Co-perpetration by extraneus in tax fraud and retroactivity of base salaryCoautoría de extraneus en delito de fraude a la Hacienda Pública y retroactividad del salario base

*040000220618PE* Case file: 04-000022-0618-PE Resolution: 2020-00733 CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS. San José, at eleven o'clock on June twelfth, two thousand twenty.

Appeals in cassation filed in this case against Wilson Gerardo Soto Mora, [...], Jeannette Soto Navarro, [...], Ericka Alicia Soto Navarro, [...], Jorge Alberto Murillo Hernández, [...], Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, [...] and Ólger Arturo Murillo Hernández c.c. Rolando, [...]; for the crime of inducing error in the tax administration, to the detriment of the Public Treasury. The magistrates Jesús Alberto Ramírez Quirós, Patricia Solano Castro, Álvaro Burgos Mata, Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas, and Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales participate in the decision on the appeal. Also, at this instance, attorney William Charpentier Morales, as private defense counsel for the defendants.

Whereas:

1.- By judgment No. 2018-1750 of sixteen thirty hours on December third, two thousand eighteen, the Criminal Sentence Appeal Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, resolved: “THEREFORE: The documents from the Dirección General de Tributación Directa, referring to the Zona Libre de Tilarán store, visible on folios 336 verso to 339, and the certification issued by the processing judge of the local Trial Tribunal referring to the activities carried out by the tribunal members during certain periods, all from the file created before this court, are admitted as new evidence. The appeals filed by: attorney Patricia Cordero Vargas, co-private defender of Jeannette Soto Navarro; attorney William Charpentier Morales, private defender of the accused Ericka Alicia Soto Navarro and of the defendants and civil defendants Jorge Murillo Hernández and Wilson Gerardo Soto Morera; attorney Marco Antonio Castro Alvarado, private defender of the accused Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza; and by the defendant Ólger Murillo Hernández, are declared without merit. The operative part of the first-instance judgment is supplemented in the sense that the civil judgment against the civil defendants is joint and several. The appeal filed by attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz, criminal prosecutor representing the State, civil plaintiff, is upheld. Consequently, the appealed judgment is partially annulled, only regarding the rejection of the sales tax items for the years 2001 and 2002, and on this point, a rehearing is ordered before a new panel of the first-instance body, respecting the principle of congruence. The remainder of the resolution remains unaffected. NOTIFY. Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Raúl Madrigal Lizano, Laura Murillo Mora, Judges of criminal sentence appeal. (sic)”.

2.- Against the previous pronouncement, attorney William Charpentier Morales, as private defender of all the defendants, and personally the defendants Olger Murillo Hernández, Jorge Murillo Mora, William Soto Mora, and Carlos Huertas Barboza, filed appeals in cassation.

3.- Having verified the respective deliberation, the Chamber proceeded to hear the appeals.

4.- The relevant legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Magistrate Ramírez Quirós reports; and,

Considering:

I.- By resolution No. 2019-01583, of 10:15 hours, on December 13, 2019, (cf. folios 1057 front to 1077 verso of volume II of the main case file), this Chamber declared admissible for a hearing on the merits only the first and second grounds of the appeal in cassation filed by the private defender, attorney William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, (cf. folios 713 to 859 of volume II of the main case file); the first and second grounds of the appeal in cassation (vices in iudicando) filed on behalf of the accused Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, (cf. folios 860 to 947 of volume II of the main case file); and, the second ground of the appeal in cassation filed on behalf of the justiciables Wilson Gerardo Soto Mora and Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, (cf. folios 948 to 1010 of volume II of the main case file); against resolution No. 2018-1750, of 16:30 hours, on December 3, 2018, of the Criminal Sentence Appeal Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared without merit the challenges raised by the material and technical defense, against judgment No. 354-2017, delivered by means of sentencing hearing (cesura), at 14:00 hours, on September 8 in its first phase and, in the second stage, at 08:30 hours, on October 4, both dates in the year two thousand seventeen, by the Criminal Trial Tribunal in Matters of the Treasury of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared Éricka Alicia and Jeannette Soto Navarro, Olger and Jorge Murillo Hernández, Wilson Soto Mora, and Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, liable as co-perpetrators (coautores), in material concurrence, of two crimes of Inducing Error in the Tax Administration, to the detriment of the Public Treasury; imposing on each of them a penalty of five years of imprisonment for each crime, for a total custodial sentence of ten years. Likewise, the ad quem supplemented the operative part of said judgment regarding the fact that the civil judgment against the civil defendants is joint and several. In turn, it upheld the appeal filed by attorney Margot Avellán Ruiz, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, regarding the point of the rejection of sales tax items, corresponding to the years 2001 and 2002, based on the principle of congruence, ordering the rehearing for a new proceeding (cf. folios 598 front to 660 verso of volume I of the main case file).

II.- Appeal in Cassation filed by attorney William Charpentier Morales, private defender of all the defendants. FIRST GROUND: Erroneous application of a substantive legal precept, specifically Article 45 of the Penal Code, which refers to criminal participation as co-perpetrator (coautoría). The foregoing in accordance with Articles 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 subsection b) and 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard, he states that the ad quem disregards the legal nature of the crime of fraud against the Public Treasury, provided for in Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter C.N.P.T.), as a special specific offense (ilícito especial propio). He argues that the action as co-perpetrators (coautoría) accredited by the a quo, and ratified by the Sentence Appeal Tribunal, of Wilson Soto Mora, and of the other accused persons, is verified in proven facts 89 to 96, which he then transcribes from folios 716 to 721. Thus, he manages to maintain that the judicial authority hearing the appeal, overlooked "the reality of the participation of each of the defendants," by admitting the perpetration as co-perpetrators (coautoría) of the demonstrated factual scenario and excluding the analysis of the scientific and dogmatic nature of the aforementioned crime of fraud against the Public Treasury, under Article 92 of the C.N.P.T.; because, in an inadequate manner, it allows co-perpetration (coautoría) in said crime "when it involves an extraneus who does not share the obligation that the criminal type requires. Therefore, only subjects who are considered intraneus, can be subject to the penal regulation of the aforementioned Article 92 (…)" (cf. folios 721 to 722). He emphasizes that in special specific offenses, the application of co-perpetration (coautoría) is not viable when an extraneus intervenes. He indicates that in order to understand the effects of co-perpetration (coautoría) in special specific offenses, when an extraneus intervenes, the dogmatics must be studied based on the dominant doctrine in Spain and Germany, which advise that the active subject in such criminal types must have particularities or qualifications, so only the subject who meets them could be the author of the act. In further abundance, the litigant points out: "Those who meet these special characteristics are called intraneus. Those who do not have them are called extraneus. This category of criminal conduct identified with certain criminal types is identified as special offenses. The foregoing in contrast to conventional crimes, because they require special characteristics of the active subject and limit the scope of the possible perpetrators" (cf. folio 722, third paragraph). A position, which in the opinion of attorney Charpentier, is assumed by Claus Roxin, in his work "Derecho Penal, Parte General" year 1997, page 338, who establishes that in certain wrongdoings only the person who presents a specific quality, known as "perpetrator qualification," would be a perpetrator, which by virtue of a general rule, this singularity stems from "a position of extra-penal duty," which is why there is a tendency to call them "offenses of breach of duty," which lack the scope of the theory of control of the act (teoría del dominio del hecho). He adds that the publication "Teoría Jurídica del delito" , by Gómez Benítez, from 1984, highlights that "Every special offense alludes to a special situation of the perpetrator's duty regarding certain legal rights or simply regarding certain behaviors. The essential characteristic of the perpetrator is constituted by the breach of a specific extra-penal duty, as stated by Roxin above. [...] the breach of the specific duty is the special criterion of objective imputation to the perpetrator in special offenses and not mere control of the act" (cf. folio 723). He adds that in the case under examination, a special specific offense is inferred, the typical description of which (Article 92 of the C.N.P.T.), linked to precepts 1 and 5 of the General Income Tax Law (Ley General del Impuesto sobre la Renta, hereinafter LGISR), requires, to determine the perpetrator (intraneus) of the crime of Fraud against the Public Treasury based on Article 92 C.N.P.T., a special subjective condition -of being a taxpayer subject to income tax- (requirement of subjective imputability and criminal reproach). Compelled by legal mandate to pay the revenue administration the payment for income tax, due to the development of economically lucrative activities. The private defender accuses the ad quem's judgment of containing an irremediable error by recognizing co-perpetration (coautoría); therefore, rendering it ineffective due to ignorance of criminal dogmatics and substantive law. Subsequently, as part of the legal and doctrinal discussion on the application of co-perpetration (coautoría), he makes an extensive transcription of the questioned judgment (cf. folios 725 to 731). He reiterates that the point of controversy against the decision appealed revolves around the dogmatic and doctrinal disregard concerning special specific offenses, their effects and restrictions, because they are offenses of infringement, and not of control, "when subjects we could identify as extraneus participate." He concludes that given the intervention of an extraneus, Article 45 of the Penal Code does not contemplate the possibility of applying co-perpetration (coautoría) in special specific offenses. He affirms that according to numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., the extraneus as a natural person lacks a special subjective condition, like being a taxpayer subject to income tax. As a grievance, he establishes that by not assessing the legal nature of the crime of fraud against the Public Treasury, provided for in Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., in relation to numerals 1 and 5 of the LGISR, which deals with –a special specific offense-, harm is caused to the material defense, since the legal situation was disregarded, and the procedural conditions of all the accused persons are aggravated, as it is not possible to apply the figure of co-perpetration (coautoría) to any person, given that from the proven facts, the necessary special subjective condition, of being a taxpayer subject to income tax, is not demonstrated, an essential aspect, as already stated, of subjective imputability and criminal reproach. An examination that the Appeal Tribunal forgot to analyze when convicting his clients for two offenses of Fraud against the Public Treasury, as co-perpetrators (coautoría); when such application was not viable. If this figure had been correctly interpreted, the ad quem would not have ratified the conviction decision of the a quo. As a claim, he requests that the ground be declared with merit and the resolution brought on appeal be annulled; acquitting all the defendants of all penalty and responsibility (cf. folios 715 to 735). The first ground of cassation is declared without merit. The appellant essentially claims an erroneous application of Article 45 of the Penal Code, referring to criminal participation as co-perpetrator (coautoría), because it is alleged that the Appeal Tribunal disregards that numeral 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures constitutes a special specific offense that does not admit the application of co-perpetration (coautoría) when an "extraneus" intervenes. Now, the Criminal Trial Tribunal in Matters of the Treasury of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment number 354-2017, delivered by means of sentencing hearing (cesura), at 14:00 hours, on September 8 in its first phase and, in the second stage, at 08:30 hours, on October 4, both dates in the year two thousand seventeen, visible from folio 7 front to 320 verso of volume I of the main case file, establishes, regarding what is relevant, the following proven facts: " 89.- Without specifying the exact date, but before October first of the year two thousand, the defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, majority partner and main developer and beneficiary of the economic activity, acting by common agreement and with a clear distribution of functions with the co-defendants CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, devised and implemented an illicit plan in order to deceive the Tax Administration and defraud the Public Treasury. Said plan consisted of disguising the business conglomerate of which they were a part, making it appear to the Tax Administration as if they were individual businesses (hereinafter stores), when in reality they comprised the commercial chain known as El Regalón, which was dedicated to the purchase and sale of various merchandise, such as clothing and shoes, in different areas of the country. In this way, as part of the complex organization created to defraud the Public Treasury, a large part of the stores entered the simplified tax regime of the Tax Administration, when the correct procedure was for them, as a whole, to be reported under the traditional regime; which allowed them facilities such as not generating invoices for retail sales and declaring their activities based on purchases made. Furthermore, as part of the illicit plan pre-established by the co-defendants, said stores did not have bank accounts, but rather part of their income was illicitly directed to the bank accounts of the co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, who in addition to forming part of the pre-established corporate, legal, or shareholder network, used their private bank accounts with the purpose of diverting the taxable income generated by the group's commercial activity. Lastly, according to the criminal scheme designed, the co-defendant CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA served as the person in charge of controlling the accounting work of the business conglomerate and providing sustainability to the aforementioned illicit scheme. 90.- Through the plan indicated above, the co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, using deceit and simulations, induced the Tax Administration into error, managing to obtain an unlawful patrimonial benefit, which caused harm to the Public Treasury of 149,716,479.15 (one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones, fifteen céntimos) for income tax corresponding to fiscal period 2001, and 277,735,106.48 (two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones, forty-eight céntimos) for income tax corresponding to fiscal period 2002. 91.- Without specifying the exact date, but between the years one thousand nine hundred eighty-seven and two thousand four, the co-defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, by common agreement with the co-defendants CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, developed the commercial activity of purchasing and selling merchandise, for which the co-defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, whether personally, on behalf of the companies he represented, or of the stores owned by the group, imported large quantities of merchandise or purchased it locally. 92.- The co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, as part of their illicit actions and the complex organization created to defraud the Public Treasury, linked themselves with the corporations Kaki del este S.A. and El Detalle Soñado S.A., which, despite having been registered with the Tax Administration as taxpayers of sales and income taxes, supplied and provided the merchandise that was sold in the stores of the El Regalón chain. 93.- According to the distribution of functions pre-established by the aforementioned criminal group, the co-defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, as legal representative and partner of the companies Kaki del este S.A. and El detalle Soñado S.A., disposed of the merchandise that these kept in their warehouses located in San José, calle ocho, avenidas dos and cuatro, where the central offices of the El Regalón chain were also located; distributing them to the various stores that comprised the business group, without any purchase record being maintained in the stores that received the merchandise. 94.- As part of the illicit actions devised by said co-defendants, the employees hired by them and who coordinated the operation of the stores located in the country, neither paid for nor recorded the merchandise they received; but rather, based on the pre-established distribution of functions, this was controlled and documented by the co-defendant CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, through semi-annual or annual entries in the accounting books, in the case of companies; through annotations in the purchase record books, in the case of individuals registered in the simplified tax regime, as well as through the tax returns filed before the Tax Administration by the registered taxpayers. 95.- Based on the proposed illicit plan, the described criminal group formed approximately one hundred thirty stores distributed in the provinces of San José, Alajuela, Limón, Puntarenas, Guanacaste, and Heredia. However, they were registered before the Tax Administration in the name of approximately fifty corporations and around eighty natural persons, some of whom were linked by consanguinity or affinity to the defendants, but mostly it involved employees who worked for the business group managed by the defendants, from whom, in some cases, the processing of municipal permits and public utilities was even requested in their personal names. 96.- As part of the illicit plan previously elaborated and in order to defraud the Public Treasury, the co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ fractioned the income received by each of the stores as if they were independent businesses, when in reality they formed a business group and subsequently, with the purpose of diverting said sums, they directed these money flows into their personal bank accounts (...)." Before resolving the complaint raised by the appellant concretely, it is important to indicate that the doctrine explains that the special specific offense reduces the figure of perpetrators to those who fulfill a special quality, that is, crimes that describe conduct that only certain subjects can perform, for example, as established in the criminal type of Article 357 of the Penal Code; while in the special impropria offense, only a differentiated penalty is imposed for a personal quality contemplated in the criminal type that aggravates the sanction, but it is a common crime, of which any imputable subject can be the perpetrator, for example, when in a crime of sexual abuse the agent has a relationship of kinship with the victim. For its part, in "offenses of control" (delitos de dominio), the co-control of the act (codominio del hecho) is established based on a distribution of work. In this way, in special specific offenses, the configuration of perpetration and participation is not achieved through the theory of control of the act (teoría del dominio del hecho) systematized by ROXIN. In this sense, GÓMEZ BENITEZ states that there are criminal types in which the active subject, "in addition to the objective possibility of control of their own action, must meet some personal characteristics or qualifications, resulting in that only those who meet these characteristics can become the perpetrator thereof. Those subjects who meet these special characteristics are called 'intraneus'; while those who do not meet these special characteristics are called 'extraneus' (…)." (GÓMEZ BENÍTEZ, José Manuel. Teoría Jurídica del Delito. Madrid: Cívitas, 1984, p. 153). Given that in special specific offenses, punishment is based on the personal characteristics of the active subject, the doctrine discusses the possibility of admitting the "extraneus" as a co-perpetrator. Thus, for example, the German and Spanish doctrine, by majority, denies the possibility that the "extraneus" can be a co-perpetrator in special specific offenses, having at most complicity or instigation in the wrongdoing, since only those who meet the qualifications contemplated in the criminal type can be so ("intraneus"); while in special impropria offenses, "if the extraneus has control of the act (dominio del hecho), they can become a co-perpetrator of the basic offense," provided that the special impropria offense contemplates the possibility of a common crime. (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 382). A certain sector of the Spanish doctrine admits the possibility of the intervention of the "extraneus" as co-perpetrator, although several authors establish limitations for its application. In the case at hand, Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures that was in force at the time of the facts, established the following: "Article 92.- Inducing error in the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration into error, by means of data simulation, distortion or concealment of true information, or any other form of deception suitable for inducing error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be punished with imprisonment of five to ten years. For the purposes of the provisions in the preceding paragraph, it must be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines, or penalty surcharges. b) To determine the mentioned amount, if taxes are involved whose period is annual, the defrauded quota for that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the defrauded amounts during the period between January 1 and December 31 of the same year shall be added. For other taxes, the amount shall be understood as referring to each of the concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to determination. The fact that the subject remedies their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the remedy, shall be considered a legal exemption from punishment. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, action by the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out with notification to the taxpayer, aimed at verifying compliance with the tax obligations referring to the tax and period in question." This article was reformed in the year 2012 and added to in the year 2016; however, the continuity of the wrongdoing is maintained, that is, the new law presents a new unitary valuation of the same behavior sanctioned by the old law; let us see: " Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury. Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, by evading the payment of taxes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of benefits in kind, or by improperly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same form, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the amount not paid from withholdings or payments on account, or of the improperly obtained or enjoyed refunds or tax benefits exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (…)." As can be observed, the criminal type does not describe any qualification in the active subject that could be adjusted to the dogmatic requirements of the so-called special specific offenses; on the contrary, Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures can be committed by any person who performs the typical action, without requiring any special characteristic in the perpetrator of the crime. This means that the configuration of perpetration and participation is defined based on the application of the theory of control of the act (teoría del dominio del hecho). As set forth in the proven facts, the defendants, following a devised plan and according to a previously agreed distribution of functions, carried out different maneuvers that built a network of anonymous corporations registered under the traditional tax regime and natural persons registered under the simplified tax regime, which sought to disguise the business conglomerate of which they were a part, making it appear to the Tax Administration as if they were individual stores, when in reality they constituted a commercial chain known as "El Regalón," which caused the taxes being paid not to correspond with the income generated by the lucrative activity, thereby managing to deceive the Tax Administration and harm the Public Treasury. The conduct of each of the justiciables went beyond simple cooperation as complicity, since they maintained functional control of the act (dominio funcional del hecho), with a clear distribution of functions, despite the fact that Wilson Soto Mora was the majority partner and main developer and beneficiary of the economic activity. Thus, based on the objective material theory, also known as the theory of control of the act (teoría del dominio del hecho), the participants in this complex organization hold the status of co-perpetrators (coautores), because according to the theory of control of the act, they maintained functional co-control of the act in which each of the accused could decide on the execution of the wrongdoing, making an objective contribution to a common plan. In this regard, FRANCISCO CASTILLO points out: “The particularity of the injury to the norm in co-perpetration (coautoría) is that each co-perpetrator does not carry out the criminal action with their own hands, but rather what is done by one of the co-perpetrators is imputed to the others as their own. In co-perpetration, each contribution is transformed into a common unlawful act, for which each co-perpetrator is responsible. Under this premise, in acting as co-perpetrators, one can distinguish the collective act from the action of each of the co-perpetrators.” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Volume III. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 440.). The act is imputed to the co-perpetrator because they provided an essential contribution to the crime, for which a common resolution is required that sets the common goals and distributes functions according to the principle of division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators base the control of the act (dominio del hecho) by having a decisive participation in the deployment of the illicit activity.

In this line of reasoning, the Criminal Cassation Chamber, through ruling No. 2011-00389, of 10:25 a.m. on April 8, 2011, resolves the following: "There shall be co-dominion of the act (codominio del hecho) whenever the acting subject who intervenes has made a contribution to the total act, at the execution stage, of such magnitude that without this contribution the act could not have been committed. Now, the wording of section 45 of the Penal Code, cited above, requires, for co-perpetration (coautoría) to exist, a joint commission of the act. To commit jointly means to execute jointly. For a joint commission of the unlawful act, with criminal relevance, to exist, it is absolutely necessary that the behavior deployed is found, at least, in acts of execution. That is, those acts that are located from an attempted stage to a consummation stage are typical, and one can intervene regarding them in co-perpetration, unless there is an express legal regulation in which preparatory acts are penalized. Stated simply, according to the cited section: 1.- Whoever, during the acts of execution, makes with their behavior an objective contribution to the unlawful act, without which this act could not have been committed, must be considered a co-perpetrator (coautor). 2.- If that contribution is made at a stage of the Iter Criminis prior to the beginning of execution, then whoever contributes to the unlawful act is not a co-perpetrator, but an accessory (cómplice), since they could not have dominated the act, nor acted jointly in its execution. But, furthermore, (3.) if someone makes, during the acts of execution or the preparatory acts, a contribution that is not necessary, that is, one without which the act could still have been committed, then they must be considered an accessory (…)." Thus, it is verified that the two crimes committed to the detriment of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) were deployed by the accused persons as co-perpetrators (coautores), who acted with full functional dominion of the act, being able to decide on the execution of the illegality and making an objective contribution to a common plan to induce the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) into error, given that it is evident from the proven facts of the conviction judgment No. 354-2017, (cf. folio 169 front to 203 back of volume I of the main file), that each of the defendants carried out a specific task to set in motion a complex criminal plan, which required a very well-structured logistics, in which each accused fulfilled an essential role, for example, [Name 001] and [Name 002], were in charge of the administrative matters demanded by the commercial activity developed by the group; while José Rosales Rosales, as administrator or supervisor of the stores located in the Santa Cruz area, among other tasks, deposited into one of the savings accounts owned by the co-accused Éricka Alicia Soto Navarro. That is, each task performed by the defendants constituted an essential contribution without which the crime could not have been committed, which required a joint action to reduce the amount of taxes they were legally obliged to pay for the economic activity of the business group, by simulating data and concealing true information to cause harm to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). Consequently, as the existence of no error in the application of substantive law is observed, the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by the private defense attorney, Mr. William Charpentier Morales, is declared without merit.

