Loss of pension due to criminal conduct is unconstitutionalPérdida de jubilación por conducta penal es inconstitucional

01147 Vote 1147-90 Date: 9-21-90 Time: 16:00 Case File: No. 208-90 Petitioner: Di Leoni Badilla, Nombre45274 Challenges: Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch For violating: Articles 34, 40, 45, 51, 73, 7 of the Political Constitution and 25, 28, 29 and Concordant Articles of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization RIGHT TO RETIREMENT Retirement as a fundamental right of every worker CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hundred hours on the twenty-first of September, nineteen hundred and ninety.

Action of unconstitutionality (case file No. 208-90) filed by Nombre45274 against Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as amended by Law No. 34 of June 9, 1939, for being contrary to Articles 34—non-retroactivity of the law—, 40—prohibited penalties—, 45—inviolability of property—, 51—protection of the family, the mother, the child, the elderly, and the helpless sick—, 73—right to social security—, and 7—normative rank of international treaties in domestic law—of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Articles 25, 28, 29, and concordant articles of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization, ILO, (approved by Law No. 4736 of March 29, 1971), relating generally to old-age benefits.

In this latter context, it is also claimed, in parallel, that the challenged provision, contained in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch since its enactment by Law No. 8 of November 29, 1937, was purely and simply repealed, both by virtue of the higher rank within the domestic legal order of the international provisions invoked, in accordance with the same Article 7 of the Constitution, and by operation of the Political Constitution itself, according to the repeal clause of its Article 197.

WHEREAS:

I.- The complaint was filed on February 20, 1990, together with a notarial declaration that the unconstitutionality was alleged before the First Labor Court, the Superior Court, and the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, during the proceedings of an ordinary labor action filed by the petitioner against the State (case file No. 820-87 of the Court). The attorneys Nombre8672, Gonzalo Retana Sandí, and Guillermo Rojas Paniagua appear as special judicial representatives of the plaintiff.

II.- By virtue of the accepted recusal of Magistrates Alejandro Rodríguez Vega and Juan Luis Arias Arias, alternate Magistrates Danilo Elizondo Cerdas, later replaced due to recusal by Hernando Arias Gómez, and Manuel Emilio Rodríguez Echeverría were appointed. Replacing the former, Magistrate Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante presides over the Court.

III.- The presidency allowed the action by resolution at sixteen forty hours on April 3, and the legal notices were published in Judicial Bulletins No. 75, 76, and 77 of the 20th, 23rd, and 24th of the same month.

IV.- The written hearing was answered by the Associate Attorney General of the Republic, Lic. Farid Beirute Brenes. An informal telegram was also received from Lic. Mario Alfaro A., President of the so-called Fenalpe, whom it is not appropriate to recognize as an assistant due to that informality.

V.- The oral hearing was held on August 16, 1990, with the attendance of the petitioner's judicial representatives, Dr. Gonzalo Retana Sandí and Lic. Guillermo Rojas Paniagua, on one side, and the Associate Attorney General Lic. Farid Beirute Brenes and Attorney Dr. Román Solís Zelaya, on the other, the latter reiterating their opposition to the nullity requested.

VI.- This judgment is issued without being subject to a deadline, within the authorization granted by Transitory Provision II, paragraph 3, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

Drafted by Magistrate Piza Escalante; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- The action challenges, as unconstitutional, the provision of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, according to which:

"Article 240 Although retirements and pensions are of a lifetime tenure (vitalicias) nature, with the exceptions of articles 237 and 239, the beneficiary loses their right when, due to their vices, lack of morality, or criminal responsibilities, qualified by the Court, they become unworthy of receiving them"; insofar as, based on said provision, the Supreme Court of Justice, when he was prosecuted by the Criminal Courts for the crime of homicide to the detriment of Nombre43945, recognized his right to retirement as a former official of the Judicial Branch, but under the condition of the outcome of that criminal case (agreements of the Full Court according to Article XVII of August 17, 1987, related to XXIX of the 10th, XVIII of the 20th, and XV of the 27th of the same month, and II of the following September 17th; as well as its confirmation by judgments of the First Labor Court at 9:00 hours on October 19, 1988, and the Superior Labor Court of San José, First Section, at 8:00 hours on May 24, 1989); and later, even after this action was filed, when that condition was met, it canceled said conditional retirement as of the finality of the condemnatory sentence that concluded the aforementioned process (agreement of the Full Court in Article XXII of April 2, 1990, communicated by resolution of the General Secretariat at 10:30 on the 9th of that month).

II.- By contrast, neither the social commotion produced by the crime attributed to the petitioner and now declared final by the criminal courts, nor his particular situation as former administrative director of the Judicial Branch, nor, in general, his merits or his conduct, personally or as a former judicial official, are of interest, nor should they be of interest to it.

The function of constitutional control entrusted to this Jurisdiction by Article 10 of the Constitution and which is exercised, in what is relevant, through the "action of unconstitutionality," is carried out by means of the confrontation of the challenged provisions or acts, or their effects, interpretation, or application, with the constitutional provisions and principles (Art. 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), objectively and with total abstraction from the circumstances of the case motivating its action, so that any consideration that must be made about concrete facts must take these as mere normative hypotheses, not as realities whose truth or falsehood or whose legal or moral validity this Chamber is called upon to declare: except, perhaps, to the extent that such concrete facts could have affected the petitioner's standing (legitimación), founded on the prior existence of the labor process mentioned in Whereas Clause I, standing which is not at all in question here.

III.- First, the Chamber declares that a constitutional and fundamental right to retirement (jubilación) does indeed exist, in favor of every worker, generally speaking; a right which, as such, belongs to and must be recognized for every human being, under conditions of equality and without any discrimination, in accordance with Articles 33 and 73 of the Constitution, according to which:

"Article 33 All persons are equal before the law, and no discrimination contrary to human dignity may be made" "Article 73 Social security is established for the benefit of manual and intellectual workers, regulated by a system of compulsory contribution by the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect the latter against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law..." This conclusion is confirmed in a series of international principles and standards of human rights, which have, not only the rank superior to ordinary law conferred upon them by Article 7 of the Constitution, but also a direct constitutional protection that practically equates them to those expressly enshrined by the Fundamental Charter itself, pursuant to Article 48 thereof, (amended by Law No. 7128 of August 18, 1989); among those rights, specifically, those recognized in Articles 25, 28, 29, and 30—thus correcting those invoked in the action—of the Social Security Convention, No. 102 of the ILO, which establish:

"Article 25 Every Member for which this Part of the Convention is in force shall secure to the persons protected the provision of old-age benefit, in accordance with the following Articles of this Part" "Article 28 The benefit shall be a periodical payment calculated as follows... " "Article 29 1. The benefit specified in Article 28 shall be secured, in the contingency covered, at least:

(a) to a person protected who has completed, before the contingency, in accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period which may be 30 years of contribution or employment, or 20 years of residence...

"2. Where the provision of the benefit specified in paragraph 1 is conditional upon a minimum period of contribution or employment, a reduced benefit shall be secured at least:

"(a) to a person protected who has completed, before the contingency, in accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period of 15 years of contribution or employment... " "Article 30 The benefits specified in Articles 28 and 29 shall be granted throughout the contingency" Other international texts also recognize, either specifically the right to retirement—by age or old age—(e.g., Art. 16, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 22 and 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 31, International American Charter of Social Guarantees; 5, Convention concerning Equality of Treatment in Social Security, No. 118, ILO), or, in general, the Right to Social Security, within which retirement is universally considered to be included (e.g., Art. 11, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and 9, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).

IV.- As can be seen, in both classes of the aforementioned provisions, the fundamental right of every worker to their retirement is recognized, and old age is clearly alluded to, in what is relevant, as the "contingency" determining the right to the benefit—retirement—. The objection of the Attorney General's Office is not understood by this, when it affirms that the provisions of Convention No. 102, ILO, only protect "workers who suffered a contingency within their employment relationship, which is not the case of the appellant... (f. 62 fte.); thus giving, it seems, the expression an incomprehensible sense of abnormality, certainly without any explanation.

