Revocation of custody in favor of father based on the child's best interestRevocatoria de guarda y custodia a favor del padre por interés superior de la niña

**FILE No. 07-001930-292-FA INTERNAL No. 453-10-** **MATTER: CUSTODY, UPBRINGING, AND EDUCATION** **PLAINTIFF: D.** **DEFENDANT: S.** **VOTO N°522-10** **FAMILY COURT.** San José, at ten hours and thirty minutes on the twentieth of April of two thousand ten.

**CUSTODY, UPBRINGING, AND EDUCATION** proceeding brought by D, of legal age, identity card number xxx, married, laborer, resident of Montencillos de Alajuela, against S, of legal age, identity card number xxx, resident of Alajuela.

**WHEREAS:** A. Mr. D. brings an action and, through the complaint visible on pages 3 to 5, states that he lived in a common-law union with the defendant from the year two thousand one until the end of the year two thousand five, that from said relationship the girl [Nombre1] was born, that his daughter from the end of the year two thousand six to date has been under the custody, upbringing, and education of his person, because the mother of the girl so desired and they agreed upon it; he indicates that this happened because the mother has no one to care for the minor, sometimes has no work, and furthermore has serious alcoholism and now apparently other drugs. He states that now that his daughter is by his side, the mother arrives occasionally to see her (perhaps once a month), and sometimes takes the girl with her for a day or two. He indicates that on no fewer than five occasions she has arrived in a state of drunkenness, for which reason he has had problems and does not hand the minor over to her. He further states that when the minor returns, the girl arrives unbathed and in a poor state of health, as she is allergic to many foods and the mother takes no care in this aspect; that the girl uses orthopedic shoes and the mother does not let her use them, arguing they are ugly. That he is worried because the girl commented to him when passing by a certain bar, the minor affirmed she has been there with the mother, when she meets with her current partner, and they make rolled paper cigarettes, which could mean the mother is consuming drugs in front of the minor. He indicates that a few weeks ago he contracted marriage and has more possibilities to give his daughter a stable family, with the help of his wife who agrees. Based on this factual framework, the plaintiff requests that in the judgment he be granted the **CUSTODY, UPBRINGING, AND EDUCATION** of the minor [Nombre1], so that the custody, upbringing, and education may henceforth be exercised by him, without the mother being able to interfere, and the mother losing the right to demand child support for the minor.- B. That upon the statutory hearing being granted to the defendant, she responded to it negatively. (see pages 14 to 16).

C. Licenciada [Nombre2], Judge of the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, by judgment of fifteen hours and seven minutes of the eleventh of February of two thousand ten, resolved: "**THEREFORE:** In accordance with the foregoing, cited doctrine, and mentioned articles, the present abbreviated petition for modification of custody, upbringing, and education brought by D. against S. is declared **WITHOUT MERIT** in all its aspects. The minor must return to her mother's side. Let the plaintiff negotiate the respective family interaction arrangement if he deems it appropriate. Judgment is entered without special award of personal or procedural costs due to the nature of the matter. Both parents are reminded that their daughter [Nombre1] is in the full stage of emotional, physical, and spiritual growth and that both are important in her growth, hence they must collaborate closely so that the girl grows up in the best family conditions. **NOTIFY.**" D. This Court hears the present matter by virtue of the appeal filed by the PLAINTIFF against the aforementioned judgment. This judgment is delivered within the statutory time limit. The corresponding procedural requirements have been followed in these proceedings.

Drafted by Judge [Nombre3]; AND; **WHEREAS** I.- Mr. [Nombre4] challenges judgment No. 104-2010, of 15:57 hours of the past 11th of February, by which the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela declared his petition for modification of custody, upbringing, and education without merit and ordered the return of [Nombre1] to her mother's side. He argues that Mrs. [Nombre5] does indeed exhibit abandonment and neglectful conduct, having gone almost a year without seeing her daughter, nor inquiring about her. In his view, the fact that she did not attend the forensic psychosocial assessment and has never paid the imposed support obligation proves that she does not care about her obligations to the girl, as well as her decision not to assume her responsibility. He questions the validity of the technical evidence performed to demonstrate that she does not present alcohol intake or drug use, and highlights that the testimonial evidence did mention those behaviors and the neglect in which she kept [Nombre1]. Finally, he regrets that the psychological and emotional harm the decision will cause the girl was not assessed, as she has resided with him since December 2006 and is accustomed to being part of a stable family also composed of his wife, who behaves with her like a mother, and her siblings. For all this, he requests the appealed ruling be overturned (pages 138-140).- II.- The list of factual assertions contained in the appealed judgment (first whereas clause) is endorsed, to which the following are added: g) Between [Nombre1] and her father there is a strong affective bond (forensic psychosocial assessment on pages 95-106). h) The girl identifies her family as her current co-residential unit, composed of her father's wife, Mrs. [Nombre6], and the latter's daughter, with whom she shares the first surname (forensic psychosocial assessment on pages 95-106). i) [Nombre1] recognizes as maternal figures both her biological mother and her father's spouse (forensic psychosocial assessment on pages 95-106). j) She regularly attends the Kindergarten of the [Nombre7] School, fulfills her academic obligations, duly justifies her absences on health grounds (asthma condition), does not present behavioral problems, and for her teacher, those responsible for her education are her father and his wife (forensic psychosocial assessment on pages 95-106). k) In the psychological instrument KBIT, which assesses verbal and non-verbal intelligence and measures verbal abilities related to school learning, the girl obtained an above-average performance, which suggests adequate stimulation (forensic psychosocial assessment on pages 95-106). l) The paternal-filial relationship does not present risk elements (forensic psychosocial assessment on pages 95-106).- III.- As the Constitutional Chamber has declared in several pronouncements (see votes Nos. 1319-97, of 14:51 hours of March 4, 1997; 8857-98, of 16:30 hours of December 15, 1998 and 2008-15461, of 15:07 hours of October 15, 2008), due to its content in the area of human rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, approved by Law No. 7184 of July 18, 1990, like other international instruments that develop or complement its provisions, forms part of the parameter of constitutionality. This means it has supreme force and, indeed, is a rule of interpretation for the provisions of the Constitution itself. In vote No. 2313-95 of 16:18 hours of May 9, 1995, that body expressed that “(…) regarding international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution do not apply, since Constitutional Article 48 has a special rule for those referring to human rights, granting them a normative force at the constitutional level itself. To the point that, as the jurisprudence of this Chamber has recognized, the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica, have not only a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to individuals, they prevail over the Constitution (cf. judgment No. 3435-92 and its clarification, No. 5759-93).” (See, in the same sense, votes Nos. 1147-90, of 16 hours of September 21, 1990; 3435-92, of 16:20 hours of November 11, 1992; 3724-93, of 15 hours of August 4, 1991 (sic); 5759-93, of 14:15 hours of November 10, 1993; 1112-94, of 9:12 hours of February 25, 1994; 2002-10693, of 18:20 hours of November 7, 2002; [Telf1], of 11:40 hours of April 4, 2003; [Telf2], of 10:34 hours of February 9; [Telf3], of 14:54 hours of March 7 and [Telf4], of 14:49 hours of March 27, all three of 2007). And it is appropriate to clarify that, according to that canon, such instruments are not only those of a conventional nature; that is, conventions, treaties, or protocols, but also those that form part of so-called soft law; that is, declarations, recommendations, programs, and action plans, among others, and that their validity in the country is not conditioned on the issuance of the formal act of ratification for each one, when that is possible. Furthermore, in the already cited vote No. 2313-95, it was warned “(…) that if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural organ for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this regulation, whether in a contentious case or in a mere consultation, will have – in principle – the same value as the norm interpreted. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now uphold, moreover, is received in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms – such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law – shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.).” Now, although it is a verity of Perogrullo, it is necessary to insist that Constitutional Law binds all public powers. In accordance with the provisions of sections 154 and 11 of the Constitution, those of us who exercise the jurisdictional function are obligated to apply it in a preferential manner; that is, we are guarantors of the observance and effective validity of its precepts, values, and principles. In vote No. 3495-92, previously cited, the Constitutional Chamber stated that "Constitutional Law, composed of constitutional norms and principles, as well as those of International Law and, particularly, those of its human rights instruments, as the primary foundations of the entire positive legal order, transmit their own logical structure and axiological sense, based on values even prior to the legislative texts themselves, which are, in turn, the source of any normative system typical of a society organized under the concepts of the Rule of Law, the constitutional regime, democracy, and freedom, in such a way that any norm or act that violates those values or principles – among them those of rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are, by definition, criteria of constitutionality – or that leads to absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations, or to dead ends for individuals or the State, cannot be constitutionally valid.” Corollary of all this is, without a doubt, that any reading or application of secondary or ordinary norms must necessarily adjust to the rules, principles, and values established in those instruments or inferred from their provisions. As that same Court evidenced in the cited vote No. 1319-97, "The regulation of human rights not only implies the fulfillment of the rights enshrined therein but also means an interpretation, even more, a rereading of internal legislation based on these international provisions and the postulates incorporated into national legislation as part of the legal order. This is why procedural guarantees are of particular importance for human rights and identify, in essence, the Democratic Rule of Law.”- IV.- As is known, the Convention on the Rights of the Child enshrines, at least on the formal-normative level, the doctrine of comprehensive protection (doctrina de la protección integral), which produces a qualitative leap in the juridical consideration of childhood in that “(...) it incorporates the child and adolescent as full subjects of constitutional rights and duties, passing from a marked influence of social aspects to juridical ones, within a framework of constitutional respect for the minor (sic).” (Vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. [Telf5], of 15:49 hours of July 4, 2000) and brings together the general principles of the protection framework for these persons and the special ones intended for those who have been or are victims of deprivations derived from the negligent or abandonment treatment of their parents (see, in the same sense, the vote of this Court No. 1568-05, of 10:10 hours of October 12, 2005). For what is relevant here, that transcendental multilateral Treaty postulates that, for the full and harmonious development of their personality, persons under eighteen years of age must grow up within a family, in an environment of happiness, love, and understanding, and have the right to special care and assistance (preamble). It also recognizes their right to know their parents and to be cared for by them (Article 7) and to an adequate standard of living for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (paragraph 1 of Article 27) and declares that the primary responsibility for their upbringing and for providing them, within their possibilities and financial means, the living conditions necessary for their development falls on both parents, their legal representatives, or other persons responsible for them (paragraphs 1 of Article 18 and 2 of 27). Moreover, it grants these subjects, the members of the extended family or community, and their guardians, the authority to impart on them, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance so they can exercise their rights (Articles 3, paragraph 2, and 5), guarantees respect for their responsibilities, rights, and duties in the exercise of that transcendental social function (Articles 3, paragraph 2, and 5), and requires that their fundamental concern be the best interests of the child (interés superior) (paragraph 1 of Article 18). The State, for its part, is obligated to ensure them the protection and care necessary for their well-being, for which it must implement all appropriate legislative and administrative measures (paragraph 2 of Article 3). Especially, it must make every effort to guarantee the recognition of the principle that both parents have common obligations in fulfilling their parental functions (paragraph 1 of Article 18); it must render appropriate assistance to them for the full performance of their functions in order to guarantee and promote the rights set forth in the Convention and must take, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, appropriate measures to assist those directly responsible to give effect to the right to an adequate standard of living for their comprehensive development and, in case of need, provide material assistance and support programs (paragraph 3 of Article 27). It is also a State obligation to take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to protect the child against all forms of physical or mental harm or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment, or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of the parents, a legal representative, or any other person (paragraph 1 of Article 19). These include effective procedures for the establishment of social programs to provide the necessary assistance for the person under eighteen years of age and for those who care for them, as well as forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment, and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment (paragraph 2), as well as the adoption of all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child who has been a victim of any form of abandonment, exploitation, or abuse, torture, or any other form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, which must take place in an environment which fosters their health, self-respect, and dignity (Article 39). In this context, the State's duty not to separate children from their parents against their will is stipulated and must be conceived, as is the exceptional possibility of doing so when that decision is necessary in consideration of their best interests (interés superior) (paragraph 1 of Article 9). In similar terms, the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 41/85, of December 3, 1986, reiterates principle 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, resolution 1386 (XIV) of November 20, 1959, by virtue of which the person under eighteen years of age must grow up in the care and under the responsibility of their parents and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security, and establishes as a priority that they must be cared for by those subjects (Article 3), that when they cannot properly care for the child or do so inappropriately, consideration must be given to the possibility of the care being entrusted to other family members, a substitute family, or, if necessary, to an appropriate institution (Article 4), and that in all matters relating to their care by persons other than their own parents, the fundamental consideration must be the child's interests and, in particular, their need to receive affection and their right to security and continuous care (Article 5).- V.- In accordance with those precepts of a fundamental nature and with the rest of the current legal system, while daughters and sons have not reached the age of majority or have not become emancipated, the father and mother are the primary persons obligated to satisfy their basic requirements for care, assistance, protection, education, security, and legal representation. For this purpose, both are recognized as joint holders of parental authority (patria potestad) or parental responsibility (autoridad parental) —a direct and immediate consequence of the act of procreation which, therefore, corresponds exclusively to those who hold the status of parents (it is advisable to review the votes of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1975-94, of 15:37 hours of April 26, 1994 and 2006-12019, of 16:32 hours of August 16, 2006; that of the Second Chamber No. 2004-825, of 10:35 hours of September 29, 2004 and those of this body Nos. 2014-04, of 10:50 hours of November 16; 2218-04, of 10:50 hours of December 14, both of 2004 and 324-05, of 7:50 hours of March 30, 2005)— which, unlike what happened in other historical moments, can no longer continue to be viewed as an absolute power or right but as a social function whose core is the duty to guarantee persons under eighteen years of age the effective enjoyment of their basic rights with the aim of achieving their integral development. In vote No. [Telf6], of 15:54 hours of March 14, 2001, the jurisdictional authority responsible for constitutionality review established that “It must be insisted that what parents have towards their children (sic) are basically obligations, and under this perspective what can be conceived as rights are precisely the possibility to prove the paternity of the minor (sic) and give them their surname, in order to exercise the functions expected of a parent (sic), which include not only (sic) economic support, but also attention, care, and development of emotional bonds with the children (sic).” (See, in the same sense, votes Nos. 1975-94; 2006-12019, both already cited and 2006-16030, of 9:33 hours of November 3, 2006).- VI.- Based on the provisions of Articles 33, 52, and 53 of the Political Constitution; 16, paragraph d), of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, approved by Law No. 6968 of October 2, 1984; 7, paragraph 1) and 18, paragraph 1), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and with absolute independence from the marital status of the father and mother (see the votes of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1975-94 and 2006-12019, already cited), as a general rule, parental authority (patria potestad) or parental responsibility (autoridad parental) over their common sons and daughters must be exercised by both jointly, with equal powers, duties, and rights. Eloquent, in this regard, is the text of the last cited norm, by virtue of which "States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. / Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their basic concern shall be the best interests of the child (interés superior del niño)." In the relevant parts and in order, sections 151 and 140 of the Family Code provide that: “The father and the mother exercise, with equal rights and duties, parental authority (autoridad parental) over the children born (…).” “It is incumbent upon the parents to govern their children, protect them, administer their property, and represent them legally.” Finally, section 30 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code stipulates the following: “Minors shall have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow and develop by their side and be cared for by them. They shall have the right to remain in their home, from which they cannot be expelled or prevented from returning, except by judicial decision that so provides.” This means that, in principle, decisions concerning sons and daughters must be adopted by mutual agreement and that, should they fail to reach one, they may resort to the judicial authority so that it may decide what is pertinent. In both cases, the best interests of the child (mejor interés) must always be safeguarded. As this Court stated in its vote No. 2207-04, of 9 hours of December 14, 2004: "Based on this principle, a mandatory line of action is established for public institutions, private social welfare entities, courts of justice, administrative authorities, and administrative bodies. The Rights of Boys and Girls can be summarized in four categories: Survival, Development, Protection, and Participation. Within Survival is the right to life, health, and happiness. In Development, the right to a family, to be educated in a spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality, and solidarity that allows them to grow as a unique, distinct, and special person. In protection, they hold the right to respect for their identity and integrity, to be protected from all physical, sexual, or mental abuse, not to be mistreated or punished. In participation, the right to play, to think, to express themselves.” Without a doubt, all of these entail correlative duties for the father and mother, which make indispensable the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers oriented towards enabling their effective enjoyment by their holders. Such powers-duties make up the content of parental authority (patria potestad) or parental responsibility (autoridad parental), which doctrine usually classifies into three categories: personal content, economic content, and that related to legal representation. The first refers to the traditional custody, upbringing, and education of the son or daughter. Custody (guarda) or physical and legal custody (custodia) translates into the power and correlative duty to keep them in their company (cohabit), assist them, care for them, discipline them, and constantly watch over their physical and mental integrity. Upbringing (crianza) involves providing them with the necessary maintenance (alimentos) and stimuli for their proper development, as well as attending to their fundamental needs. Education implies the duty to train and prepare them for autonomous social life and not only to offer them the opportunity to acquire formal knowledge (Articles 143 and 144 of the Family Code and vote of this Court No. 1236-02, of 8:30 hours of September 12, 2002). The power of administration of the assets of the child under eighteen years of age constitutes the economic content (Articles 145, 146, and 147 ibid.). Lastly, through legal representation, the father and mother act on behalf of their offspring, as long as they have not acquired full capacity to act and provided they do not have an interest contrary to theirs; in which case a special guardian must be appointed for them (Article 140 of the Family Code). The same must be done when some cognitive disability is present, as provided in Article 162 ibid. (see, among others, the votes of this Chamber Nos. 1473-03, of 13:05 hours of October 23, 2003; 1681-08, of 8:10 hours of September 18; 589-08, of 9:40 hours of March 27 and 929-08, of 11:20 hours of May 14, all three of 2008). At this point, it is essential to note that a more proper denomination than the classic "custody, upbringing, and education" (guarda, crianza y educación) referred to by the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the plenary session held on October 25, 1980, within the framework of its Fourteenth Session and approved by the Legislative Assembly by Law No. 7746 of February 23, 1998 (Article 5, paragraph a) and the Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children, adopted at the Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law on July 15, 1989 and approved by the Legislative Assembly by Law No. 8032 of October 9, 2000 (Article 3, paragraph a), is that of "right of custody" (derecho de custodia), used to describe the relationship and obligations between one of the parents and the son or daughter when the latter cannot live with both and must be under the primary care of one of them, with whom they will reside (physical custody) and who must ensure the full satisfaction of their needs and will make the daily decisions about their upbringing (legal custody).- VII.- The points made in the preceding section lead to the assertion that the powers-duties to care for and keep in one’s company (custody - guarda) [Nombre1], to prepare her for her life (education), and to watch over her integrity, provide her with maintenance (alimentos) and stimuli for her proper development, and attend to her fundamental needs (upbringing - crianza) concern both parties. However, as this tends to be the case when they cohabit as a couple and, in this case, that situation does not apply and there is no agreement between them regarding who shall be in charge of the right of custody of the girl, it becomes necessary to decide it in this manner, in the interest of guaranteeing her stability and full development, without prejudice, of course, to the right of the other parent to supervise that she is well cared for and to maintain communication and interrelate with her, and without what is definitively resolved preventing her from participating in some determinations about her upbringing, especially when it has been so ordered (see, in similar sense, the vote of this Court No. 929-08, of 11:20 hours of May 14, 2008). On this matter, it must be borne in mind that "Important aspects to take into account (…) are distinguished as ownership (titularidad) and exercise (ejercicio). Ownership is the condition of being the recipient of those rights and duties that correspond to the subject who has parental authority (autoridad parental) over the children; it is non-transferable, inalienable, and indivisible; joint owners - cases of father and mother with that authority - do not have 'parts' of this right, hence its indivisibility. Exercise, on the other hand, is the faculty of acting concretely by virtue of those rights, and unlike ownership, this (sic) may correspond separately to one or the other progenitor, or to both. Exercise translates into the performance of attributes derived from parental authority (autoridad parental) such as custody, upbringing, and education, among others." (Vote No. 142-02, of 9:30 hours of February 6, 2002, reiterated, among others, in Nos. 2041-04, of 7:30 hours of November 24, 2004; 1863-06, of 9:55 hours of November 22, 2006; 1598-07, of 9:20 hours of November 20, 2007 and 1353-09, of 10:30 hours of September 8, 2009).

