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Res. 01427-1990 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 26/10/1990
OutcomeResultado
The amparo is denied as no due process violation was found.Se declara sin lugar el amparo por no encontrar violación al debido proceso.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber dismissed an amparo action filed by the Costa Rican Human Rights Commission against the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA), the Ministry of the Interior, and the Attorney General's Office, regarding the eviction of a group of squatters from lands acquired by the IDA in Río Frío de Sarapiquí. The petitioner alleged a violation of due process because the squatters were not notified of the eviction order and were denied an opportunity to defend themselves. The Chamber verified in the administrative record that the squatters had signed an agreement with the IDA to remain in a limited area while beneficiary qualification was underway, that they were formally warned on at least three occasions before the eviction, that they had the opportunity to appeal the land allocation, and that more than four months elapsed from the eviction order to its execution. It therefore concluded that there was no due process violation. Additionally, the Chamber held that the opinions of the Attorney General's Office are binding on the requesting entity and that the Office could potentially be held liable in an amparo proceeding, though in this case no improper advice regarding due process was found.La Sala Constitucional desestimó un recurso de amparo interpuesto por la Comisión Costarricense de Derechos Humanos en contra del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), el Ministerio de Gobernación y la Procuraduría General de la República, por el desalojo de un grupo de ocupantes de tierras adquiridas por el IDA en Río Frío de Sarapiquí. La recurrente alegó violación al debido proceso porque los ocupantes no fueron notificados del desalojo ni tuvieron oportunidad de defensa. La Sala verificó en el expediente administrativo que los ocupantes firmaron un convenio con el IDA para permanecer en un área limitada mientras se realizaba la calificación de beneficiarios, que fueron prevenidos formalmente en al menos tres ocasiones antes del desalojo, que tuvieron la oportunidad de apelar la adjudicación de parcelas y que transcurrieron más de cuatro meses desde la orden de desalojo hasta su ejecución. Por ello, concluyó que no existió violación al debido proceso. Además, la Sala señaló que los dictámenes de la Procuraduría General de la República son vinculantes para el ente que los solicita y que esa institución podría eventualmente ser declarada responsable en un amparo, aunque en este caso no se encontró asesoría indebida en cuanto a la protección del debido proceso.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The Chamber does not share the view expressed by the Attorney General's Office regarding the liability that arises from its opinions, since these are binding on the requesting entity under Article 2 of its constitutive law. Furthermore, under the doctrine of Article 356 of the General Public Administration Act, its opinions constitute acts that give content to subsequent actions of the Active Administration, which may not depart from such opinions; it follows that the Attorney General's Office could also eventually be held liable in an amparo proceeding.La Sala no comparte el criterio expuesto por la Procuraduría General de la República, en cuanto a la responsabilidad que cabe por sus pronunciamientos, pues estos tienen el carácter de vinculantes para el ente que los solicita conforme al artículo 2 de su ley constitutiva. Además, conforme la doctrina del artículo 356 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, los pronunciamientos serían actos que dan contenido a las actuaciones posteriores de la Administración Activa, que no podrá apartarse de estos pronunciamientos, de lo que se concluye que la Procuraduría General de la República también podría ser eventualmente declarada como responsable en un caso de amparo.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"...los pronunciamientos tienen el carácter de vinculantes para el ente que los solicita conforme al artículo 2 de su ley constitutiva."
"...its opinions are binding on the requesting entity under Article 2 of its constitutive law."
Considerando III
"...los pronunciamientos tienen el carácter de vinculantes para el ente que los solicita conforme al artículo 2 de su ley constitutiva."
Considerando III
"...la Procuraduría General de la República también podría ser eventualmente declarada como responsable en un caso de amparo."
"...the Attorney General's Office could also eventually be held liable in an amparo proceeding."
Considerando III
"...la Procuraduría General de la República también podría ser eventualmente declarada como responsable en un caso de amparo."
Considerando III
"Véase como el derecho a la defensa se cumplió sobradamente pues, aún después de notificados de la orden de desalojo, los interesados presentaron apelaciones en contra de la declaratoria de beneficiarios, sin que hicieran gestión alguna en contra de esta orden."
"It can be seen that the right to defense was fully satisfied, since even after being notified of the eviction order, the interested parties filed appeals against the beneficiary declaration, without making any challenge against that order."
Considerando I
"Véase como el derecho a la defensa se cumplió sobradamente pues, aún después de notificados de la orden de desalojo, los interesados presentaron apelaciones en contra de la declaratoria de beneficiarios, sin que hicieran gestión alguna en contra de esta orden."
Considerando I
Full documentDocumento completo
**Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. San José, at fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on the twenty-sixth of October, nineteen hundred and ninety.** Amparo action (Recurso de amparo) filed by Licda. [Nombre62 001], of legal age, married, resident of San José, Social Worker, identity card number [CED62 ], in her personal capacity and as Executive Secretary of the association: "Comisión Costarricense de Derechos Humanos", legal entity [Valor CED103], against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario "I.D.A." and two of its officials, Messrs. Luis Angel Zúñiga Salas and Jesús Rodríguez; against the Procuraduría General de la República; against the Minister and the Legal Department of the Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía; and the Cantonal Delegate of the Guardia de Asistencia Rural of Río Frío, province of Heredia.
