pretermission of evidence to lead to that consequence, the overlooked evidence must be essential, meaning it must have an impact on the decision taken, which is not the case here. From the analysis of the appealed judgment, it has been verified that the judge did not set forth any assessment regarding the certification of corporate legal status of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., nor regarding the certification of the motor vehicle in question. Nevertheless, that pretermission did not cause harm to the civil plaintiff, insofar as it is inferred from the reasoning contained in the ruling that the judge did not disregard that the vehicle with license plates [Value 003] was registered in the name of the civil co-defendant, nor that this was a corporation (sociedad anónima), whose certification of corporate legal status records the purpose of commerce and industry. The trial judge based their arguments on the fact that it was not enough for the vehicle involved in the traffic accident to be the property of a corporation to give rise to the scenarios contemplated in subsection b) of Article 199 of the Traffic Law, or the fourth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, but rather it had to be demonstrated that the vehicle was the object of exploitation, which did not occur in the specific case. Thus, hypothetically including the evidence whose assessment the appellant misses, the result would have been the same. Indeed, and as already pointed out above, the civil plaintiff did not bother to demonstrate "the exploitation of the motor vehicle for a commercial or industrial purpose," but rather considered it sufficient that the vehicle was registered in the name of a corporation and that this purpose should therefore be presumed, a criterion that was not shared by the trial judge, nor by this Court. It is worth noting that the judge, indeed, in their arguments, referred to the statement given by [Name 001], who indicated that the vehicle in question was registered in the name of a corporation belonging to her mother, but that it had no business activity, as her mother is a homemaker and that she was the one who used the vehicle, specifically to transport her daughter. The judge intertwined this with the statement of [Name 004] himself, who, among other statements given to him by the sentenced defendant, mentioned that she told him that – at the time of the events – she was heading to San José to address a family matter. The judge's arguments correspond to a comprehensive examination of the evidence, as was done throughout the appealed ruling, both to demonstrate the culpable conduct of [Name 001] and her criminal and civil liability, as well as to dismiss the civil liability of América Ciento Siete S.A. However, it is evident that this was an additional assessment made by the judge, who based the decision challenged here on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate the exploitation of the vehicle by the civil co-defendant, which has been confirmed by this Court through a comprehensive examination of the ruling and the trial that preceded it. In this way, the combined analysis of both referred statements, in which the victim and the accused were coincident, does not constitute any defect. For all the foregoing reasons, the appellant's objection must be dismissed.

(3) Erroneous interpretation of the principle of congruence (fourth ground of the appeal). The reasoning put forward by the judge was challenged, according to which the civil plaintiff did not allege the circumstances contained in Articles 199 of the Traffic Law and 1048 of the Civil Code, by which civil liability was attributed to the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A.. Although this Court shares the criterion put forward by the appellant, in that the principle of congruence cannot be analyzed solely with respect to the section of facts contained in the civil indemnification action (acción civil resarcitoria) brief, but rather said brief must be assessed in its entirety, the truth is that the argument put forward by the judge in this regard, though erroneous, was a brief additional mention, but was not the basis for their decision, and therefore it is not capable of invalidating the judgment regarding the rejection of the full joint and several liability of América Ciento Siete S.A., on which matter – as has been extensively argued – the decision is in accordance with law. The principle of congruence, which is derived from both Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 61.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does not mean – as the trial court understood it – that the description of the circumstances contained in the norms whose application is sought must necessarily be located in the statement of facts of the civil indemnification action. What is relevant is that it emerges from the content of the civil indemnification action brief, under any of the other titles or sections provided by the plaintiff, for what matters is that the parties against whom the action is brought know what they must defend against. This criterion has been shared by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, in reiterated case law. It is worth citing Resolution 1109-2011 of said Chamber, which states: "What is relevant and important is that within the initial brief, the civil plaintiffs did describe and detail the grounds on which they base their action, as well as the damages they sought to be compensated by the defendants" (cf. Resolution N° 2011–01109 of 3:09 p.m. on September 13, 2011. In the same vein, see Resolution 446-2014 of the same Criminal Cassation Chamber. In the case at hand, as the appellant correctly pointed out, from the content of the civil indemnification action brief, the claims are clearly inferred, so that – had the joint and several liability claimed by the plaintiff been accepted – no violation of the principle of congruence would have been incurred. However, as indicated, this was an additional argument, briefly mentioned in the judgment, which – even if hypothetically removed – would not change what was decided, because the judge analyzed the merits of the matter, the evidence submitted for their consideration, and, based on those arguments and not on a matter of congruence, chose to dismiss the civil indemnification action with respect to the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., which is in accordance with law. For all the foregoing reasons, upon verifying that the reasoning set forth in the appealed ruling to reject the full joint and several liability of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. is in accordance with law, it is appropriate to dismiss grounds one, two, four, and five of the appeal filed by the civil plaintiff's representation.

VIII.- The third ground of the challenge raised by the attorney for the Civil Defense of the Victim is granted. The appellant claimed the non-application of Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Traffic Law, as the trial judge ordered the lifting of the lien (gravamen) that weighed on the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], without considering what is expressly provided in said regulations and violating the duty to provide reasoning, as they did not explain the reasons for doing so and for disregarding the limited civil liability of the registered owner of the vehicle involved in the criminal act. It is held that the appellant's claim is correct and causes harm to the civil plaintiff, because the registered owner of the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], that is, América Ciento Siete S.A., must indeed be liable for the damages caused to [Name 004], exclusively up to the value of the vehicle. Thus, the vehicle with license plates [Value 003] must remain subject to a lien as a kind of objective and real guarantee until the effective fulfillment of what has been decided, as established by the regulations that were violated by the judge. Given its importance for resolving the point under discussion, we proceed to cite Resolution 963-2006 of the First Chamber, which clearly explains the matter under discussion: "Damages produced in a traffic accident are subject to the rules of civil liability imposed by specific and special mandates regulated in the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes, No. 7331. From this point of view, as a general principle, liability falls on drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and third parties, who with their conduct (by action or omission) have produced damage in the legal sphere of a person, in such a way that this effect is attributable to them. This follows from numeral 186 of the referred legal body. In this way, upon the occurrence of an injury produced by a traffic accident, its compensation will be subject to the demonstration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial suffering, as well as the causal link between the behavior of the subject to whom it is attributed and the legal injury whose repair is requested. Therefore, the rule is that the person civilly liable will be the one who caused the damage directly or indirectly. Now then, when liability falls on the driver, two specific scenarios may arise. The first is that the liable driver is also the owner of the vehicle. In this case, they would be the sole and direct party obliged to compensate for the damage. However, it may be the case that the person driving is not the owner of the asset. In that hypothesis, except for the scenarios that will be indicated below, in which joint and several liability is generated, the registered owner is not fully civilly liable with the entirety of their assets, but only up to the value of the automobile. Here it is imperative to clarify that ordinal 188 of the aforementioned legal body establishes a lien of an objective nature that is imposed on the asset with which the damage was caused, which is noted in the margin of the respective registry entry. The initial paragraph of that mandate states, in relevant part: ‘The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain subject to a lien pending the result of the respective proceeding and at the order of the judicial authority hearing it. Said authority shall order it to be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry, if it is registered…’. This lien is imposed on the motor vehicle even when the driver at the time of the accident is not the owner, or does not appear with that subjective condition in the Public Registry (Article 192 ibidem). It may only be lifted when there is reliable proof within the civil collection proceeding that the economic reparations have been fully satisfied, legally waived, or the guarantee substituted to the satisfaction of the judge (numeral 193). Thus seen, it is a charge that weighs on the asset, regardless of who its owner is. It constitutes a lien on that exclusive asset of the owner, whoever that may be over time. From the foregoing, it is inferred that when the owner of the vehicle is not the driver, their ‘liability’ is limited to the value of the automobile, which for such purposes, constitutes a total or partial guarantee of the compensation that is ultimately ordered by the judge, which derives from the patrimonial link they hold over the asset – that is, of a real nature. However, the owner is not exempt from such duty of restitution for damage in all cases. Indeed, as an exception to the rule just set forth, the Traffic Law provides for certain hypotheses in which the owner assumes joint and several liability – therefore full – together with the driver. These are exhaustive and restricted grounds, a condition that derives from the fact that they aggravate the obligation to compensate. In this regard, precept 187 of the same body of law lists the following: (…). In such situations, it is reiterated, the owner of the asset jointly and severally assumes the obligation to repair the damage, thereby granting the victim the possibility of making their claim against only one of them or both at the same time. The application of this joint and several liability regime depends on the demonstration, which falls upon the plaintiff (canon 317, subsection 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure), of the occurrence of any of these referred scenarios, such that if not proven, said joint and several liability regime would be inapplicable. So, in that eventuality, the quantitative terms of the owner's obligation are limited to the value of the vehicle, upon which the law places a lien. That is to say, in that scenario, they cannot be considered fully liable, however, the asset upon which a lien is imposed by law means that that specific part of their assets is liable for the obligation, limiting their civil obligation to the value of the vehicle. This differs from when it is the person who directly caused the damage, as in that case, they are liable exclusively with the entirety of their assets." (The highlighting is not from the original). The previous reasoning is shared by this Court, for as is clear from the conjunction of the aforementioned norms, currently contained in Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Traffic Law, when there is no identity between the registered owner and the driver, the former must be jointly and severally liable with the latter for the damages caused by a traffic accident, but in a manner limited to the value of the vehicle. Consequently, the motor vehicle with which the damage is caused must remain subject to a lien until the proceeding concludes and it is recorded that the civil damages have been paid, waived, the guarantee substituted, or if one year has elapsed since the finality of the judgment that ordered the compensation, the sentence enforcement court has not requested that the lien be placed at its order. This is so because, in the case of damages caused by a traffic accident, with respect to the registered owner of the vehicle, the rule is limited liability and the exception is joint and several liability. In this case, as noted in the previous considering clause, the judge correctly assessed that the exception was not applicable (under the terms of Article 199 of the Traffic Law, nor under the terms of numeral 1048 of the Civil Code), so that the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. would be liable with the entirety of its assets for the damages caused to [Name 004]. Hence, with sound reasoning and in accordance with law, the judge rejected the principal claim of the civil plaintiff. However, without due reasoning and violating the legal provisions already mentioned, the trial judge omitted any consideration regarding limited civil liability and ordered the lifting of the lien that legitimately weighed on the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], owned by América Ciento Siete S.A.. Said decision must be revoked by this Court, in strict adherence to the aforementioned regulations, so that América Ciento Siete S.A. must be liable, in a limited manner, only up to the value of the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], and the lien that weighs on said motor vehicle must be maintained and may only be lifted under the scenarios set forth in Article 204 of the Traffic Law, as the legislator so expressly provided. This position has already been previously upheld by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, as recorded in Resolution No. 447-2017, with the following arguments, which are shared by this Court: "Given that in this case none of the above circumstances were proven, the possibility of decreeing joint and several civil liability of the registered owner of the vehicle is excluded, but the limited objective civil liability up to the value of the vehicle subsists, as the Constitutional Chamber determined in decision 2000-5517, of 2:50 p.m., on July 5, 2000, and which the Third Chamber echoed when it stated: ‘Objective tort liability is not applicable to the case at hand; it is important to note that the judgment does not find it proven that the vehicle driven by Mr. [Name 002] was a vehicle dedicated to remunerated public transport or business activity as required by our legislation (essentially in Article 1048 of the Civil Code and the rules in force on civil liability of the 1941 Penal Code, according to Law 4891 of November 8, 1971), as a kind of exception for certain activities generating lucrative or functional risk. It is not enough to simply use a motor vehicle to thereby create objective liability, which would lead to that citizen always being civilly liable for the damages occurred, unless they prove they were due to force majeure or the fault of the injured party. The appropriate course is to resolve the grievance by applying the rules relating to subjective liability (in this case dismissible regarding [Name 017], given the fortuitous event proven by the trial judge -folio 282-). Paragraph 3 of Article 1048 of the Civil Code must be harmonized with what is prescribed by numeral seven, paragraph 2 of Traffic Law No. 7331. It is necessary to indicate that the registered owner of the motor vehicle is only liable, regarding their civil liability, up to the amount or value of their vehicle.’ (# 345-98, at 9:25 a.m., on April 3, 1998)”. Thus, the jurisprudential line followed by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Chamber, which is binding erga omnes, consists of the limitation of the civil liability of the registered owner of the vehicle involved in the criminal act up to the value thereof, as long as the scenarios contained in Article 199 of the Traffic Law or those contained in the fourth paragraph of numeral 1048 of the Civil Code are not demonstrated, as occurred in the case at hand. The foregoing is congruent with what is expressly provided in Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the repeatedly cited special law, which would have no reason to exist were it not as a logical consequence of that limited liability strictly up to the value of the vehicle that weighs on the registered owner of the vehicle with which the damages were caused. The representation of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., which has never disputed being the registered owner of the vehicle in question, upon being notified of the appeal filed by the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim, with respect to the ground of interest here, alleged that the judge ruled in accordance with law, for two reasons. The first of them is because, according to their criterion, once the civil indemnification action filed against their client was dismissed, the appropriate course is that the vehicle owned by it should not be liable for the damages, so the lifting of the lien was correct. However, this position is contrary to the letter of the law, as has already been explained, and therefore cannot be accepted by this Court. The second reason upheld by the representation of the civil co-defendant consisted of the assertion that the civil plaintiff, according to their criterion, attempts to mislead this Court, as the truth is that they never claimed limited liability, but only the full liability of América Ciento Siete S.A. as a civil co-defendant. Having examined the civil indemnification action brief, in its entirety, as well as the conclusions issued by the representation of the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim during the adversarial proceedings, this claim must be rejected. It is on record that the representation of the civil plaintiff, at all times, requested that the lien weighing on the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], owned by América Ciento Siete S.A., be maintained so that it would be liable for the damages caused to [Name 004], so it is not true that this claim by the civil plaintiff was not on record. As already noted in the previous considering clause, the defect of lack of congruence, which is essentially what the representation of América Ciento Siete S.A. alleges should the appellant's position be accepted, is determined based on the claims of the parties. Thus, in the specific case, the civil plaintiff, throughout the entire proceeding, contemplated the aforementioned lien among their claims, so we would not be facing a defect of extra petita, as the representation of the civil co-defendant has alleged. Added to this, it must be remembered that it is the judge who knows the law, in accordance with the principle of iuria novit curia, so the parties may not expressly invoke the normative basis for their claims, without this meaning that they should not be granted. As has been indicated, limited liability up to the value of the vehicle and the lien in question are expressly provided in Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the special law governing the matter, and therefore should not have been disregarded by the trial judge and cannot be overlooked by this appellate court. In this regard, see Judgment 61-1997 of the First Chamber. For the foregoing reasons, the third ground of the challenge by the civil plaintiff's representation is granted. Consequently, the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., in its capacity as registered owner of the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], must be liable in a limited manner for the damages suffered by [Name 004], already declared, only up to the value of the vehicle in question. Furthermore, the decision to lift the lien weighing on the vehicle with license plates [Value 003] is revoked, and said lien must remain until one of the scenarios contained in Article 204 of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes occurs.

POR TANTO

The appeals of the judgment filed by the public defender Eduardo Monterrey Carmona and the sentenced defendant [Name 001] are dismissed in all respects. Grounds one, two, four, and five of the challenge formulated by the attorney for the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, are dismissed. The third ground of the appeal filed by Martínez Solano is granted. Consequently, the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., in its capacity as registered owner of the vehicle with license plates [Value 003], must be liable in a limited manner for the damages suffered by [Name 004], only up to the value of the vehicle in question. Furthermore, the decision to lift the lien weighing on the vehicle with license plates [Value 003] is revoked, and said lien must remain until one of the scenarios contained in Article 204 of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes occurs. Notify.

María Milagro Granados García Hannia Soto Arroyo Raúl Madrigal Lizano Judges of the Sentence Appeals Court Accused: [Name 001].

Crime: Culpable Injuries.

Victim: [Name 004].

kmurillog The public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona, appeared at this venue; the challenge (impugnación) filed by the convicted person [Name 001]; and the attorney from the Civil Defense Office for Victims (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), Karla Nancy Martínez Solano; and, **WHEREAS (RESULTANDO):**

**I.-** That by judgment number 660-2024, of fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October ninth, two thousand twenty-four, the CRIMINAL COURT OF HEREDIA, Single-Judge Section (Tribunal Penal de Heredia, Sección Unipersonal), resolved: "**THEREFORE (POR TANTO):** In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 5.6. and 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 1, 30, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 71 and 128 of the Penal Code; 122 et seq. of the Civil Liability Rules of the 1941 Penal Code; 1 to 16, 111 to 118, 142, 182 to 184, 265, 267, 356, 358, 360 to 365 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal); 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code; 74, 197 and 199 of the Law of Transit on Terrestrial Public Roads and Road Safety (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial); and Fee Decree 41457-JP, it is resolved as follows: **1)** [Name 001] is declared to be a **RESPONSIBLE PERPETRATOR (AUTORA RESPONSABLE)** of the crime of **NEGLIGENT INJURIES (LESIONES CULPOSAS)** against [Name 004], and in that capacity, a principal penalty of **SIXTY (60) FINE-DAYS (DÍAS MULTA)** is imposed, at a rate of **FIVE THOUSAND COLONES (₡5,000) PER DAY**, for a total of **THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (₡300,000)**, which she must pay in favor of the Board of Constructions, Installations and Acquisitions of the Ministry of Justice (Patronato de Construcciones, Instalaciones y Adquisiciones de Bienes del Ministerio de Justicia) to the Banco Nacional account [Value 002], having to provide the payment receipt to this office, under the warning that once this judgment becomes final (firme), a period of fifteen business days is granted to make the corresponding payment. The convicted person is warned that if she does not have the economic resources to pay the fine imposed nor to pay the amount in installments, she must inform this office before the expiration of the previously mentioned period, indicating whether she is interested in performing community service (servicios de utilidad pública) for the benefit of the State or its public welfare institutions, an aspect that will be determined by the competent judge and whose control will be the responsibility of the General Directorate of Social Adaptation (Dirección General de Adaptación Social); on the contrary, if the period of fifteen business days after the finality of the judgment elapses without the fine having been paid or any statement regarding the lack of ability to pay having been made, each fine-day will be converted into one day of imprisonment. **2)** The accessory penalty of **DISQUALIFICATION FROM DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLES ON TERRESTRIAL PUBLIC ROADS (INHABILITACIÓN PARA LA CONDUCCIÓN DE VEHÍCULOS AUTOMOTORES POR VÍAS PÚBLICAS TERRESTRES)** is imposed on Ms. [Name 001] for a period of **SIX MONTHS**. **3)** The cessation of any personal precautionary measure that has been imposed against Ms. [Name 001] on the occasion of this process is ordered. **4)** The civil compensatory action (acción civil resarcitoria) brought by [Name 004] against [Name 001] is declared partially **WITH MERITS (CON LUGAR)**, for which reason Ms. [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following items: **a.** ₡96,873,925.62 (ninety-six million eight hundred seventy-three thousand nine hundred twenty-five colones and sixty-two cents) for permanent disability (incapacidad permanente). **b.** ₡2,000,000 (two million colones) for moral damage (daño moral). **c.** ₡14,837,392.56 (fourteen million eight hundred thirty-seven thousand three hundred ninety-two colones and fifty-six cents) for civil costs (costas civiles) in favor of the Civil Defense Office for Victims. **d.** ₡49,381 (forty-nine thousand three hundred eighty-one colones) in favor of [Name 004] for procedural costs derived from the payment of the mathematical expert witness (perito actuario matemático). The claim for temporary disability (incapacidad temporal) requested in the civil claim is rejected. The legal interest generated from its enforceability until its effective payment must be added to the monetary amounts stated above, as well as the corresponding indexation (indexación). Since the civil judgment was made based on liquid amounts, [Name 001] is granted a period of fifteen business days from the finality of this judgment to proceed with the corresponding payments to the account that Mr. [Name 004] must provide and to the account that the Civil Defense Office for Victims must provide; otherwise, the interested party is authorized to proceed with collection via the corresponding route. **5)** The civil compensatory action brought by [Name 004] against AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA is declared **WITHOUT MERITS (SIN LUGAR)**, but it is exempted from paying costs because a plausible reason for litigating existed. **6)** The lifting of lien number 2021-00785971-002 and of the collision notation with ticket number 20180315300615, which burden the registration of the vehicle with plates [Value 003], is ordered, once the judgment is final. **7)** Once the judgment is final, the destruction of the material evidence associated with the case file is ordered. **8)** This matter is resolved without special assessment of costs in the criminal aspect, for which reason the expenses of the process must be borne by the State. **9)** Once this judgment is final, its registration in the Judicial Registry and Archive (Registro y Archivo Judicial) is ordered, as well as the referral of the corresponding testimonials to the National Institute of Criminology (Instituto Nacional de Criminología) and the Sentence Execution Court (Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena). Notify the judgment to the General Directorate of Traffic (Dirección General de Tránsito) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) for its corresponding purposes. **NOTIFY (NOTIFÍQUESE).** Juan Carlos Morales Jiménez Trial Judge" (sic).

**II.-** That, against the previous pronouncement, the public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona; the challenge filed by the convicted person [Name 001]; and the attorney from the Civil Defense Office for Victims, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, filed appeals of criminal judgment (recursos de apelación de sentencia penal), which will be resolved by this panel of the Sentence Appeals Court Specialized in Organized Crime (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada), according to the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), number XXVI, in session number 53-2023, of June 23, 2023.

**III.-** That, having conducted the respective deliberation in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), the Court considered the questions formulated in the challenge.

**IV.-** That the pertinent legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by the Criminal Judgment Appeals Judge **Granados García**, and; **CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO)** **I.- Admissibility, jurisdiction and evidence. (A) Admissibility examination.** In the present case, the Criminal Court of Heredia, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October ninth, two thousand twenty-four, issued judgment number 660-2024, through which it declared [Name 001] a responsible perpetrator of the crime of Negligent injuries, against [Name 004], for which it imposed on Ms. [Name 001] a fine and another penalty of disqualification. In addition, it resolved regarding the civil claims submitted to its cognizance. Thus, we are faced with a decision that is appealable via this route (objective specificity). In accordance with Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights and as resolved by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Mauricio Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica by judgment of July two, two thousand fourteen, many formalities are not necessary to hear appeals against judgment. However, according to the provisions of numerals 437 to 440, 446, 458 and 460 to 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), simple requirements regarding form, deadline, and standing to challenge (legitimación) must be met, which is why an examination of these demands proceeds. The integral reading of the ruling occurred on October sixteenth, two thousand twenty-four, for which reason there was a deadline to appeal until November sixth, two thousand twenty-four. On November first, two thousand twenty-four, the public defender Eduardo Monterrey Carmona, exercising the technical defense of [Name 001], filed an appeal against the indicated judgment, verifying its presentation within the legal deadline and with the due standing for these purposes. Subsequently, on November sixth, two thousand twenty-four, the convicted person herself, [Name 001], exercising her material defense (defensa material), raised an appeal, also having standing for it and within the legal deadline. On that same date and, therefore, in time, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, in her capacity as attorney of the Civil Defense Office for Victims and representing the civil plaintiff (actor civil) [Name 004], filed an appeal, specifically regarding civil claims, for which reason she also has standing. In addition, all the challenges were filed by means of reasoned briefs, with express indication of the grievances, before the body of origin. Therefore, the appeals are admissible and it is appropriate to rule on the merits.

**(B) Jurisdiction**. This Specialized Court of Criminal Sentencing Appeals for Organized Crime has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, as stipulated in articles 93 ter and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in relation to agreement number XXVI of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session number 53-2023 of June twenty-third, two thousand twenty-three. **(C) Examination of the admissibility of the evidence**. In the appeal filed by the convicted person [Name 001], in the section titled "evidence to be gathered and for better provision," she textually stated: *"With all due respect, I offer as evidence for better resolution and to be gathered, that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros be requested, through its authority, for information on all payments made to the victim in order to verify what amounts have been paid so that there is no double payment in this matter or double collection."*. Furthermore, [Name 005], representing the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., upon responding to the service of the appeal filed by the Victim's Civil Defense Office, in a section titled "Offering of evidence for better resolution," proposed the following: *"The possibility of offering evidence for better resolution, even during the appeals phase, is specifically provided for by numeral 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code; which indeed provides for such faculty as a necessary guarantee to ensure and materialize the search for the real truth - a proper and consubstantial aim of every criminal process. Under the protection of said legal norm; in this act, a series of receipts from the Ministerio de Hacienda are offered - as evidence for better resolution - which have the character of official documents, and which demonstrate that AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE S.A., is neither a company, nor does it develop economic or lucrative activities, much less does it organize or intervene in the market for the intermediation of goods and services or in the activities of organizing the different factors of production, which will allow demonstrating the case theory of this representation of the co-defendant party, regarding the absence of a purpose of profit or economic gain in the actions of said corporate consortium."* (The underline belongs to the original). Having assessed the offerings and arguments of the parties, in light of article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Chamber rejects the evidence offered by both parties, for the following reasons: The numeral referenced and even cited by one of them, provides: *"The appealing party may offer, in the brief filing the appeal, new evidence regarding the facts that are the subject of the process or the manner in which an act was performed, when it contradicts what is indicated in the proceedings, in the record, in the trial records, or the judgment itself. The court will accept as new only the evidence offered in a timely manner but which was arbitrarily rejected, that which appears novel after the judgment, and that which, although previously existing, was not effectively possible to be offered by the interested party at the time."* (The highlighting does not belong to the original). In accordance with the express provision regulating the matter, this Chamber is of the opinion that only evidence that was arbitrarily rejected, that is novel or appears subsequently, or that which the interested party did not have the possibility of offering at the time can be accepted. In this case, from the study of the case file, it is clear that neither the evidence requested by the accused and civil defendant [Name 001] nor that offered by the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., falls under any of those assumptions. It is not evident in the case file that it was previously offered and rejected, nor was this alleged by the parties, and, by its very nature, it is ruled out that it is novel or that the parties did not have the possibility of offering it in the prior procedural stages, if they had considered it pertinent. On the contrary, it concerns documentation that was held in public entities (Instituto Nacional de Seguros and Ministerio de Hacienda), so the parties could have requested it previously, which they did not do. It should be noted that, during the adversarial proceedings, the representation of the civil co-defendant offered a mathematical expert opinion, which was admitted, without having, at that time, requested or provided the documentation it now seeks to have assessed by this Court of Appeals. For the foregoing reasons, in strict application of the cited norm, **the evidence offered - by both parties - is rejected as inadmissible** at the appeals stage.

**II.-** **Summary of the arguments. (A) Appeal filed by the public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona.** In his sole ground for appeal, titled *"Disagreement with the determination of facts, illegitimate substantiation of the conviction"*, he cited articles 1, 9, 62, 142, 184 and following of the Criminal Procedure Code as the violated regulations. According to his statement, the Trial Court (hereinafter, in this section, the court) omitted factual circumstances that were detailed in the accusation and were never proven, thereby weakening the accused's factual construction and erroneously pointing to the responsibility of the defendant. He censured that the court considered the excessive speed attributed to his client as proven, but that the rules of logic and experience alluded to by the court were presented from its subjectivity, without mentioning which logic or experience it was referring to. He claimed that the court used the police report as a parameter to compare the damage to the vehicles and from there, using its own logic and experience, inferred the excessive speed. He reproached that the police report contained hearsay information, insufficient to assess the nature of the damage. He added that the judge mentioned Newton's third law, but without having the exact speed data to arrive at a measurable result. He criticized that the court referred to the victim's testimony regarding the accused having told him that she had pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, since with that - according to the appellant - it evidenced an inclination to consider ideas, musings, or mere gossip, which in any case were discredited by his client. He stated that holding that the victim maintained the same version in the complaint and in the trial to justify the conviction is a fallacious argument. Furthermore, according to the appellant, the court did not explain why it considered the victim to be coherent, consistent, and persistent, thereby reflecting that it accepted as true facts impossible to prove, relying solely on the aggrieved party's statement. He alleged that the court did not assess that it was never proven that vehicle [Value 004], driven by [Name 006], stopped and kept its distance from the victim's vehicle. In this regard, the testimony of [Name 006] was not received, nor was any document available on the matter. However, in his opinion, the court took it for granted without anyone proving it. He requested that the appeal be granted, the judgment be annulled, and a new trial be ordered. **B)** **Challenge raised by the convicted person [Name 001].** *(1) First ground: Disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. Violation of the rules of sound criticism that violates the universal principle in dubio pro reo.* She claimed the violation of articles 1, 2, 6, 142, and 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code and numerals 39 and 41 of the Constitution. She argued that the court disqualified evidentiary elements that showed that the breach of the duty of care belonged to the other vehicles by not maintaining the required distance. She added that the court did not fully set forth the reasons of fact and law that led it to disqualify the version given by her, limiting itself to dismissing it as a mere attempt to evade responsibility. She alleged a logical error in the judge's analysis, as he granted credibility to the victim while simultaneously holding excluding assessments to detract from the reliability of her (the appellant's) version. She cited excerpts from the judgment. She added that the judge did not explain which logical rule and rule of experience allowed him to conclude which was the generating fact, but simply leaned towards the version given by the victim. According to the appellant, it is not derived from the evidence that her vehicle generated the impact beyond the victim's version about the alleged excessive speed, but there are no skid marks and the traffic officer did not note that the distance of 3.80 meters was because she was the one who generated the impact. She argued that the court's conclusion is contrary to the rules of logic, considering the weight of the vehicles, that it is a road on which one travels at minimum speed, as well as that Mrs. [Name 006], despite being pregnant, did not suffer injuries, nor did the victim, who acknowledged that he got out of the vehicle without help and, rather, helped the others out. According to the complainant, the judge recorded what the victim indicated and accepted it, without providing further explanation, lacking technical criteria to support his conclusions. Furthermore, in her appeal, she presented two alternatives that explained the final position of her vehicle: 1. That at the time of the crash, the vehicles ahead had already collided seconds before, thus forming a single block, so when her vehicle impacted that of Mrs. [Name 006], the latter was stopped by the Toyota Prado. 2. That before the crash, the vehicles were traveling so close together that, when hers impacted, it rebounded due to the cohesion formed at that moment, given the lesser mass, density, and size of the vehicle she was driving. She continued to argue that the judge omitted to analyze her statements in the trial, with the judge being satisfied with indicating that they lacked evidentiary support. She reproached that her statements were used against her to prove excessive speed, but at the same time, she was not believed because they lacked evidentiary support, thus involving contradictory and mutually excluding assessments. She reiterated that the judge substituted the rules of sound criticism with the victim's phrases and the mere compatibility between the accounts of the aggrieved party and the witness. She added that the analysis to dismiss the concurrence of fault was superficial and cursory, based exclusively on the 3.80-meter distance of her vehicle, without considering the position of the other vehicles and that Mrs. [Name 006] did not suffer injuries. She concluded by indicating that the judge was more interested in the quantity of prosecution witnesses than in their quality and truthfulness. *(2) Second ground: Disagreement with the determination of civil facts. Erroneous assessment of the mathematical expert calculation regarding the regulations of numeral 74 of the Transit Law.* She cited articles 99 and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code, 363 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as 74 and following of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (hereinafter, Transit Law) as violated. After a brief indication of the requirements of a judgment, she alleged that the verdict omitted to explain, with the necessary clarity, the cause-and-effect relationship between the collision and the knee injury, limiting itself to referring to the non-opposition to the medical-legal opinions and treating them as "holy writ." As she stated, the court omitted to assess the discussion about whether it was a long-standing injury, resulting from walks in the mountains, and that it was demonstrated in the trial that the victim walked on his own, helped others, without any problems with his knee or shoulder, and therefore did not require medical attention. She added that the judge accepted the permanent disability and the compensatory amounts, without providing further details on the matter. She alleged that the compensatory calculation should have been made based on net salary, not gross, because the latter does not conform to the actual amount the person receives, but includes amounts inherent to social security and the treasury, as derived from the mathematical expert report managed by the defense. She reiterated that the criterion for attribution that gives rise to the compensatory obligation is not extracted from the judgment, as it concerns injuries that appeared months later, whose causal link had to be proven by the civil party. She indicated that the judgment did not consider any fact to support the civil verdict as proven. *(3) Third ground: Disagreement with the individualization of the penalty.* She accused a violation of numerals 1, 2, 12, 142, and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code and articles 71 and 128 of the Penal Code. She claimed against the imposition of the measure of disqualification (inhabilitación), which she indicated is not of indiscriminate or automatic application, but must analyze the connection with the profession or trade of driver and be substantiated for each specific case. She cited resolutions 865-99 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber and 145-2008 of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of Cartago. She alleged that the judge did not analyze whether it was a habitual activity that generated economic profit, and therefore also failed to assess criteria of reasonableness and proportionality in imposing a burdensome penalty such as disqualification (inhabilitación). **(C) Appeal filed by the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano.** *(1) **First ground**: Erroneous and omitted application of substantive law, specifically numeral 199 subsection b) of the Transit Law, in relation to the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against the civil co-defendant company América Ciento Siete S.A.* After summarizing the civil action in what was relevant and citing part of the judgment's reasoning, she argued that the judge performed an extensive and arbitrary interpretation of article 199 subsection b) of the Transit Law, contravening article 10 of the Civil Code, which establishes that norms must be interpreted based on the proper meaning of the words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative antecedents, and social reality, attending to their spirit and purpose. She added that the judge confused joint and several civil liability with pure strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva pura) derived from the creation of risks (article 1048 of the Civil Code). Thus, in her view, the profit that the court requested is not a legal requirement. All that the legislator requires for the mandatory application of indirect joint and several civil liability, besides the driver's fault in causing the damage, is that the natural or legal person operates the vehicle for commercial or industrial purposes. According to the appellant, economic profit is a type of utility or operation, but not the only one, and what is required is that the operation be for commercial or industrial purposes. She alleged that it is a notorious fact and, therefore, requires no evidentiary elements, that the civil co-defendant is a corporation (sociedad anónima). Consequently, by legal provision, its nature is commercial and its assets are arranged for the fulfillment of that purpose. She added that, with the corporate charter (personería jurídica) of the company, which was offered as evidence, the corporate purpose and objectives were demonstrated, which are commercial and industrial, and with that, the purpose of the civil co-defendant company's vehicle and its joint and several liability were proven. She cited resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber. She added that, if the civil co-defendant opposed the civil action or what the corporate charter indicated, by provision of article 41.1.2. of the Civil Procedure Code, the burden of proof belonged to it and not to the civil plaintiff, as the judge required. However, the corporate purposes were not contested. She insisted that the judge required a condition not contemplated in the law, and it is irrelevant that the accused, at the time of the accident, was not engaged in a lucrative activity. She reiterated that the judge overlooked the fact that evidentiary activity is necessary to prove controversial events, which is not the case for notorious facts or those on which there was no dispute. She cited resolution 1837-2020 of the First Chamber.

It concluded that, having been proven that [Name 001] breached the duty of care in driving the vehicle owned by América Ciento Siete S.A., and caused damages to the victim, as well as having been accredited that the company's purposes were commercial and industrial, without the civil co-defendant opposing or offering evidence to the contrary, it was necessary to declare the civil action for damages against América Ciento Siete S.A., as jointly and severally liable civil party, through a correct application of article 199 subsection b) of the Ley de Tránsito. (2) Second ground: Erroneous application of article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), as a case of strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva). The appellant explained that, independently of [Name 001]'s subjective liability, given the mercantile nature of the company América Ciento Siete S.A., strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) derived from article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) was also claimed. It claimed that the judgment implicitly recognized all the legal and factual conditions for declaring that type of liability, but required a condition not contemplated in the law, consisting of proving that, at the time of the collision, the vehicle was being used for a pecuniary activity. It cited, again, resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) to support its position that the only requirements are: that injuries or death were produced with a motor machine, that the individual or legal entity is the owner of the means by which the injuries were caused, and that force majeure or fault of the victim has not been proven. It reiterated that, in the case of corporations (sociedades anónimas), as they are destined for profit and mercantile activity, the vehicles they own have a purpose of exploitation and, given the risk in the activity they develop, strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) is contemplated. It cited resolution 903-F-SI-2021 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera). It added that the documentary evidence demonstrated that América Ciento Siete is a corporation (sociedad anónima) and the mercantile activity is recorded since its incorporation, so there was no doubt that the vehicle it owned was being exploited for commercial purposes, which was not contested by the civil co-defendant nor did it offer evidence to the contrary. It concluded that the judge exceeded the legal requirements, in an arbitrary and extensive application of article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and ignoring the legal nature of the company owning the vehicle and, therefore, the purpose of the asset, as established in articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio). (3) Third ground: Regarding the non-application of articles 200, 203 and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito. The appellant pointed out that, pursuant to the cited articles, limited joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria limitada) was claimed. However, the judge did not rule on this matter, but merely ordered the lifting of the encumbrances and notations once the judgment became final. The foregoing, according to the complainant, constitutes a formal defect in the judgment due to a lack of reasoning, despite forming part of the civil claim and the arguments presented. It added that it is also a substantive defect, due to the non-application of articles 200, 203 and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, according to which the vehicle must remain encumbered until the damage caused is answered for, given the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). It recalled that limited joint and several civil liability persists regardless of what is resolved regarding subjective civil liability (article 199 of the Ley de Tránsito) and joint and several liability (article 1048 of the Civil Code). It cited resolution 523-2024 of this Court, partially with a different composition, as well as resolution 212-2018 of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José). (4) Fourth ground: Erroneous application of the principle of congruence. It claimed the violation of articles 112 and 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) and article 61.2 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). It alleged that within the reasoning contained in the contested judgment, it was included that it was not alleged “that said car was being exploited by the legal entity or by the driver -an individual- to generate their own profit from a commercial or industrial point of view,” nor was it alleged that “América Ciento Siete S.A. or [Name 001], on November 19, 2018, were exploiting the vehicle to fulfill a particular pecuniary activity.” However, in the filing document for the civil action for damages, according to the appellant, the description of the three criteria of attribution sustained by the civil party is indeed stated, on folios 4 and 5 verso of the civil action file. Thus, regarding the joint and several civil liability contained in article 199 of the Ley de Tránsito, it was noted that with respect to the civil co-defendant company, the claim derived from the following: “for being the owner of the vehicle that the accused was driving, given that this vehicle (sic) belongs to a legal entity whose purpose is commerce, industry, among others, according to the same certification of legal status (personería jurídica), therefore falling under the liability detailed in article 199 subsection b) of the Ley de Tránsito.” Regarding the strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) of article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), the document contemplated: “it is a motor machine and by its very nature, driving vehicles in itself generates a risk and it also specifically points out the joint and several civil liability that is generated by means of a motor machine.” Regarding the last criterion of attribution, the limited joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria limitada), it was outlined that it stemmed from the mere verification that the defendant corporation (sociedad anónima) is the registered owner of the vehicle with license plate [Value 003]. It concluded that the foregoing verifies a defect of erroneous application of the aforementioned precepts and a defect of reasoning, according to article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal). (5) Fifth ground: Erroneous and omitted factual, evidentiary, and legal basis of the judgment. Articles 142, 184, and 363 subsection b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) were deemed infringed. It was reproached that the judge considered that the civil party had not alluded to what the commercial activities of the civil co-defendant company were, nor the use of the vehicle in that context. However, according to the appellant, it did indicate the commercial activity the company was engaged in and proved it through the certification of legal status (personería jurídica), which contains its corporate purpose or objectives. Furthermore, the inherent nature of corporations (sociedades anónimas) was alleged, according to articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), which allows one to deduce that their assets are destined to fulfill the company's profit-making purposes. In its view, strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) arises from there, given the purpose of exploitation and the risk existing in the activity. It mentioned, again, resolution 187-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal). It criticized that, despite the foregoing, the civil action for damages against the civil co-defendant company was rejected, without weighing the certification provided nor the arguments described. According to the appellant, the foregoing translates into a defect of lack of reasoning and preterition of evidence. It maintained that the judge erred in considering that automatic civil liability had been alleged, but rather the criterion of attribution focused on the legal nature of the defendant company, on its corporate purposes, and on the commercial exploitation activity it exercised, which is deduced from an analysis of the commercial rules and the certification of legal status (personería jurídica) (all of which was not contested nor was evidence offered to the contrary). It added that the judge did not explain the reasons why the commercial purposes of the company were disregarded and that its assets were the means of its commercial activity based on the mere statement of [Name 001] or why the latter had more weight than the evidence offered by the civil party. According to the appellant, all the foregoing constitutes a defect of lack of reasoning and also a violation of the logical rule, in its principle of sufficient reason, in addition to the preterition of evidence, both the certification of legal status (personería jurídica) and the vehicle's registration certification. It added that the judge laconically justified the rejection of the second criterion of attribution, through a mere routine reference, without assessing the documentary evidence offered by the civil party, which was not even mentioned. According to the appellant, the same occurred regarding the decision to lift the encumbrances, since the sole argument was the rejection of the civil action for damages filed against the corporation (sociedad anónima), without analyzing the cited regulations, by which said encumbrance should persist as a model of limited joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria limitada). (D) Position of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público): It did not issue a pronouncement, despite having been summoned since November twelve, two thousand twenty-four. (E) Position of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A.: On November eighteen, two thousand twenty-four, by email addressed to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of San Ramón (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de San Ramón), a document titled “Rejection of the criminal sentence appeal promoted by the Victim's Civil Defense Office of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima del Ministerio Público) is requested” was received, signed by [Name 005], representing América Ciento Siete S.A., through which it rejected some of the grounds of the aforementioned appeal. Regarding the first ground: It argued that it lacks clarity, does not provide direct, precise, and consistent arguments, resorts to jurisprudential citations, and is not self-sufficient. It reiterated that its represented party has no for-profit purpose and that they had no obligation to prove it, as the essential circumstances of the accusation must be proven by the civil party, as derived from a correct reading of article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). It added that the evidence allows the conclusion reached by the judge to be inferred, in that its represented party does not exercise economic activity and is a simple family holding company, a common figure in our country, as declared by Mrs. [Name 001]. In its view, it is not enough that it is a corporation (sociedad anónima) to have a for-profit purpose, which constitutes a presumption by the civil party. It cited resolution 304-F-97 of the Criminal Cassation Court (Tribunal de Casación Penal). Regarding the second ground: It alleged that it is a reiteration of the first and stems from an erroneous interpretation of article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). It estimates that the purpose of the rule is to grant strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) when the company exercises a true and authentic commercial activity. It indicated that the jurisprudential citations provided by the appellant are biased and attempt to mislead, and are also old and have been contradicted by more recent rulings. It cited an excerpt from judgment 244-2018 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal). It reiterated that América Ciento Siete S.A. is not a company, does not develop economic or lucrative activities, does not intervene in the intermediation of goods and services, and the burden of proof was on the civil party. It added that the vehicle was being used for personal errands of [Name 001]. Regarding the third ground: It pointed out that it contains novel and surreptitious arguments, which were not directly sustained before the Trial Court, and therefore violate the principle of congruence, that is, the conformity between the petitions and the judgment that ends the litigation. It cited resolution 20-2018 of the Second Civil Court of San José (Tribunal Segundo Civil de San José). It criticized that the application of articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito was never formally requested, so the judge was inhibited from granting such a claim. It added that, even hypothetically including those arguments from the time of the complaint, it is not appropriate to keep a vehicle encumbered if its registered owner was exonerated from liability, so the decision was correct in light of articles 1, 9, and 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) and articles 39 and 42 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). It pointed out that those norms of the Ley de Tránsito are not binding or applicable to the specific case, given the exoneration of liability. In general, regarding the appeal filed by the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), it petitioned that the conformity of the first-instance judgment be declared and concluded by recalling that nullity for nullity's sake is not appropriate.

III.- Given their affinity, and to avoid reiterations, the sole ground of the appeal filed by the public defender Monterrey Carmona and the first ground contained in the challenge presented by the sentenced [Name 001] are resolved jointly, both being declared without merit. As stated in the preceding recital, the appellants criticized the determination of the criminal facts, considering that the judge incurred errors in the assessment of the evidence, by granting full credibility to the aggrieved party, while rejecting the defense's version, without adequately setting forth the factual and legal grounds that led him to this. Furthermore, according to the appellants, the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) were violated, because the judge did not explain the rules of logic and experience that allowed him to establish the dynamics of the events and, consequently, the responsibility of the accused, making it evident that the decision was based on subjectivities and the absolute credibility granted to the victim. According to the criterion of both appellants, the evidence that was submitted to the judge's knowledge, assessed objectively and in accordance with the rules of rational sound criticism (sana crítica racional), did not allow the dynamics of the events that were accused to be considered accredited, nor to invalidate the one that was proposed by [Name 001] in the exercise of her material defense. Upon examining the reasoning that the a quo set forth in the appealed judgment, this Appeals Chamber (Cámara de Apelación) concludes that the claims in question are due to a fragmented and incomplete reading of the intellectual analysis on which the conviction was based. Contrary to what was alleged by the sentenced person and her public defender, it is corroborated that the Trial Judge carried out an objective, exhaustive, and integral analysis of the evidence admitted at trial, which allowed him to consider the following facts as proven: “1.

On November 19, 2018, at approximately 9:20 a.m., in Heredia, Ulloa, Route 1, in the direction from Alajuela toward San José, 300 meters before the Alfredo González Flores bridge, [Name 004] was driving the vehicle with license plate [Value 005] in the left lane, with the right of way, and was traveling in the company of his minor child [Name 009], who was in the front passenger seat. **2.** That same day, time, and place, **[Name 001]** was driving the vehicle with license plate [Value 003], in the same direction as the victim [Name 004]. **3.** In the traffic flow dynamics on the described roadway, the vehicle traveling in front of the victim's vehicle, driven by [Name 010] with license plate [Value 006], stopped due to traffic congestion, so the victim [Name 004] also stopped, maintaining the proper distance. Behind the victim came the vehicle with license plate [Value 004] driven by [Name 006], who also stopped. Behind [Name 006] drove the accused **[Name 001]**, who, failing in her objective duty of care in the operation of motor vehicles because she was driving at an excessive speed for the road conditions and the area's traffic congestion, did not stop and strongly collided with the vehicle driven by [Name 006] and, with the force exerted on this vehicle, **[Name 001]** projected the vehicle driven by [Name 006] against the vehicle of the victim [Name 004] and, in this way, caused it to collide against the victim's vehicle in the rear, and in turn, caused the vehicle driven by [Name 004] to impact against the vehicle in front of it, which was driven by [Name 010]. In this manner, Mrs. **[Name 001]** caused the victim [Name 004] to also impact against the dash and against the lower internal part of his vehicle, suffering blows to his right knee, while the seat belt produced a blow to the victim, due to the whiplash effect, in the neck, shoulder, and right arm; injuries that required medical attention hours after the event. **4.** As a consequence of the failure in the objective duty of care in the operation of vehicles by **[Name 001]**, [Name 004] was injured and, according to medico-legal expert reports 2019-0551 (dated January 21, 2019) and 2020-7387 (dated October 1, 2020), suffered trauma to the neck, back, right shoulder, and right knee, showing bicipital tenosynovitis, subacromial-subdeltoid bursitis, heterogeneous thickening of the supraspinatus tendon fibers of a post-traumatic inflammatory nature, treated conservatively and through infiltrations; and edema of the prepatellar and infrapatellar subcutaneous fatty tissue, grade I sprain of the medial collateral ligament, and chondral lesion, which required arthroscopic surgery of the right knee. Currently, the described injuries cause the victim [Name 004] pain in the shoulder, arm, and forearm, making it difficult for him to lift weight, and pain in the right knee. These injuries caused by the defendant **[Name 001]** caused physical harm to the victim and required a temporary incapacity for the performance of his usual occupations of two (2) months, from the date of the events, and a permanent incapacity of ten percent (10%) for loss of general organic capacity." (Verbatim quote). It is necessary to clarify that there were facts that were not controverted by the technical or material defense; rather, the defensive thesis, with respect to the criminal perspective, during the trial, rested on two arguments, the first concerning the dynamics of the incident and the second regarding the cause of the victim [Name 004]'s injuries (the latter argument is, in part, the subject of the second ground for appeal by the convicted [Name 001], which will be elaborated upon further below). Regarding the dynamics of the accident, according to [Name 001], the vehicles preceding the one she was driving did not maintain the proper distance and, in fact, had already collided before she impacted the vehicle driven by [Name 006]. In this regard, at trial, she stated: "*(...) I want to declare myself not guilty, I want to explain the characteristics of the cars, his is a large, tall, strong car, with a chassis, my car is a small one, it's a car with no front end, it's old, made of soft metal, it's a little car, I feel that in all of this the responsibility is shared, I feel that there was no distance between the vehicles, I was coming slowly, on several occasions the gentleman indicated that there was a traffic jam, so it was impossible to go at another speed. Let me tell you how things happened, I was coming from Alajuela to San José when I saw that the gentleman braked suddenly, the car in front hit him and I hit her, at that moment everything happened fast, I was super scared, ...*" (Quote extracted verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). As is easily verified, it is the same position maintained in the appeal under review. Now, from the transcribed facts, it is clear that the *a quo* court effectively dismissed the defensive version and, on the contrary, deemed the dynamics of the events that were charged as proven, according to which the convicted [Name 001] breached the duty of care in driving the vehicle with license plate [Value 003], by driving at excessive speed, without taking into consideration the traffic congestion, failing to stop in a timely manner, and colliding with the vehicle driven by Mrs. [Name 006] (license plate [Value 004]), which caused the latter to collide with the vehicle driven by the victim [Name 004] (license plate [Value 005]), and the latter with the vehicle driven by Mr. [Name 010] (license plate [Value 006]). As will be analyzed later, the foregoing caused the injuries suffered by [Name 004]. Having examined the judge's arguments contained in the judgment, as well as the evidence submitted to his knowledge, this Chamber detects no defect in the assessment of the evidentiary elements, nor any violation of the rules of sound judgment (*sana crítica*), perceiving that the *a quo* court carried out a clear and precise reasoning of the points under discussion in the debate, which led him to the conviction decision. It is true that the court granted full credibility to the statement of the victim [Name 004]; however, this does not translate into a defect, insofar as the judge amply explained the reasons that allowed him to reach that conclusion, complying with the provisions of Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), while conducting a concatened analysis of the evidence and correctly applying the rules of sound judgment (*sana crítica*), as established in Article 184 of the same legal body. In consideration of the arguments raised by the appellants, summarized in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), it must be remembered that in our criminal procedure system the principle of freedom of evidence governs, according to which any fact can be demonstrated by any means, provided it is legal. Thus, arguments according to which the dynamics of the event could not be deemed proven because the statement of Mrs. [Name 006] was not available, no technical evidence was provided, there is no skid mark, or because the traffic citations and official report did not record who was responsible for the collision or the magnitude of the damages, are not acceptable. These arguments attempt to apply a kind of *tariffed evidence* (prueba tasada) system, which cannot be admitted by this Chamber, as it would openly contravene the aforementioned principle and the system of free assessment of evidence that governs us, contemplated in Article 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), which states: "*Assessment. The court shall assign the corresponding value to each of the elements of evidence, with strict application of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). It must adequately justify and substantiate the reasons for which it grants a certain value, based on the joint and harmonious appreciation of all essential evidence.*" In the appealed judgment, the reasons were clearly explained as to why, through the examination of the statements that were received during the debate, together with the duly incorporated documentary evidence, it was possible for the judge to deem the charged facts as proven, that is, that at the date, time, and place described in the factual account (circumstances on which there was no contention), three of the four vehicles involved in the accident stopped in a timely manner due to traffic congestion, and it was the vehicle driven by the convicted [Name 001] that did not stop and caused the multiple collision in question. This Chamber, having examined the appealed ruling, has verified the correct application of the rules of logic, specifically of derivation and sufficient reason, as the judge intertwined documentary and expert evidence (complaint, sketch, official report, traffic citations, medical expert reports) with the testimonies provided by the victim [Name 004], the witness [Name 009], and the traffic officer [Name 011], which reasonably allowed him to lean toward crediting the version of the victim and excluding that of the accused.