III.- Cassation Appeal filed by Mr. William Charpentier Morales, private defender, of all the accused persons. SECOND GROUND: Error in the application of a substantive legal precept. The private attorney explains that the challenged resolution disregards the retroactive interpretation of the most favorable criminal law, regarding the base salaries, prevailing as components of the criminal type of Inducing Error to the Tax Administration (Inducción a Error a la Administración Tributaria) – amount of the defrauded items -. The foregoing, by omitting to apply, for the benefit of the accused persons, the base salary in force. All due to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal) ignoring its duty to observe the application of the Conventionality Block, in accordance with the jurisprudential line stipulated by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Corte Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos). Legal basis: precepts 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos), 15.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 of the Political Constitution, articles 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 subsection b) and 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 12 and 13 of the Penal Code, 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter C.N.P.T.), 1 and 5 of the Income Tax Law. The defender affirms that the core point of this ground lies in the fact that the ad quem does not specify the normative difference of the diverse contents of article 92 of the C.N.P.T., “(…) at two historical moments of the law’s validity and, the erroneous application of those substantive norms regarding their content (…).” In that sense, he points out that Law No. 7900, of August 3, 1999, originally established the content in force of the cited 92 of the C.N.P.T., whose amount of the defrauded sum exceeded two hundred base salaries; the foregoing, in contrast to the reform of Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, “Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management” (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria), which modified section 92 of the C.N.P.T., currently in application. In this regard, subsection a) stipulates that the item of five hundred base salaries constitutes an objective condition of punishability in the crime of Fraud against the Public Treasury (Fraude a la Hacienda Pública) (cf. folios 742 to 745). He adds that, according to the historical evolution of section 92 of the C.N.P.T., article 68 of that regulatory body defines the base salary as that contained in ordinal 2 of Law No. 7337. On this aspect, Charpentier Morales states that the ad quem incurs an error of interpretation, and of application of article 92 of the C.N.P.T., in relation to the defrauded amount, “when it amounts to two hundred base salaries or, subsequently, by legal reform, to five hundred base salaries, as an objective condition of punishability” (The text highlighted in bold belongs to the original text). Thus he affirms the clear modification of the 1999 legislation, with the 2012 reform, which falls on two aspects: “the increase of the amount from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, as well as the progressive increase year by year, of the amount of the base salary, referring to the monthly salary of Office Clerk 1 of the Judicial Branch, being the highest in amount” (cf. folios 746 to 747). He refutes that the interpretation of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), regarding the retroactivity of the most beneficial criminal law to the accused Soto Mora, is partial, as it limits the progressivity of fundamental rights, and the extensive scope to all States that have signed and ratified the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). A procedure that evades the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos) (cf. folios 748 to 749). The technical defense summarizes that, in this case, significant changes have arisen, such as going from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, with the base salary for the year 2001 being one hundred twenty thousand colones; for the year 2002, one hundred thirty-six thousand colones, which are lower than the base salary of the year 2019. He maintains that the reference salary, to establish criminal sanctions, was imposed by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session of December 18, 2018, effective from January 1, 2019, in the sum of four hundred forty-six thousand two hundred colones. He indicates that the base salary value for 2019, calculated at four hundred forty-six thousand two hundred colones, multiplied by the five hundred base salaries, according to section 92 of the C.N.P.T., results in an item of two hundred twenty-three million, one hundred thousand colones, as an objective condition of punishability. It is fitting to define the defrauded sums for the fiscal periods of the years 2001 and 2002. To further elaborate, he points out: “As held as proven by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia), for the year 2001 it was ₡149,716,479.15 (one hundred forty-nine million, seven hundred sixteen thousand, four hundred seventy-nine colones and fifteen céntimos), therefore, it is less than the amount indicated as an objective condition of punishability of five hundred base salaries, for the amount of ₡223,100,000 (two hundred twenty-three million, one hundred thousand colones). Consequently, the action is not contrary to law and there is no possibility of proceeding criminally, because the conduct is atypical, pursuant to article 92 C.N.P.T. All accused persons must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility, for this act charged from its origin. On the other hand, regarding the fiscal period of the year 2002, where arbitrarily, by the Economic and Accounting Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Organism (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), it establishes capriciously and without the application of the lex artis of accounting and calculation of gross income, the amount of ₡277,735,106.48 (two hundred seventy-seven million, seven hundred thirty-five thousand, one hundred six colones and forty-eight céntimos). A figure that exceeds the calculation of five hundred base salaries, established for 2019 at ₡223,200,000 (two hundred twenty-three million, one hundred thousand colones (…).” (cf. folios 750 to 751). Finally, Charpentier Morales affirms that the appeal judgment is contradictory to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), and neglectful of the binding resolutions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos), concerning the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law. He assures that resolutions numbers 3929-95, and 5924-1996, of the Constitutional Court, regarding “the non-retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law, in cases where the elements varied in the new legislation are not directly related to the criminal penalty,” are outdated before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos); for which reason, in his opinion, it is up to the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) to carry out the optional consultation of constitutionality on the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law, as it involves variations to the punitive extreme, or to the content of the criminal wrong or factual assumption, more favorable to the accused party (cf. folios 758 to 762). As a grievance, the legal counsel points out that, if the ad quem had respected the legality block, the fundamental rights provided in article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos) would not have been infringed upon, and therefore, it would recognize the retroactive application of the most beneficial normative provision for the interests of the accused party, and the accused persons would have been acquitted. (cf. folio 762 to 764). As a claim, he requests to declare the claim with merit, and proceed to annul the judgment of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia); exonerating all his clients from all penalty and responsibility (cf. folios 764 to 765). The second ground of cassation is declared without merit. The appellant reproaches, in essence, that the challenged resolution disregards the retroactive interpretation of the most favorable criminal law regarding base salaries, by omitting to apply what is most beneficial to the accused persons, that is, considering that the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) must be calculated starting from five hundred base salaries and according to the base salary in force for the year 2019. In the first instance, it must be indicated that according to the proven facts, the two criminal actions were committed in the years 2001 and 2002. Said typical conduct is described in article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (C.N.P.T.), and at the time of the facts, its wording was the following: “Article 92.- Inducing error to the Tax Administration (Inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria). When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) into error, by simulating data, distorting or concealing true information, or any other form of deception suitable to induce it into error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of five to ten years. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, it must be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines, or punitive surcharges. b) To determine the mentioned amount, if it involves taxes whose period is annual, the quota defrauded in that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the amounts defrauded during the period between January 1 and December 31 of the same year shall be added. In other tributes, the amount shall be understood as referred to each one of the concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to determination. The fact that the subject remedies their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) to obtain the remediation, shall be considered an absolute legal excuse. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, an action of the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out upon notification to the passive subject, conducive to verifying compliance with the tax obligations referring to the tax and period in question. (As amended by article 2 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999).” However, subsequently, this article was amended by Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, called “Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management” (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria); likewise, article 16 of the “Law to Improve the Fight against Tax Fraud” (Ley para Mejorar la Lucha contra el Fraude Fiscal), Law No. 9416, of December 14, 2016, added a paragraph to the norm, such that section 92 of the C.N.P.T. currently presents the following wording: " Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury (Fraude a la Hacienda Pública). Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, evading the payment of tributes, withheld amounts or amounts that should have been withheld, or income on account of in-kind remunerations, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the non-deposited amount of withholdings or income on account, or of the refunds or tax benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, it must be understood that: a) The amount of five hundred base salaries shall be considered an objective condition of punishability. b) The amount shall not include interest, fines, or punitive surcharges. c) To determine the mentioned amount, if it involves periodic tributes, withholdings, income on account, or refunds, or of periodic declaration, the amount defrauded in each tax or declaration period shall be considered and, if these are less than twelve months, the amount defrauded shall refer to the calendar year. In other cases, the amount shall be understood as referred to each one of the different concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to liquidation. The fact that the subject remedies their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) to obtain the remediation, shall be considered an absolute legal excuse. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, an action of the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out upon notification to the passive subject, conducive to verifying compliance with the tax obligations. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) shall be constituted as a civil actor in the exercise of the civil action for damages, in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code; for this, it must have the active technical participation within the criminal process of the General Directorate of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación), which shall act through the General Directorate or those delegated this function by it. For the purposes of complying with this article, all acts of the process must be notified to the General Directorate of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación)." As a general rule, the criminal law to be applied to a specific case corresponds to the law that was in force at the time the events occur; however, if a criminal law is subsequently enacted that is more beneficial to the accused, it must be applied retroactively. The Penal Code establishes in article 11 that “punishable acts shall be judged in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their commission”; while section 12 stipulates that “if after the commission of a punishable act a new law is enacted, that act shall be governed by the one most favorable to the offender, in the particular case being judged.” Both principles of legality and retroactivity are recognized in article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos), by stating that “no one can be condemned for actions or omissions that at the time of commission were not criminal according to the applicable law. Nor can a heavier penalty be imposed than the one applicable at the time of the crime’s commission. If after the commission of the crime the law provides for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit from it.” Regarding the scope of this provision, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos) has stated that “the most favorable criminal law must be interpreted as both that which establishes a lesser penalty regarding crimes, and that which encompasses laws that decriminalize conduct previously considered a crime, create a new cause for justification, for exculpation, and for impeding the operability of a penalty, among others. These cases do not constitute an exhaustive list of the cases that merit the application of the principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law” (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case Ricardo Canese vs Paraguay, para. 179) The Penal Code expressly recognizes in its article 12 the most favorable criminal law not only regarding the penalty, but in any aspect. However, for the subsequent criminal law to be applicable to a specific case, it “must subject to penalty the same behavior as the preceding law. If the type contained in the new law is formed in such a way that it punishes a different wrong, what occurred was the derogation of the prior incrimination and the enactment of a new wrong. In this case there is discontinuity of the wrong and the new law cannot be applied to the author.” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Criminal Law. General Part. Volume I. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 206.). That is, for the new law to be applicable to the accused, it must refer to the same conduct that the old law sanctioned, that is, it must be analyzed which of the two laws is more favorable, for containing lesser essential legal consequences for the active subject of the crime. In the case at hand, the aspect of the norm claimed as more favorable is related to the amount of the base salary as a parameter to define the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública); however, it must be noted that what is susceptible to retroactivity is the criminal norm, that is, it retroacts its effects to the moment of the facts of this case, but the amount of the base salary existing in 2001 and 2002 is not subject to retroactivity, as this is a factual assumption already occurred, it is an objective element that can only be verified and is not considered a variation of the criminal type. The facts must be judged according to the amount of the base salary that was in force at the time the two crimes to the detriment of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) were committed; that is, the base salaries that governed for the years 2001 and 2002. In this sense, the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), through ruling number 0095-2001, of 09:20 a.m. on January 26, 2001, reiterates the criterion set forth in ruling No. 416-A-93, of 10:50 a.m. on September 30, 1993, resolving the following: “(…) the annual modification of the parameter to determine the amount in the commented criminal types does not constitute a reform aimed at favoring the offender nor at reducing the penalty annually, but on the contrary only seeks to maintain punishability in real monetary values. Indeed, by using a variable economic factor as a parameter for determining the amount, the aim is to maintain the levels of punishment in the real values that, according to a specific criminal policy criterion, the legislator adopted at a given historical moment, values that due to inflation are subject to numerical change. But that does not mean that inflationary changes in the factor constitute reforms whose purpose is aimed at favoring the offender, or to decrease the penalty in some crimes, or to convert crimes into violations (...), perhaps foreseeing a possible discussion when interpreting the legal reform, it must be indicated that the legislator itself resolved the problem and expressly indicated what the solution should be. Indeed, the possible doubt about the nature of the reform and the successive modifications to the amount is clarified, by stating in article 2 in a simple, clear, and express manner that \"...THE MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS LAW AND THOSE MADE IN THE FUTURE TO THE BASE SALARY OF OFFICE CLERK 1 CITED, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A VARIATION TO THE CRIMINAL TYPE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE PENAL CODE AND 490, SUBSECTION 4 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES...\" (Article 2 of Law 7337). This is an interpretation by the very body that approved the norm, which demonstrates the purpose of the modifications to the amount. (...), we must refer to a practical aspect, which although does not constitute a dogmatic reasoning, at least contributes to evidencing the logic of the interpretations. Reality and experience show us that our country does not maintain a stable financial situation (...). This means that the \"base salary\" referred to in the reform will have, day by day, an increasingly higher numerical denomination expressed in units of national currency. Consequently, if we conclude that those future amounts must be applied to cases decided when another numerical quantification of that base salary was in force, this will simultaneously imply affirming that the mere passage of time will become an automatic cause of decriminalization of the conduct (at least the transition from crime to violation for some cases, or the reduction of the penalty for others), due to the inflationary trend that always, absolutely always, has existed in our country, which implies an absurdity from the point of view of rational criminal policy (…).” With respect to the other questioning by the challenger that the reform to article 92 of the C.N.P.T. offers an element that is more beneficial for the defendants, namely, the establishment of an amount of five hundred base salaries as an objective condition of punishability, it is verified that this claim was accepted by the ad quem. Thus, in resolution No. 2018-1750, of 4:30 p.m. on December 3, 2018, of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, visible from folio 598 front to 660 back of volume I of the main file, the following is resolved: “ Therefore, the claims made must be rejected and the resolution on this matter upheld because, as these are temporary norms, in which the amount is modified for purposes of avoiding the loss of monetary value due to inflation, but the continuity of the wrong remains unalterable, the change of later law must be made only regarding the increase of the punishability threshold, but not regarding the amount of the salaries in force at the moment of committing the accused conduct (…). In summary, given that the base salary in 2001 was one hundred twenty thousand, six hundred colones (₡120,600; see notice number 02-2001 published in Judicial Bulletin No. 23 of February 1, 2001 and on the website: https: //www.hacienda.go.cr/ contenido/ 13944-historico -salarios- base), the five hundred (500) base salaries reached sixty million, three hundred thousand colones (₡60,300,000) and the amount accused, in fact 90, as defrauded in that year, was one hundred forty-nine million, seven hundred sixteen thousand, four hundred seventy-nine colones and fifteen céntimos (₡149,716,479.15), it is verified that the attributed conduct was typical. The same happens with the facts of 2002, in which the base salary was one hundred thirty-six thousand, six hundred colones (see notice number 01-2002 of Judicial Bulletin No. 24 of February 4, 2002) and the five hundred (500) base salaries amounted to sixty-eight million, three hundred thousand colones (₡68,300,000) for which, if the amount accused, in fact 90, as defrauded was two hundred seventy-seven million, seven hundred thirty-five thousand, one hundred six colones and forty-eight (₡277,735,106.48), this implies that this element of typicality is met (…).” Consequently, although the Appeals Court (Tribunal de Alzada) duly recognizes that the amount of five hundred base salaries that the reform of article 92 of the C.N.P.T. proposes as an objective condition of punishability, constitutes an element of the criminal type that must be applied retroactively because it is the more favorable norm, when calculating the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) based on the base salary amount in force for the years 2001 and 2002, the sums obtained amply exceed the five hundred base salaries required by the norm, for which reason the proven facts are not atypical. Finally, it is indicated that this Chamber does not consider it necessary to conduct an optional consultation of constitutionality, as requested by the appellant, regarding the legal impossibility of applying the principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law in the case of temporary laws, given that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has already issued a specific criterion on the matter in resolution number 3929-95, and furthermore, the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal) does not perceive any constitutional friction. Based on the foregoing, the second ground of cassation formulated by the private defender, Mr. William Charpentier Morales, is declared without merit.

IV.- Cassation appeal filed on behalf of Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, called “vices in iudicando.” FIRST GROUND: “The Criminal Sentence Appeals Court (Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal) did not justifiably observe substantive legal precepts by failing to apply the most favorable norm according to the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law subsequent to the commission of the punishable act, the foregoing in relation to article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios).” An omission that, in the appellant's opinion, generates a grievance, by impairing International Treaties, such as the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), subscribed by Costa Rica, within domestic legislation. They state that according to the conviction of the ad quem, it is not feasible to vary the decision of the a quo, because even though they consider that the most beneficial legal mandate is the one that increases “the punishability threshold”, the judgment contains the following sensitive contradictions: “1). They recognize that the most favorable law is that of 2012 (resulting, in this case, that it is the one from 2012, by raising the punishability threshold due to the increase of base salaries from 200 to 500, which means that acts that were a crime before 2012 (for exceeding 200 salaries, but not reaching 500) ceased to be so on that date); 2). They apply a criterion of authority (fallacy of authority) in the application of the erga homnes (sic) criterion of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (“such a thing is not possible when there exists, in the national legal order, a body with competence for it that has already done so, on the specific matter submitted to the knowledge of the ordinary jurisdiction, and its jurisprudence is also binding erga omnes, pursuant to article 13 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (…) Note that although the instance judges bypassed the issue of conventionality, they based their criterion on the constitutional ruling, which was indeed issued following the express questioning of the stipulation contained in the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), thereby closing the possibility of discussing the matter in domestic law, binding this and other ordinary courts to what was stipulated by the constitutional body. Therefore, the claims made must be rejected and the resolution on this matter upheld because, as these are temporary norms, in which the amount is modified for purposes of avoiding the loss of monetary value due to inflation, but the continuity of the wrong remains unalterable, the change of later law must be made only regarding the increase of the punishability threshold, but not regarding the amount of the salaries in force at the moment of committing the accused conduct”).

• 3)The Sentencing Appeals Court assesses that in both cases a crime exists, meaning that, for the Sentencing Appeals Court, the facts exceeded the threshold of punishability provided for in numeral 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, both in the regulation in force at the time the facts were committed and in the current one, but they forget, and this is most important, that the change in the crime threshold allows the penalty to be better adjusted for the result allegedly produced, and since a condition of punishability exists in the rule under discussion, the defendant's defense could have resorted to avenues such as conciliation or payment of the tax with other, more realistic and adjusted amounts of fines and administrative sanctions." They request that the judgment of the Appeals Court be annulled and that a remand be ordered, applying the most favorable law, so that the prevention of the "correct and bounded" payment may be carried out (see folios 935 to 937 and 928). The first ground of appeal on cassation is declared without merit. The appellants claim that the Appeals Court disregarded the application of the most favorable rule, in relation to Article 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), because despite recognizing that the reform produced in 2012 is more favorable, the amount for that year is not applied to calculate the sum defrauded from the Public Treasury. It is noted that this reproach is similar to the ground of cassation raised by the private defense attorney, Mr. William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, which was duly resolved in the preceding considerando, so in order to avoid repetition, the complaint will be resolved concretely. In this manner, it is verified that there is no violation of the principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law; on the contrary, the ad quem recognizes that the base salary as an objective element of punishability does constitute an aspect of the subsequent rule that is more beneficial to the defendants, and therefore, the calculation to determine whether the proven facts are atypical, or not, is made by the Appeals Court based on five hundred base salaries. This element of the criminal offense was reformed in 2012, pursuant to Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, "Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management", which modified numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. However, the amount of the base salary cannot be adjusted to the year 2012, or to the year in which the accused were tried, given that the amount of the base salary for 2001 and 2002 constitutes a factual circumstance already occurred, that is, it is an objective element that only needs to be verified and is not considered to be part of the offense. In this line, what is susceptible to retroactivity is the criminal law, which reverses its effects to the moment when the facts occurred, provided this is more favorable to the defendant; however, the amount of the base salary is not subject to retroactivity, because the applicable base salary amount is the one that was in force at the time the facts occurred, even if this amount is subsequently modified and results more favorable to the interests of the defendants. For its part, numeral 68 of the C.N.P.T. states that the concept of base salary used in the law corresponds to that contained in Article 2 of Law No. 7337, which indicates that “(...) said base salary will be in effect throughout the following year (...).” Furthermore, Article 2 of Law No. 7337 states that “The modifications contained in this Law and those that may be made in the future to the base salary of the 'Oficinista 1' cited, shall not be considered as a variation of the criminal offense, for the purposes of Article 13 of the Penal Code (...).” Consequently, the appellants' claim cannot prosper because the annual variations to the amount of the base salary cannot be considered variations to the criminal offense (Article 2 of Law No. 7337). It is not omitted to note that the Constitutional Chamber, through vote 3929-95, of 3:24 p.m., on July 18, 1995, regarding legislative consultation No. 2781-06, on the constitutionality of the draft law on "Tax Justice" (legislative file No. 12142), as well as in subsequent facultative consultations of constitutionality, has resolved the following: “The base salary of an Oficinista 1 varies in November of each year upon approval of the State budget, logically increasing the economic amount to be received, which raises the problem that each year the approved amount, being greater, varies the criminal offense of the figures mentioned in the law, creating a more favorable situation for those who committed the act when a lower amount was in force. Now, the problem lies in determining whether it is constitutionally mandatory to apply the principle of the most favorable law to the accused in these cases, or whether it is a matter of legality, as the Third Chamber of this Court has already defined in its judgment number 416-A-93 of ten hours fifty minutes on September thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three (...). Article 39 of the Political Constitution states, as relevant, that: \"no one shall suffer a penalty except for a crime... sanctioned by a previous law, and by virtue of a final judgment issued by a competent authority, after the opportunity granted to the accused to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt\". This rule, among others, establishes the basic principle that laws govern for the future, a principle also protected by Article 34 of our Constitution which establishes that: \"no law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, their acquired property rights, or consolidated legal situations\". For its part, Article 129 of the same regulatory body in its first and last paragraphs also addresses it, stating \"laws are mandatory and take effect from the day they designate; failing this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette; a law is not abrogated nor derogated except by a subsequent one...\". According to the logical content of cited Articles 34 and 39, the non-retroactivity of criminal law is a consequence of the principle of legal reserve, and therefore has constitutional status, a topic on which there is no discrepancy in doctrine, when it is a matter of applying the law retroactively to the detriment of the person. The problem arises, rather, with the application of the more benign criminal law, which, for the reasons that will be stated, does not have constitutional content as the Third Chamber has well resolved in the cited judgment, stating (...). In the same sense, the Argentine Supreme Court, which has a constitutional rule practically identical to ours, has pronounced, stating that \"the principle of the most benign law does not have constitutional hierarchy despite the transcendent role it plays within criminal law\" (rulings t.293 p. 522; t.253 p. 93; t.211 p. 1657. Criterion shared by Zaffaroni in Tratado de Derecho Penal, Tomo Primero General and Rodríguez Devesa, Derecho Penal, Parte General). The Chamber shares and adopts as its own the arguments contained in the cited judgment for being clear and adjusted to law, and therefore proceeds to declare the action without merit regarding this extreme.” Based on the foregoing, the first ground of cassation filed in favor of the defendants Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández is declared without merit.

V.- Cassation appeal filed in favor of Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, denominated “vicios in iudicando.” SECOND GROUND: Erroneous application of Article 45 of the Penal Code, by the Sentencing Appeals Court, by overlooking “(...) the nature of the figure of inducing error to the Tax Administration regulated by Article 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures on the date of the alleged commission of the illicit act.” The challengers claim that the Sentencing Appeals Court, by confirming the ruling of the Trial Court, generates a grievance because Article 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures, concorded with numeral 5 of the Income Tax Law, makes co-perpetration (coautoría) impossible “because the criminal reproach is of a subjective type and being the income tax declarant is a sine qua non condition to be considered the perpetrator of that crime.” They intend for the ad quem's resolution to be annulled, and for them to be exonerated from all penalty and responsibility, according to Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution (see folios 940 to 944). They state that the Appeals Court, in developing its thesis of co-perpetration (coautoría), opposes the existence of crimes of one's own hand or special own crimes (ilícitos de propia mano o especial propio); on the contrary, they affirm the concurrence of a crime of instantaneous consummation, “using the argument to justify the functional control (dominio del hecho) of the 'if' and 'how' of the causal course of the co-perpetrators, and of the manner in which the crime is executed, through the extension of liability of Article 67 of the C.N.P.T., the proven facts of the judgment on the merits are adjusted to what in doctrine is known as an economic interest group, which allows the typical fitting in support of the Trial Court's judgment endorsing the latter's positions” (see folio 944). As such, they disagree with the appealed judgment, because they consider that it is not appropriate to establish the subjective liability of all persons intervening in the economic cycle, regardless of whether they are part, or not, of the legal entity's organs, since criminal liability, which is personal, is excluded, except “it has been extended in positive law to legal entities, with the sine qua non requirement, of the link that must be demonstrated, being a legal representative (personero), and not just being a member of a family (...).” They summarize that the ad quem, by encompassing all the perpetrating subjects, as members of an economic interest group, violates both the principle of criminal liability and the causal link and the income (réditos) of each of the perpetrators and participants; in addition to the principles of innocence, of typicality, of mínima intervención del derecho penal (see folio 947). The second ground of cassation is declared without merit. It should be noted that this claim is similar to the ground of cassation filed by the private defense attorney, Mr. William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, which was duly resolved in considerando II, so with the purpose of avoiding repetition, the complaint will be resolved concretely. The appellants argue that Article 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), constitutes a special own crime (delito especial propio) or a crime of one's own hand (de propia mano), so it can only be imputed to the active taxpayer of the income tax, since only this person can commit the typical conduct described in the criminal offense, thus rejecting the possibility of participation in co-perpetration (coautoría) by any subject who does not appear as a taxpayer. Now then, it is convenient to define that in special own crimes (delitos especiales propios) “the quality of the subject is considered an element of the offense (for example: in prevarication, the quality of judge”; while crimes of one's own hand (delitos de propia mano) “are characterized, essentially, because in them the active subject delimits the circle of possible perpetrators, to that subject who corporally or personally performs the prohibited action.” (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 379 and 419). To understand if the criminal offense fits the indicated definitions, it is convenient to cite the content of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. Thus, at the time the facts occurred, the wording of the rule, in what is relevant, was as follows: “Article 92.- Inducement to error to the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces error to the Tax Administration, through data simulation, deformation or concealment of true information or any other form of deceit suitable to induce it to error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a financial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of five to ten years (...).” This article was reformed in 2012 and added to in 2016, however, maintaining the continuity of the wrong, the new wording indicates: “Article 92.- Fraud to the Public Treasury. Anyone who, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a financial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, withheld amounts or amounts that should have been withheld, or income on account of remunerations in kind or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unentered amount of withholdings or income on account or of the refunds or tax benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with the penalty of imprisonment of five to ten years (...).” As can be observed, the criminal offense does not expressly describe any qualification in the active subject that manages to fit the requirements that doctrine has defined for special own crimes (delitos especiales propios), which means that any person can commit the crime of inducement to error to the Tax Administration (currently called Fraud to the Public Treasury). Similarly, numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. cannot be considered a crime of one's own hand either, since the execution of the illicit act can occur among several participants even if they are not taxpayers; because, as described in the proven facts, each accused developed a specific and essential function within a common plan that allowed the execution and consummation of a crime that induced error to the Tax Administration and produced an economic injury to the Public Treasury. Based on the theory of functional control (dominio del hecho), which is applicable to this case, it is discerned that all the participants maintained a functional co-control (codominio funcional) of the fact, in which each of the accused could decide on the execution of the illicit act, making an objective contribution to a common plan. And although indeed, not all the defendants appeared as income tax taxpayers, it is not necessary that each accused performed the criminal action with their own hand, given that the illicit act is imputed to them because they provided an essential contribution to the crime, there existed a common resolution that fixed the common ends, and there was a distribution of functions according to the principle of division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators (coautores) grounded their functional control (dominio del hecho) by having a decisive participation in the deployment of the illicit activity, which is clearly what is described in the proven facts. Consequently, there is no erroneous application of Article 45 of the Penal Code, referring to participation in co-perpetration (coautoría), therefore the second ground of cassation filed in favor of the accused Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández is declared without merit.

VI.- Cassation appeal filed in favor of Wilson Soto Mora and Carlos Huertas Barboza. SECOND GROUND: Incorrect application of Articles 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures and 12 of the Penal Code; this in accordance with subsection b) of numeral 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and Article 1 of the Penal Code, by violating the principle of legality, according to numerals 37, 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They indicate that the ad quem ratified the position of the a quo regarding the theory of the continuity of the wrong, despite the fact that Article 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures of 1999 differs from the regulatory provision of 2012. Likewise, they reproach the disregard of a novel criminal offense, failing to analyze the modification from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, which constitutes the threshold of punishability; in addition, the criminal offense was varied, transcendental aspects omitted by the Sentencing Appeals Court (see folios 956 to 965). As a grievance, they specify the following: “the parameters used in the conviction and endorsed in the second instance, have been those in force in the fiscal periods 2001 and 2002, which would have resulted in application with the rule in force as of August 3, 1999, but which, having been the criminal offense substituted (tacit abrogation) by the rule of September 10, 2012, of course cannot be in force in September 2017 when the conviction is issued. With the above, an irreparable harm has been caused to all the defendants in this case, in the sense that a penalty of 10 years of imprisonment has been imposed on them and for such effects, the following has been done: They have been tried in September 2017, based on a law that entered into force September 2012, that is, 5 years before, but to consider their conduct, the legislation in force in September 2012 has not been considered, but rather a law from August 1999 (18 years before) has been considered as a constitutive element of the infraction, which takes as a reference a concept of base salary from 2001 and 2002, that is, from 16 and 15 years before the trial, but based on the threshold of punishability established, 11 and 10 years later, since the 200 base salaries of 1999 are no longer considered, but rather the 500 base salaries of 2012 (...).” They conclude that an irreparable harm prevails, as a result of a flagrant infraction of the right of defense (see folios 966 to 967). They request to declare this ground of cassation with merit, to annul the contested resolution, and given the impossibility of decreeing a remand –due to a defect in the application of substantive law–, to issue the corresponding acquittal (see folio 967). The second ground of cassation is declared without merit. The Penal Code sets forth the following principles of application of criminal law over time, namely: 1) punishable facts shall be judged according to the laws that are in force at the time of committing the crime (Article 11 of the Penal Code); 2) if after the commission of the crime a new law is enacted, the punishable fact shall be governed by the one that results more favorable to the defendant (Article 12 of the Penal Code); 3) if the enactment of the new, more favorable law occurs before the completion of the sentence, the competent court shall modify the judgment (Article 13 of the Penal Code); 4) illicit acts committed during the validity of a temporary law shall always be governed according to its terms (Article 14 of the Penal Code); and, 5) regarding security measures (medidas de seguridad), the law in force at the time of the judgment and those issued during execution shall be applied (Article 15 of the Penal Code). According to the proven facts, the two crimes of inducement to error to the Tax Administration (currently called Fraud to the Public Treasury), were committed in the years 2001 and 2002, and at that time, the following wording of Article 92 of the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.) was in force: “Article 92.- Inducement to error to the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces error to the Tax Administration, through data simulation, deformation or concealment of true information or any other form of deceit suitable to induce it to error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a financial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of five to ten years (...).” However, subsequently, this numeral was reformed by Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, called "Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management"; likewise, Article 16 of the "Law to Improve the Fight against Fiscal Fraud," Law No. 9416, of December 14, 2016, added a paragraph to the rule, such that numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. currently states the following wording: “Article 92.- Fraud to the Public Treasury. Anyone who, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a financial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, withheld amounts or amounts that should have been withheld, or income on account of remunerations in kind or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unentered amount of withholdings or income on account or of the refunds or tax benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with the penalty of imprisonment of five to ten years (...).” Specifically, the appellants question that there is an incorrect application of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., since based on numeral 12 of the Penal Code, it was failed to analyze that the new law presents a new criminal offense and a new threshold of punishability, so since there is a tacit derogation of the old law, the base salary amount corresponding to the years 2001 and 2002 should not be applied. Now then, it must be explained that the new law does not punish a behavior different from that which was contemplated in the previous law, but rather the reform produced in 2012 to Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. presents a new unitary valuation of the same behavior sanctioned by the law that was in force for the years 2001 and 2002, so there is continuity of the wrong, which allows a discussion of which of the rules results more favorable to the defendant. In this order of ideas, the new law does not concretize a new criminal offense, and although the wording of both rules is not identical, since the 2012 reform sets forth broader concepts, both laws sanction the same typical conduct of defrauding the Public Treasury by supplying information that does not correspond to the reality of the income generated by lucrative activities, which produces a lower payment of taxes. Now then, since there is continuity of the wrong because both rules sanction the same conduct, it is clear that the 2012 reform is outlined as the most favorable law, given that it raises the objective element of punishability to five hundred base salaries. However, as has been explained in previous considerandos, the base salary amount for the year 2012 cannot be used retroactively, because the specific amount does not form part of the criminal offense, due to the fact that the base salary amount constitutes a factual circumstance already occurred, that is, an objective element that only needs to be verified, and for this reason, it is not susceptible to retroactivity, because only the criminal law can reverse its effects to the moment of the facts, provided this is more favorable to the accused. Furthermore, Article 68 of the C.N.P.T. indicates that the concept of base salary that the law uses is based on Article 2 of Law No. 7337, which expressly establishes that the amount of the base salary will be modified year after year, and that these modifications cannot be considered as variations to the criminal offense. Consequently, if the facts occurred in the years 2001 and 2002, it cannot be pretended that the calculation of the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury be made using the base salary of 2012. Based on the foregoing, the second ground of cassation raised in favor of the defendants Wilson Soto Mora and Carlos Huertas Barboza is declared without merit.

Por Tanto:

The first and second grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the private defense attorney, Mr. William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, are declared without merit. The first and second grounds of the cassation appeal (vicios in iudicando) filed in favor of the accused O.M.H. and J.M.H. are declared without merit. The second ground of the cassation appeal filed in favor of the defendants W.G.S.M. and C.G.H.B. is declared without merit. Notifíquese.

Jesús Alberto Ramírez Q.

Patricia Solano C. Álvaro Burgos M.

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M.

N° interno. 245-1/3-4-19 paa **Whereas:**

**1.-** By judgment No. **2018-1750** of sixteen hours thirty minutes on December third, two thousand eighteen, the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, resolved: "**THEREFORE:** *The documents from the Dirección General de Tributación Directa, referring to the Zona Libre de Tilarán store, visible on folios 336 verso to 339, and the certification issued by the processing judge of the local Trial Court regarding the activities carried out by the tribunal members during certain periods, all from the file created before this court, are admitted as new evidence. The appeals filed by: Licenciada Patricia Cordero Vargas, private co-defense counsel for Jeannette Soto Navarro; Licenciado William Charpentier Morales, private defense counsel for the accused Ericka Alicia Soto Navarro and the defendants and civilly liable parties Jorge Murillo Hernández and Wilson Gerardo Soto Morera; Licenciado Marco Antonio Castro Alvarado, private defense counsel for the accused Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza; and by the defendant Ólger Murillo Hernández are declared without merit. The operative part of the trial court judgment is supplemented to the effect that the civil judgment of the civilly liable parties is joint and several. The appeal lodged by Licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, criminal attorney representing the State, as civil plaintiff, is granted. Consequently, the appealed judgment is partially annulled, only insofar as it rejected the sales tax items for the years 2001 and 2002, and, on this point, a remand for a new hearing before a new panel of the trial court is ordered, respecting the principle of congruence. The decision remains unchanged in all other respects. **NOTIFY.** Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Raúl Madrigal Lizano, Laura Murillo Mora*, Judges of criminal sentencing appeals*." (sic).

**2.-** Against the preceding ruling, Licenciado William Charpentier Morales, as private defense counsel for all the defendants, and in their personal capacity the defendants Olger Murillo Hernández, Jorge Murillo Mora, William Soto Mora, and Carlos Huertas Barboza, filed appeals in cassation.

