Non-application of the reality-of-the-contract principle due to voluntary submission to direct municipal contractingInaplicabilidad del contrato realidad por sometimiento voluntario a contratación directa municipal

**120003380679LA** **EXP. 12-000338-0679-LA** **RES. 000294-F-S1-2019** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at ten hours thirty-five minutes on the third of April of two thousand nineteen.

In the ordinary proceeding filed by URIEL FLORES OCAMPO, computer technician, holder of identity card number 0111220978; against the MUNICIPALITY OF MATINA, represented by its special judicial attorney, licensed Alba Iris Ortiz Recio, attorney, holder of identity card number 0302850594; the plaintiff files an appeal in cassation against judgment number 120-2015-V, issued by the Fifth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, at 13 hours 50 minutes on November 17, 2015.

Written by Judge Solís Zelaya **CONSIDERING** **I.-** In the complaint originating this proceeding, filed on May 7, 2012, Mr. Uries Flores Ocampo sued the Municipality of Matina. He alleged that, between September 2007 and May 2011, the Municipal Mayor hired his professional services for the maintenance and repair of computer equipment and computer systems, telling him verbally that he would do it that way because he did not have "sound resources" (*recursos sanos*) to be able to hire him as another employee of the Municipality with the obligations that would derive therefrom. He claimed that, at the end of the last period for which he was hired (from January 6 to May 6, 2011), he was told that his contract would no longer be renewed, without giving him "an explanation, nor paying my labor rights." He said he had an office in the same Municipality and was the one who personally provided computer services, and he also had a schedule from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. He added that when he arrived late, he was reprimanded; he received remuneration for his work; he had to work overtime because he was asked to make the recordings of the Municipal Councils. He pointed out that he sent official letters on the letterhead of the City Hall, since he was taken as just another worker; and his colleagues requested work from him just as is customary in the Municipality. He affirmed that in the official letters he was called "computer person in charge" (*encargado de computo*). He noted that the Mayor was the one who gave him instructions and orders in writing or verbally, such as representing the Municipality in various activities (work that someone who was not a municipal employee would not carry out), in projects such as: "SITRIMU, BIC Catastro, Registro Nacional, Fomude, Agenda 21, WEB page" and others related to the Institute of Municipal Development and Advisory (*Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal*, IFAM). He mentioned that his salary was even increased and he was paid biweekly like the rest of his colleagues. He claimed that, despite the continuity of his worker-employer relationship, he was never granted vacations, nor were Christmas bonuses paid to him; and upon being dismissed "unjustifiably," the legal items were not paid, nor was the corresponding due process carried out. He reproached that, in accordance with the principle of the reality of the contract (*contrato realidad*), his relationship with the Municipality of Matina was one of employer-employee and not of professional services. In his understanding, the three elements that characterize an employment relationship were present: i) Personal provision of a service; ii) Remuneration; and, iii) Legal subordination. He charged that he was never insured with the INS or the CCSS. He concluded that he was dismissed without just cause, violating his rights of defense and without prior notice. For these reasons, he sued the Municipality of Matina, so that the judgment declares the following (claims adjusted at the trial hearing): a) According to the evidence provided, it be declared that the defendant has acted against the legal system by trying to classify a relationship of a merely commercial nature when the reality involves a worker-employer relationship, in this specific case, a public employment relationship. b) Therefore, the total annulment of the administrative conduct be ordered (understood as the omission of the Municipality of Matina to extend the employment contract) and consequently, the worker-employer relationship existing between the defendant and the plaintiff must be declared. c) In view of the above, the Administration must be obligated to pay the back wages for the period between the month of May 2011 "and the present," the vacations not granted, and the overtime owed. d) The defendant be ordered to reinstate him to the position he held. e) It be declared that the City Hall of Matina violated the principle of defense, since he was dismissed without carrying out the corresponding administrative procedure, in clear violation of the administrative legal system and due process, abusing its administrative power. f) The Administration be condemned, in the event it does not wish to reinstate him in the position he held, to pay the legal benefits, that is, severance pay and the payment of unemployment assistance (labor benefits). In addition to vacations and Christmas bonuses that were never paid to him, as well as overtime never recognized, holidays, lost wages with the corresponding increases for the period between the month of May 2011 and the date of payment. Lost wages as damages and lost school bonuses that by convention correspond to 95% of the monthly salary, in addition to legal interest on the sums pending payment. The defendant be ordered to pay the procedural and professional costs of this proceeding according to the principal amounts indicated in the initial brief. g) A copy of the judgment be sent to the Inspection Department of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (*Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social*, CCSS) Bataan Branch, Matina, for the appropriate purposes, since he was never reported as a worker during the time the employment relationship lasted. The defendant answered negatively and asserted the defenses of lack of: exhaustion of administrative remedies, standing, right, as well as those of lack of jurisdiction and statute of limitations. At the preliminary hearing, the preliminary defenses of lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and statute of limitations were declared without merit. The Tribunal rejected the exception of lack of active and passive standing. It upheld the defense of lack of right, consequently, it declared the complaint without merit in all its aspects. It imposed both costs on the losing party. The plaintiff appeals for violation of substantive norms.

**II.- Sole ground.** He claims, regarding the fourth considering of the judgment, on the scope of the principle of the primacy of reality (*primacía de la realidad*) in matters of public employment, in his understanding, the judgment fails to clarify why this principle does not apply in the relationship that Mr. Uries Flores maintained with the Municipality of Matina, since it only indicates that Uries could not be hired because he did not meet the requirements stipulated in the Municipal Code and the non-existence of the position in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (*Manual Descriptivo de Puestos*) (Articles 17.j, 119, 120, 124, and 125 of the Municipal Code). It overlooks, he reproaches, the fact that precisely what this principle seeks is what happens in practice, being more important than what the parties have agreed upon and even what appears in documents. He affirms that the denomination or name by which the parties have given the verbal or written contract does not matter, as long as the aspects contemplated in Article 18 of the Labor Code are met, the worker is under the protection of this postulate. According to witness Lorenzo Colphan Reíd, he recalls, the Municipality urgently needed a computer technician, but since there were no sound resources "from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others to create that position, it was decided to contract professional maintenance and repair services for computer equipment and computer services, through the direct contracting procedure (*contratación directa*) (folios 41 to 64 of the judicial file). However, he protests, this does not give the right to violate contractual principles by trying to hide a typical labor figure for not having the appropriate budget or line item in this regard. From the clauses themselves and evidence provided to the file, he estimates, it can be seen that this relationship was distorted and became a public employment relationship. He assesses that, in the case of professional services contracts, this could be defined as the means to contract, for a determined term, tasks that are not typical or essential to the business or company in question, and this to a more specialized or professional provider in the field, in order to seek greater effectiveness that allows directing efforts to the primary needs of the company. However, he clarifies, in this case, the plaintiff clearly worked for the Municipality in merely essential matters, as every public or even private institution, taking into account technological modernization, must have a technician or professional in computer affairs. He reiterates that he satisfied common and permanent needs, under a regime of subordination (clauses one, five, and seven), which was reinforced by the testimony of Lorenzo Colphan who indicated that when the plaintiff could not attend, the days were deducted; he was given a day off because there was no money for overtime pay. Regarding remuneration, he censures, although Mr. Uries Flores was paid upon prior presentation of an invoice, this does not exclude, by itself, the existence of an employment relationship, especially if one takes into account that the contracting enjoyed a presumption of labor status (*presunción de laboralidad*) and that the defendant did not provide elements of evidence to rebut it. He adds, it is not relevant whether the email address used by the plaintiff is institutional or private, because according to the official letters sent on folios 18, 25, 26, 31, neither the Mayor nor other officials had an institutional email. He accuses that, regardless of whether Mr. Uries Flores did not comply with what is stipulated in the Municipal Code for hiring purposes or that the Municipality did not have the appropriate budget, it is not his responsibility, but that of the defendant.

**III.-** Before knowing the grievances, it is necessary to recall -in general terms- what the Tribunal resolved in this specific case, especially the main arguments for which it dismissed the existence of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the Municipality of Matina, declaring the complaint without merit in all its aspects. For the Judges, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 192 of the Political Constitution; 117 and 119 of the Municipal Code, with the exceptions provided in numerals 14, 22, 23, and 118 of that same Code –in this last case, regarding trust employees- and without prejudice to the other exceptions established by the legal system, municipal public officials will be appointed based on a merit system; that demonstrates their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position created by the Municipal Council and included in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (Articles 17.j, 119, 120, 124, and 125 of the Municipal Code). Furthermore, they indicated, the Municipalities may not make appointments or acquire economic commitments, if there is no budget sub-line item that covers said expense (numeral 103 of the Municipal Code). To enter the municipal administrative career, they summarize, the applicant must: i) Satisfy the minimum requirements set by the Descriptive Manual of Positions for the class in question; ii) Demonstrate suitability by undergoing the tests, exams, or competitions contemplated in the legal system; iii) Be chosen from the list sent by the office in charge of selecting personnel; iv) Take an oath before the Municipal Mayor or before the Municipal Council; v) Sign a sworn declaration guaranteeing that there is no legal impediment to linking laborally with the municipal public administration; and, vi) Fulfill any other requirements provided by law or regulation. Thus, they say, in the period between the month of September 2007 and the month of May 2011, there was no position in the Descriptive Manual of Positions of the Municipality of Matina called Head of the Computer Department, since witness Lorenzo Colphan Reid (Former Municipal Mayor of that canton, in the period between February 2007 to February 2011 and who signed all the contracts with the plaintiff), was emphatic in declaring that there were no sound resources (from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others) to create that position. They analyzed that, when the Municipality required the services of a computer technician to meet municipal needs, mainly in the areas of accounting and treasury, it was decided to contract professional maintenance and repair services for computer equipment and computer services, through the direct contracting procedure, making it clear to the bidders that in the future if the position could be opened, it would be proceeded accordingly, but that for the moment it would be done through the technical services contract financed by the income obtained from the banana tax, an agreement that would be renewed or not according to municipal requirements. For the Tribunal, the plaintiff – who according to the testimony of witness Colphan Reid was the only one who accepted those conditions – cannot validly argue that there was a public employment relationship between him and the Municipality, since from the beginning it was made very clear to him what his status was, which was not that of a municipal official, that is, since the post did not exist (position in the Descriptive Manual of Positions of that municipal entity), he did not provide his services as part of the municipal organization framed in the administrative career system, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture (ordinal 111 of the LGAP). It clarified that the budget line items that served as support for the expenditure of the technical services contracts signed for non-continuous periods, between the month of September 2007 and May 2011, are not covered by the line items for salaries for special services or occasional day laborers, through which interim or trust officials are paid their salary, according to the provisions of Article 118 of the Municipal Code, but rather through the line item called "Maintenance and Repair of Computer Equipment and Computer Systems" (*Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Informática*), budget code number 5.01.01.1.08.08. It said, contrary to what the plaintiff's legal representative affirms, it is not contrary to law that the Municipality of Matina used the direct contracting figure to contract the professional services of Flores Ocampo, since paragraph 1 of Article 163 of the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Contracting establishes that for this purpose, the Administration must follow the procedures of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate. For the Tribunal, the principle of the primacy of reality, could be applicable in the field of public employment, as long as it is not a means of evading – as happens in this case – the appointment system for municipal officials, based on a merit system, which demonstrates their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position created by the Municipal Council and included in the Descriptive Manual of Positions with its respective budget content, with the exceptions indicated above. Thus, they assess that the plaintiff seeks to be recognized the status of municipal public official, based on a contract for technical and professional services, for non-continuous periods, signed to provide the municipal entity services that were not part of an occupational profile (typical and supplementary tasks) of any position included in the Descriptive Manual of Positions of the Municipality of Matina and therefore, without undergoing an evaluation to determine his suitability and the absence of prohibitions that prevent him from being appointed as a municipal official. To that extent, they conclude and extensively analyze that the three conditions that define an employment relationship provided for in Article 18 of the Labor Code are not met: 1) subordination; 2) remuneration; and, 3) personal and continuous provision of a service. It concluded, according to the provisions of canon 203 of the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Contracting, contracts are extinguished normally, by the occurrence of the term and the execution of the contractual object. Consequently, upon the expiration of the last term of the technical services contract signed between the parties, no further extension was made as of May 7, 2011, such circumstance does not have the virtue of constituting a concealed dismissal to the detriment of the plaintiff, which is contrary to the principle of job stability and the guarantee of due process, given that the relationship that the plaintiff maintained with the defendant municipal entity was of a contractual nature and not of public employment.