In this regard, the judge—throughout his intellectual reasoning—assessed:

"(...) this Court must explain how it arrived at that conclusion, and to do so it is appropriate to begin the corresponding dissertation by noting that at trial the testimony of Mr. [Nombre 004] was received, who in a clear, spontaneous manner and without major hesitation explained, broadly speaking, that on the day in question he was traveling with his minor son in his Toyota Prado vehicle heading toward San José and that, before reaching the Alfredo González Flores bridge—popularly known as «la platina»—he stopped because there was traffic congestion and the vehicle ahead—which was red—had braked; likewise, he indicated that once stopped he looked through the rearview mirror and observed that behind them there was a vehicle he classified as a white Rav-4 and that in a matter of seconds he heard a blow, like a screech, that he reacted by looking again through the rearview mirror and the vehicle behind was already «on top of» them, so what he did was try to press the brake firmly and at the same time hold the steering wheel tightly, but the impact was inevitable and so sudden that he did not even have time to warn his son to prepare himself. Mr. [Nombre 004] continued saying that after the blow he got out of the car and observed that the vehicle ahead had practically nothing wrong with it, that in the vehicle behind there was a pregnant woman very close to the steering wheel, and that about 3 meters from the pregnant woman's vehicle there was another car and that this one was indeed very damaged, so he helped the driver out and transferred her to his vehicle, adding that this person told him that she could not stop because when she saw the line of cars she pressed the accelerator instead of the brake. Without intending to repeat everything that Mr. [Nombre 004] narrated regarding the dynamics of the accident, these were the most important points, and from there the victim drew a sketch during his testimony at trial and graphically depicted the final disposition of the vehicles, detailing that those that were most damaged from a material standpoint were those driven by [Nombre 006] (the pregnant person) and by the defendant herein **[Nombre 001]**, since Mrs. [Nombre 006]'s car had practically ended up embedded underneath the car he was driving—which as already stated was a Toyota Prado and therefore was taller than the others—and similarly, that Rav-4 had considerable damage in the rear, as dents were observed there in the rear door and bumper, while Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**'s car had been left very battered in its front part, that is, the hood, to the point that he even thought there could be some risk from the smoke and liquids that were coming out of that automobile at that moment, although he later realized that the smoke was steam from the radiator. (...) As can be derived from the previous image, what was drawn by Mr. [Nombre 004] corresponds coherently with what he verbally narrated during the trial, but if this sketch is added to the one prepared by traffic officer [Nombre 011] and which appears on folio 225 of the file, important similarities can be appreciated that evoke veracity for the Court in what was narrated by the victim (...) Note, moreover, that the version offered by the victim [Nombre 004] agrees adequately with the one he had already given before the Public Ministry in the complaint he filed in that venue on October 1, 2020, so the argumentative position he maintained during the trial must be classified as coherent, consistent, and persistent, all of which contributes to the definition of his credibility. (...) Accordingly, the undersigned judge must grant credibility to what was narrated by Mr. [Nombre 004] regarding the circumstances that permeated the accident that is the subject of analysis, especially taking into account that the version he rendered at trial was confirmed regarding the dynamics of the facts by the young man [Nombre 009]—his son—who, although honest in clarifying that the fact occurred about six years ago and that he therefore did not remember it so vividly, what he did remember was that they were heading to San José, that there was traffic congestion, that they stopped because the car ahead had stopped, that he heard a blow and almost immediately felt a strong impact that caused them to hit the vehicle ahead."

An important aspect of the testimony of [Nombre 004] and [Nombre 009] was that both were consistent in asserting that before feeling the impact on their vehicle, they heard another impact, which inevitably leads the Court to conclude that before [Nombre 006]'s vehicle struck [Nombre 004]'s Toyota Prado, that Rav-4 had already been rear-ended by the Toyota Yaris driven by ** [Nombre 001]**, that is, the logical derivation of all this is that the first person who collided and, therefore, caused the subsequent multiple collision (colisión múltiple), was the accused here, ** [Nombre 001]**, ergo, the efficient cause of the result was a rear-end collision generated by the defendant, it was that and not some other circumstance that triggered the multiple collision; indeed, during her testimony at trial, Mrs. ** [Nombre 001]** acknowledged not once, but twice, that she had accepted responsibility when the matter was still in the Traffic Court (Juzgado de Tránsito), which is a further indication of her responsibility, because although the defendant tried to explain that she was "set up" by [Nombre 004] at all times, she did accept the facts in the traffic venue in order to apply her policy and repair all the vehicles, which in and of itself is an important element for the Court, since according to the rules of logic and experience it would be at least strange that, if a person is not at fault for a collision—as the accused alleged—she would agree to admit the facts in the administrative sphere to activate her insurance policy and repair the vehicles of all the others involved; contrary sensu, what this judge has been able to infer from the trial and from the review of the case file (expediente), is that Mrs. ** [Nombre 001]** accepted the facts and repaired the damaged vehicles with her policy because she was indeed the one who caused the accident that now concerns us." (Verbatim quote). The foregoing excerpts from the judgment allow this Chamber to note that the judge extensively assessed the testimony given by the injured party [Nombre 004] and the witness [Nombre 009] during the adversarial proceedings, contrasting them with the documentary evidence; an examination that allowed him to reasonably derive that the dynamics of the accident occurred in the manner in which it was charged and, therefore, that the convicted person [Nombre 001], when the cars ahead of her stopped in a timely manner due to traffic congestion in the area, did not interrupt her course, but rather collided the vehicle she was driving with the rear of Mrs. [Nombre 006]'s vehicle, which propelled it to collide with the injured party's vehicle and that, in turn, with Mr. [Nombre 010]'s vehicle. Such a conclusion did not stem from the judge's subjectivities nor is it arbitrary, as the appellants have alleged, but rather was the consequence of the joint examination of the evidence. The aggrieved party was emphatic in pointing out that when he stopped, due to the traffic congestion, he observed that the vehicle following him also stopped and it was after he heard a bang, a screech, and then received the impact. In this regard, [Nombre 004] stated: "the vehicle that was ahead of me, brakes, I brake with it, we were coming relatively slowly, but I am in the vehicle, driving, I stop, I look in the rearview mirror, I see that the vehicle behind, white, I think it was a Rav-4, I think an SUV, I see that the one coming behind stops, we were in a traffic jam, almost close to that I continue looking ahead but in seconds, when we are stopped, I hear a loud bang, like a screech and I react by looking in the rearview mirror but I see the vehicle behind on top of me, so I have the reaction to press the brake firmly and hold the steering wheel tightly, it was so fast that I did not have time to tell my son who was 14 years old and was sitting in front, to hold on or something, it was fast." (Quote taken verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). As was well assessed by the a quo, this version was consistent with that provided by the witness [Nombre 009], who stated: "Well, we were in a traffic jam, we were just before the Platina bridge, we stopped, I heard a bang and almost immediately I felt a strong hit, after the hit we impacted the car ahead, later I realized it was a four-car collision." (Quote taken verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). In turn, the judge contrasted the aforementioned testimony with the documentary evidence, corroborating its congruence, since the description of the location of the vehicles and their damage, contained in the police report (parte policial) and the sketch drawn up by the traffic officer, were consistent with the dynamics of the facts that, from the beginning of the process, the aggrieved party maintained. It is worth reiterating that nothing prevents, in a case such as this one, even without technical evidence (for example, an opinion from the Forensic Engineering Section (Sección de Ingeniería Forense) to determine the speed of the vehicles) or additional testimony (such as that of Mrs. [Nombre 006]), from being able to grant credibility to the victim's statement and through it have the charged event be considered accredited. In this regard, the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) has maintained a uniform criterion that: "(...) the conviction of the a quo in validating or not testimonial, expert, or documentary evidence, is the exclusive domain of its jurisdictional independence, of the exercise of reason and respect for the legitimacy of the evidentiary body, both in its obtainment and its incorporation into the process. For the foregoing reasons, the victim's testimony is sufficient to base a conviction and that credibility granted by the Court cannot be substituted in cassation, unless an infraction in the logical path or an anomaly in the probity of the judges is demonstrated. Under the privilege of the principle of immediacy (principio de inmediación), the victim was believed." (Resolution 1098-2001 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). In this case, it has been possible to verify that the judge did not base his decision arbitrarily or groundlessly on the credibility of the injured party [Nombre 004], but rather supported it through assessments that are consistent with the principle of immediacy of evidence, as well as the system of free evaluation of evidence and a comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary body. In this regard, he considered the manner in which the injured party gave his statement (in a fluent and compelling manner), the verisimilitude of his account (consistent with the description of the damage and final position of the vehicles, according to the police report and sketch), the incriminating consistency and persistence (given the congruence with the complaint and, it can be added, also with his accounts before the different medical instances) and, of special importance, the corroboration of his words through the testimony of the witness [Nombre 009], who ratified a fundamental detail to accredit the accusatory version and discard the defensive one, which was that a bang was first heard and, afterwards, the impact on the vehicle in which they were traveling occurred. Furthermore, none of the declarants related that another bang was heard later; rather, once the impact was received, the aggrieved party proceeded to exit the vehicle and, from that moment on, they related the subsequent facts of interaction with the other people involved in the automotive accident and the procedures they carried out. In this way, it is evident that the judge's evaluation of the evidence is consistent with the rules of logic, specifically of derivation, since this detail is not minor and is precisely what allows the version of the convicted person to be discarded, in that she collided with [Nombre 006]'s vehicle after the latter had collided with that of the injured party. The judge carried out a concatenated analysis of the evidentiary body and, based on it, considered the facts accredited as they were charged and related by the injured party [Nombre 004]. Contrary sensu, it is clear that he discarded the defensive thesis, but he did so in a reasoned manner, without incurring contradictions and according to a logical derivation of the information yielded by the evidence, as already mentioned. Thus, having analyzed the judgment in an integral manner, as the logical unit it is, the aforementioned assessments, which this Chamber endorses, allowed him to discard the version of the event's dynamics that was related by the convicted person and to accept the accusatory thesis. It seems that the appellants intend that, by the mere existence of two opposing versions, it is not possible to accredit one of them, which is not admissible. In addition to the foregoing, the a quo expressly referred to the defensive version and set forth additional assessments—applying the rules of experience—regarding the distance at which the defendant's vehicle remained in relation to the other three vehicles, which allowed him to validly conclude that the dynamics that were consistent with that final position were those provided by the injured party and not by the accused.

In this line of reasoning, it stated: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Having said the above, this adjudicator must refer to the statement of Mrs. </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, since regarding the dynamics of the accident what she indicated was that the responsibility was shared among everyone, first because the cars were not keeping a prudent distance between them, second because she was driving slowly precisely due to the traffic congestion, third because [Name 004] was the one who braked suddenly and, fourth, because the one who first hit the victim was [Name 006] and she –</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">– hit Mrs. [Name 006]'s car at a subsequent moment; consequently, what Mrs. </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">stated was that she only felt responsible for having rear-ended the vehicle of [Name 006]. However, the statements of the accused woman bear no relation to the true dynamics of the accident, given that beyond whether someone braked suddenly or whether distances were not being maintained –which is a duty of every vehicle according to the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito)– what she indicated regarding the first collision being [Name 006] against [Name 004] because the latter braked suddenly and that it was afterward that she collided with [Name 006], bears no relation to the way the vehicles ended up as recorded in the traffic diagram, precisely because, as she herself stated at trial, the car she was driving was small. In fact, from the file what is extracted is that it was a 2006 Toyota Yaris weighing 1,305 kilograms, while [Name 004]'s car was a 2018 Toyota Prado weighing 2,990 kilograms and the one [Name 006] was driving was a 2003 Toyota Rav-4 weighing 1,355 kilograms. That is, it lacks any logic that there is a separation of 3.80 meters between the car driven by </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and the one driven by [Name 006] if –as the accused alleged– she was the one who hit afterward, after Mrs. [Name 006] had already done so. In other words, to understand and validate the dynamics narrated by the accused, one would have to suppose that the lightest car among those described, the Toyota Yaris, which supposedly was going slowly according to her statement, hit the Toyota Rav-4 when the latter had already collided with the Toyota Prado and propelled these two cars, together, those 3.80 meters forward to cause the separation recorded in the official sketch prepared by the traffic officer. That is, to try to give validity to the account of the accused </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, one would have to suppose that her Yaris, which was going slowly, meaning without much kinetic energy, had the capacity to transfer that energy to the other vehicles to achieve displacing by 3.80 meters the other two cars that had supposedly already collided; something that departs from the most basic postulates of logic and experience, since sound criticism (sana crítica) rather evokes that the initial collision was between </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and [Name 006] –with vehicles of similar weight– and based on that impact caused by the imprudence of the accused woman, the Rav-4 driven by Mrs. [Name 006] was projected into the Prado of [Name 004] and this, in turn, into the Hyundai of </span>[Name 010]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. This being the case, it must be established, although it was already indicated supra, that the efficient cause of the result was the conduct of the accused </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, who, at an imprudent speed given the context of traffic congestion, without applying the judgment of foresight that at the bottom of the ‘dip’ (subibaja) there might be a traffic jam and without keeping a distance from the vehicle preceding her, rear-ended it, which caused the latter to move into the car of the victim here and caused the latter also to move forward until hitting the vehicle preceding him; the distance existing between the vehicles of [Name 006], [Name 004] and [Name 010] being irrelevant from the point of view of foreseeability, avoidability, and determination of the result, as none of them was the one who breached the duty of care such that one could speak of other causal contributions to the event that triggered the entire multiple collision. Therefore, by way of summary, it must be emphasized that this dynamic of the accident exclusively confirms the causal link between the careless and imprudent conduct of the accused </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and the final result of material damages and physical injuries to [Name 004]. That is, through the verification of the strong blow caused by the vehicle driven by the accused –at excessive speed according to the congestion circumstances and without keeping the required distance– to the rear of the vehicle driven by [Name 006] and that the latter was propelled into the car of [Name 004], also causing the victim’s car to impact the one preceding it (occupied by </span>[Name 010]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">), the linkage between the conduct and the result (cause-effect) was corroborated, which is a basic requirement for the attribution of criminal liability.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. </span>(Exact quotation). The preceding excerpt from the judgment, although extensive, allows the verification not only of the breadth of the reasoning put forth by the adjudicator, who —as previously noted— fully complied with the duty to provide grounds (deber de fundamentación), but also that his assessments were always based on the rules of logic and experience, which, although he did not give them a specific name, as the appellants would have wished, he did describe in detail, allowing his arguments to be fully understood and the corresponding control of legality and reasonableness to be exercised. It is necessary to recall what the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) has indicated regarding the rules of experience, as quoted below: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The rule of experience emerges as a generalization constructed from a series of singular perceptions about facts or phenomena that, under certain assumptions, always or most of the time behave in a certain way. Given the coincidence of a series of facts in similar situations, it is concluded that a new fact in similar situations will happen in the same way.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span> (Resolution number 1408-2004 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, reiterated in resolution 1092-2023). In addition to this Chamber sharing the assessments made by the adjudicator regarding the credibility of the victim's account, which by themselves allow the defense thesis to be discarded, it is worth mentioning that there are two additional arguments contained in the preceding quotation that are also shared by this Chamber, as they are indeed consistent with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and in accordance with the law. The first of these consists in the fact that the defense thesis regarding the existence of contributory negligence (concurrencia de la culpa) must be rejected because the vehicle of [Name 006] did not keep the required distance from that of [Name 004]<span> and </span><span>the</span><span> latter, in turn, from the motor vehicle of [Name 010]. There is no doubt for this appellate court that the reasoning issued by the adjudicator is correct, as it was not the distance between those vehicles that caused the collision or the injuries to the victim, but rather it was the negligent conduct of the sentenced individual [Name 001], since she was the one who did not stop the automobile she was driving in time, collided with the vehicle of [Name 006] and, thereby, caused the displacement of the other cars and the subsequent collisions. Article 101 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), even cited by the appellant herself, stipulates: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">ARTICLE 101.- Maintain distance</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. The driver of a vehicle traveling on a public road must maintain a reasonable and prudent distance that guarantees timely stopping, in the event that the preceding vehicle brakes suddenly. To this end, the driver must consider their speed, the road conditions, the weather conditions, and those of their own vehicle.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span>. As is evident from the letter of the law, the duty to maintain a reasonable and prudent distance while driving automobiles has the purpose of guaranteeing timely stopping when the preceding vehicle brakes. In the case at hand, it was verified —through the evidentiary analysis already detailed— that [Name 004]<span> and [Name 006] fulfilled that duty, since the distance they kept from the vehicle preceding them allowed them to stop their automobile in a timely manner, when the latter did so, regardless of the distance they maintained between them once stopped. This being the case, there was no contributory negligence, as was sufficiently analyzed by the adjudicator. It is necessary to add that not just any infraction of traffic regulations has a cause-effect relationship with the harmful result and that criminal negligence is not configured by the simple omission of the duty of care, but rather it must have a direct relationship with the result produced. Thus, even assuming that [Name 006] and [Name 004]</span><span> had infringed the rules of motor vehicle driving, because they did not keep a required distance from the vehicle preceding them, once they stopped in a timely manner, the truth is that said infraction was not what caused the harmful result, so the defense thesis must be discarded. This conclusion is reached by performing an </span><span style="font-style: italic;">ex post</span> examination of the occurred event, through a hypothetical elimination (supresión hipotética) exercise.

Thus, if the action of the sentenced party is eliminated (if [Name 001] had stopped her vehicle in time and had not collided with [Name 006]), it is clear that the accident would not have occurred and the victim would not have suffered injuries, because the other vehicles had already stopped in time. From that perspective, there is no doubt for this appellate court, just as the lower court (*a quo*) reasonably held, that the legally relevant cause that brought about the traffic accident in question and that caused injuries to the victim was the culpable action of [Name 001] alone. The other point that deserves to be highlighted is that, as resolved by the lower court (*a quo*), the defense's version is not consistent with the evidence. That theory is based on the premise that the sentenced party [Name 001] was driving at low speed and collided with the vehicle of [Name 006] after the latter had already collided with the victim's vehicle. As can be inferred from the reasoning put forward by the judge, if the sentenced party had been driving "slowly" (to use her words), or at a speed appropriate for the traffic congestion existing in the area, when the collision occurred with the vehicle of [Name 006], which she never denied, the final position of the vehicles (which has also not been in dispute) would not have been at a distance of 3.80 meters between the vehicle of the sentenced party [Name 001] and the others. That is to say, if the collision between the vehicle of the sentenced party and that of [Name 006] had occurred under the circumstances alleged by [Name 001], i.e., driving at low speed and after the latter had already struck the vehicle of [Name 004], there would be no explanation for the aforementioned distance, because while traveling at a low speed, as the accused alleged, the vehicle of [Name 001], given its weight and size, could not have displaced the other vehicles, nor would there have been a "rebound effect" of that magnitude. In this way, the judge's reasoning was not only set out in the judgment but is also—unlike what the appellants allege—in accordance with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). With regard to the rules for grounding a judgment, the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) has stated: "The supervision of the application of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) consists of determining that the reasoning carried out by the lower court (*a quo*) when evaluating the evidentiary elements subjected to its scrutiny is consistent with the conclusions derived from it. CAFFERATA NORES points out: '... Rational sound criticism as a method for evaluating evidence imposes as the only limit on the free conviction of judges, respect for the rules that govern the connection of human thought: those of logic, those of psychology, and those of common experience...' (CAFFERATA NORES, José I. Temas de Derecho Procesal Penal. Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1988. p. 288). In other words, these rules allow for control of the logical path the judge has followed to form his opinion on what is true and what is false based on the evaluation of the evidence presented. It is clear from the contested judgment that the reasoning recorded by the lower court (*a quo*) meets the requirements of legality and objectivity for its validity, in a comprehensive analysis of the existing body of evidence." (Resolution number 542-2009 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber).

It is reiterated that the judge granted credibility to the victim and to the witness [Name 009], regarding the fact that there was no prior collision, which in itself already allowed the defense's theory to be dismissed, but the judge also interlaced the testimonial evidence with the documentary evidence (which allowed the final position of the vehicles, the distance between them, and the damage they suffered to be verified), concluding—through logical reasoning and applying the rules of experience—that the events happened in the manner they were charged and that the dynamic alleged by [Name 001] was untenable. It is necessary to emphasize that, to dismiss the defense's theory, the judge started from the accused's own statement, who affirmed in the hearing that she was driving "slowly," a claim that was not found credible at all, not only because the victim had stated otherwise, but because of the description of the damage to the vehicles and their final position. Now then, the considerable damage exhibited by the vehicle in which the sentenced party was traveling becomes one more element that cannot be ignored, simply because it is not extensively detailed in the traffic report, as appellant Monterrey Carmona intends. This is so, in application of the principle of freedom of evidence (principio de libertad probatoria), which has already been outlined. In this regard, it should be noted that the damage exhibited by vehicle with license plate [Value 003] (driven by the sentenced party) was mentioned in the official report, but it was also widely described by the victim during his deposition, without any inconsistency being detected with said documentary evidence. On this point, [Name 004] stated: "(...) and I look back and I see the white vehicle embedded in my vehicle and I see a lady, let's say at that moment I see she is pregnant, very close to her steering wheel, I ask her quickly if she feels okay, she is a little affected, I try to open the door and I look back and I see there is a space of about 3 meters, very short, and I see a vehicle that has a damaged front end, a very strong blow, evident damage, it has smoke in the engine, the hood raised, I think the vehicle is going to catch fire and I run towards the driver, I see it's a young woman, I move her to my vehicle, I open the door and I sit her there, I tell her to calm down because I feared for the vehicle, later I realized it was radiator and fluid issues (...) The vehicle has like a cover for a wheel on the back part, it has like a cover and there it is dented, also the bumper, the bottom part, looks very pushed in and the vehicle behind had significant damage, if you look at the collision you could see minor damage on the front one, on mine, the Rav-4 more or less, but the one behind had serious damage, the hood crumpled, vapor or smoke, liquids on the street and if I'm not mistaken the airbags of that vehicle were deployed, when I removed the person we managed to get her out of there, besides many people from other lanes came out to help." (Quote taken textually from the descriptive evidentiary grounds of the judgment). In turn, witness [Name 009] ratified the above, in the following manner: "Yes, I saw that the vehicle at the back, well, all three were damaged, but especially the vehicle furthest back, I remember it was black, a Hatchback, its front end was compressed, liquid was coming out and my dad told me to keep my distance." (Quote taken textually from the descriptive evidentiary grounds of the judgment). It is thus, through the combined analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence, that it can be verified that the damage was considerable, which constitutes another element supporting the judge's reasoning for rejecting the defense's theory regarding the sentenced party traveling at a low speed.

In addition to the above, as pointed out by the defense counsel in his appellate arguments, the judge assessed that the aggrieved party declared that the sentenced party told him she had pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, which is consistent with the magnitude of the damage caused. However, the opinion outlined by the appellants, that this means the lower court (*a quo*) gave value to mere musings or gossip, or that it contradictorily gave weight to statements made by her to the victim, but not to those she presented at trial, cannot be shared in any way. Spontaneous out-of-court statements by accused persons are a valid clue (indicio) that must be evaluated together with the rest of the body of evidence, just as the trial court correctly did and as has been uniformly accepted for a long time, including by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (see resolution 154-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber and resolutions 100-2002 and 282-2010 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). In any case, it was not the only evidentiary basis analyzed in the contested judgment.

Another allegation contained in the judgment that was subject to reproach consisted of the judge including among his multiple arguments that [Name 001] had admitted full responsibility for the events in other instances and, therefore, all vehicles involved in the collision were repaired using the insurance policy of the vehicle driven by [Name 001]. The lower court (*a quo*) explained that [Name 001]'s assertion at trial that this was due to manipulation by the victim [Name 004] was not credible, since it is contrary to the rules of experience that a person who knows she only collided with one vehicle and that the latter had previously caused another collision would choose to assume full responsibility. The argument in question is valid and reasonable, but, moreover, as already indicated, it was only one additional element assessed by the trial court. Furthermore, this Chamber (Cámara), based on the comprehensive examination it must conduct of the judgment, the hearing, and the evidence on record, has also not noted any reason why [Name 004] would have had any intention to harm [Name 001], whom he met on the day of the events, to the point of manipulating her—without it being clear in what way—so that she would unjustly assume full responsibility for the material damages and, subsequently, for physical and moral damages, even though—according to the defense's theory—another person ([Name 006]), whom the aggrieved party also did not know, and therefore had no reason to benefit, had previously collided with him.

Finally, it is necessary to respond to the question raised by the defense counsel regarding the proven facts not being absolutely identical to those charged. It should be emphasized that the appellant did not allege a violation of the principle of correlation between charge and judgment (principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia) as such, nor of the right to defense, but merely mentioned that the trial court omitted factual circumstances that were detailed in the charge and were never proven, without specifying them, which—according to him—weakened the prosecution's theory. By virtue of the comprehensive examination this Chamber (Cámara) must conduct, the facts charged were compared with those proven, verifying that there is no divergence whatsoever with respect to the core of the accusation. It is worth remembering that the charge is not a rigid document and, although it constitutes the factual framework upon which the judge must decide, the aim of this is that surprising circumstances are not established in the judgment, to the detriment of the accused. Consequently, the fact that there is not absolute identity between the facts charged and what is proven at the hearing does not translate into any defect as long as the right to defense is not violated. In the case before us, having analyzed the judgment and even the arguments put forward during the adversarial proceedings by both the defense counsel and the accused herself, it is evident that no such violation existed, but rather that the defense's theory was simply not accepted by the lower court (*a quo*), for the reasons already analyzed.

In conclusion, the appealed ruling does not present defects in the evaluation of the evidence or a violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) that would be capable of invalidating it, nor is there a violation of the principle of correlation between charge and judgment (principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia). The errors alleged are based on a biased and incomplete reading of the evidence gathered at the hearing and the intellectual analyses of the judgment, thereby seeking to support the defense's theory that was upheld during the hearing, but which the comprehensive and interconnected analysis of the body of evidence, duly and extensively outlined by the judge, validly allowed to be dismissed. Therefore, it is appropriate to declare both grounds for appeal without merit.

**IV.-** The **second ground for appeal by the sentenced party [Name 001]**, for the following reasons, is declared **without merit**. As indicated in the previous recital (considerando), there were two defense theories upheld during the adversarial proceedings: one regarding the dynamic of the events (already analyzed) and another regarding the injuries suffered by the victim [Name 004]. It was alleged that the injuries were not the result of the collision on November nineteenth, two thousand eighteen, because that day the aggrieved party exited the vehicle by his own means and assisted the other persons involved, so the injuries were of an older date, resulting from recreational activities the victim engaged in. Now then, the reproach contained in the appeal ground under study consisted of the fact that the judge omitted to explain the cause-and-effect relationship between the collision and the aggrieved party [Name 004]'s injuries, and ignored the discussion about whether they were old injuries. According to the appellant, to determine the existence of the injuries and the causal link between them and the culpable action of the sentenced party [Name 001], the judge merely limited himself to evaluating the medical opinions 2019-551 and 2020-7387 and exclusively based on them found the injuries, the permanent disability that arose from them, and the indemnity amount to be proven. However, upon examining the contested judgment, it is possible to verify that what the appellant claims is not true.

The *a quo* conducted a broad analysis of the evidence and the arguments raised by all parties regarding the causal link between the events and the injuries suffered by the aggrieved party. It is important to clarify that the judgment is a logical unit, structured into various recitals (*considerandos*) and, in this case, the judge further subdivided them into subsections. Thus, when assessing the intellectual reasoning set forth in the judgment, one cannot disregard sections or segments, limiting oneself to just one of them as the appellant has intended. Indeed, in recital 8.2.2, titled "On Permanent Disability" ("Sobre la incapacidad permanente"), the judge did not include an analysis of the technical and material defense's arguments that the victim's injuries were pre-existing and not a result of the events, merely reiterating the aforementioned medical opinions and then immediately focusing on another disputed point regarding the actuarial-mathematical expert reports. However, this does not mean that the judge omitted to assess the defensive allegations or weigh the evidence regarding the cause-and-effect relationship between the collision caused by the convicted person's negligent act and the injuries suffered by [Nombre 004], described in the aforementioned opinions. The judge carried out said assessment in the third recital of the judgment, titled "Intellectual Evidentiary Reasoning" ("Fundamentación probatoria intelectiva"), in which—after explaining the dynamics of the events deemed proven and the reasons for this—he proceeded with the analysis of the causal link to the injuries suffered by [Nombre 004]. In this regard, he reasoned: "One final aspect that must be addressed is the effective determination of the victim's injuries; that is, the dynamics of the accident have been defined, and it now remains to analyze whether there is a nexus between the incident and the injuries presented by [Nombre 004], despite there being a time gap between the accident (November 19, 2018) and his appearance at the Traffic Court to be medically assessed (January 17, 2019). This must be answered affirmatively, since both from what he stated at trial and from his medical records, it can be inferred that he had no prior injuries in the anatomical areas in question (right shoulder and knee), and there are also forensic medical opinions that confirm this, namely opinions 2019-551 (of January 21, 2019) and 2020-7387 (of October 1, 2020), which confirmed the victim's physical problems in his shoulder and knee, their treatment and consequences, ultimately establishing a temporary disability of two months and a permanent disability of 10% of his general capacity. In relation to these forensic medical opinions, the Court must emphasize that at no point were they debated or countered at the appropriate procedural moments, for they were not appealed nor refuted with contrary evidence when they were made known to the defense, neither at the preliminary hearing nor at trial. Consequently, the only logical conclusion this undersigned judge can reach is that the injuries of Mr. [Nombre 004] can indeed be linked to the accident caused by the reckless action of Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**, who, it is worth noting now, stated that she considered that [Nombre 004] wanted to pin old injuries on her from the accident, injuries probably derived from the cycling or hiking practiced by the victim, which are sports par excellence that cause such injuries. However, this was an assertion that lacked any evidentiary basis and which defies logic because, in effect, as the victim rightly pointed out, had that been the case, he would have been waiting to have a traffic accident in order to treat his injuries, something alien to logic and experience. But just as that was not substantiated by the accused, there was also no proof whatsoever of Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**'s statement that the victim [Nombre 004] had influence 'everywhere' and could have exerted that influence illegitimately in medical, actuarial, and legal decisions. Therefore, the argument formulated by the accused must be deemed abstract, unjustified, and reckless, as nothing supports it other than her personal presumption. Still regarding the causal link between the incident and the injuries, this Court, based on the rules of logic and experience, understands that injuries are not necessarily going to manifest in the body of the person suffering them immediately after an accident, in this case [Nombre 004], since in the face of such events, it is possible and common for an adrenaline response to mask pain and symptoms after the fact. However, this judge also understands that in the face of a traffic accident, there are two types of injuries: those that appear immediately and those that can be classified as delayed or late-onset, whose symptoms may arise or intensify days, weeks, or even months after the accident. Thus, there is nothing strange, suspicious, or illicit in the fact that Mr. [Nombre 004] requested to be assessed by the Forensic Medical Service a couple of months after the accident, on the understanding that these were not injuries of spontaneous appearance but rather, according to the victim's own account, they were pains that gradually led him to require medical attention. It is for this reason that the victim's statement must be validated in that aspect and, consequently, recognize that he indeed suffered physical impacts to the right shoulder and right knee, which had to be addressed by various doctors. Thus, for this Court, both the accident and the injuries derived from it were proven in an adequate manner, and it is for this reason that criminal responsibility must be attributed to Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**." As is clear from the broad reasoning outlined by the judge, he did not limit himself to accepting as true what was established in the opinions without any justification. Nor did he ignore the defense's thesis; rather, he responded to each of the allegations. In turn, the *a quo* analyzed the expert evidence in conjunction with the statement given by [Nombre 004] (which, it must be noted, was also corroborated in this sense by his son) and applied the rules of experience to explain that the fact that the victim did not perceive pain or was not left immobilized immediately after the traffic accident does not constitute sufficient reason to deny that the injuries were a consequence of the events. This appellate court shares the criterion expressed in the judgment because, indeed, the rules of experience allow concluding that injuries are not necessarily perceived immediately, especially under circumstances such as those surrounding the events in question. It cannot be ignored that the victim was with his minor child at the time; therefore, it is logical that he would first worry about the child's physical integrity. It is also a common reaction to exit the vehicle and check the condition of the other people; in this case, the victim [Nombre 004] noticed that the driver of the vehicle that directly impacted him was a pregnant woman and that the vehicle driven by the sentenced [Nombre 001] was emitting smoke. Therefore, [Nombre 004] reasonably provided assistance under those circumstances, from which it cannot be inferred that he did not suffer any blow, much less that the injuries confirmed through the medical opinions were pre-existing. In turn, the arguments maintained during the adversarial proceedings, mainly by the material defense, to establish that the injuries were pre-existing and that the information contained in the documentary and expert evidence was the product of manipulation or influence on the part of the victim, were reasonably rejected by the *a quo*, as they were indeed presumptions with no support whatsoever. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the judge was thorough in explaining the reasons why he granted credibility to the statement of [Nombre 004], and no defect has been detected in the judge's reasoning or in the assessment of the evidence, on which this Court has already pronounced in the previous recital. Regarding the argument that [Nombre 006] had no injuries, so it is not reasonable that [Nombre 004] did suffer them, it is not possible to admit this, as it is contrary to the rules of sound criticism. Experience and common sense allow asserting that the injuries a person suffers after a traffic accident depend on numerous factors, such as the position and tension of the body at the moment of impact, as well as the person's age, among others. It must be added that the condition of the victim's vehicle, which suffered impact to the rear and front, makes it reasonable that the aggrieved party indeed suffered the blows he claimed, which were also confirmed by the aforementioned expert evidence. Thus, the comprehensive analysis of the entire body of evidence only confirms the position adopted by the judge. Consequently, contrary to what was alleged in the appeal, the contested judgment contains an extensive assessment of the causal link that gave rise not only to criminal liability but also to civil liability, evidencing that the claim is merely a disagreement stemming from the fact that the judge did not accept the defense's thesis, and not from the alleged defect in the reasoning. Furthermore, specifically regarding the monetary amount awarded as indemnification for permanent disability, the appellant questioned the reasoning employed by the judge in using the actuarial-mathematical expert report issued by Jesú Josué Pacheco Brizuela as a parameter for this, awarding the sum of ninety-six million, eight hundred seventy-three thousand, nine hundred twenty-five colones and sixty-two cents (₡96,873,925.62), exactly as claimed by the civil plaintiff. She questioned that the expert report prepared by Edwin Castro Jiménez was not used, which established a lower monetary amount, as he performed the mathematical calculations using the net salary and not the gross salary of [Nombre 004] as a basis. For a better understanding and to resolve the allegation, it is pertinent to specify that in the contested judgment, the civil action for damages filed against [Nombre 001] was partially upheld. The civil plaintiff claimed indemnification for temporary disability, permanent disability, and moral damages (daño moral). However, the judge refused to order compensation for temporary disability, and regarding moral damages, he imposed an indemnification amount considerably lower than that claimed. These aspects of the jurisdictional decision were not challenged by the civil plaintiff or any other party, so they remain unaltered. Regarding permanent disability, during the trial, the technical defense and the sentenced person herself, in the exercise of her material defense, alleged that the amount claimed was excessive, and specifically, the technical defense of the civil co-defendant, Amércia Ciento Siete S.A., was emphatic in questioning the use of the gross salary rather than the net salary as the basis for the mathematical calculations. In this sense, the representation of the aforementioned civil co-defendant offered as evidence for better resolution an expert report prepared by Edwin Castro Jiménez, which was admitted and weighed by the judge, from which it was deduced that the sum to be compensated for permanent disability was fifty-five million, nine hundred nine thousand, one hundred ninety-two colones and sixty-eight cents (₡55,909,192.68). The only difference between the two expert reports derived from the fact that the expert Castro Jiménez performed the mathematical calculations taking into account the net salary of the victim [Nombre 004], while the expert report by Pacheco Brizuela, offered by the civil plaintiff, took into account the gross salary. The claim now made by the appellant, although not raised at the time by the technical or material defense of [Nombre 001], is in fact an issue addressed by the judge in the contested judgment, by virtue of the fact that—as indicated—it formed part of the concluding arguments of the representation of the civil co-defendant.

In this line of reasoning, the lower court (a quo) stated: "Well, the fundamental inference that must be drawn is that both expert reports established that, given the victim's permanent disability, compensation was warranted, although they differed on the amounts. Therefore, it falls to the undersigned to note that, from the standpoint of Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito, the calculation of amounts for permanent disability must take into account the wages reported to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, and in the undersigned judge's opinion, the reported wages are precisely the gross wages. Thus, faced with the different sums presented by the parties, one must opt for the one derived from the expert report prepared by Pacheco Brizuela. It is not overlooked that, during the trial, the exact amount of [Nombre 004]'s salary was questioned by the third-party civil defendant, but this is an argument that cannot succeed because that same party requested the expert report from Castro Jiménez based on the same salary that Pacheco Brizuela had previously considered, making it a circular argument. Now, reference is made at this point to the third-party civil defendant's various arguments because, in their own way, they affected the interests of Mrs. [Nombre 001], especially since it was evidence common to the parties; however, it is worth noting here that the technical defense of Mrs. [Nombre 001] did not provide any technical argument nor make any submission regarding these expert reports beyond abstractly questioning the proportionality of the amounts set by Pacheco Brizuela. Therefore, given this lack of action by the defense of the accused and civil defendant, the Court must rely on the evidence in the record and declare that [Nombre 001] must compensate [Nombre 004] for the permanent disability resulting from the accident, which is set at the sum of ¢96,873,925.62." This Chamber shares the reasoning put forth by the judge and considers that the decision was made according to law, by using the expert report prepared by Pacheco Brizuela, since the mathematical calculations contained in said report were those that conformed to the provisions of the rule cited by the judge, namely Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito. In addition, the decision is consistent with the regulations contained in the Código de Trabajo, specifically Title IV and especially the provisions of Article 235 and the interpretation that the courts have been applying in this matter. In this sense, one can mention resolutions 821-2004, 325-2009, and 707-2014 of the Sala Segunda, as well as resolution 145-2024 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección de Ejecución, in which—when the calculations made for compensation for both temporary and permanent disability were challenged—the gross reported salary is used precisely as the parameter. The appellant's argument is based on an alleged unjust enrichment, by using the gross salary which includes amounts that—according to her—will never reach the victim, as they are intended to cover social security and tax liabilities. This was the same argument maintained by the representation of the civil co-defendant. However, as the lower court (a quo) correctly pointed out, Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito is clear that the salary reported to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must be used, which is the gross salary. In addition to this, it is necessary to clarify that compensation for permanent disability does not consist of granting lost wages, but rather seeks to compensate for the damages and after-effects that the civil plaintiff has had to endure as a consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct. Thus, there is no unjust enrichment, because it is not about granting a salary from which deductions must be made. The amount granted, although high, is reasonable and proportional, considering those damages and after-effects that were accredited through the joint assessment of the statements of the victim [Nombre 004], corroborated by the witness [Nombre 009], as well as the medical opinions that verified and detailed the injuries for which a 10% loss of general capacity was established, a loss that will limit him not only in his paid work but in all his usual occupations. Furthermore, the judge granted that monetary sum not arbitrarily or capriciously, but based on an objective expert opinion, the only challenge to which was that it used the gross salary as a basis, but not the other considerations and mathematical calculations recorded therein. Thus, the judge clearly explained the reasons why the expert report he considered suitable and lawful was that of expert Pacheco Brizuela and not that of Castro Jiménez, in accordance with the letter of the law. The lower court's (a quo) reasoning regarding this specific point was concise but sufficient and was justified by the evidentiary elements that it weighed objectively and according to the applicable regulations, so the claimed grievance does not exist.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that, without further detail, it was argued that the judgment did not find any fact proven to support the civil conviction. This reproach is dismissed. In the eighth considerando of the judgment, section 8.1. called "Civil proven facts," it was expressly recorded: "The civil facts that were deemed accredited were the following: 1. On November 19, 2018, at approximately 9:20 a.m., the victim and civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] was driving vehicle license plate [Valor 005] accompanied by his minor son [Nombre 009], who was in the front passenger seat, in Heredia, Ulloa, Route 1, heading from Alajuela toward San José, 300 meters before the Alfredo González Flores bridge, in the left lane, lawfully. 2. On that same day, time, and place, the civil defendant [Nombre 001] was driving vehicle license plate [Valor 003], registered property of América Ciento Siete Sociedad Anónima, in the same direction as the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004]. 3. The vehicle traveling ahead of the victim's vehicle, license plate [Valor 006], driven by [Nombre 010], stopped due to a traffic jam, so the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] also stopped, maintaining his distance. Additionally, behind the plaintiff came vehicle license plate [Valor 004] driven by [Nombre 006], who also stopped maintaining distance, and behind [Nombre 006] drove the defendant [Nombre 001], who breached her duty of care in driving because she did not stop nor maintain the distance required by our regulations, thus she violently struck the vehicle driven by [Nombre 006], and due to the force exerted on Mrs. [Nombre 006]'s vehicle, it was propelled against the vehicle of the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004], thus striking the rear of the vehicle and, in turn, the vehicle driven by the victim was thrust against the vehicle driven by [Nombre 010] that was in front of him, which is why the victim [Nombre 004] struck the dashboard and the interior of his vehicle, hit his right knee, the seatbelt caused an injury from the whiplash effect in his neck, right shoulder and arm, injuries that required medical attention. 4. As a consequence of the above, the victim and civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] suffered injuries and, according to medico-legal opinions number 2019-551, dated January 21, 2019, and number 2020-7387, dated October 1, 2020, suffered a chondral injury in his right knee, having a rupture of the rotator cuff tendon which was treated conservatively, requiring a shaver, and his right shoulder received infiltrations. He currently suffers pain in his shoulder, arm, and forearm, making it difficult to lift weight, and in his right knee, which is exacerbated when climbing stairs and squatting, injuries that caused physical harm to the plaintiff requiring a temporary disability of two months (2 months) from the date of the events, and a permanent disability of ten percent (10%) due to loss of general organic capacity. 5. That in addition to the physical harm, [Nombre 004] also suffered moral harm as a result of these events, which refers to the effective injury to his feelings, as well as the anguish and anxiety derived from the physical ailments described above, the discomfort caused by the different injuries to his body, which manifest in episodes of anger and pain, coupled with the long medical process he has had to undergo." (Verbatim quote). In this way, the judge specified the civil facts he deemed proven in an independent section for those purposes, in addition to all the factual and evidentiary analysis he set out throughout the judgment, which makes it possible to verify which facts he deemed proven and what reasons led him to do so. Thus, for all the foregoing, the second ground of the appeal filed by [Nombre 001] must be rejected in its entirety.

V.- In the third ground of appeal, the appellant [Nombre 001] challenged the imposition of the ancillary penalty of disqualification and argued that the judge imposed it automatically and indiscriminately, without assessing that driving motor vehicles in her case was not a habitual activity that generated economic profit. The claim must be declared without merit. For clarity, it is detailed that, in the case at hand, the judge imposed, as the principal penalty, sixty days' fine, at a rate of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) per day, for a total of three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) and, as an ancillary penalty, disqualification from driving motor vehicles on public land routes for a period of six months. Now, the reasoning for the principal penalty has not been challenged; rather, the appellant's claim lay solely in the application of the disqualification penalty. This decision, in this Chamber's opinion, is fully in accordance with the law, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 50, 71, and 128 of the Código Penal. Article 50 of that normative body regulates the different types of penalties contemplated by our legislation. Expressly, that provision stipulates: "Article 50- Penalties. The penalties that this Code establishes are: 1) Principal: imprisonment, banishment, fine, and disqualification. 2) Ancillary: special disqualification. 3) Community service. 4) House arrest with electronic monitoring." 5) Drug treatment under restorative judicial supervision." In accordance with the principle of legality, each criminal offense must specify the type or types of penalty to be applied, also setting the minimum and maximum limits. Within those margins, the judge must determine the *quantum*, resorting to the parameters set forth in Article 71 of the Criminal Code and to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Thus, in the specific case, it is appropriate to analyze the provisions of Article 128 of the Criminal Code, which penalizes the conduct attributed to the sentenced individual [Name 001]. The article in question, as relevant, stipulates: "Article 128.- Culpable injuries. Imprisonment of up to one year, or up to one hundred days' fine, shall be imposed on whoever through fault causes to another injuries as defined in Articles 123, 124 and 125. To determine the appropriate penalty for the responsible party, the tribunal must take into account the degree of fault, the number of victims and the magnitude of the damages caused. In any case, the perpetrator of the culpable injuries shall also be subject to disqualification from six months to two years for the exercise of the profession, trade, art or the activity in which the event occurred…". (The highlighting and underlining do not belong to the original). As is easily appreciable, the norm - as assessed by the *a quo* - establishes the obligation, not the power, to impose an accessory penalty of disqualification not only for someone who exercises a profession, trade, or art, as the appellant seems to interpret it, but also for the activity in which the event occurred, without -with respect to this latter scenario- requiring habitualness or remuneration. In other words, the cited article simply and plainly establishes that "in any case," the perpetrator of the injuries shall be imposed a disqualification for the activity in which the event occurred, without conditioning such sanction on the person engaging in that activity professionally or habitually, it not being appropriate to distinguish where the norm does not do so. It was established as proven that the sentenced individual [Name 001], while carrying out the activity of driving a motor vehicle, caused injuries to the injured party [Name 004]. It follows from this that the judge inevitably had to impose not only the principal penalty, but also the accessory penalty, in accordance with the letter of the law. To support her argument, the appellant cited pronouncements from the Criminal Cassation Chamber that are of old date, whose legal criterion is not only not shared by this Chamber of Appeals, but has even been reversed by the same Criminal Cassation Chamber. As affirmed by the *a quo* in the appealed judgment and this Chamber endorses, the criterion that is currently upheld as a uniform jurisprudential line is that, in culpable actions committed in traffic matters, the accessory penalty of disqualification from driving vehicles must be imposed in all cases, since the injuries are precisely generated as a result of that activity. It is reiterated that it is not necessary for the perpetrator of the culpable act to obtain a profit from that activity or to exercise it habitually, but only that it was executed and gave rise to the criminal act, as it was established as accredited in the case under review. As is inferred from the commented norm and the dominant and unifying criterion of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, contained in resolution 209-2014 of said jurisdictional body, the legislator alluded to the generic concept "activity" in which the event occurred, from which it is deduced that the disqualification must be mandatorily imposed when the culpable injuries are generated in any regulated human activity, as is the case of driving motor vehicles on public roads, for which compliance with certain requirements established by the Traffic Law is required and whose license is granted and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Consequently, the judge has not committed any error in the application of substantive law, the imposition of the accessory penalty of disqualification being in accordance with the provisions of Article 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Now then, the aforementioned accessory penalty - by legal imperative - must be imposed within the limits established by the legislator, which are from six months to two years. The judge opted to impose the minimum term of disqualification, so - although there was no extensive reasoning on the reasons for choosing that term - the truth is that the decision did not cause any harm to the accused, since the accessory penalty is mandatory and the minimum term contemplated by the legislator was imposed. Consequently, it is appropriate to dismiss this ground of appeal.

**VI.-** Due to their affinity, the **first two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Civil Defense Office of the Victim, as well as the fourth and fifth grounds of said appeal**, are jointly resolved, declaring them **without merit**. As extracted from what was noted above, in the case at hand, the judge declared [Name 001] the responsible perpetrator of an offense of Culpable Injuries to the detriment of [Name 004], imposed the penalties (principal and accessory) adduced, and, likewise, declared with merit the civil action for damages filed against her. Regarding the civil action against the defendant [Name 001], he ordered compensation in favor of [Name 004] for permanent disability and for moral damage, but not for temporary disability, points on which there was no appeal by the representation of the civil plaintiff. The latter limited itself to questioning that the judge declared without merit the civil action for damages filed against América Ciento Siete S.A., which appeared as a civil co-defendant. In this regard, the judge supported his decision on the following arguments: "The joint and several civil liability of the owner of a vehicle that participates in an accident where the person who was driving the automobile is known is not automatic, but is limited to the grounds included in Article 199 of the Law on Transit on Public Roads and Road Safety, (...) Always in relation to the aforementioned, it must be emphasized that for the joint and several liability of the legal entity to be configured, it is required, on one hand, that the vehicle be in the power of a person by any possessory title, but, in addition, that this person be dedicated to the exploitation of the motor vehicle for a commercial or industrial purpose, that is, that their conduct is generating economic profit or utility, because what generates the objective civil liability is the profit obtained through the exploitation of a hazardous activity, such as the use of vehicles for commerce or industry. Consequently, to simply allege that there is automatic joint and several liability due to the fact that the automobile with license plate [Value 003] was registrationally in the name of América Ciento Siete S.A., constitutes a mistake on the part of the Civil Defense Office of the Victim. By way of a corollary to this argument, while it follows from the conjunction of Articles 197 and 199 of the Traffic Law that the owner of the vehicle could have joint and several civil liability with the driver, this is contingent upon the demonstration of one of the hypotheses provided therein, and in the case *sub iudice*, it was not proven that the defendant company exploited the automobile by any title for commercial or industrial purposes, nor that Mrs. [Name 001] was an employee of such company or was making money with that car at the time of the accident. On the contrary, the injured party himself, [Name 004], during his statement was clear in establishing that when he spoke with the defendant [Name 001] immediately after the crash, she told him that she had had a family situation and that she was heading to San José to do something at an institution regarding that matter, which excludes the commercial or industrial purpose that is normatively required. But not only that, the defendant herself [Name 001] said that that vehicle 'was hers' and that she used it as her only means of transport and to take her minor daughter to medical therapies. So, from both sides, it is derived that the automobile did not fulfill an industrial or commercial objective for América Ciento Siete S.A. Note also that the situation does not change if the case at bar is examined from the perspective of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, which, as pertinent, indicates that if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, railway vehicle, tramway, or other analogous mode of transport, the company or person exploiting the activity is obligated to repair the resulting damages. As has been explained, it was neither alleged in the civil action for damages nor accredited during the trial that América Ciento Siete S.A., the registered owner of the automobile, or its driver on November 19, 2018, [Name 001], were exploiting it to fulfill a particular pecuniary activity, that is, that they were profiting from it at the time of the accident." The appellant's position, set forth through four grounds of her appeal and which was detailed in the second recital of this resolution, can be reduced to the following three reproaches: *(1) Non-application of substantive law, both Article 199 of the Traffic Law and Article 1048 of the Civil Code (first and second grounds of appeal).* The criterion held by the representation of the civil plaintiff is that both norms fit the specific case and were erroneously disapplied by the judge, by virtue of the fact that he considered it necessary to demonstrate circumstances that said norms do not contemplate, such as the purpose of profit or pecuniary exploitation. According to the appellant, the civil liability of the co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., arises from the fact that the automobile driven by the accused [Name 001] at the time of the events was registered in the name of said corporation, which leads to the inference that the vehicle (like all its assets) is exploited for commercial or industrial purposes. This is due to the commercial nature of the corporation and its corporate purpose, which was described upon its incorporation and appears in the certification of legal capacity that was offered and admitted as evidence. According to the position advanced by the representation of the civil plaintiff, described in the first two grounds of his appeal, this is sufficient to consider the assumptions contained in both aforementioned norms as fulfilled; therefore, the judge should have declared with merit the civil action for damages filed against América Ciento Siete S.A., making it jointly and severally liable with the entirety of its assets for the damages and losses suffered by [Name 004]. Having analyzed the appellant's arguments, as well as the judge's reasonings cited above and the norms whose application the civil plaintiff intends, this Chamber of Appeals concludes that what was decided, with respect to the liability derived from Article 199 of the Traffic Law, as well as that arising from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, is in accordance with law.

