Piercing the corporate veil in child support — asset confusion and true economic capacityVelo societario en pensión alimentaria — confusión de patrimonios y verdadera capacidad económica

**FILE: 22-001453-0172-PA - 3** **PROCEEDING: SECOND INSTANCE** **PLAINTIFF: [Name 001]** **DEFENDANT: [Name 002]** **SECOND INSTANCE JUDGMENT** **No. 2023000835** **FIRST FAMILY COURT OF SAN JOSÉ.** At nine hours and three minutes on the fifth of September of two thousand twenty-three.— Child support proceeding established by [Name 001], identity card number [Value 001] against [Name 002], identity card number [Value 002]. In an appeal filed by both parties, this Court hears the judgment of 2:53 p.m. on July 4, 2023, and, **SOLE RECITAL:** The appealed ruling sets the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES as a monthly support payment and for the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), and the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES for back-to-school expenses. Both parties appeal. The obligor alleges the following: ---a) Regarding the vehicle he acquired, which is noted in the appealed ruling, he states that "a significant portion corresponds to the amount obtained from the sale of the vehicle." He provides as evidence for a better resolution a deed showing the sale of a vehicle by a third party. ---b) His income reported to the social security system is due to an intervention by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). ---c) He contributed more for the beneficiary child when he lived with the family group because he did not know the child's mother's income was double what he believed. Now, he states it must be proportional. He requests that child support be set at three hundred sixty-five thousand colones. He does not indicate whether he intends this amount as the monthly payment, year-end bonus, or back-to-school expenses. The child's mother grieves: ---a) It is not true that the obligor's economic situation has been different since 2018, as the last trip he took was in 2021. She alleges there is a contradiction in the ruling by stating there has been a decline since 2018, when in reality he traveled abroad in 2021. ---b) The child's lifestyle has been demonstrated and is not due to a proportional contribution because she had always had a lower income than she has when working in a professional promotion, and her payments as an employee of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) are delayed, and therefore cannot be considered a stable income. She indicates her promotions do not depend on her. ---c) She cannot maintain the child's lifestyle with her income, and the ruling disregards her in-kind contribution. ---d) It is not true that the breakdown of expenses outlined in the lawsuit refers to extraordinary expenses, as the contested ruling claims, and that by failing to specify which ones and why they have the connotation of extraordinary, she has been left defenseless. ---e) That, in the deposition, the defendant accepted that he uses his other companies for investments. ---f) The defendant has "absolute economic possibilities," as he bought a vehicle with a low-amount lien. She requests that child support be set at ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES or an amount higher than that established. She does not indicate whether she requests this amount for the monthly payment, year-end bonus, or back-to-school expenses.

**WHEREAS:** **I. PROVEN FACTS:** Those designated as such in the contested ruling are endorsed. The following are now added:

• 12)The defendant is not a majority shareholder of the company [Name 003] S. A. and is listed as treasurer; however, the child and the child's mother use a 2012 Kia Pio model vehicle [Value 003] belonging to the company (uncontroverted fact forming part of the lawsuit, image 7, documentary evidence in image 213, 222, spontaneous confession of the defendant in image 338 and 437, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372).
• 13)The defendant, not being a shareholder in the companies in which he merely serves on the board of directors, uses the shareholder ledgers in this proceeding—a matter of his personal life—to disclose who the shareholders of those companies are (documentary evidence in images 360 to 372).
• 14)The defendant acquired a vehicle when his income was six hundred thirty-six thousand colones per month; he acquired a new vehicle in November 2021 for the sum of approximately thirty-one thousand dollars (image 257 et seq., documentary evidence in image 453, documentary evidence visible in image 299 et seq., as well as image 552 et seq.).
• 15)The defendant used an apartment belonging to a company to provide lodging for a person who worked in caring for the beneficiary child and accepted that the company in which he is a non-majority shareholder has apartments for rent, and also another company in which he is not a shareholder has apartments for rent (uncontroverted fact appearing in the lawsuit and spontaneous confession, image 339).
• 16)The defendant performs work for three of the companies for which the plaintiff alleges piercing the corporate veil (levantamiento del velo societario), and which are billed not in his personal capacity but in the name of another company, [Name 004], in which the defendant is the majority shareholder and is listed as assistant manager on the board of directors (image 209, 210, spontaneous confession in image 334, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372, and spontaneous statement in image 340).
• 17)The defendant does not incur expenses for a place to live, although he denied having real estate registered in his name; he denied having purchased a home and resides in Tibás (uncontroverted fact and spontaneous confession in image 345 and 422, images 360 to 372).
• 18)The defendant's expenses are assumed as expenses of a company in which he is a shareholder (uncontroverted fact).
• 19)The defendant is currently registered with social security with an income of nine hundred twenty-five thousand colones since January 2023 (image 552 et seq.).
• 20)The defendant consumes the medication prescribed in a private consultation he has attended since 2009 (image 455, 458, and 460).
• 21)The defendant acts as a representative of companies for procedures in national territory (confession in the answer to the lawsuit), as an accountant, auditor, and consultant (spontaneous confession, image 341), and also identifies himself as an accountant (images 360 to 372).

**II. UNPROVEN FACTS:** Unproven facts 4 and 5 are deleted. In their place, the following are added:

• 4)The defendant did not demonstrate that his father's death caused personal losses to him or to the companies in which he is a majority or non-majority shareholder.
• 5)Nor did he demonstrate what his expenses are or why the payment for the new vehicle he purchased is excluded from his expenses, if he still owes it; expenses for gasoline or any fuel the vehicle requires, and maintenance of that vehicle; food, per diems, supplies to carry out his various occupations, as well as what he supposedly invests when the beneficiary child is with him.
• 6)It is not evident that if the company [Name 004] S. A no longer holds the membership it previously had, is not an international office, and has been classified as a "small" office, this caused a loss of income. The economic implications of this are unknown.
• 7)It is not evident that the suspended membership is impossible to renew.
• 8)It is not evident that the companies in which the defendant is a shareholder have experienced a decrease in audit or other contracts in general.

The assessment of the proven and unproven facts now included in this ruling, together with those contained in the contested judgment that are now endorsed, is conducted below.

**III. ON THE MERITS:** In this matter, the lawsuit filed by the child's mother, with the legal advice of Attorney Priscilla Vargas Córdoba, sets forth in extreme detail the elements that, according to the petition, constitute piercing the corporate veil. The defendant, for his part, centered his defense theory on the fact that the companies—seven—in which he is a shareholder or merely serves on the board of directors were incorporated many years ago, and therefore, piercing the corporate veil does not apply. That is, according to the defendant, the corporate veil depends exclusively on the creation of a company or several companies at a specific historical moment, but this argument lacks normative support, and furthermore, based on what will be stated, it is a very poor and inconsistent argument.

For greater clarity, piercing the corporate veil is distinguished, for example, by the commingling of assets (confusión de patrimonios) between shareholders and the company itself, or between non-shareholders and the company itself. In this case, it is evident that, of the seven companies, the defendant, without being a shareholder in at least three, has used the shareholder ledger to provide the certification of the current shareholder capital for this proceeding, which is a matter of his personal life. That is, the support obligor behaves like a shareholder, or even like a majority shareholder, when he is not even a shareholder, and furthermore, he disposes of something as private to a company—its shareholder ledger—for his personal use. Why does a simple assistant manager, treasurer, or board member feel he has the authority and control to use the information from the shareholder ledger for a personal judicial proceeding? Note that it has been demonstrated that the defendant is not a majority shareholder of the company [Name 003] S. A. and is merely listed as treasurer; however, the child and the child's mother use a 2012 Kia Pio model vehicle [Value 003] belonging to the company (uncontroverted fact forming part of the lawsuit, image 7, documentary evidence in image 213, 222, spontaneous confession of the defendant in image 338 and 437, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372). This disposal of an asset belonging to a third party makes it very clear that the defendant is not a simple treasurer, as he has led others to believe. No one who lacks absolute decision-making power in a company can make such a disposition and allocate a vehicle belonging to a third party—a company—for the personal use of a shareholder, even a non-majority one, including for his wife and child—as has been demonstrated in this matter. This was introduced into the debate, and the dispute was joined with this fact. See also that the defendant, not being a shareholder in companies where he merely serves on the board of directors, uses the shareholder ledger for a personal judicial proceeding such as this one (documentary evidence in images 360 to 372). This behavior cannot be done by someone who cannot make decisions in the company as if it were their own. The defendant used an apartment belonging to a company to provide lodging for a person who worked in caring for the beneficiary child (uncontroverted fact appearing in the lawsuit). When answering, the defendant disregarded everything related to the corporate veil with a single argument: the companies are old. Therefore, this deficient way of answering the lawsuit allows the elements regarding commingling of assets described in the lawsuit regarding piercing the corporate veil to be taken as uncontroverted. The dispute was joined with these facts, and the defendant remained silent. This is another element of interest—not the only one—for concluding how the defendant uses third-party assets for his personal life. Furthermore, the defendant does not incur expenses for a place to live, although he denied having real estate registered in his name and denied having acquired a property (uncontroverted fact and spontaneous confession in images 345 and 422). The curious thing is that within his breakdown of expenses, he does not even include the housing issue, and as is known, the defendant himself acknowledged that some companies own property and, furthermore, are dedicated to leasing real estate. Also note that in all the certifications provided, visible from images 360 to 372, it is recorded that the defendant lives in Tibás, and according to the context of the case file, it was the mother and child who left the property that served as the family home. Therefore, the defendant apparently resides in a property belonging to one of the companies. The commingling of assets between the defendant and the companies is such that he performs work for three companies, and although he performs it personally, it is billed not in his personal capacity but in the name of another company, [Name 004], in which he is the majority shareholder and is listed as assistant manager on the board of directors (images 209, 210, spontaneous confession in image 334, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372, and spontaneous statement in image 340). Added to this, the defendant opposed the investigation of the bank accounts of the companies. That is, he has no qualms about using the ledgers of companies in which he is not a shareholder, but he does not allow bank secrecy to be lifted regarding companies in which he is a majority or minority shareholder and from which he disposes of assets for personal use, as already explained. This is not a minor issue, as the lawsuit clearly indicates that the defendant's expenses are incorporated into the expenses of a company. This was not contested, and it is evident that the defendant did not provide a single receipt for his expenses in this proceeding. Note that among his expenses, he does not include food, payment of a loan for a vehicle he acquired, housing, cell phone service, gasoline—or any fuel the vehicle requires—per diems, supplies for the exercise of his various occupations: accountant, auditor, and consultant, etc. If none of that is within his expenses, it is not understood who pays for it. Why does a defendant who works in accounting not provide receipts for his personal consumption of goods and services in a support proceeding? Thus, there is not a single invoice or record of his personal bank account movements, or of all his expenses, in the case file, although, strangely, those receipts were reviewed by the person who issued the income certification to accredit the defendant's payment capacity, according to a document in image 453, in order to be a credit subject to acquire a new vehicle. It is not understood where those receipts are, and especially, whether they are expenses in the defendant's personal name, or expenses he incurs personally that are later reimbursed by some company in which he is a majority or minority shareholder, or a board member. Nor is it known if there are no receipts for the defendant's personal expenses, and rather, everything is in the name of one of the companies in which he is a minority or majority shareholder, or a board member. Thus, the fact that the defendant does not receive a salary, dividends, board fees, etc., from the companies in which he is a shareholder is of no relevance to this case because he evidently disposes of the assets of companies in which he is a shareholder, or even in which he is not a shareholder at all, and that includes revealing information from the shareholder ledger. That is the degree of power and ease the defendant has with respect to those companies.

Likewise, it is not evident in the record that the defendant's father's death caused personal losses to him or to the companies in which he is a majority or non-majority shareholder. This was an argument of his that was never demonstrated, and it is not evident what belongs to him following his father's death, that is, how the inheritance matter was resolved. All this, with the observation that he also did not substantiate each and every one of his personal expenses, as already explained. The commingling of assets is such that the defendant did not provide receipts for his personal consumption of goods and services. Nor is it evident that if the company [Name 004] S. A no longer has the membership it previously had, is not an international office, and has been classified as a "small" office, this caused a loss of income. The economic implications of both facts are unknown. It was the defendant who introduced this argument into the debate, so he had to demonstrate it. Furthermore, the argument of the suspension of the membership lacks support, not only for what has already been stated and because it is not evident that the membership is impossible to renew, especially given the document in the record where the person who apparently has decision-making power over the membership even states that they can offer payment facilities as necessary to regain use of the membership, but also because if the debt for the membership amounts to a little over four thousand dollars, it is not understood why the defendant decided to personally buy a new vehicle for over thirty-one thousand dollars instead of paying the membership involving a company in which he is a majority shareholder—spontaneous confession visible in image 337, and documentary evidence visible from images 360 to 372. Added to this, that company is not solely dedicated to accounting matters but provides diversified services, that is, in various branches, as shown in the record. In the same vein, it is of particular interest that the defendant acquired a new vehicle when his income was six hundred thirty-six thousand colones per month; he acquired a new vehicle in November 2021 (image 453, documentary evidence visible in image 299 et seq., as well as 552 et seq.). Why, if his income has supposedly decreased, does he decide to buy a new vehicle? Basically, he prefers to incorporate a new vehicle into his assets and keep it there, rather than pay the support requested by the plaintiff, which corresponds to the standard of living he chose to give the child, because it is clear that with the salaries the plaintiff received, it was impossible for her to acquire the standard of living the child obtained, and that, according to a study of the documentary evidence visible in image 91 et seq., these are not extraordinary expenses as the appealed ruling indicated. Of all the expenses that have been supported by the relevant evidence, the only one that could be considered non-recurring—fortunately—is that corresponding to the private pediatric service, as it is not a monthly expense because the beneficiary child enjoys good health, but as observed, not all expenses recorded from the aforementioned image—which are many—can therefore be "tainted" by the relatively sporadic nature of the private pediatric service. Furthermore, even if the lawsuit confused ordinary and extraordinary expenses—which is not true—the judge cannot surprise the child's mother by issuing a ruling that attributes an extraordinary character to expenses that are evidently systematic and not sporadic. Additionally, there is no professional reference in the record indicating that the beneficiary child has been discharged from the treatments he receives or needs, such as the use of glasses, speech therapy, dental treatment, etc. Added to this, the defendant has entered into an evident contradiction: during the proceeding, he indicated that the child's expenses were shared between father and mother, with the aim that the greater contribution not rest solely on him. Now, upon appealing, he radically changes his version and states that he contributed more, but tries to justify it by claiming he did not know the mother's income level. This contradiction is not minor, because the mother has maintained throughout the proceeding that the father was the one who contributed everything the child required because she could not manage it with her income, and upon studying the mother's salary reports to social security, it is evident that the standard of living claimed in the lawsuit for the child was acquired when she had no promotions, or she was just beginning to be promoted and her promotion pay was not stable (documentary evidence from images 332 to 336 and 543 to 551). Therefore, the argument presented by the father in the appeal basically reveals that he is punishing the mother for having advanced professionally. Furthermore, upon observing the defendant's income from 2012 onward, it is clear that the standard of living the child acquired was not achieved under those reported incomes. That is, it again underlies that the father uses the companies to move his finances.

It is also evident in the record that, upon appealing, the defendant indicates he acquired the vehicle by contributing "a significant portion [that] corresponds to the amount obtained from the sale of the vehicle." He offers as evidence for a better resolution a deed showing the sale of a vehicle by a third party, someone who appears to be a relative of his. First, this is a new fact because when answering the lawsuit, he did not introduce such a thing into the proceeding, and now he intends to surprise the counterparty in a single instance. Second, it is not even evident that when he acquired the new vehicle, he clarified the origin of the money for the purchase. Where is the purchase deed for that vehicle showing such a thing? The defendant limited himself to stating in his answer that he acquired the vehicle by establishing a lien, but he did not demonstrate that he paid part of the initial price, all of it, or a "significant portion" with resources that came from a third party, and nor is it evident that he gave an account of the origin of the rest of the resources to acquire the vehicle. What was not part of the answer, the defendant cannot now introduce into the debate in a single instance.

Added to all this, the defendant again incurs in a very serious contradiction, since in his answer he stated he cannot pay just under one hundred thousand colones to obtain medical treatment per month, but he buys a new vehicle for thirty-one thousand dollars. This is very strange, as it is evident in the record that his father died practically from the same ailments the defendant has, and which, incidentally, do not prevent him from working—images 338, 456, 458, and 460—but instead of acquiring the medication he requires, the defendant decided to acquire a new vehicle. Note that it was the defendant who stated he could not acquire the medication because his resources did not allow it. Therefore, this is an argument lacking logical sense and proof, as the treating private medical professional clearly indicates that his current state of health is due to him consuming medications not provided by social security. That is, he does buy the medications he claimed he could not afford. The inconsistencies in which the defendant has incurred are alarming and challenge the average intelligence of a judge.

With respect to his income reported to social security, given everything already stated, the reason behind the income amount reported to social security is essentially of no interest, except that when his income was lower—approximately eight hundred fifty-seven thousand colones—the defendant sought to have the support payment set at four hundred sixty-five thousand colones—images 443 and 229. Now, his reported income is higher, amounting to nine hundred twenty-five thousand colones, but he requests a support payment of three hundred sixty-five thousand colones. This is how contradictory the defendant's litigation is: his income goes up, he requests lower support, and if his income is lower, he requests higher support. Mathematics is a universal heritage: the numbers do not fit the arguments presented by the support obligor.

For all the reasoning provided, the undersigned believes the defendant uses at least seven companies to move his finances, and there is a commingling of assets that demonstrates what the plaintiff indicated in the lawsuit with particular detail, and with which the dispute was joined: piercing the corporate veil (velo societario). Note that the defendant has had resources to acquire a new car and has chosen to camouflage his income and expenses, as described in this ruling. Consequently, the undersigned believes his income cannot be considered as that reported to social security, and he has not met his burden of proving his income; moreover, within his expenses, he appears to include payment of two professional membership fees—College of Authorized Accountants of Costa Rica (Colegio de Contadores Autorizados de Costa Rica) and College of Private Accountants of Costa Rica (Colegio de Contadores Privados de Costa Rica)—and he does not explain why. It is not prohibited to belong to two Professional Colleges, but it is striking for someone who has assured his source of income diminished, and at the same time, acquires a new vehicle when he supposedly has lower income. Similarly, the defendant does not even include in his expenses what he supposedly invests when he has his son with him. If he does not include that in his "expense tables," who pays for it? For the undersigned, it is clear the defendant has not been transparent in his litigation.

It is also very clear that the standard of living the child has enjoyed could not have been provided by the mother with her income, nor by the father with the income he claims he has since 2012—image 342. It is clear the defendant made use of money that is not reflected in his income reported to social security, and he continues to do so because he does not even provide receipts and invoices for his own personal expenses. Consequently, what is appropriate is to maintain the child's standard of living. He did not ask to come into this world and has no reason to stop enjoying and taking advantage of the private education he has known since a few months before birth—a fact alleged by the mother and uncontroverted. The child deserves stability and tranquility; he deserves that his childhood not be disturbed by the conflicts of adults, and especially, that his father not prefer to pay for a new car rather than maintain the standard of living he gave him, which the child enjoys and forms an integral part of his stability. The child does not deserve to live his childhood in fear of being stripped of the environment he knows. As a complement, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia)—No. 12703, 11:51 a.m., August 1, 2014—has ruled that the advisory opinions and judgments of the IACHR are binding. It has expressly stated: "The conventionality control designed by the Inter-American Court – basically, through the judgments in the cases of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006, Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru of November 24, 2006, Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico of November 26, 2010, and Gelman v. Uruguay of February 24, 2011 – is mandatory for the Constitutional Chambers and Courts, who must contrast any conduct – active or omissive – with the conventionality parameter or the inter-American corpus iuris, composed of regional conventions and declarations on Human Rights, the jurisprudence of that Court, and its advisory opinions." On other occasions, that Constitutional Tribunal has ruled along the same lines, for example, No. 2313, 4:18 p.m., May 9, 1995; No. 16860, 2:44 p.m., December 6, 2005; No. 5017, 10:42 a.m., April 7, 2006; No. 4276, 2:49 p.m., March 27, 2007; No. 1024, 10:00 a.m., January 27, 2009; No. 4491, 4:00 p.m., April 3, 2013; and No. 12782-18, 5:45 p.m., August 8, 2018. As reinforcement, it is relevant to point out that in our country, the formal component is reinforced by the position and weight that international instruments, formal or not, on human rights hold, meaning they occupy a supra-constitutional rank as determined by constitutional jurisprudence for several decades.