**IV.-** Now, in the sole ground for cassation, the appellant claims the lack of application of the principle of the reality of the contract and violation of numeral 18 of the Labor Code, because in his view, the elements of an employment relationship were present in this case. However, this Chamber considers that the appellant is not correct in his exposition, since if there was a contracting of Mr. Flores Ocampo -since 2007- it was based on the rules of administrative contracting (contracting of technical, special, or professional services). Although it has not been properly challenged, everything analyzed by the Tribunal regarding the factual and legal reasons why it was not possible nor true that the plaintiff be considered an official of the municipal organization is endorsed. In this understanding, under the terms of cardinals 192 of the Political Constitution; 117 and 119 of the Municipal Code in force in 2007 (with the exceptions of ordinals 14, 22, 23, and 118 ibidem and established in other norms), municipal public servants must be "appointed based on the merit selection system" provided by the Municipal Code itself, in order to prove their suitability to perform the functions proper to the position previously created by the Council and that forms part of the Descriptive Manual of Positions (precepts 17.j, 119, 120, 124, and 125 ibidem). These last two provisions establish: "Article 124. - With the exceptions established by this law, the personnel of the municipalities shall be appointed and removed by the municipal mayor, after a technical report regarding the suitability of the applicants for the position. / Article 125. - Personnel shall be selected through suitability tests, to which only those who satisfy the requirements prescribed in Article 116 of this law will be admitted. The characteristics of these tests and the other requirements shall correspond to the updated criteria of modern recruitment and selection systems and shall correspond to specific and internal regulations of the municipalities. To comply with this article, municipalities may request technical collaboration from the General Directorate of Civil Service (*Dirección General de Servicio Civil*)." The plaintiff has not demonstrated that his hiring occurred under all these parameters; on the contrary, the evidence is clear that professional services contracts were signed under the modality of direct contracting procedures, covered by the line item "Maintenance and Repair of Computer Equipment and Computer Systems," budget code no. 5.01.1.08.08. That is, to enter the municipal administrative career, the plaintiff had to fulfill a series of requirements that he has not demonstrated, which are defined in the Municipal Code as follows: "Article 119. - To enter the service within the municipal regime, it is required: a) Satisfy the minimum requirements set by the Descriptive Manual of Positions for the class of position in question. b) Demonstrate suitability by undergoing the tests, exams, or competitions contemplated in this law and its regulations. c) Be chosen from the list sent by the office in charge of selecting personnel. d) Take an oath before the municipal mayor, as stipulated by Article 194 of the Political Constitution of the Republic. e) Sign a sworn declaration guaranteeing that there is no legal impediment on his person to link laborally with the municipal public administration. f) Fulfill any other requirements provided by regulations and other applicable legal provisions." Then, the then Municipal Mayor, Mr. Lorenzo Colphan Reid made it clear that the plaintiff's contracting could not be under the claimed modality (creation of a position) because there were no sound resources (from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others), for which reason, given the urgency of the professional maintenance and repair services for computer equipment and computer services, contracting was decided through the direct contracting procedure. But here it is important to emphasize that the official always made this situation clear to the three bidders, telling them that, "for now, the contracting would be done through the technical services contract financed by the income obtained from the banana tax." That is, that services could be contracted through Caproba, which is the Federation of Municipalities of Banana Producing Cantons (testimony at 9:23 and 9:28 of the oral and public hearing). In this regard, it should not be forgotten that Municipalities are prohibited from making appointments or acquiring economic commitments, if there is no budget sub-line item that covers the expenditure, because the violation of that duty will be grounds for suspension or separation of the responsible official or employee (precept 103 of the 2007 Municipal Code). What has been said so far is the reality that must prevail in this matter, but in respect of the principle of legality and not of the postulate of the reality of the contract or "primacy of reality in public employment matters" as the appellant alleges. That principle and any other invoked (from the labor regime) were not applicable to this matter (Article 18 of the Labor Code both in its previous and current wording), because it is insisted, such principles do not govern administrative contracting relationships. This Chamber has even stated that even in public employment relationships, its application is not indiscriminate, as the principle of legality must first be assessed and compliance with the public interest must be attended to (in this sense, this Chamber has recently ruled in judgment 001453-F-S1-17 of 14 hours 40 minutes of November 23, 2017). Then, it must be clarified that the municipal entity could resort to that figure of direct contracting of services by virtue of the provisions in the Regulation to the Law of Administrative Contracting in force in 2007, which in its norm 163 provides: "Article 163.- Services Contract. For the contracting of technical or professional services, by natural or legal persons, the Administration must follow the procedures of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate…". Indeed, the Law of Administrative Contracting provides in ordinal 65 that the contracting of those technical or professional services shall not originate a public employment relationship between the Administration and the contractor, with the sole exception of professional services with a fixed salary through the ordinary appointment regime (canon 67 ibidem), which did not occur in this matter. For these simple reasons, it must be clear why it is not possible to apply the principle of the reality of the contract in this matter.

**V.-** In any case, there are additional reasons why the existence of a public employment relationship must be dismissed. Many of them emerge from the eight contracts signed and provided by the plaintiff, from which several conclusions can be drawn: a) It involves an agreement for special services so that the contractor is responsible for the maintenance and repair of computer equipment, computer network, and computer systems of the Municipality of Matina. b) The contracting is for special services, so the contractor submitted in a public contract to release the City Hall from all labor liability in the execution of that contract. c) If prior and written municipal authorization is obtained, the contractor may assign or transfer the rights or obligations conferred by the agreement. d) The applicable legal framework according to the agreement of the parties is the Law of Administrative Contracting and the contract itself. e) There is the possibility that the contractor may have personnel. f) It responded to a direct contracting with a budget code that was "Maintenance and Repair of Computer Equipment and Information Systems" (no. 5.01.01.1.08.08). g) The plaintiff was contracted in certain periods for four days a week and in others for five days with an entry schedule but without an exit schedule. h) The Municipality committed to supplying 100% of the materials, machinery, labor, transportation, tools, and equipment required by the contractor. i) They were extendable temporary contracts. j) The Municipal Mayor was in charge of supervising the execution of the technical services contract signed between both parties. k) 2% of the Income Tax was withheld, as ordered by Article 23 subsection g) of the Income Tax Law in the case of income originating from public contracts. All the above reflects that the will of the parties was to resort to a direct contracting in order to solve a need of the Municipality, which was to have a computer person in charge. Therefore, the service was financed with a specific line item and it should have been respected as such. At no time was it said or mentioned that it would be a labor contract with a specific position; on the contrary, that position did not exist in the municipal position manual. Now, all those tasks of Mr. Uries coincide with the description provided by Mr. Lorenzo Reid at trial when he described the following: a) at the beginning, he maintained the computer machines and managed the equipment input; b) he began to form the network within the Municipality, which did not exist; c) he was sent to training in San José for the maintenance of the network and equipment in that process of updating the municipality (from 9:24 of the backup of the oral and public hearing). The same that Mrs. Elvira Padilla indicated when she said that Mr. Uries was the only computer assistant to the Municipal Council. She added that the council members required the professional to attend to record the sessions (at 9:42 and 9:46). For his part, Carlos Colptor Reid stated that in meetings or matters of cadastre (*catastro*) and the National Registry, they resorted to the help of the plaintiff because it involved various computer programs. He pointed out that they were designated by the Mayor to participate in courses because it was Uries Flores, as the computer technician, who managed the programs and systems for the execution of the work. He recognized that the plaintiff's task was to provide support in the systems or advice to understand the computer programs and repair equipment in poor condition (at 9:56; 10:01, 10:03, and 10:06 of the hearing). With all this evidence and the rest of the documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff himself, it was considered accredited that the contractual object was extremely broad and Mr. Uries Flores thus consented to it during the execution of the contracts, where multiple tasks were assigned to him, all linked to computer services. But this does not mean that a public employment relationship exists in between. Many of these tasks are summarized as: 1) supervising and making the digital recording of the ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Municipal Council (testimonial statement of Lorenzo Colphan Reid and Elvira Padilla Jiménez given at trial). 2) Review, repair, assignment, and installation of computer equipment. 3) Registration of the email accounts of the members of the Municipal Council. 4) Supervision and troubleshooting of the computer network of the municipal entity. 5) Attendance at training sessions and activities of IFAM, the Cadastre and Registry Regularization Program; Municipal Tax System (SITRIMU), among others, in order to instruct the Tax Administrator and the Head of the Cadastre Department in the management of the software provided by BID-Catastro.

Therefore, from the standpoint of the assigned functions, a public employment relationship does not emerge either.

VI.- Despite the foregoing, it must be made clear regarding the alleged existence of the elements that define an employment relationship, according to the current wording of numeral 18 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), that these have not occurred in the specific case. Rather than a relationship of subordination and permanent dependency and direction, what has operated are oversight activities typical of an administrative services contract (contratación administrativa de servicios), such as compliance with roles and schedules, verbal reprimands, requests for information and results, among others. These are due to events inherent to the development, execution, and oversight (control) of an administrative contract, to which the contracting Administration is obligated (precepts 9, 13, and 102 of the LCA). In this context, it is normal that in the provision of services acquired by any Administration (through an administrative contract), supervision and oversight activities occur; otherwise, the public purpose sought to be fulfilled could be transgressed by the irregularity and inefficiency of the service. Far from manifesting themselves as conducts typical of an employment relationship, these acts converge as essential requirements for the fulfillment of the administrative agreement, which were clearly set forth in some of the contracts signed when the following was agreed: a) “…THE CONSULTANT (EL CONSULTOR), undertakes to perform and deliver services in an orderly, serious, and responsible manner, following the instructions of the Mayor or whomever he assigns who will be in charge of the evaluation and final control of the works described in this contract. Furthermore, the contractor shall be responsible for the poor execution of the service, use of work equipment, materials, and any other input assigned to him for his labors…”; b) “…In the event that the work is determined to be defective, bad, erroneous, or bad due to carelessness, negligence of the contractor, it must be corrected or performed again without recognition of any extra payment or he will cover the cost of correction…”; c) “…The Contractor… accepts the oversight systems established in this contract for its quality and performance control, to abide by the legal provisions and regulatory obligations incorporated into this contract…”; d) “…THE CONTRACTED PARTY (EL CONTRATADO) shall perform all repair and maintenance tasks for the General Computer Network and all computer equipment, in coordination with the Department of the Mayor of the Municipality of Matina (Departamento del Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Matina)…” (folios 41 to 64 of the judicial file). In this way, the fact that he had an entry schedule, helped in sessions, and was reprimanded as stated by the witness Reid, does not convert the relationship into an employment one; rather, these respond to matters inherent to the execution of a professional services agreement. To the point that the only time the plaintiff was reprimanded, the Ex-Mayor said at trial, was because he was absent and that day there were problems with the system (9:24). The other extreme claimed is that of remuneration, but as the Court correctly analyzes, the plaintiff was paid for the services rendered. There is no evidence indicating that he received a salary based on a pay scale, due to a job category, which is understood, because in the City Council there did not exist a permanent position of “Computer Manager (Encargado de Informática) in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (Manual Descriptivo de Puestos)” (rules of numeral 122 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)). The foregoing leads to the consequence that the plaintiff presented to the Municipality cash invoices for “Equipment Maintenance According to Contract, Computer Consulting Services, and Assistance in the Network and Servers.” Furthermore, it is repeated, the payment for those services did not correspond to a salary or wages line item, but rather to another which was “Maintenance and Repair of Computer Equipment and Computer Systems,” budget code number 5.01.01.1.08.08. Finally, it is also necessary to insist, on the sums paid to the plaintiff, the Administration applied a 2% withholding of Income Tax, based on the provisions of article 23 subsection g) of Law number 7092, coupled with the fact that salary-specific deductions were not applied (pension regime; CCSS sickness and maternity regime, among others). Although he does not duly question it, it is not too much to clarify, that personal and continuous service is also not appreciated, first, because from the signed contracts it emerges that the plaintiff-contractor could delegate the service to third parties, since the twelfth clause of the agreement signed on September 21, 2007, indicated: “…The Contractor declares and guarantees that his personnel possess the aptitudes, capacity, knowledge, and other requirements to efficiently perform the Service for which he is contracted, that he also accepts the oversight systems established in this contract for its quality and performance control, to abide by the legal provisions and regulatory obligations incorporated into this contract…” (folios 42-43 of the judicial file). Likewise, in the seventh clause of the remaining contracts, it was stipulated that: “…THE CONTRACTED PARTY may not assign, nor transfer the rights or obligations conferred by this contract, without the prior and written authorization of the MUNICIPALITY OF MATINA…” (folios 46, 49, 52, 54, 57, 60, and 63 of the judicial file). The same must be indicated regarding the continuous provision of the service, from the month of September 2007 to the month of May 2011, as there were several interruptions, from 5 months, 1 month and 24 days, 1 month, 23 days, 11 days, and up to 5 days according to the dates of the agreements provided as evidence. Then, with these simple facts and annotations, any violation of canon 18 of the Labor Code as alleged is dismissed.

VII.- Thus, it will proceed to declare the appeal without merit, and impose the costs generated by its exercise on the appealing party in accordance with precept 150 subsection 3) of the CPCA.

