ICE Liability for Explosion of Defective Cell Phone Provided to Indirect ConsumerResponsabilidad del ICE por explosión de celular defectuoso entregado a consumidora indirecta

**PROCEEDINGS:** **PROCESS:** COGNITION (consolidated 20-002421-1027-CA) **PLAINTIFF:** [Nombre 001] AND [Nombre 002] **DEFENDANT:** INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD N° 2025000261 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECOND SECTION (Team 2), SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at eight thirty-six in the morning on the seventeenth of January two thousand twenty-five.- Consolidated cognition process (19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA) brought by [Nombre 001], a single surname due to her Argentine nationality and with passport from that country number [Valor 001] and [Nombre 002], with identification number [Valor 002], both represented by Rodolfo Alvarado Moreno, with identification number 1-0512-0482 and Jessica Valverde Campos, in their capacity as special judicial attorneys, against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD (hereinafter ICE) and represented by Luis A. Salazar Solís and Gonzalo Gómez Rodríguez, special judicial attorneys of ICE. The Collegiate Court Section II -Team 2-, which by turn was assigned to hear this matter, proceeds to issue, within the legal deadline, after holding the Supplementary Hearing of December 17, 2024, and the legal deliberation, the corresponding resolution with the unanimous vote of its members Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Eduardo González Segura and Marco Hernández Vargas.

Drafted by Judge Hernández Hernández.

**I.- PRELIMINARY ASPECTS.** As part of the procedural path, the following is noted: 1) This case has been processed in this venue electronically, so the foliation of the electronic document generated as a single file in PDF format, obtained from the Virtual Desktop with the "Descending Order" and "View Document Description (PDF)" options deselected and the "View File Cover Details" option selected as "End", will be used as a reference. The foregoing for the purpose of providing identification and reference of the documents in addition to what is described on each occasion. 2) The complaints were filed in the following order: 19-001302-1028-CA on January 29, 2020, and the claims were established at the preliminary hearing as follows: "1) The present complaint is upheld. Consequently declaring the patrimonial liability of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the moral and material damage caused, this as the main claim, the patrimonial liability being derived from the damage corresponding to material damage valued at twenty million colones and subjective moral damage estimated at one hundred million colones. Secondary claims. 2) That the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for compensating the plaintiff for the damages caused, which will be determined in the enforcement phase of the judgment. 3) That the sums awarded in the judgment must pay legal interest from the date the judgment becomes final until the date of effective payment. 4) That the amounts awarded in the judgment be duly indexed to real value as of the date of receipt thereof. 5) That the defendant entity must pay the amount of the personal and procedural costs incurred. All secondary claims must be understood as complementary to each other and/or to the principal one, and not in an exclusive or subsidiary manner." File 20-002421-1027-CA was filed on May 13, 2020, and likewise, the claims were established at the same preliminary hearing as follows: "1) The present complaint is upheld. Declaring the consequent contractual patrimonial civil liability of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused to the undersigned, valued at twenty million colones. Secondary claims. 2) That the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for compensating me for the material damage caused. 3) That the sums awarded must pay legal interest from the date the judgment becomes final until the date of effective payment. 4) That the amounts awarded must be duly indexed to real value as of the date of receipt thereof. 5) That the defendant entity must pay the amount of the personal and procedural costs incurred." (see images 2-12 in file 19-001302-1028-CA, and images 2-7 in file 20-002421-1027-CA, digital records of the preliminary hearing of February 7, 2023, its minute at images 302-306 and digital records of the trial hearing held on December 17 and 18, 2024, all in the judicial file). 3) Once the legal transfer was granted, the ICE representative answered both complaints in the negative and raised the same following defenses in both files 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA: lack of necessary passive joinder, lack of right, lack of active and passive standing, and lack of current interest. (see images 106-123 in file 19-001302-1028-CA, and images 44-60 in file 20-002421-1027-CA). 4) By final order Nº 1104-2021 of the Processing Judge issued at fifteen hours fifty minutes on August eighteenth two thousand twenty-one, the THEREFORE was issued: The consolidation of the process processed under file Nº20-002421-1027-CA with that processed under file Nº19-001302-1028-CA is ordered. Both files being at the same procedural stage, proceed to the material joinder thereof. Attach a copy of this resolution to file N°20-002421-1027-CA. Once this resolution is final, continue the proceedings jointly and continue with the corresponding procedure." (see images 79-84 of file 20-002421-1027-CA) 5) By final order Nº 0811-2022 of the Processing Judge issued at eleven hours fifteen minutes on May twenty-third two thousand twenty-two, the THEREFORE was issued: The prior defense of necessary passive litis consortium filed by the ICE representation against the two plaintiffs in the consolidated processes heard through this present process is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. (see images 225-230 of file 19-001302-1028-CA) 6) The preliminary hearing established in ordinal 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo –which is recorded in the Court's digital system–, was held on February 7, 2023, and the claims were set according to the second statement of Considering I of this resolution. The testimonial statement of: [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], ID [Valor 002], [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004] and [Nombre 005], ID [Valor 005], was admitted to be heard at the Supplementary Hearing. The dilatory exception was resolved by issuing: "resolution number 0165-2023 at fourteen hours eleven minutes on February seventh two thousand twenty-three: THEREFORE. On the defenses of Improper Representation it is declared inadmissible. On the prior defense of defects preventing a pronouncement on the merits, it is declared without merit." (see Preliminary Hearing minute at images 302-306 of the judicial file and its digital records of that judicial proceeding). 7) The supplementary oral and public trial hearing summoned for December 17, 2024, was opened at 08:37 hours, in Courtroom 4. The legal representatives of the plaintiff parties in the process appeared in person before the Court, and the defendant's representatives attended remotely via the TEAMS application. The hearing was recorded in audio and video in the corresponding electronic system and is attached to the file. All the details of the hearing are recorded in the audio and video, as well as in the minute that for this purpose is in the process file. The COLLEGIATE COURT SECTION II -Team 2-, composed of Judges EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ SEGURA, MARCO HERNÁNDEZ VARGAS, and presided over by RONALDO HERNÁNDEZ HERNÁNDEZ, was constituted in person. The opening arguments of the parties, the depositions of the admitted witnesses, and the closing arguments of the parties were heard, with which the hearing concluded on the same December 17, 2024. (Sigao recording system, minute and judicial file) 8) Finally, the Court verified the notification methods and it was indicated that the judgment would be issued in writing, within the fifteen working days period provided for in subsection 1) of article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. This hearing was concluded at 09:41 hours. All were duly notified of the resolutions and actions taken at the Supplementary Hearing in accordance with numeral 88 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (digital record of the oral and public trial hearing). 9) At the supplementary hearing, the plaintiff party was warned to present the payment receipts from the medical centers attended, since those attached to the case file are illegible, for which a deadline until December 20, 2024, was granted for due compliance. By resolution at fifteen hours twenty-eight minutes on January sixth two thousand twenty-five, it was indicated: "The plaintiff party did not provide the documents warned as indicated in the supplementary hearing session of last December 17, 2024, since those presented on December 20, 2024, do NOT match the (illegible) payment receipts provided in the case file and for which their submission was required. That being the case, issue the relevant judgment within the strict deadline in accordance with numeral 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo." 10) In the proceedings before this Court, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected or that generate defenselessness, and the judgment is issued within the period established in article 111 subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo **II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES.** 1.- OBJECT AND POSITION OF THE COMPLAINT.- In summary, insofar as relevant and without prejudice to the literal wording of some of their arguments, each of the parties alleges what is detailed below in this section. 1.A. File Nº19-001302-1027-CA. OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF [Nombre 001]: It is indicated: I base this complaint on the following Facts: First: That the plaintiff herein, [Nombre 001], is a professional in Visual Arts, of Argentine nationality, who at the beginning of this year was in the country as a tourist, visiting close friends. Second: That considering that the plaintiff intended to stay several weeks in the country for which she required the Telecommunications services provided by ICE. Due to her status as a foreigner and her lack of knowledge of how procedures are carried out in Costa Rica, she asks her friend [Nombre 002] for help to request a mobile phone plan with ICE that included a cell phone, so even though [Nombre 002] appears as the owner of the post-paid plan in the contract, the plaintiff herein is the final recipient of both the line and the mobile device delivered by Kolbi. Third: That on January 20 of the current year, as is customary, the device was placed to charge overnight in Miss [Nombre 001]'s bedroom, near her bed. Fourth: That the following day, at approximately 7:30 in the morning, while my client was asleep, the cell phone suddenly exploded in her hand, hair, and legs, causing severe second and third-degree burns, as shown in this photograph (shows photograph). Fifth: That the device had been acquired, as stated in attached documents, on January 15, 2019, meaning it had not even been in use for a week when the incident occurred. Sixth: That immediately after what happened, my client was taken to the emergency service of the Clínica del Seguro Social in Aguas Zarcas de San Carlos, where she was treated for the wound as far as possible, as they were quite severe and due to the explosion, several plastic particles were embedded in her skin, requiring several follow-up appointments for their extraction. Seventh: That likewise, the Fire Department (Cuerpo de Bomberos) was called, since as a result of the explosion, the mattress of the bed where the device was charging also caught fire, putting the infrastructure of the place at risk. The Station Manager, in the Incident Report, Description section, stated: "Response to Emergency for possible cell phone battery explosion inside a room, occurring around 07:30 hours; causing damage to the device itself, mattress, and 2nd and 3rd-degree burns on the upper limb of the interested party. Scene control and patient care occurred before the arrival of the Fire Department." Eighth: That the plaintiff herein has suffered severe physical effects as a result of the explosion. As demonstrated in the medical report, she suffered second and third-degree burns on her hands, arms, legs, lost her hair, burns that caused her to lose sensitivity in her hands, which is considerably severe, considering that the affected person is a plastic arts teacher, and her work is manual all the time. Ninth: That my client went several times to the Hospital Metropolitano so they could extract the battery particles and follow up on the wounds. As stated in the discharge summaries (epicrisis) and medical reports, she was treated on 01/22/19, where she was seen by three emergency service specialists, then seen in several medical appointments from 01-24-19 to 01-31-19, being evaluated and treated again by several specialists due to the severity of her injury. Tenth: That the plaintiff herein constantly has panic attacks; in the three months following the event, she fainted from the pain she cannot overcome, feels anxious, cries, is stressed, her self-esteem is very low, she is insecure as a woman and as a professional, fears performing daily activities, etc. Eleventh: As stated in the Psychological Consultation Report dated 02/14/19 by Psychologist Adriana Roa, it was indicated: "Since this episode, she reports significant difficulties sleeping and develops a generalized state of anguish and anxiety that seriously compromises her daily life, aggravated by the fact that due to the injuries produced, she is unable to work." Twelfth: That my client was also treated by the Argentine psychologist María Fabiana Acuña, who in her report details the following symptoms: "Anguish, intense reactive fears, flashback (the event is PERSISTENTLY experienced through thoughts, stimuli associated with the event, memories); anxiety disorders were also detected, as well as low mood that could trigger depression." Thirteenth: That the plaintiff herein is a young woman, 29 years old, accustomed since adolescence to habitually using a cell phone, which is why this event affected her greatly, because something as normal as checking the time, sleeping with the phone at hand, answering a message, has become a distressing experience for her. Fourteenth: That days after the incident, the defendant herein, ICE, was contacted, where [Nombre 002] as the signatory of the contract was told to return the device and that they would contact the manufacturer of the BMobile phones. Fifteenth: That on 01/28/19, the remaining pieces of the device were delivered with the respective reception form for damaged terminals, which is attached to this complaint. Sixteenth: That approximately at the end of January, Attorney Maritza Gamboa, representing Miss [Nombre 001], presented an amicable and extrajudicial proposal-claim before ICE, which did not show much interest in the matter. Seventeenth: That in February of this year, Attorney Gamboa again made extrajudicial arrangements by sending emails directed to ICE and the lawyers of the BMobile company, requesting a meeting to discuss the points of the agreement, to which she receives a response from Catalina Vargas Pacheco from the area: Proceso Gestión de Recursos comerciales ICE, who schedules an appointment for the second week of February; however, there was a lack of interest on the part of the defendant company in reaching a settlement.

Moral damage is claimed. Reason. The moral damage in this case is motivated by the traumatic and injurious event of the cell phone exploding on the body and hair of the affected person, Ms. [Nombre 001], for which the defendant company, a company that distributes and sells BMobile devices, bears objective liability, consisting of subjective moral damage. Content. This damage manifests, as substantiated by the various psychological reports, by affecting her normal living conditions, causing situations of anguish, frustration, insecurity, anxiety, lack of sleep, fainting, crying episodes, low self-esteem, loss of appetite, professional insecurity, panic, etc. Estimation: Moral damage is prudentially estimated at the sum of 100,000,000.00 (one hundred million colones). Material damage. The plaintiff herein was affected in her patrimonial interests, since, as is logical in these situations, she had to go to a private medical center to have her wounds treated, first for better care and second because Miss [Nombre 001], being a foreigner, did not have medical insurance to be treated by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Due to the urgency of the case, only some medical care invoices from the country are kept, which amount to the sum of 606,111.41 (six hundred six thousand one hundred eleven colones with forty-one céntimos), to which must be added medical expenses in Argentina, as well as the patrimonial loss from having had to stop working due to the loss of sensitivity in her hand. Consequently, the material damage has the same motive or origin as the moral damage, manifests as explained in the previous paragraph, and is prudentially estimated at the sum of 20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones). Cites jurisprudence on moral damage: (First Collegiate Court of First Instance Civil, at thirteen fifty-three on March fifteenth two thousand nineteen, judgment 2019-000186 and on liability for damage to third parties).

It must be noted in this process that, although BMobile is not an employee of ICE, this State entity was, or is, we are unaware of the current situation, promoting products in the national market, since it was ICE that gave the cell phone to my client, and in that sense, it is liable for the products it endorses and makes available to its customers, which it must subject to the necessary safety controls to ensure the health, life, and integrity of its consumers. That is to say, the causal link between the conduct and the damage is clearly evident, as elements of liability, there being active conduct by ICE, promoting cell phones, and offering customers, as in the case of my client, a cell phone that, in this specific case, had a factory defect, which caused it to explode after a few days of use, causing damages as those already indicated in the corresponding section, its responsibility as a National Company being to ensure it puts in its customers' hands products in optimal conditions that do not endanger their life or integrity, and that also, having knowledge of the serious events, chose to ignore its responsibility.

1.B. File Nº20-002421-1027-CA. OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF [Nombre 002]. In relation to the grounds of the previous consolidated complaint, and for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary repetitions, she adds the following to what plaintiff [Nombre 001] stated, and so it is indicated: First: That in January 2019, I received a visit from a very close foreign friend, Argentine tourist [Nombre 001], who indicated to me that she was interested in spending a long season in the country and needed a local telephone service, for which she asked for my help, as she is unaware of the national telecommunication companies and the administrative procedures necessary to obtain a mobile line. Second: That in consideration of our friendship, on January 15, 2020, I went to ICE to request in my own name a post-paid plan with a cell phone, according to the requirements that Miss [Nombre 001] indicated to me. However, I was never the recipient of the mobile equipment or the line; I only carried out the purchase procedure and gave it to its real user [Nombre 001]. In fact, it was not until January 20 that I gave her the cell phone, and in those days I never turned it on or used it in any way; I gave it to her intact, just as they gave it to me at the ICE Office. [...] Sixth: That as extracted from the Fire Department Report, the damages were to the device, not to the electrical installation, the power outlet, or any other room in the house, which makes it absolutely clear that it was a battery explosion due to damage to the same, not a short circuit or external danger in this sense. Nor is any recommendation evidenced in the Fire Department Report regarding the need to change the electrical installation due to danger of the situation recurring, thus demonstrating that the explosion was undoubtedly caused by the device itself. Seventh: That days after the incident, the incident was reported to the defendant herein, ICE. In response to my complaint, they indicated that the procedure was to return the device for reports, notify the manufacturer, and after the Investigation, they would contact me directly. In view of the above, on 01/28/19, the remaining pieces of the device were delivered with the respective reception form for damaged terminals, which is attached to this complaint. Eighth: That days later I was informed that the result of the investigation was ready; however, they did not send me the report. They only told me that it had been damage to the cell phone, in response to which, because the undersigned is not the one physically affected nor having ever used the device, I do not file any administrative claim but rather inform my friend Sonia [Nombre 001] so she can proceed as she sees fit, letting her know that if she needs my help for the procedures, since the purchase is in my name, I would gladly assist her. Ninth: That approximately at the end of January 2019, Attorney Maritza Gamboa, representing Miss [Nombre 001], presented an amicable and extrajudicial proposal-claim before ICE, which did not show much interest in the matter. [...] Eleventh: That ICE always refused to reach an agreement, considering that the manufacturer should be liable, in accordance with article 35 of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, despite the warranty, which is attached to this complaint, clearly establishing that ICE must be responsible for factory defects, and that, as is well known, the consumer is not obliged to go to all those liable in the consumer chain to claim liability. In this case, my contract was directly with ICE; I never requested a specific brand of cell phone, so my relationship with the manufacturer is causal and indirect.

The plaintiff herein was affected in her patrimonial interests. It is evident and notorious that the cell phone I bought for my close friend exploded, without giving her the possibility of using it, moreover, causing her damages, which not only meant that I lost the money invested in the purchase but also the need to carry out various procedures and assist her with medications due to her health condition, as a minimal gesture in the face of such an unfortunate situation, for which ICE must respond under contractual civil liability, since according to the attached warranty, they must be held responsible for factory defects, as was the case. Material damage. Consequently, the material damage has its motive or origin in the explosion of the cell phone, manifests as explained in the previous paragraph, and is prudentially estimated at the sum of 20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones).

2. OBJECT AND POSITION OF THE ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT BY ICE.- In summary, insofar as relevant and without prejudice to the literal wording of some of its arguments, it is indicated. 2.A. In File Nº19-001302-1027-CA: The facts are refuted, and it estimates: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. The evidence numbered with consecutives "2", "3", "4", "5", and "6" does not allow this representation to be able to determine a possible causal link between the apparent bodily harm suffered by Ms. [Nombre 001] and an action or omission on the part of my client. Said evidence is far from demonstrating the precise circumstances of time, manner, and place to be able to determine the origin of the events, and therefore the origin of the alleged accident that the plaintiff party seeks to prove. Likewise, documents are provided with the Complaint that from their reading appear in principle to be issued in the Republic of Argentina (alleged criteria of purported public medical professionals and apparent ministerial entities); however, they do not have any legalization procedure associated with them that would guarantee the authenticity and official origin of the documents to provide certainty and effectiveness not only to the Defendant Party but also to the Judicial Authority, with which these documents allegedly from abroad may not have legal effects in Costa Rica. Therefore, the documents listed and provided as Documentary Evidence 7 (Medical reports sent from Argentina) and supposed certificates issued by the Government of the City of Buenos Aires relating to alleged education studies (which are not even expressly listed as evidence), must not be admitted. Likewise, the medical reports listed in Documentary Evidence 7, in addition to lacking the aforementioned legalization and authenticity requirements to have effects in Costa Rica, also fail to prove what the professional or academic suitability is (specializations, updates) of the persons noted as specialists in medicine and psychology. Furthermore, this type of evidence should not be merely documentary in nature, but rather expert evidence, allowing the Defendant Party to conduct the respective cross-examination, as well as the Trial Court to make the respective inquiries, prior to the issuance of the respective report. That being the case, this representation requests that the alleged evidence numbered with the consecutive "7" by the plaintiff party be rejected.

The Plaintiff Party provides and lists as "Evidence" matters that are unrelated to the facts as such, and which rather correspond to procedural and fiscal accreditation aspects, such as Evidence 10 (Special Power of Attorney), Evidence 11 (Copy of Passport of Miss [Nombre 001]), and Evidence 12 (Stamp Payment). Therefore, these elements, outright, must not be admitted as evidence.

On January 23, 2019, at 3:52 pm, the ICE Telemarketing service received a call, where identification data of the service contracted by Client [Nombre 002], identification number [Valor 002], was provided, a claim being filed in her name. This complaint filed on behalf of client [Nombre 002] is precisely what originates this litigation. In this regard, among the claims that originated from said complaint was precisely the replacement of the terminal, reason for which on February 1, 2019, in the afternoon, said replacement was carried out, substituting the BMOBILE phone with a HUAWEI P SMART, IMEI 867172030714850, for which the respective terminal delivery slip was issued in the name of [Nombre 002].

Although article 48 of the General Telecommunications Law 8642 allows the claim before the telecommunications operator to be filed by the customer directly or by any person on their behalf, this does not imply that the substantive legal relationship with the service customer disappears, given that this is what determines the origin, terms, and conditions of the contract. And it is that, given that the terminal was acquired by the customer [Name 002], where ICE also provided her with the warranty terms and user manual for the phone, and given that in the present dispute, the Claimant's intended purpose is to determine the applicability or not of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) towards a third party outside the original relationship, where said BMOBILE phone must have been made available to Mrs. [Name 001] by [Name 002] (who received it from ICE), this therefore implies an issue of traceability and custody, not only of the terminal but also of the transfer of usage information. In this regard, from what is indicated in the complaint, it would appear that [Name 002] acquired the telecommunications service and the associated good, in this case the terminal, for personal purposes or for her closest family environment, which implies the mentioned friendship with Mrs. [Name 001]; however, in the complaint, there is no assertion attributable to [Name 002] indicating the capacity in which said terminal was provided to her (gratuitous loan, rental, sale, gift) and whether the information provided by ICE to the customer regarding recommendations for the use of the terminal and the user manual was transferred to Mrs. [Name 001]. That is, in accordance with national regulations, the term consumer in general terms refers to the person who acquires goods or services for personal, family, or their immediate social environment purposes, as appears to be the case with the eventual use by Mrs. [Name 001]; therefore, [Name 002] has and maintains said consumer status and, consequently, the legal standing to be part of the necessary active joinder (litis consorcio activo necesario), given that she has attempted to delegate the exercise of the action solely and exclusively to Mrs. [Name 001], with whom ICE has had no contact regarding the original delivery of the BMOBILE terminal, nor information, given that the bridge has been precisely [Name 002], to whom even the delivery of the HUAWEI P SMART terminal in replacement of the BMOBILE phone was recorded, as noted in the administrative file. As this Honorable Court is aware, Consumer Law, while the legislation establishes obligations and duties for the merchant, also contemplates the concept of the Reasonable Consumer, promoting and demanding that they be responsible and diligent; a responsibility that also implies the exercise of judicial actions, especially when claims originate from a service relationship. In this context, for the purposes of this preliminary defense, it is necessary to take into account the rule established in article 35, first paragraph, of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472, which states: "ARTICLE 35.-Liability regime. The producer, the supplier, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, of inadequate or insufficient information about them, or of their use and risks. (...)". This implies that said article establishes a concurrent and indissoluble chain of these agents of the industrial-commercial cycle under the strict liability regime towards the consumer, which therefore contemplates judicial actions, in this case under necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasivo necesario), where by provision of law must be integrated not only the merchant (the last link facing the consumer) but also representatives of the supplier and producer, who are further linked by the substantive legal relationship in this case as passive subjects or Defendants. Therefore, although ICE, for the purposes of the aforementioned article and in the context of the sale of telecommunications services under the 4GK2 Postpaid Mobile Service Plan associated with phone number 8881-0891, acted as a merchant at the time it made the BMOBILE mobile phone available to Customer [Name 002] Sánchez Gamboa, it is also true that said cell phone was supplied to the Institute by a distributing company and representative of the manufacturer, such as CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, which completes the producer-supplier-manufacturer chain under the strict liability regime towards the consumer. In this regard, the mobile phone brand BMOBILE SPEED 5 GREY IMEI 353253100027620 is part of the batch of terminal equipment acquired by ICE through purchase order 0098-2018, awarded to the company CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, a Panamanian corporation. In this sense, the administrative file provided by my represented party with this response accredits the existence of said contract, which demonstrates the links of said chain established in the aforementioned article 35 of Law 7472. VI. LEGAL GROUNDS OF THE RESPONSE: This response is based on the following regimes, substantive and procedural norms, doctrine, and jurisprudence. A. REGARDING THE ALLEGED STRICT CIVIL LIABILITY. Now, regarding the strict liability regime, both the General Law of Public Administration and the second paragraph of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 establish grounds for exoneration from liability that imply the breaking of the causal link, as recognized by doctrine and jurisprudence. In this regard, the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP) in article 190 establishes the following: (transcribes norm). For its part, article 35, second paragraph, of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 indicates: (transcribes norm). In this regard, by supplementary application of article 190 of the LGAP, the externality of the damage (ajenidad del daño) referred to in the second paragraph of Law 7472 is constituted by the exemption from liability grounds of force majeure (fuerza mayor), act of a third party (hecho de tercero), or fault of the victim (culpa de la víctima). B. EXTERNALITY OF THE DAMAGE DUE TO GROUNDS OF ACT OF A THIRD PARTY AND FAULT OF THE VICTIM WHICH EXONERATE MY REPRESENTED PARTY FROM LIABILITY: This defense, during the present process, in addition to evidencing that the Claimant has not proven the existence of damage, its severity, or causal link, will demonstrate that, in this particular case, the exemption grounds of act of a third party and fault of the victim have also occurred, which exonerate it from said strict civil liability regime. The act of a third party consists of the conduct attributable to Mrs. [Name 002], identity card number [Value 002], who, as the holder of the 4GK2 Postpaid Mobile Telecommunications Service Plan with associated terminal BMOBILE SPEED 5 GREY IMEI 353253100027620, and contrary to the concept of a reasonable consumer and the duty of care, disengaged from the use and handling of said terminal, making it available to a person with whom my represented party has no service relationship whatsoever, and who therefore cannot have traceability or certainty that the usage recommendations provided in the warranty certificate and in the user manual included with said terminal were given to her. Nor, in accordance with the principle of contractual good faith, was my represented party advised that the terminal phone, which was provided under a subsidy facility, was going to be used by a third party, which would have allowed it to provide some guidance regarding use and technical recommendations, which were indeed provided to Mrs. [Name 002]. The fault of the victim lies in the conduct of the Claimant, who even through statements made in the facts of the complaint, mentions that she charged an electrical device close to her physical integrity while sleeping. Even note, your Honor, that in the Thirteenth Fact of the Complaint, it is indicated that a normal conduct of the Claimant is "sleeping with the phone at hand"; an action which, while the terminal was being charged, falls short of the minimum duty of care. Likewise, there is no evidence in the Claimant's statements that, prior to allegedly using the terminal, she mentioned having requested the device usage manual from the service holder (Mrs. [Name 002]), nor are there any statements of her own indicating that she read said manual, nor the advice provided in the warranty certificate. From the complaint and the documentary evidence provided by the Claimant, prima facie, no elements are established that allow the proven damage suffered and its causal link to be taken as demonstrated, which also implies the quantification of material damage, aspects regarding which my represented party, under the principle of collaboration with the Justice Authorities, will progressively demonstrate said deficiencies in the respective stages. C. PARAMETERS FOR QUANTIFICATION OF MORAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL): As indicated in this brief, the Claimant in communications made to my represented party in pre-procedural stages (positions from February and June 2019) and in the complaint has presented a material fluctuation in the claims for material and subjective moral damages: 1. In February 2019, she demanded for moral and material damages the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, legal tender of the United States of America (US$200,000.00). 2. In June 2019, she requested for moral damages thirty million colones (¢30,000,000.00) and for material damages six hundred six thousand one hundred eleven colones and forty-one cents (¢606,111.41). 3. In November 2019, when filing the complaint, she requests on one hand that the material damages be set at twenty million colones (¢20,000,000) and moral damages at one hundred twenty million colones (¢120,000,000), but also requests that they be set in the enforcement of judgment phase. In this sense, taking into account that ICE, as a State company, manages public funds, which therefore form part of the concept of Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), and given the exorbitant fluctuations that the Claimant has presented to claim damages, this defense, so that it may serve as an objective and valid criterion, respectfully and prudently, takes the liberty of recalling the following jurisprudential line by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, especially on the matter of quantification of moral damages: (verbatim citation). Regarding material damages, at the appropriate procedural stage, the quantification of 20 million colones for medical expenses bears no reasonableness or proportionality whatsoever with the documents provided related to eventual invoices, some not even legible, which according to the Claimant amount to 606,111.41 colones. Although the Claimant indicates that the total sum is due to medical expenses in Argentina as well as patrimonial impairment due to ceasing to work, the fact of the matter is that she neither presents nor offers any proof. Also in this type of claimed damage, as with moral damages, the Claimant completely fails to meet the doctrinal and jurisprudential requirements for it to be considered a compensable damage, given that she does not determine, nor provides pertinent, suitable, or useful evidence, that proves it is a certain, real, effective damage, nor that a causal relationship exists between an unlawful act and the damage.

2.B. In File No. 20-002421-1027-CA: The pertinent part indicates: III. LEGAL GROUNDS OF THE RESPONSE: This response is based on the following regimes, substantive and procedural norms: A. REGARDING CONTRACTUAL CIVIL LIABILITY. As indicated by the Claimant [Name 002], the contractual relationship between [Name 002] and ICE derives from the acquisition by the former of a telecommunications services plan provided by ICE with an associated terminal brand BMOBILE facilitated by this Institute on January 15, 2019. In this regard, two obligations essentially derive from said service relationship on the part of ICE, which are explained below: The first is to provide the telecommunications services contracted in the Plan based on the legal and regulatory norms established in the telecommunications regulations, where the Claimant has not presented any claim of non-conformity for this item, nor any material claim in this process. The second derives from the warranty right for the BMOBILE SPEED 5 terminal, where ICE, as recorded in the administrative file and in response to an internal claim promoted on behalf of the Claimant on February 1, 2019, delivered to [Name 002] a mobile phone terminal brand HUAWEI, model P SMART, in replacement of the damaged device, where the new phone delivered has a higher economic value than the one reported as damaged, ICE not charging any difference in the price increase of the terminal equipment being received accordingly. In this regard, the statement made by the Claimant in the Material Damage Section regarding losing the money invested in the purchase of the BMOBILE terminal has no evidentiary basis, given that, as recorded in the administrative file, in accordance with the service and terminal acquisition contract, ICE proceeded to its replacement, even with one of higher cost, whereby there is no contractual breach, and if one existed, it has already been duly remedied, whereby there is no patrimonial obligation for which the Claimant must be compensated. Therefore, in accordance with the contractual civil liability alleged by the Claimant, ICE has complied with the only specific point invoked by [Name 002], which is the terminal exchange. B. PARAMETERS FOR DETERMINATION AND QUANTIFICATION OF MATERIAL DAMAGES: The other aspects of material damages alleged by [Name 002] are not made in her own right, but correspond to aspects that Ms. [Name 001] is claiming in another judicial process (19-1302-1028-CA-5) that includes the same amount and components for material damages, derived from procedures and medical and medicinal expenses for the sum of twenty million colones (20,000,000). Even note, your Honor, that in the legal grounds of the complaint filed by [Name 002], she cites article 197 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), which regulates liability for moral damages, a point that has been requested by Ms. [Name 001] in another judicial process, which further evidences that in the present complaint, the Claimant exercises claims for material damages that are not her own, but rather a third party's, with the sole exception of what relates to the terminal replacement, which, as indicated, has already been resolved by my represented party, there existing therefore an extra-procedural satisfaction. Regarding the material damages properly invoked, although the Claimant, in a diffuse and indeterminate manner, implies that the quantification of twenty million colones (20,000,000) for material damages is due to medical expenses that are not her own, but rather a third party's (who also claims them in the process to which consolidation is sought), the fact of the matter is that she neither presents nor offers any proof. In addition to her evidentiary omission, the Claimant completely fails to meet the doctrinal and jurisprudential requirements for it to be considered a compensable damage, given that she does not determine, nor provide pertinent, suitable evidence that proves it is a certain, real, effective damage, nor that a causal relationship exists between an unlawful act and the damage. C. EXTERNALITY OF THE DAMAGE DUE TO GROUNDS OF ACT OF A THIRD PARTY AND FAULT OF THE VICTIM WHICH EXONERATE MY REPRESENTED PARTY FROM LIABILITY. REGARDING THE INVOKED MATERIAL DAMAGE: The Claimant in some sections of the Complaint, among them in the legal grounds section, refers to an eventual strict civil liability of the Administration established in the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), regarding claims for moral damages that are not her own. In this regard, article 190 of the LGAP establishes the following: (transcribes article). This defense, during the present process, in addition to evidencing that the Claimant has not proven the existence of the damage, its severity, or causal link, will demonstrate that, in this particular case, the exemption grounds of act of a third party and fault of the victim have also occurred, which exonerate it from said strict civil liability regime. In this regard, and without prejudice that the complaint does not allow clarity as to whether the Claimant presents herself as a victim, or acts on behalf of a third party, the fact of the matter is that from the initial brief itself, it is recorded that there are conducts and omissions of [Name 002] and of [Name 001], which exonerate my represented party from liability in accordance with article 190 of the LGAP. In this sense, [Name 002], as the holder of the 4GK2 Postpaid Mobile Telecommunications Service Plan with associated terminal, BMOBILE SPEED 5 GREY IMEI 353253100027620, and contrary to the concept of a reasonable consumer and the duty of care, disengaged from the use and handling of said terminal, making it available to a person with whom my represented party has no service relationship whatsoever, and who therefore cannot have traceability or certainty that the usage recommendations provided in the warranty certificate and in the user manual included with said terminal were given to her. Nor, in accordance with the principle of contractual good faith, was my represented party advised that the terminal phone, which was provided under a subsidy facility, was going to be used by a third party, which would have allowed it to provide some guidance regarding use and technical recommendations, which were indeed provided to Mrs. [Name 002]. Likewise, it is not evident to this representation, at least from what is described in the complaint, that [Name 001] (to whom the Claimant delivered the terminal, according to her indication) fulfilled the minimum duty of care at the time of receiving and using the phone, nor is it evident that Ms. [Name 001] requested the device usage manual from the service holder, nor the usage advice provided in the warranty certificate. On the contrary, assertions are made in the complaint that would equally imply fault on the part of Ms. [Name 001], given that, in the third fact, it is indicated that she put the phone to charge before sleeping, that the terminal was on the mattress where she slept, and that the charging was for a prolonged period. These conducts that appear in the complaint itself, attributable both to the Claimant and to Ms. [Name 001], on whose behalf [Name 002] exercises the majority of her claims for material damages (except for the terminal exchange which has already been carried out), fall within the grounds for exoneration of liability of my represented party in accordance with article 190 of the LGAP.

III.- PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the resolution of the present dispute, the following facts are deemed duly accredited and are based on a single list for the consolidated files 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA:

• 1)That on January 17, 2019, the claimant [Name 002] acquired at no cost and at the instance of ICE, the terminal brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories being granted, invoiced in her name. (see folios 02 to 12 administrative file, Rodrigo [Name 002], ID [Value 003] in supplementary hearing of judicial file) 2) That [Name 001], without being a regular ICE customer but using the new terminal as of January 19, 2019, having been facilitated to her by [Name 002], of the new and unused device BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, and the device being in the charging phase starting from the nighttime hours of January 20, 2019, it happened that on January 21, 2019, in the morning hours between 06:30 and 07:30, its battery exploded, causing her, on the occasion of that explosion, injuries from second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burn to the hair on her head. Said claimant was treated for those injuries, initially on the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, subsequently treated for wound care (curaciones) at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina. (see folios 29, 31, 34, 39 to 46, 43 to 67 of administrative file, statement of [Name 003], ID [Value 003] in supplementary hearing of judicial file) 3) That [Name 001], on the occasion of the battery explosion in the cell phone BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, suffered second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burn to the hair on her head, being treated for her wound care at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, emotional damages, stress episodes, panic attacks, and suffering feelings due to her state of health and traumatic healing. (statements of [Name 003], ID [Value 003], [Name 002], in supplementary hearing, images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices from 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, from 01-24-2019/wound care, 01-28-2019/wound care, 01-29-2019/report, medical assistance and 01-31-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice from 01-27-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of judicial file) 4) The Fire Department (Cuerpo de Bomberos), Pital Station, Unit M-86, recorded the occurrence of a type 1-1-8-7 Fire Emergencies incident on 01/21/2019 at a dwelling in Alajuela, San Carlos, Agua Zarcas, after the Agua Zarcas bridge. (see folios 42-43 administrative file) 5) On January 28, 2019, the pieces remaining of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, were delivered by the claimant [Name 002] to ICE official [Name 004], ID [Value 004], for return of damaged terminal, with an indication on the form referring to bubbles due to burn on battery, burns on internal casing and others. (see image 74-75, 332 and statement of [Name 004] in supplementary hearing of judicial file) 6) On February 1, 2019, with the acceptance of the claimant [Name 002], a terminal exchange was carried out by ICE through official [Name 004], ID [Value 004], in her favor, with received delivery of the terminal brand and model HUAWEI, P Smart Black, with IMEI 867172030714850, and with a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories, in replacement of terminal brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620 due to defective manufacture - battery explosion in terminal. (see folios 15, 16, photographs at image 102-103, statement of [Name 004] in supplementary hearing, image 332 of judicial file) 7) That ICE official [Name 004], ID [Value 004], on January 28, 2019, delivered the remaining pieces of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620 to the authorized workshop SERTEC for its evaluation and diagnosis, the workshop indicating through Report SER-0007869 dated January 28, 2019, and in relation to the device that: "Fault Description: CUSTOMER INDICATES THAT THE TERMINAL'S BATTERY EXPLODED UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE IT WAS BEING CHARGED, AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION, IT CAUSED DAMAGE TO SONIA [Name 001], SECOND AND THIRD-DEGREE BURNS ON UPPER EXTREMITIES (WRISTS), HAIR, FOOT. Repair Carried Out: We proceed with the evaluation of the case finding: equipment does not present damage on the mainboard nor does it present damage on the cable or the charger, the screen is burst, marks on the phone label and on the back cover of the same due to the damage in the battery, it is concluded that the phone did not cause the damage in the battery since the connector and the charging circuit are in good condition. The only damages present are in the equipment's battery causing marks on the back casings of the same. Accessories: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDSFREE KIT, COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNT BATTERY. Equipment Status: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDSFREE KIT, COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNT BATTERY. Diagnosis Date: 01/28/2019." (see image 332, statement of [Name 004] in supplementary hearing of the judicial file) 8) That by the claimants [Name 001] and [Name 002], administrative monetary claims have been made against ICE, this for medical attention for the burn injuries indicated in relation to [Name 001], due to defective manufacture - battery explosion in terminal - on the occasion of her use of the terminal brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, occurring on January 21, 2019, in the morning hours between 06:30 and 07:30, without a satisfactory response. (see folios 29-35, 95, 96, 107-112 of administrative file and see image 332 of the judicial file, statements of [Name 003], ID [Value 003], [Name 005], ID [Value 005], in supplementary hearing of judicial file) IV.- UNPROVEN FACTS: In accordance with the evidentiary elements admitted in the proceedings, the following facts are deemed unproven as the proceedings lack suitable evidence in relation to the object of the process:
• 1)That [Name 001] is an active professional in Visual Arts in her country of origin and that by reason of the injuries suffered she had economic losses different from what was paid in the invoices from 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, from 01-24-2019/wound care, 01-28-2019/wound care, 01-29-2019/report, medical assistance and 01-31-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice from 01-27-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.
• 2)That the burn injuries on the person of [Name 001] caused her any insensitivity in her hands and that due to this, it affected her daily personal or professional tasks or current income.
• 3)That [Name 002] incurred patrimonial expenses on the occasion of any emergent material damage (daño material emergente) in relation to the injuries suffered by [Name 001], due to the battery explosion in the cell phone BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, where she sustained second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burn to the hair on her head, and that for this reason she disbursed expenses in her care for wound care at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.
• 4)That the Fire Department, Pital Station, Unit M-86, recorded in the occurrence of the type 1-1-8-7 Fire Emergencies incident on 01/21/2019 at a dwelling in Alajuela, San Carlos, Agua Zarcas, after the Agua Zarcas bridge, any recommendation regarding the results of the reported incidence.