From all of this it follows that, in principle, both its ownership and the exercise of the attributes that make up its various contents are strictly personal, inalienable, and non-negotiable or unavailable. Both the one and the others are, moreover, non-delegable, without detriment, of course, to changes made due to some temporary need of the father or mother or of the son or daughter, as would be, for example, moving to a different residence in order to pursue their studies, which does not legally translate into a delegation of parental authority (autoridad parental). In support of the foregoing, its extinction is subject to legal facts (death or reaching the age of majority) or to judicial acts with the intervention of the competent bodies. Section 36 of the Código de la niñez y adolescencia summarizes the latter in the following terms: “The grounds that give rise to the definitive separation of a minor from his or her family are those provided for in the Código de Familia, as grounds for the loss or suspension of parental authority. The suspension or termination of the powers and duties conferred by parental authority (patria potestad) can only (sic) be ordered by a judge (sic).”- VIII.- As this Chamber has emphasized, the best interest (interés superior) is a fundamental premise of the comprehensive protection doctrine and constitutes the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the regulations on children and adolescents (see, among many others, rulings n.os 2207-04, at 9:00 a.m. on December 14, 2004; 1472-05, at 8:10 a.m. on October 4, 2005; 59-08, at 11:20 a.m. on January 18; 1003-08, at 8:45 a.m. on May 27; 1681-08, at 8:10 a.m. on September 18; 1843-08, at 9:50 a.m. on October 15 and 1837-08, at 9:20 a.m. on October 15, all from 2008). Since its enactment in 1974, the Código de Familia recognized this condition in its Article 2. At that historical moment, its content was defined from a psychosocial perspective—whatever was most convenient for the boy or girl—and corresponded to the paternalistic-authoritarian scheme. With the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a change of singular importance occurred, thanks to which it was transformed into a legal concept, with a meaning based on self-determination and whose great breadth aims to guarantee the most complete protection of the rights of children within a framework of legal certainty. From this perspective, its only possible content is the rights themselves. As [Nombre9] explains, “(…) the concept of 'interest', according to the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, is equivalent to 'benefit, utility, convenience, or necessity.' However, this synonymy tells us nothing about what may be beneficial, useful, convenient, or necessary for the child. Currently, social representations about what is appropriate or harmful for children or about what their essential needs are, are nourished by globally agreed-upon ideas that define a certain universality capable of giving concrete content to the standard. International treaties and particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child constitute a framework of greater objectivity and can be seen as an effort to establish the requirements of childhood aimed at their full development. The rights granted to children precisely configure the power given to them to protect their vital interests through the demand for specific behaviors, both from the State and from the persons who have them under their care.” [El interés superior del niño. In [Nombre10], [Nombre11] (director), Los Derechos del Niño en la Familia. Discurso y Realidad, Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad, 1998, p. 45]. Meanwhile, [Nombre12]. [Nombre13] points out that “(…) this concept falls within the so-called framework definitions, since it is not easy to establish its scope, as it is an idea in permanent evolution and transformation (…). From the foregoing, it follows that the term under analysis is flexible, since it allows and requires, in turn, in each specific case, to qualify and redefine it, taking into account the particularities of the situation. Thus, the best interest of the child will depend on specific circumstances (…). This particularity obliges the enforcement bodies of the Convention, whether the administration or the Judicial Branch, to assume the very important task of discovering which course of action will lead to the defense of the child's best interest in each particular case. What the Convention establishes is, precisely, that it shall be mandatory for those agents to undertake the search that leads to that discovery of what best protects the child's best interest (…)” [Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. Buenos Aires: Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores, 2002, pp. 101-102]. These details contextualize the obligation that subsection 1), of numeral 3, of the referred international instrument imposes on public or private social welfare institutions, courts, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, to pay particular attention to the best interest of the person under eighteen years of age in all measures concerning them, as well as the duty to consider it in any public or private action that affects them, stipulated in Article 5 of the Código de la niñez y la adolescencia. The latter points out that said best interest guarantees respect for their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment, in pursuit of their full personal development, and adds that, to determine it, it is necessary to take into account: “a) Their condition as a subject of rights and responsibilities. b) Their age, degree of maturity, capacity for discernment, and other personal conditions. c) The socioeconomic conditions in which they develop. d) The correspondence between the individual and the social interest.” Finally, and in accordance with this, this regulatory body declares in its section 3 that “The rights and guarantees of this group are of public interest, inalienable, and non-negotiable (irrenunciables e intransigibles).”- IX.- Furthermore, in ruling n.º 2008-14776, at 10:09 a.m. on October 3, 2008, the Sala Constitucional indicated that “Constitutional Law imposes upon the Costa Rican State, as a fundamental duty, the protection of the child's best interest (sic). This must be reflected in the actions of the different institutions that make up part of the state apparatus (…)”. In n.º 2008-15461, at 3:07 p.m. on October 15, 2008, it held that “(…) different international instruments recognize and impose the State's duty to provide particular protection to the rights of boys and girls; from declaratory instruments such as the Universal Declaration itself, and especially since the approval and entry into force of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, a decisive impulse has been given to the protection of this special group, ensuring that at all times adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized to them are provided, within which (…) the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence stands out, as well as the right of children (sic) to remain with their parents, particularly with their mother –Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador-. The Chamber's jurisprudence is forceful in recognizing the protection that must be granted to the rights of boys and girls, recognizing, likewise, the best interest of the child's condition and nature as a general principle that, as such, forms part of the legal system and must be applied to govern all administrative and judicial activity related to minors. (…) In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, the child's best interest cannot be opposed by any rule or decision –administrative or judicial– that contradicts it, unless in specific circumstances the applicability of some other general principle of a higher level is at stake, in which case the legal operator (sic) must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal nature of the child's best interest by neglecting its strict application in those cases involving minors is contrary to the recognitions made in this regard by Constitutional Law, while also giving margin to place oneself in a position of vulnerability against the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In other words, administrative and judicial authorities have the obligation to recognize and apply the general principle of the child's best interest (sic), in perfect compliance with its nature as a principle, with the mandates established by Constitutional Law, even devising appropriate mechanisms and consistent solutions in accordance with what is ordered by the referred Article 2 of the American Convention.” And previously, in n.º 2005-11262, at 3:00 p.m. on August 24, 2005, reiterated in n.os 2006-12246, at 3:24 p.m. on August 22, 2006; 2007-13548, at 3:14 p.m. on September 18, 2007; 2008-14068, at 9:04 a.m. on September 23, 2008; [Telf7], at 12:23 p.m. on January 30 and 2009-6003, at 2:49 p.m. on April 21, both of 2009, it had expressed that “In the matter of the special rights that children have, there are several norms of constitutional, international, and infra-constitutional rank; recognizing in all of them the best interest of the child as a criterion for all public or private action concerning a person under eighteen years of age. (…) From the norms of international instruments on Human Rights (…), it is, by all lights, that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the child's best interest, avoiding the dismemberment of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority especially when the child requires special care. (…) In conclusion, after all that has been said, it is clear that children (sic) are entitled (sic) to a series of special rights and, correlatively, the State and the parents or guardians of the children (sic) are bound (sic) by a series of obligations and duties towards them, even more so when dealing with children with special needs, all of which is supported (sic) by numerous international instruments, in our Political Constitution, and in legal norms.” (See also n.º 2009-145, at 8:59 a.m. on January 13, 2009).- X.- The principle of the best interest, outlined above, requires specifying that in this type of process, in which the stability, well-being, and tranquility of a person under eighteen years of age are at stake, the criterion for establishing whether it is appropriate to attribute to the father or the mother the personal attributes of parental authority—custody (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education (educación) in traditional language—or, more properly, the right of custody (derecho de custodia), is not the lack of suitability of one of those subjects but the preeminence of their personal, material, family, and social conditions and, of course, that of their commitment, availability, and diligence, aimed at guaranteeing their full development and respect for their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment. We are not, then, in the presence of a process of a sanctioning nature, such as that brought for the purpose of ordering the suspension or termination of parental authority (see ruling n.º 1681-08, at 8:10 a.m. on September 18, 2008), but rather one in which it is appropriate to place the boy or girl as the main interested party and determine what is most convenient for him or her (see, in a similar sense, rulings n.os 204-08, at 11:10 a.m. on January 30; 324-08, at 9:10 a.m. on February 27; 1204-08, at 9:10 a.m. on June 4, the three of 2008 and 764-09, at 1:00 p.m. on May 13, 2009). In other terms, the decision ultimately adopted does not have to prejudge the inadequate exercise of the maternal or paternal role by the one who does not obtain satisfaction of their claim or their defense, but it must indeed be supported by a better assessment of the conditions of the one who does achieve judicial protection. Offspring are not objects, but human beings with rights and, precisely for this reason, the greatest possible well-being must be guaranteed to them, within the conditions of their parents. In accordance with this, one cannot agree that, in this matter, the rules on the burden of proof were applied, as was done in the first instance. If, as indicated, a sanctioning nature should not be attributed to the decision that assigns a parent the right of custody of the common son or daughter, it is obvious that the lack of suitability of the other, supposing it has been alleged, is insufficient to justify it, since accreditation is required that better personal, family, and social conditions are met to guarantee their full development. This means that both the one who requests that judicial attribution for themselves and the one who opposes that claim are incumbent upon producing the evidence they deem pertinent to demonstrate that they are in a better situation to exercise the personal attributes of parental authority. In any case, this requirement is not alien to what is provided in numeral 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, since, by virtue of that precept, “The burden of proof falls on: / 1) The one who formulates a claim, regarding the statements of the constitutive facts of their right. / 2) The one who opposes a claim, regarding the statements of impeding, modifying, or extinguishing facts of the plaintiff's right.”- XI.- In order to resolve this matter, it is also appropriate to keep in mind what was stated by the Sala Constitucional in ruling n.º [Telf8], at 2:51 p.m. on April 8, 2003: “(…) the rights corresponding to the ties of the minor (sic) with their natural family are provided for in Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These declare their right to be cared for by their parents, to preserve their family relationships without illegal interference, and to remain with them. Article 16 (…) of the Protocol of San Salvador refers to the right of the child to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents and, especially, that the young child not be separated from their mother. The Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia in norms 30, 31, and 33 provides the right of the minor (sic) to grow and develop alongside their parents and to be cared for by them, to remain in their home, to grow and be educated in the bosom of a family. / (…) Regarding the fundamental rights of the parents—reiterating that the plane they occupy is secondary, insofar as they are subordinated to the protection of the best interest of the minor (sic), in the terms already stated of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Código de la Niñez—basically, the right to family integrity is involved, excluding from that zone of intimacy all unjustified and excessive interference by public authorities. This, to the extent that the family is protected by Articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 15 of the Additional Protocol to that Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10, 17, and 23 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Particularly in Article 17 of this latter normative body, arbitrary interference in that human sphere is prohibited. / (…) Although at first glance it might seem that the fundamental thing to issue a decision in this case is to determine the prevalence of some of the groups of rights that directly concern the minor (sic) and the right of the parents referred to, this impression is false. It is preferable to resort to the expression of conciliation and not to that of sacrifice of certain rights in favor of others, based on the principle of the interdependence of these rights, which is characteristic of the subject of fundamental rights. That is, one must understand the diverse rights of which a person is the holder as part of a global scheme that must seek to be harmonized. This does not mean that all are located on a plane of equality, but that it is obligatory to seek a solution that allows their integration, and only in the event that the different plausible answers are impracticable may one right finally be preferred over another. (…) The legal authorization to administrative and judicial authorities to intervene in family relationships is an indication of conciliatory solutions for the rights involved in the decision of this matter, to the extent that despite admitting that the rule is the preservation of the family group, this rule can be altered through a state reaction –administrative or jurisdictional–, without forgetting that such interference impacts fundamental rights.” (The bold text is added).- XII.- With the means of conviction provided, it was established that [Nombre1]. was procreated during the cohabitation the parties maintained. For work reasons, at the end of 2006, her mother entrusted her care to the paternal grandmother, with whom Mr. D resided. Currently, the girl is just over seven years and ten months old and, at least for the last two, has lived with her father, his wife, Mrs. [Nombre6], and her sister. Even though it cannot be said that Mrs. [Nombre5] has incurred in serious breaches of her duties towards her daughter or has completely neglected her upbringing, nor is it possible to fail to recognize the emotional bond between them, to the point that [Nombre1] eagerly awaits her visits, the forensic psychosocial expert report on folios 95-106 requires it to be taken as proven that she maintains a strong emotional bond with her father, identifies her current cohabitation nucleus as her family, [Nombre14] recognizes Mrs. [Nombre6] as a maternal figure, regularly attends Kindergarten at the Escuela [Nombre7], fully complies with her academic obligations, to the point that her absences are for health reasons (asthma condition), and does not present behavioral problems. Furthermore, it must be considered very probable that she has been adequately stimulated, as her performance on the KBIT psychological instrument, which evaluated her verbal and non-verbal intelligence and measured her verbal skills related to school learning, was above average. If to this series of positive aspects it is added that for her teacher the father and his spouse are the ones responsible for her education, that the father-child relationship does not present risk elements, and that there is no evaluation of the mother that allows affirming her better conditions to take charge of her care, the proper course is to attribute to Mr. [Nombre4] the right of custody claimed. This being the case, and taking into account her best interest, the appealed judgment must be revoked and the filed lawsuit granted.- XIII.- It is necessary to point out that Mr. [Nombre4]'s decision to take [Nombre1] with him when he formed his current relationship and left his mother's house cannot be classified, in this specific case, as a reprehensible conduct, since it is not observed that he did so in bad faith. On the contrary, by having acted thus, he assumed his parental obligations as was fitting. As already noted, he exercises parental authority (autoridad parental) over her by full right and, at that time, the girl was not under the care or vigilance of her mother. In other words, as much as it involves a unilateral act, the truth is that it reveals an evident sense of responsibility, which is confirmed when reviewing the living conditions she currently has. It is obvious that she is part of his life project, they maintain a strong and solid emotional bond, and he has not been negligent. That said, since the ownership of parental authority (patria potestad or autoridad parental) remains shared by both parties, it is not superfluous to warn Mr. [Nombre4] that the attribution to his person of the right of custody of [Nombre1] does not authorize him to disregard her fundamental right to interact with her mother and to cultivate her mother-daughter relationship, and that he is obliged not only not to hinder it but also to guarantee it. Mrs. [Nombre5] is an essential part of her daughter's life and must have the opportunity to be a significant figure for her. That is also part of her comprehensive development.- XIV.- Under no circumstances can this Chamber share the prejudiced assertion of the first-instance judge that “(…) by nature, children must remain by their mother's side, except when situations of social risk or any other require separating them from their mother and leaving them by their father's side.” Such a conception ignores not only that the primary interest that must be attended to when resolving a matter like this is that of the son or daughter, but also the entire historical struggle for gender equality that prevents attributing rights and responsibilities based on sexual difference between men and women. A first-order international instrument such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women demands that those of us who work with the Law prevent the role of women in procreation from being a cause of discrimination, understood, in the specific case, as the unequal attribution of responsibility in the upbringing of sons and daughters. It also requires us to implement the necessary measures to “(…) modify the traditional role of both man and woman in society and in the family (…)” (preamble). For that very reason, the use of the term “delegation” to refer to the exercise of the attributes of parental authority by Mr. D is unfortunate.

XV.- As a corollary of the foregoing, the filed appeal is granted, the appealed ruling is revoked, the exercise of the right of custody over [Nombre1] is assigned to Mr. D., and this matter is resolved without a special ruling on costs; this last point in accordance with the provisions of section 106 of the Código de la niñez y la adolescencia.-

POR TANTO:

The appealed judgment is revoked. In its place, the lawsuit is declared with merit and the exercise of the right of custody over the girl [Nombre1] is assigned to Mr. D. This matter is resolved without a special order of costs.- RANDALL ESQUIVEL QUIRÓS LUIS HÉCTOR AMORETTI OROZCO MAURICIO CHACÓN JIMÉNEZ [Nombre15] (see folios 14 to 16).

**C.** Licensed attorney [Name2], Judge of the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, by judgment issued at fifteen hours and seven minutes on February eleventh, two thousand ten, resolved: **"THEREFORE:** In accordance with the foregoing, cited doctrine, and mentioned articles, the present abbreviated claim for modification of custody, upbringing, and education (guarda, crianza y educación) filed by D. against S. is declared WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects. The minor must return to her mother's side. The plaintiff shall proceed to request the respective family interaction regime if he deems it appropriate. Judgment is rendered without special condemnation for personal or procedural costs due to the nature of the matter. Both parents are reminded that their daughter [Name1] is in a full stage of emotional, physical, and spiritual growth and that both are important in her development, therefore they must collaborate closely so that the girl grows up in the best family conditions. NOTIFY." **D.** This Court hears this matter by virtue of the appeal filed by the **PLAINTIFF** against the aforementioned judgment. This judgment is issued within the term established by Law. The corresponding procedural formalities have been observed.

Drafted by **JUDGE [Name3]; AND:** **CONSIDERING** **I.-** Mr. [Name4] challenges judgment No. 104-2010, issued at 15:57 hours on February 11th last, by which the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela declared his claim for modification of custody, upbringing, and education (guarda, crianza y educación) without merit and ordered the return of [Name1] to her mother's side. He argues that Mrs. [Name5] does indeed exhibit abandoning and negligent behaviors, as she has not seen her daughter, nor inquired about her, for almost a year. In his opinion, the fact that she did not attend the forensic psychosocial assessment and has never paid the imposed child support proves that she does not care about her obligations to the girl, as well as her decision not to assume her responsibility. He questions the validity of the technical evidence presented to demonstrate that she does not consume alcohol or drugs and points out that the witness evidence did mention those behaviors and the neglect in which she kept [Name1]. Finally, he misses that the psychological and emotional damage that the decision will cause the girl, who has resided with him since December 2006 and is accustomed to being part of a stable family also composed of his wife, who behaves towards her like a mother, and her siblings, was not assessed. For all these reasons, he requests that the appealed ruling be revoked (folios 138-140).- **II.-** The list of factual assertions contained in the appealed judgment (first considerando) is endorsed, to which the following are added: *g) Between [Name1] and her father there is a strong emotional bond (forensic psychosocial assessment at folios 95-106). h) The girl identifies her family as her current cohabitation nucleus, made up of her father's wife, Mrs. [Name6], and the latter's daughter, with whom they share the first surname (forensic psychosocial assessment at folios 95-106). i) [Name1] recognizes both her biological mother and her father's spouse as maternal figures (forensic psychosocial assessment at folios 95-106). j) She regularly attends the Kindergarten of the [Name7] School, fulfills her academic obligations, timely justifies her absences due to health reasons (asthma condition), does not present behavioral problems, and for her teacher, those responsible for her education are her father and his wife (forensic psychosocial assessment at folios 95-106). k) In the KBIT psychological instrument, which evaluates verbal and non-verbal intelligence and measures verbal skills related to school learning, the girl obtained above-average performance, which suggests adequate stimulation (forensic psychosocial assessment at folios 95-106). l) The paternal-filial relationship does not present risk elements (forensic psychosocial assessment at folios 95-106).* - **III.-** As the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has declared in several pronouncements (see rulings Nos. 1319-97, at 14:51 hours on March 4, 1997; 8857-98, at 16:30 hours on December 15, 1998; and 2008-15461, at 15:07 hours on October 15, 2008), due to its content regarding human rights, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, approved by Law No. 7184 of July 18, 1990, like other international instruments that develop or complement its provisions, integrates the parameter of constitutionality. This means it has supreme force and is, even, a rule for interpreting the provisions of the Fundamental Charter itself. In ruling No. 2313-95 at 16:18 hours on May 9, 1995, that body expressed that *"(...) in the case of international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution do not apply, since Constitutional Article 48 has a special norm for those referring to human rights, granting them a normative force of the constitutional level itself. To the point that, as the jurisprudence of this Chamber has recognized, the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica have not only a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution (see judgment No. 3435-92 and its clarification, No. 5759-93)."* (See, in the same sense, rulings Nos. 1147-90, at 16:00 hours on September 21, 1990; 3435-92, at 16:20 hours on November 11, 1992; 3724-93, at 15:00 hours on August 4, 1991 (sic); 5759-93, at 14:15 hours on November 10, 1993; 1112-94, at 9:12 hours on February 25, 1994; 2002-10693, at 18:20 hours on November 7, 2002; [Telf1], at 11:40 hours on April 4, 2003; [Telf2], at 10:34 hours on February 9; [Telf3], at 14:54 hours on March 7; and [Telf4], at 14:49 hours on March 27, all three from 2007). And it is worth clarifying that, according to that canon, such instruments are not only those of a conventional nature; that is, conventions, treaties, or protocols, but also those that form part of the so-called *soft law*; that is, declarations, recommendations, programs, and action plans, among others, and that their validity in the country is not conditioned by the issuance of the formal act of ratification regarding each one, when that is possible. Moreover, in the already cited ruling No. 2313-95, it was warned *"(...) that if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative framework, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will have - in principle - the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now hold, furthermore, is received in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms - such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law - shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.)."* Now, although it is a truth of [Name8], it is necessary to insist that the *Law of the Constitution* binds all public powers. In accordance with the provisions of numerals 154 and 11 of the *Political Charter*, those of us who exercise the jurisdictional function are obliged to apply it on a priority basis; that is, we are guarantors of the observance and effective validity of its precepts, values, and principles. In ruling No. 3495-92, previously cited, the Constitutional Chamber pointed out that *"The Law of the Constitution, composed of both constitutional norms and principles, and those of International Law and, particularly, those of its instruments on human rights, as primary foundations of the entire positive legal order, transmit to it its own logical structure and axiological sense, based on values even prior to the legislative texts themselves, which are, in turn, the source of all normative systems proper to a society organized under the concepts of the Rule of Law, the constitutional regime, democracy, and freedom, in such a way that any norm or act that violates those values or principles - among them rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are, by definition, criteria of constitutionality - or that leads to absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations, or to dead ends for individuals or the State, cannot be constitutionally valid."* A corollary of all this is, undoubtedly, that any reading or application of secondary or ordinary norms must necessarily adjust to the rules, principles, and values established in those instruments or inferred from their provisions. As that same Court demonstrated in the aforementioned ruling No. 1319-97, *"The norms of human rights not only imply the fulfillment of the rights enshrined therein but also mean an interpretation, even more, a re-reading of domestic legislation in light of these international provisions and the postulates incorporated into national legislation as part of the legal order. This is why procedural guarantees are of particular importance for human rights and identify, in essence, the Democratic Rule of Law State."*- **IV.-** As is known, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* enshrines, at least on the formal-normative level, the doctrine of integral protection, which produces a qualitative leap in the legal consideration of childhood as it *"(...) incorporates the child and adolescent as full subjects of constitutional rights and duties, moving from a marked influence of social aspects to legal ones, within a framework of constitutional respect for the minor (sic)."* (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. [Telf5], at 15:49 hours on July 4, 2000) and collects the general principles of the protection framework for these persons and the special ones intended for those who have been or are victims of the deficiencies derived from the negligent or abandoning treatment of their parents (see, in the same sense, ruling of this Court No. 1568-05, at 10:10 hours on October 12, 2005). For what is relevant here, that transcendental multilateral *Treaty* postulates that, for the full and harmonious development of their personality, persons under eighteen years of age must grow up within a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and understanding, and have the right to special care and assistance (preamble). It also recognizes their right to know their parents, to be cared for by them (Article 7), and to an adequate standard of living for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (paragraph 1 of Article 27) and declares that both parents, their legal representatives, or other persons responsible for them have the primary responsibility for their upbringing and for providing them, within their abilities and financial means, with the living conditions necessary for their development (paragraphs 1 of Article 18 and 2 of 27). Furthermore, it attributes to these subjects and to the members of the extended family or community, as well as to their guardians, the authority to provide them, in a manner consistent with their evolving capacities, with appropriate direction and guidance so that they can exercise their rights (Articles 3, paragraph 2, and 5), guarantees them respect for their responsibilities, rights, and duties in the exercise of that transcendental social function (Articles 3, paragraph 2, and 5), and requires that their fundamental concern be their best interest (paragraph 1 of Article 18). The State, for its part, is obligated to ensure them the protection and care necessary for their well-being, for which it must implement all appropriate legislative and administrative measures (paragraph 2 of Article 3). In particular, it must make every effort to guarantee recognition of the principle that both parents have common obligations in fulfilling their parental functions (paragraph 1 of Article 18); it must provide them with appropriate assistance for their proper performance in order to ensure and promote the rights enunciated in the *Convention*, and must adopt, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, appropriate measures to help those directly obligated to give effect to the right to an adequate standard of living for their integral development and, where necessary, provide material assistance and support programs (paragraph 3 of Article 27). It is also a State obligation to adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to protect the male or female child against all forms of physical or mental harm or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while under the custody of the parents, a legal representative, or any other person (paragraph 1 of Article 19). These include effective procedures for establishing social programs with the aim of providing both the person under eighteen years of age and those who care for them with the necessary assistance and forms of prevention, treatment, and subsequent observation of cases of maltreatment (paragraph 2), as well as the adoption of all appropriate measures to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of anyone who has been a victim of any type of abandonment, exploitation, or abuse, torture, or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, which must be carried out in an environment that fosters their health, self-respect, and dignity (Article 39). In this context, the State's duty not to separate them from their parents against the latter's will is stipulated and must be conceived, along with the exceptional possibility of doing so when that decision is necessary in light of their best interest (paragraph 1 of Article 9). The *Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally*, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 41/85, of December 3, 1986, pronounces in similar terms, reiterating principle 6 of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Child*, resolution 1386 (XIV) of November 20, 1959, by virtue of which a person under eighteen years of age must grow up under the shelter and responsibility of their parents and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and moral and material security, and establishes as a priority that they must be cared for by those subjects (Article 3), that when they cannot take care of doing so or do so inappropriately, the possibility of care being provided by other relatives, a substitute family, or, if necessary, an appropriate institution must be considered (Article 4), and that in all matters relating to their care, by persons other than their own parents, their interests and, in particular, their need to receive affection and their right to security and continued care must be the fundamental consideration (Article 5).- **V.-** In accordance with those precepts of a fundamental nature and with the rest of the current legal system, while the daughters and sons have not reached the age of majority or have not been emancipated, the father and mother are the main parties obligated to satisfy their basic requirements of care, assistance, protection, education, security, and legal representation. For this purpose, both are recognized as holders of parental authority (patria potestad) or parental authority (autoridad parental) — a direct and immediate consequence of the act of procreation that, therefore, corresponds exclusively to those who hold the status of progenitors (it is worth reviewing rulings of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1975-94, at 15:37 hours on April 26, 1994, and 2006-12019, at 16:32 hours on August 16, 2006; that of the Second Chamber No. 2004-825, at 10:35 hours on September 29, 2004, and those of this body Nos. 2014-04, at 10:50 hours on November 16; 2218-04, at 10:50 hours on December 14, both of 2004, and 324-05, at 7:50 hours on March 30, 2005) — which, unlike what happened in other historical moments, can no longer be viewed as an absolute power or right but as a social function whose core is the duty to guarantee persons under eighteen years of age the effective enjoyment of their basic rights with the aim of achieving their integral development. In ruling No. [Telf6], at 15:54 hours on March 14, 2001, the jurisdictional authority responsible for constitutionality control established that *"It must be insisted that what parents have towards their children (sic) are basically obligations, and under this perspective, what can be conceived as rights are precisely the possibility of proving the paternity of the minor (sic) and giving them their surname, in order to exercise the functions expected of a progenitor (sic), which include not only (sic) financial support but also attention, care, and development of emotional bonds with the children (sic)."* (See, in the same sense, rulings Nos. 1975-94; 2006-12019, both already cited, and 2006-16030, at 9:33 hours on November 3, 2006).- **VI.-** Based on the provisions of Articles 33, 52, and 53 of the *Political Constitution*; 16, paragraph d), of the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*, approved by Law No. 6968 of October 2, 1984; 7, paragraph 1) and 18, paragraph 1), of the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, and with absolute independence from the parents' marital status (see Constitutional Chamber rulings Nos. 1975-94 and 2006-12019, already cited), as a general rule, parental authority (patria potestad) or parental authority (autoridad parental) over their common male and female children must be exercised jointly by both, with equal powers, duties, and rights. Eloquent, in this regard, is the text of the last norm cited, by virtue of which *"States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. / Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their basic concern shall be the best interests of the child."* In relevant part and in their order, articles 151 and 140 of the *Family Code* (Código de Familia) provide that: *"The father and mother exercise, with equal rights and duties, parental authority over the children born (...)."* *"It is the parents' responsibility to govern their children, protect them, administer their assets, and represent them legally."* Finally, Article 30 of the *Childhood and Adolescence Code* (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) stipulates the following: *"Minor children shall have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow up and develop at their side and be cared for by them. They shall have the right to remain in their home from which they cannot be expelled or prevented from returning, except by judicial decision that so establishes."* This implies that, in principle, decisions concerning the male and female children must be adopted by mutual agreement and that, if they fail to reach one, they may resort to the judicial authority for it to decide what is pertinent. In both cases, their best interest must always be safeguarded. As this Court pointed out in its ruling No. 2207-04, at 9:00 hours on December 14, 2004: *"Based on this principle, a mandatory action line is established for public institutions, private social welfare entities, courts of justice, administrative authorities, and administrative bodies. The Rights of Boys and Girls can be summarized in four categories: Survival, Development, Protection, and Participation. Within Survival is the right to life, health, and happiness. In Development, the right to a family, to be educated in a spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality, and solidarity that allows them to grow as a unique, distinct, and special person. In protection, there is the right to have their identity and integrity respected, to be protected from all physical, sexual, or mental abuse, and not to be mistreated or punished. In participation, the right to play, to think, to express themselves."* Without doubt, all of these imply correlative duties for the father and mother, which makes indispensable the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers aimed at enabling their effective enjoyment by their holders.

