Non-indigenous occupation of indigenous territory does not constitute the crime of usurpationDelito de usurpación no se configura por ocupación no indígena de territorio indígena

*162001370634PE* Res: 2019-01105 SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on the fourth of September, two thousand nineteen.

Cassation Appeal filed in the present case brought against Víctor Zúñiga Mora, adult, Costa Rican, identity card number 1-0390-0839, born in San Isidro de Pérez Zeledón on June 1, 1950, farmer, son of Víctor Manuel Zúñiga Fallas and María Mora Fonseca, resident of Buenos Aires, Salitre, Olán; Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, adult, Costa Rican, holder of identity card number 1-1132-0931, born in San Isidro de Pérez Zeledón on March 20, 1982, farmer and cattle rancher, son of Víctor Zúñiga Mora and Mireya Fallas Camacho, resident of Buenos Aires, Salitre, Olán; and Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales, adult, Costa Rican, holder of identity card number 6-0292-0667, born in Salitre de Buenos Aires, on July 14, 1978, farmer, son of Ernesto Vargas Figueroa and Magdalena Obando Obando, resident of Buenos Aires, Salitre, Palmital, for the crime of Usurpation and Attempted Homicide, to the detriment of [Name 001]. The judges Patricia Solano Castro, Jorge Enrique Desanti Henderson, Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, Rafael Segura Bonilla, and Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas participate in this instance, the latter four as substitute judges. Also participating in this instance are licensed attorney Genive González Hernández, in her capacity as private defense counsel for the Accused Zúñiga Mora and Zúñiga Fallas, licensed attorney Elvia Jeanneth Quirós Quirós representing the Civil Defense Office for the Victim of Pérez Zeledón, and licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya representing the Indigenous Affairs Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry.

Resultando:

1. By means of judgment No. 2018-0320, issued at ten hours and twenty-nine minutes on July 6, two thousand eighteen, the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal of Cartago resolved: "Por tanto: The sentence appeals filed by the representative of the Public Ministry and the attorney from the Civil Defense Office for the Victim are declared without merit, and the challenged resolution is upheld in all its aspects. Notify. CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ MORA DECIDING JUDGE IVETTE CARRANZA CAMBRONERO DECIDING JUDGE JOSE MANUEL CISNEROS MOJICA DECIDING JUDGE" (sic).

2. Against the preceding pronouncement, licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, representative of the Indigenous Affairs Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry, filed a cassation appeal.

3. Once the respective deliberation was verified, the Chamber considered the issues raised in the appeal.

4. The relevant legal requirements have been observed in the appeals; and,

Considerando:

I.By resolution number 2018-866, of 16:00 hours, on November 28, 2018 (cfr. folios 69 to 75), this Chamber admitted for hearing on the merits the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, in his capacity as Prosecutor for Indigenous Affairs of the Public Ministry, in which he alleged the disregard of a substantive legal precept, specifically, the non-application of numeral 225 of the Penal Code. According to his thesis, in assessing the objective elements of the criminal type of usurpation, the ad quem forgot to carry out the indispensable conventionality control regarding the examination of the possession and collective property of indigenous communities (the possessor's spiritual relationship with the land), whose territorial scope is different and more extensive than that used daily. In this case, that scope is linked to the collective right inherent to an organized indigenous people. Furthermore, the establishment of the necessary conditions is relevant for social, cultural, and economic survival for "the reproduction and preservation of their customs and traditions." In the present case, the accused persons—who are not indigenous Bribrí from Salitre—hence their lack of legitimacy, for the purposes of possessing real estate "...within this territory, thus their rights were not being harmed, but rather the transmission system specific to the indigenous territory of Salitre was being respected, given that said land, as indicated by the Salitre Development Association and the other representative organizations of the Bribrí People of Salitre, was acquired by the aggrieved party, whose acquisition is recognized and endorsed by the respective Indigenous Development Association...". He considers that the interpretation issued by the Appeals Tribunal, leaves unprotected the cultural integrity of a group of indigenous inhabitants, accentuated in traditions; a community that distinguishes itself from the rest by granting its members a unique cultural identity, which if not protected, causes harm to fundamental rights, such as the right to dignity and personal integrity, to food, and to their own spirituality. The transmission of property holds a community or collective purpose, constituted by each of the rights of each individual person, natural in their cosmovision; they cannot risk members of other cultures modifying or devaluing the cultural identity. By virtue of this, the State has the obligation to protect them juridically, through lease contracts, etc. In support of his thesis, the appellant cites the judgment on the merits, reparations, and costs, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in the case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community vs. Paraguay, of March 29, 2006 (cfr. folios 42 back to 43 back). In this regard, the appellant points out: "...reclaiming the lands is a right that indigenous people have of an imprescriptible nature, as it remains valid over time since they are the legitimate owners of their traditional lands, for which they have the right to their use and enjoyment, despite this right having been denied to them." He affirms that, according to the inter-American system, the possession of lands in the indigenous sphere must adhere to compliance with established requirements, on the understanding that such possession has similar scope to the full domain title granted by the State, in addition to demanding recognition of ownership and registration. Likewise, the right of property is recognized for indigenous populations despite the lack of legal title. According to the applicant, the indigenous person has the power to recover their lands, even if they lack possession over them, since possession does not constitute a legal requirement to condition the existence of that right (cfr. folio 44 front and back). In turn, he states that the Criminal Sentence Appeals Tribunal failed to recognize that protection is not limited solely to possession of the real estate, as it is fundamental to assess the possessor's spiritual nexus with the lands; that is, the cultural legacy and the medium that allows the effectiveness of the right to life, in the development and transmission of cultures and traditions. In the appellant's opinion, for the crime of usurpation, contemplated in numeral 225 of the Penal Code, to arise, in addition to analyzing possession and property, due to the matter of specialty, it requires all the subjective and objective elements of the criminal type "... so that there exists not only irregular possession but also that the non-indigenous person performs acts that disturb, partially or totally evict by means of violence, threat, deception, clandestinity, or abuse of trust, by means of invasions of the real estate or by expelling the indigenous occupants or by altering territorial boundaries to fraudulently gain greater area or extension of land. All of the above with the sole purpose of disturbing the legitimate possession held by the indigenous person, either by an ancestral right or one that the local government, in this case ADI, granted them..." (cfr. folio 46). He indicates that the grievance in the ad quem's judgment arises from an assessment of private property and civil possession excluding the correct conventionality control, in which the importance of communal land rights is omitted, whose holder is the respective ethnic group, a decision that also diminishes the legal powers of the Indigenous Development Association. The claim is not admissible: From the arguments formulated, this Chamber notes that the complaint consists of disagreeing with the non-application of the criminal type contained in article 225 of the Penal Code, in the event that the indigenous territory is occupied by persons who do not hold that status. Regarding the legal framework applicable to indigenous matters, concerning the right to their traditional lands and collective property, in first order, there is the Indigenous Law No. 6172, of November 29, 1977, regulated by Executive Decrees No. 8487 of April 26, 1978 and No. 13568 of April 30, 1982, which contain broad regulation of issues of identity, organization, and territory of indigenous peoples. With regard to the territories, it is recognized that these belong to the collectivity of the indigenous community and that they must be ordered or delimited by means of geographic coordinates. Of great relevance for the respect of the rights of indigenous peoples in our legal system is the ratification of Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, called "Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," by Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, which provides in article 14, regarding territorial law, the following: "1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned." This norm refers to the recognition of the right of property and possession of the lands that indigenous peoples have traditionally occupied, imposing the obligation on the State to delimit the lands and guarantee the effective protection of those rights, as well as the creation of procedures to achieve their reclamation. Also, article 17 of the Convention establishes that: "1. Procedures established by the peoples concerned for the transmission of rights over land among their members shall be respected. 2. The peoples concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is being given to their capacity to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights over these lands outside their own community. 3. Persons not belonging to these peoples shall be prevented from taking advantage of their customs or of their lack of understanding of the laws on the part of their members to secure the ownership, possession or use of land belonging to them." Finally, the Convention in its article 18 states: "Adequate penalties shall be established by law for unauthorised intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take measures to prevent such offences." In that same vein, article 5 of the Indigenous Law provides mechanisms to finance the defense and recovery of lands in favor of indigenous communities. To this end, it expressly establishes: "In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, the ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, if they so desire; if relocation is not possible or they do not accept the relocation, they must be expropriated and compensated according to the procedures established in the Expropriation Law. (As amended by article 65, subsection d) of Law No. 7495 of May 3, 1995). The studies and expropriation and compensation procedures shall be carried out by the ITCO in coordination with CONAI. If there is a subsequent invasion by non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed with their eviction, without any payment of compensation. IN THE SPECIFIC CASE: From the comprehensive nature of the judgment, it is corroborated as proven facts that: "...the defendant Víctor Zúñiga Mora is the person who had been exercising continuous and uninterrupted possession of the real estate in question, for several years before the events, as a lessee of said real estate, so that on the date of the events narrated in the accusation, he could not have usurped the possession of a real estate that he himself had been exercising for several years before..." (cfr. folio 4 and 5). As a first observation, it must be considered that the occupation of the real estate by the accused persons originated from a lease contract and therefore, the ownership of the property right of the farm is not involved, but rather the act of occupation derives from the referred legal transaction. This point was verified through testimonial evidence; the deponent [Name 004] indicated having acquired the disputed property from Mr. [Name 008], by means of a notarized sale letter, with a plan, on July 26, 1997, and by the date of the events, he had possessed it for about 20 years, mentioning that its previous owner possessed the farm for 15 years prior. Furthermore, said witness recounted that since the year 2007 or 2006 he rented the real estate to the accused here, Víctor Zúñiga Mora (cfr. folio 5). Regarding the possession of the real estate, the aggrieved party [Name 001] stated that he entered the farm on April 3, 2016, with the endorsement of the Council of Elders Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka, in order to recover indigenous territory occupied by non-indigenous persons and that the accused Víctor had cattle there (cfr. folio 6 back); while witness [Name 014] declared that at the time of the events there were cattle inside the property and he understood that the person who had them was Víctor Zúñiga (cfr. folio 7). The appellant alleges the disregard of article 225 of the Penal Code, by omitting the conventionality control over the possession and collective property of indigenous communities. This Chamber agrees with the appellant on the thesis about the indigenous cosmovision and the important relationship between the land, nature, and their subsistence as a community, to maintain their customs. For this reason, in the progressive analysis of Human Rights regarding the right to property, contained in article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights, an evolving interpretation of the concept of property has been carried out. Consequently, indigenous territories are granted protection from the perspective of collective property; reason for which indigenous peoples who lose possession of their territories maintain their ancestral property right over them and a preferential right to recover them. However, this last aspect is relevant for the solution of this particular case, since the complainant [Name 001], as mentioned above, is an indigenous person who, with the purpose of reclaiming supposed indigenous lands, was designated by the Council Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka of the Bribrí territory of Salitre to occupy the farm in question, entering it on April 3, 2016, but at that time, it was being used by the accused Víctor Zúñiga for tending cattle (cfr. folio 6 back). The succession of actions carried out by the accused Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Víctor Zúñiga Mora, regarding the use, entering the property to repair a fence, and cutting down a tree (cfr. folio 5 back and 6), compared to those carried out by the complainant [Name 001] to recover the alleged indigenous territory, entering, building, and occupying the same, do not allow us to consider that, under the terms stipulated by article 225 of the Penal Code, a dispossession or disturbance of the possession of the real estate to the detriment of Mr. [Name 001] has been configured. In that context, it is noted rather that the events arise from the affirmative actions undertaken by the indigenous community of Bribrí de Salitre for the recovery of the supposed indigenous territories. In this sense, regarding the necessary guarantee of the right to possession and collective property of the territories traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples, especially in reference to access to justice to reivindicar the lands, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stated the following: "...Possession of the claimed lands and its requirement for the recognition of community property. 109. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding community property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) traditional possession of their lands by indigenous people has equivalent effects to that of a full domain title granted by the State; 2) traditional possession gives indigenous people the right to demand official recognition of ownership and registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title to the lands to the members of the indigenous communities; 4) members of indigenous peoples who for reasons beyond their control have left or lost possession of their traditional lands maintain the right of property over them, even in the absence of legal title, unless the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith; and 5) members of indigenous peoples who involuntarily lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal size and quality...". (Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. Vs. Paraguay). In respect for the preceding inter-American jurisprudential criterion, this Chamber considers that the State must combine efforts, taking the necessary measures to guarantee and restore the possession of indigenous peoples over their territories, through expedited reivindicatorios procedures, whether by relocation, expropriation, or eviction, as appropriate, of right-holding or illegal owners or possessors, under the terms established by the current legal system, which contemplates solutions in pursuit of defending the rights of original peoples. It is clear that indigenous and tribal peoples have not only the right to possess, but also to own their territories, as well as to exercise effective control over their lands, to safeguard their culture. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated: "...In the considerandos of the decree, the Executive Branch recognizes that the indigenous population of Costa Rica is gravely threatened in their existence by continuous and arbitrary dispossession of their lands. It also recognized that the phenomenon has increased and is due to the fact that indigenous people lack legal backing for the ownership of the lands they have occupied since time immemorial. Therefore, indigenous people have long been requesting the legalization of inalienable Reserves and the recognition of their right to a land guarantee. It concludes that, in response to the State's obligation to guarantee the security of its citizens and prevent injustices, especially against traditionally marginalized minorities such as indigenous populations, it decrees the establishment of the reserves, declares them property of the indigenous communities, and orders their registration in the Public Registry. Of great importance is that it establishes that the Indigenous Reserves are inalienable, incedible (sic), and exclusive for the aboriginal communities that inhabit them and that, therefore, non-indigenous persons who were owners or possessors of properties located in the reserve must be expropriated...". (Judgment 6229-1999, of 14:30 hours on August 11, 1999, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now then, under the established factual framework, an erroneous interpretation arises on the part of the appellant, in seeking the legal solution to the problem by means of criminal law, confusing the object of protection of the crime of usurpation with the preferential right of possession and collective property of indigenous communities. The conflict is contextualized in the dispute over supposed indigenous territories, due to the exercise of possession by the defendant Víctor Zúñiga Mora, who is a non-indigenous person. While it is true, as the appellant indicates, that a person foreign to the indigenous community should not exercise the right of possession over indigenous territories, because they constitute the fundamental basis of the culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival of indigenous peoples, it corresponds to the State, as has been indicated, based on the international obligations acquired in this matter and the legal regulations that have recognized the rights of indigenous peoples, to give special protection to the community regarding the possession of its territory. However, this situation does not mean that the crime of usurpation is configured, because the object of protection, as regulated in article 225 of the Penal Code, is the possession of a real estate, and it is more than proven regarding the legitimacy of the title to be protected by the norm; the occupation of the property in question, from years before, arising from the purchase notarized in 1997 by [Name 004] and the lease contract from 2007 with the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, does not make the latter's permanence on the real estate criminal, and it is up to the State to deploy the legal protection mechanisms that allow the indigenous community to fully exercise the attributes inherent to their right of property and possession over the ancestral lands; indigenous persons being empowered to resort to legal, administrative or judicial channels to assert their reivindicatorios rights as recognized by law. Note that the Indigenous Law in article 5 empowers for requesting the eviction, relocation, or expropriation of the possessor, whatever their condition, once the right has been recognized by the State. On the other hand, in essence and as relevant regarding the objective elements of the criminal type of usurpation, there are different ways of committing the dispossession, namely violence, threats, deception, abuse of trust, or clandestinity; also, the act of dispossession, seizure, or disturbance can occur by invading the real estate, remaining in it, or expelling its occupants. Doctrine on this subject has considered regarding the typical action that: "It is to dispossess, which has a sense of taking away, of removing from occupation or preventing the occupation of the real estate totally or partially by the passive subject; it can occur, therefore, by displacing the holder, possessor or exerciser of the real right in question from the place (land) that constitutes the real estate or by opposing that person continuing to perform the acts proper to their occupation as they had been doing. But to be typical, the dispossession must be marked by the purpose of remaining in the real estate by occupying it..." (Creus Carlos, Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, Volume I, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma, 6th edition, 1st reprint, 1998, p. 559). For the crime of usurpation to have been configured in this case, there would have had to exist a resolution issued by the competent authority declaring that territory as indigenous, and imposing on the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales the obligation to leave the farm, so that the indigenous community would take material and formal possession of the real estate, and if the accused, knowing they could no longer remain on the farm, had re-entered it, remaining there through violence, threats, deception, abuse of trust, or clandestinity. However, the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora was exercising possession of the real estate, as has been credited in the judgment, derived from a lease contract for the property, which he kept delimited with a fence and used for cattle. This does not mean that the accused has a permanent right over the property, but rather that the issue of the recovery of the presumed indigenous territories must be discussed through the corresponding legal channel. In any case, it is important to emphasize regarding the configuration of the crime of usurpation and, without detriment to the rights of the indigenous communities, that if the defendants entered into possession of the real estate in a valid way to the possession of the real estate, there could not be dispossession, seizure, or disturbance, due to the controversy that arose over whether they have the right to remain there or not. As has been explained, the appellant mistakes the channel by attempting to address the conflict through criminal law, without considering that criminal law is an exceptional channel (ultima ratio) for resolving social conflicts, whereby only when all the objective and subjective elements required by substantive criminal law are met, would it be possible to establish the typicality of a conduct, which is not the case here. It should be added that the appellant states that there were acts disturbing the legitimate possession held by the indigenous person, referring to the moment when the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Lelis Alvarado Vargas Morales, and Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas appeared to repair a fence, a situation alluded to by both the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora and Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas (cfr. folio 5 and 6), as well as the complainants [Name 014] and [Name 001] (cfr. folio 8 back). Regarding this last argument, there is no restriction on the full exercise of possession or tenure, because, as already stated, from the testimonial and documentary evidence gathered, it is verified that at the time of the allocation of the farm, March 13, 2016, to the aggrieved party [Name 001] by the Indigenous Development Association, and his subsequent entry to the real estate on April 3, 2016, it was known that the person exercising possession of the real estate was the defendant here, Víctor Zúñiga Mora, and regarding the fact that they remained on the property, as has been seen, it would have to have been declared as indigenous territory, and also, in this case, the expulsion of the accused would have been required. This being the case, the claim is declared without merit.

Por tanto:

The cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, Prosecutor for Indigenous Affairs of the Public Ministry, is declared without merit. Notify.

Patricia Solano C.

Jorge Enrique Desanti H. Substitute Judge.

Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M. Substitute Judge.

Rafael Segura B. Substitute Judge.

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V. Substitute Judge.