In this regard, subsection b) of Article 199 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) provides: "ARTICLE 199.- Joint and several liability. The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: (…) b) The natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. (…)". (The highlighting is not part of the original). The judge precisely considered that the cited assumption was not fulfilled, since the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate that the vehicle that caused the collision was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, which—in his view—could not be presumed due to it being a corporation (sociedad anónima), but rather had to be proven by the civil plaintiff. In turn, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, as relevant, stipulates: "ARTICLE 1048.- (…) And if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, or a railway, tramway, or other similar mode of transport vehicle, the exploiting company or person is obliged to repair the resulting damage, if it does not prove that the accident was caused by force majeure or by the fault of the deceased or injured person themselves." (The highlighting is not part of the original). Regarding the liability contained in said rule, the judge considered that it contemplated the same requirement, regarding the exploitation of the vehicle, which—as he had already argued—was not accredited. The civil plaintiff's representation, not only in the challenge under review, but also in the civil damages action (acción civil resarcitoria) filing, as well as through their arguments during the adversarial proceedings, has maintained that it is sufficient that it is a corporation, as well as the certification of legal representation (personería jurídica) and the purpose described therein, to consider the provisions of both rules as accredited. However, their position is based on a presumption, which cannot be admitted by this Chamber (Cámara), just as it was not by the lower court (a quo). It is true that América Ciento Siete S.A. is a corporation, there was no controversy in this regard and it is a notorious fact that requires no proof; the appellant is correct in that sense. It is also true that the provisions of Articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code establish that corporations are commercial entities (figuras mercantiles). However, it cannot be presumed for this reason, for purposes of the joint and several liability contained in the cited rules, that all assets registered in its name (in this case, a vehicle) are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, since the same regulations of the Commercial Code, as well as the majority doctrine, recognize the possibility that not all acts performed by these entities are acts of commerce per se, just as there are acts of commerce performed by persons other than those listed in the aforementioned Article 17. In this sense, see "Temas de Derecho Comercial" by the jurist Gastón Certad Maroto, as well as "Curso de Derecho Mercantil" by Boris Kozolchyk and Octavio Torrealba. Thus, the commercial nature of all corporations (and of the other entities contained in Article 17 in question) means they are subject to a special legal regime, that contained in the Commercial Code (and not in the Civil Code), but this does not allow deducing, as the appellant intends, that América Ciento Siete S.A. exploited the vehicle with license plate [Value 003] for commercial or industrial purposes, which had to be proven by the party, as it forms an integral part of the rules whose application they sought and from which they believed their right derived. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite Resolution No. 866-2002 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), in which the term "exploit" (explotar) was defined as follows: "It suffices to point out that Article 187 of the Traffic Law establishes the joint and several liability of legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial purposes. The term 'exploten,' as a verb form, is the third-person plural conjugation of the verb 'explotar,' which – among its various meanings – means: '... 2.- To derive utility from a business or industry for one's own benefit...' (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, nineteenth edition, p. 598, 1970 Madrid)." (Textual quote). Although reference is made to Section 187 of the Traffic Law, it is the same provision now contained in Article 199 of that law, so what is indicated is fully applicable and is consistent with the judge's arguments set forth in the challenged judgment. Precisely, the lower court based its decision on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate the assumption contained in Article 199 of the Traffic Law, as they did not prove that the vehicle was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, limiting themselves to maintaining that, since it was a corporation, such purpose was implicit. Thus, it is not true that the lower court made an extensive or arbitrary interpretation, or added requirements or assumptions not contained in the rule, since the main reason why the judge did not apply Article 199 of the Traffic Law (nor Section 1048 of the Civil Code) was that it was not shown that the vehicle with license plate [Value 003] was exploited by América Ciento Siete S.A.. This is regardless of whether it concerns a pecuniary benefit or could be understood as being of another type; ultimately, what matters is that this circumstance cannot be taken as proven by the mere fact that the civil co-defendant is a corporation, as the civil plaintiff sought and continues to seek. This criterion has also been upheld by the civil courts of our country, in recent resolutions, including Resolution No. 243-2020 of the Second Civil Appeals Court of San José (Tribunal Segundo de Apelación Civil de San José), which—as relevant—states: "(…) Various Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice have analyzed this issue and the verb 'explotar,' contained in the subsection in question (ruling #963-A-2006 of 2:10 p.m. on 12/11/2006 of the First Chamber and #866 of 10:30 a.m. on 08/30/2002 of the Third Chamber). Whoever obtains commercial profit through the thing that was used to cause harm, for reasons of equity and creation of a risk, must face jointly with their less solvent dependents, the consequences of the activity they foster. It does not deal with personal authority, as elaborated by the lower court authority, since it is not required by the indicated subsection b), which addresses other valuations of the legal order. The underlying idea is that, in the specific cases of Article 199 of the Traffic Law, the victim broadens the possibilities of seeing their interest satisfied, through someone of greater solvency. Particularly, the owner of the vehicle must face that duty to answer for what remains unpaid, with all their assets and not only with the value of the truck." (The citation is textual and the highlighting is not part of the original). Note that it is the same interpretation made by the lower court regarding the term "explotar," a requirement contained in both rules, which cannot be overlooked, as the appellant tacitly intends by maintaining that the commercial nature of the corporation is sufficient to take civil joint and several liability as proven. As already noted, the commercial nature of the entities contemplated in Article 17 of the Commercial Code is relevant to determine which legal regime they are subject to, but it does not constitute an irrefutable legal presumption (iuris et de iure) that allows asserting that all their assets are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes. Along the same lines, it is also appropriate to mention Resolution No. 117-2019 of Section IV of the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), which rather established joint and several liability, contained in the assumption of interest, for which it assessed not only the corporate purpose of the sued legal entity, as the appellant intends, but also multiple documentary and testimonial evidence, such as an official communication from the Tax Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, photographs of the vehicle, and the driver's own statement, all of which made it possible to prove that: "the company did allocate the vehicle involved in the accident to commercial heavy cargo transport activities, for which reason, in principle, it would be subject to the legal framework of joint and several liability in traffic matters." In this sense, the following was stated in said resolution: "(…) we are facing a legal rule of equity that seeks to guarantee fair compensation for injuries caused by the introduction of a risk into society —the motor vehicle—, the objective of which has been to obtain a commercial or industrial benefit from its use, which in turn corresponds to the fundamental principle of civil liability for created risk, that by which whoever benefits from the generation of a risk must assume the consequences derived from it: 'ubi est emolumentum, ibi debet ese onus' ('where the benefit is, there the burden should be')." (The highlighting is not part of the original). Consistent with the foregoing, clearly and for greater abundance, Section I of the Second Civil Court, through Resolution No. 351-2003, considered: "On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing that, pursuant to subsection 'b)' of Article 187 of the same Law, 'The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ...b) The natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. ...' among others, which must be understood as meaning that the persons who use vehicles for their business activities shall be jointly and severally liable to third parties only when it concerns liability derived from an accident attributable to the driver due to fault or fraud." (The underlining is not part of the original). Again, it is worth remembering that the civil plaintiff, as the trial judge correctly pointed out, did not demonstrate that the vehicle involved in the collision that caused the injuries to the civil plaintiff [Name 004] was used by América Ciento Siete S.A. for business activities, acts of commerce, or industrial activities; thus, the decision is in accordance with the content of the rule in question. Now then, as the lower court correctly assessed, for the application of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, the legislator also included the requirement of exploitation, as is evident from the reading of the rule already cited. It is the criterion of this appellate court that both rules foresee that requirement, as the difference between them lies in other elements. Specifically, the liability established in Article 199 of the Traffic Law requires proof of the driver's fault, unlike that contained in Article 1048 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the liability derived from Article 199 of the special law includes not only that arising from injuries or death, but also material damages, while that derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code does not contemplate the latter. Thus, the reasoning used by the judge to reject the application of both rules is correct, as it is based on the fact that the necessary exploitation of the vehicle with license plate [Value 003] by América Ciento Siete S.A. was not demonstrated, which was the responsibility of the civil plaintiff, a point that will be further elaborated on later. Now then, to support their position, the appellant repeatedly mentioned and cited excerpts from Resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, so this Chamber proceeds to cite it more fully, so that the issue under discussion is understood, as well as the totality of the arguments set forth therein.

In this regard, said resolution states: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The jurisprudence of this Chamber, regarding strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), has indicated the following: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The fifth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code provides: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">And if a person dies or is injured by a motor machine, or a railroad vehicle, tramway, or other analogous mode of transportation, the operating company or person is obligated to repair the resulting damage, unless it proves that the accident was caused by force majeure (fuerza mayor) or by the fault of the deceased or injured person.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> The basis for this form of strict liability is, as stated, the existence of </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">licit</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">activities</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> (there is no room here, then, to refer to unlawfulness), characteristic of man's technological development, which should not be hindered, but which, in turn, generate a risk—as potential producers of damage—which must not be assumed by the victim or their successors and close relatives, but rather by the one who benefits from the risky activity or from the possession of a dangerous object. It arises, then, not from the breach of a specific obligation, but from the violation of the general rule not to harm others (in this latter sense, see judgment 354 of the First Chamber, cited). One of the most important practical conclusions in these cases consists of the reversal of the burden of proof, as already noted, such that it will be the party designated by law as responsible who must demonstrate that the damage occurred due to force majeure or the fault of the victim themselves (see: judgments No. 61, of 14:50 hrs., of June 19, 1996, of the First Chamber of the Court; 1396, of 9:30 hrs. of May 7, 1975, of the Superior Contentious Administrative Tribunal; 481 of 10:05 hrs. of July 20, 1992, of the Second Civil Superior Tribunal, Second Section);</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-style: italic;"> it will not be discussed here whether the agent’s culpability was involved or not, since, in this latter scenario, the matter would be summarized as a case of fault-based liability (subjective liability) (civil or criminal wrong), applying the provisions of the previously transcribed Article 1045. It is extracted from this that, in its strict form, the </span><span style="font-style: italic;">duty to compensate</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> does not arise from a civil (or criminal) wrong—or, in general, from what is unlawful—but from the exercise of an activity or the possession of an object that generates risks, but which constitute completely licit acts; strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva): </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">... consists of attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a potential element for producing it... it disregards the agent's subjectivity, and centers the problem of reparation and its limits around material causality, investigating only which fact was, materially, the cause of the effect, to attribute it without further ado. The production of the harmful result is sufficient; it does not require the configuration of an illicit act through the traditional elements...</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> (ALTERINI, Atilio,</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Responsabilidad</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">civil</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">,</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">3rd.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">ed.,</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Abeledo</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). On the other hand, the legislator has set certain limits to this type of strict liability, the first of which is determined by the nature of the damage, which must consist of injury or death, thus excluding damage that falls upon property…</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">(Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Resolution No.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">1262-97, of 11:30 hours, of November 14, 1997). This position of the Chamber has not varied. Article 1048 of the Civil Code clearly determines that the owner of the motor vehicle is responsible for the damages, even when the activity in which the damage was caused is licit. When dealing with vehicles owned by corporations (sociedades anónimas), since these entities are for-profit, this provision determines that there is strict civil liability, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">given the purpose of operating the motor vehicle</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, in light of the risk existing in the activity. Therefore, we are not facing a scenario of liability for intent or negligence (dolo o culpa), but rather criteria of risk distribution. Thus, certainly, the accused [Name 300].</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">was acquitted, given the impossibility of demonstrating that they were driving the motor vehicle. This, however, does not exempt from strict civil liability, since </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">whoever operates the motor vehicle</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, as already stated, bears the risk implied by said activity and must answer for the damage caused, which is, in the cause, the death of the victim. It must be clarified that the Transit Law cited by the appellant is not applicable to the case, since we are not facing a situation where indirect subjective civil liability for the death of the victim is discussed, but rather a case where strict civil liability, as contemplated by the civil regulations already cited, applies.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. </span>(Verbatim citation. The highlighting does not belong to the original). Thus, it is highlighted that in said resolution what was discussed was the possibility of declaring the civil liability of the company owning the motor vehicle, despite the criminal liability of the driver not being proven. As is easily appreciable, that issue is not of interest with respect to the specific point discussed here, since in this case the criminal and subjective civil liability of [Name 001] was proven, as the driver of the vehicle that caused the collision and, therefore, the damages (daños y perjuicios) suffered by [Name 004]. In addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that—although the issue was not delved into, because it was not the object of the challenge—the truth is that it was established that, to find ourselves under the scenario contained in said provision, there must be operation of the motor vehicle. This was precisely what, in the case at hand, could not be proven, since in the opinion of the a quo and this Chamber, it is not enough to allege that, because it involves a corporation, such operation necessarily existed, which constitutes a mere presumption. This position has been upheld by the same Criminal Cassation Chamber, in resolutions subsequent to the one cited by the appellant, including number 244-2018, in which it was expressly stated: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Although </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">the claimant has been arguing that the joint and several civil reparation by the vehicle owner applies, because it was proven that the company has commercial, industrial, and tourist service provision purposes, according to the legal entity certification of the company, and claims the erroneous application of Articles 1048 of the Civil Code, 106 subsection 1) of the Penal Code, Articles 7 and 199 subsection b) of the Transit Law, it is necessary to state that the regulations indicated are not entirely applicable to the case according to what has been analyzed</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">supra</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">and that, based on the evidence received at trial, it was determined</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">only that the vehicle is registered in the company's name and not in any way that said asset, property of the civil co-defendant company</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Knoxvil</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">del Sur Sociedad Anónima was being used for commercial or industrial purposes (Article 188 subsection b) of Law 7331), a circumstance which, as the</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">ad</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">quem</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">correctly points out, was neither described nor demonstrated in the civil actions filed by the victim (cf. folios 360-361)</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">since only reference is made to the ownership of the asset, but not about the use of the vehicle for lucrative purposes, which is what would allow access to joint and several civil liability. Given this scenario, it is not possible in any way, for the purpose of establishing patrimonial responsibilities, to base that the ownership of the asset is equivalent to its operation for said purposes, and in that understanding, not being in the presence of the scenarios that allow establishing joint and several civil liability</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, it is impossible to order the conviction of the company</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Knoxvil</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">del Sur Sociedad Anónima, to pay jointly and severally with the accused the entirety of the civil compensation.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span> (The highlighting does not belong to the original). Observe how in this resolution the point of interest here was expressly discussed and the same conclusion was reached as that of the a quo and which this Chamber endorses, in the sense that it is not enough to allege the nature of corporations, nor the corporate purpose indicated in their incorporation, but rather what matters is the operation of the asset or the use and the purposes given to that asset. By virtue of the foregoing, the jurisprudential precedent cited by the appellant is not only inapplicable to the specific case, but there are also other precedents, subsequent, like the one just cited, which do expressly refer to the subject matter of discussion and which, precisely, coincide with what was resolved by the a quo. Likewise, the appellant cited resolution 903-F-SI-2021 of the First Chamber to support that Article 1048 of the Civil Code was applicable to the specific case.

However, upon careful analysis of the cited resolution, it is easily deduced that the factual scenario is not compatible with the one at hand, because in that case, as stated in the second recital (considerando) of the resolution, the following was deemed proven: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The defendant El Angel SA is held jointly and severally liable for the damages caused in the accident that gave rise to this litigation, as a result of strict liability in tort (responsabilidad civil objetiva), being the registered owner of the heavy vehicle [Value 007], </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">which was used for transporting raw materials for the commercial activity it carries out</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-style: italic;">. </span>The appellant cited an excerpt from said resolution, without pausing to analyze the context in which it was issued, within which not only is the fact that was deemed proven in that case, as already mentioned, of interest, but also the paragraph preceding the one cited by the appellant states: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Based on the requirements of the aforementioned legal citation, the fact is the death of Mr. </span>[Name 015]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">; the damage (daño), is the harm suffered by Mrs. </span>[Name 016]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> and Mrs. </span>[Name 017]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> due to the death of Mr. [Name 015]; </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">the risky activity, is the benefit obtained by the defendant company through the use of the truck for transporting raw materials or products</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, which is an object that generates danger by its functional nature (since, according to the rules of human knowledge, any vehicle is prone to causing damages) and the situation that links all the above; is the accident between the truck with license plate [Value 007] (property of the defendant) and the motorcycle with license plate [Value 008], in which the former invades the lane in which the latter was traveling, the collision occurs and as a result, Mr. </span>[Name 015]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> dies. In addition to the above, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">the corporation accepts (in its response to the tenth fact of the complaint) that it operates the aforementioned motor vehicle for the transport of products or raw materials, thus obtaining a benefit from this object capable of causing damages.</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Therefore, since the elements of strict liability by the theory of damage are present, the determination of the Court of Appeals (Tribunal) is correct, which is made by verifying the requirements and not only because El Ángel S.A. is the owner of the truck.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span>. (The highlighting does not belong to the original). Thus, this jurisprudential precedent cited by the appellant, which is recent, only reaffirms the stance of the <span style="font-style: italic;">a quo</span> and shows that the defect alleged by the appellant did not exist. Now, the appellant has argued that the judge incorrectly assessed the rules regarding the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), by virtue of the fact that it was a notorious and uncontested fact that América Ciento Siete S.A. is a corporation (sociedad anónima), with the commercial and industrial corporate purpose described since its incorporation. This Court (Cámara) considers that the judge did not commit any error in considering that it was incumbent upon the civil plaintiff (parte actora civil) to prove that the vehicle was operated by the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil), for which the certification of legal capacity (certificación de personería jurídica) of América Ciento Siete S.A. is not sufficient. The appellant's criterion on this issue starts from the same premise, i.e., that the commercial nature of a corporation is sufficient to deem it proven that the vehicle in question was operated for commercial or industrial purposes, which—as already indicated and as the judge properly assessed—is incorrect. In accordance with the system of dynamic burden of proof that governs in civil procedural matters and which is contained in Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), the civil plaintiff has the evidential burden regarding the facts on which its claim is based, while the civil defendant has the evidential burden regarding the preclusive, modifying, or extintive facts it alleges. In the case at hand, the judge assessed that the civil plaintiff did not prove that the vehicle with which the injuries to [Name 004] were caused was operated by the civil co-defendant corporation. This circumstance, without a doubt, had to be proven by the plaintiff, as it is a factual scenario contained in the two norms whose application was sought. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the Argentine legal scholars Roberto Loutayf and Luis Félix Costas, who in their book <span>"</span>La acción civil en sede penal<span>"</span>, stated: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Finally, the evidence of the civil party must also refer to the liability of the defendant for the damages caused by the illicit act (which is of primary importance when dealing with third-party defendants, where the cause of their liability must be proven).</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span> (Quoted in turn by Rafael Ángel Sanabria Rojas in “Reparación civil en el proceso penal”, Editorial Jurídica Continental, fourth updated edition, page 481). In the same vein, see resolution 963-2006 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), which establishes: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">(…) These are exhaustive and restrictive grounds, a condition derived from the fact that they aggravate the obligation to compensate. In this sense, provision 187 ibid lists the following: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">a) The owner of a vehicle who allows it to be driven by a person lacking the respective license or under the effects of liquor or enervating drugs./ b) Natural or legal persons (personas físicas o jurídicas) who, by any title, operate vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation./ c) The owner who allows the license plates of their vehicle to be used by another vehicle to which they have not been assigned, or does not deliver them to the Dirección General de Transporte Público for their custody, if the vehicle to which they were assigned is permanently unable to circulate./ d) Any natural or legal person that imports, assembles, produces, or commercializes motor vehicles, in the event that the traffic accident is caused by the omission, in the vehicle or vehicles involved in the traffic incident, of the respective safety measures, included in article 31 of this Law.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> In such situations, it is reiterated, the owner of the property jointly and severally assumes the obligation to repair the damage (daño), thereby granting the victim the possibility of filing a claim against only one of them or both at once. </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">The application of this joint and several regime depends on the demonstration, which is incumbent upon whoever files the action (canon 317 subsection 1) of the Civil Procedure Code), of the occurrence of any of these referred scenarios, so that if not proven, said joint and several regime would be inapplicable</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span> For all the foregoing, this appellate court considers that the decision challenged by the appellant is in accordance with the law, because in the case under review, the civil plaintiff did not conclusively prove, as was its duty, that América Ciento Siete S.A. operated the vehicle with license plate [Value 003], driven by [Name 001] at the time of the events, therefore it was not possible to attribute full joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) to it, based on either of the two norms claimed. <span style="font-style: italic;">(2) Insufficient reasoning and pretermission of evidence (fifth ground of the appeal (apelación))</span>. According to the appellant, by rejecting the civil plaintiff's thesis regarding the civil liability of América Ciento Siete S.A., the judge did not assess evidentiary elements that were duly offered and incorporated during the debate, such as the certification of legal capacity of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. and the vehicle registration certification for license plate [Value 003], which were not even mentioned, and granted greater evidentiary value to the statements of the convicted person. Regarding the reasoning contained in the contested judgment and which was cited above, this Court of Appeals (Cámara de Apelación) considers that it is brief but sufficient, as it allows an understanding of the reasoning that led the judge to reject the civil liability that the civil plaintiff sought to attribute to América Ciento Siete S.A., complying with the provisions of Article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), based on legal assessments, which in turn have been challenged by the appellant in the first two grounds of appeal and on which this Court has already ruled. As for the alleged defect of pretermission of evidence, it is true that the trial court is obliged to assess all lawful evidentiary material, duly incorporated, that may serve to clarify the facts. However, not any omission would justify the nullity of a ruling. For such non-observance or pretermission of evidence to entail that consequence, the overlooked evidence must be essential, that is, it must have an impact on the decision taken, which does not happen in the present case. From the analysis of the contested judgment, it has been verified that the judge did not set forth any assessment regarding the certification of legal capacity of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., nor regarding the registration certification of the motor vehicle in question. However, this pretermission did not cause harm to the civil plaintiff, insofar as it is inferred from the reasoning contained in the judgment that the judge did not ignore that the vehicle with license plate [Value 003] was in the name of the civil co-defendant, nor that the latter was a corporation, whose certification of legal capacity records the purpose of commerce and industry. The <span style="font-style: italic;">a quo</span> based its arguments on the fact that it was not enough for the vehicle involved in the traffic accident to be owned by a corporation to give rise to the scenarios contemplated in subsection b) of Article 199 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), or the fourth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), but rather that it had to be demonstrated that the vehicle was subject to operation, which did not occur in the specific case. Thus, hypothetically including the evidence whose assessment the appellant misses, the result would have been the same. And indeed, as already noted above, the civil plaintiff did not concern itself with proving <span style="font-style: italic;">"the operation of the motor vehicle for a commercial or industrial purpose</span><span style="font-style: italic;">"</span>, but rather considered that it was sufficient for the vehicle to be registered in the name of a corporation and that this purpose should therefore be presumed, a criterion not shared by the trial judge, nor by this Court. It should be noted that the judge, indeed, among his arguments, referred to the statement given by [Name 001], who stated that the vehicle in question was registered in the name of a corporation belonging to her mother, but that it had no business activity, since her mother is a housewife and that she was the one who made use of the vehicle, specifically to transport her daughter. The judge intertwined the above with what was declared by [Name 004] himself, who among other statements made to him by the convicted person, related that she told him that—at the time of the events—she was heading to San José to deal with a family situation. The judge's arguments correspond to a comprehensive examination of the evidence, just as he did throughout the contested judgment, both for the purpose of demonstrating the culpable conduct of [Name 001] and her criminal and civil liability, as well as to rule out the civil liability of América Ciento Siete S.A. However, it is evident that this was an additional assessment made by the judge, who based the decision challenged herein on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not prove the operation of the vehicle by the civil co-defendant, which has been confirmed by this Court through the comprehensive examination of the judgment and the debate that preceded it. Thus, the concatenated analysis of both referred statements, in which the victim and the accused were coincident, does not constitute a defect at all. For all the foregoing, the appellant's reproach must be dismissed. <span style="font-style: italic;">(3) Erroneous interpretation of the principle of congruence (cuarto motivo de la apelación)</span>. The reasoning put forth by the judge was challenged, according to which the civil plaintiff did not impute the circumstances contained in Articles 199 of the Traffic Law and 1048 of the Civil Code, by which it attributed civil liability to the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A.. Although this Court shares the criterion put forth by the appellant, in that the principle of congruence cannot be analyzed solely with respect to the facts section contained in the civil compensation action (acción civil resarcitoria) brief, but rather that said brief must be assessed integrally, the fact is that the argument put forth by the judge in this regard, although erroneous, was a brief additional mention, but was not the basis for his decision, and therefore it is not capable of invalidating the judgment regarding the rejection of full joint and several liability of América Ciento Siete S.A., on which matter—as has been extensively argued—the decision is in accordance with the law. The principle of congruence, which is extracted from both Article 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 61.2 of the Civil Procedure Code, does not mean—as the trial court understood—that the description of the circumstances contained in the norms whose application is sought must necessarily be located in the statement of facts of the civil compensation action. What is relevant is that it can be inferred from the content of the civil compensation action brief, under any of the other titles or sections arranged by the plaintiff, because what matters is that the parties against whom the action is brought know against what they must defend themselves. This criterion has been shared by the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), in reiterated jurisprudence. It is appropriate to cite resolution 1109-2011 of said Chamber, which states: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">What is relevant and important is that within the initial brief, the civil plaintiffs did describe and detail the grounds on which they base their action, as well as the damages (daños) they sought to be compensated for by the defendants</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">"</span> (cf. resolution N° 2011–01109 of 3:09 p.m. on September 13, 2011. In the same sense, see resolution 446-2014 of the same Criminal Cassation Chamber).

In the case at hand, as the appellant correctly pointed out, the claims are clearly evident from the content of the civil action for damages filing, and therefore —had the joint and several liability claimed by the plaintiff been upheld— no violation of the principle of congruence would have occurred. However, as indicated, it was an additional argument, briefly mentioned in the judgment, which —even if hypothetically removed— would not alter the decision, because the judge analyzed the merits of the matter, the evidence submitted to his consideration, and, based on those arguments and not on a matter of congruence, chose to dismiss the civil action for damages with respect to the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., which is in accordance with the law. For all the foregoing, having verified that the reasoning set forth in the contested decision to reject the full joint and several liability of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. is lawful, the appropriate course is to declare **without merit** the **first, second, fourth, and fifth** grounds of the appeal filed by the civil plaintiff's representative.

**VIII.-** The **third ground** of the appeal filed by the attorney for the Civil Defense of the Victim is declared **with merit**. The appellant claimed the non-application of articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, because the *a quo* ordered the lifting of the lien (gravamen) encumbering the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], without considering what is expressly provided in said regulations and violating the duty to provide reasons, as it did not explain the reasons for doing so and for disregarding the limited civil liability of the registered owner of the vehicle involved in the punishable act. It is held that the appellant's argument is correct and causes prejudice to the civil plaintiff, because the registered owner of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], i.e., América Ciento Siete S.A., must indeed be liable for the damages caused to [Nombre 004], <span style="text-decoration: underline;">exclusively up to the value of the vehicle</span>. Thus, the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003] must remain encumbered as a type of objective and in rem guarantee until the effective fulfillment of the decision, as established by the regulations that were violated by the judge. Given its importance for resolving the point in dispute, Resolution 963-2006 of the First Chamber is quoted, which clearly explains the issue under discussion: *“Damages caused in a traffic accident are subject to the civil liability rules imposed by concrete and special mandates regulated in the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, No. 7331. From this standpoint, in principle, it falls upon drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and third parties, whose conduct (by action or omission) has caused damage to a person's legal sphere, in such a way that this effect is attributable to them. This follows from numeral 186 of the referenced legal body. Thus, when an injury occurs caused by a traffic accident, its compensation will be subject to the demonstration of the economic or non-economic harm suffered, as well as the causal link between the conduct of the subject to whom it is attributed and the legal injury whose reparation is sought. Therefore, the rule is that the liable party will be the person who directly or indirectly caused the damage. Now, when liability falls on the driver, two specific scenarios may arise. The first is that the liable driver is also the owner of the vehicle. In this case, they would be the sole and direct party obligated to compensate the damage. However, it may be the case that the person driving is not the owner of the property.* **In that scenario, except in the situations to be indicated below, which generate joint and several liability, the registered owner is not fully civilly liable with the entirety of their assets, but only up to the value of the automobile.** **Here it is imperative to clarify that numeral 188 of the aforementioned legal body establishes a lien (gravamen) of an objective nature that is imposed on the property with which the damage was caused, which is noted in the margin of the respective registry entry.** *The initial paragraph of that mandate states, in relevant part: “The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered (gravado) pending the outcome of the respective proceeding and subject to the order of the judicial authority hearing it. Said authority shall order it to be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry, if it is registered…”* *This lien (gravamen) is imposed on the motor vehicle even when the driver at the time of the accident is not the owner, or does not appear with that subjective condition in the Public Registry (article 192 ibidem).* **It may only be lifted when there is reliable proof within the civil collection proceeding that the financial reparations have been fully satisfied, legally waived, or the guarantee substituted to the satisfaction of the judge (numeral 193).** **Thus seen, it is a charge that weighs on the property, regardless of who its owner is.** *It constitutes a lien on that exclusive property of the owner, whoever that may be over time.* **From the foregoing it follows that when the owner of the vehicle is not the driver, their “liability” is limited to the value of the automobile, which for these purposes constitutes a total or partial guarantee of the compensation ultimately ordered by the judge, which derives from the property relationship they hold over the asset —that is, of an in rem nature.** *However, the owner is not in all cases exempt from this duty of restitution for the damage. Indeed,* **as an exception to the rule just stated, the Ley de Tránsito provides for certain scenarios in which the owner assumes joint and several liability —and therefore full liability— together with the driver.** *These are exhaustive and restricted grounds, a condition derived from the fact that they aggravate the obligation to compensate. In this regard, precept 187 ibidem lists the following: (…). In these situations, it is reiterated, the owner of the property jointly and severally assumes the obligation to repair the damage, thus granting the victim the possibility of filing their claim against only one of them or both at once. The application of this joint and several regime depends on the demonstration, which is incumbent upon the party bringing the action (canon 317 subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Civil), of the occurrence of any of these referenced scenarios, such that if not proven, said joint and several regime would be inapplicable. Therefore,* **in that event, the quantitative terms of the owner's obligation are limited to the value of the vehicle, upon which the law imposes a lien. That is, in that scenario, they cannot be considered fully liable; however, the property upon which a lien rests, the imposition of which is mandated by law, causes that specific part of their assets to be liable for the obligation, limiting their civil obligation to the value of the vehicle.** *This is unlike when they are the one who directly caused the damage, as in that case, they are exclusively liable with the entirety of their assets.”* (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). The foregoing reasoning is shared by this Chamber, because as is clear from the conjunction of the referenced rules, currently contained in articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, when there is no identity between the registered owner and the driver, the former must be jointly and severally liable with the latter for the damages caused by a traffic accident, <span style="text-decoration: underline;">but in a manner limited to the value of the vehicle</span>. Consequently, the motor vehicle with which the damage is caused must remain encumbered (gravado) until the conclusion of the proceeding and it is recorded that the civil compensations have been paid, waived, the guarantee substituted, or if, after one year from the finality of the judgment ordering the compensation, the sentence enforcement court has not requested that the lien be placed under its order. This is so because, regarding damages caused by a traffic accident, with respect to the registered owner of the vehicle, the rule is limited liability and the exception is joint and several liability. In this case, as noted in the preceding whereas clause, the judge properly assessed that the exception was not applicable (under the terms of article 199 of the Ley de Tránsito, nor under the terms of numeral 1048 of the Código Civil), so that the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. would be liable with the entirety of its assets for the damages caused to [Nombre 004]. Hence, the judge, with justification and in accordance with the law, dismissed the principal claim of the civil plaintiff. However, without proper reasoning and violating the aforementioned legal provisions, the *a quo* omitted any consideration regarding limited civil liability and ordered the lifting of the lien (gravamen) that legitimately encumbered the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], owned by América Ciento Siete S.A. Said decision must be revoked by this Chamber, in strict adherence to the referenced regulations, so that América Ciento Siete S.A. must be liable, in a limited manner, solely up to the value of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], and the lien (gravamen) encumbering said motor vehicle must be maintained and may only be lifted under the scenarios of article 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, as expressly provided by the legislator.

This position has already been held previously by the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), as recorded in resolution number 447-2017, with the following arguments, which are shared by this Chamber: "Given that in this case none of the foregoing circumstances were proven, the possibility of decreeing joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria) of the registered owner (dueño registral) of the vehicle is excluded, but the strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) limited to the value of the vehicle subsists, as determined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling Voto 2000-5517, of 14:50 hours, on July 5, 2000, and which was taken up by the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) when it noted: 'The strict liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) for torts is not applicable to the case at bar; it is important to point out that the judgment does not prove that the vehicle driven by Mr. [Nombre 002] was a vehicle dedicated to remunerated public transportation or business activity as required by our legislation (essentially in Article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and the rules in force on civil liability from the 1941 Criminal Code (Código Penal), pursuant to Law 4891 of November 8, 1971), as a kind of exception for certain activities generating lucrative or functional risk. It is not enough to simply use a motor vehicle to thus create strict liability, which would lead to that citizen always being civilly liable for the damages caused, unless they prove that these were due to force majeure or fault of the injured party. The pertinent course is to resolve the grievance by applying the rules relating to fault-based liability (responsabilidad subjetiva) (in this case, discardable as to [Nombre 017], given the fortuitous event (caso fortuito) accredited by the lower court -folio 282-). Subsection 3 of Article 1048 of the Civil Code must be harmonized with the provisions of subsection 2 of Article 7 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) N° 7331. It is necessary to indicate that the registered owner (propietario registral) of the motor vehicle is liable, solely, with regard to their civil liability (responsabilidad civil), for the amount or value of their vehicle.' (# 345-98, at 9:25 hours, on April 3, 1998)." Thus, the jurisprudential line followed by the Criminal Cassation Chamber, in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Chamber, which is binding erga omnes, consists of the limitation of the civil liability (responsabilidad civil) of the registered owner (propietario registral) of the vehicle involved in the criminal act up to its value, as long as the assumptions contained in Article 199 of the Traffic Law or those contained in the fourth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code are not proven, as occurred in the case before us. The foregoing is consistent with what is expressly provided in Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the repeatedly cited special law, which would have no reason to exist unless as a logical consequence of that liability strictly limited to the value of the vehicle that weighs on the registered owner of the vehicle with which the damages were caused. The representation of the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) América Ciento Siete S.A., which has never questioned being the registered owner of the vehicle in question, when summoned regarding the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the Civil Defense Office for the Victim (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), with respect to the issue of interest here, alleged that the judge ruled according to law, for two reasons. The first of them because, in its opinion, once the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed against its represented party was dismissed, the proper outcome is that the vehicle of its property does not respond for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), so the lifting of the lien (gravamen) was correct. However, this position is contrary to the letter of the law, as has already been explained, and therefore cannot be accepted by this Chamber. The second reason held by the representation of the civil co-defendant consisted in that the civil plaintiff (parte actora civil), in its opinion, seeks to lead this Chamber into error, since the truth is that it never claimed the limited liability, but only the full liability of América Ciento Siete S.A. as a civil co-defendant. Having examined the written civil action for damages in its entirety, as well as the conclusions issued by the representation of the Civil Defense Office for the Victim during the adversarial proceedings (contradictorio), said argument must be rejected. It is on record that the representation of the civil plaintiff, at all times, requested that the lien (gravamen) weighing on the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003], property of América Ciento Siete S.A., be maintained so that it would respond for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to [Nombre 004], so it is not true that this claim of the civil plaintiff was not on record. As was already noted in the preceding recital (considerando), the defect of lack of congruence, which is basically what the representation of América Ciento Siete S.A. alleges if the appealing party's position were to be accepted, is determined based on the claims of the parties. Thus, in the specific case, the civil plaintiff (actor civil), throughout the entire process, contemplated the aforementioned lien within its claims, so we would not be facing a defect of extra petita, as the representation of the civil co-defendant has alleged. Added to this, it must be remembered that it is the judge who knows the law, according to the principle iuria novit curia, so the parties may not expressly invoke the normative support for their claims, without this meaning that they should not be granted. As has been indicated, the limited liability up to the value of the vehicle and the lien in question are expressly provided for in Articles 200, 203, and 204 of the special law governing the matter, which should not have been ignored by the trial judge and cannot be overlooked by this appellate court. In this regard, see judgment 61-1997 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera).

Based on the foregoing, the third ground of the challenge (impugnación) by the representation of the civil plaintiff is declared with merit. Consequently, the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) América Ciento Siete S.A., in its capacity as registered owner (propietaria registral) of the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003], shall respond in a limited manner for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) suffered by [Nombre 004], already declared, solely up to the value of the vehicle in question. Furthermore, the decision to lift the lien (gravamen) weighing on the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003] is revoked, which must be maintained until one of the assumptions contained in Article 204 of the Law of Transit on Land Public Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) occurs.

POR TANTO

The appeals (recursos de apelación) of the judgment filed by the public defender (defensor público) Eduardo Monterrey Carmona and the sentenced party [Nombre 001] are dismissed in all their respects. The first, second, fourth, and fifth grounds of the challenge (impugnación) filed by the attorney of the Civil Defense Office for the Victim, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, are dismissed. The third ground of the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Martínez Solano is declared with merit. Consequently, the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) América Ciento Siete S.A., in its capacity as registered owner (propietaria registral) of the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003], shall respond in a limited manner for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) suffered by [Nombre 004], solely up to the value of the vehicle in question. Furthermore, the decision to lift the lien (gravamen) weighing on the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003] is revoked, which must be maintained until one of the assumptions contained in Article 204 of the Law of Transit on Land Public Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) occurs. Let it be notified (Notifíquese).

María Milagro Granados García Hannia Soto Arroyo Raúl Madrigal Lizano Judges of the Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia) Defendant (Imputado): [Nombre 001]. Crime (Delito): Culpable Injury (Lesiones Culposas). Victim (Ofendida): [Nombre 004].

In this regard, the Criminal Cassation Chamber has maintained a uniform criterion that: "(...) the conviction of the lower court (a quo) to validate or not a testimonial, expert, or documentary evidence is the exclusive province of its jurisdictional independence, of the exercise of reason and respect for the legitimacy of the evidentiary roster, both in its obtaining and in its incorporation into the process. For the foregoing reasons, the victim's statement is sufficient to support a conviction, and that credibility granted by the Tribunal cannot be substituted in cassation, unless a violation in the logical path (iter lógico) or an anomaly in the judges' probity is demonstrated. Under the privilege of the principle of immediacy, the victim was believed." (Resolution 1098-2001 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). [...]" "III. [...] Regarding the rules for the reasoning (fundamentación) of the judgment, the Criminal Cassation Chamber has indicated: "The supervision of the application of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) consists of determining that the reasoning carried out by the lower court (a quo) when assessing the evidentiary elements submitted to its scrutiny is consistent with the conclusions it derives. CAFFERATA NORES points out: '... sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional) as a method for the assessment of evidence, imposes as the sole limit on the free conviction of judges, the respect for the rules that govern the connection of human thought: those of logic, those of psychology, and those of common experience...' (CAFFERATA NORES, José I. Temas de Derecho Procesal Penal. Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1988. p. 288). In other words, these rules allow for the control of the logical path (iter lógico) that the judge has followed to form their opinion on what is true and what is false according to the assessment of the evidence presented. It is evident from the challenged judgment that the reasoning set forth by the lower court (a quo) meets the requirements of legality and objectivity for its validity, in a comprehensive analysis of the existing body of evidence." (Resolution number 542-2009 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). [...]" "IV. [...] This Chamber shares the reasoning put forward by the judge and considers that the matter was resolved according to law, by using the expert report prepared by Pacheco Brizuela, since the mathematical calculations contemplated in that report were those that conformed to what is established in the rule cited by the judge, namely Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito. In addition to this, the decision is consistent with the regulations contained in the Código de Trabajo, specifically Title IV and especially what is established in Article 235 and the interpretation that the courts have been applying in this area.

In this regard, resolutions 821-2004, 325-2009, and 707-2014 of the Second Chamber can be mentioned, as well as resolution 145-2024 of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Execution Section, in which—when questioning the calculations made for indemnifications, both for temporary and permanent disability—the reported gross salary is precisely used as a parameter. [...]" V. [...] the norm—as assessed by the a quo—establishes the obligation, not the power, to impose an accessory penalty of disqualification (inhabilitación) not only for someone who exercises a profession, trade, or art, as the appellant seems to interpret it, but also for the activity in which the act occurred, without—regarding this latter case—requiring habitualness or remuneration. In other words, the cited article simply and plainly establishes that “in every case,” the perpetrator of the injuries shall be imposed a disqualification for the activity in which the act occurred, without conditioning such sanction on the person engaging in that activity professionally or habitually, as it is not appropriate to distinguish where the norm does not. It was proven that the convicted individual [Name 001], while engaging in the activity of driving a motor vehicle, caused injuries to the aggrieved party [Name 004]. Hence, the adjudicator unavoidably had to impose not only the principal penalty, but also the accessory one, according to the letter of the law. To support her thesis, the appellant cited pronouncements from the Criminal Cassation Chamber that are of old date, whose legal criterion is not only not shared by this Appeals Chamber, but has even been reversed by the same Criminal Cassation Chamber. As affirmed by the a quo in the appealed judgment and this Chamber endorses, the criterion currently held as a uniform jurisprudential line is that, in negligent actions committed in traffic matters, the accessory penalty of disqualification from driving vehicles must be imposed in all cases, since the injuries are precisely generated as a result of that activity. [...]

VI. [...] It is also true that the provisions of articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code establish that corporations (sociedades anónimas) are commercial entities. However, it cannot be presumed for purposes of the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) contained in the cited norms, that all assets registered in their name (in this case a vehicle) are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, since the same regulations of the Commercial Code, as well as the majority doctrine, recognize the possibility that not all acts performed by those entities are commercial acts per se, just as there are commercial acts performed by persons other than those listed in the mentioned article 17. In this sense, see “Temas de Derecho Comercial” by the jurist Gastón Certad Maroto, as well as “Curso de Derecho Mercantil” by Boris Kozolchyk and Octavio Torrealba. Thus, the commercial nature of all corporations (and of the other entities contained in article 17 in question) has the consequence that they are subject to a special legal regime, that is, the one contained in the Commercial Code (and not in the Civil Code), but this does not allow deducing, as the appellant intends, that América Ciento Siete S.A. exploited the vehicle with license plate [Value 003] for commercial or industrial purposes, which had to be proven by the party, as it forms an integral part of the norms whose application she sought and from which she considered her right derived. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite resolution number 866-2002 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, in which the term “exploit” was defined as follows: “It suffices to point out that article 187 of the Traffic Law establishes the joint and several liability of legal entities that, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial purposes.

The term “exploit” (exploten), as a verb form, is the third-person plural conjugation of the verb “to exploit” (explotar), which—among its various meanings—means: **“... 2.- To derive profit from a business or industry for one's own benefit...”** (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy of the Language, nineteenth edition, p. 598, 1970 Madrid).” (Verbatim quote). Although reference is made to section 187 of the Traffic Law, it is the same provision now contained in article 199 of that law; therefore, what was indicated is fully applicable and is consistent with the judge's arguments expressed in the contested ruling. Precisely, the trial court (a quo) based its decision on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not prove the assumption contained in article 199 of the Traffic Law, as it did not demonstrate that the vehicle was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, merely arguing that, since it is a corporation, such purpose was implicit. [...]” **5)** The civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed by **[Name 004]** against **AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA** is declared **WITHOUT MERITS**, but it is exempted from the payment of costs due to the existence of a plausible reason to litigate. **6)** The lifting of lien number 2021-00785971-002 and the collision notation with ballot number 20180315300615, which encumber the registration margin of the vehicle with license plate [Value 003], is ordered, once the judgment is final. **7)** Once the judgment is final, the destruction of the material evidence associated with the file is ordered. **8)** This matter is resolved without special condemnation in criminal costs, therefore the expenses of the process shall be borne by the State. **9)** Once this judgment is final, its registration in the Judicial Registry and Archive is ordered, as well as the remission of the corresponding testimonies to the National Institute of Criminology and the Sentence Enforcement Court. Let the judgment be communicated to the General Directorate of Traffic of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport for its corresponding actions. **NOTIFY.** **Juan Carlos Morales Jiménez Trial Judge"** (*sic*).

**II.-** That, against the preceding ruling, the public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona; the Appeal filed by the sentenced [Name 001]; and the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, filed appeals against the criminal sentence, which shall be resolved by this integration of the Specialized Sentence Appeals Tribunal for Organized Crime, according to the agreement of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, number XXVI, in session number 53-2023, of June 23, 2023.

**III.-** That once the respective deliberation was verified in accordance with the provisions of Article 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Tribunal considered the questions formulated in the appeal.

**IV.-** That the pertinent legal prescriptions have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Criminal Sentence Appeals Judge **Granados García**, and; **CONSIDERING** **I.- Admissibility, jurisdiction and evidence. (A) Admissibility examination.** In the present case, the Criminal Trial Court of Heredia, at fourteen hours and thirty minutes on October 9, two thousand twenty-four, issued judgment number 660-2024, through which it declared [Name 001] criminally responsible (autora responsable) for the crime of Culpable Injuries, to the detriment of [Name 004], for which it imposed upon Mrs. [Name 001] a fine and a disqualification penalty. It also resolved regarding the civil claims submitted for its consideration. Thus, we are faced with a resolution that is appealable through this means (objective taxativity). In accordance with Article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights and what was resolved by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Mauricio Herrera Ulloa vs. Costa Rica through the judgment of July 2, two thousand fourteen, many formalities are not necessary to hear appeals against a sentence. However, according to the provisions of articles 437 to 440, 446, 458 and 460 to 462 of the Criminal Procedure Code, simple requirements regarding form, term, and standing to appeal (legitimación para impugnar) must be met, therefore, the examination of said requirements proceeds. The integral reading of the judgment was given on October 16, two thousand twenty-four, therefore, there was a term to appeal until November 6, two thousand twenty-four. On November 1, two thousand twenty-four, the public defender Eduardo Monterrey Carmona, acting as technical defense for [Name 001], filed an appeal against the indicated judgment, verifying its presentation within the legal term and with the proper standing for those purposes. In turn, on November 6, two thousand twenty-four, the sentenced individual herself, [Name 001], acting in her material defense, filed an appeal, also having standing for it and being within the legal term. On that same date and, therefore, in time, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, in her capacity as attorney for the Victim's Civil Defense Office and representing the civil claimant [Name 004], filed an appeal, specifically regarding civil claims, for which she also has standing. Furthermore, all appeals were filed through motivated writings, with an express indication of the grievances, before the trial court. Based on the foregoing, the appeals are admissible and it is appropriate to rule on the merits. **(B) Jurisdiction**. This Specialized Sentence Appeals Tribunal for Organized Crime has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, as stipulated in Articles 93 ter and 101 bis of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, in relation to agreement number XXVI of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session number 53-2023 of June 23, two thousand twenty-three. **(C) Admissibility examination of the evidence**. In the appeal filed by the sentenced [Name 001], in a section titled "evidence to be gathered and for better provision (prueba por recabar y mejor proveer)," she literally stated: *"With all due respect, I offer as evidence for a better resolution and to be gathered, that the National Insurance Institute be requested through its authority the information of all payments made to the offended party in order to be able to verify what amounts have been paid so that there is no (sic) double payment in this matter or double collection."* Additionally, [Name 005], representing the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., upon responding to the notice of the appeal filed by the Victim's Civil Defense Office, in a section titled "Offer of evidence for better provision (Ofrecimiento de prueba para mejor resolver)," proposed the following: *"The possibility of offering evidence for better provision, even during the appeal phase, is specifically provided for by article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code; which provides for said faculty, indeed, as a necessary guarantee to ensure and materialize the search for the real truth -a proper and consubstantial purpose of any criminal process-. Under the protection of said legal norm; by this act, a series of receipts from the Ministry of Finance are offered -in the nature of evidence for better provision-, which bear the nature of official documents, and which demonstrate that AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE S.A., is neither a company, nor does it develop economic or lucrative activities, much less organize or intervene in the market for intermediation of goods and services or in the activities of organizing the different factors of production, which will allow demonstrating the case theory of this representation of the co-defendant party, regarding the absence of a profit or economic gain purpose in the actions of said corporate consortium."* (The underline belongs to the original). Having assessed the offers and arguments of the parties, in light of Article 464 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Chamber rejects the evidence offered by both parties, for the following reasons: The aforementioned article, even cited by one of them, provides: *"The appealing party may offer, in the filing of the appeal, new evidence regarding the facts that are the object of the process or regarding the manner in which an act was performed, when it contradicts what is indicated in the proceedings, in the minutes, in the trial records or the judgment itself. The tribunal shall accept as new only the evidence offered in its timely moment but that was arbitrarily rejected, that which appears as novel after the judgment, and that which, although existing previously, was not in the effective possibility of being offered by the interested party at that time."* (The highlighting does not belong to the original). In light of the express provision regulating the matter, this Chamber is of the view that only evidence that was arbitrarily rejected, that is novel or appears subsequently, or that the interested party did not have the possibility of offering at the time, can be accepted. In this case, from the study of the case file, it is evident that neither the evidence requested by the accused and civil defendant [Name 001] nor that offered by the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., falls within any of those circumstances. It does not appear in the case file that it was offered and rejected previously, nor was it argued as such by the parties and, by its very nature, it is discounted that it is novel or that the parties did not have the possibility of offering it in the preceding procedural stages, if they considered it pertinent. On the contrary, it involves documentation that existed in public entities (National Insurance Institute and Ministry of Finance), so the parties could have requested it previously, and they did not do so. Note that, during the development of the adversarial proceeding, the representation of the civil co-defendant offered a mathematical expert opinion, which was admitted to it, without it having requested or provided at that time the documentation it now intends for this Appeals Chamber to assess. Therefore, in strict application of the cited norm, **the evidence offered -by both parties- is rejected as not being admissible** in the appeal stage.

**II.-** **Summary of the allegations. (A) Appeal filed by the public defender, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona.** In his sole ground for appeal, titled *"Disagreement with the determination of the facts, illegitimate foundation of the conviction,"* he cited articles 1, 9, 62, 142, 184 and following of the Criminal Procedure Code as the violated regulations. According to his exposition, the Trial Court (hereinafter, in this section, the court) omitted factual circumstances that were detailed in the accusation and that were never proven, thereby weakening the accused factual construct and, erroneously, indicated the responsibility of the defendant. He criticized that the court deemed proven the excess speed attributed to his client, but that the rules of logic and experience alluded to by the court were exposed from its subjectivity, without mentioning which logic or experience it was referring to. He claimed that the court used the police report as a parameter to compare the damage to the vehicles and from that, based on its logic and experience, represented the excess speed. He reproached that the police report contained mere reference information, insufficient to assess the quality of the damages. He added that the judge mentioned Newton's third law, but without having the exact data on speeds to arrive at a measurable result. He criticized that the court referenced the testimony of the offended party regarding the defendant having told him that she had pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, since with this -according to the appellant- it evidenced an inclination to consider ideas, occurrences or mere gossip, which in any case were discredited by his client. He stated that to hold that the offended party maintained the same version in the complaint and in the plenary hearing to justify the conviction is a fallacious argument. Furthermore, according to the appellant, the court did not explain why it considered the offended party to be coherent, consistent, and persistent, thereby reflecting that it took as true facts impossible to prove, relying only on the statement of the aggrieved party. He alleged that the court did not assess that it was never demonstrated that the vehicle [Value 004], driven by [Name 006], stopped and maintained a distance from the offended party's vehicle. In this sense, the testimony of [Name 006] was not received, nor was any document available in this regard. However, according to his view, the court took it as a fact without anyone having proven it. He requested that the appeal be granted, the judgment annulled, and a rehearing ordered. **B)** **Appeal filed by the sentenced [Name 001]**. *(1) First ground: Disagreement with the assessment of the evidence. Violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) that violates the universal principle in dubio pro reo.* She claimed a violation of Articles 1, 2, 6, 142 and 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 39 and 41 of the Magna Carta. She argued that the court disqualified evidentiary elements that showed that the breach of the duty of care was on the part of the other vehicles for not maintaining the required distance. She added that the court did not completely set forth the factual and legal reasons that led it to disqualify the version given by her, limiting itself to dismissing it as a mere attempt to evade responsibility. She alleged a logical error in the judge's analysis, as he granted credibility to the offended party while simultaneously holding exclusionary assessments to detract reliability from her version (that of the appellant). She cited excerpts from the judgment. She added that the judge did not explain which logical rule and experience allowed him to conclude what the generating fact was, but simply opted for the version given by the offended party. According to the appellant, it does not follow from the evidence that her vehicle was the one that generated the impact beyond the offended party's version regarding the alleged excess speed, but there is no skid mark and the traffic officer did not note that the distance of 3.80 meters was due to her being the one who generated the collision.

