Rejection of unconstitutionality action against Mining Code RegulationRechazo de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra Reglamento al Código de Minería

Res: 2001-04245 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours and one minute of the twenty-third of May of two thousand one.- Unconstitutionality action brought by Nombre33927, of legal age, Attorney, single, resident of San José, bearer of identity card number CED15475 and Florinia Ramírez Villalobos, of legal age, single, Attorney, resident of Heredia, with identity card number CED15476; against Executive Decree number 29300-MINAE, which is the Reglamento al Código de Minería.-

Resultando:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at ten hours and forty-six minutes of the thirtieth of March of two thousand one, the claimants request that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree number 29300-MINAE, published in La Gaceta number 54 of March 16, 2001, which is the Reglamento al Código de Minería, be declared, considering it contrary to the provisions of articles 9, 11, 50, 56, 121 subsection 1), 140 subsections 3) and 18) of the Constitución Política. They allege that the questioned decree, by which Executive Decree number 15442-MIEN is repealed, overreaches, by expanding concepts, functions, and competencies, and by modifying the terms contemplated in the Código de Minería; modifications that are only possible through a law reform. Consequently, the principles of legality and hierarchy of norms established in our Constitución Política are violated. They allege: a) That in articles 3, 8, 15, 17, 18, 24 subsection b), 57, 77, 90 and following of the Código de Minería, the existence of the Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos is contemplated, nomenclature with which said institutional body is identified. However, in the challenged Reglamento, a different concept is established for said directorate and it is renamed Dirección de Geología y Minas in articles 2 3, 5, 19, 33, 44, 53, 77, 98, 123, 148 and following and concordant articles; they consider that the foregoing is contrary to what is stipulated by law, and furthermore, the matter of hydrocarbons is left unprotected, as well as the competencies inherent to that matter. b) That the Código de Minería in its article 34 (referring to the obligations of the concessionaire of an exploitation) stipulates that the concessionaire must submit a complete environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) in accordance with articles 97, 101, and 102 of that legal body, on the understanding that said obligation arises once the concession has been granted. However, article 29 of the challenged regulation modifies the foregoing so that the submission of the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) is established as a matter prior to the submission of the application, and its non-compliance is sanctioned with the rejection ad portas of the application. The foregoing also evidences a regulatory overreach, since the procedural moment established by law for the submission of that requirement is changed, and it makes the procedure more burdensome because it forces expenses to be incurred from the outset. c) That the referred decree regulates new situations that have not been aired in the law, such is the case of the creation of special procedures like those for the mining activity of the Municipalities and the Autonomous Institutions, regulated from article 109 of the questioned decree, and that referring to the mining activity of the State and its contractors, which is regulated from article 136. d) That furthermore, normative bodies of public order are transgressed, such as those concerning labor relations and working conditions contemplated in international conventions, in the Código de Trabajo, and the Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial; where employer obligations are clearly established from the start of the work. Given that the challenged norms grant deadlines for compliance with those norms, as reflected in articles 68, 69, and 81 of the questioned decree.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing they hold to bring this unconstitutionality action, they indicate that because it involves environmental material, there is a diffuse interest (interés difuso).

3.- Article 9 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient grounds for judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of an equal or similar previous petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Piza Escalante; and,

Considerando:

I.- Standing of the claimants. This Tribunal considers that the claimants are duly legitimized to act in this venue directly (that is, without the need for a prior matter), given that, as they allege, there is a legitimate interest of citizens in general regarding the adequate protection of the environment, with which it can well be said that it involves the existence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) in relation to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment insofar as this has been understood (both by doctrine and by constitutional jurisprudence) as the interest that every person has in relation to personal circumstances with a specific right or legal situation, but that can extend to the members of a certain category that are equally affected, as previously indicated in judgment 3705-93, of fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July of nineteen ninety-three:

"In environmental law, the procedural prerequisite of standing tends to extend and broaden in such a dimension that it necessarily leads to the abandonment of the traditional concept, it being understood that in general terms, any person can be a party and that their right does not emanate from titles of property, rights, or concrete actions that they could exercise according to the rules of conventional law, but rather that their procedural action responds to what modern treatise writers call the diffuse interest (interés difuso), through which the original standing of the legitimate interested party or even the simple interested party is diffused among all the members of a certain category of persons who are thus equally affected by the illegal acts that violate them. In the case of environmental protection, the typically diffuse interest that legitimizes the subject to act is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the list of the rights of the human person, becoming a true 'reactive right,' which, as its name indicates, empowers its holder to 'react' against the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions." II.- Object of the challenge. In this unconstitutionality action, four concrete challenges are raised against Executive Decree number 29300-MINAE, published in La Gaceta number 54 of March 16, 2001, and which is the Reglamento al Código de Minería, namely: a) That in articles 3, 8, 15, 17, 18, 24 subsection b), 57, 77, 90 and following of the Código de Minería, the existence of the Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos is contemplated, nomenclature with which said institutional body is identified. However, in the challenged Reglamento, a different concept is established for said directorate and it is renamed Dirección de Geología y Minas in articles 2 3, 5, 19, 33, 44, 53, 77, 98, 123, 148 and following and concordant articles; they consider that the foregoing is contrary to what is stipulated by law, and furthermore, the matter of hydrocarbons is left unprotected, as well as the competencies inherent to that matter.