V.- To the extent that, according to the foregoing, fundamental rights of the petitioner are involved, his circumstances, his conduct, or his merits, whatever these may be, have nothing and can have nothing to do with their recognition and guarantee, because such fundamental rights are so, by definition, for every human being, by the mere fact of being one, under conditions of equality and "(without) any discrimination contrary to human dignity" (see Arts. 33 Political Constitution; Preamble and 2, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 1, 2.1, and 7, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1.1 and 24, American Convention on Human Rights; Preamble, 2.1, and 26, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Preamble and 2.2, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and other international texts, as stated today expressly incorporated into the former in its Article 48, amended by Law No. 7128 of August 18, 1989).

The Law of Human Rights, both domestic and international, prohibits, among others but with very special emphasis, all discrimination in the recognition and guarantee of the same to alleged, accused, or convicted criminals, regardless of their degree of responsibility, their economic, political, or social position, or even the gravity or repugnance of their crimes.

VI.- The Attorney General's Office of the Republic, after accepting that a fundamental right to retirement exists, claims that this is limited to that of the general regime, entrusted by the same Article 73 of the Constitution to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), thus denying that, as such, it extends to other special regimes or, particularly, to that of the Judicial Branch referred to in the challenged Article 240, which, besides being privileged, it considers as in no way excluding the general one administered by the Fund, so that whoever loses their retirement within the former always retains the possibility of availing themselves of the latter, under conditions of equality with the other members thereof.

However, the Chamber considers this argument unacceptable, for two reasons, namely:

• a)First, because from the very text of Article 73, its location in the chapter of "social guarantees" of the Constitution, and the international instruments alluded to, its meaning and its intention to enshrine it as a worker's right and not as a simple competence of the Fund, for the benefit of the latter, are clearly derived, even though its fulfillment is also specifically attributed to the latter. In other words, the clear meaning of the constitutional provision is that of the recognition of old-age retirement, among others, as a fundamental right of every worker, although at the same time it is included within the competences of the Fund, but this is in function of the former, that is, entrusting it to it as an attribution-duty, with the evident purpose of giving the simple recognized right an administrative guarantee; which, moreover, is no stranger to the very nature of the so-called economic, social, or cultural rights, or rights of provision, which require a complex economic and institutional apparatus for their effectiveness.
• b)Second, because, in any case, it is not true that, upon the petitioner or any other former judicial servant being excluded from the special regime provided for by the Organic Law, they have a full right to avail themselves of the ordinary one of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund; on the contrary, Article 244 of the former, invoked for this purpose by the Attorney General's Office, literally establishes that "official and permanent or interim employees who have ceased, or who cease in the exercise of their positions, shall not have the right to have the amount of the contributions they may have made towards the formation of the retirement and pension fund returned to them. However, if they have not obtained the retirement or pension benefits, they shall have the right to have the amount of the contributions with which they have contributed to the formation of the judicial retirement and pension fund transferred to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, so that these contributions are computed for them within the Disability, Old-Age, and Survivors' Regime, or to the institution administering the regime under which the retirement or pension is to be granted, for the same purpose of computing contributions..." that is, that the most it grants the servant is the possibility of transferring to the Fund the amount of their own contributions, not those made by the Supreme Court of Justice, that is, by the State in their favor.

VII.- In any case, the Chamber considers that the right to retirement, in general or in the special regimes alluded to, cannot normally be conditioned upon the conduct of its holder, whether this is prior or subsequent to its consolidation as a vested right. In reality, it is not ignored that the right to retirement, like any other right, is subject to conditions and limitations, but both only insofar as they are provided for by the provisions that recognize and guarantee them and are, in addition, reasonably necessary for the exercise of the right itself, in accordance with its nature and purpose. This is nothing other than an expression of a well-known principle of the Law of Human Rights, which may be called proportionality, and which is collected, in general, as a sine qua non condition of the limitations and restrictions on such rights exceptionally authorized by the very texts that enshrine them; a principle that is listed, for example, in Articles 29.2 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 29 and 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 4 and 5 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

In such cases of reasonableness and proportionality would obviously fall the conditions established in Articles 237 and 239 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch itself, to which the challenged Article 240 expressly refers; and they would also fall, even in the absence of an express text, for example, the suspension of retirement when the beneficiary returns to active paid service, and while they are in it, or the loss of the rights of legal heirs (causahabientes) in events such as the coming of age of the children or the marriage of the surviving spouse.

VIII.- On the contrary, it is clearly unconstitutional, as unreasonable, disproportionate, and totally detached from the nature and purpose of retirement, as a fundamental right derived from the provision of work and constituted to a significant extent by the contributions of the worker themselves, to deprive them of it for causes such as the improper conduct of the beneficiary, regardless of whether this occurs before or after the acquisition, consolidation, recognition, or effective enjoyment of their current right to the benefit, and even if it should constitute a crime, and whatever the gravity or repugnance thereof; because, furthermore, such a consequence would be absolutely incompatible with the very concept of what is, as stated, a right of the worker and not a gracious concession from the State or the Employer.

IX.- It is worth clarifying that the worker's contribution to the retirement regime is only mentioned for the sake of greater abundance, since the existence of the right to retirement is indifferent to whether the regime is wholly or partially sustained by the contributions of its beneficiaries or of the State or employers on whom they depend: rights are such by their recognition, and fundamental rights, moreover, by their link with human dignity, not by who must recognize them nor, much less, who must bear the costs of their provision. To use a known example in another context, in Costa Rica, since 1869, primary education, since 1949, primary and secondary education, and since 1973, general basic education, preschool, and diversified education are, by express constitutional provision, free and paid for by the Nation (Arts. 6, Political Constitution of 1869, 52, later 67 Political Constitution of 1871, and 78 current Constitution of 1949, the latter amended by Law No. 5202 of May 30, 1973); however, no one would think of denying that access to public education is an authentic fundamental right of every human being, as such universal, equal, and enforceable, not a gracious concession of the Nation or the State that they can condition, limit, or suppress at their discretion. In the same way, the general right to social security, in all its fundamental manifestations, among them retirement, continues to be such a right, universal, equal, and enforceable, whatever the participation or the legal or moral merits of the beneficiary may be.

X.- On the other hand, the Chamber observes that the challenged provision of Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is the only one among the various retirement regimes in force in Costa Rica that imposes the loss of the right due to the beneficiary's vices, lack of morality, or criminal responsibilities; whereby it also becomes unconstitutional for violation of the principle and right of equality, without discrimination, recognized, in general, by Article 33, and, in particular, by Articles 57 and 68 of the Constitution, the latter with respect to matters of wages and working conditions, of which retirement is either a species, or justifies an analogous application of its rules and mandates; principle and right of equality without discrimination, as stated, invariably recognized by Constitutions and international instruments on human rights, both as a fundamental right in itself, and as a necessary criterion for the interpretation and application of all other rights, fundamental or not (see citations in Whereas Clause V supra).

XI.- It has already been stated that the right to retirement cannot be unreasonably or disproportionately limited, conditioned, or suppressed, regardless of whether by circumstances prior or subsequent to its acquisition, consolidation, recognition, or effective enjoyment. In this sense, it is necessary to observe that this right ceases to be a mere expectancy and is acquired from the moment one enters the retirement regime, at least as a general right of belonging to it, and from the instant the beneficiary meets the factual conditions provided for receiving the benefit, as a right to the current benefit, without it being necessary that they have claimed it, much less that the recognition has been declared or that they have begun to receive it... in the same way that the right to inheritance is acquired at the moment of the decedent's death, not at the opening of the probate proceedings, nor, much less, at the adjudication of the inheritance right or the delivery of the assets to the heir.

XII.- It has also been alleged that Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch violates the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, the right of property, and the prohibition of the penalty of confiscation, enshrined, in order, by Articles 34, 45, and 40 of the Constitution. The Attorney General's Office has objected to this proposition, at least as applicable to the petitioner, considering that the provision of causes for loss of retirement contained in that provision already existed even before he entered the Judicial Branch regime, so that both his right to retirement itself, and the actual entry of it into his assets, were conditioned beforehand under the terms of the provision in question.

