Public interest declaration of private road by tolerance and prolonged public useDeclaratoria de interés público de camino privado por tolerancia y uso público prolongado

CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A Building _________________________________________________________________________________ FILE No.: 22-001805-1027-CA. MATTER: Municipal Appeal APPELLANT: Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas La Mina S.A. RESPONDENT: Municipality of Santa Ana.

No. 225 -2023 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. THIRD SECTION, ANNEX A OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at eight hours fifty-five minutes on the thirty-first of May two thousand twenty-three. - This Tribunal hears, as a non-hierarchical controller of legality, the appeal filed by Derk Van Wilpe Von Malchus, bearer of identity card number 8-035-0252, in his capacity as representative of the companies Wilpetrac Sociedad Anónima, with legal ID 3-101-014220, and Quintas La Mina Sociedad Anónima, with legal ID 3-101-019788; against agreement No. 07, adopted by the Municipal Council of Santa Ana, in its ordinary session No. 94 dated February 15, 2022. Drafted by Judge Chaves Torres. Considering. I.- Proven Facts: Of interest for the resolution of this appeal, the following has been accredited: 1) That on October 3, 2016, following a complaint from two neighbors regarding the closure of the street in "Barrio Los Fonseca," the Geomatics Process issued its report MSA-GEM-SGE-01-181-2016, which states it relied on a study of the "...cadastral, registry, cartographic information and orthorectified aerial photography existing in the National Cadastre and National Property Registry, Municipality of Santa Ana, Territorial Information System of the Real Estate Registry (SIRI), Comisión Nacional de Emergencias (CNE) and Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN), also supplemented with the field inspection conducted on September 5, 2016..."; for this purpose, it provides the geographical location of the access under study, and divides it into 5 sections or segments, called A, B, C, D, and E. Of interest for this resolution is segment A, which is located from point 0+000.00 to A 0+117.22, specifically between the Cartesian coordinates (E= 482093.2 m, N= 1098551.1 m, CRTM05 projection and extends northwest to the Cartesian coordinates (E= 482049.2 m, N= 1098651.3 m, CRTM05 projection, and describes it graphically in figures 2, 3, and 3A of the report. It sets out the background of the access according to official cartography, taking as a starting point documents dating from 1956 to the present, with segment A of the access being clearly observed in plan SJ-05867-1967, the Cartographic sheet of Real de Pereira, first edition (1991) scale 1:10000, and in the 1980 aerial photograph. In the following section, it sets out the physical characteristics of the access, attaching a photograph of segment A dated 2016, showing the paved road in good condition for vehicle transit, and states it has a measurement of 117.22 meters (measured by the center line), and an average width of 9.00 meters, adding that the entire segment has a concrete surface, storm drains, and underground storm sewer pipe built by the Municipality of Santa Ana, and also has electric utility poles, lighting, and CNFL-type electrical connections, as well as AyA-type water meters. It also references several background records found in the municipal archives of the Cadastre, Territorial Planning, and Legal Advisory Processes, the official letters No. MSA-AL-04-165-10 and MSA-AL-04-225-10 signed by the Legal Advisor in 2010 being of importance, where it is concluded that segment A is a public road, and official letter MSA-DOT-APU-USV-03-005-2009 signed by the Municipal Engineer concluding that segment A, according to the dimensions of the right-of-way and its length, qualifies as a tertiary road, in accordance with the Reglamento de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Finally, the Geomatics Process concludes that its report should be forwarded to the Municipal Legal Advisory Office for the respective study. (See images 29 to 106). 2) That in a brief dated November 9, 2021, several neighbors of "Calle los Fonseca" in Alto de las Palomas, Santa Ana, filed a complaint with the Municipal Council for the following: "...today, November 9, 2021, in the morning hours, several people supposedly hired by Mr. Van Wilpe came to our neighborhood with the intention of fencing off our properties and dwelling houses, to prevent us access to the public street, a street that has been used as such for more than 25 years, and which the Municipality even repaired, compacted, and paved (…) We, the neighbors, opposed such actions and did not allow any fence to be put up because, in our opinion, the street is public, gives free access to pedestrians and vehicles of all kinds, and it is the Municipality that maintains said street, and the garbage collection truck also accesses it, which is why the registered owners of the properties located there also pay our respective taxes for garbage collection and public lighting. There are also electricity poles along the entire street, and public lighting, and consequently, at this moment, the street is of public domain...". (See Image 5). 3) That on November 16, 2021, in ordinary session number 81, the Municipal Council of Santa Ana adopted agreement No. 18, by which it decided to forward the briefs related to the Calle los Fonseca case to the Municipal Administration with the objective that the Legal Advisory Office and the Geomatics Department conduct a technical and legal study to effectively determine whether the mentioned property is of public or private domain. (See image 12). 4) That on January 31, 2022, the Legal Advisor, with official letter MSA-ALc-ASL-03-091-2022, addressed the request of the Municipal Council, providing her legal opinion based on official letter MSA-GEAM-SGE-01-181-2016 from the Geomatics Process, and based on which the following is deemed accredited: "...That in the Real de Pereira sheet, first edition 1991, scale 1: 10000; segments A+0000.00 to A0+117 22 are completely observed. 2) In the cadastral plans SJ-16011-1974 and SJ-342015-1979, the entirety of segment A0+000.00 to A 0+117.22 is indicated (…) That segment A0+000.00 to A0+117.22 has an approximate length of 117.22 ml and has a concrete surface, storm drains, and underground storm sewer pipe built by the municipality. The entire segment has electric utility poles, public lighting, CNFL-type electrical connections, and AyA-type water meters. (…) In 2009, the municipality conducted this same study, which concluded that segments A0+000.00 to A0+117.22 (…) are public roads. (…) according to cadastral plan SJ-24008-1975 (property 3, mostly located in Escazú), the access segment between station A0+000.00 to A0+117.22 forms part of the estate with real folio 100248943-001-002, which is registered in the name of Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas la Mina S.A.; and for many years, the municipality has considered all segments of this street to be public, proof of this being the granting of municipal approval to survey plans that describe it as such and the provision of maintenance services in ballast, waste collection, and road cleaning provided for more than 30 years. So much so that, through an administrative contracting process carried out in 2010, the municipality invested in the placement of rigid asphalt and storm sewer channelization from station A0+000.00 to A0+117.22. (…) however, in December 2015, the municipality received a complaint that this street had been closed at the end of the pavement to the left. Which produced report MSA- GEM-SGE-01-181-2016, and during its preparation, the existence of the estate with real folio 1- 248943- 001 and 2 was found in the name of Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas la Mina S.A., located in Escazú under cadastral plan SJ-24008-1975, which contains within its boundary description the access segment A0+000.00 to A0+117.22 (…) indicating that it is a private street and an easement (servidumbre) of 10.00 m and 8.00 m respectively (…) Regarding the segment between station A0+000.00 to A0+117 (…) this segment is open for public use, first with ballast and since 2010 with rigid asphalt (concrete), built by this Municipality. Thus, we have that the use for free transit that this road segment has received has been public and notorious for more than 10 years, rendering Article 24 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos No. 5060 applicable, which establishes: 'Article 24.- The rights and actions to claim the corresponding compensation from the State or municipalities shall prescribe in one year, counted from the date on which the damages were caused or from when the strip of land was taken for the construction of public roads. The actions filed shall lapse and be deemed not to have been filed after one year has elapsed without the interested party activating the proceedings.' (…) Based on the foregoing, we have that for reasons of public interest, the existence of the road must prevail over the right of property, but in exchange for compensation; which claim must be filed by the injured party within a period of 1 year from when the damage was caused or the strip of land was taken. In the present case, that annual period is amply exceeded, so only the effective delivery of the land by the owner is lacking (…) It is recommended to adopt the agreement declaring the road known as Calle los Fonseca, from its beginning in front of national route 121 to the 117.22 m where the pavement ends, to be of municipal public interest character, a strip of land located on the estate with real folio 1- 248943- 001 and 2 owned by Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas la Mina S.A., incorrectly located in Escazú under cadastral plan SJ-24008-1975. Request the legal representatives of these companies to deliver that strip of land by public deed of donation...". (See images 16 to 23). 5) That on February 15, 2022, in Ordinary Session No. 94, the Municipal Council of Santa Ana decided the following: "...Agreement No. 7: It is approved unanimously and definitively: First: Ruling No. 14 of the Legal Affairs Committee is approved; Second: The recommendations of official letter MSA- ALC- ASL 03- 091- 2022, signed by Licda. Andrea Robles Álvarez, head of the Legal Advisory Process, are accepted; Third: The agreement declaring the road known as Calle Los Fonseca, from its beginning in front of national route 121 to the 117.22 ml where the asphalt ends, to be of municipal public interest is adopted, a strip of land located on the estate with real folio 1- 248943- 001 and 2 owned by Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas la Mina S.A., incorrectly located in Escazú under cadastral plan SJ- 24008- 1975; Fourth: The legal representatives of these companies are requested to deliver that strip of land by public deed of donation; Fifth: The Administration is ordered that the Geomatics Process prepare the cadastral plan of said strip of land; Sixth: The costs of surveying, cadastre, notary, and registration shall be borne by the Municipality; Seventh: Regarding the strip of land of segment B0+000.00 to B0+083.73, the Administration is requested to conduct an appraisal and then assess whether the Municipal Council declares it of public interest, to initiate negotiations with the co-owners for the possible acquisition; Eighth: Regarding the strip of land of segment B0+326 to B0+453, the Administration is instructed to issue a report to assess its necessity as a public road, since free access to properties 9, 10, and 11 would be ensured with the delivery of segment B0+000.00 to B0+83.73, for which reason, preliminarily, the declaration of a public road for this third segment seems unnecessary; Ninth: To make decisions regarding these two segments, the Council must conduct a field inspection and interview the affected neighbors; Tenth: Notify this agreement to the Municipal Mayor's Office, the Legal Advisory Process, the Geomatics Process, and the legal representatives of those owning companies of the strips of land to be delivered, and to the incumbent councilor Catalina Obregón López. Agreement definitively approved." (See image 125). 6) That dissatisfied with the agreement just described, the representation of the companies Wilbetrac S.A. and Quintas La Mina S.A. filed a motion for revocation with subsidiary appeal, the horizontal challenge being rejected by agreement No. 05 adopted in Ordinary Session No. 98 on Tuesday, March 15, 2022, and it was decided to elevate the appeal to this Tribunal. (See images 127 and 175). -

III.Arguments of the appeal. Without prejudice to the comprehensive reading that has been made of the arguments deduced by the appellant, in summary, it alleges the following: 1) Violation of the right to private property. It points out, based on resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber No. 3145-96 and 2009-003820, that the Municipality of Santa Ana cannot unilaterally appropriate the strip of land measuring 117 meters in depth from route 122, which is part of the estate owned by its represented companies, with real folio No. 1-248943-001 and 002, without first carrying out the pertinent expropriation acts, as this is clearly an abuse of authority in violation of Article 45 of the Magna Carta. It adds that only if the land in question is of public domain, and was in fact used as a public road, does that land, over the course of time, become a public road, because custom and its purpose make it a public thoroughfare used despite not being officially established as such. It indicates that the Municipality could clearly have declared that road as public if the land with registration number 1-248943 appeared in the name of the municipality of Santa Ana, which clearly does not occur in this case, as the municipal agreement not only recognizes that this property is in the name of the companies but also seeks to obligate said companies to donate that strip of land to the Municipality in an act of absolute abuse of authority. 2) Violation of the right to self-determination. The appellant representation indicates that in the challenged agreement, the legal representatives of the companies are being ordered to donate their land to the Municipality, which clearly violates the principle of self-determination of persons, in this regard noting that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its judgment in the case of Murillo et al. vs. Costa Rica, stated: "...in other words, it constitutes the right of every organized person to organize according to the law and their individual and social life according to their own choices and conditions (principle of personal self-determination)…" In the same sense, it cites judgment No. 176-2005 issued by the Constitutional Chamber, which reiterates the criterion set out in judgment No. 5483-95, which states "...it must be kept in mind, as doctrine has held, that public freedoms are nothing other than the constitutional recognition of personal autonomy; precisely because it is a sphere of autonomy, the powers that comprise it may be exercised or not with identical power of self-determination...". It explains that based on the cited judgments and the principle of personal self-determination, the companies it represents are permitted to decide how and when they dispose of their property, rendering the Municipality of Santa Ana unable to order the signing of a donation deed for that strip of land in its favor. It explains that, given the order issued by the Municipality, it is concerned that if the companies' representatives refuse to appear before a notary to donate this strip of land that the Municipality of Santa Ana seeks, they could be reported to the Public Ministry for the crime of disobedience to authority. 3) The non-existence of public interest. It accuses that the Municipality of Santa Ana has not bothered to find out who or who lives on the boundaries of this road and what legal condition their houses are in, and whether they are in compliance with construction permits; given that, in response to a previously filed request, a reply was given with official letter number MSA- ALC- ASL- 02- 365- 2021 from official Laura Valverde Quiroz of the legal advisory office, which indicated to it that only seven estates border the property of its represented companies, thus questioning how many people live on those seven estates, for the Municipal Council to take the trouble of making a public interest declaration for that strip of land owned by the companies, since in its view, the Municipality cannot favor a single person to the detriment of another, or a very small group of people to the detriment of others, as this would clearly undermine the general interest of the Canton's community. It considers that to carry out the act of declaring that strip of land to be of public interest in favor of the Municipality of Santa Ana, the first thing the Municipality should have done was to verify the existence of general interest, namely the number of people who would benefit from that declaration, and whether there are constructions on those lands that are in compliance, specifically whether they were built respecting the canton's regulatory plan, and therefore obtained the respective permits, aspects which we find lacking in this case. 4) Lack of reasoning. It points out that since in this case there is no study from the Municipality of Santa Ana indicating how many people in the Canton would be beneficiaries of this public interest declaration, to acquire this strip of private land, forming a public road, and the records also do not show whether the constructions on the site are in accordance with the stipulations of the Regulatory Plan, and therefore were built with the respective permits, then clearly there is also no adequate reasoning for the challenged act. 5) Contradictory reports from the municipality. It indicates that by means of the official letter from the official of the Legal Advisory Office cited, it was stated that the estate with real folio 248943 is registered in the Canton of Escazú, and that for reasons of competence, its Municipal Administration is legally responsible for taking the corresponding measures, and now, just one year later, it is said that this same estate is not only now within the limits of the Municipality of Santa Ana, but that a strip is being confiscated from it for the establishment of a public road, in favor of an indeterminate number of people who supposedly live bordering this strip and who require this public access, from which it is substantiated that there is an internal contradiction and it is an error from less than a year ago. 6) Error of concept. It mentions that for many years the Municipality has considered all segments of this street to be public, proof of this being the granting of municipal approval to survey plans that describe it as such and the provision of maintenance services in ballast, waste collection, and road cleaning, provided for more than 30 years. It considers this statement to be regrettable, as it has been an error on the part of the Municipality to grant approvals on boundary plans, indicating that part of the land registered with real folio 1-248943, owned by its represented companies, is a public road, and instead of amending and correcting its error or defect of the act, the Municipality of Santa Ana rather seeks to consolidate its error, forcing that part of the estate with the indicated real folio be donated to it in its favor, to perpetuate its error and artificially convert this strip into a public road.