V.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE PROCESS. 1.- Applicable preliminary observation. In both consolidated complaints, the claiming parties base the legal grounds of their actions and their arguments on the following norms: Articles 9, 11, 21, and 41 of the Political Constitution, 190, 196, 197 of the General Law of Public Administration, 1, 10, 12, 36, 58 and following of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code, and 1022 of the Civil Code. Also, making scant and loose justification and announcement in the eleventh fact of complaint 20-002421-1027-CA, as well as in the arguments of file 13-001302-1028-CA, reference was made to the application of article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. That is, the claimants only argued the action through and by means of the facts they presented, without carrying out a legal subsumption foundation on the underlying situation with the given facts and the stated norm, for the completeness and necessary demonstration of unlawfulness under the structure of the Cartesian or logical/legal syllogism. Under that recount of the applicable law alleged and the factual framework, the defendant was summoned, who, concerning what is indicated, reported the normative application of its interest, pointing out in its defense the mention of the Effective Consumer Defense Law 7472, article 35 on the liability regime and the exclusion of liability due to externality, as also regarding the grounds of fault of the victim and act of a third party incurred by the claimant, established in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration and what is established in article 48 of the General Telecommunications Law 8642, which allows, as it affirmed, the claim before the telecommunications operator to be filed by the customer directly or by any person on their behalf insofar as this does not imply that the substantive legal relationship with the service customer disappears, given that what this determines is the origin, terms, and conditions of the contract.

In the foregoing, and although the general principle that the judge knows the fullness of the law (iura novit curia) is well known, it is also true that the litigation was circumscribed by the factual and normative terms invoked, and therefore that will be the scope of analysis and assessment of the case within the reach of the parties' statements.

2.- COURT'S CRITERION. General parameters regarding the claim. Under the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) regime of the Public Administration, liability arises without the need to prove malice or fault of the agent causing the damage, it being sufficient to prove the existence of the "risk" to generate it, which is why the notions of unlawfulness and culpability do not apply; therefore, the principle of reversal of the burden of proof in favor of the injured party applies. For these purposes, the alleged Public Administration (ICE), the cause of the damages claimed, must compensate them if its conduct effectively and efficiently generated them, unless it demonstrates an exonerating cause, without prejudice to the unavoidable condition, it is reiterated, that the damaging effect must constitute or have its cause in the deployment of administrative activity or omission, or its commercial operations (giro comercial) in the field of telecommunications. Thus, the concurrence of four elements is required, namely: a) An injury (lesión), consisting of unlawful patrimonial damages because the person suffering them does not have the duty to bear them; b) Administrative conduct (conducta administrativa) in relation to which the production of the alleged damage is linked; c) A causal link (nexo causal), formed by the existence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act (administrative conduct) charged and the damage produced; and d) That there are no causes of justification, as their existence can legally dissociate the damage produced from the conduct of the Public Administration, such that the damaging effect is not attributable to it, breaking the causal link upon the occurrence of an exempting situation such as force majeure, fault of the victim, and the act of a third party. This regime of patrimonial liability of the State and its institutions, provided for in Articles 9 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and Article 190 et seq. of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, is therefore essentially objective in nature, so for it to arise it is sufficient that there is an indemnifiable damage, administrative conduct, and a causal link between the two. Thus, in cases of objective liability, the Administration's defense would lie in demonstrating that one of the causes that break the causal link indicated in numeral 190, paragraph 1 of the Ley General de Administración Pública has intervened, namely force majeure, the act of a third party, or the act of the victim itself, and consequently the application of the principle of the damage's externality. However, as a general rule of principle, to establish the origin of the Public Administration's liability, it arises as a sine qua non requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate the existence, consistency, and magnitude of the damage and the pertinent causal link with the administrative conduct that produced it. Based on that objective parameter, the analysis of the specific case proceeds.

VI.- Regarding the inadmissibility of the claim in case file 20-002421-1027-CA. At the core of the claims of this action is a request: to declare the consequential contractual civil liability of a patrimonial nature (responsabilidad civil contractual de carácter patrimonial) of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage (daño material) caused to the undersigned, valued at twenty million colones, and that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for proceeding with the compensation by reason of the material damage caused. Court's Criterion: For cases such as the present one, it is unavoidable for the plaintiff to fulfill the duty of proving the necessary factual and material elements that configure the status of injured party (damnificado), as the mere allegation of having suffered material damage on the part of the Administration, as the plaintiff intends in the present case, is not sufficient if this party failed—it is reiterated—in her duty to prove, substantiate, and justify the existence and consistency of the material damage incurred in the sum of twenty million colones, and it must be considered that from the relationship of Article 41.1 of the Código Procesal Civil with Article 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, derives what is known as the onus probandi (or burden of proof), a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a certain fact before the courts. The foundation of the onus probandi lies in an old legal aphorism that expresses that "what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal is proven." Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality, to justify a state of indemnity or injury (damnificación), and consequently the payment of material damage valued at twenty million colones, must prove it ("affirmanti incumbit probatio": he who affirms bears the burden of proof). Basically, what is meant by this aphorism is that the burden or work of proving a statement must fall on the one who breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a new truth on a subject). Although it is proven in the record that on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff [Name 002], acquired at no cost and through ICE's instance, the terminal brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, being granted a warranty period of 365 days for the device and 30 days for accessories and invoiced in her name, and that her friend [Name 001], without being a regular ICE customer but using that new terminal starting January 19, 2019, as [Name 002] had provided it to her, and that while the device was charging starting late in the night of January 20, 2019, it happened that on January 21, 2019, just 2 days after having acquired it and in the morning hours between 6:30 and 7:30 a.m., its battery exploded, causing her on that occasion second- and third- degree burn injuries on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burns to the hair on her head. And that for this reason, the said Mrs. [Name 001] was treated for those injuries, initially on the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, subsequently treated for related wound dressings (curaciones) at Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, the plaintiff, at that moment, had not suffered any material damage whatsoever, nor proven any pecuniary expense on occasion of any use of the indicated terminal that would cause her any direct and immediate harm to her legal patrimony, besides the fact that on January 28, 2019, the plaintiff [Name 002] was delivered by ICE official [Name 004], ID [Value 004], a replacement for the defective terminal in her favor, with delivery receipt of the terminal brand and model HUAWEI, P Smart Negro, with IMEI 867172030714850, and with a warranty period of 365 days for the device and 30 days for accessories, in substitution of the defective terminal brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620. None of these aspects and circumstances justify the material damage requested, and it is reiterated, it is not proven that [Name 002] incurred patrimonial expenses on occasion of any emergent material damage (daño material emergente) in relation to the injuries suffered by [Name 001]. Consequently, as the plaintiff does not prove the existence and consistency of the material damage claimed through or by means of the singularization or individualization of the component of this aspect, much less for the amount requested, nor that this had its genesis in the conduct accused to her detriment; therefore, this Court cannot conclude that the material damage originates from the complained-of situation regarding her injury, its granting not being a state of economic justice or discretion, but on the contrary, it must arise from an effective and indubitable proof of the causation of the accused damage, so not even, and consequently, is a causal link or connection proven between the alleged damage and in correspondence with the service provided by ICE to the plaintiff [Name 002], a necessary requirement for the origin of the administrative liability sought. Damage is a necessary element for the right to compensation to arise in objective or no-fault liability (responsabilidad objetiva o sin culpa), damage being understood as "the injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection." So, for the right to compensation to arise, the accused act or conduct must produce an "injury or invasion of another's legal sphere. Damage is compensable only if it results from an injury to a lawful interest worthy of protection (...)" (Pérez Vargas Víctor. Principios de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, primera edición, 1984, página 46, 47). Since old times already, and on this topic, which has not varied in its application criteria and even in relation to the application of numeral Article 35 of the Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor 7472, the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has ruled in vote number 467-F-SI-2008, at 2:25 p.m. on July 4, 2008, stating that "(...) Article 35, widely cited, establishes the liability regime applicable in consumer law matters, which is of an objective nature. It is worth recalling that civil liability, according to the imputation criterion used as its foundation, is divided into subjective and objective. The former bases the attribution of liability on culpability in a broad sense, that is, on the judgment of reproach made regarding the damaging agent's conduct. It comprises both fault in the strict sense and malice. An example of this is traditional contractual liability, regulated by Articles 701 and 702 of the Código Civil; the first of them refers to malicious liability and the second to fault-based liability. In such cases, fortuitous events are a cause exempting civil liability, since unforeseeability eliminates the judgment of reproach on the damaging agent's conduct. Objective civil liability (responsabilidad civil objetiva), on the other hand, has as its imputation criterion causes expressly established by law. Examples of this are Article 1048 of the Código Civil, regarding civil liability derived from damages caused by motive machines, and the cited Article 35, referring to civil liability in consumer law matters. The latter presupposes the civil liability of the producer or merchant when the existence of a damage caused as a result of the activity carried out by the producer or merchant is demonstrated. Thus, the consumer only needs to prove that the damage exists and that it occurs as a direct and immediate consequence of the activity carried out by the producer or merchant (adequate causation). Proof of fault or malice (culpability in a broad sense) is not required, since the imputation criterion is objective." In this way, according to what has been stated, material damage (daño material) falls upon the patrimony, on the goods and rights that compose it, and consequently, the affected party must accredit, demonstrate, and prove its existence, as well as its causal relationship. In this sense, it is divided into emergent damage (daño emergente), which is the direct injury caused by the reproached conduct, the loss generated, and loss of profit (lucro cesante), which is what was left unearned due to such activity, the frustrated gain or profit that was reasonable and probable to be received had the injurious action not occurred. Furthermore, regarding the requirements for damage in general to be compensable, it has been stated: "VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically concur to be a "compensable damage" (daño resarcible): A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on assumed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or of difficult appreciation or proof; nor should certainty be confused with currentness, as the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage cannot be confused with loss of profit or injury, since the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating fact of the damage, i.e., its repercussions are not projected at the time of filing the lawsuit (...). B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection (...)." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Nº606-F-2002 at 4:10 p.m. on August 7, 2002). -bold and italics intentional-. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is unnecessary to further justify or in greater consideration the inadmissibility in all its aspects of this present consolidated claim, the foregoing being sufficient to uphold the opposed exception of lack of right (falta de derecho).

VII.- 1.- Regarding the admissibility of the claim in case file 19-001302-1028-CA in the following terms: At the core of the claims of this action is a request: to declare the patrimonial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial) of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the moral damage (daño moral) and material damage (daño material) caused, the patrimonial liability derived from the damage corresponding to the material damage valued at twenty million colones and the subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) estimated at one hundred million colones. Court's Criterion: The legal situation claimed in this case file contains a different nuance from the one previously resolved, which focuses its shift in relation to the legality of the issue on the protective core of the Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor, as the plaintiff accuses the existence of ICE's strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), as a company that distributes and sells BMobile devices and that in this way, she states, has responsibility for the products it endorses and makes available to its clients, which, she asserts, it must subject to the necessary safety controls to ensure the health, life, and integrity of its consumers; that is, she points out as elements of liability an active conduct by ICE, promoting cell phones, and offering them to clients, that in this instance, one of the delivered devices had a factory defect, which caused it to explode a few days after use, causing damages such as those already indicated in the claim, its responsibility as a National Company being to ensure that products placed in the hands of its clients are in optimal conditions that do not endanger their life or integrity. In this regard, it is proven in the record that on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff in the consolidated case 20-002421-1027-CA, [Name 002], as a regular client of the defendant institute, acquired at no cost and through ICE's instance, the terminal brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, being granted a warranty period of 365 days for the device and 30 days for accessories, and the acquisition being invoiced in her name, and immediately, by her liberality, she gave it unused to her friend [Name 001]—without being a regular ICE client—due to her temporary stay in Costa Rica, given her tourist status, so she could make use of that new terminal starting January 19, 2019, and it happened that while the device was charging starting late in the night of January 20, 2019, on January 21, 2019, between 6:30 and 7:30 in the morning, just 2 days after having acquired it, its battery exploded, causing her, on that occasion and due to that explosion, second- and third-degree burn injuries on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burns to the hair on her head, warranting therefore that said Mrs. [Name 001] be treated for those injuries. Initially on the same day, the 21st, at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently treated for correlated wound dressings at Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina. It is equally evident in the record, although in a fairly illegible manner, that medical services were provided to her in private medicine at the expense of the person treated, for amounts that cannot be determined or particularly specified due to the illegibility of the documents provided in the record, but which nevertheless, this Court considers as justifications for the expenses incurred and estimates them as logical, corresponding, consequent, and necessary for her care in those private clinics—but not at the Ebais—as otherwise, she would not have been treated since they are not charity hospital centers.

Under that understanding, and with regard to the burden of proof, Article 35 of the Ley de Protección al Consumidor establishes the presumption of liability of the producer, supplier, and merchant, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, and only whoever proves to have been extraneous to the damage is released. That is, in matters of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) in consumer relations, the reversal of the burden of proof prevails as a general rule, thus placing upon the defendant ICE the proof of the exonerating circumstances that are subject to the rules of due diligence. Due to the positive and prospective development of the objective thesis of created risk or dangerousness, it is the Court's criterion that the duty to avoid damage becomes more demanding; hence, once damage is produced, the reversal of the burden of proof is imposed. The producer, supplier, or merchant must demonstrate the objective fact that all the most functional technical and safety measures have been taken to avoid or reduce the danger of the activity they carry out and, with it, the products they market, all in protection of the consumer/user. Thus, the principle of symmetry is established, stating that there will be greater burdens for whoever has better possibilities due to the possession of suitable means of proof, which is what is known as dynamic proof. The harmed consumer, injured on their part, must demonstrate: a. The harm suffered. b. The link between the damage and the used good or product received or the service received from the supplier, producer, or merchant (causation relationship). The burden of proof cannot be altered to the detriment of the consumer or user, who is also in a disadvantaged situation in the consumer relationship. Regarding this issue, the Sala I of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has ruled: [...] IV.- Regarding the burden of proof. Based on what has been stated up to this point, it is appropriate to refer to the duty of proof incumbent upon each of the parties that comprise the litigation, when the object of the proceeding is the declaration of a duty to repair damage in cases like the present. Firstly, it is noted that the plaintiff finds herself in a situation where it is very difficult or practically impossible to prove some of the essential facts or prerequisites for her claim, placing her before potential defenselessness. As a result of the foregoing, and as this Chamber has previously indicated, the duty of proof is redistributed among the litigating parties, where the "onus probandi" (evidentiary duty) corresponds to whoever is in a better position to provide proof to the proceeding..." (in this sense, see resolution no. 212 at 8:15 a.m. on March 25, 2008). The plaintiff [Name 001] demonstrated in the record that, making ordinary, normal, and intended or reasonably foreseeable use of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, just 2 days after having received it from [Name 002] and 4 days since ICE had delivered it new to the latter, and with the device charging since late in the night of January 20, 2019, it happened that on January 21, 2019—a few hours later—the device's battery exploded, causing her the injuries already indicated above (statements of [Name 003], ID [Value 003], [Name 002], in supplementary hearing, epicrisis and treatments in private hospitals according to documents visible in images 27-37 of the judicial case file and invoices dated 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound dressings, dated 01-24-2019/wound dressings, 01-28-2019/wound dressings, 01-29-2019/report, medical assistance and 01-31-2019/wound dressings, processed at Hospital Metropolitano and invoice dated 01-27-2019/wound dressings, processed at Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 of the administrative case file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial case file).

Now, although it is also proven that Mrs. [Name 001] did not acquire the defective device directly from ICE, nor is she configured as a contracting party with ICE, she was indeed constituting herself, through the use of the device, as an indirect, mediate, or effective consumer of the products marketed by ICE, not a stranger to the entity nor commercialized by third parties, which entails a broadening of protection over the extension of liability for the distribution and delivery of defective goods or products by it to direct or indirect users, especially under the understanding that the device was new and with only 2 days of use by Mrs. [Name 001] and 4 days since ICE delivered it, which gives the present matter a special and differentiated accent. By extensive interpretation of the Ley de Protección al Consumidor, in matters of consumer relations, the concept of what a consumer is has been broadened, understood not only as the effective consumer, i.e., the person who acquires a good or service, but also as the potential consumer or client, who is the one who does not actually acquire that good or service, but who may come to acquire or use it under any title, provided it comes from the lawful distribution chain of the device, in this case from ICE, making the statement by ICE ineffective when it asserts its excuse from liability due to the lack in the sub litem of an issue of traceability and custody not only of the terminal but also of the transfer of usage information. Thus, as a comparable example, through vote number 295-2007 at 10:45 a.m. on April 26, 2007, the Sala Primera ruled as follows: "[…] In the criterion of this Chamber, the simple fact of not acquiring a product, or requesting a service, is not a legally acceptable reason to exempt the producer, supplier, or merchant from liability, in those cases where the user is injured by reason of the good or service received. The term 'consumer' referring to the legal situation of the plaintiff when he entered the supermarket, corresponds to a broader concept than that of buyer. In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer must be understood in an expansive approach with respect to the scope of application of persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not contingent upon a 'consumer contract', because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited way to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that it be conceived as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer—and not an effective buyer—of goods and services from the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called a legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract the good or service, but can potentially acquire it or use it. The latter is the center of legal protection in the sphere of consumer safety […]". That is, the liability dealt with in consumer and user matters is that in which the damage is caused by the utilization, whether by use or consumption, or the handling of a defective product, when the damage is caused by the defectiveness of the product, and that it was thus delivered by ICE, even without its knowledge, which by marketing it, its position links and binds the product that was imported and subsequently distributed to the consumer or user within the framework of its ordinary and usual business activities, at least for the duration of its warranty, which gains greater relevance as the right to health is safeguarded and protected under Article 32 of the cited law, on occasion of the existence of a defective product, which in its literal wording establishes: "Article 32.- Consumer rights. Without prejudice to what is established in treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, customs and practices, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a) Protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and the environment (...)." Because of this, civil liability for defective products refers to the liability of a manufacturer or seller (ICE) for placing a defective product in the hands of a consumer and/or user, it not being foreign to the case under study that in the case of explosions of lithium-ion batteries—common in cell phones—the claim is not excluded or limited by referring to design or manufacturing defects, as it is prone to overheating due to charging or, if a failure occurred during its production that caused its explosive nature, what matters is that this was not observed prior to its subsequent effective distribution and commercialization, the onus being on the manufacturer and the distributor to prove that the device had no defect whatsoever, an aspect that in the record, ICE has not managed to prove otherwise.

This being the case, it is the Court's criterion that ICE's opposition based on the argument of the externality of the damage due to the victim's fault and the act of a third party is inadmissible, especially when not even an expert opinion on the manufacturing quality of the device and its battery in question as a single commercial unit is provided, it being even the case that the authorized workshop SERTEC for the review of those devices laconically stated: "Report SER-0007869 dated January 28, 2019 and in relation to the device that: 'Failure Description: CLIENT INDICATES THAT THE TERMINAL'S BATTERY EXPLODED UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE IT WAS CHARGING, AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION, CAUSED DAMAGES TO SONIA [Name 001], SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS ON THE UPPER EXTREMITIES (WRISTS), HAIR, FOOT. Repair Performed: Proceeding with the evaluation of the case finding: equipment shows no damage to the main board nor shows damage to the cable or charger, the screen is shattered, marks on the phone's label and its back cover as a result of the damage to the battery, it is concluded that the phone did not cause the damage to the battery since the connector and the charging circuit are in good condition. The only damages present are on the equipment's battery causing marks on the back casings of the same. Accessories: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDSFREE, BACK COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNT BATTERY. Equipment Condition: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDSFREE, BACK COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNT BATTERY. Diagnosis Date: 01/28/2019.'"; which, a fortiori, does not determine the cause of the battery explosion nor its improper use, its improper use not being transferable to the injured party. In this sense, externality of damage must be understood as when only whoever proves to have been extraneous to the damage is released, and for this, it must be taken into account that Ley 7472 itself, in Article 71, contemplates the integration of that regulation with the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). So, it has been the criterion of this jurisdiction, and supported by the Sala Primera and now in its integration as Tribunal de Casación, that since in Act 7472 there is no express detail of what should be understood as externality from the damage, the exempting causes contained in the LGAP are applicable. Ordinal 190.1 ibid establishes as exempting from liability the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, or force majeure. Thus, for a risk to be attributable to a company, in such a way that its materialization entails liability, it must be taken into account that the risk to which the consumer is exposed must exceed those that are tolerable for the person suffering the damage.

In summary, article 35 of the Consumer Law establishes a regime of strict and joint and several liability among the producer, the supplier, and the merchant, towards the consumer and effective user under the terms given in this decision and who was injured in their physical and emotional moral integrity on the occasion of the good or service placed at their disposal, with the result that ICE does not demonstrate that, after a retrospective examination, the damage was not linked by a causal nexus to its intervention in that economic chain of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, and that it came into the hands of Mrs. [Name 001] by mere liberality, much less that she made unreasonable use of the device, exceeding the normality of use of such a generic and commonplace device as is the use of a cell phone. Therefore, it is consequent to declare the patrimonial liability of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused and accredited, which is limited solely to the amount that is determined on what was paid in the invoices of 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/dressings, of 24-01-2019/dressings, 28-01-2019/dressings, 29-01-2019/report, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 27-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, denying any other compensation for lack of justification and accreditation of other requested items. The determination of the payments made as indicated is deferred to the enforcement of the judgment, together with the recognition of legal interest from the date of their payment to the hospital centers and until their effective payment in this jurisdictional venue, concomitantly denying their indexation to real value at the date of receipt thereof, because the granted interest contains an inflationary component in its composition, which undoubtedly would grant a double financial compensation without any basis, which is improper.

2.- Regarding the claimed moral damage: Regarding the demonstration of subjective moral damage, it has been reiterated by this Tribunal that this type of detriment consists of the affectation of the psychic conditions of the subject; its assessment – it has been insisted – is in re ipsa, that is, it depends on the estimations of the judging body not on concrete evidentiary elements, but on indicia and on the factual scenario itself, from which an affectation in this extra-patrimonial sphere of the individual is logically deduced. In other words, it does not require direct demonstration, but is inferred from the accredited facts, through indicia and rational inferences. In the sub judice, this Tribunal appreciates by logical inference that the plaintiff Leyla Rioba suffered intensely, emotionally and internally, not only due to her physical injuries on the occasion of the explosion of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, which caused her second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet and head hair burn, and that being in that state she was attended for her dressings at the Ebais of the CCSS of Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, which naturally caused her emotional damage, stress conditions, panic crises and suffering feelings due to her state of health and traumatic healing (testimonies of [Name 003], ID [Value 003], [Name 002], in supplementary hearing of the judicial file), resulting thereby in suffering uncertainty, suffering and emotional exhaustion due to the dressing treatment and the result thereof in relation to her physical condition prior to the event that occurred, which is an intuitive, reasonable and expected behavior in people who do not expect such a significant event as the one suffered, where there is the expectation of receiving a reliable, safe device, reviewed and approved by ICE for its distribution and commercialization. Rationally, no one expected the opposite. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the limits of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality for the determination of moral damage. This has a direct effect on its determination, because it is not a matter of quantifying the suffering, since it is invaluable, but of setting monetary compensation for her injury, the only mechanism to which the law can resort, in order to repair, at least in part, the offense suffered. The financial quantification or liquidation of subjective moral damage or pretium doloris, is of strictly psychic, affective character and not linked to material deficiencies, hence its demonstration is excludable, which entails the application of judicial discretion, under the internal control and limit of the indicated reasonableness and proportionality. It must then be considered that the moral harm and the alterations in the conditions of existence, in the plaintiff, are items of moral damage that are neither synonyms nor express the same damage as a result of the strict liability applied, whose object of its indemnification is independent through the figure of alterations in the conditions of existence (materiality), while through subjective moral harm, the suffering produced by the harmful event is compensated, niche in which the material claim of the requested moral damage resides. The compensation in this regard is set at FOUR MILLION COLONES and not in the requested amount, which is jurisprudentially delimited by the appreciation that this Tribunal has perceived in the process of the sufferings that affect the affective sphere of the victim, derived from the facts and testimonies that were taken into account to estimate it (testimonies of [Name 003], ID [Value 003], [Name 002], in supplementary hearing, images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices of 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/dressings, of 24-01-2019/dressings, 28-01-2019/dressings, 29-01-2019/report, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 27-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of judicial file) and that even such suffering has been obtained from the events lived internally by the plaintiff, so this Section has no doubt whatsoever about the existence of the moral damage caused, estimating a compensation for pain, but not a damages; representing a sanction but not an exaction from the offender. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal observes from the situations indicated in the case file, according to which, the personal affliction of the plaintiff, constitutes the only stage to be compensated and that it, is the source of consequent frustration, is sufficient fact so that the adequate retribution, does not transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as principles that were intrinsically valued precisely by this Tribunal, so no sufficient reason is found to vary the quantum of the compensation and adjust it to the sum requested in the claim. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration had to avoid it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of article 194 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) such as those given and proven in this case file, and assume the compensatory consequences of that which it could not prevent, producing the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person, and to that extent, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim [Name 001] must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory repair in the sum ordered, together with the recognition of legal interest until its effective payment once this decision is firm, concomitantly denying its indexation to real value at the date of receipt thereof, because the granted interest contains an inflationary component in its composition, which undoubtedly would grant a double financial compensation without any basis, which is improper.

VIII.- Of the defenses raised. In both proceedings, the representatives of the defendant raised the same defenses of lack of right, lack of active and passive standing, and lack of current interest. In accordance with what has been considered and the scope of what has been indicated, the defense of lack of right is upheld solely in relation to the action filed in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA and, also regarding the denied excess claimed of the amounts for material and moral damage within the action filed in proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA. The defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of current interest are rejected in both consolidated actions, by virtue of the analyzed legal and factual situation, because being a civil process of the public treasury, the affected parties in this case have the power to sue the institution or subject they consider responsible for the damages to their patrimony.

IX.- Of the litigation costs. Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, in accordance with the provisions of that same rule, in concordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. It is ordered: in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA, the plaintiff lost and in that order, in the Tribunal's opinion, she must bear the condemnation in both costs in favor of the defendant party. In proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, ICE lost and in that order, in the Tribunal's opinion, it must bear the condemnation in both costs in favor of the plaintiff party. In both proceedings and from the firm quantification of both costs in the Judgment Enforcement stage and until their effective payment, the respective legal interest shall be recognized in favor of the beneficiaries.

POR TANTO

It is ruled: The defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of current interest are rejected in both consolidated actions 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA. The defense of lack of right is upheld solely in relation to the action filed in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA and consequently the action filed by [Name 002] is declared without merit in all its terms. In relation to proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, the patrimonial liability of the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD is declared for the material damage caused and accredited, which is limited solely to the amount to be recognized to [Name 001] and that is determined on what was paid in the invoices of 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/dressings, of 24-01-2019/dressings, 28-01-2019/dressings, 29-01-2019/report, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 27-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, and the determination of the payments made as indicated is deferred to the enforcement of the judgment, together with the recognition of legal interest from the date of their payment to the hospital centers and until their effective payment in this jurisdictional venue, concomitantly denying their indexation; and the claim for moral damage is also recognized, setting this item at FOUR MILLION COLONES together with the recognition of legal interest until its effective payment once this decision is firm, concomitantly denying its indexation. In its relation, the defense of lack of right is upheld regarding the denied excess claimed of the amounts for material and moral damage. Of the litigation costs: It is ordered: in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA, the plaintiff lost and in that order, must bear the condemnation in both costs in favor of the defendant party. In proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, ICE lost and in that order, must bear the condemnation in both costs in favor of the plaintiff party. In both proceedings and from the firm quantification of both costs in the Judgment Enforcement stage and until their effective payment, the respective legal interest shall be recognized in favor of the beneficiaries. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández. Eduardo González Segura. Marco Hernández Vargas. Deciding Judges.

CERTIFICATION. On the same date of the above decision, it is certified that Judge Eduardo González Segura does not sign this decision because he is on vacation and it is noted that he participated in the deliberation and terms of the drafting of this decision. Presiding Judge. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández.

• 2)The lawsuits were filed, in order, as follows: 19-001302-1028-CA on January 29, 2020, and the claims were set forth in the preliminary hearing as follows: "1) Grant the present lawsuit. Declaring the consequent patrimonial liability of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the moral and material damage caused, as the main claim, with the patrimonial liability derived from the corresponding material damage valued at twenty million colones and the subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) estimated at one hundred million colones. Secondary claims. 2) That the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is liable to compensate the plaintiff for the damages caused, which will be determined in the execution phase of the judgment. 3) That the sums awarded in the judgment shall bear legal interest from the date the judgment becomes final and until the date of effective payment. 4) That the amounts awarded in the judgment be duly indexed to real value as of the date of receipt thereof. 5) That the defendant entity must pay the amount of the personal and procedural costs incurred. All secondary claims shall be understood as complementary to each other and/or to the main claim, and not as mutually exclusive or subsidiary." File 20-002421-1027-CA was filed on May 13, 2020, and likewise, the claims were set forth in the same preliminary hearing as follows: "1) Grant the present lawsuit. Declaring the consequent contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil contractual) of a patrimonial nature of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused to the undersigned, valued at twenty million colones. Secondary claims. 2) That the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is liable to compensate me for the material damage caused. 3) That the sums awarded shall bear legal interest from the date the judgment becomes final and until the date of effective payment. 4) That the amounts awarded must be duly indexed to real value as of the date of receipt thereof. 5) That the defendant entity must pay the amount of the personal and procedural costs incurred." (see images 2-12 in file 19-001302-1028-CA, and images 2-7 in file 20-002421-1027-CA, digital recordings of the preliminary hearing of February 7, 2023, its minutes at image 302-306 and digital recordings of the trial hearing held on December 17 and 18, 2024, all in the judicial file).
• 3)Once the legal transfer was granted, the representative of ICE answered both lawsuits in the negative and raised the following same preliminary objections (excepciones) in both files 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA: lack of necessary joinder of parties (falta de integración pasivo necesaria), lack of right, lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva) and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). (see images 106-123 in file 19-001302-1028-CA, and images 44-60 in file 20-002421-1027-CA).
• 4)By final order No. 1104-2021 of the Processing Judge, issued at fifteen hours fifty minutes on August eighteenth, two thousand twenty-one, the HOLDING (Por tanto) was issued: It is ordered to consolidate the proceeding processed under file No. 20-002421-1027-CA into the one processed under file No. 19-001302-1028-CA. Both files being at the same procedural stage, proceed to the material joinder of the same. Attach a copy of this ruling to file No. 20-002421-1027-CA. Once this ruling is final, continue the proceeding jointly and continue with the corresponding procedure." (see images 79-84 of file 20-002421-1027-CA) 5) By final order No. 0811-2022 of the Processing Judge, issued at eleven hours fifteen minutes on May twenty-third, two thousand twenty-two, the HOLDING (Por tanto) was issued: The preliminary defense (defensa previa) of necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) filed by the representation of ICE against the two plaintiffs in the consolidated proceedings known through this present proceeding is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. (see images 225-230 of file 19-001302-1028-CA) 6) The preliminary hearing established in section 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -which is recorded in the Court's digital system-, was held on February 7, 2023, and the claims were set forth in accordance with the second statement of Recital (Considerando) I of this ruling. The following were admitted to render testimonial evidence (declaración testimonial): [Name 003], ID [Value 003], [Name 002], ID [Value 002], [Name 004], ID [Value 004] and [Name 005], ID [Value 005], to be examined at the Complementary Hearing (Audiencia Complementaria). The dilatory exception (excepción dilatoria) was resolved, issuing: "ruling number 0165-2023 at fourteen hours eleven minutes on February seventh, two thousand twenty-three: HOLDING (Por tanto). Regarding the defenses of Improper representation, it is declared inadmissible. Regarding the preliminary defense of defects that prevent issuing a ruling on the merits (defectos que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo), the same is declared without merit." (see Preliminary Hearing minutes at images 302-306 of the judicial file and its digital recordings of that judicial proceeding).
• 7)The complementary oral and public trial hearing convened for December 17, 2024, was opened at 08:37 hours, in Courtroom 4. The legal representatives of the plaintiff parties appeared in person before the Tribunal and the representatives of the defendant attended remotely via the TEAMS application. The hearing was recorded in audio and video in the corresponding electronic system and is attached to the file. All details of the hearing are recorded in the audio and video, as well as in the minutes that are in the process file for this purpose. The COLLEGIATE TRIBUNAL SECTION II -Team 2- was constituted in person, comprised of Judges EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ SEGURA, MARCO HERNÁNDEZ VARGAS, and presided over by RONALDO HERNÁNDEZ HERNÁNDEZ. The opening arguments of the parties, the depositions of the admitted witnesses, and the closing arguments (conclusiones) of the parties were heard, with which the hearing concluded on the same December 17, 2024. (Sigao recording system, minutes and judicial file) 8) Finally, the Tribunal verified the means of notification and it was indicated that the judgment would be issued in writing, within the fifteen business day period provided for in subsection 1) of article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. This hearing was concluded at 09:41 hours. All were duly notified of the rulings and actions taken in the Complementary Hearing in accordance with numeral 88 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (digital recording of the oral and public trial hearing).
• 9)In the complementary hearing, the plaintiff party was ordered to submit the payment receipts from the assisted medical centers, since those attached to the case file are illegible, and a deadline until December 20, 2024, was granted for compliance thereof.

By resolution at fifteen hours twenty-eight minutes on the sixth of January of two thousand twenty-five, it was indicated: "The plaintiff did not provide the documents requested as indicated in the supplementary hearing session of the past 17th of December 2024, since those submitted on the date of 20th of December 2024 do NOT correspond with the payment receipts (illegible) provided in the case file and for which their submission was requested. Therefore, issue the judgment of pertinence within the strict deadline in accordance with article 111 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code." 10) In the proceedings before this Court, no procedural defects that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness have been observed, and the judgment is issued within the deadline established in article 111, subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code.