(1) Second ground: Disagreement with the determination of the civil facts. Erroneous assessment of the mathematical expert calculation regarding the regulation of numeral 74 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito). She cited as violated articles 99 and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), 363 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), as well as 74 and following of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, hereinafter Traffic Law). After a brief indication of the requirements of a judgment, she argued that the ruling omitted to explain with the necessary clarity the cause–effect relationship between the collision and the knee injury, limiting itself to referring to the non-opposition to the medical-legal opinions and treating them as “holy word.” According to her presentation, the court omitted to assess the discussion on whether it was a long-standing injury, the product of walks in the mountains, and that it was demonstrated in the hearing that the victim walked on his own, assisted the others, without any problems with his knee or shoulder, and therefore did not require medical attention. She added that the judge accepted the permanent disability and the compensatory amounts, without providing further details in that regard. She argued that the compensatory calculation should have been made on the basis of the net salary, not the gross, since the latter does not adjust to the real amount the person receives, but rather includes amounts inherent to social security and the treasury, as can be inferred from the mathematical expertise managed by the defense. She reiterated that the judgment does not extract the criterion of imputation that gives rise to the compensatory obligation, dealing with injuries that appear months later, whose nexus had to be proven by the civil plaintiff. She indicated that the judgment did not consider any fact proven to support the civil conviction. (3) Third ground: Disagreement with the individualization of the penalty. She accused violation of numerals 1, 2, 12, 142, and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code and articles 71 and 128 of the Criminal Code. She complained that the penalty of disqualification (inhabilitación) was imposed, which she indicated is not of indiscriminate or automatic application, but rather the link to the profession or occupation of a driver must be analyzed and substantiated for each specific case. She cited resolutions 865-99 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) and 145-2008 of the Cartago Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago). She argued that the judge did not analyze whether it was a habitual activity that generated economic profit, and therefore also did not evaluate criteria of reasonableness and proportionality to impose a burdensome sanction such as disqualification. (C) Appeal filed by the attorney of the Office of Civil Defense of the Victim (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), Karla Nancy Martínez Solano. (1) First ground: Erroneous and omitted application of substantive law, specifically numeral 199 subsection b) of the Traffic Law, in relation to the rejection of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed against the co-defendant civil company América Ciento Siete S.A. After summarizing the civil action in what was relevant and quoting part of the reasoning of the judgment, she argued that the judge made an extensive and arbitrary interpretation of article 199 subsection b) of the Traffic Law, contravening article 10 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which establishes that norms must be interpreted starting from the proper meaning of the words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative antecedents, and social reality, attending to their spirit and purpose. She added that the judge confused solidary civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria) with pure objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva pura) derived from the creation of risks (article 1048 of the Civil Code). Thus, according to her criterion, the profit that the court requested is not a legal requirement. The only thing the legislator requires for the imperative application of indirect solidary civil liability, in addition to the driver's fault in producing the damage, is that the natural or legal person exploits the vehicle and does so for commercial or industrial purposes. According to the appellant, economic profit is a type of utility or exploitation, but not the only one, and what is required is that the exploitation be for commercial or industrial purposes. She argued that it is a notorious fact and, therefore, does not require evidentiary elements, that the civil co-defendant is a public limited company (sociedad anónima). Consequently, by legal provision, its nature is mercantile and its assets are arranged for the fulfillment of that purpose. She added that, with the legal status (personería jurídica) of the company, which was offered as evidence, the corporate purpose and ends were demonstrated, which are commercial and industrial and, with that, the purpose of the vehicle of the co-defendant company and its solidary liability were accredited. She cited resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber. She added that, if the civil co-defendant opposed the civil action or what the legal status indicated, by provision of article 41.1.2. of the Civil Procedure Code, the burden of proof corresponded to it and not to the civil plaintiff, as the judge demanded. However, the corporate purposes were not controverted. She insisted that the judge demanded a requirement that is not contemplated in the law, without it being relevant that the accused, at the time of the accident, was not engaged in a profit-making activity. She reiterated that the judge bypassed the fact that evidentiary activity is necessary for the accreditation of controverted events, not dealing with notorious facts or those over which there was no contention. She cited resolution 1837-2020 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera). She concluded that, having proven that [Name 001] breached the duty of care in the driving of the vehicle owned by América Ciento Siete S.A., and caused damages to the victim, as well as having accredited that the purposes of the company were commercial and industrial, without the civil co-defendant opposing or offering evidence to the contrary, it was imperative to grant the civil action for damages against América Ciento Siete S.A., as a solidary civil liable party, through a correct application of article 199 subsection b) of the Traffic Law. (2) Second ground: Erroneous application of article 1048 of the Civil Code, as a case of objective civil liability. The appellant explained that the objective civil liability derived from article 1048 of the Civil Code was also demanded, independent of the subjective liability of [Name 001], given the mercantile nature of the company América Ciento Siete S.A. She complained that the judgment implicitly recognized all the normative and factual assumptions to declare that type of liability, but demanded a requirement not contemplated in the law, consisting of accrediting that, at the time of the collision, the vehicle was being used for a pecuniary activity. She cited, again, resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber to support her position that the only requirements are: that injuries or death have been produced by a motor vehicle (máquina motiva), that the natural or legal person is the owner of the means with which the injuries were caused, and that force majeure or fault of the victim has not been accredited. She reiterated that, in the case of public limited companies, since they are destined for profit and mercantile activity, the vehicles they own have an exploitation purpose and, given the risk in the activity they carry out, objective civil liability is contemplated. She cited resolution 903-F-SI-2021 of the First Chamber. She added that the documentary evidence demonstrated that América Ciento Siete is a public limited company and the mercantile line of business appears from its incorporation, so there was no doubt that the vehicle it owned was being exploited for commercial purposes, which was not controverted by the civil co-defendant nor did it offer evidence to the contrary. She concluded that the judge exceeded the normative demands, in an arbitrary and extensive application of article 1048 of the Civil Code and bypassing the legal nature of the company owning the vehicle and, therefore, the purpose of the asset, according to what is established in articles 5 and 17 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio). (3) Third ground: Regarding the non-application of articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Traffic Law. The appellant noted that, pursuant to the cited articles, limited solidary liability (responsabilidad solidaria limitada) was claimed. However, the judge did not rule in that regard, but rather limited himself to ordering the release of liens and annotations (levantamiento de los gravámenes y anotaciones), once the judgment was firm. The foregoing, according to the complainant, constitutes a formal defect (vicio formal) of the judgment due to a lack of reasoning (falta de motivación), even though it formed part of the civil claim and of the arguments presented. She added that it is also a substantive defect (vicio sustantivo), due to the non-application of articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Traffic Law, according to which the vehicle must remain encumbered until the damage caused is responded to, given the objective liability. She recalled that limited solidary civil liability persists regardless of what is decided regarding subjective civil liability (article 199 of the Traffic Law) and solidary liability (numeral 1048 of the Civil Code). She cited resolution 523-2024 of this Court, partially with a different composition, as well as resolution 212-2018 of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José). (4) Fourth ground: Erroneous application of the principle of consistency (principio de congruencia). She claimed the violation of articles 112 and 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code and numeral 61.2 of the Criminal Procedure Code. She argued that among the reasonings contained in the challenged judgment, it was included that it was not alleged “that said car was being exploited by the legal entity or by the driver -natural person- to generate their own profit from a commercial or industrial point of view,” and that neither was it alleged that “América Ciento Siete S.A. or [Name 001], on November 19, 2018, were exploiting the vehicle to fulfill a particular pecuniary activity.” However, in the document filing the civil action for damages, according to the appellant, the description of the three criteria of imputation sustained by the civil plaintiff does appear, on pages 4 and 5 verso of the civil action for damages file. Thus, regarding the solidary civil liability contained in article 199 of the Traffic Law, it was noted that with respect to the civil co-defendant company, the claim derived from the following: “because it is the owner of the vehicle driven by the defendant, as this vehicle (sic) belongs to a legal entity whose purpose is commerce, industry, among others, according to the same certification of legal status, therefore it is within the liability detailed in numeral 199 subsection b) of the Traffic Law.” Regarding the objective civil liability of numeral 1048 of the Civil Code, the document contemplated: “it is a motor vehicle (máquina motiva) and by its very nature, the driving of vehicles in itself generates a risk and it also specifically indicates the solidary civil liability that is generated by means of a motor vehicle.” Regarding the last criterion of imputation, the limited solidary civil liability, it was outlined that it stemmed from the mere verification that the defendant public limited company is the registered owner of the vehicle with plates [Value 003]. She concluded that the foregoing verifies a defect of erroneous application of the previously mentioned precepts and a defect of reasoning (vicio de motivación), according to article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (5) Fifth ground: Erroneous and omitted factual, probative, and legal reasoning (fundamentación) of the judgment. Articles 142, 184, and 363 subsection b) of the Criminal Procedure Code were considered infringed. She reproached that the judge considered that the civil plaintiff had not made reference to what the commercial activities of the civil co-defendant company were nor the use of the vehicle in that sphere. However, according to the appellant, she did indicate the commercial activity in which the company was engaged and proved it through the certification of legal status, which contains its purpose or ends. Moreover, the very nature of public limited companies was alleged, according to articles 5 and 17 of the Commerce Code, which allows one to deduce that its assets are destined to fulfill the profit-making ends of the company. According to her criterion, from there the objective civil liability arises, given the purpose of exploitation and the risk existing in the activity. She mentioned, again, resolution 187-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber. She criticized that, despite the foregoing, the civil action for damages against the civil co-defendant company was rejected, without considering the certification provided nor the described arguments. According to the appellant, this translates into a defect of lack of reasoning (vicio de falta de motivación) and preterition of evidence (preterición de prueba). She maintained that the judge erred in considering that automatic civil liability had been alleged, but rather the criterion of imputation was focused on the legal nature of the defendant company, on the ends it had, and on the mercantile exploitation activity it exercised, which can be inferred from an analysis of the commercial norms and the certification of legal status (all of which was not controverted nor was evidence offered to the contrary). She added that the judge did not explain the reasons why the mercantile ends that the company had were disregarded and that the assets were the means of its commercial activity based on the mere statement of [Name 001] or why this had more weight than the evidence offered by the civil plaintiff. According to the appellant, all of the foregoing constitutes a defect of lack of reasoning (vicio de falta de motivación) and also a violation of the rule of logic, in its principle of sufficient reason, in addition to the preterition of evidence, both of the certification of legal status and the registered certification of the vehicle. She added that the judge provided a laconic reasoning for the rejection of the second criterion of imputation, through a mere routine reference, without evaluating the documentary evidence offered by the civil plaintiff, of which he did not even make mention.

According to the appellant, the same occurred regarding the decision to lift the liens (levantamiento de los gravámenes), since the only argument was the rejection of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed against the corporation, without analyzing the cited regulations, by which said lien should have persisted as a model of limited joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria limitada). **(D) Position of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público)**: It did not issue a pronouncement, despite having been served notice since November twelfth, two thousand twenty-four. **(E) Position of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A.**: On November eighteenth, two thousand twenty-four, via email addressed to the Criminal Appeal Court of San Ramón, a brief was received titled "*It is requested that the appeal of the criminal sentence promoted by the Victim's Civil Defense Office of the Public Ministry be rejected*", signed by [Name 005], representing América Ciento Siete S.A., through which it rejected some of the grounds of the aforementioned appeal. Regarding the first ground: It argued that it lacks clarity, direct, precise, and consistent arguments are not provided, it resorts to jurisprudential citations and is not self-sufficient. It reiterated that its represented entity has no for-profit purpose (fin de lucro) and that they had no obligation to prove it, since the fundamental circumstances of the accusation must be proven by the civil plaintiff (actor civil), as follows from a correct reading of article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code. It added that the evidence allows inferring the conclusion reached by the judge, in that its represented entity does not carry out economic activity and is a simple family holding company, a common figure in our country, just as Mrs. [Name 001] declared. In its opinion, it is not enough that it is a corporation to have a for-profit purpose, which constitutes an assumption by the civil plaintiff. It cited resolution 304-F-97 of the Criminal Cassation Tribunal. Regarding the second ground: It alleged that it is a reiteration of the first and stems from an erroneous interpretation of article 1048 of the Civil Code. It estimates that the purpose of the regulation is to grant strict civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) when the company exercises a true and authentic commercial activity. It indicated that the jurisprudential citations provided by the appellant are biased and attempt to mislead and are also old and have been contradicted by more recent rulings. It cited an excerpt from judgment 244-2018 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber. It reiterated that América Ciento Siete S.A. is not a company, does not develop economic or for-profit activities, does not intervene in the intermediation of goods and services, and the burden of proof was on the civil plaintiff. It added that the vehicle was being used for personal errands of [Name 001]. As for the third ground: It pointed out that it contains novel and surreptitious allegations that were not directly sustained before the Trial Court, thus violating the principle of congruence, that is, the conformity between the petitions and the judgment that ends the litigation. It cited resolution 20-2018 of the Second Civil Court of San José. It criticized that the application of articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Traffic Law was never formally requested, so the judge was prevented from granting such a claim. It added that, even hypothetically including those arguments from the moment of the complaint, it is not appropriate to keep a vehicle encumbered (gravado) if its registered owner (propietario registral) was exonerated from liability, so the decision was correct in light of articles 1, 9, and 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code and articles 39 and 42 of the Political Constitution. It pointed out that those rules of the Traffic Law are not binding or applicable to the specific case, given the exoneration from liability. In general, regarding the appeal filed by the Victim's Civil Defense Office, it petitioned that the conformity of the first-instance judgment be declared and concluded by recalling that nullity for nullity's sake is not appropriate.

**III.-** Given their affinity, in order to avoid repetition, the **sole ground of the appeal filed by public defender Monterrey Carmona and the first ground contained in the challenge (impugnación) presented by the sentenced [Name 001]** are resolved jointly, both being declared **without merit (sin lugar)**. As stated in the preceding recital (considerando), the appellants challenged the determination of the criminal facts, estimating that the judge incurred errors in the evaluation of the evidence, by granting full credibility to the aggrieved party, while rejecting the defensive version, without adequately explaining the factual and legal reasons that led him to do so. Furthermore, according to the appellants, the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) were violated, since the judge did not explain the rules of logic and experience that allowed him to establish the dynamics of the facts and, consequently, the responsibility of the accused, making it evident that the decision was based on subjectivities and the absolute credibility granted to the victim. According to the opinion of both appellants, the evidence that was submitted to the judge's knowledge, evaluated objectively and in accordance with the rules of rational sound criticism, did not allow the dynamics of the facts that were accused to be taken as proven, nor to disprove the one that was raised by [Name 001] in the exercise of her material defense. Upon examining the reasoning that the *a quo* set forth in the appealed judgment, this Chamber of Appeals concludes that the claims in question are due to a fragmented and incomplete reading of the intellectual analysis on which the conviction was based. Contrary to what was alleged by the sentenced party and her public defender, it is corroborated that the Trial Judge carried out an objective, exhaustive, and integral analysis of the evidence incorporated at trial, which allowed him to take the following facts as proven: "*1. On November 19, 2018, at approximately 9:20 a.m., in Heredia, Ulloa, route 1, heading from Alajuela towards San José, 300 meters before the Alfredo González Flores bridge, [Name 004] was driving vehicle license plate [Value 005] in the left lane, with the right of way (derecho de vía), and was traveling in the company of his minor son [Name 009], who was in the front passenger seat. 2. That same day, time, and place, [Name 001] was driving vehicle license plate [Value 003], in the same direction as the victim [Name 004]. 3. In the dynamics of the traffic circulation on the described roadway, the vehicle traveling in front of the victim's motor vehicle, driven by [Name 010] and with license plate [Value 006], stopped due to traffic congestion, so the victim [Name 004] also stopped, keeping the proper distance. Behind the aggrieved party came vehicle license plate [Value 004] driven by [Name 006], who also stopped. Behind [Name 006] the accused [Name 001] was driving, who, breaching the objective duty of care in the driving of motor vehicles, because she was driving at excess speed for the road conditions and the area's traffic congestion, did not stop and strongly collided with the vehicle that [Name 006] was driving and, with the force exerted on this vehicle, [Name 001] projected the motor vehicle that [Name 006] was driving against the victim [Name 004]'s vehicle and, in this way, caused it to collide against the aggrieved party's vehicle in the rear part, and in turn, caused the vehicle that [Name 004] was driving to impact against the automobile that was in front and was driven by [Name 010]. In this way, Mrs. [Name 001] caused the victim [Name 004] to also impact the dash and the lower internal part of his vehicle, suffering blows to his right knee, while the seatbelt produced a blow to the victim, by whip effect, in the neck, shoulder, and right arm; injuries that required medical attention hours after the event. 4. As a consequence of the breach of the objective duty of care in driving vehicles by [Name 001], [Name 004] was injured and, according to medico-legal reports 2019-0551 (of January 21, 2019) and 2020-7387 (of October 1, 2020), suffered trauma to the neck, back, right shoulder, and right knee, evidencing bicipital tenosynovitis, subacromial-subdeltoid bursitis, heterogeneous thickening of the supraspinatus tendon fibers of a post-traumatic inflammatory nature, of conservative treatment and by infiltrations; and edema of the prepatellar and infrapatellar subcutaneous fatty tissue, grade I sprain of the medial collateral ligament and chondral lesion, which required arthroscopic surgery of the right knee. Currently, the described injuries cause the victim [Name 004] pain in the shoulder, arm, and forearm, making it difficult to lift weight, and pain in the right knee. These injuries caused by the accused [Name 001] caused physical harm (daño físico) to the aggrieved party and required a temporary disability for the performance of his usual occupations of two (2) months, from the date of the events, and a permanent disability of ten percent (10%) for loss of general organic capacity.*". (Verbatim quote). It is necessary to clarify that there were facts that were not disputed by the technical or material defense, but rather the defensive thesis, regarding the criminal perspective, during the trial, rested on two arguments, the first referring to the dynamics of the accident and the second regarding the cause of the injuries to the aggrieved party [Name 004] (the second of the appeal grounds of the sentenced [Name 001] partially deals with this last argument, so it will be elaborated on further below). As for the dynamics of the accident, according to [Name 001], the vehicles that preceded the one driven by her did not keep the proper distance and, even, had already collided before she impacted the motor vehicle driven by [Name 006]. In this sense, she stated at trial: "*... I want to declare myself not guilty, I want to explain the characteristics of the cars, his is a big, tall, strong car, with a chassis, my car is a small one, it is a car that has no hood, it is old, made of soft metal, it is a little car, I feel that in all of this the responsibility is shared, I feel that there was no distance between the vehicles, I was coming slowly, on few occasions the gentleman indicated that there was a traffic jam, so it was impossible to go at another speed. I am going to tell you how things happened, I was coming from Alajuela to San José when I saw the gentleman brake suddenly, the car in front hit him and I hit her, at that moment everything happened quickly, I was super scared, ...*". (Quote extracted verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary reasoning of the judgment). As is easily verified, it is the same position sustained in the challenge being examined.

Now, from the transcribed facts it appears that, indeed, the *a quo* dismissed the defensive version and, on the contrary, deemed the dynamics of the events that were charged to be accredited, according to which the sentenced [Nombre 001] breached the duty of care in driving the vehicle with plates [Valor 003], by driving at excessive speed, without taking into consideration the traffic congestion, not stopping the vehicle in a timely manner, and colliding with the vehicle driven by Mrs. [Nombre 006] (plates [Valor 004]), which caused it to collide with the vehicle driven by the victim [Nombre 004] (plates [Valor 005]), and that one to collide with the vehicle driven by Mr. [Nombre 010] (plates [Valor 006]). As will be analyzed further below, the foregoing caused the injuries suffered by [Nombre 004]. Having examined the judge's arguments contained in the judgment, as well as the evidence submitted to his knowledge, this Chamber detects no defect in the assessment of the evidentiary elements, nor any violation of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), it being observed that the *a quo* carried out a clear and precise reasoning of the points submitted for discussion in the debate, which led him to the conviction decision. It is true that the court granted full credibility to the statement of the aggrieved party [Nombre 004]; however, this does not translate to a flaw, insofar as the judge amply explained the reasons that allowed him to reach that conclusion, complying with the provisions of article 142 of the Código Procesal Penal, while he conducted a concatenated analysis of the evidence and correctly applied the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), as established in article 184 of that same normative body. In view of the arguments raised by the appellants, summarized in the preceding considering clause, it is necessary to recall that in our criminal procedural system, the principle of freedom of evidence governs, according to which any fact can be proven by any means, provided it is legal. Thus, the arguments are not acceptable, according to which the dynamics of the event could not be deemed proven, because the statement of Mrs. [Nombre 006] was not available, no technical evidence was available, there is no skid mark, or because the traffic citations and report did not state who was the person responsible for the collision or the magnitude of the damages. These arguments attempt to apply a kind of weighted evidence, which cannot be admitted by this Chamber, given that it would openly contravene the aforementioned principle and the system of free assessment of evidence that governs us, contemplated in article 184 of the Código Procesal Penal, which provides: "*Assessment. The court shall assign the corresponding value to each element of evidence, with strict application of the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica). It must justify and adequately substantiate the reasons for granting it a specific value, based on the joint and harmonious appreciation of all essential evidence.*" In the challenged judgment, the reasons were clearly explained why, through the examination of the statements that were received during the debate, together with the documentary evidence duly incorporated, it was possible for the judge to deem the charged events accredited, namely that on the date, time, and place described in the factual account (circumstances on which there was no dispute) three of the four vehicles involved in the accident stopped in a timely manner, given the traffic congestion, and it was the vehicle driven by the sentenced [Nombre 001] that did not stop and caused the multiple collision in question. This Chamber, having examined the challenged ruling, has verified the correct application of the rules of logic, specifically derivation and sufficient reason, since the judge interwove the documentary and expert evidence (complaint, sketch, official report, traffic citations, medical opinions) with the testimonies provided by the victim [Nombre 004], the witness [Nombre 009], and the traffic officer [Nombre 011], which reasonably allowed him to incline towards accrediting the version of the aggrieved party and excluding that of the accused. In this sense, the judge - throughout his intellectual reasoning - assessed: "*(...) this Court must explain how it reached that conclusion and for this purpose it is appropriate to begin the corresponding dissertation by pointing out that at trial, the statement of Mr. [Nombre 004] was received, who in a clear, spontaneous manner and without great hesitation explained, roughly, that on the day in question he was traveling in the company of his minor son in his Toyota Prado vehicle heading towards San José and that, before reaching the Alfredo González Flores bridge – popularly known as 'la platina' – he stopped because there was traffic congestion and the vehicle ahead – which was red – had braked. Likewise, he indicated that once stopped, he looked through the rearview mirror and observed that there was a vehicle behind them that he classified as a white Rav-4, and that in a matter of seconds he heard a blow, like a screech, that he reacted by looking again through the rearview mirror and they already had the vehicle behind them 'on top' of them, so what he did was try to hold the brake and at the same time, firmly hold the steering wheel, but the impact was inevitable and so fast that he did not even have time to warn his son to prepare himself. Mr. [Nombre 004] continued saying that after the blow, he got out of the car and observed that practically nothing had happened to the vehicle ahead, that in the vehicle behind there was a pregnant woman very close to the steering wheel and that, about 3 meters from the pregnant woman's vehicle, there was another car and that this one was indeed very damaged, so he helped the driver to get out and transferred her to his vehicle, to which he added that this person indicated to him that she could not stop because when she saw the line of cars she pressed the accelerator instead of the brake. Without wishing to repeat everything that Mr. [Nombre 004] narrated regarding the dynamics of the accident, these were the most important points and, from there, the victim drew a sketch during his testimony at trial and graphically captured the final disposition of the vehicles, detailing that those most damaged from a material point of view were those driven by [Nombre 006] (the pregnant person) and by the herein accused [Nombre 001], since Mrs. [Nombre 006]'s car had practically been embedded under the car he was driving – which, as already stated, was a Toyota Prado and therefore taller than the others – and likewise, that Rav-4 had considerable damage to the rear, as there were dents observed on the rear door and bumper, while Mrs. [Nombre 001]'s car had been left very battered at its front end, that is to say, on the hood, to the point that he even thought there might be some risk from the smoke and liquids that were coming out of that vehicle at that time, although he later realized that the smoke was steam from the radiator. (...) As can be derived from the previous image, what was drawn by Mr. [Nombre 004] responds coherently with what he verbally narrated during the trial, but, if to this sketch is added the one prepared by the traffic officer [Nombre 011] which is on file page 225, important similarities can be appreciated that evoke truthfulness in what was narrated by the victim to the Court (...) Note, moreover, that the version offered by the victim [Nombre 004] adequately coincides with the one he had already provided before the Ministerio Público in the complaint he filed there on October 1, 2020, so the argumentative position he maintained during the trial must be classified as coherent, consistent, and persistent, all of which contributes to the definition of his credibility."* As such, the undersigned judge must grant credibility to the account given by Mr. [Nombre 004] regarding the circumstances surrounding the accident under analysis, especially considering that the version he gave at trial was confirmed, as to the dynamics of the events, by the young man [Nombre 009] –his son– who, while being honest in clarifying that the event happened about six years ago and therefore he did not remember it so vividly, recalled that they were on their way to San José, there was traffic congestion, they stopped because the car ahead had stopped, he heard a bang and almost immediately felt a hard impact that caused them to hit the vehicle in front. An important aspect of the statements of Mr. [Nombre 004] and [Nombre 009] was that both agreed in asserting that before feeling the impact on their vehicle, they heard another bang, which inevitably leads the Court to conclude that before the vehicle of [Nombre 006] hit the Toyota Prado of [Nombre 004], this Rav-4 had already been hit from behind by the Toyota Yaris driven by Mrs. **[Nombre 001]** , that is, the logical derivation of all this is that the first person who collided and, therefore, caused the subsequent multiple collision, was the accused herein **[Nombre 001]** , ergo, the efficient cause of the result was a rear-end collision generated by the defendant; it was that and not some other circumstance that triggered the multiple crash. Indeed, during her statement at trial, Mrs. **[Nombre 001]** acknowledged not once, but twice, that she had accepted responsibility when the matter was still in the Traffic Court, which is a further indication of her responsibility, since, although the defendant attempted to explain that she was 'set up' by [Nombre 004] from the outset, she did indeed accept the facts in the traffic venue in order to apply her insurance policy and repair all the vehicles, which in itself is an important element for the Court, because according to the rules of logic and experience, it would be, at the very least, strange that, if a person is not at fault for a crash –as the accused alleged–, they would agree to admit the facts in the administrative sphere to activate their insurance policy and repair the vehicles of all other parties involved; conversely, what this judge has managed to infer from the trial and the review of the case file is that Mrs. **[Nombre 001]** accepted the facts and repaired the damaged vehicles with her policy because she indeed caused the accident that now concerns us." (Verbatim quote). The preceding excerpts from the judgment allow this Chamber to note that the judge comprehensively assessed the statements given by the victim [Nombre 004] and the witness [Nombre 009] during the adversarial stage, contrasting them with the documentary evidence; an examination that allowed him to reasonably derive that the dynamics of the accident occurred in the manner charged and, therefore, that the sentenced individual [Nombre 001], when the cars ahead of her stopped in a timely manner due to traffic congestion in the area, did not interrupt her course, but rather collided the vehicle she was driving with the rear of the vehicle of Mrs. [Nombre 006], which propelled the latter to collide with the victim's vehicle, and that one in turn with the vehicle of Mr. [Nombre 010]. Such a conclusion did not stem from the judge's subjectivity nor is it arbitrary, as the appellants have alleged, but was the consequence of the joint examination of the evidence. The aggrieved party was emphatic in pointing out that when he stopped due to traffic congestion, he observed that the vehicle following him also stopped, and it was after he heard a bang, a screech, and then received the impact. In this regard, [Nombre 004] asserted: "the vehicle that was ahead of me braked, I braked along with him, we were coming relatively slowly, but I am in the vehicle, driving, I stop, I look in the rearview mirror, I see that the vehicle behind, white, I think it was a Rav-4, an SUV I think, I see that the one behind stops, we were in traffic, almost stuck. I continue looking ahead but in seconds, when we are stopped, I hear a loud bang, like a screech, and I react by looking in the rearview mirror, but I see the vehicle behind on top of me, so I have the reaction to hold the brake and grip the steering wheel tightly. It was so fast that I didn't have time to tell my son, who was 14 years old and was in the front, to hold on or something, it was fast." (Excerpt taken verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary basis of the judgment). As the a quo correctly assessed, this version was consistent with the one provided by the witness [Nombre 009], who stated: "Well, we were in traffic, we were just before the Platina bridge, we stopped, I heard a bang and almost immediately I felt a hard impact. After the impact, we hit the car in front. Later I found out it was a four-car collision." (Excerpt taken verbatim from the descriptive evidentiary basis of the judgment). In turn, the judge contrasted the aforementioned statements with the documentary evidence, corroborating their congruence, since the description of the location of the vehicles and their damages, contained in the police report and the sketch prepared by the traffic officer, were consistent with the dynamics of the events that the aggrieved party maintained from the beginning of the process. It is worth reiterating that nothing prevents, in a case like this one, even without technical evidence (for example, an opinion from the Forensic Engineering Section to determine the speed of the vehicles) or with additional testimonies (such as that of Mrs. [Nombre 006]), from granting credibility to the victim's statement and, through it, holding the accused event as accredited. In this regard, the Criminal Cassation Chamber has maintained a uniform criterion that: "(...) the conviction of the a quo in validating or not testimonial, expert, or documentary evidence is the exclusive purview of their jurisdictional independence, the exercise of reason, and respect for the legitimacy of the evidentiary body, both in its obtaining and in its incorporation into the process. Therefore, the victim's statement is sufficient to support a conviction, and that credibility granted by the Court cannot be substituted in cassation, unless a violation in the logical process or an anomaly in the probity of the judges is demonstrated. Under the privilege of the principle of immediacy, the victim was believed." (Resolution 1098-2001 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). In this case, it has been possible to verify that the judge did not arbitrarily or unfoundedly rely on the credibility of the victim [Nombre 004], but rather supported it through assessments that are consistent with the principle of immediacy of evidence, as well as the system of free evaluation of evidence and a comprehensive analysis of the evidentiary body. In this sense, he considered the manner in which the victim gave his statement (in a fluid and compelling manner), the verisimilitude of his account (consistent with the description of the damages and final position of the vehicles, according to the police report and sketch), the consistency and incriminating persistence (given the congruence with the complaint and, it can be added, also with his accounts before the different medical instances) and, of special importance, the corroboration of his statement through the testimony of the witness [Nombre 009], who ratified a fundamental detail to credit the accusatory version and dismiss the defensive one, which was that first a bang was heard, and then the impact occurred to the vehicle in which they were traveling. Furthermore, none of the deponents related hearing another bang afterward; rather, once the impact was received, the aggrieved party proceeded to exit the vehicle, and from that moment on, they related the subsequent acts of interaction with the other people involved in the car accident and the procedures they carried out. Thus, it is evident that the assessment of the evidence made by the judge is consistent with the rules of logic, specifically of derivation, since that detail is not minor and is precisely what allows the version of the sentenced individual to be dismissed, in that she collided with [Nombre 006]'s vehicle after the latter had collided with the victim's. The judge carried out a concatenated analysis of the evidentiary body and, based on it, held the facts as accredited as they were charged and related by the victim [Nombre 004]. Conversely, it is clear that he dismissed the defense theory, but he did so in a well-founded manner, without incurring contradictions and according to a logical derivation of the information yielded by the evidence, as already referenced. Thus, having analyzed the judgment in a comprehensive manner, as the logical unit it is, the aforementioned assessments, which this Chamber endorses, allowed him to dismiss the version of the dynamics of the event that was related by the sentenced individual and to accept the accusatory theory. The appellants seem to intend that, by the mere existence of two conflicting versions, it is not possible to credit one of them, which is not admissible. In addition to the foregoing, the a quo expressly referred to the defense version and presented additional assessments –applying the rules of experience– regarding the distance at which the defendant's vehicle ended up in relation to the other three vehicles, which validly allowed him to conclude that the dynamics consistent with that final position were the one provided by the victim and not the accused.

In this line of reasoning, it stated: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Having said the above, this adjudicator must refer to the statement of Mrs. </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, since regarding the dynamics of the accident what she indicated was that the responsibility was shared among everyone, first because the cars were not keeping a prudent distance between them, second because she was driving slowly precisely due to the traffic congestion, third because [Name 004] was the one who braked suddenly and, fourth, because the one who first hit the victim was [Name 006] and she –</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">– hit Mrs. [Name 006]'s car at a subsequent moment; consequently, what Mrs. </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">stated was that she only felt responsible for having rear-ended the vehicle of [Name 006]. However, the statements of the accused woman bear no relation to the true dynamics of the accident, given that beyond whether someone braked suddenly or whether distances were not being maintained –which is a duty of every vehicle according to the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito)– what she indicated regarding the first collision being [Name 006] against [Name 004] because the latter braked suddenly and that it was afterward that she collided with [Name 006], bears no relation to the way the vehicles ended up as recorded in the traffic diagram, precisely because, as she herself stated at trial, the car she was driving was small. In fact, from the file what is extracted is that it was a 2006 Toyota Yaris weighing 1,305 kilograms, while [Name 004]'s car was a 2018 Toyota Prado weighing 2,990 kilograms and the one [Name 006] was driving was a 2003 Toyota Rav-4 weighing 1,355 kilograms. That is, it lacks any logic that there is a separation of 3.80 meters between the car driven by </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and the one driven by [Name 006] if –as the accused alleged– she was the one who hit afterward, after Mrs. [Name 006] had already done so. In other words, to understand and validate the dynamics narrated by the accused, one would have to suppose that the lightest car among those described, the Toyota Yaris, which supposedly was going slowly according to her statement, hit the Toyota Rav-4 when the latter had already collided with the Toyota Prado and propelled these two cars, together, those 3.80 meters forward to cause the separation recorded in the official sketch prepared by the traffic officer. That is, to try to give validity to the account of the accused </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, one would have to suppose that her Yaris, which was going slowly, meaning without much kinetic energy, had the capacity to transfer that energy to the other vehicles to achieve displacing by 3.80 meters the other two cars that had supposedly already collided; something that departs from the most basic postulates of logic and experience, since sound criticism (sana crítica) rather evokes that the initial collision was between </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and [Name 006] –with vehicles of similar weight– and based on that impact caused by the imprudence of the accused woman, the Rav-4 driven by Mrs. [Name 006] was projected into the Prado of [Name 004] and this, in turn, into the Hyundai of </span>[Name 010]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. This being the case, it must be established, although it was already indicated supra, that the efficient cause of the result was the conduct of the accused </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001]</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, who, at an imprudent speed given the context of traffic congestion, without applying the judgment of foresight that at the bottom of the ‘dip’ (subibaja) there might be a traffic jam and without keeping a distance from the vehicle preceding her, rear-ended it, which caused the latter to move into the car of the victim here and caused the latter also to move forward until hitting the vehicle preceding him; the distance existing between the vehicles of [Name 006], [Name 004] and [Name 010] being irrelevant from the point of view of foreseeability, avoidability, and determination of the result, as none of them was the one who breached the duty of care such that one could speak of other causal contributions to the event that triggered the entire multiple collision. Therefore, by way of summary, it must be emphasized that this dynamic of the accident exclusively confirms the causal link between the careless and imprudent conduct of the accused </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">[Name 001] </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">and the final result of material damages and physical injuries to [Name 004]. That is, through the verification of the strong blow caused by the vehicle driven by the accused –at excessive speed according to the congestion circumstances and without keeping the required distance– to the rear of the vehicle driven by [Name 006] and that the latter was propelled into the car of [Name 004], also causing the victim’s car to impact the one preceding it (occupied by </span>[Name 010]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">), the linkage between the conduct and the result (cause-effect) was corroborated, which is a basic requirement for the attribution of criminal liability.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. </span>(Exact quotation). The preceding excerpt from the judgment, although extensive, allows the verification not only of the breadth of the reasoning put forth by the adjudicator, who —as previously noted— fully complied with the duty to provide grounds (deber de fundamentación), but also that his assessments were always based on the rules of logic and experience, which, although he did not give them a specific name, as the appellants would have wished, he did describe in detail, allowing his arguments to be fully understood and the corresponding control of legality and reasonableness to be exercised. It is necessary to recall what the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) has indicated regarding the rules of experience, as quoted below: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The rule of experience emerges as a generalization constructed from a series of singular perceptions about facts or phenomena that, under certain assumptions, always or most of the time behave in a certain way. Given the coincidence of a series of facts in similar situations, it is concluded that a new fact in similar situations will happen in the same way.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span> (Resolution number 1408-2004 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, reiterated in resolution 1092-2023). In addition to this Chamber sharing the assessments made by the adjudicator regarding the credibility of the victim's account, which by themselves allow the defense thesis to be discarded, it is worth mentioning that there are two additional arguments contained in the preceding quotation that are also shared by this Chamber, as they are indeed consistent with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and in accordance with the law. The first of these consists in the fact that the defense thesis regarding the existence of contributory negligence (concurrencia de la culpa) must be rejected because the vehicle of [Name 006] did not keep the required distance from that of [Name 004]<span> and </span><span>the</span><span> latter, in turn, from the motor vehicle of [Name 010]. There is no doubt for this appellate court that the reasoning issued by the adjudicator is correct, as it was not the distance between those vehicles that caused the collision or the injuries to the victim, but rather it was the negligent conduct of the sentenced individual [Name 001], since she was the one who did not stop the automobile she was driving in time, collided with the vehicle of [Name 006] and, thereby, caused the displacement of the other cars and the subsequent collisions. Article 101 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), even cited by the appellant herself, stipulates: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">ARTICLE 101.- Maintain distance</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. The driver of a vehicle traveling on a public road must maintain a reasonable and prudent distance that guarantees timely stopping, in the event that the preceding vehicle brakes suddenly. To this end, the driver must consider their speed, the road conditions, the weather conditions, and those of their own vehicle.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span>. As is evident from the letter of the law, the duty to maintain a reasonable and prudent distance while driving automobiles has the purpose of guaranteeing timely stopping when the preceding vehicle brakes. In the case at hand, it was verified —through the evidentiary analysis already detailed— that [Name 004]<span> and [Name 006] fulfilled that duty, since the distance they kept from the vehicle preceding them allowed them to stop their automobile in a timely manner, when the latter did so, regardless of the distance they maintained between them once stopped. This being the case, there was no contributory negligence, as was sufficiently analyzed by the adjudicator. It is necessary to add that not just any infraction of traffic regulations has a cause-effect relationship with the harmful result and that criminal negligence is not configured by the simple omission of the duty of care, but rather it must have a direct relationship with the result produced. Thus, even assuming that [Name 006] and [Name 004]</span><span> had infringed the rules of motor vehicle driving, because they did not keep a required distance from the vehicle preceding them, once they stopped in a timely manner, the truth is that said infraction was not what caused the harmful result, so the defense thesis must be discarded. This conclusion is reached by performing an </span><span style="font-style: italic;">ex post</span> examination of the occurred event, through a hypothetical elimination (supresión hipotética) exercise.

Thus, if the action of the sentenced party is eliminated (if [Name 001] had stopped her vehicle in time and had not collided with [Name 006]), it is clear that the accident would not have occurred and the victim would not have suffered injuries, because the other vehicles had already stopped in time. From that perspective, there is no doubt for this appellate court, just as the lower court (*a quo*) reasonably held, that the legally relevant cause that brought about the traffic accident in question and that caused injuries to the victim was the culpable action of [Name 001] alone. The other point that deserves to be highlighted is that, as resolved by the lower court (*a quo*), the defense's version is not consistent with the evidence. That theory is based on the premise that the sentenced party [Name 001] was driving at low speed and collided with the vehicle of [Name 006] after the latter had already collided with the victim's vehicle. As can be inferred from the reasoning put forward by the judge, if the sentenced party had been driving "slowly" (to use her words), or at a speed appropriate for the traffic congestion existing in the area, when the collision occurred with the vehicle of [Name 006], which she never denied, the final position of the vehicles (which has also not been in dispute) would not have been at a distance of 3.80 meters between the vehicle of the sentenced party [Name 001] and the others. That is to say, if the collision between the vehicle of the sentenced party and that of [Name 006] had occurred under the circumstances alleged by [Name 001], i.e., driving at low speed and after the latter had already struck the vehicle of [Name 004], there would be no explanation for the aforementioned distance, because while traveling at a low speed, as the accused alleged, the vehicle of [Name 001], given its weight and size, could not have displaced the other vehicles, nor would there have been a "rebound effect" of that magnitude. In this way, the judge's reasoning was not only set out in the judgment but is also—unlike what the appellants allege—in accordance with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). With regard to the rules for grounding a judgment, the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) has stated: "The supervision of the application of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) consists of determining that the reasoning carried out by the lower court (*a quo*) when evaluating the evidentiary elements subjected to its scrutiny is consistent with the conclusions derived from it. CAFFERATA NORES points out: '... Rational sound criticism as a method for evaluating evidence imposes as the only limit on the free conviction of judges, respect for the rules that govern the connection of human thought: those of logic, those of psychology, and those of common experience...' (CAFFERATA NORES, José I. Temas de Derecho Procesal Penal. Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1988. p. 288). In other words, these rules allow for control of the logical path the judge has followed to form his opinion on what is true and what is false based on the evaluation of the evidence presented. It is clear from the contested judgment that the reasoning recorded by the lower court (*a quo*) meets the requirements of legality and objectivity for its validity, in a comprehensive analysis of the existing body of evidence." (Resolution number 542-2009 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber).

It is reiterated that the judge granted credibility to the victim and to the witness [Name 009], regarding the fact that there was no prior collision, which in itself already allowed the defense's theory to be dismissed, but the judge also interlaced the testimonial evidence with the documentary evidence (which allowed the final position of the vehicles, the distance between them, and the damage they suffered to be verified), concluding—through logical reasoning and applying the rules of experience—that the events happened in the manner they were charged and that the dynamic alleged by [Name 001] was untenable. It is necessary to emphasize that, to dismiss the defense's theory, the judge started from the accused's own statement, who affirmed in the hearing that she was driving "slowly," a claim that was not found credible at all, not only because the victim had stated otherwise, but because of the description of the damage to the vehicles and their final position. Now then, the considerable damage exhibited by the vehicle in which the sentenced party was traveling becomes one more element that cannot be ignored, simply because it is not extensively detailed in the traffic report, as appellant Monterrey Carmona intends. This is so, in application of the principle of freedom of evidence (principio de libertad probatoria), which has already been outlined. In this regard, it should be noted that the damage exhibited by vehicle with license plate [Value 003] (driven by the sentenced party) was mentioned in the official report, but it was also widely described by the victim during his deposition, without any inconsistency being detected with said documentary evidence. On this point, [Name 004] stated: "(...) and I look back and I see the white vehicle embedded in my vehicle and I see a lady, let's say at that moment I see she is pregnant, very close to her steering wheel, I ask her quickly if she feels okay, she is a little affected, I try to open the door and I look back and I see there is a space of about 3 meters, very short, and I see a vehicle that has a damaged front end, a very strong blow, evident damage, it has smoke in the engine, the hood raised, I think the vehicle is going to catch fire and I run towards the driver, I see it's a young woman, I move her to my vehicle, I open the door and I sit her there, I tell her to calm down because I feared for the vehicle, later I realized it was radiator and fluid issues (...) The vehicle has like a cover for a wheel on the back part, it has like a cover and there it is dented, also the bumper, the bottom part, looks very pushed in and the vehicle behind had significant damage, if you look at the collision you could see minor damage on the front one, on mine, the Rav-4 more or less, but the one behind had serious damage, the hood crumpled, vapor or smoke, liquids on the street and if I'm not mistaken the airbags of that vehicle were deployed, when I removed the person we managed to get her out of there, besides many people from other lanes came out to help." (Quote taken textually from the descriptive evidentiary grounds of the judgment). In turn, witness [Name 009] ratified the above, in the following manner: "Yes, I saw that the vehicle at the back, well, all three were damaged, but especially the vehicle furthest back, I remember it was black, a Hatchback, its front end was compressed, liquid was coming out and my dad told me to keep my distance." (Quote taken textually from the descriptive evidentiary grounds of the judgment). It is thus, through the combined analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence, that it can be verified that the damage was considerable, which constitutes another element supporting the judge's reasoning for rejecting the defense's theory regarding the sentenced party traveling at a low speed.

In addition to the above, as pointed out by the defense counsel in his appellate arguments, the judge assessed that the aggrieved party declared that the sentenced party told him she had pressed the accelerator instead of the brake, which is consistent with the magnitude of the damage caused. However, the opinion outlined by the appellants, that this means the lower court (*a quo*) gave value to mere musings or gossip, or that it contradictorily gave weight to statements made by her to the victim, but not to those she presented at trial, cannot be shared in any way. Spontaneous out-of-court statements by accused persons are a valid clue (indicio) that must be evaluated together with the rest of the body of evidence, just as the trial court correctly did and as has been uniformly accepted for a long time, including by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (see resolution 154-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber and resolutions 100-2002 and 282-2010 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber). In any case, it was not the only evidentiary basis analyzed in the contested judgment.

Another allegation contained in the judgment that was subject to reproach consisted of the judge including among his multiple arguments that [Name 001] had admitted full responsibility for the events in other instances and, therefore, all vehicles involved in the collision were repaired using the insurance policy of the vehicle driven by [Name 001]. The lower court (*a quo*) explained that [Name 001]'s assertion at trial that this was due to manipulation by the victim [Name 004] was not credible, since it is contrary to the rules of experience that a person who knows she only collided with one vehicle and that the latter had previously caused another collision would choose to assume full responsibility. The argument in question is valid and reasonable, but, moreover, as already indicated, it was only one additional element assessed by the trial court. Furthermore, this Chamber (Cámara), based on the comprehensive examination it must conduct of the judgment, the hearing, and the evidence on record, has also not noted any reason why [Name 004] would have had any intention to harm [Name 001], whom he met on the day of the events, to the point of manipulating her—without it being clear in what way—so that she would unjustly assume full responsibility for the material damages and, subsequently, for physical and moral damages, even though—according to the defense's theory—another person ([Name 006]), whom the aggrieved party also did not know, and therefore had no reason to benefit, had previously collided with him.

Finally, it is necessary to respond to the question raised by the defense counsel regarding the proven facts not being absolutely identical to those charged. It should be emphasized that the appellant did not allege a violation of the principle of correlation between charge and judgment (principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia) as such, nor of the right to defense, but merely mentioned that the trial court omitted factual circumstances that were detailed in the charge and were never proven, without specifying them, which—according to him—weakened the prosecution's theory. By virtue of the comprehensive examination this Chamber (Cámara) must conduct, the facts charged were compared with those proven, verifying that there is no divergence whatsoever with respect to the core of the accusation. It is worth remembering that the charge is not a rigid document and, although it constitutes the factual framework upon which the judge must decide, the aim of this is that surprising circumstances are not established in the judgment, to the detriment of the accused. Consequently, the fact that there is not absolute identity between the facts charged and what is proven at the hearing does not translate into any defect as long as the right to defense is not violated. In the case before us, having analyzed the judgment and even the arguments put forward during the adversarial proceedings by both the defense counsel and the accused herself, it is evident that no such violation existed, but rather that the defense's theory was simply not accepted by the lower court (*a quo*), for the reasons already analyzed.

In conclusion, the appealed ruling does not present defects in the evaluation of the evidence or a violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) that would be capable of invalidating it, nor is there a violation of the principle of correlation between charge and judgment (principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia). The errors alleged are based on a biased and incomplete reading of the evidence gathered at the hearing and the intellectual analyses of the judgment, thereby seeking to support the defense's theory that was upheld during the hearing, but which the comprehensive and interconnected analysis of the body of evidence, duly and extensively outlined by the judge, validly allowed to be dismissed. Therefore, it is appropriate to declare both grounds for appeal without merit.

**IV.-** The **second ground for appeal by the sentenced party [Name 001]**, for the following reasons, is declared **without merit**. As indicated in the previous recital (considerando), there were two defense theories upheld during the adversarial proceedings: one regarding the dynamic of the events (already analyzed) and another regarding the injuries suffered by the victim [Name 004]. It was alleged that the injuries were not the result of the collision on November nineteenth, two thousand eighteen, because that day the aggrieved party exited the vehicle by his own means and assisted the other persons involved, so the injuries were of an older date, resulting from recreational activities the victim engaged in. Now then, the reproach contained in the appeal ground under study consisted of the fact that the judge omitted to explain the cause-and-effect relationship between the collision and the aggrieved party [Name 004]'s injuries, and ignored the discussion about whether they were old injuries. According to the appellant, to determine the existence of the injuries and the causal link between them and the culpable action of the sentenced party [Name 001], the judge merely limited himself to evaluating the medical opinions 2019-551 and 2020-7387 and exclusively based on them found the injuries, the permanent disability that arose from them, and the indemnity amount to be proven. However, upon examining the contested judgment, it is possible to verify that what the appellant claims is not true.

The *a quo* conducted a broad analysis of the evidence and the arguments raised by all parties regarding the causal link between the events and the injuries suffered by the aggrieved party. It is important to clarify that the judgment is a logical unit, structured into various recitals (*considerandos*) and, in this case, the judge further subdivided them into subsections. Thus, when assessing the intellectual reasoning set forth in the judgment, one cannot disregard sections or segments, limiting oneself to just one of them as the appellant has intended. Indeed, in recital 8.2.2, titled "On Permanent Disability" ("Sobre la incapacidad permanente"), the judge did not include an analysis of the technical and material defense's arguments that the victim's injuries were pre-existing and not a result of the events, merely reiterating the aforementioned medical opinions and then immediately focusing on another disputed point regarding the actuarial-mathematical expert reports. However, this does not mean that the judge omitted to assess the defensive allegations or weigh the evidence regarding the cause-and-effect relationship between the collision caused by the convicted person's negligent act and the injuries suffered by [Nombre 004], described in the aforementioned opinions. The judge carried out said assessment in the third recital of the judgment, titled "Intellectual Evidentiary Reasoning" ("Fundamentación probatoria intelectiva"), in which—after explaining the dynamics of the events deemed proven and the reasons for this—he proceeded with the analysis of the causal link to the injuries suffered by [Nombre 004]. In this regard, he reasoned: "One final aspect that must be addressed is the effective determination of the victim's injuries; that is, the dynamics of the accident have been defined, and it now remains to analyze whether there is a nexus between the incident and the injuries presented by [Nombre 004], despite there being a time gap between the accident (November 19, 2018) and his appearance at the Traffic Court to be medically assessed (January 17, 2019). This must be answered affirmatively, since both from what he stated at trial and from his medical records, it can be inferred that he had no prior injuries in the anatomical areas in question (right shoulder and knee), and there are also forensic medical opinions that confirm this, namely opinions 2019-551 (of January 21, 2019) and 2020-7387 (of October 1, 2020), which confirmed the victim's physical problems in his shoulder and knee, their treatment and consequences, ultimately establishing a temporary disability of two months and a permanent disability of 10% of his general capacity. In relation to these forensic medical opinions, the Court must emphasize that at no point were they debated or countered at the appropriate procedural moments, for they were not appealed nor refuted with contrary evidence when they were made known to the defense, neither at the preliminary hearing nor at trial. Consequently, the only logical conclusion this undersigned judge can reach is that the injuries of Mr. [Nombre 004] can indeed be linked to the accident caused by the reckless action of Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**, who, it is worth noting now, stated that she considered that [Nombre 004] wanted to pin old injuries on her from the accident, injuries probably derived from the cycling or hiking practiced by the victim, which are sports par excellence that cause such injuries. However, this was an assertion that lacked any evidentiary basis and which defies logic because, in effect, as the victim rightly pointed out, had that been the case, he would have been waiting to have a traffic accident in order to treat his injuries, something alien to logic and experience. But just as that was not substantiated by the accused, there was also no proof whatsoever of Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**'s statement that the victim [Nombre 004] had influence 'everywhere' and could have exerted that influence illegitimately in medical, actuarial, and legal decisions. Therefore, the argument formulated by the accused must be deemed abstract, unjustified, and reckless, as nothing supports it other than her personal presumption. Still regarding the causal link between the incident and the injuries, this Court, based on the rules of logic and experience, understands that injuries are not necessarily going to manifest in the body of the person suffering them immediately after an accident, in this case [Nombre 004], since in the face of such events, it is possible and common for an adrenaline response to mask pain and symptoms after the fact. However, this judge also understands that in the face of a traffic accident, there are two types of injuries: those that appear immediately and those that can be classified as delayed or late-onset, whose symptoms may arise or intensify days, weeks, or even months after the accident. Thus, there is nothing strange, suspicious, or illicit in the fact that Mr. [Nombre 004] requested to be assessed by the Forensic Medical Service a couple of months after the accident, on the understanding that these were not injuries of spontaneous appearance but rather, according to the victim's own account, they were pains that gradually led him to require medical attention. It is for this reason that the victim's statement must be validated in that aspect and, consequently, recognize that he indeed suffered physical impacts to the right shoulder and right knee, which had to be addressed by various doctors. Thus, for this Court, both the accident and the injuries derived from it were proven in an adequate manner, and it is for this reason that criminal responsibility must be attributed to Mrs. **[Nombre 001]**." As is clear from the broad reasoning outlined by the judge, he did not limit himself to accepting as true what was established in the opinions without any justification. Nor did he ignore the defense's thesis; rather, he responded to each of the allegations. In turn, the *a quo* analyzed the expert evidence in conjunction with the statement given by [Nombre 004] (which, it must be noted, was also corroborated in this sense by his son) and applied the rules of experience to explain that the fact that the victim did not perceive pain or was not left immobilized immediately after the traffic accident does not constitute sufficient reason to deny that the injuries were a consequence of the events. This appellate court shares the criterion expressed in the judgment because, indeed, the rules of experience allow concluding that injuries are not necessarily perceived immediately, especially under circumstances such as those surrounding the events in question. It cannot be ignored that the victim was with his minor child at the time; therefore, it is logical that he would first worry about the child's physical integrity. It is also a common reaction to exit the vehicle and check the condition of the other people; in this case, the victim [Nombre 004] noticed that the driver of the vehicle that directly impacted him was a pregnant woman and that the vehicle driven by the sentenced [Nombre 001] was emitting smoke. Therefore, [Nombre 004] reasonably provided assistance under those circumstances, from which it cannot be inferred that he did not suffer any blow, much less that the injuries confirmed through the medical opinions were pre-existing. In turn, the arguments maintained during the adversarial proceedings, mainly by the material defense, to establish that the injuries were pre-existing and that the information contained in the documentary and expert evidence was the product of manipulation or influence on the part of the victim, were reasonably rejected by the *a quo*, as they were indeed presumptions with no support whatsoever. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the judge was thorough in explaining the reasons why he granted credibility to the statement of [Nombre 004], and no defect has been detected in the judge's reasoning or in the assessment of the evidence, on which this Court has already pronounced in the previous recital. Regarding the argument that [Nombre 006] had no injuries, so it is not reasonable that [Nombre 004] did suffer them, it is not possible to admit this, as it is contrary to the rules of sound criticism. Experience and common sense allow asserting that the injuries a person suffers after a traffic accident depend on numerous factors, such as the position and tension of the body at the moment of impact, as well as the person's age, among others. It must be added that the condition of the victim's vehicle, which suffered impact to the rear and front, makes it reasonable that the aggrieved party indeed suffered the blows he claimed, which were also confirmed by the aforementioned expert evidence. Thus, the comprehensive analysis of the entire body of evidence only confirms the position adopted by the judge. Consequently, contrary to what was alleged in the appeal, the contested judgment contains an extensive assessment of the causal link that gave rise not only to criminal liability but also to civil liability, evidencing that the claim is merely a disagreement stemming from the fact that the judge did not accept the defense's thesis, and not from the alleged defect in the reasoning. Furthermore, specifically regarding the monetary amount awarded as indemnification for permanent disability, the appellant questioned the reasoning employed by the judge in using the actuarial-mathematical expert report issued by Jesú Josué Pacheco Brizuela as a parameter for this, awarding the sum of ninety-six million, eight hundred seventy-three thousand, nine hundred twenty-five colones and sixty-two cents (₡96,873,925.62), exactly as claimed by the civil plaintiff. She questioned that the expert report prepared by Edwin Castro Jiménez was not used, which established a lower monetary amount, as he performed the mathematical calculations using the net salary and not the gross salary of [Nombre 004] as a basis. For a better understanding and to resolve the allegation, it is pertinent to specify that in the contested judgment, the civil action for damages filed against [Nombre 001] was partially upheld. The civil plaintiff claimed indemnification for temporary disability, permanent disability, and moral damages (daño moral). However, the judge refused to order compensation for temporary disability, and regarding moral damages, he imposed an indemnification amount considerably lower than that claimed. These aspects of the jurisdictional decision were not challenged by the civil plaintiff or any other party, so they remain unaltered. Regarding permanent disability, during the trial, the technical defense and the sentenced person herself, in the exercise of her material defense, alleged that the amount claimed was excessive, and specifically, the technical defense of the civil co-defendant, Amércia Ciento Siete S.A., was emphatic in questioning the use of the gross salary rather than the net salary as the basis for the mathematical calculations. In this sense, the representation of the aforementioned civil co-defendant offered as evidence for better resolution an expert report prepared by Edwin Castro Jiménez, which was admitted and weighed by the judge, from which it was deduced that the sum to be compensated for permanent disability was fifty-five million, nine hundred nine thousand, one hundred ninety-two colones and sixty-eight cents (₡55,909,192.68). The only difference between the two expert reports derived from the fact that the expert Castro Jiménez performed the mathematical calculations taking into account the net salary of the victim [Nombre 004], while the expert report by Pacheco Brizuela, offered by the civil plaintiff, took into account the gross salary. The claim now made by the appellant, although not raised at the time by the technical or material defense of [Nombre 001], is in fact an issue addressed by the judge in the contested judgment, by virtue of the fact that—as indicated—it formed part of the concluding arguments of the representation of the civil co-defendant.