**RESULTANDO** I.- The petitioner alleges that a violation of the right to due process (debido proceso) occurred in an eviction (desalojo) proceeding for a farm recently acquired by the "I.D.A." and invaded by several persons, as they were not notified of the eviction order (orden de desalojo) issued by that institution and were not granted the opportunity to present a defense as mandated by Article 39 of the Constitution.
II.- The "I.D.A.", in its report, indicates that the eviction order (orden de desalojo) was taken under the protection of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización N°2825 of October 14, 1961, and its reforms, and the Ley de Creación del "I..D.A", N°6735, which empowers it to take such a measure against those who do not qualify as beneficiaries of its programs. The "I.D.A.", at the request of farmers and farmers' organizations from the northern zone, began in 1988 the procedures to acquire lands owned by several companies represented by Mr. Florindo Cerdas Fernández. The negotiations culminated when the Board of Directors, by agreement taken in Article 12 of Session N°40-89, of May 16, 1989, agreed to buy the properties, and the transaction was materialized in public deed N°20 at 15:30 hours on June 8, 1989, granted before notaries Jorge Manuel Solano Chinchilla and Ana Victoria Mora Mora. It adds that the representatives of the farmer groups signed a document on May 22, 1989, in which they committed to settling in an area of five hectares within the farm, while the "I.D.A." carried out the selection, which was completed a month later. As some of the original applicants did not qualify as beneficiaries, they filed an appeal (recurso de apelación). Subsequently, on June 30, the original group of applicants violated the agreement signed on May 22 and invaded the entire farm, for which reason on June 7 they proceeded to notify them to vacate the parts they had invaded. On June 30, the occupants were formally warned (prevenidos) by two rural guards, and they neither obeyed, opposed, nor filed any appeal against that warning of eviction (prevención de desalojo). For this reason, the Board of Directors of the "I.D.A.", in session on July 4, 1989, Article Three, authorized the Superior Directorate to proceed to evict the invaders, for which they sent official letters DL-933-89 and DL-994-89 of July 6, 1989, requesting the intervention of the Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía to execute the eviction agreement.
III.- The representatives of the "I.D.A." held three meetings with the occupants on June 30, July 14, and July 20 without a positive result. On July 14, the occupants were again warned (prevenidos) of the eviction, so that they could argue whatever they deemed appropriate. On July 24, the Board of Directors approved the socio-economic study of the original applicants, which was appealed by the representative of one of the favored groups, who requested that the administrative channel be considered exhausted. The studies for these appeals were ready in October 1989, and the interested parties were notified. However, as the occupants had refused to vacate, despite the multiple warnings (prevensiones) made, the eviction (desahucio) was carried out on November 14, 1989, which, according to the "I.D.A.", was executed without major setbacks and within the framework of the law, while some occupants, led by Mr. Adrián Cortés Garro, behaved violently and even held two rural guards hostage and threatened them with knives. The shacks were not burned, nor were people beaten, as the petitioner alleges. On the contrary, they were invited to take their belongings and the materials from their houses. Once the property was vacated, the "I.D.A." proceeded to the definitive qualification of the applicants who met the legal requirements and to correctly locate them on the lands acquired for that purpose.
IV.- It indicates that it is not true that the eviction orders (órdenes de desalojo) were executed without being final (firmes), since the organic law authorizes the Board of Directors of the "I.D.A." to make final agreements (acuerdos en firme) in cases of urgency (see also Article 56.2 of the Ley General de Administración Pública). It explains that what occurred is that the plaintiff learned of the resolution issued by the Superior Directorate, based on the Board of Directors' agreement, which omitted to mention that circumstance.
V.- Regarding the lack of notification of the eviction order (orden de desalojo), it states that at least three warnings (prevensiones) are recorded in the administrative files, apart from the fact that it was discussed on many occasions with the interested parties, and 4 and a half months elapsed since the Board of Directors ordered it. They also allege that a second agreement exists, signed by the evictees, to maintain the population center of "finca cinco" in Sarapiquí, while the qualification process was completed. The eviction orders (órdenes de desalojo) and the execution itself have not been appealed, so there is tacit consent, in accordance with Articles 149 and 150 of the Ley General de Administración Pública. Therefore, the "I.D.A." and regarding the other belongings of the evictees, it has been shown that they were not destroyed or confiscated. Neither has the privacy of the home been violated because the procedures have been in accordance with the law, and they consider that the action has been filed recklessly.
VI.- That the Ministerio de Gobernación, represented by the Minister Lic. Antonio Alvarez Desanti, in his report, responded that on July 6, 1989, they received the request from the "I.D.A" for the Guardia de Asistencia Rural to proceed with the eviction of the occupants of its properties. Once the documentation was studied, it was approved on June 13, and the eviction was authorized based on the pronouncement of the Procuraduría General de la República N°C-217-82 of September 6, 1982.
VII.- On August 21, the "I.D.A." again requested that Ministry carry out the eviction as the first order had not been possible to execute, a measure authorized by official letter N°2264-89. The eviction was carried out on November 14 and 15.