THEREFORE

The cassation appeal filed is declared without merit, with costs borne by the appealing party.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero JROSALES Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected] It ended; he was dismissed without just cause, violating his rights to defense and without prior notice. For these reasons, he sued the Municipality of Matina, so that the judgment declares the following (claims adjusted at the trial hearing): a) In accordance with the evidence provided, it be declared that the defendant has acted contrary to the legal system by attempting to classify a merely commercial relationship when in reality it is an employer-worker relationship, in this specific case, a public employment relationship. b) By virtue of the above, the total annulment of the administrative conduct be ordered (understood as the omission of the Municipality of Matina to extend the employment contract) and therefore, the employer-worker relationship existing between the defendant and the plaintiff must be declared. c) In view of the above, the Administration must be obliged to pay the back wages (salarios caídos) for the period between the month of May 2011 “and the present”, the unprovided vacations, and the owed overtime. d) The respondent be ordered to reinstate him to the position he held. e) It be declared that the Municipality of Matina violated the principle of defense, since he was dismissed without carrying out the corresponding administrative procedure, in clear violation of the administrative legal order and due process, abusing its administrative power. f) The Administration be ordered, should it not wish to reinstate him to the position he held, to pay the statutory benefits, i.e., severance pay (preaviso) and the payment of unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) (labor benefits). In addition to vacations and year-end bonuses (aguinaldos) that were never paid to him, as well as overtime never recognized, holidays, lost wages with the corresponding increases for the period between the month of May 2011 until the date of payment. Lost wages as damages and the lost school bonuses (salarios escolares) that by convention correspond to 95% of the monthly salary, in addition to legal interest on the sums pending payment. The defendant be ordered to pay the procedural and professional costs of this process in accordance with the principal amounts indicated in the initial brief. g) A copy of the judgment be sent to the Inspection Department of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS) Bataan, Matina Branch, for whatever is appropriate, since he was never reported as a worker during the time the employment relationship lasted. The defendant answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: exhaustion of administrative remedies, standing, right, as well as those of lack of jurisdiction and statute of limitations. At the preliminary hearing, the preliminary defenses of lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and statute of limitations were declared without merit. The Tribunal rejected the exception of lack of active and passive standing. It upheld the lack of right defense, and consequently, declared the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects. It imposed both costs on the losing party. The plaintiff appeals for violation of substantive norms.

II.- Sole Consideration. He claims, regarding the fourth whereas clause (considerando) of the ruling, concerning the scope of the principle of the primacy of reality (primacía de la realidad) in public employment matters, that in his understanding, the judgment fails to clarify why this principle does not apply to the relationship Mr. Uries Flores maintained with the Municipality of Matina, as it only indicates that Uries could not be hired because he did not meet the requirements stipulated in the Municipal Code and the non-existence of the position in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (Manual Descriptivo de Puestos) (Articles 17.j, 119, 120, 124, and 125 of the Municipal Code). He reproaches that it overlooks the fact that precisely what this principle seeks is what occurs in practice, being more important than what the parties may have agreed upon and even what appears in documents. He affirms that regardless of the denomination or name by which the parties may have given to the verbal or written hiring, as long as the aspects contemplated in Article 18 of the Labor Code are present, the worker is under the protection of this postulate. According to witness Lorenzo Colphan Reíd, he recalls, the Municipality urgently needed a computer technician, but since there were no sound resources "from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others" to create that position, the hiring of professional services for maintenance and repair of computer equipment and computer services was arranged, through the direct hiring procedure (folios 41 to 64 of the judicial file). However, he protests, it did not have the right to violate contractual principles by trying to hide a typical labor figure due to a lack of budget or the appropriate specific allocation for it. From the contract clauses and evidence provided in the file, he estimates, it becomes apparent that this relationship was distorted and became a public employment relationship. He assesses that, in the case of professional services contracts, it could be defined as the means to hire, for a determined term, tasks not inherent or essential to the business or entity in question, and this from a supplier more specialized or professional in the field, with the aim of seeking greater effectiveness to allow directing efforts to the primary needs of the entity. However, he clarifies, in this case, the plaintiff clearly worked for the Municipality on purely essential matters, since every public or even private institution, taking into consideration technological modernization, must have a technician or professional in computer matters. He reiterates he satisfied common and permanent needs, under a subordination regime (clauses one, five, and seven), which was reinforced by the testimony of Lorenzo Colphan who indicated that when the plaintiff could not attend, the days were deducted; he was granted a free day because there was no money for overtime pay. Regarding remuneration, he censures that although Mr. Uries Flores was paid upon presentation of an invoice, this does not, by itself, exclude the existence of an employment relationship, especially if one takes into account that the hiring enjoyed a presumption of laborality and that the defendant party did not provide evidence to rebut it. He adds that it is not relevant if the email address used by the plaintiff is not institutional, but private, since according to the official letters filed at folios 18, 25, 26, 31, neither the Mayor nor other officials had institutional email. He accuses that regardless of whether Mr. Uries Flores did not comply with the stipulations of the Municipal Code for purposes of being hired, or that the Municipality did not have the appropriate budget, it is not his responsibility, but the defendant's.

III.- Before addressing the grievances, it is necessary to recall –in general terms– what the Tribunal resolved in this specific case, especially the main arguments by which it dismissed the existence of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the Municipality of Matina, declaring the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects. For the Judges, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 192 of the Political Constitution; 117 and 119 of the Municipal Code, with the exceptions provided in numerals 14, 22, 23 and 118 of that same Code –in this latter case, regarding trust employees (empleados de confianza)– and without prejudice to the other exceptions established by the legal system, municipal public officials will be appointed based on a merit system; that demonstrates their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position created by the Municipal Council and included in the Descriptive Manual of Positions (Articles 17.j, 119, 120, 124, and 125 of the Municipal Code). Furthermore, they indicated, Municipalities may not make appointments or acquire economic commitments if there is no budget sub-allocation that supports said expenditure (numeral 103 of the Municipal Code). To enter the municipal administrative career, they summarize, the applicant must: i) Satisfy the minimum requirements established by the Descriptive Manual of Positions for the class in question; ii) Demonstrate suitability by undergoing the tests, exams, or competitions contemplated in the legal system; iii) Be chosen from the list sent by the office in charge of personnel selection; iv) Take an oath before the Municipal Mayor or the Municipal Council; v) Sign a sworn declaration guaranteeing that there is no legal impediment to becoming employed by the municipal public administration; and, vi) Fulfill any other requirements provided by law or regulation. That being the case, they say, in the period between September 2007 and May 2011, a position titled Head of the Computer Department did not exist in the Descriptive Manual of Positions of the Municipality of Matina, since witness Lorenzo Colphan Reid (Former Municipal Mayor of that canton, in the period from February 2007 to February 2011 and who signed all the contracts with the plaintiff), was emphatic in declaring that there were no sound resources (from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others) to create that position. They analyzed that, since the Municipality required the services of an IT specialist to attend to municipal needs, mainly in the accounting and treasury areas, the hiring of professional services for maintenance and repair of computer equipment and computer services was arranged, through the direct hiring procedure, making it clear to the bidders that if the position could be opened in the future, it would proceed accordingly, but for the moment it would be done through the technical services contract financed by income obtained from the banana tax, an agreement that would be renewed or not in accordance with municipal requirements. For the Tribunal, the plaintiff –who according to the statement of witness Colphan Reid was the only one who accepted those conditions– cannot validly claim that a public employment relationship existed between him and the Municipality, since from the beginning his condition was made very clear to him, which was not that of a municipal official, that is, since the position did not exist (position in the Descriptive Manual of Positions of that municipal entity), he did not provide his services as part of the municipal organization framed in the administrative career system, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture (ordinal 111 of the LGAP). It clarified that the budget allocations that supported the expenditure for the technical services contracts signed for non-continuous periods, between September 2007 and May 2011, are not covered by the allocations for salaries for special services or occasional day-laborers, through which interim or trust employees are paid their salary, as provided in Article 118 of the Municipal Code, but rather through the allocation called “Computer Equipment Maintenance and Repair and Computer Systems”, budget code number 5.01.01.1.08.08. It stated that, contrary to what the plaintiff's legal representative claims, it is not contrary to law that the Municipality of Matina used the figure of direct contracting to hire the professional services of Flores Ocampo, since paragraph 1 of Article 163 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa) establishes that for such purpose, the Administration must follow the public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting procedures, as appropriate. For the Tribunal, the principle of the primacy of reality could be applicable in the scope of public employment, as long as it is not a means of evading –as occurs in this case– the appointment system for municipal officials, based on a merit system, that demonstrates their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position created by the Municipal Council and included in the Descriptive Manual of Positions with its respective budget content, with the exceptions indicated above. Thus, they assess, the plaintiff intends to have the status of municipal public official recognized, based on a technical and professional services contract, for non-continuous periods, signed to provide the municipal entity with services that were not part of an occupational profile (typical and supplementary tasks) of any position included in the Descriptive Manual of Positions of the Municipality of Matina and therefore, without undergoing an evaluation to determine his suitability and the non-existence of prohibitions that prevent him from being appointed as a municipal official. To that extent, they conclude and extensively analyze that the three conditions that define an employment relationship provided in Article 18 of the Labor Code are not met: 1) subordination; 2) remuneration; and, 3) personal and continuous provision of a service. It concluded that, according to the provisions of canon 203 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law, contracts are extinguished by normal means, upon the expiration of the term and the execution of the contractual purpose. Consequently, upon the expiration of the last term of the technical services contract signed between the parties, no further extension was made as of May 7, 2011, and this circumstance does not have the virtue of constituting a disguised dismissal to the detriment of the plaintiff, contrary to the principle of job stability and the guarantee of due process, given that the relationship the plaintiff sustained with the sued municipal entity was of a contractual nature and not public employment.

IV.- Now, in the sole ground of cassation, the appellant claims the failure to apply the principle of the reality of the contract (contrato realidad) and violation of numeral 18 of the Labor Code, because, in his view, the elements of an employment relationship were present in this case. However, this Chamber considers that the appellant is not correct in his exposition, since the hiring of Mr. Flores Ocampo –since 2007– was based on the rules of administrative contracting (contracting of technical, special, or professional services). Although it has not been adequately questioned, everything analyzed by the Tribunal is endorsed regarding the factual and legal reasons why it was not possible nor true for the plaintiff to be considered an official of the municipal organization. In this understanding, under the terms of cardinal numbers 192 of the Political Constitution; 117 and 119 of the Municipal Code in force in 2007 (with the exceptions of ordinals 14, 22, 23 and 118 ibidem and established in other norms), municipal servants must be "appointed based on the merit-based selection system" provided by the Municipal Code itself, in order to prove their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position previously created by the Council and which is part of the Descriptive Manual of Positions (precepts 17.j, 119, 120, 124 and 125 ibidem). These latter two provisions establish: "Article 124.- With the exceptions established by this law, municipal personnel shall be appointed and removed by the municipal mayor, following a technical report regarding the suitability of the applicants for the position. / Article 125.- Personnel shall be selected through suitability tests, to which only those who satisfy the requirements prescribed in Article 116 of this law shall be admitted. The characteristics of these tests and the other requirements shall correspond to the updated criteria of modern recruitment and selection systems and shall correspond to specific internal regulations of the municipalities. To comply with this article, the municipalities may request technical collaboration from the Directorate General of Civil Service." The plaintiff has not demonstrated that his hiring occurred under all these parameters; on the contrary, the evidence is clear that professional services contracts were signed under the modality of direct contracting procedures, covered by the allocation of "Computer Equipment Maintenance and Repair and Computer Systems," budget code no. 5.01.1.08.08.

That is to say, to enter the municipal administrative career, the plaintiff had to satisfy a series of requirements that he has not demonstrated, which are defined in the Código Municipal as follows: "Article 119.- To enter the service within the municipal regime it is required: a) Satisfy the minimum requirements set out in the Manual descriptivo de puestos for the class of position in question. b) Demonstrate suitability by undergoing the tests, examinations, or competitions contemplated in this law and its regulations. c) Be chosen from the list sent by the office in charge of selecting personnel. d) Swear the oath before the municipal mayor, as stipulated in article 194 of the Constitución Política de la República. e) Sign a sworn declaration guaranteeing that no legal impediment exists to be employed by the municipal public administration. f) Fulfill any other requirements provided for in the regulations and other applicable legal provisions." Then, the then Municipal Mayor, Mr. Lorenzo Colphan Reid, made it clear that the plaintiff's hiring could not be under the claimed modality (creation of a position) because there were no sound resources (from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others), and therefore, given the urgency of the professional maintenance and repair services for computer equipment and information technology services, the hiring was arranged through the direct contracting (contratación directa) procedure. But here it is important to emphasize that the official always made this situation clear to the three bidders, telling them that, "for now, the contracting would be done through the technical services contract financed by the income obtained from the banana tax." That is, they could contract through services via Caproba, which is the Federación de Municipalidades de Cantones Productores de Banano (statement at 9:23 and 9:28 of the oral and public hearing). In this regard, it should not be forgotten that the Municipalities are forbidden from making appointments or acquiring financial commitments if there is no budget line item (subpartida presupuestaria) that covers the expenditure, because the violation of that duty will be grounds for suspension or removal of the responsible official or employee (precept 103 of the Código Municipal of 2007). What has been said thus far is the reality that must prevail in this matter, but in respect of the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) and not of the postulate of the reality of the contract (contrato realidad) or "primacy of reality in public employment (primacía de la realidad en materia de empleo público)" as the appellant claims. That principle and any other invoked (from the labor regime) were not applicable to this matter (article 18 of the Código de Trabajo, both in its previous and current wording), because it is insisted, such principles do not govern administrative contracting relationships. Even this Chamber has come to state that, even in public employment relationships, its application is not indiscriminate, as the principle of legality must first be assessed and compliance with the public interest must be observed (in this sense, this Chamber has recently pronounced itself in judgment 001453-F-S1-17 of 14 hours 40 minutes of November 23, 2017). Then it must be clarified, the municipal entity could resort to that figure of direct contracting of services by virtue of the provisions in the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa in force in 2007, which in its rule 163 provides: "Article 163.- Services Contract. For the contracting of technical or professional services, by natural or legal persons, the Administration must follow the procedures of public tender, abbreviated tender, or direct contracting, as appropriate…". Even the Ley de Contratación Administrativa provides in ordinal 65 that the contracting of those technical or professional services will not give rise to a public employment relationship between the Administration and the contractor, with the sole exception of professional services with a fixed salary through the ordinary appointment regime (canon 67 ibidem), which did not occur in this matter. For these simple reasons, it must be clear why it is not possible to apply the principle of the reality of the contract in this matter.