III.- On the merits. It is previously considered important to clarify that, at this instance, by legal mandate, only a control of legality over the formal actions of the municipal authorities - Mayor's Office or Municipal Council - is conducted, with the appeal constituting the limit of the Tribunal's competence, in such a way that it is at the instance of the party who considers themselves dissatisfied with the resolution and through their specific request, that this Chamber proceeds to its analysis for the purpose of determining whether or not it is in accordance with the law. This controlling function is thus based on the prior exposition of the specific and precise grounds of grievance, which delimit the examination of what was resolved, without it being possible for the Tribunal to cover aspects different from those claimed or to rule on grievances not raised. Therefore, this Judicial Tribunal, in its function as Controller of Legality, restricts itself to the study of the charges submitted and may only hear the points that are the subject of the claim -181 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública-, without being able to conduct an ex officio examination of what was decided by the Municipal Body in the absence of argumentative substance in the appeal. It is imposed as an indispensable requirement, then, that the appellant formulates the appeal clearly and precisely, that they outline the objections they maintain against the challenged pronouncement, being obliged to clearly set forth the errors alleged in the resolution or agreement being challenged, so that it is self-sufficient for its full understanding, with express indication of the infractions they accuse the latter of having committed. In the case at hand, from a meticulous study of the administrative file, as well as the appeal brief confronted with the act challenged herein, it is possible to conclude that the controversy originates from the appellant's attempts to close the public road that provides access to Barrio Los Rodríguez, technically located (see first proven fact) in Alto de las Palomas within the Canton of Santa Ana, a situation that has escalated before the Municipal Council, and consequently, the act challenged herein was issued, which aims at the public interest declaration of the road and an exhortation for the strip of land serving as a road to be donated in favor of the City Council. In view of this, this Chamber considers that it is necessary to specify that in the current "legal" system, there is a prohibition against closing, narrowing, building on, or fencing off a road or street delivered by law or in fact to the service of the community, -see art. 32 Ley General de Caminos Públicos No. 5060-, so that, if the above occurs, the legal framework must be respected for the reopening of the public thoroughfare. In this sense, in the case of public domain goods (bienes demaniales), the administrative action replaces the possessory action, as a means for the Administration to protect its goods -principle of administrative self-tutelage-. However, there is an important difference between two modalities of administrative action, namely, the first referring to direct coercion over the individual to guarantee the public service for which the property is intended, in which the Administration, on behalf of the community, defends the real right that belongs to it, by its own hand, given that the property, its use, and its destination, particularly public domain, does not admit discussion regarding the ownership of the proprietor, meaning the State or its public entities. For example, a public park, registered or not, in the name of a Municipality, delivered for public use without margin for error, as the possession held by the individual is openly illegitimate, or contrary to the service it provides -arts. 261 to 263 of the Civil Code-. The same criterion could be applied in the case of a route that is part of the road network, provided that such ownership is indisputable; therefore, a private individual cannot impede passage or free transit; in this regard, the provisions of numerals 131 and 231 of the Ley de Tránsito y Seguridad Vial No. 9078 can be consulted. On the other hand, there is a declaratory modality, which refers to cases where circumstances prevent easily identifying, without any margin of error, that ownership, that destination, or that public characteristic that supposedly distinguishes goods of public domain. In such cases, the law provides that to remove the closure, narrowing, building, or fence constructed on the roadway, a special administrative procedure must be followed, which aims to verify that the closed road is not of private domain. Consequently, the declaration of three witnesses must be collected to record the pertinent facts, that is, since when the road was at the collective or private service, and since when it was narrowed or closed, and must include a technical report. For this purpose, the offender must also be heard, which undoubtedly requires prior due notice regarding the purpose of the proceeding, the rights that assist them, and the specific consequence through a correct presentation of the facts, so that if it is proven that the road was affected without authorization, or that it was at the collective service for more than one year, the reopening shall be ordered within a period of no more than three days, and in default of the obligated party, the order shall be executed at their expense, all in accordance with Article 33 of the Ley General de Caminos and Article 308 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. It can be seen that it is an administrative act that requires prior procedure to support its validity and efficacy -arts. 129 to 189 Ley General de la Administración Pública-. By reason of the foregoing, in the case of a dispute over the ownership of the property, the corresponding legal procedure must be followed, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in its Voto No. 2010016599 of 10:01 hrs on October 8, 2010, which ordered "...initiate the procedure provided for in articles 32 and 33 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, in order to determine the public or private nature of the closed road and conclude it within a reasonable period..."; however, in this case, we are not faced with this latter scenario, since the strip of land in question has been intended for public use for several years and, as the neighbors have stated, they have prevented its closure, given that it is the only access to their homes. Having clarified the foregoing, and in response to the grievances set forth by the appellant representation, the criterion of this Tribunal regarding the source of the public domain nature (demanialidad) of public roads and its scope is reiterated, in the following sense: “In matters of public roads, our legislation provides several mechanisms to make their public domain nature and destination for public use concrete. In our country, the constitution of public roads can arise through various paths, which may well be through expropriation processes that subject the strips of land to public domain, or as a consequence of urban developments where new roads are opened in light of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, and even by the simple delivery for public use by their owners. In such cases, public roads have a special regime of Public Law, as they are intended for the enjoyment of the community and are protected by an initial registration principle (principio de inmatriculación) derived from article 44 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which means that a deed of transfer of ownership or its registry inscription is not required for the property to leave private domain". (Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Third Section, resolution number 309-2017 of 15 hours 20 minutes on August 10, 2017). Which is aligned with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which in this regard has indicated: “…the indicated presumption of public domain nature (presunción de demanialidad) operates when the Administration has just title to demonstrate the nature and ownership of the property, or when there are express acts of tolerance by the former owner that lead to establishing the delivery of the property to such use, either by the passage of time, or by the existence of reliable evidence in that sense. And this is so because, in addition, the inveterate use that has been given to the property as a public thoroughfare means that the burden of proof falls on whoever claims to be a better possessor or exclusive owner, whose jurisdictional action will have the purpose of destroying the presumption of public domain nature, precisely because it is based on another presumption of the same rank, which means that the appearance of the lands in official plans -public-, in national or municipal cadastres, or in archives, museums, or libraries, together with reliable proof of effective public use, makes the affectation the main characteristic, which may only disappear by virtue of a final judgment issued by the courts of the Republic”. (Constitutional Chamber, judgments number 1996-003145-1996 of 09 hours 26 minutes on June 28, 1996 and 2007-00593 of 08 hours and 51 minutes on January 29, 2007).

In summary, the public domain status of a public road can originate from the tolerance of the owner regarding the public use and purpose granted to it by the community, as is the case here, given that the road providing access to Barrio Los Rodríguez has been open to public use for several years (30 years according to municipal authorities), unquestioned by the appellant, to the extent that the Municipal Corporation was permitted to invest public funds in the maintenance and upkeep of the road. Also, it is important to recall that these public roads enjoy a presumption of public domain status contained in Article 7 of the Ley de Construcciones, which states: “Article 7.- Property. Any land that in the existing plans of the Municipality, or in the Archive of the Dirección General de Obras Públicas, or that of the Dirección General de Caminos, or in the Catastro, or in any other public archive, museum, or library, appears as a public road shall be presumed to have such status, except upon full proof to the contrary, which must be provided by whomever affirms that the land in question is private property or claims any exclusive right to its use. As long as no final judgment so declaring has been issued, no one may impede or obstruct the public use of the land in question.” This presumption, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, arises from a comprehensive analysis of the official documents located in the various offices of the Public Administration, which keep a record that accredits it; this analysis was developed by the Proceso de Geomática y Asuntos Jurídicos of the Municipality of Santa Ana, which, considering the following documents: cartographic sheets, neighboring property plans, and historical photographs, in light of the use and characteristics of the road, reached the conclusion that it is a public road in section A. Now, regarding the grievance related to the necessary registration of the property in favor of the Municipality, as a prerequisite to the recognition of a public road, it must be rejected, as it is contrary to the scope of the principle of initial registration (inmatriculación) recognized in Article 44 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which provides: “The municipal domain over the areas of streets, squares, gardens, parks, or other open spaces for general public use is constituted by that same use and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with if it is recorded on the Official Map". (The highlighting is not part of the original). That is, the nature of a public road shall prevail even if the property remains registered in the National Public Registry in the name of the appellants. On the other hand, regarding the objection raised by the appellant's representation against section "Fourth" of the challenged agreement, which literally states: "The legal representatives of those companies are requested to deliver that strip of land by public deed of donation...". This Chamber considers that said text must be interpreted in harmony with the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico), insofar as the Municipal Body uses the legal institution of donation; regarding which it is necessary to consider the following clarification from Sala I of the Supreme Court: "...V.- On this matter, this Chamber dissents from the respectable criterion set forth by the Superior Court. Surrounding the legal figure of donation lies a whole historical background of special significance for the proper interpretation of the referred Article 1399. The foregoing, in addition to other considerations that will be made, leads the Chamber to a conclusion different from that sustained by the Ad-quem. Legal science in general, as well as positive law, specifically, have always been characterized by rigorous treatment given to donations, both in terms of substantive conditions and formal requirements. The liberality inherent in donation has traditionally aroused suspicion and distrust. That is, the alienation or transfer of patrimonial rights that it implies, with no more justificatory cause than that of favoring the donee, has been a source of unease to the point of being reputed a dangerous institution for the interest of the family, of social order, of creditors, and of the donor himself, by concomitantly signifying an enrichment of another's patrimony and a detriment to one's own. Commonly, economic and social relations among human beings do not exhibit disinterested actions. It is for this reason that, since ancient times, a gratuitous transfer of ownership or one out of mere generosity prompted distrust, for fear that the will of the transferor may not have been free or conscious; that is, that it may have been influenced in some way by exogenous manipulation, or by the spurious interest of the disposer himself (such as an attempt to defraud creditors), or the purpose of obtaining from the donee some performance contrary to the law. It was thus that already in the times of Roman law, restrictive measures began to be applied to the donation, such as, for example, the Lex Cincia, enacted in the year 204 before Christ, which imposed a limit on donations, with the exception of those made between certain relatives. Under that orientation, the institution in question was legally shaped within a severe system, sponsored by a scrutinizing tendency on the part of the legislator concerning the donor's motivations. Such restrictive philosophy was inherited and renovated by French civil law. A faithful reflection of that phenomenon is constituted by the words of the jurists Planiol and Ripert, who attribute to French legislation 'a traditional spirit of severity and almost hostility towards liberalities, and this spirit,' they add, 'has inspired special legal provisions. The principal motive is that individual property, despite everything, continues to offer a familial character. Moreover, every gratuitous act is suspicious in the eyes of the legislator, because it is abnormal.' (Droit Civil Français, t. 5, no. 1., Ed. Cultural, Havana, 1939). VI.- The national legislator, upon issuing the Civil Code of 1888, did so under strong influence of French legislation and doctrine. Consequently, the regulation concerning donation does not escape the philosophy derived from the historical tradition commented upon. A clear example of this is constituted, among others, by Articles 1397, 1398, the same 1399, and 1402. It clashes, therefore, with the referred concepts, that a provision of said Code would fetter the power of the disposer to revoke the promise or offer to donate before the donee's acceptance. It must be taken into account in this regard that the spirit of said regulation, for the reasons noted, aspires, among its most cherished objectives, to ensure that the will to donate is at all times entirely free and conscious. Within such understanding, the period prescribed by Article 1399 of our Civil Code could not be interpreted as a right or provision in favor of the donee and a limitation for the transferor, but rather, as an obligation for the former, inherent to that of accepting, which at no time restricts the right of the transferor to retract before acceptance. Put another way, the objective of the period is to put an end to the state of uncertainty produced by an indefinite wait for acceptance, for the sake of legal certainty. National and foreign doctrine, as well as the legislation invoked by the Superior Court in support of its thesis (namely, the existence of the period prevents the donor from revoking his offer), refers to the period established by the proponent himself. This, within the general provisions relating to the offer as a manifestation of will directed at a specific person (future contracting party), which our Civil Code contemplates in Articles 1011 ab initio and 1013; the first reads: 'If the parties are not together, acceptance must be made within the period fixed by the proponent for this purpose.' The second prescribes the following: 'The proponent is obliged to maintain his proposal, as long as he does not receive a response from the other party in the terms established in the previous article' (one of whose provisions was the transcribed one). In such a case, when the proponent sets a period, it is understood that he is waiving - within the autonomy of the will - the right he possesses, in accordance with Article 1010, to withdraw the proposition as long as it has not been accepted. However, that commented principle, characteristic of the offer in general, is not applicable to that which is inherent in the institution of donation, as it confers a particular nature upon it that rejects it. First, as was already suggested, in the case of donation - Article 1399 - it is not the proponent who sets the period, but the law itself; and secondly, it does so under the influence of the philosophy that characterizes said contract, daughter of the historical process already mentioned, a philosophy which, as has been said, resists, in this special case, the adoption of the alluded principle from the general doctrine on offer...” (Voto N°137-1992 issued by Sala I of the Supreme Court of Justice at 14:20 on September 10, 1992). See that, in light of the above excerpt, donation is a voluntary act by which a person grants a patrimonial benefit to another, and which must be entirely free and conscious, with no other intent than to favor the donee; so that in this case, this Court understands that the petition contained in section "Fourth" of the appealed agreement was raised by the Municipality solely with the objective of formalizing the legal situation of the strip of land on which the public road lies; however, it can in no way be considered an exogenous will of the Municipal Corporation that constrains or obligates the representative of the appellant companies to donate the land; since said act is voluntary for the donor and also for the receiver. The foregoing, because this Court finds no provision in the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico) that establishes any obligation in that sense, despite the possible fiscal incentive the property owner may have to stop paying taxes on land that is a public road. It seems the Municipality erroneously treated it in the same manner as public roads that are the result of a subdivision (fraccionamiento) for urban development purposes, where the situation is completely different, in which once the developer has satisfied all the parameters established by the block of legality in the construction of the urbanization, he is assisted by the obligation and the right to have the donations processed under the terms of Article 40 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana. However, that article is not applicable in the present case, which involves a public road originating from the simple tolerance of the property owner, repeatedly over the years, towards public use, which is now described in official documents and has even been the object of investment of public funds for its maintenance, as well as for the provision of public services. In summary, in agreement N°07, adopted by the Council of the Municipality of Santa Ana, in its ordinary session N°94 of February 15, 2022, no violation whatsoever of the private property of the appellant companies occurred, insofar as the existence of the public road that the farm 1-24008-1975 supports arose prior to the appealed act, due to years of tolerance regarding the purpose that said strip of land has, which, being open to public use, the legal system normatively recognizes a public interest to protect. Neither is a lack of reasoning in the agreement observed, insofar as it is based on the extensive reports of the Proceso de Geomática and Legal Advisory MSA-GEM-SGE-01-181-2016 and MSA-ALc-ASL-03-091-2022 respectively, where the reasons why the road has been recognized by the municipal authorities as public in nature are sufficiently explained; the error of concept alluded to by the companies' representation being a consequence of having omitted from their analysis the principle of initial registration (inmatriculación) contained in Article 44 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which together with the presumption of public domain status are part of the system of protection for public roads. For this reason, the donation deed is unnecessary for the road to continue being public, and the donation request cannot be understood as an obligation, given the voluntary nature of said legal transaction. In light of the foregoing considerations, it is unavoidable for this Court to declare the appeal without merit, and the challenged agreement is confirmed with the exception made above regarding section "Fourth". As there is no further recourse in this venue, the administrative remedy must be deemed exhausted." III.- Return of the file. As these proceedings were conducted electronically, it is available to the parties to obtain a complete copy containing both the administrative file sent by the Municipal Corporation as well as the entirety of the documents that make up the present appeal, for which purpose they must provide the electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, in the event that physical or electronic documentation (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) was submitted that remains in the custody of this Office, whoever submitted it may withdraw it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, approved by the Full Court in session N° 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial N° 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session N° 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Por Tanto.

The appeal filed is declared without merit and, consequently, the appealed agreement is confirmed. The administrative remedy is deemed exhausted.

Francisco José Chaves Torres Jorge Leiva Poveda Evelyn Solano Ulloa ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal RECURRENTE: Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas La Mina S.A.

RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de Santa Ana.