The Chamber recognizes that this is so; however, it considers that the principle of non-retroactivity, like the others relating to fundamental rights or freedoms, is not merely formal, but also and above all material, so that it is violated, not only when a new provision or the amendment of a previous one illegitimately alters vested rights or situations consolidated under the protection of said previous provision, but also when the effects, interpretation, or application of the latter produces unreasonable or disproportionate harm to the holder of the right or situation that it itself enshrines. This is so, because from the moment one enters the retirement regime, the worker is protected, not only by the legal and regulatory rules and criteria of the regime itself, but also by the constitutional norms and principles that enshrine their right to retirement or surround it with the special guarantees of the Fundamental Law, among them that which prohibits giving the former retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, or of their vested rights or consolidated legal situations (Art. 34 Constitution), as well as that of "own acts" (actos propios), according to which public authorities cannot go against their own acts declaratory of rights, except for strictly regulated exceptions; a principle linked, in turn, to Article 34 itself and to the overarching principle of good faith, which constitutes one of the pillars of the democratic rule of law and, therefore, of the constitutional order.

XIII.- Furthermore, to the extent that the challenged Article 240 is clearly susceptible to being applied to the worker who has already met the necessary conditions to have a current right to retirement, and even to one who has already claimed it, obtained it, or even enjoyed it, it also violates the right of property guaranteed by Article 45 of the Constitution, insofar as it is evident that this incorporates a content and a set of general attributes easily deducible from the constitutional order as a whole, and that its scope is not limited to ownership or real property, but extends to the protection of everything that has entered, de facto or de jure, into the assets of private individuals. So that, by depriving the worker of their vested right to retirement, the challenged provision also illegitimately harms that worker's assets, thus violating their fundamental right of property.

XIV.- Finally, the Chamber considers it must make at least a brief allusion to the case of "criminal responsibilities" referred to in the challenged article, in consideration that it was this that the Supreme Court of Justice expressly invoked to apply it to the petitioner, although considered here only as a working hypothesis due to the nature of the action of unconstitutionality, which has already been mentioned.

In this case, the constitutional violations that have been uncovered in the provision in question would be aggravated by the circumstance that in the democratic rule of law, it is not at all admissible to impose on those accused of committing a crime an additional penalty or one different from those expressly provided for by criminal legislation, which, moreover, must be imposed exclusively by the corresponding criminal courts of justice. These are some of the dimensions specifically attached to the principles of due process, which the Constitution collects, in general, in its Articles 39 and 41. With the aggravating circumstance, in the case of Costa Rica, that our criminal system does not even contemplate disqualification from holding public office as a normal accessory sanction, but only as a specific penalty for certain crimes and, of course, to be imposed at the conclusion of the respective criminal process. If a person convicted of a very serious crime, but one that does not entail that disqualification, could not even be prevented from holding or continuing to hold a public office—except, naturally, their material impossibility of doing so while they must serve a custodial sentence—this Chamber finds no justification for, on top of the criminal and civil conviction imposed by the punitive courts, adding to the convict the unforeseen sanction of exclusion from the retirement regime, thus confiscating an asset which, incidentally, is not only theirs but also that of their dependent third parties.

XV.- The Chamber considers, therefore, that the challenged provision of Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is unconstitutional, for violation of the rights of the judicial servant to their retirement, to equality before the law, to the non-retroactivity of its application to their detriment, to the inviolability of their assets, and to the prohibition of the penalty of confiscation, as well as to due process and the principle of criminal specificity, enshrined in Articles 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45, and 73 of the Political Constitution, as well as in the invoked provisions of Articles 25, 28, 29, and 30 of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization, approved by Law No. 4736 of March 29, 1971.

XVI.- In contrast, of the provisions invoked by the petitioner, it rejects Art. 51 of the Constitution as inapplicable, considering that this is not in question when dealing with provisions that, like the one at hand, do not specifically threaten the special protection that must be given to the family, although it is evident that the challenged provision does so indirectly, just like any other capable of causing a loss or decrease in the assets of those obliged to support it.

THEREFORE:

The action of unconstitutionality is hereby granted, and, consequently, the nullity of the challenged provision, Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, is declared, insofar as it establishes causes for the loss of the right to retirement or pension other than those contemplated in Articles 237 and 239 of that same law. Under the terms of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the date of enactment of the annulled provision. Notify and publish.

Rodolfo E. Piza E., Jorge Baudrit G., Jorge E. Castro B., Luis Fernando Solano C., Luis Paulino Mora M., Manuel E.

Vote 1147-90 Date: 21-9-90 Time: 16:00 Action: Unconstitutionality action (file No. 208-90) filed by Nombre45274 against Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, according to reform introduced by Law No. 34 of June 9, 1939, in relation to Articles 34, 40, 45, 51, 73, 7 of the Political Constitution and 25, 28, 29 and Concordant of the International Labour Organization WHERE:

"Article 240 Although retirements and pensions have the character of vitalicias, with the exceptions of Articles 237 and 239, the aggrieved loses his right, when for their vices, faults of morality or criminal liability, qualified by the Court, be made unworthy of receiving them.

Article 33 Every man is equal before the law and may not be discriminated against contrary to human dignity.

Article 73 It is established that insurance benefits workers' manual and intellectual, regulated by the system of compulsory contribution from the State, employers and employees, in order to protect these against the risks of disease, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines.

Article 48 Constitutional All men are created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men and women are created equal, they have certain unalienable rights, which no one shall be deprived of, or abridged, and without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

In every case, the Constitution, and the United States of America, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.

Do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

We the people.

Thus, by depriving the worker of their acquired right to retirement (jubilación), the challenged rule also unlawfully injures that worker's property, thereby violating their fundamental right to property.

XIV.- Finally, this Chamber considers that it must make at least a brief allusion to the assumption of "criminal liability" (responsabilidades penales) to which the challenged article refers, given that this was the very ground the Supreme Court of Justice expressly invoked to apply it to the claimant, albeit considered here only as a working hypothesis due to the nature of the unconstitutionality action, which has already been mentioned.

In this case, the constitutional violations that have been exposed in the rule in question would be aggravated by the circumstance that, in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, it is not entirely admissible to impose on those accused of committing a crime an additional or different penalty than those expressly provided for by criminal legislation, which, furthermore, must be imposed exclusively by the corresponding criminal justice tribunals. These are some of the dimensions specifically attached to the principles of due process (debido proceso), which the Constitution generally enshrines in its Articles 39 and 41. With the aggravating circumstance, in the case of Costa Rica, that our penal system does not even contemplate disqualification from holding public office (inhabilitación para el ejercicio de cargos públicos) as a standard accessory sanction, but only as a specific penalty for certain crimes and, of course, to be imposed at the conclusion of the respective criminal proceeding. If a person convicted of a very serious crime, but one that does not entail such disqualification, could not even be prevented from holding or continuing to hold a public office—except, naturally, for their material impossibility of doing so while serving a custodial sentence—this Chamber finds no justification for, above and beyond the criminal and civil sentence imposed by the repressive courts, adding to the convicted person the unforeseen sanction of exclusion from the retirement regime, thereby confiscating a property that, incidentally, is not only theirs but also that of their dependent third parties.

XV.- This Chamber therefore considers that the challenged rule of Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) is unconstitutional, for violating the rights of the judicial servant to their retirement, to equality before the law, to the non-retroactivity of the law's application to their detriment, to the inviolability of their property, and to the proscription of the penalty of confiscation, as well as the right to due process and the principle of criminal specialty (especialidad penal), enshrined in Articles 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45, and 73 of the Political Constitution, as well as in the invoked rules of Articles 25, 28, 29, and 30 of Convention No. 102 of the International Labour Organization, approved by Law No. 4736 of March 29, 1971.

XVI.- Conversely, of the rules invoked by the claimant, it rejects as inapplicable Article 51 of the Constitution, considering that this is not at issue when dealing with rules that, like the one in these proceedings, do not specifically undermine the special protection that must be afforded to the family, although it is evident that the challenged provision does so indirectly, as would any other rule capable of causing a loss or diminution in the property of those obligated to provide for it.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The unconstitutionality action is upheld and, consequently, the nullity of the challenged rule, Article 240 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, is declared, insofar as it establishes grounds for loss of the right to retirement or pension (pensión) different from those contemplated in Articles 237 and 239 of the same law. Under the terms of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), this judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the date of enactment of the annulled rule. Let it be notified and published.