**V.-** In any case, there are additional reasons why the existence of a public employment relationship must be dismissed. Many of them arise from the eight contracts signed and provided by the plaintiff, from which several conclusions are drawn: **a)** It is an agreement for special services so that the contractor is in charge of maintenance and repair of computer equipment, information network, and information systems of the Municipalidad de Matina. **b)** The contracting is for special services, so the contractor, in a public contract, agreed to release the City Council from all labor liability in the execution of that contract. **c)** If prior and written municipal authorization is obtained, the contractor may assign or transfer the rights or obligations conferred by the agreement. **d)** The applicable legal framework according to the parties' agreement is the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and the contract itself. **e)** There is a possibility that the contractor has personnel available. **f)** It responded to a direct contracting with a budget code that was “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Información” (no. 5.01.01.1.08.08). **g)** The plaintiff was contracted in certain periods for four days a week and in others for five days with a start time but no end time. **h)** The Municipality committed to supply 100% of the materials, machinery, labor, transportation, tools, and equipment required by the contractor. **i)** They were temporary, extendable contracts. **j)** The Municipal Mayor was in charge of supervising the execution of the contract for technical services signed between both parties. **k)** 2% of the Impuesto sobre la Renta was withheld, as ordered by article 23 subsection g) of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta in the case of income originating from public contracts. All of the above reflects that the will of the parties was to resort to direct contracting to solve a need of the Municipality, which was to have a person in charge of information technology. Therefore, the service was financed with a specific budget allocation (partida) and should have been respected. At no time was it said or mentioned that it was a labor contract with a specific position; on the contrary, that position did not exist in the municipal manual de puestos. Now, all those tasks of Mr. Uries coincide with the description provided by Mr. Lorenzo Reid at trial when he described the following: a) at the beginning he maintained the computer machines and managed the entry and more equipment; b) he began to form the network within the Municipality, which did not exist; c) he was sent to training in San José for network and equipment maintenance in that process of updating the municipality (from 9:24 of the recording of the oral and public hearing). The same as indicated by Ms. Elvira Padilla when she said that Mr. Uries was the only information technology assistant for the Concejo Municipal). She added, the council members required the professional to come to record the sessions (at 9:42 and 9:46). For his part, Carlos Colptor Reid stated that in meetings or matters of the Catastro and the Registro Nacional, they would come to the plaintiff for help because of the various computer programs. He indicated, they were designated by the Mayor to participate in courses because it was Uries Flores, as the information technology specialist, who managed the programs and systems for the execution of the tasks. He acknowledged, the plaintiff's work was to provide support in the systems or advice to understand the computer programs and repair equipment in poor condition (at 9:56; 10:01, 10:03 and 10:06 of the hearing). With all of this evidence and the rest of the documentation presented by the plaintiff himself, it was considered proven that the contractual object was extremely broad and Mr. Uries Flores consented to this during the execution of the contracts, where multiple tasks were assigned to him, all related to information technology services. But that does not mean that there is a public employment relationship involved. Many of those tasks are summarized as: 1) supervising and carrying out the digital recording of the ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Concejo Municipal (testimonial statement of Lorenzo Colphan Reid and Elvira Padilla Jiménez given at trial). 2) Review, repair; assignment and installation of computer equipment. 3) Registration of the email accounts of the members of the Concejo Municipal. 4) Supervision and troubleshooting of the municipal entity's information network. 5) Attendance at training and activities of the IFAM, the Programa de Regularización de Catastro y Registro; Sistema Tributario Municipal (SITRIMU), among others, in order to instruct the Tax Administrator and the Head of the Catastro Department on the use of the software provided by BID-Catastro. Ergo, from the point of view of the assigned functions, a public employment relationship does not emerge either.

**VI.-** Despite the above, it must be made clear regarding the supposed existence of the elements that define an employment relationship, according to the current wording of numeral 18 of the Código de Trabajo, that these have not occurred in the specific case. Rather than a relationship of subordination (relación de subordinación) and of permanent dependency and direction (dependencia permanente y dirección), what has taken place are oversight activities typical of an administrative services contract, such as compliance with roles and schedules, verbal warnings, requests for information and results, among others. They correspond to events typical of the development, execution, and oversight (control) of an administrative contract, to which the contracting Administration is obligated (precepts 9, 13 and 102 of the LCA). In this context, it is normal that in the provision of services acquired by any Administration (through an administrative contract), supervision and oversight activities occur; otherwise, the public purpose sought to be fulfilled could be violated by the irregularity and inefficiency of the service. Far from manifesting themselves as behaviors typical of an employment relationship, they converge as essential requirements for the fulfillment of the administrative agreement, which were clearly stated in some of the signed contracts when the following was agreed: **a)** *"…THE CONSULTANT undertakes to perform and deliver services in an orderly, serious, and responsible manner, following the instructions of the Mayor or his designee, who will be in charge of the final evaluation and control of the works described in this contract. Furthermore, the contractor shall be responsible for the poor execution of the service, use of work equipment, materials, and any other input assigned to him for his tasks…"*; **b)** *"…In the event that the work is determined to be defective, bad, erroneous, or bad due to the contractor's carelessness or negligence, it must be corrected or carried out again without recognition of any extra payment, or the correction cost will be covered…"*; **c)** *"… The Contractor… accepts the oversight systems established in this contract for quality control and performance thereof, abide by the legal provisions, regulatory obligations incorporated in this contract…"*; **d)** *"…The CONTRACTOR shall carry out all the repair and maintenance tasks of the Information Network in general and all computer equipment, in coordination with the Department of the Mayor of the Municipalidad de Matina…"* (folios 41 to 64 of the judicial file). Thus, the fact that he had a start time, helped in the sessions, and was called out, as witness Reid stated, does not turn the relationship into a labor one; rather, they respond to matters inherent in the execution of a professional services agreement. To the point that the only time the plaintiff was called out, said the former Mayor at trial, was because he was absent and that day there were problems with the system (9:24). The other extreme claimed is remuneration (remuneración), but as the Tribunal correctly analyzes, the plaintiff was paid for the services rendered. There is no evidence indicating that he received a salary based on a pay scale, due to a job category, which is understood, because in the City Council there was no fixed position of “Encargado de Informática in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos” (rules of numeral 122 of the Código Municipal). The foregoing results in the consequence that the plaintiff submitted cash invoices to the Municipality for “Equipment Maintenance According to Contract, Information Technology Consulting Services and Network and Server Assistance.” Furthermore, it is repeated, the payment for those services did not correspond to a budget line for wages or salaries, but to another which was “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Informática,” budget code number 5.01.01.1.08.08. Finally, it is also necessary to insist, on the sums paid to the plaintiff, the Administration applied a 2% withholding of the Impuesto sobre la Renta, based on the provisions of article 23 subsection g) of Ley número 7092, coupled with the fact that own deductions typical of a salary were not applied (pension scheme; sickness and maternity scheme of the CCSS, among others). Although it does not properly challenge it, it is not superfluous to clarify, nor is personal and continuous provision (prestación personal y continua) appreciated; first, because it emerges from the signed contracts that the plaintiff contractor could delegate the service to third parties, since the twelfth clause of the agreement signed on September 21, 2007, indicated: *"… The Contractor declares and guarantees that his personnel possess the aptitudes, capacity, knowledge, and other requirements to efficiently exercise the performance of the Service being contracted, that he also accepts the oversight systems established in this contract for quality control and performance thereof, abide by the legal provisions, regulatory obligations incorporated in this contract…”* (folios 42-43 of the judicial file). Similarly, in the seventh clause of the remaining contracts, it was stipulated that: *"…THE CONTRACTED PARTY may not assign or transfer the rights or obligations conferred by this contract, without the prior written authorization of the MUNICIPALIDAD DE MATINA…"* (folios 46, 49, 52, 54, 57, 60 and 63 of the judicial file). The same must be indicated regarding the continuous provision of the service, from the month of September 2007 to the month of May 2011, as there were several interruptions, from 5 months, 1 month and 24 days, 1 month, 23 days, 11 days, and up to 5 days according to the dates of the agreements provided as evidence. Therefore, with these simple facts and annotations, any violation of canon 18 of the Código de Trabajo as alleged is dismissed.

**VII.-** Accordingly, it will proceed to declare the appeal without merit, and to impose the costs generated by its exercise on the appellant in accordance with precept 150 subsection 3) of the CPCA.

**POR TANTO** The appeal of cassation (recurso de casación) filed is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the appellant.

</span></p><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify; text-indent:35.5pt"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify; text-indent:35.5pt"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse; margin-left:0pt; width:468.6pt"><tr><td colspan="2" style="padding-left:3.5pt; padding-right:3.5pt; vertical-align:top; width:468.6pt"><p style="font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="padding-left:3.5pt; padding-right:3.5pt; vertical-align:top; width:241.4pt"><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Román Solís Zelaya </span></p></td><td style="padding-left:3.5pt; padding-right:3.5pt; vertical-align:top; width:227.2pt"><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:right"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Rocío Rojas Morales</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="padding-left:3.5pt; padding-right:3.5pt; vertical-align:top; width:241.4pt"><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">William Molinari Vílchez</span></p></td><td style="padding-left:3.5pt; padding-right:3.5pt; vertical-align:top; width:227.2pt"><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:right"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Yazmín Aragón Cambronero</span></p></td></tr><!--[if !supportMisalignedColumns]><tr style="height:0pt"><td style="width:241.4pt; border:none"></td><td style="width:227.2pt; border:none"></td></tr><![endif]--></table><p style="font-size:9pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:9pt; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:8pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:baseline">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="font-size:8pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">JROSALES </span></p><p style="margin:0pt; text-align:center"><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Teléfonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electrónico [email protected]</span></p></div></body></html> In addition, the performance was not continuous, as there were several interruptions (vote 294-F-2019). *120003380679LA* RES. 000294-F-S1-2019 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten thirty-five in the morning on April third, two thousand nineteen. In the ordinary proceeding filed by URIEL FLORES OCAMPO, computer technician, holder of identity card number 0111220978; against the MUNICIPALITY OF MATINA, represented by its special judicial attorney, licensed attorney Alba Iris Ortiz Recio, lawyer, holder of identity card number 0302850594; the plaintiff files a cassation appeal against judgment number 120-2015-V, issued by the Fifth Section of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, at 1:50 p.m. on November 17, 2015. Drafting magistrate Solís Zelaya CONSIDERING I.- In the complaint that originated this proceeding, filed on May 7, 2012, Mr. Uries Flores Ocampo sued the Municipality of Matina. He alleged that, between September 2007 and May 2011, the Municipal Mayor hired his professional services for the maintenance and repair of computer equipment and information systems, verbally indicating that he would do it that way because he did not have “healthy resources” to be able to hire him as another employee of the Municipality with the obligations that would derive from it. He claimed that, at the end of the last period for which he was hired (from January 6 to May 6, 2011), he was told that his contract would no longer be renewed, without granting him “explanation, nor paying my labor rights.” He stated that he had an office in the Municipality itself and was the one who personally provided the computer services, and he also had a schedule from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. He added that when he arrived late, he was reprimanded; he received remuneration for his work; he had to work overtime because he was asked to record the Municipal Council sessions. He pointed out that he sent official letters with the letterhead of the City Hall, as he was considered just another worker; and his colleagues requested tasks from him as was customary in the Municipality. He affirmed that in the official letters he was called “computer manager.” He noted that the Mayor was the one who gave him instructions and orders, whether written or verbal, such as representing the Municipality in various activities (a task that someone who was not a municipal employee would not carry out), in projects such as: “SITRIMU, BIC Catastro, Registro Nacional, Fomude, Agenda 21, WEB page” and others related to the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). He mentioned that his salary was even increased and he was paid biweekly like the rest of his colleagues. He claimed that, despite the continuity of his employer-worker relationship, he was never granted vacation leave, nor were his Christmas bonuses paid; and when he was dismissed “unjustifiably,” the statutory items were not paid, nor was the corresponding due process carried out. He reproached that, in accordance with the principle of the reality of the contract, his relationship with the Municipality of Matina was one of employer-employee and not of professional services. In his view, the three elements that characterize an employment relationship were present: i) Personal provision of a service; ii) Remuneration; and, iii) Legal subordination. He charged that he was never insured with either the INS or the CCSS. He concluded that he was dismissed without just cause, violating his rights of defense and without prior notice. For these reasons, he sued the Municipality of Matina, so that the judgment declares the following (claims adjusted at trial): a) In accordance with the evidence provided, it be declared that the defendant has acted against the legal system by trying to classify a relationship of a merely commercial nature when the reality is an employer-worker relationship, in this specific case, a public employment relationship. b) Therefore, the total annulment of the administrative conduct be ordered (understood as the omission of the Municipality of Matina to extend the employment contract) and therefore, the employer-worker relationship existing between the defendant and the plaintiff must be declared. c) In view of the foregoing, the Administration must be obligated to pay the back pay for the period from May 2011 “to the present,” the vacation leave not granted, and the overtime owed. d) The defendant be ordered to reinstate him to the position he held. e) It be declared that the City Hall of Matina violated the principle of defense, since he was dismissed without carrying out the corresponding administrative procedure, in clear violation of the administrative legal system and due process, abusing its administrative power. f) The Administration be ordered, in the event it does not wish to reinstate him to the position he held, to pay the statutory severance pay, that is, prior notice and the payment of severance assistance (labor benefits). In addition to vacation leave and Christmas bonuses that were never paid to him, as well as the overtime never recognized, holidays, lost wages with the corresponding increases for the period from May 2011 until the date of payment. Lost wages as damages and the lost school wages that by convention correspond to 95% of the monthly salary, in addition to legal interest on the unpaid sums. The defendant be ordered to pay the procedural and professional costs of this proceeding according to the principal amounts indicated in the initial filing. g) A copy of the judgment be sent to the Inspection Department of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) Bataan Branch, Matina, for the appropriate purposes, since he was never reported as a worker during the time the employment relationship lasted.