• b)That the Mining Code, in its Article 34 (referring to the obligations of the concessionaire of an exploitation), stipulates that the concessionaire must submit a complete environmental impact study in accordance with Articles 97, 101, and 102 of that legal body, on the understanding that said obligation arises once the concession has been granted. However, the challenged regulation’s Article 29 modifies the foregoing such that the submission of the environmental impact study is established as a matter prior to the submission of the application, and its non-compliance is sanctioned with the rejection of the application ad portas. The foregoing also evidences a regulatory overreach, as it changes the procedural moment established by law for the submission of that requirement. c) That the referred decree regulates new situations that have not been aired in the law, such is the case of the creation of special procedures like those for mining activity by Municipalities and Autonomous Institutions, regulated starting from Article 109 of the challenged decree, and that referring to mining activity by the State and its contractors, which is regulated starting from Article 136. d) That moreover, public order normative bodies are transgressed, such as those pertaining to labor relations and working conditions contemplated in international conventions, in the Labor Code, and in the Industrial Safety and Hygiene Regulation (Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial); where employer obligations are clearly established once work commences. Given that the challenged norms grant timeframes for compliance with those norms, as reflected in Articles 68, 69, and 81 of the challenged decree. Each of these grounds will be analyzed individually.

**III.-** As a first ground, the claimants allege that Executive Decree number 29300-MINAE, which is the new Regulation to the Mining Code, is contrary to law, because by speaking of the Directorate of Geology and Mines, instead of the Directorate of Geology, Mines, and Hydrocarbons, which is the denomination provided by law, it leaves the subject matter of hydrocarbons unprotected. This allegation is unfounded. While it is true that the Mining Code, Law No. 6797 of October twenty-second, nineteen eighty-two, refers to the Directorate of Geology, Mines, and Hydrocarbons, as of nineteen ninety-four, the year in which Law No. 7399, called the Hydrocarbons Law, was promulgated, this subject matter became the competence of the General Directorate of Hydrocarbons. The purpose of said law is, as provided in its second article: *"… to develop, promote, regulate, and control the exploration and exploitation of petroleum deposits and any other hydrocarbon substances, regardless of their physical state; furthermore, it aims to preserve and protect the environment, in order to ensure its rational use and guarantee the interests of the State…" (Article 2 of Law 7399).* We have, then, that in our legal system the subject matter of hydrocarbons is not unprotected, as the claimants erroneously and groundlessly state; therefore, this ground is unfounded.

**IV.-** In their second allegation, the appellants accuse that the challenged regulation changes the procedural moment established by the Mining Code for the submission of the environmental impact study, because Article 29 provides that said study must be prior to the submission of an application for an exploration permit or an exploitation concession to the National Mining Registry, while Article 34 of the Mining Code requires said study from concessionaires. This ground is also not acceptable. The requirement established in Article 29 of the challenged Decree, consisting of the obligation to prepare an environmental impact study as a prerequisite to submitting an application for a permit or concession to the National Mining Registry, does not contradict or modify the Mining Code. In the national legal system, there are numerous norms that require, as an indispensable requirement to initiate activities, works, or projects that alter or destroy environmental elements or generate toxic or hazardous materials or waste, the prior approval of the environmental impact assessment. This requirement finds support in Articles 11, 21, 50, and 89 of the Political Constitution, in numerous international instruments that are of mandatory compliance and enjoy full enforceability, among them the Rio Convention on Environment and Development, in Articles 92 to 97 of the Biodiversity Law, number 7788, Articles 17, 14 - 28, 31, 38, 44, 45, 56 to 72, 83, 88 to 89, 99, 98, and 101 of the Organic Law on the Environment, number 7554, in numeral 6 b) of the Law on Soil Use, Management, and Conservation, number 7779, Article 41 of the Hydrocarbons Law, number 7399, in numerals 3, 6.2, 101, 102, and 103 of the Mining Code, and in Articles 11, 239, and 240 of the General Law on Public Administration. Amidst all these norms, it is worth pointing out that according to Article 3 of the Mining Code itself, every exploration permit or exploitation concession requires the prior analysis and approval of the environmental impact study or assessment, so the regulation is not contrary to law. For its part, this Chamber has recognized the validity and importance of the requirement in question; thus, in judgment number 6240-93, at fourteen hours on November twenty-six, nineteen ninety-three, the Chamber deemed unconstitutional a norm that required environmental impact studies after the approval of the concession, stating the following on the matter:

"XX.- All these international instruments are of mandatory compliance and enjoy full enforceability insofar as their norms do not require further legislative development, and therefore they must be respected by the Hydrocarbons Bill, given that the normative rank of the former is superior. Consequently, what is provided by Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Bill, which requires environmental impact studies after the exploration or exploitation concession is approved, especially in the case of private parties, is contrary to the aims, purposes, and constitutional obligations in environmental matters, since the contract, once signed, creates rights in favor of the interested party. Therefore, the Chamber deems Article 41, para. 2 unconstitutional in this respect…" From the reasons set forth in this recital, we have, then, that no violation of the Political Constitution is verified, and therefore the action, regarding this point, is likewise unfounded.