**3.-** Having conducted the respective deliberation, the Court (Sala) proceeded to hear the appeals.

**4.-** The pertinent legal requirements have been observed in these proceedings. Magistrate Ramírez Quirós provides the report; and, **Considering:** **I.-** By resolution No. 2019-01583, at 10:15 hours on December 13, 2019, (cf. folios 1057 r. to 1077 v. of volume II of the main case file), this Court declared admissible for hearing on the merits only the first and second grounds of the cassation appeal brought by the private defense counsel, Licenciado William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, (cf. folios 713 to 859 of volume II of the main case file); the first and second grounds of the cassation appeal (in iudicando errors) filed on behalf of the accused Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, (cf. folios 860 to 947 of volume II of the main case file); and, the second ground of the cassation appeal lodged on behalf of the defendants Wilson Gerardo Soto Mora and Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, (cf. folios 948 to 1010 of volume II of the main case file); against resolution No. 2018-1750, of 16:30 hours, on December 3, 2018, of the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared without merit the challenges raised by the material and technical defense, against judgment No. 354-2017, issued by bifurcated process (cesura), at 14:00 hours on September 8 in its first phase and, in the second phase, at 08:30 hours on October 4, both dates in two thousand seventeen, by the Criminal Trial Court in Treasury Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, which declared Éricka Alicia and Jeannette Soto Navarro, Olger and Jorge Murillo Hernández, Wilson Soto Mora, and Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, responsible as co-perpetrators, in material concurrence, of two crimes of Inducing Error in the Tax Administration, to the detriment of the Public Treasury; imposing upon each of them, a penalty of five years in prison for each offense, for a total deprivation of liberty punishment of ten years. Likewise, the ad quem court supplemented the operative part of that judgment, regarding the point that the civil judgment of the civilly liable parties is joint and several. In turn, it granted the appeal lodged by Licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, representative of the Procuraduría General de la República, regarding the issue of the rejection of the sales tax items corresponding to the years 2001 and 2002, based on the principle of congruence, ordering a remand for a new proceeding (cf. folios 598 r. to 660 v. of volume I of the main case file).

**II.-** **Cassation Appeal brought by Licenciado William Charpentier Morales, private defense counsel for all the defendants**. **FIRST GROUND**: **Erroneous application of a substantive legal precept, specifically Article 45 of the Penal Code, which refers to criminal participation as a co-perpetrator**. The foregoing in accordance with Articles 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 subsection b), and 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this regard, he states that the ad quem court disregards the legal nature of the crime of defrauding the Public Treasury, provided for in Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (C.N.P.T.), as a special crime (delito especial propio). He asserts that the co-perpetrator action accredited by the a quo court, and ratified by the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, of Wilson Soto Mora and the rest of the charged individuals, is confirmed in proven facts 89 to 96, which he then transcribes from folios 716 to 721. Thus, he manages to maintain that the judicial authority hearing on appeal overlooked “*the reality of the participation of each of the defendants*”, by admitting co-perpetration of the demonstrated factual framework and excluding an analysis of the scientific and dogmatic nature of the cited crime of defrauding the Public Treasury, under Article 92 of the C.N.P.T.; in that, inappropriately, it allows co-perpetration in said crime “*when an extraneus is involved who does not share the obligation required by the criminal definition. Therefore, only the subjects who are considered intraneus may be subjected to the penal regulation of Article 92 mentioned above (…)*” (cf. folios 721 to 722). He emphasizes that in special crimes, the application of co-perpetration is not viable when an extraneus intervenes. He indicates that in order to understand the effects of co-perpetration in special crimes when an extraneus intervenes, the dogmatics must be studied based on the dominant doctrine in Spain and Germany, which note that the active subject in such criminal definitions must possess particularities or qualifications, and therefore only the subject who meets those qualifications could be the perpetrator of the act. Expanding further, the litigant points out: “*Those who meet these special characteristics are called intraneus. Those who do not have them are called extraneus. This category of criminal conduct identified with certain criminal definitions is identified as special crimes. The foregoing in contrast to conventional crimes, because they require special characteristics of the active subject and limit the scope of possible perpetrators*” (cf. folio 722, third paragraph). A position, which in the opinion of Licenciado Charpentier, Claus Roxin adopts in his work “*Derecho Penal, Parte General*”, year 1997, page 338, who establishes that in certain unlawful acts, only the person presenting a specific quality, known as “*author qualification*”, can be the perpetrator, a singularity that, as a general rule, derives from “*an extra-penal duty position*”, which is why there is a tendency to call them “*breach of duty crimes (delitos de infracción del deber)*”, which lack the scope of the theory of control over the act. He adds that the publication “*Teoría Jurídica del delito*”, by Gómez Benítez, from 1984, highlights that “*Every special crime alludes to a special situation of duty on the part of the perpetrator regarding certain legal interests or simply regarding certain conducts. The essential characteristic of the perpetrator is constituted by the breach of a specific extra-penal duty, as stated by Roxin above… the breach of the specific duty is the special criterion for objective imputation to the perpetrator in special crimes and not mere control over the act*” (cf. folio 723). He adds that in the sub examine case, a special crime can be inferred, whose criminal definition (Article 92 of the C.N.P.T.), linked to precepts 1 and 5 of the Ley General del Impuesto sobre la Renta (LGISR), requires, in order to determine the perpetrator (intraneus) of the crime of Defrauding the Public Treasury based on Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., a special subjective condition – that of being a taxpayer subject to the income tax – (a requirement of subjective imputability and criminal reproach). Compelled by legal mandate to reimburse the tax administration for the payment of income tax, given the carrying out of economically lucrative activities. The private defense counsel accuses the ad quem judgment of containing an insurmountable error by recognizing co-perpetration; therefore, rendering it ineffective due to a lack of knowledge of criminal dogmatics and substantive law. Subsequently, as part of the legal and doctrinal discussion on the application of co-perpetration, he provides an extensive transcription of the questioned judgment (cf. folios 725 to 731). He reiterates that the point of controversy against the appealed iterative proceeding revolves around the dogmatic and doctrinal inobservance concerning special crimes, their effects, and restrictions, as they are breach crimes and not control crimes, “*when subjects we could identify as extraneus participate*”. He concludes that when an extraneus intervenes, Article 45 of the Penal Code does not contemplate the possibility of applying co-perpetration in special crimes. He affirms that according to numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., the extraneus as a natural person lacks the special subjective condition, which is that of being a taxpayer subject to the income tax. As a grievance, he establishes that by failing to assess the legal nature of the crime of defrauding the Public Treasury, provided for in Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., in relation to numerals 1 and 5 of the LGISR, which is a special crime, a prejudice is caused to the material defense, because the legal situation was not assessed, and it aggravates the procedural conditions of all the indicted persons, since it is not possible to apply the concept of co-perpetration to any person, given that the proven facts do not demonstrate the necessary special subjective condition of being a taxpayer subject to the income tax, an essential aspect, as already stated, of subjective imputability and criminal reproach. An examination the Appeals Tribunal forgot to analyze when convicting his clients for two unlawful acts of Defrauding the Public Treasury as co-perpetrators, when such application was not viable. If that concept had been interpreted correctly, the ad quem court would not have ratified the a quo court's condemnatory decision. As a requested remedy, he asks that the ground be declared with merit and the resolution appealed be annulled; all defendants be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility (cf. folios 715 to 735). **The first ground of cassation is declared without merit.** The cassation appellant essentially claims an erroneous application of Article 45 of the Penal Code, regarding criminal participation as a co-perpetrator, in that he alleges the Appeals Tribunal ignores that numeral 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios constitutes a special crime that does not admit the application of co-perpetration when an “extraneus” intervenes. Now, the Criminal Trial Court in Treasury Matters of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment number 354-2017, issued by bifurcated process (cesura), at 14:00 hours on September 8 in its first phase and, in the second phase, at 08:30 hours on October 4, both dates in two thousand seventeen, visible from folio 7 r. to 320 v. of volume I of the main case file, establishes, in what is relevant, the following proven facts: “*89.- Without specifying an exact date, but before October first of the year two thousand, the defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, majority partner and principal developer and beneficiary of the economic activity, acting in common accord and with a clear distribution of functions with the co-defendants CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, devised and implemented an illicit plan to deceive the Tax Administration and defraud the Public Treasury. Said plan consisted of disguising the business conglomerate of which they formed part, making it appear before the Tax Administration as individual businesses (hereinafter stores), when in reality they made up the commercial chain known as El Regalón, which was dedicated to the purchase and sale of various goods, such as clothing and shoes, in different areas of the country. In this way, as part of the complex organization created to defraud the Public Treasury, a large part of the stores entered the simplified taxation regime of the Tax Administration, when the correct course was that they be reported jointly under the traditional regime, which allowed them facilities such as non-generation of invoices for retail sales and the declaration of their activities based on purchases made. Furthermore, as part of the pre-established illicit plan by the co-defendants, said stores did not have bank accounts, but rather part of their income was illicitly directed to the bank accounts of the co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, who, in addition to forming part of the pre-established corporate or shareholder network, used their private bank accounts for the purpose of diverting the taxable income generated by the group's commercial activity. Lastly, according to the criminal scheme designed, the co-defendant CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA acted as the person in charge of controlling the accounting work of the business conglomerate and giving sustainability to the aforementioned illicit scheme. 90.- Through the plan previously indicated, the co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, using deceit and simulations, induced error in the Tax Administration, managing to obtain an unlawful pecuniary benefit, which caused a loss to the Public Treasury of 149,716,479.15 (one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones, with fifteen céntimos) for income tax corresponding to the 2001 fiscal period, and 277,735,106.48 (two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones with forty-eight céntimos) for income tax corresponding to the 2002 fiscal period. 91.- Without specifying an exact date, but between the years nineteen eighty-seven and two thousand four, the co-defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, in common accord with the co-defendants CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, carried out the commercial activity of buying and selling goods, for which the co-defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, whether personally, in the name of the companies he represented, or in the name of stores owned by the group, imported a large quantity of goods or purchased them locally. 92.- The co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, as part of their illicit activity and the complex organization created to defraud the Public Treasury, linked themselves to the companies Kaki del este S.A. and El Detalle Soñado S.A., which, despite having been registered before the Tax Administration as taxpayers of sales and income taxes, supplied and provided the goods that were sold in the stores of the El Regalón chain. 93.- In accordance with the distribution of functions pre-established by the aforementioned criminal group, the co-defendant WILSON SOTO MORA, as the legal representative and partner of the companies Kaki del este S.A. and El Detalle Soñado S.A., disposed of the goods that these maintained in their warehouses located in San José, calle ocho, avenidas dos y cuatro, where the central offices of the El Regalón chain were also located; distributing them to the various stores that made up the business group, without leaving a purchase record in the stores that received the goods. 94.- As part of the illicit activity devised by said co-defendants, the employees hired by them, who coordinated the operation of the stores located throughout the country, neither paid for nor recorded the goods they received; rather, based on the pre-established distribution of functions, this was controlled and documented by the co-defendant CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, through semi-annual or annual entries in the accounting books, in the case of companies; through annotations in the purchase record books, in the case of persons registered in the simplified taxation regime, as well as through the tax returns filed before the Tax Administration by the registered taxpayers. 95.- Based on the proposed illicit plan, the described criminal group formed approximately one hundred thirty stores distributed in the provinces of San José, Alajuela, Limón, Puntarenas, Guanacaste, and Heredia. However, they were registered before the Tax Administration in the name of approximately fifty companies and around eighty natural persons, some of whom were linked by consanguinity or affinity to the defendants, but mostly they were employees who worked for the business group managed by the defendants, from whom, in some cases, they were even requested to process municipal permits and public utilities in their personal name. 96.- As part of the illicit plan previously prepared and for the purpose of defrauding the Public Treasury, the co-defendants WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ split the income received by each of the stores as if they were independent businesses, when in reality they formed a single business group, and subsequently, for the purpose of diverting said sums, they directed those cash flows to their personal bank accounts (…).*” Before resolving the complaint raised by the appellant in a concrete manner, it is important to indicate that the doctrine explains that a special crime (delito especial propio) limits the class of perpetrators to those who meet a special quality, that is, crimes that describe conduct that only certain subjects can carry out, for example, as established in the criminal definition of Article 357 of the Penal Code; whereas in an improper special crime (delito especial impropio), a differentiated penalty is only imposed due to a personal quality contemplated in the criminal definition that aggravates the penalty, but it is a common crime, of which any imputable subject can be the perpetrator, for example, when in a crime of sexual abuse the agent has a kinship relationship with the victim. For their part, in “control crimes (delitos de dominio)”, the co-control over the act is established based on a division of labor. In this way, in special crimes, the configuration of perpetration and participation is not achieved starting from the theory of control over the act, systematized by ROXIN.

In this regard, GÓMEZ BENITEZ notes that there are criminal offenses in which the active subject, "in addition to the objective possibility of control over their own action, must possess certain personal characteristics or qualifications, meaning that only those who possess these characteristics can be the perpetrator of the offense. These subjects who possess these special characteristics are called 'intraneus'; while those who do not possess these special characteristics are called 'extraneus' (...)." (GÓMEZ BENÍTEZ, José Manuel. Teoría Jurídica del Delito. Madrid: Cívitas, 1984, p. 153). Given that in strictly special offenses, punishment is based on the personal characteristics of the active subject, the doctrine discusses the possibility of admitting the "extraneus" as a co-perpetrator. For example, the majority of German and Spanish doctrine denies the possibility of the "extraneus" being a co-perpetrator in strictly special offenses, holding them at most to accessoryship or instigation of the illicit act, since only the person who meets the qualifications contemplated by the criminal offense ("intraneus") can be a co-perpetrator; whereas in non-strictly special offenses, "if the extraneus has control over the act, they can become a co-perpetrator of the basic offense," provided the non-strictly special offense contemplates the possibility of a common offense. (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 382). A certain sector of Spanish doctrine admits the possibility of intervention by the "extraneus" as a co-perpetrator, although several authors establish limitations for its application. In the case at hand, Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures that was in force at the time of the facts, established the following: "Article 92.- Inducement of Error to the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration to error, through simulation of data, distortion or concealment of true information, or any other form of deceit suitable to induce it to error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of five to ten years. For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, it shall be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines, or punitive surcharges. b) To determine the aforementioned amount, if it concerns taxes whose period is annual, the quota defrauded in that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the amounts defrauded during the period between January 1 and December 31 of the same year shall be added together. For other taxes, the amount shall be understood as referring to each of the concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to determination. It shall be considered a complete legal defense that the subject remedies their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the remediation. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, any action carried out with notification to the taxpayer, aimed at verifying compliance with the tax obligations referring to the tax and period in question, shall be understood as an action by the Administration." This article was amended in 2012 and added to in 2016; however, the continuity of the wrongdoing is maintained, that is, the new law proposes a new unitary valuation of the same behavior sanctioned by the old law; let us see: " Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury. Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of remunerations in kind, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the amount not paid from withholdings or payments on account, or the refunds or tax benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (...)." " As can be observed, the criminal offense does not describe any qualification in the active subject that manages to conform to the dogmatic requirements of so-called strictly special offenses; on the contrary, Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures can be committed by any person who performs the typical action, without requiring any special characteristic in the perpetrator of the crime. This means that the configuration of perpetration and participation is defined based on the application of the theory of control over the act. As set forth in the proven facts, the accused persons, following a devised plan and according to a previously agreed distribution of functions, carried out different maneuvers that constructed a network of corporations (sociedades anónimas) registered under the traditional taxation regime and natural persons registered under the simplified taxation regime, which sought to disguise the business conglomerate of which they were a part, presenting it to the Tax Administration as if they were individual stores, when in reality they composed a commercial chain known as "El Regalón," which resulted in the taxes being paid not corresponding to the income being generated by the lucrative activity, thus managing to deceive the Tax Administration and harm the Public Treasury. The conduct of each of the defendants exceeded simple cooperation under the title of accessoryship, since they maintained functional control over the act (dominio funcional del hecho), with a clear division of functions, even though Wilson Soto Mora was the majority and principal partner, developer, and beneficiary of the economic activity. Thus, based on the objective material theory, also known as the theory of control over the act, the participants in this complex organization hold the status of co-perpetrators, because according to the theory of control over the act, they maintained a functional co-control over the act in which each of the accused could decide on the execution of the illegality, making an objective contribution to a common plan. In this regard, FRANCISCO CASTILLO points out: " the particularity of the violation of the norm in co-perpetration is that each co-perpetrator does not carry out the criminal action with their own hand, but rather what is done by one of the co-perpetrators is imputed to the others as their own. In co-perpetration, each of the contributions is transformed into a common unlawful act, for which each of the co-perpetrators is responsible. Under this premise, in acting as a co-perpetrator, a distinction can be made between the collective act and the action of each of the co-perpetrators." (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo III. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 440.). The fact is imputed to the co-perpetrator because they provided an essential contribution to the crime, which requires a common resolution that sets the common goals and distributes functions according to the principle of the division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators base their control over the act by having a decisive participation in the deployment of the illicit activity. In this line of reasoning, the Criminal Cassation Chamber, through Voto N°2011-00389, of 10:25 a.m., on April 8, 2011, resolves the following: " Co-control over the act (codominio del hecho) will exist whenever the acting subject who intervenes has made a contribution to the total act, at the execution stage, of such magnitude that without that contribution the act could not have been committed. Now then, the wording of numeral 45 of the Penal Code, cited above, requires, for co-perpetration to exist, a joint realization of the act. To realize jointly means to execute jointly. For a joint realization of the illicit act, with criminal relevance, to exist, it is absolutely necessary that the behavior deployed is at least in acts of execution. That is, those acts ranging from an attempted stage to a consummated stage are typical, and one can intervene in them as a co-perpetrator, unless there is an express legal regulation penalizing preparatory acts. Said simply, according to the cited numeral: 1.- Whoever, during the acts of execution, makes an objective contribution with their behavior to the illicit act, without which this act could not have been committed, must be considered a co-perpetrator. 2.- If that contribution is made at a stage of the Iter Criminis prior to the beginning of execution, then whoever contributes to the illicit act is not a co-perpetrator, but an accessory, since they could not have controlled the act, nor acted jointly in its execution. But, furthermore, (3.) if someone makes, during the acts of execution or the preparatory acts, a contribution that is not necessary, that is, even without which the act could have been committed, then they must be considered an accessory (...)." " Thus, it is verified that the two crimes committed to the detriment of the Public Treasury were deployed by the accused persons as co-perpetrators, who acted with full functional control over the act, being able to decide on the execution of the illegality and making an objective contribution to a common plan to induce the Tax Administration to error, for it is evident from the proven facts of the condemnatory judgment N°354-2017, (cfr. folio 169 front to 203 back of volume I of the main case file), that each of the defendants carried out a specific task to set in motion a complex criminal plan, which required very well-structured logistics, in which each accused fulfilled an essential role, for example, [Nombre 001] and [Nombre 002], were in charge of the administrative matters demanded by the commercial activity developed by the group; while José Rosales Rosales, as administrator or supervisor of the stores located in the Santa Cruz area, among other tasks, deposited into one of the savings accounts owned by the co-accused Éricka Alicia Soto Navarro. That is, each task performed by the defendants constituted an essential contribution without which the crime could not have been committed, which required a joint action to reduce the amount of taxes that legally corresponded to them to pay for the economic activity of the business group, simulating data and hiding the true information to cause harm to the Public Treasury. Consequently, as no error in the application of substantive law is observed, the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by the private defender, attorney William Charpentier Morales, is declared without merit.

III.- Cassation Appeal promoted by attorney William Charpentier Morales, private defender of all the accused persons. SECOND GROUND: Error in the application of a substantive legal precept. The private attorney explains that the contested resolution ignores the retroactive interpretation of the most favorable criminal law, regarding the base salaries prevailing as components of the criminal offense of Inducement of Error to the Tax Administration – amount of the defrauded items -. The foregoing, by omitting to apply the current base salary for the benefit of the accused persons. All of this, due to the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal's failure to recognize its duty to observe the application of the Conventionality Block, in accordance with the jurisprudential line stipulated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Legal basis: precepts 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 15.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 of the Political Constitution, Articles 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 subsection b) and 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 12 and 13 of the Penal Code, 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), 1 and 5 of the Income Tax Law. The defender affirms that the core point of the present ground lies in the fact that the ad quem does not specify the normative difference of the diverse contents of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., "(...) in two historical moments of the law's validity and, the erroneous application of those substantive norms regarding their content (...)." In that sense, he points out that Law N°7900, of August 3, 1999, originally established the content in force of the cited Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., whose amount of the defrauded sum exceeded two hundred base salaries; the foregoing, compared to the amendment by Law N°9069, of September 10, 2012, "Law to Strengthen Tax Management," which modified numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., which is currently applicable. In this regard, subsection a) stipulates that the amount of five hundred base salaries constitutes an objective condition of punishability in the crime of Fraud against the Public Treasury (cfr. folios 742 to 745). He adds that, according to the historical evolution of numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., Article 68 of that normative body defines the base salary as that contained in ordinal 2 of Law N°7337. On this aspect, Charpentier Morales states that the ad quem incurs in a defect of interpretation and application of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., in relation to the defrauded amount, "when it exceeds two hundred base salaries or, subsequently, by legal amendment, five hundred base salaries, as an objective condition of punishability" (The bold highlighting belongs to the original text). Thus, he affirms the clear modification of the 1999 legislation, with the 2012 amendment, which falls into two aspects: "the increase in the amount from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, as well as the progressive increase year by year, of the amount of the base salary, referring to the monthly salary of Office Clerk 1 of the Judicial Branch, being the highest in amount" (cfr. folios 746 to 747). He refutes that the interpretation by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal, concerning the retroactivity of the most beneficial criminal law for the accused Soto Mora, is partial, as it limits the progressiveness of fundamental rights and the extensive scope for all States that have signed and ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. A proceeding that sidesteps the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (cfr. folios 748 to 749). The technical defense summarizes that, in this case, significant changes have arisen, such as going from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, with the base salary for the year 2001 being one hundred twenty thousand colones; for the year 2002, one hundred thirty-six thousand colones, which are lower than the base salary for the year 2019. He maintains that the reference salary for establishing criminal sanctions was set by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session on December 18, 2018, effective from January 1, 2019, at the sum of four hundred forty-six thousand two hundred colones. He indicates that calculating the value of the base salary for 2019, at four hundred forty-six thousand two hundred colones, multiplied by the five hundred base salaries, according to numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., results in an amount of two hundred twenty-three million one hundred thousand colones, this being an objective condition of punishability. It is necessary to define the defrauded sums for the fiscal periods of the years 2001 and 2002. In further elaboration, he points out: "As proven by the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal, for the year 2001 it was ₡149,716,479.15 (one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones and fifteen céntimos), therefore, it is less than the amount indicated as the objective condition of punishability of five hundred base salaries, for the amount of ₡ 223,100,000 (two hundred twenty-three million one hundred thousand colones). Consequently, the action is not contrary to law and there is no possibility of proceeding criminally, because the conduct is atypical, pursuant to Article 92 C.N.P.T. All accused persons must be acquitted of all punishment and responsibility for this act charged from its origin. On the other hand, regarding the fiscal period of the year 2002, where the Section of Economic and Accounting Crimes of the Judicial Investigation Agency arbitrarily, in a whimsical manner and without the application of the lex artis of accounting and calculation of gross income, establishes the amount of ₡277,735,106.48 (two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones and forty-eight céntimos). A figure that exceeds the calculation of the five hundred base salaries, established for 2019 at ₡223,200,000 (two hundred twenty-three million one hundred thousand colones (...)." (cfr. folios 750 to 751). Finally, Charpentier Morales affirms that the appellate ruling is contradictory to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber and omits the binding resolutions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, concerning the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law. He asserts that resolutions numbers 3929-95 and 5924-1996 of the Constitutional Tribunal, regarding "the non-retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law, in cases where the elements varied in the new legislation do not directly concern the criminal sanction," are outdated before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; therefore, in his opinion, it is for the Criminal Cassation Chamber to carry out the optional consultation of constitutionality regarding the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law, given that these are variations to the punitive extreme, or to the content of the criminal wrongdoing or factual assumption, more favorable to the accused party (cfr. folios 758 to 762). The legal representation points out as a grievance that, if the ad quem had respected the legality block, the fundamental rights provided for in Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights would not have been infringed, and therefore, it would recognize the retroactive application of the most beneficial normative provision for the interests of the accused party, and the accused persons would have been acquitted. (cfr. folio 762 to 764). As a claim, he requests that the claim be declared with merit, and that the ruling of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal be annulled; exonerating all his clients from all punishment and responsibility (cfr. folios 764 to 765). The second ground of cassation is declared without merit. The appellant reproaches, in essence, that the contested resolution ignores the retroactive interpretation of the most favorable criminal law regarding the base salaries, by omitting to apply what is most beneficial to the accused persons, that is, considering that the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury must be calculated starting from five hundred base salaries and according to the base salary in force for the year 2019. In the first instance, it must be indicated that according to the proven facts, the two criminal actions were committed in the years 2001 and 2002. Said typical conduct is described in Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), and at the time of the facts, its wording was as follows: "Article 92.- Inducement of Error to the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration to error, through simulation of data, distortion or concealment of true information, or any other form of deceit suitable to induce it to error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of five to ten years. For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, it shall be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines, or punitive surcharges. b) To determine the aforementioned amount, if it concerns taxes whose period is annual, the quota defrauded in that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the amounts defrauded during the period between January 1 and December 31 of the same year shall be added together. For other taxes, the amount shall be understood as referring to each of the concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to determination. It shall be considered a complete legal defense that the subject remedies their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the remediation. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, any action carried out with notification to the taxpayer, aimed at verifying compliance with the tax obligations referring to the tax and period in question, shall be understood as an action by the Administration. (As amended by Article 2 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999)." However, subsequently, this article was amended by Law N°9069, of September 10, 2012, called "Law to Strengthen Tax Management"; likewise, Article 16 of the "Law to Improve the Fight against Tax Fraud," Law N°9416, of December 14, 2016, added a paragraph to the norm, such that now numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. currently presents the following wording: " Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury.

Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of in-kind compensation, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unremitted amount of withholdings or payments on account, or the unduly obtained or enjoyed refunds or tax benefits exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years. For the purposes of the provisions in the preceding paragraph, it shall be understood that: a) The amount of five hundred base salaries shall be considered an objective condition of punishability. b) The amount shall not include interest, fines, or punitive surcharges. c) To determine the aforementioned amount, if it concerns periodic taxes, withholdings, payments on account, or refunds, or those of periodic declaration, the amount defrauded in each tax period or declaration period shall be considered, and if these are less than twelve months, the amount defrauded shall refer to the calendar year. In other cases, the amount shall be understood to refer to each of the different concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to liquidation.

A legal excuse absolving liability shall be considered the fact that the subject remedies their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the remedy. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, an action by the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out with notification to the taxpayer, aimed at verifying compliance with tax obligations. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic shall be constituted as a civil actor in the exercise of the civil action for damages, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; for this, it must have the active technical participation within the criminal process of the Directorate General of Taxation, which shall act through the Directorate General or through those to whom it delegates the function. For the purposes of complying with the provisions of this article, all procedural acts must be notified to the Directorate General of Taxation.