For example: n°282-90, 17:00 of March 13, 1990; n°719-90, 16:30 of June 26, 1990; n°1147-90, 16:00 of September 21, 1990; n°709-91, 13:56 of April 20, 1991; n°3435-92, 16:20 of November 11, 1992; n°3550-92, 16:00 of November 24, 1992; n°5759-93, 14:15 of November 10, 1993; n°2665-94, 15:51 of June 7, 1994; n°2313-95, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; n°7072-95, 11:15 of December 22, 1995; n°103296, 9:03 of March 1, 1996; n°1319-97, 14:51 of March 4, 1997; n°3001-97, 16:18 of May 30, 1997; n°7706-97, 12:09 of November 19, 1997; n°1232-98, 16:00 February 25, 1998; n°2822-98, 15:18 of April 28, 1998; n°1801-98, 9:12 of March 13, 1998; n°3223-98, 9:00 of May 15, 1998, n°6830-98, 15:06 of September 24, 1998; n°7484-00, 9:21 of August 25, 2000; n°7498-00, 9:35 of August 25, 2000; n°9685-00, 14:56 of November 1, 2000; n°10693-02, 18:20 of November 7, 2002, n°2771-03, 11:40 of April 4, 2003; n°9992-04, 14:30 of September 8, 2004; n°17745-06, 14:35 of December 11, 2006; n°649-07, 11:40 of January 19, 2007; n°1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; n°3043-07, 14:54 of March 7, 2007; n°4276-07, 14:59 of March 27, 2007; n°14183-07, 9:53 of September 24, 2007; n°1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; n°4276-07, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; n°14193-08, 10:03 of September 24, 2008, n°7387-09, 14:56 of May 6, 2009, n°15481-13, 11:30 of November 22, 2013 and n°13821-20, 9:15 of July 22, 2020.

In this vein, it is relevant to highlight that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights –Protocol of San Salvador– form part of the “international corpus juris” for the protection of minors. IACHR Court. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauiri Brothers Vs. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Case of Rochac Hernández et al. Vs. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2014. Case of Chitay Nech et al. Vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010, para. 165. Case of Fornerón and daughter Vs. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of April 27, 2012, para. 137. Case of the Río Negro Massacres Vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 4, 201262, para. 142. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” Vs. Colombia. Judgment of September 15, 2005. IACHR Court, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) vs. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment of November 19, 1999, Series C, No. 63. Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated that the Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child form part of the international corpus juris. IACHR Commission. Report No. 41/99. Case 11.491. Detained Minors in Honduras. March 10, 1999. For greater understanding, the aforementioned Court has resolved: “115. The corpus juris of International Human Rights Law is composed of a set of international instruments of varied content and legal effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions, and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on International Law, in the sense of affirming and developing the latter's capacity to regulate relations between States and human beings under their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, this Court must adopt an adequate criterion to consider the issue under examination within the framework of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.” IACHR Court. Advisory Opinion OC-16. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of Due Process, October 1, 1999, para. 115. For its part, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated: “21. It is pertinent to specify that the existence of a corpus juris not only includes the text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child but also the decisions adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in fulfillment of its mandate. Such a perspective represents a significant advance that demonstrates not only the existence of a common legal framework in International Human Rights Law applicable to children but also the interdependence that exists internationally between the different international systems for the protection of the human rights of girls and boys.” IACHR Commission. Rapporteurship on the Rights of Children. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135 Doc. 14. August 5, 2009. Report on Corporal Punishment and the Human Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents. Promoting the defense and respect of the human rights of girls, boys, and adolescents in the Americas.” This is decisive because many of the General Comments issued by the Committee develop substantive and procedural rights of minors.

For all the foregoing, the best interest of the child beneficiary must be primarily protected, and even more so, considering that he was born in 2016 -image 18-, and is therefore in early childhood. Thus, this ruling must respond to the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as General Comment No. 7 issued by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, on “Implementing child rights in early childhood.” In this sense, it is recorded that the entire standard of living alleged and demonstrated by the mother regarding the child and, provided by the father, was acquired during early childhood. Therefore, with greater reason, it is not possible to deprive the child of the stability he deserves and which must be guaranteed primarily by the persons responsible for his presence in this world.

Additionally, the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is a priority over any other obligation, and that includes the payment for a new vehicle. Therefore, the child's life cannot be restricted so that the father can continue paying for the vehicle—if he still owes it—or maintain it in his assets. The preferential nature of the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is present in different norms. For example, Article 171 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), Article 62 of the Law on Support Pensions (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), 172 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), Article 44 of Law No. 9859 published in Alcance No. 150 to La Gaceta No. 147, June 20, 2020, and Article 155 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central), as well as Article 30, subsection a) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), among other norms. In the case of Article 171 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), the norm states: “The support debt (deuda alimentaria) shall have priority over any other, without exception.” Therefore, priority cannot be given to the purchase of a vehicle as the father seems to intend, nor can the context in which the father acquires it be made invisible: when he claims to have fewer resources.

As an additional line, the in-kind contribution of the mother cannot be made invisible. On the contrary, her contribution must be accounted for in accordance with Article 35 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) reformed by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Alcance No. 280-, as well as, by direct application of numerals 5.a, 13.a and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and, also by application of Law No. 9325 -Law for the Accounting of the Contribution of Unpaid Domestic Work in Costa Rica (Ley de Contabilización del Aporte del Trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica)-. Thus, the mother of the minor participates in the “care economy (economía de cuidado)” which refers to “unpaid work performed in the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, care for other persons in the home or the community, and the maintenance of the paid workforce.” That law warns that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For greater understanding, that normative instrument indicates in Article 3 that “the following, among others, are considered unpaid domestic and care work activities: a) The organization, distribution, and supervision of domestic tasks. b) The preparation of food. c) The cleaning and maintenance of housing and household goods. d) The cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, formation, and instruction of children (transportation to school and help with the development of school tasks). f) The care of older adults and sick persons. g) Carrying out purchases, payments, or procedures related to the home. h) The cleaning and maintenance of goods for family use. i) Services to the community and unpaid help to other homes of relatives, friends, and neighbors. This classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course.” Added to this is that the mother does not have permanent work as a professional and although her promotions (ascensos) were initially limited, it now appears that is not the case, but at the same time, she must now incur housing payments, because no one can be required to provide a place to live for the child and the mother for free. For greater clarity, the support (pensión) that is imposed must address the proportional payment of rent, mortgage and/or maintenance of the property where the child lives as applicable, which includes taxes if applicable; transportation for all types of activity, food considering the real nutritional needs of the beneficiary person and according to the sport they practice, hobbies or illness they may have as the case may be, proportional payment of public services, recreation, clothing, acquisition of personal hygiene products, of hygiene for their clothing and the home, etc. Furthermore, I refer to the binding jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). For example, resolution No. 2008-13010, 15:57 of August 27, 2008, where it stated: “On the right to a support benefit (prestación alimentaria). This Tribunal has already specified that the right to a support benefit (prestación alimentaria) derives from the family ties imposed by marriage, parental authority (patria potestad), or kinship, and its purpose is to ensure the support beneficiary (beneficiario alimentario) receives the supply of those necessities for their normal physical and psychological development. Thus, the obligation to provide support (alimentos) is based both on Articles 51 and 52 of the Political Constitution, as well as on International Human Rights Law, since with its satisfaction the support creditor (acreedor alimentario) is guaranteed the enjoyment of a series of human rights indispensable for their subsistence and integral development, among which are included, among others, the right to life, to health, to housing, and to education (see in this sense judgments number 2001-07517 of fourteen hours and fifty minutes of August first, two thousand one, and 2003-15392 of fifteen hours and fifty-eight minutes of December nineteenth, two thousand three).” This has been a reiterated criterion, for example in resolutions 8707-15, 18406-19, 9159-16, 1689-16, 15675-16, 14935-14 and 8677-19 among others. Article 13 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).

For all the stated reasons, the appeal filed by the support obligor (obligado alimentario) is denied. The appeal filed by the mother is partially upheld. Observing that her appellate claim is identical to what she requested in the complaint, it is understood that the sum she requests is to be set as a monthly payment, expenses for the start of the school year, and annual bonus (aguinaldo). However, it is not proven in the record that in the month of December the child beneficiary has the same needs as at the start of the school year or those that must be covered by the monthly payment. For example, in December the housing item is not paid twice, nor are therapies or internet service paid twice, etc. Added to this is that the mother is also a support obligor (obligada alimentaria) without this allowing her in-kind contribution to be made invisible and placing her in a situation of not being able to meet her own needs. Consequently, the contested judgment is revoked and in its place, the sum of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES is set as the monthly support payment (cuota alimentaria mensual). The sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES is established as the support payment (cuota alimentaria) for the annual bonus (aguinaldo), and, for expenses for the start of the school year—which is precisely a very important issue because the minor is studying in a private center where academic activities between school periods, for example, are foreseeable and do not occur only at the start of the school year—the sum of ONE MILLION COLONES is set, which is understood to cover not only expenses for the start of the school year but also the academic activities arising from the child's permanence in the educational center in which he is enrolled at the time of issuing this ruling. To all these sums must be added the joint contribution of the mother without, as already stated, this allowing her in-kind contribution to be disregarded, and that she must also cover her living expenses and even have solvency to face eventual periods without promotions (ascensos) or with promotions (ascensos) but with difficulties in the payment of her salary due to belonging to the complex payroll of a public institution. Furthermore, it is a non-controversial fact that the mother is assuming the maintenance of the vehicle that serves as transportation for the child and herself. It must be very clear that the monthly amount is set at this sum provided that the child continues to enjoy the vehicle that the mother currently uses to transport him. If at any time the child no longer enjoys that vehicle for whatever reason, it will be up to the mother to take the pertinent action. The latter, unless the vehicle suffers a total or partial loss due to a traffic accident where the mother is responsible according to a final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in the respective process. All this given that the mother is driving a vehicle that does not belong to her.

On the other hand, it must also be clear that this ruling has been possible due to the detailed content of the complaint and because the appeal has been punctual, with concrete and detailed grievances. That is, the appealed judgment has been attacked as an appeal must be formulated, since an appeal is not for re-answering a complaint, reiterating the filed complaint, completing what was not said when suing or answering, etc. The issue of the corporate veil (velo societario) was the subject of the litigation (litis) and, from the complaint, it flowed throughout the entire process and especially, from the poor and unfounded defense thesis of the defendant.

Regarding costs, no pronouncement is issued, as it was not an appealed aspect.

Now then, it is pointed out to the lower court that a ruling where the litigation (litis) has been joined with the issue of the corporate veil (velo societario) requires a detailed and comprehensive effort of the evidence to find the real truth about distinctive elements of said figure. In this case, the proven facts have been well constructed, but in the substance of the matter, a certain naivety is observed on the part of the lower court and a scarce handling of the basic theory of the corporate veil (velo societario). Thus, the ruling denotes a shallow analysis of a topic that, as in this case, is evident and notorious. So, it is not that the ruling lacks reasoning, but rather it does not have the necessary depth, and that is not a cause for nullity. A ruling on the corporate veil (velo societario) requires minimum knowledge of corporate law (derecho societario) and strength to gradually lift the veil. Without that knowledge, there is no strength.

Let it be known that the images cited in this ruling correspond to the location of the documents or briefs from the download of the case file in PDF format.

Let the child beneficiary be summoned so that, in simple language, this ruling may be explained to him and to give him the peace of mind that the opportunity to remain in the educational environment in which he has developed for a long time has been guaranteed to him. The child must appear at the facilities of the First Family Court (Juzgado Primero de Familia) located on the first floor of the Courts Building (Edificio de Tribunales), Barrio Luján, at nine in the morning on September 6, 2023. Article 20 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia).

Let the defendant be informed that, if he fails to comply with what is set forth herein, he may face a criminal case managed by the legal representative of the minor, for the crime of non-compliance with the support duty (incumplimiento del deber alimentario) or even aggravated non-compliance with the support duty (incumplimiento agravado del deber alimentario). Articles 185 and 186 of the Penal Code (Código Penal). Furthermore, if he diverts assets to evade the fulfillment of the support duty (deber alimentario) and thus burdens the child's mother with the care of all his needs, he could eventually face a criminal case pursuant to the Law for the Penalization of Violence against Women (Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra Las Mujeres), Article 8.h) and 35 et seq. This is because the defendant is an accountant, auditor, and consultant, as well as a representative of companies for proceedings in the national territory, which generates broad knowledge on how to evade income, profits, etc. Furthermore, he is informed that, if he is criminally convicted, this could affect him in the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) and the exercise of his occupations, at least in the matter of professional licensing (colegiaturas). Likewise, all this would affect him so that, in the future, he could find himself in a cause for exclusion of the right to support (alimentos) with respect to his child when he is an adult.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

---a) The appeal filed by the defendant is denied. ---b) The contested judgment is revoked and in its place, the sum of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES is set as the monthly support payment (cuota alimentaria mensual). ---c) As the support payment (cuota alimentaria) for the annual bonus (aguinaldo), the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES is established. ---d) For expenses for the start of the school year, the sum of ONE MILLION COLONES is set, which is understood to cover not only expenses for the start of the school year but also the academic activities arising from the child's permanence in the educational center in which he is enrolled at the time of issuing this ruling. ---e) It must be very clear that the monthly amount is set at this sum provided that the child continues to enjoy the vehicle that the mother currently uses to transport him. If at any time the child no longer enjoys that vehicle for whatever reason, it will be up to the mother to take the pertinent action. The latter, unless the vehicle suffers a total or partial loss due to a traffic accident where the mother is responsible according to a final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in the respective process. ---f) Let the child beneficiary be summoned so that, in simple language, this ruling may be explained to him and to give him the peace of mind that the opportunity to remain in the educational environment in which he has developed for a long time has been guaranteed to him. The child must appear at the facilities of the First Family Court (Juzgado Primero de Familia) located on the first floor of the Courts Building (Edificio de Tribunales), Barrio Luján, at nine in the morning on September 6, 2023. ---g) Let the defendant be informed that, if he fails to comply with what is set forth herein, he may face a criminal case managed by the legal representative of the minor, for the crime of non-compliance with the support duty (incumplimiento del deber alimentario) or even aggravated non-compliance with the support duty (incumplimiento agravado del deber alimentario). Articles 185 and 186 of the Penal Code (Código Penal). Furthermore, if he diverts assets to evade the fulfillment of the support duty (deber alimentario) and thus burdens the child's mother with the care of all his needs, he could eventually face a criminal case pursuant to the Law for the Penalization of Violence against Women (Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra Las Mujeres), Article 8.h) and 35 et seq. Furthermore, he is informed that, if he is criminally convicted, this could affect him in the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) and the exercise of his occupations, at least in the matter of professional licensing (colegiaturas). Likewise, all this would affect him so that, in the future, he could find himself in a cause for exclusion of the right to support (alimentos) with respect to his child when he is an adult. ---h) Regarding costs, no pronouncement is issued. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Judge (a).- MSOLISM *?NDRQ??FDAFU??* MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - DECISION-MAKING JUDGE/A [email protected] and, appears as treasurer; however, the child and the child's mother make use of a company vehicle, a 2012 Kia Pio [Value 003] (an undisputed fact that forms part of the claim, image 7, documentary evidence image 213, 222, spontaneous admission of the respondent image 338 and 437, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372).

• 13)The respondent, not being a shareholder in the companies where he only appears on the board of directors, makes use of the shareholder registers in this proceeding—a matter of his personal life—to disclose who the shareholders of those companies are (documentary evidence in images 360 to 372).
• 14)The respondent acquired a vehicle when his income was six hundred thirty-six thousand colones per month; he acquired a new vehicle in November 2021 for the sum of approximately thirty-one thousand dollars (image 257 and following, documentary evidence of image 453, documentary evidence visible in image 299 and following, as well as image 552 and following).
• 15)The respondent made use of an apartment belonging to a company in order to provide lodging for a person who worked in the care of the beneficiary child and acknowledged that the company in which he is a non-majority shareholder has apartments for rent and also another company where he is not a shareholder has apartments for rent (an undisputed fact contained in the claim and spontaneous admission image 339).
• 16)The respondent performs work for three of the companies over which the plaintiff alleges piercing of the corporate veil (levantamiento del velo societario) and, which are billed not personally but in the name of another [Name 004] in which the respondent is a majority shareholder and appears as assistant manager on the board of directors (image 209, 210, spontaneous admission image 334, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372, and spontaneous statement image 340).
• 17)The respondent does not incur expenses to occupy a place to live, although he denied having real property registered in his name; he denied having purchased a home and resides in Tibás (an undisputed fact and spontaneous admission image 345 and 422, images 360 to 372).
• 18)The respondent's expenses are assumed as expenses of a company in which he appears as a shareholder (an undisputed fact).
• 19)The respondent currently appears registered with social security with an income of nine hundred twenty-five thousand colones since January 2023 (image 552 and following). 20) The respondent consumes medication prescribed in a private consultation he has attended since 2009 (image 455, 458, and 460).
• 21)The respondent acts as a representative of companies for proceedings within the national territory (admission in the response to the claim), as an accountant, auditor, and consultant (spontaneous admission image 341), as well as identifying himself as an accountant (images 360 to 372).

**II. UNPROVEN FACTS:** Unproven facts 4 and 5 are eliminated. In their place, the following are added:

• 4)The respondent did not demonstrate that his father's death caused him personal losses or losses to the companies in which he appears as a majority or non-majority shareholder.
• 5)Nor did he demonstrate what his expenses are or why the payment for the new vehicle he purchased—if he still owes it—is excluded from his outlays; expense for gasoline or any fuel required by the vehicle, and maintenance of that vehicle; food, per diems, supplies to carry out his various occupations, as well as what he supposedly invests when the beneficiary child is with him.
• 6)It does not appear on the record that if the company [Name 004] S. A. no longer has the membership it previously had, is not an international office, and has been classified as a "small" office, this caused a loss of income. The economic implications of this are unknown.
• 7)It does not appear on the record that the suspended membership is impossible to renew.
• 8)It does not appear on the record that the companies in which the respondent is a shareholder have suffered a decrease in audit or general contracts.

**The assessment of the proven and unproven facts now included in this judgment, together with those contained in the appealed judgment and which are now endorsed, is made below.** **III. ON THE MERITS:** In this matter, the claim filed by the child's mother, with the legal assistance of **Licenciada Priscilla Vargas Córdoba**, sets forth in extreme detail the elements which, as invoked in the brief, constitute a corporate veil (velo societario). The respondent, for his part, centered his defense theory on the fact that because the companies —seven— in which he is a shareholder or only appears on the board of directors were incorporated many years ago, the corporate veil is not configured. That is, according to the respondent, the corporate veil depends exclusively on the creation of a company or several at a specific historical moment, but that argument lacks normative support, and furthermore, for what will be stated, it is a very poor and inconsistent argument.