II.ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES. 1.- OBJECT AND POSITION OF THE COMPLAINT.- In synthesis of what is pertinent and without prejudice to the literalness of some of their arguments, each of the parties alleges what is subsequently detailed in this section. 1.A. Docket No. 19-001302-1027-CA. OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF [Name 001]: It is indicated: I base this complaint on the following Facts: First: That the plaintiff here, [Name 001], is a professional in Visual Arts, of Argentine nationality, who at the beginning of this year was in the country as a tourist, visiting some close friends. Second: That considering that the plaintiff intended to stay several weeks in the country for which she required the Telecommunications services provided by ICE. Due to her condition as a foreigner and her lack of knowledge about how procedures are carried out in Costa Rica, she asks her friend Mrs. [Name 002] for help to request a mobile phone plan with ICE that included a cell phone, so despite the fact that Mrs. [Name 002] appears as the owner of the postpaid plan in the contract, the plaintiff here is the final recipient of both the line and the mobile device delivered by Kolbi. Third: That on the 20th day of January of the current year, as is customary, the device was put to charge during the night, placing it in the bedroom of Miss [Name 001], near her bed. Fourth: That the following day, at approximately 7:30 in the morning, while my client was sleeping, the cell phone unexpectedly exploded in her hand, hair, legs, causing her severe second and third-degree burns, as evidenced in this photograph (shows photograph). Fifth: That the device had been acquired, as stated in the attached documents, on January 15, 2019, that is, it had not even been a week in use when the mishap occurred. Sixth: That immediately after what happened, my client was taken to the emergency service of the Social Security Clinic of Aguas Zarcas of San Carlos, where she was attended and the wound was treated as far as possible, since they were quite serious and due to the explosion several plastic particles became embedded in her skin, which require several follow-up appointments for their extraction. Seventh: That likewise, the Fire Department was called, since as a result of the explosion, the mattress of the bed on which the device was charging also caught fire, putting the infrastructure of the place at risk. The person in charge of the Station, in the Incident Report, Description section, indicated: "Responding to Emergency due to possible explosion of a cell phone battery inside a room, occurring at around 07:30 hours; causing damage to the device itself, mattress and 2nd and 3rd degree burns to the interested party's upper extremity. Control of the scene and patient care occurred before the arrival of the Fire Department." Eighth: That the plaintiff here has had serious physical effects as a result of the explosion, as demonstrated in the medical report, she suffered second and third-degree burns on hands, arms, legs, lost her hair, burns that caused her to lose sensitivity in her hands, which is considerably serious, considering that the affected party here is a visual arts teacher, and her work is manual all the time. Ninth: That my client went on several occasions to the Hospital Metropolitano so they could extract the battery particles and follow up on the wounds, as stated in the epicrisis and medical certificates. She was attended on 01/22/19, where she was seen by three specialists from the emergency service. Later, she was seen in several medical appointments from 01-24-19 to 01-31-19, being evaluated and treated again by several specialists due to the seriousness of her injury. Tenth: That the plaintiff here constantly has panic attacks. In the three months following the event, she would faint due to the pain she cannot overcome. She feels anxious, cries, is stressed, her self-esteem is very low, she feels insecure as a woman and as a professional, she is afraid to perform daily activities, etc. Eleventh: As stated in the Psychological Consultation report dated 02/14/19 from Psychologist Adriana Roa, it was indicated: "Since this episode, she reports significant difficulties sleeping and develops a generalized picture of anguish and anxiety that seriously compromises her daily life, with the aggravating factor that as a result of the injuries sustained, she is unable to work." Twelfth: That my client was also treated by Argentine psychologist María Fabiana Acuña, who in her report details the following symptoms: "Anguish, intense reactive fears, flashback (the event is experienced PERSISTENTLY, through thoughts, stimuli associated with the event, memories). Anxiety disorders were also detected, as well as a decline in energy (anímico) that could trigger depression." Thirteenth: That the plaintiff here is a young woman, 29 years old, accustomed since her adolescence to using a cell phone on a regular basis, which is why this event affected her greatly, since something that was as normal as checking the time, sleeping with the phone at hand, answering a message, has become a distressing experience for her.

Fourteenth: That days after what occurred, the defendant herein, ICE, was notified, wherein [Name 002], as the signatory of the contract, was instructed to return the device and that they would communicate with the manufacturer of the BMobile phones. Fifteenth: That on 01/28/19, the remaining pieces of the device were delivered with the corresponding reception form for damaged terminals, which is annexed to the present claim. Sixteenth: That approximately at the end of January, Ms. Maritza Gamboa, representing Miss [Name 001], presented an amicable and extrajudicial proposal-claim before ICE, who showed little further interest in the matter. Seventeenth: That in February of this year, Ms. Gamboa again undertook extrajudicial efforts by sending emails addressed to ICE and to the lawyers of the BMobile company requesting a meeting to discuss the points of the agreement, to which she receives a response from Catalina Vargas Pacheco of the area: Commercial Resource Management Process ICE, who schedules an appointment for the second week of February; however, there was a lack of interest on the part of the defendant company in reaching a conciliation.

Moral damages are claimed. Reason. The moral damages in the present case are based on the traumatic and injurious event of the cell phone exploding on the body and hair of the affected party, [Name 001], for which the defendant company bears strict liability, a company that distributes and sells BMobile devices, the same consisting of moral damages of a subjective type. It Consists Of. This damage manifests itself, as substantiated by the various psychological reports, as affecting her normal living conditions, causing situations of anguish, frustration, insecurity, anxiety, sleeplessness, fainting, crying episodes, low self-esteem, loss of appetite, professional insecurity, panic, etc. Estimation: The moral damages are prudentially estimated in the sum of 100,000,000.00 (one hundred million colones). Material damages. The plaintiff herein was affected in her pecuniary interests, since, as is logical in these situations, she had to go to a private medical center to have her wounds treated, first for better care and second because Miss [Name 001], being a foreigner, did not have medical insurance to be treated by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social; due to the urgency of the case, only some medical care invoices are preserved in the country, which amount to the sum of 606,111.41 (six hundred six thousand one hundred eleven colones and forty-one céntimos), to which must be added the medical expenses in Argentina, as well as the pecuniary loss for having had to stop working due to the loss of sensitivity in her hand. Consequently, the material damages have as their reason or origin the same factual basis as the moral damages, which manifests itself in the manner explained in the preceding paragraph and is prudentially estimated in the sum of 20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones). Cites jurisprudence on moral damages: (Tribunal Primero Colegiado de Primera Instancia Civil, at thirteen hours and fifty-three minutes on the fifteenth of March two thousand nineteen, judgment 2019-000186 and on liability for damage to third parties).

It must be noted in this proceeding that even though BMobile is not an employee of ICE, this State entity was, or is—we are unaware of the current situation—promoting the products in the national market, given that it was ICE who gave the cell phone to my represented party, and in that sense, it bears responsibility for the products it endorses and makes available to its clients, which it must subject to the necessary safety controls to ensure the health, life, and integrity of its consumers. That is to say, it is clearly evident the causal link between the conduct and the damage, as elements of liability, there being an active conduct by ICE, promoting cell phones and offering them to clients as in the case of my represented party, a cell phone that, in this specific case, had a manufacturing defect, which caused it, after a few days of use, to explode, causing damages as already indicated in the corresponding section, its responsibility as a National Company being to ensure that it places in the hands of its clients products in optimal conditions that do not endanger their life or integrity, and furthermore, having knowledge of the serious events, it chose to ignore its responsibility.

1.B. File No. 20-002421-1027-CA. OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF [Name 002]. In relation to the grounds of the prior accumulated claim, and with the purpose of not incurring unnecessary repetitions, she adds the following to what the plaintiff [Name 001] stated, and thus it is further indicated: First: That in January 2019, I received the visit of a very close foreign friend, the Argentine tourist [Name 001], who indicated to me that she is interested in spending a long season in the country and needs a local telephone service, for which she asks for my help, as she is unfamiliar with the national telecommunications service companies and the administrative procedures necessary to obtain a mobile line. Second: That in consideration of our friendship, on the 15th day of January of the year 2020, I go to ICE to request in my own name a postpaid plan with a cell phone, according to the requirements that Miss [Name 001] indicated to me; however, I was never the recipient of the mobile device or the line, I only carried out the purchase procedure and delivered it to its real user [Name 001]; in fact, it is not until the 20th of January that I deliver the cell phone to her, and during those days I did not turn it on or use it in any way; I delivered it to her intact, just as it was given to me at the ICE Office.

Sixth: That as extracted from the Fire Department Report, the damage was to the device, not to the electrical installation, the power outlet, or any other room in the house, which makes it absolutely clear that it was a battery explosion due to damage within the battery itself, not due to a short circuit or an external danger in this regard; likewise, the Fire Department Report contains no recommendation whatsoever regarding the need to change the electrical installation due to a danger that the situation might recur, thus demonstrating that the explosion was undoubtedly produced by the device itself. Seventh: That days after the incident, the incident was reported to the defendant herein, ICE. In response to my complaint, they indicated that the procedure is to return the device for reports to be made, notify the manufacturer, and after the investigation, they would contact me directly. Accordingly, on 01/28/19, the remaining pieces of the device were delivered with the respective receipt form for damaged terminals, which is attached to this complaint. Eighth: That days later, I was informed that the result of the investigation carried out was ready; however, they did not send me the report; they only told me that it had been damage to the cellphone, in response to which, since the subscriber was not the affected party physically and had never used the device, I did not file any administrative claim, but rather informed my friend Sonia [Name 001], so that she might proceed as she sees fit, letting her know that should she need my help with the formalities, since the purchase is in my name, I would gladly assist her. Ninth: that approximately at the end of January 2019, Attorney Maritza Gamboa, representing Miss [Name 001], presented a friendly, extrajudicial proposal-claim to ICE, which showed little interest in the matter. Tenth First: That ICE was always unwilling to reach an agreement, considering that the manufacturer should be liable, pursuant to Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, despite the fact that the warranty attached to this complaint clearly states that ICE must be responsible for factory defects and that, as is well known, the consumer is not obligated to pursue all those liable in the chain of consumption to claim liability; in this case, my contract was directly with ICE, I never requested a specific brand of cellphone, so my relationship with the manufacturing company is causal and indirect.

The plaintiff herein was affected in her pecuniary interests. It is evident and notorious that the cellphone I bought for my close friend exploded, without giving her the possibility of using it; moreover, it caused her damages, which not only meant she lost the money invested in the purchase, but also the need to carry out various formalities and assist her with medications due to her health condition, as a minimal gesture in the face of such a regrettable situation, for which ICE must be held liable under contractual civil liability, since, as stated in the attached warranty, they must be held responsible for factory defects, as was the case. Material damage. Consequently, the material damage has as its motive or origin the explosion of the cellphone, which manifested itself as explained in the preceding paragraph and is prudentially estimated at the sum of 20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones).

2. OBJECT AND POSITION OF THE RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINT BY ICE.- In summary and without prejudice to the literalness of some of its arguments, it is stated. 2.A. In File No. 19-001302-1027-CA: The facts are refuted and it considers: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. The evidence that has been numbered with consecutives "2", "3", "4", "5" and "6" does not allow this representation to determine a possible causal link between the apparent bodily injuries suffered by Mrs. [Name 001] and an action or omission by my client. Said evidence is far from demonstrating the precise circumstances of time, manner, and place in order to determine the origin of the facts, and therefore the origin of the alleged accident that the plaintiff seeks to prove. Likewise, documents are provided with the Complaint, the reading of which appears in principle to have been issued in the Republic of Argentina (alleged criteria of possible medical professionals and apparent ministerial entities); however, they are not associated with any legalization procedure that would guarantee the authenticity and official origin of the documents necessary to provide certainty and legal effect not only to the Defendant, but also to the Judicial Authority, meaning these documents allegedly from abroad will not be able to produce legal effects in Costa Rica. Therefore, the documents enumerated and provided as Documentary Evidence 7 (Medical Opinions sent from Argentina) and alleged certificates issued by the Government of the City of Buenos Aires relating to possible education studies (which are not even expressly enumerated as evidence), should not be admitted. Likewise, the medical opinions enumerated in Documentary Evidence 7, in addition to lacking the aforementioned legalization and authenticity requirements to produce effects in Costa Rica, also fail to prove the professional or academic suitability (specialized studies, continuing education) of the persons identified as specialists in medicine and psychology. Furthermore, this type of evidence should not be merely documentary in nature, but rather expert evidence, which would allow the Defendant to conduct the respective cross-examination, as well as allow the Trial Court to make the respective inquiries, prior to the issuance of the respective report. Thus, this representation requests that the alleged evidence numbered with the consecutive "7" by the plaintiff be rejected.

The Plaintiff provides and enumerates as "Evidence" matters that are extraneous to the facts as such, and which rather correspond to aspects of procedural and fiscal accreditation, such as Evidence 10 (Special Power of Attorney), Evidence 11 (Copy of Passport of Miss [Name 001]), and Evidence 12 (Payment of Filing Fees).

Therefore, such elements should outright not be admitted as evidence.

On January 23, 2019, at 3:52 pm, ICE's Telemarketing service received a call, in which identifying information for the service contracted by the Client [Nombre 002], identity card [Valor 002], was provided, and where a claim was filed in her name. This complaint filed in the name of the client [Nombre 002] is precisely what originates the present dispute. In this regard, one of the claims that originated from said complaint was precisely the change of terminal, which is why on February 1, 2019, in the afternoon, said replacement was carried out, substituting the BMOBILE phone for a HUAWEI P SMART, IMEI 867172030714850, for which the respective terminal delivery slip was issued in the name of [Nombre 002]. Although Article 48 of the General Telecommunications Law 8642 allows the claim before the telecommunications operator to be filed by the client directly or by any person on their behalf, this does not imply the disappearance of the substantive legal relationship with the service client, given that this is what determines the origin, terms, and conditions of the contract. And given that the terminal was acquired by the client [Nombre 002], to whom ICE also provided the warranty terms and the phone usage instruction manual, and given that in the present dispute, the Claimant Party seeks to determine the appropriateness of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) with respect to a third party outside the original relationship—where said BMOBILE phone must have been made available to Mrs. [Nombre 001] by [Nombre 002] (who received it from ICE) and therefore implies an issue of traceability and chain of custody not only of the terminal but also of the transfer of usage information. In this regard, from what is indicated in the lawsuit, it seemed that [Nombre 002] acquired the telecommunications service and the associated good, in this case the terminal, for personal purposes or for her closest family environment, which implies the mentioned friendship with Mrs. [Nombre 001]; however, in the lawsuit, there is no statement attributable to [Nombre 002] indicating the nature under which said terminal was provided (gratuitous loan, rental, sale, gift) and whether the information provided by ICE to the client regarding the recommendations for terminal use and the instruction manual were transferred to Mrs. [Nombre 001]. That is, according to national regulation, the term consumer (consumidor) in general terms refers to the person who acquires goods or services for personal, family, or immediate social environment purposes, as seems to be the case of the eventual use by Mrs. [Nombre 001]; therefore, [Nombre 002] has and maintains said consumer status and therefore the standing (legitimación) to form part of the necessary active joinder of parties (litis consorcio activo necesario), given that she has attempted to delegate the exercise of the action exclusively and excludably to Mrs. [Nombre 001], with whom ICE has had no contact regarding the original delivery of the BMOBILE terminal, nor information, given that the bridge has been precisely [Nombre 002], to whom even the delivery of the HUAWEI P SMART terminal was consigned in substitution of the BMOBILE phone, as stated in the administrative file. As the Honorable Court is aware, in Consumer Law (Derecho del Consumo), although the legislation establishes obligations and duties for the merchant, it also contemplates the concept of the Reasonable Consumer, promoting and requiring that they be responsible and diligent; a responsibility that also implies the exercise of judicial actions, especially when claims originate from a service relationship. In this context, for the purposes of this prior defense (defensa previa), it is necessary to take into account the rule established in Article 35, first paragraph, of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472, which states: "ARTÍCULO 35.- Liability regime (Régimen de responsabilidad). The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. (...)." This implies that said numeral establishes a concurrent and indissoluble chain of said agents of the industrial-commercial cycle under the strict liability regime in relation to the consumer, which therefore contemplates judicial actions, in this case under a necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario), where by law, not only the merchant (last link facing the consumer) must be integrated, but also representatives of the provider and producer, who are also linked by the substantive legal relationship in this case as defendants or the Defendant Party. Therefore, although ICE, for the purposes of the aforementioned numeral and in the context of the sale of telecommunications services under the Móvil Postpago 4GK2 Service Plan associated with telephone number 8881-0891, acted as a merchant at the time it made the BMOBILE mobile phone available to Client [Nombre 002] Sánchez Gamboa, it is also true that said cell phone was supplied to the Institute by a distributing company and representative of the manufacturer, which is CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, which completes the chain of producer-provider-manufacturer, under the strict liability regime vis-à-vis the consumer. In this regard, the BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS mobile phone, IMEI 353253100027620, is part of the batch of terminal equipment acquired by ICE through purchase order 0098-2018, awarded to the company CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, a Panamanian corporation. In this sense, the administrative file provided by my represented party with this response (contestación) proves the existence of said contract, demonstrating the links of said chain established in the mentioned numeral 35 of Law 7472. VI. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE RESPONSE (CONTESTACIÓN): This response is based on the following regimes, substantive and procedural rules, doctrine, and jurisprudence. A. REGARDING ALLEGED STRICT CIVIL LIABILITY. Now, regarding the strict liability regime, both the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and the second paragraph of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 establish grounds for exoneration from liability that imply the breaking of the causal link, as recognized by doctrine and jurisprudence. In this regard, the General Public Administration Law (LGAP) in Article 190 establishes the following: (transcribes rule). Meanwhile, Article 35, second paragraph, of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 indicates: (transcribes rule). In this regard, by supplementary application of numeral 190 of the LGAP, the externality of the damage (ajenidad del daño) referred to in the second paragraph of Law 7472 is constituted by the exonerating defenses (eximentes de responsabilidad) of force majeure, act of a third party, or fault of the victim. B.

ALIENNESS OF THE DAMAGE DUE TO THE GROUNDS OF ACT OF A THIRD PARTY AND FAULT OF THE VICTIM THAT EXEMPT MY REPRESENTED PARTY FROM LIABILITY: This defense, during the present process, in addition to evidencing that the Plaintiff has not proven the existence of the damage, its severity, nor the causal link, will demonstrate that in this particular case, the exonerating grounds of act of a third party and fault of the victim have also occurred, which exonerate him from said objective civil liability regime. The act of a third party consists of the conduct attributable to Mrs. [Nombre 002], identity card number [Valor 002], who, as the holder of the postpaid mobile telecommunications Service Plan 4GK2, with associated terminal BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRAY IMEI 353253100027620, and contrary to the concept of a reasonable consumer and the duty of care, disassociated herself from the use and handling of said terminal, making it available to a person with whom my represented party has no service relationship whatsoever, and for whom, therefore, it cannot have traceability or certainty that the usage recommendations provided in the warranty certificate and the user manual included with said terminal were given to them. Nor, in accordance with the principle of contractual good faith, was my represented party notified that the terminal phone, which was provided under the subsidy facility, was going to be used by a third party, which would have allowed it to provide some guidance regarding use and technical recommendations, which were indeed provided to Mrs. [Nombre 002]. The fault of the victim lies in the conduct of the Plaintiff, who even, through statements made in the facts of the complaint, mentions that she charged an electrical device near her physical integrity while she slept. Your Authority should even note that in the Thirteenth Fact of the Complaint, it is indicated that a normal conduct of the Plaintiff is "sleeping with the phone at hand"; an action which, when the terminal is charging, falls far from the minimum duty of care. Likewise, it is not evident from the Plaintiff's statements that prior to allegedly using the terminal, she mentioned having requested the device's user manual from the service holder (Mrs. [Nombre 002]), nor are there any statements of her own that she read said manual, nor the advice provided in the warranty certificate. From the complaint filing and the documentary evidence provided by the Plaintiff, prima facie, no elements are established that allow the damage suffered and its causal link to be deemed proven, which also implies the quantification of the material damage, aspects regarding which my represented party, under the principle of collaboration with the Justice Authorities, will be demonstrating said deficiencies in the respective stages. C. PARAMETERS FOR QUANTIFICATION OF MORAL DAMAGES: As indicated in this brief, the Plaintiff, in the communications made to my represented party in pre-trial stages (positions of February and June 2019) and in the complaint brief, has presented a material fluctuation in the claims for subjective material and moral damages: 1. In February 2019, she demanded for moral and material damages the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, legal tender of the United States of America (US$200,000.00). 2. In June 2019, she requested for moral damages thirty million colones (₡30,000,000.00) and for material damages six hundred six thousand one hundred eleven colones and forty-one céntimos (₡606,111.41). 3. In November 2019, when filing the complaint, she requests on one hand that material damages be set at twenty million colones (₡20,000,000.00) and moral damages at one hundred twenty million colones (₡120,000,000.00), but also requests that they be fixed in the execution of judgment. In this sense, taking into account that ICE, as a State company, manages public funds, which therefore form part of the concept of Public Treasury, and given the exorbitant fluctuations the Plaintiff has presented to claim damages, this defense, so that it may serve as an objective and valid criterion, respectfully and prudently, permits itself to recall the following jurisprudential line by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, especially regarding the quantification of moral damages: (direct quote). Regarding material damages, at the appropriate procedural stage, the quantification of 20 million colones for medical expenses bears no reasonableness or proportionality whatsoever with the documents provided related to eventual invoices, some not even legible, which, according to the Plaintiff, amount to ₡606,111.41. Although the Plaintiff indicates that the total sum is due to medical expenses in Argentina as well as patrimonial impairment from ceasing to work, the truth of the matter is that she presents and offers no proof whatsoever. Also, for this type of claimed damage, as with moral damages, the Plaintiff completely fails to meet the doctrinal and jurisprudential requirements for it to be considered compensable damage, given that she does not determine, nor provide pertinent, suitable, or useful evidence, that accredits it is certain, real, effective damage or that a causal relationship exists between an unlawful act and the damage.

2.B. In File No. 20-002421-1027-CA: It is stated in the pertinent part: III. LEGAL GROUNDS OF THE ANSWER: This answer is based on the following regimes, substantive and procedural rules: A. ON CONTRACTUAL CIVIL LIABILITY. As indicated by the Plaintiff, the contractual relationship between [Nombre 002] and ICE derives from the former's acquisition of a telecommunications service plan provided by ICE with an associated terminal of the brand BMOBILE facilitated by this Institute, on January 15, 2019. In this regard, two essential obligations for ICE derive from said service relationship, which are explained below: The first, to provide the telecommunications services contracted in the Plan based on the legal and regulatory rules established in the telecommunications regulations, where the Plaintiff has not presented any claim of non-conformity for this item, nor any material claim in this process. The second derives from the warranty right for the BMOBILE SPEED 5 terminal, where ICE, as recorded in the administrative file and in response to an internal claim filed on behalf of the Plaintiff on February 1, 2019, delivered to [Nombre 002] a mobile telephone terminal of the brand HUAWEI, model P SMART, as a replacement for the damaged device, where the new phone delivered to her has a higher economic value than the one reported as damaged, with ICE not charging any difference for the price increase of the terminal equipment it was receiving in accordance.

In this regard, the assertion made by the Plaintiff in the Material Damages Section that she lost the money invested in the purchase of the BMOBILE terminal has no evidentiary basis, given that, as recorded in the administrative file, in accordance with the service and terminal acquisition contract, ICE proceeded to replace it, even with one of higher cost, with which there is no contractual breach, and if there were, it has already been duly remedied, with which there is no patrimonial obligation for which the Plaintiff must be compensated. Therefore, in accordance with the contractual civil liability alleged by the Plaintiff, ICE has fulfilled the sole specific element invoked by [Name 002], which is the change of terminal.

B. PARAMETERS FOR THE DETERMINATION AND QUANTIFICATION OF MATERIAL DAMAGES: The other elements of material damages alleged by [Name 002] are not made on her own behalf, but rather correspond to elements that Ms. [Name 001] is claiming in another judicial process (19-1302-1028-CA-5) that includes the same amount and components for material damages, derived from medical and pharmaceutical procedures and expenses, in the sum of twenty million colones (20,000,000). Your Honor should even note that in the legal grounds of the lawsuit filed by [Name 002], she cites Article 197 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) which regulates liability for non-pecuniary damages (daño moral), an element that Ms. [Name 001] has requested in another judicial process, which further demonstrates that in the present lawsuit, the Plaintiff is exercising claims for material damages that are not her own, but rather those of a third party, with the sole exception of the matter relating to the replacement of the terminal, which, as we indicated, has already been resolved by my represented party, thus existing an out-of-court satisfaction.

Regarding the material damages invoked specifically, although the Plaintiff, in a diffuse and indeterminate manner, implies that the quantification of twenty million colones (20,000,000) for material damages is due to medical expenses that are not her own, but those of a third party (who is also claiming them in the process to which accumulation is sought), the fact of the matter is that she does not present, nor does she offer, any evidence. Furthermore, beyond her evidentiary omission, the Plaintiff completely fails to meet the doctrinal and jurisprudential requirements for a damage to be considered compensable, given that she does not determine, nor does she provide pertinent, suitable evidence to prove that it is a certain, real, effective damage, nor that a causal link exists between an illicit act and the damage.

C. EXTRAVAGANCE OF THE DAMAGE DUE TO GROUNDS OF ACT OF A THIRD PARTY AND FAULT OF THE VICTIM THAT EXEMPT MY REPRESENTED PARTY FROM LIABILITY. REGARDING THE MATERIAL DAMAGES INVOKED: The Plaintiff, in some sections of the Lawsuit, among them in the section on legal grounds, refers to a potential strict civil liability of the Administration established in the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), regarding claims for non-pecuniary damages (daño moral) that are not her own. In this regard, Article 190 of the LGAP establishes the following: (transcribes article). This defense, during the present process, in addition to demonstrating that the Plaintiff has not accredited the existence of the damage, its severity, nor the causal link, will demonstrate that in this particular case, the exonerating grounds of act of a third party and fault of the victim have also occurred, which release it from said strict civil liability regime.

In this regard, and without prejudice to the demand not allowing clarity as to whether the Plaintiff is presenting herself as the victim, or is acting on behalf of a third party, the fact of the matter is that from the filing memorial itself, it is recorded that there exist conducts and omissions by [Name 002] and by [Name 001] that exonerate my represented party from liability in accordance with Article 190 of the LGAP. In this sense, [Name 002], as the holder of the 4GK2 postpaid mobile telecommunications Service Plan, with an associated terminal, BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS IMEI 353253100027620, and contrary to the concept of a reasonable consumer and the duty of care, disassociated herself from the use and handling of said terminal, making it available to a person with whom my represented party has no service relationship whatsoever, and who therefore cannot have traceability or certainty that she was provided the usage recommendations given in the warranty certificate and in the user manual that comes with said terminal. Nor, in accordance with the principle of contractual good faith, was my represented party notified that the terminal telephone, which was provided under the subsidy facility, was going to be used by a third party, which would have allowed providing some guidance regarding usage and technical recommendations, which were indeed provided to Mrs. [Name 002].

Likewise, it is not recorded by this representation, at least from what is described in the lawsuit, that [Name 001] (to whom the Plaintiff handed the terminal according to what is indicated) complied with the minimum duty of care at the moment of receiving and using the telephone, nor is it recorded that Ms. [Name 001] requested from the service holder the device's user manual or the usage advice provided in the warranty certificate. On the contrary, assertions are made in the lawsuit that would equally imply fault on the part of Ms. [Name 001], given that, in the third fact, it is indicated that she put the telephone to charge before sleeping, that the terminal was on the mattress on which she slept, and that the charging was for a prolonged period. These conducts, which appear in the lawsuit itself, attributable to both the Plaintiff and Ms. [Name 001], on whose behalf [Name 002] exercises the majority of her material damages claims (except for the terminal change, which has already been carried out), fall within the grounds for exoneration of my represented party's liability in accordance with Article 190 of the LGAP.

III.- PROVEN FACTS: Of importance for the resolution of the present litigation, the following facts are considered duly accredited, based on a single list for the accumulated files 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA:

• 1)That on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff [Name 002] acquired, at no cost and at the instance of ICE, the terminal with brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, with a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories being granted, invoiced under her name. (see folios 02 to 12 of the administrative file, Rodrigo [Name 002], ID card [Value 003] in supplementary hearing of the judicial file) 2) That [Name 001], without being a regular client of ICE but using the new terminal as of January 19, 2019, as [Name 002] had provided it to her, from the new and unused device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, and with the device in a charging phase from the evening hours of January 20, 2019, it happened that on January 21, 2019, in the morning hours between 06:30 and 07:30, its battery exploded, causing, on the occasion of that explosion, injuries from second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and a burn to the hair on her head. Said plaintiff was treated for those injuries, initially on the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently treated for wound care at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.

(see folios 29, 31, 34, 39 to 46, 43 to 67 of the administrative file, declaration of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003] in the supplemental hearing of the judicial file) **3)** That [Nombre 001], as a result of the explosion of the battery in the cell phone BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, suffered second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and a burn to the hair on her head, being treated for her wound care at the CCSS Ebais in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, emotional distress, episodes of stress, panic attacks, and feelings of suffering due to her health condition and traumatic healing. (declarations of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], in the supplemental hearing, images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices dated 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, dated 24-01-2019/wound care, 28-01-2019/wound care, 29-01-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice dated 27-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 of the administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial file) **4)** The Fire Department, Pital Station, Unit M-86, recorded the occurrence of a type 1-1-8-7 Fire Emergency incident on 21/01/2019 at a dwelling in Alajuela, San Carlos, Agua Zarcas, after the Agua Zarcas bridge (see folios 42-43 administrative file).

**5)** On January 28, 2019, the plaintiff [Nombre 002] delivered to the ICE official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], the remaining pieces of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, as a damaged terminal return, with a notation on the form regarding bubbles from battery burn, burns on the internal casing, and other damage (see image 74-75, 332 and declaration of [Nombre 004] in the supplemental hearing of the judicial file) **6)** On February 1, 2019, with the acceptance of the plaintiff [Nombre 002], ICE, through the official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], performed a terminal exchange in her favor, with received delivery of a terminal of the make and model HUAWEI, P Smart Black, with IMEI 867172030714850, and with a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories, as a replacement for the terminal make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620 due to defective manufacturing —explosion of the battery in the terminal—. (see folios 15, 16, photographs at image 102-103, declaration of [Nombre 004] in the supplemental hearing, image 332 of the judicial file) **7)** That the ICE official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], on January 28, 2019, delivered the remaining pieces of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620 to the authorized workshop SERTEC for its evaluation and diagnosis, with the workshop stating, through Report SER-0007869 dated January 28, 2019, and regarding the device that: "Fault Description: CUSTOMER INDICATES THAT THE TERMINAL'S BATTERY EXPLODED UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE IT WAS CHARGING, AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION, IT CAUSED DAMAGES TO SONIA [Nombre 001], SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS, ON THE UPPER LIMBS (WRISTS), HAIR, FOOT. Repair Performed: The case evaluation proceeds, finding: equipment shows no damage to the main board, nor does it show damage to the cable or the charger, the screen is shattered, marks on the phone's label and on its back cover are a product of the damage to the battery, it is concluded that the phone did not cause the damage to the battery since the connector and the charging circuit are in good condition. The only damages present are in the equipment's battery, causing marks on its rear casings. Accessories: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDS-FREE KIT, COVER AND RUBBER PROTECTOR, BURNT BATTERY. Equipment Status: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDS-FREE KIT, COVER AND RUBBER PROTECTOR, BURNT BATTERY. Diagnosis Date: 1/28/2019." (see image 332, declaration of [Nombre 004] in the supplemental hearing of the judicial file) **8)** That the plaintiffs [Nombre 001] and [Nombre 002] have filed monetary administrative claims against ICE, concerning medical care for the burn injuries indicated in relation to [Nombre 001], due to defective manufacturing —explosion of the battery in the terminal— arising from her use of the terminal make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, which occurred on January 21, 2019, in the morning between 06:30 and 07:30 hours, without a satisfactory response. (see folios 29-35, 95, 96, 107-112 of the administrative file and see image 332 of the judicial file, declarations of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 005], ID [Valor 005], in the supplemental hearing of the judicial file) **IV.- UNPROVEN FACTS:** In accordance with the evidentiary elements admitted in the case file, the following facts are deemed unproven as the case file lacks suitable evidence in relation to the object of the process:

**1)** That [Nombre 001] is an active professional in Visual Arts in her country of origin and that due to the injuries suffered, she had distinct economic losses in addition to what was paid in the invoices dated 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/ general medicine/wound care, dated 24-01-2019/wound care, 28-01-2019/wound care, 29-01-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice dated 27-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.

**2)** That the burn injuries to the person of [Nombre 001] caused her any loss of sensitivity in her hands and that, therefore, it affected her daily personal or professional tasks or current income.

**3)** That [Nombre 002] incurred out-of-pocket expenses as a result of any direct material damage (daño material emergente) in relation to the injuries suffered by [Nombre 001], caused by the explosion of the battery in the cell phone BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, in which she sustained second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and a burn to the hair on her head, and that, therefore, he disbursed expenses for her care for wound care at the CCSS Ebais in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.

• 4)That the Fire Department, Pital Station, Unit M-86, recorded in the incident report type 1-1-8-7 Fire Emergencies on 21/01/2019 at a dwelling in Alajuela, San Carlos, Agua Zarcas, after the Agua Zarcas bridge, no recommendation regarding the results of the reported incident.

**V.- PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 1.- Preliminary applicable observation.** In both consolidated lawsuits, the plaintiff parties justify the legal basis of their actions and their arguments on the following rules: Articles 9, 11, 21, and 41 of the Political Constitution, 190, 196, 197 of the General Law of Public Administration, 1, 10, 12, 36, 58 and following of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, and 1022 of the Civil Code. Also, through a meager and lax justification and announcement in the eleventh fact of lawsuit 20-002421-1027-CA, as well as in the arguments of case file 13-001302-1028-CA, reference was made to the application of article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. That is, the claimants solely argued the action through and by means of the facts they set forth, without providing a foundation in legal subsumption of the underlying situation with the given facts and the stated rule, for the completeness and necessary demonstration of unlawfulness under the structure of the Cartesian or logical/legal syllogism. Under that account of the accused applicable law and the factual framework, the defendant was served with process, who, for the purpose indicated, reported on the regulatory application of their interest, pointing out in their defense the mention of the Effective Consumer Defense Law 7472, article 35 on the liability regime and the exclusion of liability for alienness, as well as on the grounds of victim's fault and act of a third party incurred by the plaintiff, established in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration and what is established in article 48 of the General Telecommunications Law 8642, which allows, as they affirmed, that the claim before the telecommunications operator may be filed by the client directly or by any person on their behalf, insofar as this does not imply that the material legal relationship with the service client disappears, given that what this determines is the origin, terms, and conditions of the contract.

In the foregoing, and although the general principle that the judge knows the fullness of the law (*iura novit curia*) is well-known, it is also true that the litigation was circumscribed to the factual and normative terms invoked, thus the scope of analysis and assessment of the case will be limited to the reach of the parties' statements.

**2.- COURT'S OPINION. General parameters regarding the claim.** Under the strict liability regime of the Public Administration, liability arises without needing to demonstrate intent or fault of the agent causing the harm, it being sufficient, however, to prove the existence of the "risk" to generate it, which is why the notions of unlawfulness and culpability do not operate; therefore, the principle of reversal of the burden of proof in favor of the injured party applies. For these purposes, the alleged Public Administration (ICE), causing the claimed damages, must compensate them if its conduct effectively and efficiently generated them, unless it proves some exonerating ground, without prejudice to the essential condition, it is reiterated, that the harmful effect must constitute or have its cause in the deployment of administrative activity or omission, or in its commercial operations within the telecommunications field. Thus, the concurrence of four elements is required, namely: a) An injury, consisting of unlawful patrimonial losses, because the one suffering them does not have the duty to bear them; b) An administrative conduct to which the production of the alleged harm is linked; c) A causal nexus, consisting of the existence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact (administrative conduct) imputed and the harm produced; and d) That there are no grounds for justification, given that their existence can legally disconnect the harm produced from the Public Administration's conduct, so that the harmful effect is not attributable to it, breaking the causality nexus upon the occurrence of an exempting situation such as force majeure, the victim's fault, and the act of a third party. This patrimonial liability regime of the State and its institutions, provided for in articles 9 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, is therefore essentially objective in nature, so for it to arise, it suffices that there is an compensable harm, an administrative conduct, and a causal nexus between both. Thus, in cases of strict liability, the Public Administration's defense would lie in demonstrating that one of the grounds that break the causality nexus, indicated in article 190, paragraph 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, occurred: force majeure, the act of a third party, or the act of the victim itself, and consequently the application of the principle of alienness of harm. However, as a general principle rule, for establishing the admissibility of the Public Administration's liability, it arises as a *sine qua non* requirement that the plaintiff party demonstrates the existence, consistency, and magnitude of the harm and the pertinent causal nexus with the administrative conduct that produced it. Based on that objective parameter, the analysis of the specific case proceeds.

