Certainty of moral damages for inducement to error in public appointmentCertidumbre del daño moral por inducción a error en nombramiento público

**Review of the Document** **Supreme Court of Justice** **SECOND DIVISION** **Exp: 17-001198-0639-LA** **Res: 2023-000744** **SECOND DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at twelve hours fifty minutes on the thirty-first of March two thousand twenty-three.

Ordinary labor proceeding established before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, by [Name 001], bachelor's degree in administration and pedagogical teaching, against UNIVERSIDAD TÉCNICA NACIONAL, represented by its rector, licenciado Marcelo Prieto Jiménez. Acting as special judicial attorneys; for the plaintiff, licenciada Alejandra Barquero Ruiz, of unknown marital status; for the defendant, attorneys Abel Chinchilla Bazan, resident of Heredia; and José Esteban Cerdas Acuña, single, resident of Limón. All of legal age, married, attorneys, and residents of Alajuela, with the exceptions indicated.

Opinion drafted by Judge Olaso Álvarez; and, **CONSIDERING:** I.- BACKGROUND: Mr. [Name 001], through his representative, sued the Universidad Técnica Nacional (UTN) and stated that he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 30, 2017, at the company Impresora DELTA S.A, when he resigned having been selected in External Competition No. 02-2015 of the defendant University, corresponding to a permanent technical position in the Training and Development area, as shown by official communication CD-112-2017 of May 30, 2017, signed by [Name 003], Head of the Training and Development Area. He indicated that the cited official communication requested his appointment (nombramiento) starting June 5, 2017, with a full-time workday and a salary of ₡544,261.00 colones, according to University Council agreement 210-2016. He emphasized that Ms. [Name 003] called him to tell him he had been selected, and even told him he could resign from his current job, as she needed his hiring (contratación) to occur as soon as possible, so he began working on June 5, 2017; furthermore, he was assigned an institutional email. On June first of that year, he signed the necessary documentation to start his duties on the indicated date. He added that, as recorded in the competition file, he completed the entire administrative process to obtain the permanent position. He related that he performed his duties from June 5 to 22, 2017, when Ms. [Name 003] told him he could not continue working because rector Marcelo Prieto had retained the appointment (nombramiento) action and would not sign it, so she asked him not to return, because he would not be appointed, and also refused to pay him for the days actually worked. He stated that the negligent actions of the UTN caused moral and patrimonial harm (daño moral y patrimonial), since he resigned from his previous job, and an expectation was created for him of achieving a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family. This was compounded by the anguish, frustration, distress, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, among others, generated by the institution's irregular conduct. Based on the foregoing, he requested reinstatement in the position since he met all the required criteria, and recognition of back pay (salarios caídos) as damages (daños y perjuicios), ordering payment of the salary corresponding to the days worked at the UTN, with recognition of legal interest and indexation (indexación). He requested payment of objective and subjective moral harm and, of both costs (image 1 to 6 of the Court's electronic file). The Special Judicial Attorney for the defendant answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. He stated that document CD-112-2017 shows that what official [Name 003] formulated is a request for appointment (nombramiento), that is, an act prior to the formalization of a hiring (contratación). He added that the creation of the institutional email account does not formalize a hiring (contratación), but rather is a prior act. He emphasized that it is not possible to assume the existence of an employment relationship for the plaintiff, as there was no formal act of appointment (nombramiento) (images 113 to 120). In judgment number 281-2020 at 17:00 hours on February 24, 2020, the Labor Court of the I Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, partially granted the action, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the days worked from June 5 to 22, 2017. It recognized legal interest and indexation, as well as the payment of both costs, setting the attorney's fees (costas personales) at 15% of the condemnation (images 248 to 264).

II.- SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL: The plaintiff's attorney files a cassation appeal against the Court's ruling. She argues that the judge made an incorrect assessment of the evidence regarding the moral harm and damages claimed, since it is not true that there is no evidence to support this claim. She highlights that there is no justification for why it was considered that her client did not suffer damages. The ruling recognizes that the plaintiff was induced into error by the Head of the Training and Development Area of the UTN's Human Development Management Directorate. There is documentary and testimonial evidence proving that she told the plaintiff he had won the competition, asked him to report to work, he resigned from his job to join the Universidad Técnica Nacional, began working, and almost a month later was dismissed. Therefore, she finds it inconsistent that the judge indicates there is no moral harm, no damages, because the plaintiff was induced into error and as a consequence, the plaintiff was left unemployed, with discouragement, desperation, and anguish. She highlights that the harm caused is obvious, moreover, it is not true that no evidence supporting what was requested was provided, as Mr. [Name 001]'s file was provided, which includes a note from the company Impresora DELTA, indicating that he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017, when he resigned to join the UTN on June first, 2017. Resigning implies he lost his severance pay (cesantía). She emphasizes that moral harm is appropriate if the circumstances of the dismissal are especially qualified, as happened in this case. Based on the foregoing, she requests that the appeal be granted and that payment of damages be ordered, including moral harm.

III.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: Upon analyzing the objections raised by the legal representative of the plaintiff, the majority of this Division considers that these must be denied, for the reasons that will be set forth below. It is pertinent to highlight that in a case like the present one, whose applicable regulations correspond to the labor procedural reform (reforma procesal laboral), implemented by Law No. 9343, the moving party must necessarily, within the framework of the claim for harm, specify the reason giving rise to that compensation for harm, what it consists of, and its estimation (Article 495, subsection 5 of that reform). From the context of the complaint filed by the plaintiff, it is extracted that the alleged moral harm intended by him is indicated in fact 8 of the complaint as follows: "[...] the moral and patrimonial harm (daño moral y patrimonial) caused by the negligent conduct of the UTN is great, since my client resigned from his previous job. An expectation was created for him of achieving a stable job that would allow him to improve the quality of life and that of his family. He was not paid for the time worked, causing him to incur transportation, food, and clothing expenses, among others, since he lives in San Isidro de Alajuela. The foregoing, coupled with the anguish, frustration, distress, helplessness, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, unease, disillusionment generated by the irregular conduct of the Rector and officials [Name 003] and [Name 008], which led to suffering or psychic and emotional affliction, finding himself without work and without knowing clearly why, after all the administrative process he undertook to apply for the position, he is simply asked not to return because the Rector did not want to sign, without being explained the reason for this decision...". (Our emphasis). From the analysis of this petition, it is deduced that the plaintiff seeks moral harm derived from the alleged helplessness, sadness, insecurity, etc., generated by the eventual conduct of the Rector and other officials within the administrative process initiated for his possible transfer of position. But, on the other hand, it also introduces situations of another nature, no longer of moral content but eminently patrimonial, such as compensation for the time worked, expenses for food, transportation, and clothing (among others) as a reason for the supposed transfer of position. This difference between both types of harm is essential in this matter. In general, harm can be conceptualized as any detriment, loss, or impairment that can affect a person in themselves, such as those that may compromise their assets. Understanding harm in that way (so broadly) implies denying it significance and, on the other hand, does not allow the full exercise of the right to defense of the party against whom that harm is claimed, because a specific determination is required that allows limiting its scope when deciding whether to grant it or not and, on the other hand, the eventual possibility of debating it (hence the provision of numeral 495, subsection 5 cited). This is why, given this dialectic between the petition for compensation and the exercise of the right to defense of the party from whom the harm is claimed, it is necessary to differentiate between patrimonial harm and moral harm. The former is that which falls on the assets, either directly on the things that compose them or indirectly as a consequence of harm caused to the person themselves, in their rights or faculties: thus, direct material or patrimonial harm is that suffered by economic goods destroyed or deteriorated; and indirect patrimonial harm, for example, the expenses incurred (actual damages - daño emergente) for the healing of bodily injuries, or the lost profits (lucro cesante) due to the incapacity suffered by the victim. On the other hand, moral harm is that which injures rights affecting the personality, generally directed against health, privacy, honor, etc. As has been explained, the plaintiff raises his claims between these two classes of harm, however, he has the evidentiary burden of proving the facts he intends to claim as the basis for these compensations (Article 477, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code). In previous rulings, we have already criticized that the Division, with different composition, incorrectly applies the dogmatic formula "in re ipsa" to fill the evidentiary negligences of the claiming parties and compensate for harm that has not been demonstrated. We cannot deny that there is the possibility of compensating for harm caused on the occasion of the development or termination of the employment relationship. National authors like Víctor Pérez Vargas, citing Manava Dharma Sastra who referred to the Code of Manú, show how already in Ancient India the possibility of satisfaction for an injured interest was regulated. In said Code, its article 288, of Book Eight, established "...he who damages the property of another, knowingly or through neglect (willful misconduct or negligence - dolo o culpa), must give him satisfaction". That premise is the same contained in numeral 1045 of the Costa Rican Civil Code, which prescribes an obligation to "repair," that is, to "satisfy." In other words, compensation is a patrimonial restoration to the person or their property. In this regard, Messineo indicates that patrimonial compensation restores value, despite its composition being diverse. Regarding moral harm, the function of compensation suffers variations. In Roman Law it was called "pretium doloris", in Germanic law "Schmerzgelt", meaning "to pay a price for the pain", so it does not directly tend to the integral restitution of the harm caused, since dealing with harm affecting non-patrimonial values, the situation is different. Despite the above, compensation for moral harm does not seek a generic satisfactory function but a form of compensation for the suffering or humiliation endured (Trabucchi and Borrel, cited by Víctor Pérez Vargas, in "Derecho Privado", p. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explains that, by reason of that non-patrimonial nature, "tensions" arise in specifying it to a determined sum, as there is a short step from its correct reparation to a so-called "judicial lottery". Likewise, the cited Spanish author emphasizes the aspect that moral harm must be proven. To support her position, which by majority we share, she cites a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 30, 1999 (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi 1999, 5726), in which it is stated that a judicial separation for marital infidelity does not originate "per se" compensation for moral harm, just as the breach of a promise to marry does not generate it either (See "Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil", "El Daño", Vicente Domingo, Elena, p. 80). Following this same conceptual line, the Spanish author Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León precisely criticizes the approaches made by the dissenting vote, as he establishes that, in a strict conception of moral harm, it is not possible to presume it as a consequence of the injuries suffered. He emphasizes that moral harm must be the subject of some type of evidence, because otherwise the notion of reparation for the unlawful conduct that generates it is lost, and it would then become a form of "punitive damages" (daño punitivo) (Diez Picazo y Ponce De León, Luis, "DERECHO DE DAÑOS", p. 329), which, we add, overflows the notions of harm as reparation provided for in numeral 41 of our Political Constitution. In this way, with a substantive approach, the harm sought by the plaintiff must be denied, as the Court did, since he did not offer evidence to support his claims regarding that harm. But there are also procedural reasons for not granting moral harm in this case. The minority of this Division argues that compensation for moral harm due to an unjustified dismissal causes suffering in and of itself, that is, it is through a human presumption (presunción humana) from which that suffering, and therefore the compensation, can be derived. Human presumptions were eliminated as a means of proof in the new civil procedural legislation (Article 41.2). However, they did have specific regulation in the repealed civil procedural rule, specifically in Article 417. That numeral established that this type of presumption only constitutes evidence if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. Furthermore, it emphasized that proof of presumptions must be serious and consistent with the other evidence rendered in the proceeding. Even if we were to apply that repealed rule to the case at hand, we conclude that there is no evidence allowing a "logical inference" to grant the claims for moral and patrimonial harm that the plaintiff outlined in his complaint, given that he did not prove any of the factual circumstances with which he seeks compensation, so it is not possible to qualify as "logical" the inference reached by the minority of this Division. In our view, this way of resolving would violate the principle of congruence (principio de congruencia) and the right of defense of the opposing party, since the plaintiff never used that approach to quantify the supposed moral or patrimonial harm, but rather, ex officio and infringing upon the right of defense of the defendant, compensation would be ordered using compensatory guidelines that were not requested by the plaintiff. This situation, totally violative of due process, together with the fact that the harm sought was not even proven by the plaintiff, leads this majority to consider that what was decided by the lower court (a quo) is in accordance with law and the merits of the case file, therefore, the appeal should be denied and the appealed judgment confirmed.