These powers-duties make up the content of parental authority (patria potestad) or parental responsibility, which legal doctrine usually classifies into three categories: personal content, property (patrimonial) content, and content related to representation. The first refers to the traditional care (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education (educación) of the son or daughter. Care (guarda) or custody translates into the power and the corresponding duty to have the child in one's company (to cohabit), to assist them, to care for them, to discipline them, and to constantly watch over their physical and psychological integrity. Upbringing (crianza) entails providing them with the nourishment and the stimuli necessary for their proper development, as well as attending to their fundamental needs. Education (educación) implies the duty to form and prepare them for autonomous social life and not only the duty to offer them the opportunity to acquire formal knowledge (Articles 143 and 144 of the Código de Familia and ruling of this Court no. 1236-02, at 8:30 a.m. on September 12, 2002). The power of administration of the property of a son or daughter under eighteen years of age constitutes the property (patrimonial) content (Articles 145, 146, and 147 ibídem). Finally, through representation, the father and mother act on behalf of their offspring, so long as they have not acquired full capacity to act and provided they do not have an interest adverse to that of the child; in which case a special curator (curador especial) must be appointed for them (Article 140 of the Código de Familia). The same must be done when a cognitive disability is present, as provided in Article 162 ibídem (see, among others, the rulings of this Chamber nos. 1473-03, at 1:05 p.m. on October 23, 2003; 1681-08, at 8:10 a.m. on September 18; 589-08, at 9:40 a.m. on March 27; and 929-08, at 11:20 a.m. on May 14, all three from 2008). At this point, it is essential to note that a more appropriate term than the classic "care, upbringing and education" (guarda, crianza y educación) referred to in the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the plenary session held on October 25, 1980, during its Fourteenth Session and approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 7746 of February 23, 1998 (Article 5, subsection a), and the Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children, adopted at the Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law on July 15, 1989, and approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 8032 of October 9, 2000 (Article 3, subsection a), is that of "right of custody" (derecho de custodia), used to describe the relationship and obligations between one of the parents and the son or daughter when the latter cannot live with both and must be under the primary care of one of them, with whom they will reside (physical custody) and who must procure for them the full satisfaction of their needs and will make the day-to-day decisions about their upbringing (legal custody).- **VII.-** What was indicated in the previous section leads to the conclusion that the powers-duties to care for and have in one's company (care (guarda)) [Name1], to prepare her for her life (education (educación)) and watch over her integrity, to provide her with nourishment and stimulation for her proper development and attend to her fundamental needs (upbringing (crianza)) concern both parties. However, since this is usually the case when they live together as a couple, and in this instance, that is not the situation and there is no agreement between them on who is to have the right of custody (derecho de custodia) of the girl, it becomes necessary to decide it through this avenue, in order to guarantee her stability and full development, without prejudice, certainly, to the right of the other party to monitor that she is well cared for and to maintain communication and interact with her, and without the final decision making it impossible for that party to participate in some determinations regarding her upbringing, especially when so ordered (see, in a similar vein, the ruling of this Court no. 929-08, at 11:20 a.m. on May 14, 2008). On this matter, it must be borne in mind that *"Two important aspects to consider are distinguished (...), ownership (titularidad) and exercise. Ownership (titularidad) is the condition of being the recipient of those rights and duties that correspond to the subject who has parental authority over the children; it is non-transferable, inalienable, and indivisible; joint holders—cases of father and mother with that authority—do not have 'parts' of this right, hence its indivisibility. Exercise, on the other hand, is the faculty to act concretely by virtue of those rights, and unlike ownership (titularidad), this may correspond separately to one or the other, or to both parents. Exercise translates into the execution of attributes derived from parental authority such as care (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education (educación), among others."* (Ruling no. 142-02, at 9:30 a.m. on February 6, 2002, reiterated, among others, in nos. 2041-04, at 7:30 a.m. on November 24, 2004; 1863-06, at 9:55 a.m. on November 22, 2006; 1598-07, at 9:20 a.m. on November 20, 2007; and 1353-09, at 10:30 a.m. on September 8, 2009). It follows from all this that, in principle, both the ownership (titularidad) and the exercise of the attributes that make up its various contents are strictly personal, inalienable, and non-negotiable or unavailable. Both are, furthermore, non-delegable, without detriment, of course, to changes made due to some temporary need of the father or mother or of the son or daughter, such as, for example, moving to a different residence to be able to pursue their studies, which does not legally translate into a delegation of parental authority. Supporting the foregoing is that its extinction is subject to legal facts (death or reaching the age of majority) or to judicial acts with the intervention of the competent bodies. Section 36 of the Código de la niñez y adolescencia summarizes the latter in the following terms: *"The causes that give rise to the definitive separation of a minor from their family are those provided for in the Código de Familia, as grounds for loss or suspension of parental authority. The suspension or termination of the powers and duties conferred by parental authority (patria potestad) may only be decreed by a judge."*- **VIII.-** As this Chamber has emphasized, the best interest (interés superior) is a fundamental premise of the doctrine of integral protection and constitutes the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of laws regarding childhood and adolescence (see, among many others, rulings nos. 2207-04, at 9:00 a.m. on December 14, 2004; 1472-05, at 8:10 a.m. on October 4, 2005; 59-08, at 11:20 a.m. on January 18; 1003-08, at 8:45 a.m. on May 27; 1681-08, at 8:10 a.m. on September 18; 1843-08, at 9:50 a.m. on October 15; and 1837-08, at 9:20 a.m. on October 15, all from 2008). Since its enactment in 1974, the Código de Familia recognized this status in its Article 2. At that historical moment, its content was defined from a psychosocial perspective—what is most convenient for the child—and responded to the paternalistic-authoritarian model. With the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a change of singular importance occurred, thanks to which it transformed into a legal concept, with a meaning based on self-determination and whose great breadth aims to guarantee the most complete protection of children's rights within a framework of legal certainty. From this perspective, its only possible content is the rights themselves. As [Name9] explains, *"(...) the concept of 'interest', according to the Dictionary of the Real Academia Española, is equivalent to 'benefit, utility, convenience, or necessity'. However, this synonymy tells us nothing about what may be beneficial, useful, convenient, or necessary for the child. Currently, social representations about what is appropriate or harmful for children or about what their essential needs are, are nourished by ideas agreed upon worldwide that define a certain universality capable of giving concrete content to the parameter. International treaties, and particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child, constitute a framework of greater objectivity and can be seen as an effort to set the requirements of childhood aimed at their full development. The rights accorded to children precisely configure the power granted to them intended to protect their vital interests through the demand for certain behaviors, both from the State and from the persons who have them under their care."* [The best interest of the child. In [Name10], [Name11] (director), *Los Derechos del Niño en la Familia. Discurso y Realidad*, Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad, 1998, p. 45]. For her part, [Name12]. [Name13] points out that *"(...) this concept falls within so-called framework definitions, since it is not easy to establish its scope, as it is an idea in permanent evolution and transformation (...). From the foregoing, it follows that the term under analysis is flexible, as it allows and requires, in turn, in each specific case, to qualify and redefine it, attending to the particularities of the situation. Thus, the best interest of the child will depend on specific circumstances (...). This particularity obliges the implementing bodies of the Convention, whether the administration or the Judiciary, to assume the extremely important task of discovering which course of action will lead to the defense of the best interest of the child in each particular case. What the Convention establishes is, precisely, that it will be mandatory for those agents to carry out the search that leads to that discovery of what best safeguards the best interest of the child (...)"* [*Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño*. Buenos Aires: Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores, 2002, pp. 101-102]. These precisions contextualize the obligation that subsection 1) of numeral 3 of the referred-to international instrument imposes on public or private social welfare institutions, courts, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, to pay particular attention to the best interest of the person under eighteen years of age in all measures concerning them, as well as the duty to consider it in any public or private action that affects them, stipulated in Article 5 of the Código de la niñez y la adolescencia. The latter points out that said best interest guarantees respect for their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment, in pursuit of their full personal development, and adds that, to determine it, it is necessary to take into account: *"a) Their condition as a subject of rights and responsibilities. b) Their age, degree of maturity, capacity for discernment, and other personal conditions. c) The socioeconomic conditions in which they develop. d) The correspondence between the individual interest and the social interest."* Finally, and in accordance with this, this regulatory body declares in its Section 3 that *"The rights and guarantees of this group are of public interest, inalienable, and non-transigible."*- **IX.-** Furthermore, in ruling no. 2008-14776, at 10:09 a.m. on October 3, 2008, the Sala Constitucional stated that *"Constitutional Law imposes on the Costa Rican State, as a fundamental duty, the protection of the best interest of the child. This must be reflected in the actions of the different institutions that make up part of the state apparatus (...)"*. In no. 2008-15461, at 3:07 p.m. on October 15, 2008, it held that *"(...) different international instruments recognize and impose the state duty to provide particular protection to the rights of boys and girls; from declaratory instruments such as the Universal Declaration itself, and especially since the approval and entry into force of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, a decisive impulse has been given to the protection of this special group, seeking to ensure that at all times adequate assistance and respect are provided for the rights recognized to them, among which stand out (...) the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence, as well as the right of children to remain with their parents, particularly with their mother –Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador-. The jurisprudence of this Chamber is emphatic in recognizing the protection that must be granted to the rights of boys and girls, also recognizing the best interest of the child's status and nature as a general principle which, as such, forms part of the legal system and must be applied to govern and direct all administrative and judicial activity related to minors. (...) In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, the best interest of the child cannot be opposed by any rule or decision –administrative or judicial– that contradicts it, unless in certain circumstances the applicability of some other general principle of a higher level is at stake, in which case the legal operator must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal nature of the best interest of the child, disregarding its strict application in cases involving minors, is contrary to the recognitions that Constitutional Law makes on this matter, while also giving rise to a position of vulnerability in the face of the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In other words, administrative and judicial authorities have the obligation to recognize and apply the general principle of the best interest of the child, in perfect compliance with its nature as a principle, with the mandates established by Constitutional Law, including devising appropriate mechanisms and consequent solutions in accordance with what is ordered by the referenced Article 2 of the American Convention."* And previously, in no. 2005-11262, at 3:00 p.m. on August 24, 2005, reiterated in nos. 2006-12246, at 3:24 p.m. on August 22, 2006; 2007-13548, at 3:14 p.m. on September 18, 2007; 2008-14068, at 9:04 a.m. on September 23, 2008; [Telf7], at 12:23 p.m. on January 30; and 2009-6003, at 2:49 p.m. on April 21, both from 2009, it had expressed that *"In the matter of the special rights that children have, there are several norms of constitutional, international, and infra-constitutional rank; all of them recognizing the best interest of the child as a criterion for every public or private action concerning a person under eighteen years of age. (...) From the norms of the international Human Rights instruments (...), it is abundantly clear that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the best interest of the child, avoiding the dismemberment of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions so that they enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority (autoridad parental), especially when the child requires special care. (...) In conclusion, after all that has been said, it is clear that children are entitled to a series of special rights and, correspondingly, the State and the parents or guardians of the children are bound by a series of obligations and duties towards them, even more so when dealing with children with special needs, all of which is supported by numerous international instruments, our Political Constitution, and legal norms."* (See also no. 2009-145, at 8:59 a.m. on January 13, 2009).- **X.-** The principle of the best interest, outlined above, makes it necessary to specify that in this type of proceeding, where the stability, well-being, and tranquility of a person under eighteen years of age are at stake, the criterion for establishing whether it is appropriate to attribute the personal attributes of parental authority (autoridad parental)—care (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education (educación) in traditional language—or, more properly, the right of custody (derecho de custodia), to the father or the mother, is not the lack of suitability of one of these subjects but rather the preeminence of their personal, material, family, and social conditions, and, of course, that of their commitment, availability, and diligence, aimed at guaranteeing their full development and respect for their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment. We are not, then, in the presence of a proceeding of a punitive nature, such as one brought for the purpose of ordering the suspension or termination of parental authority (autoridad parental) (see ruling no. 1681-08, at 8:10 a.m. on September 18, 2008), but rather one in which it is appropriate to place the child as the main interested party and determine what is most convenient for him or her (see, in a similar vein, rulings nos. 204-08, at 11:10 a.m. on January 30; 324-08, at 9:10 a.m. on February 27; 1204-08, at 9:10 a.m. on June 4, all three from 2008; and 764-09, at 1:00 p.m. on May 13, 2009). In other words, the decision ultimately adopted does not have to prejudge the inadequate exercise of the maternal or paternal role by the party who does not obtain satisfaction of their claim or their defense, but it must be supported by a better assessment of the conditions of the party who does achieve judicial protection. Offspring are not objects, but human beings with rights, and precisely for that reason, the greatest possible well-being must be guaranteed to them, within their parents' conditions. In accordance with this, it cannot be shared that, in this matter, the rules on the burden of proof were applied, as was done in the first instance. If, as indicated, the decision assigning one parent the right of custody (derecho de custodia) of the common son or daughter should not be attributed a punitive nature, it is obvious that the other parent's lack of suitability, assuming it has been alleged, is insufficient to justify it, since it requires proof that one has better personal, family, and social conditions to guarantee their full development. This means that both the party requesting that judicial attribution for themselves and the party opposing that claim are responsible for producing the evidence they deem pertinent to demonstrate that they are in a better position to exercise the personal attributes of parental authority. In any case, this requirement is not unrelated to what is provided in numeral 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, since, by virtue of that precept, *"The burden of proof falls upon: / 1) The party who formulates a claim, regarding the statements of the facts constitutive of their right. / 2) The party who opposes a claim, regarding the statements of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right."*- **XI.-** In order to resolve this matter, it is also advisable to keep in mind what was stated by the Sala Constitucional in ruling no. [Telf8], at 2:51 p.m. on April 8, 2003: *"(...) the rights corresponding to the minor's ties with their natural family are provided for in Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These declare their right to be cared for by their parents, to preserve their family relationships without unlawful interference, and to remain with them. Article 16 (...) of the Protocol of San Salvador refers to the right of the child to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents and, especially, that a very young child shall not be separated from their mother. The Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, in norms 30, 31, and 33, provides for the minor's right to grow and develop alongside their parents and to be cared for by them, to remain in their home, to grow up and be educated in the bosom of a family. / (...) Regarding the fundamental rights of the parents—reiterating that the plane they occupy is secondary, insofar as they are subordinated to the protection of the minor's best interest, in the terms already stated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Código de la Niñez—basically, the right to the integrity of the family is involved, excluding from that zone of intimacy all unjustified and excessive interference by public authorities. This, to the extent that the family is protected by Articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 15 of the Additional Protocol to that Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 10, 17, and 23 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Particularly, Article 17 of this latter regulatory body prohibits arbitrary interference in that human sphere. / (...) Although at first glance it might seem that the fundamental thing for issuing a decision in this case is to determine the prevalence of one of the groups of rights that directly concern the minor and the right of the parents referred to, this impression is false.* ***It is preferable to resort to the expression of conciliation and not to that of sacrifice of certain rights in favor of others, based on the principle inherent in the matter of fundamental rights of interdependence of those rights. That is, the various rights of which a person is a holder must be understood as part of a global scheme that must seek to be harmonized. This does not mean that all are placed on a plane of equality, but rather that it is obligatory to seek a solution that allows their integration, and only in the event that the different plausible responses are impracticable, may one right finally be preferred over another.** *(...)* ***The legal authorization for administrative and judicial authorities to intervene in family relationships is an indication of solutions for the conciliation of rights** that the decision of this matter involves,* ***to the extent that, although it is admitted that the rule is the preservation of the family group, this rule can be altered through a state reaction –administrative or jurisdictional–, without forgetting that such interference impacts fundamental rights.**"* (The bolding is added).- **XII.-** With the evidence submitted, it was established that [Name1] was procreated during the cohabitation maintained by the parties. For work-related reasons, at the end of 2006, her mother entrusted her care to the paternal grandmother, with whom Mr. D resided. Currently, the girl is a little over seven years and ten months old and, at least for the last two, has been living with her father, his wife, Mrs. [Name6], and her sister.

Even though it cannot be said that Mrs. [Nombre5] has incurred in serious breaches of her duties towards her daughter or has completely neglected her upbringing, nor is it possible to fail to recognize the emotional bond between them, to the point that [Nombre1] enthusiastically awaits her visits, the forensic psychosocial expert report on folios 95-106 compels us to consider it proven that she maintains a strong emotional bond with her father, identifies her current cohabitation nucleus as her family, [Nombre14] recognizes Mrs. [Nombre6] as a maternal figure, attends the [Nombre7] School Kindergarten regularly, fully complies with her academic obligations, to the point that her absences are for health reasons (asthma condition), and does not present behavioral problems. Furthermore, it must be considered very probable that she has been adequately stimulated, since her performance on the KBIT psychological instrument, which evaluated her verbal and non-verbal intelligence and measured her verbal skills related to school learning, was above average. To this series of positive aspects, if we add that for her teacher, the father and his spouse are responsible for her education, that the paternal-filial relationship does not present risk elements, and that there is no evaluation of the mother that allows affirming her better conditions to take charge of her care, the appropriate course is to grant Mr. [Nombre4] the claimed custody right (derecho de custodia). Therefore, and considering her best interest (interés superior), the appealed judgment must be revoked and the filed claim must be granted.- **XIII.-** It is necessary to point out that Mr. [Nombre4]'s decision to take [Nombre1] with him when he formed his current relationship and left his mother's house cannot be categorized, in this specific case, as reprehensible conduct, as it is not observed that he did so in bad faith. On the contrary, by acting in this way, he assumed his parental obligations (obligaciones parentales) as appropriate. As already noted, he exercises parental authority (autoridad parental) over her by full right and, at that time, the girl was not under the care or supervision of her mother. In other words, even though it was a unilateral act, the truth is that it reveals an evident sense of responsibility, which is confirmed when reviewing the living conditions she currently has. It is obvious that she is part of his life project, they maintain a strong and solid emotional bond, and he has not been negligent. That said, since the ownership of parental authority remains shared by both parties, it is not superfluous to warn Mr. [Nombre4] that the attribution to his person of the custody right (derecho de custodia) of [Nombre1] does not authorize him to ignore her fundamental right to interrelate with her mother and to cultivate her maternal-filial relationship, and that he is obligated not only not to hinder it but also to guarantee it. Mrs. [Nombre5] is an essential part of her daughter's life and must have the opportunity to be a significant figure for her. That is also part of her integral development.- **XIV.-** Under no circumstances can this Chamber share the prejudiced assertion of the first instance judge that "(…) by nature, children must remain by their mother's side, unless situations of social risk or any other require separating them from their mother and leaving them by their father's side." Such a conception ignores not only that the primary interest to be addressed when resolving a matter like this is that of the son or daughter, but also the entire historical struggle for gender equality that prevents attributing rights and responsibilities based on sexual difference between men and women. A first-order international instrument such as the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* demands that those of us who operate with the Law prevent the role of women in procreation from being a cause of discrimination, understood this, in the specific case, as the unequal attribution of responsibility in the upbringing of sons and daughters. It also requires us to implement the necessary measures to "(…) modify the traditional role of both men and women in society and in the family (…)" (preamble). For this very reason, the use of the term "delegation" to refer to Mr. D.'s exercise of the attributes of parental authority is unfortunate.