As a general rule, the criminal law that must be applied to a specific case corresponds to the law that was in force at the time the events occurred; however, if a criminal law is subsequently enacted that is more favorable to the accused, it must be applied retroactively. The Penal Code establishes in Article 11 that "punishable acts shall be judged in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their commission"; while numeral 12 stipulates that "if a new law is enacted after the commission of a punishable act, it shall be governed by the law that is most favorable to the offender, in the particular case being judged." Both principles of legality and retroactivity are recognized in Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which states that "no one shall be convicted of actions or omissions that were not criminal under the applicable law at the time they were committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the crime the law provides for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby." Regarding the scope of this provision, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that it "must be interpreted as a more favorable penal law, both that which establishes a lesser penalty for crimes, and that which encompasses laws that decriminalize conduct previously considered a crime, create a new cause of justification, of non-culpability, and of impediment to the enforcement of a penalty, among others. Such cases do not constitute an exhaustive list of the instances that warrant the application of the principle of retroactivity of the more favorable penal law" (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case of Ricardo Canese vs. Paraguay, para. 179). The Penal Code expressly recognizes in its Article 12 the more favorable penal law, not only regarding the penalty but in any aspect. Now, for a subsequent penal law to be applicable to a specific case, it "must subject the same conduct to punishment as the previous law. If the offense contained in the new law is formed in such a way that it punishes a different wrong, what occurred was the repeal of the prior criminalization and the creation of a new wrong. In this case, there is a discontinuity of the wrong and the new law cannot be applied to the perpetrator." (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Criminal Law. General Part. Volume I. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 206.). That is, for the new law to be applicable to the accused, it must refer to the same conduct that the old law sanctioned; that is, it must be analyzed which of the two laws is more favorable, as it contains lesser essential legal consequences for the active subject of the crime. In the instant case, the aspect of the norm claimed as more favorable is related to the amount of the base salary as a parameter to define the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury; however, it must be noted that what is susceptible to retroactivity is the penal norm; that is, its effects are traced back to the moment of the events of the present case, but the amount of the base salary existing in 2001 and 2002 is not subject to retroactivity, as this is a factual situation that has already occurred; it is an objective element that can only be verified, which is not considered a variation of the criminal type. The facts must be judged according to the amount of the base salary that was in force at the time the two crimes to the detriment of the Public Treasury were committed; that is, the base salaries that governed for the years 2001 and 2002. In this regard, the Criminal Cassation Chamber, through vote number 0095-2001, at 09:20 hours on January 26, 2001, reiterates the criterion set forth in vote No. 416-A-93, at 10:50 hours on September 30, 1993, resolving the following: "(...) the annual modification of the parameter for determining the amount in the criminal types under commentary does not constitute a reform aimed at favoring the offender, nor at annually reducing the penalty, but on the contrary, only seeks to maintain punishability in real monetary values. In effect, by using a variable economic factor as a parameter for determining the amount, the intention is to maintain the levels of sanction in the real values that, according to a specific criminal policy criterion, the legislator adopted at a particular historical moment, values that, due to inflation, are subject to numerical change. But this does not mean that inflationary changes in the factor constitute reforms whose purpose is aimed at favoring the offender, or to decrease the penalty in some crimes, or to convert crimes into infractions (...), perhaps foreseeing a possible discussion at the time of interpreting the legal reform, it must be indicated that the legislator himself resolved the problem and expressly indicated what the solution should be. In effect, the possible doubt about the nature of the reform and the successive modifications to the amount is clarified by indicating in Article 2 in a simple, clear, and express manner that '...THE MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS LAW AND THOSE THAT MAY BE MADE IN THE FUTURE TO THE BASE SALARY OF THE OFFICE CLERK 1 CITED, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A VARIATION TO THE CRIMINAL TYPE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE AND ARTICLE 490, SUBSECTION 4 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE...' (Article 2 of Law 7337). This is an interpretation by the very body that approved the norm, which demonstrates to us the purpose of the modifications to the amount. (...) we must refer to a practical aspect, which, although it does not constitute a dogmatic reasoning, at least helps to demonstrate the logic of the interpretations. Reality and experience show us that our country does not maintain a stable financial situation (...). This means that the 'base salary' referred to in the reform will have, day by day, a numerical denomination expressed in units of national currency that is increasingly higher. Consequently, if we conclude that these future amounts must be applied to cases decided when another numerical quantification of that base salary was in force, this would also imply affirming that the mere passage of time becomes an automatic cause for the decriminalization of the conduct (at least the change from crime to infraction for some cases, or the reduction of the penalty for others), due to the inflationary trend that has always, absolutely always, existed in our country, which implies an absurdity from the point of view of a rational criminal policy (...)." Regarding the challenger's other objection that the reform to Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. offers an element that is more beneficial for the defendants, namely, the establishment of an amount of five hundred base salaries as an objective condition of punishability, it is verified that this claim was accepted by the ad quem. Thus, in resolution No. 2018-1750, at 16:30 hours on December 3, 2018, of the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, visible from folio 598 front to 660 back of volume I of the main file, the following is resolved: "Therefore, the claims made must be rejected and what was resolved on this issue maintained, because, as these are temporary norms, in which the amount is modified for the purpose of preventing the loss of currency value due to inflation, but the continuity of the wrong remains unaltered, the change of the subsequent law must be made only concerning the increase in the threshold of punishability, but not regarding the amount of the salaries in force at the time of carrying out the accused conduct (...). In summary, given that the base salary in 2001 was one hundred twenty thousand six hundred colones (₡120,600; see notice number 02-2001 published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 23 of February 1, 2001, and on the website: https://www.hacienda.go.cr/contenido/13944-historico-salarios-base), the five hundred (500) base salaries amounted to sixty million three hundred thousand colones (₡60,300,000) and the accused amount, in fact 90, as defrauded in that year, was one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones with fifteen céntimos (₡149,716,479.15), it is verified that the attributed conduct was typical. The same occurs with the events of 2002, in which the base salary was one hundred thirty-six thousand six hundred colones (see notice number 01-2002 of the Judicial Bulletin No. 24 of February 4, 2002) and the five hundred (500) base salaries amounted to sixty-eight million three hundred thousand colones (₡68,300,000); therefore, if the accused amount, in fact 90, as defrauded was two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones with forty-eight céntimos (₡277,735,106.48), this implies that this element of the typicality is met (...)." Consequently, although the Appellate Court duly recognizes that the amount of five hundred base salaries established by the reform of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. as an objective condition of punishability constitutes an element of the criminal type that must be applied retroactively because it results in a more favorable norm, when calculating the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury based on the amount of the base salary in force for the years 2001 and 2002, the sums obtained amply exceed the five hundred base salaries required by the norm, and therefore the proven facts are not atypical. Finally, it is indicated that this Chamber does not consider it necessary to conduct an optional consultation on constitutionality, as requested by the appellant, regarding the legal impossibility of applying the principle of retroactivity of the more favorable penal law in the case of temporary laws, since the Constitutional Chamber has already issued a specific opinion on the matter in resolution number 3929-95, and furthermore, the Criminal Cassation Chamber does not foresee any constitutional conflicts. Based on the foregoing, the second ground for cassation formulated by the private defense attorney, licensed William Charpentier Morales, is declared without merit.

IV.- Appeal for cassation filed on behalf of Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, denominated "vices in iudicando." FIRST GROUND: "The Criminal Sentence Appeals Court did not justifiably observe substantive legal precepts by failing to apply the most favorable norm according to the retroactive application of the most favorable penal law subsequent to the commission of the punishable act, the foregoing in relation to Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures." An omission which, in the opinion of the appellant, causes grievance by undermining International Treaties, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, subscribed by Costa Rica, within domestic legislation. They state that according to the conviction of the ad quem, it is not viable to vary the decision of the a quo, because although they consider that the most beneficial legal mandate is the one that increases "the threshold of punishability," the ruling contains the following sensitive contradictions: "1). They recognize that the most favorable law is that of 2012 (resulting, in this case, that it is that of 2012, by raising the threshold of punishability due to the increase in base salaries from 200 to 500, which makes acts that were crimes before 2012 (for exceeding 200 salaries, but not reaching 500) cease to be so at that date); 2). They apply a criterion of authority (fallacy of authority) in the application of the erga homnes (sic) criterion of the Constitutional Chamber ('such a thing is not possible when there exists, in the national legal system, a body with competence for it which has already done so, on the specific topic submitted to the ordinary jurisdiction, and its jurisprudence is also binding erga omnes, pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (sic) (...) Note that although the trial judge and judges sidestepped the issue of conventionality, they based their criterion on the constitutional vote, which was indeed issued based on the express questioning of the stipulation contemplated in the American Convention on Human Rights, thereby closing the possibility of discussing the topic in domestic law, binding this and other ordinary courts to what was stipulated by the constitutional body. Therefore, the claims made must be rejected and what was resolved on this issue maintained because, as these are temporary norms, in which the amount is modified for the purpose of preventing the loss of currency value due to inflation, but the continuity of the wrong remains unaltered, the change of the subsequent law must be made only concerning the increase in the threshold of punishability, but not regarding the amount of the salaries in force at the time of carrying out the accused conduct'). 3) The Sentence Appeals Court assesses that in both cases a crime exists, that is, that for the Sentence Appeals Court the facts exceeded the threshold of punishability provided for in numeral 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures, both in the regulation in force at the time of the commission of the facts and in the current one, but they forget, and this is the most important thing, that the change in the threshold of the crime allows for a better adjustment of the penalty based on the supposedly produced result, and with an objective condition of punishability existing in the norm under commentary, the defense of the accused could have resorted to avenues such as conciliation or the payment of the tax with other, more real and adjusted, amounts of fines and administrative sanctions." They request that the sentence of the Appeals Court be annulled, and a remand be ordered, applying the most favorable law, so that it may proceed to make the prevention of the "correct and delimited" payment (cf. folios 935 to 937 and 928). The first ground for cassation is declared without merit. The appellants claim that the Appeals Court failed to observe the application of the most favorable norm, in relation to Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), because despite recognizing that the reform produced in 2012 is more favorable, the amount of that year is not applied to calculate the sum defrauded from the Public Treasury. It is noted that this reproach is similar to the ground for cassation set forth by the private defense attorney, licensed William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the accused, which was duly resolved in the preceding recital; therefore, with the aim of avoiding repetition, the complaint is resolved concretely. In this way, it is verified that there is no violation of the principle of retroactivity of the more favorable penal law; on the contrary, the ad quem recognizes that the base salary as an objective element of punishability does constitute an aspect of the subsequent norm that is more beneficial for the defendants, and therefore, the calculation to determine whether the proven facts are atypical or not is carried out by the Appellate Court based on five hundred base salaries. This element of the criminal type was reformed in 2012, according to Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, "Law for Strengthening Tax Management," which modified numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. However, the amount of the base salary cannot be adjusted to the year 2012, or to the year in which the defendants were judged, since the amount of the base salary for the years 2001 and 2002 constitutes a factual situation that has already occurred; that is, it is an objective element that must only be verified and is not considered part of the criminal type. In this line, what is susceptible to retroactivity is the penal norm, which traces its effects back to the moment the events occurred, provided this is more favorable to the accused; however, the amount of the base salary is not subject to retroactivity, because the base salary amount that applies is the one that was in force at the time the events occurred, even if this amount is subsequently modified and results more favorable to the interests of the defendants. For its part, numeral 68 of the C.N.P.T. refers that the concept of base salary used in the law corresponds to that contained in Article 2 of Law No. 7337, which indicates that "(...) said base salary shall govern throughout the following year (...)." Furthermore, Article 2 of Law No. 7337 contemplates that "The modifications contained in this Law and those that may be made in the future to the base salary of 'Office Clerk 1' cited, shall not be considered as a variation to the criminal type, for the purposes of Article 13 of the Penal Code (...)." Consequently, the appellants' claim cannot prosper because the annual variations to the amount of the base salary cannot be considered variations to the criminal type (Article 2 of Law No. 7337). It is not omitted to indicate that the Constitutional Chamber, through vote 3929-95, at 15:24 hours on July 18, 1995, regarding legislative consultation No. 2781-06, on the constitutionality of the bill for "Tax Justice" (legislative file No. 12142), as well as in subsequent optional consultations on constitutionality, has resolved the following: "The base salary of an Office Clerk 1 varies in November of each year upon the approval of the State budget, logically increasing the economic amount to be received, which raises the problem that each year the approved amount, being higher, varies the criminal type of the figures mentioned in the law, creating a more favorable situation for those who committed the act when a lower amount governed. Now, the problem lies in determining whether it is constitutionally obligatory to apply to these cases the principle of the law most favorable to the offender, or whether it is a problem of legality, as the Third Chamber of this Court has already defined in its judgment number 416-A-93 of ten hours fifty minutes on September thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three (...). Article 39 of the Political Constitution indicates, in what is relevant, that: 'no one shall be made to suffer penalty, except for a crime...sanctioned by previous law, and by virtue of a final judgment issued by competent authority, after opportunity has been granted to the indictee to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt.' This norm, among others, establishes the basic principle that laws govern for the future, a principle also protected by Article 34 of our Constitution, which establishes that: 'no law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, of their acquired patrimonial rights or consolidated legal situations.' For its part, Article 129 of the same normative body in its first and last paragraphs also collects this by indicating 'laws are obligatory and take effect from the day they designate; in the absence of this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette; the law is neither abrogated nor derogated, except by another subsequent one...' According to the logical content of Articles 34 and 39 cited, the non-retroactivity of criminal law is a consequence of the principle of reservation of law, and therefore has constitutional rank, a topic on which there is no discrepancy in doctrine when it comes to applying the law retroactively to the detriment of the person. The problem rather arises before the application of the more benign penal law, which, for the reasons that will be stated, does not have constitutional content, as the Third Chamber has well resolved in the cited judgment by indicating (...). In the same sense, the Supreme Court of Argentina has pronounced, which has a constitutional norm practically identical to ours, indicating that 'the principle of the more benign law does not have constitutional hierarchy, despite the transcendent role it plays within criminal law' (rulings t.293 p. 522; t.253 p. 93; t.211 p. 1657. Criterion shared by Zaffaroni in Treatise on Criminal Law, Volume One General Part, and Rodríguez Devesa, Criminal Law, General Part).

The Chamber shares and adopts the arguments contained in the cited judgment as they are clear and in accordance with the law, and therefore the action must be declared without merit on this point.</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong><em>” </em></strong></span> <span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">Based on the foregoing, the first ground of cassation raised on behalf of the defendants Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández is declared without merit. </span></span></span></span></div> <div style=\"text-indent: 12mm; line-height: 200%; margin: 0.00mm 0mm 0.00mm 0mm;\" align=\"justify\"><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span class=\"287089\" style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong>V.- Cassation appeal filed on behalf of Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, termed “<em>in iudicando</em> errors.” SECOND GROUND</strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">: </span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong>Erroneous application of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, by the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, by disregarding “<em>(…) the nature of the figure of inducing the Tax Administration into error regulated by Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures at the date of the alleged commission of the offense</em></strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong>”.</strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> The appellants claim that the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, by confirming the ruling of the Trial Court, causes harm because Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, concordant with numeral 5 of the Income Tax Law, makes co-perpetration impossible “<em>since the criminal reproach is subjective in nature and being the income tax filer is a sine qua non condition</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> (sic) <em>to be considered the perpetrator of that crime</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">”. They seek that the <em>ad quem</em> decision be annulled, and that they be exonerated from all penalty and liability, in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution (cf. folios 940 to 944). They argue that the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal, in developing its thesis of co-perpetration, opposes the existence of strictly personal or special own offenses; on the contrary, they affirm the occurrence of an instantaneous offense, “<em>using the argument to justify the control over whether and how the causal course is determined for the co-perpetrators, and how the crime is executed, through the extension of liability under Article 67 of the C.N.P.T., the proven facts of the judgment on the merits are adapted to what doctrine knows as an economic interest group, which allows for the typical classification in support of the Trial Court’s judgment, endorsing the latter’s positions</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">” (cf. folio 944). Thus, they disagree with the appealed ruling, as they consider it is improper to establish the subjective liability of all persons involved in the economic cycle, regardless of whether or not they are part of the organs of the legal entity, as criminal liability, which is personal, is excluded, except “<em>it has been extended in positive law to legal entities, with the sine qua non requirement of the link that must be demonstrated, being a legal representative, and not merely a family member (…)</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">.” They summarize that the <em>ad quem</em>, by encompassing all the perpetrator subjects as members of an economic interest group, violates both the principle of criminal liability and the causal link, and the income of each of the authors and participants; in addition to the principles of innocence, legality of the offense, and minimal intervention of criminal law (cf. folio 947). <strong>The second ground of cassation is declared without merit.</strong> It must be noted that this claim is similar to the ground of cassation filed by the private defense attorney, Lic. William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, which was duly resolved in Considerando II, so to avoid repetition, the complaint is resolved concisely. The appellants argue that Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.) constitutes a special own offense or a strictly personal offense, meaning it can only be attributed to the active taxpayer of the income tax, since only this person can commit the typical conduct described in the criminal type, thus rejecting the possibility of co-perpetration by any subject who does not appear as a taxpayer. Now, it is appropriate to define that in special own offenses, “<em>the status of the subject is considered an element of the type (for example: in malfeasance, the status of judge)</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">”; while strictly personal offenses “<em>are essentially characterized because the active subject limits the circle of possible perpetrators to that subject who corporally or personally carries out the prohibited action.”</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Author and Co-Author in Criminal Law. General Part. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 379 and 419). To understand whether the criminal type fits these definitions, it is useful to cite the content of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. Thus, at the time the events occurred, the wording of the norm, in what is relevant, was as follows: <strong>“</strong> <em>Article 92.- Inducing the Tax Administration into error. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration into error, through simulation of data, distortion or concealment of true information, or any other form of suitable deception to induce it into error, with the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or for a third party, a financial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be punished with five to ten years of imprisonment (…).</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong><em>”</em></strong></span> <span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">This article was amended in 2012 and added to in 2016; however, maintaining the continuity of the wrongdoing, the new wording states: <strong><em>“</em></strong> <em>Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury. Whoever, by act or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or for a third party, a financial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of in-kind remuneration, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unremitted amount of withholdings or payments on account, or the unduly obtained or enjoyed refunds or tax benefits exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (…).</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> <strong><em>”</em></strong></span> </span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><span class=\"287089 example1 287090\" style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">As can be observed, the criminal type does not expressly describe any qualification in the active subject that fits the requirements doctrine has defined for special own offenses, meaning any person can commit the crime of inducing the Tax Administration into error (currently termed Fraud against the Public Treasury). Similarly, numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. cannot be considered a strictly personal offense either, because the execution of the offense can occur among several participants even if they are not taxpayers; since, as described in the proven facts, each defendant carried out a specific and essential function within a common plan that enabled the execution and completion of a crime that induced the Tax Administration into error and caused economic harm to the Public Treasury. Starting from the theory of control over the act, which is applicable to this case, it is evident that all participants maintained a functional co-control over the act, in which each of the defendants could decide on the execution of the offense, making an objective contribution to a common plan. And although it is indeed true that not all the defendants appeared as income taxpayers, it is not necessary that each accused personally carried out the criminal action with their own hand, since the unlawful act is attributed to them because they provided an essential contribution to the crime, there was a common resolution that set the common goals, and there was a distribution of functions according to the principle of division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators grounded their control over the act by having a decisive participation in the unfolding of the unlawful activity, which is clearly what is described in the proven facts.</span> Consequently, there is no erroneous application of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, regarding co-perpetration, so the second ground of cassation filed on behalf of the defendants Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández is declared without merit. </span></span></div> <div style=\"text-indent: 12mm; line-height: 200%; margin: 0.00mm 0mm 0.00mm 0mm;\" align=\"justify\"><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong>VI.</strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong>-</strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong> Cassation appeal filed on behalf of Wilson Soto Mora and Carlos Huertas Barboza. SECOND GROUND: Incorrect application of Articles 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures and 12 of the Criminal Code</strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">; this in accordance with subsection b) of numeral 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 1 of the Criminal Code, by violating the principle of legality, according to numerals 37, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution; 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They indicate that the <em>ad quem</em> ratified the <em>a quo</em>’s position regarding the theory of the continuity of the wrongdoing, despite Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures of 1999 being distant from the normative provision of 2012. Likewise, they reproach the disregard of a new criminal type, failing to analyze the modification from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, which constitutes the punishability threshold; moreover, the criminal type was changed, transcendental aspects omitted by the Sentencing Appeals Tribunal (cf. folios 956 to 965). As a specific grievance, they state the following: “<em>the parameters used in the conviction judgment and endorsed in the second instance have been those in force in the 2001 and 2002 fiscal periods, which would have been applicable with the norm in force as of August 3, 1999, but since the criminal type was replaced (tacit abrogation) by the norm of September 10, 2012, they certainly cannot be in force in September 2017 when the conviction ruling is issued. With the foregoing, irreparable harm has been caused to all the defendants in this case, in that they have been imposed a 10-year prison sentence, and for these effects, the following procedure has been followed: Judgment was passed in September 2017, based on a law that came into force in September 2012, that is, 5 years earlier, but to consider their conduct, the legislation in force in September 2012 was not considered; rather, a (sic) law of August 1999 (18 years earlier) was considered as a constituent element of the infraction, taking as reference a concept of base salary from the years 2001 and 2002, that is, 16 and 15 years before the trial, but based on the punishability threshold established 11 and 10 years later, since the 200 base salaries of 1999 were no longer considered, but rather the 500 base salaries of 2012 (…).</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">” They conclude that irreparable harm predominates, due to a flagrant violation of the right of defense</span> <span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">(cf. folios 966 to 967). They request that this ground of cassation be declared with merit, that the contested decision be annulled, and given the impossibility of ordering a rehearing —due to a defect in the application of substantive law—, that the corresponding acquittal be issued (cf. folio 967). <strong>The second ground of cassation is declared without merit.</strong> The Criminal Code sets forth the following principles for the application of criminal law over time, namely: 1) punishable acts shall be judged according to the laws that are in force at the time the crime is committed (Article 11 of the Criminal Code); 2) if a new law is enacted after the crime is committed, the punishable act shall be governed by whichever is more favorable to the defendant (Article 12 of the Criminal Code); 3) if the enactment of the new, more favorable law occurs before the sentence is served, the competent court shall modify the judgment (Article 13 of the Criminal Code); 4) unlawful acts committed during the term of a temporary law shall always be governed in accordance with its terms (Article 14 of the Criminal Code); and, 5) regarding security measures, the law in force at the time of sentencing and those enacted during execution shall apply (Article 15 of the Criminal Code). According to the proven facts, the two crimes of inducing the Tax Administration into error (currently termed Fraud against the Public Treasury) were committed in the years 2001 and 2002, and at that time, the following wording of Article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.) was in force: <strong><em>“</em></strong><em>Article 92.- Inducing the Tax Administration into error. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration into error, through simulation of data, distortion or concealment of true information, or any other form of suitable deception to induce it into error, with the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or for a third party, a financial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be punished with five to ten years of imprisonment (…).</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong><em>”</em></strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> However, subsequently, this numeral was amended by Law N°9069, of September 10, 2012, called “<em>Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management”; </em>likewise, Article 16 of the <em>“Law to Improve the Fight against Tax Fraud”,</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> Law N°9416, of December 14, 2016, added a paragraph to the norm, such that numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. currently presents the following wording: <strong><em>“</em></strong> <em>Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury. Whoever, by act or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or for a third party, a financial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of in-kind remuneration, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unremitted amount of withholdings or payments on account, or the unduly obtained or enjoyed refunds or tax benefits exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (…).</em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> <strong><em>”</em></strong></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><em> </em></span><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">Specifically, the appellants question an incorrect application of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., arguing that based on numeral 12 of the Criminal Code, it was overlooked that the new law presents a new criminal type and a new punishability threshold, so given the tacit repeal of the old law, the amount of the base salary corresponding to the years 2001 and 2002 should not be applied. Now, it must be explained that the new law does not punish a different behavior than was contemplated in the previous law, but rather the amendment made in 2012 to Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. presents a new unitary valuation of the same behavior sanctioned by the law that was in force for the years 2001 and 2002, meaning there is continuity of the wrongdoing, which allows for discussion of which of the norms is more favorable to the defendant. In this order of ideas, the new law does not specify a new criminal type, and although the wording of both norms is not identical, since the 2012 amendment introduces broader concepts, both laws sanction the same typical conduct of defrauding the Public Treasury by providing information that does not correspond with the reality of the income generated by lucrative activities, which results in a lower payment of taxes. Now, given that there is continuity of the wrongdoing because both norms sanction the same conduct, it is clear that the 2012 amendment appears to be the more favorable law, as it raises the objective element of punishability to five hundred base salaries. However, as explained in previous considerandos, the amount of the 2012 base salary cannot be applied retroactively,</span></span><span style=\"color: #010101; font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> because the specific amount is not part of the criminal type,</span></span><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> since the amount of the base salary constitutes a factual assumption already occurred, that is, an objective element that only must be verified, which</span></span><span style=\"color: #010101; font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> therefore, </span></span> <span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">is not susceptible to retroactivity, since only the criminal norm can retroact its effects to the moment of the facts, provided this is more favorable to the accused. Furthermore, Article 68 of the C.N.P.T. indicates that the concept of base salary used by the law is based on Article 2 of Law N°7337, which expressly establishes that the amount of the base salary will be modified year by year, and these modifications cannot be considered as variations to the criminal type. Consequently, if the facts occurred in 2001 and 2002, it cannot be pretended that the calculation of what was defrauded from the Public Treasury be carried out based on the 2012 base salary. Based on the foregoing, the second ground of cassation raised on behalf of the defendants Wilson Soto Mora and Carlos Huertas Barboza is declared without merit. </span></span></div> <div style=\"line-height: 200%;\" align=\"center\"><span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><strong>Therefore:</strong></span></span></div> <div style=\"line-height: 200%;\" align=\"justify\"><span style=\"color: #010101; font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"> </span></span> <span style=\"font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">The first and second grounds of the cassation appeal brought by the private defense attorney, Lic. William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the defendants, are declared without merit. The first and second grounds of the cassation appeal (<em>in iudicando</em> errors) filed on behalf of the defendants O.M.H. and J.M.H. are declared without merit. The second ground of the cassation appeal filed on behalf of the defendants W.G.S.M and C.G.H.B. is declared without merit.</span></span><span style=\"color: #010101; font-family: Arial;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">.</span></span></div> Notifíquese.

Jesús Alberto Ramírez Q.

Patricia Solano C. Álvaro Burgos M.

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M.

Internal No. 245-1/3-4-19 paa For its part, numeral 68 of the C.N.P.T. states that the concept of base salary used in the law corresponds to that contained in Article 2 of Law N°7337, which indicates that <em>"(…) said base salary shall govern throughout the following year (…)."</em> Furthermore, Article 2 of Law N°7337 provides that <em>"The modifications contained in this Law and any future modifications to the base salary of the 'Office Clerk 1' cited, shall not be considered a variation of the criminal type, for the purposes of Article 13 of the Criminal Code (…)."</em> Consequently, the petitioners' claim cannot succeed because the annual variations to the amount of the base salary cannot be considered variations to the criminal type (Article 2 of Law N°7337). [...].

V. (...). As can be observed, the criminal type does not expressly describe any qualification in the active subject that can be adjusted to the requirements that the doctrine has defined for special own crimes, which means that any person can commit the crime of induction into error to the Tax Administration (currently denominated Public Treasury Fraud). Similarly, numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. also cannot be considered a crime of one's own hand, since the execution of the illicit act can occur among several intervening parties even if they are not taxpayers; because, as described in the proven facts, each defendant performed a specific and essential function within a common plan that allowed for the execution and consummation of a crime that induced the Tax Administration into error and produced economic harm to the Public Treasury. Starting from the theory of control over the act, which is applicable to this case, it is discerned that all the intervening parties maintained a functional co-control over the act, in which each of the defendants could decide on the execution of the illegality, making an objective contribution to a common plan. And although, indeed, not all the accused were listed as income tax taxpayers, it is not necessary that each accused has carried out the criminal action by their own hand, since the illicit act is attributed to them because they provided an essential contribution to the crime, there existed a common resolution that fixed the common purposes, and there was a distribution of functions according to the principle of division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators grounded their control over the act by having a decisive participation in the deployment of the illicit activity, which is clearly what is described in the proven facts. (...).