For greater clarity, the corporate veil is distinguished, for example, by the commingling of assets (confusión de patrimonios) that occurs between those who are shareholders and the company itself, or else, between those who are not shareholders and the company itself. In this case, it is evident that, of the seven companies, the respondent, without being a shareholder in at least three, has used the shareholder register to provide a certification of the current share capital in this proceeding, which is something that pertains to his personal life. That is, the child support obligor behaves as a shareholder or even as a majority shareholder when he is not even a shareholder and, furthermore, disposes of something as intimate to a company—the shareholder register—for his personal use. Why does a simple assistant manager, treasurer, or board member feel he has the authority and control to use information from the shareholder register for his personal judicial proceeding? It can be seen that it is proven that the respondent is not a majority shareholder of the company [Name 003] S. A. and merely appears as treasurer; however, the child and the child's mother make use of a company vehicle, a 2012 Kia Pio [Value 003] (an undisputed fact that forms part of the claim, image 7, documentary evidence image 213, 222, spontaneous admission of the respondent image 338 and 437, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372). This disposal of an asset of a third party makes it very clear that the respondent is not a simple treasurer as he has made believe. No one who does not have absolute decision-making power in a company can make such a disposal and dispose of a vehicle of a third party—company—for the personal use of a shareholder, even a non-majority one, even intended for his wife and child—as has been demonstrated in this matter. This was introduced into debate and the dispute (litis) was joined with this fact. See also that the respondent, not being a shareholder in the companies where he only appears on the board of directors, makes use of the shareholder register for a personal judicial proceeding like the present one (documentary evidence in images 360 to 372). This behavior cannot be done by someone who cannot make decisions in the company as if it were his own. The respondent made use of an apartment belonging to a company in order to provide lodging for a person who worked in the care of the beneficiary child (an undisputed fact contained in the claim). When responding, the respondent disassociated himself from everything related to the corporate veil with a single argument: the companies are long-standing. Therefore, this deficient manner of responding to the claim allows the elements regarding commingling of assets contemplated in the claim concerning the issue of the corporate veil to be considered undisputed. The dispute was joined with these facts and the respondent remained silent. This is another element of interest—not the only one—to conclude how the respondent uses third-party assets for his personal life. Furthermore, the respondent does not incur expenses to occupy a place to live, although he denied having real property registered in his name and denied having acquired real property (an undisputed fact and spontaneous admission image 345 and 422). What is curious is that within his breakdown of expenses, he does not even include the housing item, and as is known, the respondent himself acknowledged that some companies have assets and also engage in the leasing of real property. Note also that in all the certifications provided, visible from image 360 to 372, it is recorded that the respondent lives in Tibás and, according to the context of the case file, it was the mother and the child who left the property that served as the family's dwelling. Therefore, it seems the respondent resides in a property belonging to one of the companies. The commingling of assets between the respondent is such that he performs work for three companies and, although he performs it personally, it is billed not personally but in the name of another [Name 004] in which he is a majority shareholder and appears as assistant manager on the board of directors (image 209, 210, spontaneous admission image 334, documentary evidence in images 360 to 372, and spontaneous statement image 340). Added to this, the respondent opposed the investigation of the bank accounts of the companies. That is, he has no qualms about using the records of the companies in which he is not a shareholder, but he does not allow the lifting of bank secrecy regarding companies in which he is a majority or minority shareholder and from which he disposes of assets for personal use as already explained. This is not a minor issue; rather, the claim clearly indicates that the respondent's expenses are incorporated into the expenses of a company. This was not disputed, and it is on record that the respondent did not provide a single receipt for his expenses in this proceeding. Note that among his outlays he does not include food, payment of credit for a vehicle he acquired, housing, cellular telephone, gasoline—or any fuel the vehicle requires—, per diems, supplies for the exercise of his various occupations: accountant, auditor, and consultant, etc. If all of that is not within his outlays, it is not understood who pays for it. Why does a respondent who is engaged in accounting not provide receipts for the consumption of goods and services personally to a child support proceeding? Thus, there is not in the case file a single invoice or movement from his personal bank accounts or, indeed, all his outlays, although oddly enough, those receipts were at hand for the person who issued the income certification to accredit the respondent's payment capacity, according to the document in image 453, in order to be eligible for credit to acquire a new vehicle. It is not understood where those receipts are, and especially, if they are outlays in the respondent's personal name or else, outlays he makes personally and are then reimbursed by some company in which he appears as a majority or minority shareholder—or a member of the board of directors. Nor is it known if there are no receipts for the respondent's personal outlays and, rather, everything is in the name of some of the companies in which he is a shareholder—minority or majority—or a member of the board of directors. Thus, the fact that the respondent does not receive salary, dividends, fees, etc., from the companies in which he is a shareholder has no relevance to this case because he evidently disposes of the assets of companies in which he is a shareholder or even those in which he is not even a shareholder, and that includes revealing information from the shareholder register. That is the degree of power and ease the respondent has with respect to those companies.

Similarly, it does not appear in the case file that the respondent's father's death caused him personal losses or losses to the companies in which he appears as a majority or non-majority shareholder. This was an argument of his that he never demonstrated, and it does not appear what belongs to him after his father passed away, that is, how the inheritance matter was resolved. All this, with the observation that he also did not accredit each and every one of his personal expenses, as already explained. The commingling of assets is such that the respondent did not provide receipts for the consumption of goods and services personally. Nor does it appear on the record that if the company [Name 004] S. A. no longer has the membership it previously had, is not an international office, and has been classified as a "small" office, this caused a loss of income. The economic implications of both data are unknown. It was the respondent who introduced that argument into the debate, so he had to demonstrate it. Furthermore, the argument of the suspension of the membership lacks support not only for what has already been said and because it does not appear on the record that the membership is impossible to renew—especially the document in the case file where the person who seemingly has decision-making power over the membership even asserts they can provide payment facilities as needed to regain the membership—but also because if the debt for the membership amounts to a little over four thousand dollars, it is not understood why the respondent decided to personally purchase a new vehicle for over thirty-one thousand dollars instead of paying the membership that involves a company in which he is a majority shareholder—spontaneous admission visible in image 337 and documentary evidence visible from image 360 to 372. Added to this, that company is not solely engaged in accounting matters but provides diversified services, that is, in various branches, as recorded in the case file. In the same vein, it is of special interest that the respondent acquired a new vehicle when his income was six hundred thirty-six thousand colones per month; he acquired a new vehicle in November 2021 (image 453, documentary evidence visible in image 299 and following, as well as 552 and following). Why, if his income is supposed to have decreased, does he decide to buy a new vehicle? Basically, he prefers to incorporate a new vehicle into his assets and keep it there, rather than pay the child support requested by the plaintiff, which corresponds to the standard of living he decided to give the child, because it is clear that with the salaries the plaintiff received, it was impossible for her to acquire the standard of living the child acquired, and which, according to a study of the documentary evidence visible in image 91 and following, are not extraordinary expenses as the appealed judgment indicated. Of all the expenses that have been supported with the pertinent evidence, the only one that could be considered non-habitual—fortunately—is the one corresponding to the private pediatric service, insofar as it is not a monthly expense because the beneficiary child enjoys good health, but as observed, not all the expenses that appear from the aforementioned image—and which are many—can thereby be "tainted" by the relatively sporadic nature of the private pediatric service. Furthermore, even if the claim confused ordinary with extraordinary expenses—which is not true—the adjudicator cannot surprise the child's mother by issuing a judgment where she attributes an extraordinary character to outlays that are evidently systematic and not sporadic. In addition to this, there is no professional reference in the case file indicating that the beneficiary child has been discharged from the treatments he receives or needs, such as the use of glasses, speech therapy, dental treatment, etc. Added to this, the respondent has fallen into an evident contradiction: he indicated during the course of the proceeding that the child's expenses were assumed jointly between father and mother. That was so the greater contribution did not rest on him. Now, upon appealing, he radically changes the version and asserts that he contributed more, but tries to justify it by alleging that he did not know what the mother's income was. This contradiction is not minor, because the mother has maintained throughout the entire proceeding that it was the father who contributed everything the child required because she could not with her income, and upon studying the mother's salary reports before social security, it is evident that the standard of living claimed in the claim for the child was acquired when she had no promotions or was just beginning to be promoted, and her promotion pay was not stable (documentary evidence from image 332 to 336 and 543 to 551). Therefore, the argument presented by the father in the appeal basically reveals that he is punishing the mother for having improved professionally. Furthermore, upon observing the respondent's income from the year 2012 onward, it is clear that the standard of living the child acquired was not under the auspices of that income. That is, it again underlies that the father uses the companies to move his finances.

It is also in the case file that, upon appealing, the respondent indicates he acquired the vehicle by contributing "a significant portion corresponds to the amount obtained from the sale of the vehicle." He offers as evidence for a better resolution a deed recording the sale of a vehicle by a third person, and it is someone who appears to be a relative of his. In the first place, this is a new fact because when responding to the claim, he introduced no such thing into the proceeding and now intends to surprise the opposing party in a single instance. In the second place, it does not even appear on the record that when he acquired the new vehicle, he clarified where the money for the purchase came from. Where is the purchase deed for that vehicle where such a thing is recorded? The respondent limited himself to saying, when responding, that he acquired the vehicle by constituting a pledge, but he did not demonstrate that he paid part of the initial price, all of it, or a "significant portion" with resources that came from a third person, and it also does not appear on the record that he accounted for where the rest of the resources to acquire the vehicle came from. What was not part of the response, the respondent cannot now introduce into the debate in a single instance.

Added to all this, the respondent again incurs a very serious contradiction, because when responding he indicated that he cannot pay a little less than one hundred thousand colones to acquire a medical treatment per month, but he buys a new vehicle for thirty-one thousand dollars.

This is very strange, since the record shows that his father died practically from the same ailments that the respondent has and which, incidentally, do not prevent him from working—images 338, 456, 458, and 460—but the respondent, instead of acquiring the medication he requires, decided to acquire a new vehicle. Note that it was the respondent who stated that he could not acquire the medication because his resources did not allow it. Therefore, it is an argument that lacks logical sense and proof, since clearly the treating private medical professional indicates that his current state of health is due to him consuming medications that the social security system does not provide. That is, he does buy the medications he claimed he could not afford. The inconsistencies in which the respondent has incurred are alarming and challenge the average intelligence of a judge.

Regarding his income reported to the social security system, given all that has been stated, it is basically of no interest what the amount of income reported to the social security system is due to, except that, when his income was lower—approximately eight hundred fifty-seven thousand colones—the respondent sought to have the sum of four hundred sixty-five thousand colones set as the child support payment—images 443 and 229. Now, his reported income is higher, as it amounts to nine hundred twenty-five thousand colones, but he requests a child support payment of three hundred sixty-five thousand colones. This is how contradictory the respondent's litigation is: his income rises, he requests a lower payment, and if his income is lower, he requests a higher payment. Mathematics is a universal heritage: the numbers do not fit in the arguments put forth by the support obligor.

For all the reasoning set forth, the undersigned considers that the respondent uses at least seven companies to move his finances and, there exists a commingling of assets that demonstrates what the plaintiff indicated in the petition with special detail and with which the litis was framed: corporate veil. Note that the respondent has had the resources to acquire a new car and has chosen to camouflage his income and expenses as has been described in this judgment. Consequently, the undersigned considers that his income cannot be considered to be that which has been reported to the social security system, and he has not met the burden of proving his income and, even among his expenses, it seems he includes the payment of two professional association fees—Colegio de Contadores Autorizados de Costa Rica and Colegio de Contadores Privados de Costa Rica—and he does not explain why. It is not prohibited to belong to two Professional Associations, but it draws attention for someone who has assured that his source of income diminished and, at the same time, acquires a new vehicle when he supposedly has lower income. Likewise, the respondent does not even include among his expenses what he supposedly spends when he has his son with him. If he does not include that in his "expense tables," who pays for it? For the undersigned, it is clear that the defendant has not been transparent in his litigation.

It is also very clear that the standard of living the child has enjoyed could not have been provided by the mother with her income, nor by the father with the income he claims since the year 2012—image 342. It is clear that the defendant made use of monies that are not reflected in his income reported to the social security system, and he continues to do so because not even for his own personal expenses does he provide receipts and invoices. Consequently, what is appropriate is to maintain the child's standard of living. He did not ask to come into this world and he should not have to stop enjoying and taking advantage of the private education he has known since a few months before birth—a fact alleged by the mother and not contested. The child deserves stability and tranquility; he deserves that his childhood not be disturbed by the conflicts of adults and especially, that his father not prefer to pay for a new car before maintaining the standard of living he provided him and which the child enjoys and is an integral part of his stability. The child does not deserve to live his childhood with the fear of being stripped of the environment he knows. As a complement, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice—No. 12703, 11:51 of August 1, 2014—has established that the advisory opinions and judgments of the IACHR are binding. It has expressly stated: "The conventionality control designed by the Inter-American Court—basically, through the judgments in the cases Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006, Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru of November 24, 2006, Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico of November 26, 2010, and Gelman v. Uruguay of February 24, 2011—is of mandatory compliance for the Constitutional Chambers and Tribunals, having to contrast any conduct—active or omissive—with the conventionality parameter or the inter-American corpus juris, composed of the regional conventions and declarations on Human Rights, the jurisprudence of that Court, and its advisory opinions." On other occasions, that Constitutional Tribunal has ruled along the same lines, such as, for example, No. 2313, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 16860, 14:44 of December 6, 2005; No. 5017, 10:42 of April 7, 2006; No. 4276, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 1024, 10:00 of January 27, 2009; No. 4491, 16:00 of April 3, 2013, and No. 12782-18 of 17:45 of August 8, 2018. As a reinforcement, it is relevant to point out that, in our country, the formal component is reinforced by the position and weight held by international instruments, formal or not, on human rights, that is, they occupy a supra-constitutional rank as determined by constitutional jurisprudence for several decades. For example: No. 282-90, 17:00 of March 13, 1990; No. 719-90, 16:30 of June 26, 1990; No. 1147-90, 16:00 of September 21, 1990; No. 709-91, 13:56 of April 20, 1991; No. 3435-92, 16:20 of November 11, 1992; No. 3550-92, 16:00 of November 24, 1992; No. 5759-93, 14:15 of November 10, 1993; No. 2665-94, 15:51 of June 7, 1994; No. 2313-95, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 7072-95, 11:15 of December 22, 1995; No. 103296, 9:03 of March 1, 1996; No. 1319-97, 14:51 of March 4, 1997; No. 3001-97, 16:18 of May 30, 1997; No. 7706-97, 12:09 of November 19, 1997; No. 1232-98, 16:00 of February 25, 1998; No. 2822-98, 15:18 of April 28, 1998; No. 1801-98, 9:12 of March 13, 1998; No. 3223-98, 9:00 of May 15, 1998; No. 6830-98, 15:06 of September 24, 1998; No. 7484-00, 9:21 of August 25, 2000; No. 7498-00, 9:35 of August 25, 2000; No. 9685-00, 14:56 of November 1, 2000; No. 10693-02, 18:20 of November 7, 2002; No. 2771-03, 11:40 of April 4, 2003; No. 9992-04, 14:30 of September 8, 2004; No. 17745-06, 14:35 of December 11, 2006; No. 649-07, 11:40 of January 19, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 3043-07, 14:54 of March 7, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:59 of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-07, 9:53 of September 24, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 14193-08, 10:03 of September 24, 2008; No. 7387-09, 14:56 of May 6, 2009; No. 15481-13, 11:30 of November 22, 2013, and No. 13821-20, 9:15 of July 22, 2020.

In this line, it is relevant to highlight that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—Protocol of San Salvador—, form part of the "international corpus juris" for the protection of minors. IACHR. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauiri Brothers Vs. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Case of Rochac Hernández et al. Vs. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2014. Case of Chitay Nech et al. Vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010, para. 165. Case of Fornerón and daughter Vs. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of April 27, 2012, para. 137. Case of the Río Negro Massacres Vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 4, 201262, para. 142. Case of the "Mapiripán Massacre" Vs. Colombia. Judgment of September 15, 2005. I/A Court H.R., Case of the "Street Children" (Villagrán Morales et al.) vs. Guatemala, Merits, judgment of November 19, 1999, Series C, No. 63. Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated that the Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child form part of the international corpus juris. IACHR. Report No. 41/99. Case 11.491. Minors detained in Honduras. March 10, 1999. For greater understanding, the cited Court has resolved: "115. The corpus juris of International Human Rights Law is formed by a set of international instruments of varied content and legal effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions, and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on International Law, in the sense of affirming and developing the capacity of the latter to regulate relations between States and the human beings under their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, this Court must adopt an adequate criterion to consider the question subject to examination within the framework of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law." IACHR. Advisory Opinion OC-16. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of Due Process, October 1, 1999, para. 115. For its part, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated: "21. It is pertinent to specify that the existence of a corpus juris not only includes the text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child but also the decisions adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in fulfillment of its mandate. Such a perspective represents a significant advance that demonstrates not only the existence of a common legal framework in International Human Rights Law applicable to childhood but also the interdependence that exists in the international sphere between the different international systems for the protection of the human rights of girls and boys." IACHR. Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135 Doc. 14. August 5, 2009. Report on Corporal Punishment and Human Rights of Children and Adolescents. Promoting the defense and respect of the human rights of children and adolescents in the Americas." This is decisive because many of the General Observations issued by the Committee develop substantive and procedural rights of minors.

For all the above, the best interests of the child beneficiary must be primarily safeguarded, and more so, considering that he was born in the year 2016—image 18—, meaning he is in early childhood. Thus, this judgment must respond to what is established in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as to General Observation No. 7 issued by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, on the "Realization of the rights of the child in early childhood." In this sense, it is recorded that the entire standard of living alleged and demonstrated by the mother with respect to the child, and provided by the father, was acquired during early childhood. Therefore, with greater reason, it is not possible to deprive the child of the stability he deserves and that must be guaranteed primarily by the persons who are responsible for his presence in this world.

Additionally, the child support obligation is a priority over any other obligation, and that includes the payment of a new vehicle. Therefore, the child's life cannot be restricted so that the father continues to pay for the vehicle—if he still owes it—or, rather, keeps it in his assets. The preferential nature of the child support obligation is present in different norms. For example, Article 171 of the Family Code, Article 62 of the Child Support Payments Law, Article 172 of the Labor Code, Article 44 of Law No. 9859 published in Supplement No. 150 to La Gaceta No. 147, June 20, 2020, and Article 155 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank, as well as Article 30 subsection a) of the Labor Code, among other norms. In the case of Article 171 of the Family Code, the norm states: "Child support debt shall have priority over any other, without exception." Therefore, priority cannot be given to the purchase of a vehicle, as the father seems to intend, nor can the context in which the father acquires it be made invisible: when he claims to have fewer resources.

As an additional line, the mother's in-kind contribution cannot be made invisible. On the contrary, her contribution must be accounted for in accordance with Article 35 of the Family Code—reformed by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement No. 280—, as well as by direct application of numerals 5.a, 13.a, and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and, also by application of Law No. 9325—Law for the Accounting of the Contribution of Unpaid Domestic Work in Costa Rica. Therefore, the mother of the minor participates in the "care economy" which refers to the "unpaid work that is performed in the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, the care of other persons in the household or the community, and the maintenance of the paid labor force." That law warns that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For greater understanding, that normative instrument indicates in Article 3 that "the following are considered activities of unpaid domestic and care work, among others: a) The organization, distribution, and supervision of domestic tasks. b) The preparation of food. c) The cleaning and maintenance of the dwelling and household goods. d) The cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, upbringing, and instruction of children (transportation to school and assistance with the development of school tasks). f) The care of older and sick adults. g) Making purchases, payments, or errands related to the household. h) The cleaning and maintenance of goods for family use. i) Services to the community and unpaid aid to other households of relatives, friends, and neighbors. The present classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course." To this is added that the mother does not have a permanent job as a professional and, although her promotions were limited at first, now it seems that is not the case, but at the same time, she must now incur the payment of housing, because no one can be required to provide the child and the mother a place to live for free. For greater clarity, the child support payment that is imposed must attend to the proportional payment of rent, mortgage, and/or maintenance of the property where the child lives, as applicable, which includes taxes if applicable; transportation for all types of activities, food in attention to the real nutritional needs of the beneficiary person and according to the sport they practice, hobbies, or illness they may have, as the case may be, proportional payment of public utilities, entertainment, clothing, acquisition of personal hygiene products, products for the hygiene of their clothes and the home, etc. Furthermore, I refer to the binding jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber. For example, Resolution No. 2008-13010, 15:57 of August 27, 2008, where it stated: "Regarding the right to child support. This Tribunal has already specified that the right to child support derives from the family ties imposed either by marriage, parental authority, or kinship, and aims to ensure the support beneficiary the provision of those extremes necessary for their normal physical and psychological development. Thus, the obligation to provide support is based both on Articles 51 and 52 of the Political Constitution, as well as on International Human Rights Law, since its satisfaction guarantees the support creditor the enjoyment of a series of human rights indispensable for their subsistence and integral development, including, among others, the right to life, health, housing, and education (see in this sense rulings number 2001-07517 of fourteen hours fifty minutes of August first, two thousand one, and 2003-15392 of fifteen hours fifty-eight minutes of December nineteenth, two thousand three)." This has been an reiterated criterion, for example, in resolutions 8707-15, 18406-19, 9159-16, 1689-16, 15675-16, 14935-14, and 8677-19, among others. Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.