IV.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGES VARELA ARAYA AND PEREIRA RETANA: The undersigned Judges respectfully depart from the majority vote, for the reasons that will be set forth below. The object of the appeal is to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to the recognition of moral harm, which was denied by the Court. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes: "Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or harm they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be done prompt, complete justice, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws." Likewise, Article 1045 of the Civil Code states: "Anyone who, through willful misconduct, fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the damages (perjuicios)." In this case, as it involves a public employment relationship, it is also important to mention the regulation on this subject in the General Law of Public Administration, in Article 197: "There shall be liability for the harm to purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or by the injury inflicted, respectively." Compensation for moral harm is based on the violation of rights or assets of an extra-patrimonial nature, that is, it is the impairment or injury to non-patrimonial interests caused by a harmful event. Doctrine and jurisprudence have distinguished between objective and subjective or pure moral harm. The former refers to offenses against good name, reputation, and prestige, while the subjective arises from the injury to a non-patrimonial right, without repercussion on the former, generally involving an unjust disturbance of the person's mental conditions, such as annoyance, discouragement, despair, offense against honor, dignity, and privacy (see resolution No. 1030 at 10:20 hours on November 8, 2006, of Division II of the Supreme Court of Justice). In this sense, the Division, in judgment number 2001-000703 at 14:10 hours on November 23, 2001, stated: "Harm is doctrinally conceptualized as an injury to a legally relevant interest in any sphere of human life and, as such, worthy of protection. It has been defined as: 'the impairment experienced in one's assets due to the detriment of the economic values that compose it (patrimonial harm) and also the injury to feelings, honor, or legitimate affections (moral harm).' (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge), Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo Perrot, eighth edition, 1993, p. 167). A primary element of compensable harm is unlawfulness: 'For harm to be reparable, another element must be considered: the existence of illegality. In this sense, De Cupis states that the legal system chooses the harms to which it grants legal relevance, and that this choice falls primarily on harm produced by an unlawful act (opposed to law)' (MANGARELLI (Cristina), Daño moral en el Derecho Laboral, Editorial Acali, Montevideo, 1984, p. 26)." In the complaint, the plaintiff requested payment for moral harm, because he considers that: "The moral and patrimonial harm caused by the negligent conduct of the UTN is great, since my client resigned from his previous job. An expectation was created for him of achieving a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family. He was not paid for the time worked, causing him to incur transportation, food, clothing expenses, among others, since he lives in San Isidro de Alajuela. The foregoing, coupled with the anguish, frustration, distress, helplessness, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, unease, disillusionment generated by the irregular conduct of the Rector and officials [Name 003] and [Name 008], which led to suffering or psychic and emotional affliction, finding himself without work and without knowing clearly why, after all the administrative process he undertook to apply for the position, he is simply asked not to return because the Rector did not want to sign, without being explained the reason for this decision." The Court denied this claim, arguing that in this case the especially qualified circumstances that evidence suffering required for moral harm are not present, and added: "Note that the harm was not even assessed (by the plaintiff), and the case file lacks a justification to prove it, as no evidence was provided in this regard (…). In this particular case, it is by no means ignored that the plaintiff may well have suffered some uncertainty or 'sorrow' about the details surrounding his circumstances; however, it was not demonstrated here that there was harm, either to the physical integrity, honor, or privacy of the plaintiff, mainly because there is no evidence of any suffering, besides the fact that what the plaintiff had in the offing was a mere expectation of accessing the position for which he was competing, at no time was he appointed and subsequently dismissed; in fact, within the sui generis nature of this case, there was no dismissal as such, because there was simply no appointment (nombramiento)." This conclusion is challenged by the plaintiff, who insists that he was induced into error by Ms. [Name 003], Head of the Training and Development Area of the UTN's Human Development Management Directorate, as it was proven that she informed him he had won the competition and asked him to report to work, and therefore he resigned from the job he had at the company Impresora DELTA, where he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017. Once the specific case has been analyzed, the undersigned judges consider that the appealing party is correct in their argument, which should be granted, because indeed, the events that occurred give rise to the right to payment for moral harm. In this case, from the list of proven facts in the ruling, which were not appealed, it is evident that Mr. [Name 001] participated in public competition CP-02-2015, to fill the Technical Position No. AU-AD151, in the Training and Development area of the Human Development Management Directorate of the Universidad Técnica Nacional. In official communication number CD-112-2017 of May 30, 2017 (image 10), [Name 003], in her capacity as Head of the Training and Development Area of the Human Development Management Directorate, indicated to the Director of Human Development Management: "I kindly request you to process the permanent appointment (nombramiento en propiedad) of Mr. [Name 001], ID [Value 001], as of June 5, 2017, which is subject to the probationary period, with a full-time workday, as Mr. [Name 001] has the most suitable profile according to the functions to be performed in the position." In official communication number DGDH-612-2017 of May 31, 2017 (image 15), the Human Development Management Director of the defendant sent the plaintiff's appointment (nombramiento) to the Rector for his final approval. Likewise, in proven fact 4, it was indicated: "On June fifth, two thousand seventeen, Ms. [Name 003], head of the Training and Development Area of the Human Development Management Directorate, without having a response and certainty that the rector of the defendant University would approve the plaintiff's appointment (nombramiento), instructed and allowed the plaintiff to report to work, until June twenty-second of the aforementioned year." This fact was taken as proven because Ms. [Name 003] herself acknowledged it in the evidentiary hearing. So, when the plaintiff reported to work on June 5, 2017, he signed a series of documents such as sworn statements (images 69 to 78), and was also assigned an institutional email account. However, on June 22, 2017, Ms. [Name 003] informed him that the Rector did not approve his appointment (nombramiento), so he could no longer report for work. While the recognition of moral harm is conditional on evidence, the burden of which falls on the victim, the truth is that in this case the acceptance of the facts by the officials working for the defendant entails proof of the moral harm expressly alleged by the plaintiff, who explained that an expectation of stable employment was created for him, with which he would improve his family's quality of life; moreover, he resigned from a job he had held for more than 5 years, in response to the explicit call made for him to report to work. Note that the plaintiff worked for the company Impresora DELTA from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017, the date on which he resigned to take up the position at the Universidad Técnica Nacional starting the following June 5. Mr. [Name 001] was asked to report to work, was allowed to provide his services, and the defendant benefited from these, until June 22, 2017, when he was informed that the Rector had not approved the appointment (nombramiento). The situation was so serious that they did not even pay him for the days he actually provided services, which he requested and were granted in this judicial process. It is evident that if a person who has a stable job for more than five years and participates in a competition to access another position and improve their conditions is contacted by the person in charge of processing the competition and told to report to work starting the first of the following month, it generates something more than an expectation: the firm conviction that they won the competition, and therefore they resign from their job. Regarding moral harm, the defendant's thesis that the plaintiff cannot make any claim because a formal act of appointment (nombramiento) was never issued, since the Rector, who is competent to approve and sign it, did not do so, is not acceptable, given that, as he himself indicated, he has no obligation to know the internal procedures that must be carried out to formalize an appointment (nombramiento), since, in application of the principle of good faith (principio de buena fe), he responded to the call made by the official in charge of processing the competition. Finally, after eighteen days of work, he was told he would not be appointed, leaving him unemployed, without the possibility of providing for his family's basic needs. We consider it logical that any person called to start providing their services should have even more than a simple expectation, indeed, the conviction that the job is theirs, especially because they participated in the competition for the appointment (nombramiento), that is, they followed the due process to be appointed, at the end of which they were summoned to report to work, without the entire procedure for formalizing the appointment (nombramiento) having been completed. This evident error, accepted by Ms. [Name 003], caused moral harm to the plaintiff, which we note must be compensated. In that sense, among the assumptions or parameters according to which the amount of compensation shall be determined in this jurisdiction, assuming the causal link exists, are prudence, proportionality, and reasonableness. It must be an equitable sum of money, in consideration of the gravity, intensity, and scope of the attributed fault, an amount that helps to mitigate the harm caused. In this sense, Professor Dr. Antonio Luis Vázquez Vialar, points out: “...In the case of fixing non-pecuniary damage (daño extrapatrimonial), the judge must be extremely prudent in determining the amount of reparation. In each case, they must make express reference to their own experience, which does not prevent them, in certain circumstances, from using some objective guidelines such as the intensity of the effects, the time the grievance persisted, its impact on emotional life, hospitalization period, after-effects causing a deterioration in social life, type of treatment the victim had to undergo ...” (Papers and conclusions of the II Jornadas de Integración Académica en Derecho Laboral. “El daño moral y el Salario en especie en el Derecho del Trabajo Costarricense”, Talleres de Mundo Gráfico, S. A., San José, Costa Rica, Escuela Judicial, 1990, page 18). As economic reference parameters, the salary and other supplements received, economic advantages, or material means granted can be considered. In this regard, the position the plaintiff held had an assigned salary of ₡544,261.00 colones, which is why, as this Division, by majority, ruled in a case similar to the present in vote No. 0707-2004 at 14:00 hours on August 27, 2004, it is estimated that a reasonable amount to grant for moral harm is the equivalent of what the plaintiff would have earned during the three months of the probationary period, taking into consideration that this is a prudential time for him to re-enter the labor market.

Now, the lower court, in the challenged judgment, granted the petitioner the salary for the eighteen days worked (from June 5 to 22, 2017). Consequently, for the remaining two months and twelve days, the sum amounts to ₡1,306,226.4. Legal interest and indexation are granted, from the date the judgment becomes final. Due to the manner in which it is decided, the amount of the award for personal costs is varied, which, since it was not appealed, is maintained at 15% of the award, that is, the sum of ₡263,632.47 (15% of ₡451,323.41 awarded by the Court, plus ₡1,306,226.4 granted by this Chamber). Regarding damages, in the action the plaintiff requested: "That he be reinstated in the position since he fulfilled all the requirements demanded and that he be paid, as damages, the back pay from the day of his entry into the institution (June 5, 2017)." It follows that the damages requested were the back pay not received from the time he stopped working until his reinstatement. However, the claim for reinstatement was not upheld by the Court and was an unappealed issue, so the back pay as damages, an accessory claim to the reinstatement, cannot be granted.

V.- FINAL CONSIDERATION: For the foregoing reasons, the majority of the Chamber considers that the appropriate course is to dismiss the appeal. For their part, Judges Varela Araya and Pereira Retana issue a dissenting vote. They partially grant the appeal and proceed to annul the appealed judgment only insofar as it denied the payment of moral damages, interest, and indexation thereon, and instead, grant those items and order payment for moral damages in the reasonable amount of one million three hundred six thousand two hundred twenty-six colones and four céntimos, together with interest and indexation from the date the judgment becomes final. Likewise, they modify the portion related to the award of costs, and instead establish the total amount for personal costs at two hundred sixty-three thousand six hundred thirty-two colones and forty-seven céntimos.

THEREFORE:

The majority of this Chamber dismisses the appeal. Judges Varela Araya and Pereira Retana issue a dissenting vote. They partially grant the appeal and annul the appealed judgment only insofar as it denied the payment of moral damages, interest, and indexation thereon. Instead, those items are granted and it is ordered that the reasonable amount of one million three hundred six thousand two hundred twenty-six colones and four céntimos be paid for moral damages, together with interest and indexation from the date the judgment becomes final. Consequently, the portion related to the award of costs is modified, and instead the total amount for personal costs is established at two hundred sixty-three thousand six hundred thirty-two colones and forty-seven céntimos.

Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Julia Varela Araya Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Sandra Maria Pereira Retana Deyanira Adelaida Martinez Bolivar Res: 2023000744 NROSITO/RDGU 1 **Email:** [email protected] **Exp:** 17-001198-0639-LA **Res:** 2023-000744 **SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at twelve hours fifty minutes on the thirty-first of March, two thousand twenty-three.

Ordinary labor proceeding established before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, by [Name 001], bachelor in administration and pedagogical teaching, against the **UNIVERSIDAD TÉCNICA NACIONAL**, represented by its rector, the licentiate Marcelo Prieto Jiménez. Acting as special judicial attorneys; for the plaintiff, the licentiate Alejandra Barquero Ruiz, of unknown marital status; for the defendant, the licentiates Abel Chinchilla Bazan, resident of Heredia; and José Esteban Cerdas Acuña, single, resident of Limón.

All are of legal age, married, attorneys, and residents of Alajuela, with the indicated exceptions.