**VI.- Regarding the inadmissibility of the lawsuit in case file 20-002421-1027-CA.** At the core of the claims of this action, it is required: to declare the consequent contractual civil liability of a patrimonial nature of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused to the undersigned, valued at twenty million colones, and that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for proceeding with the indemnification for the material damage caused. **Court's Opinion:** For cases such as the present one, compliance with the duty on the part of the plaintiff to prove the necessary factual and material elements that constitute the state of being a damaged party is unavoidable, since the mere allegation of having suffered material damage caused by the Administration, as the plaintiff intends in the present case, is not sufficient if this party did not fulfill—it is reiterated—her duty to prove, substantiate, and justify the existence and consistency of the material damage incurred in the sum of twenty million colones. It must be considered that from the relationship of Article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) with Article 220 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), what is known as the *onus probandi* (or burden of proof) is derived, a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a certain fact before the courts. The basis of the *onus probandi* lies in an old legal aphorism that states that "what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal must be proven." Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality, to justify a state of indemnity or harm, and consequently the payment for material damage valued at twenty million colones, must prove it (*"affirmanti incumbit probatio"*: the burden of proof lies with the one who affirms). Basically, what is meant by this aphorism is that the burden or work of proving a statement must fall on whoever breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a new truth on a subject). While it is demonstrated in the case file that on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff [Nombre 002] acquired, at no cost and through ICE, the terminal with make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, being granted a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories, and invoiced in her name, and that her friend [Nombre 001], without being a regular ICE customer but using that new terminal as of January 19, 2019, because [Nombre 002] had provided it to her, and that while the device was charging from the night hours of January 20, 2019, it coming to pass that on January 21, 2019, just 2 days after having acquired it and in the morning hours between 6:30 and 7:30, its battery exploded, causing her, on the occasion of that event, second and third-degree burn injuries on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burning of the hair on her head. And that because of this, the aforementioned lady [Nombre 001] was treated for those injuries, initially on the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, subsequently treated for wound care at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina; the plaintiff, at that time, had not suffered any material damage, nor proven any pecuniary expense on the occasion of any use of the indicated terminal that would have caused her any direct and immediate harm to her legal estate, besides the fact that on January 28, 2019, the plaintiff [Nombre 002] was given a replacement of the defective terminal in her favor by the ICE official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], with receipt delivered of the terminal with make and model HUAWEI, P Smart Negro, with IMEI 867172030714850, and with a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories, replacing the defective terminal with make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620. All these are aspects and circumstances that do not justify the material damage requested, and it is reiterated, it is not proven that [Nombre 002] incurred in patrimonial expenses on the occasion of any emergent material damage in relation to the injuries suffered by [Nombre 001]. Consequently, since the plaintiff does not prove the existence and consistency of the material damage claimed through or by means of the specification or individualization of the component of this aspect, and even less so for the amount requested, nor that this had its genesis in the accused conduct to her detriment; therefore, this Court cannot conclude that the material damage originates from that situation claimed in her injury, as its granting is not a state of economic or discretionary justice, but on the contrary, it must arise from effective and indubitable proof of the causation of the accused damage. Thus, a causal nexus or link (nexo causal) is not even proven, nor consequently, with the damage alleged in correspondence with the service provided by ICE to the plaintiff [Nombre 002], a necessary requirement for the admissibility of the intended administrative liability. Damage is a necessary element for the right to compensation to arise in strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) or no-fault liability, understanding damage as "the injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection." So that, for the right to compensation to arise, the accused act or conduct must produce an "injury or invasion of another's legal sphere. The damage is compensable only if it results from an injury to a licit interest worthy of protection (...)" (Pérez Vargas Víctor. Principios de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, primera edición, 1984, página 46, 47). Since long ago, and on this matter, which has not varied in its application criterion even in relation to the application of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 (Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor 7472), the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled in vote number 467-F-SI-2008, of 2:25 p.m. on July fourth, two thousand eight, by stating that "(...) Article 35 of broad citation, establishes the applicable liability regime in consumer law matters, which is of an objective nature. It is worth remembering that civil liability, according to the imputation criterion used as its basis, is divided into subjective and objective. The former bases the attribution of liability on culpability in a broad sense, that is, on the judgment of reproach made to the conduct of the harmful agent. It includes both negligence in the strict sense and willful misconduct. An example of this is the traditional contractual liability, regulated by Articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code; the first of them, referring to liability for willful misconduct and the second to liability for negligence. In such cases, a fortuitous event is an exonerating cause of civil liability, since unpredictability suppresses the judgment of reproach on the conduct of the harmful agent. Objective civil liability, on the other hand, has as its attribution criterion causes expressly established by law.

An example of this is Article 1048 of the Civil Code, regarding civil liability arising from damages caused by motive machines and the cited Article 35, referring to civil liability in consumer law matters. The latter entails the civil liability of the producer or merchant when the existence of damage is demonstrated as a result of the activity carried out by the producer or merchant. *Thus, the consumer must only prove that the damage exists and that it occurs as a direct and immediate consequence of the activity carried out by the producer or merchant (adequate causation)*. Proof of fault or intent (culpability in the broad sense) is not required, since the criterion of imputation is objective." *In this way, according to what has been indicated, material damage falls upon the patrimony, on the assets and rights that comprise it, and consequently, the affected party must credit, demonstrate, and prove its existence, as well as its causal relationship.* In that sense, it is divided into actual damage (daño emergente), which is the direct injury caused by the reprehensible conduct, the loss incurred, and loss of profits (lucro cesante) as the earnings not received because of such activity, the frustrated gain or utility that it was reasonable and probable would have been received had the harmful action not occurred. Furthermore, regarding the requirements for damage in general to be compensable, it has been stated that " VI.- *Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically concur to be a "compensable damage": A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations*. The damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or of difficult appreciation or proof; certainty must not be confused with actuality, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage must not be confused with loss of profits or prejudice, since the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating fact of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project when the process is initiated (...). B) There must be injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection (...). " (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 606-F-2002 at sixteen ten hours on August seven, two thousand two). -intentional bold and italics-. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is pointless to further justify and in greater consideration, the unfoundedness in all its extremes of the present accumulated lawsuit, the foregoing being sufficient to uphold the opposed exception of lack of right.

**VII.- 1.- On the merits of the lawsuit in case file 19-001302-1028-CA in the following terms:** In the core of the claims of this action, it is required: to declare the patrimonial liability of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the moral and material damage caused, the patrimonial liability being derived from the damage corresponding to the material damage valued at twenty million colones and the subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) estimated at one hundred million colones. **Criterion of the Tribunal:** The legal situation claimed in this case file contains a different nuance from the one previously resolved, which concentrates its shift in relation to the legality of the matter within the protective core of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, when the plaintiff thus accuses the existence of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of ICE, as a company that distributes and sells BMobile devices and that, in this way, she states, has responsibility for the products it endorses and makes available to its clients, which, she assures, must subject to the necessary safety controls to ensure the health, life, and integrity of its consumers, that is, she indicates as elements of liability an active conduct by ICE, promoting cell phones, and offering them to clients, in this instance, one of the delivered devices had a factory defect, which caused that after a few days of use, it exploded, causing damages as those already indicated in the lawsuit, its responsibility as a National Company being to ensure it places in the hands of its clients products in optimal conditions that do not endanger their life or integrity. In this regard, it is proven in the record that on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff in the accumulated process 20-002421-1027-CA [Name 002], as a regular client of the defendant institute, acquired at no cost and at the instance of ICE, the terminal with brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, being granted a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories and having the acquisition invoiced in her name, and immediately out of her liberality, she gave it, unused, to her friend [Name 001] -not being a regular client of ICE- due to her temporary stay in Costa Rica, due to her tourist status, so that she could make use of that new terminal starting January 19, 2019, it occurring that while the device was in charging phase from the night hours of January 20, 2019, on January 21, 2019, between 06:30 and 07:30 in the morning, only 2 days after having acquired it, its battery exploded, causing to her person due to that explosion, injuries from second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet and a burn to the hair on her head, warranting thereby, that said Mrs. [Name 001] was treated for those injuries. Initially, on the same day the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently treated for correlated wound care at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina. It is also recorded in the record, although in a rather illegible manner, that the medical services were provided to her in private medicine at the cost of payment by the treated person, for amounts that cannot be determined or concretized particularly due to the illegibility of the documents provided in the record, but which however, the Tribunal considers as justifications for the expenses incurred and estimates them as logical, corresponding, consequent, and necessary for her care in those private clinics -not so in the Ebais-, since otherwise, she would not have been treated for not being hospital charity centers. Under that understanding, and with regard to the burden of proof, Article 35 of the Consumer Protection Law establishes the presumption of liability on the producer, the supplier, and the merchant, if the consumer is harmed because of the good or the service, and only one who proves to have been unrelated to the damage is released. That is, in matters of strict liability in consumer relations, the reversal of the burden of proof prevails as a general rule, thus placing upon the defendant ICE the burden of proving the circumstances of exoneration that are subject to the rules of due diligence.

Due to the positive and prospective development of the objective thesis of created risk or hazardousness, it is the Court's criterion that the duty to avoid damage becomes more demanding; hence, once the damage has occurred, the reversal of the burden of proof is imposed. The producer, supplier, or merchant must demonstrate the objective fact that all the most functional technical and safety measures have been taken to avoid or reduce the danger of the activity they carry out and, with it, the products they market, all in protection of the consumer/user. Thus, the principle of symmetry is established, which provides that greater burdens shall fall upon whoever has better possibilities by reason of possessing suitable means of proof, which is what is known as dynamic proof. The injured consumer, the harmed party, for their part, must demonstrate: a. The harm suffered. b. The link between the damage and the good used or product received or the service received from the supplier, the producer, or the merchant (causal relationship). The burden of proof cannot be altered to the detriment of the consumer or user, who is also in a situation of disadvantage in the consumer relationship. Regarding this matter, Chamber I of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled: [...] IV.- On the burden of proof. Based on what has been set forth up to this point, it is pertinent to refer to the duty of demonstration incumbent upon each of the parties comprising the litigation, when the object of the proceeding is the declaration of a duty to repair damage in cases such as the present one. In the first instance, it is noted that the plaintiff finds herself in a situation where it is very difficult or practically impossible to prove some of the essential facts or prerequisites for her claim, placing her in a position of potential defenselessness. As a result of the foregoing, and as this Chamber has previously indicated, the duty of demonstration is redistributed among the litigating parties, where the "onus probandi" (evidentiary duty) falls upon whoever is in a better position to provide evidence to the proceeding..." (in this regard, see resolution no. 212 of 8:15 a.m. on March 25, 2008). The plaintiff [Name 001] demonstrated in the case file that, during ordinary, normal use and in the manner foreseen or reasonably foreseeable for the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, only 2 days after having received it from [Name 002] and 4 days since ICE delivered it new to the latter, and while the device was in the charging phase since the late hours of the night of January 20, 2019, it happened that on January 21, 2019—just a few hours later—the device's battery exploded, causing her the injuries already indicated ut supra (statements of [Name 003], identification document [Value 003], [Name 002], in supplementary hearing, epicrisis and treatments in private hospitals according to documents visible in images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices of 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, of 01-24-2019/wound care, 01-28-2019/wound care, 01-29-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 01-31-2019/wound care, processed at Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 01-27-2019/wound care, processed at Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial file). Now, even though it is also accredited that Mrs. [Name 001] did not directly acquire the defective device from ICE, nor does she configure herself as a contracting party with ICE, she was, by using the device, constituting herself as an indirect, mediate, or effective consumer of the products marketed by ICE, not a stranger to the entity nor one marketed by third parties, which entails a broadening of protection concerning the extension of liability for the distribution and delivery of defective goods or products by it to direct or indirect users, especially under the understanding that the device was new and with only 2 days of use by Mrs. [Name 001] and 4 days since ICE delivered it, which gives the present matter a special and differentiated accent. By extensive interpretation of the Consumer Protection Law, in matters of consumer relations, the concept of what a consumer is has been broadened, understanding it not only as the effective consumer, that is, the person who acquires a good or service, but also as the potential consumer or client who is the one who does not actually acquire that good or service but may come to acquire or use it in any capacity, provided it comes from the lawful distribution chain of the device, in this case from ICE, rendering useless what was affirmed by ICE when it claims its excuse from liability due to a lack in the sub-litem of a matter of traceability and custody not only of the terminal but also of the transfer of usage information. Thus, in comparison and through vote number 295-2007 of ten hours forty-five minutes of April twenty-seventh, two thousand seven, Chamber One ruled as follows: "[…] In the opinion of this Chamber, the simple fact of not acquiring a product, or requiring a service, is not a legally acceptable reason to exempt the producer, supplier, or merchant from liability, in those cases where the user is injured by reason of the good or service received. The term “consumer” referred to the legal situation of the plaintiff when he entered the supermarket, corresponds to a broader concept than that of buyer. In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer, must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not conditioned upon a “consumer contract”, because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that they be conceived of as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer—and not an effective buyer—of goods and services with the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called the legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it.

This latter is the center of legal protection in the realm of consumer safety [...]. That is, the liability addressed in matters of consumers and users is that in which the damage is caused by the utilization, whether through use or consumption, or the handling of a defective product, when the damage is caused by the defectiveness of the product, and which was thus delivered by ICE, even without its knowledge, whose position, upon commercializing it, links and binds the product that was imported and subsequently distributed to the consumer or user within the framework of its ordinary and usual business activities, at least for the duration of the product's warranty, which gains greater relevance as the right to health is safeguarded and protected under Article 32 of the procedural law, on the occasion of the existence of a defective product, which in its literal wording establishes: "Article 32.- Consumer Rights. Without prejudice to the provisions of treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary domestic legislation, regulations, general principles of law, usages, and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a) Protection against risks that may affect their health, safety, and the environment (...)". For this reason, civil liability for defective products refers to the liability of a manufacturer or seller (ICE) for placing a defective product in the hands of a consumer and/or user, and it is not foreign to the case under study that, in the case of lithium-ion battery explosions -common in cell phones-, the claim is neither excluded nor limited when referring to design or manufacturing defects, as it proved prone to overheating during charging or if a failure occurred during its production that caused its explosive nature, it being significant that this was not observed prior to its distribution and subsequent effective commercialization, with the burden falling on the manufacturer and the distributor to prove that the device had no defect whatsoever, an aspect which, in the case file, ICE has failed to demonstrate to the contrary.

Thus, it is the Court's criterion that ICE's opposition based on the argument of the damage being caused by the fault of the victim and the act of a third party is unfounded, especially since not even an expert opinion on the manufacturing quality of the device and its battery in question as a single commercial unit was provided, given that even the authorized workshop SERTEC, for the inspection of these devices, laconically indicated: "Report SER-0007869 dated January 28, 2019, and in relation to the device: 'Description of the fault: CLIENT INDICATES THAT THE DEVICE'S BATTERY EXPLODED UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE IT WAS CHARGING, AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION, IT CAUSED DAMAGE TO SONIA [Name 001], SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS, ON THE UPPER EXTREMITIES (WRISTS), HAIR, FOOT. Repair Performed: Case evaluation proceeded, finding: equipment shows no damage to the main board, nor does it show damage to the cable or the charger; the screen is shattered, there are marks on the phone's label and on its back cover resulting from the damage to the battery; it is concluded that the phone did not cause the damage to the battery since the connector and the charging circuit are in good condition. The only damages present are in the equipment's battery, causing marks on its rear casings. Accessories: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDSFREE KIT, COVER AND RUBBER CASE, BURNED BATTERY. Equipment Status: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDSFREE KIT, COVER AND RUBBER CASE, BURNED BATTERY. Diagnosis Date: 01/28/2019.'"; which, all the more so, does not determine the cause of the battery explosion nor its improper use, the improper use not being transferable to the injured party. In this sense, the damage being caused by an external factor must be understood as when only a party that demonstrates it was external to the damage is released from liability, and for this, it must be taken into account that Law 7472 itself, in Article 71, contemplates the integration of that regulation with the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). Therefore, it has been the criterion of this jurisdiction, supported by the First Chamber and now in its integration as the Court of Cassation, that since Law 7472 does not contain an express detail of what should be understood by damage caused by an external factor, the exempting causes contained in the LGAP are applicable. Article 190.1 of the same law establishes as exonerations from liability the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, or force majeure. Consequently, for a risk to be attributable to a company in such a way that its materialization entails liability, it must be considered that the risk to which the consumer is exposed must exceed those that are tolerable for the person suffering the damage. In summary, canon 35 of the Consumer Law establishes a strict and joint liability regime among the producer, the supplier, and the merchant, towards the effective consumer and user in the terms set forth in this resolution, who was injured in their physical and moral-emotional integrity on the occasion of the good or service made available to them, with ICE failing to demonstrate that, after a retrospective examination, the damage was not linked through a causal nexus to its intervention in that economic chain of the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, and that it reached the hands of Mrs. [Name 001] by mere liberality, even less so that she made unreasonable use of the device, exceeding the normality of use of such a generic device and common task as cell phone use, for which reason it is consequent to declare the patrimonial liability of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused and accredited, which is limited solely to the amount determined on the payments made in the invoices of 01/22/2019/pharmacy/consultation/ general medicine/wound care, 01/24/2019/wound care, 01/28/2019/wound care, 01/29/2019/medical opinion, medical assistance, and 01/31/2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano, and the invoice of 01/27/2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, denying any other recognition for lack of justification and accreditation regarding other requested items.

The determination of the payments made, as indicated, together with the recognition of legal interest from the date of their payment at the hospital centers and until their effective payment in this jurisdictional venue, is deferred to the execution of the judgment, concomitantly denying their indexation to real value as of the date of receipt thereof, since the interest granted contains an inflationary component in its composition, which would undoubtedly provide double financial compensation without any basis, which is improper.

**2.- Regarding the moral damages (daño moral) sought:** As for the demonstration of subjective moral damages, this Tribunal has reiterated that this type of detriment consists of the impact on the individual's emotional conditions; its assessment –it has been insisted– is *in re ipsa*, that is, it depends on the estimations of the adjudicating body not based on concrete evidentiary elements, but on indications and on the factual scenario itself, from which an impact on this extra-patrimonial sphere of the individual is logically deduced. In other words, it does not require direct proof, but rather is inferred from the accredited facts, through indications and rational inferences. In the case at hand, this Tribunal finds by logical inference that the plaintiff Leyla Rioba suffered intensely, emotionally and internally not only from her physical injuries caused by the explosion of the BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS device, IMEI 353253100027620, which caused second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet and a head hair burn, and that while in that state she was treated for her wound care at the CCSS Ebais in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, which naturally caused her emotional damages, stress episodes, panic attacks and suffering feelings due to her state of health and traumatic recovery (statements of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], in a supplementary hearing of the judicial file), thereby resulting in her suffering uncertainty, suffering and emotional exhaustion from the treatment of the wound care and the outcome of those in relation to her physical condition prior to the given incident, which is an intuitive, reasonable and expected conduct in people who do not expect such a significant event as the one suffered, where there is an expectation of receiving a reliable, safe device, reviewed and approved by ICE for its distribution and commercialization. Rationally, no one expected the contrary. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the limits of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality for the determination of moral damages. This has a direct effect on its determination, because it is not about quantifying suffering, as it is inappreciable, but about setting a monetary compensation for her injury, the only mechanism to which the law can resort, in order to thus repair, at least in part, the offense suffered. The patrimonial quantification or liquidation of subjective moral damages or *pretium doloris* is of a strictly psychic, affective nature and not linked to material deficiencies, hence its demonstration is excludable, thereby entailing the application of judicial discretion, under the internal control and limit of the indicated reasonableness and proportionality. It must then be considered that the moral prejudice and the alterations in the conditions of existence, in the plaintiff, are items of moral damages that are neither synonymous nor express the same damage as a result of the applied strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), the object of which, through the figure of alterations in the conditions of existence (the materiality), is an independent compensation, whereas through subjective moral prejudice, the suffering caused by the harmful event is compensated, a niche in which the material claim for the moral damages sought resides. The compensation in this regard is set at **FOUR MILLION COLONES** and not at the amount requested, which is jurisprudentially delimited by the assessment that this Tribunal has perceived in the process of the sufferings affecting the victim's emotional sphere, derived from the facts and statements that were taken into account to estimate it (statements of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], in a supplementary hearing, images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices of 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, 24-01-2019/wound care, 28-01-2019/wound care, 29-01-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 27-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 of the administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial file) and that even such suffering has been obtained from the events internally experienced by the plaintiff, for which this Section has no doubt whatsoever about the existence of the moral damages caused, considering it a compensation for pain, but not a redress; representing a sanction but not an exaction against the offender. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal observes from the situations indicated in the case file, according to which the plaintiff's personal affliction constitutes the only stage to be compensated and that it, the source of the consequent frustration, is sufficient fact so that the adequate recompense does not transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as principles that were intrinsically and fairly assessed by this Tribunal, so no sufficient reason is found to vary the *quantum* of the compensation and adjust it to the sum requested in the lawsuit. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of Article 194 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) like those given and proven in these case files, and assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, producing a breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person, and to that extent, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim [Nombre 001] must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation in the sum ordered, together with the recognition of legal interest until its effective payment once this resolution becomes final, concomitantly denying its indexation to real value as of the date of receipt thereof, since the interest granted contains an inflationary component in its composition, which would undoubtedly provide double financial compensation without any basis, which is improper.

**VIII.- Regarding the defenses raised.** In both proceedings, the representatives of the defendant raised the same objections of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). In accordance with what has been considered and the scope of what has been indicated, the objection of lack of right (falta de derecho) is upheld solely in relation to the action filed in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA and, also, regarding the denied excess claimed for the material and moral damage items within the action filed in proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA. The objections of lack of active and passive standing and lack of current interest are rejected in both consolidated actions, by virtue of the legal and factual situation analyzed, given that, being a civil proceeding involving public funds, those affected in this case have the power to sue the institution or subject they consider responsible for the damages to their patrimony.

**IX.- Costs of the litigation.** Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to the provisions of that same rule, in conjunction with numeral 119.2 ibidem. **It is ordered:** in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA, the plaintiff was the losing party and, in that order, in the Tribunal's opinion, she must bear the award of both costs in favor of the defendant. In proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, ICE was the losing party and, in that order, in the Tribunal's opinion, it must bear the award of both costs in favor of the plaintiff. In both proceedings and from the final quantification of both costs in the Judgment Enforcement stage and until their effective payment, the respective legal interest shall be recognized in favor of the beneficiaries.

**POR TANTO** **It is adjudged:** The objections of lack of active and passive standing and lack of current interest are rejected in both consolidated actions **19-001302-1028-CA** and **20-002421-1027-CA**. The objection of lack of right is upheld solely in relation to the action filed in proceeding **20-002421-1027-CA** and, consequently, the action brought by **[Name 002]** is declared without merit in all its aspects. In relation to proceeding **19-001302-1028-CA**, the patrimonial liability of the **INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD** is declared for the material damage caused and credited, which is limited solely to the amount to be recognized to **[Name 001]** that is determined from what was paid on the invoices of 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, of 24-01-2019/wound care, 28-01-2019/wound care, 29-01-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance, and 31-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano, and the invoice of 27-01-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, and the determination of the payments made, as indicated, is deferred to the execution of the judgment, along with the recognition of legal interest from the date of their payment to the hospital centers until their effective payment in this jurisdictional venue, their indexation being concomitantly denied; and the claim for moral damage is also recognized, this item being set at **FOUR MILLION COLONES** along with the recognition of legal interest until its effective payment once this resolution is final, its indexation being concomitantly denied. In relation thereto, the objection of lack of right (falta de derecho) is upheld regarding the denied excess claimed for the material and moral damage items. **Regarding the costs of the litigation:** It is ordered: in proceeding **20-002421-1027-CA**, the plaintiff was the losing party and, in that order, she must bear the award of both costs in favor of the defendant. In proceeding **19-001302-1028-CA**, ICE was the losing party and, in that order, it must bear the award of both costs in favor of the plaintiff. In both proceedings and from the final quantification of both costs in the Judgment Enforcement stage and until their effective payment, the respective legal interest shall be recognized in favor of the beneficiaries. **Ronaldo Hernández Hernández. Eduardo González Segura. Marco Hernández Vargas. Deciding Judges.**               **RECORD.** On the same date of the foregoing resolution, it is recorded that Judge Eduardo González Segura does not sign this resolution because he is on vacation, and it is noted that he participated in the deliberation and terms of the drafting of this resolution. **Presiding Judge. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández.**   |   | | ???????????????

|   | |   Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Café Dorado. Telephones: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006.

[Item 6]. Identification of environmental impacts that could be caused by Forest-Cover Land-Use Change (cambio de uso de suelo de cobertura boscosa): In order to determine the environmental impacts that could be caused by the activity, work, or project, the environmental viability applicant must analyze the ecosystem presented in the project site and the potential environmental impacts that could be caused by forest-cover land-use change. The analysis shall use the methodology known as "Environmental Fragility" (Fragilidad Ambiental), which the SETENA will provide. The project site referred to in the previous paragraph is understood as the polygon that directly corresponds to the land-use change; that is, the specific area that the developer intends to submit to forest-cover land-use change. The polygon of the project site shall be geographically identified by a shape file, and maps of the following environmental variables or elements, with the primary objective of analyzing the spatial behavior and geographic location of the ecosystem and its relationship with the proposed land-use change:

"VII.-[...] For this reason, civil liability for defective products refers to the liability of a manufacturer or seller (ICE) for placing a defective product in the hands of a consumer and/or user, this being not unrelated to the case under study, which in the case of lithium-ion battery explosions -common in cell phones- the claim is not excluded or limited when referring to design or manufacturing defects, by proving prone to overheating due to charging or, if a failure occurred during its production that caused its explosive nature, it being significant that this was not observed prior to its distribution and subsequent effective marketing, the burden of proof (acreditación) remaining on the manufacturer and the distributor to demonstrate that the device had no defect whatsoever, an aspect which, in the case file, ICE has not managed to prove otherwise." Documento PJEDITOR | EXPEDIENTE: | 19-001302-1028-CA - 5 | | PROCESO: | CONOCIMIENTO (acumulado 20-002421-1027-CA) | | ACTOR/A: | [Nombre 001] Y [Nombre 002] | | DEMANDADO/A: | INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD | N° 2025000261 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN SEGUNDA (Equipo 2), SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at eight thirty-six hours on the seventeenth of January of the year two thousand twenty-five.- Accumulated ordinary proceeding (proceso de conocimiento) (19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA) established by [Nombre 001], a single surname due to her Argentine nationality and with a passport from that country number [Valor 001] and [Nombre 002], with identity card number [Valor 002], both represented by Rodolfo Alvarado Moreno, with identity card number 1-0512-0482 and Jessica Valverde Campos, in their capacity as special judicial attorneys-in-fact (apoderados especiales judiciales) against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD (hereinafter ICE) and represented by Luis A. Salazar Solís and Gonzalo Gómez Rodríguez, special judicial attorneys-in-fact for ICE. Subsequently, the Collegiate Court Section II -Team 2-, which by turn corresponded to hear this matter, proceeds to issue within the legal deadline, following the holding of the Supplementary Hearing (Audiencia Complementaria) of December 17, 2024, and the legal deliberation, the corresponding ruling by unanimous vote of its members Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Eduardo González Segura and Marco Hernández Vargas.

Drafted by Judge Hernández Hernández.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- PRELIMINARY ASPECTS. As part of the procedural process (íter procesal) the following is noted: 1) The present case has been processed in this venue in electronic form, therefore the foliation of the electronic document generated as a single PDF file, obtained from the Virtual Desktop with the options "Descending Order" and "View Document Description (PDF)" checked and with the option "View case file cover details" selected in "End" will be used as a reference. This for purposes of providing identification and reference of the documents in addition to what is described on each occasion.

• 2)The lawsuits were filed in their respective order as follows: 19-001302-1028-CA on January 29, 2020, and the claims (pretensiones) were set at the preliminary hearing in the following manner: "1) Grant the present lawsuit. Declaring the consequent patrimonial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial) of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the moral damages (daño moral) and material damages (daño material) caused, this as a principal claim (pretensión principal), with the patrimonial liability derived from the damage corresponding to the material damages valued at twenty million colones and the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) estimated at one hundred million colones. Secondary claims.
• 2)That the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for compensating the plaintiff for the damages caused, which shall be determined in the enforcement phase of the judgment. 3) That legal interest shall be paid on the sums awarded in the judgment from the date the judgment becomes final until the date of effective payment. 4) That the amounts awarded in the judgment be duly indexed to real value as of the date of receipt thereof. 5) That the defendant entity must pay the amount of the personal and procedural costs incurred. All secondary claims shall be understood as complementary to each other and/or to the principal claim, and not in an exclusive or subsidiary manner." Case file 20-002421-1027-CA was filed on May 13, 2020, and likewise, the claims were set at the same preliminary hearing as follows: "1) The present lawsuit be granted. Declaring the consequent contractual civil liability of a patrimonial nature of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused to the undersigned, valued at twenty million colones. Secondary claims. 2) That the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for indemnifying me for the material damage caused. 3) That legal interest shall be paid on the sums awarded from the date the judgment becomes final until the date of effective payment. 4) That the amounts awarded must be duly indexed to real value as of the date of receipt thereof. 5) That the defendant entity must pay the amount of the personal and procedural costs incurred." (see images 2-12 in case file 19-001302-1028-CA, and images 2-7 in case file 20-002421-1027-CA, digital backups of the preliminary hearing of February 7, 2023, its minutes at image 302-306 and digital backups of the trial hearing held on December 17 and 18, 2024, all in the judicial case file).
• 3)Once the legal transfer was granted, the representative of ICE answered both lawsuits negatively and raised the following same defenses in both case files 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA: lack of necessary passive joinder (falta de integración pasivo necesaria), lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). (see images 106-123 in case file 19-001302-1028-CA, and in images 44-60 in case file 20-002421-1027-CA).
• 4)By means of final order No. 1104-2021 of the Case Management Judge issued at fifteen hours fifty minutes on August eighteenth, two thousand twenty-one, the POR TANTO was issued: It is ordered to consolidate the proceeding processed under case file No. 20-002421-1027-CA with the one processed under case file No. 19-001302-1028-CA. Since both case files are at the same procedural stage, proceed with the material joinder thereof. Attach a copy of this resolution to case file No. 20-002421-1027-CA. Once this resolution becomes final, continue the proceedings jointly and continue with the corresponding procedure. (see images 79-84 of case file 20-002421-1027-CA) 5) By means of final order No. 0811-2022 of the Case Management Judge issued at eleven hours fifteen minutes on May twenty-third, two thousand twenty-two, the POR TANTO was issued: The preliminary defense of necessary passive joinder (litis consorcio pasivo necesario) filed by the representation of ICE against both plaintiffs in the consolidated proceedings known through this process is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. (see images 225-230 of case file 19-001302-1028-CA) 6) The preliminary hearing established in section 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo —which is recorded in the digital system of the Court— was held on February 7, 2023, and the claims were set according to the second statement of Considerando I of this resolution. [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], ID [Valor 002], [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], and [Nombre 005], ID [Valor 005], were admitted to provide testimonial statement in the Supplementary Hearing. The dilatory defense was resolved by issuing: "resolution number 0165-2023 at fourteen hours eleven minutes on February seventh, two thousand twenty-three: POR TANTO. Regarding the defenses of Inadequate representation, it is declared inadmissible. Regarding the preliminary defense of defects that impede a pronouncement on the merits, it is declared without merit." (see Preliminary Hearing minutes at images 302-306 of the judicial case file and its digital backups of said judicial proceeding).
• 7)The supplementary hearing of oral and public trial convened for December 17, 2024, was opened at 08:37 hours, in Courtroom 4. The legal representations of the plaintiff parties of the proceeding appeared in person before the Tribunal and the representatives of the defendant appeared remotely via the TEAMS application. The hearing was recorded in audio and video in the corresponding electronic system and is attached to the case file. All the details of the hearing are registered in the audio and video, as well as in the minutes that for such effect are contained in the proceeding's case file. The COLLEGIATE TRIBUNAL SECTION II -Team 2-, composed of Judges EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ SEGURA, MARCO HERNÁNDEZ VARGAS, and presiding RONALDO HERNÁNDEZ HERNÁNDEZ, was constituted in person. The opening arguments of the parties, the depositions of the admitted witnesses, and the closing arguments were heard, after which the hearing concluded on December 17, 2024, itself. (Sigao recording system, minutes, and judicial case file) 8) Finally, the Tribunal verified the means of notification and it was indicated that the judgment would be issued in writing, within the fifteen-business-day period established in subsection 1) of article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. This hearing was concluded at 09:41 hours. Everyone was duly notified of the resolutions and actions taken in the Supplementary Hearing in accordance with section 88 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (digital backup of the oral and public trial hearing).
• 9)In the supplementary hearing, the plaintiff party was requested to present the payment receipts from the assisted medical centers, given that those attached to the record are illegible, for which reason a deadline was granted until December 20, 2024, to comply. By resolution of fifteen hours twenty-eight minutes on January sixth, two thousand twenty-five, it was indicated: "The plaintiff party did not provide the requested documents as indicated in the supplementary hearing session of last December 17, 2024, given that those presented on December 20, 2024, DO NOT match the payment receipts (illegible) provided in the record and for which their submission was requested." As such, let the admissibility judgment be issued within the strict deadline in accordance with numeral 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo." 10) In the proceedings before this Court, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness, and the judgment is issued within the deadline established in article 111, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

II.ALLEGATIONS OF THE PARTIES. 1.- PURPOSE AND POSITION OF THE COMPLAINT.- In summary, as pertinent and without prejudice to the literalness of some of their arguments, each of the parties alleges what is detailed below in this section. 1.A. Expediente Nº 19-001302-1027-CA. FROM THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF [Name 001]: It is stated: I base this complaint on the following Facts: First: That the plaintiff herein, [Name 001], is a Visual Arts professional, of Argentine nationality, who at the beginning of this year was in the country as a tourist, visiting some close friends. Second: That considering the plaintiff intended to stay several weeks in the country, for which she required the Telecommunications services provided by ICE. Due to her condition as a foreigner and her unfamiliarity with how procedures are carried out in Costa Rica, she requests help from her friend Mrs. [Name 002] to request a mobile phone plan with ICE that included a cellphone, so although in the contract Mrs. [Name 002] appears as the owner of the post-paid plan, the plaintiff herein is the final recipient of both the line and the mobile device provided by Kolbi. Third: That on January 20 of the current year, as is customary, the device was put to charge overnight, placing it in Miss [Name 001]'s bedroom, near her bed. Fourth: That the following day, at approximately 7:30 in the morning, while my client was sleeping, the cellphone suddenly exploded in her hand, hair, and legs, causing her severe second- and third-degree burns, as evidenced in this photograph (displays photograph). Fifth: That the device had been acquired, as stated in the attached documents, on January 15, 2019, meaning it did not even have a week of use when the incident occurred. Sixth: That immediately after what happened, my client was taken to the emergency service of the Clínica del Seguro Social de Aguas Zarcas de San Carlos, where she was treated and the wound was treated as far as possible, given that they were quite serious and due to the explosion, several plastic particles became embedded in her skin, which require several follow-up appointments for their extraction. Seventh: That likewise, the Fire Department was called, given that as a result of the explosion, the mattress on the bed on which the device was charging also caught fire, endangering the infrastructure of the place. The person in charge of the Fire Station, in the Incident Report, Description section, stated: "Responding to an Emergency for a possible cellphone battery explosion inside a room, occurring around 07:30 hours; causing damage to the device itself, mattress, and 2nd and 3rd degree burns to the interested party's upper extremity. Scene control and patient care occurred before the arrival of the Fire Department." Eighth: That the plaintiff herein has had serious physical effects as a result of the explosion, as demonstrated in the medical report; she suffered second- and third-degree burns on her hands, arms, and legs, she lost her hair, these burns caused her to lose sensitivity in her hands, which is considerably serious, considering that the affected party herein is a plastic arts teacher; her work is manual all the time. Ninth: That my client went to the Hospital Metropolitano on several occasions so that the battery particles could be extracted and the wounds followed up on, as stated in the medical discharge summaries and records; she was attended on 01/22/19, where she was seen by three emergency service specialists; later, she was seen in several medical appointments from 01/24/19 to 01/31/19, being evaluated and treated again by several specialists due to the severity of her injury. Tenth: That the plaintiff herein constantly has panic attacks; in the three months following the event, she fainted due to the pain which she has not been able to overcome, she feels anxious, cries, is stressed, her self-esteem is very low, she feels insecure as a woman and as a professional, she is afraid to perform daily activities, etc. Eleventh: As stated in the Psychological Consultation report dated 02/14/19 from Psychologist Adriana Roa, it was indicated: "As a result of this episode, she reports significant difficulties sleeping and develops a generalized picture of anguish and anxiety that seriously compromises her daily life, with the aggravating factor that as a result of the injuries sustained, she is unable to work." Twelfth: That likewise, my client was treated by the Argentine psychologist María Fabiana Acuña, who in her report details the following symptoms: "Anguish, intense reactive fears, flashback (the event is PERSISTENTLY experienced, through thoughts, stimuli associated with the event, memories) anxiety disorders were also detected as well as mood decline that could trigger depression." Thirteenth: That the plaintiff herein is a young woman, 29 years old, accustomed since her adolescence to using a cellphone regularly, which is why this event affected her too much, because something that was as normal as checking the time, sleeping with the phone at hand, answering a message, has become a distressing experience for her.

Fourteenth: That days after what occurred, the defendant herein, ICE, was notified, wherein [Name 002], as the signatory of the contract, was instructed to return the device and that they would communicate with the manufacturer of the BMobile phones. Fifteenth: That on 01/28/19, the remaining pieces of the device were delivered with the corresponding reception form for damaged terminals, which is annexed to the present claim. Sixteenth: That approximately at the end of January, Ms. Maritza Gamboa, representing Miss [Name 001], presented an amicable and extrajudicial proposal-claim before ICE, who showed little further interest in the matter. Seventeenth: That in February of this year, Ms. Gamboa again undertook extrajudicial efforts by sending emails addressed to ICE and to the lawyers of the BMobile company requesting a meeting to discuss the points of the agreement, to which she receives a response from Catalina Vargas Pacheco of the area: Commercial Resource Management Process ICE, who schedules an appointment for the second week of February; however, there was a lack of interest on the part of the defendant company in reaching a conciliation.