**V.-** As a third ground, the claimants accuse that the challenged decree regulates new situations that have not been aired in the law, such is the case of the creation of special procedures like those for mining activity by Municipalities and Autonomous Institutions, regulated starting from Article 109 of the challenged decree, and that referring to mining activity by the State and its contractors, which is regulated starting from Article 136. Regarding this argument, the claimants merely point out that the constitutional violation consists of the fact that the Mining Code does not provide for these procedures and that, therefore, the regulation violates the law and the provisions of subparagraph 3) of Article 140 of the Political Constitution. On this particular matter, the Constitutional Court considers that the problem of the regulatory norm relates exclusively to the violation of the principle of administrative legality derived from Articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Constitution, and what is asked of the Chamber is that it make the principle of legality prevail by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged provisions. But it turns out that this task has been assigned by the Constituent Power itself to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, as derived from Article 49 of the Political Constitution, which compels a systematic interpretation of the constitutional text and an understanding that questions of legality must be submitted to the cited jurisdiction, with the aim of maintaining that uniform distribution of competencies and respecting all the rules that make up the Political Constitution. Obviously, any challenge such as the one raised implicitly carries a violation of the Political Constitution, since the entire legal system is derived from it, but there is a distribution of competencies clearly established in the Constitution itself, in order to guarantee the citizen a way to protect the different classes of rights and interests they possess. Thus, the contentious and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Political Constitution (Articles 49 and 70 of the Political Constitution), and it is within that context that constitutional jurisdiction must be placed, on the understanding that its competence complements and does not overlap with the aforementioned ones, for the purposes of protecting the citizen (in the same sense, judgment number 3379-96, at ten hours and fifty-seven minutes on July fifth, nineteen ninety-six). For the foregoing reason, this ground of the action is inadmissible and must be declared as such.

**VI.-** As a fourth and final ground of challenge, the appellants state that Executive Decree number 29300-MINAE, "transgresses public order normative bodies such as those pertaining to labor relations and working conditions contemplated in international conventions, in the Labor Code, and in the Industrial Safety and Hygiene Regulation (Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial); where employer obligations are clearly established once work commences. Given that the challenged norms grant timeframes for compliance with those norms, as reflected in Articles 68, 69, and 81 of the challenged decree…". However, by virtue of the standing held by the claimants, the foregoing challenge is inadmissible, since it falls outside of environmental matters.

**VII.- Conclusion.** For the reasons set forth in each of the topics analyzed, the Chamber considers that Executive Decree number 29300-MINAE, which is the Regulation to the Mining Code, published in La Gaceta number 54 of March 16, 2001, does not transgress the provisions of Articles 9, 11, 50, 56, 121 subparagraph 1), 140 subparagraphs 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution. Consequently, the action must be dismissed, as is hereby done.

**Therefore:** The action is rejected on the merits.

R. E. Piza E.

President Eduardo Sancho G. Carlos M. Arguedas R.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.

Manrique Jiménez M. Alejandro Batalla B.

This Court considers that the claimants are duly legitimized to bring action directly in this venue (that is, without the need for a prior matter), given that, as they allege, there exists a legitimate interest of citizens in general regarding the adequate protection of the environment, whereby it can well be said that this concerns the existence of a diffuse interest in relation to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, inasmuch as this has been understood (by both legal doctrine and constitutional jurisprudence) as the interest that every person has in relation to personal circumstances with a specific right or legal situation, but which may extend to the members of a particular category who are equally affected, as previously noted in judgment 3705-93, of fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July, nineteen ninety-three:

"In environmental law, the procedural prerequisite of standing tends to extend and broaden to such a dimension that it necessarily leads to the abandonment of the traditional concept, it being necessary to understand that, in general terms, any person may be a party and that their right does not emanate from property titles, rights, or specific actions that they could exercise according to the rules of conventional law, but rather that their procedural action responds to what modern scholars call the diffuse interest, through which the original standing of the legitimate interested party, or even the simply interested party, diffuses among all members of a certain category of persons who are thus equally affected by the illegal acts that harm them. In the case of environmental protection, the typically diffuse interest that legitimizes the subject to bring action is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the catalogue of the rights of the human person, becoming a true 'reactional right,' which, as its name indicates, empowers its holder to 'react' against the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions." **II.-** Object of the challenge. In this action of unconstitutionality, four specific challenges are raised against Decreto Ejecutivo number 29300-MINAE, published in La Gaceta number 54 of March 16, 2001, which is the Reglamento al Código de Minería, namely: a) That articles 3, 8, 15, 17, 18, 24 subsection b), 57, 77, 90 and following of the Código de Minería contemplate the existence of the Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, the nomenclature by which that institutional body is identified. However, in the challenged Regulation, a different concept is established for that directorate, and it is renamed Dirección de Geología y Minas in articles 2, 3, 5, 19, 33, 44, 53, 77, 98, 123, 148 and following and concordant articles; they consider that the foregoing is contrary to what is stipulated by law, and furthermore, the subject of hydrocarbons is left unprotected, as well as the jurisdictions inherent to that subject. b) That the Código de Minería in its article 34 (referring to the obligations of the concessionaire of an exploitation) stipulates that the concessionaire must submit a complete environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) in accordance with articles 97, 101, and 102 of that legal body, on the understanding that said obligation arises once the concession has been granted. However, in article 29 of the questioned regulation, the foregoing is modified so that the submission of the environmental impact study is established as a prerequisite prior to the submission of the application, and its breach is penalized with the rejection *ad portas* of the application. The foregoing also demonstrates a regulatory overreach, as the procedural moment established by law for the submission of that requirement is changed. c) That the aforementioned decree regulates new situations that have not been aired in the law, such is the case of the creation of special procedures like those for the mining activity of the Municipalities and the Autonomous Institutions, regulated starting from article 109 of the questioned decree, and that referring to the mining activity of the State and its contractors, which is regulated starting from article 136. d) That in addition, normative bodies of public order are transgressed, such as those concerning labor relations and working conditions contemplated in international conventions, in the Código de Trabajo and the Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial; where employer obligations are clearly established as soon as work begins. Given that the challenged norms grant deadlines for compliance with those norms, as reflected in articles 68, 69, and 81 of the questioned decree. Each of these grounds will be analyzed individually.

**III.-** As a first ground, the claimants allege that Decreto Ejecutivo number 29300-MINAE, which is the new Reglamento al Código de Minería, is contrary to law, because by speaking of Dirección de Geología y Minas, instead of Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, which is the name provided by law, it leaves the subject of hydrocarbons unprotected. This claim is without merit. While it is true that the Código de Minería, Law No. 6797 of October twenty-second, nineteen eighty-two, refers to the Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, as of nineteen ninety-four, the year in which Law No. 7399, called the Ley de Hidrocarburos, was enacted, this matter became the jurisdiction of the Dirección General de Hidrocarburos. The purpose of said law is, as provided in its second article: *"... to develop, promote, regulate, and control the exploration and exploitation of petroleum deposits and any other hydrocarbon substances, regardless of the physical state in which they are found; furthermore, it aims to preserve and protect the environment, in order to ensure its rational use and guarantee the interests of the State…" (article 2 of Law 7399).* We therefore have that in our legal system, the subject of hydrocarbons is not left unprotected, as the claimants erroneously and unfoundedly state; hence, this ground is without merit.

**IV.-** In their second claim, the appellants assert that the challenged regulation changes the procedural moment established by the Código de Minería for the submission of the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental), because article 29 provides that said study must be prior to the submission of the application for an exploration permit or an exploitation concession to the Registro Nacional Minero, while article 34 of the Código de Minería requires said study of the concessionaires. This ground is also not admissible. The requirement established in article 29 of the questioned Decree, which consists of the obligation to prepare an environmental impact study as a procedure prior to the submission of the permit or concession application to the Registro Nacional Minero, does not contradict or modify the Código de Minería. In the national legal system, there are numerous norms that require, as an indispensable prerequisite to initiate activities, works, or projects that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate toxic or hazardous waste materials, the prior approval of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA). This requirement finds support in articles 11, 21, 50, and 89 of the Constitución Política, in numerous international instruments that are mandatory and fully enforceable, among them the Convention of Rio on Environment and Development, in articles 92 to 97 of the Ley de la Biodiversidad, number 7788, articles 17, 14-28, 31, 38, 44, 45, 56 to 72, 83, 88 to 89, 99, 98, and 101 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, number 7554, in numeral 6 b) of the Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, number 7779, Article 41 of the Ley de Hidrocarburos, number 7399, in numerals 3, 6.2, 101, 102, and 103 of the Código de Minería, and in articles 11, 239, and 240 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Among all these norms, it is worth specifying that according to article 3 of the Código de Minería itself, every exploration permit or exploitation concession requires the prior analysis and approval of the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental) or assessment, and therefore the regulation is not contrary to law. For its part, this Chamber has recognized the validity and importance of the requirement in question; thus, in judgment number 6240-93, of fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of November, nineteen ninety-three, the Chamber found unconstitutional a norm that required environmental impact studies after the approval of the concession, and in this respect stated the following:

"XX.- All these international instruments are mandatory and fully enforceable insofar as their norms do not require further legislative development, and therefore must be respected by the Hydrocarbons Bill, as the normative rank of those instruments is superior. Consequently, what is provided by article 41, paragraph 2, of the Bill, which requires environmental impact studies after the exploration or exploitation concession is approved, especially in the case of private parties, is contrary to the constitutional purposes, aims, and obligations in environmental matters, insofar as the contract, once signed, creates rights in favor of the interested party. Therefore, the Chamber considers that article 41, para. 2, is unconstitutional in this aspect…" From the reasons set forth in this recital (considerando), we thus find that no violation of the Constitución Política is established; therefore, the appeal, regarding this point, is equally without merit.