**XV.-** As a corollary of the foregoing, the filed appeal is granted, the appealed ruling is revoked, the exercise of the custody right (derecho de custodia) over [Nombre1] is assigned to Mr. D., and this matter is resolved with no special pronouncement on costs; the latter in accordance with the provisions of article 106 of the *Childhood and Adolescence Code* (Código de la niñez y la adolescencia).- **THEREFORE:** The appealed judgment is revoked. In its place, the claim is declared granted, and the exercise of the custody right (derecho de custodia) over the girl [Nombre1] is assigned to Mr. D. This matter is resolved with no special condemnation on costs.- **RANDALL ESQUIVEL QUIRÓS** **LUIS HÉCTOR AMORETTI OROZCO MAURICIO CHACÓN JIMÉNEZ** [Nombre15] 101-102", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "temasEstrategicos": [ "Human Rights", "Rights of the minor" ], "redactor": "Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco", "expediente": "070019300292FA", "hora": "10:30", "esProtegida": "1", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "claseAsunto": "Incident for modification of custody, upbringing, and education", "tipoTexto": "1", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "contenidosInteresOrden": "3", "despachoOrden": "54", "normas": [ { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "4859", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "74424", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "11" }, { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "4881", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "74424", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "33" }, { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "4899", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "74424", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "51" }, { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "4900", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "74424", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "52" }, { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "4901", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "74424", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "53" }, { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "5002", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "74424", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "154" }, { "norm_nom": "Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales Pacto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales Pacto de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y Protocolo Facultativo", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "65057", "norm_anno": "1968", "norm_num": "4229", "norm_ver": "12008", "norm_fecha": "11 Dic 1968", "norm_id": "11190", "art_num": "10" }, { "norm_nom": "Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales Pacto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales Pacto de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y Protocolo Facultativo", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "65064", "norm_anno": "1968", "norm_num": "4229", "norm_ver": "12008", "norm_fecha": "11 Dic 1968", "norm_id": "11190", "art_num": "17" }, { "norm_nom": "Pacto Internacional 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5.4pt;\r\n\tmso-para-margin:0cm;\r\n\tmso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;\r\n\tmso-pagination:widow-orphan;\r\n\tfont-size:10.0pt;\r\n\tfont-family:\"Times New Roman\";\r\n\tmso-ansi-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-fareast-language:#0400;\r\n\tmso-bidi-language:#0400;}\r\n</style>\r\n<![endif]-->\r\n</head>\r\n\r\n<body lang=ES style='tab-interval:35.4pt'>\r\n\r\n<div class=Section1>\r <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:36.85pt;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>“III.-</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'> As the Constitutional Chamber (<st1:PersonName style="BACKGROUND-POSITION: left bottom; BACKGROUND-IMAGE: url(res://ietag.dll/#34/#1001); BACKGROUND-REPEAT: repeat-x" tabIndex="0" ProductID="la Sala Constitucional" w:st="on">la Sala Constitucional</st1:PersonName>) has declared in several pronouncements (see votes No. 1319-97, at 14:51 on March 4, 1997; 8857-98, at 16:30 on December 15, 1998; and 2008-15461, at 15:07 on October 15, 2008), due to its content on human rights, the <i>Convention on the Rights of the Child</i> (<st1:PersonName style="BACKGROUND-POSITION: left bottom; BACKGROUND-IMAGE: url(res://ietag.dll/#34/#1001); BACKGROUND-REPEAT: repeat-x" tabIndex="0" ProductID="la Convención" w:st="on">la <i>Convención</i></st1:PersonName><i> sobre los derechos del niño</i>), approved by Law No. 7184 of July 18, 1990, like other international instruments that develop or complement its provisions, forms part of the parameter of constitutionality.

That means it has supreme force and, indeed, serves as a rule of interpretation for the provisions of the Fundamental Charter itself. In ruling No. 2313-95 of 16:18 hours on May 9, 1995, that body stated that *“(…) in the case of international human rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Political Constitution do not apply, since Article 48 of the Constitution contains a special provision for those referring to human rights, granting them normative force at the constitutional level itself. To the point that, as the jurisprudence of this Chamber has recognized, the human rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to individuals, they prevail over the Constitution (see judgment No. 3435-92 and its clarification, No. 5759-93).”* (See, to the same effect, rulings Nos. 1147-90, of 16:00 hours on September 21, 1990; 3435-92, of 16:20 hours on November 11, 1992; 3724-93, of 15:00 hours on August 4, 1991 (sic); 5759-93, of 14:15 hours on November 10, 1993; 1112-94, of 9:12 hours on February 25, 1994; 2002-10693, of 18:20 hours on November 7, 2002; 2003-2771, of 11:40 hours on April 4, 2003; 2007-1682, of 10:34 hours on February 9; 2007-3043, of 14:54 hours on March 7 and 2007-4276, of 14:49 hours on March 27, all three from 2007). And it is worth clarifying that, according to that canon, such instruments are not only those of a conventional nature; that is, conventions, treaties, or protocols, but also those that form part of the so-called *soft law*; that is, declarations, recommendations, programs and action plans, among others, and that their validity in the country is not conditioned upon the issuance of a formal act of ratification for each one, when that is possible. Moreover, in the aforementioned ruling No. 2313-95, it was noted *“(…) that if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural organ for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative framework, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will—in principle—have the same value as the interpreted norm. Not merely ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now uphold, moreover, is incorporated into our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms—such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law—shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.).”* Now, although it is a truism, it is necessary to insist that the *Constitutional Law* binds all public powers. In accordance with the provisions of numerals 154 and 11 of the *Political Charter*, those of us who exercise the jurisdictional function are obligated to apply it as a priority; that is, we are guarantors of the observance and effective validity of its precepts, values, and principles. In ruling No. 3495-92, cited above, the Constitutional Chamber pointed out that *“The Constitutional Law, composed of both constitutional norms and principles, and those of International Law and, particularly, those of its human rights instruments, as the primary foundations of the entire positive legal order, transmit their own logical structure and axiological sense to it, based on values even prior to the legislative texts themselves, which are, in turn, the source of every normative system characteristic of a society organized under the concepts of the Rule of Law, the constitutional regime, democracy, and freedom, in such a way that any norm or act that violates those values or principles—among them rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are, by definition, criteria of constitutionality—or that leads to absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations, or to dead ends for individuals or for the State, cannot be constitutionally valid.”* A corollary of all this is, without doubt, that any reading or application of secondary or ordinary norms must necessarily conform to the rules, principles, and values established in those instruments or inferred from their provisions. As that same Court evidenced in the referenced ruling No. 1319-97, *“The human rights normative framework not only implies compliance with the rights enshrined therein, but also signifies an interpretation, even more so, a re-reading of domestic legislation in light of these international provisions and the postulates incorporated into national legislation as part of the legal order. This is why procedural guarantees are of particular importance for human rights and essentially identify the Democratic Rule of Law.”* **IV.-** As is known, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* enshrines, at least on the formal-normative level, the doctrine of integral protection (doctrina de la protección integral), which produces a qualitative leap in the legal consideration of childhood insofar as it *“(…) incorporates the child and adolescent as full subjects of constitutional rights and duties, moving from a marked influence of social aspects to legal ones, within a framework of constitutional respect for the minor (sic).”* (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2000-5495, of 15:49 hours on July 4, 2000) and gathers the general principles of the framework for protecting these persons and the special ones intended for those who have been or are victims of deficiencies derived from negligent or abandonment treatment by their parents (see, to the same effect, ruling of this Court No. 1568-05, of 10:10 hours on October 12, 2005). In what is relevant here, that momentous multilateral *Treaty* postulates that, for the full and harmonious development of their personality, persons under eighteen years of age must grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, and are entitled to special care and assistance (preamble). It also recognizes their right to know their parents and to be cared for by them (Article 7) and to an adequate standard of living for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development (subsection 1 of Article 27) and declares that it is incumbent upon both parents, their legal representatives, or other persons responsible for them, the primary responsibility for their upbringing and for providing them, within their capabilities and financial means, the living conditions necessary for their development (subsections 1 of Article 18 and 2 of Article 27). Furthermore, it attributes to these subjects and to the members of the extended family or community and to their guardians, the authority to provide them, consistent with the evolution of their faculties, appropriate direction and guidance so they can exercise their rights (Articles 3, subsection 2 and 5), guarantees them respect for their responsibilities, rights and duties in the exercise of that transcendental social function (Articles 3, subsection 2 and 5) and demands that their fundamental concern be their best interests (interés superior) (subsection 1 of Article 18). The State, for its part, is obligated to ensure them the protection and care necessary for their well-being, for which it must implement all appropriate legislative and administrative measures (subsection 2 of Article 3). In particular, it must make every effort to guarantee the recognition of the principle that both parents have common obligations in fulfilling their parental functions (subsection 1 of Article 18); it must provide them appropriate assistance for the full performance of their role in order to guarantee and promote the rights set forth in the *Convention* and must adopt, in accordance with national conditions and within its means, appropriate measures to help those directly obligated to give effect to the right to an adequate standard of living for their integral development and, in case of need, provide them material assistance and support programs (subsection 3 of Article 27). It also constitutes a state obligation to adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the boy or girl against all forms of prejudice or physical or mental abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while under the custody of their parents, a legal representative, or any other person (subsection 1 of Article 19). These include effective procedures for the establishment of social programs with the object of providing, both to the person under eighteen and to those caring for them, the necessary assistance and forms of prevention, treatment, and subsequent observation of cases of maltreatment (subsection 2), as well as the adoption of all appropriate measures to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of any victim of any type of abandonment, exploitation or abuse, torture or other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which must be carried out in an environment that fosters their health, self-respect and dignity (Article 39). In that context, the State's duty not to separate them from their parents against the latter's will, and the exceptional possibility of doing so when that decision is necessary in consideration of their best interests (subsection 1 of Article 9), is stipulated and must be conceived. In similar terms, the *Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Well-being of Children, with Special Reference to Adoption and Placement in Foster Homes, at National and International Levels*, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 41/85, of December 3, 1986, reiterates principle 6 of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Child*, resolution 1386 (XIV) of November 20, 1959, by virtue of which the person under eighteen years of age must grow up under the shelter and responsibility of their parents and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and moral and material security, and establishes as a priority that they must be cared for by those subjects (Article 3), that when they cannot take care of it or do so inappropriately, the possibility of care being provided by other relatives, a substitute family, or, in necessary cases, an appropriate institution must be considered (Article 4), and that in all matters relating to their care by persons other than their own parents, their interests and, particularly, their need to receive affection and their right to security and continued care must be the fundamental consideration (Article 5).- **V.-** In accordance with those precepts of a fundamental nature and with the rest of the current legal system, as long as the daughters and sons have not reached the age of majority or have not been emancipated, the father and mother are the primary obligors to satisfy their basic requirements for care, assistance, protection, education, security, and legal representation. For this purpose, both are recognized as holders of parental authority (patria potestad) or parental authority — a direct and immediate consequence of the act of procreation that, therefore, corresponds exclusively to those who hold the status of parents (it is advisable to review rulings of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1975-94, of 15:37 hours on April 26, 1994 and 2006-12019, of 16:32 hours on August 16, 2006; that of the Second Chamber No. 2004-825, of 10:35 hours on September 29, 2004 and those of this body Nos. 2014-04, of 10:50 hours on November 16; 2218-04, of 10:50 hours on December 14, both of 2004, and 324-05, of 7:50 hours on March 30, 2005)— which, unlike what occurred in other historical moments, can no longer be viewed as an absolute power or right but rather as a social function whose core is the duty to guarantee persons under eighteen years of age the effective enjoyment of their basic rights with the purpose of realizing their integral development. In ruling No. 2001-2050, of 15:54 hours on March 14, 2001, the jurisdictional authority responsible for constitutionality control established that *“It must be insisted that what parents have towards their children (sic) are basically obligations, and under this perspective, what can be conceived as rights, are precisely the possibility of establishing the paternity of the minor (sic) and giving them their surname, in order to exercise the functions expected of a parent (sic), which include not only economic support, but also attention, care and the development of emotional bonds with the children (sic).”* (See, to the same effect, rulings Nos. 1975-94; 2006-12019, both already cited, and 2006-16030, of 9:33 hours on November 3, 2006).- **VI.-** Based on the provisions of Articles 33, 52 and 53 of the *Political Constitution*; 16, subsection d), of the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*, approved by Law No. 6968 of October 2, 1984; 7, subsection 1) and 18, subsection 1), of the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* and with absolute independence from the civil status of the father and mother (see rulings of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1975-94 and 2006-12019, already cited), as a general rule, parental authority (patria potestad) or parental authority over their common children must be exercised jointly by both, with equal powers (potestades), duties, and rights. Eloquent, in this regard, is the text of the last cited norm, by virtue of which *"States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. / Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their basic concern shall be the best interests of the child."* In relevant part and in their order, articles 151 and 140 of the *Family Code* provide that: *“The father and mother exercise, with equal rights and duties, the parental authority over their children (…).”* *“It is incumbent upon parents to govern their children, protect them, administer their property and represent them legally.”* Finally, Article 30 of the *Childhood and Adolescence Code* stipulates the following: *“Minors shall have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow and develop at their side and be cared for by them. They shall have the right to remain in their home from which they cannot be expelled or prevented from returning, except by judicial decision that so establishes.”* That supposes that, in principle, decisions concerning the sons and daughters must be adopted by mutual agreement and that, in case they fail to reach one, they may resort to the judicial authority so that it decides what is pertinent. In both scenarios, their best interests must always be safeguarded. As this Court pointed out in its ruling No. 2207-04, of 9:00 hours on December 14, 2004: *"Based on this principle, a mandatory line of action is established for public institutions, private social welfare entities, courts of justice, administrative authorities and administrative bodies. The Rights of Boys and Girls can be summarized in four categories: Survival, Growth, Protection and Participation. Within Survival is the right to life, to health, and to happiness. In Growth, the right to a family, to be educated in a spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality, and solidarity that allows them to grow as a unique, distinct and special person. In Protection, the right to have their identity and integrity respected, to be protected from all physical, sexual or mental abuse, to not be mistreated or punished. In Participation, the right to play, to think, to express themselves."* Without doubt, all of them suppose correlative duties of the father and mother, which make indispensable the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers (potestades instrumentales) aimed at enabling their effective enjoyment by their holders. Such powers-duties make up the content of parental authority, which doctrine usually classifies into three categories: personal content, patrimonial content, and that related to representation. The first refers to the traditional guardianship (guarda), upbringing (crianza) and education (educación) of the son or daughter. Guardianship or custody translates into the power and correlative duty to have them in their company (cohabit), assist them, care for them, discipline them and constantly watch over their physical and psychological integrity. Upbringing supposes providing them the food and stimuli necessary for their adequate development, as well as attending to their fundamental needs. Education implies the duty to train and prepare them for autonomous social life and not only that of providing them the opportunity to acquire formal knowledge (Articles 143 and 144 of the *Family Code* and ruling of this Court No. 1236-02, of 8:30 hours on September 12, 2002). The power (potestad) to administer the property of the son or daughter under eighteen years of age constitutes the patrimonial content (Articles 145, 146 and 147 *ibidem*). Lastly, through representation, the father and mother act on behalf of their offspring, as long as they have not acquired full capacity to act and provided they do not have an interest opposed to theirs; a case in which a special guardian (curador especial) must be appointed for them (Article 140 of the *Family Code*). The same must be done when in the presence of some cognitive disability, as provided by Article 162 *ibidem* (see, among others, rulings of this Chamber Nos. 1473-03, of 13:05 hours on October 23, 2003; 1681-08, of 8:10 hours on September 18; 589-08, of 9:40 hours on March 27 and 929-08, of 11:20 hours on May 14, all three from 2008).

At this point, it is essential to note that a more appropriate term than the classic "care, upbringing, and education" (guarda, crianza y educación) referred to in the *Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction*, adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the plenary session held on October 25, 1980, within the framework of its fourteenth session and approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 7746 of February 23, 1998 (article 5, subsection a), and the *Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children*, adopted at the Fourth Specialized Inter-American Conference on Private International Law on July 15, 1989, and approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 8032 of October 9, 2000 (article 3, subsection a), is that of "right of custody" (derecho de custodia), used to describe the relationship and obligations between one of the parents and the son or daughter when the latter cannot live with both and must be under the primary care of one of them, with whom they will reside (physical custody) and who must ensure the full satisfaction of their needs and will make the daily decisions regarding their upbringing (legal custody).- **VII.-** The foregoing leads to the assertion that the powers-duties to care for and have in one's company (care, guarda) K, to prepare her for life (education), and to ensure her well-being, provide her with sustenance and stimulation for her proper development, and attend to her fundamental needs (upbringing, crianza) concern both parties. However, as this is usually the case when they live together as a couple, and in this instance, that assumption does not apply and there is no agreement between them regarding who should hold the right of custody of the girl, it becomes necessary to decide this matter through this channel, in order to guarantee her stability and full development, without prejudice, of course, to the right of the other party to monitor that she is well cared for and to maintain communication and interrelate with her, and without the final decision precluding that party from participating in certain determinations regarding her upbringing, especially when so stipulated (see, in a similar sense, ruling No. 929-08 of this Court, issued at 11:20 a.m. on May 14, 2008). In this regard, it must be borne in mind that "A distinction is made, as important aspects to consider (…), between ownership and exercise. Ownership (titularidad) is the condition of being the recipient of those rights and duties corresponding to the subject who holds parental authority (autoridad parental) over the children; it is non-transferable, inalienable, and indivisible; joint owners –in cases of father and mother with such authority– do not have 'shares' of this right, hence its indivisibility. Exercise (ejercicio), on the other hand, is the power to act concretely by virtue of those rights, and unlike ownership, it can belong separately to one or the other, or to both parents. The exercise translates into the execution of attributes derived from parental authority such as care (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education, among others." (Ruling No. 142-02, issued at 9:30 a.m. on February 6, 2002, reiterated, among others, in Nos. 2041-04, issued at 7:30 a.m. on November 24, 2004; 1863-06, issued at 9:55 a.m. on November 22, 2006; 1598-07, issued at 9:20 a.m. on November 20, 2007; and 1353-09, issued at 10:30 a.m. on September 8, 2009). It follows from all this that, in principle, both its ownership and the exercise of the attributes that make up its various contents are highly personal, inalienable, and non-negotiable or non-waivable. Both are, furthermore, non-delegable, without detriment, of course, to changes implemented due to some temporary need of the father, mother, son, or daughter, such as, for example, moving to a different residence to pursue studies, which does not legally translate into a delegation of parental authority. This is supported by the fact that its extinction is subject to legal facts (death or reaching the age of majority) or judicial acts with the intervention of the competent bodies. Article 36 of the *Childhood and Adolescence Code* (Código de la niñez y adolescencia) summarizes the latter in the following terms: "The causes that give rise to the definitive separation of a minor from their family are those provided for in the Family Code, as grounds for the loss or suspension of parental authority. The suspension or termination of the powers and duties conferred by parental authority (patria potestad) can only be decreed by a judge."- **VIII.-** As this Chamber has emphasized, the best interest is a fundamental premise of the doctrine of comprehensive protection and constitutes the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of regulations concerning childhood and adolescence (see, among many others, rulings Nos. 2207-04, issued at 9:00 a.m. on December 14, 2004; 1472-05, issued at 8:10 a.m. on October 4, 2005; 59-08, issued at 11:20 a.m. on January 18; 1003-08, issued at 8:45 a.m. on May 27; 1681-08, issued at 8:10 a.m. on September 18; 1843-08, issued at 9:50 a.m. on October 15; and 1837-08, issued at 9:20 a.m. on October 15, all from 2008). Since its enactment in 1974, the *Family Code* has recognized this status in its article 2. At that historical moment, its content was defined from a psychosocial perspective—whatever was most convenient for the boy or girl—and responded to a paternalistic-authoritarian scheme. With the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, a change of singular importance took place, thanks to which it transformed into a legal concept, with a meaning based on self-determination and whose great breadth seeks to guarantee the most complete protection of children's rights within a framework of legal certainty. From this perspective, its only possible content is the rights themselves. As Cecilia GROSMAN explains, "(…) the concept of 'interest,' according to the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, is equivalent to 'benefit, utility, convenience, or necessity.' However, this synonymy tells us nothing about what may be beneficial, useful, convenient, or necessary for the child. Currently, social representations of what is appropriate or harmful for children or what their essential needs are, are nourished by globally agreed-upon ideas that define a certain universality capable of giving concrete content to the parameter. International treaties, and particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child, constitute a more objective framework and can be seen as an effort to establish the requirements of childhood aimed at its full development. The rights granted to children precisely configure the power conferred upon them to safeguard their vital interests by claiming certain behaviors, both from the State and from the persons who have them under their care." [The best interest of the child. In GROSMAN, Cecilia (director), *Children's Rights in the Family. Discourse and Reality*, Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad, 1998, p. 45]. For her part, Inés M. WEIMBERG DE ROCA points out that "(…) this concept falls within what are known as framework definitions, since it is not easy to establish its scope, as it is an idea in permanent evolution and transformation (…). From the foregoing, it turns out that the term under analysis is flexible, in that it permits and requires, in each specific case, its qualification and redefinition, taking into account the particularities of the situation. Thus, the best interest of the child will depend on specific circumstances (…). This particularity obliges the bodies responsible for applying the Convention, whether the administration or the Judiciary, to undertake the highly important task of discovering which course of action will lead to the defense of the child's best interest in each particular case. What the Convention establishes is, precisely, that it will be mandatory for those agents to undertake the search leading to that discovery of what best safeguards the child's best interest (…)" [*Convention on the Rights of the Child*. Buenos Aires: Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores, 2002, pp. 101-102]. These clarifications contextualize the obligation imposed by subsection 1) of article 3 of the aforementioned international instrument on public or private social welfare institutions, courts, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, to pay particular attention to the best interest of the person under eighteen years of age in all measures concerning them, as well as the duty to consider it in any public or private action affecting them, stipulated in article 5 of the *Childhood and Adolescence Code*. The latter points out that said best interest guarantees respect for their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment, in pursuit of their full personal development, and adds that, to determine it, it is necessary to take into account: "a) Their condition as a subject of rights and responsibilities. b) Their age, degree of maturity, capacity for discernment, and other personal conditions. c) The socioeconomic conditions in which they develop. d) The correspondence between the individual and social interest." Finally, and in accordance with this, this regulatory body declares in its article 3 that "The rights and guarantees of this group are of public interest, inalienable, and non-negotiable."- **IX.-** Furthermore, in ruling No. 2008-14776, issued at 10:09 a.m. on October 3, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated that "Constitutional Law imposes upon the Costa Rican State, as a fundamental duty, the protection of the best interest of the child. This must be reflected in the actions of the different institutions that form part of the state apparatus (…)". In No. 2008-15461, issued at 3:07 p.m. on October 15, 2008, it held that "(…) different international instruments recognize and impose the state duty to provide particular protection to the rights of boys and girls; from declarative instruments such as the Universal Declaration itself, and especially since the approval and entry into force of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, a decisive impetus has been given to the protection of this special group, seeking to ensure that adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized therein are provided at all times, among which stand out (…) the promotion of the conditions necessary for family coexistence, as well as the right of children to remain with their parents, particularly with their mother –article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador–. The jurisprudence of the Chamber is emphatic in recognizing the protection that must be granted to the rights of boys and girls, also recognizing the best interest of the child’s condition and nature as a general principle which, as such, forms part of the legal system and must be applied to govern and guide all administrative and judicial activity related to minors. (…) In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, no norm or decision –administrative or judicial– that contradicts the best interest of the child can be invoked against it, except when, in specific circumstances, the applicability of some other higher-level general principle is at stake, in which case the legal operator must adhere to the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal nature of the child's best interest by disregarding its strict application in cases involving minors, is contrary to the recognitions that Constitutional Law makes on this matter, while also creating room to place oneself in a position of vulnerability against the mandate of article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In other words, administrative and judicial authorities have the obligation to recognize and apply the general principle of the best interest of the child, in full compliance with its character as a principle, with the mandates established by Constitutional Law, even devising appropriate mechanisms and consequent solutions in accordance with what is ordered by the aforementioned article 2 of the American Convention." And previously, in No. 2005-11262, issued at 3:00 p.m. on August 24, 2005, reiterated in Nos. 2006-12246, issued at 3:24 p.m. on August 22, 2006; 2007-13548, issued at 3:14 p.m. on September 18, 2007; 2008-14068, issued at 9:04 a.m. on September 23, 2008; 2009-1301, issued at 12:23 p.m. on January 30 and 2009-6003, issued at 2:49 p.m. on April 21, both from 2009, it had expressed that "Regarding the special rights that children possess, there are several norms of constitutional, international, and infra-constitutional rank; all of which recognize the best interest of the child as a criterion for all public or private action concerning a person under eighteen years of age. (…) From the norms of international Human Rights instruments (…), it is, quite clearly, the fundamental duty of States to protect the best interest of the child, avoiding the dismemberment of the family nucleus and promoting the conditions necessary for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority, especially when the child requires special care. (…) In conclusion, after all that has been said, it is clear that children are entitled to a series of special rights and, correspondingly, the State and the parents or guardians of children have a series of obligations and duties towards them, even more so when dealing with children with special needs, all of which is supported by numerous international instruments, our Political Constitution, and legal norms." (See also No. 2009-145, issued at 8:59 a.m. on January 13, 2009).- **X.-** The principle of best interest, outlined above, obliges us to specify that in this type of proceeding, where the stability, well-being, and tranquility of a person under eighteen years of age are at stake, the criterion for establishing whether it is appropriate to attribute the personal attributes of parental authority to the father or the mother—the care (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education in traditional language—or, more properly, the right of custody, is not the lack of suitability of one of those subjects but the preeminence of their personal, material, family, and social conditions and, of course, their commitment, availability, and diligence, aimed at guaranteeing the child's full development and respect for their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment. We are not, therefore, in the presence of a proceeding of a punitive nature, such as one brought with the purpose of ordering the suspension or termination of parental authority (see ruling No. 1681-08, issued at 8:10 a.m. on September 18, 2008), but rather one in which the principal interested party must be placed as the boy or girl and what is most convenient for him or her must be determined (see, in a similar sense, rulings Nos. 204-08, issued at 11:10 a.m. on January 30; 324-08, issued at 9:10 a.m. on February 27; 1204-08, issued at 9:10 a.m. on June 4, all three from 2008, and 764-09, issued at 1:00 p.m. on May 13, 2009). In other words, the decision ultimately adopted does not have to prejudge the inadequate exercise of the maternal or paternal role by the party who does not obtain the satisfaction of their claim or defense, but it must be supported by a better assessment of the conditions of the party who does achieve jurisdictional protection. Offspring are not objects, but human beings with rights, and precisely for this reason, the greatest possible well-being must be guaranteed to them, within the conditions of their parents. In accordance with this, it cannot be agreed that, in this matter, the rules on the burden of proof were applied, as was done in the first instance. If, as stated, the decision assigning the right of custody of the common son or daughter to one parent should not be given a punitive nature, it is obvious that the other parent's lack of suitability, assuming it was alleged, is insufficient to justify it, as accreditation is required that one possesses superior personal, family, and social conditions to guarantee the child's full development. This means that both the party who seeks that jurisdictional attribution for themselves and the party who opposes that claim are responsible for producing the evidence they deem pertinent to demonstrate that they are in a better position to exercise the personal attributes of parental authority. In any case, this requirement is not alien to what is provided in article 317 of the *Code of Civil Procedure* (Código Procesal Civil), since, by virtue of that precept, "The burden of proof falls: / 1) On the party formulating a claim, regarding the assertions of the facts constituting their right. / 2) On the party opposing a claim, regarding the assertions of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right."- **XI.-** For the purpose of resolving this matter, it is also appropriate to bear in mind what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling No. 2003-2793, issued at 2:51 p.m. on April 8, 2003: "(…) the rights corresponding to the ties of the minor with their natural family are provided for in articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These declare their right to be cared for by their parents, to preserve their family relationships without illicit interference, and to remain with them. Article 16 (…) of the Protocol of San Salvador refers to the right of the child to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents and, especially, that the young child shall not be separated from their mother. The Childhood and Adolescence Code, in norms 30, 31, and 33, provides for the right of the minor to grow and develop alongside their parents and to be cared for by them, to remain in their home, to grow up and be educated within the bosom of a family. / (…) Regarding the fundamental rights of the parents –reiterating that the plane they occupy is secondary, insofar as they are subordinated to the protection of the best interest of the minor, in the terms already set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Childhood Code– the right to family integrity is basically involved, excluding from that zone of privacy any unjustified and excessive interference by public authorities.