As a grievance, he states that by not assessing the legal nature of the crime of fraud against the Public Treasury (Fraude a la Hacienda Pública), provided for in Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., in relation to numerals 1 and 5 of the LGISR, which deals with—a special own crime (delito especial propio)—harm is caused to the material defense, since the legal situation was not assessed, and it aggravates the procedural conditions of all the accused persons, since it is not possible to apply the figure of co-perpetration (coautoría) to any person, given that from the proven facts, the necessary special subjective condition of being a subject taxpayer of the income tax is not demonstrated, an essential aspect, as already stated, of subjective imputability and criminal reproach. An examination that the Court of Appeal forgot to analyze when condemning his clients for two offenses of Fraud against the Public Treasury, as co-perpetrators; when such application was not viable. If such figure had been correctly interpreted, the *ad quem* would not have ratified the condemnatory decision of the *a quo*. As a claim, he requests that the ground be granted and the appealed resolution be annulled; absolving all the accused persons of all penalty and responsibility (cf. folios 715 to 735). **The first ground of cassation is denied.** The appellant claims, basically, an erroneous application of Article 45 of the Penal Code, referring to criminal participation as co-perpetrator, inasmuch as it is alleged that the Court of Appeal disregards that numeral 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) constitutes a special own crime that does not admit the application of co-perpetration when an *"extraneus"* intervenes. Now, the Trial Criminal Court in matters of Treasury of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, through judgment number 354-2017, issued in a bifurcated proceeding, at 2:00 p.m., on September 8 in its first phase, and in the second stage, at 8:30 a.m., on October 4, both dates of the year two thousand seventeen, visible from folio 7 front to 320 back of volume I of the main file, establishes, as relevant, the following proven facts: ***"** 89.- Without specifying an exact date, but before the first of October of the year two thousand, the accused WILSON SOTO MORA, majority partner and principal developer and beneficiary of the economic activity, acting by common agreement and with a clear distribution of functions with the co-accused CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, devised and set in motion an illicit plan with the aim of deceiving the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) and defrauding the Public Treasury. Said plan consisted of disguising the business conglomerate of which they formed part, passing it off before the Tax Administration as if they were individual businesses (hereinafter shops), when in reality they composed the commercial chain known as El Regalón, which was dedicated to the purchase and sale of various goods, such as clothing and shoes, in different areas of the country. In this way, as part of the complex organization created to defraud the Public Treasury, a large part of the shops entered the simplified taxation regime (régimen de tributación simplificada) of the Tax Administration, when the correct action was that they be reported as a whole in the traditional regime; which allowed them facilities such as the non-generation of invoices for retail sales and the declaration of their activities based on purchases made. Furthermore, as part of the illicit plan pre-established by the co-accused, said shops did not have bank accounts, but rather part of their income was illicitly directed into the bank accounts of the co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, who, in addition to forming part of the pre-established corporate, legal or shareholder framework, used their private bank accounts with the purpose of diverting the taxable income generated by the commercial activity of the group. Finally, according to the designed criminal scheme, the co-accused CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA acted as the person in charge of controlling the accounting work of the business conglomerate and giving sustainability to the aforementioned illicit scheme. 90.- Through the plan indicated above, the co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, using deceit and simulations, induced the Tax Administration into error, managing to obtain an unlawful patrimonial benefit, which caused a loss to the Public Treasury of 149,716,479.15 (one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones, with fifteen céntimos) for income tax corresponding to the fiscal period 2001, and 277,735,106.48 (two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones with forty-eight céntimos) for income tax corresponding to the fiscal period 2002. 91.- Without specifying an exact date, but between the years nineteen eighty-seven and two thousand four, the co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, by common agreement with the co-accused CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, developed the commercial activity of buying and selling goods, for which the co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, whether personally, on behalf of the companies he represented, or of the shops owned by the group, carried out the importation of a large quantity of merchandise or the local purchase thereof. 92.- The co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, as part of their illicit actions and the complex organization created to defraud the Public Treasury, linked themselves with the companies Kaki del este S.A. and El Detalle Soñado S.A., who, despite having been registered before the Tax Administration as taxpayers of sales and income taxes, supplied and provided the merchandise that was commercialized in the shops of the El Regalón chain. 93.- In accordance with the distribution of functions pre-established by the criminal group before mentioned, the co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, as legal representative and partner of the companies Kaki del este S.A. and El detalle Soñado S.A., had at his disposal the merchandise that these kept in their warehouses located in San José, 8th Street, 2nd and 4th Avenues, where the central offices of the El Regalón chain were also located; distributing them to the various shops that composed the business group, without leaving a purchase record in the shops that received the goods. 94.- As part of the illicit actions devised by said co-accused, the employees hired by them and who coordinated the operation of the shops located in the country did not pay for or record the merchandise they received; but rather, based on the pre-established distribution of functions, this was controlled and documented by the co-accused CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, through semi-annual or annual entries in the accounting books, for companies; through annotations in the purchase record books, for persons registered in the simplified taxation regime, as well as by means of the tax returns filed before the Tax Administration by the registered taxpayers. 95.- Based on the proposed illicit plan, the criminal group described formed approximately one hundred thirty shops distributed in the provinces of San José, Alajuela, Limón, Puntarenas, Guanacaste and Heredia. However, they were registered before the Tax Administration in the name of approximately fifty companies and around eighty natural persons, some of whom were linked by consanguinity or affinity to the accused, but mostly they were employees who worked for the business group managed by the accused, who in some cases were even asked to manage municipal permits and public services on a personal basis. 96.- As part of the illicit plan previously elaborated and with the aim of defrauding the Public Treasury, the co-accused WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ and JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ split the income received by each of the shops as if they were independent businesses, when in reality they formed a business group and subsequently, with the purpose of diverting said sums, directed those money flows into their personal bank accounts (...).**"* Before resolving concretely the complaint raised by the appellant, it is important to indicate that the doctrine explains that the special own crime limits the figure of perpetrator to those who fulfill a special quality, that is, crimes that describe a conduct that only certain subjects can carry out, *verbigracia*, such as that established in the criminal type of Article 357 of the Penal Code; while in the improper special crime (delito especial impropio), a differentiated penalty is only imposed due to a personal quality contemplated in the criminal type that aggravates the sanction, but it is a common crime, of which any imputable subject can be the perpetrator, *verbigracia*, when in a crime of sexual abuse the agent has a kinship relationship with the victim. Meanwhile, in *"control crimes (delitos de dominio)"*, the co-control of the act is established based on a division of labor. In this manner, in special own crimes, the configuration of perpetration and participation is not achieved through the theory of control over the act (teoría del dominio del hecho) systematized by ROXIN. In this sense, GÓMEZ BENITEZ states that there are criminal types in which the active subject, *"in addition to the objective possibility of controlling their own action, must meet some personal characteristics or qualifications, with the result that only those who meet these characteristics can become the perpetrator thereof. These subjects who meet these special characteristics are called "intraneus"; while those who do not meet these special characteristics are called "extraneus" (...)."* (GÓMEZ BENÍTEZ, José Manuel. Teoría Jurídica del Delito. Madrid: Civitas, 1984, p. 153). Given that in special own crimes the sanction is based on the personal characteristics of the active subject, the doctrine discusses the possibility of admitting the *"extraneus"* as a co-perpetrator. Thus, for example, the German and Spanish doctrine, in its majority, denies the possibility that the *"extraneus"* can be a co-perpetrator in special own crimes, having at most an complicity or instigation in the unlawful act, since only those who meet the qualifications contemplated by the criminal type can be so (*"intraneus"*); while in improper special crimes, *"if the extraneus has control over the act, they can become a co-perpetrator of the basic crime"*, provided that the improper special crime contemplates the possibility of a common crime. (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 382). A certain sector of the Spanish doctrine admits the possibility of intervention of the *"extraneus"* as a co-perpetrator, although several authors establish limitations for its application. In the case at hand, Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures that was in force at the time of the facts, established the following: **"** *Article 92.- Inducement of error to the Tax Administration (Inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria). When the amount defrauded exceeds two hundred base salaries (salarios base), whoever induces the Tax Administration into error, through simulation of data, deformation or concealment of true information or any other suitable form of deceit to induce it into error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of five to ten years. For the effects of the provisions in the preceding paragraph, it must be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines, or surcharges of a sanctioning nature. b) To determine the mentioned amount, if it concerns tributes whose period is annual, the quota defrauded in that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the amounts defrauded during the period between January 1 and December 31 of the same year shall be added. In other tributes, the amount shall be understood to refer to each one of the concepts by which a taxable event is susceptible to determination. The fact that the subject repairs their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the repair, shall be considered an absolute legal excuse (excusa legal absolutoria). For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, any action carried out with notification to the passive subject, aimed at verifying compliance with the tax obligations related to the tax and period in question, shall be understood as an action by the Tax Administration.**"* This article was reformed in the year 2012 and added to in the year 2016; however, the continuity of the wrong is maintained, that is, the new law proposes a new unitary assessment of the same behavior sanctioned by the old law; let us see: ***"** Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury. Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, evading the payment of tributes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of in-kind compensation or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unremitted amount of the withholdings or payments on account or of the refunds or tax benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (...). **"* As can be observed, the criminal type does not describe any qualification in the active subject that manages to adjust to the dogmatic requirements of the so-called special own crimes; on the contrary, Article 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures can be committed by any person who carries out the typical action, without any special characteristic being required in the perpetrator of the crime. This means that the configuration of perpetration and participation is defined based on the application of the theory of control over the act. As set forth in the proven facts, the accused persons, following a devised plan and according to a previously agreed distribution of functions, carried out various maneuvers that built a framework of corporations (sociedades anónimas) registered in the traditional taxation regime and natural persons registered in the simplified taxation regime, which sought to disguise the business conglomerate of which they formed part, passing it off before the Tax Administration as if they were individual shops, when in reality they composed a commercial chain known as *"El Regalón"*, which resulted in the tributes being paid not corresponding to the income being generated by the lucrative activity, thereby managing to deceive the Tax Administration and harm the Public Treasury. The conduct of each of the defendants exceeded simple cooperation as an accomplice, since they maintained functional control over the act (dominio funcional del hecho), with a clear distribution of functions, even though Wilson Soto Mora was the majority partner and principal developer and beneficiary of the economic activity. Thus, based on the material-objective theory, also known as the theory of control over the act, the participants in this complex organization hold the status of co-perpetrators, because according to the theory of control over the act, they maintained functional co-control over the act in which each of the accused could decide on the execution of the illegality, making an objective contribution to a common plan. In this regard, FRANCISCO CASTILLO indicates: ***"** the particularity of the injury to the norm in co-perpetration is that each co-perpetrator does not carry out the criminal action with their own hand, but rather what is done by one of the co-perpetrators is imputed to the others as their own. In co-perpetration, each of the contributions is transformed into a common unlawful act, for which each of the co-perpetrators is responsible. Under this premise, in acting as a co-perpetrator, one can distinguish the collective act from the action of each of the co-perpetrators.*" (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo III. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 440.). The act is imputed to the co-perpetrator because they provided an essential contribution to the crime, for which a common resolution is required that sets the common goals and distributes functions according to the principle of division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators base their control over the act by having a decisive participation in the deployment of the illicit activity. In this order of ideas, the Criminal Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación Penal), through Vote No. 2011-00389, of 10:25 a.m., on April 8, 2011, resolves the following: ***"** There will be co-control over the act every time the acting subject who intervenes has provided a contribution to the total act, at the execution stage, of such importance that without that contribution the act could not have been committed. Now, the wording of numeral 45 of the Penal Code, cited above, requires for co-perpetration to exist a joint commission of the act. To commit jointly means to execute jointly. For there to be a joint commission of the illicit act, with typical relevance, it is absolutely necessary that the deployed behavior be at least in acts of execution. That is, those acts that are located from an attempted stage to a consummation stage are typical, and one can intervene regarding them in co-perpetration, unless there is an express legal regulation where preparatory acts are penalized. Simply put, according to the cited numeral: 1.- Whoever during the acts of execution performs with their behavior an objective contribution to the illicit act, without which this act could not have been committed, must be considered a co-perpetrator. 2.- If that contribution is made at a stage of the Iter Criminis prior to the beginning of execution, then whoever contributes to the illicit act is not a co-perpetrator, but an accomplice, since they could not control the act, nor act jointly in its execution. But, furthermore, (3.) if someone makes, during the acts of execution or the preparatory acts, a contribution that is not necessary, that is, even without it the act could have been committed, then they must be considered an accomplice (...).*" In this way, it is verified that the two crimes committed to the detriment of the Public Treasury were deployed by the accused persons in the capacity of co-perpetrators, who acted with full functional control over the act, being able to decide on the execution of the illegality and making an objective contribution to a common plan to induce the Tax Administration into error, because it is evident from the proven facts of the condemnatory judgment No. 354-2017, (cf. folio 169 front to 203 back of volume I of the main file), that each of the accused developed a specific task to set in motion a complex criminal plan, which required a very well-structured logistics, in which each accused fulfilled an essential role; for example, [Name 001] and [Name 002] were in charge of the administrative matters demanded by the commercial activity developed by the group; while Josén Rosales Rosales, as administrator or supervisor of the shops located in the Santa Cruz area, among other tasks, deposited money into one of the savings accounts owned by the co-accused Éricka Alicia Soto Navarro. That is, each task exercised by the defendants constituted an essential contribution without which the crime could not have been committed, which required a joint action to reduce the amount of taxes they were legally required to pay for the economic activity of the business group, simulating data and concealing the true information to cause harm to the Public Treasury. Consequently, as no error is observed in the application of substantive law, the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by the private defender, attorney William Charpentier Morales, is denied.

**III.-** **Cassation Appeal brought by attorney William Charpentier Morales, private defender, of all the accused persons**. **SECOND GROUND**: **Error in the application of a substantive legal precept.** The private attorney explains that the impugned resolution disregards the retroactive interpretation of the most favorable criminal law, concerning the base salaries, prevailing as components of the criminal type of Inducement of Error to the Tax Administration—amount of the defrauded items. The foregoing, by omitting to apply, for the benefit of the accused persons, the base salary in force. All of this, because the Court of Criminal Sentence Appeal disregarded its duty to observe the application of the conventionality control block (bloque de Convencionalidad), in accordance with the jurisprudential line stipulated by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. Legal basis: precepts 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 15.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 of the Political Constitution, Articles 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 subsection b) and 469 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), 12 and 13 of the Penal Code, 92 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), 1 and 5 of the Income Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre la renta).

The defense asserts that the core point of this ground is that the *ad quem* does not specify the normative difference between the various contents of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., " (...) in two historical moments of the law's validity and, the erroneous application of those substantive norms regarding their content (...)." In that sense, it indicates that Law No. 7900, of August 3, 1999, originally established the strict content of the aforementioned Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., where the amount of the defrauded sum exceeded two hundred base salaries; the foregoing, in contrast to the reform by Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria," which modified numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., which is currently applicable. In this regard, subsection a) stipulates that the figure of five hundred base salaries constitutes an objective condition of punishability (condición objetiva de punibilidad) in the crime of Fraud against the Public Treasury (cfr. folios 742 to 745). It adds that, according to the historical evolution of numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., Article 68 of that normative body defines the base salary as that contained in ordinal 2 of Law No. 7337. On this aspect, Charpentier Morales states that the *ad quem* incurs a flaw in the interpretation and application of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T., in relation to the defrauded amount, "when it exceeds two hundred base salaries or, subsequently, by legal reform to five hundred base salaries, as an **objective condition of punishability**" (The bold highlighting belongs to the original text). Thus, it affirms the clear modification of the 1999 legislation with the 2012 reform, which falls into two aspects: "the increase in the amount from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, as well as the progressive increase year after year, of the amount of the base salary, referred to the monthly salary of an Office Clerk 1 of the Judicial Branch, it being the highest in amount" (cfr. folios 746 to 747). It refutes that the interpretation of the Sentencing Appeals Court, concerning the retroactivity of the criminal law more favorable to the accused Soto Mora, is partial, as it limits the progressivity of fundamental rights and the extensive scope for all States that have signed and ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. A course of action that ignores the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (cfr. folios 748 to 749). The technical defense summarizes that, in this case, significant changes have arisen, such as the shift from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, the base salary for the year 2001 being one hundred twenty thousand colones; for the year 2002, one hundred thirty-six thousand colones, which are lower than the base salary for the year 2019. It maintains that the reference salary for establishing criminal sanctions was set by the Consejo Superior de Poder Judicial, in a session on December 18, 2018, effective from January 1, 2019, at the sum of four hundred forty-six thousand two hundred colones. It indicates that calculating the value of the base salary for 2019, at four hundred forty-six thousand two hundred colones, multiplied by the five hundred base salaries, according to numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T., results in a figure of two hundred twenty-three million one hundred thousand colones, as an objective condition of punishability. It is necessary to define the sums defrauded for the fiscal periods of the years 2001 and 2002. Furthermore, it points out: "According to what was deemed proven by the Sentencing Appeals Court, for the year 2001 it was ₡149,716,479.15 (one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones with fifteen céntimos), therefore, it is less than the amount indicated as the objective condition of punishability of the five hundred base salaries, for the amount of ₡ 223,100,000 (two hundred twenty-three million one hundred thousand colones). Consequently, the conduct is not contrary to law and there is no possibility of proceeding criminally, because the conduct is atypical, pursuant to Article 92 C.N.P.T. All accused persons must be acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for this fact charged from its origin. On the other hand, regarding the fiscal period of the year 2002, where arbitrarily, by the Economic and Accounting Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency, the amount of ₡277,735,106.48 (two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones with forty-eight céntimos) is whimsically established without the application of the lex artis of accounting and gross income calculation. A figure that exceeds the calculation of the five hundred base salaries, established for 2019 at ₡223,200,000 (two hundred twenty-three million one hundred thousand colones (...)." (cfr. folios 750 to 751). Finally, Charpentier Morales affirms that the appellate ruling is contradictory to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, and neglects the binding resolutions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, concerning the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law. It asserts that resolutions number 3929-95 and 5924-1996, of the Constitutional Court, on "the non-retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law, in cases where the elements changed in the new legislation are not directly related to the criminal sanction," are outdated in the view of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; therefore, in his opinion, it is for the Criminal Cassation Chamber to carry out the optional consultation of constitutionality of the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law, as it concerns variations to the punitive end, or to the content of the criminal wrong or factual assumption, more favorable to the accused party (cfr. folios 758 to 762). As a grievance, the legal representation indicates that if the *ad quem* had respected the legality block, the fundamental rights provided for in Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights would not have been infringed, and therefore, it would recognize the retroactive application of the most beneficial normative provision for the interests of the accused party, and the accused persons would have been acquitted. (cfr. folio 762 to 764). As a claim, it requests to declare the claim with merit, and to proceed to annul the ruling of the Sentencing Appeals Court; exonerating all its represented persons from all penalty and responsibility (cfr. folios 764 to 765).

**The second cassation ground is declared without merit.** The appellant essentially reproaches that the challenged resolution disregards the retroactive interpretation of the most favorable criminal law regarding the base salaries, by omitting to apply what is most beneficial to the accused persons, that is, considering that the amount defrauded to the Public Treasury must be calculated starting from five hundred base salaries and according to the base salary in effect for the year 2019. In the first instance, it must be indicated that according to the proven facts, the two criminal actions were committed in the years 2001 and 2002. Said typical conduct is described in Article 92 of the Code of Tax Regulations and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter C.N.P.T.), and at the time of the facts, its wording was as follows: ***"Article 92.- Induction to error to the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded sum exceeds two hundred base salaries, it shall be punished with imprisonment of five to ten years whoever induces error to the Tax Administration, through simulation of data, deformation or concealment of true information or any other suitable form of deception to induce it to error, for the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or for a third party, a pecuniary benefit, an exemption or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury. For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, it should be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines or surcharges of a sanctioning nature. b) To determine the aforementioned amount, if it concerns taxes whose period is annual, the quota defrauded in that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the amounts defrauded during the period between January 1st and December 31 of the same year shall be added. In other taxes, the amount shall be understood as referring to each one of the concepts by which a taxable event is susceptible of determination. It shall be considered an absolute legal excuse that the subject repairs their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the repair. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, action by the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out with the notification to the taxpayer, leading to verify compliance with the tax obligations referred to the tax and period in question. (Thus amended by Article 2 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999)."*** However, subsequently, this article was amended by Law No. 9069, of September 10, 2012, called *"Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria"*; likewise, Article 16 of the *"Ley para Mejorar la Lucha contra el Fraude Fiscal,"* Law No. 9416, of December 14, 2016, added a paragraph to the norm, such that numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. currently presents the following wording: ***"Article 92.- Fraud against the Public Treasury. Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury for the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or for a third party, a pecuniary benefit, evading the payment of taxes, withheld amounts or amounts that should have been withheld, or payments on account of compensations in kind or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying tax benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unentered amount of withholdings or payments on account or of the refunds or tax benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years. For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, it should be understood that: a) The amount of five hundred base salaries shall be considered an objective condition of punishability. b) The amount shall not include interest, fines or surcharges of a sanctioning nature. c) To determine the aforementioned amount, if it concerns taxes, withholdings, payments on account or refunds, periodic or of periodic declaration, what was defrauded in each tax period or declaration period shall be considered and, if these are less than twelve months, the amount of what was defrauded shall refer to the calendar year. In other cases, the amount shall be understood as referring to each one of the distinct concepts by which a taxable event is susceptible of liquidation. It shall be considered an absolute legal excuse that the subject repairs their non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the repair. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, action by the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out with the notification to the taxpayer, leading to verify compliance with tax obligations. The Procuraduría General de la República shall constitute itself as a civil actor in the exercise of the civil action for damages, in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code; for this, it must count on the active technical participation within the criminal process of the Dirección General de Tributación, which shall act through the Dirección General or those to whom it delegates the function. For the purposes of complying with the provisions of this article, all acts of the process must be notified to the Dirección General de Tributación."*** As a general rule, the criminal law that must be applied to a specific case corresponds to the law that was in effect at the time the facts occur; however, if a criminal law is subsequently enacted that is more favorable to the accused, it must be applied retroactively. The Penal Code establishes in Article 11 that "punishable acts shall be judged in accordance with the laws in effect at the time of their commission"; while numeral 12 stipulates that "if subsequent to the commission of a punishable act a new law is enacted, it shall be governed by that which is more favorable to the offender, in the specific case being judged." Both principles of legality and retroactivity are recognized in Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which indicates that "no one shall be convicted of actions or omissions that at the time they were committed were not criminal according to the applicable law. Nor shall a more severe penalty be imposed than that applicable at the time of the commission of the crime. If subsequent to the commission of the crime the law provides for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit from it." Regarding the scope of this provision, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that "the most favorable criminal law must be interpreted as both that which establishes a lesser penalty with respect to the crimes, and that which includes laws that decriminalize conduct previously considered a crime, create a new cause of justification, of non-culpability, and of impediment to the operability of a penalty, among others. These cases do not constitute an exhaustive list of the cases that merit the application of the principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law" (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case of Ricardo Canese vs Paraguay, para. 179). The Penal Code expressly recognizes in its Article 12 the most favorable criminal law not only concerning the penalty, but in any aspect. Now, for the subsequent criminal law to be applicable to a specific case, it "must subject the same behavior to penalty as the preceding law. If the criminal type contained in the new law is formed in such a way that it punishes a different wrong, what occurred was the repeal of the previous incrimination and the materialization of a new wrong. In this case, there is a discontinuity of the wrong and the new law cannot be applied to the author." (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 206.). That is, for the new law to be applicable to the accused, it must refer to the same conduct that the old law sanctioned; that is, an analysis must be made as to which of the two laws is more favorable, for containing lesser essential legal consequences for the active subject of the crime. In the case at hand, the aspect of the norm that is claimed as more favorable is related to the amount of the base salary as a parameter to define the amount defrauded to the Public Treasury; however, it must be indicated that what is susceptible to retroactivity is the criminal norm, that is, it retracts its effects to the moment of the facts of the present case, but the amount of the base salary existing in 2001 and 2002 is not subject to retroactivity, as this is a factual assumption already occurred, it is an objective element that can only be verified, which is not considered a variation of the criminal type. The facts must be judged according to the amount of the base salary that was in effect at the time the two crimes to the detriment of the Public Treasury were committed; that is, the base salaries that were in effect for the years 2001 and 2002.

In this sense, the Criminal Cassation Chamber, through vote number 0095-2001, of 09:20 hours, of January 26, 2001, reiterates the criterion expressed in vote No. 416-A-93, of 10:50 hours, of September 30, 1993, resolving the following: **"*(...) the annual modification of the parameter to determine the amount in the discussed criminal types, does not constitute a reform directed at favoring the offender nor at reducing the penalty on an annual basis, but rather, it only seeks to maintain the punishability in real monetary values. Indeed, by using a variable economic factor as a parameter for determining the amount, the aim is to maintain the levels of punishment at the real values that, according to a specific criminal policy criterion adopted by the legislator at a particular historical moment, values that due to the effect of inflation are subject to numerical change. But this does not mean that inflationary changes in the factor constitute reforms whose purpose is directed at favoring the offender, or to decrease the penalty in certain crimes, or to convert crimes into infractions (...), perhaps foreseeing a possible discussion at the moment of interpreting the legal reform, it must be indicated that the legislator itself resolved the problem and expressly indicated what the solution should be. Indeed, the possible doubt about the nature of the reform and the successive modifications to the amount is clarified, by stating in Article 2 in a simple, clear, and express manner that "* **...THE MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS LAW AND THOSE MADE IN THE FUTURE TO THE BASE SALARY OF OFFICE CLERK 1 CITED, SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A VARIATION OF THE CRIMINAL TYPE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE PENAL CODE AND 490, SUBSECTION 4 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE...** *" (Article 2 of Law 7337). This is an interpretation by the very body that approved the norm, which demonstrates the purpose of the modifications to the amount. (...)*, *we must refer to a practical aspect, which, although it does not constitute dogmatic reasoning, at least contributes to demonstrating the logic of the interpretations. Reality and experience show us that our country does not maintain a stable financial situation (...). This means that the "base salary" referred to in the reform will day by day have a numerical denomination expressed in units of national currency that is increasingly high. Consequently, if we conclude that those future amounts must be applied to cases ruled upon when another numerical quantification of that base salary was in effect, this will imply at the same time affirming that the mere passage of time will constitute an automatic cause of decriminalization of the conduct (at least the change from crime to infraction for some cases, or the reduction of the penalty for others), due to the inflationary trend that always, absolutely always, has existed in our country, which implies an absurdity from the perspective of rational criminal policy (...).***" Regarding the other challenge by the appellant that the reform to Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. offers an element that is more beneficial for the defendants, namely, the establishment of an amount of five hundred base salaries as an objective condition of punishability, it is verified that this claim was accepted by the *ad quem*. Thus, in resolution No. 2018-1750, of 16:30 hours, of December 3, 2018, of the Sentencing Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, visible from folio 598 front to 660 back of volume I of the main case file, the following is resolved: **"*Consequently, the claims made must be rejected and what was decided on this topic must be maintained because, as these are temporary rules, in which the amount is modified for the purpose of preventing the loss of currency value due to inflation, but the continuity of the wrong remains unaltered, the change in the subsequent law must be made only regarding the increase in the punishability threshold, but not regarding the amount of the salaries in effect at the time of conducting the conduct accused (...). In summary, given that the base salary in 2001 was one hundred twenty thousand six hundred colones (₡ 120,600; see notice number 02-2001 published in the Boletín Judicial No. 23 of February 1, 2001 and on the web page: https://www.hacienda.go.cr/contenido/13944-historico-salarios-base), the five hundred (500) base salaries reached sixty million three hundred thousand colones (₡ 60,300,000) and the amount accused, in fact 90, as defrauded in that year, was one hundred forty-nine million seven hundred sixteen thousand four hundred seventy-nine colones with fifteen céntimos (₡ 149,716,479.15), it is verified that the attributed conduct was typical. The same occurs with the facts of 2002, in which the base salary was one hundred thirty-six thousand six hundred colones (see notice number 01-2002 of the Boletín Judicial No. 24 of February 4, 2002) and the five hundred (500) base salaries amounted to sixty-eight million three hundred thousand colones (₡ 68,300,000), therefore, if the amount accused, in fact 90, as defrauded was two hundred seventy-seven million seven hundred thirty-five thousand one hundred six colones with forty-eight céntimos (₡ 277,735,106.48), this implies that this element of the typicity is met (...).***" Consequently, even though the Court of Appeals duly recognizes that the amount of five hundred base salaries set forth in the reform of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. as an objective condition of punishability, constitutes an element of the criminal type that must be applied retroactively as it is the more favorable norm, when the calculation of the amount defrauded to the Public Treasury is made based on the amount of the base salary in effect for the years 2001 and 2002, the sums obtained amply exceed the five hundred base salaries required by the norm, wherefore the proven facts are not atypical. Finally, it is indicated that this Chamber does not consider it necessary to carry out an optional consultation of constitutionality, as requested by the appellant, regarding the legal impossibility of applying the principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law in the case of temporary laws, given that the Constitutional Chamber has already issued a specific criterion on the topic in resolution number 3929-95, and furthermore, the Criminal Cassation Chamber does not perceive any conflicts of constitutionality. Based on the foregoing, the second cassation ground filed by the private defender, attorney William Charpentier Morales, is declared without merit.

**IV.-** Appeal filed on behalf of Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, termed "errors *in iudicando*." **FIRST GROUND**: "The Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court unjustifiably failed to observe substantive legal precepts by not applying the most favorable rule according to the retroactive application of the most favorable criminal law subsequent to the commission of the punishable act, in relation to Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios." An omission that, in the opinion of the appealing party, generates grievance, by undermining International Treaties, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, subscribed to by Costa Rica, in domestic legislation. They state that according to the conviction of the *ad quem*, it is not viable to vary the decision of the *a quo*, because although they consider that the most beneficial legal mandate is the one that increases "the punishability threshold," the ruling contains the following sensitive contradictions: *"1). They recognize that the most favorable law is the 2012 one (resulting, in this case, in the 2012 law being the most favorable, by raising the punishability threshold due to the increase of the base salaries from 200 to 500, meaning that acts that were crimes before 2012 (for exceeding 200 salaries but not reaching 500) ceased to be so on that date); 2). They apply a criterion of authority (fallacy of authority) in the application of the erga omnes criterion (sic) of the Constitutional Chamber ('such a thing is not possible when there exists, in the national legal system, an organ with competence for it that has already done so, on the specific issue submitted to the knowledge of the ordinary jurisdiction, and its jurisprudence is also binding erga omnes, pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdiccional (sic) Constitucional (...) Note that although the trial judge and judges sidestepped the issue of conventionality, they based their criterion on the constitutional vote, which was indeed issued based on the express questioning of the stipulation contemplated in the American Convention on Human Rights, thereby closing the possibility of discussing the issue in domestic law, binding this and other ordinary courts to what is stipulated by the constitutional organ. Therefore, the claims made must be rejected and what was resolved on this issue must be maintained because, since these are temporary norms, in which the amount is modified for the purpose of avoiding the loss of currency value due to inflation, but the continuity of the offense remains unaltered, the change of the subsequent law must be made only regarding the increase of the punishability threshold, but not regarding the amount of the salaries in effect at the time the accused conduct was carried out'). 3) The Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court assesses that in both cases there is a crime, that is, for the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court the acts exceeded the punishability threshold foreseen in numeral 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, both in the regulation in effect at the time of commission of the acts and in the current one, but they forget, and this is the most important thing, that the change in the crime threshold allows for a better adjustment of the penalty for the supposedly produced result and, since there exists a condition of punishability in the rule under comment, the defense of the accused could have resorted to avenues such as conciliation or payment of the tax with other amounts of fines and administrative sanctions that are more real and adjusted."* They request that the judgment of the Appeals Court be annulled, and that a remand be ordered, applying the most favorable law, so that a prevention of "correct and limited" payment can be carried out (cfr. folios 935 to 937 and 928). **The first ground of appeal is declared without merit.** The appellants claim that the Appeals Court failed to observe the application of the most favorable rule, in relation to Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), because despite recognizing that the reform produced in 2012 is more favorable, the amount from that year is not applied to calculate the amount defrauded from the Hacienda Pública. It is noted that this reproach is similar to the ground of appeal set forth by the private defender, licensed attorney William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the accused, which was duly resolved in the preceding recital, so with the aim of avoiding repetitions, we proceed to resolve the complaint in a concrete manner. In this way, it is verified that there is no violation of the principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law; on the contrary, the *ad quem* recognizes that the base salary as an objective element of punishability does constitute an aspect of the subsequent rule that is more beneficial for the justiciable parties, and therefore, the calculation to determine whether the proven facts are atypical, or not, is carried out by the Appellate Court based on five hundred base salaries. This element of the criminal type was reformed in 2012, according to Ley N°9069, of September 10, 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria," which modified numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. However, the amount of the base salary cannot be adjusted to the year 2012, or to the year in which the defendants were judged, since the amount of the base salary for the years 2001 and 2002 constitutes a factual assumption that has already occurred, that is, it is an objective element that must only be verified and is not considered part of the criminal type. In this line, what is susceptible to retroactivity is the criminal norm, which retroacts its effects to the moment the facts occurred, provided that this is more favorable to the accused; however, the amount of the base salary is not subject to retroactivity, because the governing base salary amount is the one that was in effect at the time the facts occurred, even if this amount is subsequently modified and is more favorable to the interests of the justiciable parties. For its part, numeral 68 of the C.N.P.T. states that the concept of base salary used in the law corresponds to that contained in Article 2 of Ley N°7337, which indicates that *"(...) said base salary will govern throughout the following year (...)."* Furthermore, Article 2 of Ley N°7337 contemplates that *"The modifications contained in this Law and those made in the future to the base salary of the 'Clerk 1' cited, shall not be considered as a variation to the criminal type, for the purposes of Article 13 of the Criminal Code (...)."* Consequently, the appellants' claim cannot prosper because the annual variations to the amount of the base salary cannot be considered variations to the criminal type (Article 2 of Ley N°7337). It is not omitted to indicate that the Constitutional Chamber, through vote 3929-95, of 3:24 p.m., of July 18, 1995, regarding the legislative consultation No. 2781-06, on the constitutionality of the bill for the "Ley de Justicia Tributaria" (legislative file No. 12142), as well as in subsequent facultative consultations of constitutionality, has resolved the following: *"The base salary of a Clerk 1 varies in November of each year upon approval of the State budget, logically increasing the economic amount to be received, which poses the problem that each year the approved amount, being greater, varies the criminal type of the figures mentioned in the law, creating a more favorable situation for those who committed the act when a lower amount governed. Now, the problem lies in determining whether it is constitutionally obligatory to apply the principle of the most favorable law to the offender to these cases, or whether it is a problem of legality, as the Third Chamber of this Court has already defined in its judgment number 416-A-93 of ten hours fifty minutes of September thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three (...). Article 39 of the Political Constitution indicates, in relevant part, that: 'no one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime... sanctioned by prior law, and by virtue of a final judgment issued by a competent authority, prior opportunity granted to the indictee to exercise their defense and through the necessary demonstration of guilt.' This norm, among others, establishes the basic principle that laws govern for the future, a principle also protected by Article 34 of our Constitution which establishes that: 'no law shall be given retroactive effect to the detriment of any person, their acquired patrimonial rights, or consolidated legal situations.' For its part, Article 129 of the same normative body in its first and last paragraphs also collects it, indicating 'laws are obligatory and take effect from the day they designate; in the absence of this requirement, ten days after their publication in the Official Gazette; a law is not abrogated or derogated except by a subsequent one...' According to the logical content of Articles 34 and 39 cited, the non-retroactivity of criminal law is a consequence of the principle of legal reserve, and therefore has constitutional rank, an issue on which there is no discrepancy in doctrine, when it concerns applying the law retroactively to the detriment of the person. The problem arises rather, regarding the application of the more benign criminal law, which, for the reasons that will be stated, does not have constitutional content, as the Third Chamber has well resolved, in the cited judgment, by indicating (...). In the same sense, the Argentine Supreme Court has pronounced, which has a constitutional norm practically identical to ours, indicating that 'the principle of the more benign law does not have constitutional hierarchy, despite the transcendent role it plays within criminal law' (rulings t.293 p. 522; t.253 p. 93; t.211 p. 1657. Criterion shared by Zaffaroni in Tratado de Derecho Penal, Tomo Primero General and Rodríguez Devesa, Derecho Penal, Parte General). The Chamber shares and makes its own the arguments contained in the cited judgment for being clear and adjusted to law, and therefore proceeds to declare the action without merit regarding this extremity."* Based on the foregoing, the first ground of appeal lodged on behalf of the justiciable parties Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández is declared without merit.