In this line of reasoning, the lower court (a quo) stated: "Well, the fundamental inference that must be drawn is that both expert reports established that, given the victim's permanent disability, compensation was warranted, although they differed on the amounts. Therefore, it falls to the undersigned to note that, from the standpoint of Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito, the calculation of amounts for permanent disability must take into account the wages reported to the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social, and in the undersigned judge's opinion, the reported wages are precisely the gross wages. Thus, faced with the different sums presented by the parties, one must opt for the one derived from the expert report prepared by Pacheco Brizuela. It is not overlooked that, during the trial, the exact amount of [Nombre 004]'s salary was questioned by the third-party civil defendant, but this is an argument that cannot succeed because that same party requested the expert report from Castro Jiménez based on the same salary that Pacheco Brizuela had previously considered, making it a circular argument. Now, reference is made at this point to the third-party civil defendant's various arguments because, in their own way, they affected the interests of Mrs. [Nombre 001], especially since it was evidence common to the parties; however, it is worth noting here that the technical defense of Mrs. [Nombre 001] did not provide any technical argument nor make any submission regarding these expert reports beyond abstractly questioning the proportionality of the amounts set by Pacheco Brizuela. Therefore, given this lack of action by the defense of the accused and civil defendant, the Court must rely on the evidence in the record and declare that [Nombre 001] must compensate [Nombre 004] for the permanent disability resulting from the accident, which is set at the sum of ¢96,873,925.62." This Chamber shares the reasoning put forth by the judge and considers that the decision was made according to law, by using the expert report prepared by Pacheco Brizuela, since the mathematical calculations contained in said report were those that conformed to the provisions of the rule cited by the judge, namely Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito. In addition, the decision is consistent with the regulations contained in the Código de Trabajo, specifically Title IV and especially the provisions of Article 235 and the interpretation that the courts have been applying in this matter. In this sense, one can mention resolutions 821-2004, 325-2009, and 707-2014 of the Sala Segunda, as well as resolution 145-2024 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección de Ejecución, in which—when the calculations made for compensation for both temporary and permanent disability were challenged—the gross reported salary is used precisely as the parameter. The appellant's argument is based on an alleged unjust enrichment, by using the gross salary which includes amounts that—according to her—will never reach the victim, as they are intended to cover social security and tax liabilities. This was the same argument maintained by the representation of the civil co-defendant. However, as the lower court (a quo) correctly pointed out, Article 74 of the Ley de Tránsito is clear that the salary reported to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social must be used, which is the gross salary. In addition to this, it is necessary to clarify that compensation for permanent disability does not consist of granting lost wages, but rather seeks to compensate for the damages and after-effects that the civil plaintiff has had to endure as a consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct. Thus, there is no unjust enrichment, because it is not about granting a salary from which deductions must be made. The amount granted, although high, is reasonable and proportional, considering those damages and after-effects that were accredited through the joint assessment of the statements of the victim [Nombre 004], corroborated by the witness [Nombre 009], as well as the medical opinions that verified and detailed the injuries for which a 10% loss of general capacity was established, a loss that will limit him not only in his paid work but in all his usual occupations. Furthermore, the judge granted that monetary sum not arbitrarily or capriciously, but based on an objective expert opinion, the only challenge to which was that it used the gross salary as a basis, but not the other considerations and mathematical calculations recorded therein. Thus, the judge clearly explained the reasons why the expert report he considered suitable and lawful was that of expert Pacheco Brizuela and not that of Castro Jiménez, in accordance with the letter of the law. The lower court's (a quo) reasoning regarding this specific point was concise but sufficient and was justified by the evidentiary elements that it weighed objectively and according to the applicable regulations, so the claimed grievance does not exist.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that, without further detail, it was argued that the judgment did not find any fact proven to support the civil conviction. This reproach is dismissed. In the eighth considerando of the judgment, section 8.1. called "Civil proven facts," it was expressly recorded: "The civil facts that were deemed accredited were the following: 1. On November 19, 2018, at approximately 9:20 a.m., the victim and civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] was driving vehicle license plate [Valor 005] accompanied by his minor son [Nombre 009], who was in the front passenger seat, in Heredia, Ulloa, Route 1, heading from Alajuela toward San José, 300 meters before the Alfredo González Flores bridge, in the left lane, lawfully. 2. On that same day, time, and place, the civil defendant [Nombre 001] was driving vehicle license plate [Valor 003], registered property of América Ciento Siete Sociedad Anónima, in the same direction as the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004]. 3. The vehicle traveling ahead of the victim's vehicle, license plate [Valor 006], driven by [Nombre 010], stopped due to a traffic jam, so the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] also stopped, maintaining his distance. Additionally, behind the plaintiff came vehicle license plate [Valor 004] driven by [Nombre 006], who also stopped maintaining distance, and behind [Nombre 006] drove the defendant [Nombre 001], who breached her duty of care in driving because she did not stop nor maintain the distance required by our regulations, thus she violently struck the vehicle driven by [Nombre 006], and due to the force exerted on Mrs. [Nombre 006]'s vehicle, it was propelled against the vehicle of the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004], thus striking the rear of the vehicle and, in turn, the vehicle driven by the victim was thrust against the vehicle driven by [Nombre 010] that was in front of him, which is why the victim [Nombre 004] struck the dashboard and the interior of his vehicle, hit his right knee, the seatbelt caused an injury from the whiplash effect in his neck, right shoulder and arm, injuries that required medical attention. 4. As a consequence of the above, the victim and civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] suffered injuries and, according to medico-legal opinions number 2019-551, dated January 21, 2019, and number 2020-7387, dated October 1, 2020, suffered a chondral injury in his right knee, having a rupture of the rotator cuff tendon which was treated conservatively, requiring a shaver, and his right shoulder received infiltrations. He currently suffers pain in his shoulder, arm, and forearm, making it difficult to lift weight, and in his right knee, which is exacerbated when climbing stairs and squatting, injuries that caused physical harm to the plaintiff requiring a temporary disability of two months (2 months) from the date of the events, and a permanent disability of ten percent (10%) due to loss of general organic capacity. 5. That in addition to the physical harm, [Nombre 004] also suffered moral harm as a result of these events, which refers to the effective injury to his feelings, as well as the anguish and anxiety derived from the physical ailments described above, the discomfort caused by the different injuries to his body, which manifest in episodes of anger and pain, coupled with the long medical process he has had to undergo." (Verbatim quote). In this way, the judge specified the civil facts he deemed proven in an independent section for those purposes, in addition to all the factual and evidentiary analysis he set out throughout the judgment, which makes it possible to verify which facts he deemed proven and what reasons led him to do so. Thus, for all the foregoing, the second ground of the appeal filed by [Nombre 001] must be rejected in its entirety.

V.- In the third ground of appeal, the appellant [Nombre 001] challenged the imposition of the ancillary penalty of disqualification and argued that the judge imposed it automatically and indiscriminately, without assessing that driving motor vehicles in her case was not a habitual activity that generated economic profit. The claim must be declared without merit. For clarity, it is detailed that, in the case at hand, the judge imposed, as the principal penalty, sixty days' fine, at a rate of five thousand colones (¢5,000.00) per day, for a total of three hundred thousand colones (¢300,000.00) and, as an ancillary penalty, disqualification from driving motor vehicles on public land routes for a period of six months. Now, the reasoning for the principal penalty has not been challenged; rather, the appellant's claim lay solely in the application of the disqualification penalty. This decision, in this Chamber's opinion, is fully in accordance with the law, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 50, 71, and 128 of the Código Penal. Article 50 of that normative body regulates the different types of penalties contemplated by our legislation. Expressly, that provision stipulates: "Article 50- Penalties. The penalties that this Code establishes are: 1) Principal: imprisonment, banishment, fine, and disqualification. 2) Ancillary: special disqualification. 3) Community service. 4) House arrest with electronic monitoring." 5) Drug treatment under restorative judicial supervision." In accordance with the principle of legality, each criminal offense must specify the type or types of penalty to be applied, also setting the minimum and maximum limits. Within those margins, the judge must determine the *quantum*, resorting to the parameters set forth in Article 71 of the Criminal Code and to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. Thus, in the specific case, it is appropriate to analyze the provisions of Article 128 of the Criminal Code, which penalizes the conduct attributed to the sentenced individual [Name 001]. The article in question, as relevant, stipulates: "Article 128.- Culpable injuries. Imprisonment of up to one year, or up to one hundred days' fine, shall be imposed on whoever through fault causes to another injuries as defined in Articles 123, 124 and 125. To determine the appropriate penalty for the responsible party, the tribunal must take into account the degree of fault, the number of victims and the magnitude of the damages caused. In any case, the perpetrator of the culpable injuries shall also be subject to disqualification from six months to two years for the exercise of the profession, trade, art or the activity in which the event occurred…". (The highlighting and underlining do not belong to the original). As is easily appreciable, the norm - as assessed by the *a quo* - establishes the obligation, not the power, to impose an accessory penalty of disqualification not only for someone who exercises a profession, trade, or art, as the appellant seems to interpret it, but also for the activity in which the event occurred, without -with respect to this latter scenario- requiring habitualness or remuneration. In other words, the cited article simply and plainly establishes that "in any case," the perpetrator of the injuries shall be imposed a disqualification for the activity in which the event occurred, without conditioning such sanction on the person engaging in that activity professionally or habitually, it not being appropriate to distinguish where the norm does not do so. It was established as proven that the sentenced individual [Name 001], while carrying out the activity of driving a motor vehicle, caused injuries to the injured party [Name 004]. It follows from this that the judge inevitably had to impose not only the principal penalty, but also the accessory penalty, in accordance with the letter of the law. To support her argument, the appellant cited pronouncements from the Criminal Cassation Chamber that are of old date, whose legal criterion is not only not shared by this Chamber of Appeals, but has even been reversed by the same Criminal Cassation Chamber. As affirmed by the *a quo* in the appealed judgment and this Chamber endorses, the criterion that is currently upheld as a uniform jurisprudential line is that, in culpable actions committed in traffic matters, the accessory penalty of disqualification from driving vehicles must be imposed in all cases, since the injuries are precisely generated as a result of that activity. It is reiterated that it is not necessary for the perpetrator of the culpable act to obtain a profit from that activity or to exercise it habitually, but only that it was executed and gave rise to the criminal act, as it was established as accredited in the case under review. As is inferred from the commented norm and the dominant and unifying criterion of the Criminal Cassation Chamber, contained in resolution 209-2014 of said jurisdictional body, the legislator alluded to the generic concept "activity" in which the event occurred, from which it is deduced that the disqualification must be mandatorily imposed when the culpable injuries are generated in any regulated human activity, as is the case of driving motor vehicles on public roads, for which compliance with certain requirements established by the Traffic Law is required and whose license is granted and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. Consequently, the judge has not committed any error in the application of substantive law, the imposition of the accessory penalty of disqualification being in accordance with the provisions of Article 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Now then, the aforementioned accessory penalty - by legal imperative - must be imposed within the limits established by the legislator, which are from six months to two years. The judge opted to impose the minimum term of disqualification, so - although there was no extensive reasoning on the reasons for choosing that term - the truth is that the decision did not cause any harm to the accused, since the accessory penalty is mandatory and the minimum term contemplated by the legislator was imposed. Consequently, it is appropriate to dismiss this ground of appeal.

**VI.-** Due to their affinity, the **first two grounds of the appeal filed by the representative of the Civil Defense Office of the Victim, as well as the fourth and fifth grounds of said appeal**, are jointly resolved, declaring them **without merit**. As extracted from what was noted above, in the case at hand, the judge declared [Name 001] the responsible perpetrator of an offense of Culpable Injuries to the detriment of [Name 004], imposed the penalties (principal and accessory) adduced, and, likewise, declared with merit the civil action for damages filed against her. Regarding the civil action against the defendant [Name 001], he ordered compensation in favor of [Name 004] for permanent disability and for moral damage, but not for temporary disability, points on which there was no appeal by the representation of the civil plaintiff. The latter limited itself to questioning that the judge declared without merit the civil action for damages filed against América Ciento Siete S.A., which appeared as a civil co-defendant. In this regard, the judge supported his decision on the following arguments: "The joint and several civil liability of the owner of a vehicle that participates in an accident where the person who was driving the automobile is known is not automatic, but is limited to the grounds included in Article 199 of the Law on Transit on Public Roads and Road Safety, (...) Always in relation to the aforementioned, it must be emphasized that for the joint and several liability of the legal entity to be configured, it is required, on one hand, that the vehicle be in the power of a person by any possessory title, but, in addition, that this person be dedicated to the exploitation of the motor vehicle for a commercial or industrial purpose, that is, that their conduct is generating economic profit or utility, because what generates the objective civil liability is the profit obtained through the exploitation of a hazardous activity, such as the use of vehicles for commerce or industry. Consequently, to simply allege that there is automatic joint and several liability due to the fact that the automobile with license plate [Value 003] was registrationally in the name of América Ciento Siete S.A., constitutes a mistake on the part of the Civil Defense Office of the Victim. By way of a corollary to this argument, while it follows from the conjunction of Articles 197 and 199 of the Traffic Law that the owner of the vehicle could have joint and several civil liability with the driver, this is contingent upon the demonstration of one of the hypotheses provided therein, and in the case *sub iudice*, it was not proven that the defendant company exploited the automobile by any title for commercial or industrial purposes, nor that Mrs. [Name 001] was an employee of such company or was making money with that car at the time of the accident. On the contrary, the injured party himself, [Name 004], during his statement was clear in establishing that when he spoke with the defendant [Name 001] immediately after the crash, she told him that she had had a family situation and that she was heading to San José to do something at an institution regarding that matter, which excludes the commercial or industrial purpose that is normatively required. But not only that, the defendant herself [Name 001] said that that vehicle 'was hers' and that she used it as her only means of transport and to take her minor daughter to medical therapies. So, from both sides, it is derived that the automobile did not fulfill an industrial or commercial objective for América Ciento Siete S.A. Note also that the situation does not change if the case at bar is examined from the perspective of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, which, as pertinent, indicates that if a person dies or is injured by a motive machine, railway vehicle, tramway, or other analogous mode of transport, the company or person exploiting the activity is obligated to repair the resulting damages. As has been explained, it was neither alleged in the civil action for damages nor accredited during the trial that América Ciento Siete S.A., the registered owner of the automobile, or its driver on November 19, 2018, [Name 001], were exploiting it to fulfill a particular pecuniary activity, that is, that they were profiting from it at the time of the accident." The appellant's position, set forth through four grounds of her appeal and which was detailed in the second recital of this resolution, can be reduced to the following three reproaches: *(1) Non-application of substantive law, both Article 199 of the Traffic Law and Article 1048 of the Civil Code (first and second grounds of appeal).* The criterion held by the representation of the civil plaintiff is that both norms fit the specific case and were erroneously disapplied by the judge, by virtue of the fact that he considered it necessary to demonstrate circumstances that said norms do not contemplate, such as the purpose of profit or pecuniary exploitation. According to the appellant, the civil liability of the co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A., arises from the fact that the automobile driven by the accused [Name 001] at the time of the events was registered in the name of said corporation, which leads to the inference that the vehicle (like all its assets) is exploited for commercial or industrial purposes. This is due to the commercial nature of the corporation and its corporate purpose, which was described upon its incorporation and appears in the certification of legal capacity that was offered and admitted as evidence. According to the position advanced by the representation of the civil plaintiff, described in the first two grounds of his appeal, this is sufficient to consider the assumptions contained in both aforementioned norms as fulfilled; therefore, the judge should have declared with merit the civil action for damages filed against América Ciento Siete S.A., making it jointly and severally liable with the entirety of its assets for the damages and losses suffered by [Name 004]. Having analyzed the appellant's arguments, as well as the judge's reasonings cited above and the norms whose application the civil plaintiff intends, this Chamber of Appeals concludes that what was decided, with respect to the liability derived from Article 199 of the Traffic Law, as well as that arising from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, is in accordance with law.

In this regard, subsection b) of Article 199 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) provides: "ARTICLE 199.- Joint and several liability. The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: (…) b) The natural or legal persons that, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport. (…)". (The highlighting does not belong to the original). The judge precisely considered that the cited premise was not met, since the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate that the vehicle that caused the collision was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, which—in his opinion—could not be presumed simply because it involved a corporation (sociedad anónima), but rather had to be proven by the civil plaintiff. In turn, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, in the pertinent part, stipulates: "ARTICLE 1048.- (…) And if a person dies or is injured by a powered machine, or a railroad car, tram, or other similar mode of transport, the exploiting company or person is obligated to repair the damage resulting therefrom, if it does not prove that the accident was caused by force majeure or by the fault of the deceased or injured person themselves.". (The highlighting does not belong to the original). Regarding the liability contained in said norm, the judge estimated that it contemplated the same requirement, concerning the exploitation of the vehicle, which—as he had already argued—was not accredited. The civil plaintiff's representation, not only in the appeal under review, but also in the writ of the civil action for damages, as well as through its arguments in the adversarial proceedings, has maintained that it is sufficient for the entity to be a corporation (sociedad anónima), along with the certification of legal capacity (certificación de personería jurídica) and the corporate purpose described therein, to deem the provisions of both norms as accredited. However, its position is based on a presumption, which cannot be admitted by this Chamber, just as it was not admitted by the court of first instance (a quo). It is true that América Ciento Siete S.A. is a corporation (sociedad anónima); there was no controversy regarding this, and it is a well-known fact that requires no proof; the appellant is correct in this regard. It is also true that the provisions of Articles 5 and 17 of the Commercial Code establish that corporations (sociedades anónimas) are commercial entities. However, it cannot be presumed, for the purposes of the joint and several liability contained in the cited norms, that all assets registered in its name (in this case, a vehicle) are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, because the same regulations of the Commercial Code, as well as the prevailing doctrine, recognize the possibility that not all acts performed by these entities are commercial acts per se, just as there are commercial acts performed by persons other than those listed in the mentioned Article 17. In this sense, see "Temas de Derecho Comercial" by the jurist Gastón Certad Maroto, as well as "Curso de Derecho Mercantil" by Boris Kozolchyk and Octavio Torrealba. Thus, the commercial nature of all corporations (sociedades anónimas) (and of the other entities contained in Article 17 in question) results in them being subject to a special legal regime, namely the one contained in the Commercial Code (and not in the Civil Code), but this does not allow one to deduce, as the appellant intends, that América Ciento Siete S.A. exploited the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003] for commercial or industrial purposes, which had to be proven by the party, as it forms an integral part of the norms whose application it sought and from which it considered its right derived. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite Resolution Number 866-2002 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), in which the term "exploit" was defined as follows: "Suffice it to point out, that Article 187 of the Traffic Law provides for the joint and several liability of legal persons that, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial purposes. The term 'exploit' (exploten), as a verb form, is the third-person plural conjugation of the verb 'exploit' (explotar) which – among its various meanings – means: '... 2.- To derive utility from a business or industry for one's own benefit...' (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy of Language, nineteenth edition, p. 598, 1970 Madrid)". (Verbatim citation). Although reference is made to Article 187 of the Traffic Law, it is the same provision now contained in Article 199 of that law, so what is indicated is fully applicable and is consistent with the arguments of the judge set forth in the contested ruling. Precisely, the court of first instance (a quo) based its decision on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not prove the premise contained in Article 199 of the Traffic Law, because it did not prove that the vehicle was exploited for commercial or industrial purposes, merely maintaining that, as it involved a corporation (sociedad anónima), said purpose was implicit. Thus, it is not true that the lower court (a quo) made an extensive or arbitrary interpretation, added requirements or premises not contained in the norm, because the main reason the judge did not apply Article 199 of the Traffic Law (nor Article 1048 of the Civil Code) was that it was not proven that the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003] was exploited by América Ciento Siete S.A.. This is independent of whether it involves a monetary utility or could be understood to be of another type; ultimately, what matters is that this circumstance cannot be deemed proven by the mere fact that the civil co-defendant is a corporation (sociedad anónima), as the civil plaintiff sought and continues to seek. This criterion has also been upheld by the civil courts of our country, in recent resolutions, including Resolution Number 243-2020 of the Second Civil Appeals Tribunal of San José (Tribunal Segundo de Apelación Civil de San José), which—in the pertinent part—states: "(…) Various Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice have analyzed that issue and the verb 'exploit' (explotar), contained in the subsection under discussion (Vote #963-A-2006 of 2:10 p.m. on 12/11/2006 of the First Chamber and #866 of 10:30 a.m. on 08/30/2002 of the Third Chamber). He who obtains commercial profit through the thing that was used to cause harm, for reasons of equity and the creation of a risk, must jointly face, with his less solvent dependents, the consequences of the activity they promote. It does not concern itself with personal authority, as pondered by the lower authority, since it is not required by the indicated subsection b), which addresses other legal evaluations. The underlying idea is that, in the situations enumerated in Article 199 of the Traffic Law, the victim expands the possibilities of seeing their interest satisfied, through someone of greater solvency. Particularly, the owner of the vehicle must face that duty to answer for what remains unsatisfied, with all its assets and not just with the value of the truck.". (The citation is verbatim and the highlighting does not belong to the original). Note that it is the same interpretation made by the court of first instance (a quo) regarding the term "exploit" (explotar), a requirement contained in both norms, which cannot be circumvented, as the appellant tacitly intends by maintaining that the commercial nature of the corporation (sociedad anónima) is sufficient to deem joint and several civil liability as proven. As already noted, the commercial nature of the entities contemplated in Article 17 of the Commercial Code is relevant for determining which legal regime they are subject to, but it does not constitute an irrebuttable presumption (iuris et de iure) that allows one to affirm that all their assets are exploited for commercial or industrial purposes. In the same vein, it is also appropriate to mention Resolution Number 117-2019 of Section IV of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Sección IV del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), in which joint and several liability was established under the premise of interest, for which not only the corporate purpose of the legal entity sued, as the appellant intends, was assessed, but also multiple documentary and testimonial evidence, such as an official communication from the Tax Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Finance, photographs of the vehicle, and the declaration of the driver himself, all of which allowed accrediting that: "the company did indeed use the vehicle involved in the accident for commercial heavy-load transport activities, and therefore it would in principle be subject to the legal framework of joint and several liability in traffic matters". In this sense, it was stated in said resolution: "(…) we are faced with an equitable legal rule that seeks to guarantee fair compensation for injuries caused as a result of the introduction of a risk into society—the motor vehicle—whose objective has been to obtain a commercial or industrial benefit from its use, which in turn corresponds with the fundamental principle of civil liability for created risk, that by which he who benefits from the generation of a risk must assume the consequences derived from it: 'ubi est emolumentum, ibi debet esse onus' ('where the benefit is, there the burden should be').". (The highlighting does not belong to the original). Congruent with the foregoing, and for greater clarity, Section I of the Second Civil Tribunal (Sección I del Tribunal Segundo Civil), through Resolution Number 351-2003, considered: "On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing that, according to subsection "b)" of Article 187 of the same Law, 'They shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ...b) The natural or legal persons that, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport. ...' among others, which must be understood as meaning that persons who use vehicles for their business activities shall be jointly and severally liable towards third parties only when dealing with liability derived from an accident attributable to the driver due to fault or fraud.". (The underlining does not belong to the original). Again, it is worth remembering that the civil plaintiff, just as the trial judge correctly indicated, did not prove that the vehicle involved in the collision that caused the injuries to the civil plaintiff [Nombre 004] was used by América Ciento Siete S.A. for business activities, commercial or industrial acts; so the decision is adjusted to the content of the norm in question. Now, just as the court of first instance (a quo) correctly assessed, for the application of Article 1048 of the Civil Code, the legislator also included the requirement of exploitation, as emerges from the reading of the already cited norm. It is the criterion of this appellate court that both norms provide for that requirement, because the difference between them lies in other elements. Specifically, the liability established in Article 199 of the Traffic Law requires proof of the driver's fault, whereas the liability contained in Article 1048 of the Civil Code does not. Furthermore, the liability derived from Article 199 of the special law includes not only that which arises from injury or death, but also material damages, while the liability derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code does not contemplate the latter. Thus, the reasoning employed by the judge to reject the application of both norms is correct, as it stems from the fact that the necessary exploitation of the vehicle with license plates [Valor 003] by América Ciento Siete S.A. was not proven, which was the responsibility of the civil plaintiff, a matter that will be elaborated upon further below. Now, to support its position, the appellant repeatedly mentioned and quoted excerpts from Resolution 1867-2013 of the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), so this Chamber proceeds to cite it more extensively, so that the issue under discussion is understood, as well as the entirety of the arguments put forth therein.

In this regard, that ruling states: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The jurisprudence of this Chamber, regarding strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), has indicated the following: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“…</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The fifth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code provides: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">And if a person dies or is injured by a motor machine, or a railway, tramway, or other similar mode of transport vehicle, the operating company or person is obligated to repair the resulting damage, unless it proves that the accident was caused by force majeure or by the fault of the deceased or injured person.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> The basis for this form of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) is, as stated, the existence of </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">licit</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;"> activities</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> (there is no room here, then, to refer to unlawfulness), characteristic of man's technological development, which should not be obstructed, but which, in turn, generate a risk—as potential damage-producing entities—which must not be assumed by the victim or their successors and relatives, but by the one who benefits from the risky activity or the possession of a dangerous object. It therefore arises not from a breach of a specific obligation, but from the violation of the general rule not to harm others (in this latter sense, see judgment 354 of the First Chamber, cited). One of the most important practical conclusions in these cases consists of the reversal of the burden of proof, as already noted, such that it will be the person designated by law as liable who must demonstrate that the damage occurred through force majeure or through the fault of the victim themselves (see: judgments No. 61, of 2:50 p.m., of June 19, 1996, of the First Chamber of the Court; 1396, of 9:30 a.m. of May 7, 1975, of the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court; 481 of 10:05 a.m. of July 20, 1992, of the Second Civil Superior Court, Second Section);</span><span style=\"font-style: italic;\"> </span><span style=\"font-style: italic;\"> the culpability of the agent shall not be discussed here, since, in this latter case, the matter would be reduced to a case of subjective liability (civil or criminal wrongful act), applying the provisions of Article 1045 already transcribed. It follows from this that, in its strict form, the duty to compensate does not arise from a civil (or criminal) wrongful act—or, in general, from something unlawful—but from the exercise of an activity or the possession of a risk-generating object, which constitute completely licit acts; the liability: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">... consists of attributing the damage to anyone who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it... it dispenses with the subjectivity of the agent, and focuses the problem of repair and its limits on material causation, investigating only which act was, materially, the cause of the effect, in order to attribute it to them without further ado. The production of the harmful result is sufficient; it does not require the configuration of a wrongful act through the traditional elements...</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> (ALTERINI, Atilio,</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Responsabilidad</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">civil</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">,</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">3rd.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">ed.,</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Abeledo</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). Moreover, the legislator has set certain limits on this type of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), the first of which is determined by the nature of the damage, which must consist of injuries or death, thus excluding damage to property…</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">(Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Resolution No. 1262-97, of 11:30 a.m., of November 14, 1997). This position of the Chamber has not varied. Article 1048 of the Civil Code clearly determines that the owner of the motor vehicle is liable for the damages, even if the activity in which the damage was caused is licit. When it comes to vehicles owned by corporations (sociedades anónimas), as these entities are for-profit, this provision determines that there is strict civil liability, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">given the purpose of exploitation (explotación) of the motor vehicle</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, in light of the risk inherent in the activity. Therefore, we are not facing a case of liability for fraud or fault, but rather criteria of risk distribution. Thus, it is true, the accused [Name 300].</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">was acquitted, given the impossibility of proving that they were driving the motor vehicle. This, however, does not exempt from strict civil liability because, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">whoever exploits (explota) the motor vehicle</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, as already stated, bears the risk involved in that activity and must answer for the damage caused, that is, in this case, the death of the victim. It must be clarified that the Traffic Law cited by the appellant does not apply to this case, because we are not dealing with a situation where indirect subjective civil liability for the victim’s death is discussed, but rather a case where the strict civil liability contemplated by the aforementioned civil regulations operates.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">. </span>(Verbatim quote. The highlighting does not belong to the original). Thus, it is highlighted that in said ruling, what was discussed was the possibility of declaring the civil liability of the company owning the motor vehicle, despite the fact that the criminal liability of the driver was not proven. As is easily appreciable, that topic is not of interest regarding the specific point discussed here, because in this case, the criminal and subjective civil liability of [Name 001] was proven, as the driver of the vehicle that caused the collision and, therefore, the damages suffered by [Name 004]. In addition to the above, note that—although the issue was not delved into, because it was not the subject of the challenge—the truth is that it was established that, in order to be in the situation contained in said norm, there must be exploitation (explotación) of the motor vehicle. This was, precisely, what in the case before us was not proven, since in the opinion of the lower court (a quo) and of this Chamber, it is not enough to argue that, because it involves a corporation (sociedad anónima), such exploitation necessarily existed, which constitutes a mere presumption. This position has been upheld by the Criminal Cassation Chamber itself, in rulings subsequent to the one cited by the appellant, among them number 244-2018, in which it expressly argued: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Although </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">the claimant has been pointing out that the joint and several civil reparation (reparación civil solidaria) of the vehicle owner applies, because it was proven that the company has commercial, industrial, and tourist service purposes, according to the legal entity certification of the company, and claims the erroneous application of Articles 1048 of the Civil Code, 106 subsection 1) of the Penal Code, Articles 7 and 199 subsection b) of the Traffic Law, it is necessary to state that the regulations indicated are not entirely applicable to the case as has been analyzed</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">supra</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">and that, based on the evidence received in the trial, it was determined</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">solely that the vehicle is registered in the name of the company and in no way that said asset, owned by the co-defendant civil corporation</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Knoxvil</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">del Sur Sociedad Anónima was being used for commercial or industrial purposes (Article 188 subsection b) of Law 7331), a circumstance that, as the</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">appellate court (ad quem)</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">correctly points out, was neither described nor demonstrated in the civil actions filed by the victim (cf. folios 360-361)</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">since reference is only made to the ownership of the asset, but not to the use of the vehicle for profit-making purposes, which is what would allow access to joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria). Given this scenario, it is in no way possible, for the purpose of establishing patrimonial liabilities, to ground that ownership of the asset is equivalent to its exploitation for said purposes, and in that understanding, not being in the presence of the assumptions that allow establishing joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria)</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, it is impossible to order the condemnation of the company</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Knoxvil</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">del Sur Sociedad Anónima to pay jointly and severally with the accused the entirety of the civil compensation.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span> (The highlighting does not belong to the original). See how in this ruling, the point of interest here was expressly discussed and the same conclusion was reached as the lower court (a quo) and which this Chamber endorses, in the sense that it is not enough to claim the nature of corporations (sociedades anónimas), nor the corporate purpose indicated in their incorporation, but rather what matters is the exploitation (explotación) of the asset or the use and the purposes given to that asset. By virtue of the foregoing, the jurisprudential precedent cited by the appellant is not only inapplicable to the specific case, but there are also other precedents, later ones, such as the one just cited, which do expressly refer to the subject matter under discussion and which, precisely, coincide with what was resolved by the lower court (a quo). Likewise, the appellant cited resolution 903-F-SI-2021 of the First Chamber to support that Article 1048 of the Civil Code was applicable to the specific case.

However, upon carefully analyzing the cited resolution, it is easily extracted that the factual scenario is not compatible with the one before us, because in that case, as stated in the second recital (considerando) of the resolution, it was demonstrated that: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">The defendant El Angel SA is held jointly and severally liable for the damages caused in the accident that gave rise to this litigation, as a result of strict liability, being the registered owner of the heavy vehicle [Value 007], </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">which was used for transporting raw materials for the commercial activity it carries out</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-style: italic;">. </span>The appellant cited an excerpt from said resolution, without stopping to analyze the context in which it was issued, within which not only is the fact proven in that already-mentioned case of interest, but even the paragraph preceding the one cited by the appellant states: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Based on the requirements of the cited doctrine, the fact is the death of Mr. </span>[Name 015]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">; the damage is the harm suffered by Mrs. </span>[Name 016]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> and </span>[Name 017]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> due to the death of Mr. [Name 015]; </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">the risky activity is the benefit obtained by the defendant company through the use of the truck for transporting raw materials or products</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">, which is a good generating danger due to its functional nature</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> (since, according to the rules of human knowledge, every vehicle is prone to cause damages) and the situation linking all the above; is the mishap between the truck with plate [Value 007] (property of the defendant) and the motorcycle with plate [Value 008], in which the former invades the lane in which the latter was traveling, the collision occurs and as a result, Mr. </span>[Name 015]<span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> dies. In addition to the above, </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">the corporation accepts (in its response to the tenth fact of the complaint) that it operates the aforementioned motor vehicle for the transport of products or raw materials, thus obtaining a benefit from this object of potential damages.</span> <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">Thus, since the elements of strict liability by risk-creation theory are present, the Court's determination is correct, which is made by verifying the requirements and not only because El Ángel S.A. is the owner of the truck.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span>. (The highlighting does not belong to the original). Thus, this recent jurisprudential precedent cited by the appellant only reaffirms the position of the lower court (a quo) and demonstrates that the defect alleged by the appellant did not exist. Now, the challenger has argued that the judge incorrectly assessed the regulations regarding the burden of proof, given that it was a notorious and uncontested fact that América Ciento Siete S.A. is a corporation (sociedad anónima), with the commercial and industrial purpose described since its incorporation. This Chamber considers that the judge did not err in considering that it was incumbent upon the civil plaintiff to demonstrate that the vehicle was operated by the civil co-defendant, for which the corporate legal status certification of América Ciento Siete S.A. is insufficient. The appellant's criterion on this matter stems from the same premise, i.e., that the commercial nature of the corporation alone is sufficient to consider it proven that the vehicle in question was operated for commercial or industrial purposes, which—as already indicated and as the judge correctly assessed—is not correct. In accordance with the dynamic burden of proof system governing civil procedural matters and as contemplated in Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), the civil plaintiff bears the evidentiary burden regarding the facts on which its claim is based, while the civil defendant bears the evidentiary burden for the barring, modifying, or extinguishing facts it alleges. In the case before us, the judge assessed that the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate that the vehicle causing the injuries to [Name 004] was operated by the civil co-defendant corporation. This circumstance, without a doubt, had to be proven by the plaintiff, as it constitutes a factual scenario contained in the two norms whose application it sought. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the Argentine commentators Roberto Loutayf and Luis Félix Costas, who in their book “The Civil Action in Criminal Proceedings” (“La acción civil en sede penal”), stated: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">Finally, the civil party's evidence must also refer to the defendant's liability for the damages caused by the wrongful act (which is of primary importance when dealing with third-party defendants, where the basis of their liability must be proven).</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span> (Cited in turn by Rafael Ángel Sanabria Rojas in “Civil Reparation in Criminal Proceedings” (“Reparación civil en el proceso penal”), Editorial Jurídica Continental, fourth updated edition, p. 481). Along the same lines, see resolution 963-2006 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), which establishes: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">(</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">…</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">) These are exhaustive and restricted grounds, a condition derived from the fact that they aggravate the reparation obligation. In this sense, article 187 ibidem lists the following: </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">a) The owner of a vehicle who allows it to be driven by a person lacking the respective license or under the influence of alcohol or enervating drugs./ b) Individuals or legal entities that, under any title, operate vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport./ c) The owner who allows the license plates of their vehicle to be used by another vehicle to which they have not been assigned, or fails to deliver them to the Dirección General de Transporte Público for custody, if the vehicle to which they were assigned is permanently rendered unable to circulate./ d) Any individual or legal entity that imports, assembles, produces, or commercializes motor vehicles, in the event that the traffic accident</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">is caused by the omission, in the vehicle or vehicles involved in the traffic</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">event, of the respective safety measures, as defined in article 31 of this Law.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;"> In these situations, it is reiterated, the titleholder of the good jointly and severally assumes the obligation to repair the damage, thus granting the victim the possibility of filing a claim against only one of them or both simultaneously. </span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">The application of this joint and several regime depends on the demonstration, which is incumbent upon the party bringing the action (canon 317 subsection 1) of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil)), of the occurrence of any of these referenced scenarios, such that if not proven, said joint and several regime would be inapplicable</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span> For all the foregoing reasons, this appellate court considers that the decision challenged by the appellant is in accordance with law, since in the case under review, the civil plaintiff did not reliably demonstrate, as was its duty, that América Ciento Siete S.A. operated the vehicle with plate [Value 003], driven by [Name 001] at the time of the events, so it was not possible to attribute full joint and several liability to it, based on either of the two norms invoked. <span style="font-style: italic;">(2) Insufficient reasoning and omission of evidence (preterición de prueba) (fifth ground of the appeal (apelación))</span>. According to the appellant, by rejecting the civil plaintiff's thesis regarding the civil liability of América Ciento Siete S.A., the judge failed to assess evidentiary elements that were duly offered and incorporated during the proceedings, such as the corporate legal status certification of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. and the vehicle registration certificate for plate [Value 003], which were not even mentioned, and granted greater evidentiary weight to the convicted defendant's statement. Regarding the reasoning contained in the contested judgment and cited above, this Court of Appeals (Cámara de Apelación) considers it to be brief but sufficient, as it allows understanding the reasoning that led the judge to reject the civil liability that the civil plaintiff sought to attribute to América Ciento Siete S.A., complying with the provisions of Article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), relying on legal assessments, which in turn have been challenged by the appellant in the first two grounds of appeal and on which this Chamber has already spoken. As for the alleged defect of omission of evidence (preterición de prueba), it is true that the trial court is obligated to assess all the lawful evidentiary material, duly incorporated, that may serve to clarify the facts. However, not just any omission would justify the annulment of a ruling. For such non-observance or omission of evidence to carry this consequence, the overlooked evidence must be essential, that is, it must have an impact on the decision made, which is not the case here. From the analysis of the contested judgment, it has been possible to verify that the judge did not set forth any assessment regarding the corporate legal status certification of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., nor regarding the certification of the motor vehicle in question. However, this omission (preterición) did not cause harm to the civil plaintiff, insofar as it is extracted from the reasoning contained in the ruling that the judge did not ignore that the vehicle with plate [Value 003] was registered in the name of the civil co-defendant, nor that the latter was a corporation (sociedad anónima), whose corporate legal status certification records the purpose of commerce and industry. The lower court (a quo) based its arguments on the fact that it was not sufficient for the vehicle involved in the traffic accident to be owned by a corporation to invoke the situations contemplated in subsection b) of Article 199 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), or the fourth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), but rather that it had to be demonstrated that the vehicle was the subject of operation (explotación), which did not occur in the specific case. Thus, hypothetically including the evidence whose assessment the appellant finds lacking, the result would have been the same. In fact, and as already noted above, the civil plaintiff did not concern itself with demonstrating “<span style="font-style: italic;">the operation of the motor vehicle for a commercial or industrial purpose</span><span style="font-style: italic;">”</span>, but rather considered it sufficient that the vehicle was registered in the name of a corporation and that this purpose should therefore be presumed, a criterion not shared by the trial judge, nor by this Chamber. It is worth noting that the judge, indeed, among his arguments, referred to the statement made by [Name 001], who indicated that the vehicle in question was registered in the name of a corporation belonging to her mother, but that it had no business activity, since her mother was a housewife and that she was the one who used the vehicle, specifically to transport her daughter. The judge intertwined the above with the statements of [Name 004] himself, who among other statements made to him by the convicted defendant, related that she told him that—at the time of the events—she was heading to San José to deal with a family situation. The judge's arguments correspond to a comprehensive examination of the evidence, just as he did throughout the contested judgment, both to demonstrate [Name 001]'s culpable conduct and her criminal and civil liability, and to rule out the civil liability of América Ciento Siete S.A. However, it is evident that this was an additional assessment made by the judge, who based the decision challenged here on the fact that the civil plaintiff did not demonstrate the operation (explotación) of the vehicle by the civil co-defendant, which has been confirmed by this Chamber through the comprehensive examination of the judgment and the proceedings that preceded it. Thus, the combined analysis of the two referenced statements, in which the victim and the accused were coincident, does not constitute any defect. For all the foregoing reasons, the appellant's reproach must be dismissed. <span style="font-style: italic;">(3) Erroneous interpretation of the principle of congruence (principio de congruencia) (fourth ground of the appeal (apelación))</span>. The reasoning put forth by the judge was challenged, according to which the civil plaintiff did not impute the circumstances contained in Articles 199 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) and 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), by which it attributed civil liability to the civil co-defendant, América Ciento Siete S.A.. While this Chamber shares the criterion put forward by the appellant, in that the principle of congruence cannot be analyzed solely with respect to the facts section contained in the civil reparation action brief, but rather that said brief must be assessed in its entirety, the truth is that the argument put forward by the judge in this regard, although erroneous, was a brief additional mention, but was not the basis of his decision, and therefore is not capable of invalidating the judgment regarding the rejection of the full joint and several liability of América Ciento Siete S.A., regarding which—as has been extensively argued—the decision is in accordance with law. The principle of congruence (principio de congruencia), which is extracted from both Article 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal) and Article 61.2 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), does not mean—as the trial court understood it—that the description of the circumstances contained in the norms whose application is sought must necessarily be located within the statement of facts of the civil reparation action. The relevant point is that it emerges from the content of the civil reparation action brief, under any of the other titles or sections provided by the plaintiff, since what matters is that the parties against whom the action is brought know what they must defend against. This criterion has been shared by the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), in repeated jurisprudence. It is worth citing resolution 1109-2011 of said Chamber, which states: <span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">“</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">What is relevant and important is that within the initial brief, the civil plaintiffs did describe and detail the reasons on which their action is based, as well as the damages they sought to be compensated for by the defendants</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-style: italic;">”</span> (cf. resolution No. 2011–01109 of 3:09 p.m. on September 13, 2011. In the same sense, see resolution 446-2014 of the same Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal).

In the case at hand, as the appellant correctly pointed out, the claims are clearly evident from the content of the civil action for damages filing, and therefore —had the joint and several liability claimed by the plaintiff been upheld— no violation of the principle of congruence would have occurred. However, as indicated, it was an additional argument, briefly mentioned in the judgment, which —even if hypothetically removed— would not alter the decision, because the judge analyzed the merits of the matter, the evidence submitted to his consideration, and, based on those arguments and not on a matter of congruence, chose to dismiss the civil action for damages with respect to the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A., which is in accordance with the law. For all the foregoing, having verified that the reasoning set forth in the contested decision to reject the full joint and several liability of the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. is lawful, the appropriate course is to declare **without merit** the **first, second, fourth, and fifth** grounds of the appeal filed by the civil plaintiff's representative.

**VIII.-** The **third ground** of the appeal filed by the attorney for the Civil Defense of the Victim is declared **with merit**. The appellant claimed the non-application of articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, because the *a quo* ordered the lifting of the lien (gravamen) encumbering the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], without considering what is expressly provided in said regulations and violating the duty to provide reasons, as it did not explain the reasons for doing so and for disregarding the limited civil liability of the registered owner of the vehicle involved in the punishable act. It is held that the appellant's argument is correct and causes prejudice to the civil plaintiff, because the registered owner of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], i.e., América Ciento Siete S.A., must indeed be liable for the damages caused to [Nombre 004], <span style="text-decoration: underline;">exclusively up to the value of the vehicle</span>. Thus, the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003] must remain encumbered as a type of objective and in rem guarantee until the effective fulfillment of the decision, as established by the regulations that were violated by the judge. Given its importance for resolving the point in dispute, Resolution 963-2006 of the First Chamber is quoted, which clearly explains the issue under discussion: *“Damages caused in a traffic accident are subject to the civil liability rules imposed by concrete and special mandates regulated in the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, No. 7331. From this standpoint, in principle, it falls upon drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and third parties, whose conduct (by action or omission) has caused damage to a person's legal sphere, in such a way that this effect is attributable to them. This follows from numeral 186 of the referenced legal body. Thus, when an injury occurs caused by a traffic accident, its compensation will be subject to the demonstration of the economic or non-economic harm suffered, as well as the causal link between the conduct of the subject to whom it is attributed and the legal injury whose reparation is sought. Therefore, the rule is that the liable party will be the person who directly or indirectly caused the damage. Now, when liability falls on the driver, two specific scenarios may arise. The first is that the liable driver is also the owner of the vehicle. In this case, they would be the sole and direct party obligated to compensate the damage. However, it may be the case that the person driving is not the owner of the property.* **In that scenario, except in the situations to be indicated below, which generate joint and several liability, the registered owner is not fully civilly liable with the entirety of their assets, but only up to the value of the automobile.** **Here it is imperative to clarify that numeral 188 of the aforementioned legal body establishes a lien (gravamen) of an objective nature that is imposed on the property with which the damage was caused, which is noted in the margin of the respective registry entry.** *The initial paragraph of that mandate states, in relevant part: “The vehicle with which damage is caused shall remain encumbered (gravado) pending the outcome of the respective proceeding and subject to the order of the judicial authority hearing it. Said authority shall order it to be noted in the margin of the vehicle's registration entry, if it is registered…”* *This lien (gravamen) is imposed on the motor vehicle even when the driver at the time of the accident is not the owner, or does not appear with that subjective condition in the Public Registry (article 192 ibidem).* **It may only be lifted when there is reliable proof within the civil collection proceeding that the financial reparations have been fully satisfied, legally waived, or the guarantee substituted to the satisfaction of the judge (numeral 193).** **Thus seen, it is a charge that weighs on the property, regardless of who its owner is.** *It constitutes a lien on that exclusive property of the owner, whoever that may be over time.* **From the foregoing it follows that when the owner of the vehicle is not the driver, their “liability” is limited to the value of the automobile, which for these purposes constitutes a total or partial guarantee of the compensation ultimately ordered by the judge, which derives from the property relationship they hold over the asset —that is, of an in rem nature.** *However, the owner is not in all cases exempt from this duty of restitution for the damage. Indeed,* **as an exception to the rule just stated, the Ley de Tránsito provides for certain scenarios in which the owner assumes joint and several liability —and therefore full liability— together with the driver.** *These are exhaustive and restricted grounds, a condition derived from the fact that they aggravate the obligation to compensate. In this regard, precept 187 ibidem lists the following: (…). In these situations, it is reiterated, the owner of the property jointly and severally assumes the obligation to repair the damage, thus granting the victim the possibility of filing their claim against only one of them or both at once. The application of this joint and several regime depends on the demonstration, which is incumbent upon the party bringing the action (canon 317 subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Civil), of the occurrence of any of these referenced scenarios, such that if not proven, said joint and several regime would be inapplicable. Therefore,* **in that event, the quantitative terms of the owner's obligation are limited to the value of the vehicle, upon which the law imposes a lien. That is, in that scenario, they cannot be considered fully liable; however, the property upon which a lien rests, the imposition of which is mandated by law, causes that specific part of their assets to be liable for the obligation, limiting their civil obligation to the value of the vehicle.** *This is unlike when they are the one who directly caused the damage, as in that case, they are exclusively liable with the entirety of their assets.”* (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). The foregoing reasoning is shared by this Chamber, because as is clear from the conjunction of the referenced rules, currently contained in articles 200, 203, and 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, when there is no identity between the registered owner and the driver, the former must be jointly and severally liable with the latter for the damages caused by a traffic accident, <span style="text-decoration: underline;">but in a manner limited to the value of the vehicle</span>. Consequently, the motor vehicle with which the damage is caused must remain encumbered (gravado) until the conclusion of the proceeding and it is recorded that the civil compensations have been paid, waived, the guarantee substituted, or if, after one year from the finality of the judgment ordering the compensation, the sentence enforcement court has not requested that the lien be placed under its order. This is so because, regarding damages caused by a traffic accident, with respect to the registered owner of the vehicle, the rule is limited liability and the exception is joint and several liability. In this case, as noted in the preceding whereas clause, the judge properly assessed that the exception was not applicable (under the terms of article 199 of the Ley de Tránsito, nor under the terms of numeral 1048 of the Código Civil), so that the civil co-defendant América Ciento Siete S.A. would be liable with the entirety of its assets for the damages caused to [Nombre 004]. Hence, the judge, with justification and in accordance with the law, dismissed the principal claim of the civil plaintiff. However, without proper reasoning and violating the aforementioned legal provisions, the *a quo* omitted any consideration regarding limited civil liability and ordered the lifting of the lien (gravamen) that legitimately encumbered the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], owned by América Ciento Siete S.A. Said decision must be revoked by this Chamber, in strict adherence to the referenced regulations, so that América Ciento Siete S.A. must be liable, in a limited manner, solely up to the value of the vehicle with license plate [Valor 003], and the lien (gravamen) encumbering said motor vehicle must be maintained and may only be lifted under the scenarios of article 204 of the Ley de Tránsito, as expressly provided by the legislator.

This position has previously been upheld by the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación Penal), as stated in resolution number 447-2017, with the following arguments, which are shared by this Chamber: *"Given that in this case none of the previous circumstances were proven, the possibility of decreeing joint and several civil liability (responsabilidad civil solidaria) on the part of the registered owner (dueño registral) of the vehicle is excluded, but the objective civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva) limited to the value of the vehicle subsists, as determined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling 2000-5517, of 14:50 hours, on July 5, 2000, and which was taken up by the Third Chamber (Sala Tercera) when noting: "Extracontractual objective civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual objetiva) does not apply to the case at hand, it is important to point out that the judgment does not demonstrate that the vehicle driven by Mr. [Name 002]., was a vehicle dedicated to remunerated public transportation or business activity as required by our legislation (essentially in article 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and the rules in force on civil liability of the 1941 Penal Code (Código Penal), according to Law 4891 of November 8, 1971), as a kind of exception for certain activities generating lucrative or functional risk. It is not enough to simply use a motor vehicle to thus create objective liability, which would lead to that citizen always being civilly liable for the damages caused, unless he proves they were due to force majeure (fuerza mayor) or fault of the injured party. The appropriate course is to resolve the grievance by applying the rules relating to subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva) (in this case dismissible with respect to [Name 017]., given the fortuitous event (caso fortuito) accredited by the lower court (a-quo) -folio 282-). Paragraph 3 of article 1048 of the Civil Code must be harmonized with what is prescribed by the seventh numeral, paragraph 2 of the Transit Law (Ley de Tránsito) No. 7331. **It is necessary to indicate that the registered owner (propietario registral) of the motor vehicle is only liable, regarding his civil liability, for the amount or value of his vehicle.**" (# 345-98, at 9:25 hours, on April 3, 1998)"*.

Thus, the jurisprudential line followed by the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación Penal), in accordance with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which is binding *erga omnes*, consists of the limitation of the civil liability of the registered owner (propietario registral) of the vehicle involved in the punishable act up to its value, as long as the assumptions contained in article 199 of the Transit Law or those contained in the fourth paragraph of numeral 1048 of the Civil Code are not demonstrated, as happened in the case at hand. The foregoing is consistent with what is expressly provided in articles 200, 203, and 204 of the repeatedly cited special law, which would have no reason to exist unless as a logical consequence of that liability strictly limited to the value of the vehicle that weighs on the registered owner (propietario registral) of the vehicle with which damages were caused. The representation of the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) América Ciento Siete S.A., which has never disputed being the registered owner (propietaria registral) of the vehicle in question, when summoned regarding the appeal filed by the Civil Defense Office for Victims (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), with respect to the ground that is of interest here, alleged that the judge ruled according to law, for two reasons. The first of them because, in her opinion, the civil indemnification action (acción civil resarcitoria) filed against her client was declared without merit, the proper course is that her owned vehicle does not answer for the damages, so the lifting of the lien (gravamen) was correct. However, this position is contrary to the letter of the law, as has already been explained, and therefore cannot be accepted by this Chamber. The second reason held by the representation of the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) was that the civil plaintiff (parte actora civil), in her opinion, intends to mislead this Chamber, since the truth is that they never claimed limited liability, but only the full liability of América Ciento Siete S.A. as civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil). Upon examining the brief of the civil indemnification action (acción civil resarcitoria), comprehensively, as well as the conclusions issued by the representation of the Civil Defense Office for Victims (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) during the adversarial proceedings, this allegation must be rejected. It is recorded that the representation of the civil plaintiff (parte actora civil), at all times, requested that the lien (gravamen) on vehicle license plate [Value 003], property of América Ciento Siete S.A., be maintained, so that it would answer for the damages caused to [Name 004], so it is not true that this claim by the civil plaintiff (parte actora civil) was not recorded. As already noted in the preceding considering, the defect of lack of congruence, which is basically what the representation of América Ciento Siete S.A. alleges if the appellant's position were to be accepted, is determined based on the claims of the parties. Thus, in the specific case, the civil plaintiff (actor civil), throughout the entire process, included the aforementioned lien (gravamen) among his claims, so we would not be facing a defect of *extra petita*, as the representation of the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) has alleged. Added to this, it must be remembered that it is the judge who knows the law, according to the principle *iuria novit curia*, so the parties may not expressly invoke the normative basis of their claims, without this meaning they should not be granted. As has been indicated, the liability limited to the value of the vehicle and the lien (gravamen) in question are expressly provided in articles 200, 203, and 204 of the special law governing the matter, and therefore should not have been disregarded by the trial judge and cannot be ignored by this appellate court. In this regard, see judgment 61-1997 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera).