CBADILLAB 590-4/16-6-18 *162001370634PE* </strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">San José, at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on the fourth of September, two thousand nineteen.</span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="justify"><span style="color: #010101; font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> </span></span> <span style="font-family: Arial;"> <span style="font-size: 12pt;">Cassation Appeal filed in the present case against </span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>Víctor Zúñiga Mora</strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, of legal age, Costa Rican, identity card number 1-0390-0839, born in San Isidro de Pérez Zeledón on June 1, 1950, farmer, son of Víctor Manuel Zúñiga Fallas and María Mora Fonseca, resident of Buenos Aires, Salitre, Olán; </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> <strong>Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas</strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, of legal age, Costa Rican, bearer of identity card number 1-1132-0931, born in San Isidro de Pérez Zeledón on March 20, 1982, farmer and cattle rancher, son of Víctor Zúñiga Mora and Mireya Fallas Camacho, resident of Buenos Aires, Salitre, Olán, and </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales</strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, of legal age, Costa Rican, bearer of identity card number 6-0292-0667, born in Salitre de Buenos Aires, on July 14, 1978, farmer, son of Ernesto Vargas Figueroa and Magdalena Obando Obando, resident of Buenos Aires, Salitre, Palmital, for the crime of </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>Usurpation and Attempted Homicide, </strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> to the detriment of </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 001]</span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>. </strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Participating in this instance are the Judges Patricia Solano Castro, Jorge Enrique Desanti Henderson, Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, Rafael Segura Bonilla, and Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas, the latter four as Substitute Judges. Also participating in this instance are licensed attorney Genive González Hernández, in her capacity as Private Defender of the Defendants Zúñiga Mora and Zúñiga Fallas, licensed attorney Elvia Jeanneth Quirós Quirós representing the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim of Pérez Zeledón, and licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya representing the Indigenous Affairs Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry.</span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="center"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>Whereas:</strong></span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="justify"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong> 1.</strong></span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"> By judgment </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>No. 2018-0320</strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, issued at ten hours and twenty-nine minutes on July 6, 2018, the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court of Cartago resolved: </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em>"Por Tanto: </em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>The appeals against the judgment filed by the representative of the Public Ministry and the attorney from the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim are dismissed, and the challenged resolution is upheld in all its aspects. </em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em>Notifíquese. </em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em> CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ MORA DECISION-MAKING JUDGE/ IVETTE CARRANZA CAMBRONERO DECISION-MAKING JUDGE</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em> </em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> <em>JOSE MANUEL CISNEROS MOJICA DECISION-MAKING JUDGE</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em> " </em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">(sic).</span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="justify"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong> 2.</strong></span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"> Against the preceding pronouncement, licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, representative of the Indigenous Affairs Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry, filed a cassation appeal.</span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="justify"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong> 3.</strong></span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"> Having completed the respective deliberation, the Chamber considered the questions raised in the appeal.</span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="justify"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong> 4. </strong></span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;">In the appeal, the pertinent legal requirements have been observed; and, </span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="center"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>Considering:</strong></span></span></div> <div style="line-height: 200%;" align="justify"><span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong> </strong></span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong>I.</strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> Through resolution number 2018-866, of 16:00 hours, on November 28, 2018 (cf. folios 69 to 75), this Chamber admitted for a hearing on the merits the first ground of the cassation appeal filed by licensed attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, in his capacity as Prosecutor for Indigenous Affairs of the Public Ministry, in which he alleged failure to observe a substantive legal precept, specifically, the non-application of numeral 225 of the Penal Code. According to his thesis, in the assessment of the objective elements of the criminal type of usurpation (usurpación), the </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>ad quem</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> forgot to carry out the indispensable conventionality control regarding the examination of collective possession and property of indigenous communities (the spiritual relationship of the possessor with the land), whose territorial scope is different and more extensive than that used daily. In the present case, said scope is linked to the collective right inherent to an organized indigenous people. Furthermore, the establishment of the necessary conditions is relevant for the social, cultural, and economic survival for "</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>the reproduction and preservation of their customs and traditions</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">". In the present case, the accused persons –are not indigenous people of Bribrí de Salitre-, hence their lack of standing, for the purposes of possessing properties "</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>...within this territory, whereby their rights were not being harmed, but rather respecting the transmission system proper to the indigenous territory of Salitre, given that said land, as indicated by the Salitre Development Association and the other representative organizations of the Bribrí People of Salitre, was acquired by the aggrieved party, whose acquisition is recognized and endorsed by the respective Indigenous Development Association...</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">". He considers that the interpretation issued by the Appeals Court abandons the cultural integrity of a group of indigenous inhabitants, accentuated in traditions; a community that distinguishes itself among the others by granting its members –a unique cultural identity-, which, if not protected, leads to violations of fundamental rights, such as the right to dignity and personal integrity, to food, and to their own spirituality. The transmission of property encloses a community or collective purpose, constituted by each of the rights of each individual person, which by their nature in their cosmovision cannot risk that members of other cultures modify or devalue the cultural identity. By virtue of this, the State has the obligation to legally protect them, through lease contracts, etc. In support of his thesis, the appellant cites the judgment on merits, reparations, and costs, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in the case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community vs. Paraguay, of March 29, 2006 (cf. folios 42 verso to 43 verso). In this regard, the appellant points out: "...</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>to reclaim the lands, is a right that indigenous people have of an imprescriptible nature, since it remains in force over time because they are the legitimate owners of their traditional lands, for which reason they have the right to the use and enjoyment of the same, even though this right may have been denied to them</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">". He affirms that, according to the inter-American system, the possession of lands in the indigenous sphere must adhere to the fulfillment of the established requirements, with the understanding that such possession has scope similar to the title of full ownership (título de pleno dominio) granted by the State, in addition to requiring the recognition of ownership and registration. Likewise, the right of property is recognized for indigenous populations despite the lack of a legal title. As indicated by the petitioner, the indigenous person has the power to recover their lands, even if they lack possession over them, since possession does not constitute a legal requirement to condition the existence of that right (cf. folio 44 front and verso). In turn, he refers that the Criminal Sentence Appeals Court ignored that protection is not limited only to the possession of the property, since it is fundamental to assess the spiritual nexus of the possessor with the lands; that is, the cultural legacy and the means that allow the effectiveness of the right to life, in the development and transmission of cultures and traditions. In the appellant's opinion, for the emergence of the crime of usurpation (usurpación), contemplated in numeral 225 of the Penal Code, in addition to analyzing possession and property, due to the issue of specialty, it requires all the subjective and objective elements of the criminal type "... </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>so that there is not only an irregular possession but rather that the non-indigenous person performs acts that disturb, partially or totally dispossess by means of violence, threat, deceit, clandestinity, or abuse of trust, through invasions of the property or by expelling the indigenous occupants or altering the territorial limits to gain greater area or extension of land fraudulently. All of the above with the sole purpose of disturbing the legitimate possession held by the indigenous person, whether by an ancestral right or one granted by the local government, in this case the ADI.</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">.." (cf. folio 46). He indicates that the grievance in the judgment of the </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>ad quem</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> is generated from an assessment of private property and civil possession that excludes the correct conventionality control and in which the importance of communal land rights is omitted, whose titleholder is the respective ethnic group, a decision that also undermines the legal powers of the Indigenous Development Association (Asociación de Desarrollo Indígena). </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em>The claim is not admissible:</em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> From the arguments formulated, this Chamber appreciates that the complaint consists of disagreeing with the non-application of the criminal type contained in article 225 of the Penal Code, in the event that the indigenous territory is occupied by persons who do not hold such condition. <span class="example1 282985" style="font-size: 12pt;">In relation to the legal framework applied in indigenous matters, regarding the right to their traditional lands and collective property, the Indigenous Law No. 6172, of November 29, 1977, regulated by Executive Decrees No. 8487 of April 26, 1978, and No. 13568 of April 30, 1982, contains a broad regulation of issues concerning the identity, organization, and territory of indigenous peoples. Regarding the territories, it is recognized that these belong to the collectivity of the indigenous community and that they must be ordered or delimited by means of geographical coordinates. Of great relevance for the respect of the rights of indigenous peoples in our legal system is the ratification of Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, called "Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries", through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, which provides in article 14, on territorial rights, the following: </span></span><span class="example1 282985" style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>"1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">". This norm refers to the recognition of the right of property and possession of the lands traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples, imposing the State's obligation to delimit the lands and guarantee the effective protection of those rights, as well as the creation of procedures to achieve their recovery (reivindicación). Also, article 17 of the Convention establishes that: </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>"1. Procedures established by the peoples concerned for the transmission of rights to land among their members shall be respected. 2. The peoples concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is being given to their capacity to alienate their lands or to transmit their rights over these lands outside their own community. 3. Persons not belonging to these peoples shall be prevented from taking advantage of their customs or of their lack of understanding of the laws to secure the ownership, possession or use of land belonging to them."</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> Finally, the Convention in its article 18 states: </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>"Adequate penalties shall be established by law for unauthorised intrusion upon, or use of, the lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take measures to prevent such offences."</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> In that same sense, article 5 of the Indigenous Law establishes mechanisms to finance the defense and recovery of lands in favor of indigenous communities. To this end, it expressly establishes: </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>"In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, the ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, if they so wish; if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate them and indemnify them in accordance with the procedures established in the Expropriation Law. (Thus reformed by article 65, subsection d) of Law No. 7495 of May 3, 1995). The studies and procedures for expropriation and indemnification will be carried out by the ITCO in coordination with CONAI. If there is subsequently an invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed to evict them, without payment of any indemnification. </em></span></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong> <em>IN THE CONCRETE CASE</em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em>"</em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><strong><em>:</em></strong></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> From the entirety of the judgment, it is corroborated as proven facts that: </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>"...the defendant Víctor Zúñiga Mora is the person who had been exercising continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property in question, since several years before the events, as the lessee of said property, so that on the date of the events narrated in the accusation, he could not have usurped (usurpado) the possession of a property that he himself had been exercising for several years before..."