VIII.- The Minister of Gobernación states that the actions taken are based on pronouncements N° C-162-82 of July 20, 1982, and N° C-217-82 of the Procuraduría General de la República, which oblige the "I.D.A." to carry out evictions following the procedures contemplated in Article 691 of the Código de Procedimientos Civiles, which requires prior approval from the Ministry. He therefore considers that the amparo action (recurso de amparo) filed against him should be dismissed.
IX.- The Procuraduría General de la República responded that, as it is an Active entity, its acts do not have the character of Active Administration since its acts do not transcend the internal sphere of the institutions that request its legal opinion, and it could never cause harm or a violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. It does not issue material acts, which are issued by the competent entities, and therefore its pronouncements have the character of preparatory acts. Its opinions (dictámenes) are generic in nature, intended to guide material legal activity because it does not have the legal capacity to issue concrete instructions and orders to other authorities of the active administration and merely explains the correct interpretation of the laws.
XII.- That the prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.
Drafted by Magistrate Sancho González; and, **Considerando:** I.- The petitioning entity bases this action on the absence of administrative procedures that guaranteed the persons who occupied "I.D.A." lands in the locality of Río Frío, canton of Sarapiquí, province of Heredia, the right to due process (debido proceso) before being evicted by the police authorities. However, the case presents circumstances that demonstrate the opposite.
In effect, as recorded in administrative file No. 462 at folio 32, on May 22, 1989, an agreement was signed between the leaders of the peasant group and the "I.D.A.", in which the former undertook to "...respect our provisional location in an area of the acquired farm of approximately 5 hectares as agreed upon by the IDA and the owners and timely qualification by means of the Beneficiary Selection Section...". However, the farms were invaded again, despite the described agreement, so on July 4, the Board of Directors of the "I.D.A." adopted the decision to evict them; Article III of session No. 53-89. See folios 73 to 77 of administrative file No. 462. On June 30, 1989, Rural Guards Oldemar Artavia Cubillo and Oldemar Méndez Segura had verified the beginning of the invasion and a warning (prevensión) was issued that they must leave immediately; they stated that they were encouraged by Mr. Adrián Cortés Garro to remain outside the originally defined area, see folios 77 to 75. The second eviction warning (prevensión de desalojo) was made on July 14 by Rural Guards Gabriel Víctor Duarte and Róger Mora. (see folios 86 and 87) which was approved in Board of Directors session No. 81-89. Subsequently, the declaration of awardees (declaratoria de adjudicatarios) was made, July 1989, article 16, with 47 applicants out of a total of 98 being favored, an award that was appealed on September 13 by Mr. Carlos Ramos Arias, General Secretary of the National Agrarian Union Education (FESIAN), who requested that several of his associates rejected by the "I.D.A." be re-evaluated; likewise, Mr. Adrián Cortés Garro, general secretary of the Union of Independent Peasants of Sarapiquí (SICAISA), legal identification number CED37286, filed a review appeal (recurso de revisión) against this act on August 14, considering that there was discriminatory treatment in favor of another group of peasants not affiliated with his union. On August 24, Mr. Jorge Chévez Vargas, Coordinator of the Huetar Atlántica and Norte Region, reported to the Executive Presidency that on July 20 they made a visit to the area to warn (prevenir) the group led by Mr. Cortés to leave because they breached the arrangement, and that two weeks earlier they had again invaded the farm. The Board of Directors allocated the parcels to the beneficiaries by means of Article VII of session No. 109-89 of December 12, 1989. To date, the interested parties had not challenged the eviction warnings (prevenciones de desalojo) because the "I.D.A" was fulfilling its legal obligation to select potential beneficiaries to provide them with land, which demonstrates that the entire case of the purchase of the mentioned farms was a long proceeding of more than six months, of which those affected by the eviction order had full knowledge, whereby any possible violation of due process completely disappears; aside from the fact that the formalities required by Article 691 of the former Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Civiles), which was in force at the time of the eviction, were complied with, since the occupants were formally notified on three occasions before executing the eviction. See how the right to defense was more than amply fulfilled, since, even after being notified of the eviction order, the interested parties filed appeals against the declaration of beneficiaries, without taking any action against this order. In any event, it has been demonstrated that those affected by the eviction knew perfectly well that the "I.D.A." was carrying out a qualification process to subsequently assign them the parcels of the invaded farms, an event that indeed occurred, apart from the existence of an agreement signed by them in which they undertook to remain in an area of five hectares. Thus, the execution of the eviction was not done suddenly, without giving those affected an opportunity for defense, as the appellant claims, but rather, on the contrary, during those months the interested parties were able to employ all types of remedies placed within their reach by the legislator.
II.- Therefore, the discussion about the appropriate procedure to carry out evictions on farms owned by the "I.D.A." is not important for this case, because, as stated, those affected had ample time to appeal.