For all the reasoning stated, the appeal filed by the support obligor is denied. The appeal filed by the mother is partially granted. Observing that her appellate claim is identical to what she requested in the petition, it is understood that the sum she requests is to be set as the monthly amount, expenses for the start of the school year, and year-end bonus (aguinaldo). However, it is not recorded in the case file that in the month of December, the child beneficiary has the same needs as at the start of the school year or, indeed, those that must be covered by the monthly amount. For example, in December, the housing item is not paid twice, nor are therapies or internet service paid twice, etc. Added to this is that the mother is also a support obligor, without this allowing her in-kind contribution to be made invisible and placing her in a situation of not being able to attend to her own needs. Consequently, the contested judgment is reversed, and in its place, the sum of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES is set as the monthly child support payment. As a child support payment for the concept of year-end bonus, the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES is established, and, for the concept of expenses for the start of the school year—which is precisely a very important topic because the minor is studying in a private center where academic activities between school terms, for example, are foreseeable and do not occur only at the beginning of the school year—, the sum of ONE MILLION COLONES is set, which is understood to cover not only the expenses for the start of the school year but also the academic activities that derive from the child's permanence in the educational center where he is at the time of issuing this judgment. To all these sums must be added the shared contribution of the mother, without, as already stated, this allowing her in-kind contribution to be disregarded, and that she must also cover her expenses to live and even have solvency to face eventual periods without promotions or, indeed, with promotions but with difficulties in the payment of her salary for belonging to the complex payroll of a public institution. Furthermore, it is an uncontested fact that the mother is assuming the maintenance of the vehicle that serves as transportation for the child and herself. It must be very clear that the monthly amount is set at this sum provided that the child continues to enjoy the vehicle that the mother currently uses to transport him. If at any time the child no longer enjoys that vehicle for whatever reason, the mother shall take the pertinent action. This last point, except if the vehicle suffers total or partial loss due to a traffic accident where the mother is responsible according to a final judgment issued in the respective process. All this given that the mother is driving a vehicle that does not belong to her.

On the other hand, it must also be clear that this judgment has been possible due to the detailed content of the petition and because the appeal has been timely, with concrete and circumstantiated grievances.

That is, the appealed ruling has been challenged as an appeal (recurso de apelación) should be formulated, since an appeal is not for answering a complaint again, reiterating the complaint filed, completing what was not said when complaining or answering, etc. The issue of piercing the corporate veil (velo societario) was the subject of the dispute and, from the complaint, flowed throughout the entire process and especially from the poor and unfounded defense theory of the defendant.

Regarding costs, no pronouncement is issued, as it was not an appealed aspect.

V.Now then, it is pointed out to the first instance that a ruling where the dispute has been joined with the issue of piercing the corporate veil (velo societario) requires a detailed and comprehensive effort of the evidence to find the real truth regarding distinctive elements of that figure. In this case, the proven facts have been well constructed, but in the merits of the matter, a certain naivety is observed on the part of the first instance and a limited handling of the basic theory of piercing the corporate veil (velo societario). Thus, the ruling denotes a shallow analysis of an issue that, as in this case, is evident and notorious. Therefore, it is not that the ruling lacks reasoning, but rather that it does not have the necessary depth, and that is not grounds for nullity. A ruling on piercing the corporate veil (velo societario) requires minimum knowledge of corporate law (derecho societario) and strength to gradually lift the veil. Without that knowledge, there is no strength.

VI.It is made known that the images cited in this ruling correspond to the location of the documents or memorials from the download of the case file (expediente) in PDF format.

VII.Summon the child beneficiary so that, in simple language, this ruling may be explained to him and to give him the peace of mind that the opportunity to remain in the educational environment in which he has developed for a long time has been guaranteed. The child must appear at the facilities of the First Family Court (Juzgado Primero de Familia) located on the first floor of the Court Building (Edificio de Tribunales), Barrio Luján, at nine in the morning on September 6, 2023. Article 20 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia).

VIII.It is made known to the defendant that, if he fails to comply with what is ordered herein, he may face a criminal case at the initiative of the legal representative of the minor, for the crime of breach of the duty of support (incumplimiento del deber alimentario) or even aggravated breach of the duty of support (incumplimiento agravado del deber alimentario). Articles 185 and 186 of the Penal Code (Código Penal). Furthermore, if he diverts assets to evade compliance with the duty of support (deber alimentario) and thus overloads the child's mother with the attention of all his needs, he could eventually face a criminal case in accordance with the Law on the Penalization of Violence against Women (Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra Las Mujeres), article 8.h) and 35 et seq. This is because the defendant is an accountant, auditor, and consultant, as well as a representative of companies for procedures in the national territory, which generates broad knowledge on how to evade earnings, profits, etc. Furthermore, it is made known to him that, if he were criminally convicted, it could affect the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) and the exercise of his occupations, at least regarding the issue of professional affiliations (colegiaturas). Likewise, all this would affect him so that, in the future, he could find himself in a cause for exclusion from the right to support (alimentos) with respect to his son when he is an adult.

POR TANTO:

---a) The appeal filed by the defendant is denied. ---b) The challenged ruling is revoked and in its place a monthly child support payment (cuota alimentaria) is set in the amount of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES. ---c) As a child support payment (cuota alimentaria) for the concept of year-end bonus (aguinaldo), the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES is established. ---d) For the concept of expenses for the start of the school year, the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES is set, which is understood to cover not only the expenses for the start of the school year but also the academic activities arising from the child's permanence in the educational center in which he is enrolled at the time of issuing this ruling. ---e) It must be very clear that the monthly amount is set at this sum provided that the child continues to enjoy the vehicle that the mother currently uses to transport him. If at any time the child no longer enjoys that vehicle for whatever reason, it will be up to the mother to take the pertinent action. This last point, except if the vehicle suffers a total or partial loss due to a traffic accident where the mother is responsible according to a final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in the respective process. ---f) Summon the child beneficiary so that, in simple language, this ruling may be explained to him and to give him the peace of mind that the opportunity to remain in the educational environment in which he has developed for a long time has been guaranteed. The child must appear at the facilities of the First Family Court (Juzgado Primero de Familia) located on the first floor of the Court Building (Edificio de Tribunales), Barrio Luján, at nine in the morning on September 6, 2023. ---g) It is made known to the defendant that, if he fails to comply with what is ordered herein, he may face a criminal case at the initiative of the legal representative of the minor, for the crime of breach of the duty of support (incumplimiento del deber alimentario) or even aggravated breach of the duty of support (incumplimiento agravado del deber alimentario). Articles 185 and 186 of the Penal Code (Código Penal). Furthermore, if he diverts assets to evade compliance with the duty of support (deber alimentario) and thus overloads the child's mother with the attention of all his needs, he could eventually face a criminal case in accordance with the Law on the Penalization of Violence against Women (Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra Las Mujeres), article 8.h) and 35 et seq. Furthermore, it is made known to him that, if he were criminally convicted, it could affect the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) and the exercise of his occupations, at least regarding the issue of professional affiliations (colegiaturas). Likewise, all this would affect him so that, in the future, he could find himself in a cause for exclusion from the right to support (alimentos) with respect to his son when he is an adult. ---h) Regarding costs, no pronouncement is issued. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Judge (Juez/a).- MSOLISM Email: asis-</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: center; line-height: 108%; font-size: 8pt;"><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman';">[email protected]</span></p> </div> </div> Why would a defendant who works in accounting not provide receipts for the consumption of goods and services on a personal level to a child support proceeding? Thus, there is not a single invoice or movement from his personal bank accounts in the file, or of all his expenses, although strangely those receipts were seen by the person who issued the income certification to prove the defendant's payment capacity according to the document in image 453 for the purpose of being a credit subject to acquire a new vehicle. It is not understood where those receipts are and, especially, if they are expenses that are in the defendant's personal name or else, if they are expenses he makes personally and then are reimbursed by some company in which he appears as a majority or minority partner—or member of the board of directors. Nor is it known if there are no receipts for the defendant's personal expenses and, rather, everything is in the name of one of the companies in which he is a partner—minority or majority—or a member of the board of directors. So, the fact that the defendant does not receive a salary, dividends, stipends (dietas), etc., from the companies in which he is a partner has no relevance for this case because he evidently has access to the assets of companies in which he is a partner or even those in which he is not a partner at all, and that includes revealing information from the shareholders' registry. That is the degree of power and ease the defendant has with respect to those companies.[...]

For all the reasoning set forth, the undersigned finds that the defendant uses at least seven companies to move his finances and, there is a confusion of assets that demonstrates what the plaintiff indicated in the claim with special detail and with which the litis was framed: corporate veil (velo societario). Note that the defendant has had resources to acquire a new car and has chosen to camouflage his income and expenses as has been described in this judgment. Consequently, the undersigned finds that his income cannot be considered to be what has been reported to social security, and he has not met the burden of proving his income and even, within his expenses, he seems to include the payment of two professional dues—Colegio de Contadores Autorizados de Costa Rica and, Colegio de Contadores Privados de Costa Rica—and he does not explain why. It is not prohibited to belong to two Professional Associations, but it draws attention for someone who has claimed that his source of income diminished and, at the same time, acquires a new vehicle when he supposedly has lower income. Similarly, the defendant does not even include among his expenses what he supposedly spends when he has his child with him. If he does not include that within his "expense tables," who pays it? For the undersigned, it is clear that the defendant has not been transparent in his litigation. It is also very clear that the child's standard of living (nivel de vida) that he has enjoyed could not have been provided by the mother with her income, nor by the father with the income he claims since the year 2012—image 342. It is clear that the defendant used money that is not reflected in his income reported to social security, and he continues to do so because not even for his own personal expenses does he provide receipts and invoices. Consequently, what is appropriate is to maintain the child's standard of living. He did not ask to come into this world and has no reason to stop enjoying and benefiting from the private education he has known since a few months before birth—a fact alleged by the mother and not contested. The child deserves stability and tranquility; he deserves that his childhood not be disturbed by the conflicts of adults and especially, that his father not prefer to pay for a new car rather than maintain the standard of living he gave him and which the child enjoys and that forms an integral part of his stability. The child does not deserve to live his childhood with the fear of being stripped of the environment he knows. As a complement, the Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia—No. 12703, 11:51 of August 1, 2014—has ordered that the advisory opinions and judgments of the IACHR are binding. It has expressly stated: “The conventionality control designed by the Inter-American Court—basically, through the judgments in the cases of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006, Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso v. Peru of November 24, 2006, Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico of November 26, 2010, and Gelman v. Uruguay of February 24, 2011—is of obligatory compliance for the Constitutional Chambers and Tribunals, having to contrast any conduct—active or omissive—with the conventionality parameter or the Inter-American corpus iuris, comprised of the regional conventions and declarations on Human Rights matters, the jurisprudence of that Court and its advisory opinions.” On other occasions, that Constitutional Tribunal has issued rulings along the same line, as for example, No. 2313, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 16860, 14:44 of December 6, 2005; No. 5017, 10:42 of April 7, 2006; No. 4276, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 1024, 10:00 of January 27, 2009; No. 4491, 16:00 of April 3, 2013 and No. 12782-18 of 17:45 of August 8, 2018. As reinforcement, it is relevant to point out that, in our country, the formal component is reinforced by the position and weight held by formal or informal international instruments on human rights matters, that is, they occupy a supra-constitutional rank as determined by constitutional jurisprudence for several decades. For example: No. 282-90, 17:00 of March 13, 1990; No. 719-90, 16:30 of June 26, 1990; No. 1147-90, 16:00 of September 21, 1990; No. 709-91, 13:56 of April 20, 1991; No. 3435-92, 16:20 of November 11, 1992; No. 3550-92, 16:00 of November 24, 1992; No. 5759-93, 14:15 of November 10, 1993; No. 2665-94, 15:51 of June 7, 1994; No. 2313-95, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 7072-95, 11:15 of December 22, 1995; No. 103296, 9:03 of March 1, 1996; No. 1319-97, 14:51 of March 4, 1997; No. 3001-97, 16:18 of May 30, 1997; No. 7706-97, 12:09 of November 19, 1997; No. 1232-98, 16:00 of February 25, 1998; No. 2822-98, 15:18 of April 28, 1998; No. 1801-98, 9:12 of March 13, 1998; No. 3223-98, 9:00 of May 15, 1998, No. 6830-98, 15:06 of September 24, 1998; No. 7484-00, 9:21 of August 25, 2000; No. 7498-00, 9:35 of August 25, 2000; No. 9685-00, 14:56 of November 1, 2000; No. 10693-02, 18:20 of November 7, 2002, No. 2771-03, 11:40 of April 4, 2003; No. 9992-04, 14:30 of September 8, 2004; No. 17745-06, 14:35 of December 11, 2006; No. 649-07, 11:40 of January 19, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 3043-07, 14:54 of March 7, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:59 of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-07, 9:53 of September 24, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 14193-08, 10:03 of September 24, 2008, No. 7387-09, 14:56 of May 6, 2009, No. 15481-13, 11:30 of November 22, 2013 and No. 13821-20, 9:15 of July 22, 2020. In this line, it is relevant to highlight that the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos has stated that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights – Protocol of San Salvador – form part of the “international corpus juris” for the protection of minors. IACHR. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauiri Brothers Vs. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Case of Rochac Hernández et al. Vs. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2014. Case of Chitay Nech et al. Vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010, para. 165. Case of Fornerón and daughter Vs. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 27, 2012, para. 137. Case of the Río Negro Massacres Vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012, para. 142. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” Vs. Colombia. Judgment of September 15, 2005. I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) vs. Guatemala, Merits, judgment of November 19, 1999, Series C, No. 63. Furthermore, the Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos has stated that the Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child form part of the international corpus juris. IACHR. Report No. 41/99. Case 11.491. Detained Minors in Honduras. March 10, 1999. For a better understanding, the cited Court has resolved: “115. The corpus juris of International Human Rights Law is formed by a set of international instruments of varied content and legal effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on International Law, in the sense of affirming and developing the capacity of the latter to regulate relations between States and the human beings under their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, this Court must adopt a suitable criterion to consider the issue under examination within the framework of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law.” IACHR. Advisory Opinion OC-16. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of Due Process, October 1, 1999, para. 115. For its part, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated: “21. It is pertinent to clarify that the existence of a corpus juris not only includes the text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child but also the decisions adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in fulfillment of its mandate. Such a perspective represents a significant advance that shows not only the existence of a common legal framework in International Human Rights Law applicable in matters of childhood but also the interdependence that exists in the international sphere between the different international systems for the protection of the human rights of children.” IACHR. Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135 Doc. 14. August 5, 2009. Report on Corporal Punishment and the Human Rights of Children and Adolescents. Promoting the defense and respect of the human rights of children and adolescents in the Americas. This is determinant because many of the General Observations issued by the Committee develop substantive and procedural rights of minors. For all that has been said, the best interest of the child beneficiary must be primarily protected, especially considering that he was born in 2016—image 18—, so he is in early childhood. Thus, this judgment must respond to what is established in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as General Observation No. 7 issued by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, regarding the “Implementing child rights in early childhood.” In this sense, it is clear that the entire standard of living alleged and demonstrated by the mother with respect to the child, and provided by the father, was acquired during early childhood. Therefore, with greater reason, it is not possible to deprive the child of the stability he deserves and which must be guaranteed primarily by the persons who are responsible for his presence in this world. Additionally, the child support obligation is a priority over any other obligation and that includes the payment of a new vehicle. Thus, the child's life cannot be restricted so that the father continues paying for the vehicle—if he still owes it—or, maintains it in his assets. The preferential nature of the child support obligation is present in different laws. For example, Article 171 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), Article 62 of the Child Support Law (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), 172 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), Article 44 of Law No. 9859 published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 150 to La Gaceta No. 147, June 20, 2020 and Article 155 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central), as well as Article 30, subsection a) of the Labor Code, among other norms. In the case of Article 171 of the Family Code, the norm states: "The support debt shall have priority over any other, without exception." Therefore, priority cannot be given to the purchase of a vehicle as the father seems to intend and also, the context in which the father acquires it cannot be made invisible: when he claims to have fewer resources.

As an additional point, the in-kind contribution of the mother cannot be made invisible. On the contrary, her contribution must be accounted for in accordance with Article 35 of the Family Code—reformed by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Supplement No. 280—, as well as by direct application of Articles 5.a, 13.a and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and, also by application of Law No. 9325—Law for the Accounting of the Contribution of Unpaid Domestic Work in Costa Rica (Ley de Contabilización del Aporte del Trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica)—. Thus, the mother of the minor participates in the "care economy" (economía de cuidado) which refers to "unpaid work performed in the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, the care of other persons in the household or the community and the maintenance of the paid labor force." That law warns that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For a better understanding, this normative instrument indicates in Article 3 that "unpaid domestic and care work activities are considered, among others, the following: a) The organization, distribution and supervision of domestic tasks. b) Food preparation. c) Cleaning and maintenance of the dwelling and household goods. d) Cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, upbringing and instruction of children (transport to school and help with school tasks). f) Care of elderly and sick persons. g) Making purchases, payments or procedures related to the home. h) Cleaning and maintenance of family-use property. i) Services to the community and unpaid aid to other households of relatives, friends and neighbors. This classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course." Added to this is that the mother does not have a permanent job as a professional and while her career advancements were initially limited, now it seems that is not the case, but at the same time, she must now incur the payment of housing, because no one can be required to provide a place to live for the child and the mother for free. For greater clarity, any child support that is imposed must address the proportional payment of rent, mortgage and/or maintenance of the property where the child lives as applicable, which includes taxes if corresponding; transport for all types of activities, food in attention to the real nutritional needs of the beneficiary and according to the sport practiced, hobbies or illness they have as the case may be, proportional payment of public services, recreation, clothing, acquisition of personal hygiene products, products for the hygiene of their clothes and home, etc. Furthermore, I refer to the binding jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional. For example, resolution No. 2008-13010, 15:57 of August 27, 2008, where it stated: "Regarding the right to a child support payment. This Tribunal has already specified that the right to a child support payment derives from family bonds imposed either by marriage, parental authority (patria potestad) or kinship, and its purpose is to ensure the supply of those ends necessary for the beneficiary's normal physical and psychological development. Thus, the obligation to provide support is grounded both in Articles 51 and 52 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and in International Human Rights Law, since with its satisfaction the support creditor is guaranteed the enjoyment of a series of indispensable human rights for their subsistence and integral development, which include, among others, the right to life, to health, to housing and to education (see in this sense judgments number 2001-07517 of fourteen hours and fifty minutes of August first, two thousand one and 2003-15392 of fifteen hours and fifty-eight minutes of December nineteenth, two thousand three)." This has been a reiterated criterion for example in resolutions 8707-15, 18406-19, 9159-16, 1689-16, 15675-16, 14935-14 and 8677-19 among others.