*J7CEP47LF6RW61* In the present case, that annual period has been more than exceeded, so only the effective delivery of the land by the owner is pending (…) It is recommended to adopt the agreement declaring the road known as Calle los Fonseca to be of municipal public interest, from its start at national route 121 up to 117.22 m where the asphalt ends, a strip of land located on the property with real estate folio 1-248943-001 and 2, owned by Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas la Mina S.A., incorrectly located in Escazú under cadastral map SJ-24008-1975. Request the legal representatives of those companies to deliver that strip of land by public deed of donation…". (See images 16 through 23).

**5)** That on February 15, 2022, in Ordinary Session No. 94, the Municipal Council of Santa Ana decided the following: **"…Agreement No. 7: It is approved unanimously and definitively: First:** Dictamen No. 14 of the Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos is approved; **Second:** The recommendations of official letter MSA-ALC-ASL 03-091-2022, signed by Licda. Andrea Robles Álvarez, head of the Proceso Asesoría Legal, are accepted; **Third:** The agreement is adopted to declare of municipal public interest the road known as Calle Los Fonseca from its start at national route 121 up to 117.22 linear meters where the asphalt ends, a strip of land located on the property with real estate folio 1-248943-001 and 2, owned by Wilpetrac S.A. and Quintas la Mina S.A., incorrectly located in Escazú under cadastral map SJ-24008-1975; **Fourth:** The legal representatives of those companies are requested to deliver that strip of land by public deed of donation; **Fifth:** The Administration is ordered to have the Proceso de Geomática prepare the cadastral map of said strip of land; **Sixth:** The costs of surveying, cadastre, notary, and registration shall be borne by the Municipality; **Seventh:** Regarding the strip of land of section B0+000.00 to B0+083.73, the Administration is requested to provide an appraisal and then assess whether the Municipal Council declares it of public interest, to initiate negotiations with the co-owners for possible acquisition; **Eighth:** Regarding the strip of land of section B0+326 to B0+453, the Administration is instructed to render a report to assess its necessity as a public road, since free access to lots 9, 10, and 11 would be ensured with the delivery of section B0+000.00 to B0+83.73, therefore, preliminarily, the declaration of public road for this third section appears unnecessary; **Ninth:** For decision-making regarding these two sections, the Council must conduct a field inspection and interview the affected neighbors; **Tenth:** Notify this agreement to the Alcaldía Municipal, the Proceso de Asesoría Legal, the Proceso de Geomática, and the legal representatives of those companies owning the strips of land to be surrendered, and to the proprietary councilmember Catalina Obregón López. Agreement definitively approved."** (See image 125).

**6)** That, dissatisfied with the agreement just described, the representation of the companies Wilbetrac S.A. and Quintas La Mina S.A., filed a motion for reversal with a subsidiary appeal, the horizontal challenge being rejected by Agreement No. 05 adopted in Ordinary Session No. 98 on Tuesday, March 15, 2022, and it was decided to elevate the appeal to this Court. (See images 127 and 175).

**III. Arguments of the appeal.** Without prejudice to the integral reading that has been made of the arguments deduced by the appellant, in summary, it alleges the following: **1) Violation of the right to private property.** It points out, based on resolutions of the Sala Constitucional No. 3145-96 and 2009-003820, that the Municipality of Santa Ana cannot unilaterally appropriate the 117-meter deep strip of land from route 122, which is part of the property owned by its represented companies, with real estate folio No. 1-248943-001 and 002, without first carrying out the pertinent expropriation acts, as this is clearly an abuse of authority contrary to Article 45 of the Constitution. It adds that only if the land in question is of public domain, and was in fact used as a public road, does that land, over time, become a public road because custom and its purpose make it a public thoroughfare even though it is not officially established as such. It indicates that the Municipality could clearly have declared that road public if property registration number 1-248943 appeared in the name of the Municipality of Santa Ana, something that clearly does not occur in this case, since the municipal agreement not only recognizes that the property is in the name of the companies but even attempts to force said companies to donate that strip of land to the Municipality in an act of absolute abuse of authority. **2) Violation of the right to self-determination.** The appellant's representation indicates that the challenged agreement orders the companies' legal representatives to donate their land to the Municipality, which clearly violates the principle of personal self-determination; in this regard, it points out that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its judgment in the case of Murillo et al. vs. Costa Rica, stated: *"…in other words, it constitutes the right of every person to organize, and to organize in accordance with the law, their individual and social life according to their own choices and conditions (principle of personal self-determination)…"* In the same vein, it cites Judgment No. 176-2005 issued by the Sala Constitucional, which reiterates the criterion set forth in Judgment No. 5483-95, stating *"…it must be clear, as has been held in doctrine, that public liberties are nothing other than the constitutional recognition of personal autonomy; precisely because it is a sphere of autonomy, the faculties that comprise it may be exercised or not with the identical power of self-determination…"*. It explains that, based on the cited judgments and the principle of personal self-determination, the companies it represents are allowed to decide how and when they dispose of their property, and the Municipality of Santa Ana is barred from ordering the signing of a donation deed for that strip in its favor. It explains that, given the order issued by the Municipality, it is concerned that if the companies' representatives refuse to appear before a notary to donate this strip of land sought by the Municipality of Santa Ana, they could be reported to the Public Prosecutor's Office for the crime of disobedience to authority. **3) The non-existence of public interest.** It accuses the Municipality of Santa Ana of not having bothered to find out who lives adjacent to this road and under what legal status their houses stand, and whether they are in compliance with construction permits; given that, in response to a previously filed request, a reply was given by official letter number MSA-ALC-ASL-02-365-2021 from official Laura Valverde Quiroz of the legal advisory office, which indicated that only seven properties are adjacent to the property of its represented companies. It therefore questions how many people live on those seven properties, for the Municipal Council to take the trouble to make a public interest declaration for that strip of land owned by the companies, since in its view the Municipality cannot favor a single person to the detriment of another, or a very small group of people to the detriment of others, as this would clearly be prejudicial to the general interest of the Canton's community. And it considers that, to carry out the act of public interest declaration for that strip of land in favor of the Municipality of Santa Ana, the first thing the Municipality should have done was verify the existence of a general interest, namely the number of people who would benefit from that declaration, and whether there are legally compliant constructions on those lands, namely whether they were built respecting the canton's regulatory plan and therefore obtained the respective permits, aspects that are noticeably absent in this case. **4) Lack of reasoning.** It points out that, as there is no study by the Municipality of Santa Ana in this case that tells us how many people in the Canton would benefit from this public interest declaration to acquire this strip of private land, forming a public road, and the information also does not show whether the constructions on the site comply with the stipulations of the Regulatory Plan and were therefore built with the respective permits, then clearly there is also no adequate reasoning for the challenged act. **5) Contradictory reports from the municipality.** It indicates that through the official letter from the Asesoría Legal official cited, it was stated that the property with real estate folio 248943 is registered in the Canton of Escazú, and that by reason of competence, it is legally up to its Municipal Administration to take the appropriate measures; and now, just one year later, it is said that this same property is not only now within the boundaries of the Municipality of Santa Ana, but that a strip is being confiscated for the establishment of a public road, for the benefit of an indeterminate number of people supposedly living adjacent to this strip, and who require this public access. Based on the foregoing, it argues that there is an internal contradiction and an error made less than a year ago. **6) Conceptual error.** It mentions that for many years the Municipality has considered all sections of this road to be public, proof of which is the granting of municipal approval to survey plans that describe it as such, and the provision of maintenance services, such as gravel, waste collection, and road cleaning, provided for more than 30 years. It considers that this statement is regrettable, as it has been an error by the Municipality to grant approvals on boundary plans, indicating that part of the land registered under real estate folio 1-248943, owned by its represented companies, is a public road. Instead of amending and correcting its error or the defect of the act, the Municipality of Santa Ana rather seeks to consolidate its error, forcing the donation in its favor of part of the property with the indicated real estate folio, to perpetuate its error and artificially convert this strip into a public road.

**III.- On the merits.** Beforehand, it is considered important to clarify that, in this instance, by legal mandate, only a legality review of the formal actions of the municipal authorities—Alcaldía or Concejo Municipal—is conducted. The appeal constitutes the limit of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, such that it is at the instance of the party that considers itself aggrieved by the resolution, and through its specific petition, that this Chamber proceeds to its analysis to determine whether or not it is in accordance with the law. This oversight function thus finds its basis in the prior exposition of the concrete and precise grounds of grievance, which delimit the examination of what was decided, without it being possible for the Tribunal to cover aspects different from those claimed or to rule on grievances not raised. Therefore, this Judicial Tribunal, in its function as Contralor de Legalidad, is restricted to the study of the charges submitted and may only hear the points objected to in the claim—Article 181 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública—without being able to conduct an ex officio review of what was decided by the Municipal Body when the appeal lacks argumentation. It is thus imposed as an indispensable requirement that the appellant formulate the appeal clearly and precisely, outlining the objections maintained against the challenged pronouncement, being obliged to transparently set forth the errors alleged in the resolution or agreement being challenged, so that it is self-sufficient in terms of its full understanding, with express indication of the infractions it accuses as committed by the latter. **In the present case,** from a meticulous study of the administrative file, as well as the appeal brief confronted with the act challenged here, it is possible to conclude that the controversy originates from the appellant's attempts to close the public road that provides access to Barrio Los Rodríguez, technically located (see first proven fact) in Alto de las Palomas within the Canton of Santa Ana, a situation that has escalated before the Concejo Municipal, and consequently, the act challenged here has been issued, whose objective is the public interest declaration of the road and a request for the strip of land serving as the road to be donated in favor of the Municipality. In view of this, this Chamber considers it necessary to specify that, in the current legal "framework," there is a prohibition against closing, narrowing, building on, or fencing off a road or street given over by law or in fact to the service of the community—see Art. 32, Ley General de Caminos Públicos No. 5060—so that, if this occurs, the reopening of the public road must respect the legal framework. In this sense, regarding public domain assets, administrative action replaces possessory actions as a means for the Administration to protect its assets—principle of administrative self-protection (autotutela administrativa). However, there is an important difference between two modalities of administrative action, namely, the first refers to direct coercion against the individual to guarantee the public service for which the property is intended, in which the Administration, on behalf of the community, defends the real right that corresponds to it by its own hand, given that the asset, its use, and its destination, particularly public domain, admit no discussion regarding the ownership of the titleholder, understood as the State or its public entities. For example, a public park, registered or not, in the name of a Municipality, unquestionably given over to public use with no margin for error, since the possession held by the individual is openly illegitimate, or contrary to the service provided—Arts. 261 to 263 of the Civil Code. The same criterion could apply in the case of a route that is part of the road network, provided that said ownership is indisputable, therefore, a private individual cannot impede passage or free transit; in this regard, one may consult what is ordered in numerals 131 and 231 of the Ley de Tránsito y Seguridad Vial No. 9078. On the other hand, there is a declaratory modality, which refers to cases in which the circumstances prevent easily identifying, without any margin of error, that ownership, that destination, or that public characteristic that supposedly distinguishes public domain assets. In such cases, the law provides that, to remove the closure, narrowing, building, or fence built over the road, a special administrative procedure must be followed, whose purpose is to verify that the closed road is not of private domain. Consequently, the testimony of three witnesses must be gathered to record the pertinent facts, understood as from when the road was at the collective or private service and from when it was narrowed or closed, which must include a technical report. For this purpose, the violator must also be heard, which undoubtedly requires due prior notification regarding the purposes of the proceeding, the rights they hold, and the specific consequence through a correct imputation of the facts, so that if it is proven that the road was affected without authorization, or that it was at the collective service for more than a year, its reopening shall be ordered within a period of no more than three days, and if the obligated party fails to comply, the order shall be executed at their expense, all in accordance with Article 33 of the Ley General de Caminos and Article 308 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Note that this is an administrative act that requires prior procedure to support its validity and effectiveness—Arts. 129 to 189, Ley General de la Administración Pública. Therefore, in case of dispute regarding the ownership of the asset, the corresponding legal procedure must be followed, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional in its Voto No. 2010016599 of 10:01 hrs on October 8, 2010, which ordered *"…the procedure provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos be initiated, in order to determine the public or private nature of the closed road and to conclude it within a reasonable time…"*; however, in the present case, we are not faced with this latter scenario, as the strip of land in question has been destined for public use for several years, and according to what the neighbors have stated, they have prevented its closure, given that it is the only access to their homes. Having clarified the foregoing, and in consideration of the grievances set forth by the appellant's representation, we reiterate this Tribunal's criterion on the source of the public domain status (demanialidad) of public roads and its scope, in the following sense: *“In the matter of public roads, our legislation provides several mechanisms to concretize their public domain status and their destination for public use. In our country, the creation of public roads can occur through various means, which may well be through expropriation processes that subject strips of land to public domain, or as a consequence of urban developments where new roads are opened in light of the Ley de Planificación Urbana,* ***and even by the mere delivery to public use by their owners.*** *In these cases, public roads have a special Public Law regime, as they are destined for the enjoyment of the community and are protected by a* ***principle of first registration (inmatriculación)*** *that derives from Article 44 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana,* ***which means that a deed of transfer of ownership or its registration in the Registry is not required for the asset to leave private domain***.” (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera, resolution number 309-2017 of 3:20 p.m. on August 10, 2017). This is aligned with what was decided by the Sala Constitucional, which in this regard has indicated: *“the indicated presumption of public domain status operates when the Administration has just cause to demonstrate the nature and ownership of the asset, or when there are* ***express acts of tolerance by the former owner that lead to considering the delivery of the asset to such use as established, whether through the passage of time***, or through the existence of credible proof in that sense. And this is so, because, in addition, the long-standing use given to the property as a public road means that the burden of proof falls on whoever claims to be the better possessor or exclusive owner, whose jurisdictional action will have the purpose of destroying the presumption of public domain status, precisely because it is based on another presumption of the same rank, which means that the appearance of the lands on official—public—plans, in national or municipal cadastres, or in archives, museums, or libraries, together with credible proof of effective public use, makes the designation the main characteristic, which may not disappear except by virtue of a final judgment handed down by the courts of the Republic”* (Sala Constitucional, judgments number 1996-003145-1996 of 09:26 on June 28, 1996, and 2007-00593 of 08:51 on January 29, 2007). In summary, the public domain status of a public road can originate from the owner's tolerance of the public use and destination given to it by the community, as occurs in the present case, given that the road providing access to Barrio Los Rodríguez has been open to public use for several years (30 years according to municipal authorities), unchallenged by the appellant, to the extent that the Municipal Corporation was allowed to invest public funds in the maintenance and upkeep of the road. Also, it is important to recall that these public roads enjoy a presumption of public domain status contained in Section 7 of the Ley de Construcciones, which states: *"Article 7.- Ownership. Any land that, on existing plans of the Municipality, or in the Archive of the Dirección General de Obras Públicas, or that of the Dirección General de Caminos, or in the Catastro, or in any other public archive, museum, or library, appears as a public road, shall be presumed to have such status, except upon full proof to the contrary, which must be provided by whoever affirms that the land in question is private property or claims to have any exclusive right to its use. As long as no final judgment so declaring it is pronounced, no one may impede or hinder the public use of the land in question."* This presumption, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional, arises from the comprehensive analysis of official documents located in the various offices of the Public Administration that keep a record that accredits it; this analysis was carried out by the Proceso de Geomática and Legal Affairs of the Municipality of Santa Ana, which, considering the following documents—cartographic sheets, neighboring property plans, and historical photographs—in light of the use and characteristics of the road, reached the conclusion that it is a public road in section A. Now, regarding the grievance related to the necessary registration of the property in favor of the Municipal Government as a prerequisite for the recognition of a public road, it must be rejected, as it is contrary to the scope of the principle of first registration recognized in Section 44 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which provides: *"The municipal domain over areas of streets, squares, gardens, parks, or other open spaces for general public use is constituted* ***by that same use, and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with***, *if it is recorded on the Official Map." (The emphasis is not part of the original).* That is, the nature of a public road will prevail even though the property continues to be registered in the National Public Registry in the name of the appellants. *On the other hand, regarding the objection raised by the appellant's representation against section "Fourth" of the challenged agreement, which literally states: "The legal representatives of those companies are requested to deliver that strip of land by public deed of donation…".* This Chamber considers that said text must be interpreted in harmony with the legal "order" (ordenamiento), insofar as the Municipal Body uses the legal institution of donation; regarding which it is necessary to take into account the following precision from the First Chamber of the Court: "...V.- On this matter, this Chamber disagrees with the respectable criterion established by the Superior Court. An entire historical background of special significance for the proper interpretation of the said Article 1399 underlies the legal figure of donation. This, besides other considerations that will be made, leads this Chamber to a conclusion different from that sustained by the Ad-quem. Legal science in general, as well as positive law, specifically, have always been characterized by a rigorous treatment given to donations, both in terms of substantive conditions and formal ones. The liberality inherent in donation has traditionally aroused suspicion and distrust. That is, the alienation or transfer of patrimonial rights that it implies, without more justifiable cause than to favor the donee, has been a source of unease to the point of being considered a dangerous institution for the interest of the family, social order, creditors, and the donor themselves, as it simultaneously signifies an enrichment of another's patrimony and a detriment to one's own. Currently, the economic and social relations between human beings do not show disinterested actions. It is for this reason that, since ancient times, a free or purely generous transfer of ownership raised distrust, for fear that the transferor's will had not been free or conscious; that is, that exogenous manipulation, or the spurious interest of the disposer themselves (such as the attempt to defraud creditors), or the purpose of obtaining from the donee some performance contrary to law, had influenced it in some way. It was thus that already in the times of Roman Law, restrictive measures applied to donation began to be arbitrated, such as, for example, the Lex Cincia, issued in the year 204 before Christ, which imposed a limit on donations, with the exception of those made between certain relatives. Under that orientation, the institute in question was legally shaped within a severe regime, supported by a scrutinizing tendency, on the part of the legislator, concerning the motivations of the donor. Such a restrictive philosophy was inherited and renovated by French civil law. A faithful reflection of this phenomenon is constituted by the words of the treatise writers Planiol and Ripert who attribute to French legislation "a traditional spirit of severity and almost hostility towards liberalities, and such spirit - they add - has inspired special legal provisions. The main reason is that individual property, despite everything, continues to offer a family character. Furthermore, any gratuitous act is suspicious in the eyes of the legislator, because it is abnormal." (French Civil Law, t. 5, num 1., Ed. Cultural, Havana, 1939). VI.- The national legislator, upon issuing the Civil Code of 1888, did so under strong influence of French legislation and doctrine. Consequently, the regulation concerning donation does not escape the philosophy derived from the commented historical tradition. A clear example of this is constituted by, among others, Articles 1397, 1398, the same Article 1399, and 1402. It clashes, therefore, with the referred concepts that a provision of said Code shackles the faculty to revoke the promise or offer to donate that assists the disposer, before the acceptance of the donee. It must be taken into account in this regard that the spirit of said regulation, for the reasons pointed out, aspires, among its dearest objectives, to ensure that the will to donate is, at all times, entirely free and conscious. Within such understanding, the term prescribed by Article 1399 of our Civil Code could not be interpreted as a right or provision in favor of the donee and a limitation for the transferor, but rather, as an obligation for the former, inherent to that of accepting, which in no moment restricts the right of the transferor to retract before acceptance. In other words, the objective of the term is to put a stop to the state of uncertainty produced by an indefinite waiting for acceptance, for the sake of legal certainty. The national and foreign doctrine, as well as the legislation invoked by the Superior Court in support of its thesis (namely, the existence of the term prevents the donor from revoking their offer), refers to the term established by the proponent themselves. This, within the general provisions relative to the offer as a manifestation of will directed to a determined person (future contracting party), which our Civil Code contemplates in Articles 1011 ab initio and 1013; the first reads: "If the parties are not gathered, acceptance must be made within the term fixed by the proponent for this purpose". The second prescribes the following: "The proponent is obliged to maintain their proposal, while they do not receive a response from the other party in the terms set forth in the previous article" (one of whose provisions was transcribed). In such case, when the proponent fixes a term, it is understood that they are renouncing - within the autonomy of will - the right that assists them, according to Article 1010, to withdraw the proposition while it has not been accepted. However, that commented principle, typical of the offer in general, is not applicable to that which is inherent in the institution of donation, for it confers upon it a particular nature that rejects it. In the first place, as already conjectured, in the case of donation - Article 1399 - it is not the proponent who fixes the term, but the law itself; and in the second place, the law does so under the influence of the philosophy that characterizes said contract, daughter of the historical process already referred to, a philosophy which, as has been said, resists, in the special case, the adoption of the aforementioned principle coming from the general doctrine on offer..." (Voto N° 137-1992 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice at 14:20 hours on September 10, 1992). See that, in light of the previous extract, donation is a voluntary act by which one person grants a patrimonial benefit to another, and that it must be entirely free and conscious, with no other intention than to favor the donee; therefore, in the present case this Tribunal understands that the request contained in section "Cuarto" (Fourth) of the appealed agreement was raised by the Municipality solely with the objective of formalizing the legal situation of the strip of land upon which the public road (camino público) lies; however, in no moment can it be considered as an exogenous will of the Municipal Corporation that constrains or obligates the representative of the appellant companies to donate the land; given that said act is voluntary for the donor and also for the recipient. The foregoing, because this Tribunal does not find in the legal "order" a norm that establishes any obligation in that sense, despite the possible fiscal incentive that the property owner may have to stop paying taxes on land that is a public road. It seems the Municipality has erroneously treated it in the same manner as public streets that are the result of a subdivision with urban development purposes, where the situation is completely different, in which once the developer has satisfied all the parameters established by the legality block in the construction of the development, they have the obligation and the right to have the donations processed in the terms of Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana). However, that ordinal is not applicable in the present case, which concerns a public road originating from the simple tolerance of the property owner in a reiterated manner over years for public use, which is now described in official documents and has even been the object of public fund investment for its maintenance, as well as in the provision of public services. In sum, in Agreement No. 07, adopted by the Council of the Municipality of Santa Ana, in its ordinary session No. 94 dated February 15, 2022, no violation of the private property of the appellant companies occurred, insofar as the existence of the public road that burdens farm 1-24008-1975, has arisen prior to the appealed act, due to years of tolerance regarding the destination that said strip of land has, which being open to public use, the legal order normatively recognizes a public interest to protect. Neither is a lack of reasoning (motivación) of the agreement observed, insofar as it is based on the extensive reports of the Geomatics Process and Legal Advisory MSA-GEM-SGE-01-181-2016 and MSA-ALc-ASL-03-091-2022 respectively, where the reasons why the road has been recognized by the municipal authorities as being of a public nature are sufficiently explained; the error of concept referred to by the companies' representation being a consequence of having omitted in their analysis the principle of initial registration (inmatriculación) contained in ordinal 44 of the Urban Planning Law, which, together with the presumption of public domain (demanialidad), are part of the protection regime for public roads. For this reason, the deed of donation is unnecessary for the road to continue being public, and the request for donation cannot be understood as an obligation, given the voluntary condition of said legal transaction (negocio jurídico). By reason of the previous considerations, it is unavoidable for this Tribunal to declare the appeal (recurso de apelación) without merit, and the challenged agreement is confirmed with the previously made exception regarding section "Cuarto". As there is no subsequent recourse in this venue, the administrative channel must be considered exhausted.