III.- The Chamber does not share the criterion expressed by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), regarding the liability arising from its pronouncements, as these are binding on the entity that requests them pursuant to Article 2 of its constitutive law. Furthermore, according to the doctrine of Article 356 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública), the pronouncements would be acts that give content to the subsequent actions of the Active Administration, which may not depart from these pronouncements, from which it is concluded that the Office of the Attorney General could also eventually be declared liable in an amparo case. However, from the analysis of pronouncements No. C-162-82 of July 27, and No. C-217-82 of September 6, 1982, it does not follow that the Office of the Attorney General improperly advised the Ministry of Governance and Police or the "I.D.A." regarding the protection of the right to due process. On the contrary, the initial practice of the "I.D.A." was to carry out evictions through the Rural Guard of the Ministry of Governance and Police, not only on farms it owned, but also on others subject to precarious occupation conflicts, in application of Article 68 of Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, using the Administrative Eviction (Desahucio Administrativo) procedure developed by Article 691 of the now-repealed Code of Civil Procedure. The eviction (desahucio) was based on the privilege granted by Article 7, subsection e) of its creation law No. 6735 of March 29, 1982, which declares the final resolutions it issues to be enforceable, as long as there is no final judicial resolution. The Office of the Attorney General defined, on the contrary, that the "I.D.A." does not have that privilege, because the eviction (desahucio) is not within its competences (see Article 50.1 of the General Law of Public Administration). The Office of the Attorney General also differentiated the situation of "possessors" (poseedores) who have been in possession of a property for more than one year, which is governed by other procedures. For these reasons, it had recommended following the procedure established in the repealed Article 691 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with prior authorization from the General Directorate of the Rural Assistance Guard and the Ministry of Governance. Subsequently, in the second pronouncement, the Office of the Attorney General reaffirmed, as it pertains to us, that evictions of farms owned by the "I.D.A" or under its administration must be carried out in accordance with Article 691 of the Code, without it having been recommended that when applying this procedure, the "I.D.A." or the Rural Assistance Guard violate the right to due process, a sufficient reason to deem the appeal (recurso) dismissed on this point.
THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The appeal (recurso) is declared without merit.
Nombre43935 . President / Jorge Baudrit G. / Jorge E. Castro B. / Luis Fdo. Solano Carrera / Luis Paulino Mora / Fernando Del Castillo / Eduardo Sancho G. /Juan Carlos Castro L. Secretary.
It explains that what occurred is that the plaintiff became aware of the resolution issued by the Superior Directorate, based on the agreement of the Board of Directors, which omitted mentioning that circumstance.
V.- Regarding the lack of notification of the eviction order, it states that at least three warnings appear in the administrative files, apart from the fact that it was discussed on many occasions with the interested parties and 4 and a half months elapsed since the Board of Directors ordered it. They also allege that there is a second agreement signed by the evicted persons to remain in the population center of "finca cinco" in Sarapiquí, while the qualification process was being completed. No appeal has been filed against the eviction orders or the execution itself, so tacit consent exists, in accordance with Articles 149 and 150 of the General Law on Public Administration. Therefore, for the "I.D.A." and with respect to the other belongings of the evicted persons, it has been demonstrated that they were not destroyed or confiscated. Nor have they violated the privacy of the home because the procedures have been in accordance with the law, and they consider that the action has been filed with recklessness.
VI.- That the Ministry of Governance, represented by the Minister, Lic. Antonio Alvarez Desanti, in its report, responded that on July 6, 1989, they received the request from the "I.D.A." for the Rural Assistance Guard to proceed with the eviction of the occupants of its properties. Once the documentation was studied, it was approved on June 13, and the eviction was authorized based on the pronouncement of the Attorney General's Office No. C-217-82 of September 6, 1982.
VII.- On August 21, the "I.D.A." again requested the eviction from that Ministry because it had not been possible to execute the first order, a measure that was authorized by official communication No. 2264-89. The eviction was carried out on November 14 and 15.
VIII.- The Minister of Governance states that the actions taken are based on pronouncements No. C-162-82 of July 20, 1982, and No. C-217-82 of the Attorney General's Office, which oblige the "I.D.A." to carry out evictions following the procedures contemplated in Article 691 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires prior approval from the Ministry. Therefore, he considers that the amparo appeal filed against him should be dismissed.
IX.- The Attorney General's Office responded that, because it is an entity whose acts do not have the character of Active Administration, as its acts do not transcend the internal sphere of the institutions that request its legal opinion, and it could never cause harm or a violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. It does not issue material acts, which are issued by the competent entities, and therefore its pronouncements have the character of preparatory acts. The opinions are generic in nature, intended to guide material legal activity because they lack the legal capacity to issue specific instructions and orders to other authorities of the active administration and are limited to explaining the correct interpretation of the laws.
XII.- That the prescriptions of the law have been observed in the proceedings.