**FILE NUMBER:** 22-001453-0172-PA - 3 **PROCEEDING:** SECOND INSTANCE **PLAINTIFF:** [Name 001] **DEFENDANT:** [Name 002] **SECOND INSTANCE JUDGMENT** **No. 2023000835** **FIRST FAMILY COURT OF SAN JOSÉ.-** At nine hours and three minutes on the fifth of September of two thousand twenty-three.- Child support proceeding established by **[Name 001]** , identity card number [Value 001] against **[Name 002]** , identity card number [Value 002]. In an appeal filed by both parties, this Court reviews the judgment of 14:53 of July 4, 2023, and, **SOLE WHEREAS:** The appealed decision sets as a monthly payment and for the concept of year-end bonus, the sum of **SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES** and, for the concept of school year start-up expenses, the sum of **FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES**. Both parties appeal. ***The obligor argues as follows:*** ---a) Regarding the vehicle he acquired and which is indicated in the appealed decision, he points out that, "a significant portion corresponds to the amount obtained from the sale of the vehicle". He provides as evidence for better resolution, a deed showing the sale of a vehicle by a third person. ---b) His income reported to social security is due to an intervention by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). ---c) He contributed more for the child beneficiary when he lived with the family group, because he did not know that the income of the child's mother was double what he thought. Now, he states it must be proportional. He requests that child support be set at the sum of three hundred sixty-five thousand colones. He does not indicate if this amount is intended as monthly payment, year-end bonus, and school year start-up expenses. ***The child's mother raises a grievance:*** ---a) It is not true that the obligor's economic situation has been different since 2018, as the last trip he took was in 2021. She claims there is a contradiction in the decision by affirming a worsening since 2018, when in reality he traveled outside the country in 2021. ---b) The child's lifestyle has been demonstrated and is not due to a proportional contribution because she had always had an income lower than the one she has when working in a promotion as a professional, and her payments as an employee of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) are delayed, so they cannot be considered a stable income. She indicates that her promotions do not depend on her. ---c) She cannot maintain the child's lifestyle with her income, and the decision disregards her in-kind contribution. ---d) It is not true that the expense breakdown contemplated in the lawsuit refers to extraordinary expenses as the contested decision affirms, and that, by not specifying which and why they have the connotation of extraordinary, she has been left defenseless. ---e) That, in the deposition (confesional), the defendant accepted that he uses his other companies for investments. ---f) The defendant has "absolute economic possibilities," because he bought a vehicle with a lien for a low amount. She requests that child support be set at the sum of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES or a sum greater than the one established. She does not indicate if this amount is requested as a monthly payment, year-end bonus, and school year start-up expenses.

**WHEREAS:** **I. PROVEN FACTS:** Those indicated as such in the appealed decision are endorsed. Now, the following are added:

• 12)The defendant is not the majority shareholder of the corporation [Name 003] S. A. and appears as treasurer; however, the child and the child's mother make use of a corporation vehicle, a Kía Pio model 2012 [Value 003] (an uncontroversial fact that forms part of the lawsuit image 7, documentary evidence image 213, 222, spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) of the defendant image 338 and 437, documentary evidence in image 360 to 372).
• 13)The defendant, not being a partner in the companies where he only appears on the board of directors, makes use of the shareholder ledgers in this present proceeding—a matter of his personal life—to disclose who the shareholders are of those companies (documentary evidence in image 360 to 372).
• 14)The defendant acquired a vehicle when his income was six hundred thirty-six thousand colones monthly; he acquired a new vehicle in November 2021 for the sum of approximately thirty-one thousand dollars (image 257 and following, documentary evidence of image 453 documentary visible in image 299 and following, as well as image 552 and following).
• 15)The defendant made use of an apartment that belonged to a corporation for the purpose of providing lodging to a person who worked in the care of the child beneficiary and accepted that the corporation in which he is a non-majority shareholder has apartments for rent and also another corporation where he is not a shareholder has apartments for rent (an uncontroversial fact that appears in the lawsuit and spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) image 339).
• 16)The defendant performs work for three of the corporations over which the plaintiff argues piercing of the corporate veil (levantamiento del velo societario), and that these are invoiced not personally but in the name of another [Name 004] in which the defendant is the majority shareholder and appears as deputy manager on the board of directors (image 209, 210, spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) image 334, documentary evidence in image 360 to 372 and spontaneous statement image 340).
• 17)The defendant does not incur expenses for occupying a place to live, although he denied having real estate registered in his name; he denied having purchased a home and resides in Tibás (an uncontroversial fact and spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) image 345 and 422, images 360 to 372).
• 18)The defendant's expenses are assumed as expenses of a company in which he appears as a shareholder (an uncontroversial fact).
• 19)The defendant is currently registered with social security with an income of nine hundred twenty-five thousand colones since January of 2023 (image 552 and following). 20) The defendant consumes the medication prescribed in the private consultation he has attended since 2009 (image 455, 458 and 460).
• 21)The defendant serves as a representative of companies for procedures in national territory (admission in the answer to the lawsuit), as an accountant, auditor and consultant (spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) image 341), and he identifies himself as an accountant (images 360 to 372).

**II. UNPROVEN FACTS:** Unproven facts 4 and 5 are eliminated. In their place, the following are added:

• 4)The defendant did not demonstrate that the death of his father caused losses to him personally or to the companies in which he appears as a majority partner or not.
• 5)Nor did he demonstrate what his expenses are, or why the payment for the new vehicle he bought is excluded from his expenses, if he still owes it; nor the expense for gasoline or any fuel the vehicle requires — and maintenance of that vehicle; food, per diems, supplies to carry out his various occupations, as well as what he supposedly invests when the child beneficiary is with him.
• 6)It is not recorded that if the company [Name 004] S. A no longer has the membership it previously had, is not an international office, and has been classified as a "small" office, this has caused a loss of income. The economic implications of this are unknown.
• 7)It is not recorded that the suspended membership is impossible to renew.
• 8)It is not recorded that the companies in which the defendant is a shareholder have had a decrease in audit or other contracts in general.

**The assessment of the proven and unproven facts now included in this decision, together with those contained in the contested judgment and which are now endorsed, is made below.** **III. ON THE MERITS:** In this matter, the lawsuit filed by the child's mother, with the legal advice of **Attorney Priscilla Vargas Córdoba**, sets out in extreme detail the elements that, according to the brief, constitute piercing of the corporate veil (velo societario). The defendant, for his part, centered his defense thesis on the fact that since the corporations —seven— in which he is a shareholder or only appears on the board of directors were incorporated many years ago, the corporate veil is not configured. That is, according to the defendant, social veil depends exclusively on the creation of a corporation or several at a specific historical moment, but this argument lacks normative support, and, moreover, for what will be stated, it is a very poor and inconsistent argument.

For greater clarity, the corporate veil (velo social) is distinguished, for example, by the confusion of assets that operates between those who are partners and the corporation itself, or between those who are not partners and the corporation itself. In this case, it is evident that, of the seven companies, the defendant, without being a partner in at least three, has used the shareholder ledger to provide certification regarding the current share capital to this present proceeding, which is something pertaining to his personal life. That is, the obligor for child support (obligado alimentario) behaves as a partner or even as a majority partner when he is not even a partner and, furthermore, disposes of something so intimate to a corporation—the shareholder ledger—for his personal use. Why does a mere deputy manager, treasurer, or vocal feel he has the authority and control to use the information from the shareholder ledger for a personal judicial proceeding of his own? See that it is demonstrated that the defendant is not the majority shareholder of the corporation [Name 003] S. A. and only appears as treasurer; however, the child and the child's mother make use of a corporation vehicle, a Kía Pio model 2012 [Value 003] (an uncontroversial fact that forms part of the lawsuit image 7, documentary evidence image 213, 222, spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) of the defendant image 338 and 437, documentary evidence in image 360 to 372). This disposition of a third party's good makes it very clear that the defendant is not a simple treasurer as he has tried to make believe. No one who does not have resounding decision-making power in a company can make such a disposition and dispose of a third party's vehicle—a corporation—for the personal use of even a non-majority partner, allocated even to his wife and son—as has been demonstrated in this matter. This was introduced into debate and the joinder of issue was established with this fact. See also that the defendant, not being a partner in the companies where he only appears on the board of directors, makes use of the shareholder ledger for a personal judicial proceeding like the present one (documentary evidence in image 360 to 372). This behavior cannot be done by someone who cannot make decisions in the company as if it were his own. The defendant made use of an apartment that belonged to a corporation for the purpose of providing lodging to a person who worked in the care of the child beneficiary (an uncontroversial fact that appears in the lawsuit). When answering, the defendant disengaged from everything related to the corporate veil with a single argument: the companies are old. Therefore, that deficient way of answering the lawsuit allows the elements regarding confusion of assets that the lawsuit contemplates concerning the issue of the corporate veil to be considered uncontroversial. The joinder of issue was established with these facts, and the defendant remained silent. This is another element of interest—not the only one—to conclude how the defendant makes use of third-party goods for his personal life. Additionally, the defendant does not incur expenses for occupying a place to live, although he denied having real estate registered in his name and denied having acquired a property (an uncontroversial fact and spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) image 345 and 422). The curious thing is that within his breakdown of expenses, he does not even include the housing issue, and as is known, the defendant himself acknowledged that some corporations have assets and, furthermore, are dedicated to the leasing of real estate. Note also that in all the certifications provided, visible from image 360 to 372, it is recorded that the defendant lives in Tibás and, according to the context of the expediente, those who left the property that served as the family's home were the mother and the child. So, apparently, the defendant resides in a property belonging to one of the corporations. The confusion of assets between the defendant is such that, he performs work for three companies, and, although he performs them personally, they are invoiced not personally but in the name of another [Name 004] in which he is the majority shareholder and appears as deputy manager on the board of directors (image 209, 210, spontaneous admission (confesión espontánea) image 334, documentary evidence in image 360 to 372 and spontaneous statement image 340). Added to this, the defendant opposed the investigation of the bank accounts of the companies. That is, he has no objection to making use of the ledgers of companies in which he is not a partner, but he does not allow the bank secrecy to be lifted regarding companies in which he is a majority or minority shareholder and from which he disposes of assets for personal use, as already explained. This is not a minor issue; rather, the lawsuit clearly indicates that the defendant's expenses are incorporated into the expenses of a company. This was not controverted, and it is recorded that the defendant did not provide a single receipt for his expenses to this proceeding.

Note that his expenses do not include food, payment of the credit for a vehicle he acquired and housing, mobile phone service, gasoline—or any fuel the vehicle may require—travel allowances, supplies for the exercise of his various occupations: accountant, auditor and consultant, etc. If none of that is within his expenses, it is unclear who pays for it. Why does a respondent who works in accounting fail to provide receipts for the consumption of goods and services in a personal capacity in a support proceeding?

Thus, there is not in the case file a single invoice or movement from his bank accounts personally or, indeed, of all his expenses, although strangely those receipts were seen by the person who issued the income certification to accredit the respondent's payment capacity according to the document in image 453 for the purpose of being a credit subject to acquire a new vehicle. It is unclear where those receipts are and, especially, whether they are expenses that are in the name of the respondent personally or, rather, expenses that he makes personally and are later reimbursed by some company in which he appears as a majority or minority partner, or a member of the board of directors. Nor is it known whether receipts for the respondent's personal expenses simply do not exist and, instead, everything is in the name of one of the companies in which he is a partner—minority or majority—or a member of the board of directors. Thus, the fact that the respondent does not receive a salary, dividends, board fees, etc., from the companies in which he is a partner has no relevance for this case because he evidently has access to the assets of companies in which he is a partner or even those in which he is not even a partner, and that includes revealing information from the shareholder registry. That is the degree of power and ease the respondent has with respect to those companies.

Likewise, it is not evident in the record that the death of his father generated losses for the respondent personally or for the companies in which he appears as a majority partner or not. This was an argument of his that he never proved, and it is unclear what belongs to him after his father passed away, that is, how the succession matter was resolved. All of this, with the observation that he also did not substantiate each and every one of his personal expenses as already explained. The confusion of assets (confusión de patrimonios) is such that the respondent did not provide receipts for the consumption of goods and services in a personal capacity. Nor is it evident that, if the company [Name 004] S.A. no longer has the membership it previously had, is not an international office, and has been classified as a "small" office, this has caused a loss of income. The economic implications of both facts are unknown. It was the respondent who introduced that argument into the debate, so he had to prove it. Furthermore, the argument regarding the suspension of the membership lacks support not only because of what has already been said and because it is not evident that the membership is impossible to renew—especially given the document in the record where whoever apparently has decision-making power over the membership even states they can provide payment facilities as necessary to regain access to the membership—but also because if the debt for the membership amounts to just over four thousand dollars, it is unclear why the respondent decided to purchase a new vehicle in his personal capacity for over thirty-one thousand dollars instead of paying the membership that involves a company in which he is a majority partner—spontaneous confession visible in image 337 and documentary evidence visible from image 360 to 372. Added to this, that company is not solely dedicated to accounting matters, but rather provides diversified services, that is, in several branches as evidenced in the record. In the same vein, it is of special interest that the respondent acquired a new vehicle when his income was six hundred thirty-six thousand colones per month; he acquired a new vehicle in November 2021 (image 453, documentary evidence visible in image 299 and following, as well as 552 and following). Why, if his income is supposedly diminished, does he decide to buy a new vehicle? Essentially, he prefers to incorporate a new vehicle into his personal assets and keep it there, rather than pay the support (pensión) requested by the plaintiff, which corresponds to the standard of living he decided to provide the child, because it is clear that with the salaries the plaintiff received, it was impossible for her to acquire the standard of living the child obtained and which, according to a study of the documentary evidence visible in image 91 and following, does not involve extraordinary expenses as the appealed judgment indicated. Of all the expenses that have been supported with the pertinent evidence, the only one that could be considered non-recurring—fortunately—is the one corresponding to the private pediatric service, insofar as it is not a monthly expense because the beneficiary child enjoys good health, but as can be seen, not because of this can all the expenses evidenced from the mentioned image onwards—and which are many—be "tainted" by the relatively sporadic nature of the private pediatric service. Furthermore, if the claim confused ordinary expenses with extraordinary ones—which is not true—the judge cannot surprise the child's mother by issuing a ruling where she attributes an extraordinary character to expenses that are evidently systematic and not sporadic. In addition to this, there is no professional reference in the record indicating that the beneficiary child has been discharged from the treatments he receives or needs, such as the use of glasses, speech therapy, dental treatment, etc. Added to this, the respondent has entered into an evident contradiction: he indicated during the course of the proceeding that the child's expenses were shared between father and mother. This was so that the greater contribution would not rest on him. Now, upon appealing, he radically changes his version and affirms that he contributed more, but tries to justify it by claiming he did not know what the mother's income was. This contradiction is not minor, because the mother has maintained throughout the entire proceeding that the father contributed everything the child required because she could not manage with her income, and upon studying the mother's salary reports to the social security system, it is evident that the standard of living she claimed in the claim for the child was acquired when she did not have promotions or, rather, was just starting to be promoted and her promotion pay was not stable (documentary evidence from image 332 to 336 and 543 to 551). Therefore, the argument presented by the father in the appeal basically reveals that he is punishing the mother for having improved professionally. Furthermore, upon observing the respondent's income from the year 2012 onwards, it is clear that the standard of living the child acquired was not supported by that income. That is, it again underlies that the father uses the companies to move his finances.

It is also evident in the record that, upon appealing, the respondent indicates that he acquired the vehicle by contributing "a significant portion corresponding to the amount obtained from the sale of the vehicle". He offers as evidence for better resolution a deed showing the sale of a vehicle by a third party, someone who appears to be a relative of his. In the first place, this is a new fact because when answering the claim, he did not introduce such a thing into the process and now intends to surprise the counterparty in a single instance. In the second place, it is not even evident that when he acquired the new vehicle, he clarified where the money for the purchase came from. Where is the purchase deed for that vehicle stating such a thing? The respondent limited himself to saying when answering that he acquired the vehicle by constituting a pledge (prenda), but he did not demonstrate that he paid part of the initial price, all of it, or a "significant portion" with resources that came from a third party, and it is also not evident that he accounted for where the rest of the resources to acquire the vehicle came from. What was not part of the answer to the claim cannot now be introduced into the debate by the respondent in a single instance.

Added to all this, the respondent again incurs a very serious contradiction, because when answering he indicated that he cannot pay just under one hundred thousand colones to acquire a monthly medical treatment, but he buys a new vehicle for thirty-one thousand dollars. This is very strange, because it is evident in the record that his late father died practically from the same ailments the respondent has and which, incidentally, do not prevent him from working—images 338, 456, 458 and 460—but the respondent, instead of acquiring the medication he requires, decided to acquire a new vehicle. Note that it was the respondent who affirmed he could not acquire the medication because his resources did not allow it. Therefore, it is an argument that lacks logical sense and proof, because clearly the treating private medical professional indicates that his current state of health is due to the fact that he consumes medications not provided by the social security system. That is, he does buy the medications he claimed he could not acquire. The inconsistencies the respondent has incurred are alarming and challenge the average intelligence of a judge.

Regarding his income reported to the social security system, given everything already stated, basically what the amount of income reported to the social security system is due to is irrelevant, except that when his income was lower—approximately eight hundred fifty-seven thousand colones—the respondent sought to have the sum of four hundred sixty-five thousand colones set as the child support quota (cuota alimentaria)—images 443 and 229. Now, his reported income is higher, amounting to nine hundred twenty-five thousand colones, but he requests a child support payment (pensión alimentaria) in the sum of three hundred sixty-five thousand colones. That is how contradictory the respondent's litigation is: his income goes up, he requests a lower support payment, and if his income is lower, he requests a higher support payment. Mathematics is a universal heritage: the numbers do not fit in the arguments presented by the support obligor (obligado alimentario).

For all the reasons stated, the undersigned considers that the respondent uses at least seven companies to move his finances, and there is a confusion of assets (confusión de patrimonios) that demonstrates what the plaintiff indicated in the claim with particular detail and with which the litis was joined: corporate veil (velo societario). Note that the respondent has had the resources to acquire a new car and has chosen to camouflage his income and expenses as described in this judgment. Consequently, the undersigned considers that his income cannot be considered to be what has been reported to the social security system, and he has not fulfilled the burden of proving his income, and even within his expenses, he seems to include the payment of two professional association fees—Colegio de Contadores Autorizados de Costa Rica and Colegio de Contadores Privados de Costa Rica—and does not explain why. It is not prohibited to belong to two Professional Associations, but it draws attention for someone who has insisted his source of income diminished and, at the same time, acquires a new vehicle when he supposedly has lower income. Likewise, the respondent does not even include among his expenses what he supposedly spends when he has his son with him. If he does not include that in his "expense tables", who pays for it? For the undersigned, it is clear that the respondent has not been transparent in his litigation.

It is also very clear that the standard of living the child has enjoyed could not have been provided by the mother with her income, nor by the father with the income he claims he has had since 2012—image 342. It is clear that the respondent used monies that are not reflected in his income reported to the social security system, and he continues to do so because he does not even provide receipts and invoices for his own personal expenses. Consequently, what is appropriate is to maintain the child's standard of living. He did not ask to come into this world and has no reason to stop enjoying and benefiting from the private education he has known since a few months before birth—a fact alleged by the mother and not contested. The child deserves stability and tranquility; he deserves that his childhood not be disturbed by the conflicts of adults and especially, that his father not prefer to pay for a new car rather than maintain the standard of living he gave him and which the child enjoys and forms an integral part of his stability. The child does not deserve to live his childhood with the fear of being stripped of the environment he knows. As a complement, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) —No. 12703, 11:51 of August 1, 2014— has established that the advisory opinions and judgments of the IACHR are binding. It has expressly stated: "The conventionality control designed by the Inter-American Court—basically, through the judgments in the cases of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile of September 26, 2006, Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru of November 24, 2006, Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico of November 26, 2010, and Gelman v. Uruguay of February 24, 2011—is of mandatory observance for the Constitutional Chambers and Courts, and any conduct—active or passive—must be contrasted with the conventionality parameter or the inter-American corpus juris, composed of regional conventions and declarations regarding Human Rights, the jurisprudence of that Court, and its advisory opinions." On other occasions, that Constitutional Court has ruled along the same lines, for example No. 2313, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 16860, 14:44 of December 6, 2005; No. 5017, 10:42 of April 7, 2006; No. 4276, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 1024, 10:00 of January 27, 2009; No. 4491, 16:00 of April 3, 2013 and No. 12782-18 of 17:45 of August 8, 2018. As reinforcement, it is relevant to point out that, in our country, the formal component is strengthened by the position and weight that international instruments—formal or not—regarding human rights have; that is, they occupy a supra-constitutional rank as determined by constitutional jurisprudence for several decades. For example: No. 282-90, 17:00 of March 13, 1990; No. 719-90, 16:30 of June 26, 1990; No. 1147-90, 16:00 of September 21, 1990; No. 709-91, 13:56 of April 20, 1991; No. 3435-92, 16:20 of November 11, 1992; No. 3550-92, 16:00 of November 24, 1992; No. 5759-93, 14:15 of November 10, 1993; No. 2665-94, 15:51 of June 7, 1994; No. 2313-95, 16:18 of May 9, 1995; No. 7072-95, 11:15 of December 22, 1995; No. 103296, 9:03 of March 1, 1996; No. 1319-97, 14:51 of March 4, 1997; No. 3001-97, 16:18 of May 30, 1997; No. 7706-97, 12:09 of November 19, 1997; No. 1232-98, 16:00 of February 25, 1998; No. 2822-98, 15:18 of April 28, 1998; No. 1801-98, 9:12 of March 13, 1998; No. 3223-98, 9:00 of May 15, 1998, No. 6830-98, 15:06 of September 24, 1998; No. 7484-00, 9:21 of August 25, 2000; No. 7498-00, 9:35 of August 25, 2000; No. 9685-00, 14:56 of November 1, 2000; No. 10693-02, 18:20 of November 7, 2002, No. 2771-03, 11:40 of April 4, 2003; No. 9992-04, 14:30 of September 8, 2004; No. 17745-06, 14:35 of December 11, 2006; No. 649-07, 11:40 of January 19, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 3043-07, 14:54 of March 7, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:59 of March 27, 2007; No. 14183-07, 9:53 of September 24, 2007; No. 1682-07, 10:34 of February 9, 2007; No. 4276-07, 14:49 of March 27, 2007; No. 14193-08, 10:03 of September 24, 2008, No. 7387-09, 14:56 of May 6, 2009, No. 15481-13, 11:30 of November 22, 2013 and No. 13821-20, 9:15 of July 22, 2020.