Moral damages are claimed. Reason. The moral damages in the present case are based on the traumatic and injurious event of the cell phone exploding on the body and hair of the affected party, [Name 001], for which the defendant company bears strict liability, a company that distributes and sells BMobile devices, the same consisting of moral damages of a subjective type. It Consists Of. This damage manifests itself, as substantiated by the various psychological reports, as affecting her normal living conditions, causing situations of anguish, frustration, insecurity, anxiety, sleeplessness, fainting, crying episodes, low self-esteem, loss of appetite, professional insecurity, panic, etc. Estimation: The moral damages are prudentially estimated in the sum of 100,000,000.00 (one hundred million colones). Material damages. The plaintiff herein was affected in her pecuniary interests, since, as is logical in these situations, she had to go to a private medical center to have her wounds treated, first for better care and second because Miss [Name 001], being a foreigner, did not have medical insurance to be treated by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social; due to the urgency of the case, only some medical care invoices are preserved in the country, which amount to the sum of 606,111.41 (six hundred six thousand one hundred eleven colones and forty-one céntimos), to which must be added the medical expenses in Argentina, as well as the pecuniary loss for having had to stop working due to the loss of sensitivity in her hand. Consequently, the material damages have as their reason or origin the same factual basis as the moral damages, which manifests itself in the manner explained in the preceding paragraph and is prudentially estimated in the sum of 20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones). Cites jurisprudence on moral damages: (Tribunal Primero Colegiado de Primera Instancia Civil, at thirteen hours and fifty-three minutes on the fifteenth of March two thousand nineteen, judgment 2019-000186 and on liability for damage to third parties).

It must be noted in this proceeding that even though BMobile is not an employee of ICE, this State entity was, or is—we are unaware of the current situation—promoting the products in the national market, given that it was ICE who gave the cell phone to my represented party, and in that sense, it bears responsibility for the products it endorses and makes available to its clients, which it must subject to the necessary safety controls to ensure the health, life, and integrity of its consumers. That is to say, it is clearly evident the causal link between the conduct and the damage, as elements of liability, there being an active conduct by ICE, promoting cell phones and offering them to clients as in the case of my represented party, a cell phone that, in this specific case, had a manufacturing defect, which caused it, after a few days of use, to explode, causing damages as already indicated in the corresponding section, its responsibility as a National Company being to ensure that it places in the hands of its clients products in optimal conditions that do not endanger their life or integrity, and furthermore, having knowledge of the serious events, it chose to ignore its responsibility.

1.B. File No. 20-002421-1027-CA. OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF [Name 002]. In relation to the grounds of the prior accumulated claim, and with the purpose of not incurring unnecessary repetitions, she adds the following to what the plaintiff [Name 001] stated, and thus it is further indicated: First: That in January 2019, I received the visit of a very close foreign friend, the Argentine tourist [Name 001], who indicated to me that she is interested in spending a long season in the country and needs a local telephone service, for which she asks for my help, as she is unfamiliar with the national telecommunications service companies and the administrative procedures necessary to obtain a mobile line. Second: That in consideration of our friendship, on the 15th day of January of the year 2020, I go to ICE to request in my own name a postpaid plan with a cell phone, according to the requirements that Miss [Name 001] indicated to me; however, I was never the recipient of the mobile device or the line, I only carried out the purchase procedure and delivered it to its real user [Name 001]; in fact, it is not until the 20th of January that I deliver the cell phone to her, and during those days I did not turn it on or use it in any way; I delivered it to her intact, just as it was given to me at the ICE Office.

Sixth: That as extracted from the Fire Department Report, the damage was to the device, not to the electrical installation, the power outlet, or any other room in the house, which makes it absolutely clear that it was a battery explosion due to damage within the battery itself, not due to a short circuit or an external danger in this regard; likewise, the Fire Department Report contains no recommendation whatsoever regarding the need to change the electrical installation due to a danger that the situation might recur, thus demonstrating that the explosion was undoubtedly produced by the device itself. Seventh: That days after the incident, the incident was reported to the defendant herein, ICE. In response to my complaint, they indicated that the procedure is to return the device for reports to be made, notify the manufacturer, and after the investigation, they would contact me directly. Accordingly, on 01/28/19, the remaining pieces of the device were delivered with the respective receipt form for damaged terminals, which is attached to this complaint. Eighth: That days later, I was informed that the result of the investigation carried out was ready; however, they did not send me the report; they only told me that it had been damage to the cellphone, in response to which, since the subscriber was not the affected party physically and had never used the device, I did not file any administrative claim, but rather informed my friend Sonia [Name 001], so that she might proceed as she sees fit, letting her know that should she need my help with the formalities, since the purchase is in my name, I would gladly assist her. Ninth: that approximately at the end of January 2019, Attorney Maritza Gamboa, representing Miss [Name 001], presented a friendly, extrajudicial proposal-claim to ICE, which showed little interest in the matter. Tenth First: That ICE was always unwilling to reach an agreement, considering that the manufacturer should be liable, pursuant to Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, despite the fact that the warranty attached to this complaint clearly states that ICE must be responsible for factory defects and that, as is well known, the consumer is not obligated to pursue all those liable in the chain of consumption to claim liability; in this case, my contract was directly with ICE, I never requested a specific brand of cellphone, so my relationship with the manufacturing company is causal and indirect.

The plaintiff herein was affected in her pecuniary interests. It is evident and notorious that the cellphone I bought for my close friend exploded, without giving her the possibility of using it; moreover, it caused her damages, which not only meant she lost the money invested in the purchase, but also the need to carry out various formalities and assist her with medications due to her health condition, as a minimal gesture in the face of such a regrettable situation, for which ICE must be held liable under contractual civil liability, since, as stated in the attached warranty, they must be held responsible for factory defects, as was the case. Material damage. Consequently, the material damage has as its motive or origin the explosion of the cellphone, which manifested itself as explained in the preceding paragraph and is prudentially estimated at the sum of 20,000,000.00 (twenty million colones).

2. OBJECT AND POSITION OF THE RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINT BY ICE.- In summary and without prejudice to the literalness of some of its arguments, it is stated. 2.A. In File No. 19-001302-1027-CA: The facts are refuted and it considers: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. The evidence that has been numbered with consecutives "2", "3", "4", "5" and "6" does not allow this representation to determine a possible causal link between the apparent bodily injuries suffered by Mrs. [Name 001] and an action or omission by my client. Said evidence is far from demonstrating the precise circumstances of time, manner, and place in order to determine the origin of the facts, and therefore the origin of the alleged accident that the plaintiff seeks to prove. Likewise, documents are provided with the Complaint, the reading of which appears in principle to have been issued in the Republic of Argentina (alleged criteria of possible medical professionals and apparent ministerial entities); however, they are not associated with any legalization procedure that would guarantee the authenticity and official origin of the documents necessary to provide certainty and legal effect not only to the Defendant, but also to the Judicial Authority, meaning these documents allegedly from abroad will not be able to produce legal effects in Costa Rica. Therefore, the documents enumerated and provided as Documentary Evidence 7 (Medical Opinions sent from Argentina) and alleged certificates issued by the Government of the City of Buenos Aires relating to possible education studies (which are not even expressly enumerated as evidence), should not be admitted. Likewise, the medical opinions enumerated in Documentary Evidence 7, in addition to lacking the aforementioned legalization and authenticity requirements to produce effects in Costa Rica, also fail to prove the professional or academic suitability (specialized studies, continuing education) of the persons identified as specialists in medicine and psychology. Furthermore, this type of evidence should not be merely documentary in nature, but rather expert evidence, which would allow the Defendant to conduct the respective cross-examination, as well as allow the Trial Court to make the respective inquiries, prior to the issuance of the respective report. Thus, this representation requests that the alleged evidence numbered with the consecutive "7" by the plaintiff be rejected.

The Plaintiff provides and enumerates as "Evidence" matters that are extraneous to the facts as such, and which rather correspond to aspects of procedural and fiscal accreditation, such as Evidence 10 (Special Power of Attorney), Evidence 11 (Copy of Passport of Miss [Name 001]), and Evidence 12 (Payment of Filing Fees).

Therefore, such elements should outright not be admitted as evidence.

On January 23, 2019, at 3:52 pm, ICE's Telemarketing service received a call, in which identifying information for the service contracted by the Client [Nombre 002], identity card [Valor 002], was provided, and where a claim was filed in her name. This complaint filed in the name of the client [Nombre 002] is precisely what originates the present dispute. In this regard, one of the claims that originated from said complaint was precisely the change of terminal, which is why on February 1, 2019, in the afternoon, said replacement was carried out, substituting the BMOBILE phone for a HUAWEI P SMART, IMEI 867172030714850, for which the respective terminal delivery slip was issued in the name of [Nombre 002]. Although Article 48 of the General Telecommunications Law 8642 allows the claim before the telecommunications operator to be filed by the client directly or by any person on their behalf, this does not imply the disappearance of the substantive legal relationship with the service client, given that this is what determines the origin, terms, and conditions of the contract. And given that the terminal was acquired by the client [Nombre 002], to whom ICE also provided the warranty terms and the phone usage instruction manual, and given that in the present dispute, the Claimant Party seeks to determine the appropriateness of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) with respect to a third party outside the original relationship—where said BMOBILE phone must have been made available to Mrs. [Nombre 001] by [Nombre 002] (who received it from ICE) and therefore implies an issue of traceability and chain of custody not only of the terminal but also of the transfer of usage information. In this regard, from what is indicated in the lawsuit, it seemed that [Nombre 002] acquired the telecommunications service and the associated good, in this case the terminal, for personal purposes or for her closest family environment, which implies the mentioned friendship with Mrs. [Nombre 001]; however, in the lawsuit, there is no statement attributable to [Nombre 002] indicating the nature under which said terminal was provided (gratuitous loan, rental, sale, gift) and whether the information provided by ICE to the client regarding the recommendations for terminal use and the instruction manual were transferred to Mrs. [Nombre 001]. That is, according to national regulation, the term consumer (consumidor) in general terms refers to the person who acquires goods or services for personal, family, or immediate social environment purposes, as seems to be the case of the eventual use by Mrs. [Nombre 001]; therefore, [Nombre 002] has and maintains said consumer status and therefore the standing (legitimación) to form part of the necessary active joinder of parties (litis consorcio activo necesario), given that she has attempted to delegate the exercise of the action exclusively and excludably to Mrs. [Nombre 001], with whom ICE has had no contact regarding the original delivery of the BMOBILE terminal, nor information, given that the bridge has been precisely [Nombre 002], to whom even the delivery of the HUAWEI P SMART terminal was consigned in substitution of the BMOBILE phone, as stated in the administrative file. As the Honorable Court is aware, in Consumer Law (Derecho del Consumo), although the legislation establishes obligations and duties for the merchant, it also contemplates the concept of the Reasonable Consumer, promoting and requiring that they be responsible and diligent; a responsibility that also implies the exercise of judicial actions, especially when claims originate from a service relationship. In this context, for the purposes of this prior defense (defensa previa), it is necessary to take into account the rule established in Article 35, first paragraph, of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472, which states: "ARTÍCULO 35.- Liability regime (Régimen de responsabilidad). The producer, the provider, and the merchant must respond concurrently and independently of the existence of fault, if the consumer is harmed by reason of the good or service, inadequate or insufficient information about them, or their use and risks. (...)." This implies that said numeral establishes a concurrent and indissoluble chain of said agents of the industrial-commercial cycle under the strict liability regime in relation to the consumer, which therefore contemplates judicial actions, in this case under a necessary passive joinder of parties (litis consorcio pasivo necesario), where by law, not only the merchant (last link facing the consumer) must be integrated, but also representatives of the provider and producer, who are also linked by the substantive legal relationship in this case as defendants or the Defendant Party. Therefore, although ICE, for the purposes of the aforementioned numeral and in the context of the sale of telecommunications services under the Móvil Postpago 4GK2 Service Plan associated with telephone number 8881-0891, acted as a merchant at the time it made the BMOBILE mobile phone available to Client [Nombre 002] Sánchez Gamboa, it is also true that said cell phone was supplied to the Institute by a distributing company and representative of the manufacturer, which is CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, which completes the chain of producer-provider-manufacturer, under the strict liability regime vis-à-vis the consumer. In this regard, the BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS mobile phone, IMEI 353253100027620, is part of the batch of terminal equipment acquired by ICE through purchase order 0098-2018, awarded to the company CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, a Panamanian corporation. In this sense, the administrative file provided by my represented party with this response (contestación) proves the existence of said contract, demonstrating the links of said chain established in the mentioned numeral 35 of Law 7472. VI. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE RESPONSE (CONTESTACIÓN): This response is based on the following regimes, substantive and procedural rules, doctrine, and jurisprudence. A. REGARDING ALLEGED STRICT CIVIL LIABILITY. Now, regarding the strict liability regime, both the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and the second paragraph of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 establish grounds for exoneration from liability that imply the breaking of the causal link, as recognized by doctrine and jurisprudence. In this regard, the General Public Administration Law (LGAP) in Article 190 establishes the following: (transcribes rule). Meanwhile, Article 35, second paragraph, of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 indicates: (transcribes rule). In this regard, by supplementary application of numeral 190 of the LGAP, the externality of the damage (ajenidad del daño) referred to in the second paragraph of Law 7472 is constituted by the exonerating defenses (eximentes de responsabilidad) of force majeure, act of a third party, or fault of the victim. B.

ALIENNESS OF THE DAMAGE DUE TO THE GROUNDS OF ACT OF A THIRD PARTY AND FAULT OF THE VICTIM THAT EXEMPT MY REPRESENTED PARTY FROM LIABILITY: This defense, during the present process, in addition to evidencing that the Plaintiff has not proven the existence of the damage, its severity, nor the causal link, will demonstrate that in this particular case, the exonerating grounds of act of a third party and fault of the victim have also occurred, which exonerate him from said objective civil liability regime. The act of a third party consists of the conduct attributable to Mrs. [Nombre 002], identity card number [Valor 002], who, as the holder of the postpaid mobile telecommunications Service Plan 4GK2, with associated terminal BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRAY IMEI 353253100027620, and contrary to the concept of a reasonable consumer and the duty of care, disassociated herself from the use and handling of said terminal, making it available to a person with whom my represented party has no service relationship whatsoever, and for whom, therefore, it cannot have traceability or certainty that the usage recommendations provided in the warranty certificate and the user manual included with said terminal were given to them. Nor, in accordance with the principle of contractual good faith, was my represented party notified that the terminal phone, which was provided under the subsidy facility, was going to be used by a third party, which would have allowed it to provide some guidance regarding use and technical recommendations, which were indeed provided to Mrs. [Nombre 002]. The fault of the victim lies in the conduct of the Plaintiff, who even, through statements made in the facts of the complaint, mentions that she charged an electrical device near her physical integrity while she slept. Your Authority should even note that in the Thirteenth Fact of the Complaint, it is indicated that a normal conduct of the Plaintiff is "sleeping with the phone at hand"; an action which, when the terminal is charging, falls far from the minimum duty of care. Likewise, it is not evident from the Plaintiff's statements that prior to allegedly using the terminal, she mentioned having requested the device's user manual from the service holder (Mrs. [Nombre 002]), nor are there any statements of her own that she read said manual, nor the advice provided in the warranty certificate. From the complaint filing and the documentary evidence provided by the Plaintiff, prima facie, no elements are established that allow the damage suffered and its causal link to be deemed proven, which also implies the quantification of the material damage, aspects regarding which my represented party, under the principle of collaboration with the Justice Authorities, will be demonstrating said deficiencies in the respective stages. C. PARAMETERS FOR QUANTIFICATION OF MORAL DAMAGES: As indicated in this brief, the Plaintiff, in the communications made to my represented party in pre-trial stages (positions of February and June 2019) and in the complaint brief, has presented a material fluctuation in the claims for subjective material and moral damages: 1. In February 2019, she demanded for moral and material damages the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, legal tender of the United States of America (US$200,000.00). 2. In June 2019, she requested for moral damages thirty million colones (₡30,000,000.00) and for material damages six hundred six thousand one hundred eleven colones and forty-one céntimos (₡606,111.41). 3. In November 2019, when filing the complaint, she requests on one hand that material damages be set at twenty million colones (₡20,000,000.00) and moral damages at one hundred twenty million colones (₡120,000,000.00), but also requests that they be fixed in the execution of judgment. In this sense, taking into account that ICE, as a State company, manages public funds, which therefore form part of the concept of Public Treasury, and given the exorbitant fluctuations the Plaintiff has presented to claim damages, this defense, so that it may serve as an objective and valid criterion, respectfully and prudently, permits itself to recall the following jurisprudential line by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, especially regarding the quantification of moral damages: (direct quote). Regarding material damages, at the appropriate procedural stage, the quantification of 20 million colones for medical expenses bears no reasonableness or proportionality whatsoever with the documents provided related to eventual invoices, some not even legible, which, according to the Plaintiff, amount to ₡606,111.41. Although the Plaintiff indicates that the total sum is due to medical expenses in Argentina as well as patrimonial impairment from ceasing to work, the truth of the matter is that she presents and offers no proof whatsoever. Also, for this type of claimed damage, as with moral damages, the Plaintiff completely fails to meet the doctrinal and jurisprudential requirements for it to be considered compensable damage, given that she does not determine, nor provide pertinent, suitable, or useful evidence, that accredits it is certain, real, effective damage or that a causal relationship exists between an unlawful act and the damage.

2.B. In File No. 20-002421-1027-CA: It is stated in the pertinent part: III. LEGAL GROUNDS OF THE ANSWER: This answer is based on the following regimes, substantive and procedural rules: A. ON CONTRACTUAL CIVIL LIABILITY. As indicated by the Plaintiff, the contractual relationship between [Nombre 002] and ICE derives from the former's acquisition of a telecommunications service plan provided by ICE with an associated terminal of the brand BMOBILE facilitated by this Institute, on January 15, 2019. In this regard, two essential obligations for ICE derive from said service relationship, which are explained below: The first, to provide the telecommunications services contracted in the Plan based on the legal and regulatory rules established in the telecommunications regulations, where the Plaintiff has not presented any claim of non-conformity for this item, nor any material claim in this process. The second derives from the warranty right for the BMOBILE SPEED 5 terminal, where ICE, as recorded in the administrative file and in response to an internal claim filed on behalf of the Plaintiff on February 1, 2019, delivered to [Nombre 002] a mobile telephone terminal of the brand HUAWEI, model P SMART, as a replacement for the damaged device, where the new phone delivered to her has a higher economic value than the one reported as damaged, with ICE not charging any difference for the price increase of the terminal equipment it was receiving in accordance.

In this regard, the assertion made by the Plaintiff in the Material Damage Section that she lost the money invested in the purchase of the BMOBILE terminal has no evidentiary basis, given that, as recorded in the administrative file, in accordance with the service and terminal acquisition contract, ICE proceeded to replace it, even with a higher-cost one, and therefore there is no breach of contract, and if one existed, it has been duly remedied, and consequently there is no pecuniary obligation for which the Plaintiff must be compensated. Therefore, in accordance with the contractual civil liability alleged by the Plaintiff, ICE has fulfilled the sole specific claim invoked by [Name 002], that being the terminal replacement. B. PARAMETERS FOR DETERMINATION AND QUANTIFICATION OF MATERIAL DAMAGE: The other claims of material damage alleged by [Name 002] are not made on her own behalf, but rather correspond to claims that Ms. [Name 001] is demanding in another judicial proceeding (19-1302-1028-CA-5) which includes the same amount and components for material damage, derived from medical and medicinal expenses and costs totaling twenty million colones (20,000,000). Your Honor should even note that in the legal grounds of the lawsuit filed by [Name 002], she cites Article 197 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP) which regulates liability for moral damage, a claim that Ms. [Name 001] has requested in another judicial proceeding, thereby further demonstrating that in this lawsuit, the Plaintiff is asserting material damage claims that are not her own, but rather belong to a third party, with the sole exception of the matters relating to the terminal replacement, which, as we indicated, has already been resolved by my client, resulting therefore in an extrajudicial satisfaction. With respect specifically to the material damage invoked, although the Plaintiff, in a diffuse and indeterminate manner, implies that the quantification of twenty million colones (20,000,000) for material damage arises from medical expenses that are not her own, but those of a third party (who is also claiming them in the proceeding to which joinder is sought), the truth of the matter is that she presents no evidence, and offers none. Furthermore, beyond her evidentiary omission, the Plaintiff entirely fails to meet the doctrinal and jurisprudential requirements for damage to be considered compensable, given that she does not determine, nor provide pertinent, suitable evidence to prove that it is actual, real, and effective damage, nor that a causal relationship exists between an unlawful act and the damage. C. NON-ATTRIBUTABILITY OF THE DAMAGE DUE TO THE GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ACT OF A THIRD PARTY AND FAULT OF THE VICTIM WHICH EXEMPT MY CLIENT FROM LIABILITY. REGARDING THE MATERIAL DAMAGE INVOKED: In some sections of the Lawsuit, including the legal grounds section, the Plaintiff makes reference to an eventual strict liability of the Administration established in the General Public Administration Law (LGAP), regarding moral damage claims that are not her own. In this regard, Article 190 of the LGAP establishes the following: (transcribes article). This defense, during the present proceeding, in addition to demonstrating that the Plaintiff has not proven the existence of damage, its seriousness, or the causal link, will also demonstrate that in this particular case, the grounds for exclusion of act of a third party and fault of the victim, which exonerate it from this strict liability regime, have also occurred. In this regard, and without prejudice to the demand not allowing clarity as to whether the Plaintiff appears as a victim or acts in representation of a third party, the truth of the matter is that the filing brief itself shows that there are conducts and omissions by [Name 002] and by [Name 001] that exculpate my client from liability pursuant to Article 190 of the LGAP. In this sense, [Name 002], as the holder of the postpaid mobile telecommunications Service Plan 4GK2, with associated terminal, BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS IMEI 353253100027620, contrary to the concept of a reasonable consumer and the duty of care, disassociated herself from the use and handling of said terminal, placing it at the disposal of a person with whom my client has no service relationship whatsoever, and for whom there can therefore be no traceability or certainty that the usage recommendations provided in the warranty certificate and in the user manual that comes with said terminal were provided. Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of contractual good faith, my client was not informed that the terminal phone, which was provided under the subsidy facility, was going to be used by a third party, which would have allowed providing some guidance on use and technical recommendations, which were indeed provided to Ms. [Name 002]. Likewise, it is not evident to this representation, at least from what is described in the lawsuit, that [Name 001] (to whom the Plaintiff delivered the terminal, as she indicates) complied with the minimum duty of care at the time of receiving and using the phone, nor is it evident that Ms. [Name 001] requested the device's user manual or the usage advice provided in the warranty certificate from the service holder. On the contrary, the lawsuit makes assertions that would equally imply fault on the part of Ms. [Name 001], given that, in the third fact, it states that she put the phone to charge before sleeping, that the terminal was on the mattress on which she slept, and that the charging was for a prolonged period. These conducts, which appear in the lawsuit itself, attributable both to the Plaintiff and to Ms. [Name 001], on whose behalf [Name 002] exercises the majority of her material damage claims (except for the terminal replacement, which has already been carried out), fall within the grounds for exoneration of liability of my client in accordance with Article 190 of the LGAP.

III.- PROVEN FACTS: Deemed important for the resolution of this dispute, the following facts are considered duly proven and are based on a single set of evidence for the consolidated case files 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA:

• 1)That on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff [Name 002], acquired at no cost and through ICE's initiative, the terminal with brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories being granted, invoiced in her name. (see folios 02 to 12 administrative file, Rodrigo [Name 002], ID [Value 003] in a complementary hearing of the judicial file) 2) That [Name 001], without being a regular ICE customer but using the new terminal as of January 19, 2019, as [Name 002] had provided it to her, with the new and unused BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS device, IMEI 353253100027620, and with the device in the charging phase from the nighttime hours of January 20, 2019, it happened that on the morning of January 21, 2019, between 06:30 and 07:30 hours, its battery exploded, causing, on the occasion of that explosion, injuries from second- and third-degree burns to her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burn to the hair on her head. Said plaintiff was treated for these injuries, initially on the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently treated for wound care at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.

(see folios 29, 31, 34, 39 to 46, 43 to 67 of the administrative file, statement of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003] in the supplementary hearing of the judicial file) **3)** That [Nombre 001], as a result of the explosion of the battery in the BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS cell phone, IMEI 353253100027620, suffered second- and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burns to the hair on her head; she was treated for her wound care at the CCSS Ebais in Aguas Zarcas, San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina; she suffered emotional damages, episodes of stress, panic attacks, and painful feelings regarding her state of health and traumatic healing process. (statements of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], in supplementary hearing, images 27-37 of the judicial file, and invoices from 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, from 01-24-2019/wound care, 01-28-2019/wound care, 01-29-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance, and 01-31-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano, and invoice from 01-27-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 of the administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial file) **4)** The Fire Department, Pital Station, Unit M-86, recorded the occurrence of a type 1-1-8-7 Fire Emergency incident on 01/21/2019 at a dwelling in Alajuela, San Carlos, Aguas Zarcas, after the Aguas Zarcas bridge (see folios 42-43 of the administrative file).

**5)** On January 28, 2019, the plaintiff [Nombre 002] delivered the remaining pieces of the BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS device, IMEI 353253100027620, to ICE official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], for the return of the damaged terminal, with an indication on the form referring to bubbles from battery burns, burns on the internal casing, and other damage (see image 74-75, 332, and statement of [Nombre 004] in the supplementary hearing of the judicial file).

**6)** On February 1, 2019, with the acceptance of the plaintiff [Nombre 002], a terminal exchange was processed in her favor by ICE, through official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004]; she received delivery of a terminal, make and model HUAWEI P Smart Black, with IMEI 867172030714850, with a warranty period of 365 days for the device and 30 days for accessories, as a replacement for the terminal make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, due to defective manufacturing—battery explosion in the terminal—. (see folios 15, 16, photographs at image 102-103, statement of [Nombre 004] in supplementary hearing, image 332 of the judicial file) **7)** That ICE official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], on January 28, 2019, delivered the remaining pieces of the BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS device, IMEI 353253100027620, to the authorized repair shop SERTEC for evaluation and diagnosis; the repair shop indicated, through Report SER-0007869 dated January 28, 2019, and in relation to the device, that: "Fault description: CUSTOMER INDICATES THAT THE TERMINAL'S BATTERY EXPLODED UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE IT WAS CHARGING; AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION, IT CAUSED DAMAGE TO SONIA [Nombre 001], SECOND- AND THIRD-DEGREE BURNS TO THE UPPER EXTREMITIES (WRISTS), HAIR, AND FOOT. Repair Performed: The case was evaluated, finding: the equipment shows no damage to the main board, nor does it show damage to the cable or charger; the screen is shattered, and there are marks on the phone label and back cover as a result of the battery damage. It is concluded that the phone did not cause the damage to the battery, as the connector and charging circuit are in good condition. The only damage present is in the equipment's battery, causing marks on the back casings. Accessories: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDS-FREE KIT, BACK COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNED BATTERY. Equipment Status: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDS-FREE KIT, BACK COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNED BATTERY. Diagnosis Date: 01/28/2019." (see image 332, statement of [Nombre 004] in the supplementary hearing of the judicial file) **8)** That the plaintiffs [Nombre 001] and [Nombre 002] have filed monetary administrative claims against ICE concerning medical care for the burn injuries sustained by [Nombre 001], as described, due to defective manufacturing—battery explosion in terminal—resulting from her use of the terminal make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, which occurred on January 21, 2019, in the morning between 6:30 and 7:30 a.m., without a satisfactory response. (see folios 29-35, 95, 96, 107-112 of the administrative file and see image 332 of the judicial file, statements of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 005], ID [Valor 005], in the supplementary hearing of the judicial file) **IV.- UNPROVEN FACTS:** In accordance with the evidentiary elements admitted in the case record, the following facts are considered unproven, as the record lacks suitable evidence in relation to the subject matter of the proceedings:

**1)** That [Nombre 001] was an active professional in Visual Arts in her country of origin and that, due to the injuries suffered, she had economic losses distinct from what was paid in the invoices from 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, from 01-24-2019/wound care, 01-28-2019/wound care, 01-29-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance, and 01-31-2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano, and the invoice from 01-27-2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.

**2)** That the burn injuries to [Nombre 001]'s person caused her any loss of sensation in her hands, and that this therefore affected her daily personal or professional tasks or current income.

**3)** That [Nombre 002] incurred financial expenses due to any incidental material damage in relation to the injuries suffered by [Nombre 001], caused by the explosion of the battery in the BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS cell phone, IMEI 353253100027620, in which she suffered second- and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burns to the hair on her head, and that he therefore disbursed expenses for her treatment and wound care at the CCSS Ebais in Aguas Zarcas, San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.

• 4)That the Fire Department, Pital Station, Unit M-86, recorded in the incident report type 1-1-8-7 Fire Emergencies on 21/01/2019 at a dwelling in Alajuela, San Carlos, Agua Zarcas, after the Agua Zarcas bridge, no recommendation regarding the results of the reported incident.

**V.- PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 1.- Preliminary applicable observation.** In both consolidated lawsuits, the plaintiff parties justify the legal basis of their actions and their arguments on the following rules: Articles 9, 11, 21, and 41 of the Political Constitution, 190, 196, 197 of the General Law of Public Administration, 1, 10, 12, 36, 58 and following of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, and 1022 of the Civil Code. Also, through a meager and lax justification and announcement in the eleventh fact of lawsuit 20-002421-1027-CA, as well as in the arguments of case file 13-001302-1028-CA, reference was made to the application of article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. That is, the claimants solely argued the action through and by means of the facts they set forth, without providing a foundation in legal subsumption of the underlying situation with the given facts and the stated rule, for the completeness and necessary demonstration of unlawfulness under the structure of the Cartesian or logical/legal syllogism. Under that account of the accused applicable law and the factual framework, the defendant was served with process, who, for the purpose indicated, reported on the regulatory application of their interest, pointing out in their defense the mention of the Effective Consumer Defense Law 7472, article 35 on the liability regime and the exclusion of liability for alienness, as well as on the grounds of victim's fault and act of a third party incurred by the plaintiff, established in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration and what is established in article 48 of the General Telecommunications Law 8642, which allows, as they affirmed, that the claim before the telecommunications operator may be filed by the client directly or by any person on their behalf, insofar as this does not imply that the material legal relationship with the service client disappears, given that what this determines is the origin, terms, and conditions of the contract.

In the foregoing, and although the general principle that the judge knows the fullness of the law (*iura novit curia*) is well-known, it is also true that the litigation was circumscribed to the factual and normative terms invoked, thus the scope of analysis and assessment of the case will be limited to the reach of the parties' statements.

**2.- COURT'S OPINION. General parameters regarding the claim.** Under the strict liability regime of the Public Administration, liability arises without needing to demonstrate intent or fault of the agent causing the harm, it being sufficient, however, to prove the existence of the "risk" to generate it, which is why the notions of unlawfulness and culpability do not operate; therefore, the principle of reversal of the burden of proof in favor of the injured party applies. For these purposes, the alleged Public Administration (ICE), causing the claimed damages, must compensate them if its conduct effectively and efficiently generated them, unless it proves some exonerating ground, without prejudice to the essential condition, it is reiterated, that the harmful effect must constitute or have its cause in the deployment of administrative activity or omission, or in its commercial operations within the telecommunications field. Thus, the concurrence of four elements is required, namely: a) An injury, consisting of unlawful patrimonial losses, because the one suffering them does not have the duty to bear them; b) An administrative conduct to which the production of the alleged harm is linked; c) A causal nexus, consisting of the existence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact (administrative conduct) imputed and the harm produced; and d) That there are no grounds for justification, given that their existence can legally disconnect the harm produced from the Public Administration's conduct, so that the harmful effect is not attributable to it, breaking the causality nexus upon the occurrence of an exempting situation such as force majeure, the victim's fault, and the act of a third party. This patrimonial liability regime of the State and its institutions, provided for in articles 9 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, is therefore essentially objective in nature, so for it to arise, it suffices that there is an compensable harm, an administrative conduct, and a causal nexus between both. Thus, in cases of strict liability, the Public Administration's defense would lie in demonstrating that one of the grounds that break the causality nexus, indicated in article 190, paragraph 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, occurred: force majeure, the act of a third party, or the act of the victim itself, and consequently the application of the principle of alienness of harm. However, as a general principle rule, for establishing the admissibility of the Public Administration's liability, it arises as a *sine qua non* requirement that the plaintiff party demonstrates the existence, consistency, and magnitude of the harm and the pertinent causal nexus with the administrative conduct that produced it. Based on that objective parameter, the analysis of the specific case proceeds.

**VI.- Regarding the inadmissibility of the lawsuit in case file 20-002421-1027-CA.** At the core of the claims of this action, it is required: to declare the consequent contractual civil liability of a patrimonial nature of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the material damage caused to the undersigned, valued at twenty million colones, and that the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is responsible for proceeding with the indemnification for the material damage caused. **Court's Opinion:** For cases such as the present one, compliance with the duty on the part of the plaintiff to prove the necessary factual and material elements that constitute the state of being a damaged party is unavoidable, since the mere allegation of having suffered material damage caused by the Administration, as the plaintiff intends in the present case, is not sufficient if this party did not fulfill—it is reiterated—her duty to prove, substantiate, and justify the existence and consistency of the material damage incurred in the sum of twenty million colones. It must be considered that from the relationship of Article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) with Article 220 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), what is known as the *onus probandi* (or burden of proof) is derived, a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a certain fact before the courts. The basis of the *onus probandi* lies in an old legal aphorism that states that "what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal must be proven." Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality, to justify a state of indemnity or harm, and consequently the payment for material damage valued at twenty million colones, must prove it (*"affirmanti incumbit probatio"*: the burden of proof lies with the one who affirms). Basically, what is meant by this aphorism is that the burden or work of proving a statement must fall on whoever breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a new truth on a subject). While it is demonstrated in the case file that on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff [Nombre 002] acquired, at no cost and through ICE, the terminal with make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, being granted a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories, and invoiced in her name, and that her friend [Nombre 001], without being a regular ICE customer but using that new terminal as of January 19, 2019, because [Nombre 002] had provided it to her, and that while the device was charging from the night hours of January 20, 2019, it coming to pass that on January 21, 2019, just 2 days after having acquired it and in the morning hours between 6:30 and 7:30, its battery exploded, causing her, on the occasion of that event, second and third-degree burn injuries on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet, and burning of the hair on her head. And that because of this, the aforementioned lady [Nombre 001] was treated for those injuries, initially on the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, subsequently treated for wound care at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina; the plaintiff, at that time, had not suffered any material damage, nor proven any pecuniary expense on the occasion of any use of the indicated terminal that would have caused her any direct and immediate harm to her legal estate, besides the fact that on January 28, 2019, the plaintiff [Nombre 002] was given a replacement of the defective terminal in her favor by the ICE official [Nombre 004], ID [Valor 004], with receipt delivered of the terminal with make and model HUAWEI, P Smart Negro, with IMEI 867172030714850, and with a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories, replacing the defective terminal with make and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620. All these are aspects and circumstances that do not justify the material damage requested, and it is reiterated, it is not proven that [Nombre 002] incurred in patrimonial expenses on the occasion of any emergent material damage in relation to the injuries suffered by [Nombre 001]. Consequently, since the plaintiff does not prove the existence and consistency of the material damage claimed through or by means of the specification or individualization of the component of this aspect, and even less so for the amount requested, nor that this had its genesis in the accused conduct to her detriment; therefore, this Court cannot conclude that the material damage originates from that situation claimed in her injury, as its granting is not a state of economic or discretionary justice, but on the contrary, it must arise from effective and indubitable proof of the causation of the accused damage. Thus, a causal nexus or link (nexo causal) is not even proven, nor consequently, with the damage alleged in correspondence with the service provided by ICE to the plaintiff [Nombre 002], a necessary requirement for the admissibility of the intended administrative liability. Damage is a necessary element for the right to compensation to arise in strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) or no-fault liability, understanding damage as "the injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection." So that, for the right to compensation to arise, the accused act or conduct must produce an "injury or invasion of another's legal sphere. The damage is compensable only if it results from an injury to a licit interest worthy of protection (...)" (Pérez Vargas Víctor. Principios de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, primera edición, 1984, página 46, 47). Since long ago, and on this matter, which has not varied in its application criterion even in relation to the application of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense 7472 (Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor 7472), the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled in vote number 467-F-SI-2008, of 2:25 p.m. on July fourth, two thousand eight, by stating that "(...) Article 35 of broad citation, establishes the applicable liability regime in consumer law matters, which is of an objective nature. It is worth remembering that civil liability, according to the imputation criterion used as its basis, is divided into subjective and objective. The former bases the attribution of liability on culpability in a broad sense, that is, on the judgment of reproach made to the conduct of the harmful agent. It includes both negligence in the strict sense and willful misconduct. An example of this is the traditional contractual liability, regulated by Articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code; the first of them, referring to liability for willful misconduct and the second to liability for negligence. In such cases, a fortuitous event is an exonerating cause of civil liability, since unpredictability suppresses the judgment of reproach on the conduct of the harmful agent. Objective civil liability, on the other hand, has as its attribution criterion causes expressly established by law.