**Drafted by Magistrate Olaso Álvarez; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- BACKGROUND:** Mr. [Name 001], through his representative, sued the Universidad Técnica Nacional (UTN) and stated that he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 30, 2017, at the company Impresora DELTA S.A., when he resigned because he had been selected in External Competition No. 02-2015 of the defendant University, for a permanent technical position in the Training and Development area, as shown in official letter CD-112-2017 of May 30, 2017, signed by [Name 003], Head of the Training and Development Area. He indicated that the cited official letter requested his appointment starting June 5, 2017, on a full-time schedule and a salary of ₡544,261.00 colones, according to agreement 210-2016 of the University Council. He emphasized that Ms. [Name 003] called him to tell him he had been selected, and even told him he could resign from his current job, as she needed his hiring to happen as soon as possible, so he began working on June 5, 2017; furthermore, an institutional email was assigned to him. On June first of that year, he signed the necessary documentation to begin his duties on the indicated date. He added that, as shown in the competition file, he completed the entire administrative process to obtain the permanent position. He related that he performed his duties from June 5 to 22, 2017, when Ms. [Name 003] told him he could not continue working because the rector, Marcelo Prieto, had withheld the appointment action and was not going to sign it, so she asked him not to return because he was not going to be appointed; additionally, she also refused to pay him for the days actually worked. He stated that the negligent act of the UTN caused moral and pecuniary harm, since he resigned from his previous job, and the expectation of securing a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family was created for him. This, coupled with the anguish, frustration, grief, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, among other things, generated by the institution's irregular action. For the foregoing reasons, he requested reinstatement in the position, since he met all the required conditions, and that back pay be recognized as damages, that payment of the salary corresponding to the days worked at the UTN be ordered, with the recognition of legal interest and indexation. He required payment for objective and subjective moral damages and both costs (images 1 to 6 of the Court's electronic file). The Special Judicial Representative of the defendant answered the action negatively and raised the defenses of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. He stated that official document CD-112-2017 shows that what was formulated by official [Name 003] is an appointment request, that is, an act prior to the formalization of a hiring. He added that the creation of the institutional email account does not formalize a hiring, but is a prior act. He emphasized that it is not possible to assume the existence of an employment relationship with the plaintiff, as there is no formal act of appointment (images 113 to 120). In judgment number 281-2020 at 5:00 p.m. on February 24, 2020, the Labor Court of the I Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, partially granted the action and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the days worked from June 5 to 22, 2017. It recognized legal interest and indexation, as well as the payment of both costs, setting personal costs at 15% of the award (images 248 to 264).

**II.- SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL:** The plaintiff's legal representative files an appeal for cassation (casación) against the Court's ruling. She argues that the judge made an incorrect assessment of the evidence regarding the claimed moral damages and damages, as it is not true that there is no evidence supporting this claim. She highlights that there is no reasoning for why her client was considered not to have suffered damages. The ruling acknowledges that the plaintiff was induced into error by the Head of the Training and Development Area of the UTN's Human Development Management Directorate. There is documentary and testimonial evidence proving that she informed the plaintiff that he had won the competition, asked him to report for work, he resigned from his job to join the Universidad Técnica Nacional, started working, and almost a month later was dismissed. Therefore, she finds it inconsistent that the judge indicates there is no moral damage, damages, because the plaintiff was induced into error, and as a consequence, the plaintiff was left unemployed, with discouragement, despair, and anguish. She highlights that the damage caused is obvious, and furthermore, it is not true that no evidence was provided to support what was requested, as the file of Mr. [Name 001] was provided, which includes a note from the company Impresora DELTA, indicating that he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017, when he resigned to join the UTN on June first, 2017. Having resigned implies that he lost his severance pay (cesantía). She emphasizes that moral damages are appropriate if the circumstances of the dismissal are especially qualified, as happened in this case. For the foregoing reasons, she requests that the appeal be granted and that payment of damages, including moral damages, be ordered.

**III.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** Upon analyzing the objections raised by the plaintiff's legal representation, the majority of this Chamber considers that they must be denied, for the reasons that will be set forth below. It is appropriate to note that in a case like the present one, whose applicable regulations correspond to the labor procedural reform, effected by Law No. 9343, the moving party must necessarily, within the framework of the damage claim, specify the cause giving rise to that compensation for damage, what it consists of, and its estimation (article 495, subsection 5 of that reform). From the context of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, it is extracted that the alleged moral damage claimed by him is indicated in fact 8 of the lawsuit as follows: "[...] *the moral and pecuniary damage caused by the negligent act of the UTN is great, since my client resigned from his previous job. An expectation of securing a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family was created for him. He was not paid for the time worked, making him incur expenses for transportation, food, clothing, among others, as he lives in San Isidro de Alajuela. This, coupled with the anguish, frustration, grief, impotence, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, unease, disillusionment generated by the irregular action of the Rector and officials [Name 003] and [Name 008], which resulted in psychological and emotional suffering or affliction, upon finding himself without work and without knowing clearly why (sic) after the entire administrative process he undertook to apply for the position, he was simply asked not to return because the Rector did not want to sign, without being explained the reason for said decision...*". (Our emphasis). From the analysis of that request, it is clear that the plaintiff seeks moral damages derived from the supposed impotence, sadness, insecurity, etc., generated by the eventual action of the Rector and other officials within the administrative process initiated for his possible job transfer. But, on the other hand, he also introduces situations of another nature, no longer of moral content but eminently pecuniary, such as compensation for the time worked, expenses for food, transportation, and clothing (among others) as a reason for the supposed job transfer. This difference between both types of damage is essential in this matter. In general terms, damage can be conceptualized as any detriment, loss, or impairment that can affect a person in themselves, such as those that can compromise their assets. Understanding damage in that (such broad) way implies denying its significance and, on the other hand, does not allow the full exercise of the right of defense of the party against whom that damage is claimed, since a concretion is required that allows limiting its scope when deciding whether to grant it or not and, on the other hand, the eventual possibility of debating it (and hence the provision of numeral 495 subsection 5 cited). It is for this reason that, given this dialectic between the claim for compensation and the exercise of the right of defense of the party from whom the damage is claimed, it is necessary to differentiate between pecuniary and moral damage. The former is that which falls on the assets, either directly on the things that compose them or indirectly as a consequence of damage caused to the person themselves, in their rights or faculties: thus, direct material or pecuniary damage is that suffered by destroyed or deteriorated economic goods; and indirect pecuniary damage, for example, expenses incurred (actual damages, daño emergente) for curing bodily injuries, or lost profits (lucro cesante) due to the disability occurring to the victim. On the other hand, moral damage is that which injures rights affecting personality, generally directed against health, privacy, honor, etc. As has been explained, the plaintiff raises his claims between these two classes of damage; however, he has the probative obligation to prove the facts he intends to claim as the basis for these compensations (article 477, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code). In previous pronouncements, we have criticized that the Chamber, with a different composition, incorrectly applies the dogmatic formula "*in re ipsa*" to fill the probative negligence of the claiming parties and compensate damage that has not been demonstrated. We cannot deny that there is a possibility of compensating damage caused on the occasion of the development or termination of the employment relationship. National authors like Víctor Pérez Vargas, citing Manava Dharma Sastra who referred to the Code of Manu, show how already in Ancient India the possibility of satisfaction for an injured interest was regulated. In said Code, its article 288, of the Eighth Book, established "...*he who damages the goods of another, knowingly or through carelessness (fraud or fault, dolo o culpa), must give him satisfaction*". That premise is the same contained in numeral 1045 of the Costa Rican Civil Code, which prescribes an obligation to "repair," that is, to "satisfy". In other words, compensation is a pecuniary restoration in the person or their property. In this regard, Messineo indicates that pecuniary compensation restores the value, despite its composition being diverse. Regarding moral damage, the function of compensation suffers variations. In Roman Law, it was called "*pretium doloris*", in Germanic law "*Schmerzgelt*", that is, "paying a price for the pain", so it does not directly tend towards the full restitution of the damage caused, since when dealing with damage that affects non-pecuniary values, the situation is different. Despite the above, compensation for moral damage does not seek a generic satisfactory function but a form of compensation for the suffering or humiliation suffered (Trabucchi and Borrel, cited by Víctor Pérez Vargas, in "Derecho Privado", p. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explains that, given this non-pecuniary nature, "tensions" arise in converting it to a specific sum, as it is a short step from its correct repair to what is called a "judicial lottery". Likewise, this Spanish author emphasizes the aspect that moral damage must be proven. To support her position, which we, by majority, share, she cites a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 30, 1999 (Aranzadi Jurisprudence Repertoire 1999, 5726), in which it is stated that a judicial separation due to marital infidelity does not originate "*per se*" compensation for moral damage, just as the breach of a promise to marry does not generate it (See "Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil", "El Daño", Vicente Domingo, Elena, p. 80). Following this same conceptual line, the Spanish author Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León criticizes precisely the approaches made by the dissenting vote (voto de minoría), since he establishes that, in a strict conception of moral damage, it is not possible to presume it as a consequence of the injuries suffered. He emphasizes that moral damage must be subject to some type of proof, because otherwise the notion of reparation for the unlawful conduct that generates it is lost, and it would then become a form of "punitive damage" (Díez Picazo y Ponce de León, Luis, "DERECHO DE DAÑOS", p. 329), which, we add, overflows the notions of damage as reparation provided for in numeral 41 of our Political Constitution. In this way, with a substantive approach, the damage claimed by the plaintiff must be denied, just as the Court did, since no evidence was offered to prove his affirmations regarding that damage. But there are also procedural reasons for not granting moral damages in this case. The minority of this Chamber proposes that compensation for moral damage for an unjustified dismissal by itself causes suffering, that is, it is through a human presumption from which that suffering and, therefore, the compensation, can be derived. Human presumptions were eliminated as a means of proof within the new civil procedural legislation (article 41.2). However, they did enjoy specific regulation in the repealed civil procedural norm, specifically in article 417. That numeral established that presumptions of that type only constitute proof if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. Likewise, it emphasized that the proof of presumptions must be serious and concord with the others rendered in the process. Even if we were to apply that repealed norm to the case at hand, we conclude that there is no evidence allowing a "logical inference" to grant the claims for moral and pecuniary damages outlined by the plaintiff in his lawsuit, given that he did not prove any of the factual circumstances with which he seeks compensation, so it is not possible to qualify as "logical" the inference reached by the minority of this Chamber. In our understanding, this manner of resolving it would violate the principle of congruence and the right of defense of the opposing party, since the plaintiff never used that approach to quantify the supposed moral or pecuniary damage, but rather, officially and infringing upon the right of defense of the defendant party, compensation would be ordered using compensatory guidelines that were not claimed by the plaintiff. This situation, totally violating due process, coupled with the fact that the damages sought were not even proven by the plaintiff, leads us, by majority, to consider that what was resolved by the lower court (a quo) is in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, so it is appropriate to deny the appeal and confirm the appealed judgment.

**IV.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND PEREIRA RETANA:** The undersigned Magistrates respectfully depart from the majority vote, for the reasons set forth below. The purpose of the appeal is to determine if the plaintiff is entitled to recognition of moral damages, which was denied by the Court. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes: “*By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt, complete justice must be done to them, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*”. Likewise, article 1045 of the Civil Code states: “*Anyone who, through fraud (dolo), fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it along with the damages (perjuicios)*”. In this case, as it concerns a public employment relationship, it is also important to mention the regulation on the matter in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in article 197: “*Liability shall exist for damage to purely moral goods, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or injury inflicted, respectively*”. Compensation for moral damages is based on the violation of rights or goods of an extra-pecuniary nature, that is, it is the impairment or injury to non-pecuniary interests caused by a harmful event. Doctrine and jurisprudence have distinguished between objective and subjective or pure moral damage. The former refers to offenses against good name, reputation, and prestige, while the subjective one arises from the injury of a non-pecuniary right, without repercussion on the latter, generally involving an unjust disturbance of the person's mental conditions, such as disgust, discouragement, despair, offense against honor, dignity, and intimacy (see resolution No. 1030 at 10:20 a.m. on November 8, 2006, of Chamber II of the Supreme Court of Justice). In that sense, the Chamber, in judgment number 2001-000703 at 2:10 p.m. on November 23, 2001, stated: “*Doctrinally, damage is conceptualized as a prejudice to a legally relevant interest in any sphere of human life and, as such, deserving of protection. It has been defined as: “the impairment experienced in one's assets due to the detriment of the economic values that compose it (pecuniary damage, daño patrimonial) and also the injury to feelings, honor, or legitimate affections (moral damage, daño moral).” (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge), Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo Perrot, eighth edition, 1993, p. 167). A primary element of compensable damage is unlawfulness: “For damage to be reparable, another element must be considered, which is the existence of illegality. In this sense, De Cupis states that the legal system chooses the damages to which it grants legal relevance, and that this choice falls above all on damage produced by an unlawful act (opposite to law)” (MANGARELLI (Cristina), Daño moral en el Derecho Laboral, Editorial Acali, Montevideo, 1984, p.26).*” In the lawsuit, the plaintiff requested payment for moral damages, as he considers that: “*The moral and pecuniary damage caused by the negligent act of the UTN is great, since my client resigned from his previous job. The expectation of securing a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family was created for him. He was not paid for the time worked, having made him incur expenses for transportation, food, clothing, among others, as he lives in San Isidro de Alajuela. This, coupled with the anguish, frustration, grief, impotence, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, unease, disillusionment generated by the irregular action of the Rector and officials [Name 003] and [Name 008], which resulted in psychological and emotional suffering or affliction, upon finding himself without work and without knowing clearly why after the entire administrative process he undertook to apply for the position, he was simply asked not to return because the Rector did not want to sign, without being explained the reason for said decision*”. The Court denied this claim, arguing that in this case, the especially qualified circumstances that demonstrate the suffering required for moral damages to occur are not present and added: “*Note that the damage was not even assessed (by the plaintiff), likewise in the record a justification accrediting it is lacking, as no evidence was provided in that regard (...). In this particular case, it is by no means overlooked that the plaintiff may well have suffered some uncertainty or 'sorrow' regarding the details surrounding his circumstances; however, it was not demonstrated here that there was damage, either to the physical integrity, honor, or privacy of the plaintiff, primarily because no suffering whatsoever was evidenced, besides the fact that the plaintiff had in prospect was a mere expectation of accessing the position for which he was competing; at no time was he appointed and subsequently dismissed; indeed, within what is peculiar about this case, there was not even a dismissal strictly speaking, because there simply was no appointment*”. This conclusion is challenged by the plaintiff, who insists that he was induced into error by Ms. [Name 003], Head of the Training and Development Area of the Human Development Management Directorate of the UTN, as it was proven that she informed him that he had won the competition and asked him to report for work, therefore he resigned from the job he had at the company Impresora DELTA, where he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017. Once the specific case has been analyzed, we, the undersigned judges, consider that the appellant is correct in her argument, which must be granted, since indeed, the events that occurred entail the right to payment for moral damages. In the present case, from the list of proven facts of the ruling, which were not appealed, it is clear that Mr. [Name 001] participated in public competition CP-02-2015 to fill the position of Technician No. AU-AD151, in the Training and Development area of the Human Development Management Directorate of the Universidad Técnica Nacional. In official letter number CD-112-2017 of May 30, 2017 (image 10), [Name 003], in her capacity as Head of the Training and Development Area of the Human Development Management Directorate, indicated to the Director of Human Development Management: “*I request you please process the permanent appointment (nombramiento en propiedad) of Mr. [Name 001], ID [Value 001], starting June 05, 2017, the same is subject to the probationary period, on a full-time schedule, as Mr. [Name 001] has the most suitable profile according to the duties to be performed in the position*”. In official letter number DGDH-612-2017 of May 31, 2017 (image 15), the Director of Human Development Management of the defendant forwarded the plaintiff's appointment to the Rector for final approval. Likewise, in proven fact 4, it was indicated: “*On June fifth, two thousand seventeen, Ms. [Name 003], head of the Training and Development area of the Human Development Management Directorate, without having a response or certainty that the rector of the defendant University would give the green light for the plaintiff's appointment, told and allowed the plaintiff to report to work, until June twenty-second of the above-indicated year*”. This fact was considered proven because Ms. [Name 003] herself acknowledged it in the evidence reception hearing. So, when the plaintiff reported to work on June 5, 2017, he signed a series of documents such as sworn statements (images 69 to 78), and furthermore, an institutional email account was assigned to him. However, on June 22, 2017, Ms. [Name 003] informed him that the Rector did not give the green light for his appointment, so he could no longer report.