Rodolfo E. Piza E., Jorge Baudrit G., Jorge E. Castro B., Luis Fernando Solano C., Luis Paulino Mora M., Manuel E. Rodríguez E., Hernando Arias G., Juan Carlos Castro L., Secretary.

of ILO Convention No. 102, which establish:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>" Article 25</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Every Member for which this Part of the Convention is in force shall guarantee to the persons protected the provision of old-age benefits, in accordance with the following Articles of this Part"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>" Article 28</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The benefit shall be a periodical payment calculated as follows... "</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>" Article 29</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>1. The benefit specified in Article 28 shall be secured, in the contingency covered, at least:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>a) to persons protected who have completed, prior to the contingency, in accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period which may be thirty years of contribution or employment, or twenty years of residence...</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>"2. Where the provision of the benefit specified in paragraph 1 is conditional upon the completion of a minimum period of contribution or employment, a reduced benefit shall be secured at least:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>"a) To persons protected who have completed, prior to the contingency, in accordance with prescribed rules, a qualifying period of fifteen years of contribution or employment... "</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>" Article 30</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>"The benefits mentioned in Articles 28 and 29 shall be granted throughout the contingency"</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Other international texts also recognize, either specifically the right to retirement (jubilación)—by age or old age—(e.g., Art. 16 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 22 and 25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 31 International American Charter of Social Guarantees; 5th Convention concerning Equality of Treatment in Social Security, ILO No. 118), or, in general, the Right to Social Security, within which retirement (jubilación) is universally understood to be included (e.g., Art. 11 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and 9th International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>IV.- As can be seen, in both classes of the said norms, the fundamental right of every worker to their retirement (jubilación) is recognized, and reference is clearly made to old age, in what is relevant, as the "contingency" determining the right to the benefit—retirement (jubilación). The objection of the Procuraduría General is not understood by this, when it affirms that the provisions of ILO Convention No. 102 only protect</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>"the workers who suffer a contingency within their employment relationship, which is not the case of the appellant... (f. 62 fte.);</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>thus giving, it seems, to the expression an incomprehensible sense of abnormality, certainly without any explanation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>V.- To the extent that, in accordance with the foregoing, fundamental rights of the plaintiff are involved, his circumstances, his conduct, or his merits, whatever they may be, have nothing and can have nothing to do with their recognition and guarantee, because such fundamental rights are, by definition, rights of every human being, by the mere fact of being human, under conditions of equality and "(without) any discrimination contrary to human dignity" (see Arts. 33 Political Constitution; Preamble and 2 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; 1, 2.1 and 7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1.1 and 24 American Convention on Human Rights; Preamble, 2.1 and 26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Preamble and 2.2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and other international texts, as stated today expressly incorporated into the former in its Article 48, reformed by Law No. 7128 of August 18, 1989).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The Law of Human Rights, both domestic and international, prohibits, among others but with very special emphasis, all discrimination in the recognition and guarantee of the same to alleged, accused, or convicted criminals, no matter what their degree of responsibility, their economic, political, or social position, or even the gravity or repugnance of their crimes.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>VI.- The Procuraduría General de la República, after accepting that a fundamental right to retirement (jubilación) exists, claims that this is limited to that of the general regime, entrusted by the same Article 73 of the Constitution to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, thus denying that, as such, it extends to other special regimes or, particularly, to that of the Judicial Branch referred to in the challenged Article 240, which, besides being privileged, it considers as in no way excluding the general one administered by the Caja, so that whoever loses their retirement (jubilación) within the former always retains the possibility of resorting to the latter, under conditions of equality with the other members thereof.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>However, this Chamber considers that argument unacceptable, for two reasons, namely:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>a) In the first place, because from the very text of Article 73, from its location in the chapter on "social guarantees" of the Constitution, and from the international instruments alluded to, its meaning and its intention to enshrine it as a worker's right and not as a simple competence of the Caja, for the benefit of the latter, clearly emerge, although its fulfillment is also specifically attributed to the latter. In other words, the clear meaning of the constitutional norm is the recognition of retirement by age (jubilación por edad), among others, as a fundamental right of every worker, although at the same time it is included within the competences of the Caja, but this as a function of the former, that is, entrusting it to the Caja as an attribution-duty, with the evident purpose of giving the simple recognized right an administrative guarantee; which, moreover, is not alien to the very nature of the so-called economic, social, or cultural rights, or benefit rights, which require for their effectiveness a complex economic and institutional apparatus.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>b) Secondly, because, in any case, it is not true that, upon the plaintiff or any other former judicial server being excluded from the special regime provided for by the Ley Orgánica, they have a full right to resort to the ordinary one of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social; on the contrary, Article 244 of the former, invoked for that purpose by the Procuraduría, textually establishes that "the permanent or interim officials and employees who have ceased, or who cease in the exercise of their positions, shall not have the right to have the amount of the contributions with which they had contributed to the formation of the retirement and pension fund returned to them. However, if they have not obtained the benefits of retirement (jubilación) or pension, they shall have the right to have the amount of the contributions with which they had contributed to the formation of the judicial retirement and pension fund transferred to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, so that these contributions may be counted for them within the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, or to the institution administering the regime in which the retirement (jubilación) or pension is to be granted, for the same purpose of counting contributions...""</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>that is, the most it grants to the server is the possibility of transferring to the Caja the amount of their own contributions, not those made by the Corte Suprema de Justicia, that is, by the State in favor of the former.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>VII.- In any case, this Chamber considers that the right to retirement (jubilación), in general or in the special regimes alluded to, cannot normally be conditioned upon the conduct of its holder, whether this conduct occurs before or after its consolidation as an acquired right. In reality, it is not ignored that the right to retirement (jubilación), like any other right, is subject to conditions and limitations, but both only insofar as they are provided for by the norms that recognize and guarantee them and are, moreover, reasonably necessary for the exercise of the right itself, according to its nature and purpose. This is nothing other than the expression of a well-known principle of the Law of Human Rights, which may be called proportionality, and which is generally enshrined as a sine qua non condition of the limitations and restrictions on such rights exceptionally authorized by the very texts that consecrate them; a principle that is listed, for example, in Articles 29.2 and 30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 29 and 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 4 and 5 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Under such assumptions of reasonableness and proportionality would obviously fall the conditions established in Articles 237 and 239 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial itself, to which the challenged Article 240 expressly refers; and they would fall, even in the absence of an express text, for example, the suspension of retirement (jubilación) when the beneficiary returns to active paid service, and while they are in it, or the loss of the rights of heirs (causahabientes) in events such as the coming of age of the children or the marriage of the surviving spouse.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>VIII.- On the contrary, it is clearly unconstitutional, for being unreasonable, disproportionate, and totally disconnected from the nature and purpose of retirement (jubilación), as a fundamental right derived from the provision of work and constituted to a significant extent by the contributions of the worker themselves, the deprivation thereof for causes such as the improper conduct of the beneficiary, whether this occurs before or after the acquisition, consolidation, recognition, or effective enjoyment of their current right to the benefit, and even if it were to constitute a crime, and whatever the gravity or repugnance thereof; because, moreover, such a consequence would be absolutely incompatible with the very concept of what it is, as stated, a worker's right and not a gracious concession of the State or the Employer.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>IX.