Based on the foregoing, the **third ground of the appeal** by the representation of the civil plaintiff (actor civil) is declared **with merit**. Consequently, the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) América Ciento Siete S.A., in its capacity as registered owner (propietaria registral) of vehicle license plate [Value 003], must answer in a limited manner, for the damages suffered by [Name 004], already declared, only up to the value of the vehicle in question. Furthermore, the decision to lift the lien (gravamen) on vehicle license plate [Value 003] is revoked, which must be maintained until one of the assumptions contained in article 204 of the Transit Law on Terrestrial Public Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) occurs.

**POR TANTO** The appeals of the sentence filed by public defender Eduardo Monterrey Carmona and the convicted [Name 001] are declared without merit, in all their respects. The first, second, fourth, and fifth grounds of the appeal filed by the attorney of the Civil Defense Office for Victims (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, are declared without merit. The third ground of the appeal filed by Martínez Solano is declared with merit. Consequently, the civil co-defendant (co-demandada civil) América Ciento Siete S.A., in its capacity as registered owner (propietaria registral) of vehicle license plate [Value 003], must answer in a limited manner, for the damages suffered by [Name 004], only up to the value of the vehicle in question. Furthermore, the decision to lift the lien (gravamen) on vehicle license plate [Value 003] is revoked, which must be maintained until one of the assumptions contained in article 204 of the Transit Law on Terrestrial Public Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) occurs. **Notifíquese**.

*María Milagro Granados García* *Hannia Soto Arroyo* *Raúl Madrigal Lizano* *Judges of the Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia)* *Expediente: 19-000743-0497-TR.* *Imputado: [Name 001].* *Delito: Lesiones Culposas.* *Ofendida: [Name 004].* *kmurillog* **Expediente N° 19-000743-0497-TR - Voto N° 2025-0276 - Pág.: 1**

Resolución: 2025-0276.

TRIBUNAL DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA ESPECIALIZADO EN DELINCUENCIA ORGANIZADA. Primer Circuito Judicial de San José (En funciones como Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, del Tercer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, San Ramón), alas once horas con cuarenta y siete minutos, del día veintisiete de marzo del año dos mil veinticinco.

RECURSO DE APELACIÓN DE SENTENCIA PENAL interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra [Nombre 001], mayor, costarricense, portadora de la cédula de identidad [Valor 001], nacida el 9 de marzo de 1981, 43 años de edad, hija de [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 003], viuda, administradora en una tienda de juguetes, vecina de [...], por el delito de LESIONES CULPOSAS en perjuicio de [Nombre 004]. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso, las juezas María Milagro Granados Garcia, Hannia Soto Arroyo y el juez Raúl Madrigal Lizano. Se apersonó en esta sede, el defensor público, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona; la Impugnación planteada por la sentenciada [Nombre 001]; y la abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano; y,

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que mediante sentencia número 660-2024, de las catorce horas con treinta minutos del nueve de octubre del dos mil veinticuatro, el TRIBUNAL PENAL DE HEREDIA. Sección Unipersonal, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 10 y 11 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 5.6. y 8 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 1, 30, 45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 71 y 128 del Código Penal; 122 y siguientes de las Reglas de Responsabilidad Civil del Código Penal de 1941; 1 al 16, 111 al 118, 142, 182 al 184, 265, 267, 356, 358, 360 al 365 y 367 del Código Procesal Penal; 1045 y 1048 del Código Civil; 74, 197 y 199 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial; y Decreto de Honorarios 41457-JP, se resuelve lo siguiente: 1) Se declara a [Nombre 001], AUTORA RESPONSABLE de un delito de LESIONES CULPOSAS en perjuicio de [Nombre 004] y en tal carácter se le impone la pena principal de SESENTA (60) DÍAS MULTA a razón de CINCO MIL COLONES (¢5.000) POR DÍA, para un total de TRESCIENTOS MIL COLONES (¢300.000), los cuales deberá cancelar a favor de Patronato de construcciones, instalaciones y adquisiciones de bienes del Ministerio de Justicia a la cuenta del Banco Nacional [Valor 002], debiendo aportar el recibo de cancelación a este despacho, bajo apercibimiento de que una vez firme esta sentencia se le concede el plazo de quince días hábiles para hacer el pago correspondiente. Se le advierte a la sentenciada que en caso de no contar con recursos económicos para la cancelación de la multa impuesta ni para hacer el pago del importe en cuotas, deberá informarlo a este despacho antes del fenecimiento del plazo previamente referido, señalando si es de su interés realizar servicios de utilidad pública a favor del Estado o de sus instituciones de bien público, aspecto que será determinado por el juez competente y de cuyo control estará a cargo la Dirección General de Adaptación Social; por el contrario, de consumirse el plazo de quince días hábiles después de la firmeza de la sentencia sin que se haya hecho la cancelación de la multa ni se haya hecho manifestación alguna respecto a la carencia de capacidad de pago, se convertirá cada día multa en un día de prisión. 2) A la señora [Nombre 001] se le impone como pena accesoria la INHABILITACIÓN PARA LA CONDUCCIÓN DE VEHÍCULOS AUTOMOTORES POR VÍAS PÚBLICAS TERRESTES por un lapso de SEIS MESES. 3) Se ordena el cese de cualquier medida cautelar de carácter personal que se hubiere impuesto en contra de la señora [Nombre 001] con ocasión de este proceso. 4) Se declara parcialmente CON LUGAR la acción civil resarcitoria incoada por [Nombre 004] en contra de [Nombre 001], por lo que se le condena a la señora [Nombre 001] al pago de los siguientes rubros: a. ¢96.873.925,62 (noventa y seis millones ochocientos setenta y tres mil novecientos veinticinco colones con sesenta y dos céntimos) por incapacidad permanente. b. ¢2.000.000 (dos millones de colones) por daño moral. c. ¢14.837.392,56 (catorce millones ochocientos treinta y siete mil trescientos noventa y dos colones con cincuenta y seis céntimos) por costas civiles a favor de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima. d. ¢49.381 (cuarenta y nueve mil trescientos ochenta y un colones) a favor de [Nombre 004] por costas procesales derivadas del pago del perito actuario matemático. Se rechaza la pretensión de cobro por la incapacidad temporal solicitada en la demanda civil. A las cantidades dinerarias antes dichas se les deberán sumar los intereses de ley generados desde su obligatoriedad y hasta su efectivo pago, así como la correspondiente indexación. Por haberse realizado la condena civil con base en sumas líquidas, se le otorga a [Nombre 001] el plazo de quince días hábiles a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia para que proceda a realizar los pagos correspondientes a la cuenta que deberá aportar el señor [Nombre 004] y a la cuenta que deberá aportar la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, de lo contrario se autoriza a la parte interesada a efectuar el cobro por la vía correspondiente. 5) Se declara SIN LUGAR la acción civil resarcitoria planteada por [Nombre 004] en contra AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, pero se le exonera del pago de costas por existir razón plausible para litigar. 6) Se ordena el levantamiento del gravamen número 2021-00785971-002 y de la anotación por colisión con número de boleta 20180315300615, que pesan al margen registral del vehículo placas [Valor 003], esto una vez que la sentencia esté firme. 7) Una vez firme la sentencia se ordena la destrucción de la evidencia material asociada al expediente. 8) Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas en lo penal, por lo que los gastos del proceso deben correr por cuenta del Estado. 9) Una vez firme esta sentencia se ordena su inscripción en el Registro y Archivo Judicial, así como también la remisión de los testimonios correspondientes para ante el Instituto Nacional de Criminología y el Juzgado de Ejecución de la Pena. Comuníquese la sentencia a la Dirección General de Tránsito del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes para lo de su cargo. NOTIFÍQUESE. Juan Carlos Morales Jiménez Juez de juicio" (sic).

II.- Que, contra el anterior pronunciamiento, el defensor público, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona; la Impugnación planteada por la sentenciada [Nombre 001]; y la abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, interpusieron los recursos de apelación de sentencia penal, mismos que serán resueltos por la presente integración del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada, según el acuerdo del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, número XXVI, en la sesión número 53-2023, del 23 de junio de 2023.

III.- Que verificada la deliberación respectiva de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 465 del Código Procesal Penal, el Tribunal se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en la impugnación.

IV.- Que en los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Redacta la jueza de Apelación de Sentencia Penal Granados García, y;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Admisibilidad, competencia y prueba. (A) Examen de admisibilidad. En la presente causa, el Tribunal Penal de Heredia, al ser las catorce horas con treinta minutos del nueve de octubre de dos mil veinticuatro, dictó sentencia número 660-2024, a través de la cual declaró a [Nombre 001] autora responsable de un delito de Lesiones culposas, en perjuicio de [Nombre 004], por lo cual impuso a la señora [Nombre 001] una pena de multa y otra de inhabilitación. Además, resolvió respecto a los extremos civiles sometidos a su conocimiento. Así, nos encontramos ante una resolución que es recurrible por esta vía (taxatividad objetiva). De conformidad con el artículo 8.2.h de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y lo resuelto por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso de Mauricio Herrera Ulloa contra Costa Rica mediante sentencia de dos de julio de dos mil catorce, para conocer los recursos de apelación de sentencia no son necesarias muchas formalidades. Sin embargo, según lo establecido en los numerales 437 a 440, 446, 458 y 460 a 462 del Código Procesal Penal, deben cumplirse requisitos simples, en cuanto a la forma, el plazo y la legitimación para impugnar, por lo que se procede con el examen de dichas exigencias. La lectura integral del fallo se dio el dieciséis de octubre de dos mil veinticuatro, por lo que existía plazo para recurrir hasta el seis de noviembre de dos mil veinticuatro. En fecha primero de noviembre de dos mil veinticuatro, el defensor público Eduardo Monterrey Carmona, en ejercicio de la defensa técnica de [Nombre 001], interpuso recurso de apelación contra la sentencia indicada, verificándose la presentación dentro del plazo legal y con la debida legitimación para esos efectos. A su vez, en fecha seis de noviembre de dos mil veinticuatro, la propia sentenciada, [Nombre 001], en ejercicio de su defensa material, planteó recurso de apelación, encontrándose también legitimada para ello y dentro del plazo legal. En esa misma fecha y, por ende, en tiempo, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano, en su condición de abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima y en representación del actor civil [Nombre 004], presentó recurso de apelación, específicamente respecto a extremos civiles, por lo que también cuenta con legitimación. Además, todas las impugnaciones se plantearon mediante escritos motivados, con expresa indicación de los agravios, ante el órgano de instancia. Por lo expuesto, los recursos son admisibles y procede pronunciarse sobre el fondo. (B) Competencia. Este Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal Especializado en Delincuencia Organizada es competente para conocer del presente recurso, conforme lo estipulan los artículos 93 ter y 101 bis de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en relación con el acuerdo número XXVI del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en sesión número 53-2023 del veintitrés de junio de dos mil veintitrés. (C) Examen de admisibilidad de la prueba. En el recurso de apelación planteado por la sentenciada [Nombre 001], en acápite que tituló “prueba por recabar y mejor proveer” textualmente expuso: “Con todo respeto ofrezco como prueba para mejor resolver y recabar se solicite al Instituto Nacional de Seguros por medio de su autoridad la información de todos los pagos realizados al ofendido a fin de poder verificar que montos han sido pagados para que no se de (sic) un doble pago en el presente asunto o un doble cobro.”. Además, [Nombre 005], en representación de la co-demandada civil, América Ciento Siete S.A., al contestar el emplazamiento del recurso de apelación presentado por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, en apartado titulado “Ofrecimiento de prueba para mejor resolver”, planteó lo siguiente: “La posibilidad de ofrecer prueba para mejor resolver, incluso en la fase de impugnaciones, está especialmente prevista por el numeral 464 del Código Procesal Penal; el cual prevé dicha facultad, en efecto, como garantía necesaria para asegurar y materializar la búsqueda de la verdad real -fin propio y consustancial de todo proceso penal-. Al amparo de dicha norma jurídica; en el presente acto se ofrece -en carácter de prueba para mejor resolver- una serie de comprobantes del Ministerio de Hacienda, que ostentan el carácter de documentos oficiales, y que demuestran que AMÉRICA CIENTO SIETE S.A., ni es una empresa, ni desarrolla actividades de tipo económico o lucrativo, ni mucho menos organiza o interviene en el mercado de la intermediación de los bienes y los servicios o en las actividades de organización de los distintos factores de la producción, lo cual permitirá demostrar la teoría del caso de esta representación de la parte codemandada, en torno a la ausencia de una finalidad de lucro o de ganancia económica en el accionar de dicho consorcio societario.”. (El subrayado pertenece al original). Valorados los ofrecimientos y argumentos de las partes, a la luz del artículo 464 del Código Procesal Penal, esta Cámara rechaza la prueba ofrecida por ambas partes, por las siguientes razones: El numeral referido e incluso citado por una de ellas, dispone: “La parte recurrente podrá ofrecer, en el escrito de interposición del recurso, pruebas nuevas sobre los hechos objeto del proceso o sobre la forma en que fue realizado un acto, cuando se contradiga lo señalado en las actuaciones, en el acta, en los registros del debate o la propia sentencia. El tribunal aceptará como nueva solo la prueba ofrecida en su oportunidad pero que sea arbitrariamente rechazada, la que aparezca como novedosa con posterioridad a la sentencia y aquella que, aunque existiendo previamente, no estuvo en posibilidad efectiva de ser ofrecida por el interesado en su momento.”. (El resaltado no pertenece al original). Atendiendo a la expresa disposición que regula la materia, esta Cámara es del criterio que sólo puede ser aceptada la prueba que fue arbitrariamente rechazada, la que es novedosa o aparezca con posterioridad, o la que el interesado no tuvo la posibilidad de ofrecer en su momento. En este caso, del estudio de los autos, se desprende que tanto la prueba solicitada por la acusada y demandada civil [Nombre 001] como la ofrecida por la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A., no se encuentra en alguno de esos supuestos. No consta en autos que haya sido ofrecida y rechazada con anterioridad ni tampoco fue así alegado por las partes y, por su propia naturaleza, se descarta que sea novedosa o que las partes no tuvieran la posibilidad de ofrecerla en las anteriores etapas procesales, si así lo consideraban pertinente. Por el contrario, se trata de documentación que constaba en entidades públicas (Instituto Nacional de Seguros y Ministerio de Hacienda), por lo que las partes pudieron requerirla con anterioridad, sin que así lo hayan hecho. Nótese que, durante el desarrollo del contradictorio, la representación de la co-demandada civil ofreció un dictamen pericial matemático, el cual le fue admitido, sin que en esa oportunidad haya solicitado ni aportado la documentación que ahora pretende que sea valorada por esta Cámara de Apelaciones. Por lo expuesto, en aplicación estricta de la norma citada, se rechaza la prueba ofrecida -por ambas partes- al no ser admisible en la etapa de impugnación.

II.- Resumen de los alegatos. (A) Recurso interpuesto por el defensor público, Eduardo Monterrey Carmona. En su único motivo de apelación, titulado “Inconformidad con la determinación de los hechos, ilegítima fundamentación de la condena”, citó como normativa quebrantada los artículos 1, 9, 62, 142, 184 y siguientes del Código Procesal Penal. Según su exposición, el Tribunal de Juicio (en adelante, en este acápite, el tribunal) omitió circunstancias fácticas que estaban detalladas en la acusación y que nunca se lograron acreditar, con lo que debilitó la construcción fáctica acusada y, erróneamente, señaló la responsabilidad de la endilgada. Fustigó que el tribunal tuvo por acreditado el exceso de velocidad atribuido a su representada, pero que las reglas de la lógica y experiencia aludidas por el tribunal fueron expuestas desde su subjetividad, sin mencionar a cuál lógica o experiencia se refería. Reclamó que el tribunal utilizara el parte policial como parámetro para comparar los daños de los vehículos y a partir de ello, desde su lógica y su experiencia, se representara el exceso de velocidad. Recriminó que el parte policial contenía información de mera referencia, insuficiente para valorar la cualidad de los daños. Añadió que el juzgador mencionó la tercera ley de Newton, pero sin contar con los datos exactos de velocidades para llegar a un resultado medible. Criticó que el tribunal hiciera referencia al testimonio del ofendido en cuanto a que la acusada le había dicho que había apretado el acelerador en lugar del freno, pues con ello -según el recurrente- evidenció una inclinación a considerar ideas, ocurrencias o meros cotilleos, que en todo caso fueron desacreditados por su defendida. Expuso que sostener que el ofendido mantuvo la misma versión en la denuncia y en el plenario para justificar la condenatoria se trata de un argumento falaz. Además, según el recurrente, el tribunal no explicó por qué consideró que el ofendido era coherente, consistente y persistente, con lo que reflejó que dio por ciertos hechos imposibles de probar, sustentándose solamente en la declaración del agraviado. Alegó que el tribunal no valoró que nunca se demostró que el vehículo [Valor 004], conducido por [Nombre 006], se detuviera y guardara la distancia con el vehículo del ofendido. En este sentido, no se recibió el testimonio de [Nombre 006] ni se contó con algún documento al respecto. Sin embargo, según su criterio, el tribunal lo dio por hecho sin que nadie lo acreditara. Solicitó se declare con lugar el recurso, se anule la sentencia y se ordene el reenvío. B) Impugnación planteada por la sentenciada [Nombre 001]. (1) Primer motivo: Inconformidad con la valoración de la prueba. Violación a las reglas de la sana crítica que violenta el principio universal in dubio pro reo. Reclamó la violación de los artículos 1, 2, 6, 142 y 184 del Código Procesal Penal y los numerales 39 y 41 de la Carta Magna. Argumentó que el tribunal descalificó elementos probatorios que evidenciaban que la falta al deber de cuidado fue de los otros vehículos al no mantener la distancia requerida. Agregó que el tribunal no expuso -de forma completa- los motivos de hecho y derecho que lo llevaron a descalificar la versión rendida por ella, limitándose a desecharla como un mero intento de evasión de responsabilidad. Alegó un error lógico en el análisis del juzgador, pues concedió credibilidad al ofendido a la vez que sostuvo valoraciones excluyentes para restarle fiabilidad a su versión (la de la recurrente). Citó extractos de la sentencia. Agregó que el juez no explicó cuál regla lógica y de la experiencia le permitió concluir cuál era el hecho generador, sino que simplemente se decantó por la versión rendida por el ofendido. Según la recurrente, de la prueba no se deriva que su vehículo haya sido el generador del impacto más allá de la versión del ofendido sobre el supuesto exceso de velocidad, pero no hay marca de frenado y el oficial de tránsito no anotó que la distancia de 3.80 metros se debiera a que ella haya sido quien generó el golpe. Argumentó que la conclusión del tribunal es contraria a las reglas de la lógica, tomando en cuenta el peso de los vehículos, que es una vía en la que se viaja a velocidad mínima, así como que la señora [Nombre 006], pese a estar embarazada, no sufrió lesiones y tampoco el ofendido, quien reconoció que salió del vehículo sin ayuda y más bien auxilió a los demás a salir. Según la quejosa, el juzgador plasmó lo indicado por el ofendido y lo aceptó, sin brindar mayor explicación, a falta de criterios técnicos para sustentar sus conclusiones. Además, en su recurso presentó dos alternativas que explicaban la posición final de su vehículo: 1. Que al momento del choque los automotores que iban delante ya habían chocado, segundos antes, por lo que formaban un solo bloque, de modo que al impactar su vehículo con el de la señora [Nombre 006], éste es frenado por el Toyota Prado. 2. Que previo al choque, los vehículos iban tan pegados, que al impactar el suyo, éste rebota por la cohesión que se formó en ese momento, dada la menor masa, densidad y tamaño del automotor que ella conducía. Continuó alegando que se omitió analizar sus manifestaciones en juicio, bastándole al juez con indicar que carecía de apoyo probatorio. Reprochó que sus manifestaciones fueran utilizadas en su contra para acreditar exceso de velocidad, pero a la vez no se le creyera por carecer de sustento probatorio, tratándose entonces de valoraciones contradictorias y excluyentes. Reiteró que el juzgador sustituyó las reglas de la sana crítica por las frases del ofendido y la mera compatibilidad entre los relatos del agraviado y el testigo. Agregó que el análisis para descartar la concurrencia de culpas fue superficial y ligero, basándose exclusivamente en la distancia de 3.80 metros de su vehículo, sin ponderar la posición del resto de vehículos y que la señora [Nombre 006] no sufrió lesiones. Concluyó indicando que al juzgador le interesó más la cantidad de testigos de cargo que la calidad y veracidad. (2) Segundo motivo: Inconformidad en la determinación de los hechos civiles. Errónea valoración del cálculo perito matemático en cuanto a la normativa del numeral 74 Ley de Tránsito. Citó como vulnerados los artículos 99 y 155 del Código Procesal Civil, 363 del Código Procesal Penal, así como 74 y siguientes de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres (en adelante, Ley de Tránsito). Después de una breve indicación de los requisitos de una sentencia, alegó que el fallo omitió explicar con la claridad necesaria la relación causa – efecto entre la colisión y la lesión en la rodilla, limitándose a referirse a la no oposición a los dictámenes médico - legales y tratándolos como “santa palabra”. Según expuso, el tribunal omitió valorar la discusión sobre si se trata de una lesión de vieja data, producto de caminatas en la montaña y que se demostró en debate que el ofendido caminó por sus propios medios, auxilió a los demás, sin mediar problemas con su rodilla ni hombro, por lo que no requirió atención médica. Agregó que el juzgador aceptó la incapacidad permanente y los montos indemnizatorios, sin brindar mayores detalles al respecto. Alegó que el cálculo indemnizatorio debió realizarse sobre la base del salario neto, no el bruto, pues el segundo no se ajusta al monto real que percibe la persona, sino que incluye montos inherentes a la seguridad social y hacienda, tal y como se desprende de la pericia matemática gestionada por la defensa. Reiteró que en la sentencia no se extrae el criterio de imputación que hace nacer la obligación indemnizatoria, tratándose de lesiones que aparecen meses después, cuyo nexo tenía que ser probado por el actor civil. Indicó que la sentencia no tuvo por demostrado algún hecho que sustente la condena civil. (3) Tercer motivo: Inconformidad con la individualización de la pena. Acusó violación de los numerales 1, 2, 12, 142, y 367 del Código Procesal Penal y artículos 71 y 128 del Código Penal. Reclamó que se impusiera la pena de inhabilitación, la cual indicó que no es de aplicación indiscriminada ni automática, sino que debe analizarse la vinculación con la profesión u oficio de conductor y fundamentarse para cada caso concreto. Citó las resoluciones 865-99 de la Sala de Casación Penal y 145-2008 del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago. Alegó que el juzgador no analizó si se trataba de una actividad habitual que generara provecho económico, por lo que tampoco valoró criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad para imponer una sanción gravosa como es la inhabilitación. (C) Recurso interpuesto por la abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano. (1) Primer motivo: Errónea y omisa aplicación de la ley sustantiva propiamente el numeral 199 inciso b) de la Ley de Tránsito, en relación al rechazo de la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta en contra de la empresa codemandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A.. Después de resumir la acción civil en lo que interesaba y citar parte de la fundamentación de la sentencia, arguyó que el juzgador realizó una interpretación extensiva y arbitraria del artículo 199 inciso b) de la Ley de Tránsito, contraviniendo el artículo 10 del Código Civil que establece que las normas deben interpretarse partiendo del sentido propio de las palabras, en relación con el contexto, antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social, atendiendo a su espíritu y finalidad. Agregó que el juzgador confundió la responsabilidad civil solidaria con la responsabilidad objetiva pura derivada de la creación de riesgos (artículo 1048 del Código Civil). Así, según su criterio, el lucro que pidió el tribunal no es un requisito legal. Lo único que exige el legislador para la aplicación imperativa de la responsabilidad civil solidaria indirecta, además de la culpa del conductor en la producción del daño es que la persona física o jurídica explote el vehículo y que lo haga con fines comerciales o industriales. Según la impugnante, el lucro económico es una especie de utilidad o explotación, pero no el único y lo que se requiere es que la explotación sea con fines comerciales o industriales. Alegó que es un hecho notorio y, por ende, no necesita elementos de prueba, que la co-demandada civil es una sociedad anónima. Consecuentemente, por disposición legal, su naturaleza es mercantil y sus activos están dispuestos para el cumplimiento de ese fin. Añadió que, con la personería jurídica de la empresa, la cual se ofreció como prueba, se demostró el objeto y fines de la sociedad, los cuales son comerciales e industriales y, con ello, se acreditó el fin del vehículo de la sociedad co-demandada y su responsabilidad solidaria. Citó la resolución 1867-2013 de la Sala de Casación Penal. Agregó que, si la co-demandada civil se oponía a la acción civil o a lo que apuntaba la personería jurídica, por disposición del artículo 41.1.2. del Código Procesal Civil, la carga de la prueba le correspondía a ella y no al actor civil, como lo exigió el juzgador. Sin embargo, los fines de la sociedad no fueron controvertidos. Insistió en que el juzgador exigió un requisito que no está contemplado en la ley, sin que sea relevante que la acusada, para el momento del accidente, no se encontrara en una actividad de lucro. Reiteró que el juzgador obvió que la actividad probatoria resulta necesaria para la acreditación de sucesos controvertidos, no tratándose de hechos notorios o sobre los cuales no existió contención. Citó la resolución 1837-2020 de la Sala Primera. Concluyó que, al haberse probado que [Nombre 001] faltó al deber de cuidado en la conducción del vehículo propiedad de América Ciento Siete S.A., y produjo daños en la víctima, así como haberse acreditado que los fines de la sociedad eran comerciales e industriales, sin que la codemandada civil se opusiera u ofreciera prueba en contrario, se imponía declarar con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria contra América Ciento Siete S.A., como responsable civil solidaria, a través de una correcta aplicación del artículo 199 inciso b) de la Ley de Tránsito. (2) Segundo motivo: Aplicación errónea del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, como supuesto de responsabilidad civil objetiva. Explicó la recurrente que también se demandó, con independencia de la responsabilidad subjetiva de [Nombre 001], dada la naturaleza mercantil de la empresa América Ciento Siete S.A., la responsabilidad civil objetiva derivada del artículo 1048 del Código Civil. Reclamó que la sentencia, de manera implícita, reconoció todos los supuestos normativos y fácticos para declarar ese tipo de responsabilidad, pero exigió un requisito que no está contemplado en la ley, consistente en que se acreditara que, al momento de la colisión, se estuviera usando el vehículo para una actividad pecuniaria. Citó, nuevamente, la resolución 1867-2013 de la Sala de Casación Penal para sustentar su postura en cuanto a que los únicos requisitos son: que se hayan producido lesiones o muerte con una máquina votiva, que la persona física o jurídica sea la dueña del medio con el que se causaron las lesiones y que no se haya acreditado fuerza mayor o culpa de la víctima. Reiteró que, tratándose de sociedades anónimas, por estar destinadas al lucro y actividad mercantil, los vehículos de su propiedad tienen un destino de explotación y, dado el riesgo en la actividad que desarrollan, se contempla la responsabilidad civil objetiva. Citó la resolución 903-F-SI-2021 de la Sala Primera. Agregó que la prueba documental demostraba que América Ciento Siete es una sociedad anónima y el giro mercantil consta desde su constitución, por lo que no cabía duda que el vehículo de su propiedad estaba siendo explotado con fines comerciales, lo que no fue controvertido por la co-demandada civil ni ofreció prueba en contrario. Concluyó que el juzgador sobrepasó las exigencias normativas, en aplicación arbitraria y extensiva del artículo 1048 del Código Civil y obviando la naturaleza jurídica de la empresa dueña del automotor y, por ende, la finalidad del bien, según lo establecido en los artículos 5 y 17 del Código de Comercio. (3) Tercer motivo: En cuanto a la inaplicación de los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la Ley de Tránsito. Señaló la recurrente que, conforme a los artículos citados, se reclamó la responsabilidad solidaria limitada. Sin embargo, el juzgador no se pronunció al respecto, sino que se limitó a ordenar el levantamiento de los gravámenes y anotaciones, una vez que la sentencia estuviera firme. Lo anterior, según la quejosa, constituye un vicio formal de la sentencia por ausencia de motivación, pese a formar parte del reclamo civil y de los alegatos planteados. Agregó que también se trata de un vicio sustantivo, por inaplicación de los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la Ley de Tránsito, según los cuales el vehículo debe mantenerse gravado hasta que se responda por el daño ocasionado, dada la responsabilidad objetiva. Recordó que la responsabilidad civil solidaria limitada persiste con independencia de lo resuelto respecto a la responsabilidad civil subjetiva (artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito) y la responsabilidad solidaria (numeral 1048 del Código Civil). Citó la resolución 523-2024 de este Tribunal, parcialmente con distinta integración, así como la resolución 212-2018 del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. (4) Cuarto motivo: Errónea aplicación del principio de congruencia. Reclamó la violación de los artículos 112 y 365 del Código Procesal Penal y el numeral 61.2 del Código Procesal Penal. Alegó que dentro de los razonamientos contenidos en la sentencia impugnada se incluyó que no se imputó “que ese coche estaba siendo explotado por la persona jurídica o por el conductor -persona física- para generar provecho propio desde el punto de vista comercial o industrial”, como que tampoco se imputó que “América Ciento Siete S.A. o [Nombre 001], el 19 de noviembre de 2018, estuvieran explotando el vehículo para cumplir con una actividad pecuniaria en particular”. Sin embargo, en el escrito de interposición de la acción civil resarcitoria, según la recurrente, sí consta la descripción de los tres criterios de imputación sostenidos por el actor civil, en folios 4 y 5 vuelto del legajo de acción civil resarcitoria. Así, en cuanto a la responsabilidad civil solidaria contenida en el artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, se advirtió que respecto a la empresa co-demandada civil el reclamo derivaba de lo siguiente: “por ser dueña del vehículo que conducía la encartada, siendo que este vículo (sic) pertenece a una persona jurídica cuyo fin es el comercio, industria, entre otros, según la misma certificación de personería jurídica, por lo que encuentra en la responsabilidad detallada en el numeral 199 inciso b) de la Ley de Tránsito.”. En cuanto a la responsabilidad civil objetiva del numeral 1048 del Código Civil, en el escrito, se contempló: “se trata de una máquina motiva y por su propia naturaleza, la conducción de vehículos genera por sí sola un riesgo y se señala además de manera específica la responsabilidad civil solidaria que se genera por medio de una máquina motiva”. En torno al último criterio de imputación, la responsabilidad civil solidaria limitada, se reseñó que partía de la mera constatación de que la sociedad anónima demandada es la propietaria registral del vehículo placas [Valor 003]. Concluyó que con lo anterior se verifica un vicio de aplicación errónea de los preceptos ya mencionados y un vicio de motivación, según el artículo 142 del Código Procesal Penal. (5) Quinto motivo: Errónea y omisa fundamentación fáctica, probatoria y jurídica de la sentencia. Se estimaron infringidos los artículos 142, 184 y 363 inciso b) del Código Procesal Penal. Se reprochó que el juzgador considerara que el actor civil no había hecho alusión a cuáles eran las actividades comerciales de la empresa co-demandada civil ni el uso del vehículo en ese ámbito. No obstante, según la recurrente, sí indicó la actividad comercial a la que se dedicaba la sociedad y lo probó a través de la certificación de la personería jurídica, la cual contiene su objeto o fines. Además, se alegó la naturaleza propia de las sociedades anónimas, según los artículos 5 y 17 del Código de Comercio, lo que permite deducir que sus bienes están destinados a cumplir con los fines de lucro de la empresa. Según su criterio, de allí nace la responsabilidad civil objetiva, dado el fin de explotación y el riesgo existente en la actividad. Mencionó, nuevamente, la resolución 187-2013 de la Sala de Casación Penal. Fustigó que, pese a lo anterior, se rechazó la acción civil resarcitoria contra la empresa co-demandada civil, sin ponderar la certificación aportada como tampoco los alegatos descritos. Según la recurrente, lo anterior se traduce en un vicio de falta de motivación y preterición de prueba. Sostuvo que juzgador erró al considerar que se haya alegado la responsabilidad civil automática, sino que el criterio de imputación se enfocó en la naturaleza jurídica de la empresa demandada, en los fines que tenía y en la actividad de explotación mercantil que ejercía, lo que se desprende de un análisis de las normas mercantiles y la certificación de personería jurídica (todo lo cual no fue controvertido ni se ofreció prueba en contrario). Agregó que el juzgador no explicó las razones por las cuales se desdeñaban los fines mercantiles que tenía la empresa y que los bienes eran el medio de su actividad comercial a partir de la mera manifestación de [Nombre 001] o por qué ésta tenía más peso que la prueba ofrecida por el actor civil. Según la recurrente, todo lo anterior se constituye en un vicio de falta de motivación y también de violación a la regla de la lógica, en su principio de razón suficiente, además de la preterición de la prueba, tanto de la certificación de personería jurídica como la certificación registral del vehículo. Agregó que el juzgador fundamentó de manera lacónica el rechazo del segundo criterio de imputación, a través de una mera referencia rutinaria, sin valorar la prueba documental ofrecida por el actor civil, sobre los cuales ni siquiera hizo mención. Según la recurrente, lo mismo ocurrió respecto a la decisión del levantamiento de los gravámenes, puesto que el único argumento fue el rechazo de la acción civil resarcitoria incoada contra la sociedad anónima, sin analizar la normativa citada, por la cual dicho gravamen debía persistir como un modelo de responsabilidad civil solidaria limitada. (D) Posición del Ministerio Público: No emitió pronunciamiento, pese a que fue emplazado desde el doce de noviembre de dos mil veinticuatro. (E) Posición de la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A.: En fecha dieciocho de noviembre de dos mil veinticuatro, mediante correo electrónico dirigido al Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de San Ramón, se recibió escrito titulado “Se solicita rechazo de recurso de apelación de sentencia penal promovido por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima del Ministerio Público”, suscrito por [Nombre 005], en representación de América Ciento Siete S.A., a través del cual rechazó algunos de los motivos del recurso de apelación mencionado. Respecto al primer motivo: Adujo que carece de claridad, no se proporcionan argumentos directos, precisos y consistentes, recurre a citas jurisprudenciales y no se basta a sí mismo. Reiteró que su representada no tiene fin de lucro y que no tenían la obligación de demostrarlo, pues las circunstancias elementales de la imputación deben ser acreditadas por el actor civil, como se desprende de una lectura correcta del artículo 41.1 del Código Procesal Civil. Agregó que la prueba permite inferir la conclusión a la que llegó el juzgador, en cuanto a que su representada no ejerce actividad económica y es una simple sociedad familiar tenedora de bienes, figura usual en nuestro país, tal y como lo declaró la señora [Nombre 001]. Según su criterio, no basta que se trate de una sociedad anónima para tener finalidad de lucro, lo que se constituye en una presunción del actor civil. Citó la resolución 304-F-97 del Tribunal de Casación Penal. Sobre el segundo motivo: Alegó que es una reiteración del primero y parte de una errónea interpretación del artículo 1048 del Código Civil. Según estima, la finalidad de la norma es conceder responsabilidad civil objetiva cuando la empresa ejercita una verdadera y auténtica actividad comercial. Indicó que las citas jurisprudenciales aportadas por el recurrente están sesgadas e intentan llevar a error y además son antiguos y han sido contrariados por fallos más recientes. Citó un extracto de la sentencia 244-2018 de la Sala de Casación Penal. Reiteró que América Ciento Siete S.A. no es una empresa, no desarrolla actividades de tipo económico o lucrativo no interviene en intermediación de bienes y servicios y la carga de la prueba era del actor civil. Agregó que el vehículo estaba siendo usado para diligencias personales de [Nombre 001]. En cuanto al tercer motivo: Señaló que contiene alegatos novedosos y subrepticios, que no fueron sostenidos directamente ante el Tribunal de Juicio, por lo que son violatorios del principio de congruencia, sea la conformidad entre las peticiones y la sentencia que pone fin al litigio. Citó la resolución 20-2018 del Tribunal Segundo Civil de San José. Fustigó que la aplicación de los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la Ley de Tránsito nunca fue requerido formalmente, por lo que el juez estaba inhibido para conceder tal pretensión. Agregó que, incluyendo hipotéticamente esos alegatos desde el momento de la demanda, no resulta procedente mantener gravado un vehículo si su propietario registral fue exonerado de responsabilidad, por lo que la decisión fue correcta a la luz de los artículos 1, 9 y 268 del Código Procesal Penal y artículos 39 y 42 de la Constitución Política. Señaló que esas normas de la Ley de Tránsito no son vinculantes ni aplicables al caso concreto, dada la exoneración de responsabilidad. En general, del recurso planteado por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, peticionó se declare la conformidad de la sentencia de primera instancia y concluyó recordando que no es procedente la nulidad por la nulidad misma.