III.- Of the return of the file. As this venue has been substantiated electronically, a comprehensive copy containing both the administrative file (expediente) sent by the Municipal Corporation as well as all the pieces that make up this present appeal is available to the parties, for which they must provide the electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, in case physical or electronic documentation entered (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) that still remains in the custody of the Office, whoever provided it may withdraw it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Regulation on Electronic File before the Judiciary (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Therefore.

The appeal filed is declared without merit and consequently the appealed agreement is confirmed. The administrative channel is considered exhausted.

Francisco José Chaves Torres Jorge Leiva Poveda Evelyn Solano Ulloa ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal RECURRENTE: Wilpetrac S.A.

and Quintas La Mina S.A.

**RESPONDENT: Municipalidad de Santa Ana.** <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 8pt; line-height: 150%; font-size: 11pt; background-color: #ffffff;"> </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 8pt; line-height: 150%; font-size: 14pt; background-color: #ffffff;">- Verification Code -<br />*J7CEP47LF6RW61*<br />J7CEP47LF6RW61</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 8pt; text-align: center; line-height: 150%; background-color: #ffffff;"><br /><br /> </p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="width: 389.2pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 8pt; text-align: center; line-height: 150%; font-size: 10pt; background-color: #ffffff;">Document signed by:<br /><br />FRANCISCO CHAVES TORRES, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE<br />JORGE LEIVA POVEDA, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE<br />EVELYN SOLANO ULLOA, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 8pt; text-align: center; line-height: 150%; background-color: #ffffff;"> </p> The following national regulations are cited: Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), No. 4240, of January 25, 2022; Articles 32 and 33 of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), No. 5060, of March 29, 2023; Articles 129 to 189 and 308 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), No. 6227, of March 8, 2022; Articles 261 and 263 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), No. 63, of March 30, 2022; Article 7 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), No. 833, of September 26, 2017; and Articles 131 and 231 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads and Road Safety (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial), No. 9078, of May 5, 2022.

"III.- On the merits [...]

In the instant case, after a meticulous review of the administrative file, as well as the appeal brief compared with the act challenged herein, it is possible to conclude that the dispute arises from the appellant's attempts to close the public road that provides access to Barrio Los Rodríguez, technically located (see first proven fact) in Alto de las Palomas within the Cantón of Santa Ana, a situation that has escalated before the Municipal Council, and consequently the act challenged herein has been issued, whose purpose is the declaration of public interest of the road and an exhortation for the strip of land that serves as the road to be donated in favor of the Municipality.

In view of this, this Chamber considers it necessary to specify that in the current legal "system," there is a prohibition against closing, narrowing, building upon, or fencing off a road or street given by law or in fact to the service of the community—see Art. 32 of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) N°5060—such that, if the foregoing occurs, the legal framework must be respected for the reopening of the public road. In this sense, dealing with public domain assets (bienes demaniales), administrative action substitutes for interdictal action as the means for the Administration to protect its assets—the principle of administrative self-protection (principio de autotutela administrativa). However, there is an important difference between two modalities of administrative action, namely, the first referring to direct coercion upon the individual to guarantee the public service for which the property is intended, in which the Administration, on behalf of the community, defends the real right that corresponds to it, by its own hand, given that the asset, its use, and its purpose, particularly as a public domain asset, admits no discussion as to the owner's title, understood to be the State or its public entities. For example, a public park, registered or not, in the name of a Municipality, given over to public use without margin for error, since the possession held by the administered party is openly illegitimate, or contrary to the service they provide—Arts. 261 to 263 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). The same criterion could be applied in the case of a route that forms part of the road network, provided that this title is indisputable; therefore, a private individual cannot impede passage or free transit; in this regard, one may consult the provisions of numerals 131 and 231 of the Law of Transit and Road Safety (Ley de Tránsito y Seguridad Vial) N°9078. On the other hand, there exists a declarative modality, which refers to cases in which circumstances prevent easily identifying, without any margin of error, that title, that purpose, or that public characteristic that supposedly distinguishes public domain assets. In such scenarios, the law provides that, to remove the closure, narrowing, building, or fence constructed on the road, a special administrative procedure must be followed, the object of which is to verify that the closed road is not of private domain. Consequently, the declaration of three witnesses must be gathered, to record the pertinent facts, meaning, since when the road was at the service of the community or of private individuals and since when it was narrowed or closed, and must include a technical report. For this purpose, the offender must also be heard, which undoubtedly requires proper prior notification, regarding the purposes of the proceeding, the rights that assist them, and the specific consequence through a correct imputation of the facts, so that if it is verified that the road was affected without authorization, or that it was at the collective service for more than one year, the reopening shall be ordered within a period not exceeding three days, and in default of the obligated party, the order shall be executed at their expense, all in accordance with Article 33 of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos) and Article 308 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Note that this is an administrative act that requires a prior procedure to sustain its validity and effectiveness—Arts. 129 to 189 General Law of Public Administration [...]

[...] the criterion of this Court regarding the source of the public domain status (demanialidad) of public roads and its scope, in the following sense: "In matters of public roads, our legislation provides several mechanisms to concretize their public domain status and purpose for public use. In our country, the constitution of public roads can be generated through various means, which may well be through expropriation processes that affect strips of land to the public domain, or as a consequence of urban developments where new roads are opened in light of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), and even, by the simple delivery to public use by their owners. In those scenarios, public roads have a special Public Law regime, since they are intended for the enjoyment of the community and are protected by a principle of initial registration exemption (principio de inmatriculación) that derives from Article 44 of the Urban Planning Law, which means that a deed of transfer of ownership or its registry inscription is not required for the asset to leave the private domain." (Administrative Litigation Court, Third Section, resolution number 309-2017 of 15 hours 20 minutes on August 10, 2017). Which is aligned with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) that in this regard has indicated: "...the indicated presumption of public domain status operates when the Administration has just title to demonstrate the nature and ownership of the asset, or when there exist express acts of tolerance by the former owner that lead to considering the delivery of the asset to such use as established, whether by the passage of time, or by the existence of reliable proof in that sense. And this is so, because, furthermore, the long-standing use that has been given to the property as a public road means that the burden of proof falls on whoever claims to be the better possessor or excluding owner, whose jurisdictional action will have the purpose of destroying the presumption of public domain status, precisely because it is based on another presumption of the same rank, which means that the appearance of the land on official public plans, in national or municipal cadasters (catastros), or in archives, museums, or libraries, together with reliable proof of effective public use, makes the public dedication (afectación) the main characteristic, which cannot disappear except by virtue of a final judgment issued by the courts of the Republic." (Constitutional Chamber, judgments number 1996-003145-1996 of 09 hours 26 minutes on June 28, 1996, and 2007-00593 of 08 hours 51 minutes on January 29, 2007). In short, the public domain status of the public road can have its origin in the owner's tolerance of the use and public purpose given to it by the community, just as happens in the present case, since the road that provides access to Barrio Los Rodríguez has been open to public use for several years (30 years according to municipal authorities), unchallenged by the appellant party, to the extent that the Municipal Corporation was allowed to invest public funds in the maintenance and attention of the road. Also, it is important to remember that these public roads enjoy a presumption of public domain status contained in numeral 7 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) which states: "Article 7.- Property. Any land that in the existing plans of the Municipality, or in the Archive of the General Directorate of Public Works, or that of the General Directorate of Roads, or in the Cadaster (Catastro), or in any other public archive, museum, or library, appears as a public road shall be presumed to have that status, unless full proof to the contrary is provided, which must be rendered by whoever affirms that the land in question is private property or claims to have any exclusive right to its use. As long as an executory judgment declaring so has not been issued, no one may impede or obstruct the public use of the land in question." This presumption, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, arises from the integral analysis of official documents located in the different offices of the Public Administration that keep a record accrediting it; this analysis was developed by the Process of Geomatics and Legal Affairs of the Municipality of Santa Ana, which, considering the following documents: the cartographic sheets, the plans of the adjacent properties (colindantes), and historical photographs, in light of the use and characteristics of the road, reached the conclusion that it is a public street in section A [...]