Drafted by Judge Sancho González; and, **Considering:** I.- The appellant entity bases this appeal on the absence of administrative procedures that would guarantee the right to due process for the persons who occupied lands belonging to the "I.D.A." in the locality of Río Frío in the canton of Sarapiquí, province of Heredia, before being evicted by the police authorities. However, the case presents circumstances that demonstrate the contrary. Indeed, as recorded in administrative file No. 462 at folio 32, on May 22, 1989, an agreement was signed between the leaders of the group of farmers and the "I.D.A.", in which the former committed to **"...respect our provisional location in an area of the acquired farm of approximately 5 hectares as agreed upon by the IDA and the owners and timely qualification through the Beneficiary Selection Section..."**. However, the farms were invaded again, despite the described agreement, so on July 4, the Board of Directors of the "I.D.A." adopted the agreement to evict them; article III of session No. 53-89. See folios 73 to 77 of administrative file No. 462. On June 30, 1989, Rural Guards Oldemar Artavia Cubillo and Oldemar Méndez Segura had verified the start of the invasion, and the warning was issued that they must leave immediately; they stated that they were encouraged by Mr. Adrián Cortés Garro to remain outside the originally defined area, see folios 77 to 75. The second eviction warning was made on July 14 by Rural Guards Gabriel Víctor Duarte and Róger Mora. (see folios 86 and 87), which was approved in session of the Board of Directors No. 81-89. Subsequently, the declaration of awardees was made, July 1989, article 16, with 47 applicants being favored out of a total of 98, an award that was appealed on September 13 by Mr. Carlos Ramos Arias, Secretary General of the National Agrarian Trade Union Education (FESIAN), who requested the re-evaluation of several of his rejected associates by the "I.D.A."; likewise, Mr. Adrián Cortés Garro, secretary general of the Union of Independent Farmers of Sarapiquí (SICAISA), legal ID CED37286, filed a petition for review against this act on August 14, considering there was discriminatory treatment in favor of another group of farmers not affiliated with his union. On August 24, Mr. Jorge Chévez Vargas, Coordinator of the Huetar Atlántica and North Region, informed the Executive Presidency that on July 20 they made a visit to the area to warn the group led by Mr. Cortés to leave because they breached the arrangement, and that two weeks previously they had again invaded the farm. The Board of Directors assigned the parcels to the beneficiaries through article VII of session No. 109-89 of December 12, 1989. At that date, the interested parties had not questioned the eviction warnings because the "I.D.A." was fulfilling its legal obligation to select potential beneficiaries to provide them with land, which demonstrates that the entire case of the purchase of the mentioned farms was a long process of more than six months, of which those affected by the eviction order had full knowledge, so any possible violation of due process disappears completely; apart from the fact that the formalities required by former Article 691 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force at the time of the eviction, were complied with, since the occupants were formally notified on three occasions before executing the eviction. See how the right to defense was amply fulfilled, as even after being notified of the eviction order, the interested parties filed appeals against the declaration of beneficiaries, without making any action against this order. In any case, it has been demonstrated that those affected by the eviction knew perfectly well that the "I.D.A." was carrying out a qualification process to later assign them the parcels of the invaded farms, a fact that indeed occurred, apart from the existence of an agreement signed by them in which they committed to remain in an area of five hectares. Thus, the execution of the eviction was not done suddenly, without giving those affected an opportunity for defense, as the appellant states, but rather, on the contrary, during those months the interested parties were able to use all kinds of remedies made available to them by the legislator.
II.- The discussion about the appropriate procedure to carry out evictions on farms owned by the "I.D.A." is therefore not important for this case, because as has been stated, those affected had ample time to appeal.
III.- The Chamber does not share the opinion expressed by the Attorney General's Office regarding the responsibility it bears for its pronouncements, since these are binding on the entity that requests them, in accordance with Article 2 of its constitutive law. Furthermore, according to the doctrine of Article 356 of the General Law on Public Administration, the pronouncements would be acts that give content to the subsequent actions of the Active Administration, which cannot depart from these pronouncements, from which it is concluded that the Attorney General's Office could also eventually be declared responsible in an amparo case. However, from the analysis of pronouncements No. C-162-82 of July 27, and No. C-217-82 of September 6, 1982, it does not follow that the Attorney General's Office improperly advised the Ministry of Governance and Police or the "I.D.A." regarding the protection of the right to due process. On the contrary, the initial practice of the "I.D.A." was to carry out evictions through the Rural Guard of the Ministry of Governance and Police, not only on farms of its own property, but also on others subject to conflicts of precarious occupation, in application of Article 68 of Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, using the Administrative Eviction procedure developed by Article 691 of the now-repealed Code of Civil Procedure. The eviction was based on the privilege granted by Article 7(e) of its founding law No. 6735 of March 29, 1982, which declares the final resolutions it issues to be enforceable, as long as no final judicial resolution exists. The Attorney General's Office defined, on the contrary, that the "I.D.A." does not have that privilege, because eviction is not within its competencies, (see Article 50.1 of the General Law of Public Administration). The Attorney General's Office also differentiated the situation of "possessors" with more than one year of possessing a property, which is governed by other procedures. For these reasons, it had recommended following the procedure established in Article 691 of the repealed Code of Civil Procedure, prior authorization from the General Directorate of the Rural Assistance Guard and the Ministry of Governance. Later, in the second pronouncement, the Attorney General's Office reaffirmed, in what concerns us, that evictions from farms owned by the "I.D.A." or under its administration must be carried out in accordance with Article 691 of the Code, without having recommended that, by applying this procedure, the "I.D.A." or the Rural Assistance Guard violate the right to due process, sufficient reason to deem the appeal dismissed on this point.
**THEREFORE** The appeal is declared without merit.
Nombre43935 . President / Jorge Baudrit G. / Jorge E. Castro B. / Luis Fdo. Solano Carrera / Luis Paulino Mora / Fernando Del Castillo / Eduardo Sancho G. / Juan Carlos Castro L. Secretary.
Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. San José, a las quince horas veintiún minutos del veintiséis de octubre de mil novecientos noventa.