- It is worth clarifying that the worker's contribution to the retirement regime is mentioned only for greater abundance, since for the existence of the right to retirement (jubilación), it is indifferent whether the regime is sustained totally or partially by the contributions of its beneficiaries or of the State or employers on whom they depend: rights are such by their recognition, and fundamental rights also by their link to the dignity of the human being, not by who must recognize them nor, much less, by who bears the costs of their provision. To use a well-known example in another order of things, in Costa Rica, since 1869, primary education, since 1949, primary and secondary education, and since 1973, basic general, preschool, and diversified education are, by express constitutional provision, free and financed by the Nation (Arts. 6, Political Constitution of 1869, 52, later 67 Political Constitution of 1871, and 78 current Constitution of 1949, the latter reformed by Law No. 5202 of May 30, 1973); however, no one would think of denying that access to public education is an authentic fundamental right of every human being, as such universal, equal, and enforceable, not a gracious concession of the Nation or the State that they may arbitrarily condition, limit, or suppress. In the same way, the general right to social security, in all its fundamental manifestations, among them retirement (jubilación), continues to be such a right, universal, equal, and enforceable, whatever the participation or the legal or moral merits of the beneficiary.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>X.- Furthermore, this Chamber observes that the challenged provision of Article 240 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial is the only one of the various retirement regimes in force in Costa Rica that imposes the loss of the right for vices, moral failings, or criminal liabilities of the beneficiary; whereby it also becomes unconstitutional for violation of the principle and right of equality, without discrimination, recognized, in general, by Article 33, and, in particular, by Articles 57 and 68 of the Constitution, the latter regarding the matters of salary and working conditions, of which retirement (jubilación) is either a species, or justifies an analogous application of its rules and mandates; the principle and right of equality without discrimination, as stated invariably recognized by the Constitutions and by international human rights instruments, as much a fundamental right in itself as a necessary criterion for the interpretation and application of all other rights, fundamental or not (see citations in Considerando V supra).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>XI.- It has already been said that the right to retirement (jubilación) cannot be limited, conditioned, or suppressed unreasonably or disproportionately, regardless of whether by circumstances prior or subsequent to its acquisition, consolidation, recognition, or effective enjoyment. In this sense, it is necessary to observe that this right ceases to be a mere expectation and is acquired from the moment one enters the retirement regime, at least as a general right of membership therein, and from the instant the beneficiary meets the factual conditions foreseen to receive the benefit, as a right to the current benefit, without it being necessary that they have claimed it, nor much less that recognition has been declared or that they have begun to receive it... in the same way that the right to inheritance is acquired at the moment of the death of the deceased (causante), not at the opening of the succession proceeding, nor, much less, at the adjudication of the inheritance right or the delivery of the assets to the heir.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>XII.- It has also been alleged that Article 240 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial violates the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, the right of property, and the proscription of the penalty of confiscation, enshrined, in that order, by Articles 34, 45, and 40 of the Constitution. The Procuraduría General has objected to this argument, at least as applicable to the plaintiff, considering that the provision of causes for loss of retirement (jubilación) contained in that provision already existed even before the plaintiff entered the Judicial Branch regime, so that both his right to retirement (jubilación) itself, and the current entry thereof into his patrimony, were conditioned in advance under the terms of the norm in question.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>This Chamber recognizes that this is so; however, it considers that the principle of non-retroactivity, like the others relating to fundamental rights or freedoms, is not merely formal, but also and above all material, so that it is violated not only when a new norm or the reform of a previous one illegitimately alters acquired rights or situations consolidated under the protection of the said previous norm, but also when the effects, interpretation, or application of the latter produces an unreasonable or disproportionate harm to the holder of the right or situation that it itself enshrines. This is so, because from the moment one enters the retirement regime, the worker is protected not only by the legal and regulatory rules and criteria of the regime itself but also by the constitutional norms and principles that enshrine their right to retirement (jubilación) or surround it with the special guarantees of the Fundamental Law, among them the one that prohibits giving the former retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, or of their acquired rights or consolidated legal situations (Art. 34 Constitution), as well as that of "one's own acts," according to which public authorities cannot go against their own declaratory acts of rights, except for rigorously regulated exceptions; this principle linked, in turn, to Article 34 itself and to the essential principle of good faith, which constitutes one of the pillars of the democratic rule of law and, therefore, of the constitutional order.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>XIII.- Furthermore, to the extent that the challenged Article 240 is clearly susceptible to being applied to the worker who has already met the necessary conditions to have a current right to retirement (jubilación), and even to one who has already claimed, obtained, or even enjoyed it, it also violates the right of property guaranteed by Article 45 of the Constitution, insofar as it is evident that this incorporates a content and a set of general attributes easily deducible from the constitutional order as a whole, and that its scope is not limited to ownership or immovable property, but extends to the protection of everything that has entered, de facto or de jure, into the patrimony of private individuals. So that, by depriving the worker of their acquired right to retirement (jubilación), the challenged norm also illegitimately harms the patrimony of that worker, thus violating their fundamental right of property.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>XIV.- Finally, this Chamber deems it necessary to make at least a brief allusion to the assumption of "criminal liabilities" referred to in the challenged article, considering that it was this that the Corte Suprema de Justicia expressly invoked to apply it to the plaintiff, although considering it here only as a working hypothesis due to the nature of the acción de inconstitucionalidad, which has already been mentioned.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>In this case, the constitutional violations that have been uncovered in the norm in question would be aggravated by the circumstance that in a democratic rule of law, it is not entirely admissible to impose on those accused of committing a crime an additional penalty or one different from those expressly provided for by criminal legislation, which, moreover, must be imposed exclusively by the corresponding criminal courts. These are some of the dimensions specifically attached to the principles of due process, which the Constitution enshrines, in general, in its Articles 39 and 41. With the aggravating circumstance, in the case of Costa Rica, that our criminal system does not even contemplate disqualification from holding public office as a normal accessory sanction, but only as a specific penalty for certain crimes and, of course, to be imposed at the end of the respective criminal process. If a person sentenced for a very serious crime, but which does not entail such disqualification, could not even be prevented from holding or continuing to hold a public office—except, naturally, their material impossibility to do so while they must serve a custodial sentence—this Chamber finds no justification for, above and beyond the criminal and civil sentence imposed by the repressive courts, adding to the sentenced person the unforeseen sanction of exclusion from the retirement regime, thus confiscating a patrimony which, incidentally, is not only theirs but also belongs to their dependent third parties.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>XV.- This Chamber considers, then, that the challenged norm of Article 240 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial is unconstitutional, for violation of the rights of the judicial server to their retirement (jubilación), to equality before the law, to the non-retroactivity of the application of the latter to their detriment, to the inviolability of their patrimony, and to the proscription of the penalty of confiscation, as well as to due process and the principle of criminal specificity, enshrined in Articles 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45, and 73 of the Political Constitution, as well as in the invoked norms of Articles 25, 28, 29, and 30 of ILO Convention No. 102, approved by Law No. 4736 of March 29, 1971.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>XVI.- In contrast, of the norms invoked by the plaintiff, it rejects as inapplicable Art. 51 of the Constitution, considering that this is not at issue when dealing with norms that, like the one at hand, do not specifically threaten the special protection that must be given to the family, although it is evident that the challenged provision does so indirectly, as would any other capable of causing a loss or diminution in the patrimony of those obliged to support it.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>POR TANTO:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>The acción de inconstitucionalidad is declared with merit and, consequently, the nullity of the challenged norm, Article 240 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, insofar as it establishes causes for loss of the right to retirement (jubilación) or pension other than those contemplated in Articles 237 and 239 of the same law. Under the terms of Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this judgment is declaratory and its effects retroactive to the date of promulgation of the annulled norm. Let it be notified and published.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt\"><span>Rodolfo E. Piza E., Jorge Baudrit G., Jorge E. Castro B., Luis Fernando Solano C., Luis Paulino Mora M., Manuel E. Rodríguez E., Hernando Arias G., Juan Carlos Castro L., secretary.</span></p>