**V.-** Appeal filed on behalf of Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández, termed "errors *in iudicando*." **SECOND GROUND**: Erroneous application of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court, by sidestepping *"(...) the nature of the figure of inducing error to the Tax Administration regulated by Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios at the date of the alleged commission of the illicit act."* The challengers claim that the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court, by confirming the ruling of the Trial Court, generates a grievance for the reason that Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, in concordance with numeral 5 of the Ley del Impuesto de Renta, makes co-authorship impossible *"because the criminal reproach is of a subjective type and being the income tax declarant is a conditio sine qua non (sic) to be considered the perpetrator of that crime."* They seek to have the resolution of the *ad quem* annulled, and to be exonerated from all penalty and responsibility, according to Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution (cfr. folios 940 to 944). They set forth that the Appeals Court, in developing its thesis of co-authorship, opposes the existence of personally committed offenses or special own offenses; on the contrary, they affirm the concurrence of an instantaneously consummated crime, *"employing the argument to justify the dominion over the yes and the how of the causal course of the co-perpetrators, and of the manner in which the crime is executed, by means of the extension of responsibility of Article 67 of the C.N.P.T., they adapt the proven facts of the judgment on the merits to what in doctrine is known as an economic interest group, which allows the typical adaptation in support of the Trial Court's judgment, endorsing the latter's positions"* (cfr. folio 944). Thus, they disagree with the ruling on appeal, because they consider it is not appropriate to establish the subjective responsibility of all the persons intervening in the economic cycle, regardless of whether they are part or not of the organs of the legal entity, since criminal responsibility, which is personal, is excluded, except *"it has been extended in positive law to legal entities, with the sine qua non requirement of the link that must be demonstrated, being a legal representative, and not just being a member of a family (...)."* They synthesize that the *ad quem*, by encompassing all the perpetrator subjects, as members of an economic interest group, violates both the principle of criminal responsibility and the link of causality, and the returns of each of the perpetrator and participant persons; in addition to the principles of innocence, of typicality, of minimum intervention of criminal law (cfr. folio 947). **The second ground of appeal is declared without merit.** It must be noted that this claim is similar to the ground of appeal filed by the private defender, licensed attorney William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the accused, which was duly resolved in recital II, so with the purpose of avoiding repetitions, we proceed to resolve the complaint in a concrete manner. The appellants argue that Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (hereinafter C.N.P.T.), constitutes a special own crime or a personally committed crime, and therefore can only be attributed to the active taxpayer of the income tax, since only this person can commit the typical conduct described in the criminal type, thus rejecting the possibility of participation in co-authorship by any subject who does not appear as a taxpayer. Now, it is appropriate to define that in special own crimes *"the quality of the subject is considered an element of the criminal type (for example: in prevarication, the quality of judge)";* while personally committed crimes *"are characterized, essentially, because in them the active subject delimits the circle of possible perpetrators, towards that subject who corporally or personally performs the prohibited action."* (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 379 and 419). To understand if the criminal type conforms to the indicated definitions, it is appropriate to cite the content of Article 92 of the C.N.P.T. Thus, for the moment when the facts occur, the wording of the norm, in relevant part, was as follows: *"Article 92.- Induction to error of the Tax Administration. When the amount of the defrauded amount exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces the Tax Administration to error, through simulation of data, deformation or concealment of true information or any other form of deceit suitable for inducing it to error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption or a refund to the detriment of the Hacienda Pública, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment from five to ten years (...)."* This article was reformed in 2012 and added to in 2016; however, maintaining the continuity of the offense, the new wording indicates: *"Article 92.- Fraud against the Hacienda Pública. Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Hacienda Pública with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, evading the payment of tributes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of remunerations in kind, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying fiscal benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the unentered amount of the withholdings or payments on account, or of the refunds or fiscal benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (...)."* As can be observed, the criminal type does not expressly describe any qualification in the active subject that manages to conform to the demands that doctrine has defined for special own crimes, which means that any person can commit the crime of induction to error of the Tax Administration (currently termed Fraud against the Hacienda Pública). Equally, numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. also cannot be considered a personally committed crime, because the execution of the illicit act can occur among several intervenors even if they are not taxpayers; since, as described in the proven facts, each defendant developed a specific and essential function within a common plan that allowed the execution and consummation of a crime that induced the Tax Administration to error and caused economic damage to the Hacienda Pública. Based on the theory of functional dominion over the act, which is applicable to this case, it is glimpsed that all the intervenors maintained a functional co-dominion over the act, in which each one of the defendants could decide on the execution of the illegality, making an objective contribution to a common plan. And although indeed, not all the accused appeared as income tax taxpayers, it is not necessary that each accused personally performed the criminal action, since the illicit act is attributed to them because they provided an essential contribution to the crime; there existed a common resolution that fixed the common objectives and there was a distribution of functions in accordance with the principle of division of labor, through which the co-perpetrators based their dominion over the act by having a decisive participation in the deployment of the illicit activity, which is clearly what is described in the proven facts. Consequently, there is no erroneous application of Article 45 of the Criminal Code, concerning participation in co-authorship, and therefore the second ground of appeal filed on behalf of the defendants Olger Murillo Hernández and Jorge Murillo Hernández is declared without merit.

**VI.-** Appeal lodged on behalf of Wilson Soto Mora and Carlos Huertas Barboza. **SECOND GROUND**: Incorrect application of Articles 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios and 12 of the Criminal Code; this in accordance with subsection b) of numeral 468 of the Código Procesal Penal, and Article 1 of the Criminal Code, by violating the principle of legality, according to numerals 37, 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They indicate that the *ad quem* ratified the position of the *a quo* in relation to the theory of the continuity of the offense, even though Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios of 1999 differs from the normative provision of 2012. Likewise, they reproach the failure to observe a novel criminal type, failing to analyze the modification from two hundred to five hundred base salaries, which constitutes the punishability threshold; furthermore, the criminal type was varied, transcendental aspects omitted by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court (cfr. folios 956 to 965). As a specific grievance, they point out the following: *"the parameters used in the judgment of conviction and endorsed in the second instance have been those in effect in the 2001 and 2002 fiscal periods, which would have resulted from application with the rule in effect as of August 3, 1999, but which, having been replaced the criminal type (tacit abrogation) by the rule of September 10, 2012, of course cannot have effect in September 2017 when the judgment of conviction was issued. With the foregoing, irreparable harm has been caused to all the accused in this case, in the sense that a penalty of 10 years in prison has been imposed on them and for such effects it has proceeded in the following manner: They were judged in September 2017, based on a law that entered into effect in September 2012, that is, 5 years earlier, but to consider their conduct, the legislation in effect in September 2012 has not been considered, but rather an (sic) law of August 1999 (18 years earlier) has been considered as a constitutive element of the infraction, which takes as a reference a concept of base salary from the year 2001 and 2002, that is, from 16 and 15 years prior to the judging, but based on the punishability threshold established 11 and 10 years later, since the 200 base salaries of 1999 are no longer considered, but rather the 500 base salaries of 2012 (...)."* They conclude that irreparable harm predominates, as a result of a flagrant infraction of the right to defense (cfr. folios 966 to 967). They request that this ground of appeal be declared with merit, that the objected resolution be annulled, and given the impossibility of ordering a remand – due to a defect in the application of substantive law – the corresponding acquittal be issued (cfr. folio 967).

**The second ground of cassation is dismissed.** The Criminal Code sets forth the following principles for the application of criminal law over time, namely: 1) punishable acts shall be judged according to the laws in force at the time the offense was committed (article 11 of the Criminal Code); 2) if a new law is enacted after the offense was committed, the punishable act shall be governed by whichever law is more favorable to the accused (article 12 of the Criminal Code); 3) if the enactment of the new, more favorable law occurs before the sentence has been served, the competent court shall modify the judgment (article 13 of the Criminal Code); 4) unlawful acts committed during the term of a temporary law shall always be governed in accordance with the terms of that law (article 14 of the Criminal Code); and, 5) regarding security measures, the law in force at the time of sentencing, and any measures ordered during execution, shall apply (article 15 of the Criminal Code). According to the proven facts, the two offenses of inducing error in the Tax Administration (currently called Public Treasury Fraud) were committed in the years 2001 and 2002, and at that time, the following wording of article 92 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter C.N.P.T.) was in force: "***Article 92.- Inducing error in the Tax Administration.** When the amount defrauded exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces error in the Tax Administration, through simulation of data, distortion or concealment of true information, or any other form of deception suitable to induce it into error, with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption, or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be punished with imprisonment of five to ten years (…).*" However, subsequently, this provision was reformed by Law No. 9069, dated September 10, 2012, called "*Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management*"; likewise, article 16 of the "*Law to Improve the Fight against Tax Fraud*", Law No. 9416, dated December 14, 2016, added a paragraph to the rule, such that numeral 92 of the C.N.P.T. currently reads as follows: "* **Article 92.- Public Treasury Fraud.** Whoever, by action or omission, defrauds the Public Treasury with the purpose of obtaining, for themselves or for a third party, a patrimonial benefit, evading the payment of taxes, amounts withheld or that should have been withheld, or payments on account of in-kind remuneration, or unduly obtaining refunds or enjoying fiscal benefits in the same manner, provided that the amount of the defrauded quota, the amount not paid of the withholdings or payments on account, or of the refunds or fiscal benefits unduly obtained or enjoyed exceeds five hundred base salaries, shall be punished with a prison sentence of five to ten years (…).*" Specifically, the appellants challenge that there is an incorrect application of article 92 of the C.N.P.T., since, based on numeral 12 of the Criminal Code, it was not analyzed that the new law establishes a new criminal offense and a new threshold of punishability, so that, given the tacit repeal of the old law, the amount of the base salary corresponding to the years 2001 and 2002 should not be applied. Now, it must be explained that the new law does not punish a different behavior from that which was contemplated in the previous law, but rather the reform produced in 2012 to article 92 of the C.N.P.T. provides a new unitary assessment of the same behavior punished by the law that was in force in the years 2001 and 2002, meaning there is continuity of the wrongful act, which allows for a discussion of which of the rules is more favorable to the accused. In this vein, the new law does not define a new criminal offense, and although the wording of the two rules is not identical, since the 2012 reform presents broader concepts, both laws punish the same typical conduct of defrauding the Public Treasury by supplying information that does not correspond to the reality of the income generated by lucrative activities, which results in a lower payment of taxes. Now, since there is continuity of the wrongful act because both rules punish the same conduct, it is clear that the 2012 reform appears as the more favorable law, since it increases the objective element of punishability to five hundred base salaries. However, as has been explained in prior recitals, the amount of the base salary for the year 2012 cannot be applied retroactively, because the specific amount is not part of the criminal offense, since the amount of the base salary constitutes a factual situation that has already occurred, that is, an objective element that only needs to be verified, which, for this reason, is not susceptible to retroactivity, since only the criminal rule can trace its effects back to the moment of the facts, provided this is more favorable to the accused. Furthermore, article 68 of the C.N.P.T. indicates that the concept of base salary used by the law is based on article 2 of Law No. 7337, which expressly establishes that the amount of the base salary will be modified year by year, and that these modifications cannot be considered as variations to the criminal offense. Consequently, if the facts occurred in the years 2001 and 2002, it cannot be claimed that the calculation of the amount defrauded from the Public Treasury be made using the base salary for the year 2012. Based on the foregoing, the second ground of cassation raised on behalf of the accused Wilson Soto Mora and Carlos Huertas Barboza is dismissed.

**Therefore:** The first and second grounds of the cassation appeal filed by the private defense attorney, Mr. William Charpentier Morales, on behalf of all the accused persons, are dismissed. The first and second grounds of the cassation appeal (*in iudicando* defects) filed on behalf of the defendants O.M.H. and J.M.H. are dismissed. The second ground of the cassation appeal filed on behalf of the defendants W.G.S.M and C.G.H.B. is dismissed. Notify.

Jesús Alberto Ramírez Q.

Patricia Solano C. Álvaro Burgos M.

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V. Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M.

Internal No. 245-1/3-4-19 paa

*040000220618PE* Res: 2020-00733 SALA DE CASACIÓN PENAL. San José, a las once horas del doce de junio de dos mil veinte.

Recurso s de casación interpuestos en la presente causa seguida contra Wilson Gerardo Soto Mora, [...], Jeannette Soto Navarro, [...], Ericka Alicia Soto Navarro, [...], Jorge Alberto Murillo Hernández, [...], Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, [...] y Ólger Arturo Murillo Hernández c.c. Rolando, [...]; por el delito de inducción a error a la administración tributaria , en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública. Intervienen en la decisión del recurso las magistradas y los magistrados Jesús Alberto Ramírez Quirós, Patricia Solano Castro, Álvaro Burgos Mata, Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas y Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales. Además, en esta instancia, el licenciado William Charpentier Morales, como defensor particular de los encartados .

Resultando:

1.- Mediante sentencia N° 2018-1750 de las dieciséis horas treinta minutos del tres de diciembre del dos mil dieciocho, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, resolvió: “ POR TANTO: Se admiten, como prueba nueva, los documentos de la Dirección General de Tributación Directa, referente a la tienda Zona Libre de Tilarán visibles en folios 336 vuelto a 339 y la constancia emitida por el juez tramitador del Tribunal de Juicio local referente a las actividades desplegadas por los integrantes del tribunal en ciertos lapsos, todos del legajo creado ante esta sede. Se declaran sin lugar los recursos interpuestos por: la licenciada Patricia Cordero Vargas, co-defensora particular de Jeannette Soto Navarro; el licenciado William Charpentier Morales, defensor particular de la encartada Ericka Alicia Soto Navarro y de los imputados y demandados civiles Jorge Murillo Hernández y Wilson Gerardo Soto Morera; el licenciado Marco Antonio Castro Alvarado, defensor particular del acusado Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza y por el imputado Ólger Murillo Hernández. Se adiciona la parte dispositiva de la sentencia de instancia en el sentido que la condena civil de los demandados civiles es solidaria. Se acoge la apelación incoada por la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, procuradora penal en representación del Estado, actor civil. En consecuencia, se anula parcialmente la sentencia impugnada, solo en cuanto rechazó las partidas de impuesto sobre las ventas de los años 2001 y 2002 y, sobre este extremo, se ordena el reenvío ante una nueva integración del órgano de instancia y con respeto al principio de congruencia. En lo restante permanece incólume lo resuelto. NOTIFÍQUESE. Rosaura Chinchilla Calderón, Raúl Madrigal Lizano, Laura Murillo Mora, Juezas y juez de apelación de sentencia penal. (sic)”.

2.- Contra el anterior pronunciamiento el licenciado William Charpentier Morales, como defensor particular de todos los imputados, y en su carácter personal los imputados Olger Murillo Hernández, Jorge Murillo Mora, William Soto Mora y Carlos Huertas Barboza, interpusieron recursos de casación.

3.- Verificada la deliberación respectiva, la Sala entró a conocer de los recursos.

4.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes.

Informa el Magistrado Ramírez Quirós ; y,

Considerando:

I.- Mediante resolución N°2019-01583, de las 10:15 horas, del 13 de diciembre de 2019, (cfr. folios 1057 fte. a 1077 vto. del tomo II del expediente principal), esta Sala declaró admisible para su conocimiento de fondo únicamente los motivos primero y segundo del recurso de casación que promueve el defensor particular, licenciado William Charpentier Morales, a favor de todas las personas imputadas, (cfr. folios 713 a 859 del tomo II del expediente principal); primero y segundo del recurso de casación (vicios in iudicando) interpuesto a favor de los encausados Olger Murillo Hernández y Jorge Murillo Hernández, (cfr. folios 860 a 947 del tomo II del del expediente principal); y, el segundo motivo del recurso de casación incoado a favor de los justiciables Wilson Gerardo Soto Mora y Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, (cfr. folios 948 a 1010 del tomo II del expediente principal); contra la resolución N°2018-1750, de las 16:30 horas, del 03 de diciembre de 2018, del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, que declaró sin lugar las impugnaciones planteadas por la defensa material y técnica, contra el fallo N°354-2017, dictado por medio de cesura, a las 14:00 horas, del 08 de setiembre en su primera fase y, en la segunda etapa, a las 08:30 horas, del 04 de octubre, ambas fechas del año dos mil diecisiete, por el Tribunal Penal de Juicio en materia de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, que declaró a Éricka Alicia y Jeannette Soto Navarro, Olger y Jorge Murillo Hernández, Wilson Soto Mora y Carlos Gerardo Huertas Barboza, coautores responsables, en concurso material, de dos delitos de Inducción a Error a la Administración Tributaria, en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública; imponiéndoseles a cada uno de ellos, la pena de cinco años de prisión por cada delincuencia, para una sanción privativa de libertad total de diez años. Asimismo, el ad quem adicionó la parte dispositiva de tal fallo, en lo que concierne a que la condena civil de los demandados civiles, resulta solidaria. A su vez, acogió la apelación incoada por la licenciada Margot Avellán Ruiz, representante de la Procuraduría General de la República, en lo que respecta al extremo del rechazo de partidas de impuesto sobre las ventas, correspondiente a los años 2001 y 2002, lo anterior con base en el principio de congruencia, ordenando el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación (cfr. folios 598 fte. a 660 vto. del tomo I del expediente principal).