This, to the extent that the family is protected by Articles 51 of <st1:PersonName style="BACKGROUND-POSITION: left bottom; BACKGROUND-IMAGE: url(res://ietag.dll/#34/#1001); BACKGROUND-REPEAT: repeat-x" tabIndex="0" ProductID="la Constitución Política" w:st="on">the Political Constitution</st1:PersonName>, 17 of <st1:PersonName style="BACKGROUND-POSITION: left bottom; BACKGROUND-IMAGE: url(res://ietag.dll/#34/#1001); BACKGROUND-REPEAT: repeat-x" tabIndex="0" ProductID="la Convención Americana" w:st="on">the American Convention</st1:PersonName> on Human Rights, 15 of the Additional Protocol to that Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10, 17 and 23 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Particularly in Article 17 of this last normative body, arbitrary interference in that human sphere is prohibited. / (…) Although at first glance it might seem that the fundamental issue for issuing a decision in this case is to determine the prevalence of one of the groups of rights that directly concern the minor (sic) and the right of the parents to which reference was made, this impression is false. <b>It is preferable to resort to the expression of conciliation and not to that of the sacrifice of certain rights in favor of others, based on the principle proper to the area of fundamental rights of the interdependence of those rights. That is to say, one must understand the various rights of which a person is a holder <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:City w:st="on">as</st1:City></st1:place> part of a global scheme that must seek to harmonize them. This does not mean that all are located on a plane of equality, but rather that it is obligatory to seek a solution that allows their integration, and only in the event that the different plausible responses are impracticable, may one right finally be preferred over another.</b> (…) <b>The legal permission for administrative and judicial authorities to intervene in family relationships is an indication of conciliation solutions for the rights</b> involved in the decision of this matter, <b>to the extent that even while admitting that the rule is the preservation of the family group, this rule may be altered through a state reaction –administrative or jurisdictional–, without forgetting that such interference impacts fundamental rights.</b>” (Bold text has been added).- **XII.-** With the means of conviction provided, it was established that K. was procreated during the cohabitation maintained by the parties. For work reasons, at the end of 2006, her mother entrusted her care to her paternal grandmother, with whom Mr. D resided. Currently, the girl is just over seven years and ten months old and, at least for the last two, has lived with her father, his wife, Mrs. R., and her sister. Even though it cannot be said that Ms. S. has incurred in serious breaches of her duties toward her daughter or has completely disengaged from her upbringing, nor is it possible to fail to recognize the emotional bond between them, to the point that K. enthusiastically awaits her visits, the forensic psychosocial expert report (peritaje psicosocial forense) on pages 95-106 obliges us to consider it proven that she maintains a strong emotional bond with her father, identifies her current cohabitation nucleus as her family, also recognizes Mrs. R. as a mother figure, attends Kinder at the <st1:PersonName style="BACKGROUND-POSITION: left bottom; BACKGROUND-IMAGE: url(res://ietag.dll/#34/#1001); BACKGROUND-REPEAT: repeat-x" tabIndex="0" ProductID="la Escuela Maurilio" w:st="on">Maurilio Soto Alfaro School</st1:PersonName> regularly, fully meets her academic obligations, to the point that her absences are for health reasons (suffering from asthma), and does not present behavioral problems. Furthermore, it must be considered very likely that she has been adequately stimulated, since her performance on the KBIT psychological instrument, which evaluated her verbal and non-verbal intelligence and measured her verbal skills related to school learning, was above average. If to this series of positive aspects is added that for her teacher, her father and his spouse are responsible for her education, that the paternal-filial relationship presents no risk elements, and that there is no evaluation of the mother that would allow us to affirm her better conditions to take charge of her care, the appropriate action is to grant Mr. D. the custody right claimed. This being the case, and considering her best interests, the appealed judgment must be revoked and the filed complaint upheld.- **XIII.-** It is necessary to point out that Mr. D.’s decision to take K. with him when he formed his current relationship and left his mother's house cannot be classified, in this specific case, as a reprehensible conduct, as it is not observed that he did so in bad faith. On the contrary, by having acted in this way, he assumed his parental obligations as was appropriate. As already noted, he exercises parental authority (autoridad parental) over her by full right, and at that time, the girl was not under the care or supervision of her mother. In other words, no matter how much it is a unilateral act, the truth is that it reveals a clear sense of responsibility, which is confirmed when reviewing the living conditions she currently has. It is obvious that she is part of his life project, they maintain a strong and solid emotional bond, and he has not been negligent. That said, as the ownership of parental authority (patria potestad) or parental authority (autoridad parental) is held jointly by both parties, it is not superfluous to warn Mr. D. that the attribution to his person of the custody right of K. does not authorize him to disregard her fundamental right to interrelate with her mother and to cultivate her maternal-filial relationship, and that he is obligated not only not to hinder it but also to guarantee it. Mrs. S. is an essential part of her daughter's life and must have the opportunity to be a significant figure for her. That is also part of her integral development.- **XIV.-** Under no circumstances can this Chamber share the prejudiced statement of the first-instance judge that *“(…) by nature, children must remain by their mother's side, unless situations of social risk or any other require separating them from their mother and leaving them by their father's side.”* Such a conception disregards not only that the primary interest to be served when resolving a matter like this is that of the son or daughter, but also the entire historical struggle for gender equality that prevents the attribution of rights and responsibilities in consideration of the sexual difference between men and women. A first-order international instrument such as the <st1:PersonName style="BACKGROUND-POSITION: left bottom; BACKGROUND-IMAGE: url(res://ietag.dll/#34/#1001); BACKGROUND-REPEAT: repeat-x" tabIndex="0" ProductID="la Convención" w:st="on">*Convention*</st1:PersonName> *on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* demands of those of us who operate with the Law to prevent the role of women in procreation from being a cause of discrimination, understood this, in the specific case, as the unequal attribution of responsibility in the upbringing of children. It also requires us to implement the necessary measures in order to *“(…) modify the traditional role of both the man and the woman in society and in the family (…)”* (preamble). For this very reason, the use of the term “delegation” to refer to the exercise of the attributes of parental authority (autoridad parental) by Mr. D. is unfortunate.

**XV.-** As a corollary of the foregoing, the filed appeal is upheld, the appealed ruling is revoked, the exercise of the custody right over K. is assigned to Mr. D., and this matter is resolved without a special ruling on costs; the latter pursuant to the provisions of article 106 of the *Childhood and Adolescence Code* (Código de la niñez y la adolescencia).” l) The parent-child relationship does not present risk factors (forensic psychosocial assessment on folios 95-106).

**III.-** As the Constitutional Chamber has declared in several rulings (see votes nos. 1319-97, at 14:51 hours of March 4, 1997; 8857-98, at 16:30 hours of December 15, 1998, and 2008-15461, at 15:07 hours of October 15, 2008), due to its content in the area of human rights, the *Convención sobre los derechos del niño*, approved by Ley N.° 7184 of July 18, 1990, like other international instruments that develop or complement its provisions, forms part of the constitutionality parameter. This means it has supreme force and even serves as a rule of interpretation for the provisions of the Fundamental Charter itself. In vote no. 2313-95 at 16:18 hours of May 9, 1995, that body expressed that *“(…) in the case of international Human Rights instruments in force in the country, the provisions of Article 7 of the Constitución Política do not apply, since Article 48 of the Constitution has a special rule for those referring to human rights, granting them normative force at the constitutional level itself. To the point that, as the jurisprudence of this Chamber has recognized, the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Constitución Política, but to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail over the Constitution (see judgment No. 3435-92 and its clarification, No. 5759-93).”* (See, in the same sense, votes nos. 1147-90, at 16 hours of September 21, 1990; 3435-92, at 16:20 hours of November 11, 1992; 3724-93, at 15 hours of August 4, 1991 (sic); 5759-93, at 14:15 hours of November 10, 1993; 1112-94, at 9:12 hours of February 25, 1994; 2002-10693, at 18:20 hours of November 7, 2002; [Telf1], at 11:40 hours of April 4, 2003; [Telf2], at 10:34 hours of February 9; [Telf3], at 14:54 hours of March 7, and [Telf4], at 14:49 hours of March 27, all three of 2007). And it is appropriate to clarify that, according to that canon, such instruments are not only those of a conventional nature; that is, covenants, treaties, or protocols, but also those that form part of the so-called *soft law*; that is, declarations, recommendations, programs, and plans of action, among others, and that their validity in the country is not conditioned by the issuance of a formal act of ratification for each one, when that is possible. Moreover, in the aforementioned vote no. 2313-95, it was warned *“(…) that if the Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos is the natural body for interpreting the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normative, whether in a contentious case or a mere consultation, shall have—in principle—the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis we now uphold is, moreover, accepted in our law, when the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides that unwritten norms—such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law—shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.).”* Now then, although it is a truth of [Nombre8], it is necessary to insist that the *Derecho de la Constitución* binds all public powers. In accordance with the provisions of numerals 154 and 11 of the *Carta Política*, those of us who exercise the jurisdictional function are obliged to apply it on a priority basis; that is, we are guarantors of the observance and effective validity of its precepts, values, and principles. In vote no. 3495-92, cited above, the Constitutional Chamber specified that *"The Derecho de la Constitución, composed of both constitutional norms and principles and those of International Law, particularly those of its human rights instruments, as primary foundations of the entire positive legal order, transmit to it their own logical structure and axiological sense, based on values even prior to the legislative texts themselves, which are, in turn, the source of all normative systems proper to a society organized under the concepts of the Estado de Derecho, the constitutional regime, democracy, and liberty, such that any norm or act that violates those values or principles—among them rationality, reasonableness, and proportionality, which are, by definition, criteria of constitutionality—or that leads to absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations, or to dead ends for individuals or for the State, cannot be constitutionally valid.”* A corollary of all this is, without a doubt, that any reading or application of secondary or ordinary norms must necessarily be adjusted to the rules, principles, and values established in those instruments or that are inferred from their provisions. As that same Tribunal evidenced in the referred vote no. 1319-97, *“Human rights normative not only implies the fulfillment of the rights enshrined therein, but also signifies an interpretation, even more, a re-reading of internal legislation in light of these international provisions and the postulates incorporated into national legislation as part of the legal order. It is for this reason that procedural guarantees are of particular importance for human rights and identify, by essence, the Estado de Democrático de Derecho.”*- **IV.-** As is known, the *Convención sobre los derechos del niño* enshrines, at least on the formal-normative plane, the doctrine of comprehensive protection (protección integral), which produces a qualitative leap in the juridical consideration of childhood in that *“(…) it incorporates the child and the adolescent as full subjects of constitutional rights and duties, moving from a marked influence of social aspects to juridical ones, within a framework of constitutional respect for the minor (sic).”* (Vote of the Constitutional Chamber no. [Telf5], at 15:49 hours of July 4, 2000) and gathers the general principles of the framework for the protection of those persons and the special ones intended for those who have been or are victims of the deficiencies derived from negligent treatment or abandonment (abandónico) by their parents (see, in the same sense, the vote of this Tribunal no. 1568-05, at 10:10 hours of October 12, 2005). In what is of interest here, that momentous multilateral *Treaty* postulates that, for the full and harmonious development of their personality, persons under eighteen years of age should grow up in the bosom of a family, in an environment of happiness, love, and understanding, and have the right to special care and assistance (preamble). It also recognizes their right to know their parents and to be cared for by them (Article 7), to an adequate standard of living (nivel de vida adecuado) for their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (paragraph 1 of Article 27), and declares that it is incumbent upon both parents, their legal representatives, or other persons responsible for them, the primary responsibility for their upbringing (crianza) and for providing them, within their possibilities and economic means, the living conditions necessary for their development (paragraph 1 of Article 18 and paragraph 2 of 27). Furthermore, it attributes to these subjects and to the members of the extended family or the community and to their guardians, the authority to impart to them, in accordance with the evolution of their capacities, appropriate direction and guidance so they can exercise their rights (Articles 3, paragraph 2 and 5), guarantees them respect for their responsibilities, rights, and duties in the exercise of that momentous social function (Articles 3, paragraph 2 and 5), and demands that their fundamental concern be the best interests of the child (interés superior) (paragraph 1 of Article 18). The State, for its part, is obliged to ensure them the protection and care necessary for their well-being, for which it must implement all appropriate legislative and administrative measures (paragraph 2 of Article 3). In particular, it must make every effort to guarantee recognition of the principle that both parents have common obligations in the fulfillment of their parental functions (paragraph 1 of Article 18); it must provide them appropriate assistance for their full performance in order to guarantee and promote the rights enunciated in the *Convention*, and it must adopt, in accordance with national conditions and with its means, appropriate measures to help the direct obligors give effect to the right to an adequate standard of living for their comprehensive development and, if necessary, provide them material assistance and support programs (paragraph 3 of Article 27). It is also a state obligation to adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to protect the male or female child against all forms of physical or mental harm or abuse, neglect, or negligent treatment, ill-treatment, or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while under the custody (custodia) of the parents, a legal representative, or any other person (paragraph 1 of Article 19). Among these are included effective procedures for the establishment of social programs for the purpose of providing both the person under eighteen years of age and those who care for them the necessary assistance and forms of prevention, treatment, and subsequent observation of cases of ill-treatment (paragraph 2), as well as the adoption of all appropriate measures to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of anyone who has been a victim of any type of abandonment, exploitation, or abuse, torture, or other form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, which must be carried out in an environment that fosters their health, self-respect, and dignity (Article 39). In that context, the duty of the State not to separate them from their parents against the latter's will is stipulated and must be conceived, along with the exceptional possibility of doing so when that decision is necessary in consideration of their best interests (paragraph 1 of Article 9). In similar terms is pronounced the *Declaración sobre los principios sociales y jurídicos relativos a la protección y el bienestar de los niños, con particular referencia a la adopción y la colocación en hogares de guarda, en los planos nacional e internacional*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/85, of December 3, 1986, which reiterates principle 6 of the *Declaración de los derechos del niño*, resolution 1386 (XIV) of November 20, 1959, by virtue of which the person under eighteen years of age must grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents and, in any case, in an environment of affection and moral and material security, and establishes as a priority that they must be cared for by those subjects (Article 3), that when they cannot take care of doing so or do so inappropriately, the possibility must be considered that the care be entrusted to other relatives, a substitute family, or, if necessary, an appropriate institution (Article 4), and that in all matters relating to their care by persons other than their own parents, the fundamental consideration must be their interests and, in particular, their need to receive affection and their right to security and continuous care (Article 5).- **V.-** In accordance with those fundamental precepts and with the rest of the legal system in force, as long as daughters and sons have not reached the age of majority or have not become emancipated, the father and the mother are the primary obligors to satisfy their basic requirements of care, assistance, protection, education, security, and legal representation. For that purpose, both are recognized as holders of parental authority (patria potestad or autoridad parental)—a direct and immediate consequence of the act of procreation which, therefore, corresponds exclusively to those who hold the status of parents (it is advisable to review votes of the Constitutional Chamber nos. 1975-94, at 15:37 hours of April 26, 1994 and 2006-12019, at 16:32 hours of August 16, 2006; that of the Second Chamber no. 2004-825, at 10:35 hours of September 29, 2004, and those of this body nos. 2014-04, at 10:50 hours of November 16; 2218-04, at 10:50 hours of December 14, both of 2004 and 324-05, at 7:50 hours of March 30, 2005)— which, unlike what happened in other historical moments, can no longer continue to be viewed as an absolute power or right but rather as a social function whose core is the duty to guarantee persons under eighteen years of age the effective enjoyment of their basic rights with the purpose of realizing their comprehensive development. In vote no. [Telf6], at 15:54 hours of March 14, 2001, the jurisdictional authority responsible for constitutionality control established that *“It must be insisted that what parents have before their children (sic) are basically obligations, and under this perspective, what can be conceived of as rights are precisely the possibility to prove the paternity of the minor (sic) and give them their surname, in order to exercise the functions expected of a parent (sic), which include not only (sic) economic support, but also the attention, care, and development of emotional bonds with the children (sic).”* (See, in the same sense, votes nos. 1975-94; 2006-12019, both already cited, and 2006-16030, at 9:33 hours of November 3, 2006).- **VI.-** Based on the provisions of articles 33, 52, and 53 of the *Constitución Política*; 16, paragraph (d), of the *Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la Mujer*, approved by Ley N.º 6968 of October 2, 1984; 7, paragraph 1) and 18, paragraph 1), of the *Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño*, and with absolute independence from the civil status of the father and the mother (see votes of the Constitutional Chamber nos. 1975-94 and 2006-12019, already cited), as a general rule, parental authority over their common sons and daughters must be exercised by both jointly, with equal powers, duties, and rights. Eloquent, in this regard, is the text of the last cited norm, by virtue of which *"States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. / Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. Their basic concern shall be the best interests of the child."* In what is relevant and in order, ordinals 151 and 140 of the *Código de Familia* provide that: *“The father and the mother exercise, with equal rights and duties, parental authority over the children born (…).”* *“It is incumbent upon the parents to govern the children, protect them, administer their property, and represent them legally.”* Finally, 30 of the *Código de la niñez y adolescencia* stipulates the following: *“Minor persons shall have the right to know their father and mother; likewise, to grow and develop alongside them and be cared for by them. They shall have the right to remain in their home from which they may not be expelled or prevented from returning, except by judicial decision that so establishes it.”* This means that, in principle, decisions concerning the sons and daughters must be adopted by mutual agreement and that, in the event they cannot reach one, they may resort to the judicial authority so that it may decide what is pertinent. In both cases, their best interests must always be safeguarded. As this Tribunal specified in its vote no. 2207-04, at 9 hours of December 14, 2004: *"Based on this principle, a mandatory line of action is established for public institutions, private social welfare entities, courts of justice, administrative authorities, and administrative bodies. The Rights of Boys and Girls can be summarized in four categories: Survival, Development, Protection, and Participation. Within Survival is the right to life, health, and happiness. In Development, the right to a family, to be educated in a spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, liberty, equality, and solidarity that allows them to grow as a unique, distinct, and special person. In Protection, the right to have their identity and integrity respected, to be protected from all physical, sexual, or mental abuse, not to be mistreated or punished. In Participation, the right to play, to think, to express themselves.”* Without a doubt, all of these entail correlative duties of the father and the mother, which make indispensable the legislative recognition of a set of instrumental powers oriented to enabling their effective enjoyment by their holders. Such powers-duties make up the content of parental authority, which doctrine usually classifies into three categories: personal content, patrimonial content, and that related to representation. The first refers to the traditional custody, upbringing, and education of the son or daughter. Custody or custody (guarda or custodia) translates into the power and the correlative duty to have them in one's company (to cohabit), to assist them, care for them, discipline them, and constantly watch over their physical and psychological integrity. Upbringing entails providing them with the necessities and the stimuli necessary for their adequate development, as well as attending to their fundamental needs. Education implies the duty to form and prepare them for autonomous social life and not only to provide them the opportunity to acquire formal knowledge (articles 143 and 144 of the *Código de Familia* and vote of this Tribunal no. 1236-02, at 8:30 hours of September 12, 2002). The power of administration of the property of the son or daughter under eighteen years of age constitutes the patrimonial content (articles 145, 146, and 147 *ibidem*). Finally, through representation, the father and the mother act in the name of their offspring, while they have not acquired full capacity to act and provided they do not have an interest opposed to that of the son or daughter; in which case a special curator (curador especial) must be appointed for them (article 140 of the *Código de Familia*). The same must be done when in the presence of some cognitive disability, pursuant to article 162 *ibidem* (see, among others, votes of this Chamber nos. 1473-03, at 13:05 hours of October 23, 2003; 1681-08, at 8:10 hours of September 18; 589-08, at 9:40 hours of March 27, and 929-08, at 11:20 hours of May 14, all three of 2008). At this point, it is essential to note that a more proper denomination than the classic *“guarda, crianza y educación”* referred to by the *Convenio sobre los aspectos civiles de la sustracción internacional de menores*, adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law at the plenary session held on October 25, 1980, in the framework of its fourteenth session and approved by the Legislative Assembly by Ley N.º 7746 of February 23, 1998 (Article 5, subsection a), and the *Convención interamericana sobre restitución internacional de menores*, adopted at the Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law on July 15, 1989, and approved by the Legislative Assembly by Ley N.º 8032 of October 9, 2000 (Article 3, subsection a), is that of *“right of custody (derecho de custodia)”*, used to describe the relationship and obligations between one of the parents and the son or daughter when he or she cannot live with both and must be under the primary care of one of them, with whom they will reside (physical custody) and who must procure the full satisfaction of their needs and make the daily decisions about their upbringing (legal custody).- **VII.-** What is indicated in the preceding section leads us to maintain that the powers-duties to care for and have in one's company (custody) [Nombre1] , prepare her for life (education), and watch over her integrity, provide her with the necessities and stimuli for her adequate development, and attend to her fundamental needs (upbringing) concern both parties. However, as this is usually the case when they cohabit as a couple and, in this case, they are not in that situation and there is no agreement between them as to who should be in charge of the right of custody (derecho de custodia) of the girl, it becomes necessary to decide it in this proceeding, in order to guarantee her stability and full development, without prejudice, of course, to the right of the other to supervise that she is well attended to and to maintain communication and interrelate with her, and without what is definitively resolved making it impossible for the other to participate in some determinations about her upbringing, especially when so ordered (see, in similar sense, the vote of this Tribunal no. 929-08, at 11:20 hours of May 14, 2008). On this matter, it must be kept in mind that *"Distinguished as important aspects to take into account (…) are the holding and the exercise. The holding is the condition of being the recipient of those (sic) rights and duties that correspond to the subject who has parental authority over the children; it is non-transferable, inalienable (irrenunciable), and indivisible, the joint holders—cases of father and mother with that authority—do not have 'parts' of this right, hence its indivisibility. The exercise, in contrast, is the faculty to act concretely by virtue of those rights, and unlike the holding, this (sic) may indeed correspond separately to one or the other, or to both parents. The exercise translates into the execution of attributes derived from parental authority, such as custody, upbringing, and education, among others."* (Vote no. 142-02, at 9:30 hours of February 6, 2002, reiterated, among others, in nos. 2041-04, at 7:30 hours of November 24, 2004; 1863-06, at 9:55 hours of November 22, 2006; 1598-07, at 9:20 hours of November 20, 2007, and 1353-09, at 10:30 hours of September 8, 2009). From all this it follows that, in principle, both the holding and the exercise of the attributes that make up its various contents are highly personal (personalísimos), inalienable, and non-negotiable or non-disposable. Both the one and the others are, moreover, non-delegable, without detriment, of course, of changes made due to some temporary need of the father or the mother or of the son or daughter, such as, for example, moving to a different residence to be able to pursue their studies, which does not translate juridically into a delegation of parental authority. Supporting what is indicated is that its extinction is subject to legal facts (death or majority age) or to judicial acts with the intervention of competent organs.