**V.-** As a third ground, the claimants assert that the challenged decree regulates new situations that have not been aired in the law, such is the case of the creation of special procedures like those for the mining activity of the Municipalities and the Autonomous Institutions, regulated starting from article 109 of the questioned decree, and that referring to the mining activity of the State and its contractors, which is regulated starting from article 136. Regarding this argument, the claimants merely point out that the constitutional violation consists of the fact that the Código de Minería does not provide for these procedures and that, therefore, the regulation violates the law and what is provided in subsection 3) of article 140 of the Constitución Política. On this matter, the Constitutional Court considers that the problem of the regulatory norm relates exclusively to the violation of the principle of administrative legality that derives from articles 11, 49, 121, and 140 of the Constitution, and what is requested of the Chamber is to make the principle of legality prevail by declaring the existence of a violation of legal precepts by the challenged provisions. But it so happens that this task has been assigned by the Constituent Power itself to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa), as follows from article 49 of the Constitución Política, which obliges us to interpret the constitutional text systematically and to understand that questions of legality must be submitted to the cited jurisdiction, this in order to maintain that uniform distribution of competencies and respect for all the rules that make up the Constitución Política. Obviously, any challenge such as the one raised implicitly carries a violation of the Constitución Política, given that the entire legal system derives from it, but a distribution of competencies is clearly established in the Constitution itself, in order to guarantee the citizen a means of protecting the different classes of rights and interests they possess. Thus, the contentious and labor jurisdictions are regulated in the Constitución Política (articles 49 and 70 of the Constitución Política), and it is within that context that constitutional jurisdiction must be embedded, in the understanding that its competency complements and does not overlap with those indicated, for the purposes of protecting the citizen (in the same sense, judgment number 3379-96, of ten hours and fifty-seven minutes on the fifth of July, nineteen ninety-six). Having said this, this ground of the appeal is inadmissible and must be so declared.

**VI.-** As the fourth and final ground of challenge, the appellants state that Decreto Ejecutivo number 29300-MINAE "transgresses normative bodies of public order such as those concerning labor relations and working conditions contemplated in international conventions, in the Código de Trabajo, and the Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial; where employer obligations are clearly established as soon as work begins. Given that the challenged norms grant deadlines for compliance with those norms, as reflected in articles 68, 69, and 81 of the questioned decree…". However, by virtue of the standing held by the claimants, the foregoing challenge is inadmissible, since it falls outside environmental matters.

**VII.- Conclusion.** For the reasons stated in each of the topics analyzed, the Chamber considers that Decreto Ejecutivo number 29300-MINAE, which is the Reglamento al Código de Minería, published in La Gaceta number 54 of March 16, 2001, does not transgress what is provided in articles 9, 11, 50, 56, 121 subsection 1), 140 subsections 3) and 18) of the Constitución Política. Consequently, it is appropriate to dismiss the action, as is hereby done.

**Por tanto:** The action is rejected on the merits.

R. E. Piza E.

Eduardo Sancho G. Carlos M. Arguedas R.

Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.

Manrique Jiménez M. Alejandro Batalla B.

Res: 2001-04245 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas con un minuto del veintitrés de mayo del dos mil uno.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Nombre33927, mayor, Abogado, soltero, vecino de San José, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED15475 y Florinia Ramírez Villalobos, mayor, soltera, Abogada, vecina de Heredia, con cédula número CED15476; contra el decreto Ejecutivo número 29300-MINAE, que es el Reglamento al Código de Minería.-