01147 Voto 1147-90 Fecha: 21-9-90 Hora: 16:00 Accionante: Di Leoni Badilla, Nombre45274 Impugna: Artículo 240 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Por violar: Artículos 34, 40, 45, 51, 73, 7 de la Constitución Política y 25, 28, 29 y Concordantes del Convenio No. 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo Redacta: Magistrado Piza Escalante DERECHO A LA JUBILACION La jubilación como derecho fundamental de todo trabajador SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas del veintiuno de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad (expediente No. 208-90) interpuesta por Nombre45274 contra el artículo 240 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, según reforma introducida por Ley No. 34 de 9 de junio de 1939, por contrario a los artículos 34- irretroactividad de la ley- ,40 - penas prohibidas-, 45- inviolabilidad de la propiedad-, 51 - protección de la familia, la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido-, 73- derecho a la seguridad social- y 7- rango normativo de los tratados internacionales en el derecho interno- de la Constitución, el último en relación con los artículos 25,28, 29 y concordantes del Convenio No. 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, OIT, (aprobado por Ley No. 4736 de 29 de marzo de 1971), relativos en general, a las prestaciones por vejez.

En este último contexto también se reclama, paralelamente, que la norma impugnada, contenida en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial desde su promulgación por Ley No. 8 de 29 de noviembre de 1937, quedó derogada pura y simplemente, tanto por virtud del mayor rango en el ordenamiento interno de las internacionales invocadas, conforme al mismo artículo 7 constitucional, cuanto por obra de la propia Constitución Política, según la cláusula derogatoria de su artículo 197.

RESULTANDO:

I.- La demanda se presentó el 20 de febrero de 1990, junto con una declaración notarial de que la inconstitucionalidad fue alegada ante el Juzgado Primero de Trabajo, el Tribunal Superior y la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el trámite de una acción ordinaria laboral del accionante contra el Estado (expediente No. 820-87 del Juzgado). Figuran como apoderados especiales judiciales del actor los licenciados Nombre8672. Gonzalo Retana Sandí y el Lic. Guillermo Rojas Paniagua.

II.- En virtud de la excusa acogida de los Magistrados Alejandro Rodríguez Vega y Juan Luis Arias Arias, se designó a los Magistrados suplentes Danilo Elizondo Cerdas, reemplazado después por excusa por Hernando Arias Gómez, y Manuel Emilio Rodríguez Echeverría. En sustitución del primero preside el Tribunal el Magistrado Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante.

III.- La presidencia dio curso a la acción por resolución de las dieciséis y cuarenta horas del 3 de abril y los avisos de ley se publicaron en los Boletines Judiciales No. 75, 76 y 77 de 20, 23 y 24 del mismo mes.

IV.- La audiencia escrita fue contestada por el Procurador General adjunto de la República, Lic. Farid Beirute Brenes. Se recibió, además, un telegrama informal del Lic. Mario Alfaro A., Presidente de la llamada Fenalpe, a quien por esa informalidad no procede reconocerle como coayudante.

V.- La audiencia oral se celebró el 16 de agosto de 1990, con asistencia de los apoderados judiciales del accionante, Dr. Gonzalo Retana Sandí y Lic. Guillermo Rojas Paniagua, por una parte, y del Procurador General Adjunto Lic. Farid Beirute Brenes y el Procurador Dr. Román Solís Zelaya, por la otra, los últimos reiterando su oposición a la nulidad pedida.

VI.- Esta sentencia se dicta sin sujeción a plazo, dentro de la autorización otorgada por el transitorio II párrafo 3 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Redacta el Magistrado Piza Escalante; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- La acción objeta, por inconstitucional, la disposición de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, conforme a la cual:

" Artículo 240 Aunque las jubilaciones y pensiones tienen el carácter de vitalicias, con las excepciones de los artículos 237 y 239, el agraciado pierde su derecho, cuando por sus vicios, faltas de moralidad o responsabilidades penales, calificados por la Corte, se haga indigno de percibirlas"; en cuanto, con base en dicha norma, la Corte Suprema de Justicia, al ser él procesado por los Tribunales Penales por el delito de homicidio en perjuicio de Nombre43945 , le reconoció su derecho de jubilación como ex funcionario del Poder Judicial, pero bajo condición del resultado de esa causa penal (acuerdos de Corte Plena según artículo XVII del 17 de agosto de 1987, relacionado con el XXIX del 10, XVIII del 20 y XV del 27 del mismo mes, y II del 17 de setiembre siguiente; así como su confirmación por sentencias del Juzgado Primero de Trabajo de las 9:00 horas del 19 de octubre de 1988, y del Tribunal Superior de Trabajo de San José, Sección Primera, de las 8:00 horas del 24 de mayo de 1989); y más tarde, aun después de planteada esta acción, al cumplirse esa condición le canceló, dicha jubilación condicional a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia condenatoria que puso término al citado proceso (acuerdo de Corte Plena en artículo XXII del 2 de abril de 1990, comunicada por resolución de la Secretarla General de las 10:30 del 9 de ese mes).

II.- En cambio, no le interesan ni deben interesarle la conmoción social producida por el delito imputado al accionante y ahora declarado en firme por los tribunales penales, ni su situación particular como ex director administrativo del Poder Judicial, ni, en general, sus méritos o su conducta, en lo personal o como ex funcionario judicial.

La función de control de constitucionalidad que confía a esta Jurisdicción el artículo 10 de la Constitución y que se actúa, en lo que interesa, a través de la "acción de inconstitucionalidad", se realiza mediante la confrontación de las normas o actos impugnados, o de sus efectos, interpretación o aplicación, con las normas y principios constitucionales (art. 3 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), objetivamente y con total abstracción de las circunstancias del caso que motiva su actuación, de manera que cualquier consideración que haya de hacerse sobre hechos concretos deba tomar éstos como meras hipótesis normativas, no como realidades cuya verdad o falsedad o cuya validez jurídica o moral la Sala esté llamada a declarar: salvo, si acaso, en la medida en que tales hechos concretos hubieran podido afectar la legitimación del accionante, fundada en la existencia previa del proceso laboral mencionado en el Resultando I, legitimación que del todo no está aquí en cuestión.

III.- En primer lugar, la Sala declara que sí existe un derecho constitucional y fundamental a la jubilación, a favor de todo trabajador, en general; derecho que, como tal, pertenece y debe ser reconocido a todo ser humano, en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación alguna, de conformidad con los artículos 33 y 73 de la Constitución, según los cuales:

" Artículo 33 Todo hombre es igual ante la ley y no podrá hacerse discriminación alguna contraria a la dignidad humana" " Artículo 73 Se establecen los seguros sociales en beneficio de los trabajadores manuales e intelectuales, regulados por el sistema de contribución forzosa del Estado, patronos y trabajadores, a fin de proteger a éstos contra los riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine..." Esa conclusión se confirma en una serie de principios y normas internacionales de derechos humanos, que tienen, no sólo el rango superior a la ley ordinaria que les confiere el artículo 7 de la Constitución, sino también un amparo constitucional directo que prácticamente los equipara a los consagrados expresamente por la propia Carta Fundamental, al tenor del artículo 48 de la misma, (reformado por la Ley No. 7128 de 18 de agosto de 1989); entre esos derechos, concretamente, los reconocidos en los artículos 25, 28, 29 y 30- así corregidos los que se invocan en la acción- del Convenio sobre la Seguridad Social, No. 102 de la OIT, en los cuales se establece:

" Artículo 25 Todo Miembro para el cual esté en vigor esta parte del Convenio deberá garantizar a las personas protegidas la concesión de prestaciones de vejez, de conformidad con los artículos siguientes de esta parte" " Artículo 28 La prestación consistirá en un pago periódico, calculado en la forma siguiente... " " Artículo 29 1. La prestación mencionada en el artículo 28 deberá garantizarse, en la contingencia cubierta, por lo menos:

• a)a las personas protegidas que hayan cumplido, antes de la contingencia, de conformidad con reglas prescritas, un período de calificación que podrá consistir en treinta años de cotización o de empleo, o en veinte años de residencia...

"2. Cuando la concesión de la prestación mencionada en el párrafo 1 esté condicionada al cumplimiento de un período mínimo de cotización o de empleo, deberá garantizarse una prestación reducida por lo menos:

"a) A las personas protegidas que hayan cumplido, antes de la contingencia, de conformidad con reglas prescritas un período de calificación de quince años de cotización o de empleo... " " Artículo 30 "Las prestaciones mencionadas en los artículos 28 y 29 deberán concederse durante todo el transcurso de la contingencia" Otros textos internacionales reconocen también, o específicamente el derecho a la jubilación -por edad o vejez- (p. ej. art.16 Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; 22 y 25 Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 31 Carta Internacional Americana de Garantías Sociales; 5o Convención sobre Igualdad de Trato en Materia de Seguridad Social, No. 118 OIT), o, en general, el Derecho a la Seguridad Social, dentro de la cual se tiene universalmente por comprendida la jubilación (p. ej. art.11 Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; y 9° Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales).