Recurso de amparo interpuesto por la Licda. [Nombre62 001], mayor, casada, vecina de San José, Trabajadora Social, cédula de identidad número [CED62 ], en su condición personal y de Secretaría Ejecutiva de la asociación: "Comisión Costarricense de Derechos Humanos", persona jurídica [Valor CED103], en contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario "I.D.A." y dos de sus funcionarios, señores Luis Angel Zúñiga Salas y Jesús Rodríguez; contra la Procuraduría General de la República; contra el Ministro y el Departamento Legal del Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía; y del Delegado Cantonal de la Guardia de Asistencia Rural de Río Frío, provincia de Heredia.
RESULTANDO
I.- Alega la recurrente que se ha producido una violación del derecho al debido proceso en un trámite de desalojo de una finca recién adquirida por el "I.D.A." e invadida por varias personas, pues a ellos no se les notificó de la orden de desalojo dictada por esa institución y no se les otorgó la oportunidad de defensa tal y como lo manda el artículo 39 constitucional.
II.- El "I.D.A." en su informe, indica que la orden de desalojo fue tomada al amparo de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización N°2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961 y sus reformas y de la Ley de Creación del "I..D.A", N°6735 que faculta a tomar esa medida contra aquéllos que no califiquen como beneficiarios de sus programas. El "I.D.A.", ante la solicitud de campesinos y organizaciones de campesinos de la zona norte, inició en 1988 los trámites para adquirir terrenos propiedad de varias compañías representadas por el señor Florindo Cerdas Fernández. Las gestiones culminaron cuando la Junta Directiva, mediante acuerdo tomado en el artículo 12 de la sesión N°40-89, de 16 de mayo de 1989, acordó comprar los inmuebles y se materializó la operación en la escritura pública N°20 de las 15:30 horas del 8 de junio de 1989, otorgada ante los notarios Jorge Manuel Solano Chinchilla y Ana Victoria Mora Mora. Agrega que los representantes de los grupos de campesinos, firmaron el 22 de mayo de 1989 un documento en el que se comprometían a asentarse en un área de cinco hectáreas dentro de la finca, en tanto el "I.D.A." efectuaba la selección que se completó un mes después. Como algunos de los solicitantes originales no calificaron como beneficiarios interpusieron recurso de apelación. Posteriormente, el 30 de junio, el grupo de solicitantes original violó el acuerdo suscrito el 22 de mayo e invadieron la totalidad de la finca, razón por la cual el 7 de junio de procedió a notificarles que desalojaran las partes invadidas por ellos. El 30 de junio los ocupantes fueron prevenidos formalmente por dos guardias rurales y ellos no obedecieron ni se opusieron o presentaron recurso alguno contra esa prevención de desalojo, razón por la que la Junta Directiva del "I.D.A.", en sesión de 4 de julio de 1989, artículo tercero, autorizó a la Dirección Superior para que procediera a desalojar a los invasores, para lo que enviaron los oficios DL-933-89 y DL-994-89 de 6 de julio de 1989, en los que solicitan la intervención del Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía para ejecutar el acuerdo de desalojo.
III.- Los personeros del "I.D.A." tuvieron tres reuniones con los ocupantes los días 30 de junio, 14 de julio y 20 de julio sin resultado positivo. El 14 de julio a los ocupantes se les previno nuevamente del desalojo, para que alegaran lo que consideraran oportuno. El 24 de julio, la Junta Directiva aprobó el estudio socio-económico de los solicitantes originales, que fue apelado por el representante de uno de los grupos favorecidos y pide que se de por agotada la vía administrativa. Los estudios de esta apelaciones quedaron listos en octubre de 1989 y se les notificó a los interesados. Sin embargo, como los ocupantes se habían negado a desalojar, pese a las múltiples prevensiones hechas, se procedió el 14 de noviembre de 1989 al desahucio, que según el "I.D.A." se ejecutó sin mayores contratiempos y dentro del marco de la ley, en tanto que algunos ocupantes, dirigidos por el señor Adrián Cortés Garro, se comportaron violentamente e incluso mantuvieron como rehenes a dos guardias rurales y los amenazaron con puñales. No se quemaron los ranchos ni se golpearon a las personas, como alega la recurrente. Por el contrario se les invitó a llevarse las pertenencias y los materiales de las casas. Una vez desalojado el inmueble, el "I.D.A." procedió a la calificación definitiva de los solicitantes que reunieron los requisitos legales y a ubicarlos correctamente en los terrenos adquiridos al efecto.
IV.- Indica que no es cierto que las órdenes de desalojo se hayan ejecutado sin ser firmes, pues la ley orgánica autoriza a la Junta Directiva del "I.D.A." a tomar acuerdos en firme cuando sean casos de urgencia (ver además artículo 56.2 de la Ley General de Administración Pública). Explica que lo que ocurre es que la actora conoció de la resolución dictada por la Dirección Superior, con fundamento en el acuerdo de Junta Directiva, que omitió mencionar esa circunstancia.