The defendant answered negatively and raised the defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, lack of standing, lack of right, as well as lack of jurisdiction and statute of limitations. At the preliminary hearing, the preliminary defenses of lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and statute of limitations were dismissed. The Tribunal rejected the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing. It upheld the exception of lack of right, and consequently, dismissed the lawsuit in all its particulars. It imposed costs on the losing party. The plaintiff appeals on grounds of violation of substantive norms.

**II.-** **Only.** He claims, regarding the fourth recital (considerando) of the judgment, concerning the scope of the principle of the primacy of reality in public employment, in his understanding, the judgment fails to clarify why this principle does not apply to the relationship that Mr. Uries Flores maintained with the Municipality of Matina, since it only indicates that Uries could not be hired because he did not meet the requirements stipulated in the Código Municipal and the nonexistence of the position in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (Articles 17.j, 119, 120, 124 and 125 of the Código Municipal). It overlooks, he reproaches, the fact that precisely what this principle seeks is what occurs in practice, being more important than that which the parties may have agreed upon and even what appears in documents. He states that the denomination or name by which the parties may have given to the verbal or written contract does not matter, as long as the aspects contemplated in Article 18 of the Código de Trabajo are present, the worker is under the protection of this postulate. According to the witness Lorenzo Colphan Reíd, he recalls, the Municipality urgently needed an IT technician, but since there were no sound resources "from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others to create that position, the contracting of professional services for maintenance and repair of computer equipment and IT services was arranged, through the direct contracting procedure (folios 41 to 64 of the judicial file). However, he protests, this did not give the right to violate contractual principles by trying to hide a typical employment figure due to a lack of the appropriate budget or line item. From the actual clauses and evidence provided in the file, he estimates, it can be seen that this relationship was distorted and became a public employment relationship. He assesses that in the case of professional services contracts, it could be defined as the means to contract for a fixed term, tasks not inherent to or essential for the business or company in question, and this to a more specialized or professional provider in the field, with the aim of seeking greater effectiveness that allows directing efforts toward the company's primary needs. However, he clarifies, in this case, the plaintiff clearly worked for the Municipality in purely essential matters, since every public or even private institution, taking technological modernization into consideration, must have an IT technician or professional. He reiterates that he satisfied common and permanent needs, under a regime of subordination (first, fifth, and seventh clauses), which was reinforced by the testimony of Lorenzo Colphan, who indicated that when the plaintiff could not attend, the days were deducted; he was given a day off because there was no money to pay overtime. Regarding the compensation, he censures, although Mr. Uries Flores was paid upon presentation of an invoice, that alone does not exclude the existence of an employment relationship, especially taking into account that the contracting enjoyed a presumption of employment and that the defendant party did not provide evidentiary elements to refute it. He adds, it is not relevant whether the email address used by the plaintiff is not institutional but private, because according to the official letters sent on folios 18, 25, 26, 31, neither the Mayor nor other officials had institutional email. He accuses, regardless of whether Mr. Uries Flores did not comply with what is stipulated in the Código Municipal for the purpose of being hired or that the Municipality did not have the appropriate budget, it is not his responsibility, but that of the defendant.

**III.-** Before addressing the grievances, it is necessary to recall -in general terms- what the Tribunal resolved in this specific case, especially the main arguments by which it discarded the existence of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the Municipality of Matina, dismissing the lawsuit in all its particulars. For the Judges, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 192 of the Constitución Política; 117 and 119 of the Código Municipal, with the exceptions provided for in numerals 14, 22, 23 and 118 of that same Code –in the latter case, regarding confidential employees- and without prejudice to other exceptions established by the legal system, municipal public officials shall be appointed based on a merit system; demonstrating their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position created by the Concejo Municipal and included in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (Articles 17.j, 119, 120, 124 and 125 of the Código Municipal). Furthermore, they indicated, the Municipalities may not make appointments or acquire economic commitments if there is no budget sub-line item to support said expenditure (numeral 103 of the Código Municipal). To enter the municipal administrative career, they summarize, the applicant must: **i)** Meet the minimum requirements established by the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos for the class in question; **ii)** Demonstrate suitability by undergoing the tests, examinations, or competitions contemplated in the legal system; **iii)** Be chosen from the list sent by the office responsible for selecting personnel; **iv)** Take an oath before the Alcalde Municipal or before the Concejo Municipal; **v)** Sign a sworn declaration guaranteeing that there is no legal impediment to employment with the municipal public administration; and, **vi)** Fulfill any other requirements established by law or regulation. Thus, it says, in the period between September 2007 and May 2011, a position called Head of the IT Department did not exist in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos of the Municipality of Matina, since the witness Lorenzo Colphan Reid (former Alcalde Municipal of that canton, in the period from February 2007 to February 2011 and who signed all the contracts with the plaintiff), was emphatic in declaring that there were no sound resources (from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others) to create that position. They analyzed that, when the Municipality required the services of an IT professional to attend to municipal needs, mainly in the areas of accounting and treasury, the contracting of professional services for maintenance and repair of computer equipment and IT services was arranged, through the direct contracting procedure, making it clear to the offerors that if the position could be opened in the future it would be proceeded with accordingly, but that for the moment it would be done through the technical services contract financed by the income obtained from the banana tax, an agreement that would be renewed or not according to municipal requirements. For the Tribunal, the plaintiff –who according to the declaration of the witness Colphan Reid was the only one who accepted those conditions- cannot validly claim that a public employment relationship existed between him and the Municipality, since from the beginning his condition was made very clear to him, which was not that of a municipal official, that is, as the position did not exist (position in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos of that municipal entity), he did not provide his services as part of the municipal organization framed within the administrative career system, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture (numeral 111 of the LGAP). It clarified that the budget line items that supported the expenditure of the technical services contracts signed for non-continuous periods, between September 2007 and May 2011, are not covered by the line items for salaries for special services or occasional day wages, through which interim or confidential officials are paid their salary, according to the provisions of Article 118 of the Código Municipal, but rather by the line item called “Maintenance and Repair of Computer Equipment and IT Systems,” budget code number 5.01.01.1.08.08. It stated that, contrary to what the legal representative of the plaintiff asserts, it is not contrary to law that the Municipality of Matina used the figure of direct contracting to contract the professional services of Flores Ocampo, since paragraph 1 of Article 163 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa establishes that for such purpose, the Administration must follow the procedures of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate. For the Tribunal, the principle of the primacy of reality could be applicable in the sphere of public employment, insofar as it is not a means of evading –as happens in this case- the system of appointment of municipal officials, based on a merit system, that demonstrates their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position created by the Concejo Municipal and included in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos with its corresponding budgetary content, with the exceptions indicated above. Thus, they assess, the plaintiff seeks to be recognized as a municipal public official, based on a contract for technical and professional services, for non-continuous periods, signed to provide the municipal entity with services that did not form part of an occupational profile (typical and supplementary tasks) of any position included in the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos of the Municipality of Matina and therefore, without undergoing an evaluation to determine his suitability and the absence of prohibitions that prevent him from being appointed as a municipal official. To that extent, they conclude and broadly analyze that the three conditions that define an employment relationship provided for in Article 18 of the Código de Trabajo are not met: 1) subordination; 2) compensation; and, 3) personal and continuous provision of a service. It concluded, according to the provisions of canon 203 of the Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, that contracts are extinguished normally, by the expiration of the term and the execution of the contractual object. Consequently, upon the expiration of the last term of the technical services contract signed between the parties, no further extension was made as of May 7, 2011; said circumstance does not have the virtue of constituting a covert dismissal to the detriment of the plaintiff, which would be contrary to the principle of employment stability and the guarantee of due process, given that the relationship the plaintiff maintained with the defendant municipal entity was contractual in nature and not of public employment.

**IV.-** Now, in the sole cassation ground, the appellant claims the failure to apply the principle of the reality contract and the violation of numeral 18 of the Código de Trabajo, because in his view, the elements of an employment relationship were present in this case. However, this Chamber considers that the appellant is not correct in his exposition, since the engagement of Mr. Flores Ocampo -since 2007- was based on the rules of administrative contracting (contracting of technical, special, or professional services). Although it has not been properly challenged, everything analyzed by the Tribunal regarding the factual and legal reasons why it was neither possible nor true that the plaintiff be considered an official of the municipal organization is endorsed. In this understanding, according to cardinals 192 of the Constitución Política; 117 and 119 of the Código Municipal in force in 2007 (with the exceptions of ordinals 14, 22, 23 and 118 ibid and established in other norms), municipal servants must be “*appointed based on the merit selection system*” established by the Código Municipal itself, in order to prove their suitability to perform the functions inherent to the position previously created by the Council and that forms part of the Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (precepts 17.j, 119, 120, 124 and 125 ibid). These last two provisions establish: “*Artículo 124. - With the exceptions established by this law, the personnel of the Municipalities shall be appointed and removed by the alcalde municipal, upon prior technical report regarding the suitability of the applicants for the position. / Artículo 125. - Personnel shall be selected through suitability tests, to which only those who meet the requirements prescribed in Article 116 of this law shall be admitted. The characteristics of these tests and the other requirements shall correspond to the updated criteria of modern recruitment and selection systems and shall correspond to specific internal regulations of the Municipalities. To comply with this article, the Municipalities may request technical collaboration from the Dirección General de Servicio Civil*.” The plaintiff has not demonstrated that his hiring occurred under all these parameters; on the contrary, the evidence is clear that contracts for professional services were signed under the modality of direct contracting procedures, covered by the line item of “*Maintenance and Repair of Computer Equipment and IT Systems*,” budget code no. 5.01.1.08.08. That is, to enter the municipal administrative career, the plaintiff had to meet a series of requirements that he has not demonstrated, which are defined in the Código Municipal as follows: “*Artículo 119. - To enter the service within the municipal regime, it is required: a) Meet the minimum requirements established by the Manual descriptivo de puestos for the class of position in question. b) Demonstrate suitability by undergoing the tests, examinations, or competitions contemplated in this law and its regulations. c) Be chosen from the list sent by the office responsible for selecting personnel. d) Take an oath before the alcalde municipal, as stipulated in Article 194 of the Constitución Política de la República. e) Sign a sworn declaration guaranteeing that there is no legal impediment to employment with the municipal public administration. f) Fulfill any other requirements established by the regulations and other applicable legal provisions*.” Then, the then Alcalde Municipal, Mr. Lorenzo Colphan Reid made it clear that the plaintiff's engagement could not be under the claimed modality (creation of a position) because there were no sound resources (from municipal income from taxes, licenses, concessions, among others), for which reason, given the urgency of the professional services for maintenance and repair of computer equipment and IT services, the contracting was arranged through the direct contracting procedure. But here it is important to emphasize that the official always made this situation clear to the three offerors, telling them that, “*for now, the contracting would be done through the technical services contract financed by the income obtained from the banana tax*.” That is, that services could be contracted through Caproba, which is the Federation of Municipalities of Banana Producing Cantons (declaration at 9:23 and 9:28 of the oral and public hearing). In this regard, it must not be forgotten that Municipalities are prohibited from making appointments or acquiring economic commitments if there is no budget sub-line item to support the expenditure, because the violation of that duty shall be grounds for suspension or separation of the responsible official or employee (precept 103 of the Código Municipal of 2007). What has been said so far is the reality that must prevail in this matter, but in respect of the principle of legality and not of the postulate of the reality contract or “*primacy of reality in public employment*” as the appellant claims. That principle and any other invoked (from the labor regime) were not applicable to the present matter (Article 18 of the Código de Trabajo both in its previous and current wording), because it is insisted, such principles do not govern administrative contracting relationships. Even this Chamber has come to state that even in public employment relationships, its application is not indiscriminate, because the principle of legality must first be assessed and the fulfillment of public interest must be attended to (in this sense, this Chamber has recently pronounced in judgment 001453-F-S1-17 of 14 hours 40 minutes of November 23, 2017). Then it must be clarified, the municipal entity could resort to that figure of direct contracting of services by virtue of the provisions of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa in force in 2007, which in its norm 163 provides: “*Artículo 163.- Contrato de Servicios. For the contracting of technical or professional services, by natural or legal persons, the Administration shall follow the procedures of public bidding, abbreviated bidding, or direct contracting, as appropriate*…” **V.-** In any case, there are additional reasons why the existence of a public employment relationship must be dismissed. Many of them derive from the eight contracts signed and submitted by the plaintiff, from which several conclusions can be drawn: **a)** It involves an agreement for special services for the contractor to be in charge of maintenance and repair of computer equipment, the computer network, and computer systems of the Municipality of Matina. **b)** The contracting is for special services, so the contractor, in a public contract, agreed to release the Municipality from all labor liability in the execution of that contract. **c)** If prior and written municipal authorization is obtained, the contractor may assign or transfer the rights or obligations conferred by the agreement. **d)** The applicable legal framework, according to the parties' agreement, is the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and the contract itself. **e)** There is the possibility that the contractor may employ staff. **f)** It responded to a direct contracting with a budget code that was “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Información” (no. 5.01.01.1.08.08). **g)** The plaintiff was contracted in certain periods for four days a week and in others for five days, with an entry time but no departure time. **h)** The Municipality committed to supplying 100% of the materials, machinery, labor, transportation, tools, and equipment required by the contractor. **i)** They were temporary, renewable contracts. **j)** The Municipal Mayor was in charge of supervising the execution of the contract for technical services signed between both parties. **k)** 2% of Income Tax was withheld, as ordered by Article 23, subsection g) of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) in the case of income originating from public contracts. All of the above reflects that the will of the parties was to resort to a direct contracting to solve a need of the Municipality, which was to have a person in charge of information technology. For this reason, the service was financed with a specific budget line and should have been respected as such. At no time was it said or mentioned that it was an employment contract and with a specific position; on the contrary, that position did not exist in the municipal job manual. Now, all those tasks of Mr. Uries coincide with the description provided by Mr. Lorenzo Reid at trial when he described the following: a) at the beginning, he maintained the computer machines and managed incoming equipment; b) he began to form the network within the Municipality, which did not exist; c) he was sent to training in San José for network and equipment maintenance in that modernization process of the municipality (from 9:24 of the oral and public trial recording). The same was indicated by Mrs. Elvira Padilla when she said that Mr. Uries was the only information technology assistant for the Municipal Council). She added that the council members required the professional to attend to record the sessions (at 9:42 and 9:46). For his part, Carlos Colptor Reid stated that in meetings or matters of cadastre and the National Registry, they sought the plaintiff's help because various computer programs were involved. He indicated that they were designated by the Mayor to participate in courses because Mr. Uries Flores, as the computer technician, was the one who managed the programs and systems for executing the work. He acknowledged that the plaintiff's work was to provide support in the systems or advice to understand computer programs and repair damaged equipment (at 9:56; 10:01, 10:03, and 10:06 of the hearing). With all these pieces of evidence and the rest of the documents presented by the plaintiff himself, it was considered proven that the contractual object was extremely broad and Mr. Uries Flores consented to it during the execution of the contracts, where multiple tasks were assigned to him, all related to information technology services. But this does not mean that a public employment relationship existed. Many of those tasks are summarized as: 1) supervising and performing the digital recording of the ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the Municipal Council (testimony of Lorenzo Colphan Reid and Elvira Padilla Jiménez given at trial). 2) Review, repair; assignment, and installation of computer equipment. 3) Registration of email accounts for Municipal Council members. 4) Supervision and troubleshooting of the municipal entity's computer network. 5) Attendance at training and activities of IFAM, the Programa de Regularización de Catastro y Registro; Sistema Tributario Municipal (SITRIMU), among others, to instruct the Tax Administrator and the Head of the Cadastre Department in handling the software provided by BID-Catastro. Ergo, from the point of view of assigned functions, a public employment relationship does not emerge either.