Paragraph 36 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence (Código de la niñez y adolescencia) summarizes the latter in the following terms: “The causes that give rise to the definitive separation of a minor from their family are those provided for in the Family Code, as grounds for loss or suspension of parental authority (autoridad parental). The suspension or termination of the powers and duties conferred by parental authority (patria potestad) may only (sic) be decreed by a judge (sic).”- **VIII.-** As this Chamber has emphasized, the best interest (interés superior) is a fundamental premise of the doctrine of comprehensive protection and constitutes the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of regulations on childhood and adolescence (see, among many others, votes no. 2207-04, at 9:00 hours on December 14, 2004; 1472-05, at 8:10 hours on October 4, 2005; 59-08, at 11:20 hours on January 18; 1003-08, at 8:45 hours on May 27; 1681-08, at 8:10 hours on September 18; 1843-08, at 9:50 hours on October 15 and 1837-08, at 9:20 hours on October 15, all from 2008). Since its enactment in 1974, the Family Code (Código de Familia) recognized this status in its Article 2. At that historical moment, its content was defined from a psychosocial perspective —that which is most convenient for the child— and responded to the paternalistic-authoritarian scheme. With the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Convención sobre los derechos del niño), a change of singular importance occurred, thanks to which it transformed into a concept of a legal nature, with a meaning based on self-determination and whose great breadth aims to guarantee the most complete protection of the rights of childhood within a framework of legal certainty. From this perspective, its only possible content is the rights themselves. As [Nombre9] explains, "the concept of 'interest', according to the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy, is equivalent to 'profit, utility, convenience, or need.' However, this synonymy tells us nothing about what may be profitable, useful, convenient, or necessary for the child. Currently, social representations about what is appropriate or harmful for children, or about what their essential needs are, are nourished by globally agreed-upon ideas that define a certain universality capable of giving concrete content to the parameter. International treaties, and particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child, constitute a framework of greater objectivity and can be seen as an effort to establish the requirements of childhood aimed at their full development. The rights agreed upon for children precisely configure the power granted to them aimed at protecting their vital interests through the claim of certain behaviors, both by the State and by the persons who have them under their care." [The best interest of the child. In [Nombre10], [Nombre11] (director), The Rights of the Child in the Family. Discourse and Reality (Los Derechos del Niño en la Familia. Discurso y Realidad), Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad, 1998, p. 45]. For their part, [Nombre12]. [Nombre13] points out that “(…) this concept falls within the so-called framework definitions, since it is not easy to establish its scope, as it is an idea in permanent evolution and transformation (…). Consequently, it turns out that the term under analysis is flexible, insofar as it allows and demands, in turn, in each specific case, to qualify and redefine it, attending to the particularities of the situation. Thus, the best interest of the child will depend on specific circumstances (…). This particularity obliges the bodies applying the Convention, whether the administration or the Judicial Branch, to undertake the very important task of discovering which course of action will lead to the defense of the best interest of the child in each particular case. What the Convention establishes is, precisely, that it will be mandatory for these agents to carry out the search leading to that discovery of what best safeguards the best interest of the child (…)” [Convention on the Rights of the Child. Buenos Aires: Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores, 2002, pp. 101-102]. These specifications contextualize the obligation that subsection 1), of numeral 3, of the referenced international instrument imposes on public or private social welfare institutions, courts, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, to pay particular attention to the best interest of the person under eighteen years of age in all measures concerning them, as well as the duty to consider it in any public or private action that affects them, stipulated in Article 5 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence. The latter points out that said best interest guarantees the respect of their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment, in pursuit of their full personal development and adds that, to determine it, it is necessary to take into account: "a) Their condition as a subject of rights and responsibilities. b) Their age, degree of maturity, capacity for discernment, and other personal conditions. c) The socioeconomic conditions in which they develop. d) The correspondence between the individual and the social interest." Finally, and in accordance with this, this regulatory body declares in its paragraph 3 that “The rights and guarantees of this group are of public interest, inalienable, and non-negotiable.”- **IX.-** For greater abundance, in vote no. 2008-14776, at 10:09 hours on October 3, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicated that “Constitutional Law imposes on the Costa Rican State, as a fundamental duty, the protection of the best interest of the child (sic). This must be reflected in the actions of the different institutions that form part of the state apparatus (…).” In no. 2008-15461, at 15:07 hours on October 15, 2008, it held that “(…) different international instruments recognize and impose the state duty to provide particular protection to the rights of children; from declarative instruments like the Universal Declaration itself, and especially since the approval and entry into force of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño), a decisive impetus has been given to the protection of this special group, ensuring that at all times adequate assistance and respect for the rights recognized to them are provided, among which stand out (…) the promotion of the necessary conditions for family coexistence, as well as the right of children (sic) to remain with their parents, particularly with their mother –Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or Protocol of San Salvador-. The jurisprudence of the Chamber is forceful in recognizing the protection that must be granted to the rights of children, recognizing, equally, the best interest of the child’s condition and nature as a general principle that, as such, forms part of the legal system and must be applied to govern and guide all administrative and judicial activity related to minors. (…) In this sense, as a recognized and fully applicable general principle, the best interest of the child cannot be opposed by any contradictory norm or decision –administrative or judicial–, unless in specific circumstances the applicability of some other general principle of the highest level is at stake, in which case the legal operator (sic) must abide by the balancing test and the role of each principle in the particular case. Thus, ignoring the principal character of the best interest of the child by disregarding its strict application in those cases involving minors is contrary to the recognitions that Constitutional Law makes on the matter, while also giving rise to placing oneself in a position of vulnerability in the face of the mandate of Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In other words, administrative and judicial authorities have the obligation to recognize and apply the general principle of the best interest of the child (sic), in perfect compliance with its character as a principle, with the mandates established by Constitutional Law, including devising appropriate mechanisms and consistent solutions in accordance with what is ordered by the referenced Article 2 of the American Convention.” And previously, in no. 2005-11262, at 15:00 hours on August 24, 2005, reiterated in nos. 2006-12246, at 15:24 hours on August 22, 2006; 2007-13548, at 15:14 hours on September 18, 2007; 2008-14068, at 9:04 hours on September 23, 2008; [Telf7], at 12:23 hours on January 30 and 2009-6003, at 14:49 hours on April 21, both of 2009, it had expressed that “In the matter of the special rights that children have, there are several norms of constitutional, international, and infra-constitutional rank; recognizing in all of them the best interest of the child as a criterion for any public or private action concerning a person under eighteen years of age. (…) From the norms of international instruments on Human Rights (…), it appears, quite clearly, that States have as fundamental duties the protection of the best interest of the child, avoiding the breakup of the family nucleus and promoting the necessary conditions for them to enjoy the permanent presence of parental authority (autoridad parental), especially when the child requires special care. (…) In conclusion, after all that has been said, it is clear that children (sic) are entitled to a series of special rights and correlatively, the State and the parents or guardians of the children (sic) are bound by a series of obligations and duties towards them, even more so when dealing with children with special needs, all of which is supported (sic) in numerous international instruments, in our Political Constitution, and in legal norms.” (See also no. 2009-145, at 8:59 hours on January 13, 2009).- **X.-** The principle of the best interest, previously outlined, obliges us to point out that in this type of process, in which the stability, well-being, and tranquility of a person under eighteen years of age are at stake, the criterion to establish whether it is appropriate to attribute to the father or mother the personal attributes of parental authority —custody (guarda), upbringing (crianza), and education in traditional language— or, more properly, the right of custody (derecho de custodia), is not the lack of suitability of one of those subjects but the preeminence of their personal, material, family, and social conditions and, of course, that of their commitment, availability, and diligence, aimed at guaranteeing their full development and the respect of their rights in a healthy physical and mental environment. We are not in the presence, then, of a process of a sanctioning nature, such as one filed with the purpose of ordering the suspension or termination of parental authority (see vote no. 1681-08, at 8:10 hours on September 18, 2008), but rather one in which it is appropriate to place the child as the main interested party and determine what is most convenient for him or her (see, in a similar sense, votes nos. 204-08, at 11:10 hours on January 30; 324-08, at 9:10 hours on February 27; 1204-08, at 9:10 hours on June 4, the three from 2008 and 764-09, at 13:00 hours on May 13, 2009). In other terms, the decision ultimately adopted does not have to prejudge the inadequate exercise of the maternal or paternal role by the one who does not obtain satisfaction of their claim or their resistance, but it must be supported by a better assessment of the conditions of the one who does achieve jurisdictional protection. Offspring are not objects, but human beings with rights and, precisely because of that, the greatest possible well-being must be guaranteed to them, within the conditions of their parents. In accordance with this, it is not possible to agree that, in this matter, the rules on the burden of proof (carga de la prueba) have been applied, as was done in the first instance. If, as indicated, the decision that assigns to one parent the right of custody of the common son or daughter should not be attributed a sanctioning nature, it is obvious that the lack of suitability of the other, assuming it has been alleged, is insufficient to justify it, since it requires proof that one meets better personal, family, and social conditions to guarantee their full development. This means that both the one who requests for themselves that jurisdictional attribution and the one who opposes that claim are responsible for producing the evidence they deem pertinent to demonstrate that they are in a better situation to exercise the personal attributes of parental authority. In any case, this requirement is not unrelated to what is provided for in numeral 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), since, by virtue of that precept, “The burden of proof falls upon: / 1) The one who formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting their right. / 2) The one who opposes a claim, regarding the affirmations of facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the plaintiff's right.” - **XI.-** In order to resolve this matter, it is also appropriate to keep in mind what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in vote no. [Telf8], at 14:51 hours on April 8, 2003: “(…) the rights corresponding to the ties of the minor (sic) with their natural family are provided for in Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In these, their right to be cared for by their parents, to preserve their family relationships without illicit interference, and to remain with them is declared. Article 16 (…) of the Protocol of San Salvador refers to the child's right to grow up under the protection and responsibility of their parents and, especially, that the young child not be separated from their mother. The Code on Childhood and Adolescence in norms 30, 31, and 33 provides for the right of the minor (sic) to grow and develop alongside their parents and to be cared for by them, to remain in their home, to grow and be educated in the bosom of a family. / (…) As for the fundamental rights of the parents –reiterating that the plane they occupy is secondary, insofar as they are subordinated to the protection of the best interest of the minor (sic), in the terms already enunciated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Code on Childhood– basically, the right to the integrity of the family is involved, excluding from that zone of intimacy all unjustified and excessive interference from public authorities. This, to the extent that the family is protected by Articles 51 of the Political Constitution, 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 15 of the Additional Protocol to that Convention in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10, 17, and 23 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Particularly, in Article 17 of this last regulatory body, arbitrary interferences in that human sphere are prohibited. / (…) Although at first glance it might seem that what is fundamental to issue a decision in this case is to determine the prevalence of one of the groups of rights that directly concern the minor (sic) and the right of the parents referred to, this impression is false. It is preferable to resort to the expression of conciliation and not to that of sacrifice of certain rights in favor of others, based on the principle, inherent to the matter of fundamental rights, of the interdependence of those rights. That is, one must understand the diverse rights of which a person is a holder as part of a global scheme that must seek to be harmonized. This does not mean that all are located on a plane of equality, but rather that it is mandatory to seek a solution that allows their integration, and only in the event that the different plausible responses are impracticable, may one right finally be preferred over another. (…) The legal permission for administrative and judicial authorities to intervene in family relationships is an indication of solutions for the conciliation of the rights that the decision in this matter involves, insofar as, despite admitting that the rule is the conservation of the family group, this rule can be altered through a state reaction –administrative or jurisdictional–, without forgetting that such interference affects fundamental rights.” (The bold type is added).- **XII.-** With the means of conviction provided, it was established that [Nombre1] was procreated during the cohabitation that the parties maintained. For work reasons, at the end of 2006, her mother entrusted her care to her paternal grandmother, with whom Mr. [Nombre4] resided. Currently, the girl is a little over seven years and ten months old and, at least for the last two, has lived with her father, his wife, Mrs. [Nombre6], and her sister. Even though it cannot be said that Mrs. [Nombre5] has incurred serious breaches of her duties towards her daughter or has completely disengaged from her upbringing, nor is it possible to fail to recognize the emotional bond between them, to the point that [Nombre1] eagerly awaits her visits, the forensic psychosocial expert report on folios 95-106 obliges us to consider it proven that she maintains a strong emotional bond with her father, identifies her current domestic unit as her family, [Nombre14] recognizes Mrs. [Nombre6] as a maternal figure, regularly attends the Kindergarten of School [Nombre7], fully complies with her academic obligations, to the point that her absences are for health reasons (suffering from asthma), and does not present behavioral problems. Furthermore, it must be considered very probable that she has been adequately stimulated, since her performance on the KBIT psychological instrument, which evaluated her verbal and non-verbal intelligence and measured her verbal skills related to school learning, was above average. If to this series of positive aspects is added that for her teacher the father and his spouse are those responsible for her education, that the paternal-filial relationship does not present elements of risk, and that there is no evaluation of the mother that allows affirming her better conditions to take charge of her care, the appropriate course is to grant Mr. [Nombre4] the right of custody claimed. This being the case, and taking into account her best interest, the appealed judgment must be revoked and the filed lawsuit granted.- **XIII.-** It is necessary to point out that the decision of Mr. [Nombre4] to take [Nombre1] with him when he formed his current partner relationship and left his mother's house cannot be classified, in this specific case, as a reprehensible conduct, since it is not observed that he did so in bad faith. On the contrary, by having acted in this way, he assumed his parental obligations as he should. As already noted, he exercises parental authority over her by full right, and at that time, the girl was not under the care or supervision of her mother. In other words, however much it is a unilateral act, the truth is that it reveals an evident sense of responsibility, which is confirmed when the living conditions she currently has are reviewed. It is obvious that she is part of his life project, they maintain a strong and solid emotional bond, and he has not been negligent. However, since the ownership of parental authority remains shared by both parties, it is not superfluous to warn Mr. [Nombre4] that the attribution to his person of the right of custody of [Nombre1] does not authorize him to disregard her fundamental right to interact with her mother and to cultivate her maternal-filial relationship, and that he is obliged not only not to obstruct it but also to guarantee it. Mrs. [Nombre5] is an essential part of her daughter's life and must have the opportunity to be a significant figure for her. That is also part of her comprehensive development.- **XIV.-** Under no circumstances can this Chamber share the prejudiced affirmation of the first-instance judge that “(…) by nature, children must remain at the side of their mother, unless situations of social risk or any other require separating them from their mother and leaving them at the side of their father.” Such a conception ignores not only that the primary interest that must be attended to when resolving a matter such as this is that of the son or daughter, but also the entire historical struggle for gender equality that prevents attributing rights and responsibilities based on the sexual difference between men and women. A first-order international instrument such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer) demands of those of us who operate with the Law to prevent the role of women in procreation from being a cause of discrimination, understood, in the specific case, as the unequal attribution of responsibility in the upbringing of sons and daughters. It also demands we implement the necessary measures in order to “(…) modify the traditional role of both men and women in society and in the family (…)” (preamble). For this very reason, the use of the term “delegation” to refer to the exercise of the attributes of parental authority by Mr. [Nombre4] is unfortunate.- **XV.-** As a corollary of the foregoing, the filed appeal is granted, the appealed ruling is revoked, Mr. [Nombre4] is assigned the exercise of the right of custody over [Nombre1], and this matter is resolved without special pronouncement on costs; the latter according to the provisions of paragraph 106 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence.- **POR TANTO:** The appealed judgment is revoked. In its place, the lawsuit is declared granted and Mr. [Nombre4] is assigned the exercise of the right of custody over the girl [Nombre1].

This matter is resolved without a special award of costs.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-weight:bold">RANDALL ESQUIVEL QUIRÓS</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span style="font-weight:bold">LUIS HÉCTOR AMORETTI OROZCO</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> MAURICIO CHACÓN JIMÉNEZ</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span>[Name15]</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>

VOTO N°522-10 TRIBUNAL DE FAMILIA. San José, a las diez horas con treinta minutos del veinte de abril del dos mil diez.

Proceso GUARDA, CRIANZA Y EDUCACIÓN establecido por D , mayor de edad, cédula de identidad número xxx , casado, operario, vecino de Montencillos de Alajuela contra S , mayor de edad, cédula de identidad número xxx , vecina de Alajuela.

RESULTANDO:

A. Acciona el señor D. y mediante el libelo de demanda visible a folio 3 al 5, refiere que convivió en unión de hecho con la demandada, desde el año dos mil uno y hasta finales del año dos mil cinco, que de dicha relación nació la niña [Nombre1] , que su hija desde finales del año dos mil seis y hasta la fecha ha estado bajo la guarda crianza y educación de su persona, porque la madre de la niña así lo quiso y convinieron en ello; indica que esto se dio por cuanto la madre no tiene quien cuide de la menor, a veces no tiene trabajo y que además tiene graves de alcoholismo y ahora aparentemente otras drogas. Refiere que ahora que su hija está a su lado la madre llega ocasionalmente a verla (tal vez una vez al mes), que algunas veces se lleva la niña consigo un día o dos. Indica que en no menos de cinco ocasiones ha llegado en estado de ebriedad por lo que ha tenido problemas y no le entrega a la menor. Refiere además que cuando regresa a la menor la niña llega sin bañarse y en mal estado de salud pues es alérgica a muchos alimentos y la madre no tiene ningún cuidado en este aspecto, que la niña usa zapatos ortopédicos y que la madre no la deja usarlos argumentado que son feos. Que le preocupa que la niña le comentó cuando pasó frente a algún bar, la menor afirmó que ha estado allí con la madre, cuando ésta se reúne con su actual compañero y que hacen cigarrillos de papel, lo que podría significar que la madre está consumiendo drogas delante de la menor, indica que hace unas semanas contrajo matrimonio y cuenta con más posibilidades de darle a su hija una familia estable, con la ayuda de su esposa quién está de acuerdo. Con fundamento en este cuadro fáctico solicita el actor que en sentencia se le otorgue la GUARDA, CRIANZA Y EDUCACIÓN de la menor [Nombre1] , para que la guarda, crianza y educación, sea ejercida en lo sucesivo por él, sin que la madre pueda interferir, perdiendo la madre el derecho de exigir alimentos para la menor.- B. Que conferida la audiencia de ley a la demandada contestó la misma en forma negativa. (ver folios 14 al 16).