</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> (cf. folios 4 and 5). As a first appreciation, it must be taken into account that the occupation of the property by the accused persons originated from a lease contract and therefore, the title of the ownership right of the farm is not involved, but rather the act of occupation derives from the referred legal transaction. This point was verified through testimonial evidence; the deponent </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 004]</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> indicated having acquired the property in dispute from Mr. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 008]</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, by means of a notarized private sales agreement (carta venta protocolizada), with a survey plan, dated July 26, 1997, and, that on the date of the events, he had possessed it for around 20 years, mentioning that its previous owner had possessed the farm for 15 years prior. Furthermore, said witness narrated that since the year 2007 or 2006, he rented the property to the herein accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora (cf. folio 5). Regarding the possession of the property, the victim (ofendido) </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 001]</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> stated that he entered the farm on April 3, 2016, with the endorsement of the Council of Elders Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka, in order to recover indigenous territory occupied by non-indigenous persons and that the accused Víctor had livestock there (cf. folio 6 verso); while the witness </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 014]</span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"> declared that at the time of the events, there was livestock inside the property and he understood that it was Víctor Zúñiga who had it (cf. folio 7). The appellant alleges the failure to observe article 225 of the Penal Code, by omitting the conventionality control over the collective possession and property of indigenous communities. This Chamber agrees with the appellant on the thesis about the indigenous cosmovision and the important relationship between land, nature, and their subsistence as a community, to maintain their customs. Therefore, in the progressive analysis of Human Rights regarding the right to property, contained in article 21 of the </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>American Convention on Human Rights</em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, an evolutive interpretation of the concept of property has been made. Consequently, indigenous territories are granted protection from the perspective of collective property; for which reason indigenous peoples who lose possession of their territories maintain their right of ancestral property over them and a preferential right to recover them. However, this last aspect is relevant for the solution of the particular case, since the complainant (denunciante) </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 001]</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, as referred to above, is an indigenous person who, in order to reclaim (reivindicar) supposed indigenous lands, was designated by the Council Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka of the Bribrí territory of Salitre, to occupy the farm in question, entering it on April 3, 2016, but at that moment, it was being used by the accused Víctor Zúñiga for grazing livestock (cf. folio 6 verso). The succession of actions carried out by the accused Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Víctor Zúñiga Mora, referring to the use, entering the farm to repair a fence, and the cutting of a tree (cf. folios 5 verso and 6), versus those carried out by the complainant (denunciante) </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 001]</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">, to recover the alleged indigenous territory, entry, construction, and occupation therein, do not allow for considering that a dispossession (despojo) or disturbance of the possession of the property to the detriment of Mr. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">[Nombre 001]</span> <span style="font-size: 12pt;"> has been configured in the terms set forth by article 225 of the Penal Code. In that context, it is rather denoted that the events arise from affirmative actions undertaken by the indigenous community of Bribrí de Salitre, for the recovery of the supposed indigenous territories. In this sense, regarding the necessary guarantee of the right to possession and collective property of the territories traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples, especially in reference to access to justice to reclaim (reivindicar) lands, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has repeatedly pronounced itself in the following manner: </span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> <em>"...Possession of the claimed lands and its requirement for the recognition of community property. 109. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding the community property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) the traditional possession of indigenous people over their lands has equivalent effects to the title of full ownership (título de pleno dominio) granted by the State; 2) traditional possession grants indigenous people the right to demand official recognition of ownership and its registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title of the lands to the members of the indigenous communities; 4) members of indigenous peoples who for reasons beyond their will have left or lost possession of their traditional lands maintain the right of property over the same, even in the absence of a legal title, except when the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith, and 5) members of indigenous peoples who have involuntarily lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal size and quality..." </em></span><span style="font-size: 12pt;">(Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. Vs. Paraguay). In respect for the preceding inter-American jurisprudential criterion, this Chamber considers that the State must combine efforts, taking the necessary measures to guarantee and restore the possession of indigenous peoples over their territories, by means of expeditious recovery (reivindicatorios) procedures, whether through relocation, expropriation, or eviction, as appropriate, of the legal or illegal owners or possessors, under the terms set forth by the current legal system which contemplates solutions seeking the defense of the rights of original peoples. It is clear that indigenous and tribal peoples have, not only the right to possess, but also to be owners of their territories, as well as to exercise effective control over their lands, to safeguard their culture.</span></span></div> On this point, the Constitutional Chamber has stated: “…<em>In the considerandos of the decree, the Executive Branch acknowledges that the indigenous population of Costa Rica is gravely threatened in its existence by a continuous and arbitrary dispossession of their lands. It also acknowledged that the phenomenon has increased and that it stems from the fact that indigenous people lack legal backing for ownership of the lands they have occupied since time immemorial. For this reason, indigenous people have long been requesting the legalization of inalienable Reservations and the recognition of their right to a guarantee of land. It concludes that, in consideration of the State’s obligation to guarantee the security of its citizens and prevent injustices, especially regarding traditionally marginalized minorities, such as indigenous populations, it decrees the establishment of the reservations, declares them property of the indigenous communities, and orders their registration in the Public Registry. Of great importance is the provision that the Indigenous Reservations are inalienable, non-transferable (sic), and exclusive to the aboriginal communities that inhabit them, and that for this reason, non-indigenous persons who were owners or possessors of parcels located within the reservation must be expropriated…”</em> (Judgment 6229-1999, of 14:30 hours on August 11, 1999, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Now, under the established factual framework, an erroneous interpretation arises on the part of the appellant in seeking a legal solution to the problem through criminal law, confusing the protected interest of the usurpation (usurpación) offense with the preferential right of possession and collective ownership of indigenous communities. The conflict is contextualized within a dispute over alleged indigenous territories, due to the exercise of possession by the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, who is a non-indigenous person. While it is true, as the appellant indicates, that a person outside the indigenous community should not exercise the right of possession over indigenous territories, because they constitute the fundamental basis of the culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival of indigenous peoples, it falls to the State, as has been indicated, based on the international obligations acquired in this matter and the legal norms that have recognized the rights of indigenous peoples, to grant special protection to the community regarding possession of its territory. However, this situation does not mean that the crime of usurpation (usurpación) is constituted, because the protected interest, as regulated in Article 225 of the Penal Code, is the possession of real property, and the legitimacy of the title to be protected by the norm has been amply proven; the occupation of the property in question, which occurred years ago, arising from the purchase formalized in 1997 from [Nombre 004] and the lease contract from 2007 of the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, does not make the latter's continued stay on the property criminal, and the State is responsible for deploying the legal protection mechanisms that allow the indigenous community to fully exercise the powers inherent to its right of ownership and possession over ancestral lands; indigenous persons are empowered to resort to legal, administrative, or judicial avenues to assert their reivindicatory rights as recognized by law. Note that the Indigenous Law, in Article 5, empowers the request for eviction, relocation, or expropriation of the possessor, whatever their condition, once the right has been recognized by the State. On the other hand, essentially and for what is relevant regarding the objective elements of the criminal type of usurpation (usurpación), there are different ways of committing the dispossession, namely violence, threats, deception, abuse of trust, or clandestinity; also, the act of dispossession, seizure, or disturbance can occur by invading the property, remaining on it, or expelling its occupants. Doctrine on this subject has considered regarding the typical action that: <em>"It is the action of dispossessing, which has a sense of removing, of taking out of occupation, or preventing the occupation of the property, in whole or in part, on the part of the passive subject; it can occur, consequently, by displacing the holder, possessor, or exerciser of the real right in question from the place (land) that constitutes the property, or by opposing that person continuing to perform the acts proper to their occupation as they had been executing them. But in order to be typical, the dispossession must be marked by the purpose of remaining on the property occupying it..."</em> (Creus Carlos, Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, tomo I, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma, 6th edition, 1st reprint, 1998, p. 559). For the crime of usurpation (usurpación) to have been constituted in this case, there would have to have been a resolution issued by the competent authority declaring that territory as indigenous, and imposing on the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales the obligation to leave the farm, so that the indigenous community would take material and formal possession of the property, and if the defendants, knowing that they could no longer remain on the farm, had re-entered it, maintaining themselves there through violence, threats, deception, abuse of trust, or clandestinity. However, the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora exercised possession of the property, as has been established as proven in the judgment, derived from a lease contract for the parcel, which he kept delimited with a fence and used with cattle. This does not mean that the accused has a right to the property permanently, but rather that the issue of the recovery of the alleged indigenous territories must be discussed through the appropriate legal avenue. It is important, in any case, to emphasize regarding the constitution of the crime of usurpation (usurpación) and, without detriment to the rights of indigenous communities, that if the defendants entered into possession of the property in a valid manner, there could be no dispossession, seizure, or disturbance, due to the controversy that arose over whether they have the right to remain on it or not. As has been explained, the appellant confuses the avenue, attempting to address the conflict under criminal law, without considering that criminal law is an exceptional avenue (last ratio) for solving social conflicts, and only when all the objective and subjective elements required by substantive criminal law are met would the typicality of a conduct be establishable, which does not happen in this case. It should be added that the appellant refers to alleged acts of disturbance of the legitimate possession held by the indigenous person, referring to the moment when the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Lelis Alvarado Vargas Morales, and Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas showed up to repair a fence, a situation alluded to by both the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora and Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas (cf. folio 5 and 6), and the complainants [Nombre 014] and [Nombre 001] (cf. folio 8 verso). In relation to this last argument, there is no restriction on the full exercise of possession or tenancy, because, as has already been stated, from the testimonial and documentary evidence gathered, it is noted that at the time the farm was assigned, March 13, 2016, to the aggrieved party [Nombre 001], by the Indigenous Development Association, and his subsequent entry onto the property on April 3, 2016, it was known that the person exercising possession of the property was the defendant here, Víctor Zúñiga Mora, and regarding the fact that they remained on the property, as has been seen, it would have to have been declared indigenous territory and, moreover, in this case, the expulsion of the defendants would have had to have been required. Things being thus, the claim is declared without merit.