It seems the Municipality has erroneously treated it in the same way as public streets that are the result of a subdivision (fraccionamiento) for urban development purposes, where the situation is completely different, in which, once the developer has satisfied all the parameters established by the legality framework in the construction of the development, they are obliged and entitled to have the donations processed under the terms of Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law. However, that numeral is not applicable in the present case, which concerns a public road originating from the simple, repeated tolerance of the property owner for years towards public use, which is now described in official documents and has even been the object of investment of public funds for its maintenance, as well as in the provision of public services [...]." and Quintas la Mina S.A., incorrectly located in Escazú under cadastral map SJ-24008-1975; <span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Fourth:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> The legal representatives of these companies are requested to convey that strip of land by public deed of donation; </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Fifth:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> The Administration is ordered that the Geomatics Process prepare the cadastral map of said strip of land; </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Sixth:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> The surveying, cadastre, notary, and registration costs shall be borne by the Municipality; </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Seventh:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> Regarding the strip of land from section B0+000.00 to B0+083.73, the Administration is requested to conduct an appraisal and then assess whether the Municipal Council declares it of public interest, in order to begin negotiations with the co-owners for its possible acquisition; </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Eighth:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> Regarding the strip of land from section B0+326 to B0+453, the Administration is instructed to issue a report to assess its necessity as a public road, given that free access to lots 9, 10, and 11 would be ensured by the conveyance of the section from B0+000.00 to B0+83.73, and therefore, preliminarily, the declaration of this third section as a public road appears unnecessary; </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Ninth:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> For decision-making regarding these two sections, the Council must conduct a field inspection and interview the affected neighbors; </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">Tenth:</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> Notify this </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; background-color: #00ffff;">agreement to the</span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;"> Municipal Mayor's Office, the Legal Advisory Process, the Geomatics Process, and the legal representatives of those Companies that are owners of the strips of land to be conveyed, and to the proprietary councilor Catalina Obregón López. Agreement definitively approved." (</span><span style="font-style: italic;">See image 125). </span><span style="font-weight: bold;">6)</span> That, disagreeing with the agreement just described, the representation of the companies Wilbetrac S.A. and Quintas La Mina S.A. filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal, <a name="_Int_tQjn6Ere"></a>and the horizontal challenge was rejected by Agreement No. 05 adopted at Ordinary Session No. 98 on Tuesday, March 15, 2022, and it was decided to elevate the appeal to this Court. (See images 127 and 175). - **III. Arguments of the appeal.** Without prejudice to the comprehensive reading that has been made of the arguments put forth by the appellant, in summary, they allege the following: **1) Violation of the right to private property.** It points out, based on Constitutional Chamber resolutions No. 3145-96 and 2009-003820, that the Municipality of Santa Ana cannot unilaterally appropriate the strip of land measuring 117 meters in depth from Route 122, which is part of the property owned by its represented companies, under real estate folio number 1-248943-001 and 002, without first carrying out the pertinent expropriation acts, since this is clearly an abuse of authority in violation of Article 45 of the Magna Carta. It adds that only if the land in question is in the public domain, and was later in fact used as a public road, does that land, with the passage of time, become a public road because custom and its purpose make it a traveled public way even though it is not officially established as such. It indicates that clearly the Municipality could have declared that road public, if the land under registration number 1-248943 appeared in the name of the municipality of Santa Ana, which is clearly not the case here, since the municipal agreement not only acknowledges that this property is in the name of the companies but also seeks to force said companies to donate that strip of land to the Municipality in an act of absolute abuse of authority. **2) Violation of the right to self-determination.** The appellant's representation indicates that in the challenged agreement, the legal representatives of the companies are being ordered to donate their land to the Municipality, which clearly violates the principle of personal self-determination, and in this regard points out that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its judgment in the case of Murillo et al. versus Costa Rica, stated: *"...in other words, it constitutes the right of every person to organize themselves and organize with, in accordance with the law, their individual and social life according to their own choices and conditions (principle of personal self-determination)…"* In the same vein, it cites Judgment No. 176-2005 issued by the Constitutional Chamber, which reiterates the criterion set forth in Judgment No. 5483-95, which states: *"...it must be clear, as doctrine has held, that public liberties are nothing other than the constitutional recognition of personal autonomy; precisely because it is a sphere of autonomy, the faculties that comprise it can be exercised or not with identical power of self-determination…"*. It explains that, based on the cited judgments and the principle of personal self-determination, the companies it represents are permitted to decide how and when they dispose of their property, and the Municipality of Santa Ana is barred from ordering the signing of a deed of donation of that strip in its favor. It explains that, given the order issued by the Municipality, it is concerned that if the companies' representatives refuse to appear before a notary to donate this strip of land sought by the Municipality of Santa Ana, they could be reported to the Public Prosecutor's Office for the crime of disobedience to authority. **3) The non-existence of public interest.** It accuses the Municipality of Santa Ana of not having taken the trouble to find out who lives on the adjoining properties of this road and under what legal status their houses are, and whether they are in compliance with construction permits; since, in response to a previously filed request, it received a reply by official letter number MSA-ALC-ASL-02-365-2021 from official Laura Valverde Quiroz of the Legal Advisory Office, who informed it that only seven properties are adjacent to the property of its represented companies, and therefore questions how many people live on those seven properties, for the Municipal Council to take the trouble to make a declaration of public interest for that strip of land owned by the companies, since in its view the Municipality cannot favor a single person to the detriment of another, or a very small group of people, to the detriment of others, as this would clearly be to the detriment of the general interest of the Canton's community. And it considers that to carry out the act of declaring that strip of land of public interest, in favor of the Municipality of Santa Ana, the first thing the Municipality should have done was to verify the existence of the general interest, namely the number of people who would benefit from that declaration, and whether there are legally compliant constructions on those lands, that is, whether they were built respecting the canton's regulatory plan (Plan Regulador), and therefore obtained the respective permits, aspects that we find lacking in this case. **4) Lack of reasoning (motivación).** It points out that since there is no study by the Municipality of Santa Ana in this case that tells us how many people in the Canton would benefit from this declaration of public interest to acquire this strip of private land, forming a public road, and the file also lacks information on whether the on-site constructions are in accordance with the stipulations of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) and were therefore built with the respective permits, then clearly there is also no adequate reasoning (motivación) for the appealed act. **5) Contradictory reports from the municipality.** It indicates that through the cited official letter from the Legal Advisory Office, it was stated that the property under real estate folio number 248943 is registered in the Canton of Escazú, and that for jurisdictional reasons, it is legally the responsibility of its Municipal Administration to take the corresponding measures, and now, just one year later, it is said that this same property is not only now within the boundaries of the Municipality of Santa Ana, but that a strip is being confiscated from it for the establishment of a public road, for the benefit of an indeterminate number of people who supposedly live adjacent to this strip and require this public access. From the foregoing, it is argued that there is an internal contradiction and it is an error from less than a year ago. **6) Error of concept.** It mentions that for many years the Municipality has considered that all sections of this street are public, proof of which is the granting of municipal approval (visado municipal) to survey maps that describe it as such, and the provision of maintenance services such as gravel (lastre), waste collection, and road cleaning, provided for more than 30 years. It considers this claim regrettable, as it has been an error of the Municipality to grant approvals (visados) on boundary maps, indicating that part of the land registered under real estate folio number 1-248943, owned by its represented companies, is a public road, and instead of amending and correcting its error or defect (vicio) of the act, the Municipality of Santa Ana rather seeks to consolidate its error by forcing a donation in its favor of part of the property under the indicated real estate folio number, to perpetuate its error and artificially turn this strip into a public road.

**III.- On the merits.** Beforehand, it is considered important to clarify that, in this instance, by legal mandate, only a review of the legality of the formal actions of the municipal authorities—Mayor's Office or Municipal Council—is conducted, and the appeal constitutes the limit of the Court's jurisdiction, in such a way that it is at the request of the party that disagrees with the resolution and through its specific petition, that this Chamber proceeds to its analysis for the purpose of determining whether or not it is in accordance with the law. This supervisory function thus finds support in the prior exposition of the concrete and precise grounds of grievance, which delimit the examination of what was resolved, without it being possible for the Court to cover aspects different from those claimed or to rule on grievances not raised. Therefore, this Judicial Court, in its function as Controller of Legality, is restricted to the study of the charges submitted and may only hear the points that are the subject of the claim—181 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—without being able to conduct an ex officio examination of what was decided by the Municipal Body in the face of argumentative deficiencies in the appeal. Thus, an indispensable requirement is that the appellant formulate the appeal clearly and precisely, outlining the objections they maintain against the challenged pronouncement, being obligated to clearly state the errors alleged in the resolution or agreement being appealed, so that it is self-sufficient for its complete understanding, with express indication of the infractions they accuse it of having committed. **In this specific case (En la especie),** from a meticulous study of the administrative file, as well as the appellate brief contrasted with the act challenged here, it is possible to conclude that the controversy originates from the appellant's attempts to close the public road that provides access to Barrio Los Rodríguez, technically located (see first proven fact) in Alto de las Palomas within the Canton of Santa Ana, a situation that has escalated before the Municipal Council, and consequently, the act challenged here was issued, which aims at the declaration of public interest of the road and an exhortation for the strip of land serving as the road to be donated to the Municipality. In view of this, this Chamber considers it necessary to specify that in the current legal system (ordenamiento), there is a prohibition against closing, narrowing, building upon, or fencing off a road or street given by law or in fact to the service of the community—see Art. 32 of the General Law of Public Roads No. 5060 (Ley General de Caminos Públicos)—so that, if the foregoing occurs, the legal framework must be respected for the reopening of the public way. In this sense, when dealing with public domain assets, administrative action replaces interdictal action as a means for the Administration to protect its assets—principle of administrative self-protection (autotutela administrativa). However, there is an important difference between two modalities of administrative action, namely, the first refers to direct coercion of the individual to guarantee the public service for which the property is intended, in which the Administration, on behalf of the community, defends the real right that corresponds to it, by its own hand, given that the property, its use, and its purpose, particularly as a public domain asset, does not admit discussion regarding the owner's title—understood as the State or its public entities. For example, a public park, registered or not, in the name of a Municipality, given over to public use without any margin of error, since the possession held by the private individual is openly illegitimate, or contrary to the service it provides—Arts. 261 to 263 of the Civil Code. The same criterion could apply in the case of a route that is part of the road network, provided that such ownership is indisputable; therefore, a private individual cannot impede passage or free transit. In this regard, the provisions of Articles 131 and 231 of the Traffic and Road Safety Law No. 9078 (Ley de Tránsito y Seguridad Vial) may be consulted. On the other hand, there is a declarative modality, which refers to cases where circumstances prevent easily identifying, without any margin of error, that ownership, that purpose, or that public characteristic that supposedly distinguishes public domain assets. In such cases, the law provides that to remove the closure, narrowing, building, or fence constructed on the way, a special administrative procedure must be followed, which aims to verify that the closed way is not privately owned. Consequently, the statement of three witnesses must be gathered to record the pertinent facts, meaning, since when the road was at the collective or private service and since when it was narrowed or closed, and a technical report must be included. For this purpose, the offender must also be heard, which undoubtedly requires proper prior notification about the purposes of the proceeding, the rights they are entitled to, and the specific consequence through a correct imputation of the facts, so that if it is verified that the road was affected without authorization, or that it was in the collective service for more than one year, the reopening will be ordered within a period not exceeding three days, and in the event of non-compliance by the obligated party, the order will be executed at their expense, all in accordance with Article 33 of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos) and Article 308 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). It can be seen that it is an administrative act that requires the prior procedure to support its validity and efficacy—Arts. 129 to 189 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). For this reason, in the event of a dispute about the ownership of the asset, the corresponding legal procedure must be followed, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in its Vote No. 2010016599 at 10:01 a.m. on October 8, 2010, which ordered: *"...that the procedure provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the General Law of Public Roads be initiated, in order to determine the public or private nature of the closed road and that it be concluded within a reasonable time..."*; however, in this specific case we are not facing the latter scenario, since the strip of land in question has been destined for public use for several years and, as the neighbors have stated, they have prevented its closure given that it is the only access to their homes. Having clarified the foregoing, and in response to the grievances raised by the appellant's representation, it is necessary to reiterate this Court's criterion on the source of the public domain status (demanialidad) of public roads and its scope, in the following sense: *"In matters of public roads, our legislation provides for several mechanisms to materialize their public domain status and destiny for public use. In our country, the constitution of public ways can arise through various means, which may well be through expropriation processes that transfer strips of land to the public domain, or as a consequence of urban developments where new roads are opened under the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana),* ***and even, by the simple delivery to public use by their owners.** *In those cases, public roads have a special Public Law regime, as they are destined for the enjoyment of the community and are protected by a* ***principle of exemption from registration (inmatriculación)*** *that derives from Article 44 of the Urban Planning Law,* ***which means that a deed of title transfer or its registration is not required for the property to leave private ownership*** *"*. (Contentious-Administrative Court, Third Section, resolution number 309-2017 at 3:20 p.m. on August 10, 2017). This is aligned with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which has indicated in this regard: *"…the indicated presumption of public domain status operates when the Administration has just title to demonstrate the nature and ownership of the asset, or when there exist* ***express acts of tolerance by the former owner that lead to establishing the delivery of the asset to such use, whether through the passage of time*** *, or through the existence of reliable proof to that effect. And this is so because, furthermore, the long-standing use that has been given to the property as a public way means that the burden of proof falls on whoever claims to be a better possessor or exclusive owner, whose jurisdictional action will aim to destroy the presumption of public domain status, precisely because this is based on another presumption of the same rank, which means that the appearance of the lands on official—public—maps, in national or municipal cadastres, or in archives, museums, or libraries, together with reliable proof of effective public use, makes the dedication (afectación) the main characteristic, which cannot disappear except by virtue of a final judgment issued by the courts of the Republic"*. (Constitutional Chamber, judgments number 1996-003145-1996 at 9:26 a.m. on June 28, 1996, and 2007-00593 at 8:51 a.m. on January 29, 2007). In short, the public domain status of the public road can originate from the owner's tolerance of the public use and destiny that the community grants it, as is the case here, since the road that provides access to Barrio Los Rodríguez has been open to public use for several years (30 years according to the municipal authorities), not questioned by the appellant, to the extent that the Municipal Corporation was allowed to invest public funds in the maintenance and upkeep of the road. It is also important to recall that these public roads enjoy a presumption of public domain status contained in Article 7 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), which states: *"Article 7.- Property. Any land that appears as a public way on the existing maps of the Municipality, or in the Archive of the General Directorate of Public Works, or that of the General Directorate of Roads, or in the Cadastre, or in any other public archive, museum, or library, shall be presumed to have that status, barring full proof to the contrary, which must be provided by anyone affirming that the land in question is private property or claims any exclusive right to its use. As long as an executory judgment declaring otherwise is not issued, no one may impede or obstruct the public use of the land in question"*. This presumption, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, arises from the comprehensive analysis of the official documents located in the different offices of the Public Administration that maintain a record accrediting it; this analysis was carried out by the Geomatics and Legal Affairs Process of the Municipality of Santa Ana, which, considering the following documents: cartographic sheets, maps of the adjoining properties (colindantes), and historical photographs, in light of the use and characteristics of the road, reached the conclusion that it is a public street in Section A. Now, regarding the grievance related to the need for the property to be registered in the name of the Municipality as a prerequisite for recognizing a public street, this must be rejected, as it is contrary to the scope of the principle of exemption from registration (inmatriculación) recognized in Article 44 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), which provides: *"The municipal ownership over the areas of streets, plazas, gardens, parks, or other open spaces for general public use, is constituted* ***by that same use and its registration in the Property Registry may be dispensed with*** *, if it appears on the Official Map". (The highlighting is not part of the original).* That is, the nature of a public road will prevail even if the property remains registered in the National Public Registry in the name of the appellants. *On the other hand, regarding the objection raised by the appellant's representation against the "Fourth" section of the challenged agreement, which literally states: "The legal representatives of these companies are requested to convey that strip of land by public deed of donation...".* This Chamber considers that said text must be interpreted in harmony with the legal system (ordenamiento), insofar as the Municipal Body uses the legal institute of donation; regarding which it is necessary to take into account the following clarification from Court Chamber I: *"...V.- On this particular matter, this Chamber differs from the respectable criterion set by the Superior Court. Underlying the legal figure of donation is an entire historical background of special significance for the proper interpretation of the cited Article 1399. The foregoing, along with other considerations that will be made, leads the Chamber to a different conclusion from that upheld by the Ad-quem. Legal science in general, as well as positive law, specifically, have always been characterized by a rigorous treatment given to donations, both in terms of substantive and formal conditions. The liberality, inherent in donation, has traditionally aroused suspicion and distrust.* ***That is, the alienation or transfer of patrimonial rights it implies, with no other justifying cause than that of favoring the donee*** *, has been a source of anxiety to the point of deeming it a dangerous institution for the interests of the family, the social order, creditors, and the donor themselves, as it concomitantly signifies an enrichment of another's patrimony and a diminishment of one's own.* ***Commonly, economic and social relations among human beings do not show disinterested actions*** *. That is why, since very ancient times, a gratuitous or purely generous transfer of title has aroused distrust,* ***for fear that the transferor's will might not have been free or conscious*** *; that is, that it may have been influenced in some way by* ***exogenous manipulation,*** *or the spurious interest of the transferor themselves (such as an attempt to defraud creditors), or the purpose of obtaining from the donee some service contrary to the law.*" It was thus that, already in the time of Roman law, restrictive measures began to be applied to the gift (donación), such as, for example, the Lex Cincia, issued in the year 204 before Christ, which imposed a limit on gifts, with the exception of those made between certain relatives. Under that orientation, the institute in question was legally shaped within a severe regime, sponsored by a scrutinizing tendency on the part of the legislator regarding the donor's motivations. Such restrictive philosophy was inherited and renovated by French civil law. A faithful reflection of that phenomenon is constituted by the words of the commentators Planiol and Ripert, who attribute to French legislation "a traditional spirit of severity and almost of hostility towards liberalities, and such spirit—they add—has inspired special legal provisions. The principal reason is that individual property, in spite of everything, continues to offer a family character. Furthermore, every gratuitous act is suspicious in the eyes of the legislator, because it is abnormal." (Derecho Civil Francés, t. 5, núm. 1., Ed. Cultural, La Habana, 1939). VI.- Our national legislator, when issuing the Civil Code of 1888, did so under the strong influence of French legislation and doctrine. Consequently, the regulation concerning the gift (donación) does not escape the philosophy derived from the aforementioned historical tradition. A clear example of this is constituted, among others, by Articles 1397, 1398, the same 1399, and 1402. It clashes, therefore, with the referenced concepts, that a provision of said Code should fetter the faculty to revoke the promise or offer to give (donar) available to the disposer, before the acceptance of the donee (donatario). It must be taken into account in this regard that the spirit of said regulation, for the reasons noted, aspires, among its most cherished objectives, to ensure that the will to give (donar) is, at all times, entirely free and conscious. Within such an understanding, the period prescribed by Article 1399 of our Civil Code could not be interpreted as a right or provision in favor of the donee (donatario) and a limitation for the transferor, but rather as an obligation for the former, inherent to that of acceptance, which at no time restricts the right of the transferor to retract before acceptance. Said another way, the objective of the period is to put a limit on the state of uncertainty produced by an indefinite wait for acceptance, in the interest of legal certainty. The national and foreign doctrine, as well as the legislation that the Superior Tribunal invokes in support of its thesis (namely, the existence of the period prevents the donor from revoking his offer), refers to the period established by the proponent himself. That, within the general provisions relative to the offer as a manifestation of will directed at a specific person (future contracting party), which our Civil Code contemplates in Articles 1011 ab initio and 1013; the first reads: "If the parties are not assembled, the acceptance must be made within the period fixed by the proponent for this purpose." The second prescribes the following: "The proponent is obliged to maintain his proposal, as long as he does not receive a response from the other party within the terms set in the preceding article" (one of whose provisions was the one transcribed). In such a case, when the proponent sets a period, it is understood that he is renouncing—within the autonomy of the will—the right that assists him, in accordance with Article 1010, to withdraw the proposition as long as it has not been accepted. However, that commented principle, proper to the offer in general, is not applicable to the one that is inherent in the institute of the gift (donación), as the latter confers a particular nature that rejects it. In the first place, as was already sensed, in the case of the gift (donación)—Article 1399—it is not the proponent who sets the period, but the law itself; and in the second place, the latter does so under the influence of the philosophy that characterizes said contract, born of the historical process already mentioned, a philosophy which, as has been said, resists, in the special case, the adoption of the alluded principle coming from the general doctrine on the offer..." (Voto N°137-1992 issued by Sala I of the Corte Suprema de Justicia at 14:20 hours on September 10, 1992). It is seen that, in light of the previous excerpt, the gift (donación) is a voluntary act by which a person grants a patrimonial benefit to another, and which must be entirely free and conscious, with no other intent than to favor the donee (donatario); therefore, in the present case this Tribunal understands that the request contained in section "Cuarto" of the appealed agreement was raised by the Municipality solely with the objective of formalizing the legal situation of the strip of land upon which the public road lies, however, at no time can it be considered as an exogenous will of the Municipal Corporation, that constrains or obligates the representative of the appellant companies to donate (donar) the land; since said act is voluntary for the donor (donante) and also for the one who receives. The foregoing, because this Tribunal does not find in the legal "ordenamiento" a norm that establishes any obligation in that sense, despite the possible fiscal incentive that the titleholder of the property may have to stop paying taxes on a land that is a public road. It seems the Municipality has erroneously treated it in the same way as public streets that are the result of a subdivision (fraccionamiento) for urban planning purposes, where the situation is completely different, in which once the developer has satisfied all the parameters established by the block of legality in the construction of the urbanization, the obligation and the right assist him so that the donations (donaciones) are processed under the terms of Article 40 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana). However, that article is not applicable in the present case, which concerns a public road originating from the simple tolerance of the titleholder of the property in a reiterated manner over the years, with respect to public use, which is now described in official documents and has even been the object of investment of public funds for its maintenance, as well as in the provision of public services. In sum, in agreement N°07, adopted by the Council of the Municipality of Santa Ana, in its ordinary session N°94 of February 15, 2022, no violation whatsoever was made to the private property of the appellant companies, insofar as the existence of the public road that supports farm 1-24008-1975, arose prior to the appealed act, due to years of tolerance regarding the purpose that said strip of terrain has, which by being open to public use, the legal system normatively recognizes a public interest to protect. Nor is a lack of motivation of the agreement observed, insofar as it is based on the extensive reports of the Geomatics Process and Legal Advisory MSA-GEM-SGE-01-181-2016 and MSA-ALc-ASL-03-091-2022 respectively, where the reasons are sufficiently explained for which the road has been recognized by the municipal authorities as being of a public nature; it being that the error of concept alluded to by the representation of the companies is a consequence of having omitted in their analysis the principle of initial registration (inmatriculación) contained in Article 44 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), which together with the presumption of public domain (demanialidad) are part of the regime of protection of public roads. For this reason, the deed of donation (donación) is made unnecessary, for the road to continue being public, and the request for donation (donación) cannot be understood as an obligation, given the voluntary condition of said legal transaction. By reason of the foregoing considerations, it is unavoidable for this Tribunal to declare the appeal without merit, and the appealed agreement is confirmed with the exception previously made regarding section "Cuarto". As there is no further appeal in this venue, the administrative channel must be considered exhausted.