C. La licenciada [Nombre2], Jueza del Juzgado de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, por sentencia de las quince horas y siete minutos del once de febrero del dos mil diez, resolvió: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, doctrina citada y artículos mencionados, se declara SIN LUGAR en todos los extremos la presente demanda abreviada de modificación de guarda, crianza y educación que promueve D. contra S . Deber volver la menor al lado de su madre. Proceda el actor a gestionar el respectivo régimen de interrelación familiar si así lo tiene a bien. Se falla sin especial condenatoria den costas personales ni procesales por razón de la materia. Se les recuerda a ambos progenitores, que su hija [Nombre1]. está en plena etapa de crecimiento emocional, físico y espiritual y que ambos son importantes en su crecimiento, de ahí que deben colaborar estrechamente para que la niña crezca en las mejores condiciones familiares. NOTIFIQUESE." D. Conoce este Tribunal del presente asunto en virtud del recurso de apelación interpuesto por ACTOR contra la referida sentencia. Esta sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo de Ley. En los procedimientos se han seguido las prescripciones correspondientes.

Redacta el JUEZ [Nombre3]:Y;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El señor [Nombre4]. impugna la sentencia n.º 104-2010, de las 15:57 horas del pasado 11 de febrero, mediante la cual el Juzgado de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela declaró sin lugar su demanda de modificación de guarda, crianza y educación y ordenó la devolución de [Nombre1]. al lado de su madre. Defiende que la señora [Nombre5]. sí presenta conductas abandónicas y negligentes, pues tiene casi un año de no ver a su hija, ni preguntar por ella. A su juicio, que no se haya presentado al peritaje psicosocial forense y nunca haya pagado la pensión impuesta acredita que no le importan sus obligaciones con la niña, así como su decisión de no asumir su responsabilidad. Cuestiona la validez de la prueba técnica practicada para demostrar que no presenta ingesta etílica ni consume drogas y destaca que la testimonial sí hizo mención a esas conductas y al descuido en que tenía a [Nombre1] . Por último, echa de menos que no se haya valorado el daño psicológico y emocional que la decisión le va a ocasionar a la niña, quien reside con él desde diciembre de 2006 y está acostumbrada a ser parte de una familia estable compuesta también por su esposa, quien se comporta con ella como una madre y sus hermanos. Por todo ello, solicita revocar el fallo apelado (folios 138-140).- II.- Se avala el elenco de aseveraciones fácticas que contiene la sentencia recurrida (considerando primero), al cual se agregan las siguientes: g) Entre [Nombre1]. y su padre existe un fuerte vínculo afectivo (peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106). h) La niña identifica como su familia a su núcleo de convivencia actual, conformado por la esposa de su progenitor, señora [Nombre6]. y la hija de esta, con quien comparten el primer apellido (peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106). i) [Nombre1]. reconoce como figuras maternas tanto a su madre biológica como a la cónyuge de su padre (peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106). j) Ella asiste regularmente al Kinder de la Escuela [Nombre7], cumple con sus obligaciones académicas, justifica en forma oportuna sus ausencias en motivos de salud (padecimiento de asma), no presenta problemas de conducta y para su docente los responsables de su educación son su progenitor y su esposa (peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106). k) En el instrumento psicológico KBIT, que evalúa la inteligencia verbal y no verbal y mide habilidades verbales relacionadas con el aprendizaje escolar, la niña obtuvo un desempeño superior al promedio, lo que sugiere una adecuada estimulación (peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106). l) La relación paterno filial no presenta elementos de riesgo (peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106).- III.- Como lo ha declarado la Sala Constitucional en varios pronunciamientos (ver los votos n.os 1319-97, de las 14:51 horas del 4 de marzo de 1997; 8857-98, de las 16:30 horas del 15 de diciembre de 1998 y 2008-15461, de las 15:07 horas del 15 de octubre de 2008), por su contenido en materia de derechos humanos, la Convención sobre los derechos del niño, aprobada por Ley N.° 7184 de 18 de julio de 1990, al igual que otros instrumentos internacionales que desarrollan o complementan sus disposiciones, integra el parámetro de constitucionalidad. Eso quiere decir que tiene una fuerza suprema y que, incluso, es regla de interpretación de las disposiciones de la propia Carta Fundamental. En el voto n.º 2313-95 de las 16:18 horas del 9 de mayo de 1995, ese órgano expresó que “(…) tratándose de instrumentos internacionales de Derechos Humanos vigentes en el país, no se aplica lo dispuesto por el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, ya que el 48 Constitucional tiene norma especial para los que se refieren a derechos humanos, otorgándoles una fuerza normativa del propio nivel constitucional. Al punto de que, como lo ha reconocido la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos vigentes en Costa Rica, tienen no solamente un valor similar a la Constitución Política, sino que en la medida en que otorguen mayores derechos o garantías a las personas, priman por sobre la Constitución (vid. sentencia N° 3435-92 y su aclaración, N° 5759-93).” (Ver, en igual sentido, los votos n.os 1147-90, de las 16 horas de 21 de septiembre de 1990; 3435-92, de las 16:20 horas del 11 de noviembre de 1992; 3724-93, de las 15 horas del 4 de agosto de 1991 (sic); 5759-93, de las 14:15 horas del 10 de noviembre de 1993; 1112-94, de las 9:12 horas del 25 de febrero de 1994; 2002-10693, de las 18:20 horas de 7 de noviembre de 2002; [Telf1], de las 11:40 horas del 4 de abril de 2003; [Telf2], de las 10:34 horas del 9 de febrero; [Telf3], de las 14:54 horas del 7 de marzo y [Telf4], de las 14:49 horas del 27 de marzo, los tres de 2007). Y conviene aclarar que, de acuerdo con ese canon, tales instrumentos no son solo los de naturaleza convencional; o sea, los convenios, tratados o protocolos, sino también los que forman parte del llamado soft law; es decir, las declaraciones, recomendaciones, programas y planes de acción, entre otros y que su vigencia en el país no está condicionada por la emisión del acto formal de ratificación respecto de cada uno, cuando eso es posible. Es más, en el ya citado voto n.º 2313-95, se advirtió “(…) que si la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos es el órgano natural para interpretar la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica), la fuerza de su decisión al interpretar la convención y enjuiciar leyes nacionales a la luz de esta normativa, ya sea en caso contencioso o en una mera consulta, tendrá -de principio- el mismo valor de la norma interpretada. No solamente valor ético o científico, como algunos han entendido. Esta tesis que ahora sostenemos, por lo demás, está receptada en nuestro derecho, cuando la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que las normas no escritas -como la costumbre, la jurisprudencia y los principios generales del derecho- servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpretan, integran o delimitan (artículo 7.l.).” Ahora bien, aunque se trata de una verdad de [Nombre8], es preciso insistir en que el Derecho de la Constitución vincula a todos los poderes públicos. De conformidad con lo dispuesto por los numerales 154 y 11 de la Carta Política, quienes ejercemos la función jurisdiccional estamos obligados/as a aplicarlo de manera prioritaria; o sea, que somos garantes de la observancia y de la vigencia efectiva de sus preceptos, valores y principios. En el voto n.° 3495-92, antes citado, la Sala Constitucional puntualizó que "El Derecho de la Constitución, compuesto tanto por las normas y principios constitucionales, como por los del Internacional y, particularmente, los de sus instrumentos sobre derechos humanos, en cuanto fundamentos primarios de todo el orden jurídico positivo, le transmiten su propia estructura lógica y sentido axiológico, a partir de valores incluso anteriores a los mismos textos legislados, los cuales son, a su vez, fuente de todo sistema normativo propio de la sociedad organizada bajo los conceptos del Estado de Derecho, el régimen constitucional, la democracia y la libertad, de modo tal que cualquier norma o acto que atente contra esos valores o principios -entre ellos los de racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, que son, por definición, criterios de constitucionalidad-, o bien que conduzca a situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas, o a callejones sin salida para los particulares o para el Estado, no puede ser constitucionalmente válido.” Corolario de todo ello es, sin duda, que cualquier lectura o aplicación de las normas secundarias u ordinarias necesariamente debe ajustarse a las reglas, principios y valores establecidos en esos instrumentos o que se infieran de sus disposiciones. Como lo evidenció ese mismo Tribunal en el referido voto n.º 1319-97, “La normativa de los derechos humanos no solo implica el cumplimiento de los derechos ahí consagrados, sino que significa una interpretación, más aún, una relectura de las legislaciones internas en función de estas disposiciones internacionales y de los postulados incorporados a las legislaciones nacionales como parte del ordenamiento. Es por esto que las garantías procesales revisten una particular importancia para los derechos humanos e identifican, por esencia, al Estado de Democrático de Derecho.”- IV.- Como es sabido, la Convención sobre los derechos del niño consagra, cuando menos en el plano formal-normativo, la doctrina de la protección integral, que produce un salto cualitativo en la consideración jurídica de la infancia en cuanto “(…) incorpora al niño y al adolescente como sujeto pleno de derechos y deberes constitucionales, pasándose de una marcada influencia de los aspectos sociales a los jurídicos, en un marco de respeto constitucional del menor (sic).” (Voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º [Telf5], de las 15:49 horas del 4 de julio de 2000) y recoge los principios generales del marco de protección de esas personas y los especiales destinados a quienes han sido o son víctimas de las carencias derivadas del trato negligente o abandónico de sus progenitores (ver, en igual sentido, el voto de este Tribunal n.º 1568-05, de las 10:10 horas del 12 de octubre de 2005). En lo que aquí interesa, ese trascendental Tratado multilateral postula que, para el pleno y armonioso desarrollo de su personalidad, las personas menores de dieciocho años deben crecer en el seno de una familia, en un ambiente de felicidad, amor y comprensión y tienen derecho a cuidados y asistencia especiales (preámbulo). También les reconoce el derecho de conocer a sus progenitores, a ser cuidadas por ellos (artículo 7) y a un nivel de vida adecuado para su desarrollo físico, mental, espiritual, moral y social (inciso 1º del artículo 27) y declara que incumbe a ambos padres, a sus representantes legales o a otras personas encargadas de ellas, la responsabilidad primordial de su crianza y de proporcionarles, dentro de sus posibilidades y medios económicos, las condiciones de vida que sean necesarias para su desarrollo (incisos 1º del artículo 18 y 2º del 27). Además, les atribuye a estos sujetos y a los miembros de la familia ampliada o de la comunidad y a sus tutores, la potestad de impartirles, en consonancia con la evolución de sus facultades, dirección y orientación apropiadas para que puedan ejercer sus derechos (artículos 3, inciso 2º y 5), les garantiza el respeto de sus responsabilidades, derechos y deberes en el ejercicio de esa trascendental función social (artículos 3, inciso 2º y 5) y les exige que su preocupación fundamental sea su interés superior (inciso 1º del artículo 18). El Estado, por su parte, está obligado a asegurarles la protección y el cuidado necesarios para su bienestar, para lo cual ha de implementar todas las medidas legislativas y administrativas adecuadas (inciso 2º del artículo 3). En especial, debe poner el máximo empeño en garantizar el reconocimiento del principio de que ambos progenitores tienen obligaciones comunes en el cumplimiento de sus funciones parentales (inciso 1º del artículo 18); ha de prestarles la asistencia apropiada para su cabal desempeño con el fin de garantizar y promover los derechos enunciados en la Convención y debe adoptar, de acuerdo con las condiciones nacionales y con arreglo a sus medios, medidas apropiadas para ayudar a los obligados directos a dar efectividad al derecho a un nivel de vida adecuado para su desarrollo integral y, en caso necesario, proporcionarles asistencia material y programas de apoyo (inciso 3º del artículo 27). También constituye una obligación estatal adoptar todas las medidas legislativas, administrativas, sociales y educativas apropiadas para proteger al niño o a la niña contra toda forma de perjuicio o abuso físico o mental, descuido o trato negligente, malos tratos o explotación, incluido el abuso sexual, mientras se encuentre bajo la custodia de los progenitores, de un representante legal o de cualquier otra persona (inciso 1º del artículo 19). Entre ellas se comprenden procedimientos eficaces para el establecimiento de programas sociales con el objeto de proporcionarles, tanto a la persona menor de dieciocho años como a quienes la cuidan, la asistencia necesaria y formas de prevención, tratamiento y observación ulterior de los casos de malos tratos (inciso 2º), así como la adopción de todas las medidas apropiadas para promover la recuperación física y psicológica y la reintegración social de quien ha sido víctima de cualquier tipo de abandono, explotación o abuso, tortura u otra forma de tratos o penas crueles inhumanos o degradantes, las cuales han de llevarse a cabo en un ambiente que fomente su salud, el respeto de sí mismo y su dignidad (artículo 39). En ese contexto, se estipula y ha de concebirse el deber del Estado de no separarles de sus padres contra la voluntad de estos y la posibilidad excepcional de hacerlo cuando esa decisión sea necesaria en atención a su interés superior (inciso 1º del artículo 9). En similares términos se pronuncia la Declaración sobre los principios sociales y jurídicos relativos a la protección y el bienestar de los niños, con particular referencia a la adopción y la colocación en hogares de guarda, en los planos nacional e internacional, adoptada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en su resolución 41/85, de 3 de diciembre de 1986, que reitera el principio 6º de la Declaración de los derechos del niño, resolución 1386 (XIV) de 20 de noviembre de 1959, en virtud del cual la persona menor de dieciocho años debe crecer al amparo y bajo la responsabilidad de sus padres y, en todo caso, en un ambiente de afecto y de seguridad moral y material y establece como prioridad que ha de ser cuidada por esos sujetos (artículo 3), que cuando no puedan ocuparse de hacerlo o lo hagan de manera inapropiada debe considerarse la posibilidad de que el cuidado quede a cargo de otros familiares, de una familia sustitutiva o, en caso necesario, de una institución apropiada (artículo 4) y que en todas las cuestiones relativas a su cuidado, por personas distintas de sus propios progenitores, la consideración fundamental deben ser sus intereses y, en particular, su necesidad de recibir afecto y su derecho a la seguridad y al cuidado continuado (artículo 5).- V.- De conformidad con esos preceptos de carácter fundamental y con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico vigente, mientras las hijas y los hijos no hayan alcanzado la mayoridad o no se hayan emancipado, el padre y la madre son los principales obligados a satisfacer sus requerimientos básicos de cuidado, asistencia, protección, educación, seguridad y representación jurídica. Con ese propósito se les reconoce a ambos la titularidad de la patria potestad o autoridad parental —consecuencia directa e inmediata del acto de procreación que, por tanto, corresponde en forma exclusiva a quienes ostenten la condición de progenitores (conviene revisar los votos de la Sala Constitucional n.os 1975-94, de las 15:37 horas del 26 de abril de 1994 y 2006-12019, de las 16:32 horas del 16 de agosto de 2006; el de la Sala Segunda n.º 2004-825, de las 10:35 horas del 29 de setiembre de 2004 y los de este órgano n.os 2014-04, de las 10:50 horas del 16 de noviembre; 2218-04, de las 10:50 horas del 14 de diciembre, ambos de 2004 y 324-05, de las 7:50 horas del 30 de marzo de 2005)— que, a diferencia de lo sucedido en otros momentos históricos, no puede continuar siendo visualizada como un poder o un derecho absoluto sino como una función social cuyo núcleo es el deber de garantizarle a las personas menores de dieciocho años el disfrute efectivo de sus derechos básicos con la finalidad de hacer realidad su desarrollo integral. En el voto n.º [Telf6], de las 15:54 horas del 14 de marzo de 2001, la autoridad jurisdiccional responsable del control de constitucionalidad estableció que “Debe insistirse en que los padres lo que tienen frente a sus hijos (sic) son básicamente obligaciones, y bajo esta perspectiva lo que pueden concebirse como derechos, son justamente la posibilidad de acreditar la paternidad del menor (sic) y otorgarle su apellido, a fin de ejercer las funciones que se esperan de un progenitor (sic), que incluyen no sólo (sic) el apoyo económico, sino además la atención, cuidado y desarrollo de vínculos emocionales con los hijos (sic).” (Ver, en igual sentido, los votos n.os 1975-94; 2006-12019, ambos ya citados y 2006-16030, de las 9:33 horas del 3 de noviembre de 2006).- VI.- Con base en lo previsto en los artículos 33, 52 y 53 de la Constitución Política; 16, inciso d), de la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la Mujer, aprobada por Ley N.º 6968 de 2 de octubre de 1984; 7, inciso 1) y 18, inciso 1), de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y con absoluta independencia del estado civil del padre y de la madre (ver los votos de la Sala Constitucional n.os 1975-94 y 2006-12019, ya citados), por regla general, la patria potestad o autoridad parental sobre sus hijos e hijas comunes, ha de ser ejercida por ambos en forma conjunta, con iguales potestades, deberes y derechos. Elocuente es, al respecto, el texto de la última norma citada, en virtud de la cual "Los Estados Partes pondrán el máximo de empeño en garantizar el reconocimiento del principio de que ambos padres tienen obligaciones comunes en lo que respecta a la crianza y el desarrollo del niño. / Incumbirá a los padres o, en su caso, a los responsables legales la responsabilidad primordial de la crianza y el desarrollo del niño. Su preocupación fundamental será el interés superior del niño." En lo conducente y por su orden, los ordinales 151 y 140 del Código de Familia disponen que: “El padre y la madre ejercen, con iguales derechos y deberes, la autoridad parental sobre los hijos habidos (…).” “Compete a los padres regir a los hijos, protegerlos, administrar sus bienes y representarlos legalmente.” Por último, el 30 del Código de la niñez y adolescencia estipula lo siguiente: “Las personas menores de edad tendrán derecho a conocer a su padre y madre; asimismo, a crecer y desarrollarse a su lado y ser cuidadas por ellos. Tendrán derecho a permanecer en su hogar del cual no podrán ser expulsadas ni impedidas de regresar a él, salvo decisión judicial que así lo establezca.” Eso supone que, en principio, las decisiones concernientes a los hijos y las hijas han de ser adoptadas de mutuo acuerdo y que, en caso de que no logren alcanzarlo, puedan acudir a la autoridad judicial con el fin de que decida lo pertinente. En ambos supuestos, siempre se debe resguardar su mejor interés. Como lo puntualizó este Tribunal en su voto n.º 2207-04, de las 9 horas del 14 de diciembre de 2004: "Con fundamento en este principio se establece una línea de acción de carácter obligatorio para las instituciones públicas, las entidades privadas de bienestar social, los tribunales de justicia, las autoridades administrativas y los órganos administrativos. Los Derechos de los Niños y Niñas se pueden resumir en cuatro categorías: Supervivencia, Crecimiento, Protección y Participación. Dentro de la Supervivencia se tiene el derecho a la vida, a la salud, y a la felicidad. En el Crecimiento el derecho a una familia, a ser educado en un espíritu de paz, dignidad, tolerancia, libertad, igualdad, y solidaridad que le permita crecer como una persona única, distinta y especial. En la protección se ostenta el derecho a que se le respete la identidad e integridad, a ser protegido de todo abuso físico, sexual o mental, a no ser maltratado ni castigado. En lo de participación, el derecho a jugar a pensar, a expresarse.” Sin duda, todos ellos suponen deberes correlativos del padre y de la madre, que hacen indispensable el reconocimiento legislativo de un conjunto de potestades instrumentales orientadas a posibilitar su efectivo disfrute por parte de sus titulares. Tales poderes-deberes conforman el contenido de la patria potestad o autoridad parental, que la doctrina suele clasificar en tres categorías: contenido personal, contenido patrimonial y el relacionado con la representación. El primero hace referencia a la tradicional guarda, crianza y educación del hijo o de la hija. La guarda o custodia se traduce en el poder y el correlativo deber de tenerle en su compañía (convivir), asistirle, cuidarle, disciplinarle y velar en forma constante por su integridad física y psíquica. La crianza supone proporcionarle los alimentos y los estímulos necesarios para su adecuado desarrollo, así como atender sus necesidades fundamentales. La educación implica el deber de formarle y prepararle para la vida social autónoma y no solo el de brindarle la oportunidad de adquirir conocimientos formales (artículos 143 y 144 del Código de Familia y voto de este Tribunal n.° 1236-02, de las 8:30 horas del 12 de setiembre de 2002). La potestad de administración de los bienes del hijo o de la hija menor de dieciocho años constituye el contenido patrimonial (artículos 145, 146 y 147 ibídem). Por último, a través de la representación, el padre y la madre actúan a nombre de sus vástagos, mientras no hayan adquirido plena capacidad de actuar y siempre que no tengan un interés opuesto al de ellos o ellas; caso en el cual ha de nombrárseles un curador especial (artículo 140 del Código de Familia). Eso mismo debe hacerse cuando se está en presencia de alguna discapacidad cognoscitiva, conforme lo dispone el artículo 162 ibídem (ver, entre otros, los votos de esta Cámara n.os 1473-03, de las 13:05 horas del 23 de octubre de 2003; 1681-08, de las 8:10 horas del 18 de setiembre; 589-08, de las 9:40 horas del 27 de marzo y 929-08, de las 11:20 horas del 14 de mayo, los tres de 2008). En este punto, es de rigor apuntar que una denominación más propia que la clásica de “guarda, crianza y educación” a la que hacen referencia el Convenio sobre los aspectos civiles de la sustracción internacional de menores, adoptado por la Conferencia de La Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado en la sesión plenaria celebrada el 25 de octubre de 1980 en el marco de su décimo cuarto período de sesiones y aprobado por la Asamblea Legislativa por Ley N.º 7746 de 23 de febrero de 1998 (artículo 5, inciso a) y la Convención interamericana sobre restitución internacional de menores, adoptada en la Cuarta Conferencia Especializada Interamericana sobre Derecho Internacional Privado el 15 de julio de 1989 y aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa por Ley N.º 8032 de 9 de octubre de 2000 (artículo 3, inciso a), es la de “derecho de custodia”, utilizada para describir la relación y las obligaciones entre uno de los progenitores y el hijo o la hija cuando este o esta no puede vivir con ambos y ha de estar bajo el cuidado primario de uno de ellos, con el cual residirá (custodia física) y quien ha de procurarle la plena satisfacción de sus necesidades y tomará las decisiones cotidianas sobre su crianza (custodia legal).- VII.