V.- En cuanto a la falta de notificación de la orden de desalojo, manifiesta que constan en los expedientes administrativos, por lo menos tres prevensiones, aparte de que se discutió en muchas oportunidades con los interesados y transcurrieron 4 meses y medio desde que la Junta Directiva lo ordenó. Alegan además que existe un segundo firmado por los desalojados de mantenerse el centro de población de "finca cinco" de Sarapiquí, en tanto se completaba el proceso de calificación. De las órdenes de desalojo y de la ejecución misma no se ha apelado por lo que existe un consentimiento tácito, conforme a los artículos 149 y 150 de la Ley General de Administración Pública. Por tanto el "I.D.A." y en cuanto a los demás bienes de los desalojados, se ha demostrado que no fueron destruidos ni confiscados. Tampoco han violado la privacidad del domicilio por que los procedimientos se ha ajustado a derecho y consideran que la acción se ha interpuesto con temeridad.
VI.- Que el Ministerio de Gobernación, representado por el Sr. Ministro Lic. Antonio Alvarez Desanti, en su informe, respondió que el 6 de julio de 1989 recibieron la solicitud del "I.D.A" para que la Guardia de Asistencia Rural procediera al desalojo de los ocupantes de sus propiedades. Una vez estudiada la documentación se aprobó el 13 de junio y se autorizó el desalojo con fundamento en el pronunciamiento de la Procuraduría General de la República N°C-217-82 de 6 de setiembre de 1982.
VII.- El 21 de agosto el "I.D.A." solicitó a ese Ministerio nuevamente el desalojo por cuanto no había sido posible ejecutar la primera orden, medida que se autorizó mediante oficio N°2264-89. El desalojo se efectuó los días 14 y 15 de noviembre.
VIII.- El Ministro de Gobernación, manifiesta que lo actuado tiene como fundamentos los pronunciamientos N° C-162-82 de 20 de julio de 1982 y N° C-217-82 de la Procuraduría General de la República que obligan al "I.D.A." a efectuar los desalojos siguiendo los procedimientos contemplados en el artículo 691 del Código de Procedimientos Civiles, que exige la aprobación previa del Ministerio. Por tanto considera que debe rechazarse el recurso de amparo interpuesto en su contra.
IX.- La Procuraduría General de la República contestó que, por ser una entidad Activa pues sus actos no tienen el carácter de Administración Activa pues sus actos no trascienden la esfera interna de las instituciones que solicitan su criterio jurídico, y no podría nunca producirse un daño o violación de los derechos constitucionales de los ciudadanos. No dicta actos materiales, que son dictados por las entidades competentes y por tanto sus pronunciamientos tienen el carácter de actos preparatorios. Los dictámenes tienen el carácter de genéricos, para orientar la actividad jurídica material porque no tienen capacidad jurídica para girar instrucciones y órdenes concretas a otras autoridades de la administración activa y se limitan explicar la correcta interposición de las leyes.
XII.- Que en los trámites se han observado las prescripciones de ley.
Redacta el Magistrado Sancho González; y,
Considerando:
I.- La entidad recurrente, fundamenta el presente recurso en la ausencia de procedimientos administrativos que garantizaran a las personas que ocuparon terrenos del "I.D.A." en la localidad de Río Frío del cantón de Sarapiquí, provincia de Heredia, el derecho al debido proceso antes de ser desalojados por las autoridades de policía. Sin embargo el caso presenta circunstancias que demuestran lo contrario. En efecto, como consta en el expediente administrativo N°462 al folio 32, el día 22 de mayo de 1989 se firmó un convenio entre los dirigentes del grupo de campesinos y el "I.D.A.", en el que los primeros se comprometían a "...respetar nuestra ubicación provisional un área de la finca adquirida de aproximadamente 5 hectáreas en lo que han convenido el IDA y los propietarios y oportuna calificación por medio de la Sección de Selección de Beneficiarios...".Sin embargo, las fincas fueron invadidas de nuevo, pese al convenio descrito, por lo que el 4 de julio, la Junta Directiva del "I.D.A." tomó el acuerdo de desalojarlos; artículo III de la sesión N°53-89. Ver folios 73 a77 del expediente administrativo N°462. El 30 de junio de 1989 los Guardias Rurales Oldemar Artavia Cubillo y Oldemar Méndez Segura habían comprobado el inicio de la invasión y se hizo la prevensión de que deberían de salir de inmediato; ellos manifestaron que eran alentados por el Sr. Adrián Cortés Garro a mantenerse fuera del área definida originalmente ver folios 77a 75. La segunda prevensión de desalojo fue hecha el día 14 de julio por los Guardias Rurales Gabriel Víctor Duarte y Róger Mora. (ver folios 86 y 87) que fue aprobada en sesión de Junta Directiva N°81-89. Posteriormente se hizo la declaratoria de adjudicatarios, julio de 1989, artículo 16, resultando favorecidos 47 solicitantes de un total de 98, adjudicación que fue apelada el 13 de setiembre por el señor Carlos Ramos Arias Secretario General de la Educación Sindical Agraria nacional (FESIAN), quién solicitó que se recalificara a varios de sus asociados rechazados por el "I.D.A."; asimismo el señor Adrián Cortés Garro, secretario general del Sindicato de Campesinos Independientes de Sarapiquí (SICAISA), cédula jurídica CED37286, presentó el 14 de agosto recurso de revisión contra este acto por considerar que había un trato discriminatorio en favor de otro grupo de campesinos no afiliados a su sindicato. El 24 