While the recognition of moral damages (daño moral) is conditioned upon proof, the burden of which lies with the victim, the truth is that in this case, the acceptance of the facts by the officials who work for the defendant carries with it the verification of the moral damages expressly alleged by the plaintiff, who explained that an expectation of stable employment was created for him, with which he would improve his family's quality of life; moreover, he resigned from a job where he had worked for more than 5 years, in response to the explicit call made for him to report to work. Note that the plaintiff worked for the company Impresora DELTA from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017, the date on which he resigned to assume the position at the Universidad Técnica Nacional starting on June 5 following. Mr. [Name 001] was asked to report to work, was permitted to provide his services, and the defendant benefited from them until June 22, 2017, when they informed him that the Rector had not given approval for the appointment. The situation was so serious that they did not even pay him for the days he actually worked, which he requested and were granted in this judicial process. It is evident that if a person who has had a stable job for more than five years and who participates in a competitive process to obtain another position and improve their conditions is contacted by the person in charge of processing the competition and told to report to work starting on the first of the following month, this generates something more than an expectation: the firm conviction that they won the competition, for which reason they resign from their job. Regarding moral damages, the defendant's thesis that the plaintiff cannot make any claim because a formal appointment act was never issued, since the Rector, who is the competent authority to approve and sign it, did not do so, is not acceptable, given that as he indicated, he is not obligated to know the internal procedures that must be carried out to formalize an appointment, since in application of the principle of good faith (principio de buena fe), he answered the call made by the official who was in charge of processing the competition. Finally, after eighteen days of work, he was told that he would not be appointed, leaving him unemployed, without the possibility of providing for his family's basic needs. We consider it logical that any person who is called to begin providing services has even more than a simple expectation, but rather, the conviction that the job is theirs, especially because they participated in the competition for the appointment, that is, they followed the due process to be appointed, at the end of which they were summoned to report to work, without the entire procedure to formalize the appointment having been completed. This evident and accepted error by Mrs. [Name 003] caused moral damages to the plaintiff, which we note must be compensated. In that sense, within the assumptions or parameters according to which the amount of compensation (indemnización) in this jurisdiction shall be determined, assuming the causal link (nexo causal), are prudentiality (prudencialidad), proportionality (proporcionalidad), and reasonableness (razonabilidad). It must be an equitable sum of money, in consideration of the gravity, intensity, and scope of the attributed fault, an amount that contributes to mitigating the damage caused. In this regard, Professor Dr. Antonio Luis Vázquez Vialar states: “...In the case of fixing non-pecuniary damage (daño extrapatrimonial), the judge must be extremely prudent in determining the amount of the reparation. In each case, they must make express reference to their own experience, which does not prevent, in certain circumstances, the use of some objective guidelines such as the intensity of the effects, the time over which the grievance extended, its repercussion on affective life, period of hospitalization, sequelae that cause a deterioration in social life, type of treatment to which the victim had to be subjected...” (Papers and conclusions of the II Jornadas de Integración Académica en Derecho Laboral. “El daño moral y el Salario en especie en el Derecho del Trabajo Costarricense”, Talleres de Mundo Gráfico, S. A., San José, Costa Rica, Escuela Judicial, 1990, page 18). As economic parameters of reference, the salary and other received bonuses, economic advantages, or material means granted can be considered. In that sense, the position the plaintiff held had an assigned salary of ₡544,261.00 colones, which is why, as this Chamber, by majority, ordered in a case similar to this one, in Voto n.° 0707-2004 of 14:00 hours of August 27, 2004, it is estimated that a reasonable amount to award for moral damages is the equivalent of what the plaintiff would have earned during the three-month probationary period (período de prueba), taking into consideration that this is a prudential time for him to be able to re-enter the labor market. Now, the lower court (a quo), in the contested judgment, granted the petitioner the salary for the eighteen days worked (from June 5 to 22, 2017). Consequently, for the remaining two months and twelve days, the sum amounts to ₡1,306,226.4. Legal interest (intereses legales) and indexation (indexación) are granted, from the finality (firmeza) of the judgment. Due to the manner in which it resolves, the amount of the award for personal costs (costas personales) is varied, which, given that it was not appealed, is maintained at 15% of the award, that is, the sum of ₡263,632.47 (15% of ₡451,323.41 granted by the Court, plus ₡1,306,226.4 granted by this Chamber). Regarding damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), in the action, the plaintiff requested: "He be reinstated in the position since he met all the required requirements and that he be paid, as damages and losses, the lost wages (salarios caídos) from the day of his entry into the institution (June 5, 2017)." It is inferred that the requested damages and losses were the lost wages not received from when he stopped working until his reinstatement. However, the claim for reinstatement was not upheld by the Court and was a non-appealed point, for which reason the lost wages claimed as damages and losses, a claim accessory to reinstatement, cannot be granted.

**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATION:** For the foregoing reasons, the majority of the Chamber estimates that the appropriate action is to declare the appeal without merit. For their part, Judges Varela Araya and Pereira Retana concur with a dissenting vote. They partially grant the appeal and proceed to annul the appealed judgment only insofar as it denied payment for moral damages, interest, and indexation regarding them, in order to, in its place, uphold those points and order payment for moral damages in the prudential amount of one million three hundred six thousand two hundred twenty-six colones with four céntimos, together with their interest and indexation from the finality of the judgment. Likewise, they modify the part regarding the order to pay costs, in order to instead establish the total amount for personal costs as two hundred sixty-three thousand six hundred thirty-two colones with forty-seven céntimos.

**POR TANTO:** The majority of this Chamber declares the appeal without merit. Judges Varela Araya and Pereira Retana concur with a dissenting vote. They partially grant the appeal and annul the appealed judgment only insofar as it denied payment for moral damages, interest, and indexation regarding them. In its place, those points are granted and payment is ordered for moral damages in the prudential amount of one million three hundred six thousand two hundred twenty-six colones with four céntimos, together with their interest and indexation from the finality of the judgment. Consequently, the part regarding the order to pay costs is modified, in order to instead establish the total amount for personal costs as two hundred sixty-three thousand six hundred thirty-two colones with forty-seven céntimos.

**Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Julia Varela Araya** **Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez** **Sandra Maria Pereira Retana** **Deyanira Adelaida Martinez Bolivar** **Res: 2023000744** **NROSITO/RDGU** 1 **Exp: 17-001198-0639-LA** **Res: 2023-000744** **SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**.

San José, at twelve hours fifty minutes on the thirty-first of March of two thousand twenty-three.

 Ordinary labor proceeding brought before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, by [Name 001], bachelor in administration and pedagogical teaching, against the **UNIVERSIDAD TÉCNICA NACIONAL**, represented by its rector, licentiate Marcelo Prieto Jiménez. Acting as special judicial attorneys; for the plaintiff, licentiate Alejandra Barquero Ruiz, of unknown marital status; for the defendant, licentiates Abel Chinchilla Bazan, resident of Heredia; and José Esteban Cerdas Acuña, single, resident of Limón. All of legal age, married, lawyers, and residents of Alajuela, with the exceptions noted.

**Drafted by Magistrate Olaso Álvarez; and,** **CONSIDERING:**  **I.- BACKGROUND:** Mr. [Name 001], through his representative, sued the Universidad Técnica Nacional (UTN) and stated that he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 30, 2017, at Empresa Impresora DELTA S.A., when he resigned having been selected in External Competition No. 02-2015 of the defendant University, corresponding to a permanent technical position in the area of Training and Development, as shown by official communication CD-112-2017 of May 30, 2017, signed by [Name 003], Head of the Training and Development Area. He indicated that in the cited communication, his appointment was requested starting June 5, 2017, with a full-time schedule and a salary of ₡544,261.00 colones, according to agreement 210-2016 of the University Council. He emphasized that Mrs. [Name 003] called him to tell him he had been selected, and even told him he could resign from his current job, since she required his hiring to occur as soon as possible, which is why he began working on June 5, 2017; additionally, he was assigned an institutional email. On the first of June of that year, he signed the necessary documentation to begin his duties on the indicated date. He added that as recorded in the competition file, he completed the entire administrative process to secure the permanent position. He recounted that he performed his duties from June 5 to 22, 2017, when Mrs. [Name 003] told him he could not continue working because Rector Marcelo Prieto had the appointment action withheld and was not going to sign it, so she asked him not to return because she was not going to appoint him, and furthermore, she also refused to pay him for the days actually worked. He stated that the negligent conduct of the UTN caused moral and patrimonial harm, since he resigned from his previous job, and an expectation was created of obtaining a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family. This was coupled with the anguish, frustration, grief, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, among other things, that the institution's irregular conduct caused him. For the reasons stated, he requested reinstatement in the position since he met all the required conditions, and that lost wages be recognized as damages (daños y perjuicios), that payment of the salary corresponding to the days worked at the UTN be ordered, with recognition of legal interest and indexation. He requested payment of objective and subjective moral damages and both costs (images 1 to 6 of the Court's electronic file). The Special Judicial Attorney for the defendant responded negatively to the action and raised the defenses of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. He stated that it is clear from document CD-112-2017 that what was formulated by official [Name 003] is a request for appointment, that is, an act prior to the formalization of a hiring. He added that the creation of the institutional email account does not formalize a hiring but is a prior act. He emphasized that it is not possible to assume the existence of an employment relationship with the plaintiff, since there is no formal act of appointment (images 113 to 120). In judgment number 281-2020 at 5:00 p.m. on February 24, 2020, the Labor Court of the I Judicial Circuit of Alajuela partially granted the action and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the days worked from June 5 to 22, 2017. It recognized legal interest and indexation, as well as the payment of both costs, setting personal costs at 15% of the award (images 248 to 264).