**Therefore:** The cassation appeal filed by attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, Indigenous Affairs Prosecutor of the Public Ministry, is declared without merit. **Let it be notified.**

| Jorge Enrique Desanti H. Alternate Magistrate. | | Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M. Alternate Magistrate. | | | | | | Rafael Segura B. Alternate Magistrate. | | Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V. Alternate Magistrate. | CBADILLAB 590-4/16-6-18 *162001370634PE* I.- [...]. On the other hand, essentially and as relevant to the objective elements of the criminal offense of usurpation, there are different ways of committing the dispossession, namely violence, threats, deceit, abuse of trust, or clandestinity; also, the act of dispossession, seizure, or disturbance can occur by invading the property, remaining on it, or expelling its occupants. The legal doctrine on this subject has considered, regarding the typical action, that: *"It is that of dispossessing, which has a sense of removing, of taking away from the occupation or preventing the occupation of the property, totally or partially, by the passive subject; it can occur, therefore, by displacing the holder, possessor, or exerciser of the real right in question from the place (land) that constitutes the property, or by opposing that person continuing to perform the acts inherent to their occupation as they had been performing them. But to be typical, the dispossession must be marked by the purpose of remaining on the property, occupying it..."* (Creus Carlos, Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, tomo I, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma, 6° edición, 1° reimpresión, 1998, pág 559). For the crime of usurpation to have been configured in this case, there would have had to be a resolution issued by the competent authority declaring that territory as indigenous, and imposing on the defendants Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales the obligation to leave the farm, so that the indigenous community could take material and formal possession of the property, and if the accused, knowing they could no longer remain on the farm, had re-entered it, maintaining themselves through violence, threats, deceit, abuse of trust, or clandestinity. However, the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora exercised possession of the property, as has been proven in the judgment, derived from a lease contract for the rural property, which he maintained delimited with a fence and used for cattle. This does not mean that the accused has a permanent right over the property, but rather that the issue of recovering the presumed indigenous territories must be discussed through the appropriate legal channel. In any case, it is important to emphasize regarding the configuration of the crime of usurpation and, without detriment to the rights of indigenous communities, that if the accused entered into possession of the property in a valid manner, there could be no dispossession, seizure, or disturbance, due to the controversy arising over whether they have the right to remain on it or not. As has been explained, the appealing party confuses the avenue, seeking to resolve the conflict through criminal law, without considering that criminal law is an avenue of exception (ultima ratio) for solving social conflicts, whereby only when all the objective and subjective elements required by substantive criminal law are met would one be in a position to establish the typicality of conduct, which does not occur in this case. [...].</p> Of great relevance to the respect for the rights of indigenous peoples in our legal system is the ratification of Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, called "Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," through Law No. 7316, of November 3, 1992, which provides in Article 14, regarding territorial rights, the following: *"1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their traditional and subsistence activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned."* This norm refers to the recognition of the right of ownership and possession of the lands that indigenous peoples have traditionally occupied, imposing the obligation on the State to demarcate the lands and guarantee the effective protection of those rights, as well as the creation of procedures to achieve their recovery. Also, Article 17 of the Convention establishes that: *"1. Procedures established by the peoples concerned for the transmission of land rights among their members shall be respected. 2. The peoples concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is being given to their capacity to alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights outside their own community. 3. Persons not belonging to these peoples shall be prevented from taking advantage of their customs or of lack of understanding of the laws on the part of their members to secure the ownership, possession or use of land belonging to them."* Finally, the Convention in its Article 18 states: *"The law shall provide for appropriate penalties against unauthorised intrusion upon, or unauthorised use of, the lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take measures to prevent such offences."* In that same sense, Article 5 of the Indigenous Law provides mechanisms to finance the defense and recovery of lands in favor of indigenous communities. To this end, it expressly establishes: *"In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, the ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, if they so desire; if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate them and compensate them in accordance with the procedures established in the Law of Expropriations. (As amended by Article 65, subsection d) of Law No. 7495 of May 3, 1995). The studies and procedures for expropriation and compensation shall be carried out by the ITCO in coordination with CONAI. If there is subsequently an invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed to evict them, without payment of any compensation whatsoever.

**IN THE SPECIFIC CASE:** From the entirety of the judgment, the following are corroborated as proven facts: *"...the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora is the person who had been exercising continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property in question, since several years before the events, as the lessee of said property, so that on the date of the events narrated in the accusation, he could not have usurped the possession of a property that he himself had been exercising since several years before..."* (cf. pages 4 and 5). As a first observation, it must be taken into account that the occupation of the property by the accused originated from a lease agreement and, therefore, the ownership of the property right is not involved, but rather the act of occupation derives from the referred legal transaction. This point was verified through testimonial evidence; the deponent [Name 004] indicated having acquired the disputed property from Mr. [Name 008], through a notarized private sale agreement, with a registered survey plan, on July 26, 1997, and, as of the date of the events, had been possessing it for around 20 years, mentioning that its previous owner had possessed the farm for 15 years prior. Furthermore, said witness narrated that since the year 2007 or 2006, he had rented the property to the accused herein, Víctor Zúñiga Mora (cf. page 5). Regarding the possession of the property, the victim [Name 001] stated that he entered the farm on April 3, 2016, with the endorsement of the Council of Elders Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka, with the purpose of recovering indigenous territory occupied by non-indigenous persons and that the accused Víctor had cattle there (cf. reverse of page 6); while the witness [Name 014] declared that at the time of the events there was cattle inside the property and he understood that the person who had it was Víctor Zúñiga (cf. page 7). The appellant alleges the non-observance of Article 225 of the Penal Code, by omitting the conventionality control regarding the possession and collective property of indigenous communities. This Chamber agrees with the appellant on the thesis regarding the indigenous worldview and the important relationship between the land, nature, and their subsistence as a community, to maintain their customs. Therefore, in the progressive analysis of Human Rights regarding the right to property, contained in Article 21 of the *American Convention on Human Rights*, an evolutionary interpretation of the concept of property has been made. Consequently, indigenous territories are granted protection from the perspective of collective property; which is why indigenous peoples who lose possession of their territories maintain their ancestral property right over them and a preferential right to recover them. However, this last aspect is relevant for the resolution of the specific case, because the complainant [Name 001], as mentioned above, is an indigenous person who, with the aim of recovering alleged indigenous lands, was designated by the Council Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka of the Bribrí Territory of Salitre, to occupy the farm in question, entering it on April 3, 2016, but at that time, it was being used by the accused Víctor Zúñiga for cattle care (cf. reverse of page 6). The succession of actions carried out by the accused Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Víctor Zúñiga Mora, concerning the use, entered the property to repair a fence, and the cutting of a tree (cf. reverse of page 5 and page 6), compared to those executed by the complainant [Name 001], to recover the purported indigenous territory, entry, construction, and occupation thereof, do not allow for considering that a dispossession or disturbance of the possession of the property to the detriment of Mr. [Name 001] has been configured in the terms established by Article 225 of the Penal Code. In this context, it is instead evident that the events arise from the affirmative actions undertaken by the indigenous community of Bribrí of Salitre, for the recovery of the alleged indigenous territories. In this sense, regarding the necessary guarantee of the right to possession and collective property of the territories traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples, with special reference to access to justice to recover lands, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has repeatedly pronounced as follows: *"...Possession of the claimed lands and its requirement for the recognition of communal property. 109. The Court recalls its jurisprudence regarding the communal property of indigenous lands, according to which: 1) the traditional possession of indigenous peoples over their lands has equivalent effects to the title of full ownership granted by the State; 2) traditional possession gives indigenous peoples the right to demand official recognition of ownership and its registration; 3) the State must delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title to the lands to the members of the indigenous communities; 4) the members of indigenous peoples who, for reasons beyond their will, have left or lost possession of their traditional lands, maintain the right of ownership over them, even in the absence of legal title, except when the lands have been legitimately transferred to third parties in good faith; and 5) the members of indigenous peoples who have involuntarily lost possession of their lands, and these have been legitimately transferred to innocent third parties, have the right to recover them or to obtain other lands of equal size and quality..."* (Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. Vs. Paraguay). In respect to the above inter-American jurisprudential criterion, this Court considers that the State must combine efforts, taking the necessary measures to guarantee and restore the possession of indigenous peoples over their territories, through expeditious recovery proceedings, whether by relocation, expropriation, or eviction as appropriate, of the lawful or illegal owners or possessors, in the terms established by the current legal system, which contemplates solutions in pursuit of the defense of the rights of the original peoples. It is clear that indigenous and tribal peoples have the right not only to possess, but also to be owners of their territories, as well as to exercise effective control over their lands, to safeguard their culture. On this point, the Constitutional Chamber has indicated: *"...In the recitals of the decree, the Executive Branch recognizes that Costa Rica's indigenous population is seriously threatened in its existence by a continuous and arbitrary dispossession of its lands. It also recognized that the phenomenon has increased and that it is due to the fact that indigenous people have no legal title of ownership to the lands they have occupied since time immemorial. For this reason, indigenous people have long requested the legalization of inalienable Reserves and the recognition of their right to guaranteed land. It concludes that, in attention to the State's obligation to guarantee the security of its citizens and prevent injustices, especially those affecting traditionally marginalized minorities, such as indigenous populations, it decrees the establishment of the reserves, declares them the property of the indigenous communities, and orders their registration in the Public Registry. Of great importance is that it establishes that the Indigenous Reserves are inalienable, non-transferable (sic) and exclusive for the aboriginal communities that inhabit them and that, therefore, non-indigenous persons who were owners or possessors of properties located in the reserve had to be expropriated..."* (Judgment 6229-1999, of 2:30 p.m. on August 11, 1999, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).