III.- On the return of the case file. As this venue has been processed electronically, the parties may obtain a complete copy containing both the administrative case file sent by the Municipal Corporation as well as the totality of the pieces that make up the present appeal, for which purpose they must provide the electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, in the event that physical or electronic documentation has been submitted (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) that still remains in custody at the Court, whoever submitted it may withdraw it within a period of 30 working days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Corte Plena in session n.º 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial n.º 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session n.º 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

**Por Tanto.** The appeal filed is declared without merit and consequently the appealed agreement is confirmed. The administrative channel is considered exhausted.

**Francisco José Chaves Torres** **Jorge Leiva Poveda** **Evelyn Solano Ulloa** **EXPEDIENTE: 22-001805-1027-CA.** **ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal** **RECURRENTE: Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas La Mina S.A.** **RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de Santa Ana.**

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, _________________________________________________________________________________ ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal RECURRENTE: Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas La Mina S.A.

RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de Santa Ana.

No. 225 -2023 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las ocho horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del treinta y uno de mayo de dos mil veintitrés. - Conoce este Tribunal en condición de contralor no jerárquico de legalidad, del recurso de apelación presentado por Derk Van Wilpe Von Malchus, portador de la cédula de identidad número 8-035-0252, en su condición de representante de las empresas Wilpetrac Sociedad Anónima, con cédula jurídica 3-101-014220, y Quintas La Mina Sociedad Anónima, con cédula jurídica 3-101-019788; contra el acuerdo N°07, adoptado por el Concejo de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, en su sesión ordinaria N°94 de fecha 15 de febrero del 2022.

Redacta el juez Chaves Torres.

Considerando.

I.- Hechos probados: De interés para la resolución del presente recurso se ha acreditado lo siguiente: 1) Que el 3 de octubre del 2016, ante las denuncia de dos vecinos por el cerramiento de la calle en “Barrio Los Fonseca”, el Proceso de Geomática rinde su informe MSA-GEM-SGE-01-181-2016, el cual dice haber apoyado en el estudio realizado a la “...información catastral, registral, cartográfica y fotografía aérea ortorectificada existente en el Catastro Nacional y Registro Nacional de la Propiedad, Municipalidad de Santa Ana, Sistema de Información Territorial del Registro Inmobiliario (SIRI), Comisión Nacional de Emergencias (CNE) e Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN), además complementada con la inspección de campo realizada el 5 de septiembre de 2016...”; para ello hace la ubicación geográfica del acceso en estudio, y lo divide en 5 secciones o tramos, denominadas A, B, C, D y E. De interés para la presente resolución es el tramo A, que ubica desde el punto 0+000.00 al A 0+117.22, específicamente entre las coordenadas cartesianas (E= 482093.2 m, N= 1098551.1 m, proyección CRTM05 y se extiende hacia el noroeste hasta las coordenadas cartesianas (E= 482049.2 m, N= 1098651.3 m, proyección CRTM05, y lo describe gráficamente en la figura 2, 3 y 3A del informe. Expone los antecedentes del acceso según la cartografía oficial, tomando como punto de partida documentos que datan desde 1956 hasta la actualidad, siendo que en el plano SJ-05867-1967, la hoja Cartográfica de Real de Pereira, primera edición (1991) escala 1:10000, y en la fotografía aérea de 1980, se observa con claridad el tramo A del acceso. En el siguiente apartado expone las características fásicas del acceso, para ello adjunta una fotografía del tramo A con fecha 2016, donde se muestra el camino pavimentado en buenas condiciones para transitar con vehículos, y dice que cuenta con una medida de 117.22 metros (medidos por la línea de centro), y un ancho promedio de 9.00 metros, agrega que todo el tramo cuenta con carpeta de concreto, colectores pluviales y tubería pluvial subterránea construida por la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, además cuenta con postes del tendido eléctrico, alumbrado y acometidas eléctricas tipo CNFL, así como hidrómetros tipo AyA. También, hace referencia a varios antecedentes encontrados en los archivos municipales de los Procesos de Catastro, Ordenamiento Territorial, y Asesoría Legal, de importancia los oficios N°MSA-AL-04-165-10 y MSA-AL-04-225-10 suscritos por la Asesora Jurídica en el año 2010, donde se concluye que el tramo A es camino público, y el oficio MSA-DOT-APU-USV-03-005-2009 suscrito por el Ingeniero Municipal que concluye que el tramo A de acuerdo con las dimensiones del derecho de vía y su longitud califica como una vía terciaria, de conformidad con el Reglamento de Fraccionamientos y Urbanizaciones. Finalmente concluye el Proceso de Geomática que su informe debe ser trasladado a la Asesoría Jurídica Municipal para el estudio respectivo. (Ver imágenes 29 a 106). 2) Que en memorial de fecha 9 de noviembre del 2021, varios vecinos de la “Calle los Fonseca” en el Alto de las Palomas de Santa Ana, presentan ante el Concejo Municipal, una denuncia por lo siguiente: “...el día de hoy 9 noviembre 2021, en horas de la mañana, se apersonaron a nuestro barrio varias personas supuestamente contratadas por el señor Van Wilpe fue con la intención de cercar nuestras propiedades y casas de habitación, para impedirnos el acceso a la calle pública, calle que ha venido siendo utilizada como tal desde hace más de 25 años, y que inclusive la Municipalidad arregló, compactó y encementó (…) Los vecinos nos opusimos a tales acciones y no permitimos que se pusiera cerca alguna pues a nuestro juicio la calle es pública, da libre acceso a peatones y vehículos de toda clase, y es la Municipalidad la que da mantenimiento a dicha calle, y por ella accede también el vehículo recolector de basura, por lo que los propietarios registrales de los inmuebles ahí ubicados también pagamos nuestros respectivos impuestos por recolección de basura, y alumbrado público. Existen además, postes de electricidad, a lo largo de toda la calle, y alumbrado público, y en consecuencia en este momento, la calle es de dominio público...”. (Ver Imagen 5). 3) Que el 16 de noviembre del 2021 en sesión ordinaria número 81, el Consejo Municipal de Santa Ana, adoptó el acuerdo N°18, mediante el cual decide trasladar a la Administración Municipal, los memoriales relacionados con el caso de calle los Fonseca con el objetivo que la Asesoría Legal y el Departamento de Geomática realicen un estudio técnico y legal, que permita conocer efectivamente si la propiedad de mención es de dominio público o privado. (Ver imagen 12). 4) Que el 31 de enero del 2022, la Asesora Legal con su oficio MSA-ALc-ASL-03-091-2022 atiende la solicitud del Concejo Municipal, brindando su criterio jurídico con base en el oficio MSA-GEAM-SGE-01-181-2016 del Proceso de Geomática, y a partir del cual tiene por acreditado lo siguiente: "...Que en la hoja Real de Pereira primera edición 1991, escala 1: 10000; se observan completamente los tramos a A+0000.00 al A0+117 22. 2) En los planos catastrados SJ-16011-1974 y SJ-342015-1979, se indica la totalidad del tramo A0+000.00 al A 0+117.22 (…) Que el tramo A0+000.00 al A0+117.22 Tiene una longitud aproximada de 117.22 ml y cuenta con carpeta de concreto, colectores y tubería pluvial subterránea construidas por la municipalidad. Todo el tramo cuenta con postes del tendido eléctrico, alumbrado público, acometidas eléctricas tipo CNFL e hidrómetros tipo AyA. (…) En el año 2009 coma la municipalidad realizó este mismo estudio, el cual tuvo como conclusión que los tramos A0+000.00 al A0+117.22 (…) son camino público. (…) de acuerdo con el plano catastrado SJ-24008-1975 (predio 3 más localizado en Escazú), el tramo de acceso entre el estacionamiento A0+000.00 al A0+117.22, forma parte de la finca folio real 100248943-001-002, la cual se encuentra inscrita a nombre de Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas la Mina S.A.; y considera por muchos años la municipalidad ha considerado que todos los tramos de esta calle son públicos, muestra de ello es el otorgamiento del visado municipal a planos de agrimensura que la escriben como tal y la prestación de los servicios de mantenimiento en lastre, recolección de residuos y limpieza de vías, brindados por más de 30 años. Tanto es así que, mediante un proceso de contratación administrativa realizado en el 2010 como la municipalidad invirtió en la colocación de asfalto rígido y canalización de pluviales desde el estacionamiento A0+000.00 al A0+117.22. (…) sin embargo, en diciembre de 2015 la municipalidad recibió la denuncia de que esta calle había sido cerrada al final del cemento hacia la izquierda. Lo cual produjo el informe MSA- GEM-SGE-01-181-2016 y que en su elaboración se encontrará la existencia de la finca folio real 1- 248943- 001 y 2. a nombre de Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas la Mina S.A., localizada en Escazú bajo el plano catastrado SJ-24008-1975, el cual contiene dentro de su derrotero el tramo de acceso A0+000.00 al A0+117.22 (…) indicando que se trata de una calle privada y servidumbre de 10.00 m y 8.00 m respectivamente (…) Sobre el tramo entre el estacionamiento A0+000.00 al A0+117 (…) este tramo está abierto el uso público, primero el lastre y desde el año 2010 con asfalto rígido (concreto), construido por esta Municipalidad. Entonces tenemos que ha sido público y notorio el uso para el libre tránsito que ha recibido este tramo de camino por más de 10 años, con lo cual resulta aplicable el artículo 24 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos N°5060, el cual establece: “Artículo 24.- Prescribirán en un año, contados de la fecha en que se causaren los daños o desde que se tomó la faja de terreno para la construcción de caminos públicos, los derechos y acciones para reclamar del Estado o municipalidades la indemnización correspondiente. Las acciones establecidas caducarán y se tendrán por no interpuestas Después si transcurriere un año sin activarse las diligencias por el interesado.” (…) Con base en lo anterior tenemos que por interés público la existencia del camino debe prevalecer sobre el derecho de propiedad, pero a cambio de una indemnización; cuyo reclamo debe ser establecido por el perjudicado en el plazo de 1 año a partir de que fue causado el daño o fue tomada la faja de terreno. En el presente caso; ese plazo anual está sobradamente superado por lo que solo falta la entrega efectivamente terreno por parte del propietario (…) Se recomienda adoptar el acuerdo de carácter de interés público municipal el camino conocido como calle los Fonseca desde su inicio frente a la ruta nacional 121 hasta los 117.22 m dónde termina el asfaltado, faja de terreno ubicada sobre la finca folio real 1- 248943- 001 y 2. propiedad de Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas la Mina S.A., mal localizada en Escazú bajo el plano catastrado SJ-24008-1975. Solicitar a los representantes legales de esas sociedades, la entrega de esa faja de terreno mediante escritura pública de donación...”. (Ver imágenes 16 al 23). 5) Que el 15 de febrero del 2022, en la Sesión Ordinaria N°94 el Concejo Municipal de Santa Ana, decide lo siguiente: “...Acuerdo N°7: Se aprueba por unanimidad y en firme: Primero: Se aprueba el Dictamen N° 14 de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos; Segundo: Se acogen las recomendaciones del oficio MSA- ALC- ASL 03- 091- 2022, suscrito por la Licda. Andrea Robles Álvarez, encargada, Proceso Asesoría Legal; Tercero: Se adopta el acuerdo de declarar de interés público municipal el camino conocido como Calle Los Fonseca desde su inicio frente a la ruta nacional 121 hasta los 117.22 ml dónde termina el asfalto, faja de terreno ubicada sobre la finca folio real 1- 248943- 001 y 2. Propiedad de Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas la Mina S.A., mal localizada en Escazú bajo el plano catastrado SJ- 24008- 1975; Cuarto: Se solicita a los representantes legales de esas sociedades, la entrega de esa faja de terreno mediante escritura pública de donación; Quinto: Se ordena a la Administración que el Proceso de Geomática confeccione el plano catastrado de dicha faja de terreno; Sexto: Los gastos de agrimensura, catastro, notario e inscripción correrán por cuenta de la Municipalidad; Séptimo: Sobre la faja de terreno del tramo B0+000.00 al B0+083.73, se solicita la Administración un avalúo y luego valorar si el Consejo Municipal lo declara de interés público, para iniciar negociaciones con los copropietarios para la posible adquisición; Octavo: Sobre la faja de terreno del tramo B0+326 al B0+453, se instruye la Administración que rinda un informe para valorar su necesidad como camino público, ya que el libre acceso a los predios 9, 10 y 11 quedaría asegurado con la entrega del tramo B0+000.00 al B0+83.73, por lo que a preliminarmente, la declaratoria de camino público de este tercer tramo, pareciera innecesario; Noveno: Para la toma de decisiones respecto de estos dos tramos, el Consejo deberá realizar inspección de campo y entrevistar a los vecinos afectados; Décimo: Notifíquese este acuerdo a la Alcaldía Municipal, al Proceso de Asesoría Legal, al Proceso de Geomática, y representantes legales de esas Sociedades Propietarias de las fajas de terreno por entregar coma y a la regidora propietaria Catalina Obregón López. Acuerdo definitivamente aprobado.” (Ver imagen 125). 6) Que inconforme con el acuerdo recién descrito la representación de las sociedades Wilbetrac S.A. y Quintas La Mina S.A., interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, resultando rechazada la impugnación horizontal con el acuerdo N°05 adoptado en la Sesión Ordinaria N°98 del martes 15 de marzo del 2022, se decide elevar la apelación para ante este Tribunal. (Ver imágenes 127 y 175). -