**VI.-** Despite the above, it must be made clear regarding the alleged existence of the elements that define an employment relationship, according to the current wording of Section 18 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), that these have not occurred in this specific case. Rather than a relationship of subordination and permanent dependency and direction, what has operated are oversight activities typical of an administrative service contract, such as fulfillment of roles and schedules, verbal warnings, requests for information and results, among others. These correspond to events inherent to the development, execution, and oversight (control) of an administrative contract, to which the contracting Administration is obligated (precepts 9, 13, and 102 of the LCA). In this context, it is normal that in the provision of services acquired by any Administration (through an administrative contract), supervision and oversight activities occur; otherwise, the public purpose sought to be fulfilled could be transgressed by the irregularity and inefficiency of the service. Far from manifesting such acts as behaviors typical of an employment relationship, they converge as essential requirements for fulfilling the administrative agreement, which were clearly set forth in some of the signed contracts when the following was agreed: **a)** *“…THE CONSULTANT undertakes to perform and deliver services in an orderly, serious, and responsible manner, following the instructions of the Mayor or whomever he assigns who will be in charge of the evaluation and final control of the works described in this contract. Furthermore, the contractor shall be responsible for the poor execution of the service, use of work equipment, materials, and any other input assigned to him for his tasks…”*; **b)** *“…In the event that the work is determined to be defective, erroneous, or bad due to carelessness or negligence of the contractor, it must be corrected or performed again without recognition of any extra payment or the cost of correction will be covered…”;* **c)** *“… The Contractor… accepts the oversight systems established in this contract for quality and performance control thereof, abides by the legal provisions and regulatory obligations incorporated in this contract…”;* **d)** *“…THE CONTRACTOR shall perform all repair and maintenance work on the General Computer Network and all computer equipment, in coordination with the Mayor's Department of the Municipality of Matina…”* (folios 41 to 64 of the judicial file). In this way, the fact that he had an entry time, helped in the sessions, and was reprimanded, as testified by witness Reid, does not turn the relationship into an employment one, but rather responds to issues inherent to the execution of a professional services agreement. To the point that the only time the plaintiff was reprimanded, the former Mayor said at trial, was because he was absent and that day there were problems with the system (9:24). The other claimed element is remuneration, but as the Court correctly analyzes, the plaintiff was paid for the services rendered. There is no evidence indicating he received a salary based on a pay scale, due to a job category, which is understood because in the Municipality there was no permanent position of “Head of Information Technology in the Descriptive Job Manual (Manual Descriptivo de Puestos)” (rules of Section 122 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)). The consequence of the above is that the plaintiff presented cash invoices to the Municipality for “Equipment Maintenance According to Contract, IT Consulting Services and Network and Server Assistance.” Furthermore, it is reiterated, the payment for those services did not correspond to a budget line for wages or salaries, but to another which was “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Informática,” budget code number 5.01.01.1.08.08. Finally, it is also necessary to insist that on the sums paid to the plaintiff, the Administration applied a 2% Income Tax withholding, based on Article 23, subsection g) of Law number 7092, coupled with the fact that the deductions typical of a salary were not applied (pension system; CCSS sickness and maternity system, among others). Although not properly questioned, it is worth clarifying that a personal and continuous provision of service is also not evident, first, because it follows from the signed contracts that the contractor plaintiff could delegate the service to third parties, as the twelfth clause of the agreement signed on September 21, 2007, indicated: *“… The Contractor states and guarantees that his personnel possess the skills, capacity, knowledge, and other requirements to efficiently perform the Service for which he is contracted, that he also accepts the oversight systems established in this contract for quality and performance control thereof, and abides by the legal provisions and regulatory obligations incorporated in this contract…”* (folios 42-43 of the judicial file). Likewise, in the seventh clause of the remaining contracts, it was stipulated that: *“…THE CONTRACTOR may not assign or transfer the rights or obligations conferred by this contract, without prior written authorization from the MUNICIPALITY OF MATINA…”* (folios 46, 49, 52, 54, 57, 60, and 63 of the judicial file). The same must be indicated regarding the continuous provision of service, from September 2007 to May 2011, as there were several interruptions, from 5 months, 1 month and 24 days, 1 month, 23 days, 11 days, and up to 5 days according to the dates of the agreements submitted as evidence. Therefore, with these simple facts and annotations, any violation of Section 18 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) as alleged is dismissed.

**VII.-** Thus, the appeal must be declared without merit, and the costs generated by its filing shall be imposed on the appealing party in accordance with precept 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA.

**POR TANTO** The cassation appeal filed is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the appealing party.

JROSALES

20150004001720-1774697-1.rtf *120003380679LA* RES. 000294-F-S1-2019 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del tres de abril de dos mil diecinueve.

En el proceso de conocimiento interpuesto por URIEL FLORES OCAMPO, técnico en informática, portador de la cédula de identidad número 0111220978; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE MATINA, representada por su apoderada especial judicial, licenciada Alba Iris Ortiz Recio, abogada, portadora de la cédula de identidad número 0302850594; el actor formula recurso de casación contra la sentencia número 120-2015-V, emitida por la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, a las 13 horas 50 minutos del 17 de noviembre de 2015.

Redacta el magistrado Solís Zelaya

CONSIDERANDO

I.- En la demanda origen de este proceso, presentada el 07 de mayo de 2012, el señor Uries Flores Ocampo, demandó a la Municipalidad de Matina. Alegó, entre setiembre de 2007 a mayo de 2011, el Alcalde Municipal, contrató sus servicios profesionales para el mantenimiento y reparación de equipos de cómputo y sistemas de informática, indicándole de manera verbal que lo haría de esa forma ya que no contaba con "recursos sanos" para poder contratarlo como un empleado más de la Municipalidad con las obligaciones que se derivarían. Reclamó, finalizado el último período por el cual fue contratado (del 06 de enero al 06 de mayo de 2011), se le indicó que ya no se le renovaría más su contrato, sin otorgarle “explicación, ni pagando mis derechos laborales”. Dijo, contaba con oficina en la misma Municipalidad y era quien personalmente prestaba lo servicios de informática, además contaba con un horario de 7:30 a.m. a 3:30 p.m. Agregó, cuando llegaba tarde se le llamaba la atención; recibía una remuneración por sus labores; debía realizar horas extras ya que se le pedía realizar las grabaciones de los Concejos Municipales. Señaló, enviaba oficios con el papel membretado del Ayuntamiento, pues se le ha tomado como un trabajador más; y sus compañeros le solicitaban las labores tal y como se acostumbra en la Municipalidad. Afirmó, en los oficios se le denominaba "encargado de computo”. Acotó, el Alcalde era quien le giraba instrucciones y órdenes por escrito o verbales, como representar al Municipio en diversas actividades (labor que no llevaría a cabo alguien que no fuera empleado municipal), en proyectos tales como: el de “SITRIMU, BIC Catastro, Registro Nacional, Fomude, Agenda 21, página WEB” y otros relacionados con el Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal (IFAM). Mencionó, incluso se le aumentaba el salario y se le pagaba quincenalmente como al resto de compañeros. Reclamó, pese a la continuidad de su relación obrero patronal nunca se le otorgaron vacaciones, ni se le cancelaron aguinaldos; y al despedírsele “de manera injustificada” no se cancelaron los rubros de Ley ni se llevó a cabo el correspondiente debido proceso. Recriminó, de conformidad con el principio de contrato realidad, su relación con la Municipalidad de Matina fue de empleado patrono y no de servicios profesionales. A su modo de entender, se presentaron los tres elementos que caracterizan una relación laboral: i) Prestación personal de un servicio; ii) Remuneración; y, iii) Subordinación jurídica. Endilgó, nunca se le aseguró ni ante el INS ni ante la CCSS. Finalizó, se le despidió sin justa causa, violándole los derechos de defensa y sin el aviso previo. Por tales razones demandó a la Municipalidad de Matina, a fin de que en sentencia se declare lo siguiente (pretensiones ajustadas en la audiencia de juicio): a) De acuerdo con las pruebas aportadas se declare que la demandada ha actuado en contra del ordenamiento jurídico al querer tipificar una relación meramente de índole comercial cuando la realidad se trata de una relación obrero-patronal, en este caso concreto, una relación de empleo público. b) Por lo anterior, se ordene la anulación total de la conducta administrativa (entendida como la omisión de la Municipalidad de Matina en prorrogar el contrato de trabajo) y por tanto, debe declararse la relación obrero patronal existente entre la demandada y el actor. c) Ante lo anterior, debe obligarse a la Administración, al pago de los salarios caídos del período comprendido entre el mes de mayo de 2011 “y el presente”, las vacaciones no otorgadas y horas extras adeudadas. d) Se ordene a la accionada que lo reinstale al puesto que ocupaba. e) Se declare violado por parte del Ayuntamiento de Matina, el principio de defensa, ya que se le despidió sin realizar el procedimiento administrativo correspondiente, en clara violación al ordenamiento jurídico administrativo y al debido proceso, abusando de su potestad administrativa. f) Se condene a la Administración en el caso de no querer reinstalarlo en el puesto que ocupaba, al pago de las prestaciones de ley, sea el preaviso y al pago del auxilio de cesantía (prestaciones laborales). Además de vacaciones y aguinaldos que nunca le fueron cancelados, así como las horas extras nunca reconocidas, feriados, salarios dejados de percibir con los aumentos correspondientes del período comprendido entre el mes de mayo de 2011 hasta la fecha de pago. Salarios dejados de percibir a título de daños y perjuicios y los salarios escolares dejados de percibir que por convención corresponden al 95% del salario mensual, además de los intereses legales sobre las sumas pendientes de pagar. Se ordene a la demandada el pago de las costas procesales y profesionales de este proceso de acuerdo a los montos principales indicados en el escrito inicial. g) Se remita copia de la sentencia al Departamento de Inspección de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) Sucursal de Bataan, Matina, para lo que corresponda, pues nunca fue reportado como trabajador durante el tiempo que duró la relación laboral. La demandada contestó negativamente e interpuso las defensas de falta de: agotamiento de la vía administrativa, legitimación, derecho, así como las de incompetencia y prescripción. En la audiencia previa, se declararon sin lugar las defensas previas de incompetencia, falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y prescripción. El Tribunal, rechazó la excepción de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva. Acogió la de falta de derecho, en consecuencia, declaró sin lugar en todos los extremos la demanda. Impuso ambas costas a cargo de la parte vencida. Recurre el actor por lesión de normas sustantivas.