II.- Recurso de Casación que promueve el licenciado William Charpentier Morales, defensor particular, de todas las personas imputadas. PRIMER MOTIVO: Errónea aplicación de un precepto legal sustantivo, específicamente el artículo 45 de Código Penal, que refiere la participación penal en coautoría. Lo anterior de conformidad con los artículos 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 inciso b) y 469 del Código Procesal Penal. Al respecto, refiere que el ad quem desconoce la naturaleza jurídica del delito de fraude a la Hacienda Pública, previsto en el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante C.N.P.T.), como un ilícito especial propio. Expone que la actuación en coautoría acreditada por el a quo, y ratificada por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, de Wilson Soto Mora, y de las restantes personas endilgadas, se constata en los hechos probados 89 a 96, que de seguido transcribe de folios 716 a 721. Así, logra sostener que la autoridad judicial que conoce en alzada, soslayó “la realidad de la participación de cada uno de los imputados”, al admitir la ejecución en coautoría del cuadro fáctico demostrado y excluir el análisis del carácter científico y dogmático del citado ilícito de fraude a la Hacienda Pública, del artículo 92 del C.N.P.T.; por cuanto, de forma inadecuada, permite la coautoría en dicha delincuencia “cuando se trata de un extraneus que no comparte la obligación que el tipo penal requiere. Por ello, únicamente los sujetos que son considerados intraneus, pueden ser sometidos a la regulación penal del supra citado artículo 92 (…)” (cfr. folios 721 a 722). Enfatiza, que en los delitos especiales propios, no resulta viable la aplicación de la coautoría, al intervenir un extraneus. Indica que a efectos de entender los efectos de la coautoría en los delitos especiales propios, al momento de intervenir un extraneus, debe estudiarse la dogmática con base en la doctrina dominante en España y Alemania, que advierten que el sujeto activo en tales tipos penales, debe gozar de particularidades o cualificaciones, por lo que únicamente el sujeto que cumpla las mismas, podría ser el autor del hecho. A mayor abundamiento, el litigante señala: “Quienes reúnen esas características especiales se les llama intraneus. Aquellos que no las tienen se les denomina extraneus. Esta categoría de conductas delictivas identificadas con determinados tipos penales, se les identifica como delitos especiales. Lo anterior en contraposición a los delitos convencionales, porque requieren especiales características al sujeto activo y limitan el ámbito de los posibles autores” (cfr. folio 722, párrafo tercero). Posición, que a criterio del licenciado Charpentier, asume Claus Roxin, en su obra “Derecho Penal, Parte General” año 1997, página 338, quien establece que en ciertas ilicitudes solamente sería autor, la persona que presente una específica cualidad, conocida como “cualificación de autor”, que en virtud de regla general, esa singularidad obedece “en una posición de deber extrapenal”, por lo que existe la tendencia a llamarlos “delitos de infracción del deber”, los cuales carecen de los alcances de la teoría del dominio del hecho. Agrega que la publicación “Teoría Jurídica del delito” , de Gómez Benítez, de 1984, resalta que “Todo delito especial alude a una especial situación de deber de autor respecto a determinados bienes jurídicos o simplemente respecto a determinadas conductas. La característica esencial del autor está constituida por la infracción de un deber específico extrapenal, como se dijo por Roxin líneas atrás.[….] la infracción del deber específico es el criterio especial de imputación objetiva al autor en los delitos especiales y no el mero dominio del hecho” (cfr. folio 723). Agrega que en el sub examine se infiere un ilícito especial propio, cuya descripción típica (artículo 92 del C.N.P.T.), vinculado a los preceptos 1 y 5 de la Ley General del Impuesto sobre la Renta (en adelante LGISR), exige para determinar el autor (intraneus) del delito de Fraude a la Hacienda Pública con base en el artículo 92 C.N.P.T., de una condición especial subjetiva -de sujeto contribuyente al impuesto sobre la renta- (requisito de imputabilidad subjetiva y reproche penal). Conminado por mandato legal a retribuir a la administración hacendaria, el pago por el impuesto sobre la renta, ante el desarrollo de actividades de corte económicamente lucrativas. Acusa el defensor particular, que el fallo del ad quem contiene un error insalvable, al reconocer la coautoría; por ende, lo convierte en ineficaz ante el desconocimiento de la dogmática penal y el derecho sustantivo. Posteriormente, como parte de la discusión legal y doctrinaria sobre la aplicación de la coautoría, formula una extensa transcripción de la sentencia cuestionada (cfr. folios 725 a 731). Reitera que el punto de controversia contra el iter recurrido, gira sobre la inobservancia dogmática y doctrinaria en lo que atañe a los delitos especiales propios, sus efectos y restricciones, por tratarse de ilicitudes de infracción, y no de dominio, “cuando participan sujetos que podríamos identificar como extraneus”. Concluye que ante la intervención de un extraneus, el artículo 45 de Código Penal, no contempla la posibilidad de aplicar la coautoría en delitos especiales propios. Afirma que según el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T., el extraneus como persona física, carece de condición especial subjetiva, como resulta ser un sujeto contribuyente al impuesto sobre la renta. Como agravio establece que al no valorarse la naturaleza jurídica del delito de fraude de la Hacienda Pública, previsto en el artículo 92 del C.N.P.T., en relación con los numerales 1 y 5 de la LGISR, que trata –de un delito especial propio-, se ocasiona un perjuicio a la defensa material, pues se dejó de valorar la situación jurídica, y agrava las condiciones procesales de todas las personas encartadas, ya que no es posible aplicar la figura de la coautoría a cualquier persona, puesto que de los hechos probados, no se demuestra la necesaria condición especial subjetiva, de sujeto contribuyente al impuesto sobre la renta, aspecto esencial como ya se dijo, de imputabilidad subjetiva y reproche penal. Examen que el Tribunal de Apelación, olvidó analizar al condenar a sus patrocinados por dos ilícitos de Fraude a la Hacienda Pública, en coautoría; cuando no era viable tal aplicación. Si se hubiese interpretado de manera correcta dicha figura, el ad quem no hubiese ratificado la decisión condenatoria del a quo. Como pretensión solicita declarar con lugar el motivo y se anule la resolución venida en alzada; absolviéndose de toda pena y responsabilidad a todas las personas imputadas (cfr. folios 715 a 735). El primer motivo de casación se declara sin lugar. El casacionista reclama, básicamente, una errónea aplicación del artículo 45 del Código Penal, referente a la participación penal en coautoría, por cuanto se alega que el Tribunal de Alzada desconoce que el numeral 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios constituye un delito especial propio que no admite la aplicación de la coautoría cuando interviene un “extraneus”. Ahora bien, el Tribunal Penal de Juicio en materia de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, mediante sentencia número 354-2017, dictada por medio de cesura, a las 14:00 horas, del 08 de setiembre en su primera fase y, en la segunda etapa, a las 08:30 horas, del 04 de octubre, ambas fechas del año dos mil diecisiete, visible de folio 7 fte. a 320 vto. del tomo I del expediente principal, establece, en lo que interesa, los siguientes hechos probados: “ 89.- Sin precisar fecha exacta, pero antes del primero de octubre del año dos mil, el imputado WILSON SOTO MORA, socio mayoritario y principal desarrollador y beneficiario de la actividad económica, actuando de común acuerdo y con clara distribución de funciones con los coimputados CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ y JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, idearon y pusieron en marcha un plan ilícito con el fin de engañar a la Administración Tributaria y defraudar a la Hacienda Pública. Dicho plan consistió en disfrazar el conglomerado empresarial del cual formaban parte, haciéndolo pasar ante la Administración Tributaria como si se trataran de empresas individuales (en adelante tiendas), cuando en realidad componían la cadena comercial conocida como El Regalón, la cual se dedicaba a la compra y venta de mercancías varias, como ropa y zapatos, en diferentes zonas del país. De este modo, como parte de la compleja organización creada para defraudar a la Hacienda Pública, gran parte de las tiendas ingresaron al régimen de tributación simplificada de la Administración Tributaria, cuando lo correcto era que en su conjunto fueran reportadas en el régimen tradicional; lo que les permitió facilidades como la no generación de facturas por ventas al detalle y la declaración de sus actividades con base en las compras efectuadas. Además, como parte del plan ilícito preestablecido por los coimputados, dichas tiendas no contaron con cuentas bancarias, sí no que parte de sus ingresos fueron direccionados de manera ilícita hacia las cuentas bancarias de los coimputados WILSON SOTO MORA, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ y JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, quienes además de formar parte del entramado societario, legal o accionario preestablecido, utilizaron sus cuentas bancarias privadas con la finalidad de distraer los ingresos gravables que generó la actividad comercial del grupo. Por último, de acuerdo al esquema delictivo diseñado, el coimputado CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, fungió como la persona encargada de controlar la labor contable del conglomerado empresarial y dar sostenibilidad al esquema ilícito antes dicho. 90.- Mediante el plan antes indicado, los coimputados WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ y JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, valiéndose de engaños y simulaciones, indujeron a error a la Administración Tributaria, logrando obtener un beneficio patrimonial antijurídico, que le causó un perjuicio a la Hacienda Pública de 149.716.479,15 (ciento cuarenta y nueve millones setecientos dieciséis mil cuatros cientos setenta y nueve colones, con quince céntimos) por impuesto de la renta correspondiente al período fiscal 2001, y 277.735.106,48 (doscientos setenta y siete millones setecientos treinta y cinco mil ciento seis colones con cuarenta y ocho céntimos) por impuesto de la renta correspondiente al período fiscal 2002. 91.- Sin precisar fecha exacta, pero entre los años mil novecientos ochenta y siete y dos mil cuatro, el coimputado WILSON SOTO MORA, de común acuerdo con los coimputados CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ y JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, desarrollaron la actividad comercial de compra y venta de mercancías, para lo cual el coimputado WILSON SOTO MORA, fuera a título personal, a nombre de las sociedades que representaba o de las tiendas propiedad del grupo, realizó la importación de gran cantidad de mercaderías o la compra local de ésta. 92.- Los coimputados WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ y JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ, como parte de su actuar ilícito y de la compleja organización creada para defraudar a la Hacienda Pública, se vincularon con las sociedades Kaki del este S.A. y El Detalle Soñado S.A., quienes pese a haber sido registradas ante la Administración Tributaria como contribuyentes de los impuestos de ventas y renta, abastecieron y proveyeron la mercadería que se comercializó en las tiendas de la cadena El Regalón. 93.-Conforme a la distribución de funciones preestablecida por el grupo criminal antes dicho, el coimputado WILSON SOTO MORA, como representante legal y socio de las compañías Kaki del este S.A. y El detalle Soñado S.A., dispuso de las mercaderías que éstas mantenían en sus bodegas ubicadas en San José, calle ocho, avenidas dos y cuatro, donde también se encontraban las oficinas centrales de la cadena El Regalón; distribuyéndolas a las diversas tiendas que componían el grupo empresarial, sin que quedara un registro de compra en las tiendas que recibían las mercancías. 94.-Como parte del actuar ilícito ideado por los coimputados dichos, los empleados contratados por éstos y que coordinaron el funcionamiento de las tiendas ubicadas en el país, no pagaron ni registraron las mercancías que recibieron; sino que a partir de la distribución de funciones preestablecida, ello fue controlado y documentado por el coimputado CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, a través de asientos semestrales o anuales en los libros contables, tratándose de sociedades; mediante anotaciones en los libros de registros de compras, tratándose de personas inscritas en el régimen de tributación simplificada, así como por medio de las declaraciones tributarias rendidas ante la Administración Tributaria por los contribuyentes inscritos. 95.- A partir del plan ilícito propuesto, el grupo delictivo descrito, conformó aproximadamente ciento treinta tiendas distribuidas en las provincias de San José, Alajuela, Limón, Puntarenas, Guanacaste y Heredia. Sin embargo, fueron registradas ante la Administración Tributaria a nombre de aproximadamente cincuenta sociedades y alrededor de ochenta personas físicas, algunas de las cuales se encontraban vinculadas por consanguinidad o afinidad con los imputados, pero mayormente se trató de empleados que trabajaron para el grupo empresarial manejado por los imputados, a quienes incluso en algunos casos se les solicitó la gestión de permisos municipales y servicios públicos a título personal. 96.-Como parte del plan ilícito previamente elaborado y con el fin de defraudar a la Hacienda Pública, los coimputados WILSON SOTO MORA, CARLOS EDUARDO HUERTAS BARBOZA, JEANNETTE SOTO NAVARRO, ERICKA ALICIA SOTO NAVARRO, OLGER ARTURO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ y JORGE ALBERTO MURILLO HERNÁNDEZ fraccionaron los ingresos percibidos por cada una de las tiendas como si fuesen negocios independientes, cuando en realidad conformaban un grupo empresarial y posteriormente, con la finalidad de distraer dichas sumas, direccionaron esos flujos de dinero hacia sus cuentas bancarias personales (...).” Antes de resolver de forma concreta la queja que plantea el recurrente, resulta importante indicar que la doctrina explica que el delito especial propio reduce la figura de autores a quienes cumplan una calidad especial, es decir, delitos que describen una conducta que únicamente ciertos sujetos pueden realizar, verbigracia, como la establecida en el tipo penal del artículo 357 del Código Penal; mientras que en el delito especial impropio solo se impone una pena diferenciada por una calidad personal contemplada en el tipo penal que agrava la sanción, pero es un delito común, del que puede ser autor cualquier sujeto imputable, verbigracia, cuando en un delito de abuso sexual el agente tiene una relación de parentesco con la víctima. Por su parte, en los “delitos de dominio”, el codominio del hecho se establece en función de una distribución de trabajo. De esta manera, en los delitos especiales propios la configuración de la autoría y la participación no se logra a partir de la teoría del dominio del hecho sistematizada por ROXIN. En este sentido, GÓMEZ BENITEZ refiere que existen tipos penales en los cuales el sujeto activo, “además de la posibilidad objetiva de dominio de su propia acción, debe reunir algunas características personales o cualificaciones, resultando que sólo quien reúne esas características puede llegar a ser autor del mismo. A estos sujetos que reúnen esas características especiales se les llama “intraneus”; mientras que aquellos que no reúnan esas características especiales se les denomina “extraneus” (…).” (GÓMEZ BENÍTEZ, José Manuel. Teoría Jurídica del Delito. Madrid: Cívitas, 1984, p. 153). Siendo que en los delitos especiales propios se sanciona en función de las características personales del sujeto activo, la doctrina discute sobre la posibilidad de admitir al “extraneus” como coautor. Así por ejemplo, la doctrina alemana y española, de forma mayoritaria, niegan la posibilidad de que el “extraneus” pueda ser coautor en los delitos especiales propios, teniendo a lo sumo una complicidad o instigación en el ilícito, toda vez que sólo quien reúna las cualificaciones que contempla el tipo penal puede serlo (“intraneus”); mientras que en los delitos especiales impropios, “si el extraneus tiene el dominio del hecho, puede llegar a ser coautor del delito básico”, siempre que el delito especial impropio contemple la posibilidad de un delito común. (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 382). Cierto sector de la doctrina española admite la posibilidad de intervención del “extraneus” como coautor, aunque varios autores establecen limitaciones para su aplicación. En el caso de marras, el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios que se encontraba vigente para el momento de los hechos, establecía lo siguiente: “Artículo 92.- Inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria . Cuando la cuantía del monto defraudado exceda de doscientos salarios base, será sancionado con prisión de cinco a diez años quien induzca a error a la Administración Tributaria, mediante simulación de datos, deformación u ocultamiento de información verdadera o cualquier otra forma de engaño idónea para inducirla a error, con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, una exención o una devolución en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública. Para los efectos de lo dispuesto en el párrafo anterior debe entenderse que: a) El monto defraudado no incluirá los intereses, las multas ni los recargos de carácter sancionatorio. b) Para determinar el monto mencionado, si se trata de tributos cuyo período es anual, se considerará la cuota defraudada en ese período; para los impuestos cuyos períodos sean inferiores a doce meses, se adicionarán los montos defraudados durante el lapso comprendido entre el 1º de enero y el 31 de diciembre del mismo año. En los demás tributos, la cuantía se entenderá referida a cada uno de los conceptos por los que un hecho generador es susceptible de determinación. Se considerará excusa legal absolutoria el hecho de que el sujeto repare su incumplimiento, sin que medie requerimiento ni actuación alguna de la Administración Tributaria para obtener la reparación. Para los efectos del párrafo anterior, se entenderá como actuación de la Administración toda acción realizada con la notificación al sujeto pasivo, conducente a verificar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias referidas al impuesto y período de que se trate.” Este artículo fue reformado en el año 2012 y adicionado en el año 2016, sin embargo, se mantiene la continuidad de lo injusto, esto es, la nueva ley plantea una nueva valoración unitaria del mismo comportamiento sancionado por la ley vieja; veamos: “ Artículo 92.- Fraude a la Hacienda Pública. El que, por acción u omisión, defraude a la Hacienda Pública con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, evadiendo el pago de tributos, cantidades retenidas o que se hayan debido retener, o ingresos a cuenta de retribuciones en especie u obteniendo indebidamente devoluciones o disfrutando beneficios fiscales de la misma forma, siempre que la cuantía de la cuota defraudada, el importe no ingresado de las retenciones o los ingresos a cuenta o de las devoluciones o los beneficios fiscales indebidamente obtenidos o disfrutados exceda de quinientos salarios base, será castigado con la pena de prisión de cinco a diez años (…). ” Como puede observarse, el tipo penal no describe ninguna cualificación en el sujeto activo que logre ajustarse a las exigencias dogmáticas de los llamados delitos especiales propios, por el contrario, el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios puede ser cometido por cualquier persona que realice la acción típica, sin que se exija ninguna característica especial en el autor del delito. Esto hace que la configuración de la autoría y la participación se defina a partir de la aplicación de la teoría del dominio del hecho. Tal y como se plantea en los hechos probados, las personas imputadas siguiendo un plan ideado y conforme a una distribución de funciones previamente acordada, realizaron distintas maniobras que construyeron un entramado de sociedades anónimas inscritas en el régimen de tributación tradicional y personas físicas inscritas en el régimen de tributación simplificado, que pretendían disfrazar el conglomerado empresarial del cual formaban parte, haciéndolo pasar ante la Administración Tributaria como si se trataran de tiendas individuales, cuando en realidad componían una cadena comercial conocida como “El Regalón”, lo cual produjo que los tributos que estaban siendo cancelados no correspondieran con los ingresos que estaba generando la actividad lucrativa, lográndose de esta forma engañar a la Administración Tributaria y perjudicar a la Hacienda Pública. La conducta de cada uno de los justiciables rebasó la simple cooperación a título de complicidad, ya que mantuvieron el dominio funcional del hecho, con una clara distribución de funciones, a pesar de que Wilson Soto Mora era el socio mayoritario y principal, desarrollador y beneficiario de la actividad económica. Así, partiendo de la teoría material objetiva, también conocida como teoría del dominio del hecho, los intervinientes de esta compleja organización ostentan la calidad de coautores, por cuanto según la teoría del dominio del hecho, mantuvieron un codominio funcional del hecho en el que cada uno de los encausados pudo decidir sobre la ejecución de la ilicitud, realizando un aporte objetivo a un plan común. Al respecto, FRANCISCO CASTILLO señala: “ la particularidad de la lesión a la norma en la coautoría está en que cada coautor no realiza de propia mano la acción delictuosa, sino que lo hecho por uno de los coautores se le imputa a los demás como propio. En la coautoría cada uno de los aportes se transforma en un hecho antijurídico común, por el cual responde cada uno de los coautores. Bajo esta premisa, en la actuación en coautoría puede distinguirse el hecho colectivo de la actuación de cada uno de los coautores.” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo III. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 440.). Al coautor se le imputa el hecho porque brindó una contribución esencial al delito, para lo cual se requiere una resolución común que fije los fines comunes y distribuya funciones conforme al principio de la división del trabajo, a través del cual los coautores fundamentan el dominio del hecho al tener una participación decisiva en el despliegue de la actividad ilícita. En este orden de ideas, la Sala de Casación Penal mediante el voto N°2011-00389, de las 10:25 horas, del 08 de abril de 2011, resuelve lo siguiente: “ Existirá codominio del hecho cada vez que el sujeto actuante que interviene haya aportado una contribución al hecho total, en el estadio de la ejecución, de tal envergadura que sin ese aporte el hecho no hubiera podido cometerse. Ahora bien, la redacción del numeral 45 del Código Penal, antes citado, exige para que exista coautoría una realización conjunta del hecho. Realizar conjuntamente, significa ejecutar conjuntamente. Para que exista una realización conjunta del hecho ilícito, con relevancia típica, es absolutamente necesario, que el comportamiento desplegado se encuentre por lo menos en actos de ejecución. Es decir, que son típicos, y se puede intervenir respecto de ellos en coautoría, aquellos actos que se ubican desde una etapa tentada hasta una etapa de consumación, salvo que exista una regulación legal expresa en que se penalicen actos preparatorios. Dicho de manera simple, según lo establece el numeral citado: 1.-Quien durante los actos de ejecución realiza con su comportamiento un aporte objetivo al hecho ilícito, sin el cual este hecho no se hubiera podido cometer, debe ser tenido como coautor. 2.- Si ese aporte se realiza en una etapa del Iter Criminis anterior al comienzo de ejecución, entonces quien contribuye al hecho ilícito no es coautor, sino cómplice, ya que no ha podido dominar el hecho, ni actuar conjuntamente en su ejecución. Pero, más aún, (3.) si alguien realiza, durante los actos de ejecución o los actos preparatorios, un aporte que no es necesario, es decir, aún sin el cual el hecho pudiera haberse cometido, entonces debe ser tenido como cómplice (…).” De esta forma, se verifica que los dos delitos cometidos en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública fueron desplegados por las personas encausadas en calidad de coautores, quienes actuaron con pleno dominio funcional del hecho, pudiendo decidir sobre la ejecución de la ilicitud y realizando un aporte objetivo a un plan común para inducir a error a la Administración Tributaria, por cuanto se desprende de los hechos probados de la sentencia condenatoria N°354-2017, (cfr. folio 169 fte. a 203 vto. del tomo I del expediente principal), que cada uno de los endilgados desarrolló una labor específica para poner en marcha un complejo plan delictivo, el cual requirió de una logística muy bien estructurada, en la que cada imputado cumplió un papel esencial, por ejemplo, [Nombre 001] y [Nombre 002], se encargaron de los asuntos administrativos que demandó la actividad comercial desarrollada por el grupo; mientras que José Rosales Rosales, como administrador o supervisor de las tiendas ubicadas en la zona de Santa Cruz, entre otras labores, depositó en una de las cuentas de ahorro propiedad de la coimputada Éricka Alicia Soto Navarro. Es decir, cada labor ejercida por los justiciables, constituyó un aporte esencial sin el cual delito no hubiera podido cometerse, el cual requería de una actuación conjunta para disminuir el monto de los impuestos que legalmente les correspondía pagar por la actividad económica del grupo empresarial, simulando datos y ocultando la información verdadera para causar un perjuicio a la Hacienda Pública. En consecuencia, al no advertirse la existencia de ningún yerro en la aplicación de la ley sustantiva, se declara sin lugar el primer motivo del recurso de casación incoado por el defensor particular, licenciado William Charpentier Morales.

III.- Recurso de Casación que promueve el licenciado William Charpentier Morales, defensor particular, de todas las personas imputadas. SEGUNDO MOTIVO: Error en la aplicación de un precepto legal sustantivo. Explica el abogado particular que la resolución impugnada inobserva la interpretación retroactiva de la ley penal más favorable, en torno con los salarios base, imperantes como componentes del tipo penal de Inducción a Error a la Administración Tributaria –cuantía de los rubros defraudados-. Lo anterior, al omitir aplicar en beneficio de las personas acriminadas, el salario base vigente. Todo ello, por desconocer el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal, su deber de observar la aplicación del bloque de Convencionalidad, acorde con la línea jurisprudencial estipulada por la Corte Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos. Fundamento de derecho: preceptos 9 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, 15.1 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, 7 de la Constitución Política, artículos 2, 8, 376, 378, 468 inciso b) y 469 del Código Procesal Penal, 12 y 13 de Código Penal, 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante C.N.P.T.), 1 y 5 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre la renta. Afirma el defensor que el punto medular del presente motivo, estriba en que el ad quem no precisa la diferencia normativa de los diversos contenidos del artículo 92 del C.N.P.T., “(…) en dos momentos históricos de vigencia de la ley y, la errónea aplicación de esas normas de fondo respecto a su contenido (…).” En ese sentido, señala que la Ley N°7900, del 03 de agosto de 1999, establecía originariamente el contenido en rigor del citado 92 del C.N.P.T., cuya cuantía de la suma defraudada excediera los doscientos salarios base; lo anterior, frente a la reforma de Ley N°9069, de 10 de setiembre de 2012, “Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria”, que modificó el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T., que actualmente tiene aplicación. Al respecto, en el inciso a) se estipula que el rubro de quinientos salarios base, constituye condición objetiva de punibilidad en el delito de Fraude a la Hacienda Pública (cfr. folios 742 a 745). Agrega que, de acuerdo con la evolución histórica del numeral 92 del C.N.P.T., el artículo 68 de ese cuerpo normativo, define como salario base, aquel que se contiene en el ordinal 2 de la ley N°7337. Sobre ese aspecto, refiere Charpentier Morales, que el ad quem incurre en un vicio de interpretación, y de aplicación del artículo 92 del C.N.P.T., en relación con el monto defraudado, “cuando ascienda de doscientos salarios base o, posteriormente, por reforma legal a quinientos salarios base, como condición objetiva de punibilidad” (Lo destacado con negrita pertenece al texto de origen). Así afirma de la clara modificación de la legislación del año de 1999, con la reforma de 2012, que recae en dos vertientes “el aumento del monto de doscientos a quinientos salarios base, así como el aumento progresivo año con año, del monto del salario base, referido al salario mensual del Oficinista 1 del Poder Judicial, al ser el más elevado en monto” (cfr. folios 746 a 747). Refuta que la interpretación del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, en lo que concierne a la retroactividad de la ley penal más beneficiosa al imputado Soto Mora, resulta parcial, pues limita la progresividad de derechos fundamentales, y el alcance extensivo a todos los Estados que han suscrito y ratificado la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Proceder que soslaya la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (cfr. folios 748 a 749). Resume la defensa técnica, que en la especie, han surgido cambios significativos, como el pasar de doscientos a quinientos salarios base, siendo el salario base para el año 2001, de ciento veinte mil colones; para el año 2002, de ciento treinta y seis mil colones, los cuales son inferiores al salario base del año 2019. Sostiene que el salario de referencia, para establecer las sanciones penales, lo impuso el Consejo Superior de Poder Judicial, en sesión de 18 de diciembre de 2018, vigente desde el día 1° de enero de 2019, en la suma de cuatrocientos cuarenta y seis mil doscientos colones. Indica que calculado el valor del salario base para el 2019, en cuatrocientos cuarenta y seis mil doscientos colones, multiplicado por los quinientos salarios base, según el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T., da como resultado un rubro de doscientos veintitrés millones cien mil colones, ello como condición objetiva de punibilidad. Correspondiendo definir las sumas defraudadas para los períodos fiscales de los años 2001 y 2002. A mayor abundamiento, señala: “Conforme lo tenido por demostrado por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, para el año 2001 fue de ¢149.716.479,15 (ciento cuarenta y nueve millones setecientos dieciséis mil cuatrocientos setenta y nueve colones con quince céntimos), por lo tanto, es inferior a la cantidad indicada como condición objetiva de punibilidad de los quinientos salarios base, por el monto de ¢ 223.100.000 (doscientos veintitrés millones cien mil colones). En consecuencia, la actuación no es contraria a derecho y no existe posibilidad de proceder penalmente, debido a que la conducta es atípica, conforme el artículo 92 C.N.P.T. Debiendo absolverse de toda pena y responsabilidad a todos los imputados, por este hecho acusado desde su origen. Por otra parte, lo relativo al período fiscal del año 2002, donde de manera arbitraria, por parte de la Sección de Delitos Económicos y Contables del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, establece de manera antojadiza y sin la aplicación de la lex artis de la contabilidad y cálculo de la renta bruta, el monto de ¢277.735.106,48 (doscientos setenta y siete millones setecientos treinta y cinco mil ciento seis colones con cuarenta y ocho céntimos). Cifra que supera el cálculo de los quinientos salarios base, establecidos para el 2019 en ¢223.200.000 (doscientos veintitrés millones cien mil colones (…).” (cfr. folios 750 a 751). Finalmente, afirma Charpentier Morales, que el fallo de alzada es contradictorio con la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, y omisa de las resoluciones vinculantes de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en lo que atañe a la aplicación retroactiva de la ley penal más favorable. Asegura que las resoluciones números 3929-95, y 5924-1996, del Tribunal Constitucional, sobre “la no aplicación retroactiva de la ley penal más favorable, en los casos donde los elementos que se varían en la nueva legislación, no tiene que ver directamente con la sanción penal”, resultan desfasadas ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; por lo que en su opinión, corresponde a la Sala de Casación Penal, llevar a cabo la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad de la aplicación retroactiva de la ley penal más favorable, al tratarse de variaciones al extremo punitivo, o al contenido del injusto penal o supuesto de hecho, más favorable para la parte imputada (cfr. folios 758 a 762). Como agravio señala el patrocinio letrado que, si el ad quem hubiese respetado el bloque de legalidad, no se hubiese infringido los derechos fundamentales previstos en el artículo 9 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, y por lo tanto, reconocería la aplicación retroactiva de la disposición normativa más beneficiosa para los intereses de la parte acriminada, y se hubiese absuelto a las personas imputadas. (cfr. folio 762 a 764). Como pretensión solicita declarar con lugar el reclamo, y se proceda a anular el fallo del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia; exonerándose de toda pena y responsabilidad a todos sus representados (cfr. folios 764 a 765). El segundo motivo de casación se declara sin lugar. El recurrente reprocha, en esencia, que la resolución impugnada inobserva la interpretación retroactiva de la ley penal más favorable en torno a los salarios base, al omitir aplicar lo que resulta más beneficio a las personas acriminadas, esto es, considerar que el monto de la defraudado a Hacienda Pública debe calcularse partiendo de quinientos salarios base y según salario base vigente para el año 2019. En primera instancia, debe indicarse que según los hechos probados, las dos acciones delictivas fueron cometidas en los años 2001 y 2002. Dicha conducta típica se encuentra descrita en el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante C.N.P.T.), y para el momento de los hechos, su redacción era la siguiente: “Artículo 92.- Inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria. Cuando la cuantía del monto defraudado exceda de doscientos salarios base, será sancionado con prisión de cinco a diez años quien induzca a error a la Administración Tributaria, mediante simulación de datos, deformación u ocultamiento de información verdadera o cualquier otra forma de engaño idónea para inducirla a error, con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, una exención o una devolución en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública. Para los efectos de lo dispuesto en el párrafo anterior debe entenderse que: a) El monto defraudado no incluirá los intereses, las multas ni los recargos de carácter sancionatorio. b) Para determinar el monto mencionado, si se trata de tributos cuyo período es anual, se considerará la cuota defraudada en ese período; para los impuestos cuyos períodos sean inferiores a doce meses, se adicionarán los montos defraudados durante el lapso comprendido entre el 1º de enero y el 31 de diciembre del mismo año. En los demás tributos, la cuantía se entenderá referida a cada uno de los conceptos por los que un hecho generador es susceptible de determinación. Se considerará excusa legal absolutoria el hecho de que el sujeto repare su incumplimiento, sin que medie requerimiento ni actuación alguna de la Administración Tributaria para obtener la reparación. Para los efectos del párrafo anterior, se entenderá como actuación de la Administración toda acción realizada con la notificación al sujeto pasivo, conducente a verificar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias referidas al impuesto y período de que se trate. (Así reformado por el artículo 2º de la ley No.7900 de 3 de agosto de 1999).” Sin embargo, posteriormente, este artículo fue reformado por la Ley N°9069, del 10 de setiembre del 2012, denominada “Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria”; asimismo, el artículo 16 de la “Ley para Mejorar la Lucha contra el Fraude Fiscal”, Ley N°9416, del 14 de diciembre del 2016, adicionó un párrafo a la norma, de tal manera que el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T. plantea, en la actualidad, la siguiente redacción: “ Artículo 92.- Fraude a la Hacienda Pública. El que, por acción u omisión, defraude a la Hacienda Pública con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, evadiendo el pago de tributos, cantidades retenidas o que se hayan debido retener, o ingresos a cuenta de retribuciones en especie u obteniendo indebidamente devoluciones o disfrutando beneficios fiscales de la misma forma, siempre que la cuantía de la cuota defraudada, el importe no ingresado de las retenciones o los ingresos a cuenta o de las devoluciones o los beneficios fiscales indebidamente obtenidos o disfrutados exceda de quinientos salarios base, será castigado con la pena de prisión de cinco a diez años. Para los efectos de lo dispuesto en el párrafo anterior debe entenderse que: a) El monto de quinientos salarios base se considerará condición objetiva de punibilidad. b) El monto no incluirá los intereses, las multas ni los recargos de carácter sancionador. c) Para determinar la cuantía mencionada, si se trata de tributos, retenciones, ingresos a cuenta o devoluciones, periódicos o de declaración periódica, se estará a lo defraudado en cada período impositivo o de declaración y, si estos son inferiores a doce meses, el importe de lo defraudado se referirá al año natural. En los demás supuestos la cuantía se entenderá referida a cada uno de los distintos conceptos por los que un hecho imponible sea susceptible de liquidación. Se considerará excusa legal absolutoria el hecho de que el sujeto repare su incumplimiento, sin que medie requerimiento ni actuación de la Administración Tributaria para obtener la reparación. Para los efectos del párrafo anterior, se entenderá como actuación de la Administración toda acción realizada con la notificación al sujeto pasivo, conducente a verificar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias. La Procuraduría General de la República se constituirá como actor civil en el ejercicio de la acción civil resarcitoria, conforme a lo establecido en el Código Procesal Penal; para ello, deberá contar con la participación técnica activa dentro del proceso penal de la Dirección General de Tributación, que actuará por medio de la Dirección General o en quienes esta delegue la función. Para efectos de cumplir con lo dispuesto en este artículo, se deberán notificar a la Dirección General de Tributación todos los actos del proceso.” Por regla general, la ley penal que debe aplicarse a un caso concreto corresponde a la ley que se encontraba vigente para el momento en que ocurren los hechos; no obstante, si con posterioridad se promulga una ley penal que resulta más beneficiosa al imputado, esta debe aplicarse de forma retroactiva. El Código Penal establece en el artículo 11 que los “hechos punibles se juzgarán de conformidad con las leyes vigentes en la época de su comisión”; mientras que el numeral 12 estipula que “si con posterioridad a la comisión de un hecho punible se promulgare una nueva ley, aquél se regirá por la que sea más favorable al reo, en el caso particular que se juzgue.” Ambos principios de legalidad y de retroactividad son reconocidos en el artículo 9 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, al señalarse que “nadie puede ser condenado por acciones u omisiones que en el momento de cometerse no fueran delictivos según el derecho aplicable. Tampoco se puede imponer pena más grave que la aplicable en el momento de la comisión del delito. Si con posterioridad a la comisión del delito la ley dispone la imposición de una pena más leve, el delincuente beneficiará de ello.” Sobre el alcance de esta disposición, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha dicho que “debe interpretarse como ley penal más favorable tanto a aquella que establece una pena menor respecto de los delitos, como a la que comprende a las leyes que desincriminan una conducta anteriormente considerada como delito, crean una nueva causa de justificación, de inculpabilidad, y de impedimento a la operatividad de una penalidad, entre otras. Dichos supuestos no constituyen una enumeración taxativa de los casos que merecen la aplicación del principio de retroactividad de la ley penal más favorable” (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, caso Ricardo Canese vs Paraguay, párr. 179) El Código Penal reconoce expresamente en su artículo 12 la ley penal más favorable no sólo tratándose de la pena, sino en cualquier aspecto. Ahora bien, para que la ley penal posterior resulte aplicable a un caso concreto, esta “debe someter a pena el mismo comportamiento que la ley precedente. Si el tipo contenido en la nueva ley está formado de modo tal que castiga un injusto diferente, lo que ocurrió fue la derogatoria de la anterior incriminación y la concreción de un nuevo injusto. En este caso hay discontinuidad de lo injusto y la nueva ley no puede aplicarse al autor.” (CASTILLO GONZÁLEZ, Francisco. Derecho Penal. Parte General. Tomo I. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2010, p. 206.). Es decir, para que la nueva ley resulte aplicable al imputado, esta debe referirse a la misma conducta que la ley vieja sancionaba, es decir, debe analizarse cuál de las dos leyes resulta más favorable, por contener menores consecuencias jurídicas esenciales para el sujeto activo del delito. En el caso de marras, el aspecto de la norma que se reclama como más favorable está relacionado con la cuantía del salario base como parámetro para definir el monto de lo defraudado a la Hacienda Pública; no obstante, debe indicarse que lo que resulta susceptible de retroactivad es la norma penal, es decir, esta retrotrae sus efectos al momento de los hechos de la presente causa, pero no es objeto de retroactividad el monto del salario base existente en el año 2001 y 2002, pues este es un supuesto fáctico ya acaecido, es un elemento objetivo que solo puede ser verificado que no se considera como una variación del tipo penal. Los hechos deben ser juzgados según la cuantía del salario base que estaba vigente para el momento en que fueron cometidos los dos delitos en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública; esto es, los salarios base que regían para los años 2001 y 2002. En este sentido, la Sala de Casación Penal mediante el voto número 0095-2001, de las 09:20 horas, del 26 de enero de 2001, reitera el criterio vertido en el voto N° 416-A-93, de las 10:50 horas, del 30 de setiembre de 1993, resolviendo lo siguiente: “(…) la modificación anual del parámetro para determinar la cuantía en los tipos penales de comentario, no constituye una reforma dirigida a favorecer al reo ni tampoco a reducir la penalidad en forma anual, sino por el contrario sólo busca mantener la punibilidad en valores monetarios reales. En efecto, al utilizarse como parámetro de determinación de la cuantía un factor económico variable, se pretende mantener los niveles de punición en los valores reales que según un específico criterio de política criminal adoptó el legislador en un determinado momento histórico, valores que por efecto de la inflación están sujetos a cambiar numéricamente. Pero eso no significa que los cambios inflacionarios en el factor constituyan reformas cuyo propósito esté dirigido a favorecer al reo, o para disminuir la penalidad en algunos delitos, o para convertir delitos en contravención (...), quizás previendo una posible discusión al momento de interpretarse la reforma legal, debe indicarse que el propio legislador resolvió el problema y señaló en forma expresa cual debía ser la solución. En efecto, se aclara la posible duda sobre el carácter de la reforma y las modificaciones sucesivas a la cuantía, al señalarse en el artículo 2 en forma simple, clara y expresa que "...LAS MODIFICACIONES CONTENIDAS EN ESTA LEY Y LAS QUE SE HICIEREN EN UN FUTURO AL SALARIO BASE DEL OFICINISTA 1 CITADO, NO SE CONSIDERARAN COMO VARIACION AL TIPO PENAL, A LOS EFECTOS DEL ARTICULO 13 DEL CODIGO PENAL Y 490, INCISO 4 DEL CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES..." (Artículo 2 de la ley 7337). Se trata de una interpretación del propio órgano que aprobó la norma, la cual nos evidencia el propósito de las modificaciones a la cuantía. (...), debemos hacer referencia a un aspecto práctico, que si bien no constituye un razonamiento dogmático al menos contribuye a evidenciar la logicidad de las interpretaciones. La realidad y la experiencia nos demuestran que nuestro país no mantiene una situación financiera estable (...). Esto significa que el "salario base" referido en la reforma tendrá día con día una denominación numérica expresada en unidades de moneda nacional cada vez más alto. En consecuencia, si concluimos que deben aplicarse esas cuantías futuras a los casos fallados cuando estaba vigente otra cuantificación numérica de ese salario base, ello implicará a la vez afirmar que el sólo transcurso del tiempo se constituirá en una causa automática de despenalización de la conducta (al menos el paso de delito a contravención para unos casos, o la reducción de la pena para otros), por la tendencia inflacionaria que siempre, absolutamente siempre, ha existido en nuestro país, lo que implica un absurdo desde el punto de vista de una racional política criminal (…).” Con respecto al otro cuestionamiento del impugnante de que la reforma al artículo 92 del C.N.P.T. ofrece un elemento que resultan más beneficioso para los justiciables, a saber, el establecimiento de un monto de quinientos salarios base como condición objetiva de punibilidad, se verifica que este reclamo fue acogido por el ad quem. Así, en la resolución N°2018-1750, de las 16:30 horas, del 03 de diciembre de 2018, del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, visible de folio 598 fte. a 660 vto. del tomo I del expediente principal, se resuelve lo siguiente: “ Por ende, deben rechazarse los reclamos efectuados y mantenerse lo resuelto sobre este tema pues, por tratarse de normas temporales, en que se modifica la cuantía para efectos de evitar la pérdida de valor de la moneda por la inflación, pero permanece inalterable la continuidad del injusto, el cambio de ley posterior debe hacerse solo en cuanto al aumento del umbral de punibilidad, pero no respecto a la cuantía de los salarios vigentes al momento de efectuarse la conducta acusada (…). En síntesis, dado que el salario base en 2001 era de ciento veinte mil seiscientos colones (? 120 600; ver aviso número 02-2001 publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 23 del 01 de febrero de 2001 y en la página de internet:https: //www.hacienda.go.cr/ contenido/ 13944-historico -salarios- base), los quinientos (500) salarios base llegaban a sesenta millones trescientos mil colones (? 60 300 000) y el monto acusado, en el hecho 90, como defraudado en ese año, fue de ciento cuarenta y nueve millones setecientos dieciséis mil cuatrocientos setenta y nueve colones con quince céntimos (? 149 716 479,15), se verifica que la conducta atribuida era típica. Igual sucede con los hechos de 2002, en que el salario base era de ciento treinta y seis mil seiscientos colones (ver aviso número 01-2002 del Boletín Judicial No. 24 del 04 de febrero de 2002) y los quinientos (500) salarios base ascendían a sesenta y ocho millones trescientos mil colones ( ? 68 300 000) por lo que, si el monto acusado, en el hecho 90, como defraudado fue de doscientos setenta y siete millones setecientos treinta y cinco mil ciento seis colones con cuarenta y ocho (? 277 735 106,48), ello implica que se cumple ese elemento de la tipicidad (…).” En consecuencia, aunque el Tribunal de Alzada reconoce, de forma debida, que el monto de quinientos salarios base que plantea la reforma del artículo 92 del C.N.P.T. como condición objetiva de punibilidad, constituye un elemento del tipo penal que debe aplicarse de forma retroactiva por resultar la norma más favorable, al realizarse el cálculo del monto defraudado a la Hacienda Pública a partir de la cuantía del salario base vigente para los años 2001 y 2002, las sumas obtenidas superan sobradamente los quinientos salarios base que exige la norma, por lo cual los hechos probados no resultan atípicos. Finalmente, se indica que esta Sala no considera necesario realizar una consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, como lo solicita el recurrente, con respecto a la imposibilidad legal de aplicar el principio de retroactividad de la ley penal más favorable tratándose de leyes temporales, toda vez que ya la Sala Constitucional ha emitido un criterio concreto referente al tema en la resolución número 3929-95, y además, la Sala de Casación Penal no vislumbra roces de constitucionalidad. Con fundamento en lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el segundo motivo de casación formulado por el defensor particular, licenciado William Charpentier Morales.