An example of this is Article 1048 of the Civil Code, regarding civil liability arising from damages caused by motive machines and the cited Article 35, referring to civil liability in consumer law matters. The latter entails the civil liability of the producer or merchant when the existence of damage is demonstrated as a result of the activity carried out by the producer or merchant. *Thus, the consumer must only prove that the damage exists and that it occurs as a direct and immediate consequence of the activity carried out by the producer or merchant (adequate causation)*. Proof of fault or intent (culpability in the broad sense) is not required, since the criterion of imputation is objective." *In this way, according to what has been indicated, material damage falls upon the patrimony, on the assets and rights that comprise it, and consequently, the affected party must credit, demonstrate, and prove its existence, as well as its causal relationship.* In that sense, it is divided into actual damage (daño emergente), which is the direct injury caused by the reprehensible conduct, the loss incurred, and loss of profits (lucro cesante) as the earnings not received because of such activity, the frustrated gain or utility that it was reasonable and probable would have been received had the harmful action not occurred. Furthermore, regarding the requirements for damage in general to be compensable, it has been stated that " VI.- *Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically concur to be a "compensable damage": A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations*. The damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or of difficult appreciation or proof; certainty must not be confused with actuality, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage must not be confused with loss of profits or prejudice, since the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating fact of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project when the process is initiated (...). B) There must be injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection (...). " (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 606-F-2002 at sixteen ten hours on August seven, two thousand two). -intentional bold and italics-. As a corollary to the foregoing, it is pointless to further justify and in greater consideration, the unfoundedness in all its extremes of the present accumulated lawsuit, the foregoing being sufficient to uphold the opposed exception of lack of right.

**VII.- 1.- On the merits of the lawsuit in case file 19-001302-1028-CA in the following terms:** In the core of the claims of this action, it is required: to declare the patrimonial liability of the defendant entity Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad for the moral and material damage caused, the patrimonial liability being derived from the damage corresponding to the material damage valued at twenty million colones and the subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) estimated at one hundred million colones. **Criterion of the Tribunal:** The legal situation claimed in this case file contains a different nuance from the one previously resolved, which concentrates its shift in relation to the legality of the matter within the protective core of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, when the plaintiff thus accuses the existence of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of ICE, as a company that distributes and sells BMobile devices and that, in this way, she states, has responsibility for the products it endorses and makes available to its clients, which, she assures, must subject to the necessary safety controls to ensure the health, life, and integrity of its consumers, that is, she indicates as elements of liability an active conduct by ICE, promoting cell phones, and offering them to clients, in this instance, one of the delivered devices had a factory defect, which caused that after a few days of use, it exploded, causing damages as those already indicated in the lawsuit, its responsibility as a National Company being to ensure it places in the hands of its clients products in optimal conditions that do not endanger their life or integrity. In this regard, it is proven in the record that on January 17, 2019, the plaintiff in the accumulated process 20-002421-1027-CA [Name 002], as a regular client of the defendant institute, acquired at no cost and at the instance of ICE, the terminal with brand and model BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, being granted a warranty period of 365 days on the device and 30 days on accessories and having the acquisition invoiced in her name, and immediately out of her liberality, she gave it, unused, to her friend [Name 001] -not being a regular client of ICE- due to her temporary stay in Costa Rica, due to her tourist status, so that she could make use of that new terminal starting January 19, 2019, it occurring that while the device was in charging phase from the night hours of January 20, 2019, on January 21, 2019, between 06:30 and 07:30 in the morning, only 2 days after having acquired it, its battery exploded, causing to her person due to that explosion, injuries from second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet and a burn to the hair on her head, warranting thereby, that said Mrs. [Name 001] was treated for those injuries. Initially, on the same day the 21st at the Ebais of the CCSS in Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently treated for correlated wound care at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina. It is also recorded in the record, although in a rather illegible manner, that the medical services were provided to her in private medicine at the cost of payment by the treated person, for amounts that cannot be determined or concretized particularly due to the illegibility of the documents provided in the record, but which however, the Tribunal considers as justifications for the expenses incurred and estimates them as logical, corresponding, consequent, and necessary for her care in those private clinics -not so in the Ebais-, since otherwise, she would not have been treated for not being hospital charity centers. Under that understanding, and with regard to the burden of proof, Article 35 of the Consumer Protection Law establishes the presumption of liability on the producer, the supplier, and the merchant, if the consumer is harmed because of the good or the service, and only one who proves to have been unrelated to the damage is released. That is, in matters of strict liability in consumer relations, the reversal of the burden of proof prevails as a general rule, thus placing upon the defendant ICE the burden of proving the circumstances of exoneration that are subject to the rules of due diligence.

Due to the positive and prospective development of the objective thesis of created risk or hazardousness, it is the Court's criterion that the duty to avoid damage becomes more demanding; hence, once the damage has occurred, the reversal of the burden of proof is imposed. The producer, supplier, or merchant must demonstrate the objective fact that all the most functional technical and safety measures have been taken to avoid or reduce the danger of the activity they carry out and, with it, the products they market, all in protection of the consumer/user. Thus, the principle of symmetry is established, which provides that greater burdens shall fall upon whoever has better possibilities by reason of possessing suitable means of proof, which is what is known as dynamic proof. The injured consumer, the harmed party, for their part, must demonstrate: a. The harm suffered. b. The link between the damage and the good used or product received or the service received from the supplier, the producer, or the merchant (causal relationship). The burden of proof cannot be altered to the detriment of the consumer or user, who is also in a situation of disadvantage in the consumer relationship. Regarding this matter, Chamber I of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled: [...] IV.- On the burden of proof. Based on what has been set forth up to this point, it is pertinent to refer to the duty of demonstration incumbent upon each of the parties comprising the litigation, when the object of the proceeding is the declaration of a duty to repair damage in cases such as the present one. In the first instance, it is noted that the plaintiff finds herself in a situation where it is very difficult or practically impossible to prove some of the essential facts or prerequisites for her claim, placing her in a position of potential defenselessness. As a result of the foregoing, and as this Chamber has previously indicated, the duty of demonstration is redistributed among the litigating parties, where the "onus probandi" (evidentiary duty) falls upon whoever is in a better position to provide evidence to the proceeding..." (in this regard, see resolution no. 212 of 8:15 a.m. on March 25, 2008). The plaintiff [Name 001] demonstrated in the case file that, during ordinary, normal use and in the manner foreseen or reasonably foreseeable for the device BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY, IMEI 353253100027620, only 2 days after having received it from [Name 002] and 4 days since ICE delivered it new to the latter, and while the device was in the charging phase since the late hours of the night of January 20, 2019, it happened that on January 21, 2019—just a few hours later—the device's battery exploded, causing her the injuries already indicated ut supra (statements of [Name 003], identification document [Value 003], [Name 002], in supplementary hearing, epicrisis and treatments in private hospitals according to documents visible in images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices of 01-22-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/wound care, of 01-24-2019/wound care, 01-28-2019/wound care, 01-29-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 01-31-2019/wound care, processed at Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 01-27-2019/wound care, processed at Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial file). Now, even though it is also accredited that Mrs. [Name 001] did not directly acquire the defective device from ICE, nor does she configure herself as a contracting party with ICE, she was, by using the device, constituting herself as an indirect, mediate, or effective consumer of the products marketed by ICE, not a stranger to the entity nor one marketed by third parties, which entails a broadening of protection concerning the extension of liability for the distribution and delivery of defective goods or products by it to direct or indirect users, especially under the understanding that the device was new and with only 2 days of use by Mrs. [Name 001] and 4 days since ICE delivered it, which gives the present matter a special and differentiated accent. By extensive interpretation of the Consumer Protection Law, in matters of consumer relations, the concept of what a consumer is has been broadened, understanding it not only as the effective consumer, that is, the person who acquires a good or service, but also as the potential consumer or client who is the one who does not actually acquire that good or service but may come to acquire or use it in any capacity, provided it comes from the lawful distribution chain of the device, in this case from ICE, rendering useless what was affirmed by ICE when it claims its excuse from liability due to a lack in the sub-litem of a matter of traceability and custody not only of the terminal but also of the transfer of usage information. Thus, in comparison and through vote number 295-2007 of ten hours forty-five minutes of April twenty-seventh, two thousand seven, Chamber One ruled as follows: "[…] In the opinion of this Chamber, the simple fact of not acquiring a product, or requiring a service, is not a legally acceptable reason to exempt the producer, supplier, or merchant from liability, in those cases where the user is injured by reason of the good or service received. The term “consumer” referred to the legal situation of the plaintiff when he entered the supermarket, corresponds to a broader concept than that of buyer. In accordance with the constitutional parameter, consumer, must be understood in an expansive approach regarding the scope of application of persons requiring special protection in this matter. It is not conditioned upon a “consumer contract”, because that would mean applying it in a restricted and limited manner to that person who buys, or who contracts. The position of modern law, according to this Deciding Body, is that they be conceived of as a client, understood as one who participates in commercial activities in the position of a potential acquirer—and not an effective buyer—of goods and services with the offeror. Depending on the stage of the process, a distinction can be made between contracting party and client. The former is called the legal consumer. They acquire a good or service through a typical legal relationship, such as, for example, a purchase. The latter is the material consumer, who does not contract the good or service, but may potentially acquire or use it.

The latter is the center of legal protection in the area of consumer safety [...]". That is, the liability addressed in matters concerning consumers and users is that in which the damage is caused by the use, whether through use or consumption, or the handling of a defective product, when the damage is caused by the defectiveness of the product, and which was thus delivered by ICE, even without its knowledge, who, by marketing it, its position links and binds the product that was imported and subsequently distributed with the consumer or user within the framework of its ordinary and usual business activities, at least for the term of its warranty, which acquires greater relevance when safeguarding and protecting the right to health protected in Article 32 of the governing law, on the occasion of the existence of a defective product, which literally states: "Article 32.- Consumer rights. Without prejudice to the provisions of treaties, international conventions to which Costa Rica is a party, ordinary internal legislation, regulations, general principles of law, uses and customs, the following are fundamental and inalienable rights of the consumer: a) Protection against risks that may affect their health, safety and the environment (...)". Therefore, civil liability for defective products refers to the liability of a manufacturer or seller (ICE) for placing a defective product in the hands of a consumer and/or user, it not being foreign to the case under study, that in the case of explosions of lithium-ion batteries -common in cell phones-, the claim is not excluded or limited when referring to design or manufacturing defects, as it is shown to be prone to overheating during charging or if a failure occurred during its production that caused its explosive nature, it being significant that this was not observed prior to its distribution and subsequent effective marketing, the burden of proof falling on the manufacturer and the distributor to demonstrate that the device had no defect whatsoever, an aspect which, in the case file, ICE has failed to prove otherwise.

Thus, it is the Tribunal's criterion that ICE's opposition based on the argument of the external nature of the damage due to the fault of the victim and the act of a third party is unfounded, especially when not even an expert opinion on the manufacturing quality of the device and its battery in question as a single commercial unit was provided, even though the authorized repair shop SERTEC for the inspection of these devices laconically stated: "Report SER-0007869 dated January 28, 2019 and in relation to the device: 'Description of failure: CUSTOMER INDICATES THE TERMINAL BATTERY EXPLODED UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE CHARGING, AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLOSION, CAUSED DAMAGE TO SONIA [Name 001], SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS ON THE UPPER EXTREMITIES (WRISTS), HAIR, FOOT. Repair Performed: Case evaluation is carried out finding: equipment shows no damage to the main board, nor does it show damage to the cable or the charger; the screen is burst, marks on the phone label and on its back cover as a result of the damage to the battery, it is concluded that the phone did not cause the damage to the battery since the connector and the charging circuit are in good condition. The only damages present are on the equipment's battery causing marks on its rear casings. Accessories: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDS-FREE, COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNT BATTERY. Equipment Condition: BOX, CHARGER WITH CABLE, HANDS-FREE, COVER AND RUBBER COVER, BURNT BATTERY. Diagnosis Date: 01/28/2019.'"; which all the more reason, does not determine the cause of the battery explosion nor its misuse, and its misuse is not transferable to the injured party. In that sense, the external nature of the damage must be understood as when only the party who demonstrates they were external to the damage is released from liability, and for this, it must be taken into account that Law 7472 itself, in Article 71, contemplates the integration of that regulation with the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). Therefore, it has been the criterion of this jurisdiction, and upheld by the First Chamber and now in the integration as the Court of Cassation, that since Law 7472 lacks an express detail of what should be understood by external nature of the damage, the exempting causes contained in the LGAP are applicable. Article 190.1 ibidem establishes as exemptions from liability the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, or force majeure. Thus, for a risk to be attributable to a company, in such a way that its materialization entails liability, it must be taken into account that the risk to which the consumer is exposed must exceed those that are tolerable for the person suffering the damage. In summary, canon 35 of the Consumer Law establishes a strict and joint and several liability regime among the producer, the supplier, and the merchant, towards the effective consumer and user in the terms set forth in this resolution, and that [Name 001] was injured in her physical and moral-emotional integrity on the occasion of the good or service placed at her disposal, with the result that ICE does not demonstrate that, after a retrospective examination, the damage was not linked by a causal nexus to its intervention in that economic chain of the BMOBILE SPEED5 GREY device, IMEI 353253100027620, and that it reached the hands of Mrs. [Name 001] through a mere liberality, much less that she made unreasonable use of the device that exceeded the normality of use of such a generic device and of the common task that is the use of a cell phone, therefore it is consequent to declare the patrimonial liability of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute for the material damage caused and accredited and which is limited solely to the amount determined to be owed on the invoices of 01/22/2019/pharmacy/consultation/ general medicine/wound care, of 01/24/2019/wound care, 01/28/2019/wound care, 01/29/2019/opinion, medical assistance and 01/31/2019/wound care, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice of 01/27/2019/wound care, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, denying any other recognition due to lack of justification and substantiation regarding other requested extremes.

The determination of the payments made, together with the recognition of legal interest from the date of their payment at the hospital centers and until their effective payment at this jurisdictional venue, is deferred to the enforcement of the judgment, concomitantly denying their indexation to real value as of the date of receipt thereof, because the interest granted contains an inflationary component in its composition, which would undoubtedly grant a double financial reparation without any basis, which is improper.

**2.- In relation to the claimed moral damages (daño moral):** Regarding the demonstration of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), this Court has reiterated that this type of detriment consists of the affectation of the emotional conditions of the subject; its assessment –it has been insisted– is *in re ipsa*, that is, it depends on the estimations of the adjudicating body not on concrete evidentiary elements, but on indications and on the factual picture itself, from which an affectation in this extra-patrimonial sphere of the individual is logically deduced. In other words, it does not require direct demonstration, but rather is inferred from the accredited facts, through indications and rational inferences. In the *sub judice*, this Court appreciates by logical inference that the plaintiff Leyla Rioba suffered intensely, emotionally and internally not only because of her physical injuries occasioned by the explosion of the BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS device, IMEI 353253100027620, which caused second and third-degree burns on her wrist, hands, arms, back, feet and hair burns on her head, and that, being in that state, she was attended to for her treatments at the CCSS Ebais of Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, and subsequently at the Hospital Metropolitano and Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, which naturally caused her emotional damages, stress episodes, panic attacks and suffering feelings due to her state of health and traumatic treatment (declarations of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], in supplementary hearing of the judicial file), consequently suffering from uncertainty, suffering and emotional exhaustion from the treatment of the treatments and their outcome in relation to her physical condition prior to the given incident, which is an intuitive, reasonable and expected behavior in people who do not expect an event as significant as the one suffered, where there is the expectation of receiving a reliable, safe device, reviewed and approved by ICE for its distribution and commercialization. Rationally, no one expected the opposite. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the limits of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality for the fixing of the moral damages (daño moral). This produces a direct effect on its fixing, because it is not about quantifying the suffering, as it is inappreciable, but about fixing a monetary compensation for her injury, the only mechanism to which the law can resort, so as to repair, at least in part, the offense suffered. The patrimonial quantification or liquidation of the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) or *pretium doloris*, is of a strictly psychic, affective nature and not linked to material deprivations, hence its demonstration is excludable, with which it entails the application of judicial discretion, under the internal control and limit of the indicated reasonableness and proportionality. It must be estimated then, that the moral prejudice and the alterations in the conditions of existence, in the plaintiff, are items of moral damages that are neither synonymous nor express the same damage as a result of the applied strict liability, the purpose of their indemnification being independent through the figure of alterations in the conditions of existence (the materiality), while through subjective moral prejudice, the suffering produced by the harmful act is indemnified, niche in which the material claim for the requested moral damages resides. The indemnification in this regard is fixed at **FOUR MILLION COLONES** and not at the requested amount, which is jurisprudentially delimited by the appreciation that this Court has perceived in the process of the sufferings that affect the victim's emotional sphere, derived from the facts and declarations that were taken into account to estimate it (declarations of [Nombre 003], ID [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], in supplementary hearing, images 27-37 of the judicial file and invoices from 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/treatments, from 24-01-2019/treatments, 28-01-2019/treatments, 29-01-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/treatments, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice from 27-01-2019/treatments, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 administrative file in relation to documents in images 39-46 of the judicial file) and that even such suffering has been obtained from the events lived internally by the plaintiff, for which reason this Section has no doubt whatsoever about the existence of the moral damages caused, estimating it as a compensation for the pain, but not a redress; representing a sanction but not an exaction against the offender. Based on the foregoing, the Court observes from the situations indicated in the case file, according to which, the plaintiff's personal affliction constitutes the only phase to be compensated and that it is the source of consequent frustration, it is sufficient fact so that the adequate retribution does not transgress the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as principles that were intrinsically assessed justly by this Court, for which reason there is no sufficient motive to vary the *quantum* of the compensation and adjust it to the sum requested in the lawsuit. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of Article 194 of the General Public Administration Law) such as those given and proven in this case file, and assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent, producing the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity of the person, and to that extent, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim [Nombre 001] must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation in the sum ordered, together with the recognition of legal interest until its effective payment once this resolution is final, concomitantly denying its indexation to real value as of the date of receipt thereof, because the interest granted contains an inflationary component in its composition, which would undoubtedly grant a double financial reparation without any basis, which is improper.

**VIII.- Regarding the defenses filed.** In both proceedings, the representatives of the defendant raised the same exceptions of lack of right, lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). In accordance with what has been considered and the scope of what has been indicated, the exception of lack of right is upheld only in relation to the action filed in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA and, also, regarding the denied excess sought for the items of material and moral damages within the action filed in proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA. In both consolidated actions, the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva) and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) are dismissed, by virtue of the legal and factual situation analyzed, because in a civil treasury proceeding, the affected parties in this case have the authority to sue the institution or subject they consider responsible for the damages to their patrimony.

IX.- On the costs of the litigation. Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, under the terms set forth in that same rule, in accordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. It is ordered: in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA, the plaintiff was the losing party and in that order, at the Tribunal's discretion, must bear the condemnation for both costs in favor of the defendant. In proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, ICE was the losing party and in that order, at the Tribunal's discretion, must bear the condemnation for both costs in favor of the plaintiff. In both proceedings and from the final quantification of both costs in the Judgment Execution stage and until their effective payment, the respective legal interest will be recognized in favor of the beneficiaries.

POR TANTO

It is hereby adjudged: In both consolidated actions 19-001302-1028-CA and 20-002421-1027-CA, the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva) and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) are dismissed. The exception of lack of right is upheld only in relation to the action filed in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA and consequently the action brought by [Nombre 002] is declared without merit in all its extremes. In relation to proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, the patrimonial liability of the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD is declared for the material damage caused and accredited, which is limited solely to the amount to be recognized to [Nombre 001] and that results determined regarding payments made on invoices from 22-01-2019/pharmacy/consultation/general medicine/dressings, from 24-01-2019/dressings, 28-01-2019/dressings, 29-01-2019/medical opinion, medical assistance and 31-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Hospital Metropolitano and invoice from 27-01-2019/dressings, processed at the Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, and the determination of the specified payments made, together with the recognition of legal interest from the date of their payment to the hospital centers until their effective payment in this jurisdictional venue, is deferred to the execution of the judgment, concomitantly denying their indexation; and the claim for moral damage is also recognized, this extreme being set at FOUR MILLION COLONES together with the recognition of legal interest until its effective payment once this ruling becomes final, concomitantly denying its indexation. In relation to it, the exception of lack of right is upheld regarding the denied excess sought for the items of material and moral damages. On the costs of the litigation: It is ordered: in proceeding 20-002421-1027-CA, the plaintiff was the losing party and in that order, must bear the condemnation for both costs in favor of the defendant. In proceeding 19-001302-1028-CA, ICE was the losing party and in that order, must bear the condemnation for both costs in favor of the plaintiff. In both proceedings and from the final quantification of both costs in the Judgment Execution stage and until their effective payment, the respective legal interest will be recognized in favor of the beneficiaries. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández. Eduardo González Segura. Marco Hernández Vargas. Deciding Judges.

CONSTANCIA. On the same date of the preceding ruling, it is hereby recorded that Judge Eduardo González Segura does not sign this ruling because he is on vacation, and it is noted that he participated in the deliberation and terms of the drafting of this ruling. Presiding Judge. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández.

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Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: [email protected]

Documento PJEDITOR ????????????????

CONOCIMIENTO (acumulado 20-002421-1027-CA) ACTOR/A:

[Nombre 001] Y [Nombre 002] DEMANDADO/A:

INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD N° 2025000261 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN SEGUNDA (Equipo 2), SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las ocho horas con treinta y seis minutos del diecisiete de Enero del dos mil venticinco.- Proceso de conocimiento acumulado (19-001302-1028-CA y 20-002421-1027-CA) establecido por [Nombre 001], un solo apellido en razón de su nacionalidad argentina y con pasaporte de ese país número [Valor 001] y [Nombre 002], con cédula número [Valor 002], ambas representadas por representada por Rodolfo Alvarado Moreno, con cédula número 1-0512-0482 y Jessica Valverde Campos, en su condición de apoderados especiales judiciales contra el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD (en adelante ICE) y representado por Luis A. Salazar Solís y Gonzalo Gómez Rodríguez, apoderados especiales judiciales del ICE. A continuación, el Tribunal Colegiado Sección II -Equipo 2-, al que por turno correspondió conocer de este asunto, procede a dictar dentro del plazo de ley, previa celebración de la Audiencia Complementaria del 17 de diciembre de 2024 y la deliberación de ley, la resolución correspondiente con el voto unánime de sus integrantes Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Eduardo González Segura y Marco Hernández Vargas.

Redacta el Juez Hernández Hernández.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- ASPECTOS PRELIMINARES. Como parte del íter procesal se tiene lo siguiente: 1) La presente causa se ha sustanciado en esta sede en forma electrónica, por lo que se utilizará como referencia la foliatura del documento electrónico generado como un único archivo en formato PDF, obtenido del Escritorio Virtual con las opciones "Orden Descendente" y "Ver descripción de Documento (PDF)" demacradas y con la opción "Ver detalles carátula del Expediente" seleccionado en "Final". Lo anterior a efectos de brindar la identificación y referencia de los documentos de forma adicional a lo descrito en cada oportunidad.

• 2)Las demandas fueron presentadas por su orden así: 19-001302-1028-CA en fecha 29 de enero de 2020, y las pretensiones fueron fijadas en la audiencia preliminar de la siguiente manera: "1) Con lugar lo presente demanda. Declarando lo consecuente responsabilidad patrimonial de la entidad demandada Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por el daño moral y material causado, ello a manera de pretensión principal, siendo la responsabilidad patrimonial derivada del daño correspondiente al daño material valuado en veinte millones de colones y el daño moral subjetivo estimado en cien millones de colones. Pretensiones secundarias. 2) Que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad es responsable de indemnizarle a la actora los daños ocasionados, los que serán determinados en la fase de ejecución de lo sentencia. 3) Que sobre las sumas concedidas en sentencia se deben cancelar los intereses legales desde la fecha de firmeza del fallo y hasta la fecha del efectivo pago. 4) Que los montos concedidos en sentencia sean debidamente indexados a valor real a la fecha de recibo de los mismos. 5) Que la entidad demandada debe cancelar el importe de las costas personales y procesales causadas. Todas las pretensiones secundarias deben entenderse como complementarias entre sí y/o la principal, y no de forma excluyente o subsidiaria." El expediente 20-002421-1027-CA fue presentado en fecha 13 de mayo de 2020, e igualmente, las pretensiones fueron fijadas en la misma audiencia preliminar de la siguiente manera: "1) Con lugar la presente demanda. Declarando la consecuente responsabilidad civil contractual de carácter patrimonial de la entidad demandada Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por el daño material causado a la suscrita, valuado en veinte millones de colones. Pretensiones secundarias. 2) Que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad es responsable de indemnizarme en razón del daño material ocasionado. 3) Que sobre las sumas concedidas se deben cancelar los intereses legales desde la fecha de firmeza del fallo y hasta la fecha del efectivo pago. 4) Que los montos concedidos deberán ser debidamente indexados a valor real a la fecha de recibo de los mismos. 5) Que la entidad demandada debe cancelar el importe de las costas personales y procesales causadas." (ver imágenes 2-12 en expediente 19-001302-1028-CA, e imágenes 2-7 en expediente 20-002421-1027-CA, respaldos digitales de la audiencia preliminar del 07 de febrero de 2023, su minuta a imagen 302-306 y respaldos digitales de la audiencia de juicio celebrada el 17 y 18 de diciembre de 2024, todo en expediente judicial).
• 3)Otorgado el traslado de ley, el representante del ICE contestó ambas demandas negativamente y opuso las siguientes mismas excepciones en ambos expedientes 19-001302-1028-CA y 20-002421-1027-CA: falta de integración pasivo necesaria, falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de interés actual. (ver imágenes 106-123 en expediente 19-001302-1028-CA, y en imágenes 44-60 en expediente 20-002421-1027-CA).
• 4)Mediante auto firme Nº 1104-2021 del Juzgador de Trámite dictada a las quince horas cincuenta minutos del dieciocho de agosto de dos mil veintiuno se dictó el POR TANTO: Se ordena acumular el proceso tramitado bajo el expediente Nº20-002421-1027-CA, al tramitado bajo el expediente Nº19-001302-1028-CA. Estando ambos expedientes en la misma etapa procesal, procédase a la unión material de los mismos. Agréguese una copia de esta resolución al expediente N°20-002421-1027-CA. Firme esta resolución, continúese el trámite de forma conjunta y continúese con el trámite correspondiente." (ver imágenes 79-84 del expediente 20-002421-1027-CA) 5) Mediante auto firme Nº 0811-2022 del Juzgador de Trámite dictada a las once horas quince minutos del veintitrés de mayo de dos mil veintidós se dictó POR TANTO: Se DECLARA SIN LUGAR la defensa previa de litis consorcio pasivo necesario interpuesta por la representación del ICE en contra de las dos actoras en los procesos acumulados que se conocen a través del presente proceso. (ver imágenes 225-230 del expediente 19-001302-1028-CA) 6) La audiencia preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -que se encuentra grabada en el sistema digital del Despacho-, se celebró en fecha 07 de febrero de 2023 y se fijaron las pretensiones de acuerdo al enunciado segundo del Considerando I de esta resolución. Se admitió para rendir declaración testimonial de: [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], cédula [Valor 002], [Nombre 004], cédula [Valor 004] y [Nombre 005], cédula [Valor 005], para ser evacuado en la Audiencia Complementaria. Se resolvió la excepción dilatoria dictándose: "resolución número 0165-2023 de las catorce horas once minutos del siete de febrero de dos mil veintitrés: POR TANTO. Sobre las defensas de Indebida representación se declara improcedente. Sobre la defensa previa de defectos que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo se declara sin lugar la misma." (ver minuta Audiencia Preliminar a imágenes 302-306 del expediente judicial y sus respaldos digitales de esa diligencia judicial).
• 7)La audiencia complementaria de juicio oral y público convocada para el día 17 de diciembre de 2024 se aperturó a las 08:37 horas, en la Sala 4. Las representaciones legales de las partes actoras del proceso se apersonaron presencialmente ante el Tribunal y los representantes del demandado, asistieron remotamente por medio de la aplicación TEAMS. La audiencia fue grabada en audio y video en el sistema electrónico correspondiente y corre agregada al expediente. Todos los pormenores de la audiencia se encuentran registrados en el audio y video, así como en la minuta que para tal efecto consta en el expediente del proceso. Se constituyó presencialmente el TRIBUNAL COLEGIADO SECCIÓN II -Equipo 2-, conformado por los Jueces EDUARDO GONZÁLEZ SEGURA, MARCO HERNÁNDEZ VARGAS y presidió RONALDO HERNÁNDEZ HERNÁNDEZ. Se escucharon los alegatos de apertura de las partes, las deposiciones de los testigos admitidos y las conclusiones de parte, con lo cual la audiencia finalizó el mismo 17 de diciembre de 2024. (sistema grabación Sigao, minuta y expediente judicial) 8) Por último, el Tribunal verificó los medios de notificación y se indicó que la sentencia se dictaría de manera escrita, en el plazo de quince días hábiles previsto en el inciso 1) del artículo 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Se dio por concluida esta audiencia a las 09:41 horas. Todos quedaron debidamente notificados de las resoluciones y actuaciones tomadas en la Audiencia Complementaria de conformidad con el numeral 88 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (respaldo digital de la audiencia de juicio oral y público).
• 9)En la audiencia complementaria se le previno a la parte actora la presentación de los recibos de pago ante los centros médicos asistidos, toda vez que los adjuntos en autos están ilegibles, por lo que se le otorgó plazo hasta el 20 de diciembre de 2024 para el cumplimiento de los debido. Por resolución de las quince horas veintiocho minutos del seis de enero de dos mil veinticinco se indicó: "La parte actora no aportó los documentos prevenidos según fueron indicados en la sesión de audiencia complementaria del pasado 17 de diciembre de 2024, toda vez que los presentados en fecha 20 de diciembre de 2024 NO concuerdan con los recibos de pago (ilegibles) aportados en autos y por los cuales se requirió su aportación. Así las cosas, díctese la sentencia de pertinencia dentro del plazo de rigor de conformidad con el numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo." 10) En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas o que generen indefensión y la sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo establecido en el artículo 111 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo

II.ALEGACIONES DE LAS PARTES. 1.- OBJETO Y POSICIÓN DE LA DEMANDA.- En síntesis en lo conducente y sin perjuicio de la literalidad de algunas de sus argumentaciones, cada una de las partes alegan lo que seguidamente se detalla en este apartado. 1.A. Expediente Nº19-001302-1027-CA. DE LOS ALEGATOS DE LA ACTORA [Nombre 001]: Se indica: Fundamento la presente demanda en los siguientes Hechos: Primero: Que la aquí actora, [Nombre 001], es una profesional en Artes Visuales, de nacionalidad Argentina, quien para inicios del presente año estuvo en el país en condición de turista, visitando a unos amigos cercanos. Segundo: Que en consideración a que la actora pretendía permanecer varias semanas en el país para lo cual requería los servicios de Telecomunicación que brinda el ICE. Por su condición de extranjera y su desconocimiento de la forma en cómo se realizan los trámites en Costa Rica solicita ayuda a su amiga la señora [Nombre 002] para que solicite un plan de telefonía móvil con el ICE que incluyera celular, por lo que a pesar de que en el contrato figura como dueña del plan post pago la señora [Nombre 002], es la aquí actora la destinataria final tanto de la línea como del dispositivo móvil entregado por Kolbi. Tercero: Que el día 20 de enero del año en curso, como es de costumbre el dispositivo fue puesto a cargar durante la noche, ubicándolo en el dormitorio de la señorita [Nombre 001], cerca de su cama. Cuarto: Que al día siguiente, al ser aproximadamente las 7:30 de la mañana estando mí representada dormida le explotó sorpresivamente el celular en su mano, pelo, piernas, causándole graves quemaduras de segundo y tercer grado, tal y como se evidencia en la presente fotografía (expone fotografía). Quinto: Que el dispositivo había sido adquirido tal y como consta en documentos anexos el día 15 de enero 2019, es decir, el mismo no contaba tan siquiera con una semana de uso cuando ocurrió el percance. Sexto: Que inmediatamente después de lo ocurrido se procedió a llevar a mí representada al servicio de emergencias de la Clínica del Seguro Social de Aguas Zarcas de San Carlos, donde fue atendida y le trataron la herida hasta donde fue posible, toda vez que las mismas eran bastantes graves y por la explosión le quedaron incrustadas en la piel varias partículas de plástico, las cuales requieren para su extracción varias citas de seguimiento. Séptimo: Que igualmente, se llamó al Cuerpo de Bomberos, toda vez que producto de la explosión, el colchón de la cama sobre la cual se encontraba el dispositivo cargando, también se incendió, poniendo en riesgo la infraestructura del lugar. El encargado de lo Estación, en la Constancia del Incidente, apartado Descripción, señaló: "Se responde a Emergencia por posible explosión de batería de celular dentro de un cuarto, sucedida a eso de las 07:30 horas; provocando daños en el propio dispositivo, colchón y quemaduras de 2do y 3er grado en extremidad superior de interesada. El control de la escena y atención del paciente se dieron antes de la llegada del Cuerpo de Bomberos." Octavo: Que la aquí actora ha tenido graves afectaciones físicas producto de la explosión, tal y como se demuestra en el dictamen médico, sufrió quemaduras de segundo y tercer grado en manos, brazos, piernas, perdió el cabello, quemaduras éstas que le provocaron que perdiera sensibilidad en las manos, lo cual es considerablemente grave. tomando en cuenta que la aquí afectada es profesora de artes plásticas, su trabajo es manual todo el tiempo. Noveno: Que mi representada, fue en varias ocasiones al Hospital Metropolitano para que pudieran extraerle las partículas de la batería, y darle seguimiento a las heridas, tal y como consta en las epicrisis y constancias médicas, fue atendida el 22/01/19, donde fue vista por tres especialistas del servicio de emergencias luego, fue vista en varias citas médicas del 24-01-19 al 31-01-19, siendo evaluada y tratada nuevamente por varios especialistas debido a la gravedad de su lesión. Décimo: Que la aquí actora, constantemente tiene crisis de pánico, en los tres meses posteriores al evento, se desmayaba a causa del dolor el cual no logra superar, se siente ansiosa, llora, está estresada, su autoestima está muy bajo, está insegura como mujer y como profesional, tiene temor de realizar actividades cotidianas, etc. Décimo Primero: Tal y como consta en dictamen de Consulta Psicológica de fecha 14/02/19 de la Psicóloga Adriana Roa, se indicó: "A partir de este episodio, refiere importantes dificultades para dormir y desarrolla un cuadro generalizado de angustia y ansiedad que compromete seriamente su vida cotidiana con el agravante de que a raíz de las lesiones producidos se ve imposibilitada de trabajar." Décimo Segundo: Que Igualmente mi representada fue tratada por la psicólogo argentina María Fabiana Acuña, quien en su informe detalla los siguientes síntomas: "Angustia, temores reactivo intensos, flashback (el acontecimiento es experimentado PERSISTENTEMENTE, a través de pensamientos, estímulos que se asocian al hecho, recuerdos) se detectaron además trastornos de ansiedad así como decaimiento anímico que podría desencadenar en una depresión." Décimo Tercero: Que la aquí actora es una mujer joven, de 29 años acostumbrada desde su adolescencia a utilizar un celular de manera habitual, razón por la cual, este evento le afectó demasiado, pues, algo que era tan normal como fijarse en la hora, dormir con el teléfono a la mano, responder un mensaje, se ha vuelto una experiencia angustiante para ella. Décimo Cuarto: Que días después de lo ocurrido, se procedió a comunicar al aquí demandado, el ICE, donde se indicó a la señora [Nombre 002] como firmante del contrato que devuelva el dispositivo y que ellos se comunicarían con la marca fabricante de los teléfonos BMobile. Décimo Quinto: Que el día 28/01/19 se entregó las piezas que quedaban del dispositivo con el respectivo formulario de recepción para terminales dañados el cual se anexa a la presente demanda. Décimo Sexto: Que aproximadamente a finales de enero, la Licenciada Maritza Gamboa en representación de la señorita [Nombre 001], presentó una propuesta-reclamo de carácter amigable y extrajudicial, ante el ICE, quien no mostró mayor interés en el tema. Décimo Sétimo: Que en febrero del presente año, la licenciada Gamboa nuevamente realizó gestiones de carácter extrajudicial, al enviar correos dirigidos al ICE y a los abogados de la empresa BMobile solicitando una reunión para discutir los puntos del acuerdo ante lo cual recibe respuesta por parte de Catalina Vargas Pacheco del área: Proceso Gestión de Recursos comerciales ICE, la cual le agenda cita para la segunda semana de febrero, sin embargo, existió un desinterés por parte de la compañía demandada en llegar a una conciliación.