In this vein, it is relevant to highlight that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—Protocol of San Salvador—form part of the "international corpus juris" for the protection of minors. IACHR. Case of the Gómez Paquiyauiri Brothers v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Case of Rochac Hernández et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2014. Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010, para. 165. Case of Fornerón and daughter v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 27, 2012, para. 137. Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 4, 201262, para. 142. Case of the "Mapiripán Massacre" v. Colombia. Judgment of September 15, 2005. I/A Court H.R., Case of the "Street Children" (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, judgment of November 19, 1999, Series C, No. 63. Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated that the Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child form part of the international corpus juris. IACHR. Report No. 41/99. Case 11.491. Detained Minors in Honduras. March 10, 1999. For better understanding, the cited Court has resolved: "115. The corpus juris of International Human Rights Law is formed by a set of international instruments of varied content and legal effects (treaties, conventions, resolutions and declarations). Its dynamic evolution has had a positive impact on International Law, in the sense of affirming and developing the latter's capacity to regulate the relations between States and the human beings under their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, this Court must adopt an appropriate criterion to consider the matter under examination within the framework of the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law." IACHR. Advisory Opinion OC-16. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance within the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process, October 1, 1999, para. 115. For its part, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated: "21. It is pertinent to specify that the existence of a corpus juris not only includes the text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child but also the decisions adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in fulfillment of its mandate. Such a perspective represents a significant advance that demonstrates not only the existence of a common legal framework in International Human Rights Law applicable in matters of childhood but also the interdependence that exists internationally among the different international systems for the protection of the human rights of girls and boys." IACHR. Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135 Doc. 14. August 5, 2009. Report on Corporal Punishment and the Human Rights of Girls, Boys and Adolescents. Promoting the defense and respect for the human rights of girls, boys and adolescents in the Americas." This is decisive because many of the General Observations issued by the Committee develop substantive and procedural rights of minors.

For all the foregoing, the best interests of the beneficiary child must be primarily protected, especially considering he was born in 2016—image 18—and is therefore in early childhood. Thus, this ruling must respond to what is established in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as to General Observation No. 7 issued by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, on "Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood." In this sense, it is evident that the entire standard of living alleged and proven by the mother regarding the child, and provided by the father, was acquired during early childhood. Therefore, there is all the more reason why it is not possible to deprive the child of the stability he deserves and which must be guaranteed primarily by the persons responsible for his presence in this world.

Additionally, the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) takes priority over any other obligation, and that includes the payment for a new vehicle. Therefore, the child's life cannot be restricted so that the father can continue paying for the vehicle—if he still owes it—or rather, keeps it in his personal assets. The preferential nature of the support obligation (obligación alimentaria) is present in different norms. For example, Article 171 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), Article 62 of the Law on Child Support Payments (Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias), Article 172 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), Article 44 of Law No. 9859 published in Supplement No. 150 to La Gaceta No. 147, June 20, 2020, and Article 155 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central), as well as Article 30, subsection a) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), among other norms.

Regarding Article 171 of the Family Code, the rule states: "The child support debt shall have priority over any other, without exception." Therefore, priority cannot be given to the purchase of a vehicle as the father seems to claim, nor can the context in which the father acquires it—when he claims to have fewer resources—be made invisible.

As an additional line of reasoning, the mother's in-kind contribution cannot be made invisible. On the contrary, her contribution must be accounted for in accordance with Article 35 of the Family Code, amended by Law No. 9765, La Gaceta No. 239 of December 16, 2019, Alcance No. 280—as well as by direct application of numerals 5.a, 13.a, and 14.1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and also by application of Law No. 9325—Law for the Accounting of the Contribution of Unpaid Domestic Work in Costa Rica—. Therefore, the mother of the minor participates in the "care economy" (economía de cuidado), which refers to the "unpaid work performed within the home, related to the maintenance of the dwelling, care for other members of the household or the community, and the maintenance of the paid workforce." This law notes that this category of work is of fundamental economic importance in a society. For greater understanding, this regulatory instrument indicates in Article 3 that "the following activities, among others, are considered unpaid domestic and care work: a) The organization, distribution, and supervision of domestic tasks. b) Food preparation. c) Cleaning and maintenance of the home and household goods. d) Cleaning and maintenance of clothing. e) The care, upbringing, and instruction of children (transportation to school and assistance with the completion of schoolwork). f) The care of elderly and sick persons. g) Performing purchases, payments, or procedures related to the home. h) Cleaning and maintenance of goods for family use. i) Community services and unpaid assistance provided to other homes of relatives, friends, and neighbors. This classification does not exclude other activities that may be incorporated in due course." To this must be added that the mother does not have a permanently professional job and although her promotions were initially limited, now this does not appear to be the case; however, at the same time, she must now incur housing payments, because no one can be required to provide a place for the child and the mother to live free of charge. For greater clarity, the support payment (pensión) that is imposed must address the proportional payment of rent, mortgage, and/or maintenance of the property where the child lives, as applicable, which includes taxes if applicable; transportation for every type of activity, food in consideration of the real nutritional needs of the beneficiary and according to the sport practiced, hobbies, or illness they have, as the case may be, proportional payment of public utilities, recreation, clothing, acquisition of personal hygiene products, laundry and household hygiene products, etc. Furthermore, I refer to the binding jurisprudence (jurisprudencia vinculante) of the Constitutional Chamber. For example, resolution No. 2008-13010, 15:57 of August 27, 2008, where it stated: "On the right to a support provision (prestación alimentaria). This Tribunal has already specified that the right to a support provision derives from family bonds imposed either by marriage, parental authority (patria potestad), or kinship, and its purpose is to ensure the support creditor (acreedor alimentario) is provided with those necessary means for their normal physical and psychological development. Thus, the obligation to provide support is based both on Articles 51 and 52 of the Political Constitution and on International Human Rights Law, since its satisfaction guarantees the support creditor the enjoyment of a series of human rights indispensable for their subsistence and integral development, including, among others, the right to life, health, housing, and education (see, in this regard, judgments number 2001-07517 at fourteen hours and fifty minutes on August first, two thousand one, and 2003-15392 at fifteen hours and fifty-eight minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand three)." This has been a reiterated criterion, for example, in resolutions 8707-15, 18406-19, 9159-16, 1689-16, 15675-16, 14935-14, and 8677-19, among others. Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and 8.1) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary.

IV.For all the stated reasons, the appeal filed by the support obligor is denied. The appeal filed by the mother is partially upheld. Observing that her appellate claim is identical to what she requested in the complaint, it is understood that the sum she requests is to be set as the monthly payment, expenses for the start of the school year, and year-end bonus (aguinaldo). However, the record does not show that in the month of December, the beneficiary child has the same needs as at the start of the school year or those that must be covered by the monthly payment. For example, in December, the housing item is not paid twice, nor are therapies or internet service paid twice, etc. To this must be added that the mother is also a support obligor, without this allowing her in-kind contribution to be made invisible and placing her in a situation of not being able to meet her own needs. Consequently, the judgment (fallo) appealed is reversed, and in its place, the sum of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES is set as the monthly support payment (cuota alimentaria mensual). As a support payment for the year-end bonus, the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES is established, and for expenses for the start of the school year, which is precisely a very important issue because the minor is pursuing studies in a private center where academic activities between school periods, for example, are foreseeable and do not occur solely at the start of the school year, the sum of ONE MILLION COLONES is set, which is understood to cover not only the expenses for the start of the school year but also the academic activities arising from the child's permanence in the educational center in which they are enrolled at the time this judgment is issued. To all these sums must be added the joint obligation of the mother, without this, as already stated, allowing her in-kind contribution to be disregarded, and also that she must cover her own living expenses and even have solvency to face eventual periods without promotions, or with promotions but with difficulties in the payment of her salary due to belonging to the complex payroll of a public institution. Furthermore, it is an undisputed fact that the mother is assuming the maintenance of the vehicle used to transport the child and herself. It must be very clear that the monthly amount is set at this sum provided that the child continues to enjoy the vehicle that the mother currently uses to transport them. If at any time the child no longer enjoys that vehicle for whatever reason, it will be up to the mother to take the pertinent action. This last point, unless the vehicle suffers a total or partial loss due to a traffic accident where the mother is responsible according to a final judgment (sentencia firme) issued in the respective process. All this given that the mother is driving a vehicle that does not belong to her.

On the other hand, it must also be clear that this judgment has been possible due to the detailed content of the complaint and because the appeal has been punctual, with specific and detailed grievances. That is, the appealed judgment has been attacked as an appeal must be formulated, since an appeal is not for re-answering a complaint, reiterating the complaint filed, completing what was not said when filing or answering, etc. The issue of piercing the corporate veil (velo societario) was the subject of the dispute (litis), and from the complaint, it permeated throughout the entire process and especially, from the poor and unfounded defense thesis of the respondent.

No ruling is issued on costs (costas), as this was not an aspect appealed.

V.Now, it is pointed out to the lower court (primera instancia) that a judgment where the dispute has been joined with the issue of piercing the corporate veil requires a detailed and comprehensive effort of the evidence to find the real truth about distinctive elements of said figure. In this case, the proven facts have been well constructed, but at the heart of the matter, a certain naivety is observed on the part of the lower court and a scarce handling of the basic theory of piercing the corporate veil. Thus, the judgment denotes a shallow analysis of an issue that, as in this case, is evident and notorious. Therefore, it is not that the judgment lacks reasoning (fundamentación), but rather that it does not have the necessary depth, and that is not grounds for nullity. A judgment on piercing the corporate veil requires minimum knowledge of corporate law and the strength to gradually lift the veil. Without that knowledge, there is no strength. VI. It is noted that the images cited in this judgment correspond to the location of the documents or briefs from the download of the case file in PDF format. VII. Summon (Cítiese) the beneficiary child so that, in simple language, this judgment is explained to them and to give them the peace of mind that the opportunity to remain in the educational environment in which they have developed for a long time has been guaranteed. The child must appear at the facilities of the First Family Court (Juzgado Primero de Familia) located on the first floor of the Courts Building, Barrio Luján, at nine o'clock in the morning on September 6, 2023. Article 20 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code. VIII. The respondent is advised that, if he breaches what is ordered herein, he may face a criminal case at the instance of the legal representative of the minor, for the crime of failure to provide support (incumplimiento del deber alimentario) or even aggravated failure to provide support. Articles 185 and 186 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, if he diverts assets to evade the fulfillment of the support obligation and thus shifts the burden of attending to all the child's needs onto the mother, he could eventually face a criminal case pursuant to the Law on the Criminalization of Violence against Women, Article 8.h) and 35 et seq. This is because the respondent is an accountant, auditor, and consultant, as well as a representative of companies for proceedings within the national territory, which generates broad knowledge on how to evade earnings, profits, etc. Moreover, he is advised that, if convicted criminally, this could affect him in the exercise of parental responsibility (responsabilidad parental) and the exercise of his occupations, at least regarding professional association memberships (colegiaturas). Likewise, all of this would affect him so that, in the future, he may find himself in a cause for exclusion from the right to support with respect to his child when they are an adult.

FOR THESE REASONS (POR TANTO):

---a) The appeal filed by the respondent is denied. ---b) The judgment appealed is reversed, and in its place, the sum of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES is set as the monthly support payment. ---c) As a support payment for the year-end bonus, the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES is established. ---d) For expenses for the start of the school year, the sum of ONE MILLION COLONES is set, which is understood to cover not only the expenses for the start of the school year but also the academic activities arising from the child's permanence in the educational center in which they are enrolled at the time this judgment is issued. ---e) It must be very clear that the monthly amount is set at this sum provided that the child continues to enjoy the vehicle that the mother currently uses to transport them. If at any time the child no longer enjoys that vehicle for whatever reason, it will be up to the mother to take the pertinent action. This last point, unless the vehicle suffers a total or partial loss due to a traffic accident where the mother is responsible according to a final judgment issued in the respective process. ---f) Summon the beneficiary child so that, in simple language, this judgment is explained to them and to give them the peace of mind that the opportunity to remain in the educational environment in which they have developed for a long time has been guaranteed. The child must appear at the facilities of the First Family Court located on the first floor of the Courts Building, Barrio Luján, at nine o'clock in the morning on September 6, 2023. ---g) The respondent is advised that, if he breaches what is ordered herein, he may face a criminal case at the instance of the legal representative of the minor, for the crime of failure to provide support or even aggravated failure to provide support. Articles 185 and 186 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, if he diverts assets to evade the fulfillment of the support obligation and thus shifts the burden of attending to all the child's needs onto the mother, he could eventually face a criminal case pursuant to the Law on the Criminalization of Violence against Women, Article 8.h) and 35 et seq. Moreover, he is advised that, if convicted criminally, this could affect him in the exercise of parental responsibility and the exercise of his occupations, at least regarding professional association memberships. Likewise, all of this would affect him so that, in the future, he may find himself in a cause for exclusion from the right to support with respect to his child when they are an adult. ---h) No ruling is issued on costs. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Judge.

MSOLISM ![image][img-0] *?NDRQ??FDAFU??* MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A [email protected]

Documento PJEDITOR *????????????PA* PROCESO: SEGUNDA INSTANCIA ACTOR/A: [Nombre 001] DEMANDADO/A: [Nombre 002] SENTENCIA DE SEGUNDA INSTANCIA N° 2023000835 JUZGADO PRIMERO DE FAMILIA DE SAN JOSÉ.- A las nueve horas tres minutos del cinco de setiembre de dos mil veintitrés.- Proceso alimentario establecido por [Nombre 001], cédula de identidad número [Valor 001] contra [Nombre 002], cédula de identidad número [Valor 002]. En apelación formulada por ambas partes, conoce este Juzgado de la sentencia de las 14:53 de 4 de julio de 2023 y, RESULTANDO ÚNICO:

El fallo apelado fija como pensión mensual y por concepto de aguinaldo, la suma de SETECIENTOS MIL COLONES y, por concepto de gastos por inicio del curso lectivo, la suma de QUINIENTOS MIL COLONES. Ambas partes recurren. El obligado, alega lo siguiente: ---a) En cuanto al vehículo que adquirió y que se indica en el fallo recurrido, señala que, “una parte que importante corresponde al monto obtenido de la venta del vehículo”. Aporta como prueba para mejor resolver, una escritura donde consta la venta de un vehículo por parte de una tercera persona. ---b) Su ingreso reportado ante la seguridad social, obedece a una intervención que por parte de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. ---c) Aportaba más para el niño beneficiario cuando convivía con el grupo familiar, porque no sabía que el ingreso de la madre del niño era el doble de lo que creía. Ahora, indica que debe ser proporcional. Solicita se fije una pensión alimentaria por la suma de trescientos sesenta y cinco mil colones. No indica si ese monto lo pretende como mensualidad, aguinaldo y gastos por inicio del curso lectivo. La madre del niño agravia: ---a) No es cierto que la situación económica del obligado es diferente desde el año 2018, pues el último viaje que hizo fue en 2021. Alega que existe contradicción en el fallo al afirmar que existe desmejora desde 2018, cuando en realidad en el 2021 viajó fuera del país. ---b) El estilo de vida del niño ha sido demostrado y no es debido a un aporte proporcional porque ella siempre había tenido un ingreso inferior al que tiene cuando labora en ascenso como profesional y, sus pagos por ser empleada de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, se atrasan, por lo que no pueden ser considerados como un ingreso estable. Indica que sus ascensos no dependen de ella. ---c) No puede mantener el estilo de vida del niño con sus ingresos y, el fallo desconoce el aporte de ella en especie. ---d) No es cierto que la liquidación de gastos que contempla la demanda se refiera a gastos extraordinarios como afirma el fallo impugnado y que, al no precisar cuáles y por qué tienen connotación de extraordinarios, se le ha causado indefensión. ---e) Que, en la confesional, el accionado aceptó que sus otras empresas las utiliza para inversiones. ---f) El accionado tiene “absolutas posibilidades económicas”, pues compró vehículo con prenda por un monto bajo. Solicita se fije como pensión alimentaria la suma de un UN MILLÓN OCHOCIENTOS MIL COLONES o una suma mayor a la establecida. No indica si ese monto lo pide por concepto de mensualidad, aguinaldo y gastos por inicio del curso lectivo.

CONSIDERANDO:

I.HECHOS PROBADOS: Se avalan los que con ese carácter señala el fallo impugnado. Ahora bien, se adicionan los siguientes:

• 12)El accionado no es accionista mayoritario de la sociedad [Nombre 003] S. A. y, figura como tesorero, sin embargo, el niño y la madre del niño, hacen uso de un vehículo de la sociedad modelo Kía Pio modelo 2012 [Valor 003] (hecho no controvertido que forma parte de la demanda imagen 7, documental imagen 213, 222, confesión espontánea del accionado imagen 338 y 437, documental en imagen 360 a la 372).
• 13)El accionado, no siendo socio de las empresas en las que figura nada más en la junta directiva, hace uso de los libros de accionistas en el presente proceso -tema de su vida personal- para exponer quiénes son las personas accionistas de esas empresas (documental en imagen 360 a la 372).
• 14)El demandado adquirió un vehículo cuando su ingreso era de seiscientos treinta y seis mil colones mensuales; adquirió vehículo nuevo en noviembre de 2021 por la suma de treinta y un mil dólares aproximadamente (imagen 257 y siguientes, documental de imagen 453 documental visible en la imagen 299 y siguientes, así como imagen 552 y siguientes).
• 15)El accionado hizo uso de un apartamento que pertenecía a una sociedad con el fin de dar alojamiento a una persona que trabajó en el cuidado del niño beneficiario y aceptó que la sociedad en la que es accionista no mayoritario tiene apartamentos para arrendar y también otra sociedad donde no es accionista tienen apartamentos para arrendar (hecho no controvertido que consta en la demanda y confesión espontánea imagen 339).
• 16)El accionado realiza trabajos para tres de las sociedades sobre las que la parte actora alega levantamiento del velo societario y, que son facturados no en lo personal sino a nombre de otra [Nombre 004] en la que el demandado es accionista mayoritario y figura como subgerente en la junta directiva (imagen 209, 210, confesión espontánea imagen 334, documental en imagen 360 a la 372 y manifestación espontánea imagen 340).
• 17)El demandado no incurre en gastos para ocupar un lugar donde vivir, aunque negó tener bienes inmuebles inscritos a su nombre; negó haber comprado vivienda y reside en Tibás (hecho no controvertido y confesión espontánea imagen 345 y 422, imagénes 360 al 372).
• 18)Los gastos del accionado son asumidos como gastos de una empresa en la que figura como accionista (hecho no controvertido).
• 19)El accionado actualmente figura inscrito ante la seguridad social con un ingreso de novecientos veinticinco mil colones desde enero del año 2023 (imagen 552 y siguientes). 20) El demandado consume la medicación recetada en consulta privada a la que asiste desde el año 2009 (imagen 455, 458 y 460).
• 21)El accionado se desempeña como representante de sociedades para trámites en territorio nacional (confesión contestación de la demanda), como contador, auditor y consultor (confesión espontánea imagen 341), así como, se identifica como contador (imágenes 360 al 372).