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las diez horas y cuarenta y seis minutos del treinta de marzo del dos mil uno, los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo número 29300-MINAE, publicado en La Gaceta número 54 del 16 de marzo del 2001, que es el Reglamento al Código de Minería, por estimarlo contrario a lo dispuesto en los artículos 9, 11, 50, 56, 121 inciso 1), 140 incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política. Alegan que el decreto cuestionado, mediante el cual se deroga el Decreto Ejecutivo número 15442-MIEN, se extralimita, al ampliar conceptos, funciones y competencias, y al modificar los términos contemplados en el Código de Minería; modificaciones que sólo son posibles por medio de una reforma de ley. Consecuentemente, se violan los principios de legalidad y de jerarquía de las normas establecidos en nuestra Constitución Política. Alegan: a) Que en los artículos 3, 8, 15, 17, 18, 24 inciso b), 57, 77, 90 y siguientes del Código de Minería se contempla la existencia de la Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, nomenclatura con la que se identifica a dicho organismo institucional. Sin embargo, en el Reglamento impugnado se establece para dicha dirección un concepto distinto y se pasa a llamar Dirección de Geología y Minas en los artículos 2 3, 5, 19, 33, 44, 53, 77, 98, 123, 148 siguientes y concordantes; estiman que lo anterior es contrario a lo estipulado por la ley, y además, se deja al descubierto la materia de hidrocarburos, así como las competencias inherentes a esa materia. b) Que el Código de Minería en su artículo 34 (referido a las obligaciones del concesionario de una explotación) estipula que el concesionario deberá presentar un estudio completo de impacto ambiental de conformidad con los artículos 97, 101 y 102 de ese cuerpo legal, en el entendido de que dicha obligación se da una vez que se ha otorgado la concesión. No obstante, el artículo 29 del reglamento cuestionado, modifica lo anterior de modo que la presentación del estudio de impacto ambiental se establece como una cuestión previa a la presentación de la solicitud, y se sanciona su incumplimiento con el rechazo ad portas de la solicitud. Lo anterior, también evidencia una extralimitación reglamentaria, pues se cambia el momento procesal establecido por la ley para la presentación de ese requisito, y hace más gravoso el procedimiento porque desde un inicio obliga a incurrir en gastos. c) Que el referido decreto regula situaciones nuevas que no han sido ventiladas en la ley, tal es el caso de la creación de procedimientos especiales como los de la actividad minera de las Municipalidades y de las Instituciones Autónomas, regulada a partir del artículo 109 del decreto cuestionado, y el referido a la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas que se regula a partir del artículo 136. d) Que además se transgreden cuerpos normativos de orden público como los atinentes a las relaciones laborales y a las condiciones de trabajo contemplados en los convenios internacionales, en el Código de Trabajo y el Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial; donde claramente se establecen obligaciones patronales a partir de que se inician las labores. Siendo que las normas impugnadas otorgan plazos para el cumplimiento de esas normas, tal y como se refleja en los artículos 68, 69 y 81 del decreto cuestionado.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostentan para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señalan que por tratarse de material ambiental existe un interés difuso.

3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el magistrado Piza Escalante; y,

Considerando:

I.- Legitimación de los accionantes. Considera este Tribunal que los accionantes se encuentran debidamente legitimados para accionar en esta vía en forma directa (esto es sin necesidad de un asunto previo), toda vez que tal y como lo alegan existe un interés legítimo de los ciudadanos en general respecto de la protección adecuada del medio ambiente, con lo cual bien puede decirse que se trata de la existencia de un interés difuso en relación con el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado en tanto éste ha sido entendido (tanto por la doctrina como por la jurisprudencia constitucional) como el interés que toda persona tiene en relación a circunstancias personales con un derecho o situación jurídica determinada, pero que puede extenderse a los miembros de una determinada categoría que resultan igualmente afectados, como se señaló con anterioridad en la sentencia 3705-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres:

"En el derecho ambiental, el presupuesto procesal de la legitimación tiende a extenderse y ampliarse en una dimensión tal, que lleva necesariamente al abandono del concepto tradicional, debiendo entender que en términos generales, toda persona puede ser parte y que su derecho no emana de títulos de propiedad, derechos o acciones concretas que pudiera ejercer según las reglas del derecho convencional, sino que su actuación procesal responde a lo que los modernos tratadistas denominan el interés difuso, mediante el cual la legitimación original del interesado legítimo o aún del simple interesado, se difunde entre todos los miembros de una determinada categoría de personas que resultan así igualmente afectadas por los actos ilegales que los vulneran. Tratándose de la protección del ambiente, el interés típicamente difuso que legitima al sujeto para accionar, se transforma, en virtud de su incorporación al elenco de los derechos de la persona humana, convirtiéndose en un verdadero "derecho reaccional", que, como su nombre lo indica, lo que hace es apoderar a su titular para "reaccionar" frente a la violación originada en actos u omisiones ilegítimos." II.- Objeto de la impugnación. En la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad se plantean cuatro impugnaciones concretas en contra del Decreto Ejecutivo número 29300-MINAE, publicado en La Gaceta número 54 del 16 de marzo del 2001, y que es el Reglamento al Código de Minería, a saber: a) Que en los artículos 3, 8, 15, 17, 18, 24 inciso b), 57, 77, 90 y siguientes del Código de Minería se contempla la existencia de la Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, nomenclatura con al que se identifica a dicho organismo institucional. Sin embargo, en el Reglamento impugnado se establece para dicha dirección un concepto distinto y se pasa a llamar Dirección de Geología y Minas en los artículos 2 3, 5, 19, 33, 44, 53, 77, 98, 123, 148 siguientes y concordantes; estiman que lo anterior es contrario a lo estipulado por la ley, y además, se deja al descubierto la materia de hidrocarburos, así como las competencias inherentes a esa materia. b) Que el Código de Minería en su artículo 34 (referido a las obligaciones del concesionario de una explotación) estipula que el concesionario deberá presentar un estudio completo de impacto ambiental de conformidad con los artículos 97, 101 y 102 de ese cuerpo legal, en el entendido de que dicha obligación se da una vez que se ha otorgado la concesión. No obstante, en el artículo 29 del reglamento cuestionado, se modifica lo anterior de modo que la presentación del estudio de impacto ambiental se establece como una cuestión previa a la presentación de la solicitud, y se sanciona su incumplimiento con el rechazo ad portas de la solicitud. Lo anterior, también evidencia una extralimitación reglamentaria, pues se cambia el momento procesal establecido por la ley para la presentación de ese requisito. c) Que el referido decreto regula situaciones nuevas que no han sido ventiladas en la ley, tal es el caso de la creación de procedimientos especiales como los de la actividad minera de las Municipalidades y de las Instituciones Autónomas, regulada a partir del artículo 109 del decreto cuestionado, y el referido a la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas que se regula a partir del artículo 136. d) Que además se transgreden cuerpos normativos de orden público como los atinentes a las relaciones laborales y a las condiciones de trabajo contemplados en los convenios internacionales, en el Código de Trabajo y el Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial; donde claramente se establecen obligaciones patronales a partir de que se inician las labores. Siendo que las normas impugnadas otorgan plazos para el cumplimiento de esas normas, tal y como se refleja en los artículos 68, 69 y 81 del decreto cuestionado. Cada uno de estos motivos será analizado en forma individualizada.