II.- Único. Reclama, en cuanto al IV considerando del fallo, sobre los alcances del principio de primacía de la realidad en materia de empleo público, a su entender, no logra la sentencia aclarar por qué no se da este principio en la relación que mantenía don Uries Flores con la Municipalidad de Matina, toda vez que solo indica que Uries no podía ser contratado porque no cumplía con los requisitos estipulados en el Código Municipal y la inexistencia de la plaza en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (artículos 17.j, 119, 120, 124 y 125 del Código Municipal). Pasa por alto, recrimina, el hecho de que precisamente este principio lo que busca es lo que ocurre en la práctica, siendo más importante de aquello que las partes hayan pactado y hasta lo que aparezca en documentos. Afirma, no importa la denominación o el nombre por el cual las partes hayan dado a la contratación verbal o escrita, mientras se den los aspectos contemplados en el artículo 18 del Código de Trabajo, el trabajador se encuentra bajo la protección de este postulado. Según el testigo Lorenzo Colphan Reíd, recuerda, la Municipalidad necesitaba urgentemente un técnico de informática, pero como no existían recursos sanos "provenientes de ingresos municipales por impuestos, licencias, concesiones, entre otros para crear esa plaza, se dispuso la contratación de servicios profesionales de mantenimiento y de reparación de equipo de cómputo y servicios de informática, mediante el procedimiento de contratación directa (folios 41 a 64 del expediente judicial). Sin embargo, protesta, no por ello tenía el derecho de violentarse los principios contractuales al querer esconder una figura típica laboral por no contar con el presupuesto o partida idónea al respecto. Del propio clausulado y pruebas que se aportó al expediente, estima, se deja ver que esta relación se desvirtuó y se convirtió en una relación de empleo público. Valora, en el caso de los contratos de servicios profesionales se podría definir como el medio para contratar a un plazo determinado, labores no propias o esenciales del negocio o empresa en cuestión, y esto a un proveedor más especializado o profesional en el campo, con el fin de buscar una mayor efectividad que permita orientar los esfuerzos a las necesidades primordiales de la empresa. No obstante, aclara, en este caso, el actor claramente laboró para la Municipalidad en asuntos meramente esenciales, pues toda institución pública o incluso privada, tomando en consideración la modernización tecnológica, debe contar con un técnico o profesional en asuntos de informática. Reitera satisfizo necesidades comunes y permanentes, bajo un régimen de subordinación (cláusulas primera, quinta y sétima), lo cual se vio reforzado con el testimonio de Lorenzo Colphan quien indicó que cuando el actor no podía asistir se le deducían los días; se le otorgaba un día libre porque no había dinero para el pago de horas extras. En cuanto a la remuneración, censura, si bien se le pagaba a don Uries Flores previa presentación de factura, ello no excluye, por sí solo, la existencia de una relación laboral, máxime si se toma en cuenta que la contratación gozaba de una presunción de laboralidad y que la parte demandada no aportó elementos de prueba que la desvirtuara. Añade, no es relevante si la dirección de correo electrónico utilizada por el actor no es de carácter institucional, sino privada, pues según los oficios remitidos a folios 18, 25, 26, 31 ni el Alcalde ni otros funcionarios tenían correo institucional. Acusa, independientemente si don Uries Flores no cumplió con lo estipulado en el Código Municipal para efectos de ser contratado o bien que la Municipalidad no tuviera el presupuesto idóneo, no es responsabilidad de él, sino de la demandada.

III.- Previo a conocer los agravios, es necesario recordar -en términos generales- lo que resolvió el Tribunal en este caso concreto, especialmente, los argumentos principales por los cuales descartó la existencia de una relación laboral entre el actor y la Municipalidad de Matina, declarando sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Para los Jueces, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 192 de la Constitución Política; 117 y 119 del Código Municipal, con las excepciones previstas en los numerales 14, 22, 23 y 118 de ese mismo Código –en este último caso, respecto a los empleados de confianza- y sin perjuicio de las demás excepciones que establezca el ordenamiento jurídico, los funcionarios públicos municipales serán nombrados con base en un sistema de méritos; que demuestre su idoneidad para desempeñar las funciones inherentes a la plaza creada por el Concejo Municipal e incluida en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (artículos 17.j, 119, 120, 124 y 125 del Código Municipal). Además, indicaron, las Municipalidades no podrán realizar nombramientos ni adquirir compromisos económicos, si no existiera una sub partida presupuestaria que ampare dicho egreso (numeral 103 del Código Municipal). Para ingresar a la carrera administrativa municipal, resumen, el aspirante deberá: i) Satisfacer los requisitos mínimos que fije el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos para la clase de que se trate; ii) Demostrar idoneidad sometiéndose a las pruebas, exámenes o concursos contemplados en el ordenamiento jurídico; iii) Ser escogido de la nómina enviada por la oficina encargada de seleccionar al personal; iv) Prestar juramento ante el Alcalde Municipal o ante el Concejo Municipal; v) Firmar una declaración jurada garante de que no pesa impedimento legal para vincularse laboralmente con la administración pública municipal; y, vi) Llenar cualesquiera otros requisitos dispuestos vía legal o reglamentaria. Así las cosas, dice, en el período comprendido entre el mes de setiembre de 2007 al mes de mayo de 2011, no existía en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos de la Municipalidad de Matina, una plaza denominada Encargado del Departamento de Informática, toda vez que el testigo Lorenzo Colphan Reid (Exalcalde Municipal de ese cantón, en el lapso comprendido entre febrero de 2007 a febrero de 2011 y quien suscribió todos los contratos con el accionante), fue enfático en declarar que no existían recursos sanos (provenientes de ingresos municipales por impuestos, licencias, concesiones, entre otros) para crear esa plaza. Analizaron, al requerir el Municipio los servicios de un informático que atendiera las necesidades municipales, principalmente en las áreas de contabilidad y tesorería, se dispuso la contratación de servicios profesionales de mantenimiento y de reparación de equipo de cómputo y servicios de informática, mediante el procedimiento de contratación directa, dejándole claro a los oferentes que a futuro si se podía abrir la plaza se procedería de conformidad, pero que por el momento se haría mediante el contrato de servicios técnicos financiado por los ingresos obtenidos del impuesto al banano, convenio que se renovaría o no de conformidad con los requerimientos municipales. Para el Tribunal, el actor –quien según la declaración del testigo Colphan Reid fue el único que aceptó esas condiciones- no puede alegar válidamente que existía una relación de empleo público entre él y la Municipalidad, toda vez que desde un principio se le dejó muy claro cuál era su condición, la cual, no era de funcionario municipal, es decir, al no existir el puesto (plaza en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos de ese ente municipal), no prestaba sus servicios como parte de la organización municipal encuadrada en el sistema de carrera administrativa, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura (ordinal 111 de la LGAP). Aclaró, las partidas presupuestarias que sirvieron de sustento a la erogación de los contratos por servicios técnicos firmados por períodos no continuos, entre el mes setiembre de 2007 y mayo de 2011, no están amparadas en las partidas de sueldos por servicios especiales o jornales ocasionales, mediante los cuales se les paga a los funcionarios interinos o de confianza su salario, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 118 del Código Municipal, sino mediante la partida denominada “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Informática”, código presupuestario número 5.01.01.1.08.08. Dijo contrario a lo que afirma la representante legal del demandante, no resulta contrario a derecho que la Municipalidad de Matina haya utilizado para contratar los servicios profesionales de Flores Ocampo, la figura de la contratación directa, toda vez que el párrafo 1º del artículo 163 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, establece que para tal efecto, la Administración deberá seguir los procedimientos de licitación pública, abreviada o contratación directa, según corresponda. Para el Tribunal, el principio de la primacía de la realidad, podría resultar aplicable en el ámbito del empleo público, en el tanto no sea un medio de evadir –como sucede en este caso- el sistema de nombramiento de los funcionarios municipales, con base en un sistema de méritos , que demuestre su idoneidad para desempeñar las funciones inherentes a la plaza creada por el Concejo Municipal e incluida en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos con su respectivo contenido presupuestario, con las excepciones antes indicadas. Así, valoran, el accionante pretende que se le reconozca la condición de funcionario público municipal, a partir de un contrato de servicios técnicos y profesionales, por períodos no continuos, suscrito para brindar al ente municipal servicios que no formaban parte de un perfil ocupacional (tareas típicas y suplementarias) de alguna plaza incluida en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos de la Municipalidad de Matina y por ende, sin someterse a una evaluación para determinar su idoneidad y la inexistencia de prohibiciones que le impidan ser nombrado como funcionario municipal. En ese tanto, concluyen y analizan ampliamente no se cumplen las tres condiciones que definen una relación de empleo previstas en el artículo 18 del Código de Trabajo: 1) subordinación; 2) remuneración; y, 3) prestación personal y continua de un servicio. Concluyó, según lo dispuesto por el canon 203 del Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, los contratos se extinguen por la vía normal, por el acaecimiento del plazo y la ejecución del objeto contractual. En consecuencia, al vencerse el último plazo del contrato de servicios técnicos suscrito entre las partes, no se hizo otra prórroga a partir del 07 de mayo del 2011, dicha circunstancia no tiene la virtud de constituir un despido encubierto en perjuicio del accionante, que resulte contrario al principio de estabilidad en el empleo y a la garantía del debido proceso, dado que la relación que sostenía el actor con el ente municipal demandado, era de naturaleza contractual y no de empleo público.

IV.- Ahora bien, en el único motivo de casación, el casacionista reclamar la falta de aplicación del principio del contrato realidad y lesión del numeral 18 del Código de Trabajo, porque a su modo de ver, en este caso estaban presentes los elementos de una relación laboral. Sin embargo, esta Sala considera, no lleva razón el recurrente en su exposición, toda vez que si hubo una contratación del señor Flores Ocampo -desde 2007- fue con base en las reglas de la contratación administrativa (contratación de servicios técnicos, especiales o profesionales). Aunque no ha sido cuestionado adecuadamente, se prohíja todo lo analizado por el Tribunal respecto de las razones fácticas y legales por las cuales no era posible ni cierto que el actor fuera considerado un funcionario de la organización municipal. En este entendido, al tenor de los cardinales 192 de la Constitución Política; 117 y 119 del Código Municipal vigente en 2007 (con las excepciones de los ordinales 14, 22, 23 y 118 ibídem y establecidas en otras normas), los servidores municipales deben ser “nombrados con base en el sistema de selección por mérito” dispuesto por el propio Código Municipal, a fin de comprobar su idoneidad para desempeñar las funciones propias de la plaza creada previamente por el Concejo y que forma parte del Manual Descriptivo de Puestos (preceptos 17.j, 119, 120, 124 y 125 ibídem). Estas dos últimas disposiciones establecen: “Artículo 124. - Con las salvedades establecidas por esta ley, el personal de las municipalidades será nombrado y removido por el alcalde municipal, previo informe técnico respecto a la idoneidad de los aspirantes al cargo. / Artículo 125. - El personal se seleccionará por medio de pruebas de idoneidad, a las cuales se admitirá únicamente a quienes satisfagan los requisitos prescritos en el artículo 116 de esta ley. Las características de estas pruebas y los demás requisitos corresponderán a los criterios actualizados de los sistemas modernos de reclutamiento y selección y corresponderán a reglamentaciones específicas e internas de las municipalidades. Para cumplir con este artículo, las municipalidades podrán solicitar colaboración técnica a la Dirección General de Servicio Civil.”. El actor no ha demostrado que su contratación se dio bajo todos estos parámetros, por el contrario, la prueba es clara que se firmaron contratos por servicios profesionales bajo la modalidad de procedimientos de contratación directa, cubiertos por la partida de “Mantenimiento y Reparación de Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Informática”, código presupuestario no. 5.01.1.08.08. Es decir, para ingresar a la carrera administrativa municipal, el demandante debía cumplir una serie de requisitos que no ha demostrado, los cuales se definen en el Código Municipal de la siguiente forma: “Artículo 119. - Para ingresar al servicio dentro del régimen municipal se requiere: a) Satisfacer los requisitos mínimos que fije el Manual descriptivo de puestos para la clase de puesto de que se trata. b) Demostrar idoneidad sometiéndose a las pruebas, exámenes o concursos contemplados en esta ley y sus reglamentos. c) Ser escogido de la nómina enviada por la oficina encargada de seleccionar al personal. d) Prestar juramento ante el alcalde municipal, como lo estatuye el artículo 194 de la Constitución Política de la República. e) Firmar una declaración jurada garante de que sobre su persona no pesa impedimento legal para vincularse laboralmente con la administración pública municipal. f) Llenar cualesquiera otros requisitos que disponga los reglamentos y otras disposiciones legales aplicadas.” Luego, el entonces Alcalde Municipal, señor Lorenzo Colphan Reid dejó claro que la contratación del actor no podía ser bajo la modalidad reclamada (creación plaza) porque no habían recursos sanos (provenientes de ingresos municipales por impuestos, licencias, concesiones, entre otros), por lo cual, dada la urgencia de los servicios profesionales de mantenimiento y de reparación de equipo de cómputo y servicios de informática, se dispuso la contratación mediante el procedimiento de contratación directa. Pero aquí es importante recalcar que el funcionario siempre les dejó clara esta situación a los tres oferentes, al decirles que, “por ahora, la contratación se haría mediante el contrato de servicios técnicos financiado por los ingresos obtenidos del impuesto del banano”. Es decir, que se podía contratar mediante servicios a través de Caproba que es la Federación de Municipalidades de Cantones Productores de Banano (declaración al ser las 9:23 y 9:28 del debate oral y público). Al respecto, no debe olvidarse que las Municipalidades tienen vedado efectuar nombramientos o adquirir compromisos económicos, si no existe subpartida presupuestaria que ampare el egreso, porque la violación de ese deber será motivo de suspensión o separación del funcionario o empleado responsable (precepto 103 del Código Municipal de 2007). Lo hasta aquí dicho, es la realidad que debe privar en este asunto, pero en respeto del principio de legalidad y no del postulado del contrato realidad o “primacía de la realidad en materia de empleo público” como alega el casacionista. Ese principio y cualquier otro invocado (del régimen laboral), no era de aplicación al presente asunto (artículo 18 del Código de Trabajo tanto en su redacción anterior como actual), porque se insiste, tales principios no rigen las relaciones de contratación administrativa. Incluso esta Sala ha llegado a afirmar que aún en las relaciones de empleo público, su aplicación no es indiscriminada, pues antes debe valorarse el principio de legalidad y atenderse el cumplimiento del interés público (en este sentido se ha pronunciado esta Cámara recientemente en la sentencia 001453-F-S1-17 de 14 horas 40 minutos del 23 de noviembre de 2017). Luego hay que aclarar, el ente municipal podía acudir a esa figura de la contratación directa de servicios en virtud de los dispuesto en el Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa vigente a 2007 que en su norma 163 dispone: “Artículo 163.-Contrato de Servicios. Para la contratación de servicios técnicos o profesionales, a cargo de personas físicas o jurídicas, la Administración, deberá seguir los procedimientos de licitación pública, abreviada o contratación directa, según corresponda…”. Incluso, la Ley de Contratación Administrativa dispone en el ordinal 65 que la contratación de esos servicios técnicos o profesionales no originará relación de empleo público, entre la Administración y el contratista, con la sola excepción de servicios profesionales con sueldo fijo a través del régimen ordinario de nombramiento (canon 67 ibídem), lo cual no sucedía en el presente asunto. Por estas simples razones, debe quedar claro por qué razón no es posible aplicar el principio del contrato realidad en este asunto.