However, under the established factual framework, a misinterpretation arises on the part of the appellant in seeking the legal solution to the problem through criminal law, confusing the protected object of the crime of usurpation with the preferential right of possession and collective property of indigenous communities. The conflict is contextualized in the dispute over alleged indigenous territories, due to the exercise of possession by the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, who is a non-indigenous person. While it is true, as the appellant indicates, that a person not belonging to the indigenous community should not exercise the right of possession over indigenous territories, because they constitute the fundamental basis of the culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival of indigenous peoples, it is incumbent upon the State, as has been indicated, based on the international obligations acquired in this matter and the legal framework that has recognized the rights of indigenous peoples, to provide special protection to the community regarding the possession of its territory. However, this situation does not mean that the crime of usurpation has been configured, because the object of protection, as regulated in Article 225 of the Penal Code, is the possession of a property, and it is overwhelmingly necessary to prove the legitimacy of the title to be protected by the norm; the occupation of the property in question, since years before, arising from the notarized purchase in the year 1997 by [Name 004] and the lease agreement from the year 2007 of the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, does not make the continued presence of the latter on the property criminal, and it is incumbent upon the State to deploy the legal protection mechanisms that allow the indigenous community to fully exercise the attributes inherent to its right of property and possession over ancestral lands; indigenous persons are empowered to resort to legal, administrative, or judicial channels, to assert their recovery rights as recognized by law. Note that the Indigenous Law in Article 5 authorizes requesting the eviction, relocation, or expropriation of the possessor, whatever his condition may be, once the right has been recognized by the State. Moreover, essentially and for what is of interest regarding the objective elements of the criminal type of usurpation, there are different ways of committing dispossession, namely violence, threats, deceit, abuse of trust, or clandestinity; also, the act of dispossession, seizure, or disturbance can be produced by invading the property, remaining on it, or expelling its occupants. The legal doctrine on this topic has considered, regarding the typical action, that: *"It is that of dispossessing, which has a sense of removing, of taking away the occupation or impeding the occupation of the property, totally or partially, by the passive subject; it can occur, consequently, by displacing the holder, possessor, or exerciser of the real right in question from the place (land) that constitutes the property, or by opposing the continuation of the acts proper to his occupation by the latter as he had been carrying them out. But to be typical, the dispossession must be marked by the purpose of remaining on the property occupying it..."* (Creus Carlos, Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, tomo I, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma, 6th edition, 1st reprint, 1998, p. 559). For the crime of usurpation to have been configured in this case, there would have had to exist a resolution issued by the competent authority declaring that territory as indigenous and imposing on the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, and Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales the obligation to leave the farm, so that the indigenous community took material and formal possession of the property, and if the accused, knowing that they could no longer remain on the farm, had re-entered it, remaining there through violence, threats, deceit, abuse of trust, or clandestinity. However, the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora was exercising possession of the property, as has been established as proven in the judgment, derived from a lease agreement for the property, which he kept delimited with a fence and used for cattle. This does not mean that the accused has a right to the property permanently, but rather that the issue of the recovery of the alleged indigenous territories must be discussed through the appropriate legal channel. It is important, in any case, to emphasize regarding the configuration of the crime of usurpation and, without detriment to the rights of indigenous communities, that if the accused entered into possession of the property in a valid manner, there could not be dispossession, seizure, or disturbance, due to the controversy that arose over whether they have the right to remain on it or not. As has been explained, the appellant is mistaken in the chosen legal mechanism, by attempting to address the conflict through criminal law, without taking into account that criminal law is an exceptional channel (ultima ratio) for resolving social conflicts, hence only when all the objective and subjective elements required by substantive criminal law are met, would it be possible to establish the typicality of a conduct, which is not the case here. It should be added that the appellant states that there were acts of disturbance of the legitimate possession held by the indigenous person, referring to the moment when the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Lelis Alvarado Vargas Morales, and Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas appeared to repair a fence, a situation alluded to by both the accused Víctor Zúñiga Mora and Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas (cf. pages 5 and 6), and the complainants [Name 014] and [Name 001] (cf. reverse of page 8). In relation to this last argument, there is no restriction on the full exercise of possession or tenancy, because, as already stated, from the testimonial and documentary evidence gathered, it is verified that at the time of the allocation of the farm, March 13, 2016, to the victim [Name 001], by the Indigenous Development Association, and his subsequent entry into the property on April 3, 2016, it was known that the person exercising possession of the property was the accused herein, Víctor Zúñiga Mora, and, regarding the fact that they remained on the land, as has been seen, it would have had to be declared as indigenous territory and, furthermore, in this case, the expulsion of the accused would have been required. Therefore, the claim is declared without merit.

Therefore:

The appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) filed by Attorney Daniel Villalobos Araya, Prosecutor for Indigenous Affairs of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), is hereby dismissed. Notify.

CBADILLAB 590-4/16-6-18 *162001370634PE*

*162001370634PE* Res: 2019-01105 SALA TERCERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y quince minutos del cuatro de setiembre del dos mil diecinueve.

Recurso de Casación interpuesto en la presente causa seguida contra Víctor Zúñiga Mora, mayor, costarricense, cédula de identidad número 1-0390-0839, nacido en San Isidro de Pérez Zeledón el 01 de junio del año 1950, agricultor, hijo de Víctor Manuel Zúñiga Fallas y María Mora Fonseca, vecino de Buenos Aires, Salitre, Olán; Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, mayor, costarricense, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-1132-0931, nacido en San Isidro de Pérez Zeledón el 20 de marzo del año 1982, agricultor y ganadero, hijo de Víctor Zúñiga Mora y Mireya Fallas Camacho, vecino de Buenos Aires, Salitre, Olán y Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales, mayor, costarricense, portador de la cédula de identidad número 6-0292-0667, nacido en Salitre de Buenos Aires, el 14 de julio del año 1978, agricultor, hijo de Ernesto Vargas Figueroa y Magdalena Obando Obando, vecino de Buenos Aires, Salitre, Palmital, por el delito de Usurpación y Tentativa de Homicidio, en perjuicio de [Nombre 001] . Intervienen en esta instancia lo s magistrados y magistradas Patricia Solano Castro, Jorge Enrique Desanti Henderson, Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga Morales, Rafael Segura Bonilla y Gerardo Rubén Alfaro Vargas, estos últimos cuatro como magistrados suplentes. También intervienen en esta instancia la licenciada Genive González Hernández, en su condición de defensora particular de los Imputados Zúñiga Mora y Zúñiga Fallas, la licenciada Elvia Jeanneth Quirós Quirós en representación de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima de Pérez Zeledón y el licenciado Daniel Villalobos Araya en representación de la Fiscalía de Asuntos Indígenas del Ministerio Público.

Resultando:

1. Mediante sentencia N° 2018-0320, dictada a las diez horas veintinueve minutos del seis de julio del dos mil dieciocho, el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago resolvió: “Por Tanto: Se declara sin lugar los recursos de apelación de sentencia incoados por el representante del Ministerio Público y la abogada de la oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima y se confirma la resolución impugnada en todos sus extremos. Notifíquese. CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ MORA JUEZ/A DECISOR/A IVETTE CARRANZA CAMBRONERO JUEZ/A DECISOR/A JOSE MANUEL CISNEROS MOJICA JUEZ/A DECISOR/A " (sic).

2. Contra el anterior pronunciamiento el Licenciado Daniel Villalobos Araya representante de la Fiscalía de Asuntos Indígenas del Ministerio Público, interpus o recurso de casación.

3. Verificada la deliberación respectiva, la Sala se planteó las cuestiones formulada en el recurso.

4. En los r ecurso se han observado las prescripciones legales pertinentes; y,

Considerando:

I.Mediante resolución número 2018-866, de las 16:00 horas, del 28 de noviembre de 2018 (cfr. folios 69 a 75), esta Sala admitió para conocimiento de fondo el primer motivo del recurso de casación interpuesto por el licenciado Daniel Villalobos Araya, en su condición de Fiscal de Asuntos Indígenas del Ministerio Público, en el que adujo inobservancia de un precepto legal sustantivo, concretamente, la inaplicación del numeral 225 del Código Penal. Según su tesis, en la valoración de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal de usurpación, el ad quem olvidó llevar a cabo el indispensable control de convencionalidad en lo concerniente al examen sobre la posesión y la propiedad colectiva de las comunidades indígenas (la relación espiritual del poseedor con la tierra), cuyo ámbito territorial es diferente y más extenso al utilizado diariamente. En la especie, dicho ámbito está vinculado al derecho colectivo propio de un pueblo indígena organizado. Además, el establecimiento de las condiciones necesarias es relevante para la supervivencia social, cultural y económica para “la reproducción y preservación de sus costumbres y tradiciones”. En el presente caso, las personas imputadas –no son indígenas de Bribrí de Salitre-, de ahí su falta de legitimación, a efectos de poseer inmuebles “…a lo interno de este territorio, con lo que no se le estaba lesionando sus derechos, si no respetando el sistema de transmisión propio del territorio indígena de Salitre, toda vez que dicho terreno como lo ha indicado la Asociación de Desarrollo de Salitre y las demás organizaciones representativas del Pueblo Bribrí de Salitre, fue adquirido por el agraviado, cuya adquisición es reconocida y avalada por la respectiva Asociación de Desarrollo Indígena…”. Estima que la interpretación emitida por el Tribunal de Apelación, desampara la integridad cultural de un grupo de habitantes indígenas, acentuada en tradiciones; comunidad que se distingue entre las restantes por conceder a sus integrantes –una identidad cultural única-, que si no es tutelada, acarrea quebrantos a derechos fundamentales, como el derecho a la dignidad e integridad personal, a la alimentación y a su propia espiritualidad. La transmisión de la propiedad encierra una finalidad comunitaria o colectiva, constituida por cada uno de los derechos de cada persona individual, naturales en su cosmovisión no pueden arriesgar que miembros de otras culturas modifiquen o devalúen la identidad cultural. En esa virtud, el Estado tiene la obligación de protegerlos jurídicamente, a través de contratos de arrendamiento, etc. En respaldo de su tesis el recurrente cita la sentencia de fondo, reparaciones y costas, de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en el caso de la Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa vs Paraguay, del 29 de marzo de 2006 (cfr. folios 42 vuelto a 43 vuelto). Al respecto, el recurrente señala: “…reivindicar las tierras, es un derecho que tienen los indígenas de naturaleza imprescriptible, pues permanece vigente en el tiempo ya que son los dueños legítimos de sus tierras tradicionales, por lo cual tienen derecho al uso y goce de las mismas, a pesar de que este derecho les haya sido negado”. Afirma que, de acuerdo con el sistema interamericano, la posesión de tierras en el ámbito indígena debe apegarse al cumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos, en el entendido de que, tal posesión tiene alcances similares al título de pleno dominio que concede el Estado, además de exigir el reconocimiento de la propiedad y del registro. De igual manera, se reconoce a las poblaciones indígenas el derecho de propiedad pese a la falta de título legal. Según indica el gestionante, la persona indígena tiene la facultad de recuperar sus tierras, aunque carezca de la posesión sobre las mismas, por cuanto la posesión no configura un requisito legal para condicionar la existencia de ese derecho (cfr. folio 44 frente y vuelto). A su vez, refiere, que el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia desconoció que la protección no se circunscribe solamente a la posesión del inmueble, pues resulta fundamental valorar el nexo espiritual del poseedor con las tierras; es decir, el legado cultural y el medio que permite la efectividad del derecho a la vida, en el desarrollo y transmisión de las culturas y tradiciones. En criterio del recurrente, para el surgimiento del delito de usurpación, contemplado en el numeral 225 del Código Penal, además de analizar la posesión y propiedad, por el tema de especialidad, requiere de todos los elementos subjetivos y objetivos del tipo penal “… de manera que solo exista una posesión irregular sino que la persona no indígena realice actos que turbare, despoje parcial o totalmente por medio de violencia, amenaza, engaño, clandestinidad o abuso de confianza, por medio de invasiones sobre el inmueble o bien expulsando a los ocupantes indígenas o bien alterare los límites territoriales para ganar mayor cavidad o extensión de terreno de forma fraudulenta. Todo lo anterior con la única finalidad de perturbar la posesión legítima que ostenta la persona indígena, ya sea por un derecho ancestral o bien que el gobierno local, en este caso ADI le otorgó...” (cfr. folio 46). Indica que, el agravio en la sentencia del ad quem se genera a partir de una valoración de propiedad privada y posesión civil excluyente del correcto control de convencionalidad y en la cual se omite la importancia del derecho comunal a la tierra, cual titular lo conforma el grupo étnico respectivo, decisión que también menoscaba las facultades legales de la Asociación de Desarrollo Indígena. El reclamo no es de recibo: De los argumentos formulados, aprecia esta Cámara que la queja consiste en discrepar en la inaplicación del tipo penal contenido en el artículo 225 del Código Penal, en el supuesto en que el territorio indígena, se encuentra ocupado por personas que no reviste dicha condición. Con relación al marco jurídico que se aplica en materia indígena, en lo que se refiere al derecho a sus tierras tradicionales y a la propiedad colectiva, se tiene en primer orden la Ley Indígena N° 6172, del 29 de noviembre de 1977, reglamentada por los Decretos Ejecutivos No. 8487 de 26 de abril de 1978 y No. 13568 de 30 de abril de 1982, contienen una amplia regulación de temas sobre la identidad, organización y territorio de los pueblos indígenas. En lo que respecta a los territorios se reconoce que estos pertenecen a la colectividad de la comunidad indígena y, que se deben ordenar o delimitar por medio de coordenadas geográficas. De gran relevancia para el respeto de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, es la ratificación del Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, denominado “Convenio sobre pueblos indígenas y Tribales en países independientes”, mediante la Ley N°7316, del 3 de noviembre de 1992, la cual dispone en el artículo 14, sobre el derecho territorial, lo siguiente: “1. Deberá reconocerse a los pueblos interesados el derecho de propiedad y de posesión sobre las tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan. Además, en los casos apropiados, deberán tomarse medidas para salvaguardar el derecho de los pueblos interesados a utilizar tierras que no estén exclusivamente ocupadas por ellos, pero a las que hayan tenido tradicionalmente acceso para sus actividades tradicionales y de subsistencia. A este respecto, deberá prestarse particular atención a la situación de los pueblos nómadas y de los agricultores itinerantes. 2. Los gobiernos deberán tomar las medidas que sean necesarias para determinar las tierras que los pueblos interesados ocupan tradicionalmente y garantizar la protección efectiva de sus derechos de propiedad y posesión. 3. Deberán instituirse procedimientos adecuados en el marco del sistema jurídico nacional para solucionar las reivindicaciones de tierras formuladas por los pueblos interesados”. Esta norma se refiere al reconocimiento del derecho de propiedad y posesión de las tierras que tradicionalmente han ocupado los pueblos indígenas imponiendo la obligación del Estado de delimitar las tierras y garantizar la protección efectiva de esos derechos, así como la creación de procedimientos para lograr su reivindicación. También, el artículo 17 del Convenio, establece que: “1. Deberán respetarse las modalidades de transmisión de los derechos sobre la tierra entre los miembros de los pueblos interesados establecidas por dichos pueblos. 2. Deberá consultarse a los pueblos interesados siempre que se considere su capacidad de enajenar sus tierras o de transmitir de otra forma sus derechos sobre estas tierras fuera de su comunidad. 3. Deberá impedirse que personas extrañas a esos pueblos puedan aprovecharse de las costumbres de esos pueblos o de su desconocimiento de las leyes por parte de sus miembros para arrogarse la propiedad, la posesión o el uso de las tierras pertenecientes a ellos.” Finalmente, el Convenio en su artículo 18 señala: “ La ley deberá prever sanciones apropiadas contra toda intrusión no autorizada en las tierras de los pueblos interesados o todo uso no autorizado de las mismas por personas ajenas a ellos, y los gobiernos deberán tomar medidas para impedir tales infracciones”. En ese mismo sentido, el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena dispone mecanismos para financiar la defensa y recuperación de tierras a favor de las comunidades indígenas. Para ello, expresamente establece: “En el caso de personas no indígenas que sean propietarias o poseedoras de buena fe dentro de las reservas indígenas, el ITCO deberá reubicarlas en otras tierras similares, si ellas lo desearen; si no fuere posible reubicarlas o ellas no aceptaren la reubicación, deberá expropiarlas e indemnizarlas conforme a los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Expropiaciones. (Así reformado por el artículo 65, inc. d) de la Ley Nº 7495 de 3 de mayo de 1995). Los estudios y trámites de expropiación e indemnización serán efectuados por el ITCO en coordinación con la CONAI. Si posteriormente hubiere invasión de personas no indígenas a las reservas, de inmediato las autoridades competentes deberán proceder a su desalojo, sin pago de indemnización alguna. EN EL CASO CONCRETO": De la integralidad de la sentencia, se corrobora como hechos demostrados que: “…el encartado Víctor Zúñiga Mora es la persona que venía ejerciendo la posesión continua e ininterrumpida del inmueble en cuestión, desde varios años antes de los hechos, como arrendatario de dicho inmueble, por lo que a la fecha de los sucesos narrados en la acusación, no podía haber usurpado la posesión de un inmueble que él mismo venía ejerciendo desde varios años antes…” (cfr. folio 4 y 5). Como primera apreciación debe tomarse en cuenta que la ocupación del inmueble por parte de los acusados, se originó en razón de un contrato de arrendamiento y por ello, no se involucra la titularidad del derecho de la propiedad de la finca, sino que el acto de ocupación deriva del referido negocio jurídico. Este punto se constató por medio de prueba testimonial; el deponente [Nombre 004] indicó haber adquirido la propiedad en disputa del señor [Nombre 008], por medio de una carta venta protocolizada, con un plano, en fecha 26 de julio de 1997 y, para la fecha de los hechos tenía alrededor de 20 años de poseerla, haciendo mención de que su anterior propietario, poseía la finca desde 15 años atrás. Además, dicho testigo narró que desde el año 2007 o 2006 le alquiló el inmueble al aquí acusado Víctor Zúñiga Mora (cfr. folio 5). Sobre la posesión del inmueble el ofendido [Nombre 001] expuso que ingresó a la finca el 3 de abril de 2016, con el aval del Consejo de Ancianos Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka, con el fin de recuperar territorio indígena ocupado por personas no indígenas y que el acusado Víctor tenía ganado ahí (cfr. folio 6 vuelto); mientras el testigo [Nombre 014] declaró que para el momento de los hechos había ganado en el interior de la propiedad y él entendía que quien lo tenía era Víctor Zúñiga (cfr. folio 7). Se alega por parte del impugnante la inobservancia del artículo 225 del Código Penal, al omitirse el control de convencionalidad sobre la posesión y propiedad colectiva de las comunidades indígenas. Coincide esta Cámara con el recurrente en la tesis sobre la cosmovisión indígena y la importante relación entre la tierra, naturaleza y su subsistencia como comunidad, para mantener sus costumbres. Por ello, en el análisis progresivo de los Derechos Humanos en cuanto al derecho de propiedad, contenido en el artículo 21 