- Lo indicado en el apartado anterior conduce a sostener que los poderes-deberes de cuidar y tener en su compañía (guarda) a [Nombre1] , prepararla para su vida (educación) y velar por su integridad, proporcionarle los alimentos y los estímulos para su adecuado desarrollo y atender sus necesidades fundamentales (crianza) atañen a ambas partes. Sin embargo, como ello suele ser así cuando estos conviven como pareja y, en este caso, no se está en ese supuesto y no existe acuerdo entre ellos sobre quién ha de tener a cargo el derecho de custodia de la niña, se hace necesario decidirlo en esta vía, en aras de garantizar su estabilidad y su pleno desarrollo, sin perjuicio, eso sí, del derecho del otro u otra de vigilar que esté bien atendida y de mantener comunicación e interrelacionarse con ella y sin que lo resuelto en definitiva le imposibilite participar en algunas determinaciones sobre su crianza, sobre todo cuando así se haya dispuesto (ver, en similar sentido, el voto de este Tribunal n.º 929-08, de las 11:20 horas del 14 de mayo de 2008). Sobre el particular, ha de tenerse presente que "Se distinguen como aspectos importantes a tomar en cuenta (…), la titularidad y el ejercicio. La titularidad es la condición de destinatario de aquéllos (sic) derechos y deberes que corresponden al sujeto que tiene autoridad parental sobre los hijos; es instransferible, irrenunciable e indivisible, los titulares conjuntos -casos de padre y madre con esa autoridad- no tienen "partes" de este derecho, de ahí su indivisibilidad. El ejercicio en cambio es la facultad de actuar concretamente en virtud de esos derechos, y a diferencia de la titularidad, éste (sic) si puede corresponder por separado a uno o al otro, o bien a ambos progenitores. El ejercicio se traduce en la ejecución de atributos derivados de la autoridad parental como la guarda, crianza y educación, entre otros." (Voto n.° 142-02, de las 9:30 horas del 6 de febrero de 2002, reiterado, entre otros, en los n.os 2041-04, de las 7:30 horas del 24 de noviembre de 2004; 1863-06, de las 9:55 horas del 22 de noviembre de 2006; 1598-07, de las 9:20 horas del 20 de noviembre de 2007 y 1353-09, de las 10:30 horas del 8 de setiembre de 2009). De todo ello se sigue que, en principio, tanto su titularidad como el ejercicio de los atributos que conforman sus diversos contenidos son personalísimos, irrenunciables e innegociables o indisponibles. Tanto una como las otras son, además, indelegables, sin detrimento, claro está, de los cambios ejecutados por alguna necesidad temporal del padre o de la madre o del hijo o de la hija, como sería, por ejemplo, el traslado a una residencia distinta para poder cursar sus estudios, lo cual no se traduce jurídicamente en una delegación de la autoridad parental. Abona lo indicado que su extinción esté sometida a hechos jurídicos (muerte o mayoría de edad) o a actos judiciales con intervención de los órganos competentes. El ordinal 36 del Código de la niñez y adolescencia resume esto último en los siguientes términos: “Las causas que dan lugar a la separación definitiva de una persona menor de edad de su familia son las previstas en el Código de Familia, como causales de pérdida o suspensión de la autoridad parental. La suspensión o terminación de los poderes y deberes que confiere la patria potestad sólo (sic) puede ser decretada por un juez (sic).”- VIII.- Como lo ha destacado esta Cámara, el interés superior es una premisa fundamental de la doctrina de la protección integral y constituye el principio rector en la interpretación y aplicación de la normativa sobre niñez y adolescencia (ver, entre muchos otros, los votos n.os 2207-04, de las 9 horas del 14 de diciembre de 2004; 1472-05, de las 8:10 horas del 4 de octubre de 2005; 59-08, de las 11:20 horas del 18 de enero; 1003-08, de las 8:45 horas del 27 de mayo; 1681-08, de las 8:10 horas del 18 de setiembre; 1843-08, de las 9:50 horas del 15 de octubre y 1837-08, de las 9:20 horas del 15 de octubre, todos de 2008). Desde su promulgación en 1974, el Código de Familia le reconoció esa condición en su artículo 2. En ese momento histórico su contenido era definido desde una perspectiva psicosocial —lo más conveniente para el niño o la niña— y respondía al esquema paternalista-autoritario. Con la Convención sobre los derechos del niño se produce un cambio de singular trascendencia, gracias al cual se transforma en un concepto de índole jurídica, con un significado basado en la autodeterminación y cuya gran amplitud pretende garantizar la más completa tutela de los derechos de la infancia en un marco de seguridad jurídica. Desde esta óptica, su único contenido posible son los propios derechos. Como lo explica [Nombre9], "(…) el concepto de "interés", de acuerdo con el Diccionario de la Real Academia Española, equivale a "provecho, utilidad, conveniencia o necesidad". Sin embargo, esta sinonimia nada nos dice acerca de lo que puede resultar provechoso, útil, conveniente o necesario para el niño. Actualmente, las representaciones sociales sobre lo que es apropiado o perjudicial para la niñez o sobre cuáles son sus necesidades esenciales se nutren de las ideas consensuadas a nivel mundial que definen una cierta universalidad capaz de dar contenido concreto al parámetro. Los tratados internacionales y particularmente la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño constituyen un marco de mayor objetividad y pueden ser vistos como un esfuerzo para fijar las exigencias de la infancia destinadas a su pleno desarrollo. Los derechos acordados a los niños configuran, precisamente, el poder que se les otorga destinado a tutelar sus intereses vitales mediante el reclamo de determinados comportamientos, tanto por parte del Estado como de las personas que los tienen bajo su cuidado." [El interés superior del niño. En [Nombre10], [Nombre11] (directora), Los Derechos del Niño en la Familia. Discurso y Realidad, Buenos Aires: Editorial Universidad, 1998, p. 45]. Por su parte, [Nombre12]. [Nombre13] señala que “(…) este concepto se encuadra dentro de las llamadas definiciones marco, ya que no resulta sencillo establecer su alcance, pues es una idea en permanente evolución y transformación (…). Por lo expuesto, resulta que el término en análisis es flexible, toda vez que permite y exige a su vez, en cada caso puntual, calificarlo y redefinirlo, atendiendo a las particularidades de la situación. Así el interés superior del niño dependerá de circunstancias específicas (…). Esta particularidad obliga a los órganos de aplicación de la Convención, ya sea la administración o el Poder Judicial, a asumir la importantísima tarea de descubrir qué curso de acción llevará a la defensa del interés superior del niño en cada caso particular. Lo que la Convención establece es, precisamente, que resultará obligatorio para esos agentes la búsqueda que lleve a ese descubrimiento de qué es lo que mejor resguarda el interés superior del niño (…)” [Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. Buenos Aires: Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores, 2002, pp. 101-102]. Esas precisiones contextualizan la obligación que el inciso 1), del numeral 3, del instrumento internacional referido le impone a las instituciones públicas o privadas de bienestar social, a los tribunales, a las autoridades administrativas y a los órganos legislativos, de prestar particular atención al interés superior de la persona menor de dieciocho años en todas las medidas concernientes a ella, al igual que el deber de considerarlo en toda acción pública o privada que le afecte, estipulada en el 5 del Código de la niñez y la adolescencia. Este último apunta que dicho interés superior le garantiza el respeto de sus derechos en un ambiente físico y mental sano, en procura de su pleno desarrollo personal y agrega que, para determinarlo, es preciso tomar en cuenta: "a) Su condición de sujeto de derechos y responsabilidades. b) Su edad, grado de madurez, capacidad de discernimiento y demás condiciones personales. c) Las condiciones socioeconómicas en que se desenvuelve. d) La correspondencia entre el interés individual y el social." Por último y en concordancia con ello, este cuerpo normativo declara en su ordinal 3 que “Los derechos y las garantías de este grupo son de interés público, irrenunciables e intransigibles.”- IX.- A mayor abundamiento, en el voto n.º 2008-14776, de las 10:09 horas del 3 de octubre de 2008, la Sala Constitucional señaló que “El Derecho de la Constitución le impone al Estado costarricense, como deber fundamental, la protección del interés superior del niño (sic). Lo que debe verse reflejado en las actuaciones de las distintas instituciones que conforman parte del aparato estatal (…)”. En el n.º 2008-15461, de las 15:07 horas del 15 de octubre de 2008, sostuvo que “(…) diferentes instrumentos internacionales reconocen e imponen el deber estatal de prestar particular protección a los derechos de los niños y las niñas; desde instrumentos declarativos como la misma Declaración Universal, y especialmente a partir de la aprobación y vigencia de la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño, se ha dado un impulso determinante en la protección de este grupo especial, procurando que en todo momento se brinde la adecuada asistencia y respeto de los derechos a él reconocidos, dentro de los que sobresalen (…) la promoción de las condiciones necesarias para la convivencia familiar, así como el derecho de los niños (sic) a permanecer junto a sus padres, particularmente junto a su madre –artículo 16 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, o Protocolo de San Salvador-. La jurisprudencia de la Sala es contundente en reconocer la protección que debe otorgarse a los derechos de los niños y las niñas, reconociendo, igualmente, al interés superior del niño su condición y naturaleza de principio general que, como tal, forma parte del ordenamiento jurídico y debe ser aplicado para que rija y gobierne toda actividad administrativa y judicial relacionada con las personas menores de edad. (…) En este sentido, como principio general reconocido y plenamente aplicable, al interés superior del niño no le es oponible norma o decisión alguna –administrativa o judicial- que le contradiga, salvo que en circunstancias determinadas se encuentre en liza la aplicabilidad de algún otro principio general del mayor nivel, en cuyo caso el operador (sic) jurídico deberá atenerse a la prueba de ponderación y al rol de cada principio en el caso particular. De tal forma, ignorar el carácter principal del interés superior del niño desatendiendo su aplicación estricta en aquellos casos que involucren a personas menores de edad, resulta contrario a los reconocimientos que sobre el particular efectúa el Derecho de la Constitución, a la vez que da margen para situarse en una posición de vulnerabilidad frente al mandato del artículo 2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. En otras palabras, las autoridades administrativas y judiciales tienen la obligación de reconocer y aplicar el principio general del interés superior del niño (sic), en perfecto acatamiento de su carácter de principio, de los mandatos establecidos por el Derecho de la Constitución, incluso ideando mecanismos apropiados y soluciones consecuentes de conformidad con lo ordenado por el referido artículo 2 de la Convención Americana.” Y con anterioridad, en el n.º 2005-11262, de las 15 horas del 24 de agosto de 2005, reiterado en los n.os 2006-12246, de las 15:24 horas del 22 de agosto de 2006; 2007-13548, de las 15:14 horas del 18 de septiembre de 2007; 2008-14068, de las 9:04 horas del 23 de septiembre de 2008; [Telf7], de las 12:23 horas del 30 de enero y 2009-6003, de las 14:49 horas del 21 de abril, ambos de 2009, había expresado que “En materia de los derechos especiales que tienen los niños se encuentran varias normas de rango constitucional, internacional e infraconstitucional; reconociéndose en todas ellas el interés superior del niño (a) como criterio de toda acción pública o privada concerniente a una persona menor de dieciocho años. (…) De las normas de los instrumentos internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos (…), resulta, a todas luces, que los Estados tienen como deberes fundamentales la protección del interés superior del niño, evitando la desmembración del núcleo familiar y promover las condiciones necesarias para que gocen de la presencia permanente de la autoridad parental en especial cuando el niño (a) requiere cuidados especiales. (…) En conclusión, luego de todo lo dicho es claro que a los niños (sic) le (sic) asisten una serie de derechos especiales y correlativamente al Estado y los padres o encargados de los niños (sic) le (sic) asisten una serie de obligaciones y deberes para con ellos, más aún cuando se trate de niños con necesidades especiales, todo lo cual tiene respaldos (sic) en numerosos instrumentos internacionales, en nuestra Constitución Política y en normas legales.” (Ver también el n.º 2009-145, de las 8:59 horas del 13 de enero de 2009).- X.- El principio del interés superior, antes reseñado, obliga a puntualizar que en esta clase de procesos, en la que está en juego la estabilidad, el bienestar y la tranquilidad de una persona menor de dieciocho años, el criterio para establecer si corresponde atribuirle al padre o a la madre los atributos personales de la autoridad parental —la guarda, la crianza y la educación en el lenguaje tradicional— o, más propiamente, el derecho de custodia, no es la falta de idoneidad de alguno de esos sujetos sino la preeminencia de sus condiciones personales, materiales, familiares y sociales y, por supuesto, la de su compromiso, disponibilidad y diligencia, orientadas a garantizarle su pleno desarrollo y el respeto de sus derechos en un ambiente físico y mental sano. No se está en presencia, entonces, de un proceso de carácter sancionatorio, como lo es el planteado con el propósito de que se disponga la suspensión o la terminación de la autoridad parental (ver el voto n.º 1681-08, de las 8:10 horas del 18 de setiembre de 2008), sino de uno en el que corresponde colocar como principal interesada al niño o a la niña y determinar lo más conveniente para él o ella (ver, en similar sentido, los votos n.os 204-08, de las 11:10 horas del 30 de enero; 324-08, de las 9:10 horas del 27 de febrero; 1204-08, de las 9:10 horas del 4 de junio, los tres de 2008 y 764-09, de las 13 horas del 13 de mayo de 2009). En otros términos, la decisión que en definitiva se adopte no tiene que prejuzgar sobre el inadecuado ejercicio del rol materno o paterno por quien no obtiene la satisfacción de su pretensión o de su resistencia, pero sí ha de apoyarse en una mejor valoración de las condiciones de quien sí logre el amparo jurisdiccional. Los vástagos no son objetos, sino seres humanos con derechos y, justamente por eso, debe garantizárseles el mayor bienestar posible, dentro de las condiciones de sus progenitores. En concordancia con ello, no se puede compartir que, en este asunto, se hayan aplicado, como se hizo en primera instancia, las reglas sobre la carga de la prueba. Si, como se indicó, no debe atribuírsele naturaleza sancionatoria a la decisión que le asigne a un progenitor el derecho de custodia del hijo o de la hija común, resulta obvio que la falta de idoneidad del otro, suponiendo que se haya alegado, es insuficiente para justificarla, pues se requiere la acreditación de que se reúnen mejores condiciones personales, familiares y sociales para garantizar su pleno desarrollo. Eso quiere decir que tanto a quien solicita para sí esa atribución jurisdiccional como a quien se opone a esa pretensión les incumbe producir las pruebas que estimen pertinentes para demostrar que están en mejor situación de ejercer los atributos personales de la autoridad parental. En todo caso, esa exigencia no es ajena a lo previsto en el numeral 317 del Código Procesal Civil, ya que, en virtud de ese precepto, “La carga de la prueba incumbe: / 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho. / 2) A quien se oponga a una pretensión, en cuanto a las afirmaciones de hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos del derecho del actor.”- XI.- A efecto de resolver este asunto, también conviene tener presente lo señalado por la Sala Constitucional en el voto n.º [Telf8], de las 14:51 horas del 8 de abril de 2003: “(…) los derechos que corresponden a los vínculos del menor (sic) con su familia natural están previstos en los artículos 7, 8 y 9 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. En ellos se declara su derecho a ser cuidado por sus padres, a preservar sus relaciones familiares sin injerencias ilícitas y a permanecer con ellos. El artículo 16 (…) del Protocolo de San Salvador se refiere al derecho del niño a crecer al amparo y bajo la responsabilidad de sus padres y, en especial, a que el niño de corta edad no sea separado de su madre. El Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia en las normas 30, 31 y 33 prevé el derecho del menor (sic) a crecer y desarrollarse al lado de sus padres y a ser cuidado por ellos, a permanecer en su hogar, a crecer y ser educado en el seno de una familia. / (…) En lo que toca a los derechos fundamentales de los padres –reiterando que el plano que ellos ocupan es secundario, en el tanto resultan subordinados a la protección del interés superior del menor (sic), en los términos ya enunciados de la Convención de los Derechos del Niño y del Código de la Niñez– básicamente resulta involucrado el derecho a la integridad de la familia, excluyendo de esa zona de intimidad toda injerencia injustificada y excesiva de las autoridades públicas. Esto, en la medida en que la familia está protegida por los artículos 51 de la Constitución Política, 17 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 15 del Protocolo adicional a esa Convención en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, 10, 17 y 23 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Particularmente en el artículo 17 de este último cuerpo normativo se prohíben las injerencias arbitrarias en ese ámbito humano. / (…) Aunque a primera vista pareciera que lo fundamental para emitir una decisión en este caso es determinar la prevalencia de alguno de los grupos de derechos que atañen directamente a la menor (sic) y el derecho de los padres al que se hizo referencia, esta impresión es falsa. Es preferible recurrir a la expresión de conciliación y no a la de sacrificio de ciertos derechos a favor de otros, con base en el principio propio de la materia de derechos fundamentales de interdependencia de esos derechos. Es decir, hay que entender los diversos derechos de los que es titular una persona como parte de un esquema global que debe procurar armonizarse. Con ello no se quiere decir que todos se ubican en un plano de igualdad, sino que es obligatorio buscar una solución que permita su integración y solo en caso que las diferentes respuestas plausibles sean impracticables, podrá finalmente preferirse un derecho sobre otro. (…) La venia jurídica a las autoridades administrativas y judiciales para intervenir en las relaciones familiares es indicio de soluciones de conciliación de los derechos que involucra la decisión de este asunto, en la medida en que pese a admitirse que la regla es la conservación del grupo familiar, esta regla puede ser alterada a través de una reacción estatal –administrativa o jurisdiccional–, sin olvidar que tal injerencia repercute sobre derechos fundamentales.” (Las negritas son agregadas).- XII.- Con los medios de convicción aportados se logró establecer que [Nombre1]. fue procreada durante la convivencia que mantuvieron las partes. Por razones laborales, a finales de 2006, su madre le encargó su cuidado a la abuela paterna, con quien residía don D . En la actualidad, la niña tiene poco más de siete años y diez meses y, cuando menos desde los últimos dos, vive con su padre, la esposa de este, señora [Nombre6]. y su hermana. Aun cuando no puede decirse que doña [Nombre5]. haya incurrido en graves incumplimientos de sus deberes para con su hija o se haya desentendido totalmente de su crianza, ni sea posible dejar de reconocer la vinculación afectiva entre ellas, al punto que [Nombre1]. espera con entusiasmo sus visitas, el peritaje psicosocial forense de folios 95-106 obliga a tener por acreditado mantiene un fuerte vínculo afectivo con su progenitor, identifica a su actual núcleo de convivencia como su familia, [Nombre14] reconoce como figura materna a la señora [Nombre6] , asiste regularmente al Kinder de la Escuela [Nombre7], cumple cabalmente sus obligaciones académicas, al punto que sus ausencias son por razones de salud (padecimiento de asma) y no presenta problemas de conducta. Además, debe tenerse como muy probable que ha sido estimulada en forma adecuada, pues su desempeño en el instrumento psicológico KBIT, que evaluó su inteligencia verbal y no verbal y midió sus habilidades verbales relacionadas con el aprendizaje escolar, fue superior al promedio. Si a esa serie de aspectos positivos se agrega que para su docente el padre y su cónyuge son los responsables de su educación, que la relación paterno filial no presenta elementos de riesgo y que no se cuenta con una evaluación de la progentora que permita afirmar sus mejores condiciones para hacerse cargo de su cuidado, lo procedente es atribuirle al señor [Nombre4]. el derecho de custodia reclamado. Así las cosas y teniendo en cuenta su interés superior, se debe revocar la sentencia recurrida y acoger la demanda incoada.- XIII.- Es preciso señalar que la decisión de don [Nombre4]. de llevarse consigo a [Nombre1]. cuando conformó su actual relación de pareja y dejó la casa de su madre no puede ser catalogada, en este caso concreto, como una conducta reprochable, pues no se observa que lo haya hecho de mala fe. Por el contrario, al haber actuado así asumió como correspondía sus obligaciones parentales. Como ya se apuntó, él ejerce la autoridad parental sobre ella de pleno derecho y, para entonces, la niña no estaba bajo el cuidado o la vigilancia de su progenitora. En otras palabras, por más que se trate de un acto unilateral, lo cierto es que trasluce un evidente sentido de la responsabilidad, que se confirma cuando se revisan las condiciones de vida que en la actualidad tiene. Es obvio que ella es parte de su proyecto de vida, mantienen una fuerte y sólida vinculación afectiva y no ha sido negligente. Eso sí, como la titularidad de la patria potestad o autoridad parental se mantiene compartida por ambas partes, no sobra advertirle a don [Nombre4]. que la atribución a su persona del derecho de custodia de [Nombre1]. no lo autoriza para desconocer su derecho fundamental a interrelacionarse con su madre y a cultivar su relación materno-filial y que él está obligado no solo a no entorpecerlo sino también a garantizarlo. La señora [Nombre5]. es parte esencial de la vida de su hija y ha de tener la oportunidad de ser una figura significativa para ella. Eso también forma parte de su desarrollo integral.- XIV.- Bajo ninguna circunstancia puede esta Cámara compartir la prejuiciada afirmación de la juzgadora de primera instancia de que “(…) por naturaleza, los hijos deben permanecer al lado de su madre, salvo que situaciones de riesgo social o cualquiera otra exijan separarlos de su progenitora y dejarlos al lado de su padre.” Semejante concepción hace caso omiso no solo de que el interés primordial al que debe atenderse a la hora de resolver un asunto como este es el del hijo o de la hija, sino también toda la histórica lucha por la igualdad de género que impide atribuir derechos y responsabilidades en atención a la diferencia sexual entre los hombres y las mujeres. Un instrumento internacional de primer orden como lo es la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer demanda de quienes operamos con el Derecho impedir que el papel de las mujeres en la procreación sea causa de discriminación, entendida esta, en el caso concreto, como la atribución desigual de la responsabilidad en la crianza de los hijos e hijas. También nos exige implementar las medidas necesarias a efecto de “(…) modificar el papel tradicional tanto del hombre como de la mujer en la sociedad y en la familia (…)” (preámbulo). Por eso mismo, es desafortunado el uso del término “delegación” para referirse al ejercicio de los atributos de la autoridad parental por parte del señor D.

XV.- Como corolario de lo expuesto, se acoge el recurso interpuesto, se revoca el fallo apelado, se asigna a don D. el ejercicio del derecho de custodia sobre [Nombre1]. y se resuelve este asunto sin especial pronunciamiento en costas; esto último al tenor de lo dispuesto por el ordinal 106 del Código de la niñez y la adolescencia.-

POR TANTO:

Se revoca la sentencia recurrida. En su defecto, se declara con lugar la demanda y se asigna al señor D. el ejercicio del derecho de custodia sobre la niña [Nombre1] . Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas.- RANDALL ESQUIVEL QUIRÓS LUIS HÉCTOR AMORETTI OROZCO MAURICIO CHACÓN JIMÉNEZ [Nombre15]