Se reclama daño moral. Motivo. El daño moral en la presente causa, tiene como motivo el evento traumático y lesivo de la explosión del celular en el cuerpo y cabello de la afectada, la señora [Nombre 001], cuya responsabilidad objetiva es de la empresa demandada, empresa que distribuye y vende los aparatos BMobile, consistiendo el mismo en un daño moral de tipo subjetivo. Consiste. Este daño se manifiesta tal y como se fundamenta con los distintos dictámenes psicológicos, afectado sus condiciones de vida normales, causando situaciones de angustia, frustración, inseguridad, zozobra. ansiedad, falta de sueño, desmayos, episodios de llanto. baja autoestima, pérdida de apetito, inseguridad profesional, pánico etc. Estimación: Se estima prudencialmente el daño moral en la suma de 100.000.000,00 (cien millones de colones). Daño material. La aquí actora se vio afectada en sus intereses patrimoniales, pues como es lógico en estas situaciones, tuvo que acudir a un centro médico privado a que le trataran sus heridas, primero por una mejor atención y segundo por ser la señorita [Nombre 001] extranjera, no contaba con un seguro médico para ser atendida por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, debido a la urgencia del caso, únicamente se conservan unas facturas de atención médica en el país, las cuales ascienden a la suma de 606.111,41 (seiscientos seis mil ciento once colones con cuarenta y un céntimos), a las cuales debe sumarse los gastos médicos en Argentina, así como el menoscabo patrimonial por haber tenido que dejar de laborar por la pérdida de sensibilidad en su mano. En consecuencia el daño material tiene como motivo u origen el mismo supuesto que en el daño moral, el cual se manifiesta de la forma como se explicó en el párrafo anterior y se estima prudencialmente el mismo en la suma de 20.000.000.00 (veinte millones de colones) Cita jurisprudencia sobre daño moral: (Tribunal Primero Colegiado de Primera Instancia Civil, a las trece horas y cincuenta y tres minutos del quince de marzo de dos mil diecinueve, sentencia 2019-000186 y sobre responsabilidad por daño a terceros).

Hay que tomar nota en el presente proceso, que si bien BMobile no es empleado del ICE, esta entidad Estatal se encontraba o se encuentra, desconocemos la situación actual, promocionando los productos en el mercado nacional, toda vez que fue el ICE quien le dio el celular a mi representada, y en ese sentido tiene responsabilidad por los productos que avala y pone a disposición de sus clientes, los cuales debe someter a los controles de seguridad necesarios para velar por la salud, vida e integridad de sus consumidores. Es decir a todas luces es evidente el nexo de causalidad entre la conducta y el daño, como elementos de la responsabilidad existiendo una conducta activa del ICE, promocionando celulares, y ofreciéndoles a clientes como en el caso de mi representada, celular que, en este caso en específico, tenía un desperfecto de fábrica, lo que provocó que a los pocos días de uso, el mismo explotara, causando daños como los ya indicados en el apartado correspondiente, siendo su responsabilidad como Empresa Nacional asegurarse de poner en manos de sus clientes productos en óptimas condiciones que no pongan en peligro su vida o su integridad y que además, tendiendo (sic) conocimiento de los graves hechos, optó por ignorar su responsabilidad.

1.B. Expediente Nº20-002421-1027-CA. DE LOS ALEGATOS DE LA ACTORA [Nombre 002]. En relación con los fundamentos de la anterior demanda acumulada, y con la finalidad de no incurrir en repeticiones innecesarias agrega lo siguiente, a lo que expuso la actora [Nombre 001] y así se indica por demás: Primero: Que en enero 2019, recibió la visita de una amiga extranjera muy cercana, la turista argentina [Nombre 001], quien me indico que es de su interés pasar una temporada larga en el país y necesita un servicio de telefonía local, por lo cual me pide ayuda, ya que desconoce de las compañías de servicio de telecomunicación nacional y de los trámites administrativos necesarios para la obtención de una línea móvil. Segundo: Que en consideración a nuestro amistad, el día 15 de enero del año 2020 acudo al ICE a solicitar en nombre propio un plan postpago con celular, según los requerimientos que me indicó la señorita [Nombre 001], sin embargo, nunca fui la destinataria del equipo móvil ni de la línea, únicamente realice el trámite de compra y lo entregué a su usuaria real [Nombre 001], incluso, es hasta el 20 de enero que le entrego el celular y en esos días no lo encendí ni utilicé de forma alguna, se lo entregué intacto, tal y como me lo dieron en la Oficina del ICE. Sexto: Que como se extrae del Informe de Bomberos, los daños fueron en el dispositivo, no en la instalación eléctrica, el torna corriente, o en alguna otra habitación de la casa, lo cual deja absolutamente claro que se trató de una explosión de la batería por daños en la misma, no por un corto circuito o peligro externo en este sentido, tampoco se evidencia en el Informe del Cuerpo de Bomberos recomendación alguna respecto a la necesidad de cambiar la instalación eléctrica por peligro a que la situación se vuelva a repetir, de modo tal se demuestra que la explosión fue sin lugar a dudas producida por el propio dispositivo. Séptimo: Que días después de lo ocurrido. se procedió a comunicar el incidente al aquí demandado, el ICE. Ante mi queja, indican que el procedimiento es devolver el dispositivo para realizar informes, comunicarlo al fabricante y posterior a la Investigación ellos se comunicarían directamente conmigo. En razón de lo anterior el día 28/01/19 se entregó las piezas que quedaban del dispositivo con el respectivo formulario de recepción para terminales dañados, el cual se anexa a la presente demanda. Octavo: Que días después se me informó que ya estaba el resultado de la investigación realizada, sin embargo no me enviaron el informe, únicamente me dijeron que había sido un daño del celular, ante lo cual, por no ser lo suscrita afectada o nivel físico ni haber usado nunca el dispositivo no presento ningún reclamo administrativo, sino que le informó a mi amiga Sonia [Nombre 001], para que ella proceda como considere conveniente, haciéndole saber que en caso de que necesite mi ayuda para los trámites, por figurar la compra a mi nombre, con el mayor gusto le colaboraría. Noveno: que aproximadamente a finales de enero 2019, la Licenciada Maritza Gamboa en representación de la señorita [Nombre 001], presentó una propuesta-reclamo de carácter amigable y extrajudicial ante el ICE, quien no mostró mayor interés en el tema. Décimo Primero: Que el ICE siempre tuvo negativas a llegar a acuerdo por considerar que debía responder el fabricante, de conformidad con el articulo 35 de lo Ley de o Promoción de lo Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor, a pesar de que en la garantía la cual se anexa a la presente demanda se establece claramente que debe ser el ICE responsable por defectos de fábrica y de que, como es bien sabido, el consumidor no está obligado a acudir a todos los responsables en la cadena de consumo a reclamar responsabilidad, en este caso, mi contrato fue directo con el ICE, nunca solicité que se me diera una determinada marca de celular, por lo que mi relación con la casa fabricante es de manera causal e indirecta.

La aquí actora, se vio afectada en sus intereses patrimoniales. Es evidente y notorio que el celular que compré para mi amiga cercana explotó, sin darle la posibilidad de utilizarlo, más aún, produciéndole daños, lo cual no solo implicó que perdiera el dinero invertido en la compro sino la necesidad de realizar diversos trámites y colaborarle con medicamentos por su condición de salud, como un gesto mínimo ante una situación tan lamentable, ante lo cual debe responder el ICE por responsabilidad civil contractual, pues según consta en la garantía que se anexa, deberán hacerse responsables por defectos de fábrica, como fue el caso. Daño material. En consecuencia, el daño material tiene como motivo u origen la explosión del celular, el cual se manifiesta de la forma como se explicó en el párrafo anterior y se estima prudencialmente el mismo en la suma de 20.000.000.00 (veinte millones de colones).

2. OBJETO Y POSICIÓN DE LA CONTESTACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA POR EL ICE.- En síntesis en lo conducente y sin perjuicio de la literalidad de algunas de sus argumentaciones, se indica. 2.A. En Expediente Nº19-001302-1027-CA: Se refutan los hechos y estima: CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES. Las pruebas que han sido numeradas con los consecutivos "2", "3", "4", "5" y "6" no permiten a esta representación poder determinar un eventual nexo causal entre los aparentes daños corporales que sufre la señora [Nombre 001] y una acción u omisión de parte de mi representada. Dichas pruebas están lejos de demostrar las circunstancias precisas de tiempo, modo y lugar para poder determinar el origen de los hechos. y por ende el origen del presunto accidente que pretende querer acreditar la parte actora. Asimismo, se aportan con la Demanda, documentos que de su lectura parecen en principio ser emitidos en la República de Argentina (presuntos criterios de eventuales profesionales médicos públicos y de aparentes entidades ministeriales), sin embargo no tienen asociado ningún trámite de legalización que permita garantizar la autenticidad y el origen oficial de los documentos que permitan dar certeza y eficacia no solo a la Parte Demandada, sino también a la Autoridad Judicial, con lo cual estos documentos presuntamente del extranjero, no podrán surtir efectos jurídicos en Costa Rica. Por ende, los documentos enumerados y aportados como Prueba Documental 7 (Dictámenes médicos enviados desde Argentina) y supuestas constancias emitidas por Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires relativas a eventuales estudios de educación (los cuales ni siquiera se enumeran expresamente como prueba), no deber ser admitidos. Asimismo, los dictámenes médicos que se enumeran en la Prueba Documental 7, además de carecer de los requisitos de legalización y autenticidad antes mencionados para surtir efectos en Costa Rica, tampoco se acredita cuál es la idoneidad profesional ni académica (estudios especialidades, actualizaciones) de las personas que se consignan como especialistas en medicina y psicología. Además este tipo de prueba no debería ser de carácter meramente documental, sino pericial, que permita a la Parte Demandada realizar el respectivo contrainterrogatorio, así como al Tribunal de Juicio realizar las respectivas consultas, previa emisión del respectivo informe. Así las cosas, esta representación solicita que se rechacen las presuntas pruebas numeradas con el consecutivo "7" por la parte actora.

La Parte Actora aporta y enumera como "Pruebas" temas que son ajenos a los hechos como tal, y que más bien corresponden a aspectos de acreditación de carácter procesal y fiscal, como es la Prueba 10 (Poder Especial Judicial), Prueba 11 (Copia de Pasaporte de la Srita. [Nombre 001]) y Prueba 12 (Entero de Timbres). Por ende, dichos elementos, de plano, no deber ser admitidos como prueba.

El 23 de enero de 2019 a las 3:52 pm, el servicio de Telemercadeo del ICE, recibió una llamada, donde se brindan datos de identificación del servicio contratado por la Cliente [Nombre 002], cédula de identidad [Valor 002], donde a su nombre se interpone una reclamación. Esta queja interpuesta a nombre de la cliente [Nombre 002], es la que precisamente origina la presente litis. A este respecto dentro de las pretensiones que se originaron en dicha reclamación fue precisamente el cambio de terminal, razón por la cual el 01 de febrero del 2019 en horas de la tarde, se realizó dicho remplazo sustituyendo el teléfono BMOBILE por un HUAWEI P SMART, IMEI 867172030714850, para lo cual se realizó la respectiva boleta de entrega de terminal a nombre de [Nombre 002]. Si bien el artículo 48 de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones 8642 permite que la reclamación ante el operador de telecomunicaciones podrá ser interpuesta por el cliente directamente o por cualquier persona en su nombre esto no implica que desaparezca la condición jurídico material con la cliente del servicio dado que este lo que determina el origen, los términos y condiciones de la contratación. Y es que dado que el terminal fue adquirido por la cliente [Nombre 002], donde el ICE le brindó también los términos de garantía y manual de indicaciones de uso del teléfono y dado que en la presente litis lo que pretende la Parte Accionante es que se determine la procedencia o no de responsabilidad objetiva frente a un tercero ajeno a la relación original, donde dicho teléfono BMOBILE tuvo que haber sido puesto a disposición de la Sra. [Nombre 001] por parte de [Nombre 002] (quien lo recibió del ICE) y por ende implica un tema de trazabilidad y custodia no solo de la terminal sino del traslado de información del uso. A este respecto, de lo indicado en el escrito de demanda pareciere que [Nombre 002] adquirió el servicio de telecomunicaciones y el bien asociado, en este caso el terminal, para fines personales. o de su entorno familiar más cercano, lo cual implica la amistad que se menciona con la Sra. [Nombre 001], sin embargo en el escrito de demanda no existe ninguna aseveración atribuible a [Nombre 002] que indique el carácter en que se le se le suministró dicho terminal (préstamo gratuito, alquiler, venta. obsequio) y si se le trasladaron a la Sra. [Nombre 001] la información brindada por el ICE a la cliente sobre las recomendaciones para el uso del terminal y manual de indicaciones. Es decir, conforme a la regulación nacional, el término consumidor en términos generales se refiere a la persona que adquiere bienes o servicios para fines personales familiares o de su entorno social inmediato, como parece que es el caso de la eventual utilización por parte de la Sra. [Nombre 001], por ende [Nombre 002], tiene y mantiene dicha condición de consumidora y por ende la legitimación para formar parte de la litis consorcio activo de tipo necesario, dado que ha pretendido delegar el ejercicio de la acción exclusiva y excluyentemente en la Sra. [Nombre 001], con la cual el ICE no ha tenido ningún contacto en cuanto a entrega original del terminal BMOBILE, ni de información, dado que el puente ha sido precisamente [Nombre 002], a quien incluso se consignó la entrega del terminal HUAWEI P SMART en sustitución del teléfono BMOBILE, según consta en el expediente administrativo. Tal y como lo conoce el Honorable Tribunal, el Derecho del Consumo, si bien la legislación establece obligaciones y deberes al comerciante, también contempla el concepto de Consumidor Razonable, promoviendo y exigiendo que sea responsable y diligente; responsabilidad que también implica el ejercicio de las acciones judiciales, máxime cuando se originan reclamaciones originadas de una relación de servicio. En este contexto, para efectos de la presente defensa previa es necesario tomar en cuenta la regla establecida en el artículo 35 párrafo primero de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor 7472, que indica: "ARTÍCULO 35.-Régimen de responsabilidad. El productor, el proveedor y el comerciante deben responder concurrente e independientemente de la existencia de culpa, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o el servicio, de informaciones inadecuadas o insuficientes sobre ellos o de su utilización y riesgos.(...)". Esto implica que dicho numeral establece una cadena concurrente e indisoluble de dichos agentes del ciclo industrial-comercial bajo el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva frente al consumidor, lo cual contempla por ende acciones de tipo judicial, en este caso bajo litis consorcio pasivo necesario, donde por disposición de ley deben integrarse no solo al comerciante (último eslabón de frente al consumidor) sino también a representantes del proveedor y productor, quienes están ligados además por la relación jurídica material en este caso como sujetos pasivos o Parte Demandada. Por ende, si bien el ICE, para efectos del numeral antes citado y en el contexto de la venta de servicios de telecomunicaciones bajo el Plan de Servicio Móvil Postpago 4GK2 asociado al número telefónico 8881-0891, fungió como comerciante al momento en que puso a disposición de la Cliente [Nombre 002] Sánchez Gamboa el teléfono móvil BMOBILE. también es cierto que dicho celular fue suministrado al Instituto por una empresa distribuidora y representante del fabricante, como es CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, lo cual completa la cadena de productor-proveedor-fabricante, bajo el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva de cara al consumidor. A este respecto. el teléfono móvil marca BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS IMEI 353253100027620 forma parte del lote de equipos terminales adquiridos por el ICE, mediante la orden de compra 0098-2018. adjudicada a la empresa CHINA BIRD CENTROAMÉRICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, sociedad panameña. En este sentido el expediente administrativo aportado por mi representado con la presente contestación, acredita la existencia de dicha contratación, que demuestra los eslabones de dicha cadena establecida en el mencionado numeral 35 de la Ley 7472. VI. FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO DE LA CONTESTACIÓN: La presente contestación se fundamenta en los siguientes regímenes, normas sustantivas y procesales, doctrina y jurisprudencia. A. SOBRE LA SUPUESTA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL OBJETIVA. Ahora bien, en lo que concierne al régimen de responsabilidad objetiva, tanto la Ley General de la Administración Pública como el párrafo segundo de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor 7472 establecen causales de exoneración de responsabilidad que implican el rompimiento del nexo causal, tal y como lo ha reconocido la doctrina y la jurisprudencia. A este respecto, la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP) en el artículo 190 establece lo siguiente: (transcribe norma). Por su parte, el articulo 35 párrafo segundo de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor 7472, indica: (transcribe norma). A este respecto, por aplicación supletoria del numeral 190 de la LGAP, la ajenidad del daño a que hace referencia el párrafo segundo de la Ley 7472 está conformada por los eximentes de responsabilidad de fuerza mayor, hecho de tercero o culpa de la víctima. B. AJENIDAD DEL DAÑO POR CAUSALES DE HECHO DE TERCERO Y CULPA DE VICTIMA QUE EXIMEN DE RESPONSABILIDAD A MI REPRESENTADO: Esta defensa, durante el presente proceso, además de evidenciar que la Parte Actora no ha acreditado la existencia del daño, gravedad, ni nexo causal, demostrará que para el caso en particular se han dado también los eximentes de hecho de tercero y culpa de la víctima que lo exoneran de dicho régimen de responsabilidad civil objetiva. El hecho de tercero consiste en la conducta atribuible la Sra. [Nombre 002], cédula de identidad número [Valor 002] quien como titular del Plan de Servicio de telecomunicaciones móvil postpago 4GK2, con terminal asociado BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS IMEI 353253100027620, y contrario al concepto de consumidor razonable y al deber de cuidado se desentendió del uso y manejo de dicho terminal, poniéndolo a disposición de una persona con la cual mi representando no tiene relación de servicio alguna, y que por ende no puede tener trazabilidad ni certeza de que se le hayan brindado las recomendaciones de uso que se brindan en el certificado de garantía y en el manual del usuario que viene en dicha terminal. Tampoco, conforme al principio de buena fe contractual, se le avisó a mi representado que el teléfono terminal, el cual se brindó bajo la facilidad de subsidio, iba a ser utilizado por un tercero, que permitiera poder suministrar alguna orientación en cuanto al uso y recomendaciones técnicas, las cuales si fueron brindados a la Sra. [Nombre 002]. La culpa de la víctima, versa en la conducta de la Parte Actora, quien incluso mediante manifestaciones que se realizan en los hechos de la demanda, menciona que realizó la carga de un dispositivo eléctrico cerca de su integridad física mientras dormía. Incluso note su Autoridad que en el Hecho Décimo Tercero de la Demanda, se indica que una conducta normal de la Accionante es "dormir con teléfono a la mano"; acción que al estarse cargando el terminal dista del mínimo deber de cuidado. Asimismo, no consta en las manifestaciones de la Parte Actora que de previo a utilizar presuntamente el terminal, haya hecho mención a que solicitó de la titular del servicio (Sra [Nombre 002]) el manual de uso dispositivo, ni tampoco constan manifestaciones propias de que haya leído dicho manual, ni los consejos brindados en el certificado de garantía. Del escrito de demanda y de la prueba documental aportada por la Parte Actora, prima facie, no se establece elementos que permitan tener por demostrado daño sufrido y su nexo causal, lo cual implica también la cuantificación del daño material, aspectos sobre los cuales mi representada bajo el principio de colaboración con las Autoridades de Justicia, irá demostrando en las etapas respectivas dichas falencias. C. PARÁMETROS PARA CUANTIFICACIÓN DEL DAÑO MORAL: Según se ha indicado en el presente memorial la Parte Actora en las comunicaciones que realiza a mi representado en etapas pre procesales (posiciones de febrero y junio de 2019) y en el memorial de demanda ha presentado una fluctuación material en las pretensiones de daño material y moral subjetivo: 1. En febrero de 2019 exigió por daño moral y material la suma de doscientos mil dólares, moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América (USS200.000°°) 2. En junio de 2019 pidió por daño moral treinta millones de colones (¢30.000.000°°) y por daño material seiscientos seis mil ciento once colones con cuarenta y un céntimos (¢606.111,41) por daño material. 3. En noviembre de 2019, al presentar la demanda, pide por un lado que el daño material sea fijado en veinte millones de colones (¢20.000.000 millones de colones) y el daño moral en ciento veinte millones de colones (¢120.000.000) millones de colones, pero también se solicita que sean fijado en ejecución de sentencia. En este sentido, tomando en cuenta que el ICE como empresa del Estado maneja fondos públicos, que por ende forman parte del concepto de Hacienda Pública y dada la fluctuaciones exorbitantes que ha presentado la Parte Actora para reclamar daño, esta defensa, a fin de que sirva como un criterio objetivo y válido, de manera respetuosa y prudente, se permite recordar la siguiente línea jurisprudencial por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia especialmente en materia de cuantificación de daño moral: (cita textual). Sobre el daño material, en la etapa procesal oportuna, la cuantificación de 20 millones de colones por gastos médicos no guarda razonabilidad y proporcionalidad alguna con los documentos aportados relativos a eventuales facturas, algunas ni siquiera legibles, que según indica la Parte Actora ascienden a 606.111.41 colones. Si bien la Parte Actora, indica que la suma total obedece a gastos médicos en Argentina así como menoscabo patrimonial por dejar de laborar, lo cierto del caso es que no presenta ni ofrece prueba alguna. También en este tipo de daño reclamado, al igual que el daño moral, la Parte Actora del todo no cumple con los requisitos doctrinarios y jurisprudenciales para que se considere un daño resarcible, dado que no determina, ni aporta prueba pertinente, idónea ni útil, que acredite que es un daño cierto, real, efectivo ni que existe relación de causalidad entre un hecho ilícito y el daño.

2.B. En Expediente Nº20-002421-1027-CA: Se indica en lo pertinente: III. FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO DE LA CONTESTACIÓN: La presente contestación se fundamenta en los siguientes regímenes, normas sustantivas y procesales: A. SOBRE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL CONTRACTUAL. Conforme lo indicado por la Actora, la relación contractual entre [Nombre 002] y el ICE se deriva de la adquisición por parte de la primera de un plan de servicios de telecomunicaciones brindado por el ICE con un terminal asociado marca BMOBILE facilitado por este Instituto, el 15 de enero de 2019. A este respecto, de dicha relación de servicio se derivan esencialmente dos obligaciones por parte del ICE, que a continuación se explican: La primera brindar los servicios de telecomunicaciones contratados en Plan con base en las normas legales y reglamentarias establecidas en la normativa de telecomunicaciones, donde la Actora no ha presentado ninguna reclamación de inconformidad por este rubro, ni pretensión material alguna en este proceso. La segunda se deriva del derecho de garantía del terminal BMOBILE SPEED 5. donde el ICE, según consta en el expediente administrativo y ante reclamación interna promovida a nombre de la Parte Actora el 1 de febrero de 201 9 hizo entrega a [Nombre 002], de un equipo terminal de telefonía móvil marca HUAWEI, modelo P SMART, en sustitución del apartado dañado, donde el nuevo teléfono que se le entregó tiene un valor económico superior al que fue reportado como dañado, no cobrando el ICE diferencia alguna en el incremento del precio del equipo terminal que estaba recibiendo de conformidad. A este respecto, no tiene asidero probatorio la afirmación realizada por la Parte Actora en el Apartado de Daño Material en cuanto a que perdiera el dinero invertido por la compra del terminal BMOBILE, dado que como consta en el expediente administrativo, conforme al contrato de servicio y de adquisición de terminal, el ICE procedió a su sustitución, incluso con uno de mayor costo, con lo cual no existe incumplimiento contractual, y si existiera ya ha sido debidamente subsanado, con lo cual no existe ninguna obligación de carácter patrimonial sobre la cual deba ser resarcida la Actora. Por ende, conforme a la responsabilidad civil contractual que alega la Parte Actora. el ICE ha cumplido con el único extremo propio invocado por [Nombre 002], como es el cambio de terminal. B. PARÁMETROS PARA DETERMINACIÓN Y CUANTIFICACIÓN DEL DAÑO MATERIAL: Los demás extremos del daño material que alega [Nombre 002] no las hace a título propio. sino que obedecen a extremos que la Srta. [Nombre 001] está reclamando en otro proceso judicial (19-1302-1028-CA-5) que incluye el mismo monto y componentes por daño material, derivado de gestiones y gastos médicos y en medicinas por la suma de veinte millones de colones (20.000.000). Incluso note su Autoridad que en los fundamentos de derecho de la demanda interpuesta por [Nombre 002] cita el artículo 197 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP) que regula la responsabilidad por daño moral, extremo que ha solicitado la Srita [Nombre 001] en otro proceso judicial, con lo cual se evidencia aún más que en la presente demanda la Actora ejerce pretensiones de daño material que no le son propias. sino de un tercero, con la única excepción de lo relativo a la sustitución del terminal, la cual, como indicamos, ya ha sido solventada por mi representado, existiendo por ende una satisfacción extraprocesal. En lo que respecta propiamente al daño material invocado, si bien la Parte Actora, de manera difusa e indeterminada da a entender que la cuantificación de veinte millones de colones (20.000.000) por daño material obedece a gastos médicos que no son propios, sino de un tercero (que también los reclama en el proceso al que se pretende acumular), lo cierto del caso es que no presenta, no ofrece prueba alguna. Además, de su omisión probatoria, la Parte Actora del todo no cumple con los requisitos doctrinarios y jurisprudenciales para que se considere un daño resarcible, dado que no determina, ni aporta prueba pertinente, idónea que acredite que es un daño cierto real, efectivo, ni que existe relación de causalidad entre un hecho ilícito y el daño. C. AJENIDAD DEL DAÑO POR CAUSALES DE HECHO DE TERCERO Y CULPA DE VÍCTIMA QUE EXIMEN DE RESPONSABILIDAD A MI REPRESENTADO. SOBRE EL DAÑO MATERIAL INVOCADO: La Parte Actora en algunos apartados de la Demanda, entre ellos en el acápite de fundamentos de derechos. hace referencia a una eventual responsabilidad civil objetiva de la Administración establecidas en la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), en cuanto a pretensiones de daño moral que no le son propias. A este respecto, el artículo 190 de la LGAP, establece lo siguiente: (transcribe artículo). Esta defensa, durante el presente proceso, además de evidenciar que la Parte Actora no ha acreditado la existencia del daño, gravedad, ni nexo causal, demostrará que para el caso en particular se han dado también los eximentes de hecho de tercero y culpa de la víctima que lo exoneran de dicho régimen de responsabilidad civil objetiva. A este respecto y sin perjuicio de que la demanda no permite tener claridad si la Parte Actora se presente como víctima, o bien actúa en representación de un tercero, lo cierto del caso es que del propio memorial de interposición consta que existen conductas y omisiones de [Nombre 002] y de [Nombre 001], que exoneran de responsabilidad a mi representado conforme al numeral 190 de la LGAP. En este sentido, [Nombre 002], como titular del Plan de Servicio de telecomunicaciones móvil postpago 4GK2, con terminal asociado, BMOBILE SPEED 5 GRIS IMEI 353253100027620, y contrario al concepto de consumidor razonable y al deber de cuidado se desentendió del uso y manejo de dicho terminal, poniéndolo a disposición de una persona con la cual mi representando no tiene relación de servicio alguna, y que por ende no puede tener trazabilidad ni certeza de que se le hayan brindado las recomendaciones de uso que se brindan en el certificado de garantía y en el manual del usuario que viene en dicho terminal. Tampoco, conforme al principio de buena fe contractual, se le avisó a mi representado que el teléfono terminal, el cual se brindó bajo la facilidad de subsidio, iba a ser utilizado por un tercero, que permitiera poder suministrar alguna orientación en cuanto al uso y recomendaciones técnicas, las cuales si fueron brindados a la Sra. [Nombre 002]. Asimismo, no consta a esta representación, al menos en lo que se describe en la demanda, que [Nombre 001] (a quien la Parte Actora le entregó el terminal según indica) haya cumplido con el mínimo deber de cuidado al momento al momento de recibir y utilizar el teléfono, ni tampoco consta que la Srta. [Nombre 001] haya solicitado a la titular del servicio el manual de uso dispositivo, ni los consejos de uso brindados en el certificado de garantía. Por el contrario, en la demanda se hacen aseveraciones que implicarían igualmente culpa de la Srta. [Nombre 001], dado que, en el hecho tercero, se indica que ella puso a cargar el teléfono antes de dormir, que el terminal estaba sobre el colchón en que ella dormía y que la carga fue durante un período prolongado. Estas conductas que constan en la propia demanda, atribuibles tanto a la Parte Actora, como a la Srta. [Nombre 001], en nombre de la cual [Nombre 002] ejerce la mayoría de sus pretensiones de daño material (salvo el cambio de terminal que ya ha sido realizado), se enmarcan dentro de las causales de exoneración de responsabilidad de mi representado conforme al numeral 190 de la LGAP.

III.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para la resolución de la presente litis, se tienen como debidamente acreditados los siguientes hechos y que se fundamentan en un solo elenco para los expedientes acumulados 19-001302-1028-CA y 20-002421-1027-CA:

• 1)Que en fecha 17 de enero de 2019, la actora [Nombre 002], adquirió sin costo y por instancia del ICE, la terminal con marca y modelo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, concediéndose un plazo de garantía de 365 días en dispositivo y 30 días en accesorios, facturándose a su nombre. (ver folios 02 a 12 expediente administrativo, Rodrigo [Nombre 002], cédula [Valor 003] en audiencia complementaria de expediente judicial) 2) Que [Nombre 001], sin ser cliente regular del ICE pero haciendo uso de la terminal nueva a partir del 19 de enero de 2019, por así habérselo facilitado [Nombre 002], del dispositivo nuevo y sin uso BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, y estando el aparato en fase de recarga desde horas de la noche del 20 de enero de 2019, sucedió que en fecha 21 de enero de 2019 en horas de la mañana entre las 06:30 y 07:30 horas, hace explosión su batería, provocándole con ocasión a esa explosión lesiones por quemaduras de segundo y tercero grado en muñeca, manos, brazos, espalda, pies y quemadura de cabello de la cabeza. Dicha actora fue atendida por esas lesiones, inicialmente el día 21 en el Ebais de la CCSS de Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, posteriormente atendida para curaciones en el Hospital Metropolitano y Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina. (ver folios 29, 31, 34, 39 a 46, 43 a 67 de expediente administrativo, declaración de [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003] en audiencia complementaria de expediente judicial) 3) Que [Nombre 001], sufrió con ocasión a la explosión de la batería en el celular BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, quemaduras de segundo y tercero grado en muñeca, manos, brazos, espalda, pies y quemadura de cabello de la cabeza, siendo atendida para sus curaciones en el Ebais de la CCSS de Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, y posteriormente en el Hospital Metropolitano y Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, daños emocionales, cuadros de estrés, crisis de pánico y sentimientos sufrientes por su estado de salud y curación traumática. (declaraciones de [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], en audiencia complementaria, imágenes 27-37 del expediente judicial y facturas del 22-01-2019/farmacia/consulta/medicina general/curaciones, del 24-01-2019/curaciones, 28-01-2019/curaciones, 29-01-2019/dictamen, asistencia médica y 31-01-2019/curaciones, tramitadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y factura del 27-01-2019/curaciones, tramitada en la Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 expediente administrativo en relación a documentos en imágenes 39-46 de expediente judicial) 4) El Cuerpo de Bomberos, Estación Pital, Unidad M-86, hizo constar la ocurrencia de un incidente tipo 1-1-8-7 Emergencias por fuego en fecha 21/01/2019 en casa de habitación en Alajuela, San Carlos. Agua Zarcas, después del puente de Agua Zarcas (ver folios 42-43 expediente administrativo.
• 5)En fecha 28 de enero de 2019 fueron entregadas por la actora [Nombre 002] al funcionario del ICE [Nombre 004], cédula [Valor 004], de las piezas que quedaban del dispositivo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, por devolución de terminal dañada, con indicación en formulario referente a burbujas por quemadura en batería, quemaduras en carcaza interna y otros (ver imagen 74-75, 332 y declaración de [Nombre 004] en audiencia complementaria de expediente judicial) 6) En fecha 01 de febrero de 2019, con aceptación de la actora [Nombre 002], se realizó por parte del ICE por medio del funcionario [Nombre 004], cédula [Valor 004], cambio de terminal a su favor, con entrega recibida de la terminal de la marca y modelo HUAWEI, P Smart Negro, con IMEI 867172030714850, y con un plazo de garantía de 365 días en dispositivo y 30 días en accesorios, en sustitución de terminal marca y modelo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620 por manufactura defectuosa -explosión de batería en terminal-. (ver folios 15, 16, fotografías a imagen 102-103, declaración de [Nombre 004] en audiencia complementaria, imagen 332 de expediente judicial) 7) Que el funcionario del ICE [Nombre 004], cédula [Valor 004], en fecha 28 de enero de 2019, hizo entrega al taller autorizado SERTEC, de las piezas que quedaban del dispositivo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620 para su evaluación y diagnóstico, señalando el taller por medio de Informe SER-0007869 de fecha 28 de enero de 2019 y en relación al dispositivo que: "Descripción de la falla: CLIENTE INDICA QUE LA BATERÍA DEL TERMINAL EXPLOTÓ DE FORMA INESPERADA MIENTRAS SE ESTABA CARGANDO, PRODUCTO DE LA EXPLOSIÓN, CAUSÓ DAÑOS A SONIA [Nombre 001], QUEMADURAS EN SEGUNDO Y TERCER GRADO, EN LAS EXTREMIDADES SUPERIORES (MUÑECAS), CABELLO PIE. Reparación Efectuada: Se procede con la evaluación del caso encontrando: equipo no presenta daños en la tarjeta principal tampoco presenta daños en el cable ni en el cargador presenta la pantalla reventada, marcas en la etiqueta del teléfono y en la tapa trasera del mismo producto del daño en la batería, se concluye que el teléfono no provoco el daño en la batería ya que el conector y el circuito de carga están en buen estado. Los únicos daños presentes están en la batería del equipo provocando marcas en las carcazas traseras del mismo. Accesorios: CAJA, CARGADOR CON CABLE, MANOS LIBRES, TAPA Y COVERTOR DE HULE, BATERÍA QUEMADA. Estado del Equipo: CAJA, CARGADOR CON CABLE, MANOS LIBRES, TAPA Y COVERTOR DE HULE, BATERÍA QUEMADA. Fecha Diagnóstico: 28/01/2019." (ver imagen 332, declaración de [Nombre 004] en audiencia complementaria del expediente judicial) 8) Que por parte de la actora [Nombre 001] y [Nombre 002], se han realizado reclamos administrativos de orden dinerario en contra el ICE, esto en atención médica por las lesiones sufridas por quemaduras indicadas en relación a [Nombre 001], por manufactura defectuosa -explosión de batería en terminal- con ocasión al uso de su parte de la terminal marca y modelo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, ocurrido en fecha 21 de enero de 2019 en horas de la mañana entre las 06:30 y 07:30 horas sin respuesta satisfactoria. (ver folios 29-35, 95, 96, 107-112 de expediente administrativo y ver imagen 332 del expediente judicial, declaraciones de [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003], [Nombre 005], cédula [Valor 005], en audiencia complementaria de expediente judicial) IV.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: De conformidad con los elementos probatorios admitidos en autos, se tienen por indemostrados los siguientes hechos por carecer los autos de prueba idonei en su relación al objeto del proceso:
• 1)Que [Nombre 001], sea profesional activa en Artes Visuales en su país de origen y que en razón de las lesiones sufridas tuviera perjuicios económicos distintos en relación a lo pagado en las facturas del 22-01-2019/farmacia/consulta/ medicina general/curaciones, del 24-01-2019/curaciones, 28-01-2019/curaciones, 29-01-2019/dictamen, asistencia médica y 31-01-2019/curaciones, tramitadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y factura del 27-01-2019/curaciones, tramitada en la Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.
• 2)Que las lesiones por quemaduras en la humanidad de [Nombre 001], le haya provocado insensibilidad alguna en las manos y que por ello le afectara a sus labores personales o profesionales cotidianas o ingresos corrientes.
• 3)Que [Nombre 002] incurriera en gastos patrimoniales con ocasión a algún daño material emergente en relación con las lesiones sufridas por [Nombre 001], por causa de la explosión de la batería en el celular BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, en donde tuvo quemaduras de segundo y tercero grado en muñeca, manos, brazos, espalda, pies y quemadura de cabello de la cabeza, y que por ello erogara gastos en sus atenciones para las curaciones en el Ebais de la CCSS de Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, y posteriormente en el Hospital Metropolitano y Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina.
• 4)Que el Cuerpo de Bomberos, Estación Pital, Unidad M-86, haya hecho constar en la ocurrencia del incidente tipo 1-1-8-7 Emergencias por fuego en fecha 21/01/2019 en casa de habitación en Alajuela, San Carlos, Agua Zarcas, después del puente de Agua Zarcas recomendación alguna respecto a los resultados de la incidencia reportada.