 **II.- SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL:** The plaintiff's attorney files an appeal (recurso de casación) against the Court's ruling. She claims the judge made an incorrect assessment of the evidence regarding the moral damages and damages (daños y perjuicios) claimed, since it is not true that there is no evidence supporting this claim. She emphasizes that there is no reasoning as to why her client was considered not to have suffered damages (daños y perjuicios). The ruling acknowledges that the plaintiff was induced into error by the Head of the Training and Development Area of the UTN's Human Development Management Directorate. There is documentary and testimonial evidence where it is proven that she informed the plaintiff that he had won the competition, asked him to report for work, he resigned from his job to join the Universidad Técnica Nacional, began work, and almost a month later was dismissed. Therefore, she deems it inconsistent for the judge to state there is no moral harm, no damages (daños y perjuicios), because the plaintiff was induced into error and as a consequence the plaintiff was left unemployed, with dejection, desperation, and anguish. She emphasizes that the harm caused is obvious, and furthermore, it is not true that no evidence was provided to support what was requested, since Mr. [Name 001]'s file was submitted, which includes a note from the company Impresora DELTA indicating he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017, when he resigned to join the UTN on June 1, 2017. Having resigned implies he lost his severance pay (cesantía). She highlights that moral damages are appropriate if the circumstances in which the dismissal occurs are especially qualified, just as happened in this case. For the reasons stated, she requests that the appeal be granted and that payment of damages (daños y perjuicios), including moral damages, be ordered.

 **III.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** Upon analyzing the reproaches formulated by the plaintiff's legal representation, the majority of this Chamber considers that they must be denied, for the reasons that will be set forth below. It is opportune to highlight that in a case like the present one, whose applicable regulations correspond to the labor procedural reform, enacted by Law No. 9343, the moving party must necessarily, within the framework of the claim for harm, specify the motive that originates that compensation for harm, what it consists of, and its estimation (article 495, subsection 5 of that reform). From the context of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, it is extracted that the alleged moral harm intended by him is indicated in fact 8 of the lawsuit as follows: "[...] *the moral and patrimonial harm caused by the negligent conduct of the UTN is great, since my client resigned from his previous job. An expectation was created of obtaining a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family. He was not paid for the time worked, causing him to incur expenses for transportation, food, clothing, among others, since he lives in San Isidro de Alajuela. This, coupled with the anguish, frustration, grief, impotence, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, uneasiness, disillusionment caused by the irregular conduct of the Rector and officials [Name 003] and [Name 008], which led to psychological and emotional suffering or affliction, upon finding himself without work and without clearly knowing why (sic) after the entire administrative process he underwent to apply for the position, he is simply asked not to return because the Rector did not want to sign, without being explained the reason for said decision...*". (Our emphasis). From the analysis of this request, it is extracted that the plaintiff seeks moral harm derived from the alleged impotence, sadness, insecurity, etcetera, caused by the eventual conduct of the Rector and other officials within the administrative process initiated for his possible transfer of position. But, on the other hand, he also introduces situations of another nature, no longer of moral content but eminently patrimonial, such as compensation for the time worked, expenses for food, transportation, and clothing (among others) as a reason for the supposed transfer of duties. This difference between the two types of harm is essential in this matter. In general terms, harm can be conceptualized as any detriment, loss, or impairment that can affect a person in themselves, such as those that can compromise their patrimony. Understanding harm in this way (so broadly) implies denying it transcendence and, on the other hand, does not allow the full exercise of the right of defense of the party against whom that harm is claimed, because a concretion is required that allows limiting its scope when deciding to grant it or not and, on the other hand, the eventual possibility of debating it (and hence the provision of the cited numeral 495 subsection 5). This is why, faced with this dialectic between the claim for compensation and the exercise of the right of defense of the party from whom the harm is claimed, it is necessary to differentiate between patrimonial harm and moral harm. The former is that which falls upon the patrimony, either directly on the things that comprise it or indirectly as a consequence of harm caused to the person themselves, in their rights or faculties: thus, direct material or patrimonial harm is that suffered by economic goods destroyed or damaged; and indirect patrimonial harm, for example, expenses incurred (direct harm) for the healing of bodily injuries, or the profits that are frustrated (lost profits) due to the incapacity that befalls the victim. On the other hand, moral harm is that which injures rights affecting the personality, generally directed against health, privacy, honor, etcetera. As has been explained, the plaintiff sets forth his claims between these two classes of harm; however, he is under the evidentiary obligation to prove the facts he intends to claim as the basis for these compensations (article 477, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code). In previous pronouncements, we have criticized that the Chamber, with a different composition, incorrectly applies the dogmatic formula "*in re ipsa*" to fill the evidentiary negligence of the claiming parties and compensate for harm that has not been demonstrated. We cannot deny that there is a possibility of compensating harm caused on the occasion of the development or termination of the employment relationship. National authors such as Víctor Pérez Vargas, citing Manava Dharma Sastra, who referred to the Code of Manu, evidence how, already in Ancient India, the possibility of satisfaction before an injured interest was regulated. In said Code, its article 288 of Book Eight established "... *he who damages another's property, knowingly or through carelessness (dolus or fault), must give him satisfaction*". That premise is the same one contained in numeral 1045 of the Costa Rican Civil Code, which prescribes an obligation to "repair," that is, to "satisfy." In other words, compensation is a patrimonial restoration in the person or their property. In this regard, Messineo indicates that patrimonial compensation restores value, despite its composition being diverse. Regarding moral harm, the function of compensation undergoes variations. In Roman Law, it was called "*pretium doloris*", in Germanic law "*Schmerzgelt*", that is, "paying a price for the pain," so it does not directly tend toward the full restitution of the harm caused, since when dealing with harm that affects non-patrimonial values, the situation is different. Despite the above, compensation for moral harm does not seek a generic satisfactory function but a form of compensation for the suffering or humiliation suffered (Trabucchi and Borrel, cited by Víctor Pérez Vargas, in "Derecho Privado," p. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explains that, due to its non-patrimonial nature, "tensions" arise in its concretion to a specific sum, because from its correct reparation to a so-called "judicial lottery" there is one step. Likewise, said Spanish author emphasizes the aspect that moral harm must be proven. To support her position, which we share by majority, she cites a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of July 30, 1999 (Aranzadi Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 1999, 5726), which states that a judicial separation due to conjugal infidelity does not originate "*per se*" an indemnity for moral harm, just as the breach of a promise to marry does not generate it (See "Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil", "El Daño", Vicente Domingo, Elena, p. 80). Following this same conceptual line, the Spanish author Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León precisely criticizes the approaches made by the dissenting vote (voto de minoría), since it establishes that, in a strict conception of moral harm, it is not possible to presume it as a consequence of the injuries suffered. He emphasizes that moral harm must be the subject of some type of proof, because otherwise, the notion of reparation for the unlawful conduct that generates it is lost, and it would then become a form of "punitive harm" (Díez Picazo y Ponce de León, Luis, "DERECHO DE DAÑOS", p. 329), which, we add, overflows the notions of harm as reparation provided for in numeral 41 of our Political Constitution. In this way, with a substantive approach, the harm sought by the plaintiff must be denied, just as the Court did, since no evidence was offered to prove his assertions regarding that harm. But there are also procedural reasons for not granting moral harm in this case. The minority of this Chamber proposes that compensation for moral harm due to an unjustified dismissal by itself causes suffering, that is, it is through a human presumption from which that suffering can be derived and, therefore, compensation. Human presumptions were eliminated as a means of proof within the new civil procedural legislation (article 41.2). However, they did enjoy specific regulation in the repealed civil procedural norm, specifically in article 417. That numeral established that such presumptions only constitute proof if they are a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. Likewise, it emphasized that the proof of presumptions must be serious and consistent with the others rendered in the proceeding. Even if we were to apply that repealed norm to the case at hand, we conclude that there is no evidence that allows a "logical inference" to grant the claims for moral and patrimonial harm that the plaintiff outlined in his lawsuit, given that he did not prove any of the factual circumstances with which he seeks compensation, for which reason it is not possible to describe the inference reached by the minority of this Chamber as "logical." In our view, this way of resolving would violate the principle of congruity and the right of defense of the opposing party, since the plaintiff never used that approach to quantify the alleged moral or patrimonial harm, but rather, officiously and infringing upon the right of defense of the defendant, a compensation would be ordered using compensatory guidelines that were not sought by the plaintiff. This situation, totally violative of due process, together with the fact that the harms sought were not even proven by the plaintiff, leads us, by majority, to consider that what was resolved by the lower court (a quo) is in accordance with law and the merits of the case file, so it is appropriate to deny the appeal and confirm the appealed judgment.

 **IV.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND PEREIRA RETANA:** The undersigned Magistrates respectfully dissent from the majority vote for the reasons that will be set forth below. The object of the appeal is to determine if the plaintiff has the right to recognition of moral harm, which was denied by the Court. Numeral 41 of the Political Constitution establishes: "*All persons, by recourse to the laws, shall find reparation for injuries or damages they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be prompt, complete, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws*". Likewise, article 1045 of the Civil Code states: "*Anyone who by deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence causes harm to another is obliged to repair it along with the damages (perjuicios)*". In this case, as it involves a public employment relationship, it is also important to mention the regulation on the matter in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in article 197: "*There shall be liability for the harm of purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by the death or injury inflicted, respectively*". Indemnity for moral harm is based on the violation of rights or assets of an extra-patrimonial nature, that is, it is the impairment or injury to non-patrimonial interests caused by a harmful event. Doctrine and jurisprudence have distinguished between objective and subjective or pure moral harm. The former refers to offenses against good name, reputation, and prestige, while the subjective arises from the injury of a non-patrimonial right, without repercussion on it, generally involving an unjust disturbance of the person's mental and emotional conditions, such as displeasure, dejection, desperation, offense against honor, dignity, and privacy (see resolution No. 1030 at 10:20 a.m. on November 8, 2006, of Chamber II of the Supreme Court of Justice). In that sense, the Chamber, in judgment number 2001-000703 at 2:10 p.m. on November 23, 2001, stated: "*Harm is doctrinally conceptualized as damage to a legally relevant interest in any sphere of human life and, as such, worthy of protection. It has been defined as: 'the impairment experienced in the patrimony by the detriment of the economic values that compose it (patrimonial harm) and also the injury to feelings, honor, or legitimate affections (moral harm).' (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA, Jorge), Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo Perrot, eighth edition, 1993, p. 167). A primary element of compensable harm is wrongfulness: 'For harm to be reparable, one must take into account another element, which is the existence of illegality. In this sense, De Cupis states that the legal system chooses the harms to which it grants legal relevance, and that this choice falls first and foremost on the harm produced by a wrongful act (opposed to the law)' (MANGARELLI (Cristina), Daño moral en el Derecho Laboral, Editorial Acali, Montevideo, 1984, p. 26)".* In the lawsuit, the plaintiff requested payment of moral harm, because he considers that: "*The moral and patrimonial harm caused by the negligent conduct of the UTN is great, since my client resigned from his previous job. An expectation was created of obtaining a stable job that would allow him to improve his quality of life and that of his family. He was not paid for the time worked, having caused him to incur expenses for transportation, food, clothing, among others, since he lives in San Isidro de Alajuela. This, coupled with the anguish, frustration, grief, impotence, sadness, insecurity, anxiety, uneasiness, disillusionment caused by the irregular conduct of the Rector and officials [Name 003] and [Name 008], which led to psychological and emotional suffering or affliction, upon finding himself without work and without clearly knowing why after the entire administrative process he underwent to apply for the position, he is simply asked not to return because the Rector did not want to sign, without being explained the reason for said decision*". The Court denied this claim, arguing that in this case, the specially qualified circumstances evidencing suffering that are required for moral harm to occur are not present, and added: "*Note that the harm was not even assessed (by the plaintiff); likewise, the case file lacks a justification to prove it, as no evidence was provided in this regard (…). In this particular case, it is by no means overlooked that the plaintiff may well have suffered some uncertainty or 'sorrow' regarding the details surrounding his circumstances, however, it was not demonstrated here that there was harm, whether to physical integrity, honor, or privacy of the plaintiff, mainly because no suffering is evident, besides the fact that what the plaintiff had in prospect was a mere expectation of accessing the position for which he was competing; at no time was he appointed and subsequently dismissed. In fact, within the sui generis nature of this case, there was no dismissal properly speaking, as there simply was no appointment*". This conclusion is contested by the plaintiff, who insists that he was induced into error by Mrs. [Name 003], Head of the Training and Development Area of the UTN's Human Development Management Directorate, as it was proven that she informed him that he had won the competition and asked him to report for work, which is why he resigned from the job he had at Empresa Impresora DELTA, where he worked from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017. Having analyzed the specific case, we, the undersigned judges, consider that the appellant is correct in their claim, which must be granted, as indeed, the events that occurred entail the right to the payment of moral harm. In this instance, from the list of proven facts of the ruling, which were not appealed, it is clear that Mr. [Name 001] participated in public competition CP-02-2015, to fill the Technical position No. AU-AD151, in the Training and Development area of the Human Development Management Directorate of the Universidad Técnica Nacional. In official communication number CD-112-2017 of May 30, 2017 (image 10), [Name 003], in her capacity as Head of the Training and Development Area of the Human Development Management Directorate, indicated that the Human Development Management Director: "*I request you please manage the permanent appointment of Mr. [Name 001], ID number [Value 001], starting June 5, 2017. He is subject to the probationary period, with a full-time schedule, since Mr. [Name 001] has the most suitable profile according to the duties he will perform in the position*".