V.- En todo caso, existen razones adicionales por las cuales la existencia de una relación de empleo público debe ser desestimada. Muchas de ellas se desprenden de los ocho contratos firmados y aportados por la parte actora, de los cuales se extraen varias conclusiones: a) Se trata de un convenio por servicios especiales para que el contratista sea el encargado de mantenimiento y reparación de equipo de cómputo, red informática y sistemas de informática de la Municipalidad de Matina. b) La contratación es de servicios especiales, por lo que el contratista se sometió en un contrato público a liberar al Ayuntamiento de toda responsabilidad laboral en la ejecución de ese contrato. c) Si se consigue una autorización municipal previa y por escrito, el contratista puede ceder, traspasar los derechos u obligaciones que le confiere el convenio. d) El marco legal aplicable según acuerdo de las partes es la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y el propio contrato. e) Existe la posibilidad que el contratista disponga personal. f) Respondió a una contratación directa con un código presupuestario que era el de “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Información” (no. 5.01.01.1.08.08). g) El actor fue contratado en ciertos periodos por cuatro días a la semana y en otros por cinco días con horario de entrada sin uno de salida. h) La Municipalidad se comprometió a suministrar el 100% de los materiales, maquinaria, mano de obra, transporte. Herramientas y equipo requerido por el contratista. i) Eran contratos temporales prorrogables. j) El Alcalde Municipal era el encargado de fiscalizar la ejecución del contrato por servicios técnicos suscrito entre ambas partes. k) Se retenía el 2% del Impuesto sobre la Renta, conforme lo ordena el artículo 23 inciso g) de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta en caso de rentas originadas de contrataciones públicas. Todo lo anterior refleja que la voluntad de las partes fue acudir a una contratación directa en aras de solventar una necesidad del Municipio, que era la de contar con un encargado de informática. Por ello, se financió el servicio con una partida determinada y así debió ser respetado. En ningún momento se dijo o se mencionó que se trataría de un contrato laboral y con una plaza específica, por el contario, en el manual de puestos municipal no existía ese cargo. Ahora bien, todas esas labores de don Uries coinciden con la descripción que brindó don Lorenzo Reid en el juicio cuando describió lo siguiente: a) al inicio daba mantenimiento a las máquinas de cómputo y manejaba el ingreso más equipo; b) inicio a formar la red dentro de la Municipalidad la cual no existía; c) se le envió a capacitaciones en San José para el mantenimiento de la red y los equipos en ese proceso de actualización del municipio (a partir de las 9:24 del respaldo del juicio oral y público). Lo mismo que indicó doña Elvira Padilla cuando dijo que don Uries era el único asistente de informática del Concejo Municipal). Agregó, los regidores requerían que el profesional acudiera para grabar las sesiones (al ser las 9:42 y 9:46). Por su parte, Carlos Colptor Reid manifestó que en reuniones o cuestiones de catastro y del Registro Nacional acudían al auxilio del actor por tratarse de diversos programas informáticos. Señaló, eran designados por el Alcalde para participar en cursos porque son Uries Flores como informático era quien manejaba los programas y sistemas para la ejecución de las labores. Reconoció, la labor del actor, era brindar apoyo en los sistemas o asesorías para entender los programas informáticos y reparar equipos en mal estado (al ser las 9:56; 10:01, 10:03 y 10:06 del debate). Con todas esas probanzas y el resto de documental presentada por el propio actor, se tuvo por acreditado que el objeto contractual era sumamente amplio y el señor Uries Flores así lo fue consintiendo durante la ejecución de los contratos, donde se le asignaron múltiples tareas, todas vinculadas con los servicios informáticos. Pero ello no significa que de por medio existe una relación de empleo público. Muchas de esas labores se resumen en: 1) supervisar y realizar la grabación digital de las sesiones ordinarias y extraordinarias del Concejo Municipal (declaración testimonial de Lorenzo Colphan Reid y Elvira Padilla Jiménez rendidas en juicio). 2) Revisión, reparación; asignación e instalación de equipos informáticos. 3) Registro de las cuentas de correo electrónico de los miembros del Concejo Municipal. 4) Supervisión y solución de problemas de la red informática del ente municipal. 5) Asistencia a capacitaciones y actividades del IFAM, del Programa de Regularización de Catastro y Registro; Sistema Tributario Municipal (SITRIMU), entre otros, a fin de instruir al Administrador Tributario y al Jefe del Departamento de Catastro, en el manejo del software facilitado por BID-Catastro. Ergo, desde el punto de vista de las funciones asignadas, tampoco se desprende una relación de empleo público.

VI.- A pesar de lo anterior, debe dejarse claro en cuanto a la supuesta existencia de los elementos que definen una relación laboral, según la redacción actual del numeral 18 del Código de Trabajo, que estos no se han presentado en el caso concreto. Antes que una relación de subordinación y de dependencia permanente y dirección, lo que ha operado son actividades de fiscalización propias de una contratación administrativa de servicios, tales como cumplimiento de roles y horarios, amonestaciones verbales, solicitudes de información y de resultados, entre otras. Ellas obedecen a eventos propios del desenvolvimiento, ejecución y fiscalización (control) de un contrato administrativo, a lo cual se encuentra obligada la Administración contratante (preceptos 9, 13 y 102 de la LCA). En este contexto, es normal que en la prestación de los servicios adquiridos por cualquier Administración (por medio de un contrato administrativo), se presenten actividades de supervisión y fiscalización, de lo contrario, el fin público que se procura cumplir podría verse transgredido por la irregularidad e ineficiencia del servicio. Lejos de manifestarse tales actos en conductas propias de una relación laboral, convergen como requisitos esenciales para el cumplimiento del convenio administrativo, los cuales, fueron claramente expuestos en algunos de los contratos firmados cuando se pactó lo siguiente: a) “…EL CONSULTOR, se compromete a realizar y entregar servicios en forma ordenada, seria y responsable, siguiendo las indicaciones del Alcalde o a quien asigne el cual estará a cargo de la evaluación y control final de los trabajos descritos en el presente contrato. Además el contratista será responsable por la mala ejecución del servicio, uso del equipo de trabajo, materiales y cualquier otro insumo que se le asigne para sus labores…”; b) “…En caso de que el trabajo se determine defectuoso, malo erróneo o malo por descuido, negligencia del contratista, deberá ser corregido o realizado nuevamente sin reconocimiento de pago extra alguno o cubrirá el costo de corrección…”; c) “… El Contratista… acepta los sistemas de fiscalización establecidos en el presente contrato para el control de calidad y rendimiento del mismo, acatar las disposiciones legales, obligaciones reglamentarias que conlleva incorporado el presente contrato…”; d) “…El CONTRATADO realizará todas las labores de reparación y mantenimiento de la Red de Informática en general y a todo el equipo informático, en coordinación con el Departamento del Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Matina…” (folios 41 a 64 del expediente judicial). De esa forma, el hecho que tuviera horario de entrada, ayudara en las sesiones y le fuera llamada la atención como manifestó el testigo Reid, no convierte la relación en una laboral, sino que responden a cuestiones propias de la ejecución de un convenio de servicios profesionales. Al punto que la única vez que se le llamó la atención al demandante, dijo el Exalcalde en juicio, fue porque este faltó y ese día hubo problemas con el sistema (9:24). El otro extremo reclamado es el de la remuneración, pero como bien analiza el Tribunal, al actor se le pagaba por los servicios prestados. No hay prueba que indique que percibía un salario con base en una escala de sueldos, a raíz de una categoría de puesto, lo cual se entiende, porque en el Ayuntamiento no existía una plaza fija de “Encargado de Informática en el Manual Descriptivo de Puestos” (reglas del numeral 122 del Código Municipal). Lo anterior, lleva como consecuencia que el demandante presentara ante el Municipio facturas de contado por “Mantenimiento de Equipo según Contrato, Servicios de Consultoría Informática y Asistencia en la Red y Servidores”. Además, se repite, el pago de esos servicios no respondía a una partida de sueldos o salarios, sino a otra que era de “Mantenimiento y Reparación del Equipo de Cómputo y Sistemas de Informática”, código presupuestario número 5.01.01.1.08.08. Por último, también es necesario insistir, a las sumas canceladas al actor, la Administración aplicaba una retención del 2% del Impuesto sobre la Renta, con base en lo dispuesto en el artículo 23 inciso g) de la Ley número 7092, aunado a que no se le aplicaban las deducciones propias de un salario (régimen de pensiones; régimen de enfermedad y maternidad de la CCSS, entre otras). Aunque no lo cuestiona debidamente, no está de más aclarar, tampoco se aprecia una prestación personal y continua, primero, porque de los contratos firmados se desprende que el actor contratista podía delegar el servicio a terceras personas, ya que la cláusula décima segunda del convenio suscrito el 21 de setiembre de 2007, indicaba: “… El Contratista manifiesta y garantiza que su personal posee las aptitudes, capacidad, conocimiento y demás requisitos para ejercer eficientemente el desempeño del Servicio que se le contrata, que además acepta los sistemas de fiscalización establecidos en el presente contrato para el control de calidad y rendimiento del mismo, acatar las disposiciones legales, obligaciones reglamentarias que conlleva incorporado el presente contrato…” (folios 42-43 del expediente judicial). De igual modo, en la cláusula sétima de los restantes contratos se estipuló que: “… EL CONTRATADO no podrá ceder, ni traspasar los derechos u obligaciones que le confiere el presente contrato, sin la autorización previa y por escrita de la MUNICIPALIDAD DE MATINA…” (folios 46, 49, 52, 54, 57, 60 y 63 del expediente judicial). Lo mismo debe indicarse sobre la prestación del servicio de manera continua, desde el mes setiembre de 2007 al mes de mayo de 2011, pues hubo varias interrupciones, desde los 5 meses, 1 mes y 24 días, 1 mes, 23 días, 11 días y hasta 5 días según las fechas de los convenios aportados como prueba. Entonces, con estos simples hechos y anotaciones, se descarta cualquier lesión del canon 18 del Código de Trabajo como alega.

VII.- Así las cosas, procederá declarar sin lugar el recurso, e imponer las costas generadas con su ejercicio a la parte recurrente conforme al precepto 150 inciso 3) del CPCA.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto, con las costas a cargo de la parte recurrente.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero JROSALES