II. HECHOS NO PROBADOS

Se eliminan los hechos no probados 4 y 5. En su lugar, se agregan los que se dirán:

• 4)No demostró el accionado que la muerte de su padre le haya generado pérdidas a él en lo personal o a las empresas en las que figura como socio mayoritario o no.
• 5)Tampoco demostró cuáles son sus gastos ni por qué esetá excluido dentro de sus egresos el pago del vehículo nuevo que compró, si es que todavía lo debe; gasto por concepto de gasolina o cualquier combustible que requiera el vehículo- y mantenimiento de ese vehículo; alimentación, viáticos, insumos para desarrollar sus diversas ocupaciones, así como lo que supuestamente invierte cuando el niño beneficiario está con él.
• 6)No consta que si la sociedad [Nombre 004] S. A ya no tiene la membresía que antes tenía, no es una oficina internacional y, ha sido calificada como una oficina “pequeña”, eso haya hecho perder ingresos. Se desconocen las implicaciones económicas de esto.
• 7)No consta que la membresía suspendida sea de imposible renovación.
• 8)No consta que las empresas en las que el accionado sea accionista hayan tenido disminución de contratos de auditoría o en general.

La apreciación de los hechos probados y no probados ahora incluidos en este fallo, conjuntamente con los que contiene la sentencia impugnada y que ahora son avalados, se hace a continuación.

III. SOBRE EL FONDO

En este asunto la demanda planteada por la madre del niño y contando con la asesoría jurídica de la Licenciada Priscilla Vargas Córdoba expone con extremo detalle los elementos que según se invoca en el memorial, constituyen velo societario. El accionado por su parte, centró su tesis de defensa en que como las sociedades -siete- en las que es accionista o nada más figura en la junta directiva, fueron constituidas hace muchos años y por ello no se configura el velo societario. Es decir, según el accionado, el velo social depende exclusivamente de la creación de una sociedad o varias en un momento histórico determinado, pero ese argumento carece de respaldo normativo, pero, además, por lo que se dirá, es un argumento muy pobre e inconsistente.

Para mayor claridad, el velo social se distingue, por ejemplo, por la confusión de patrimonios que opera entre quienes son socios y la sociedad misma o bien, entre quienes no son socios y, la sociedad misma. En este caso, es evidente que, de las siete sociedades, el demandado, sin ser socio en al menos tres, ha usado el libro de accionistas para aportar al presente proceso que es algo que corresponde a su vida personal, la certificación sobre el actual capital accionario. Es decir, el obligado alimentario se comporta como socio o incluso, como socio mayoritario cuando ni siquiera es socio y, además, dispone de algo tan íntimo de una sociedad -libro de accionistas- para su uso personal. ¿Por qué un simple subgerente, tesorero o vocal, se siente con la autoridad y el control de usar la información del libro de accionistas para un proceso judicial suyo en lo personal? Véase que está demostrado que el demandado no es accionista mayoritario de la sociedad [Nombre 003] S. A. y, nada más figura como tesorero, sin embargo, el niño y la madre del niño, hacen uso de un vehículo de la sociedad modelo Kía Pio modelo 2012 [Valor 003] (hecho no controvertido que forma parte de la demanda imagen 7, documental imagen 213, 222, confesión espontánea del accionado imagen 338 y 437, documental en imagen 360 a la 372). Esta disposición de un bien de un tercero, deja muy claro que el accionado no es un simple tesorero como ha hecho creer. Nadie que no tenga rotundo poder de decisión en una empresa, puede hacer semejante disposición y disponer un vehículo de un tercero -sociedad- para uso personal de un socio incluso no mayoritario destinado incluso a su esposa e hijo- como ha quedado demostrado en este asunto. Esto fue introducido a debate y con este hecho fue trabada la litis. Véase también que, el accionado, no siendo socio de las empresas en las que nada más figura en la junta directiva, hace uso del libro de accionistas para un proceso judicial personal como el presente (documental en imagen 360 a la 372). Este comportamiento no lo puede hacer quien no pueda tomar decisiones en la empresa como suya. El accionado hizo uso de un apartamento que pertenecía a una sociedad con el fin de dar alojamiento a una persona que trabajó en el cuidado del niño beneficiario (hecho no controvertido que consta en la demanda). Al contestar, el accionado se desentendió de todo lo relacionado con el velo social con un argumento único: las sociedades son de vieja data. Entonces, esa deficiente forma de contestar la demanda, permite tener por no controvertido los elementos sobre confusión de patrimonios que contempla la demanda en cuanto al tema del velo societario. La litis fue trabada con estos hechos y el accionado guardó silencio. Este es otro elemento de interés -no el único- para concluir cómo el accionado hace uso de bienes de terceros para su vida personal. Además, el demandado no incurre en gastos para ocupar un lugar donde vivir, aunque negó tener bienes inmuebles inscritos a su nombre y negó haber adquirido un inmueble (hecho no controvertido y confesión espontánea imagen 345 y 422). Lo curioso es que dentro de su desglose de gastos, ni siquiera incluye el tema habitacional y como se sabe, el propio accionado reconoció que algunas sociedades tienen bienes y además, se dedican al arriendo de bienes inmuebles. Nótese también que en todas las certificaciones aportadas y que son visibles desde la imagen 360 a la 372 consta que el accionado vive en Tibás y, según el contexto del expediente, quienes salieron del inmueble que servía de habitación a la familia fueron la madre y el niño. Entonces, al parecer el accionado reside en un inmueble de una de las sociedades. La confusión de patrimonios entre el accionado es tal que, realiza trabajos para tres sociedades y, aunque los realiza a título personal, son facturados no en lo personal sino a nombre de otra [Nombre 004] en la que es accionista mayoritario y figura como subgerente en la junta directiva (imagen 209, 210, confesión espontánea imagen 334, documental en imagen 360 a la 372 y manifestación espontánea imagen 340). Sumado a esto, el accionado se opuso a que las cuentas bancarias de las sociedades fueran investigadas. Es decir, no tiene reparos en hacer uso de los libros de las sociedades en las que no es socio, pero, no permite que se levante el secreto bancario respecto a sociedades en las que es accionista mayoritario o minoritario y de las que dispone de bienes para uso personal como ya se explicó. Esto no es un tema menor, sino que, en la demanda se indica claramente que los gastos del accionado son incorporados a los gastos de una empresa. Esto no fue controvertido y, consta que el demandado no aportó a este proceso ni un solo recibo por concepto de gastos suyos. Nótese que entre sus egresos no incluye alimentación, pago de crédito de un vehículo que adquirió y vivienda, telefonía celular, gasolina -o cualquier combustible que requiera el vehículo-, viáticos, insumos para el ejercicio de sus diversas ocupaciones: contador, auditor y consultor, etc. Si todo eso no está dentro de sus egresos no se entiende quién lo paga. ¿Por qué una persona demanada que se dedica a la contabilidad no aporta a un proceso alimentario recibos por el consumo de bienes y servicios a título personal? Así, no consta en el expediente ni una sola factura o movimiento de sus cuentas bancarias en lo personal o bien, de todos sus egresos, aunque extrañamente esos recibos los tuvo a la vista quien expidió la certificación de ingresos para acreditar la capacidad de pago del accionado según documento en la imagen 453 con el fin de ser sujeto de crédito para adquirir un vehículo nuevo. No se entiende dónde están esos recibos y especialmente, si se trata de egresos que estén a nombre del accionado en lo personal o bien, que sean egresos que realiza en lo personal y luego le son reintegrados por alguna empresa en las que figura como socio mayoritario o minoritario- o integrante de la junta directiva. Tampoco se sabe si es que no existen recibos de los egresos del accionado en lo personal y más bien, todo está a nombre de alguna de las empresas en las que es socio -minoritario o mayoritario- o integrante de la junta directiva. Así, que el accionado no reciba salario, dividendos, dietas, etc., por parte de las empresas en las que es socio, no tiene ninguna relevancia para este caso porque evidentemente él dispone de los bienes de empresas en las que es socio o incluso, en las que ni siquiera es socio y eso incluye revelar información del libro de accionistas. Ese es el grado de poder y soltura que tiene el accionado con respecto a esas empresas.

De igual forma, no consta en autos que, al accionado, la muerte de su padre le haya generado pérdidas a él en lo personal o a las empresas en las que figura como socio mayoritario o no. Este fue un argumento suyo que nunca demostró y no consta qué es suyo una vez que su padre falleció, es decir, cómo fue resuelto el tema sucesorio. Todo esto, con la observación de que tampoco acreditó todos y cada uno de sus gastos en lo personal como ya se explicó. Las confusión de patrimonios es tal, que el accionado no aportó recibos por el consumo de bienes y servicios en lo personal. No consta tampoco que si la sociedad [Nombre 004] S. A ya no tiene la membresía que antes tenía, no es una oficina internacional y, ha sido calificada como una oficina “pequeña”, eso haya hecho perder ingresos. Se desconocen las implicaciones económicas de ambos datos. Fue el accionado quien introdujo al debate ese argumento, de forma que debió demostrarlo. Además, el argumento de la suspensión de la membresía carece de sustento no solamente por lo ya dicho y porque no consta que la membresía sea de imposible renovación, máxime el documento que consta en autos donde quien al parecer tiene poder de decisión sobre la membresía, hasta afirma que puede dar facilidades de pago según sea necesario para volver a disponer de la membresía, sino además, porque si la deuda por la membresía asciende a poco más de cuatro mil dólares, no se entiende por qué el accionado decidió comprar a título personal un vehículo nuevo por más de treinta y un mil dólares en lugar de pagar la membresía que involucra a una sociedad en la que él es socio mayoritario -confesión espontánea visible en imagen 337 y, documental visible desde imagen 360 a 372-. Sumado a esto, esa sociedad no se dedica nada más al tema contable, sino que, presta servicios diversificados, es decir, en varias ramas tal como consta en autos. En la misma línea, es de especial interés que el demandado adquirió un vehículo nuevo cuando su ingreso era de seiscientos treinta y seis mil colones mensuales; adquirió vehículo nuevo en noviembre de 2021 (imagen 453, documental visible en la imagen 299 y siguientes, así como 552 y siguientes). ¿Por qué si se supone que sus ingresos han disminuido, decide comprar un vehículo nuevo? Básicamente, prefiere incorporar dentro de su patrimonio un vehículo nuevo y, mantenerlo ahí, antes que pagar la pensión que solicita la actora y que responde al nivel de vida que decidió darle al niño porque está claro que con los salarios que recibía la actora, era imposible para ella adquirir el nivel de vida que el niño adquirió y que, según estudio de la documental visible en la imagen 91 y siguientes, no se trata de gastos extraordinarios como indicó el fallo apelado. De todos los gastos que han sido respaldados con la prueba pertinente, el único que podría considerarse no habitual afortunadamente- es el que corresponde al servicio de pediatría privado, en tanto no es un gasto mensual porque el niño beneficiario goza de buena salud, pero como se observa, no por eso todos los gastos que constan a partir de la imagen dicha -y que son muchos- puedan “contagiarse” del carácter relativamente esporádico del servicio de pediatría privado. Además, si es que la demanda confundía gastos ordinarios con extraordinarios -lo que no es cierto- no puede la persona juzgadora sorprender a la madre del niño dictando un fallo donde atribuye el carácter extraordinario a egresos que, evidentemente son sistemáticos y no esporádicos. Adicional a esto, no existe en autos una referencia profesional que indique que el niño beneficiario ha sido dado de alta de los tratamientos que recibe o necesita como uso de lentes, terapia del lenguaje, tratamiento dental, etc. Sumado a esto, el accionado ha entrado en una evidente contradicción: indicó en el curso del proceso que los gastos del niño eran asumidos entre padre y madre. Eso con el fin de que no descansara en él el mayor aporte. Ahora, al recurrir, cambia radicalmente la versión y afirma que él aportaba más, pero intenta justificarlo alegando que no sabía cuál era el ingreso de la madre. Esta contradicción no es menor, porque la madre ha sostenido durante todo el proceso que quien aportaba todo lo que el niño requería era el padre porque ella no podía con sus ingresos y, al estudiar los reportes de salario de la madre ante la seguridad social, es evidente que el nivel de vida que reclamó en la demanda para el niño, fue adquirido cuando ella no tenía ascensos o bien, apenas estaba empezando a ser ascendida y su pago en ascenso no era estable (documental de imagen 332 al 336 y 543 al 551). Entonces, el argumento expuesto por el padre en la apelación, básicamente lo que deja ver es que está castigando a la madre por haberse superado profesionalmente. Además, al observar los ingresos del accionado desde el año 2012 en adelante, es claro que el nivel de vida que el niño adquirió no fue al amparo de esos ingresos. Es decir, nuevamente subyace que el padre utiliza las sociedades para movilizar sus finanzas.

En autos consta también que, al recurrir, el accionado indica que adquirió el vehículo aportando “una parte importante corresponde al monto obtenido de la venta del vehículo”. Ofrece como prueba para mejor resolver, una escritura donde consta la venta de un vehículo por parte de una tercera persona y, es alguien que parece ser familiar suyo. En primer lugar, este es un hecho nuevo porque al contestar la demanda, no introdujo tal cosa al proceso y ahora pretende sorprender a la contraparte en única instancia. En segundo lugar, ni siquiera consta que cuando adquirió el vehículo nuevo, haya aclarado de dónde proviene el dinero para la compra. ¿Dónde está la escritura de compra de ese vehículo donde conste tal cosa? El accionado se limitó a decir al contestar que adqurió el vehículo constituyendo una prenda, pero no demostró que haya pagado parte del precio inicial, todo o una "parte importante" con recursos que provenian de una tercera persona y, tampoco consta que haya dado cuenta de dónde provenía el resto de los recursos para adquirir el vehículo. Lo que no fue parte de la contestación, no puede ahora el accionado introducirlo a debate en única instancia.

Sumado a todo esto, el accionado incurre nuevamente en una gravísima contradicción, pues al contestar indicó que no puede pagar poco menos de cien mil colones para adquirir un tratamiento médico al mes, pero compra vehículo nuevo por treinta y un mil dólares. Esto es muy extraño, pues en autos consta que su señor padre falleció prácticamente de los mismos padecimientos que tiene el accionado y que dicho sea de paso, no le impiden laborar -imagen 338, 456, 458 y 460-, pero el accionado en lugar de adquirir la medicación que requiere, decidió adquirir un vehículo nuevo. Véase que fue el accionado quien afirmó que no podría adquirir la medicación porque sus recursos no se lo permitían. Entonces, es un argumento que carece de sentido lógico y prueba, pues claramente la persona profesional en medicina privada tratante, indica que su estado de salud actual obedece a que consume medicamentos que no brinda la seguridad social. Es decir, sí compra los medicamentos que afirmó no poder adquirir. Las inconsistencias en las que ha incurrido el accionado son alarmantes y retan la inteligencia media de una persona juzgadora.

En lo que respecta a su ingreso reportado ante la seguridad social, dado todo lo ya expuesto, básicamente carece de interés a qué obedece el monto de ingreso que es reportado ante la seguridad social, salvo que, cuando su ingreso era inferior -ochocientos cincuenta y siete mil colones aproximadamente-, el accionado pretendía que fuera fijada como cuota alimentaria la suma de cuatrocientos sesenta y cinco mil colones -imagen 443 y 229-. Ahora, su ingreso reportado es mayor, pues asciende a los novecientos veinticinco mil colones, pero solicita una pensión alimentaria por la suma de trescientos sesenta y cinco mil colones. Así de contradictorio es el litigio del accionado: suben sus ingresos, solicita una pensión más baja y si sus ingresos son inferiores, solicita una pensión más alta. Las matemáticas son un patrimonio universal: los números no calzan en los argumentos expuestos por el obligado alimentario.

Por todos los razonamientos expuestos, estima la suscrita que el accionado utiliza al menos siete sociedades para movilizar sus finanzas y, existe una confusión de patrimonios que evidencia lo que la actora indicó en la demanda con especial detalle y con lo que fue trabada la litis: velo societario. Véase que el accionado ha tenido recursos para adquirir un carro nuevo y ha optado por camuflar sus ingresos y egresos como ha sido descrito en este fallo. En consecuencia, estima la suscrita que no puede considerarse que sus ingresos son los que han sido reportados ante la seguridad social y, él no ha cumplido con la carga de probar sus ingresos e incluso, dentro de sus egresos parece que incluye el pago de dos colegiaturas -Colegio de Contadores Autorizados de Costa Rica y, Colegio de Contadores Privados de Costa Rica- y no explica por qué. No está prohibido pertenecer a dos Colegios Profesionales, pero llama la atención para quien ha asegurado que su fuente de ingresos mermó y a la vez, adquiere un vehículo nuevo cuando supuestamente tiene menores ingresos. De igual forma, el accionado ni siquiera incluye entre sus egresos lo que supuestamente invierte cuando tiene a su hijo consigo. Si no incluye eso dentro de sus “tablas de egresos”, ¿quién lo paga? Para la suscrita es claro que el demandado no ha sido transparente en su litigio.