In official communication number DGDH-612-2017 of May 31, 2017 (image 15), the Director of Human Development Management of the defendant forwarded the claimant's appointment to the Rector for final approval. Likewise, in proven fact 4 it was stated: “On June 5, 2017, Mrs. [Name 003], head of the Training and Development area of the Human Development Management Directorate, without having a response and certainty that the Rector of the defendant University would give approval for the claimant's appointment, instructed and allowed the claimant to report for work, until June 22 of the aforementioned year.” This fact was held as proven because Mrs. [Name 003] herself acknowledged it in the evidentiary hearing. So, when the claimant reported for work on June 5, 2017, he signed a series of documents such as sworn statements (affidavits) (images 69 to 78), and he was also assigned an institutional email account. However, on June 22, 2017, Mrs. [Name 003] informed him that the Rector had not approved his appointment, and therefore he could no longer report. While the recognition of non-economic damage (daño moral) is conditioned upon proof, the burden of which lies with the victim, the truth is that in this case, the acceptance of the facts by the officials working for the defendant results in the verification of the non-economic damage (daño moral) expressly alleged by the claimant, who explained that an expectation of stable employment was created for him, with which he would improve his family's quality of life, and moreover, he resigned from a job he had held for more than 5 years, given the explicit call made for him to report for work. Note that the claimant worked for the company Impresora DELTA from April 9, 2012, to May 31, 2017, the date on which he resigned to assume the position at the Universidad Técnica Nacional starting the following June 5. Mr. [Name 001] was asked to report for work, was allowed to provide his services, and the defendant benefited from them, until June 22, 2017, when he was informed that the Rector had not approved the appointment. The situation was so serious that they did not even pay him for the days he actually worked, which he requested and were awarded in this judicial proceeding. It is evident that if a person who has had stable employment for more than five years, who participates in a competitive process to access another position and improve his conditions, is contacted by the person in charge of processing the process and instructed to report for work as of the first of the following month, this generates something more than an expectation: the firm conviction that he won the process, and therefore he resigns from his job. Regarding non-economic damage (daño moral), the defendant's argument that the claimant cannot assert any claim because a formal act of appointment was never issued—since the Rector, who is the competent authority to approve and sign it, did not do so—is untenable, given that, as the claimant stated, he is not obliged to know the internal procedures that must be carried out to formalize an appointment, since, in application of the principle of good faith (principio de buena fe), he responded to the call made by the official who was in charge of processing the competitive process. Finally, after eighteen days of work, he was told that he would not be appointed, leaving him unemployed, without the possibility of providing for the satisfaction of his family's basic needs. We consider it logical that any person who receives a call to begin providing services would have, even more than a simple expectation, the conviction that the job is theirs, especially because they participated in the competitive process for the appointment, that is, they followed the due process to be appointed, at the end of which they were summoned to report for work, even though the entire procedure to formalize the appointment had not been completed. This evident error, accepted by Mrs. [Name 003], caused non-economic damage (daño moral) to the claimant, which we find must be compensated. In that regard, among the premises or parameters according to which the amount of compensation shall be determined in this jurisdiction, assuming the causal link (nexo causal), are prudentiality, proportionality, and reasonableness. It must be an equitable sum of money, considering the gravity, intensity, and scope of the attributed fault, an amount that helps to alleviate the damage caused. In this sense, Professor Dr. Antonio Luis Vázquez Vialar states: “...In the case of setting non-pecuniary damage (daño extrapatrimonial), the judge must be extremely prudent in determining the amount of reparation. In each case, express reference must be made to their own experience, which does not preclude, in certain circumstances, the use of some objective guidelines such as the intensity of the effects, the time over which the grievance was projected, its repercussion on affective life, the period of internment, sequelae that cause a deterioration in social life, the type of treatment to which the victim had to be subjected ...” (Papers and conclusions of the II Jornadas de Integración Académica en Derecho Laboral. “El daño moral y el Salario en especie en el Derecho del Trabajo Costarricense”, Talleres de Mundo Gráfico, S. A., San José, Costa Rica, Escuela Judicial, 1990, page 18). As economic reference parameters, the salary and other bonuses received, economic advantages, or material means granted may be considered. In that sense, the position the claimant held had an assigned salary of ₡544,261.00 colones, which is why, as this Chamber, by majority, ruled in a case similar to the present one, in vote no. 0707-2004 at 14:00 hours on August 27, 2004, it is estimated that a reasonable amount to award for non-economic damage (daño moral) is the equivalent of what the claimant would have earned during the three-month probationary period (período de prueba), taking into consideration that this is a prudential time for him to be able to re-enter the labor market. Now, the lower court (a quo), in the appealed judgment, awarded the petitioner the salary for the eighteen days worked (from June 5 to 22, 2017). Consequently, for the remaining two months and twelve days, the sum amounts to ₡1,306,226.4. Legal interest and indexation (intereses legales e indexación) are granted from the date the judgment becomes final (firmeza de la sentencia). Due to the manner in which this is resolved, the amount of the award for personal costs (costas personales) is varied, which, since it was not appealed, is maintained at 15% of the award, that is, the sum of ₡263,632.47 (15% of ₡451,323.41 awarded by the Trial Court, plus ₡1,306,226.4 awarded by this Chamber). Regarding damages (daños y perjuicios), in the action the claimant requested: “That he be reinstated in the position since he met all the required qualifications and that he be paid, as damages (daños y perjuicios), the back pay (salarios caídos) from the date of his entry to the institution (June 5, 2017).” It is clear that the damages (daños y perjuicios) requested were the back pay (salarios caídos) lost from the time he stopped working until his reinstatement. However, the claim for reinstatement was not granted by the Trial Court and was an unappealed issue, therefore the back pay (salarios caídos) as damages (daños y perjuicios), an ancillary claim to reinstatement, cannot be awarded.

**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATION:** Based on the foregoing, the majority of the Chamber considers that the appropriate course is to dismiss the appeal. Magistrates Varela Araya and Pereira Retana dissent (salvan el voto). They partially grant the appeal and proceed to annul the appealed judgment only insofar as it denied payment for non-economic damage (daño moral), interest, and indexation (intereses e indexación) with respect thereto, and in its place, grant those claims and order the defendant to pay for non-economic damage (daño moral) the prudential amount of one million three hundred six thousand two hundred twenty-six colones with four céntimos (cents), together with interest and indexation (intereses e indexación) as of the date the judgment becomes final (firmeza del fallo). Likewise, they modify the award of costs (costas), and in its place, set the total amount for personal costs (costas personales) at two hundred sixty-three thousand six hundred thirty-two colones with forty-seven céntimos (cents).

**POR TANTO (THEREFORE):** The majority of this Chamber dismisses the appeal. Magistrates Varela Araya and Pereira Retana dissent (salvan el voto). They partially grant the appeal and annul the appealed judgment only insofar as it denied payment for non-economic damage (daño moral), interest, and indexation (intereses e indexación) with respect thereto. In its place, those claims are granted, and the defendant is ordered to pay for non-economic damage (daño moral) the prudential amount of one million three hundred six thousand two hundred twenty-six colones with four céntimos (cents), together with interest and indexation (intereses e indexación) as of the date the judgment becomes final (firmeza del fallo). Consequently, the award of costs (costas) is modified, and in its place, the total amount for personal costs (costas personales) is set at two hundred sixty-three thousand six hundred thirty-two colones with forty-seven céntimos (cents).

**Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Julia Varela Araya** **Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez** **Sandra Maria Pereira Retana** **Deyanira Adelaida Martinez Bolivar** **Res: 2023000744** **NROSITO/RDGU**

Revisión del Documento  Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2023-000744 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas cincuenta minutos del treinta y uno de marzo de dos mil veintitrés.

Proceso ordinario laboral establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, por [Nombre 001], bachiller en administración y enseñanza pedagógica, contra la UNIVERSIDAD TÉCNICA NACIONAL, representada por su rector el licenciado Marcelo Prieto Jiménez. Figuran como apoderados especiales judiciales; de la parte actora, la licenciada Alejandra Barquero Ruiz, de estado civil desconocido; de la parte demandada, los licenciados Abel Chinchilla Bazan, vecino de Heredia; y José Esteban Cerdas Acuña, soltero, vecino de Limón. Todos mayores, casados, abogados y vecinos de Alajuela, con las excepciones indicadas.

Redacta el Magistrado Olaso Álvarez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: El señor [Nombre 001], a través de su representante demandó a la Universidad Técnica Nacional (UTN) y expuso que trabajó desde el 9 de abril de 2012 al 30 de mayo de 2017 en la Empresa Impresora DELTA S.A, cuando renunció por haber resultado electo en el Concurso Externo n.° 02-2015 de la Universidad demandada, correspondiente a un puesto técnico en propiedad en el área de Capacitación y Desarrollo, lo que se desprende del oficio CD-112-2017 del 30 de mayo de 2017, suscrito por [Nombre 003], Jefa del Área de Capacitación y Desarrollo. Indicó que en el citado oficio se solicitó su nombramiento a partir del 5 de junio de 2017, con una jornada de tiempo completo y un salario de ₡544.261,00 colones, según acuerdo 210-2016 del Consejo Universitario. Destacó que la señora [Nombre 003] lo llamó para indicarle que fue seleccionado, incluso le dijo que podía renunciar a su actual trabajo, ya que requería que su contratación se diera lo más pronto posible, por lo que comenzó a laborar el 5 de junio de 2017, además, se le asignó un correo institucional. El primero de junio de ese año, firmó la documentación necesaria para iniciar sus labores en la fecha indicada. Añadió que según consta en el expediente del concurso, él cumplió con todo el proceso administrativo para lograr obtener la plaza en propiedad. Relató que ejerció sus labores del 5 al 22 de junio de 2017, cuando la señora [Nombre 003] le indicó que no podía continuar trabajando, porque el rector Marcelo Prieto tenía la acción de nombramiento retenida y no la iba a firmar, por lo que le pidió que no volviera, porque no lo iba a nombrar, además, también se negó a pagarle los días efectivamente laborados. Expuso que con el actuar negligente de la UTN se causó daño moral y patrimonial, ya que renunció a su trabajo anterior, se le creó la expectativa de lograr un trabajo estable que le permitiría mejorar su calidad de vida y la de su familia. Lo anterior aunado a la angustia, frustración, desconsuelo, tristeza, inseguridad, ansiedad, entre otras que le generó el actuar irregular de la institución. Por lo expuesto solicitó la reinstalación en el puesto ya que cumplió con todos los requerimientos exigidos y que se le reconozcan los salarios caídos a título de daños y perjuicios, que se ordene el pago del salario correspondiente a los días laborados en la UTN, con el reconocimiento de intereses legales e indexación. Requirió el pago del daño moral objetivo y subjetivo y, de ambas costas (imágenes 1 a 6 del expediente electrónico del Juzgado). El Apoderado Especial Judicial de la demandada contestó negativamente la acción e interpuso las defensas de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y falta de derecho. Expuso que del documento CD-112-2017 se desprende que lo formulado por la funcionaria [Nombre 003] es una solicitud de nombramiento, es decir, un acto previo a la formalización de una contratación. Agregó que la creación de la cuenta de correo electrónico institucional no formaliza una contratación, sino que es un acto previo. Destacó que no es posible suponer la existencia de un vínculo laboral del actor, por no existir un acto formal de nombramiento (imágenes 113 a 120). En sentencia número 281-2020 de las 17:00 horas del 24 de febrero de 2020, el Juzgado de Trabajo del I Circuito Judicial de Alajuela, declaró parcialmente con lugar la acción, y ordenó a la accionada a cancelarle al actor los días laborados comprendidos del 5 al 22 de junio de 2017. Reconoció intereses legales e indexación, así como el pago de ambas costas, estableciendo las personales en el 15% de la condena (imágenes 248 a 264).