IV.- Como se ve, en ambas clases de las normas dichas se reconoce el derecho fundamental de todo trabajador a su jubilación, y se alude claramente a la vejez, en lo que interesa, como la "contingencia" determinante del derecho a la prestación -jubilación-. No se entiende por esto la objeción de la Procuraduría General, cuando afirma que las disposiciones del Convenio No. 102 OIT solamente protegen "a los trabajadores que sufriesen una contingencia dentro de su relación laboral, que no es el caso del recurrente... (f. 62 fte.); dando así, al parecer, a la expresión un sentido incomprensible de anormalidad, por cierto que sin ninguna explicación.

V.- En la medida en que, conforme a lo expuesto, se encuentran implicados derechos fundamentales del actor, sus circunstancias, su conducta o sus méritos, cualesquiera que éstos sean, nada tienen ni pueden tener que ver para su reconocimiento y garantía, porque tales derechos fundamentales lo son, por definición, de todo ser humano, por el solo hecho de serlo, en condiciones de igualdad y "(sin) discriminación alguna contraria a la dignidad humana" (v. arts. 33 Constitución Política; Preámbulo y 2 Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; 1, 2.1 y 7 Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos; 1.1 y 24 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; Preámbulo, 2.1 y 26 Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos; Preámbulo y 2.2 Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales; y otros textos internacionales, como se dijo hoy incorporados expresamente a la primera en su artículo 48, reformado por Ley No. 7128 de 18 de agosto de 1989).

El Derecho de los Derechos Humanos, tanto interno como internacional, prohíbe, entre otras pero con un énfasis muy especial, toda discriminación en el reconocimiento y garantía de los mismos a los delincuentes presuntos, imputados o condenados, no importa cuales sean su grado de responsabilidad, su posición económica, política o social, o incluso la gravedad o repugnancia de sus crímenes.

VI.- La Procuraduría General de la República, luego de aceptar que existe un derecho fundamental a la jubilación, pretende que éste se limita al del régimen general, encomendado por el mismo artículo 73 de la Constitución a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, negando así que, como tal, se extienda a otros regímenes especiales o, particularmente, al del Poder Judicial a que se refiere el artículo 240 impugnado, que, además de privilegiado, considera como no excluyente, en modo alguno, del general administrado por la Caja, de manera que quien pierde su jubilación dentro del primero conserva siempre la posibilidad de acogerse al segundo, en condiciones de igualdad con los otros miembros del mismo.

Sin embargo, la Sala considera inaceptable esa argumentación, por dos razones, a saber:

• a)En primer lugar, porque del texto mismo del artículo 73, de su ubicación en el capítulo de "garantías sociales" de la Constitución y de los instrumentos internacionales aludidos se desprenden claramente su sentido y su intención de consagrarlo como derecho del trabajador y no como simple competencia de la Caja, en beneficio de ésta, aunque también su cumplimiento se atribuya específicamente a esta última. Con otras palabras, el significado claro de la norma constitucional es el del reconocimiento de la jubilación por edad, entre otros, como derecho fundamental de todo trabajador, aunque a la vez se incluya dentro de las competencias de la Caja, pero esto en función de aquello, es decir, encomendándoselo como una atribución-deber, con el evidente propósito de darle al simple derecho reconocido una garantía administrativa; lo cual, por lo demás, no es extraño a la naturaleza misma de los llamados derechos económicos, sociales o culturales, o derechos de prestación, que requieren para su eficacia de un complejo aparato económico e institucional.
• b)En segundo, porque, de todos modos, no es verdad que, al ser excluido el actor o cualquier otro ex servidor judicial del régimen especial previsto por la Ley Orgánica, tenga derecho pleno de acogerse al ordinario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social; por el contrario, el artículo 244 de aquélla, invocado a ese propósito por la Procuraduría, establece textualmente que "los funcionarios y empleados propietarios o interinos que hubieren cesado, o que cesen en el ejercicio de sus cargos, no tendrán derecho a que se les devuelva el monto de las cuotas con que hubieren contribuido a la formación del fondo de jubilaciones y pensiones. Sin embargo, si no hubieren obtenido los beneficios de jubilación o pensión, sí tendrán derecho a que el monto de las cuotas con que hubieren contribuido a la formación del fondo de jubilaciones y pensiones judiciales, se traslade a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a fin de que estas cuotas se le computen dentro del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, o a la institución administradora del régimen en que se vaya a otorgar la jubilación o pensión, para el mismo propósito del cómputo de cuotas..." es decir, que lo más que concede al servidor es la posibilidad de trasladar a la Caja el monto de sus propias cotizaciones, no las hechas por la Corte Suprema de Justicia, es decir, por el Estado a favor de aquél.

VII.- En todo caso, la Sala considera que el derecho a la jubilación, en general o en los regímenes especiales aludidos, no puede ser normalmente condicionado a la conducta de su titular, ya sea ésta anterior o posterior a su consolidación como derecho adquirido. En realidad, no se ignora que el de jubilación, como cualquier otro derecho, está sujeto a condiciones y limitaciones, pero unas y otras solamente en cuanto se encuentren previstas por las normas que las reconocen y garantizan y resulten, además, razonablemente necesarias para el ejercicio del derecho mismo, de acuerdo con su naturaleza y fin. Esto no es otra cosa que expresión de un conocido principio del Derecho de los Derechos Humanos, que puede denominarse de proporcionalidad, y que se recoge, en general, como condición sine qua non de las limitaciones y restricciones a tales derechos autorizadas excepcionalmente por los propios textos que los consagran; principio que se encuentra enumerado, por ejemplo, en los artículos 29.2 y 30 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, 29 y 30 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 5o del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, y 4 y 5 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.

En tales supuestos de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad estarían, obviamente, las condiciones establecidas en los artículos 237 y 239 de la propia Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, a las que se remite expresamente el 240 impugnado; y lo estarían, aún a falta de texto expreso, por ejemplo, la suspensión de la jubilación cuando el beneficiario se reintegre al servicio activo remunerado, y mientras lo esté, o la pérdida de los derechos causahabientes en eventos como la mayoridad de los hijos o el matrimonio del cónyuge supérstite.

VIII.- Por el contrario, resulta a todas luces inconstitucional, por irrazonable, por desproporcionada y por desvinculada totalmente de la naturaleza y fin de la jubilación, como derecho fundamental derivado de la prestación del trabajo y constituido en una medida importante por los aportes del propio trabajador, la privación de aquélla por causas tales como la conducta impropia del beneficiario, lo mismo si ésta ocurriere antes o después de la adquisición, consolidación, reconocimiento o goce efectivo de su derecho actual al beneficio, e incluso si llegare a ser constitutiva de delito, y cualquiera que fuere la gravedad o repugnancia de éste; porque, además, una tal consecuencia resultaría absolutamente incompatible con el concepto mismo de lo que es, según se dijo, un derecho del trabajador y no una concesión graciosa del Estado o del Patrono.

IX.- Valga aclarar que la contribución del trabajador al régimen jubilatorio solamente se menciona a titulo de mayor abundamiento, ya que para la existencia del derecho a la jubilación es indiferente que el régimen se sustente total o parcialmente en los aportes de sus beneficiarios o del Estado o patronos de quienes dependan: los derechos son tales por su reconocimiento, y los fundamentales además por su vinculación con la dignidad del ser humano, no por quién haya de reconocerlos ni, mucho menos, de cargar con los costos de su prestación. Para utilizar un ejemplo conocido en otro orden de cosas, en Costa Rica, desde 1869, la educación primaria, desde 1949, la primaria y secundaria, y desde 1973, la general básica, la preescolar y la diversificada son, por expresa disposición constitucional, gratuitas y costeadas por la Nación (arts. 6, Constitución Política de 1869,52, después 67 Constitución Política de 1871, y 78 Constitución vigente de 1949, este último reformado por Ley No. 5202 de 30 de mayo de 1973); sin embargo, a nadie se le ocurriría negar que el acceso a la educación pública es un auténtico derecho fundamental de todo ser humano, como tal universal, igual y exigible, no una concesión graciosa de la Nación o del Estado que éstos puedan a su arbitrio condicionar, limitar o suprimir. De la misma manera, el derecho general a la seguridad social, en todas sus manifestaciones fundamentales, entre ellas la jubilación, sigue siendo tal derecho, universal, igual y exigible, cualesquiera que sean la participación o los méritos legales o morales del beneficiario.