III.- Dada su afinidad, en aras de no incurrir en reiteraciones, se resuelven en conjunto el único motivo del recurso de apelación interpuesto por el defensor público Monterrey Carmona y el primer motivo contenido en la impugnación presentada por la sentenciada [Nombre 001], declarándose ambos sin lugar. Como consta en el considerando previo, los recurrentes recriminaron la determinación de los hechos penales, estimando que el juzgador incurrió en yerros en la valoración de la prueba, por concederle plena credibilidad al agraviado, al tiempo que rechazaba la versión defensiva, sin exponer adecuadamente los motivos de hecho y derecho que lo condujeron a ello. Además, según los impugnantes, se violentaron las reglas de la sana crítica, pues el juzgador no explicó las reglas de la lógica y experiencia que le permitieron establecer la dinámica de los hechos y, consecuentemente, la responsabilidad de la acusada, evidenciándose que la decisión se sustentó en subjetividades y en la credibilidad absoluta que le concedió al ofendido. Según el criterio de ambos impugnantes, la prueba que fue sometida al conocimiento del juez, valorada objetivamente y conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, no permitía tener por acreditada la dinámica de los hechos que fue acusada ni desvirtuar la que fue planteada por [Nombre 001] en ejercicio de su defensa material. Al examinar los razonamientos que el a quo plasmó en la sentencia recurrida, esta Cámara de Apelación concluye que los reclamos en cuestión obedecen a una lectura fragmentada e incompleta del análisis intelectivo en que se fundó la condena. Contrario a lo alegado por la sentenciada y su defensor público, se corrobora que el Juez de instancia efectuó un análisis objetivo, exhaustivo e integral de las pruebas incorporadas al juicio, lo que le permitió tener por acreditados los siguientes hechos: “1. En fecha 19 de noviembre de 2018, aproximadamente a las 9:20 horas, en Heredia, Ulloa, ruta 1, sentido Alajuela hacia San José, 300 metros antes del puente Alfredo González Flores, [Nombre 004] conducía el vehículo placas [Valor 005] por el carril de la izquierda, con derecho de vía, y viajaba en compañía de su hijo [Nombre 009] menor de edad, quien iba en el asiento del acompañante en la parte delantera. 2. Ese mismo día hora y lugar, [Nombre 001], conducía el vehículo placas [Valor 003], en el mismo sentido que el ofendido [Nombre 004]. 3. En la dinámica de la circulación vial que se daba en la calzada descrita, el vehículo que viajaba delante del automotor del ofendido, conducido por [Nombre 010] y con la placa [Valor 006], se detuvo por el congestionamiento vehicular, por lo que el ofendido [Nombre 004] también se detuvo, manteniendo la distancia debida. Detrás del agraviado venía el vehículo placas [Valor 004] conducido por [Nombre 006], quien también se detuvo. Detrás de [Nombre 006] conducía la encartada [Nombre 001], quien faltando al deber objetivo de cuidado en la conducción de vehículos automotores, debido a que conducía a exceso de velocidad para las condiciones de la vía y el congestionamiento vial de la zona, no se detuvo y colisionó fuertemente el vehículo que conducía [Nombre 006] y, con la fuerza ejercida sobre este vehículo, [Nombre 001] proyectó el automotor que conducía [Nombre 006] contra el vehículo del ofendido [Nombre 004] y, de esta manera, produjo que colisionara contra el vehículo del agraviado en la parte trasera, y a su vez, ocasionó que el vehículo que conducía [Nombre 004], impactara contra el automóvil que tenía en frente y que conducía [Nombre 010]. De este modo la señora [Nombre 001] provocó que el ofendido [Nombre 004] también impactara contra el dash y contra la parte interna inferior de su vehículo, sufriendo golpes en la rodilla derecha, mientras el cinturón de seguridad le produjo al ofendido un golpe, por el efecto de latigazo, en el cuello, hombro y brazo derecho; lesiones que ameritaron atención médica horas después del hecho. 4. Consecuencia de la falta al deber objetivo de cuidado en la conducción de vehículos por parte de [Nombre 001], [Nombre 004], resultó lesionado y, según dictámenes médico legales 2019-0551 (del 21 de enero de 2019) y 2020-7387 (del 1 octubre de 2020), sufrió trauma en cuello, espalda, hombro derecho y rodilla derecha, evidenciando tenosinovitis bicipital, bursitis subarcromiosubdeltoidea, engrosamiento heterogéneo de las fibras del tendón supraespinoso de naturaleza inflamatoria postraumática, de tratamiento conservador y mediante infiltraciones; y edema del tejido graso subcutáneo prepatelar e infrapatelar, esguince grado I del ligamento colateral medial y lesión condral, que ameritó una cirugía artroscópica de la rodilla derecha. Actualmente, las lesiones descritas producen en el ofendido [Nombre 004] dolor en el hombro, brazo y antebrazo, por lo que se le dificulta levantar peso, y dolor en la rodilla derecha. Estas lesiones producidas por la imputada [Nombre 001] ocasionaron un daño físico al agraviado y le ameritaron una incapacidad temporal para el desempeño de sus ocupaciones habituales de dos (2) meses, a partir de la fecha de los hechos, y una incapacidad permanente de un diez por ciento (10%) por pérdida de la capacidad general orgánica.”. (Cita textual). Es menester aclarar que hubo hechos que no fueron controvertidos por la defensa técnica ni material, sino que la tesis defensiva, en lo que respecta a la perspectiva penal, durante el juicio, radicó en dos alegatos, el primero referente a la dinámica del siniestro y el segundo respecto a la causa de las lesiones del agraviado [Nombre 004] (sobre este último argumento versa, parcialmente, el segundo de los motivos de apelación de la sentenciada [Nombre 001], por lo que se ampliará más adelante al respecto). En cuanto a la dinámica del accidente, de acuerdo con [Nombre 001], los vehículos que antecedían al conducido por ella no guardaban la distancia debida e, incluso, ya habían colisionado previo a que ella impactara el automotor manejado por [Nombre 006]. En este sentido, en juicio manifestó: “(…) quiero declararme no culpable, quiero explicar las características de los carros, el de él es un carro grande, alto, fuerte, con chasis, el carro mío es uno pequeño, es un carro que no tiene trompa, es viejo, de lata suave, es un carrito pequeño, yo siento que en todo esto la responsabilidad es compartida, siento que no había distancia entre los vehículos, yo venía despacio, en retiradas ocasiones el señor indicó que había presa, entonces era imposible ir a otra velocidad. Le voy a contar cómo sucedieron las cosas, yo venía de Alajuela a San José cuando vi que el señor frenó de pronto, el carro de adelante lo chocó a él y yo le choqué a ella, en ese momento todo pasó rápido, yo estaba super asustada, …”. (Cita extraída textualmente de la fundamentación probatoria descriptiva de la sentencia). Como se constata con facilidad, se trata de la misma posición sostenida en la impugnación que se examina. Ahora bien, de los hechos transcritos se desprende que, efectivamente, el a quo desechó la versión defensiva y, por el contrario, tuvo por acreditada la dinámica de los hechos que fue acusada, según la cual la sentenciada [Nombre 001] faltó al deber de cuidado en la conducción del automotor placas [Valor 003], al manejar a exceso de velocidad, sin tomar en consideración la congestión vial, no detener la marcha oportunamente y colisionar con el vehículo conducido por la señora [Nombre 006] (placas [Valor 004]), lo que provocó que éste colisionara con el automóvil guiado por el ofendido [Nombre 004] (placas [Valor 005]) y éste con el automotor conducido por el señor [Nombre 010] (placas [Valor 006]). Como se analizará más adelante, lo anterior ocasionó las lesiones sufridas por [Nombre 004]. Examinadas las argumentaciones del juzgador contenidas en la sentencia, así como la prueba que fue sometida a su conocimiento, esta Cámara no detecta defecto alguno en la valoración de los elementos probatorios, como tampoco vulneración a las reglas de la sana crítica, apreciándose que el a quo llevó a cabo una fundamentación clara y precisa de los puntos sometidos a discusión en el debate, que lo condujeron a la decisión condenatoria. Es cierto que el tribunal concedió plena credibilidad al dicho del agraviado [Nombre 004]; no obstante, ello no se traduce en un vicio, en el tanto el juzgador explicó sobradamente las razones que le permitieron llegar a esa conclusión, cumpliendo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 142 del Código Procesal Penal, al tiempo que realizó un análisis concatenado de la prueba y aplicó correctamente las reglas de la sana crítica, según lo establecido en el artículo 184 del mismo cuerpo normativo. En atención a los argumentos planteados por los recurrentes, sintetizados en el considerando anterior, es menester recordar que en nuestro sistema procesal penal rige el principio de libertad probatoria, según el cual cualquier hecho se puede demostrar por cualquier medio, siempre que sea legal. De esta forma, no son aceptables los alegatos, según los cuales la dinámica del suceso no se podía tener por probada, porque no se contó con la declaración de la señora [Nombre 006], no se dispuso de prueba técnica, no hay huella de frenado o porque las boletas y parte de tránsito no consignaron quién era la persona responsable de la colisión ni la magnitud de los daños. Dichos argumentos pretenden aplicar una especie de prueba tasada, lo cual no puede ser admitido por esta Cámara, dado que contravendría abiertamente el principio mencionado y el sistema de libre valoración de la prueba que nos rige, contemplado en el artículo 184 del Código Procesal Penal, el cual dispone: “Valoración. El tribunal asignará el valor correspondiente a cada uno de los elementos de prueba, con aplicación estricta de las reglas de la sana crítica. Debe justificar y fundamentar, adecuadamente, las razones por las cuales les otorga determinado valor, con base en la apreciación conjunta y armónica de toda la prueba esencial.”. En la sentencia impugnada se explicaron con claridad las razones por las cuales, a través del examen de las declaraciones que sí se recibieron durante el debate, en conjunto con la prueba documental debidamente incorporada, fue posible para el juzgador tener por acreditados los hechos acusados, sea que en la fecha, hora y lugar descritos en la relación fáctica (circunstancias sobre las cuales no existió contención) tres de los cuatro vehículos involucrados en el accidente se detuvieron oportunamente, dada la congestión vehicular, y fue el automotor conducido por la sentenciada [Nombre 001], el que no se detuvo y provocó la colisión múltiple en cuestión. Esta Cámara, examinado el fallo impugnado, ha constatado la aplicación correcta de las reglas de la lógica, específicamente de la derivación y razón suficiente, pues el juzgador entrelazó las pruebas documentales y periciales (denuncia, croquis, parte oficial, boletas de tránsito, dictámenes médicos) con los testimonios brindados por el ofendido [Nombre 004], el testigo [Nombre 009] y el oficial de tránsito [Nombre 011], lo que le permitió, razonablemente, decantarse por acreditar la versión de la parte ofendida y excluir la de la acusada. En este sentido, el juzgador -a lo largo de su fundamentación intelectiva- valoró: “(…) este Tribunal debe explicar cómo llegó a esa conclusión y para ello es oportuno iniciar la correspondiente disertación señalando que en el juicio se recibió la declaración del señor [Nombre 004], quien de manera clara, espontánea y sin mayores titubeos explicó, grosso modo, que el día en cuestión viajaba en compañía de su hijo menor de edad en su vehículo Toyota Prado con dirección hacia San José y que, antes de llegar al puente Alfredo González Flores –conocido popularmente como «la platina»– se detuvo porque había congestionamiento vial y el automotor de adelante –que era rojo– había frenado, del mismo modo indicó que ya detenido observó por el espejo retrovisor y que apreció que detrás de ellos había un vehículo al que catalogó como un Rav-4 blanco y que en cuestión de segundos escuchó un golpe, como un chillido, que reaccionó viendo de nuevo por el retrovisor y ya tenían el vehículo de atrás «encima», por lo que él lo que hizo fue tratar de afirmar el freno y a la vez, sostener fuerte la manivela, pero el impacto fue inevitable y tan rápido que ni siquiera le dio tiempo de avisarle a su hijo para que se preparara. Continuó diciendo el señor [Nombre 004] que después del golpe salió del carro y observó que al automotor de adelante prácticamente no le pasó nada, que en el vehículo de atrás había una señora embarazada muy pegada al volante y que, a unos 3 metros del vehículo de la embarazada, había otro carro y que este sí que estaba muy dañado, por lo que ayudó a la conductora a salir y la trasladó hasta su vehículo, a lo que añadió que esta persona le indicó que no pudo detenerse porque cuando vio la fila de carros apretó el acelerador en lugar del freno. Sin el ánimo de repetir todo lo que el señor [Nombre 004] narró en torno a la dinámica del siniestro, estos fueron los puntos más importantes y, a partir de ahí el ofendido confeccionó un croquis durante su declaración en juicio y plasmó de forma gráfica la disposición final de los automotores, detallando que los que estaban más dañados desde el punto de vista material eran los conducidos por [Nombre 006] (la persona embarazada) y por la aquí imputada [Nombre 001], pues el de la señora [Nombre 006] prácticamente había quedado incrustado debajo del carro que él conducía –que como ya se dijo era un Toyota Prado y que por ende era más alto que los otros– y del mismo modo ese Rav-4 tenía considerables daños en la parte de atrás, ya que allí se observaban hundimientos en puerta trasera y búmper, mientras que el carro de la señora [Nombre 001] había quedado muy maltrecho en su parte delantera, es decir en la trompa, al punto de que incluso él pensó que podía haber algún riesgo por el humo y los líquidos que estaban saliendo de ese automóvil en ese momento, aunque después se dio cuenta de que el humo era vapor del radiador. (…) Como se puede derivar de la imagen anterior, lo dibujado por el señor [Nombre 004] responde de forma coherente con lo que verbalmente narró durante el juicio, pero, si a este croquis se le agrega el que elaboró el oficial de tránsito [Nombre 011] y que consta en el folio 225 del expediente, se pueden apreciar importantes semejanzas que al Tribunal le evocan veracidad en lo narrado por el ofendido (…) Nótese, además, que la versión ofrecida por el ofendido [Nombre 004] concuerda de manera adecuada con la que ya había vertido ante el Ministerio Público en la denuncia que interpuso en esa sede el 1 de octubre del 2020, por lo que la posición argumentativa que sostuvo durante el juicio tiene que catalogarse de coherente, consistente y persistente, todo lo cual abona para la definición de su credibilidad. (...) Así las cosas, el suscrito juzgador debe concederle credibilidad a lo narrado por el señor [Nombre 004] en torno a las circunstancias que permearon el accidente que es objeto de análisis, máxime si se toma en cuenta que la versión que este rindió en el juicio fue confirmada en cuanto a la dinámica de los hechos por el joven [Nombre 009] –su hijo– quien si bien fue honesto al aclarar que el hecho pasó hacía unos seis años atrás y que por eso no lo tenía tan vívido, lo que recordaba era que iban camino a San José, que había congestionamiento vial, que se detuvieron porque el carro de adelante había parado, que escuchó un golpe y casi de inmediato sintió un golpe fuerte que los hizo impactar al vehículo de adelante. Un aspecto importante de la declaración de los señores [Nombre 004] y [Nombre 009] fue que ambos fueron contestes al aseverar que antes de sentir el golpe en su automotor, escucharon otro golpe, lo que indefectiblemente lleva al Tribunal a concluir que antes de que el vehículo de [Nombre 006] impactara al Toyota Prado de [Nombre 004], este Rav-4 había sido chocado ya por detrás por el automóvil Toyota Yaris que conducía la señora [Nombre 001], es decir, la derivación lógica de todo esto es que la primera persona que chocó y que, por ende, provocó la subsiguiente colisión múltiple, fue la aquí acusada [Nombre 001], ergo, la causa eficiente del resultado fue una colisión por detrás generada por la imputada, fue eso y no alguna otra circunstancia lo que desencadenó el choque múltiple, incluso, durante su declaración en debate, la señora [Nombre 001] reconoció no una, sino dos veces, que ella había aceptado la responsabilidad cuando el asunto todavía estaba en el Juzgado de Tránsito, lo cual es un indicio más de su responsabilidad, pues aunque la imputada trató de explicar que ella estuvo «tramada» por [Nombre 004] en todo momento, sí aceptó los hechos en sede de tránsito para poder aplicar su póliza y reparar todos los vehículos, lo cual de por sí es un elemento importante para el Tribunal, pues según las reglas de la lógica y de la experiencia sería cuando menos extraño que, si una persona no tiene la culpa de un choque –como lo alegó la acusada–, acceda a admitir los hechos en el ámbito administrativo para activar su póliza de seguro y reparar los vehículos de todos los demás involucrados, contrario sensu, lo que este juzgador ha logado colegir del juicio y de la revisión del expediente, es que la señora [Nombre 001] aceptó los hechos y reparó los vehículos dañados con su póliza porque efectivamente ella fue la que provocó el accidente que ahora nos ocupa.”. (Cita textual). Los anteriores extractos de la sentencia permiten a esta Cámara advertir que el juzgador valoró ampliamente las declaraciones rendidas por el ofendido [Nombre 004] y el testigo [Nombre 009], durante el contradictorio, contrastándolas con la prueba documental; examen que le permitió derivar razonablemente que la dinámica del accidente ocurrió de la manera en la que fue acusada y, por ende, que la sentenciada [Nombre 001], cuando los carros que le antecedían se detuvieron oportunamente, ante la congestión vial en la zona, no interrumpió su marcha, sino que colisionó el vehículo que conducía con la parte trasera del automotor de la señora [Nombre 006], lo que impulsó éste a colisionar con el automóvil del ofendido y éste a su vez con el vehículo del señor [Nombre 010]. Tal conclusión no partió de subjetividades del juzgador ni resulta arbitraria, como lo han alegado los recurrentes, sino que fue consecuencia del examen conjunto de la prueba. El agraviado fue enfático en señalar que cuando se detuvo, producto de la congestión vial, observó que el vehículo que le seguía también lo hizo y fue después que escuchó un golpe, un chillido y después recibió el impacto. En este sentido, [Nombre 004] adujo: “el vehículo que venía delante de mí, frena, yo freno con él, veníamos relativamente despacio, pero estoy en el vehículo, conduciendo, me detengo, veo por el retrovisor, veo que el vehículo de atrás, de color blanco, creo que era un Rav-4, creo que un Suv, veo que el que viene atrás se detiene, estábamos en presa, casi cercano a eso sigo viendo al frente pero en segundos, cuando estamos detenidos, yo escucho un golpe fuerte, como un chillido y reacciono viendo por el retrovisor pero veo el vehículo de atrás encima, entonces tengo la reacción de afirmar el freno y sostener fuerte la manivela, fue tan rápido que no me dio tiempo de avisarle a mi hijo que tenía 14 años y venía adelante, que se sujetara o algo, fue rápido.”. (Cita extraída textualmente de la fundamentación probatoria descriptiva de la sentencia). Como bien lo valoró el a quo, esta versión fue conteste con la que brindó el testigo [Nombre 009], quien indicó: “Bueno, íbamos en presa, estábamos antitos del puente de la platina, nos detuvimos, yo escuché un golpe y casi de inmediato sentí un golpe fuerte, después del golpe impactamos al carro de adelante, después me di cuenta que era una colisión de cuatro carros.” (Cita extraída textualmente de la fundamentación probatoria descriptiva de la sentencia). A su vez, el juzgador contrastó las declaraciones apuntadas con la prueba documental, corroborando su congruencia, pues la descripción de la ubicación de los vehículos y los daños de los mismos, contenidos en el parte policial y el croquis elaborado por el oficial de tránsito, resultaban acordes a la dinámica de los hechos que, desde el inicio del proceso, sostuvo el agraviado. Conviene reiterar que nada obsta para que, en un caso como el presente, aunque no se cuente con prueba técnica (por ejemplo, un dictamen de la Sección de Ingeniería Forense que permita determinar la velocidad de los vehículos) o con testimonios adicionales (como el de la señora [Nombre 006]), sea posible concederle credibilidad a la declaración de la víctima y a través de ella tener por acreditado el suceso acusado. En este sentido, la Sala de Casación Penal ha mantenido un criterio uniforme en cuanto a que: “(…) la convicción del a quo en validar o no una prueba testimonial, pericial o documental, es de resorte exclusivo de su independencia jurisdiccional, del ejercicio de la razón y el respeto a la legitimidad del elenco probatorio, tanto en su obtención como en la incorporación al proceso. Por lo expuesto, la deposición de la víctima es suficiente para fundar un fallo condenatorio y esa credibilidad otorgada por el Tribunal no es posible sustituirla en casación, a menos que sea demostrada una infracción en el iter lógico o una anomalía en la probidad de los jueces. Bajo el privilegio del principio de inmediación, se le creyó a la víctima.”. (Resolución 1098-2001 de la Sala de Casación Penal). En este caso, se ha podido verificar que el juzgador no partió arbitraria ni infundadamente de la credibilidad del ofendido [Nombre 004], sino que la sustentó a través de valoraciones que son acordes con el principio de inmediación de la prueba, así como el sistema de libre valoración de la prueba y un análisis integral del elenco probatorio. En este sentido, consideró la forma en la que el ofendido rindió la declaración (de manera fluida y contundente), la verosimilitud de su relato (acorde con la descripción de los daños y posición final de los vehículos, según el parte y croquis policial), la consistencia y persistencia incriminatoria (dada la congruencia con la denuncia y, puede añadirse que también con sus relatos ante las diferentes instancias médicas) y, de especial importancia, la corroboración de su dicho a través de la declaración del testigo [Nombre 009], quien ratificó un detalle fundamental para acreditar la versión acusatoria y desechar la defensiva, como lo fue que primero se escuchó un golpe y, después, se dio el impacto al vehículo en el que viajaban. Además, ninguno de los declarantes relató que se escuchara otro golpe posteriormente; sino que, una vez recibido el impacto, el agraviado procedió a egresar del vehículo y, a partir de ese momento, relataron los hechos ulteriores de interacción con las demás personas involucradas en el accidente automovilístico y los trámites que realizaron. De esta forma, es evidente que la valoración que de la prueba hizo el juzgador es acorde a las reglas de la lógica, específicamente de la derivación, pues dicho detalle no es menor y es el que precisamente permite descartar la versión de la sentenciada en cuanto a que ella colisionó con el vehículo de [Nombre 006] después que éste había colisionado con el del ofendido. El juzgador realizó un análisis concatenado del elenco probatorio y, con base en el mismo, tuvo por acreditados los hechos conforme fueron acusados y relatados por el ofendido [Nombre 004]. Contrario sensu, está claro que descartó la tesis defensiva, pero lo hizo de manera fundada, sin incurrir en contradicciones y acorde a una derivación lógica de la información arrojada por la prueba, como ya se refirió. Así, analizada la sentencia de forma integral, como unidad lógica que es, las valoraciones antes apuntadas, las cuales esta Cámara avala, le permitieron descartar la versión de la dinámica del evento que fue relatada por la sentenciada y acoger la tesis acusatoria. Pareciera que los recurrentes pretenden que, por la mera existencia de dos versiones contrapuestas, no sea posible acreditar una de ellas, lo cual no es admisible. Aunado a lo antes expuesto, el a quo se refirió expresamente a la versión defensiva y expuso valoraciones adicionales -aplicando las reglas de la experiencia- en cuanto a la distancia en que el vehículo de la agraviada quedó en relación con los otros tres automotores, lo que le permitió válidamente concluir que la dinámica que era acorde a esa posición final era la que brindó el ofendido y no la acusada. En este orden de ideas, señaló: “Dicho lo anterior, este juzgador debe referirse a la declaración de la señora [Nombre 001], pues en lo que concierne a la dinámica del accidente lo que indicó fue que la responsabilidad era compartida entre todos, primero porque los carros no estaban guardando la distancia prudente entre ellos, segundo porque ella venía conduciendo despacio precisamente por el congestionamiento vial, tercero porque [Nombre 004] fue el que frenó de repente y, cuarto, porque la que chocó al ofendido de primero fue [Nombre 006] y ella –[Nombre 001]–, chocó con el carro de doña [Nombre 006] en un ulterior instante, en consecuencia, lo que manifestó la señora [Nombre 001] fue que ella solo se sentía responsable por haber colisionado por detrás al vehículo de [Nombre 006], no obstante, las manifestaciones de la señora imputada no guardan relación con la verdadera dinámica del accidente, en el entendido de que más allá de si alguien frenó de repente o de si no se estaban guardando las distancias –lo cual es un deber de todo vehículo según la Ley de Tránsito– lo que ella indicó respecto a que el primer choque fue el de [Nombre 006] contra [Nombre 004] porque este frenó de repente y que fue después que ella colisionó con [Nombre 006], no guarda relación con la forma en la que quedaron los vehículos tal como se consignó en el plano de tránsito, precisamente porque como ella misma dijo en el juicio, el carro que conducía era pequeño, de hecho del expediente lo que se extrae es que era un Toyota Yaris del año 2006 con un peso de 1305 kilogramos, mientras que el carro de [Nombre 004] era un Toyota Prado del 2018 con un peso de 2990 kilogramos y el que conducía [Nombre 006] era un Toyota Rav-4 del 2003 con un peso de 1355 kilogramos, es decir, no tiene ninguna lógica que exista una separación de 3.80 metros entre el carro que conducía [Nombre 001] y el que conducía [Nombre 006] si es que –como lo alegó la imputada– ella fue la que chocó después de que ya lo había hecho la señora [Nombre 006], dicho de otra forma, para entender y validar la dinámica narrada por la imputada habría que suponer que el carro más liviano de los antes descritos, el Toyota Yaris, que supuestamente iba despacio según su dicho, chocó al Toyota Rav-4 cuando ya este había colisionado con el Toyota Prado y propulsó a estos dos carros juntos por esos 3.80 metros adelante para provocar la separación que se consignó en el croquis oficial que confeccionó el policía de tránsito, o sea, para tratar de darle validez al relato de la imputada [Nombre 001] habría que suponer que su Yaris, que iba despacio, o sea, sin mucha energía cinética, tuvo la capacidad de trasladar esa energía a los otros vehículos para lograr desplazar por 3.80 metros a los otros dos carros que supuestamente ya habían chocado, cosa que se aleja de los postulados más básicos de la lógica y de la experiencia, ya que la sana crítica más bien lo que evoca es que el choque inicial fue entre [Nombre 001] e [Nombre 006] –con vehículos de similar peso– y con base en ese impacto ocasionado por la imprudencia de la señora imputada fue que el Rav-4 que conducía la señora [Nombre 006] se proyectó hasta el Prado de [Nombre 004] y este a su vez hacia el Hyundai de [Nombre 010]. Así las cosas, tiene que establecerse, aunque ya se indicó supra, que la causa eficiente del resultado fue la conducta de la imputada [Nombre 001], quien, a una velocidad imprudente frente al contexto de congestionamiento vial, sin aplicar el juicio de previsión de que en la parte de abajo del «subibaja» podía haber una presa vial y sin guardar la distancia con el vehículo que le precedía, lo colisionó por detrás, lo que provocó que este se desplazara hasta el carro del aquí ofendido y que este último también se moviera hasta alcanzar a chocar al vehículo que le antecedía, siendo irrelevante desde el punto de vista de la previsibilidad, evitabilidad y determinación del resultado, la distancia que había entre los vehículos de [Nombre 006], [Nombre 004] y [Nombre 010] en tanto ninguno de ellos fue el que incumplió con el deber de cuidado como para que se pueda hablar de que haya otros aportes causales al evento que desencadenó toda la colisión múltiple, entonces, a manera de resumen debe recalcarse que esa dinámica del accidente lo que hace exclusivamente es confirmar el nexo causal entre el proceder descuidado e imprudente de la imputada [Nombre 001] y el resultado final de daños materiales y lesiones físicas en [Nombre 004], es decir, mediante la constatación del fuerte golpe ocasionado por el vehículo que conducía la imputada –a exceso de velocidad según las circunstancias de congestionamiento y sin guardar la distancia debida– en la parte trasera del vehículo que manejaba [Nombre 006] y que este se impulsara hasta el carro de [Nombre 004], provocando, también, que el carro del agraviado impactase al que le precedía (ocupado por [Nombre 010]), se corroboró el ligamen entre la conducta y el resultado (causa-efecto), lo cual es un requisito básico para la atribución de responsabilidad penal.”. (Cita textual). El extracto anterior de la sentencia, si bien extenso, permite constatar no sólo la amplitud de los razonamientos esgrimidos por el juzgador, quien -como se apuntó previamente- cumplió a cabalidad con el deber de fundamentación; sino que además, sus valoraciones siempre se sustentaron en las reglas de la lógica y la experiencia, las cuales aunque no les dio una denominación específica, como lo desearían los recurrentes, sí las describió detalladamente, permitiendo entender a cabalidad sus argumentaciones y ejercer el correspondiente control de legalidad y razonabilidad. Es menester recordar lo que la Sala de Casación Penal ha señalado respecto a las reglas de la experiencia, como se cita de seguido: “La regla de experiencia surge como una generalización construida a partir de una serie de percepciones singulares sobre hechos o fenómenos que ante determinados supuestos, se comportan siempre o la mayoría de las veces de una determinada manera. Ante la coincidencia de una serie de hechos en situaciones similares, se concluye que un nuevo hecho en situaciones similares sucederá de la misma manera.”. (Resolución número 1408-2004 de la Sala de Casación Penal, reiterada en la resolución 1092-2023). Aunado a que esta Cámara comparte las valoraciones efectuadas por el juzgador, respecto a la credibilidad del relato de la víctima, las cuales por sí mismas permiten descartar la tesis defensiva; cabe mencionar que hay dos argumentos adicionales contenidos en la cita que antecede que también son compartidos por esta Cámara, pues efectivamente, son acordes a las reglas de la sana crítica y conforme a derecho. El primero de ellos consiste en que debe rechazarse la tesis defensiva en cuanto a que exista una concurrencia de la culpa, porque el vehículo de [Nombre 006] no guardara la debida distancia con el de [Nombre 004] y éste, a su vez, con el automotor de [Nombre 010]. No cabe duda para este tribunal de alzada que el razonamiento emitido por el juzgador es el correcto, pues no fue la distancia entre esos vehículos lo que provocó la colisión ni las lesiones del agraviado, sino que lo fue la conducta culposa de la sentenciada [Nombre 001], pues fue ella quien no detuvo el automóvil que conducía a tiempo, colisionó con el automotor de [Nombre 006] y, con ello, provocó el desplazamiento de los demás carros y las siguientes colisiones. El artículo 101 de la Ley de Tránsito, incluso citado por la propia recurrente, estipula: “ARTÍCULO 101.- Mantener distancia. El conductor de un vehículo que circule por la vía pública debe mantener una distancia razonable y prudente que garantice la detención oportuna, en caso de que el vehículo que lo precede frene intempestivamente. Para ello, el conductor debe considerar su velocidad, las condiciones de la vía, del clima y las de su propio vehículo.”. Como se desprende de la letra de la ley, el deber de guardar una distancia razonable y prudente durante la conducción de automóviles tiene como finalidad garantizar la detención oportuna cuando el vehículo que precede frena. En el caso que nos ocupa, se constató -a través del análisis probatorio ya detallado- que [Nombre 004] e [Nombre 006] cumplieron con ese deber, pues la distancia que guardaban del vehículo que les precedía, les permitió detener oportunamente su automóvil, cuando el anterior lo hizo, con independencia de la distancia que, una vez, detenidos, conservaran entre ellos. Así las cosas, no existió una culpa concurrente, tal y como fue suficientemente analizado por el juzgador. Es menester añadir que no cualquier infracción a las normas de tránsito tiene una relación de causa-efecto con el resultado dañoso y que la culpa penal no se configura por la simple omisión al deber de cuidado, sino que ella debe tener una relación directa con el resultado producido. Así, incluso, asumiendo que [Nombre 006] y [Nombre 004] hubiesen infringido las normas de la conducción de automotores, porque no guardaron una distancia debida con el vehículo que les antecedía, una vez que se detuvieron oportunamente, lo cierto es que dicha infracción no fue la que ocasionó el resultado dañoso, por lo que debe descartarse la tesis defensiva. A dicha conclusión se llega, al realizar un examen ex post en torno al hecho ocurrido, mediante un ejercicio de supresión hipotética. Así, si se elimina la acción de la sentenciada (si [Nombre 001] hubiese detenido oportunamente su vehículo y no hubiese colisionado con [Nombre 006]), está claro que el accidente no se hubiese dado y el ofendido no hubiese sufrido lesiones, pues los demás vehículos ya se habían detenido oportunamente. Desde esa perspectiva, no cabe duda para este tribunal de alzada, tal y como razonablemente lo sustentó el a quo, que la causa jurídicamente relevante que ocasionó el accidente de tránsito en mención y que produjo lesiones a la víctima, fue la acción culposa de [Nombre 001], únicamente. El otro punto que merece ser destacado es que, tal y como lo resolvió el a quo, la versión defensiva no es congruente con la prueba. Dicha tesis parte de que la sentenciada [Nombre 001] conducía a baja velocidad y colisionó con el vehículo de [Nombre 006], cuando éste ya había chocado con el del ofendido. Tal y como se desprende de los razonamientos esgrimidos por el juzgador, si la sentenciada hubiese conducido “despacio” (para usar sus palabras), o bien a una velocidad acorde con el congestionamiento vial que existía en la zona, al darse la colisión con el vehículo de [Nombre 006], la cual nunca negó, la posición final de los vehículos (sobre la cual tampoco ha existido contención) no hubiese sido de una distancia de 3.80 metros entre el vehículo de la sentenciada [Nombre 001] con los demás. Es decir, si la colisión entre el vehículo de la sentenciada y el de [Nombre 006] se hubiese dado, bajo las circunstancias aducidas por [Nombre 001], sea conduciendo a baja velocidad y después de que la segunda ya había impactado el vehículo de [Nombre 004], no existiría explicación para la distancia aludida, pues transitando a una baja velocidad, como lo alegó la acusada, el vehículo de [Nombre 001], dado su peso y tamaño, no hubiese podido desplazar los demás vehículos, como tampoco hubiese existido un “efecto rebote” de esa magnitud. De esta manera, el razonamiento del juzgador no sólo fue explayado en la sentencia, sino que -a diferencia de lo alegado por los recurrentes- es acorde a las máximas de la sana crítica. Con relación a las normas de fundamentación de la sentencia, la Sala de Casación Penal ha indicado: “La supervisión de la aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica, consiste en determinar que los razonamientos realizados por el a quo al valorar los elementos probatorios sometidos a su escrutinio, sean consecuentes con las conclusiones a las que se deriva. Señala CAFFERATA NORES: “… La sana crítica racional como método para la valoración de prueba, pone como único límite a la libre convicción de los jueces, el respeto a las reglas que gobiernan la conexión del pensamiento humano: las de la lógica, las de la psicología y las de la experiencia común…” (CAFFERATA NORES, José I. Temas de Derecho Procesal Penal. Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1988. p. 288). En otras palabras, dichas reglas permiten controlar el iter lógico que ha seguido el juzgador para formar su criterio sobre lo cierto y lo falso conforme a la valoración de la prueba evacuada. Se desprende de la sentencia impugnada, que los razonamientos consignados por el a quo responden a los requisitos de legalidad y objetividad para su validez, en un análisis integral del acervo probatorio existente.”. (Resolución número 542-2009 de la Sala de Casación Penal). Se reitera que el juzgador concedió credibilidad a la víctima y al testigo [Nombre 009], en cuanto a que no existió colisión previa, lo que ya de por sí permitía descartar la tesis defensiva, pero además entrelazó la prueba testimonial con la documental (la que permitía constatar la posición final de los vehículos, la distancia entre ellos y los daños que sufrieron), concluyendo -con un razonamiento lógico y aplicando las reglas de la experiencia- que los hechos acaecieron de la forma en que fueron acusados y la dinámica alegada por [Nombre 001] era insostenible. Es menester recalcar que, para descartar la tesis defensiva, el juzgador partió de la propia declaración de la acusada, quien en el debate afirmó que conducía “despacio”, lo cual no le mereció credibilidad alguna, no sólo porque el ofendido así lo hubiese afirmado, sino por la descripción de los daños a los vehículos y la posición final de éstos. Ahora bien, el considerable daño que presentaba el vehículo en el que viajaba la sentenciada, se torna en un elemento más que no puede desdeñarse, simplemente porque no esté detallado ampliamente en el parte de tránsito, como lo pretende el recurrente Monterrey Carmona. Ello es así, en aplicación del principio de libertad probatoria, que ya fue reseñado. En este sentido, conviene señalar que los daños que presentaba el vehículo placas [Valor 003] (conducido por la sentenciada) fueron mencionados en el parte oficial, pero además fueron ampliamente descritos por la víctima durante su deposición, sin que se detectara inconsistencia alguna con dicha prueba documental. Al respecto, [Nombre 004] refirió: “(…) y me fijo hacia atrás y veo el vehículo blanco incrustado en mi vehículo y a una señora digamos que en ese momento veo que está embarazada, muy pegada a su manubrio, le pregunto rápido si se siente bien, ella está un poco afectada, trato de abrir la puerta y veo hacia atrás y veo que hay un espacio de unos 3 metros, muy corto y veo un vehículo que tiene el frente dañado, un golpe muy fuerte, un daño evidente, tiene humo en el motor, la tapa levantada, pienso que el vehículo se va a incendiar y corro hacia el conductor, veo que es una muchacha, la traslado hacia mi vehículo, abro la puerta y la siento ahí, le digo que se tranquilice porque temía por el vehículo, posteriormente me di cuenta que eran temas del radiador y fluidos (…) El vehículo tiene como un cobertor de una rueda en la parte de atrás, tiene como un cobertor y ahí está hundido, también el búmper, la parte de abajo, se ve como muy metido y el vehículo de atrás tenía daños importantes, si se pone a observar la colisión uno veía daños menores en el de adelante, en el mío, el Rav-4 más o menos, pero el de atrás eran daños graves, recogida la trompa, vapor o humo, líquidos por la calle y si no me equivoco las bolsas de aire de ese vehículo estaban estalladas, cuando retiré a la persona logramos que ella saliera de ahí, además muchas personas de otros carriles salieron a ayudar.” (Cita extraída textualmente de la fundamentación probatoria descriptiva de la sentencia). A su vez, el testigo [Nombre 009] ratificó lo anterior, de la siguiente manera: “Sí, vi que el vehículo de atrás, bueno, los tres estaban dañados, pero sobre todo el vehículo de más atrás, me acuerdo que era negro, un Hatchback, el frente lo tenía comprimido, salía líquido y padre me dijo que guardara distancia.” (Cita extraída textualmente de la fundamentación probatoria descriptiva de la sentencia). Es así como, a través del análisis conjunto de la prueba testimonial y documental, se puede constatar que los daños fueron considerables, lo que se constituye en un elemento más que sustenta los razonamientos del juzgador para rechazar la tesis defensiva respecto a que la sentenciada viajaba a baja velocidad. Aunado a lo expuesto, tal y como lo señaló el defensor en sus alegatos recursivos, el juzgador valoró que el agraviado declaró que la sentenciada le manifestó que había apretado el acelerador en lugar del freno, lo cual es congruente con la magnitud de los daños ocasionados. No obstante, de ninguna manera puede compartirse el criterio esbozado por los recurrentes en cuanto a que eso significa que el a quo le dio valor a meras ocurrencias o cotilleos, o bien que contradictoriamente le hubiese dado peso a manifestaciones brindadas por ella al ofendido, pero no a las que expuso en el juicio. Las manifestaciones espontáneas extra proceso de las personas acusadas son un indicio válido que debe ser valorado en conjunto con el resto del elenco probatorio, como acertadamente lo hizo el tribunal de instancia y como ha sido aceptado uniformemente y desde vieja data, incluso por la Sala Constitucional (véase la resolución 154-2000 de la Sala Constitucional y las resoluciones 100-2002 y 282-2010 de la Sala de Casación Penal). En todo caso, no se trató del único sustento probatorio analizado en la sentencia impugnada. Otro alegato contenido en la sentencia que fue objeto de reproche consistió en que el juzgador incluyera dentro de sus múltiples argumentaciones que [Nombre 001] había admitido responsabilidad plena de los hechos en otras instancias y, por ello, todos los vehículos involucrados en la colisión fueron reparados haciendo uso de la póliza del automóvil conducido por [Nombre 001]. El a quo explicó que no era creíble la aseveración de [Nombre 001] en juicio, en el sentido, de que ello se debió a una manipulación por parte del ofendido [Nombre 004], pues resulta contrario a las reglas de la experiencia que una persona que sabe que solamente colisionó con un vehículo y que éste, de previo, había provocado otra colisión, optara por asumir la responsabilidad plena. El argumento en cuestión es válido y razonable, pero, además, como ya se indicó, fue tan solo un elemento adicional valorado por el tribunal de instancia. Además, esta Cámara, del examen integral que debe realizar de la sentencia, el debate y las pruebas que constan en autos, tampoco ha advertido alguna razón por la cual [Nombre 004] tuviera alguna intención de perjudicar a [Nombre 001], a quien conoció el día de los hechos, al punto que la manipulara -sin que quede claro de qué manera- para que asumiera injustamente plena responsabilidad de los daños materiales y, luego, de físicos y morales, pese a que -según la tesis defensiva- otra persona ([Nombre 006]), a quien el agraviado tampoco conocía, por lo que no tenía razón para beneficiarla, había colisionado previamente con él. Finalmente, es menester responder al cuestionamiento emitido por la defensa técnica en cuanto a que los hechos demostrados no son absolutamente coincidentes con los acusados. Cabe enfatizar que el recurrente no alegó una vulneración al principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia como tal, ni al derecho de defensa, sino que se limitó a mencionar que el tribunal de instancia omitió circunstancias fácticas que estaban detalladas en la acusación y que nunca se lograron acreditar, sin precisarlas, lo que -según él- debilitaba la tesis fiscal. En virtud del examen integral que debe realizar esta Cámara, se contrastaron los hechos acusados con los probados, verificando que no existe divergencia alguna en lo que respecta al núcleo de la imputación. Cabe recordar que la acusación no es una pieza rígida y, si bien se constituye en el marco fáctico sobre el cual el juzgador debe resolver, lo que se persigue con ello es que en sentencia no se establezcan circunstancias sorpresivas, en perjuicio de la persona imputada. De esta manera, que no exista identidad absoluta entre los hechos acusados y lo que se acredita en el debate, no se traduce en vicio alguno mientras no se vulnere el derecho de defensa. En el caso que nos ocupa, analizada la sentencia e incluso los alegatos esgrimidos durante el contradictorio por la defensa técnica y material, resulta evidente que no existió tal vulneración, sino que simplemente la tesis defensiva no fue acogida por el a quo, por las razones ya analizadas. En conclusión, el fallo apelado no presenta vicios en la valoración de la prueba ni vulneración a las reglas de la sana crítica que sean capaces de invalidarla, como tampoco violación al principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia. Los yerros que se acusan se basan en una lectura sesgada e incompleta de la prueba recabada en debate y los análisis intelectivos de la sentencia, con ello procurando respaldar la tesis defensiva que se sostuvo durante el debate, pero que el análisis integral y concatenado del elenco probatorio, debida y ampliamente esbozado por el juzgador, permitió válidamente descartar, por lo que procede declarar sin lugar ambos motivos de impugnación.

IV.- El segundo motivo de apelación de la sentenciada [Nombre 001], por las siguientes razones, se declara sin lugar. Como se indicó en el considerando anterior, dos fueron las tesis de defensa sostenidas durante el contradictorio, una respecto a la dinámica de los hechos (ya analizada) y otra sobre las lesiones sufridas por el ofendido [Nombre 004]. Se alegó que las lesiones no fueron producto de la colisión del diecinueve de noviembre de dos mil dieciocho, pues ese día el agraviado salió del vehículo por sus propios medios y auxilió a las demás personas involucradas, de modo que se trataba de lesiones de vieja data, producto de actividades recreacionales que realizaba el ofendido. Ahora bien, el reproche contenido en el motivo recursivo bajo estudio consistió en que el juzgador omitió explicar la relación causa – efecto entre la colisión y las lesiones del agraviado [Nombre 004] y obvió la discusión sobre si se trataba de lesiones antiguas. Según la recurrente, para determinar la existencia de las lesiones y el nexo causal entre éstas y la acción culposa de la sentenciada [Nombre 001], el juzgador se limitó a valorar los dictámenes médicos 2019-551 y 2020-7387 y exclusivamente con base en ellos tuvo por demostradas las lesiones, la incapacidad permanente que surgió de las mismas y concedió el monto a indemnizar. Sin embargo, examinada la sentencia impugnada, es posible constatar que lo aducido por la recurrente no es cierto. El a quo realizó un análisis amplio de la prueba y de las argumentaciones planteadas por todas las partes respecto al nexo causal entre los hechos y las lesiones sufridas por el agraviado. Es importante aclarar que la sentencia es una unidad lógica, estructurada en diversos considerandos y, en este caso, el juzgador, a su vez, los subdividió en acápites. Así, al valorar la fundamentación intelectiva plasmada en la sentencia no pueden obviarse apartados o secciones, limitándose a uno de ellos como lo ha pretendido la recurrente. Efectivamente, en el considerando 8.2.2. denominado “Sobre la incapacidad permanente” el juzgador no incluyó un análisis respecto a las argumentaciones de la defensa técnica y material en cuanto a que las lesiones del ofendido eran de vieja data y no producto de los hechos, limitándose a reiterar los dictámenes médicos aludidos y, de seguido, enfocarse en otro punto que se discutió, respecto a los peritajes actuario matemáticos. Sin embargo, ello no significa que el juzgador haya omitido valorar los alegatos defensivos ni sopesar la prueba respecto a la relación causa - efecto entre la colisión provocada por el actuar culposo de la sentenciada y las lesiones sufridas por [Nombre 004], descritas en los dictámenes aludidos. Dicha valoración la realizó en el tercer considerando de la sentencia, denominado “Fundamentación probatoria intelectiva”, en el cual -después de explicar la dinámica de los hechos que tuvo por acreditada y las razones para ello- continuó con el análisis del nexo causal con las lesiones sufridas por [Nombre 004]. En este sentido, razonó: “Un último aspecto al que se tiene que hacer referencia a la efectiva determinación de las lesiones del ofendido, es decir, ya la dinámica del accidente quedó definida y ahora resta analizar si hay un nexo entre el siniestro y las lesiones que presentó [Nombre 004], pese a que hubo un espacio de tiempo entre el accidente (19 de noviembre del 2018) y la manifestación en el Juzgado de Tránsito para ser valorado médicamente (17 de enero del 2019) a lo que se tiene que contestar afirmativamente, ya que tanto de lo que declaró en el juicio como de sus atenciones médicas se extrae que no había tenido lesiones previas en las áreas anatómicas en cuestión (hombro y rodilla derechos), así como también existen dictámenes médico legales que así lo confirman, a saber los dictámenes 2019-551 (del 21 de enero del 2019) y 2020-7387 (del 1 de octubre del 2020), los cuales confirmaron los problemas físicos del ofendido en su hombro y en su rodilla, su tratamiento y consecuencias, para finalmente establecer una incapacidad temporal de dos meses y una incapacidad permanente del 10% de su capacidad general. En relación con estos dictámenes médicos legales, el Tribunal debe recalcar que en ningún momento fueron debatidos o contrarrestados en los instantes procesales correspondientes, pues no se apelaron ni se refutaron con prueba en contrario cuando fueron puestos en conocimiento de la defensa ni en la audiencia preliminar ni en el juicio. En consecuencia, la única derivación lógica que puede tener el suscrito juzgador es que las lesiones del señor [Nombre 004] sí se pueden vincular con el accidente que fue provocado por la actuación imprudente de la señora [Nombre 001], quien, valga señalarlo ahora, declaró que ella consideraba que [Nombre 004] quería endosarle a ella, por el accidente, lesiones viejas probablemente derivadas del ejercicio del ciclismo o del hiking que practicaba el ofendido y que por excelencia son deportes que provocan ese tipo de lesiones, sin embargo esta fue una afirmación que no contó con ningún fundamento probatorio y que se opone a la lógica porque en efecto, como bien lo señaló el ofendido, de ser así habría estado esperando tener un accidente de tránsito para poder tratarse las lesiones, cosa que es ajena a la lógica y a la experiencia, pero así como eso no fue sustentado por la imputada, tampoco hubo ninguna prueba de lo dicho por la señora [Nombre 001] sobre que el ofendido [Nombre 004] tenía influencias «por todo lado» y que pudo haber ejercido esa influencia de forma ilegítima en las decisiones médicas, actuariales y jurídicas, por lo que el planteamiento formulado por la sindicada tiene que reputarse como abstracto, injustificado y temerario, pues nada lo fundamenta más que su presunción personal. Siempre en relación con el nexo causal entre el siniestro y las lesiones, este Tribunal, con base en las reglas de la lógica y de la experiencia comprende que no necesariamente de forma inmediata después de un accidente se van a manifestar lesiones en el cuerpo de la persona que lo sufre, en este caso de [Nombre 004], pues frente a estos eventos es posible y frecuente que la respuesta de adrenalina pueda enmascarar el dolor y los síntomas después del hecho, sin embargo, también este juzgador entiende que frente a un accidente de tránsito hay dos tipos de lesiones, aquellas que aparecen de inmediato y las que pueden recibir el calificativo de diferidas o tardías, cuyos síntomas pueden surgir o profundizarse días, semanas o hasta meses después del accidente, de modo que no hay nada extraño, sospechoso o ilícito en que el señor [Nombre 004] haya solicitado ser valorado por Medicatura Forense un par de meses después del accidente, en el entendido de que no se trató de lesiones de surgimiento espontáneo, sino que según lo narró el propio ofendido, fueron dolores que gradualmente lo llevaron a necesitar la atención médica y es por ello que en ese aspecto se debe validar la declaración de la víctima y reconocer, por consiguiente, que efectivamente se le produjeron afectaciones físicas en el hombro derecho y en la rodilla derecha, las cuales tuvieron que ser abordadas por diferentes médicos. Así pues, para este Tribunal tanto el accidente como las lesiones derivadas de él, se comprobaron de un modo adecuado y es por ello que debe achacarse responsabilidad penal a la señora [Nombre 001].”. Como se desprende de la amplia argumentación esbozada por el juzgador, éste no se limitó a dar por cierto lo establecido en los dictámenes, sin justificación alguna. Tampoco obvió la tesis defensiva, sino que más bien respondió cada uno de los alegatos. A su vez, el a quo analizó la prueba pericial en conjunto con la declaración rendida por [Nombre 004] (que cabe indicar que también fue corroborada en este sentido por su hijo) y aplicó las reglas de la experiencia para explicar que el hecho de que el ofendido no hubiese percibido dolor o no hubiese quedado inmovilizado inmediatamente después del accidente de tránsito, no se constituye en razón suficiente para negar que las lesiones fueran consecuencia de los hechos. Este tribunal de alzada comparte el criterio plasmado en sentencia, pues -efectivamente- las reglas de la experiencia permiten concluir que las lesiones no necesariamente se perciben de forma inmediata, máxime ante circunstancias como las que rodearon los hechos en cuestión. No puede obviarse que el ofendido se encontraba con su hijo menor de edad para la fecha, por lo que es lógico que se preocupara primero por la integridad física de éste. También es una reacción común egresar del vehículo y verificar el estado de las demás personas, siendo que en este caso el ofendido [Nombre 004] se percató que la conductora del vehículo que lo impactó directamente era una mujer embarazada y que el vehículo de la sentenciada [Nombre 001] botaba humo, por lo que -razonablemente- [Nombre 004] prestó auxilio ante dichas circunstancias, sin que de ello pueda desprenderse que no sufriera golpe alguno y mucho menos que las lesiones que fueron constatadas a través de los dictámenes médicos fueran antiguas. A su vez, los argumentos sostenidos durante el contradictorio, principalmente por parte de la defensa material, para establecer que las lesiones eran de vieja data y la información contenida en la prueba documental y pericial eran producto de la manipulación o influencias de parte del ofendido, fueron fundadamente rechazadas por el a quo, pues efectivamente se trataban de presunciones, sin sustento alguno. En este sentido, cabe reiterar que el juzgador fue profuso en explicar las razones por las cuales concedió credibilidad a la declaración de [Nombre 004], sin que se haya detectado vicio alguno en los razonamientos del juzgador ni en la valoración de la prueba, sobre lo cual este Tribunal ya se pronunció en el considerando anterior. En cuanto al alegato que [Nombre 006] no tuvo lesiones, por lo que no es razonable que [Nombre 004] sí las haya sufrido, no es posible admitirlo, pues es contrario a las reglas de la sana crítica. La experiencia y el sentido común permiten aseverar que las lesiones que sufre una persona, tras un accidente de tránsito, dependen de numerosos factores, como pueden ser la posición y la tensión del cuerpo al momento del impacto, así como la edad de la persona, entre otras. Cabe añadir que el estado del vehículo del ofendido, el cual sufrió impacto en la parte trasera y en la parte delantera torna razonable que, efectivamente, el agraviado sufriera los golpes que adujo y que además se constataron con la prueba pericial aludida, de modo que el análisis integral de todo el elenco probatorio no hace más que confirmar la posición adoptada por el juzgador. Así, contrario a lo que se alegó en el recurso de apelación, la sentencia impugnada contiene una amplia valoración sobre el nexo de causalidad que hizo nacer no sólo la responsabilidad penal sino también la civil, evidenciándose que el reclamo se trata de una mera inconformidad derivada de que el juzgador no acogió la tesis defensiva, mas no del alegado vicio en la fundamentación. Por otra parte, propiamente en cuanto al monto dinerario que se concedió como indemnización por concepto de incapacidad permanente, la recurrente cuestionó los razonamientos esgrimidos por el juzgador para utilizar el peritaje actuarial matemático emitido por Jesús Josué Pacheco Brizuela como parámetro para ello, concediendo la suma de noventa y seis millones ochocientos setenta y tres mil novecientos veinticinco colones con sesenta y dos céntimos (¢96.873.925,62), tal y como fue reclamado por la parte actora civil. Cuestionó que no se utilizara el peritaje elaborado por Edwin Castro Jiménez, en el que se establecía un monto dinerario menor, pues realizaba los cálculos matemáticos utilizando como base el salario neto y no el salario bruto de [Nombre 004]. A efectos de una mejor comprensión y resolver el alegato, conviene precisar que en la sentencia impugnada se declaró parcialmente con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria que fue interpuesta contra [Nombre 001]. El actor civil reclamó indemnización por incapacidad temporal, incapacidad permanente y daño moral. Sin embargo, el juzgador rechazó ordenar el resarcimiento por concepto de incapacidad temporal y, en cuanto al daño moral impuso un monto de indemnización considerablemente menor que el reclamado. Estos aspectos de la decisión jurisdiccional no fueron impugnados por el actor civil ni alguna otra parte, por lo que se mantienen incólumes. En cuanto a la incapacidad permanente, durante el juicio, la defensa técnica y la propia sentenciada, en ejercicio de su defensa material, alegaron que el monto reclamado era excesivo y, específicamente la defensa técnica de la co-demandada civil, América Ciento Siete S.A., fue enfática en cuestionar que se utilizara como base para los cálculos matemáticos el salario bruto y no el neto. En este sentido, la representación de la co-demandada civil mencionada ofreció como prueba para mejor resolver un peritaje elaborado por Edwin Castro Jiménez, el cual fue admitido y sopesado por el juzgador, del cual se desprendía que la suma que debía resarcirse por concepto de la incapacidad permanente era de cincuenta y cinco millones novecientos nueve mil ciento noventa y dos colones con sesenta y ocho céntimos (¢55.909.192,68). La única diferencia entre ambos peritajes provenía del hecho que el perito Castro Jiménez realizó los cálculos matemáticos tomando en consideración el salario neto del ofendido [Nombre 004], mientras que el peritaje de Pacheco Brizuela, ofrecido por la parte actora civil, tomó en consideración el salario bruto. El reclamo que ahora hace la recurrente, aunque no fue planteado en su momento por la defensa técnica ni material de [Nombre 001], lo cierto es que fue un tema abordado por el juzgador en la sentencia impugnada, en virtud de que -como se indicó- formó parte de los alegatos conclusivos de la representación de la co-demandada civil. En este orden de ideas, el a quo expuso: “Pues bien, la inferencia fundamental que se tiene que hacer es que ambos peritajes establecieron que frente a la incapacidad permanente del ofendido correspondía una indemnización, aunque difirieron en los montos, por lo que corresponde al suscrito señalar que desde el punto de vista de lo que establece el numeral 74 de la Ley de Tránsito, para el cálculo de los montos por incapacidad permanente se deben tomar en cuenta los salarios reportados a la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social y a criterio del suscrito juzgador, los salarios reportados son, precisamente, los salarios brutos, de modo que ante las diferentes sumas presentadas por las partes, se tiene que optar por la que derivó del peritaje elaborado por Pacheco Brizuela. No se omite señalar sobre este punto que durante el juicio se cuestionó por parte de la tercera civil demandada el monto exacto del salario de [Nombre 004], pero este es un argumento que no puede prosperar porque esa misma instancia gestionó la realización del peritaje de Castro Jiménez con base en el mismo salario que en su momento consideró Pacheco Brizuela, por lo que se trataría de un argumento circular. Ahora bien, se hace referencia en este punto a sendos planteamientos de la tercera civil demandada porque a su manera incidían en los intereses de la señora [Nombre 001], máxime por tratarse de prueba común para las partes, sin embargo, valga señalar aquí que la defensa técnica de la señora [Nombre 001] no aportó ningún argumento técnico ni hizo planteamiento alguno sobre estos peritajes más allá de cuestionar en abstracto la proporcionalidad de los montos fijados por Pacheco Brizuela, por lo que ante tal falta de acción de la defensa de la imputada penal y demandada civil, el Tribunal debe atenerse a la prueba que consta en autos y declarar que [Nombre 001] debe indemnizar a [Nombre 004] por la incapacidad permanente derivada del accidente, la cual se fija en la suma de ¢96.873.925,62.”. Esta Cámara comparte los razonamientos esgrimidos por el juzgador y estima que se resolvió conforme a derecho, al utilizar el peritaje confeccionado por Pacheco Brizuela, pues los cálculos matemáticos contemplados en dicho peritaje eran los que se adecuaban a lo establecido en la norma reseñada por el juzgador, sea el artículo 74 de la Ley de Tránsito. Aunado a ello, la decisión es congruente con la normativa contenida en el Código de Trabajo, propiamente el título IV y especialmente lo establecido en el artículo 235 y la interpretación que los tribunales han venido aplicando en la materia. En este sentido, pueden mencionarse las resoluciones 821-2004, 325-2009 y 707-2014 de la Sala Segunda, así como la resolución 145-2024 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección de Ejecución, en las que -al cuestionarse los cálculos realizados para indemnizaciones, tanto por incapacidad temporal como permanente- se usa como parámetro, precisamente, el salario bruto reportado. El alegato de la recurrente parte de un presunto enriquecimiento injusto, al utilizar el salario bruto que incluye montos que -según dice- nunca llegarán al agraviado, pues están destinados para cubrir las cargas sociales y tributarias. Este fue el mismo argumento sostenido por la representación de la co-demandada civil. No obstante, como bien lo apuntó el a quo, el artículo 74 de la Ley de Tránsito es claro en que debe utilizarse el salario reportado a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, el cual consiste en el salario bruto. Aunado a ello, es menester aclarar que la indemnización por incapacidad permanente no consiste en el otorgamiento de salarios no percibidos, sino que lo que pretende es compensar los daños y secuelas que ha debido soportar el actor civil, como consecuencia de la conducta culposa de la demandada. De esta forma, no existe enriquecimiento injusto, porque no se trata del otorgamiento de un salario, del cual deban realizarse deducciones. El monto concedido, si bien es alto, resulta razonable y proporcional, atendiendo a esos daños y secuelas que fueron acreditados a través de la valoración conjunta del dicho del ofendido [Nombre 004], ratificado por el testigo [Nombre 009], así como los dictámenes médicos que constataron y detallaron las lesiones por las cuales se estableció una pérdida del 10% de la capacidad general, pérdida que no sólo lo limitará en sus labores remuneradas, sino en todas sus ocupaciones habituales. Además, el juzgador concedió ese monto dinerario, no de manera arbitraria o antojadiza, sino que se fundó en un dictamen pericial objetivo y del cual lo único que se cuestionó fue que utilizara como base el salario bruto, mas no las demás consideraciones y cálculos matemáticos consignados. Así, el juzgador explicó con claridad las razones por las cuales el peritaje que consideró idóneo y conforme a derecho lo fue el del perito Pacheco Brizuela y no el de Castro Jiménez, según lo establecido en la letra de la ley. La fundamentación del a quo respecto a este punto en específico fue concreta pero suficiente y se justificó en los elementos de prueba que ponderó en forma objetiva y según lo establecido en la normativa aplicable, de modo que no existe el agravio planteado. Finalmente, cabe mencionar que, sin mayor detalle, se alegó que la sentencia no tuvo por demostrado algún hecho que sustente la condena civil. El reproche se descarta. En el octavo considerando de la sentencia, acápite 8.1. denominado “Hechos probados civiles”, expresamente se consignó: “Los hechos civiles que se tuvieron por acreditados, fueron los siguientes: 1. En fecha 19 de noviembre de 2018, aproximadamente a las 9:20 horas, el ofendido y actor civil [Nombre 004], conducía el vehículo placas [Valor 005] en compañía de su hijo [Nombre 009] menor de edad, quien iba en el asiento del acompañante en la parte delantera, en Heredia, Ulloa, ruta 1, sentido Alajuela hacia San José, 300 metros antes del puente Alfredo González Flores, por el carril de la izquierda, con derecho de vía. 2. Ese mismo día, hora y lugar, la demandad civil [Nombre 001] conducía el vehículo placas [Valor 003], propiedad registral de América Ciento Siete Sociedad Anónima, en el mismo sentido que el actor civil [Nombre 004]. 3. El vehículo que viajaba adelante del vehículo del ofendido, placas [Valor 006], conducido por [Nombre 010], se detuvo, debido a una presa vial por lo que el actor civil [Nombre 004] también se detuvo, manteniendo su distancia, además, detrás del accionante venía el vehículo placas [Valor 004] conducido por [Nombre 006], quien igualmente se detuvo manteniendo la distancia y detrás de [Nombre 006] conducía la demandada [Nombre 001] quien faltó al deber de cuidado en la conducción de vehículos siendo que no se detuvo ni mantuvo la distancia que exige nuestra normativa por lo que golpeó fuertemente el vehículo que conducía [Nombre 006] y en razón de la fuerza ejercida sobre el vehículo de doña [Nombre 006], este se proyectó contra el vehículo del actor civil [Nombre 004], de esta manera golpeó el vehículo en la parte trasera y a su vez el vehículo que conducía el ofendido se lanzó contra el vehículo que tenía en frente que conducía [Nombre 010], razón por la cual el ofendido [Nombre 004], se golpeó contra el dash y contra la parte interior de su vehículo, se golpeó la rodilla derecha, el cinturón de seguridad le produjo un golpe por el efecto de latigazo en el cuello, hombro y brazo derecho, lesiones que ameritaron atención médica. 4. Consecuencia de lo anterior, el ofendido y actor civil [Nombre 004], sufrió lesiones y según dictámenes médico legales número 2019-551, de fecha 21 de enero de 2019, y número 2020-7387, de fecha 1 octubre de 2020, sufrió lesión condal en rodilla derecha, siendo que tenía ruptura del tendón de manguito rotador que se trató de forma conservadora, por lo que ameritó shaver y en el hombro derecho le realizaron infiltraciones. Actualmente padece dolor en el hombro, brazo y antebrazo, por lo que se le dificulta levantar peso y en la rodilla derecha que se le exacerba al subir gradas y acuclillarse, lesiones que ocasionaron un daño físico al accionante que ameritó una incapacidad temporal de dos meses (2 meses), a partir de la fecha de los hechos, y una incapacidad permanente de un diez (10%) por ciento, por pérdida de la capacidad general orgánica. 5. Que además del daño físico, [Nombre 004] también sufrió un daño de tipo moral a raíz de estos hechos, que se refiere a la lesión efectiva en sus sentimientos, así como por la angustia y ansiedad derivados de los padecimientos físicos supra descritos, las molestias que le han generado las diferentes lesiones en su cuerpo, que se manifiestan en episodios de ira y dolor, aunado a ello, por el largo proceso médico al que se ha tenido que someter.”. (Cita textual). De esta manera, el juzgador precisó los hechos civiles que tuvo por demostrados en un acápite independiente para esos efectos, sumado a todo el análisis fáctico y probatorio que plasmó a lo largo de la sentencia y que permite controlar cuáles hechos tuvo por demostrados y cuáles fueron las razones que lo condujeron a ello. Así las cosas, por todo lo expuesto, el segundo motivo del recurso de apelación planteado por [Nombre 001] debe rechazarse en todos sus extremos.

V.- En el tercer motivo de impugnación, la recurrente [Nombre 001] cuestionó la imposición de la pena accesoria de inhabilitación y consideró que el juzgador la impuso de forma automática e indiscriminada, sin valorar que la conducción de automotores en su caso no se trataba de una actividad habitual que generara provecho económico. El reclamo debe declararse sin lugar. A efectos de claridad, se detalla que, en el caso que nos ocupa, el juzgador impuso, como pena principal, sesenta días multa, a razón de cinco mil colones (¢5.000,00) por día, para un total de trescientos mil colones (¢300.000,00) y, como pena accesoria, la inhabilitación en la conducción de vehículos automotores por las vías públicas terrestres, por un período de seis meses. Ahora bien, la fundamentación de la pena principal no ha sido objeto de impugnación, sino que el reclamo de la quejosa radicó únicamente en la aplicación de la pena de inhabilitación. Dicha decisión, a criterio de esta Cámara, se encuentra plenamente ajustada a derecho, conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 50, 71 y 128 del Código Penal. El artículo 50 de dicho cuerpo normativo regula los distintos tipos de penas que contempla nuestra legislación. Expresamente, dicho numeral dispone: “Artículo 50- Las penas. Las penas que este Código establece son: 1) Principales: prisión, extrañamiento, multa e inhabilitación. 2) Accesorias: inhabilitación especial. 3) Prestación de servicios de utilidad pública. 4) Arresto domiciliario con monitoreo electrónico. 5) Tratamiento de drogas bajo supervisión judicial restaurativa.”. Conforme al principio de legalidad, cada figura delictiva debe especificar el o los tipos de pena a aplicar, fijando además los extremos mínimos y máximos. Dentro de esos márgenes el juzgador debe determinar el quantum, acudiendo a los parámetros contemplados en el artículo 71 del Código Penal y a criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Entonces, en el caso concreto, procede analizar lo dispuesto en el artículo 128 del Código Penal, que es el que sanciona la conducta que le fue atribuida a la sentenciada [Nombre 001]. El numeral en mención, en lo que interesa, estipula: “Artículo 128.- Lesiones culposas. Se impondrá prisión hasta de un año, o hasta cien días multa, a quien por culpa cause a otro lesiones de las definidas en los artículos 123, 124 y 125. Para la adecuación de la pena al responsable, el tribunal deberá tener en cuenta el grado de culpa, el número de víctimas y la magnitud de los daños causados. En todo caso, al autor de las lesiones culposas también se le impondrá inhabilitación de seis meses a dos años para el ejercicio de la profesión, el oficio, el arte o la actividad en la que se produjo el hecho…”. (El resaltado y subrayado no pertenecen al original). Como es fácilmente apreciable, la norma -tal y como lo valoró el a quo- establece la obligación, no la potestad, de imponer una pena accesoria de inhabilitación no sólo para quien ejerce una profesión, oficio o arte, como parece interpretarlo la recurrente, sino también para la actividad en la que se produjo el hecho, sin que -en cuanto a este último supuesto- exija habitualidad o remuneración. En otras palabras, el artículo citado, simple y llanamente, establece que “en todo caso”, al autor de las lesiones se le impondrá una inhabilitación para la actividad en la que se produjo el hecho, sin que condicione tal sanción a que la persona se dedique profesional o habitualmente a esa actividad, no resultando procedente distinguir donde la norma no lo hace. Se tuvo por demostrado que la sentenciada [Nombre 001], mientras ejercía la actividad de conducción de un vehículo automotor, ocasionó lesiones al agraviado [Nombre 004]. De allí que, al juzgador, ineludiblemente, le correspondía imponer no solo la pena principal, sino también la accesoria, conforme a la letra de la ley. Para sostener su tesis, la recurrente citó pronunciamientos de la Sala de Casación Penal que son de vieja data, cuyo criterio jurídico no sólo no es compartido por esta Cámara de Apelación, sino que incluso ha sido revertido por la misma Sala de Casación Penal. Tal y como lo afirmó el a quo en la sentencia impugnada y esta Cámara avala, el criterio que hoy se sostiene como línea jurisprudencial uniforme es que, en acciones culposas cometidas en materia de tránsito, la pena accesoria de inhabilitación para la conducción de vehículos debe ser impuesta en todos los casos, pues precisamente las lesiones se generan a raíz de esa actividad. Se reitera que no es necesario que el autor del hecho culposo obtenga un lucro de esa actividad ni la ejerza de forma habitual, sino únicamente que la misma haya sido ejecutada y diera origen al hecho delictivo, como se tuvo por acreditado en el caso bajo examen. Como se desprende de la norma comentada y el criterio dominante y uniformador de la Sala de Casación Penal, contenido en la resolución 209-2014 de dicho órgano jurisdiccional, el legislador aludió al genérico concepto “actividad” en la que se produjo el hecho, de lo que se extrae que la inhabilitación debe imponerse, de manera obligatoria, cuando las lesiones culposas se generen en cualquier actividad humana regulada, como es el caso de la conducción de vehículos automotores por vías terrestres, para la cual se requiere el cumplimiento de ciertos requisitos establecidos por la Ley de Tránsito y cuya licencia es otorgada y supervisada por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. En consecuencia, el juzgador no ha cometido yerro alguno en la aplicación de la ley sustantiva, encontrándose la imposición de la pena accesoria de inhabilitación conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 128 del Código Procesal Penal. Ahora bien, la pena accesoria aludida -por imperativo de ley- debe ser impuesta dentro de los márgenes establecidos por el legislador, los cuales son de seis meses a dos años. El juzgador optó por imponer el plazo mínimo de inhabilitación, de modo que -aunque no existió una fundamentación amplia sobre las razones para decantarse por ese plazo- lo cierto es que decisión no ocasionó agravio alguno a la imputada, pues la pena accesoria resulta imperativa y se impuso el plazo mínimo contemplado por el legislador. Consecuentemente, procede rechazar el presente motivo de apelación.