IV.- Recurso de casación planteado a favor de Olger Murillo Hernández y Jorge Murillo Hernández, denominados “vicios in iudicando. ” PRIMER MOTIVO: “ El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal no observó de manera justificada preceptos legales sustantivos al no aplicar la norma más favorable según la aplicación retroactiva de la ley penal más favorable posterior a la comisión del hecho punible, lo anterior en relación al artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios”. Omisión que en criterio de la parte recurrente, genera agravio, al menoscabar Tratados Internacionales, como la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, suscritos por Costa Rica, en la legislación interna. Refieren que de acuerdo a la convicción del ad quem, no resulta viable variar la decisión del a quo, porque a pesar de que estiman que el mandato legal más beneficioso es el que incrementa “el umbral de punibilidad”, el fallo contiene las siguientes contradicciones sensibles: “1).Reconocen que la ley más favorable es la del 2012 (resultando, en este caso, que lo es la de 2012, al subir el umbral de punibilidad por el aumento de los salarios base de 200 a 500, lo que hace que hechos que eran delito antes de 2012 (por superar los 200 salarios, pero no llegar a 500). Dejaran de serlo en esa fecha); 2). Aplican un criterio de autoridad (falacia de autoridad) en la aplicación del criterio erga hommnes (sic) de la Sala Constitucional (“tal cosa no es posible cuando existe, en el ordenamiento jurídico nacional, un órgano con competencia para ello que ya lo ha efectuado, en el tema específico sometido a conocimiento de la jurisdicción ordinaria, y su jurisprudencia también resulta vinculante erga omnes, al tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdiccional (sic) Constitucional (…) Nótese que si bien el juez y las juezas de instancia soslayaron el tema de la convencionalidad, basaron su criterio en el voto constitucional, el cual sí fue emitido a partir del cuestionamiento, expreso de la estipulación contemplada en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, con lo que se cerró la posibilidad de discutir el tema en el derecho interno, vinculado a este y otros tribunales ordinarios a lo estipulado por el órgano constitucional. Por ende, deben rechazarse los reclamos efectuados y mantenerse lo resuelto sobre este tema pues, por tratarse de normas temporales, en que se modifica la cuantía para efectos de evitar la pérdida de valor de la moneda por la inflación, pero permanece inalterable la continuidad del injusto, el cambio de ley posterior debe hacerse solo en cuanto al aumento del umbral de punibilidad, pero no respecto a la cuantía de los salarios vigentes al momento de efectuarse la conducta acusada”. 3) Valora el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia que en ambos casos existe delito, es decir que, para el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia los hechos superaron el umbral de punibilidad previsto en el numeral 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, tanto en la regulación vigente al momento de comisión de los hechos como en la actual, pero olvidan y esto es lo más importante, que el cambio en el umbral del delito permite que se pueda adecuar mejor la pena por el resultado supuestamente producido y existiendo una condición de punibilidad en la norma de comentario, la defensa del imputado pudo acudir a vías como la conciliación o el pago del impuesto con otros montos de multas y de sanciones administrativas más reales y ajustadas”. Solicitan anular la sentencia del Tribunal de Apelación, y se ordene el reenvío, aplicando la ley más favorable, a efectos de que se proceda a realizar la prevención del pago “correcto y acotado” (cfr. folios 935 a 937 y 928). El primer motivo de casación se declara sin lugar. Los casacionistas reclaman que el Tribunal de Apelación inobservó la aplicación de la norma más favorable, en relación al artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante C.N.P.T.), por cuanto a pesar de reconocer que la reforma producida en el año 2012 resulta más favorable, no se aplica la cuantía de ese año para calcular el monto de lo defraudado a la Hacienda Pública. Se advierte que este reproche resulta similar al motivo de casación expuesto por el defensor particular, licenciado William Charpentier Morales, a favor de todos los imputados, el cual fue debidamente resuelto en el considerando anterior, por lo que con el objetivo de evitar repeticiones, se procede a resolver de forma concreta la queja. De esta manera, se verifica que no existe una vulneración al principio de retroactividad de la ley penal más favorable; por el contrario, el ad quem reconoce que el salario base como elemento objetivo de punibilidad sí constituye un aspecto de la norma posterior que resulta más beneficiosa para los justiciables, y por ello, el cálculo para determinar si los hechos probados resultan atípicos, o no, lo efectúa el Tribunal de Alzada con fundamento en quinientos salarios base. Este elemento del tipo penal fue reformado en el año 2012, según la Ley N°9069, del 10 de setiembre del 2012, “Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria”, la cual modificó el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T. Sin embargo, la cuantía del salario base no puede ajustarse al año 2012, o al año en que los encausados fueron juzgados, toda vez que el monto del salario base del año 2001 y 2002 constituye un supuesto fáctico ya acaecido, es decir, es un elemento objetivo que solo debe ser verificado y no se considera forme parte del tipo. En esta línea, lo que resulta susceptible de retroactividad es la norma penal, la cual retrotrae sus efectos al momento en que acontecieron los hechos, siempre que esto resulte más favorable al imputado; empero, no es objeto de retroactividad el monto del salario base, por cuanto el monto del salario base que rige es el que se encontraba vigente al momento en que ocurrieron los hechos, aunque posteriormente este monto sea modificado y resulte más favorable a los intereses de los justiciables. Por su parte, el numeral 68 del C.N.P.T refiere que el concepto de salario base que se emplea en la ley corresponde al contenido en el artículo 2 de la Ley N°7337, el cual señala que “(…) dicho salario base regirá durante todo el año siguiente (…).” Además, el artículo 2 de la Ley N°7337 contempla que “Las modificaciones contenidas en esta Ley y las que se hicieren en un futuro al salario base del “Oficinista 1” citado, no se considerarán como variación al tipo penal, a los efectos del artículo 13 del Código Penal (…).” Consecuentemente, el reclamo de los recurrentes no puede prosperar porque las variaciones anuales a la cuantía del salario base no pueden considerarse variaciones al tipo penal (artículo 2 de la Ley N°7337). No se omite indicar que la Sala Constitucional mediante el voto 3929-95, de las 15:24 horas, del 18 de julio de 1995, referente a la consulta legislativa N°2781-06, sobre la constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley de “Justicia Tributaria” (expediente legislativo N°12142), así como en consultas facultativas de constitucionalidad posteriores, ha resuelto lo siguiente: “ El salario base de un Oficinista 1 varía en noviembre de cada año al aprobarse el presupuesto del Estado, lógicamente aumentando el monto económico a percibir, lo que plantea el problema de que todos los años el monto aprobado, al ser mayor, varía el tipo penal de las figuras mencionadas en la ley, creando una situación más favorable para quienes cometieron el hecho cuando regía un monto inferior. Ahora bien, el problema radica en determinar, si es constitucionalmente obligatorio aplicar a estos casos el principio de la ley más favorable al reo, o bien, si es un problema de legalidad, como lo ha definido ya la Sala Tercera de esta Corte en su sentencia número 416-A-93 de las diez horas cincuenta minutos del treinta de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres (...). El artículo 39 de la Constitución Política señala, en lo que interesa, que: "a nadie se hará sufrir pena, sino por delito...sancionado con ley anterior, y en virtud de sentencia firme dictada por autoridad competente, previa oportunidad concedida al indiciado para ejercitar su defensa y mediante la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad". Esta norma, entre otros, establece el principio básico de que las leyes rigen para el futuro, principio también protegido por el artículo 34 de nuestra Constitución que establece que: "a ninguna ley se le dará efecto retroactivo en perjuicio de persona alguna, de sus derechos patrimoniales adquiridos o de situaciones jurídicas consolidadas". Por su parte, el artículo 129 del mismo cuerpo normativo en sus párrafos primero y último también lo recoge señalando "las leyes son obligatorias y surten efectos desde el día que ellas designen; a falta de este requisito, diez días después de su publicación en el Diario Oficial; la ley no queda abrogada no derogada, sino por otra posterior...". Según el contenido lógico de los artículos 34 y 39 citados, la irretroactividad de la ley penal es una consecuencia del principio de reserva de ley, y por lo tanto tiene rango constitucional, tema sobre el cual no existe ninguna discrepancia en la doctrina, cuando se trata de aplicar la ley retroactivamente en perjuicio de la persona. El problema surge más bien, ante la aplicación de la ley penal más benigna, el cual, por las razones que se dirán, no tiene contenido constitucional como bien lo ha resuelto, en la sentencia citada, la Sala Tercera al señalar (…). En el mismo sentido se ha pronunciado la Corte Suprema Argentina que tiene una norma constitucional prácticamente idéntica a la nuestra, señalando que "el principio de ley más benigna no tiene jerarquía constitucional no obstante el trascendente papel que juega dentro del derecho penal" (fallos t.293 p. 522; t.253 p. 93;t.211 p. 1657. Criterio compartido por Zaffaroni en Tratado de Derecho Penal, Tomo Primero General y Rodríguez Devesa, Derecho Penal, Parte General). La Sala comparte y hace suyos los argumentos contenidos en la citada sentencia por ser claros y ajustados a derecho, y por ello procede declarar sin lugar la acción en cuanto a este extremo.” Con fundamento en lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el primer motivo de casación incoado a favor de los justiciables Olger Murillo Hernández y Jorge Murillo Hernández.

V.- Recurso de casación planteado a favor de Olger Murillo Hernández y Jorge Murillo Hernández, denominados “vicios in iudicando. ” SEGUNDO MOTIVO: Aplicación errónea del artículo 45 de Código Penal, por parte del Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, al soslayar “(…) la naturaleza de la figura de inducción al error a la Administración Tributaria regulado por el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios a la fecha de la supuesta comisión del ilícito”. Reclaman los impugnantes que el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia, al confirmar el fallo del Tribunal de Juicio, genera un agravio en razón de que el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, concordado con el numeral 5 de la Ley del Impuesto de Renta, imposibilita la coautoría “por ser el reproche penal de tipo subjetivo y ser el declarante de renta una condición sinequanon (sic) para tenerse como autor de ese delito”. Pretenden que se anule la resolución del ad quem, y se les exonere de toda apena y responsabilidad, según los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política (cfr. folios 940 a 944). Exponen que el Tribunal de Apelación, al desarrollar su tesis de coautoría, se opone a la existencia de ilícitos de propia mano o especial propio; por el contrario, afirman la concurrencia de un delito de consumación instantánea, “empleando el argumento para justificar el dominio del sí y el cómo del curso causal de los coautores, y de la forma de cómo se ejecuta el delito, por medio de la ampliación de responsabilidad del artículo 67 del C.N.P.T., se adecuan los hechos probados de la sentencia de mérito a lo que en doctrina se conoce como un grupo de interés económico, que le permita la adecuación típica en apoyo de la sentencia del Tribunal de Juicio avalando las posturas de este último” (cfr. folio 944). Así las cosas, discrepan del fallo venido en alzada, por cuanto consideran que no procede establecer la responsabilidad subjetiva de todas las personas intervinientes en el ciclo económico, indistintamente sean parte o no, de los órganos de la persona jurídica, pues se excluye la responsabilidad penal, que es personal, excepto “se ha extendido en el derecho positivo a las personas jurídicas, con la exigencia sine qua non, del vínculo el que debe demostrarse, siendo personero, y no solo siendo integrante de una familia (…).” Sintetizan que el ad quem, al abarcar a todos los sujetos autores, como miembros de un grupo de interés económico, violenta tanto el principio de responsabilidad penal, como el ligamen de causalidad, y los réditos de cada una de las personas autoras y participes; además de los principios de inocencia, de tipicidad, de mínima intervención del derecho penal (cfr. folio 947). El segundo motivo de casación se declara sin lugar. Debe advertirse que este reclamo resulta semejante al motivo de casación que interpuso el defensor particular, licenciado William Charpentier Morales, a favor de todos los imputados, el cual fue debidamente resuelto en el considerando II, por lo que con la finalidad de evitar repeticiones, se procede a resolver de forma concreta la queja. Los casacionistas argumentan que el artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante C.N.P.T), constituye un delito especial propio o de propia mano, por lo que solo puede imputarse al contribuyente activo del impuesto sobre la renta, ya que solo esta persona puede cometer la conducta típica descrita en el tipo penal, rechazándose así la posibilidad de una participación en coautoría de cualquier sujeto que no figure como contribuyente. Ahora bien, conviene definir que en los delitos especiales propios “la calidad del sujeto es considera como un elemento del tipo (por ejemplo: en la prevaricación la calidad de juez”; mientras que los delitos de propia mano “se caracterizan, esencialmente, porque en ellos el sujeto activo delimita el círculo de los posibles autores, hacia aquel sujeto que realiza corporal o personalmente la acción prohibida.” (CHINCHILLA SANDÍ, Carlos. Autor y Coautor en Derecho Penal. Parte General. Costa Rica: Editorial Jurídica Continental, 2004, p. 379 y 419). Para comprender si el tipo penal se ajusta a las definiciones indicadas, conviene citar el contenido del artículo 92 del C.N.P.T. Así, para el momento en que ocurren los hechos, la redacción de la norma, en lo que interesa, era la siguiente: “ Artículo 92.- Inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria. Cuando la cuantía del monto defraudado exceda de doscientos salarios base, será sancionado con prisión de cinco a diez años quien induzca a error a la Administración Tributaria, mediante simulación de datos, deformación u ocultamiento de información verdadera o cualquier otra forma de engaño idónea para inducirla a error, con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, una exención o una devolución en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública (…).” Este artículo fue reformado en el año 2012 y adicionado en el año 2016, sin embargo, manteniéndose la continuidad de lo injusto, la nueva redacción indica: “ Artículo 92.- Fraude a la Hacienda Pública. El que, por acción u omisión, defraude a la Hacienda Pública con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, evadiendo el pago de tributos, cantidades retenidas o que se hayan debido retener, o ingresos a cuenta de retribuciones en especie u obteniendo indebidamente devoluciones o disfrutando beneficios fiscales de la misma forma, siempre que la cuantía de la cuota defraudada, el importe no ingresado de las retenciones o los ingresos a cuenta o de las devoluciones o los beneficios fiscales indebidamente obtenidos o disfrutados exceda de quinientos salarios base, será castigado con la pena de prisión de cinco a diez años (…). ” Como puede observarse, el tipo penal no describe expresamente ninguna cualificación en el sujeto activo que logre ajustarse a las exigencias que la doctrina ha definido para los delitos especiales propios, lo que hace que cualquier persona pueda cometer el delito de inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria (actualmente denominado Fraude a la Hacienda Pública). De igual forma, el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T tampoco puede ser considerado un delito de propia mano, por cuanto la ejecución del ilícito puede darse entre varios intervinientes aunque no sean contribuyentes; pues, tal y como se describe en los hechos probados, cada encausado desarrolló una función específica y esencial a un plan común que permitió ejecutar y consumar un delito que indujo a error a la Administración Tributaria y produjo un perjuicio económico a la Hacienda Pública. Partiendo de la teoría del dominio del hecho, la cual resulta aplicable a este caso, se vislumbra que todos los intervinientes mantuvieron un codominio funcional del hecho, en el que cada uno de los encausados pudo decidir sobre la ejecución de la ilicitud, realizando un aporte objetivo a un plan común. Y aunque efectivamente, no todos los imputados figuraban como contribuyentes al impuesto sobre la renta, no es necesario que cada acusado haya realizado de propia mano la acción delictuosa, toda vez que el hecho ilícito se les imputa porque brindaron una contribución esencial al delito, existió una resolución común que fijó los fines comunes y hubo distribución de funciones conforme al principio de la división del trabajo, a través del cual los coautores fundamentaron el dominio del hecho al tener una participación decisiva en el despliegue de la actividad ilícita, lo cual claramente es lo que se describe en los hechos probados. En consecuencia, no existe una errónea aplicación del artículo 45 del Código Penal, referente a la participación en coautoría, por lo que se declara sin lugar el segundo motivo de casación interpuesto a favor de los encausados Olger Murillo Hernández y Jorge Murillo Hernández.

VI.- Recurso de casación incoado a favor de Wilson Soto Mora y Carlos Huertas Barboza. SEGUNDO MOTIVO: Aplicación incorrecta de los artículos 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios y 12 del Código Penal; ello de conformidad con el inciso b) del numeral 468 de Código Procesal Penal, y artículo 1° de Código Penal, al violentarse el principio de legalidad, según los numerales 37, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 8.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 10 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, y 9.1 de Pacto Internacional sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Indican que el ad quem ratificó la postura del a quo en relación a la teoría de la continuidad del injusto, pese a que el artículo 92 de Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios de 1999, dista de la disposición normativa del 2012. Asimismo, reprochan la inobservancia de un tipo penal novedoso, dejándose de analizar la modificación de doscientos a quinientos salarios base, que constituye el umbral de punibilidad; además se varió el tipo penal, aspectos trascendentales omitidos por el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia (cfr. folios 956 a 965). Como agravio puntualizan el siguiente: “los parámetros utilizados en la sentencia condenatoria y avalados en la segunda instancia, han sido los vigentes en los períodos fiscales 2001 y 2002, que hubieran resultado de aplicación con la norma vigente al 3 de agosto de 1999, pero que al haber sido sustituido el tipo penal (abrogación tácita) por la norma del 10 de septiembre de 2012, desde luego no pueden tener vigencia en septiembre de 2017 cuando se emite el fallo condenatorio. Con lo expuesto, se ha causado un gravamen irreparable a todos los imputados en esta causa, en el sentido de que se les ha impuesto una pena de 10 años de prisión y para tales efectos se ha procedido de la siguiente manera: Se ha juzgado en septiembre de 2017, con base en una ley que entró en vigencia septiembre de 2012, es decir 5 años antes, pero para considerar su conducta, no se ha considerado la legislación vigente en septiembre de 2012, sino que se ha considerado como elemento constitutivo de la infracción un (sic) ley de agosto de 1999 (18 años antes), que toma como referencia un concepto de salario base del año 2001 y 2002, es decir, de 16 y 15 años antes al juzgamiento, pero con base en el umbral de punibilidad establecido, 11 y 10 años después, pues ya no se ha considerado los 200 salarios base del año 1999, sino los 500 salarios base del año 2012 (…).” Concluyen que predomina un gravamen irreparable, a raíz de una flagrante infracción al derecho de defensa (cfr. folios 966 a 967). Solicitan declarar con lugar el presente motivo de casación, se anule la resolución objetada, y ante la imposibilidad de decretar el reenvío –por un vicio en la aplicación de la ley sustantiva-, se dicte la correspondiente absolutoria (cfr. folio 967). El segundo motivo de casación se declara sin lugar. El Código Penal plantea los siguientes principios de aplicación de la ley penal en el tiempo, a saber: 1) los hechos punibles se juzgarán según las leyes que estén vigentes para el momento de la comisión del delito (artículo 11 del Código Penal); 2) si con posterioridad a la comisión del delito se promulga una nueva ley, el hecho punible se regirá por la que resulte más favorable al imputado (artículo 12 del Código Penal); 3) si la promulgación de la nueva ley más favorable se produce antes del cumplimiento de la condena, el tribunal competente modificará la sentencia (artículo 13 del Código Penal); 4) los hechos ilícitos cometidos durante la vigencia de una ley temporal se regirán siempre de conformidad con lo términos de esta (artículo 14 del Código Penal); y, 5) en cuanto a las medidas de seguridad, se aplicará la ley vigente en el momento de la sentencia y las que se dicten durante la ejecución (artículo 15 del Código Penal). Según los hechos probados, los dos delitos de inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria (actualmente denominado Fraude a la Hacienda Pública), fueron cometidos en los años 2001 y 2002, y para ese momento, se encontraba vigente la siguiente redacción del artículo 92 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante C.N.P.T.): “Artículo 92.- Inducción a error a la Administración Tributaria. Cuando la cuantía del monto defraudado exceda de doscientos salarios base, será sancionado con prisión de cinco a diez años quien induzca a error a la Administración Tributaria, mediante simulación de datos, deformación u ocultamiento de información verdadera o cualquier otra forma de engaño idónea para inducirla a error, con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, una exención o una devolución en perjuicio de la Hacienda Pública (…).” Sin embargo, posteriormente, este numeral fue reformado por la Ley N°9069, del 10 de setiembre del 2012, denominada “Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria”; asimismo, el artículo 16 de la “Ley para Mejorar la Lucha contra el Fraude Fiscal”, Ley N°9416, del 14 de diciembre del 2016, adicionó un párrafo a la norma, de tal manera que el numeral 92 del C.N.P.T. plantea, en la actualidad, la siguiente redacción: “ Artículo 92.- Fraude a la Hacienda Pública. El que, por acción u omisión, defraude a la Hacienda Pública con el propósito de obtener, para sí o para un tercero, un beneficio patrimonial, evadiendo el pago de tributos, cantidades retenidas o que se hayan debido retener, o ingresos a cuenta de retribuciones en especie u obteniendo indebidamente devoluciones o disfrutando beneficios fiscales de la misma forma, siempre que la cuantía de la cuota defraudada, el importe no ingresado de las retenciones o los ingresos a cuenta o de las devoluciones o los beneficios fiscales indebidamente obtenidos o disfrutados exceda de quinientos salarios base, será castigado con la pena de prisión de cinco a diez años (…). ” De forma específica, los recurrentes cuestionan que existe una aplicación incorrecta del artículo 92 del C.N.P.T, ya que con fundamento en el numeral 12 del Código Penal, se dejó de analizar que la nueva ley plantea un nuevo tipo penal y un nuevo umbral de punibilidad, por lo que al existir una derogación tácita de la ley vieja, no debe aplicarse la cuantía del salario base que corresponde a los años 2001 y 2002. Ahora bien, debe explicarse que la nueva ley no castiga un comportamiento diferente al que estaba contemplado en la ley anterior, sino que la reforma producida en el año 2012 al artículo 92 del C.N.P.T. plantea una nueva valoración unitaria del mismo comportamiento sancionado por la ley que se encontraba vigente para los años 2001 y 2002, por lo que existe continuidad de lo injusto, lo cual permite discutir cuál de las normas resulta más favorable al imputado. En este orden de ideas, la nueva ley no concreta un nuevo tipo penal, y aunque la redacción de ambas normas no resulta idéntica, ya que la reforma del año 2012 expone conceptos más amplios, ambas leyes sancionan la misma conducta típica de defraudar a la Hacienda Pública mediante el suministro de información que no corresponde con la realidad de los ingresos que generan las actividades lucrativas, lo cual produce un menor pago de tributos. Ahora bien, siendo que hay continuidad de lo injusto porque ambas normas sancionan la misma conducta, resulta claro que la reforma del año 2012, se esboza como la ley más favorable, toda vez que aumenta el elemento objetivo de punibilidad hasta quinientos salarios base. Sin embargo, tal y como se ha explicado en considerandos anteriores, no puede emplearse de forma retroactiva el monto del salario base del año 2012, porque la cuantía específica, no forma parte del tipo penal, debido a que el monto del salario base constituye un supuesto fáctico ya acaecido, esto es, un elemento objetivo que solo debe ser verificado,que por ello, no resulta susceptible de retroactividad, por cuanto solo la norma penal puede retrotraer sus efectos al momento de los hechos, siempre que esto sea más favorable al endilgado. Además, el artículo 68 del C.N.P.T. indica que el concepto de salario base que utiliza la ley se basa en el artículo 2 de la Ley N°7337, la cual establece de forma expresa que la cuantía del salario base será modificada año con año, y que estas modificaciones no pueden ser consideradas como variaciones al tipo penal. En consecuencia, si los hechos ocurrieron en los años 2001 y 2002, no puede pretenderse que el cálculo de lo defraudado a la Hacienda Pública se efectúe a partir del salario base del año 2012. Con fundamento en lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar el segundo motivo de casación planteado a favor de los imputados Wilson Soto Mora y Carlos Huertas Barboza.

Por Tanto:

Se declaran sin lugar los motivos primero y segundo del recurso de casación que promueve el defensor particular, licenciado William Charpentier Morales, a favor de todas las personas imputadas. Se declaran sin lugar los motivos primero y segundo del recurso de casación (vicios in iudicando) interpuesto a favor de los encausados O.M.H. y J.M.H. Se declara sin lugar el segundo motivo del recurso de casación incoado a favor de los justiciables W.G.S.M y C.G.H.B.. Notifíquese.

Jesús Alberto Ramírez Q .

Patricia Solano C. Álvaro Burgos M .

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V . Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M.

N° interno. 245-1/3-4-19 paa