V.- DEL OBJETO DEL PROCESO. 1.- Observación preliminar aplicable. En ambas demandas acumuladas, las partes actoras justifican el fundamento de derecho de sus acciones y sus argumentos en las siguientes normas: Ordinales 9, 11, 21 y 41 de la Constitución Política, 190, 196, 197 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 1, 10, 12, 36, 58 y siguientes del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y 1022 del Código Civil. También, haciendo exigua y laxa justificación y anunciación en el hecho décimo primero de la demanda 20-002421-1027-CA, como en los alegatos del expediente 13-001302-1028-CA, se hizo referencia de la aplicación del numeral 35 de la Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor. Esto es, los reclamantes únicamente argumentaron la acción a través y por medio de los hechos que expuso, sin realización de fundamentación en subsunción jurídica sobre la situación subyacente con los hechos dados y la norma enunciada, para la complitud y necesaria demostración de antijuricidad bajo la estructura del silogismo cartesiano o lógico/jurídico. Bajo ese recuento del derecho aplicable acusado y el cuadro fáctico, se otorgó emplazamiento a la parte demandada, cual al efecto de lo que se indica, informó de la aplicación normativa de su interés, señalando en su defensa, la mención a la ley Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor 7472, artículo 35 sobre el régimen de responsabilidad y la exclusión de responsabilidad por ajenidad, como igualmente sobre las causales de culpa de víctima y hecho de tercero incurridas por la actora, establecidas en el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y lo establecido en el artículo 48 de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones 8642, mismo que permite, según afirmó, que la reclamación ante el operador de telecomunicaciones podrá ser interpuesta por el cliente directamente o por cualquier persona en su nombre en cuanto ello no implica que desaparezca la condición jurídico material con la cliente del servicio dado que esto lo que determina es el origen, los términos y condiciones de la contratación.

En lo expuesto, y si bien, es de todos conocido el principio general de que el juzgador conoce la complitud del derecho (iura novit curia), también es cierto que el litigio se circunscribió en los términos fácticos y normativos invocados, por lo que será ese el ámbito de análisis y valoración del caso a los alcances de las manifestaciones de las partes.

2.- CRITERIO DEL TRIBUNAL. Parámetros generales sobre lo reclamado. En el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración Pública, se genera sin que sea necesario demostrar el dolo o la culpa del agente causante del daño, bastando con la acreditación eso sí, de la existencia del "riesgo" para generarla, razón por la cual no operan las nociones de antijuridicidad y culpabilidad, por lo tanto, se aplica el principio de inversión de la carga de la prueba en beneficio del lesionado. A los efectos, la presunta Administración Pública (ICE), causante de los daños y perjuicios reclamados, debe resarcirlos si efectiva y eficazmente su conducta los generó, salvo que demuestre alguna causal exonerativa, sin perjuicio de que como condición insalvable se reitera, el efecto dañoso debe constituir o tener su causa en el despliegue de la actividad u omisión administrativa, o bien de su giro comercial en el ámbito de las telecomunicaciones. De este modo, se requiere de la concurrencia de cuatro elementos, a saber: a) Una lesión, que consiste en los perjuicios patrimoniales antijurídicos, porque el que los padece no tiene el deber de soportarlos; b) Una conducta administrativa en relación con la cual se encuentre vinculada la producción del daño reprochado; b) Un nexo causal, conformado por la existencia de una relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho (conducta administrativa) que se imputa y el daño producido; y c) Que no existan las causas de justificación, siendo que la existencia de las mismas puede desvincular jurídicamente el perjuicio producido con la conducta de la Administración Pública, de modo tal que el efecto dañoso no le sea imputable, rompiendo el nexo de causalidad al acontecer una situación eximente como la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero. Este régimen de responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado y sus instituciones previsto en los artículos 9, y 41 de la Constitución Política, y 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es entonces de naturaleza esencialmente objetiva, por lo que para nacer basta con que exista un daño indemnizable, una conducta administrativa y un nexo causal entre ambas. Así entonces, en los casos de responsabilidad objetiva, la defensa de la Administración radicaría en la demostración de haber mediado alguna de las causales que rompen el nexo de causalidad que indica el numeral 190, párrafo 1 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, la fuerza mayor, el hecho de un tercero o hecho de la propia víctima y consecuentemente la aplicación del principio de ajenidad del daño. No obstante, como regla general de principio, para establecer la procedencia de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, surge como requisito sine qua non, que la parte actora demuestre la existencia, consistencia y magnitud del daño y el pertinente nexo causal con la conducta administrativa que la produjo. A partir de ese parámetro objetivo, se procede con el análisis del caso concreto.

VI.- De la improcedencia de la demanda en el expediente 20-002421-1027-CA. En lo medular de las pretensiones de esta acción se requiere: declarar la consecuente responsabilidad civil contractual de carácter patrimonial de la entidad demandada Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por el daño material causado a la suscrita, valuado en veinte millones de colones y que el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad es responsable de proceder a la indemnización en razón del daño material ocasionado. Criterio del Tribunal: Para los casos como el presente, resulta ineludible el cumplimiento del deber por parte de la actora, de acreditar los elementos necesarios fácticos y materiales que configuren el estado de damnificado, pues no basta con la mera alegación de haber sufrido un daño material por parte de la Administración tal y como lo pretende la actora en el presente caso, si esta parte no cumplió -se reitera- con su deber de probar, fundamentar y justificar la existencia y consistencia del daño material incurrido por la suma de veinte millones de colones, y es que hay que considerar que de la relación del 41.1 del Código Procesal Civil con el artículo 220 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se deriva lo que se conoce como el onus probandi (o carga de la prueba) expresión latina del principio jurídico que señala quién está obligado a probar un determinado hecho ante los tribunales. El fundamento del onus probandi, que radica en un viejo aforismo de derecho que expresa que "lo normal se presume, lo anormal se prueba". Por tanto, quien invoca algo que rompe el estado de normalidad, para justificar un estado de indemnidad o damnificación, y consecuentemente el pago de un daño material valorado en veinte millones de colones debe probarlo ("affirmanti incumbit probatio": a quien afirma, incumbe la prueba). Básicamente, lo que se quiere decir con este aforismo, es que la carga o el trabajo de probar un enunciado debe recaer en aquel que rompe el estado de normalidad (el que afirma poseer una nueva verdad sobre un tema). Si bien está demostrado en autos que en fecha 17 de enero de 2019, la actora [Nombre 002], adquirió sin costo y por instancia del ICE, la terminal con marca y modelo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, concediéndosele un plazo de garantía de 365 días en dispositivo y 30 días en accesorios y facturándose a su nombre, y que su amiga [Nombre 001], sin ser cliente regular del ICE pero haciendo uso de esa terminal nueva a partir del 19 de enero de 2019, por así habérselo facilitado [Nombre 002], y que mientras el aparato estaba en fase de recarga desde horas de la noche del 20 de enero de 2019, sucediendo que en fecha 21 de enero de 2019, tan solo 2 días después de haberlo adquirido y en horas de la mañana entre las 06:30 y 07:30 horas, hace explosión su batería, provocándole con ocasión a ese evento lesiones por quemaduras de segundo y tercero grado en muñeca, manos, brazos, espalda, pies y quemadura de cabello de la cabeza. Y que por ello, dicha señora [Nombre 001] fue atendida por esas lesiones, inicialmente el día 21 en el Ebais de la CCSS de Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, posteriormente atendida para curaciones en el Hospital Metropolitano y Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, la actora, para ese momento no había sufrido daño material alguno, ni acreditado gasto pecuniario con ocasión a algún uso de la terminal indicada que le ocasionara perjuicio directo e inmediato alguno en su patrimonio jurídico, amén de que en fecha 28 de enero de 2019 le fue entregada a la actora [Nombre 002] por parte del funcionario del ICE [Nombre 004], cédula [Valor 004], cambio de la terminal defectuosa y a su favor, con entrega recibida de la terminal de la marca y modelo HUAWEI, P Smart Negro, con IMEI 867172030714850, y con un plazo de garantía de 365 días en dispositivo y 30 días en accesorios, en sustitución de la terminal defectuosa marca y modelo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620. Aspectos y circunstancias todas que no justifican el daño material pedido y se reitera, no está demostrado que [Nombre 002] incurriera en gastos patrimoniales con ocasión a algún daño material emergente en relación con las lesiones sufridas por [Nombre 001]. En consecuencia y al no acreditar la actora la existencia y la consistencia del daño material reclamado a través o por medio de la singularización o individualización del componente de este extremo y menos que menos por el montante pedido, que ello tuviese su génesis en la conducta acusada a su perjuicio; por lo que tampoco este Tribunal puede concluir que el daño material se origine en dicha situación reclamada en su lesión, no siendo su otorgamiento un estado de justicia económica o discrecional, sino por el contrario, debe surgir a partir de una acreditación eficaz e indubitable de la causación del daño acusado, por lo que ni siquiera y en consecuencia, se acredita nexo causal o vínculo con el daño alegado en correspondencia con el servicio otorgado por el ICE a la actora [Nombre 002], requisito necesario para la procedencia de la responsabilidad administrativa pretendida. El daño es un elemento necesario para que surja el derecho al resarcimiento en la responsabilidad objetiva o sin culpa, entendiéndose por daño "la lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de tutela". De modo que, para que surja el derecho al resarcimiento, el acto o la conducta acusada, debe producir una "lesión o invasión de la esfera jurídica ajena. El daño es resarcible sólo si resulta de una lesión a un interés lícito digno de tutela (...)" (Pérez Vargas Víctor. Principios de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, primera edición, 1984, página 46, 47). Desde vieja data ya, y sobre este tema, que no ha variado en su criterio de aplicación e incluso con relación a la aplicación del numeral artículo 35 de la Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor 7472, se ha pronunciado la Sala Primera de Corte Suprema de Justicia en el voto número 467-F-SI-2008, de las 14:25 horas del cuatro de julio del dos mil ocho, al manifestar que " (...) el artículo 35 de amplia cita, establece el régimen de responsabilidad aplicable en materia de derecho del consumidor, el cual es de naturaleza objetiva. Valga recordar que la responsabilidad civil, según el criterio de imputación utilizado como su fundamento, se divide en subjetiva y objetiva. La primera, funda la atribución de la responsabilidad en la culpabilidad en sentido lato, es decir, en el juicio de reproche que se hace a la conducta del agente dañoso. Comprende tanto a la culpa en sentido estricto, como al dolo. Ejemplo de esto es la responsabilidad contractual tradicional, regulada por los artículos 701 y 702 del Código Civil; el primero de ellos, referido a la responsabilidad dolosa y el segundo a la culposa. En tales casos, el caso fortuito es causa eximente de la responsabilidad civil, puesto que la imprevisibilidad suprime el juicio de reproche sobre la conducta del agente dañoso. La responsabilidad civil objetiva, en cambio, tiene como criterio de atribución causas expresamente establecidas por la ley. Ejemplo de esto son el artículo 1048 del Código Civil, en cuanto a la responsabilidad civil derivada de los daños ocasionados por máquinas motivas y el artículo 35 citado, referido a la responsabilidad civil en materia de derecho del consumidor. Este último supone la responsabilidad civil del productor o comerciante cuando se demuestra la existencia de un daño causado como resultado de la actividad desplegada por el productor o comerciante. Así, el consumidor sólo debe probar que el daño existe y que éste se produce como consecuencia directa e inmediata de la actividad desplegada por el productor o comerciante (causalidad adecuada). No requiere demostración de la culpa o el dolo (culpabilidad en sentido lato), puesto que el criterio de imputación es objetivo.". De este modo, acorde a lo indicado el daño material recae sobre el patrimonio, en los bienes y derechos que lo componen, debiendo en consecuencia el afectado acreditar, demostrar y probar su existencia, así como su relación causal. En ese sentido, el mismo se divide en el daño emergente que es la lesión directa causada por la conducta reprochada, la pérdida generada y el lucro cesante como lo dejado de percibir a causa de tal actividad, la ganancia o utilidad frustrada que era razonable y probable que se percibiera de no haber acontecido la acción lesiva. Además, en cuanto a los requisitos del daño en general para ser indemnizable, se ha dicho que " VI.- No cualquier daño da pie a la obligación de resarcir. Para tal efecto, han de confluir, básicamente las siguientes características para ser un "daño resarcible": A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjeturales. El daño no pierde esta característica si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; asimismo, no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio, pues el primero está referido a aquél que surge como una consecuencia necesaria derivada del hecho causal o generador del daño, es decir, sus repercusiones no se proyectan al incoarse el proceso (...). B) Debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo (...). " (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Nº606-F-2002 de las dieciséis y diez horas del siete de agosto del dos mil dos). -negrita y cursiva intencional-. Como corolario de lo anterior, es anodino justificar por demás y en mayor consideración, la improcedencia en todos sus extremos de la presente demanda acumulada, resultando lo expuesto suficiente para acoger la excepción opuesta de falta de derecho.

VII.- 1.- De la procedencia de la demanda en el expediente 19-001302-1028-CA en los siguientes términos: En lo medular de las pretensiones de esta acción se requiere: declarar la responsabilidad patrimonial de la entidad demandada Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por el daño moral y material causado, siendo la responsabilidad patrimonial derivada del daño correspondiente al daño material valuado en veinte millones de colones y el daño moral subjetivo estimado en cien millones de colones. Criterio del Tribunal: La situación jurídica reclamada en este expediente contiene un matiz diverso al anteriormente resuelto, que concentra su viraje en relación a la juricidad de la cuestión en el núcleo de protección de la Ley de la Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del Consumidor, cuando así la actora acusa la existencia de la responsabilidad objetiva del ICE, como empresa que distribuye y vende los aparatos BMobile y que de esa manera, refiere, tiene responsabilidad por los productos que avala y pone a disposición de sus clientes, los cuales, asegura debe someter a los controles de seguridad necesarios para velar por la salud, vida e integridad de sus consumidores, es decir, señala como elementos de la responsabilidad una conducta activa del ICE, promocionando celulares, y ofreciéndoles a clientes, que en esta oportunidad, uno de los dispositivos entregados tenía un desperfecto de fábrica, lo que provocó que a los pocos días de uso, el mismo explotara, causando daños como los ya indicados en la demanda, siendo su responsabilidad como Empresa Nacional asegurarse de poner en manos de sus clientes productos en óptimas condiciones que no pongan en peligro su vida o su integridad. Al respecto, en autos está comprobado que en fecha 17 de enero de 2019, la actora en el proceso acumulado 20-002421-1027-CA [Nombre 002], como cliente regular del instituto demandado, adquirió sin costo y por instancia del ICE, la terminal con marca y modelo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, concediéndosele un plazo de garantía de 365 días en dispositivo y 30 días en accesorios y facturándose a su nombre la adquisición, e inmediatamente por su liberalidad, entregó el mismo sin uso, a su amiga [Nombre 001] -sin ser cliente regular del ICE- por su permanencia transitoria en Costa Rica, por su estado de turista, para que hiciera uso de esa terminal nueva y a partir del 19 de enero de 2019, ocurriendo que mientras el aparato estaba en fase de recarga desde horas de la noche del 20 de enero de 2019, el 21 de enero de 2019, entre las 06:30 y 07:30 horas de la mañana, tan solo 2 días después de haberlo adquirido, hizo explosión su batería, provocándole en su persona con ocasión a esa explosión, lesiones por quemaduras de segundo y tercero grado en muñeca, manos, brazos, espalda, pies y quemadura de cabello de la cabeza, ameritando por ello, que dicha señora [Nombre 001] fuera atendida por esas lesiones. Inicialmente el mismo día 21 en el Ebais de la CCSS de Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, y posteriormente atendida para curaciones correlacionadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina. Igual consta en autos, aunque de manera bastante ilegible, que los servicios médicos le fueron brindados en la medicina privada a cuenta de pago por la atendida, por montos que no se logran determinar ni concretar particularmente por la ilegibilidad de los documentos aportados en autos, pero que sin embargo, el Tribunal los considera como justificantes de los gastos erogados y los estima como lógicos, correspondientes, consecuentes y necesarios para su atención en esas clínicas privadas -no así en el Ebais-, pues de otro modo, no hubiera sido atendida por no ser centros de caridad hospitalaria. Bajo ese entendido, y en lo que respecta a la carga de la prueba, el artículo 35 de la Ley de Protección al Consumidor establece la presunción de responsabilidad al productor, el proveedor y comerciante, si el consumidor resulta perjudicado por razón del bien o del servicio, y solo se libera quien demuestre haber sido ajeno al daño. Es decir, en materia de responsabilidad objetiva en relaciones de consumo, prevalece la inversión de la carga de la prueba como regla general, por lo que coloca a cargo del demandado ICE la prueba de las circunstancias de exoneración que son de observancia de las reglas de la debida diligencia. Debido al desarrollo positivo y prospectivo de la tesis objetiva del riesgo creado o peligrosidad, es criterio del Tribunal, se torna más exigente el deber de evitar el daño, de allí que producido éste, se impone la inversión de la carga de la prueba. El productor, el proveedor o comerciante deben demostrar el hecho objetivo de que se han tomado todas las medidas técnicas y de seguridad más funcionales para evitar o reducir el peligro de la actividad que desarrollan y con ello, los productos que comercializa, todo ello en protección del consumidor/usuario. Así se establece el principio de simetría que establece que habrá mayores cargas para quien dispone de mejores posibilidades en razón de la posesión de medios idóneos de prueba que es lo que se conoce como la prueba dinámica. El consumidor dañado, lesionado por su parte debe demostrar: a. El perjuicio sufrido. b. La vinculación entre el daño y el bien usado o producto recibido o el servicio recibido del proveedor, el productor o comerciante (relación de causalidad). La carga de la prueba no puede alterarse en perjuicio del consumidor o usuario, el cual se encuentra además en una situación de desventaja en la relación de consumo. En cuanto a este tema, la Sala I de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dispuesto: [...] IV.- Sobre la carga de la prueba. Con base en lo expuesto hasta este punto, cabe referirse al deber de demostración que le incumbe a cada una de las partes que integran la litis, cuando el objeto del proceso es la declaratoria de un deber de reparar un daño en casos como el presente. En primer término, se advierte que la parte actora se encuentra en una situación donde le resulta muy difícil o prácticamente imposible comprobar algunos de los hechos o presupuestos esenciales para su pretensión, colocándola ante una posible indefensión. Producto de lo anterior, y según lo ha indicado esta Sala con anterioridad, se redistribuye el deber de demostración entre las partes litigantes, en donde el “onus probandi” (deber probatorio) le corresponde a quien se encuentre en mejores condiciones para aportar la prueba al proceso ..." (en este sentido, se puede ver la resolución no. 212 de las 8 horas 15 minutos del 25 de marzo de 2008). La actora [Nombre 001] demostró en autos, que haciendo uso ordinario, normal y de la forma prevista o razonablemente previsible del dispositivo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, a tan solo 2 días de haberlo recibido por parte de [Nombre 002] y a 4 días desde que el ICE se lo entregó nuevo a ésta última y que estando el aparato en fase de recarga desde altas horas de la noche del 20 de enero de 2019, sucedió que en fecha 21 de enero de 2019 -pocas horas después-, la batería del dispositivo explotó provocándole las lesiones ya indicadas ut supra (declaraciones de [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], en audiencia complementaria, epicrisis y tratamientos en hospitales privados según documentos visibles en imágenes 27-37 del expediente judicial y facturas del 22-01-2019/farmacia/consulta/medicina general/curaciones, del 24-01-2019/curaciones, 28-01-2019/curaciones, 29-01-2019/dictamen, asistencia médica y 31-01-2019/curaciones, tramitadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y factura del 27-01-2019/curaciones, tramitada en la Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 expediente administrativo en relación a documentos en imágenes 39-46 de expediente judicial). Ahora, si bien también está acreditado que la señora [Nombre 001] no adquirió directamente del ICE el dispositivo defectuoso, ni se configura como contratante del ICE, sí se estaba constituyendo, por el uso del dispositivo en una consumidora indirecta, mediata o efectiva de los productos comercializados por el ICE, no de un extraño del ente ni comercializado por terceros, lo que apareja un ensanchamiento de protección sobre la extensión de responsabilidad por la distribución y entrega de bienes o productos defectuosos por parte de éste a usuarios directos o indirectos, máxime bajo el entendimiento que el dispositivo se encontraba nuevo y con tan solo 2 días de uso por la señora [Nombre 001] y de 4 días desde que el ICE lo entregara, lo cual le da al presente asunto un acento especial y diferenciado. Por interpretación extensiva de la Ley de Protección al Consumidor, en materia de relaciones de consumo, se ha ampliado el concepto de lo que es un consumidor, entendiéndosele no solo como el consumidor efectivo, es decir, la persona que adquiere un bien o servicio, sino también como el potencial consumidor o cliente que es quien en realidad no adquiere ese bien o ese servicio, pero que puede llegar a adquirirlo o usarlo a cualquier título, siempre y cuando provenga de la cadena de distribución lícita del dispositivo, en este caso por parte del ICE, resultando inane lo afirmado por el ICE cuando afirma su excusa de responsabilidad por faltar en el sublitem un tema de trazabilidad y custodia no solo de la terminal sino del traslado de información del uso. Así, en parangón y mediante el voto número 295-2007 de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiséis de abril de dos mil siete, la Sala Primera dispuso lo siguiente: "[…] En criterio de esta Sala, el simple hecho de no adquirir un producto, o requerir un servicio, no es un motivo jurídicamente aceptable para eximir de responsabilidad al productor, proveedor o comerciante, en aquellos supuestos en donde el usuario resulte lesionado en razón del bien o servicio recibido. El término “consumidor” referido a la situación jurídica del actor cuando ingresó al supermercado, corresponde a un concepto más amplio que el de comprador. En concordancia con el parámetro constitucional, consumidor, debe entenderse en un planteamiento expansivo respecto al ámbito de aplicación de las personas que requieran de una especial protección en esta materia. No se supedita a un “contrato de consumo”, porque significaría aplicarla de forma restringida y limitada a aquella persona que compra, o que contrata. La posición del derecho moderno, según este Órgano decidor, es que se le conciba como cliente, entendido a quien participa en las actividades comerciales en la posición de potencial adquiriente -y no comprador efectivo-, de bienes y servicios con el titular de la oferta. Dependiendo de la etapa del proceso, se puede distinguir entre contratante y cliente. El primero, se denomina consumidor jurídico. Adquiere un bien o servicio mediante una relación jurídica típica, como por ejemplo, la compra. El segundo es el consumidor material, quien no contrata el bien o servicio, puede potencialmente adquirirlo o utilizarlo. Este último es el centro de protección jurídica en el ámbito de la seguridad de los consumidores […]". Esto es, la responsabilidad que se trata en materia de personas consumidoras y usuarias es aquella en que el daño es causado por la utilización, ya sea por el uso o el consumo, o la manipulación de un producto de carácter defectuoso, cuando el daño se encuentra ocasionado por la defectuosidad del producto, y que así fue entregado por el ICE, aún sin su conocimiento, quien al comercializarlo, su posición liga y vincula al producto que fue importado y posteriormente distribuido con el consumidor o usuario en el marco de sus actividades empresariales ordinarias y usuales hasta al menos por el plazo de la garantía del mismo, lo cual adquiere mayor relevancia al resguardarse y tutelarse el derecho a la salud amparado en el artículo 32 de la ley de rito, con ocasión de la existencia de un producto defectuoso, que en su literalidad establece: "Artículo 32°.- Derechos del consumidor. Sin perjuicio de lo establecido en tratados, convenciones internacionales de las que Costa Rica sea parte, legislación interna ordinaria, reglamentos, principios generales de derecho, usos y costumbres, son derechos fundamentales e irrenunciables del consumidor, los siguientes: a) La protección contra los riesgos que puedan afectar su salud, su seguridad y el medio ambiente (...)". Por esto, la responsabilidad civil por productos defectuosos se refiere a la responsabilidad de un fabricante o vendedor (ICE) por poner un producto defectuoso en manos de un consumidor y/o usuario, no siendo extraño al caso bajo estudio, que en el caso de las explosiones de baterías de iones de litio -usuales en los celulares-, la reclamación no queda excluida ni limitada al referirse a defectos de diseño o fabricación, al mostrarse propensa al sobrecalentamiento por carga o bien, si se produjo un fallo durante su producción que provocó su naturaleza explosiva, importando que ello no fue observado previamente a su distribución y comercialización posterior efectiva, quedando en el fabricante y en el distribuidor la acreditación de que el dispositivo no tenía defecto alguno, aspecto que en los autos, el ICE no ha logrado demostrar lo contrario.

Así las cosas, es criterio del Tribunal que la oposición del ICE sobre la base del argumento de la ajenidad del daño por culpa de la víctima y del hecho de un tercero resulta improcedente, cuando máxime, ni siquiera se aporta un dictamen pericial sobre la calidad de la manufactura del dispositivo y su batería en cuestión como una sola unidad comercial, siendo incluso que el taller autorizado SERTEC para la revisión de esos dispositivos lacónicamente señaló: "Informe SER-0007869 de fecha 28 de enero de 2019 y en relación al dispositivo que: "Descripción de la falla: CLIENTE INDICA QUE LA BATERÍA DEL TERMINAL EXPLOTÓ DE FORMA INESPERADA MIENTRAS SE ESTABA CARGANDO, PRODUCTO DE LA EXPLOSIÓN, CAUSÓ DAÑOS A SONIA [Nombre 001], QUEMADURAS EN SEGUNDO Y TERCER GRADO, EN LAS EXTREMIDADES SUPERIORES (MUÑECAS), CABELLO, PIE. Reparación Efectuada: Se procede con la evaluación del caso encontrando: equipo no presenta daños en la tarjeta principal tampoco presenta daños en el cable ni en el cargador presenta la pantalla reventada, marcas en la etiqueta del teléfono y en la tapa trasera del mismo producto del daño en la batería, se concluye que el teléfono no provoco el daño en la batería ya que el conector y el circuito de carga están en buen estado. Los únicos daños presentes están en la batería del equipo provocando marcas en las carcazas traseras del mismo. Accesorios: CAJA, CARGADOR CON CABLE, MANOS LIBRES, TAPA Y COVERTOR DE HULE, BATERÍA QUEMADA. Estado del Equipo: CAJA, CARGADOR CON CABLE, MANOS LIBRES, TAPA Y COVERTOR DE HULE, BATERÍA QUEMADA. Fecha Diagnóstico: 28/01/2019."; lo que a mayor razón, no determina la causa de la explosión de la batería ni su uso indebido, no siendo transferible al lesionado su uso indebido. En ese sentido, se debe entender como ajenidad del daño, cuando solo se libera quien demuestre que ha sido ajeno al daño y para ello, debe tomarse en cuenta que la propia Ley 7472 en el artículo 71, contempla la integración de esa normativa con la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). Entonces, ha sido criterio de esta jurisdicción y amparado por la Sala Primera y ahora en la integración como Tribunal de Casación, que al no haber en la ley 7472 un detalle expreso de qué debe entenderse por ajenidad al daño, resultan aplicables las causales eximentes contenidas en la LGAP. El ordinal 190.1 ídem, establece como eximentes de responsabilidad la culpa de la víctima, el hecho de un tercero o la fuerza mayor. Así las cosas, para que un riesgo sea atribuible a una empresa, de tal manera que su materialización conlleve responsabilidad, se debe tomar en cuenta que el riesgo en el que se pone al consumidor debe exceder de aquellos que sean tolerables para la persona que sufre el daño. En síntesis, el canon 35 de la Ley de la Consumidor establece un régimen de responsabilidad objetivo y solidario entre el productor, el proveedor y el comerciante, frente a la persona consumidora y usuaria efectiva en los términos dados en esta resolución y que resultó lesionada en su integridad física y emocional moral con ocasión del bien o servicio puesto a su disposición, resultando que el ICE no demuestra que, luego de un examen retrospectivo, el daño no estaba vinculado mediante un nexo causal con su intervención en esa cadena económica del dispositivo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620, y que llegó hasta manos de la señora [Nombre 001] por una mera liberalidad, menos entonces que le hiciera un uso irrazonable al dispositivo, que excediera la normalidad de utilización de un dispositivo tan genérico y del quehacer común como es el uso del celular, por lo que resulta consecuente declarar la responsabilidad patrimonial del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad por el daño material causado y acreditado y que se limita únicamente al montante que resultare determinado sobre lo pagado en las facturas del 22-01-2019/farmacia/consulta/ medicina general/curaciones, del 24-01-2019/curaciones, 28-01-2019/curaciones, 29-01-2019/dictamen, asistencia médica y 31-01-2019/curaciones, tramitadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y factura del 27-01-2019/curaciones, tramitada en la Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, denegándose cualquier otro reconocimiento por falta de justificación y acreditación sobre otros extremos pedidos. Se difiere a la ejecución del fallo la determinación de los pagos efectuados indicados junto al reconocimiento de los intereses legales desde la fecha de su cancelación ante los centros hospitalarios y hasta su efectivo pago en esta sede jurisdiccional, denegándose concomitantemente su indexación a valor real a la fecha de recibo de los mismos, por contener los intereses otorgados un componente inflacionario en su composición, lo que sin duda alguna otorgaría una doble reparación financiera sin fundamento alguno, lo cual resulta improcedente.

2.- En relación al daño moral pretendido: En cuanto a la demostración del daño moral subjetivo, ha sido reiterado por este Tribunal que este tipo de detrimento consiste en la afectación de las condiciones anímicas del sujeto; su valoración –se ha insistido- es in re ipsa, esto es, pende de las estimaciones del órgano juzgador no sobre elementos probatorios concretos, sino sobre indicios y sobre el cuadro fáctico mismo, de los cuales se deduce por lógica una afectación en esta esfera extrapatrimonial del individuo. Dicho de otro modo, no requiere demostración directa, sino que se desprende de los hechos acreditados, a través de indicios e inferencias racionales. En el subjúdice, este Tribunal aprecia por lógica inferencia que la actora Leyla Rioba sufrió de manera intensa, emocional e internamente no solo por sus lesiones físicas con ocasión a la explosión del dispositivo BMOBILE SPEED5 GRIS, IMEI 353253100027620 y que le provocaron quemaduras de segundo y tercero grado en muñeca, manos, brazos, espalda, pies y quemadura de cabello de la cabeza, y que estando en ese estado fuera atendida para sus curaciones en el Ebais de la CCSS de Aguas Zarcas San Carlos, y posteriormente en el Hospital Metropolitano y Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, lo que naturalmente le provocó daños emocionales, cuadros de estrés, crisis de pánico y sentimientos sufrientes por su estado de salud y curación traumática (declaraciones de [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], en audiencia complementaria de expediente judicial), resultando por ello padecer incertidumbre, sufrimiento y desgaste emocional por el tratamiento de las curaciones y del resultado de aquellas en relación a su condición física previa al siniestro dado, lo que resulta un proceder intuitivo, razonable y esperado en las personas que no esperan un suceso tan significativo como el sufrido, en donde se tiene la expectativa de recibir un dispositivo confiable, seguro, revisado y aprobado por el ICE para su distribución y comercialización. En lo racional, nadie espero lo contrario. Por ello, resulta apropiado aplicar los límites de los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad para la fijación del daño moral. Ello produce efecto directo en su fijación, porque no se trata de cuantificar el sufrimiento, pues es inapreciable, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo al cual puede acudir el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte, la ofensa padecida. La cuantificación patrimonial o liquidación, del daño moral subjetivo o pretium doloris, es de estricto carácter psíquico, afectivo y no ligado a las carencias materiales, de allí que es excluible su demostración con lo cual apareja la aplicación de la discrecionalidad judicial, bajo el control interno y límite de la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad indicada. Débese estimar entonces, que el perjuicio moral y las alteraciones en las condiciones de existencia, en la actora, son rubros del daño moral que no son ni sinónimos ni expresan el mismo daño como resultado de la responsabilidad objetiva aplicada, cuyo objeto de su indemnización es independiente mediante la figura de las alteraciones en la condiciones de existencia (la materialidad), en tanto que mediante el perjuicio moral subjetivo, se indemniza el sufrimiento producido por el hecho dañino, nicho en el cual se residencia la pretensión material del daño moral pedido La indemnización al respecto se fija en CUATRO MILLONES DE COLONES y no en el montante pedido, que se encuentra delimitada jurisprudencialmente por la apreciación que este Tribunal ha percibido en el proceso de los padecimientos que afecten la esfera afectiva de la víctima, derivado de los hechos y declaraciones que se tomaron en cuenta para estimarlo (declaraciones de [Nombre 003], cédula [Valor 003], [Nombre 002], en audiencia complementaria, imágenes 27-37 del expediente judicial y facturas del 22-01-2019/farmacia/consulta/medicina general/curaciones, del 24-01-2019/curaciones, 28-01-2019/curaciones, 29-01-2019/dictamen, asistencia médica y 31-01-2019/curaciones, tramitadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y factura del 27-01-2019/curaciones, tramitada en la Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, folio 31 expediente administrativo en relación a documentos en imágenes 39-46 de expediente judicial) y que incluso tal padecimiento se ha obtenido de los acontecimientos vividos internamente por la actora, por lo que a esta Sección no le cabe la menor duda de la existencia del daño moral ocasionado, estimándose una compensación al dolor, pero no un resarcimiento; representando una sanción pero no exacción al ofensor. Partiendo de lo dicho, el Tribunal observa de las situaciones indicadas en autos, según las cuales, la aflicción personal de la actora, constituye el único estadio a compensar y que ella, es la fuente de frustración consiguiente, es hecho suficiente para que la retribución adecuada, no transgreda los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, como principios que intrínsecamente fueron valorados justamente por este Tribunal, por lo que no se encuentra motivo suficiente para variar el quantum de la compensación y ajustarlo a la suma pedida en la demanda. Así, si no existe el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (entendida como la consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias (requisitos del artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) como las dadas y comprobadas en estos autos, y asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir, produciendo el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial de la persona, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión a la esfera jurídica de la víctima [Nombre 001] como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación en la suma dispuesta, junto al reconocimiento de los intereses legales hasta su efectivo pago una vez firme esta resolución, denegándose concomitantemente su indexación a valor real a la fecha de recibo de los mismos, por contener los intereses otorgados un componente inflacionario en su composición, lo que sin duda alguna otorgaría una doble reparación financiera sin fundamento alguno, lo cual resulta improcedente.

VIII.- De las excepciones opuestas. En ambos procesos, los representantes del demandado opusieron las mismas excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de interés actual. Conforme a lo considerado y a los alcances de lo señalado, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho únicamente en relación a la acción interpuesta en proceso 20-002421-1027-CA y, también sobre el exceso denegado pretendido de las partidas por daño material y moral dentro de la acción interpuesta en el proceso 19-001302-1028-CA. Se rechazan en ambas acciones acumuladas las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de interés actual, en virtud de la situación jurídica y fáctica analizada que por ser un proceso civil de hacienda, los afectados en este caso tienen la potestad para demandar a la institución o sujeto que considere responsable de los daños a su patrimonio.

IX.- De las costas del litigio. El artículo 193 del CPCA establece que las costas procesales y personales son impuestas al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en esa misma norma, en concordancia con el numeral 119.2 ibídem. Se dispone: en proceso 20-002421-1027-CA, la actora resultó vencida y en ese orden, a criterio del Tribunal, debe asumir la condenatoria en ambas costas en favor de la parte demandada. En proceso 19-001302-1028-CA, el ICE resultó vencido y en ese orden, a criterio del Tribunal, debe asumir la condenatoria en ambas costas en favor de la parte actora. En ambos procesos y desde la cuantificación en firme de ambas costas en la etapa de Ejecución de Sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago, se reconocerán a favor de los beneficiados los respectivos intereses legales.

POR TANTO

Se falla: Se rechazan en ambas acciones acumuladas 19-001302-1028-CA y 20-002421-1027-CA, las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de interés actual. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho únicamente en relación a la acción interpuesta en proceso 20-002421-1027-CA y consecuentemente se declara sin lugar la acción intentada por [Nombre 002] en todos sus extremos. En relación al proceso 19-001302-1028-CA se declara la responsabilidad patrimonial del INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD por el daño material causado y acreditado y que se limita únicamente al montante a reconocer a [Nombre 001] y que resultare determinado sobre lo pagado en las facturas del 22-01-2019/farmacia/consulta/ medicina general/curaciones, del 24-01-2019/curaciones, 28-01-2019/curaciones, 29-01-2019/dictamen, asistencia médica y 31-01-2019/curaciones, tramitadas en el Hospital Metropolitano y factura del 27-01-2019/curaciones, tramitada en la Clínica Hospital Santa Catalina, y se difiere a la ejecución del fallo la determinación de los pagos efectuados indicados junto al reconocimiento de los intereses legales desde la fecha de su cancelación ante los centros hospitalarios y hasta su efectivo pago en esta sede jurisdiccional, denegándose concomitantemente su indexación; y se le reconoce también la pretensión del daño moral, fijándose este extremo en CUATRO MILLONES DE COLONES junto al reconocimiento de los intereses legales hasta su efectivo pago una vez firme esta resolución, denegándose concomitantemente su indexación. En su relación se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho sobre el exceso denegado pretendido de las partidas por daño material y moral. De las costas del litigio: Se dispone: en proceso 20-002421-1027-CA, la actora resultó vencida y en ese orden, debe asumir la condenatoria en ambas costas en favor de la parte demandada. En proceso 19-001302-1028-CA, el ICE resultó vencido y en ese orden, debe asumir la condenatoria en ambas costas en favor de la parte actora. En ambos procesos y desde la cuantificación en firme de ambas costas en la etapa de Ejecución de Sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago, se reconocerán a favor de los beneficiados los respectivos intereses legales. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández. Eduardo González Segura. Marco Hernández Vargas. Jueces Decisores.

CONSTANCIA. En misma fecha de resolución que antecede se hace constar que el Juez Eduardo González Segura, no firma la presente resolución por encontrarse en disfrute de vacaciones y se advierte que participó de la delibración y términos de la redacción de la presente resolución. Juez Ponente. Ronaldo Hernández Hernández.

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