También queda muy claro que el nivel de vida que el niño ha disfrutado, tampoco podría haberlo dado la madre con su ingreso y, tampoco el padre con los ingresos que alega él desde el año 2012 -imagen 342-. Es claro que el demandado hizo uso de dineros que no se ven reflejados en sus ingresos ante la seguridad social y, sigue haciéndolo porque ni siquiera de sus propios gastos en lo personal, aporta recibos y facturas. En consecuencia, lo que corresponde es mantener el nivel de vida del niño. Él no pidió venir a este mundo y no tiene por qué dejar de disfrutar y aprovechar la educación privada que conoce desde pocos meses antes de nacido hecho alegado por la madre y no controvertido-. El niño merece estabilidad y tranquilidad; merece que su infancia no sea perturbada por los conflictos de las personas adultas y especialmente, que su padre no prefiera pagar un carro nuevo antes que mantener el nivel de vida que le dio y del que niño disfruta y forma parte integrante de su estabilidad. El niño no merece vivir su infancia con el temor a ser despojado del entorno que conoce. Como complemento, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia -n.°12703, 11:51 de 1 de agosto de 2014- ha dispuesto que las opiniones consultivas y las sentencias de la CIDH son vinculantes. Expresamente ha dicho: “El control de convencionalidad diseñado la Corte Interamericana – básicamente, a través de las sentencias en los casos Almonacid Arellano y otros contra Chile de 26 de septiembre de 2006, Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso contra. Perú de 24 de noviembre de 2006, Cabrera García y Montiel Flores contra México de 26 de noviembre de 2010 y Gelman contra Uruguay de 24 de febrero de 2011– es de acatamiento obligatorio para las Salas y Tribunales Constitucionales, debiendo contrastar cualquier conducta –activa u omisiva– con el parámetro de convencionalidad o el corpus iuris interamericano, conformado por las convenciones y declaraciones regionales en materia de Derechos Humanos, la jurisprudencia de esa Corte y sus opiniones consultivas.” En otras ocasiones ese Tribunal Constitucional se ha pronunciado en esa misma línea, como por ejemplo n.°2313, 16:18 de 9 de mayo de 1995; n°16860, 14:44 de 6 de diciembre de 2005; n.°5017, 10:42 de 7 de abril de 2006; n.°4276, 14:49 de 27 de marzo de 2007; n.°1024, 10:00 de 27 de enero de 2009; n.°4491, 16:00 de 3 de abril de 2013 y n.°12782-18 de 17:45 de 8 de agosto de 2018. Como refuerzo es relevante señalar que, en nuestro país, el componente formal es reforzado por la posición y peso que tienen los instrumentos internacionales formales o no en materia de derechos humanos, es decir, ocupan un rango supraconstitucional según lo ha determinado la jurisprudencia constitucional desde hace varias décadas. Por ejemplo: n°282-90, 17:00 de 13 de marzo de 1990; n°719-90, 16:30 de 26 de junio de 1990; n°1147-90, 16:00 de 21 de setiembre de 1990; n°709-91, 13:56 de 20 de abril de 1991; n°3435-92, 16:20 de 11 de noviembre de 1992; n°3550-92, 16:00 de 24 de noviembre de 1992; n°5759-93, 14:15 de 10 de noviembre de 1993; n°2665-94, 15: 51 de 7 de junio de 1994; n°2313-95, 16: 18 de 9 de mayo de 1995; n°7072-95, 11:15 de 22 de diciembre de 1995; n°103296, 9:03 de 1° de marzo de 1996; n°1319-97, 14:51 de 4 de marzo de 1997; n°3001-97, 16:18 de 30 de mayo de 1997; n°7706-97, 12:09 de 19 de noviembre de 1997; n°1232-98, 16:00 25 de febrero de 1998; n°2822-98, 15:18 de 28 de abril de 1998; n°1801-98, 9:12 de 13 de marzo de 1998; n°3223-98, 9:00 de 15 de mayo de 1998, n°6830-98, 15:06 de 24 de setiembre de 1998; n°7484-00, 9:21 de 25 de agosto de 2000; n°7498-00, 9:35 de 25 de agosto de 2000; n°9685-00, 14:56 de 1° de noviembre de 2000; n°10693-02, 18:20 de 7 de noviembre de 2002, n°2771-03, 11:40 de 4 de abril de 2003; n°9992-04, 14:30 de 8 de setiembre de 2004; n°17745-06, 14:35 de 11 de diciembre de 2006; n°649-07, 11:40 de 19 de enero de 2007; n°1682-07, 10:34 de 9 de febrero de 2007; n°3043-07, 14:54 de 7 de marzo de 2007; n°4276-07, 14:59 de 27 de marzo de 2007; n°14183-07, 9:53 de 24 de setiembre de 2007; n°1682-07, 10:34 de 9 de febrero de 2007; n°4276-07, 14:49 de 27 de marzo de 2007; n°14193-08, 10:03 de 24 de setiembre de 2008, n°7387-09, 14:56 de 6 de mayo de 2009, n°15481-13, 11:30 de 22 de noviembre de 2013 y n°13821-20, 9:15 de 22 de julio de 2020.

En esta línea es relevante resaltar que, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha dicho que la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos y el Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales –Protocolo de San Salvador–, forman parte del “corpus corpus juris internacional” de protección de las personas menores de edad. CIDH. Caso de los Hermanos Gómez Paquiyauiri Vs. Perú. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 8 de julio de 2004. Caso Rochac Hernández y otros Vs. El Salvador. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 14 de octubre de 2014. Caso Chitay Nech y otros Vs. Guatemala. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 25 de mayo de 2010, párr. 165. Caso Fornerón e hija Vs. Argentina. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de abril de 2012, párr. 137. Caso Masacres de Río Negro Vs. Guatemala. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 4 de septiembre de 201262, párr. 142. Caso de la “Masacre de Mapiripán” Vs. Colombia. Sentencia de 15 de septiembre de 2005. Corte IDH, Caso de los “Niños de la Calle” (Villagrán Morales y otros) vs. Guatemala, Fondo, sentencia de 19 de noviembre de 1999, Serie C, N° 63. Además, la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha dicho que las Observaciones del Comité de los Derechos del Niño, forman parte del corpus juris internacional. Comisión IDH. Informe N° 41/99. Caso 11.491. Menores detenidos en Honduras. 10 de marzo de 1999. Para mayor comprensión, la citada Corte ha resuelto: “115. El corpus juris del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos está formado por un conjunto de instrumentos internacionales de contenido y efectos jurídicos variados (tratados, convenios, resoluciones y declaraciones). Su evolución dinámica ha ejercido un impacto positivo en el Derecho Internacional, en el sentido de afirmar y desarrollar la aptitud de este último para regular las relaciones entre los Estados y los seres humanos bajo sus respectivas jurisdicciones. Por lo tanto, esta Corte debe adoptar un criterio adecuado para considerar la cuestión sujeta a examen en el marco de la evolución de los derechos fundamentales de la persona humana en el derecho internacional contemporáneo.” CIDH. Opinión Consultiva OC-16. El Derecho a la información sobre la asistencia consular en el marco del debido proceso, 1 de octubre de 1999, párr. 115. Por su parte, la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha expuesto: “21. Resulta pertinente precisar que la existencia de un corpus juris no sólo incluye el texto de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño sino también las decisiones adoptadas por el Comité de Derechos del Niño de las Naciones Unidas en cumplimiento de su mandato. Tal perspectiva representa un avance significativo que evidencia no sólo la existencia de un marco jurídico común en el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos aplicable en materia de niñez sino también la interdependencia que existe en el ámbito internacional entre los distintos sistemas internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos de las niñas y los niños.” Comisión IDH. Relatoría sobre los Derechos de la Niñez. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135 Doc. 14. 5 agosto 2009. Informe sobre el Castigo Corporal y los Derechos Humanos de las Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes. Promoviendo la defensa y el respeto de los derechos humanos de las niñas, los niños y los adolescentes en las Américas.” Esto es determinante porque muchas de las Observaciones Generales emitidas por el Comité, desarrollan derechos sustantivos y procesales de las personas menores de edad.

Por todo lo dicho, debe tutelarse primordialmente el interés superior del niño beneficiario y más, considerando que nació en el año 2016 -imagen 18-, por lo que se encuentra en la primera infancia. Así, este fallo debe responder a lo establecido en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, así como a la Observación General N°7 emitida por el Comité de los Derechos del Niño, sobre la “Realización de los derechos del niño en la primera infancia.” En este sentido, consta que todo el nivel de vida alegado y demostrado por la madre con respecto al niño y, dado por el padre, fue adquirido durante la primera infancia. Entonces, con mayor razón no es posible privar al niño de la estabilidad que merece y que debe ser garantizada primeramente por las personas que son responsables de su presencia en este mundo.

Adicionalmente, la obligación alimentaria es prioritaria respecto a cualquier otra obligación y eso incluye el pago de un vehículo nuevo. Entonces, no puede restringirse la vida del niño para que el padre siga pagando el vehículo -si es que lo debe todavía- o bien, lo mantenga en su patrimonio. El carácter preferente de la obligación alimentaria está presente en diferentes normas. Por ejemplo, el artículo 171 del Código de Familia, artículo 62 de la Ley de Pensiones Alimentarias, 172 del Código de Trabajo, artículo 44 de la Ley N.°9859 publicada en Alcance N.°150 a La Gaceta N.°147, 20 de junio de 2020 y artículo 155 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central, así como artículo 30 inciso a) del Código de Trabajo, entre otras normas. En el caso del artículo 171 del Código de Familia, la norma dice: “La deuda alimentaria tendrá prioridad sobre cualquier otra, sin excepción”. Entonces, no puede darse prioridad a la compra de un vehículo como parece pretender el padre y tampoco, invisibilizar el contexto en el que el padre lo adquiere: cuando menos recursos dice tener.

Como línea adicional, el aporte en especie de la madre no puede ser invisibilizado. Por el contrario, su aporte debe ser contabilizado conforme al artículo 35 del Código de Familia reformado por Ley n.°9765, La Gaceta n.°239 de 16 de diciembre de 2019, Alcance n.°280-, así como, por aplicación directa del numeral 5.a, 13.a y 14.1 de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra La Mujer y, también por aplicación de la Ley n.°9325 -Ley de Contabilización del Aporte del Trabajo doméstico no remunerado en Costa Rica-. Entonces, la madre de la persona menor de edad participa de la "economía de cuidado" que se refiere al "trabajo no remunerado que se realiza en el hogar, relacionado con el mantenimiento de la vivienda, los cuidados a otras personas del hogar o la comunidad y el mantenimiento de la fuerza de trabajo remunerado". Esa ley advierte que esta categoría de trabajo es de fundamental importancia económica en una sociedad. Para mayor comprensión, ese instrumento normativo indica en el artículo 3 que "se consideran actividades de trabajo doméstico y de cuidado no remunerado, entre otras, las siguientes: a) La organización, distribución y supervisión de las tareas domésticas. b) La preparación de alimentos. c) La limpieza y el mantenimiento de vivienda y enseres. d) La limpieza y el mantenimiento del vestido. e) El cuidado, la formación e instrucción de la niñez (traslado al colegio y ayuda al desarrollo de tareas escolares). f) El cuido de las personas adultas mayores y enfermas. g) Realizar compras, pagos o trámites relacionados con el hogar. h) La limpieza y el mantenimiento de bienes de uso familiar. i) Servicios a la comunidad y ayudas no pagadas a otros hogares de parientes, amigos y vecinos. La presente clasificación no excluye otras actividades que se puedan incorporar en su oportunidad". A esto se suma que la madre no tiene un trabajo permanentemente como profesional y si bien sus ascensos estuvieron limitados en un principio, ahora parece que no es así, pero a la vez, ahora debe incurrir en el pago de vivienda, porque a nadie se puede exigir que brinde gratis al niño y a la madre un lugar para vivir. Para mayor claridad, la pensión que sea impuesta debe atender el pago proporcional de alquiler, hipoteca y/o mantenimiento del inmueble donde viva el niño según corresponda, lo que incluye impuestos si corresponde; transporte para todo tipo de actividad, alimentación en atención a las necesidades nutricionales reales de la persona beneficiaria y según el deporte que practique, pasatiempos o enfermedad que tenga según sea el caso, pago proporcional de servicios públicos, diversión, vestido, adquisición de productos de higiene personal, de higiene de su ropa y del hogar, etc. Además, remito a la jurisprudencia vinculante de la Sala Constitucional. Por ejemplo, resolución N.°2008-13010, 15:57 de 27 de agosto de 2008, donde dijo: "Sobre el derecho a la prestación alimentaria. Este Tribunal ya ha precisado que el derecho a la prestación alimentaria se deriva de los vínculos familiares que impone ya sea el matrimonio, la patria potestad o bien el parentesco, y tiene como objeto asegurar al beneficiario alimentario el suministro de aquellos extremos necesarios para su normal desarrollo físico y psíquico. Así, la obligación de dar alimentos tiene sustento tanto en los artículos 51 y 52 de la Constitución Política, como en el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, ya que con su satisfacción se le garantiza al acreedor alimentario el disfrute de una serie de derechos humanos indispensables para su subsistencia y desarrollo integral, entre los que se incluyen, entre otros, el derecho a la vida, a la salud, a la vivienda y a la educación (ver en este sentido las sentencias número 2001-07517 de las catorce horas con cincuenta minutos del primero de agosto del dos mil uno y 2003-15392 de las quince horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del diecinueve de diciembre del dos mil tres)". Este ha sido un criterio reiterado por ejemplo en las resoluciones 8707-15, 18406-19, 9159-16, 1689-16, 15675-16, 14935-14 y 8677-19 entre otros. Artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y 8.1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.

Por todos los razonamientos dichos, se deniega la apelación formulada por el obligado alimentario. Se acoge parcialmente la apelación que planteó la madre. Observando que su pretensión recursiva es idéntica a lo que solicitó en la demanda, se entiende que la suma que pide es para que sea fijada como mensualidad, gastos por inicio del curso lectivo y aguinaldo. No obstante, no consta en autos que en el mes de diciembre el niño beneficiario tenga las mismas necesidades que al iniciar el curso lectivo o bien, las que deben ser cubiertas con la mensualidad. Por ejemplo, en diciembre no se cancela dos veces el rubro vivienda ni se paga dos veces terapias o bien, servicio de internet, etc. A esto se suma que la madre también es obligada alimentaria sin que ello permita invisibilizar su aporte en especie y colocarla en una situación de no poder atender sus propias necesidades. Por consiguiente, se revoca el fallo impugnado y en su lugar se fija como cuota alimentaria mensual, la suma de UN MILLÓN TRESCIENTOS MIL COLONES. Como cuota alimentaria por concepto de aguinaldo, se establece la suma de SETECIENTOS CINCUENTA MIL COLONES y, por concepto de gastos por inicio del curso lectivo, que es precisamente un tema muy importante porque la persona menor de edad está cursando estudios en un centro privado donde las actividades académicas entre períodos escolares por ejemplo, son previsibles y no ocurren únicamente al inicio del año lectivo, se fija la suma de UN MILLÓN DE COLONES que se entiende cubrirá no solamente los gastos por inicio del curso lectivo sino las actividades académicas que se desprenden de la permanencia del niño en el centro de estudios en el que se encuentra al momento de dictar este fallo. A todas estas sumas se debe unir el aporte solidario de la madre sin que, como ya se dijo, ello permita desconocer su aporte en especie y, que ella debe también cubrir sus gastos para vivir e incluso, tener solvencia para enfrentar eventuales períodos sin ascensos o bien, con ascensos, pero con dificultades en el pago de su salario por pertenecer a la planilla compleja de una institución pública. Además, es un hecho no controvertido que la madre está asumiendo el mantenimiento del vehículo que sirve de transporte al niño y a ella. Debe quedar muy claro que, el monto mensual se fija en esta suma siempre que, el niño siga disfrutando del vehículo que hoy en día emplea la madre para transportarlo. Si en algún momento el niño ya no disfruta de ese vehículo por la razón que sea, corresponderá a la madre accionar lo pertinente. Esto último, salvo que el vehículo llegue a tener pérdida total o parcial por un accidente de tránsito donde la madre sea la responsable según sentencia firme dictada en el proceso respectivo. Todo esto dado que la madre está conduciendo un vehículo que no le pertenece.

Por otra parte, debe quedar claro también que, este fallo ha sido posible por el contenido detallado de la demanda y porque el recurso de apelación ha sido puntual, con agravios concretos y circunstanciados. Es decir, ha sido atacado el fallo apelado como debe ser formulado un recurso de apelación, puesto que una apelación no es para volver a contestar una demanda, reiterar la demanda formulada, completar lo que no fue dicho al demandar o contestar, etc. El tema del velo societario fue objeto de la litis y, desde la demanda fue fluyendo durante todo el proceso y especialmente, a partir de la pobre e infundada tesis de defensa del accionado.

Sobre las costas no se emite pronunciamiento, pues no fue un aspecto recurrido.

Ahora bien, se hace ver a la primera instancia que, un fallo donde la litis ha sido trabada con el tema del velo societario, requiere un esfuerzo detallado e integral de las probanzas para encontrar la verdad real sobre elementos distintivos de dicha figura. En este caso, los hechos probados han sido bien construidos, pero en el fondo del asunto, se observa cierta ingenuidad por parte de la primera instancia y un escaso manejo de la teoría básica del velo societario. Así, el fallo denota un análisis poco profundo sobre un tema que, como en este caso, es evidente y notorio. Entonces, no es que el fallo carezca de fundamentación, sino que, no tiene la profundidad necesaria y, eso no es motivo de nulidad. Un fallo sobre velo societario requiere conocimiento mínimo sobre derecho societario y, fuerza para ir poco a poco corriendo el velo. Sin ese conocimiento, no hay fuerza.

Se hace saber que, las imágenes que se citan en este fallo, obedecen a la localización de los documentos o memoriales a partir de la descarga del expediente en formato PDF.

Cítese al niño beneficiario para que, en un lenguaje sencillo le sea explicado este fallo y darle la tranquilidad de que, le ha sido garantizada la oportunidad de permanecer en el ambiente educativo en el que se ha desarrollado desde hace mucho tiempo. El niño deberá comparecer a las instalaciones del Juzgado Primero de Familia ubicado en el primer piso del Edificio de Tribunales, Barrio Luján, a las nueve de la mañana del día 6 de setiembre del año 2023. Artículo 20 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia.

Se hace saber al accionado que, si incumple lo aquí dispuesto, podrá enfrentar una causa penal a gestión de la representante legal de la persona menor de edad, por el delito de incumplimiento del deber alimentario o incluso, incumplimiento agravado del deber alimentario. Artículo 185 y 186 del Código Penal. Además, si distrae bienes para sustraerse del cumplimiento del deber alimentario y recargar así en la madre del niño la atención de todas las necesidades de él, podría eventualmente, enfrentar causa penal conforme a la Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra Las Mujeres, artículo 8.h) y 35 y siguientes. Esto porque el accionado es contador, auditor y consultor, así como representante de sociedades para trámites en el territorio nacional, lo que genera conocimiento amplio sobre cómo evadir ganancias, utilidades, etc. Además, se le hace saber que, de resultar condenado penalmente, ello lo podría afectar en el ejercicio de la responsabilidad parental y, el ejercicio de sus ocupaciones, al menos en el tema de las colegiaturas. Igualmente, todo esto lo afectaría para que, en el futuro, pueda encontrarse en una causal de exclusión del derecho a los alimentos con respecto a su hijo cuando sea adulto.

POR TANTO:

---a) Se deniega la apelación formulada por el accionado. ---b) Se revoca el fallo impugnado y en su lugar se fija como cuota alimentaria mensual, la suma de UN MILLÓN TRESCIENTOS MIL COLONES. ---c) Como cuota alimentaria por concepto de aguinaldo, se establece la suma de SETECIENTOS CINCUENTA MIL COLONES. ---d) Por concepto de gastos por inicio del curso lectivo, se fija la suma de UN MILLÓN DE COLONES que se entiende cubrirá no solamente los gastos por inicio del curso lectivo sino las actividades académicas que se desprenden de la permanencia del niño en el centro de estudios en el que se encuentra al momento de dictar este fallo. ---e) Debe quedar muy claro que, el monto mensual se fija en esta suma siempre que, el niño siga disfrutando del vehículo que hoy en día emplea la madre para transportarlo. Si en algún momento el niño ya no disfruta de ese vehículo por la razón que sea, corresponderá a la madre accionar lo pertinente. Esto último, salvo que el vehículo llegue a tener pérdida total o parcial por un accidente de tránsito donde la madre sea la responsable según sentencia firme dictada en el proceso respectivo. ---f) Cítese al niño beneficiario para que, en un lenguaje sencillo le sea explicado este fallo y darle la tranquilidad de que, le ha sido garantizada la oportunidad de permanecer en el ambiente educativo en el que se ha desarrollado desde hace mucho tiempo. El niño deberá comparecer a las instalaciones del Juzgado Primero de Familia ubicado en el primer piso del Edificio de Tribunales, Barrio Luján, a las nueve de la mañana del día 6 de setiembre del año 2023. ---g) Se hace saber al accionado que, si incumple lo aquí dispuesto, podrá enfrentar una causa penal a gestión de la representante legal de la persona menor de edad, por el delito de incumplimiento del deber alimentario o incluso, incumplimiento agravado del deber alimentario. Artículo 185 y 186 del Código Penal. Además, si distrae bienes para sustraerse del cumplimiento del deber alimentario y recargar así en la madre del niño la atención de todas las necesidades de él, podría eventualmente, enfrentar causa penal conforme a la Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra Las Mujeres, artículo 8.h) y 35 y siguientes. Además, se le hace saber que, de resultar condenado penalmente, ello lo podría afectar en el ejercicio de la responsabilidad parental y, el ejercicio de sus ocupaciones, al menos en el tema de las colegiaturas. Igualmente, todo esto lo afectaría para que, en el futuro, pueda encontrarse en una causal de exclusión del derecho a los alimentos con respecto a su hijo cuando sea adulto. ---h) Sobre las costas no se emite pronunciamiento. Maureen Roxana Solis Madrigal. Juez(a).- MSOLISM *?NDRQ??FDAFU??* MAUREEN ROXANA SOLIS MADRIGAL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A [email protected]