II.- SÍNTESIS DEL RECURSO: La apoderada del actor interpone recurso de casación contra el fallo del Juzgado. Aduce que el juez realizó una valoración incorrecta de la prueba respecto al daño moral y daños y perjuicios reclamados, ya que no es cierto que no haya prueba que respalde esta pretensión. Destaca que no hay fundamentación de por qué se consideró que su representado no sufrió daños y perjuicios. El fallo reconoce que el actor fue inducido a error por parte de la Jefa del Área de Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Dirección de Gestión de Desarrollo de la UTN. Existe prueba documental y testimonial donde se comprueba que ella le comunicó al demandante que había ganado el concurso, le pidió que se presentara a trabajar, él renunció a su trabajo para incorporarse a la Universidad Técnica Nacional, inició labores y casi un mes después se le despidió. Por ello, estima incongruente que el juez indique no hay daño moral, daños y perjuicios, porque al accionante se le indujo a error y como consecuencia el demandante quedó desempleado, con desánimo, desesperación y angustia. Destaca que el daño causado es obvio, además, no es cierto que no se haya aportado prueba que respaldara lo solicitado, pues se aportó el expediente de don [Nombre 001], donde se incluye nota de la empresa Impresora DELTA, en la que se indica que él trabajó del 9 de abril de 2012 al 31 de mayo de 2017, cuando renunció para incorporarse a la UTN el primero de junio de 2017. El haber renunciado implica que perdió la cesantía. Resalta que el daño moral procede si las circunstancias en que se da el despido son especialmente calificadas, tal y como sucedió en este caso. Por lo expuesto, pide que se acoja el recurso y se condene al pago de daños y perjuicios, incluido el daño moral.

III.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO: Al analizar los reproches formulados por la representación jurídica del accionante, la mayoría de esta Sala estima que éstos deben denegarse, por las razones que seguidamente serán expuestas. Resulta oportuno destacar que en un caso como el presente, cuya normativa aplicable corresponde a la reforma procesal laboral, efectuada por Ley n° 9343, la parte promovente debe necesariamente, en el marco de la solicitud del daño, el concretar el motivo que origina ese resarcimiento del daño, en qué consiste y su estimación (artículo 495, inciso 5° de esa reforma). Del contexto de la demanda formulada por el actor se extrae que el supuesto daño moral por éste pretendido, se indica en el hecho 8° de la demanda de la siguiente forma: "[...] el daño moral y patrimonial causado por el actuar negligente de la UTN es grande, puesto que mi representado renunció a su trabajo anterior. Se le creó una expectiva de lograr un trabajo estable que le permitiría mejorar la calidad de vida y la de su familia. No se le pagó el tiempo laborado, haciéndole incurrir en gastos de traslado, alimentación, vestido entre otros, ya que éste vive en San Isidro de Alajuela. Lo anterior , aunado a la angustia, frustración, desconsuelo, impotencia, tristeza, inseguridad, ansiedad, intranquilidad, desilusión que le generó el actuar irregular del Rector y de las funcionarias [Nombre 003] y [Nombre 008], lo que desembocó en un sufrimiento o aflicción psíquica y emocional, al verse sin trabajo y sin saber con claridad el porque (sic) después de todo el proceso administrativo que realizó para optar por el puesto, simplemente se le pide que no vuelva porque el Rector no quiso firmar, sin que se le explicara el porque de dicha decisión...". (Lo destacado es nuestro). Del análisis de esa petición, se extrae que la parte actora pretende un daño moral derivado de la supuesta impotencia, tristeza, inseguridad, etcétera que le generó el eventual actuar del Rector y de otras personas funcionarias dentro del proceso administrativo iniciado para su posible traslado de puesto. Pero, por otro lado, también introduce situaciones de otra naturaleza ya no de contenido moral sino eminentemente patrimonial, como lo son el resarcimiento por el tiempo laborado, gastos de alimentación, traslado y vestido (entre otros) como motivo del supuesto traslado de cargo. Esta diferencia entre ambos tipos de daño resulta esencial en este asunto. En forma general, el daño se puede conceptualizar como todo detrimento, pérdida o menoscabo que puede afectar a una persona en sí mismo, como los que pueden comprometer su patrimonio. Entender el daño de esa forma (tan amplia) implica negarle trascendencia al mismo y, por otro lado, no permite el ejercicio pleno del derecho de defensa de la parte ante la cual se le reclama ese daño, pues se requiere una concreción que permita limitar sus alcances al resolver otorgarlo o no y, por otro lado, la eventual posibilidad de debatirlo (y de ahí lo dispuesto por el numeral 495 inciso 5° citado). Es por esto que, ante esta diálectica entre la petición de resarcimiento y el ejercicio del derecho de defensa de la parte a la que se reclama el daño, se hace necesario diferenciar entre el daño patrimonial y el moral. El primero es aquél que recae sobre el patrimonio, ya sea en forma directa sobre las cosas que lo componen o indirecta como consecuencia de un daño causado a la persona misma, en sus derechos o facultades: así, es daño material o patrimonial directo el que sufren bienes económicos destruidos o deteriorados; y daño patrimonial indirecto, por ejemplo, los gastos realizados (daño emergente) para la curación de las lesiones corporales, o las ganancias que se frustran (lucro cesante) por la incapacidad sobrevenida para la víctima. Por otro lado, el daño moral es aquel que lesiona los derechos que afectan la personalidad, generalmente dirigidos contra la salud, la intimidad, el honor, etcétera. Tal y como se ha venido explicando, el accionante plantea sus pretensiones entre estas dos clases de daños, no obstante, está en la obligación probatoria de acreditar los hechos que pretende reclamar como fundamento a estos resarcimientos (artículo 477, párrafo 1° del Código de Trabajo). Ya en anteriores pronunciamientos hemos criticado que la Sala, con diferente integración, aplica incorrectamente la fórmula dogmática "in re ipsa" para llenar las negligencias probatorias de las partes reclamantes y resarcir un daño que no ha sido demostrado. No podemos negar que existe la posibilidad de resarcir un daño provocado con ocasión del desarrollo o finalización del vínculo laboral. Autores nacionales como Víctor Pérez Vargas, citando a Manava Dharma Sastra quien hacía referencia al Código de Manú, evidencia como ya en la Antigua India se regulaba la posibilidad de satisfacción ante un interés lesionado. En dicho Código, su artículo 288, del Libro Octavo establecía "...el que daña los bienes de otro, a sabiendas o por descuido (dolo o culpa), debe darle satisfacción". Esa premisa es la misma contenida en el numeral 1045 del Código Civil costarricense que preceptúa una obligación de "reparar" o sea de "satisfacer". En otras palabras, el resarcimiento es una restauración patrimonial en la persona o en sus bienes. Al respecto, Messineo indica que el resarcimiento patrimonial vuelve el valor, a pesar de que sea diversa su composición. En cuanto al daño moral, la función del resarcimiento sufre variables. En Derecho Romano se le denominaba "pretium doloris", en derecho germánico "Schmerzgelt", o sea "pagar un precio por el dolor", por lo que no tiende directamente a la restitución íntegra del daño causado, pues al tratarse de un daño que afecta valores de orden no patrimonial la situación es diversa. A pesar de lo anterior, el resarcimiento por el daño moral no busca una genérica función satisfactoria sino una forma de compensación del sufrimiento o humillación padecida (Trabucchi y Borrel, citados por Víctor Pérez Vargas, en "Derecho Privado", pág. 423). Elena Vicente Domingo explica que, en razón de esa naturaleza no patrimonial, surgen "tensiones" en su concreción a una determinada suma pues de su correcta reparación a una llamada "lotería judicial" hay un paso. Asimismo, dicha autora española recalca el aspecto de que el daño moral ha de probarse. Para fundar su posición, la cual por mayoría compartimos, cita una sentencia del Tribunal Supremo Español del 30 de julio de 1999 (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi 1999, 5726), en la que se afirma que una separación judicial por infidelidad conyugal no origina "per se" una indemnización de daño moral, como tampoco lo genera el incumplimiento de una promesa de contraer matrimonio (Ver "Lecciones de Responsabilidad Civil", "El Daño", Vicente Domingo, Elena, pág. 80). Siguiendo esta misma línea conceptual, el autor español Luis Díez Picazo y Ponce de León, crítica precisamente los planteamientos que efectúa el voto de minoría, ya que establece que, en una concepción estricta del daño moral no es posible presumirlo como una consecuencia de las lesiones sufridas. Él recalca que el daño moral debe ser objeto de algún tipo de prueba, pues de lo contrario se pierde la noción de reparación por la conducta antijurídica que lo genera, y entonces se convertiría en una forma de "daño punitivo" (Diez Picazo y Ponce De León, Luis, "DERECHO DE DAÑOS", pág. 329), lo cual, agregamos nosotros, rebalsa las nociones del daño como reparación que prevé el numeral 41 de nuestra Constitución Política. De esta forma, con un planteamiento sustantivo se debe denegar el daño pretendido por la persona demandante, tal y como lo hizo el Juzgado, ya que no ofreció prueba que acredite sus afirmaciones en cuanto a ese daño. Pero también existen razones procesales para no conceder el daño moral en este caso. La minoría de esta Sala plantea que, el resarcimiento del daño moral por un despido injustificado provoca por sí solo sufrimiento, o sea es mediante una presunción humana de la que se puede derivar ese sufrimiento y, por ende el resarcimiento. Las presunciones humanas fueron eliminadas como un medio de prueba dentro de la nueva legislación procesal civil (artículo 41.2). No obstante, sí gozaban de una regulación concreta en la norma procesal civil derogada, concretamente en el artículo 417. Ese numeral establecía que ese tipo de presunciones solo constituyen prueba si son consecuencia directa, precisa y lógicamente deducida de un hecho comprobado. Asimismo, recalcaba que la prueba de las presunciones debe ser grave y concordar con las demás rendidas en el proceso. Aún y cuando aplicáramos esa norma derogada al caso que nos ocupa, concluimos que no hay pruebas que permitan una "inferencia lógica" para acoger las pretensiones de daño moral y patrimonial que esbozó el actor en su demanda, dado que no acreditó ninguna de las circunstancias fácticas con las que pretende el resarcimiento por lo que no es posible calificar de "lógica" la inferencia a la que llega la minoría de esta Sala. A nuestro entender esta forma de resolver violentaría el principio de congruencia y el derecho de defensa de la parte contraria, puesto que el accionante jamás utilizó ese planteamiento para cuantificar el supuesto daño moral o patrimonial, sino que oficiosamente e infringiendo el derecho de defensa de la parte accionada, se condenaría a un resarcimiento utilizando lineamientos indemnizatorios que no fueron pretendidos por el actor. Esta situación totalmente violatoria del debido proceso unida al hecho de que los daños pretendidos no fueron ni tan siquiera acreditados por el actor, conlleva a que, por mayoría, se estime que lo resuelto por el a quo está apegado a derecho y al mérito de los autos, por lo que procede denegar el recurso y confirmar la sentencia recurrida.