X.- Por otra parte, la Sala observa que la disposición impugnada del artículo 240 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial es la única de los diversos regímenes de jubilación vigentes en Costa Rica que impone la pérdida del derecho por vicios, faltas de moralidad o responsabilidades penales del beneficiario; con lo cual deviene también en inconstitucional por violación del principio y derecho de igualdad, sin discriminación, reconocido, en general, por el artículo 33, y, en especial, por los 57 y 68 de la Constitución, estos últimos respecto de las materias del salario y de las condiciones del trabajo, de los cuales la jubilación, o es una especie, o justifica una aplicación analógica de sus reglas y mandatos; principio y derecho de igualdad sin discriminación, como se dijo invariablemente reconocido por las Constituciones y por los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos, tanto como derecho fundamental en sí, cuanto como criterio necesario de interpretación y aplicación de todos los demás derechos, fundamentales o no (ver citas en Considerando V supra).

XI.- Ya se dijo que el derecho a la jubilación no puede limitarse, condicionarse o suprimirse irrazonable o desproporcionadamente, no importa si por circunstancias anteriores o posteriores a su adquisición, consolidación, reconocimiento o goce efectivo. En este sentido, es preciso observar que ese derecho deja de ser una simple expectativa y se adquiere desde que se ingresa al régimen jubilatorio, al menos como derecho general de pertenencia al mismo, y desde el instante en que el beneficiario se encuentra en las condiciones de hecho previstas para recibir el beneficio, como derecho a la prestación actual, sin que sea necesario que la haya reclamado, ni mucho menos declarado el reconocimiento o comenzado a percibirla... de la misma manera que el derecho a la herencia se adquiere en el momento de la muerte del causante, no en el de la apertura del juicio sucesorio, ni, mucho menos, en el de la adjudicación del derecho hereditario o de la entrega de los bienes al heredero.

XII.- Se ha alegado también que el artículo 240 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial viola el principio de irretroactividad de la ley, el derecho de propiedad y la proscripción de la pena de confiscación, consagrados, en su orden, por los artículos 34, 45 y 40 de la Constitución. La Procuraduría General ha objetado este planteamiento, al menos en lo aplicable al accionante, por considerar que la previsión de causales de pérdida de la jubilación contenida en aquella disposición ya existía aun desde antes de que aquél ingresara al régimen del Poder Judicial, de manera que, tanto su derecho a la jubilación en si, como el ingreso actual de ésta en su patrimonio, estaban condicionados de antemano en los términos de la norma en cuestión.

La Sala reconoce que ello es así; sin embargo, considera que el principio de irretroactividad, al igual que los demás relativos a los derechos o libertades fundamentales, no es tan sólo formal, sino también y sobre todo material, de modo que resulta violado, no sólo cuando una nueva norma o la reforma de una anterior altera ilegítimamente derechos adquiridos o situaciones consolidadas al amparo de la dicha norma anterior, sino también cuando los efectos, la interpretación o la aplicación de esta última produce un perjuicio irrazonable o desproporcionado al titular del derecho o situación que ella misma consagra. Esto es así, porque desde el momento en que se ingresa al régimen jubilatorio el trabajador queda protegido, no sólo por las reglas y criterios legales y reglamentarios del propio régimen en sí, sino también por las normas y principios constitucionales que consagran su derecho a la jubilación o lo rodean de las especiales garantías de la Ley Fundamental, entre ellos el que prohíbe dar a los primeros efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de persona alguna, o de sus derechos adquiridos o de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas (art. 34 Constitución), así como el de los "actos propios", según el cual las autoridades públicas no pueden ir contra sus propios actos declarativos de derechos, salvo excepciones rigurosamente reguladas; principio este vinculado, a su vez, al propio artículo 34 y al toral de la buena fe, que constituye uno de los pilares del Estado democrático de derecho y, por ende, del orden constitucional.

XIII.- Además, en la medida en que claramente el artículo 240 impugnado es susceptible de aplicarse al trabajador que ya ha cumplido las condiciones necesarias para tener derecho actual a la jubilación, y aún al que ya lo ha reclamado, obtenido o incluso disfrutado, viola también el derecho de propiedad garantizado por el artículo 45 de la Constitución, en cuanto es evidente que éste incorpora un contenido y un conjunto de atributos generales fácilmente deducibles del orden constitucional en su conjunto, y que su alcance no se limita al dominio o a la propiedad inmobiliaria, sino que se extienda a la protección de todo aquello que haya ingresado, de hecho o de derecho, al patrimonio de las personas privadas. De manera que, al privar al trabajador de su derecho adquirido a la jubilación, también la norma impugnada lesiona ilegítimamente el patrimonio de ese trabajador, violando así su derecho fundamental de propiedad.

XIV.- Finalmente, la Sala considera que debe hacer una por lo menos rápida alusión al supuesto de "responsabilidades penales" a que alude el artículo impugnado, en atención a que fue éste el que la Corte Suprema de Justicia expresamente invocó, para aplicarlo al accionante, si bien considerándolo aquí tan sólo como hipótesis de trabajo por la naturaleza de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, a la que ya se hizo mención.

En este caso, las violaciones constitucionales que han quedado descubiertas en la norma en cuestión, se agravarían por la circunstancia de que en el Estado democrático de derecho no es del todo admisible que se imponga a los imputados por la comisión de un delito una pena adicional o distinta a las previstas expresamente por la legislación criminal, las cuales, además, tienen que ser impuestas exclusivamente por los correspondientes tribunales de justicia penal. Estas son algunas de las dimensiones específicamente adheridas a los principios del debido proceso, que la Constitución recoge, en general, en sus artículos 39 y 41. Con la circunstancia agravante, en el caso de Costa Rica, de que nuestro sistema penal ni siquiera contempla la inhabilitación para el ejercicio de cargos públicos como sanción accesoria normal, sino sólo como pena específica para ciertos delitos y, desde luego, para ser impuesta al cabo del respectivo proceso penal. Si a la persona condenada por un delito muy grave, pero que no comporte esa inhabilitación, no podría siquiera impedírsele desempeñar o continuar desempeñando un cargo público- salvo, naturalmente, su imposibilidad material para hacerlo mientras deba descontar una pena privativa de libertad- no encuentra esta Sala ninguna justificación para que, por encima de la condena penal y civil impuesta por los tribunales represivos, se añada al condenado la sanción no prevista de la exclusión del régimen de jubilación, confiscándosele así un patrimonio que, de paso, no sólo es sólo suyo sino también de sus terceros dependientes.

XV.- La Sala considera, pues, que la norma impugnada del artículo 240 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial es inconstitucional, por violación de los derechos del servidor judicial a su jubilación, a la igualdad ante la ley, a la irretroactividad de la aplicación de ésta en su perjuicio, a la inviolabilidad de su patrimonio y a la proscripción de la pena de confiscación, así como al del debido proceso y el principio de especialidad penal, consagrados en los artículos 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45 y 73 de la Constitución Política, así como en las normas invocadas de los artículos 25, 28, 29 y 30 del Convenio No. 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, aprobado por Ley No. 4736 de 29 de marzo de 1971.

XVI.- En cambio, de las normas invocadas por el actor rechaza por inaplicable el art. 51 de la Constitución, por considerar que éste no se encuentra en cuestión cuando se trata de normas que, como la de autos, no atentan específicamente contra la protección especial que debe darse a la familia, aunque es evidente que de una manera indirecta sí lo hace la disposición impugnada, al igual que cualquiera otra capaz de causar una pérdida o disminución en el patrimonio de los obligados a alimentarla.

POR TANTO:

Se declara con lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad y, en consecuencia, la nulidad de la norma impugnada, artículo 240 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en cuanto establece causas de pérdida del derecho a jubilación o pensión diversas a las contempladas en los artículos 237 y 239 de la propia ley. En los términos del artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos a la fecha de promulgación de la norma anulada. Notifíquese y publíquese.

Rodolfo E. Piza E., Jorge Baudrit G., Jorge E. Castro B., Luis Fernando Solano C., Luis Paulino Mora M., Manuel E. Rodríguez E., Hernando Arias G., Juan Carlos Castro L., secretario.