III.- Como primer motivo, los accionantes alegan que el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29300-MINAE, que es el nuevo Reglamento al Código de Minería es contrario a la ley, porque al hablar de Dirección de Geología y Minas, en lugar de la Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, que es la denominación que da la ley, desprotege la materia de hidrocarburos. Este alegato improcedente. Si bien es cierto que el Código de Minería, Ley No. 6797 de veintidós de octubre de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, se refiere a la Dirección de Geología, Minas e Hidrocarburos, a partir de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, año en que se promulgó la Ley No. 7399, denominada Ley de Hidrocarburos, ésta materia paso a ser competencia de la Dirección General de Hidrocarburos. El propósito de dicha ley es, según lo dispone en su artículo segundo: "… desarrollar, promover, regular y controlar la exploración y la explotación de los depósitos de petróleo y de cualesquiera otras sustancias hidrocarburadas, sin importar el estado físico en que se encuentren; además, se propone preservar y proteger el ambiente, a fin de asegurar su uso racional y garantizar los intereses del Estado…" (artículo 2 de la Ley 7399). Tenemos entonces que en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico no está desprotegida la materia de hidrocarburos, como errónea e infundadamente señalan los accionantes, por ello este motivo es improcedente.

IV.- En su segundo alegato, lo recurrentes acusan que el reglamento impugnado cambia el momento procesal establecido por el Código de Minería para la presentación del estudio de impacto ambiental, pues en el artículo 29 se dispone que dicho estudio debe ser previo a la presentación de la solicitud ante el Registro Nacional Minero de un permiso de exploración o de una concesión de explotación, mientras que en el artículo 34 del Código de Minería se exige dicho estudio a los concesionarios. Este motivo tampoco es de recibo. El requisito establecido en el artículo 29 del Decreto cuestionado, y que consiste en la obligación de elaborar un estudio de impacto ambiental como trámite previo a la presentación de la solicitud de permiso o concesión al Registro Nacional Minero, no contradice ni modifica el Código de Minería. En el ordenamiento jurídico nacional existen numerosas normas que exigen, como requisito indispensable para iniciar actividades, obras o proyectos que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligrosos, la aprobación previa de la evaluación de impacto ambiental. Este requisito encuentra sustento en los artículos 11, 21, 50 y 89 de la Constitución Política, en numerosos instrumentos internacionales que son de obligado acatamiento y gozan de plena ejecutoriedad, entre ellos la Convención de Río sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, en los artículos 92 a 97 de la Ley de la Biodiversidad, número 7788, artículos 17, 14 - 28, 31, 38, 44, 45, 56 a 72, 83, 88 a 89, 99, 98 y 101 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, número 7554, en el numeral 6 b) de la Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, número 7779, Artículo 41 de la Ley de Hidrocarburos, número 7399, en los numerales 3, 6.2, 101, 102 y 103 del Código de Minería y en los artículos 11, 239 y 240 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En medio de todas estas normas, vale la pena puntualizar que según el propio artículo 3 del Código de Minería, todo permiso de exploración o concesión de explotación requiere de previo el análisis y la aprobación del estudio o evaluación de impacto ambiental, por lo que el reglamento no es contrario a la ley. Por su parte, esta Sala ha reconocido la validez e importancia del requisito en cuestión, así en la sentencia número 6240-93, de las catorce horas del veintiséis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, la Sala estimó la inconstitucionalidad de una norma que exigía los estudios de impacto ambiental después de la aprobación de la concesión, al respecto dijo lo siguiente:

"XX.- Todas estos instrumentos internacionales son de obligado acatamiento y gozan de plena ejecutoriedad en tanto sus normas no precisen de mayor desarrollo legislativo y por ende deben ser respetadas por el Proyecto de Ley sobre Hidrocarburos en tanto el rango normativo de aquéllos es superior. En consecuencia lo dispuesto por el artículo 41 párrafo 2° del Proyecto que exige los estudios de impacto ambiental después de aprobada la concesión de exploración o explotación sobre todo en caso de particulares, es contraria a los fines, propósitos y obligaciones constitucionales en materia ambiental, en tanto el contrato una vez suscrito crea derechos en favor del interesado. Por ello estima la Sala que el artículo 41 prf. 2° es inconstitucional en este aspecto…" De las razones expuestas en este considerando tenemos, entonces, que no se constata ninguna violación a la Constitución Política, por lo que el recurso, en cuanto a este extremo, es igualmente improcedente.

V.- Como tercer motivo, acusan los accionantes que el decreto impugnado regula situaciones nuevas que no han sido ventiladas en la ley, tal es el caso de la creación de procedimientos especiales como los de la actividad minera de las Municipalidades y de las Instituciones Autónomas, regulado a partir del artículo 109 del decreto cuestionado, y el referido a la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas que se regula a partir del artículo 136. En cuanto a éste argumento los accionantes se limitan a señalar que la violación constitucional consiste en que el Código de Minería no prevé esos procedimientos y que, por ello, el reglamento viola la ley y lo dispuesto en el inciso 3) del artículo 140 de la Constitución Política. Sobre este particular, el Tribunal Constitucional considera que el problema de la norma reglamentaria tiene que ver exclusivamente con la violación del principio de legalidad administrativa que se desprende de los artículos 11, 49, 121 y 140 Constitucionales y lo que se pide a la Sala es que haga prevalecer el principio de legalidad al declarar la existencia de una violación de preceptos legales por parte de las disposiciones impugnadas. Pero resulta, que esa labor ha sido asignada por el propio Constituyente a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, según se desprende del artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, lo cual obliga a interpretar de forma sistemática el texto constitucional y entender que las cuestiones de legalidad han de someterse a la citada jurisdicción, ello con el fin de mantener esa uniforme distribución de las competencias y el respeto de todas las reglas que conforman la Constitución Política. Obviamente, cualquier impugnación como la que se plantea, lleva implícita una violación de la Constitución Política, dado que de ella se deriva todo el ordenamiento jurídico, pero existe claramente establecido en la propia Constitución, un reparto de competencias con el fin de garantizar al ciudadano una manera de proteger las distintas clases de derechos e intereses que posee. De esta forma se regulan en la Constitución Política, las jurisdicciones contenciosa y de trabajo (artículos 49 y 70 de la Constitución Política) y es dentro de ese contexto que debe incrustarse la jurisdicción constitucional, en el entendido de que su competencia se complementa y no se superpone a las señaladas, a los fines de protección del ciudadano (en igual sentido la sentencia número 3379-96, de las diez horas y cincuenta y siete minutos del cinco de julio de mil novecientos noventa y seis). Por lo dicho, este motivo del recurso es inadmisible y así debe ser declarado.

VI.- Como cuarto y último motivo de impugnación los recurrentes señalan que el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29300-MINAE, "transgrede cuerpos normativos de orden público como los atinentes a las relaciones laborales y a las condiciones de trabajo contemplados en los convenios internacionales, en el Código de Trabajo y el Reglamento de Seguridad e Higiene Industrial; donde claramente se establecen obligaciones patronales a partir de que se inician las labores. Siendo que las normas impugnadas otorgan plazos para el cumplimiento de esas normas, tal y como se refleja en los artículos 68, 69 y 81 del decreto cuestionado…". Sin embargo, en virtud de la legitimación que tienen los accionantes la anterior impugnación resulta inadmisible, toda vez que escapa a la materia ambiental.

VII.- Conclusión. Por las razones expuestas en cada uno de los temas analizados, la Sala considera que el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29300-MINAE, que el Reglamento al Código de Minería, publicado en La Gaceta número 54 del 16 de marzo del 2001, no transgrede lo dispuesto en los artículos 9, 11, 50, 56, 121 inciso 1), 140 incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política. En consecuencia, procede desestimar la acción, como en efecto se hace.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción.

R. E. Piza E.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Eduardo Sancho G. Carlos M. Arguedas R.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Adrián Vargas B. Susana Castro A.

<![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> <![if !supportEmptyParas]> <![endif]> Manrique Jiménez M. Alejandro Batalla B.