IV.- VOTO SALVADO DE LAS MAGISTRADAS VARELA ARAYA Y PEREIRA RETANA: Las infrascritas Magistradas, respetuosamente nos apartamos del voto de mayoría, por las razones que de seguido se expondrán. El objeto del recurso es determinar si el actor tiene derecho al reconocimiento de daño moral, el cual fue denegado por el Juzgado. El numeral 41 de la Constitución Política establece: “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes”. Asimismo, el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, expone: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios”. En este caso, por tratarse de una relación de empleo público, también es importante mencionar la regulación que sobre el tema hace la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en el artículo 197: “Cabrá responsabilidad por el daño de bienes puramente morales, lo mismo que por el padecimiento moral y el dolor físico causados por la muerte o por la lesión inferida, respectivamente”. La indemnización por daño moral, se basa en la violación de derechos o bienes de naturaleza extra patrimonial, es decir, es el menoscabo o lesión a intereses no patrimoniales provocado por un evento dañoso. La doctrina y la jurisprudencia han distinguido entre el daño moral objetivo y el subjetivo o puro. El primero se refiere a las ofensas al buen nombre, la reputación, y al prestigio, mientras que el subjetivo se da por la lesión de un derecho no patrimonial, sin repercusión en éste, suponiendo generalmente una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas de la persona, como disgusto, desánimo, desesperación, agravio contra el honor, dignidad e intimidad (ver resolución n.º 1030 de las 10:20 horas del 8 de noviembre de 2006 de la Sala II de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). En ese sentido, la Sala en sentencia número 2001-000703 de las 14:10 horas del 23 de noviembre de 2001, expuso: “El daño doctrinariamente se conceptúa como un perjuicio a un interés jurídicamente relevante en cualquier esfera de la vida humana y, como tal, merecedor de tutela. Ha sido definido como: “el menoscabo que se experimenta en el patrimonio por el detrimento de los valores económicos que lo componen (daño patrimonial) y también la lesión a los sentimientos, al honor o a las afecciones legítimas (daño moral).” (BUSTAMANTE ALSINA (Jorge), Teoría General de la Responsabilidad Civil, Buenos Aires, Editorial Abeledo Perrot, octava edición, 1993, p. 167). Un elemento primordial del daño indemnizable es la antijuricidad: “Para que el daño sea reparable hay que tener en cuenta otro elemento que es la existencia de ilicitud. En este sentido expresa De Cupis que el ordenamiento jurídico elige los daños a los que otorga relevancia jurídica, y que dicha elección recae ante todo en el daño producido por un acto antijurídico (opuesto al derecho)” (MANGARELLI (Cristina), Daño moral en el Derecho Laboral, Editorial Acali, Montevideo, 1984, p.26)”. En la demanda el actor solicitó el pago de daño moral, pues considera que: “El daño moral y patrimonial causado por el actuar negligente de la UTN es grande, puesto que mi representado renunció a su trabajo anterior. Se le creó la expectativa de lograr un trabajo estable que le permitiría mejorar su calidad de vida y la de su familia. No se le pagó el tiempo laborado, habiéndole hecho incurrir en gastos de traslado, alimentación, vestido, entre otros, ya que éste vive en San Isidro de Alajuela. Lo anterior, aunado a la angustia, frustración, desconsuelo, impotencia, tristeza, inseguridad, ansiedad, intranquilidad, desilusión que le generó el actuar irregular del Rector y de las funcionarias [Nombre 003] y [Nombre 008], lo que desembocó en un sufrimiento o aflicción psíquica y emocional, al verse sin trabajo y sin saber con claridad el porque después de todo el proceso administrativo que realizó para optar por el puesto, simplemente se le pide que no vuelva porque el Rector no quiso firmar, sin que se le explicara el porque de dicha decisión”. El Juzgado denegó esta pretensión, pues adujo que en este caso no se dan las circunstancias especialmente calificadas que evidencian sufrimiento que se requieren para darse daño moral y agregó: “Nótese que tan si quiera se valoró el daño (por parte del actor), asimismo en los autos se echa de menos una justificación que lo acredite, pues no aportó prueba al respecto (…). En el caso en particular no se obvia bajo ningún concepto que el actor bien pudo haber sufrido algún incertidumbre o un "pesar" sobre los pormenores que rodean sus circunstancias, sin embargo no se demostró aquí que hubiese un daño, ya sea a la integridad física, en el honor, en la intimidad del accionante, principalmente por cuanto no se evidencia sufrimiento alguno, amén que el demandante lo que tenía en ciernes era una mera expectativa de acceder a la plaza por la que estaba concursando, en ningún momento se le nombró y posteriormente se le despidió, de hecho dentro de lo sui géneris de este caso no hubo un despido propiamente, por cuanto simplemente no hubo nombramiento”. Esta conclusión es impugnada por la parte actora, quien insiste que fue inducido a error por parte de la señora [Nombre 003], Jefa del Área de Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Dirección de Gestión de Desarrollo Humano de la UTN, pues se comprobó que ella le informó que él había ganado el concurso y le pidió que se presentara a trabajar, por lo que renunció al trabajo que tenía en la empresa Impresora DELTA, donde laboró del 9 de abril de 2012 al 31 de mayo de 2017. Una vez analizado el caso concreto, las suscritas juzgadoras consideramos que la parte recurrente lleva razón en cuanto a su alegato, el cual debe ser acogido, pues efectivamente, los hechos acaecidos acarrean el derecho al pago de daño moral. En la especie, del elenco de hechos probados del fallo, que no fueron recurridos, se desprende que don [Nombre 001] participó en el concurso público CP-02-2015, para ocupar la plaza de Técnico N.° AU-AD151, en el área de Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Dirección de Gestión de Desarrollo Humano de la Universidad Técnica Nacional. En oficio número CD-112-2017 del 30 de mayo de 2017 (imagen 10), [Nombre 003], en su condición de Jefe del Área de Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Dirección de Gestión de Desarrollo Humano, le indicó que la Directora de Gestión de Desarrollo Humano: “le solicito por favor gestionar el nombramiento en propiedad del señor [Nombre 001], cédula [Valor 001], a partir del 05 de junio del 2017, el mismo queda sujeto al periodo de prueba, con una jornada de tiempo completo, ya que el señor [Nombre 001] tiene el perfil más idóneo de acuerdo a las funciones que desempeñara en el puesto”. En oficio número DGDH-612-2017 del 31 de mayo de 2017 (imagen 15), la Directora de Gestión de Desarrollo Humano de la accionada, remitió al Rector el nombramiento del demandante para su aprobación definitiva. Asimismo, en el hecho probado 4° se indicó: “El día cinco de junio de dos mil diecisiete, la señora [Nombre 003], jefa del área de Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Dirección de Gestión de Desarrollo Humano, sin tener respuesta y certeza que el rector de la Universidad accionada, daría el visto bueno para el nombramiento del actor, le indica y permite al demandante que se presente a trabajar, hasta el veintidós de junio del año supraindicado”. Este hecho lo tuvo por probado, porque así lo reconoció la propia señora [Nombre 003] en la audiencia de recepción de prueba. Entonces, cuando el actor se presentó a laborar el 5 de junio de 2017, firmó una serie de documentos como declaraciones juradas (imágenes 69 a 78), además, se le asignó una cuenta de correo electrónico institucional. Sin embargo, el 22 de junio de 2017, la señora [Nombre 003], le informó que el Rector no dio el visto bueno para su nombramiento, por lo que ya no podía presentarse más. Si bien, el reconocimiento del daño moral, se encuentra condicionado a la prueba, cuya carga recae en la víctima, lo cierto es que en la especie la aceptación de los hechos por parte de las funcionarias que laboran para la demandada, acarrean la comprobación del daño moral expresamente alegado por el actor, quien explicó que se le creó una expectativa de un trabajo estable, con el cual mejoraría la calidad de vida de su familia, además, renunció a un trabajo en el que llevaba más de 5 años, ante el llamado explícito que se le hizo para presentarse a laborar. Nótese que el actor trabajó para la empresa Impresora DELTA del 9 de abril de 2012 al 31 de mayo de 2017, fecha en que renunció para asumir el puesto en la Universidad Técnica Nacional a partir del 5 de junio siguiente. A don [Nombre 001] le solicitaron presentarse a laborar, se le permitió prestar sus servicios y la accionada se vio beneficiada de estos, hasta el día 22 de junio de 2017, cuando le informaron que el Rector no había dado el visto bueno para aprobar el nombramiento. La situación fue tan grave, que incluso no le pagaron los días que efectivamente prestó sus servicios, los que solicitó y fueron otorgados en este proceso judicial. Es evidente que si a una persona que tiene un trabajo estable por más de cinco años y que participa en un concurso para acceder a otro puesto y mejorar sus condiciones, lo contacta la encargada de tramitar el concurso y le indica que se presente a laborar a partir del primero del mes siguiente, le genera algo más que una expectativa: la firme convicción que ganó el concurso, por lo que renuncia a su trabajo. Con relación al daño moral, no es atendible la tesis de la accionada en cuanto que el actor no puede ejercer ningún reclamo porque nunca se emitió un acto de nombramiento formal, pues el Rector, quien es el competente para aprobarlo y firmarlo, no lo hizo, toda vez que tal como él lo indicó, no tiene la obligación de conocer los trámites internos que deben llevarse a cabo para formalizar un nombramiento, ya que en aplicación de principio de buena fe, él acudió al llamado que le hizo la funcionaria que tenía a su cargo la tramitación del concurso. Finalmente, luego de dieciocho días de trabajo, se le dijo que no se le iba a nombrar, dejándolo desempleado, sin posibilidad de proveer para la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas de su familia. Consideramos que resulta lógico que cualquier persona que la llamen para iniciar a prestar sus servicios, tenga incluso más que una simple expectativa, sino, la convicción de que el trabajo es suyo, máxime porque participó en el concurso para el nombramiento, es decir, siguió el proceso debido para ser nombramiento, al final del cual fue convocado para presentarse a laborar, sin que se hubiera finalizado todo el procedimiento para formalizar el nombramiento. Este error evidente y aceptado por la señora [Nombre 003], acarreó daño moral para el actor, el cual advertimos que debe ser resarcido. En ese sentido, dentro de los presupuestos o parámetros con arreglo a los cuales habrá de determinarse el monto de la indemnización en esta jurisdicción, supuesto el nexo causal, están la prudencialidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. Debe tratarse de una suma de dinero equitativa, en atención a la gravedad, intensidad y alcances de la falta atribuida, un monto que contribuya a palear el daño causado. En este sentido, el profesor Dr. Antonio Luis Vázquez Vialar, señala: “...En el caso de la fijación del daño extrapatrimonial, el juez debe ser sumamente prudente para determinar el importe de la reparación. En cada caso debe hacer expresa referencia a su propia experiencia, lo que no obsta a que, en ciertas circunstancias, puede utilizar algunas pautas objetivas tales como la intensidad de los efectos, tiempo en que se proyectó el agravio, su repercusión en la vida afectiva, lapso de internación, secuelas que provocan un deterioro en la vida de relación, tipo de tratamiento a que debió ser sometida la víctima ...” (Ponencias y conclusiones de las II Jornadas de Integración Académica en Derecho Laboral. “El daño moral y el Salario en especie en el Derecho del Trabajo Costarricense”, Talleres de Mundo Gráfico, S. A., San José, Costa Rica, Escuela Judicial, 1990, página 18). Como parámetros económicos de referencia, pueden considerarse el salario y demás pluses percibidos, ventajas económicas o medios materiales concedidos. En ese sentido, el puesto que el actor ejerció tenía asignado un salario de ₡544.261,00 colones, razón por la cual, tal y como esta Sala, por mayoría, dispuso en un caso similar al presente, en el voto n.° 0707-2004 de las 14:00 horas del 27 de agosto de 2004, se estima que un monto razonable para otorgar por concepto de daño moral es el equivalente a lo que hubiera devengado el actor durante los tres meses de período de prueba, tomando en consideración que ese es un tiempo prudencial para que él pueda volver a colocarse en el mercado laboral. Ahora bien, el a quo, en el fallo impugnado, le concedió al petente el salario de los dieciocho días laborados (del 5 al 22 de junio de 2017). En consecuencia, por los dos meses y doce días restantes, la suma asciende a ₡1.306.226,4. Se conceden intereses legales e indexación, desde la firmeza de la sentencia. Por la forma en que se resuelve, se varía el monto de la condena en costas personales, la cual dado que no fue recurrida, se mantiene en un 15% de la condena, sea la suma de ₡263.632,47 (15% de ₡451.323,41 dada por el Juzgado, más ₡1.306.226,4 que otorgó esta Sala). Con relación a los daños y perjuicios, en la acción el actor solicitó: “Se le reinstale en el puesto ya que cumplió con todos los requerimientos exigidos y se le pague a título de daños y perjuicios los salarios caídos desde el día de su ingreso a la institución (5 de junio 2017)”. Se desprende que los daños y perjuicios pedidos fueron los salarios caídos dejados de percibir desde que dejó de laborar hasta su reinstalación. Sin embargo, la pretensión de reinstalación no fue acogida por el Juzgado y fue un extremo no impugnado, por lo que los salarios caídos a título de daños y perjuicios, pretensión accesoria de la reinstalación, no pueden otorgarse.

V.- CONSIDERACIÓN FINAL: Por lo expuesto, la mayoría de la Sala estima que lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso. Por su parte, las Magistradas Varela Araya y Pereira Retana, salvan el voto. Declaran parcialmente con lugar el recurso y, proceden a anular el fallo recurrido sólo en cuanto denegó el pago de daño moral, intereses e indexación a su respecto para, en su lugar, acoger esos extremos y condenar a satisfacer por el daño moral la cantidad prudencial de un millón trescientos seis mil doscientos veintiséis colones con cuatro céntimos, junto con sus intereses e indexación a partir de la firmeza del fallo. Asimismo, modifican lo relativo a la condena al pago de costas, para en su lugar establecer por las personales la cantidad total de doscientos sesenta y tres mil seiscientos treinta y dos colones con cuarenta y siete céntimos.

POR TANTO:

La mayoría de esta Sala declara sin lugar el recurso. Las Magistradas Varela Araya y Pereira Retana, salvan el voto. Acogen parcialmente el recurso y, anulan el fallo recurrido sólo en cuanto denegó el pago de daño moral, intereses e indexación a su respecto. En su lugar, se conceden esos extremos y se condena a satisfacer por el daño moral la cantidad prudencial de un millón trescientos seis mil doscientos veintiséis colones con cuatro céntimos, junto con sus intereses e indexación a partir de la firmeza del fallo. Consecuentemente, se modifica lo relativo a la condena al pago de costas, para en su lugar establecer por las personales la cantidad total de doscientos sesenta y tres mil seiscientos treinta y dos colones con cuarenta y siete céntimos.

Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Julia Varela Araya Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Sandra Maria Pereira Retana Deyanira Adelaida Martinez Bolivar Res: 2023000744 NROSITO/RDGU 1