III.Argumentos del recurso. Sin perjuicio de la lectura integral que se ha efectuado de los argumentos deducidos por el apelante, en resumen, alega lo siguiente: 1) Violación al derecho de propiedad privada. Señala con fundamento en las resoluciones de Sala Constitucional N°3145-96 y 2009-003820, que la Municipalidad de Santa Ana no puede apropiarse de forma unilateral de la faja de terreno de 117 metros de fondo desde la ruta 122, que es parte de la finca propiedad de sus representadas, con folio real N°1-248943-001 y 002, sin previo realizar los actos expropiatorios pertinentes, pues claramente esto es un abuso de autoridad en contra del artículo 45 de la Carta Magna. Agrega que solo si el terreno en cuestión es de dominio público, y luego de hecho se utilizaba como camino público, es que ese terreno con el transcurso del tiempo se convierte en un camino público pues la costumbre y su finalidad hacen de esta una vía pública transitada a pesar de que no se encuentre oficialmente establecida como tal. Indica que claramente la Municipalidad habría podido declarar ese camino como público, si el terreno matrícula número 1-248943 apareciera a nombre de la municipalidad de Santa Ana, cosa que claramente no ocurre en este caso, pues el acuerdo municipal no solo reconoce que esa propiedad está a nombre de las sociedades sino que incluso se les pretende obligar a que dichas sociedades que donen esa franja de terreno a la Municipalidad en un acto de absoluto abuso de autoridad. 2) Violación del derecho de autodeterminación. Indica la representación apelante que en el acuerdo impugnado, se le está ordenando a los representantes legales de las empresas a donar su terreno a favor de la Municipalidad, lo que claramente violenta el principio de autodeterminación de las personas, al respecto señala que la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en su sentencia del caso Murillo y otros versus Costa Rica indicó: “...en otras palabras constituye el derecho de toda persona organizada y organizar como con arreglo a la ley y coma su individual y social conforme a sus propios opciones y condiciones (principio de autodeterminación personal)…" En igual sentido cita la sentencia N°176-2005 dictada por la Sala Constitucional donde se reitera el criterio expuesto en la sentencia N°5483-95 qué dice "...debe tenerse en claro coma como lo ha sostenido en la doctrina como que las libertades públicas no son otra cosa que el reconocimiento constitucional de la autonomía personal; precisamente por ser un ámbito de autonomía como las facultades que lo integran pueden ser ejercidas o no con idéntico poder de autodeterminación...”. Explica que con fundamento en las sentencias citadas y el principio autodeterminación personal, le permite a las empresas que representa decidir cómo y cuándo disponen de su propiedad estando impedida la Municipalidad de Santa Ana a ordenar la firma de una escritura de donación de esa franja a su favor. Explica que, dada la orden girada por la Municipalidad, le preocupa que si los representantes de las empresas se niegan a comparecer ante un notario para donar esta franja de terreno que pretende la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, se podrían ver denunciados ante el Ministerio público por el delito de desobediencia a la autoridad. 3) La Inexistencia de interés público. Acusa que la Municipalidad de Santa Ana no se ha molestado en saber quién o quiénes viven en las colindancias de este camino y en qué condición legal están sus casas, y si están a derecho con permisos de construcción; ya que ante una gestión presentada previamente, se le dio respuesta con el oficio número MSA- ALC- ASL- 02- 365- 2021 de la funcionaria Laura Valverde Quiroz de la asesoría legal, que le indicó que solamente siete fincas son las colindantes a la propiedad de sus representadas, por lo que se cuestiona cuántas personas viven en esas siete fincas, para que el Consejo Municipal se tome la molestia de hacer una declaratoria de interés público para esa franja de terreno propiedad de las sociedades, ya que en su criterio la Municipalidad no puede favorecer a una única persona en detrimento de otra o de un muy pequeño grupo de personas, en detrimento de otras, pues estaría claramente en menos cabo del interés general de la colectividad del Cantón. Y es que considera que para realizar el acto de declaratoria de interés público de esa franja de terreno, a favor de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, lo primero que debió realizar la Municipalidad fue verificar la existencia del interés general, a saber la cantidad de personas que se llegan a beneficiar de esa declaratoria, y si existen en esos terrenos construcciones a derecho, a saber si fueron construidos respetando el plan regulador del cantón, y por ende obtuvieron los permisos respectivos, aspectos que echamos de menos en este caso. 4) Falta de motivación. Señala que al no existir en este caso ningún estudio de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, que nos indique cuántas personas del Cantón serían beneficiarias de esta declaratoria de interés público, para adquirir esta franja de terreno privado, formando un camino público, y tampoco consta en informaciones si las construcciones en el sitio son acordes con las estipulaciones del Plan Regulador, y por ende fueron construidas con los permisos respectivos, claramente entonces tampoco existe una motivación adecuada del acto recurrido. 5) Informes contradictorios de la municipalidad. Indica que por medio del oficio de la funcionaria de la Asesoría Legal citado se puso que la finca con folio real 248943 se encuentra registrada en el Cantón de Escazú, y que por razón de competencia le corresponde legalmente a su Administración Municipal tomar las medidas correspondientes, y ahora tan solo un año después, se dice que esa misma finca no solo ahora está dentro de los límites de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, sino que le está confiscando una franja para el establecimiento de un camino público, a favor de una cantidad indeterminada de personas que supuestamente viven colindantes a esta franja, y qué requieren de este acceso público, de lo anterior se sustenta que existe una contradicción interna y es un error de hace menos de un año. 6) Error de concepto. Menciona que por muchos años la Municipalidad ha considerado que todos los tramos de esta calle son públicos, muestra de ello es el otorgamiento del visado municipal a planos de agrimensura que la escriben como tal y la prestación de los servicios de mantenimiento en lastre como recolección de residuos y limpieza de vías, brindados por más de 30 años. Considera que dicha afirmación es lamentable, pues ha sido un error de la Municipalidad de la otorgar visados en planos de colindancia, indicando que parte del terreno inscrito con folio real 1-248943, propiedad de sus representadas es camino público, en lugar de enmendarse y corregir su error o vicio del acto, más bien la Municipalidad de Santa Ana pretende consolidar su error, obligando a que se le done a su favor parte de la finca con folio real indicado, para perpetuar su error y convertir artificialmente esta franja en un camino público.