de agosto el Sr. Jorge Chévez Vargas Coordinador de la Región Huetar Atlántica y Norte informe a la Presidencia Ejecutiva, que el 20 de julio hicieron una visita a la zona para prevenir al grupo liderado por el Sr. Cortés que salieran porque incumplieron el arreglo, y que dos semanas antes habían vuelto a invadir la finca. La Junta Directiva asignó las parcelas a los beneficiarios mediante artículo VII de la sesión N°109-89 del 12 de diciembre de 1989. A la fecha los interesados no había cuestionado las prevensiones de desalojo por el hecho de que el "I.D.A" estaba cumpliendo con su obligación legal de seleccionar posibles beneficiarios para dotarlos de tierra, lo que demuestra que todo el caso de la compra de las fincas mencionadas, fue un largo trámite de más de seis meses, del que tuvieron pleno conocimiento los afectados por la orden de desalojo, por lo que desaparece completamente cualquier posible violación al debido proceso; aparte de que se cumplieron las formalidades exigidas por el artículo 691 del Código de Procedimientos Civiles anterior, que era el vigente al momento del desalojo, puesto que se notificó a los ocupantes formalmente en tres oportunidades antes de ejecutar el desalojo. Véase como el derecho a la defensa se cumplió sobradamente pues, aún después de notificados de la orden de desalojo, los interesados presentaron apelaciones en contra de la declaratoria de beneficiarios, sin que hicieran gestión alguna en contra de esta orden. De todos modos, se ha demostrado que los afectados por el desalojo sabían perfectamente que el "I.D.A." estaba efectuando un proceso de calificación para posteriormente asignarles las parcelas de las fincas invadidas, hecho que efectivamente ocurrió, aparte de existir un convenio firmado por ellos en el que se comprometían a mantenerse en un área de cinco hectáreas. De modo que la ejecución del desalojo no se hizo repentinamente, sin darle a los afectados oportunidad de defensa, como lo dice la recurrente sino que, por el contrario, durante esos meses los interesados pudieron emplear todo tipo de remedios puestos a su alcance por el legislador.
II.- No es importante, entonces, para este caso, la discusión sobre el procedimiento apropiado para efectuar los desalojos en fincas propiedad del "I.D.A.", porque como se ha dicho, los afectados tuvieron mucho tiempo para apelar.
III.- La Sala no comparte el criterio expuesto por la Procuraduría General de la República, en cuanto a la responsabilidad que cabe por sus pronunciamientos, pues estos tienen el carácter de vinculantes para el ente que los solicita conforme al artículo 2 de su ley constitutiva. Además, conforme la doctrina del artículo 356 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, los pronunciamientos serían actos que dan contenido a las actuaciones posteriores de la Administración Activa, que no podrá apartarse de estos pronunciamientos, de lo que se concluye que la Procuraduría General de la República también podría ser eventualmente declarada como responsable en un caso de amparo. Sin embargo, del análisis de los pronunciamientos N°C-162-82 de 27 de julio, y N°C-217-82 de 6 de setiembre de 1982, no se desprende que la Procuraduría haya asesorado indebidamente al Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía o al "I.D.A." en cuanto a la protección del derecho al debido proceso se refiere. Por el contrario, la práctica inicial del "I.D.A.", era efectuar desalojos mediante la Guardia Rural del Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía, no sólo en fincas de su propiedad, sino también en otras objeto de conflictos de ocupación precaria, en aplicación del artículo 68 de la ley N°2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961, empleando el procedimiento de Desahucio Administrativo desarrollado por el artículo 691 del Código de Procedimientos Civiles hoy derogado. El desahucio era fundado en el privilegio otorgado por el artículo 7 inciso e) de su ley de creación N°6735 de 29 de marzo de 1982, que declara ejecutorias las resoluciones definitivas que dicte, en tanto no exista resolución judicial firme. La Procuraduría definió, por el contrario, que el "I.D.A." no tiene ese privilegio, porque no está dentro de sus competencias la del desahucio, (ver el artículo 50.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). También diferenció la Procuraduría, la situación de los "poseedores" con más de un año de poseer un inmueble, que, se rige por otros procedimientos. Por estas razones, había recomendado seguir el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 691 del Código de Procedimientos Civiles derogado, previa autorización de la Dirección General de la Guardia de Asistencia Rural y del Ministerio de Gobernación. Posteriormente el segundo pronunciamiento, la Procuraduría reafirmó en lo que nos interesa, que los desalojos de fincas de propiedad del "I.D.A" o que estén bajo su administración deben hacerse conforme al artículo 691 del Código, sin que se haya recomendado que al aplicar este procedimiento, el "I.D.A." o la Guardia de Asistencia Rural, violen el derecho al debido proceso razón suficiente para tener por desestimado el recurso en este extremo.
POR TANTO
Se declara sin lugar el recurso.
Nombre43935 . Presidente / Jorge Baudrit G. / Jorge E. Castro B. / Luis Fdo. Solano Carrera / Luis Paulino Mora / Fernando Del Castillo / Eduardo Sancho G. /Juan Carlos Castro L. Secretario.
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