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, se ha venido haciendo una interpretación evolutiva del concepto de propiedad. Consecuentemente, se otorga a los territorios indígenas una protección desde la perspectiva de una propiedad colectiva; razón por la cual los pueblos indígenas que pierdan la posesión de sus territorios, mantienen su derecho de propiedad ancestral sobre ellos y un derecho preferente a recuperarlos. No obstante, este último aspecto es relevante para la solución del caso en particular, pues el denunciante [Nombre 001], como se refirió líneas arriba, es una persona indígena quien con el fin de reivindicar supuestas tierras indígenas fue designado por el Consejo Ditso Iriria Ajkonuk Wapka del territorio Bribrí de Salitre, para ocupar la finca en cuestión, ingresando a esta el 03 de abril de 2016, pero para ese momento, era aprovechada por el acusado Víctor Zúñiga para cuido de ganado (cfr. folio 6 vuelto). La sucesión de acciones llevadas a cabo por los acusados Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas y Víctor Zúñiga Mora, referente al aprovechamiento, ingresó al fundo para reparar una cerca y la corta de un árbol (cfr. folio 5 vuelto y 6), frente a las ejecutadas por el denunciante [Nombre 001], para recuperar el pretendido territorio indígena, ingreso, construcción y ocupación en el mismo, no permiten tener por configurado en los términos dispuestos por el artículo 225 del Código Penal un despojo o perturbación de la posesión del inmueble en perjuicio del señor [Nombre 001] . En ese contexto, se denota más bien, que los hechos surgen a partir de las acciones afirmativas emprendida por la comunidad indígena de Bribrí de Salitre, para la recuperación de los supuestos territorios indígenas. En ese sentido, sobre la necesaria garantía del derecho a la posesión y propiedad colectiva de los territorios ocupados tradicionalmente por los pueblos indígenas, en especial referencia al acceso a la justicia para reivindicar las tierras, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en reiteradas ocasiones se ha pronunciado de la siguiente manera: “…Posesión de las tierras reclamadas y su exigencia para el reconocimiento de la propiedad comunitaria. 109. El Tribunal recuerda su jurisprudencia respecto a la propiedad comunitaria de las tierras indígenas, según la cual: 1) la posesión tradicional de los indígenas sobre sus tierras tiene efectos equivalentes al título de pleno dominio que otorga el Estado; 2) la posesión tradicional otorga a los indígenas el derecho a exigir el reconocimiento oficial de propiedad y su registro; 3) el Estado debe delimitar, demarcar y otorgar título colectivo de las tierras a los miembros de las comunidades indígenas; 4) los miembros de los pueblos indígenas que por causas ajenas a su voluntad han salido o perdido la posesión de sus tierras tradicionales mantienen el derecho de propiedad sobre las mismas, aún a falta de título legal, salvo cuando las tierras hayan sido legítimamente trasladadas a terceros de buena fe, y 5) los miembros de los pueblos indígenas que involuntariamente han perdido la posesión de sus tierras, y éstas han sido trasladadas legítimamente a terceros inocentes, tienen el derecho de recuperarlas o a obtener otras tierras de igual extensión y calidad…”. (Caso Comunidad Indígena Xákmok Kásek. Vs. Paraguay). En respeto al anterior criterio jurisprudencial interamericano, considera esta Sala que el Estado debe conjuntar esfuerzos, tomando las medidas necesarias para garantizar y restituir la posesión de los pueblos indígenas sobre sus territorios, por medio de procedimientos expeditos reivindicatorios, ya sea de reubicación, expropiación o desalojo según corresponda, de los propietarios o poseedores a derecho o ilegales, en los términos dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico vigente que contempla soluciones en procura de la defensa de los derechos de los pueblos originarios. Es claro que los pueblos indígenas y tribales tienen, no solo el derecho de poseer, sino también de ser dueños de sus territorios, así como ejercer un control efectivo de sus tierras, para resguardar su cultura. Sobre este extremo la Sala Constitucional ha indicado: “…En los considerandos del decreto, el Poder Ejecutivo reconoce que la población indígena de Costa Rica está gravemente amenazada en su existencia por un despojo continuo y arbitrario de sus tierras. Reconoció también que el fenómeno se ha incrementado y que obedece a que los indígenas no tienen respaldo legal de propiedad de las tierras que ocupan desde tiempos inmemoriales. Por ello, los indígenas han venido solicitando desde hace mucho tiempo la legalización de Reservas inalienables y el reconocimiento de su derecho a la garantía de la tierra. Concluye que, en atención a la obligación del Estado de garantizar la seguridad de sus ciudadanos e impedir las injusticias, especialmente de minorías tradicionalmente marginadas, como las poblaciones indígenas, decreta el establecimiento de las reservas, las declara propiedad de las comunidades indígenas y dispone su inscripción en el Registro Público. De gran importancia es que se establece que las Reservas Indígenas son inalienables, incedibles (sic) y exclusivas para las comunidades aborígenes que las habitan y que por ello debía expropiarse a los no indígenas que fueran propietarios o poseedores de fundos ubicados en la reserva…”. (Sentencia 6229-1999, de las 14:30 horas del 11 de agosto de 1999, de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Ahora bien, bajo el cuadro fáctico establecido, surge una interpretación errónea por parte del recurrente, en la búsqueda de la solución legal del problema por medio del derecho penal, confundiendo el objeto de tutela del delito de usurpación, con el derecho preferente de posesión y propiedad colectiva de las comunidades indígenas. El conflicto se contextualiza en la disputa por supuestos territorios indígenas, por el ejercicio de la posesión del encartado Víctor Zúñiga Mora, quien es una persona no indígena. Si bien es cierto, tal y como lo indica el recurrente, una persona ajena a la comunidad indígena no debe ejercer el derecho de posesión sobre territorios indígenas, porque constituyen la base fundamental de la cultura, vida espiritual, integridad y supervivencia económica de los pueblos indígenas, corresponde al Estado, tal y como se ha venido indicando, a partir de la obligaciones internacionales adquiridas en esta materia y la normativa jurídica que ha reconocido los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, darle una especial protección a la comunidad respecto a la posesión de su territorio. No obstante, esta situación no hace que se configure el delito de usurpación, porque el objeto de tutela, según se encuentra regulado en el artículo 225 del Código Penal, es la posesión de un inmueble y resulta sobrado probar la legitimidad del título para ser protegido por la norma; la ocupación del predio en cuestión, desde años atrás, surgida por la compra protocolizada en el año 1997 de [Nombre 004] y el contrato de arrendamiento del año 2007 del acusado Víctor Zúñiga Mora, no convierte en delictiva la permanencia de este último en el inmueble y, le corresponde al Estado desplegar los mecanismos legales de protección que le permita ejercer plenamente, a la comunidad indígena, las atribuciones inherentes a su derecho de propiedad y posesión sobre las tierras ancestrales; encontrándose facultadas las personas indígenas a acudir a las vías legales, administrativas o judiciales, para hacer valer sus derechos reivindicatorios conforme lo reconoce la ley. Nótese que la Ley Indígena en el artículo 5 faculta para solicitar el desalojo, reubicación o expropiación del poseedor, cualquiera que sea su condición, una vez que el derecho ha sido reconocido por el Estado. Por otra parte, en lo esencial y para lo que interesa respecto de los elementos objetivos del tipo penal de la usurpación, existen diferentes forma s de cometer el despojo, a saber la violencia, amenazas, engaño, abuso de confianza o clandestinidad, también el acto de despojo, apoderamiento perturbación se puede producir invadiendo el inmueble, manteniéndose en él o expulsando a sus ocupantes. La doctrina en este tema ha considerado respecto de la acción típica que: "Es la de despojar, lo cual tiene un sentido de quitar, de sacar de la ocupación o impedir la ocupación del inmueble total o parcialmente, por parte del sujeto pasivo; puede darse, por consiguiente, desplazando al tenedor, poseedor o ejercitador del derecho real de que se trate del lugar (terreno) que constituye el inmueble u oponiéndose a que aquél continúe realizando los actos propios de su ocupación tal como los venía ejecutando. Pero para ser típico, el despojo debe estar signado por la finalidad de permanecer en el inmueble ocupándolo..." (Creus Carlos, Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, tomo I, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma, 6° edición, 1° reimpresión, 1998, pág 559). Para que en este caso se hubiera configurado el delito de usurpación, habría tenido que existir una resolución emanada por la autoridad competente que declarara ese territorio como indígena, e impusiera a los imputados Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas y Lelis Álvaro Vargas Morales la obligación de salir de la finca, de modo que la comunidad indígena tomara posesión material y formal del inmueble y si los endilgados, sabiendo que ya no podían permanecer en la finca, hubieran reingresado a la misma, manteniéndose mediante violencia, amenazas, engaño, abuso de confianza o clandestinidad. Sin embargo, el acusado Víctor Zúñiga Mora, ejercía la posesión del inmueble, según se ha tenido por acreditado en la sentencia, derivada de un contrato de arrendamiento del fundo, el cual mantenía delimitado con una cerca y aprovechado con ganado. Esto no quiere decir, que el acusado tenga derecho sobre la propiedad de manera permanente, sino que debe ser por la vía legal correspondiente que se discuta el tema de la recuperación de los presuntos territorios indígenas. Es importante, en todo caso, enfatizar respecto a la configuración del delito de usurpación y, sin detrimento de los derechos de las comunidades indígenas que si los encartados entraron en posesión del inmueble de una forma válida a la posesión del inmueble, no podría haber despojo, apoderamiento o perturbación, por la controversia surgida sobre si tienen derecho de permanecer o no en el mismo. Como se ha venido explicando equivoca la parte recurrente la vía, al pretender amparar el conflicto suscitado en el derecho penal, sin tomar en cuenta que el derecho penal es una vía de excepción (última ratio) para solucionar los conflictos sociales, de donde sólo cuando se cumpla con todos los elementos objetivos y subjetivos que exige la normativa penal sustantiva, se estaría en condiciones de establecer la tipicidad de una conducta, lo cual no sucede en la especie. Cabe agregar, que el recurrente refiere que hubo actos de perturbación de la posesión legítima que ostentaba la persona indígena, refiriéndose al momento en que se presentaron los acusados Víctor Zúñiga Mora, Lelis Alvarado Vargas Morales y Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas, a reparar una cerca, situación a la que hacen alusión, tanto los acusados Víctor Zúñiga Mora y Víctor Hugo Zúñiga Fallas (cfr. folio 5 y 6), como los denunciantes [Nombre 014] y [Nombre 001] (cfr. folio 8 vuelto). En relación con este último argumento, no existe una restricción del ejercicio pleno de la posesión o la tenencia, porque como ya se ha dicho, de la prueba testimonial y documental recabada, se constata que para el momento de asignación de la finca, 13 de marzo de 2016, al ofendido [Nombre 001], por parte de la Asociación de Desarrollo Indígena, y su posterior ingreso al inmueble el día 3 de abril de 2016, se conocía que quien estaba ejerciendo la posesión del inmueble lo era el aquí imputado Víctor Zúñiga Mora y, en cuanto al hecho de que permanecieran en el predio, tal y como se ha visto, tendría que haberse declarado como territorio indígena y además, en este caso requerido la expulsión de los acusados. Así las cosas, se declara sin lugar el reclamo.

Por Tanto:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación que interpuso el licenciado Daniel Villalobos Araya, Fiscal de Asuntos Indígenas del Ministerio Público. Notifíquese.

Patricia Solano C.

Jorge Enrique Desanti H.

Magistrado Suplente.

Sandra Eugenia Zúñiga M.

Magistrada Suplente.

Rafael Segura B.

Magistrado Suplente.

Gerardo Rubén Alfaro V.

Magistrado Suplente.

CBADILLAB 590-4/16-6-18 *162001370634PE*