III.- Sobre el fondo. De previo se considera importante aclarar, que, en esta instancia por mandato legal se desarrolla únicamente un control de la legalidad sobre la actuación formal de los jerarcas municipales -Alcaldía o Concejo Municipal-, siendo que el recurso se constituye en el límite de la competencia del Tribunal, de forma tal que es a instancia de la parte que se considera inconforme con la resolución y a través de su ruego específico, que esta Cámara procede a su análisis a los efectos de determinar si se encuentra o no ajustada a derecho. Esa función contralora así, encuentra sustento en la exposición previa de los motivos concretos y precisos del agravio, los cuales, delimitan el examen de lo resuelto sin que sea posible al Tribunal abarcar aspectos diversos a los reclamados ni resolver sobre agravios no deducidos. Por ello, este Tribunal Judicial en su función de Contralor de Legalidad, se restringe al estudio de los cargos sometidos y solo podrá conocer de los puntos objeto del reclamo -181 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-, sin poder verificar un examen oficioso de lo decidido por el Órgano Municipal ante carencias argumentativas del recurso. Se impone como requisito indispensable entonces, que el recurrente formule en forma clara y precisa el recurso, que esboce los reparos que mantiene contra el pronunciamiento impugnado, quedando obligado a exponer en forma diáfana, los errores acusados en la resolución o acuerdo a impugnar, para que se baste a sí mismo en cuanto a su cabal entendimiento, con expresa indicación de las infracciones que acusa como cometidas por aquél. En la especie, de un estudio minucioso del expediente administrativo, así como del libelo recursivo confrontado con el acto aquí impugnado, es posible concluir que la controversia se origina ante los intentos del apelante en el cerramiento del camino público que da acceso al Barrio Los Rodríguez, ubicado técnicamente (ver primer hecho probado) en el Alto de las Palomas dentro del Cantón de Santa Ana, situación que ha escalado ante el Concejo Municipal, y en consecuencia se ha dictado el acto aquí impugnado, que tiene por objetivo la declaratoria de interés público de camino y una excitativa para que sea donada a favor del Ayuntamiento, la franja de terreno que sirve de camino. Ante ello, considera esta Cámara que es menester precisar que en el “ordenamiento” jurídico vigente, existe una prohibición para cerrar, estrechar, edificar o cercar un camino o calle entregado por ley o de hecho al servicio de la colectividad, -ver art. 32 Ley General de Caminos Públicos N°5060-, de manera que, ocurrido lo anterior, para la reapertura de la vía pública debe respetarse el marco legal. En este sentido tratándose de bienes demaniales, la acción administrativa sustituye a la interdictal, como medio para que la Administración proteja sus bienes -principio de autotutela administrativa-. No obstante existe una diferencia importante entre dos modalidades de la acción administrativa, a saber, la primera referida a una coacción directa sobre el individuo para garantizar el servicio público al que está destinado el inmueble, en el cual la Administración, a nombre de la colectividad, defiende el derecho real que le corresponde, por mano propia, dado que el bien, su uso y su destino, particularmente demanial, no admite discusión en cuanto a la titularidad del propietario, entiéndase el Estado o sus entes públicos. Por ejemplo, un parque público inscrito o no, a nombre de una Municipalidad, entregado al uso público sin margen de error, pues la posesión que detenta el administrado es abiertamente ilegítima, o contraria al servicio que prestan -arts. 261 al 263 del Código Civil-. El mismo criterio podría aplicarse tratándose de una ruta que integra la red vial, siempre y cuando sea indiscutible esa titularidad, por ende, un particular no puede impedir el paso o el libre tránsito, al respecto se puede consultar lo ordenado en los numerales 131 y 231 de la Ley de Transito y Seguridad Vial N°9078. Por otra parte, existe una modalidad declarativa, que se refiere a casos en los que la circunstancias impiden identificar con facilidad, sin margen alguno de error, esa titularidad, ese destino, o esa característica pública que supone distingue a los bienes de dominio público. En tales supuestos la ley dispone que para remover el cierre, el estrechamiento, la edificación o la cerca construida sobre la vía, deba seguirse un procedimiento administrativo especial, que tiene por objeto comprobar que la vía cerrada, no es de dominio privado. Por consiguiente, debe recopilarse la declaración de tres testigos, para hacer constar lo pertinente, entiéndase, desde cuando estaba el camino al servicio colectivo o de particulares y desde cuando fue estrechado o cerrado, debiendo incluir un informe técnico. Para ese efecto además debe oírse al infractor, lo que sin duda requiere de la debida notificación previa, acerca de los fines del trámite, los derechos que le asisten y de la consecuencia específica mediante una correcta imputación de los hechos, de manera que si se comprueba que el camino fue afectado sin autorización, o que estuvo al servicio colectivo por más de un año, se reordenará la apertura en un plazo no mayor de tres días, y en rebeldía del obligado, se ejecutará por su cuenta la orden, todo ello de conformidad con el 33 de la Ley General de Caminos y 308 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Véase, que se trata de un acto administrativo que requiere del procedimiento previo, para sustentar su validez y eficacia -arts. 129 al 189 Ley General de la Administración Pública-. En razón de lo anterior en caso de discusión acerca de la titularidad del bien, debe cumplirse el trámite legal correspondiente tal y como lo indica la Sala Constitucional en su Voto N°2010016599 de las 10:01 hrs de 8 de octubre de 2010, que dispuso "...se inicie el procedimiento previsto en los artículos 32 y 33 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, a fin de determinar la naturaleza pública o privada del camino cerrado y lo culmine dentro de un plazo razonable..."; no obstante en la especie no nos encontramos ante este último supuesto, ya que la franja de terreno en cuestión, está destinada al uso público desde hace varios años y según lo han expuesto los vecinos, han impedido su cerramiento, dado que es el única acceso a sus viviendas. Aclarado lo anterior, y en atención a los agravios expuestos por la representación apelante, es reiterar el criterio de este Tribunal sobre la fuente de la demanialidad de los caminos públicos y su alcance, en el siguiente sentido: “En materia de caminos públicos, nuestra legislación prevé varios mecanismos para concretar su demanialidad y destino al uso público. En nuestro país, la constitución de vías públicas se puede generar por diversas vías, que bien pueden ser a través de procesos expropiatorios que afectan al demanio público las franjas de terreno, o bien como consecuencia de desarrollos urbanísticos en donde se abren nuevos caminos a la luz de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, e inclusive, por la simple entrega al uso público por parte de sus propietarios. En esos supuestos, los caminos públicos tienen un régimen especial de Derecho Público, pues están destinados al disfrute de la colectividad y están protegido por un principio de inmatriculación que deriva del artículo 44 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, lo que significa que no se requiere de una escritura de traslado de dominio ni su inscripción registral para que el bien salga del dominio privado”. (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera, resolución número 309-2017 de las 15 horas 20 minutos del 10 de agosto del 2017). Lo cual se encuentra alineado con lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional que al respecto ha indicado: “…la señalada presunción de demanialidad opera cuando la Administración cuenta con justo título para demostrar la naturaleza y propiedad del bien, o que existan actos expresos de tolerancia del antiguo propietario que conduzcan a tener por establecida la entrega del bien a tal uso, sea por el transcurso del tiempo, sea por la existencia de prueba fehaciente en ese sentido. Y ello es así, porque, además, el uso inveterado que se le haya dado al inmueble como vía pública, hace que la carga de la prueba recaiga en quien se diga mejor poseedor o propietario excluyente, cuya acción jurisdiccional tendrá como propósito destruir la presunción de demanialidad, precisamente porque ésta se fundamenta en otra presunción del mismo rango, que significa que la aparición de los terrenos en planos oficiales -públicos-, en catastros nacionales o municipales, o en archivos, museos o bibliotecas, junto con la prueba fehaciente del uso público efectivo, hace que la afectación sea la principal característica, que no podrá desaparecer sino en virtud de una sentencia firme dictada por los tribunales de la República”. (Sala Constitucional, sentencias número 1996-003145-1996 de las 09 horas 26 minutos del 28 de junio de 1996 y 2007-00593 de las 08 horas con 51 minutos del 29 de enero de 2007). En suma, la demanialidad del camino público puede tener su origen en la tolerancia del propietario, sobre el uso y destino público que le otorgue la comunidad, tal y como acontece en el presente caso, toda vez que el camino que da acceso al Barrio Los Rodríguez está abierto al uso público desde hace varios años (30 años según indican las autoridades municipales),no cuestionado por la parte apelante, al extremo que se permitió que la Corporación Municipal invertiera fondos públicos en el mantenimiento y atención del camino. También, es importante recordar que estos caminos públicos gozan de una presunción de demanialidad contenida en el ordinal 7 de la Ley de Construcciones que dice: “Artículo 7º.- Propiedad. Todo terreno que en los planos existentes de la Municipalidad, o en el Archivo de la Dirección General de Obras Públicas, o el de la Dirección General de Caminos, o en el Catastro, o en cualquier otro archivo, museo o biblioteca pública, aparezca como vía pública se presumirá que tiene la calidad de tal, salvo prueba plena en contrario, que deberá rendir aquél que afirme que el terreno en cuestión es de propiedad particular o pretenda tener algún derecho exclusivo a su uso. Mientras no se pronuncie sentencia ejecutoria que así lo declare, nadie podrá impedir o estorbar el uso público del terreno de que se trate”. Esta presunción, tal y como lo indica la Sala Constitucional, surge a partir del análisis integral de los documentos oficiales ubicados en las distintas oficinas de la Administración Pública, que lleven un registro que así lo acredite; este análisis fue desarrollado por el Proceso de Geomática y Asuntos Jurídicos de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, que considerando los siguientes documentos; las hojas cartograficas, los planos de los colindantes y fotografías historicas, a la luz del uso y características del camino, llegaron a la conclusión que es calle pública en el tramo A. Ahora bien, en cuanto al agravio relacionado con la necesaria inscripción del inmueble a favor del Ayuntamiento, como un requisito previo al reconocimiento de una calle pública, debe ser rechazado, por cuanto es contrario a los alcances del principio de inmatriculación reconocido en el ordinal 44 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, que dispone: “El dominio municipal sobre las áreas de calles, plazas, jardines, parques u otros espacios abiertos de uso público general, se constituye por ese mismo uso y puede prescindirse de su inscripción en el Registro de la Propiedad, si consta en el Mapa Oficial". (Lo resaltado no es parte del original). Es decir, la naturaleza de camino público va prevalecer pese a que el inmueble continúe inscrito en el Registro Nacional Público, a nombre de las apelantes. Por otra parte, en cuanto al reproche planteado por la representación apelante contra el apartado “Cuarto” del acuerdo impugnado, que literalmente dice: “Se solicita a los representantes legales de esas sociedades, la entrega de esa faja de terreno mediante escritura pública de donación...”. Considera esta Cámara, que dicho texto debe ser objeto de interpretación en armonía con el “ordenamiento” jurídico, en el tanto el Órgano Municipal utiliza el instituto jurídico de la donación; sobre el cual es necesario tomar en cuenta la siguiente precisión de la Sala I de la Corte: “...V.- Sobre el particular, esta Sala disiente del respetable criterio sentado por el Tribunal Superior. En torno a la figura jurídica de la donación subyace todo un trasfondo histórico de especial significado para la debida interpretación del referido artículo 1399. Lo anterior, amén de otras consideraciones que se harán, conduce a la Sala a una conclusión distinta de la sustentada por el Ad-quem. La ciencia jurídica en general, así como el derecho positivo, concretamente, se han caracterizado siempre por un trato riguroso dado a las donaciones, tanto en lo referente a las condiciones de fondo, cuanto a las de forma. La liberalidad, ínsita en la donación, ha suscitado tradicionalmente recelo y desconfianza. Sea, la enajenación o traspaso de derechos patrimoniales que ella implica, sin más causa justificativa que la de favorecer al donatario, ha sido fuente de zozobra al punto tal de reputársela institución peligrosa para el interés de la familia, del orden social, de los acreedores y del mismo donante, al significar concomitantemente un enriquecimiento del patrimonio ajeno y un menoscabo del propio. Corrientemente, las relaciones económicas y sociales entre los seres humanos no acusan acciones desinteresadas. Es por ello que, desde muy antiguo, una trasmisión dominical graciosa o por mera generosidad suscitó desconfianza, al temerse que la voluntad del transmitente no hubiera sido libre o consciente; sea, que en ella haya influido de alguna manera la manipulación exógena, o el interés espurio del propio disponente (cual sería el intento de burlar a los acreedores), o el propósito de lograr del donatario alguna prestación contraria a la ley. Fue así como ya en tiempos del Derecho romano, comenzáronse a arbitrar medidas de restricción aplicadas a la donación, cual fue, por ejemplo, la Ley Cincia, emitida en el año 204 antes de Cristo, la cual imponía un límite a las donaciones, con la excepción de aquéllas efectuadas entre ciertos parientes. Bajo esa orientación, fue conformándose jurídicamente el instituto de mérito dentro de un severo régimen, auspiciado por una tendencia escrutadora, por parte del legislador, tocante a las motivaciones del donante. Tal filosofía restrictiva fue heredada y remozada por el Derecho civil francés. Trasunto fiel de ese fenómeno lo constituyen las palabras de los tratadistas Planiol y Ripert quienes atribuyen a la legislación francesa "un espíritu tradicional de severidad y casi de hostilidad hacia las liberalidades, y tal espíritu -añaden- ha inspirado disposiciones legales especiales. El principal motivo es que la propiedad individual, a pesar de todo, continúa ofreciendo un carácter familiar. Además, todo acto gratuito resulta sospechoso a los ojos del legislador, porque es anormal." (Derecho Civil Francés, t. 5, núm 1., Ed. Cultural, La Habana, 1939). VI.- El legislador patrio, al emitir el Código Civil de 1888, lo hizo bajo fuerte influencia de la legislación y doctrina francesas. Consiguientemente, la regulación referente a la donación no escapa a la filosofía derivada de la tradición histórica comentada. Claro ejemplo de ello lo constituyen, entre otros, los artículos 1397, 1398, el mismo 1399 y 1402. Riñe, por ende, con los referidos conceptos, que una disposición de dicho Código aherroje la facultad de revocar la promesa u oferta de donar que le asiste al disponente, antes de la aceptación del donatario. Ha de tomarse en cuenta al respecto que el espíritu de dicha regulación, por las razones apuntadas, aspira, entre sus más caros objetivos, a que la voluntad de donar sea en todo momento, enteramente libre y consciente. Dentro de tal inteligencia no podría interpretarse el plazo prescrito por el artículo 1399 de nuestro Código Civil como un derecho o disposición a favor del donatario y una limitación para el enajenante, sino más bien, como una obligación para el primero, inherente a la de aceptar, la cual en ningún momento restringe el derecho del enajenante a retractarse antes de la aceptación. Dicho de otra manera, el objetivo del plazo es el de poner coto al estado de incertidumbre producido por una indefinida espera de la aceptación, en aras de la seguridad jurídica. La doctrina nacional y extranjera, así como la legislación que en abono de su tesis invoca el Tribunal Superior (a saber, la existencia del plazo impide al donador revocar su oferta), se refiere al plazo establecido por el mismo proponente. Ello, dentro de las disposiciones generales relativas a la oferta como manifestación de voluntad dirigida a una determinada persona (futuro contratante), las cuales contempla nuestro Código Civil en los artículos 1011 ab initio y 1013; el primero reza: "Si las partes no estuvieren reunidas, la aceptación debe hacerse dentro del plazo fijado por el proponente para este objeto". El segundo, preceptúa lo siguiente: "El proponente está obligado a mantener su propuesta, mientras no reciba respuesta de la otra parte en los términos fijados en el artículo anterior" (una de cuyas disposiciones fue la transcrita). En tal caso, cuando el proponente fija un plazo, se entiende que está renunciando -dentro de la autonomía de la voluntad- al derecho que le asiste, de acuerdo con el artículo 1010, de retirar la proposición mientras no haya sido aceptada. Sin embargo, ese principio comentado, propio de la oferta en general, no es aplicable a la que se encuentra ínsita en el instituto de la donación, pues ésta le confiere una naturaleza particular que lo rechaza. En primer término, como ya se barruntó, en el caso de la donación -artículo 1399- no es el proponente quien fija el plazo, sino la misma ley; y en segundo lugar, ésta lo hace bajo el influjo de la filosofía que caracteriza a dicho contrato, hija del proceso histórico ya referido, filosofía la cual, según se ha dicho, resiste, en el caso especial, la adopción del aludido principio proveniente de la doctrina general sobre la oferta...” (Voto N°137-1992 dictado por la Sala I de la Corte Suprema de Justicia a las 14:20 horas del 10 de setiembre de 1992). Véase que, a la luz del extracto anterior, la donación es un acto voluntario por el cual una persona le otorga un beneficio patrimonial a otra, y que debe ser enteramente libre y consciente, sin otro ánimo que el de favorecer al donatario; por lo que en la especie este Tribunal comprende que la petición contenida en el apartado “Cuarto” del acuerdo recurrido, fue planteada por la Municipalidad solamente con el objetivo de formalizar la situación jurídica de la faja de terreno sobre la cual pesa el camino público, sin embargo en ningún momento puede ser considerada como una voluntad exógena de la Corporación Municipal, que constriña u obligue al representante de las empresas apelantes a donar el terreno; ya que dicho acto es voluntario para el donante y también para quien recibe. Lo anterior, por cuanto este Tribunal no encuentra en el “ordenamiento” jurídico, una norma que establezca alguna obligación en ese sentido, pese al posible incentivo fiscal que pueda tener el titular del inmueble para dejar de tributar sobre un terreno que es camino público. Según parece la Municipalidad erróneamente le ha tratado de igual manera, como las calles públicas que son resultado de un fraccionamiento con fines urbanísticos, donde la situación es completamente distinta, en los que una vez que el desarrollador ha satisfecho todos los parámetros establecidos por el bloque de legalidad en la construcción de la urbanización, le asiste la obligación y el derecho a que las donaciones sean tramitadas en los términos del artículo 40 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. No obstante, ese ordinal no es aplicable en el presente caso, que se trata de un camino público con origen en la simple tolerancia del titular del inmueble en forma reiterada durante años, para con el uso público, que ahora se encuentra descrito en documentos oficiales y hasta ha sido objeto de inversión de fondos públicos para su mantenimiento, así como en la prestación de los servicios públicos. En suma, en el acuerdo N°07, adoptado por el Concejo de la Municipalidad de Santa Ana, en su sesión ordinaria N°94 de fecha 15 de febrero del 2022, no se dio violación alguna a la propiedad privada de las sociedades apelantes, en el tanto la existencia del camino público que soporta la finca 1-24008-1975, ha surgido de previo al acto recurrido, debido a la tolerancia de años sobre el destino que tiene dicha franja de terreno, que al estar abierto al uso público el ordenamiento jurídico normativamente reconoce un interés público a proteger. Tampoco se observa una falta de motivación del acuerdo, en el tanto se fundamenta en los amplios informes del Proceso de Geomática y Asesoría Lega MSA-GEM-SGE-01-181-2016 y MSA-ALc-ASL-03-091-2022 respectivamente, donde se explica suficientemente las razones por las cuales el camino ha sido reconocido por las autoridades municipales como de naturaleza pública; siendo que el error de concepto al que alude la representación de la empresas es consecuencia de haber omitido en su análisis el principio de inmatriculación contenido en el ordinal 44 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, que en conjunto con la presunción de demanialidad son parte del régimen de protección de los caminos públicos. Por esta razón se hace innecesaria la escritura de donación, para que el camino siga siendo público, y la petición de donación no puede comprenderse como una obligación, dada la condición voluntaria de dicho negocio jurídico. En razón de las consideraciones anteriores, resulta indefectible para este Tribunal declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación, y se confirma el acuerdo impugnado con la salvedad antes efectuada sobre el apartado “Cuarto”. Al no existir ulterior recurso en esta sede, debe darse por agotada la vía administrativa.

III.- De la devolución del expediente. Al haberse sustanciado esta sede en forma electrónica, queda a disposición de las partes obtener una copia integral que contiene tanto el expediente administrativo remitido por la Corporación Municipal así como la totalidad de las piezas que conforman la presente alzada, para lo cual deberá aportar el dispositivo electrónico de almacenamiento (llave maya o disco compacto). Asimismo, en caso que hubiere ingresado documentación física o electrónica (planos, fotografías, informes, etc.) que permanezca aún en custodia el Despacho, podrá retirarla quien la aportó en un plazo de 30 días hábiles, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 12 del Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión n.° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial n.° 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión n.° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por Tanto.

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación presentado y en consecuencia se confirma el acuerdo recurrido. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa.

Francisco José Chaves Torres Jorge Leiva Poveda Evelyn Solano Ulloa ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal RECURRENTE: Wilpetrac S.A. y Quintas La Mina S.A.

RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de Santa Ana.

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