VI.- Por su afinidad, se resuelven conjuntamente los primeros dos motivos del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la representante de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, así como el cuarto y quinto motivo de dicha impugnación, declarándolos sin lugar. Como se extrae de lo apuntado líneas arriba, en la causa que nos ocupa, el juzgador declaró a [Nombre 001] autora responsable de un delito de Lesiones culposas en perjuicio de [Nombre 004], impuso las penas (principal y accesoria) aducidas y, de igual manera, declaró con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta en su contra. Respecto a la acción civil contra la demandada [Nombre 001], ordenó el resarcimiento a favor de [Nombre 004] por concepto de incapacidad permanente y por daño moral, no así por incapacidad temporal, extremos sobre los cuales no existió impugnación por parte de la representación de la parte actora civil. Ésta se limitó a cuestionar que el juzgador haya declarado sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta contra América Ciento Siete S.A., quien figuraba como co-demandada civil. En este sentido, el juzgador sustentó su decisión en las siguientes argumentaciones: “La responsabilidad civil solidaria del dueño de un vehículo que participa en un siniestro en donde es conocida la persona que conducía el automóvil, no es automática, sino que está delimitada a las causales comprendidas en el artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial, (…) Siempre en relación con lo antes mencionado tiene que recalcarse que para que se configure la responsabilidad solidaria de la persona jurídica se requiere, por una parte, que el vehículo se encuentre en poder de una persona por cualquier título adquisitivo, pero, además, que esta persona se dedique a la explotación del automotor con una finalidad comercial o industrial, o sea, que con su conducta se está generando provecho o utilidad económica, pues lo que genera la responsabilidad civil objetiva es el lucro que se obtiene a través de la explotación de una actividad riesgosa, como lo es el uso de vehículos para el comercio o la industria, en consecuencia, alegar simplemente que hay responsabilidad solidaria automática por el hecho de que el automotor placas [Valor 003] estaba registralmente a nombre de América Ciento Siete S.A., constituye una equivocación por parte de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima. A manera de corolario sobre este argumento, si bien de la conjunción de los numerales 197 y 199 de la Ley de Tránsito se desprende que el propietario del vehículo podría tener responsabilidad civil solidaria con el conductor, ello está supeditado a la demostración de alguna de las hipótesis allí previstas y en el caso sub iudici no se probó que la empresa demandada explotara el automotor por cualquier título con fines comerciales o industriales ni que la señora [Nombre 001] fuera empleada de tal empresa o estuviese ganando dinero con ese carro al momento del siniestro, por el contrario, el propio ofendido [Nombre 004] durante su declaración fue claro al establecer que cuando conversó con la demandada [Nombre 001] inmediatamente después del choque, esta le dijo que había tenido una situación familiar y que iba rumbo a San José para hacer algo en una institución sobre ese particular, lo que excluye el fin comercial o industrial que se exige normativamente, pero no solo eso, sino que la propia demandada [Nombre 001] dijo que ese vehículo era «de ella» y que lo utilizaba como único medio de transporte y para llevar a su hija menor de edad a terapias médicas, por lo que tanto de uno como de otro lado se deriva que el automotor no tenía cumplía un objetivo industrial o comercial para América Ciento Siete S.A. Adviértase, también, que la situación no cambia si se examina el caso de marras desde la óptica del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, que en lo conducente señala que si una persona muere o se lesiona por una máquina motiva, vehículo de un ferrocarril, tranvía u otro modo de trasporte análogo, la empresa o persona explotadora de la actividad está obligada a reparar el perjuicio que de ello resulte, ya que como se ha venido explicando, nunca se imputó en la acción civil resarcitoria ni se acreditó durante el juicio que América Ciento Siete S.A., propietaria registral del automotor, o que [Nombre 001], su conductora el 19 de noviembre del 2018, estuviesen explotándolo para cumplir con una actividad pecuniaria en particular, es decir, que estuviesen lucrando con él, al momento del accidente.”. La posición de la recurrente, expuesta a través de cuatro motivos de su impugnación y que fue detallada en el segundo considerando de la presente resolución, puede reducirse a los siguientes tres reproches: (1) Inaplicación de la ley sustantiva, tanto del artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, como del artículo 1048 del Código Civil (primer y segundo motivo de apelación). El criterio sostenido por la representación del actor civil es que ambas normas se ajustan al caso concreto y fueron erróneamente desaplicadas por el juzgador, en virtud de que éste consideró que se requería demostrar circunstancias que dichas normas no contemplan, como lo es la finalidad de lucro o explotación pecuniaria. Según la recurrente, la responsabilidad civil de la co-demandada, América Ciento Siete S.A., deriva de que el automóvil conducido por la acusada [Nombre 001], al momento de los hechos, se encontraba inscrito a nombre de dicha sociedad anónima, por lo que debe deducirse que el vehículo (como todos sus activos) es explotado para fines comerciales o industriales. Ello dada la naturaleza mercantil de la sociedad anónima y su objeto, el cual fue descrito desde su constitución y consta en la certificación de personería jurídica que se ofreció e incorporó como prueba. Según la posición esgrimida por la representación del actor civil, descrita en los dos primeros motivos de su impugnación, con ello basta para tener por cumplidos los supuestos contenidos en ambas normas mencionadas, por lo que el juzgador debió declarar con lugar la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta contra América Ciento Siete S.A. y ésta responder solidariamente, con la totalidad de su patrimonio, por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por [Nombre 004]. Analizados los argumentos de la recurrente, así como los razonamientos del juzgador citados líneas arriba y las normas cuya aplicación pretende la parte actora civil, esta Cámara de Apelación concluye que lo resuelto, en lo que respecta a la responsabilidad derivada del artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, como a la que se desprende del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, se encuentra conforme a derecho. En este sentido, el inciso b) del artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito dispone: “ARTÍCULO 199.- Responsabilidad solidaria. Responderán solidariamente con el conductor: (…) b) Las personas físicas o jurídicas que, por cualquier título, exploten vehículos con fines comerciales o industriales, incluyendo el transporte público. (…)”. (El resaltado no pertenece al original). El juzgador, precisamente, consideró que no se cumplía con el supuesto citado, pues la parte actora civil no demostró que el vehículo que provocó la colisión fuese explotado con fines comerciales o industriales, lo cual -según su criterio- no podía presumirse por tratarse de una sociedad anónima, sino que debía ser demostrado por el actor civil. A su vez, el artículo 1048 del Código Civil, en lo conducente, estipula: “ARTÍCULO 1048.- (…) Y si una persona muriere o fuere lesionada por una máquina motiva, o un vehículo de un ferrocarril, tranvía u otro modo de trasporte análogo, la empresa o persona explotadora está obligada a reparar el perjuicio que de ello resulte, si no prueba que el accidente fue causado por fuerza mayor o por la propia falta de la persona muerta o lesionada.”. (El resaltado no pertenece al original). En lo atinente a la responsabilidad contenida en dicha norma, el juzgador estimó que contemplaba el mismo requisito, en cuanto a la explotación del vehículo, lo cual -como ya había aducido- no se acreditó. La representación del actor civil no sólo en la impugnación bajo examen, sino en el escrito de la acción civil resarcitoria, así como a través de sus alegatos en el contradictorio, ha sostenido que basta que se trate de una sociedad anónima, así como la certificación de personería jurídica y el fin allí descrito, para tener por acreditado lo dispuesto en ambas normas. Sin embargo, su postura parte de una presunción, lo cual no puede ser admitido por esta Cámara, como no lo fue por el a quo. Es cierto que América Ciento Siete S.A. es una sociedad anónima, al respecto no existió controversia y se trata de un hecho notorio que no requiere prueba, en ese sentido tiene razón la recurrente. También es cierto que las disposiciones de los artículos 5 y 17 del Código de Comercio establecen que las sociedades anónimas son figuras mercantiles. Sin embargo, no por ello puede presumirse, para efectos de la responsabilidad solidaria contenida en las normas citadas, que todos los bienes inscritos a su nombre (en este caso un vehículo) sean explotados con fines comerciales o industriales, pues la misma normativa del Código de Comercio, así como la doctrina mayoritaria, reconoce la posibilidad de que no todos los actos realizados por esas entidades, sean actos de comercio per se, como también hay actos de comercio que son realizadas por personas distintas a las listadas en el artículo 17 mencionado. En este sentido, léase “Temas de Derecho Comercial” del tratadista Gastón Certad Maroto, así como “Curso de Derecho Mercantil” de Boris Kozolchyk y Octavio Torrealba. Así, el carácter mercantil de todas las sociedades anónimas (y de las otras figuras contenidas en el artículo 17 en cuestión) tiene como consecuencia que estén sometidas a un régimen jurídico especial, sea el contenido en el Código de Comercio (y no en el Código Civil), pero ello no permite deducir, como lo pretende la recurrente, que América Ciento Siete S.A. explotara el vehículo placas [Valor 003] con fines comerciales o industriales, lo cual debía ser probado por la parte, pues forma parte integral de las normas cuya aplicación pretendía y de las cuales consideraba que se derivaba su derecho. En este sentido, conviene citar la resolución número 866-2002 de la Sala de Casación Penal, en la que se delimitó el término “explotar” de la siguiente manera: “Basta señalar, que el artículo 187 de la Ley de Tránsito dispone la responsabilidad solidaria de las personas jurídicas que por cualquier título exploten vehículos con fines comerciales. El término “exploten”, como forma verbal, es la conjugación en tercera persona plural, del verbo “explotar” que – entre sus diversas acepciones - significa: “... 2.- Sacar utilidad de un negocio o industria en provecho propio...” (Diccionario de la Real Academia Española de la Lengua, décimo novena edición, pág. 598, 1.970 Madrid)”. (Cita textual). Si bien se hace referencia al numeral 187 de la Ley de Tránsito se trata de la misma disposición que ahora se encuentra contenida en el artículo 199 de esa ley, por lo que lo indicado resulta plenamente aplicable y resulta congruente con los argumentos del juzgador plasmados en el fallo impugnado. Precisamente, el a quo fundó su decisión en que la parte actora civil no demostró el supuesto contenido en el artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, pues no acreditó que el vehículo fuese explotado para fines de comercio o industria, limitándose a sostener que tratándose de una sociedad anónima dicho fin se encontraba implícito. De esta manera, no es cierto que el a quo haya realizado una interpretación extensiva o arbitraria, agregado requisitos o supuestos no contenidos por la norma, pues la razón principal por la cual el juzgador no aplicó el artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito (como tampoco el numeral 1048 del Código Civil) consistió en que no se demostró que el vehículo placas [Valor 003] fuese explotado por América Ciento Siete S.A.. Esto con independencia de que se trate de una utilidad pecuniaria o pueda entenderse que sea de otro tipo, finalmente, lo que interesa es que dicha circunstancia no se puede tener por demostrada por el mero hecho de que la co-demandada civil sea una sociedad anónima, como lo pretendió y sigue pretendiendo la parte actora civil. Este criterio ha sido sostenido también por los tribunales civiles de nuestro país, en resoluciones recientes, entre ellas la resolución número 243-2020 del Tribunal Segundo de Apelación Civil de San José, que -en lo conducente- señala: “(…) Diversas Salas de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, han analizado ese tema y el verbo “explotar”, contenido en el inciso de comentario (voto #963-A-2006 de las 14:10 horas de 11/12/2006 de la Primera y #866 de las 10:30 horas de 30/08/2002 de la Tercera). Quien obtiene lucro mercantil a través de la cosa que fue usada para dañar, por motivos de equidad y creación de un riesgo, debe afrontar conjuntamente con sus dependientes de menor solvencia, las consecuencias de la actividad que propician. No se ocupa la autoría personal, elucubrada por la autoridad a quo, ya que no resulta exigida por el inciso b) indicado, que atiende a otras valoraciones del ordenamiento. La idea subyacente, es que en los supuestos tasados del 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, la víctima, ensanche las posibilidades de ver satisfecho su interés, a través de alguien de mayor solvencia. Particularmente, el propietario del vehículo, debe encarar ese deber de responder por lo que haya quedado insoluto, con todo su patrimonio y no sólo con el valor del camión.”. (La cita es textual y el resaltado no pertenece al original). Véase que se trata de la misma interpretación que realizó el a quo en cuanto al término “explotar”, requisito contenido en ambas normas, el cual no puede ser soslayado, como tácitamente lo pretende la recurrente al sostener que basta la naturaleza mercantil de la sociedad anónima para tener por demostrada la responsabilidad civil solidaria. Como ya se apuntó, la naturaleza mercantil de las entidades contempladas en el artículo 17 del Código de Comercio tiene relevancia para determinar a cuál régimen jurídico son sometidas, mas no se constituye en una presunción iuris et de iure (de derecho y por derecho) que permita afirmar que todos sus bienes son explotados para fines comerciales o industriales. En el mismo orden de ideas, también procede mencionar la resolución número 117-2019 de la Sección IV del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en el que más bien se estableció la responsabilidad solidaria, contenida en el supuesto de interés, para lo cual se valoró no sólo el objeto social de la persona jurídica accionada, como lo pretende la recurrente, sino múltiple prueba documental y testimonial, como lo fue un oficio de la Dirección de Inteligencia Tributaria del Ministerio de Hacienda, fotografías del vehículo y la declaración del propio conductor, todo lo cual permitió acreditar que: “la compañía sí destinaba el vehículo comprometido en el accidente con actividades comerciales de transporte de carga pesada, por lo que en principio quedaría sujeta al marco jurídico de la responsabilidad solidaria en materia de tránsito”. En este sentido, se expuso en dicha resolución: “(…) estamos frente a una norma jurídica de equidad que busca garantizar una justa indemnización de las lesiones causadas a raíz de la introducción de un riesgo en la sociedad -el vehículo automotor-, cuyo objetivo ha sido obtener un beneficio comercial o industrial de su uso, lo cual a su vez se corresponde con el principio fundamental de la responsabilidad civil por riesgo creado, aquel por el cual quien se beneficia de la generación de un riesgo, debe asumir las consecuencias derivadas de éste: “ubi est emolumentum, ibi debet ese onus” (“donde está la retribución, allí debe estar la carga”).”. (El resaltado no pertenece al original). Congruente con lo expuesto, de manera clara y para mayor abundamiento, la Sección I del Tribunal Segundo Civil, mediante resolución número 351-2003, consideró: “Por otra parte, conviene poner de relieve que, conforme al inciso "b)" del artículo 187 de la misma Ley, "Responderán solidariamente con el conductor: ...b) Las personas físicas o jurídicas que, por cualquier título, exploten vehículos con fines comerciales o industriales, incluyendo el transporte público. ..." entre otras, lo cual debe entenderse como que las personas que se sirven de vehículos para sus actividades empresariales responderán solidariamente ante terceros únicamente cuando se trate de la responsabilidad derivada de un accidente que sea imputable al conductor por culpa o por dolo.”. (El subrayado no pertenece al original). Nuevamente conviene recordar que la parte actora civil, tal y como acertadamente lo señaló el juez de instancia, no demostró que el vehículo involucrado en la colisión que provocó las lesiones del actor civil [Nombre 004] fuera utilizado por América Ciento Siete S.A. para actividades empresariales, actos de comercio o industriales; de modo que la decisión se encuentra ajustada al contenido de la norma en mención. Ahora bien, tal y como acertadamente lo valoró el a quo, para la aplicación del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, el legislador también incluyó el requisito de la explotación, como se desprende de la lectura de la norma ya citada. Es criterio de este tribunal de alzada que ambas normas prevén ese requisito, pues la diferencia entre ellas estriba en otros elementos. Específicamente, la responsabilidad establecida en el artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito requiere que se acredite la culpa del conductor, no así la contenida en el 1048 del Código Civil. Además, la responsabilidad derivada del artículo 199 de la ley especial comprende no sólo la que surja por lesiones o muerte, sino también los daños materiales, mientras que la derivada del 1048 del Código Civil no contempla lo último. Así las cosas, el razonamiento esgrimido por el juzgador para rechazar la aplicación de ambas normas es correcto, pues estriba en que no se demostró la necesaria explotación que sobre el vehículo placas [Valor 003] realizara América Ciento Siete S.A., lo cual competía a la parte actora civil, sobre lo cual se ahondará más adelante. Ahora bien, para sustentar su posición, la recurrente mencionó y citó en reiteradas ocasiones extractos de la resolución 1867-2013 de la Sala de Casación Penal, por lo que esta Cámara procede a citarla más ampliamente, de modo que se comprenda el tema que era objeto de discusión, así como la totalidad de los argumentos allí esgrimidos. En este sentido, dicha resolución dice: “La jurisprudencia de esta Sala, al respecto de la responsabilidad objetiva, ha indicado lo siguiente: “…El párrafo quinto del artículo 1048 del Código Civil dispone: “Y si una persona muriere o fuere lesionada por una máquina motiva, o un vehículo de un ferrocarril, tranvía u otro modo de transporte análogo, la empresa o persona explotadora está obligada a reparar el perjuicio que de ello resulte, si no prueba que el accidente fue causado por fuerza mayor o por la propia falta de la persona muerta o lesionada.” El fundamento de esta forma de responsabilidad objetiva es, como se dijo, la existencia de actividades lícitas (no tiene aquí cabida, entonces, referirse a la antijuridicidad), propias del desarrollo tecnológico del hombre, que no debe ser obstaculizado, pero que, a su vez, generan un riesgo -como entidades productoras potenciales de daños-, el cual no ha de ser asumido por la víctima o sus sucesores y allegados, sino por aquel que se beneficia de la actividad riesgosa o de la tenencia de un objeto de peligro. Obedece, entonces, no al incumplimiento de un vínculo determinado, sino a la violación de la regla general de no dañar a los otros (en este último sentido, ver sentencia 354 de la Sala Primera, citada). Una de las conclusiones prácticas más importantes, en estos casos, consiste en la inversión de la carga de la prueba, que ya se hizo ver, de tal modo que será el señalado por la ley como responsable, quien deba demostrar que el daño ocurrió por fuerza mayor o por culpa de la propia víctima (ver: sentencias No. 61, de 14,50 hrs., de 19 de junio de 1996, de la Sala Primera de la Corte; 1396, de 9,30 hrs. de 7 de mayo de 1975, del Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo; 481 de 10,05 hrs. de 20 de julio de 1992, del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, Sección Segunda); no se discutirá aquí si medió o no culpabilidad del agente, pues, en este último supuesto, el asunto se resumiría en un caso de responsabilidad subjetiva (ilícito civil o penal), aplicando lo que establece el artículo 1045 ya transcrito. Se extrae de ello que, en su forma objetiva, el deber resarcitorio no surge de un ilícito civil (o penal) -o, en general, de lo antijurídico-, sino del ejercicio de una actividad o de la tenencia de un objeto generador de riesgos, pero que constituyen actos completamente lícitos; la responsabilidad: “... estriba en atribuir el daño a todo el que introduce en la sociedad un elemento virtual de producirlo... prescinde de la subjetividad del agente, y centra el problema de la reparación y sus límites en torno de la causalidad material, investigando tan solo cuál hecho fue, materialmente, causa del efecto, para atribuírselo sin más. Le basta la producción del resultado dañoso, no exige la configuración de un acto ilícito a través de los elementos tradicionales...” (ALTERINI, Atilio, Responsabilidad civil , 3a. ed., Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1987, p. 106). Por otra parte, el legislador ha fijado ciertos límites a este tipo de responsabilidad objetiva, el primero de los cuales lo determina la naturaleza del daño, que ha de consistir en lesiones o muerte, por lo que se excluye aquel que recaiga sobre las cosas….” (Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Res. N° 1262-97, de las 11:30 horas, del 14 de noviembre de 1997). Esta posición de la Sala no ha variado. El artículo 1048 del Código Civil, claramente determina que, es responsable de los daños, el dueño del automotor, aún cuando la actividad en la que se causó el daño sea lícita. Cuando de vehículos propiedad de sociedades anónimas se trata, por ser estas entidades destinadas al lucro, este numeral determina que hay responsabilidad civil objetiva, dado el fin de explotación del automotor, en aras del riesgo existente en la actividad. Por ello, es que no nos encontramos ante un supuesto de responsabilidad por dolo o culpa, sino sobre criterios de distribución del riesgo. Así, ciertamente, el imputado [Nombre 300]. fue absuelto, dada la imposibilidad de demostrar que conducía el automotor. Ello, sin embargo, no exime de responsabilidad civil objetiva pues, quien explota el automotor, como ya se dijera, cuenta con el riesgo que implica dicha actividad y ha de responder por el daño causado, sea, en la causa, la muerte de la ofendida. Se debe aclarar, que no resulta aplicable al caso la Ley de Tránsito que cita el recurrente, pues no estamos ante una situación donde se discuta la responsabilidad civil subjetiva indirecta sobre la muerte de la ofendida, sino un caso donde opera la responsabilidad civil objetiva que contempla la normativa civil ya citada.”. (Cita textual. El resaltado no pertenece al original). Así, se destaca que en dicha resolución lo que se discutió fue la posibilidad de declarar la responsabilidad civil de la empresa dueña del automotor, pese a que no se acreditó la responsabilidad penal del conductor. Como es fácilmente apreciable, dicho tema no interesa en lo que respecta al punto concreto que aquí se discute, pues en este caso sí se acreditó la responsabilidad penal y civil subjetiva de [Nombre 001], como conductora del vehículo que provocó la colisión y, por ende, los daños y perjuicios sufridos por [Nombre 004]. Aunado a lo anterior, nótese que -aunque no se ahondó en el tema, porque no era el objeto de la impugnación- lo cierto es que sí se estableció que, para encontrarnos, ante el supuesto contenido en dicha norma, debe existir explotación del automotor. Esto fue, precisamente, lo que en el caso que nos ocupa no se logró acreditar, pues a criterio del a quo y de esta Cámara, no basta con alegar que, por tratarse de una sociedad anónima, necesariamente existía tal explotación, lo que se constituye en una mera presunción. Esta posición ha sido sostenida por la misma Sala de Casación Penal, en resoluciones posteriores a la citada por la recurrente, entre ellas la número 244-2018, en la que expresamente se esgrimió: “Si bien, el reclamante ha venido señalando que aplica la reparación civil solidaria del propietario del vehículo, porque se acreditó que la empresa tiene fines comerciales, industriales y de prestación de servicios turísticos, según la certificación de persona jurídica de la empresa y reclama la errónea aplicación de los artículos 1048 del Código Civil, 106 inciso 1) del Código Penal, los artículos 7 y 199 inciso b) de la Ley de Tránsito, es menester asentar que la normativa que señala no resulta del todo aplicable a la especie según se ha analizado supra y que con fundamento en la prueba recibida en el debate, se determinó únicamente que el vehículo se encuentra inscrito a nombre de la empresa y no de forma alguna que dicho bien, propiedad de la empresa codemandada civil Knoxvil del Sur Sociedad Anónima estuviera siendo utilizando con fines comerciales o industriales (artículo 188 inciso b) de la Ley de 7331), circunstancia que, como bien apunta el ad quem no fue descrita ni demostrada en las acciones civiles que presentó la ofendida (cfr. folios 360-361) ya que solo se hace alusión a la titularidad del bien, más no sobre el uso del vehículo con fines lucrativos que es lo que permitirían acceder a la responsabilidad civil solidaria. Ante este panorama, no es posible de manera alguna con el propósito de establecer responsabilidades patrimoniales, fundar que la titularidad del bien equivale a la explotación del mismo con dichos fines y en ese entendido, no estando en presencia de los supuestos que permiten establecer la responsabilidad civil solidaria, resulta imposible disponer la condena de la empresa Knoxvil del Sur Sociedad Anónima, para que cancele en forma solidaria con el imputado la totalidad de la indemnización civil.”. (El resaltado no pertenece al original). Véase como en esta resolución sí se discutió expresamente el punto que aquí interesa y se llegó a la misma conclusión que el a quo y que esta Cámara avala, en el sentido que no basta alegar la naturaleza de las sociedades anónimas, como tampoco el objeto señalado en su constitución, sino que lo que interesa es la explotación del bien o el uso y los fines que se le dieran a ese bien. En virtud de lo expuesto, el antecedente jurisprudencial citado por la recurrente no sólo no es aplicable al caso concreto, sino que además existen otros antecedentes, posteriores, como el recién citado, que sí se refieren expresamente al tema objeto de discusión y que, precisamente, coinciden con lo resuelto por el a quo. De igual manera, la recurrente citó la resolución 903-F-SI-2021 de la Sala Primera para sustentar que el artículo 1048 del Código Civil era aplicable al caso concreto. Sin embargo, al analizar con detenimiento la resolución citada, con facilidad se extrae que el supuesto de hecho no es compatible con el que nos ocupa, pues en ese caso, como consta en el considerando segundo de la resolución, se tuvo por demostrado: “Se tiene a la demandada El Angel SA como responsable solidaria de los daños ocasionados en el accidente que provocó la existencia de esta litis, producto de la responsabilidad civil objetiva, al ser la dueña registral del vehículo pesado [Valor 007], que era utilizado para el traslado de materia prima de la actividad comercial que realiza”. La recurrente citó un extracto de dicha resolución, sin detenerse a analizar el contexto en el que se emitió, dentro del cual no sólo interesa el hecho que se tuvo por probado en ese caso ya mencionado, sino que incluso el párrafo anterior al citado por la recurrente, dice: “Con base en los requisitos de la cita apuntada, el hecho es la muerte del señor [Nombre 015]; el daño, es la afectación que sufrieron las señoras [Nombre 016] y [Nombre 017] por la muerte de don [Nombre 015]; la actividad riesgosa, es el provecho obtenido por la empresa demandada con el uso del camión para traslado de materias primas o productos, el cual, es un bien generador de peligro por su naturaleza funcional (ya que, de acuerdo con las reglas del conocimiento humano, todo vehículo es propenso a causar daños) y la situación que une todas las anteriores; es el percance entre el camión placa [Valor 007] (propiedad de la demandada) y la motocicleta placas [Valor 008], en el que el primero invade el carril por el que se conducía el segundo, se da la colisión y producto de ella, muere el señor [Nombre 015]. Aunado a lo anterior, la sociedad anónima acepta (en la contestación del hecho décimo de la demanda) que explota el mencionado automotor para el transporte de productos o materias primas, sea así que obtiene un provecho de este objeto de posibles daños. De esta forma al estar presentes los elementos de la responsabilidad objetiva por teoría del daño, es acertada la determinación del Tribunal, la cual, se efectúa por la verificación de los requisitos y no sólo porque El Ángel S.A sea la propietaria del camión.”. (El resaltado no pertenece al original). Así, este antecedente jurisprudencial citado por la recurrente, el cual es reciente, no hace más que reafirmar la postura del a quo y evidenciar que no existió el vicio alegado por la recurrente. Ahora bien, la impugnante ha aducido que el juzgador ha valorado incorrectamente la normativa respecto a la carga de la prueba, en virtud de que se trató de un hecho notorio y no controvertido que América Ciento Siete S.A. es una sociedad anónima, como el objeto comercial e industrial descrito desde su constitución. Esta Cámara estima que el juzgador no incurrió en yerro alguno al considerar que le correspondía a la parte actora civil demostrar que el vehículo fuese explotado por la co-demandada civil, para lo cual no es suficiente la certificación de personería jurídica de América Ciento Siete S.A.. El criterio de la recurrente en torno a este tema parte de la misma premisa, sea que basta la naturaleza mercantil de la sociedad anónima, para tener por demostrado que el vehículo en cuestión fuese explotado para fines comerciales o industriales, lo cual -como ya se indicó y como el juzgador valoró adecuadamente- no es correcto. Acorde con el sistema de carga de la prueba dinámica que rige en la materia procesal civil y que se encuentra contemplado en el artículo 41 del Código Procesal Civil, el actor civil tiene la carga probatoria respecto a los hechos en que funda su pretensión, mientras que el demandado civil tiene la carga demostrativa de los hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos que alegue. En el caso que nos ocupa, el juzgador valoró que la parte actora civil no demostró que el vehículo con el que se provocaron las lesiones de [Nombre 004] fuese explotado por la sociedad anónima co-demandada civil. Dicha circunstancia, sin lugar a duda, debía ser probada por la accionante, pues se trata de un supuesto de hecho contenido en las dos normas cuya aplicación pretendía. En este sentido, conviene citar a los tratadistas argentinos Roberto Loutayf y Luis Félix Costas, quienes en su libro “La acción civil en sede penal”, señalaron: “Finalmente, la prueba de la parte civil debe referirse también a la responsabilidad del demandado por los daños ocasionados por el ilícito (lo que tiene principal importancia cuando se trata de terceros demandados, donde debe acreditarse la causa de su responsabilidad).” (Citado a su vez por Rafael Ángel Sanabria Rojas en “Reparación civil en el proceso penal”, Editorial Jurídica Continental, cuarta edición actualizada, pág. 481). En el mismo orden de ideas, véase la resolución 963-2006 de la Sala Primera, la cual establece: “(…) Se trata de causales taxativas y restringidas, condición que deriva del hecho de que agravan la obligación resarcitoria. En este sentido, el precepto 187 ibidem enuncia las siguientes: “a) El dueño de un vehículo que permita que lo conduzca una persona carente de la respectiva licencia o bajo los efectos del licor o drogas enervantes./ b) Las personas físicas o jurídicas que, por cualquier título, exploten vehículos con fines comerciales o industriales, incluyendo el transporte público./ c) El propietario que permita que las placas de su vehículo sean utilizadas por otro vehículo al que no le han sido asignadas, o no las entregue a la Dirección General de Transporte Público, para su custodia, si el vehículo al que le fueron asignadas, queda imposibilitado permanentemente para circular./ d) Toda persona física o jurídica que importe, ensamble, produzca o comercialice vehículos automotores, en caso de que el accidente de tránsito tenga como causa la omisión, en el vehículo o vehículos involucrados en el hecho de tránsito, de las respectivas medidas de seguridad, comprendidas en el artículo 31 de esta Ley.” En dichas situaciones, se reitera, el titular del bien asume de manera solidaria la obligación de reparar el daño, otorgándose por ende a la víctima la posibilidad de formular su reclamo contra solo uno de ellos o ambos a la vez. La aplicación de este régimen solidario pende de la demostración, que incumbe a quien acciona (canon 317 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Civil), de la ocurrencia de alguno de estos supuestos referidos, de modo que al no acreditarse, dicho régimen solidario sería inaplicable.” Por todo lo expuesto, este tribunal de alzada estima que la decisión objetada por la recurrente se encuentra ajustada a derecho, pues en el caso bajo examen, la parte actora civil no demostró fehacientemente, como era su deber, que América Ciento Siete S.A. explotara el vehículo placas [Valor 003], conducido por [Nombre 001] al momento de los hechos, por lo que no era posible achacarle responsabilidad solidaria plena, con base en cualquiera de las dos normas reclamadas. (2) Insuficiente fundamentación y preterición de prueba (quinto motivo de la apelación). Según la recurrente, al rechazar la tesis del actor civil en cuanto a la responsabilidad civil de América Ciento Siete S.A., el juzgador no valoró elementos probatorios que fueron debidamente ofrecidos e incorporados durante el debate, como lo fue la certificación de personería jurídica de la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A. y la certificación registral del vehículo placas [Valor 003], los cuales ni siquiera mencionó y le concedió mayor valor probatorio al dicho de la sentenciada. En cuanto a la motivación que consta en la sentencia impugnada y que fue citada líneas arriba, estima esta Cámara de Apelación que la misma es breve pero suficiente, pues permite comprender el razonamiento que llevó al juzgador a rechazar la responsabilidad civil que el actor civil pretendía achacar a América Ciento Siete S.A., cumpliéndose con lo dispuesto en el artículo 142 del Código Procesal Penal, sustentándose en valoraciones de derecho, que a su vez han sido cuestionadas por la recurrente en los dos primeros motivos recursivos y sobre los cuales esta Cámara ya se ha referido. En cuanto al alegado vicio de preterición de prueba, es cierto que el tribunal de instancia está obligado a valorar todo el elenco probatorio lícito, debidamente incorporado, que pueda servir para el esclarecimiento de los hechos. Sin embargo, no cualquier omisión justificaría la nulidad de un pronunciamiento. Para que tal inobservancia o preterición de prueba pueda acarrear dicha consecuencia, la prueba obviada debe ser esencial, o sea debe tener incidencia en la decisión tomada, lo que no sucede en el presente caso. Del análisis de la sentencia impugnada, se ha podido verificar que el juzgador no plasmó valoración alguna respecto a la certificación de personería jurídica de la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A., como tampoco de la certificación del automotor de marras. No obstante, esa preterición no ocasionó agravio a la parte actora civil, en el tanto se extrae de los razonamientos contenidos en el fallo, que el juzgador no desconoció que el vehículo placas [Valor 003] estaba a nombre de la co-demandada civil, como tampoco que ésta se trataba de una sociedad anónima, cuya certificación de personería jurídica consigna el fin de comercio e industria. El a quo fundó sus argumentaciones en que no bastaba que el vehículo involucrado en el accidente de tránsito fuera propiedad de una sociedad anónima para dar cabida a los supuestos contemplados en el inciso b) del artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, como el párrafo cuarto del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, sino que debía demostrarse que el vehículo era objeto de explotación, lo cual no ocurrió en el caso concreto. De esta forma, incluyendo hipotéticamente la prueba cuya valoración echa de menos la recurrente, el resultado hubiese sido el mismo. Y es que, efectivamente y como ya se apuntó líneas arriba, la parte actora civil no se preocupó por demostrar “la explotación del automotor con una finalidad comercial o industrial”, sino que consideró que bastaba que el vehículo estuviese inscrito a nombre de una sociedad anónima y con ello debía presumirse dicha finalidad, criterio que no fue compartido por el juzgador de instancia, como tampoco por esta Cámara. Cabe acotar que el juzgador, efectivamente, entre sus argumentaciones, hizo referencia a la declaración rendida por [Nombre 001], quien señaló que el vehículo en cuestión se encontraba a nombre de una sociedad anónima perteneciente a su madre, pero que no tenía actividad empresarial, pues su madre es ama de casa y que ella era quien hacía uso del vehículo, específicamente para trasladar a su hija. Lo anterior, el juzgador lo entrelazó con lo declarado por el propio [Nombre 004], quien entre otras manifestaciones que le hizo la sentenciada, refirió que ella le indicó que -al momento de los hechos- se dirigía a San José para tratar una situación familiar. Los argumentos del juzgador corresponden a un examen integral de la prueba, tal y como lo hizo a lo largo del fallo impugnado, tanto a efectos de demostrar la conducta culposa de [Nombre 001] y su responsabilidad penal y civil, como para descartar la responsabilidad civil de América Ciento Siete S.A. Sin embargo, es evidente que se trató de una valoración adicional realizada por el juzgador, quien sustentó la decisión que aquí se cuestiona en que la parte actora civil no demostró la explotación del vehículo por parte de la co-demandada civil, lo cual ha podido ser confirmado por esta Cámara, a través del examen integral de la sentencia y el debate que le precedió. De esta forma, el análisis concatenado de ambas declaraciones referidas, en las que ofendido y acusada fueron coincidentes, no se constituye en vicio alguno. Por todo lo expuesto, debe descartarse el reproche de la recurrente. (3) Errónea interpretación del principio de congruencia (cuarto motivo de la apelación). Se impugnó el razonamiento esgrimido por el juzgador, según el cual la parte actora civil no imputó las circunstancias contenidas en los artículos 199 de la Ley de Tránsito y 1048 del Código Civil, por las cuales le atribuía responsabilidad civil a la co-demandada civil, América Ciento Siete S.A.. Si bien esta Cámara comparte el criterio esgrimido por la recurrente, en cuanto a que el principio de congruencia no puede analizarse únicamente respecto al acápite de los hechos contenido en el escrito de acción civil resarcitoria, sino que debe valorarse dicho escrito de forma íntegra, lo cierto es que el argumento esgrimido por el juzgador al respecto, aunque erróneo, se trató de una somera mención adicional, pero no fue el fundamento de su decisión, por lo que no es capaz de invalidar la sentencia respecto al rechazo de la responsabilidad solidaria plena de América Ciento Siete S.A., sobre lo cual -como ha sido ampliamente argumentado- la decisión se encuentra ajustada a derecho. El principio de congruencia, que se extrae tanto del artículo 112 del Código Procesal Penal, como del artículo 61.2 del Código Procesal Civil, no significa -como lo entendió el tribunal de instancia- que la descripción de las circunstancias contenidas en las normas cuya aplicación se pretende, necesariamente, deba ubicarse en la relación de hechos de la acción civil resarcitoria. Lo relevante es que se desprenda del contenido del escrito de acción civil resarcitoria, bajo cualquiera de los otros títulos o acápites dispuestos por el accionante, pues lo que interesa es que las partes contra quienes se acciona, sepan de qué deben defenderse. Este criterio ha sido compartido por Sala de Casación Penal, en reiterada jurisprudencia. Cabe citar la resolución 1109-2011 de dicha Sala, que dice: “Lo relevante e importante es que dentro del escrito inicial los actores civiles sí describieron y detallaron los motivos en los que basa su acción, así como los daños que pretendían fueran resarcidos por los demandados” (cfr. resolución N° 2011–01109 de las 15:09 horas del 13 de setiembre de 2011. En igual sentido, véase la resolución 446-2014 de la misma Sala de Casación Penal. En el caso que nos ocupa, como bien lo apuntó la recurrente, del contenido del escrito de la acción civil resarcitoria, se desprenden con claridad las pretensiones, por lo que -de haberse acogido la responsabilidad solidaria que reclamaba la parte actora- no se hubiese incurrido en vulneración alguna al principio de congruencia. Sin embargo, como se indicó, se trató de un argumento adicional, someramente mencionado en la sentencia, el cual -aunque se suprima hipotéticamente- no variaría lo resuelto, pues el juez analizó el fondo del asunto, la prueba sometida a su conocimiento y, con base en esos argumentos y no por un tema de congruencia, optó por declarar sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria en lo que respecta a la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A., lo cual resulta conforme a derecho. Por todo lo expuesto, al constatar que la motivación plasmada en el fallo impugnado para rechazar la responsabilidad solidaria plena de la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A. se encuentra ajustada a derecho, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar los motivos primero, segundo, cuarto y quinto del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la representación del actor civil.

VIII.- Se declara con lugar el tercer motivo de la impugnación planteada por la abogada de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima. La recurrente reclamó la inaplicación de los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la Ley de Tránsito, pues el a quo ordenó el levantamiento del gravamen que pesaba sobre el vehículo placas [Valor 003], sin considerar lo dispuesto expresamente en dicha normativa y vulnerando el deber de fundamentar, pues no explicó las razones para hacerlo y desconocer la responsabilidad civil limitada de la dueña registral del vehículo involucrado en el hecho punible. Se estima que el alegato de la recurrente es correcto y genera un agravio a la parte actora civil, pues la propietaria registral del vehículo placas [Valor 003], es decir América Ciento Siete S.A., efectivamente, debe responder por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a [Nombre 004], exclusivamente por el valor del vehículo. Así, el vehículo placas [Valor 003] debe mantenerse gravado como una especie de garantía objetiva y real hasta el efectivo cumplimiento de lo resuelto, tal y como lo establece la normativa que fue vulnerada por el juzgador. Por su importancia para resolver el punto en discusión, se procede a citar la resolución 963-2006 de la Sala Primera, en la que de manera diáfana se explica el tema en discusión: “Los daños producidos en un accidente de tránsito, están sujetos a las reglas de la responsabilidad civil impuestas por mandatos concretos y especiales regulados en la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, no. 7331. Desde este punto de vista, en tesis de principio, recae sobre los conductores, pasajeros, peatones y terceros, que con su conducta (por acción u omisión) han producido un daño en la esfera jurídica de una persona, de manera tal que ese efecto les sea imputable. Así se desprende del numeral 186 del cuerpo legal referido. De este modo, ante la ocurrencia de alguna lesión producida por un accidente de tránsito, su indemnización estará sujeta a la demostración del padecimiento patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, así como del nexo causal entre el proceder del sujeto a quien se atribuye y la lesión jurídica cuya reparación se peticiona. Por ende, la regla es que el responsable civil será aquella persona que haya causado el daño de manera directa o indirecta. Ahora bien, cuando la responsabilidad recaiga sobre el conductor, pueden darse dos supuestos concretos. El primero, que el conductor responsable sea a su vez el propietario del vehículo. En este, sería el único y directo obligado de indemnizar el daño. No obstante, puede darse el caso, de que quien conduzca no sea el dueño del bien. En esa hipótesis, salvo en los supuestos que adelante se indicarán, en los cuales, se genera una responsabilidad solidaria, el propietario registral no resulta responsable civil pleno con la universalidad de su patrimonio, sino solo con el valor del automóvil. Aquí resulta imperativo aclarar que el ordinal 188 del cuerpo legal aludido estatuye un gravamen de tipo objetivo que se impone sobre el bien con que se ha ocasionado el daño, el cual se anota al margen del asiento registral respectivo. El párrafo inicial de ese mandato indica en lo relevante: “El vehículo con el cual se cause un daño se mantendrá gravado a resultas del proceso respectivo y a la orden de la autoridad judicial que conozca de éste. Esa autoridad ordenará anotarlo al margen del asiento de la inscripción del vehículo, en caso de que esté inscrito…”. Ese gravamen se impone sobre el automotor aun cuando el conductor al momento del accidente no sea el dueño, o no aparezca con esa condición subjetiva en el Registro Público (artículo 192 ibidem). Solo podrá ser levantado cuando exista constancia fehaciente dentro del proceso de cobro civil, de que las reparaciones económicas han sido satisfechas a plenitud, renunciadas de forma legal o sustituida la garantía a satisfacción del juzgador (numeral 193). Así visto, es una carga que pesa sobre el bien, con independencia de quien sea su titular. Se constituye en un gravamen sobre ese exclusivo bien del propietario, sea quien fuere en el transcurso del tiempo. De lo anterior se colige que cuando el titular del vehículo no sea el conductor, su “responsabilidad” se limita al valor del automóvil, el que para los efectos, se constituye en una garantía total o parcial de la indemnización que en definitiva sea dispuesta por el juzgador, lo que deriva del vínculo patrimonial que sobre el bien ostenta –sea, de carácter real-. Sin embargo, no en todos los casos el propietario está exento de tal deber de restitución del daño. En efecto, como excepción a la regla recién expuesta, la Ley de Tránsito prevé ciertas hipótesis en que el titular asume una responsabilidad solidaria –por ende plena- junto con el conductor. Se trata de causales taxativas y restringidas, condición que deriva del hecho de que agravan la obligación resarcitoria. En este sentido, el precepto 187 ibidem enuncia las siguientes: (…). En dichas situaciones, se reitera, el titular del bien asume de manera solidaria la obligación de reparar el daño, otorgándose por ende a la víctima la posibilidad de formular su reclamo contra solo uno de ellos o ambos a la vez. La aplicación de este régimen solidario pende de la demostración, que incumbe a quien acciona (canon 317 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Civil), de la ocurrencia de alguno de estos supuestos referidos, de modo que al no acreditarse, dicho régimen solidario sería inaplicable. Entonces, en esa eventualidad, los términos cuantitativos de la obligación del dueño se limitan al valor del vehículo, sobre el que la ley dispone un gravamen. Es decir, en ese escenario, no puede considerarse plenamente responsable, empero, el bien sobre el que pesa un gravamen cuya imposición viene dispuesta por ley, hace que esa parte específica de su patrimonio responda por la obligación, limitando su obligación civil al valor del vehículo. Ello a diferencia de cuando es quien de manera directa ha ocasionado el daño, pues en ese tanto, responde de manera exclusiva con la totalidad su patrimonio.”. (El resaltado no corresponde al original). Los anteriores razonamientos son compartidos por esta Cámara, pues como se desprende de la conjunción de las normas aludidas, actualmente contenidas en los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la Ley de Tránsito, cuando no exista identidad entre propietario registral y conductor, el primero debe responder solidariamente con el segundo, por los daños y perjuicios provocados por un accidente de tránsito, pero de manera limitada al valor del vehículo. Consecuentemente, el automotor con el cual se cause el daño deberá mantenerse gravado hasta la finalización del proceso y conste que las indemnizaciones civiles han sido pagadas, renunciadas, sustituida la garantía o si transcurrido un año desde la firmeza de la sentencia que ordenó la indemnización, el tribunal de ejecución de sentencia, no hubiese solicitado que el gravamen se ponga a su orden. Esto es así, porque, tratándose de daños y perjuicios provocados por un accidente de tránsito, respecto al propietario registral del vehículo, la regla es la responsabilidad limitada y la excepción es la responsabilidad solidaria. En este caso, como se apuntó en el considerando anterior, el juzgador valoró adecuadamente que no era aplicable la excepción (en los términos del artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito, como en los términos del numeral 1048 del Código Civil), de modo que la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A. respondiera con la universalidad de su patrimonio por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a [Nombre 004]. De allí que, fundadamente y conforme a derecho, el juzgador rechazó la pretensión principal de la parte actora civil. Sin embargo, sin una debida fundamentación y vulnerando las disposiciones legales ya mencionadas, el a quo obvió cualquier consideración respecto a la responsabilidad civil limitada y ordenó el levantamiento del gravamen que legítimamente pesaba sobre el vehículo placas [Valor 003], propiedad de América Ciento Siete S.A.. Dicha decisión debe ser revocada por esta Cámara, en estricto apego a la normativa aludida, de modo que América Ciento Siete S.A. deberá responder, de manera limitada, únicamente hasta el valor del vehículo placas [Valor 003], y el gravamen que pesa sobre dicho automotor deberá mantenerse y sólo podrá levantarse bajo los supuestos del artículo 204 de la Ley de Tránsito, por así haberlo dispuesto expresamente el legislador. Esta postura ya ha sido sostenida, previamente por la Sala de Casación Penal, como consta en la resolución número 447-2017, con las siguientes argumentaciones, que son compartidas por esta Cámara: "Dado que en este caso no se acreditó ninguna de las anteriores circunstancias se excluye la posibilidad de decretar una responsabilidad civil solidaria del dueño registral del vehículo, pero subsiste la responsabilidad civil objetiva limitada al valor del vehículo, tal como determinó la Sala Constitucional en el voto en el voto 2000-5517, de las 14:50 horas, del 5 de julio de 2000, y que recogió la Sala Tercera al apuntar: “La responsabilidad civil extracontractual objetiva, no resulta aplicable al caso de marras, es importante señalar que la sentencia no tiene por demostrado que el vehículo conducido por el señor [Nombre 002]., fuese un vehículo dedicado al transporte público remunerado o actividad empresarial como exige nuestra legislación (esencialmente en el artículo 1048 del Código Civil y las reglas vigentes sobre responsabilidad civil del Código Penal de 1941, según Ley 4891 de 8 de noviembre de 1971), como especie de excepción para ciertas actividades generadoras de riesgo lucrativo o funcional. No basta que sencillamente se utilice un automotor para crear así una responsabilidad objetiva, lo que llevaría a que siempre ese ciudadano sería responsable civilmente de los daños acontecidos, a menos que compruebe que se debieron a fuerza mayor o culpa del ofendido. Lo pertinente es resolver el agravio con aplicación de las reglas relativas a la responsabilidad subjetiva (en este caso descartable en cuanto a [Nombre 017]., dado el caso fortuito acreditado por el a-quo -folio 282-). El párrafo 3ª, del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, debe armonizarse con lo preceptuado por el numeral sétimo, párrafo 2ª de la Ley de Tránsito Nª 7331. Es necesario indicar, que el propietario registral del automotor, responde únicamente, en cuanto a su responsabilidad civil, por el monto o valor de su vehículo.” (# 345-98, a las 9:25 horas, del 3 de abril de 1998)”. Así, la línea jurisprudencial seguida por la Sala de Casación Penal, acorde con lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional, que es vinculante erga omnes, consiste en la limitación de la responsabilidad civil del propietario registral del vehículo involucrado en el hecho punible hasta por el valor del mismo, en el tanto no se demuestren los supuestos contenidos en el artículo 199 de la Ley de Tránsito o bien lo contenidos en el párrafo cuarto del numeral 1048 del Código Civil, tal y como sucedió en el caso que nos ocupa. Lo anterior es congruente con lo expresamente dispuesto en los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la ley especial de repetida cita, los cuales no tendrían razón de ser, sino fuera como consecuencia lógica de esa responsabilidad limitada estrictamente al valor del vehículo que pesa sobre el propietario registral del vehículo con el que se ocasionó daños. La representación de la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A., la cual nunca ha cuestionado ser la propietaria registral del vehículo en cuestión, al ser emplazada del recurso de apelación interpuesto por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, en lo que respecta al motivo que aquí interesa, alegó que el juzgador resolvió conforme a derecho, por dos razones. La primera de ellos porque, según su criterio, declarada sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta contra su representada, lo procedente es que el vehículo de su propiedad no responda por los daños y perjuicios, de modo que el levantamiento del gravamen era lo correcto. Sin embargo, dicha posición es contraria a la letra de la ley, como ya se ha explicado, por lo que no puede ser acogida por esta Cámara. La segunda razón sostenida por la representación de la co-demandada civil consistió en que la parte actora civil, según su criterio, pretende inducir en error a esta Cámara, pues lo cierto es que nunca reclamó la responsabilidad limitada, sino únicamente la responsabilidad plena de América Ciento Siete S.A. como co-demandada civil. Examinado el escrito de la acción civil resarcitoria, de manera integral, así como las conclusiones emitidas por la representación de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, durante el contradictorio, dicho alegato debe ser rechazado. Consta que la representación de la parte actora civil, en todo momento, solicitó que se mantuviera el gravamen que pesaba sobre el vehículo placas [Valor 003], propiedad de América Ciento Siete S.A., para que respondiera por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a [Nombre 004], de modo que no es cierto que no constara dicha pretensión de la parte actora civil. Como ya se apuntó en el considerando anterior, el vicio de falta de congruencia, que es básicamente lo que alega la representación de América Ciento Siete S.A., en caso de acogerse la posición de la recurrente, se determina con base en las pretensiones de las partes. Así, en el caso concreto, el actor civil, a lo largo de todo el proceso, contempló dentro sus pretensiones el gravamen aludido, de modo que no estaríamos ante un vicio de extra petita, como lo ha alegado la representación de la co-demandada civil. Sumado a ello, debe recordarse que es el juez quien conoce el derecho, conforme al principio iuria novit curia, de modo que las partes pueden no invocar expresamente el sustento normativo de sus pretensiones, sin que ello signifique que no deban concederse. Como ha sido indicado, la responsabilidad limitada hasta el valor del vehículo y el gravamen en cuestión se encuentran expresamente dispuestos en los artículos 200, 203 y 204 de la ley especial que rige la materia, por lo que no debió ser desconocido por el juez de instancia y no puede ser obviado por este tribunal de alzada. Al respecto, véase la sentencia 61-1997 de la Sala Primera.sen-1-0034-1139932 Por lo expuesto, se declara con lugar el tercer motivo de la impugnación de la representación del actor civil. Consecuentemente, deberá la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A., en su condición de propietaria registral del vehículo placas [Valor 003], responder de manera limitada, por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por [Nombre 004], ya declarados, únicamente hasta el valor del vehículo de marras. Además, se revoca la decisión de levantar el gravamen que pesaba sobre el vehículo placas [Valor 003], el cual deberá mantenerse hasta tanto no ocurra alguno de los supuestos contenidos en el artículo 204 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres.

POR TANTO

Se declaran sin lugar, en todos sus extremos, los recursos de apelación de sentencia planteados por el defensor público Eduardo Monterrey Carmona y la sentenciada [Nombre 001]. Se declaran sin lugar los motivos primero, segundo, cuarto y quinto de la impugnación formulada por la abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima, Karla Nancy Martínez Solano. Se declara con lugar el tercer motivo del recurso de apelación interpuesto por Martínez Solano. Consecuentemente, deberá la co-demandada civil América Ciento Siete S.A., en su condición de propietaria registral del vehículo placas [Valor 003], responder de manera limitada, por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por [Nombre 004], únicamente hasta el valor del vehículo de marras. Además, se revoca la decisión de levantar el gravamen que pesaba sobre el vehículo placas [Valor 003], el cual deberá mantenerse hasta tanto no ocurra alguno de los supuestos contenidos en el artículo 204 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres. Notifíquese.

María Milagro Granados García Hannia Soto Arroyo Raúl Madrigal Lizano Juezas y Juez del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Imputado: [Nombre 001].

Delito: Lesiones Culposas.

Ofendida: [Nombre 004].

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