Legal nature of Sutel’s Regulatory InstructionsNaturaleza jurídica de las Instrucciones Regulatorias de la Sutel

**Exp. 15-008183-1027-CA** **Res. 001263-F-S1-2021** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours eighteen minutes on the twenty-sixth of August two thousand twenty-one.

Ordinary proceeding, established in the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal by **ASOCIACIÓN CÁMARA DE INFOCOMUNICACIÓN Y TECNOLOGÍA**, represented by its President with powers of general attorney-in-fact without limit of sum Óscar Emilio Barahona León, businessman; against the **SUPERINTENDENCIA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES**, represented by Manuel Emilio Ruiz Gutiérrez, licentiate in computer sciences, and the **AUTORIDAD REGULADORA DE SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS**, represented by its general judicial attorney Viviana Lizano Ramírez. Claro CR Telecomunicaciones S.A. appeared before this Chamber, represented by its general judicial attorney Jenniffer Salazar Ramírez. Special judicial attorneys for the plaintiff Aldo Milano Sánchez and María Lourdes Echandi Gurdían participate. For Sutel, Óscar Eduardo González Camacho, Andrés Alonso Castro Segura, Freddy Artavia Castro, and Natalia Ramírez Alfaro. For Aresep, Jeremy Andrés Moya Bermúdez. The natural persons are of legal age and, with the exceptions noted, lawyers.

Judge Rojas Morales writes; and, **CONSIDERING** **I.** On September 9, 2015, the representative of the Asociación Cámara de Infocumunicación y Tecnología (hereinafter Infocom) filed an ordinary lawsuit against the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (hereinafter Sutel), with the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep) subsequently joined. The representative of Claro CR Telecomunicaciones S.A. appeared before this Chamber as an interested third party. In essence, the plaintiff stated that on September 24, 2014, the Sutel Board, through agreement 034-055-2014, approved and submitted for consultation resolution RCS-234-2014 called “Instrucciones Regulatorias para la Atención y Resolución Efectiva de Reclamaciones interpuestas ante los Operadores o Proveedores de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones” (hereinafter referred to solely as Instrucciones Regulatorias). Subsequently, in resolution RCS-298-2014 of December 3, 2014, Sutel issued the aforementioned Instrucciones Regulatorias. Certain providers expressed opposition, considering that said Superintendency lacked competence to issue an act of this kind, which generated resolution RSC-038-2015 published on March 27, 2015, in the Diario Oficial, where they partially accepted some of the challenged issues, maintained others, and furthermore, held the criterion of being competent to issue this type of provisions. The plaintiff argued that Sutel lacks competence to issue regulations and therefore resolution RCS-298-2014 containing the Instrucciones Regulatorias is absolutely null. Based on this relation of facts and as established in the preliminary hearing, in what is of interest, it principally requested: 1- that resolutions RCS-298-2014, RCS-234-2014, and RCS-038-2015 be declared null because both Aresep and Sutel lack competence to adopt provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature. 2- That the co-defendants be ordered to refrain in the future from adopting provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature. 3- Costs to be borne by the co-defendants. In the alternative, it petitioned: 1- the nullity of resolutions RCS-298-2014, RCS-234-2014, and RCS-038-2015 insofar as Sutel exceeded its powers to adopt provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature. 2- That the co-defendants, especially Sutel, be ordered that, should they adopt provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature in the future, they must adhere to the following limits: a) analogically apply the prior procedure set forth in Article 36 of the Ley de la Aresep; b) may regulate details and procedures that develop the Law, only when the latter has defined its basic aspects and scope and has not generically referred them to parallel regulations distinct from those it regulates; c) shall not, through such acts of general application, create sanctions (penalties, fines, fees, taxes, or similar charges) and other restrictions, nor regulatory procedures, as these are matters reserved to law; d) cannot, with these general acts, supplant the law; e) the provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature must limit their normative scope to operators in the telecommunications market by virtue of an administrative title, not to the user, who shall not be obligated, even potentially. 3- Costs to be borne by the co-defendants. Aresep answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: right and passive legal standing. Sutel also expressed opposition and alleged the defenses of lack of: right and current interest. The Tribunal, in resolution number 53-2017-VII at 14 hours 55 minutes on July 28, 2017, rejected the defenses raised. It granted the lawsuit, declared resolution RCS-298-2014 inconsistent with the legal system, and by connection also annulled acts RCS-234-2014 and RCS-038-2015. It ruled with no special award of costs. Disagreeing, Aresep and Sutel each filed a cassation appeal.

**Appeal by Aresep** **II.** It raises a single ground on substantive reasons, related to the rejection of its lack of passive legal standing. The Tribunal, it points out, did not take into account the underlying procedural-legal relationship, which is important to determine the degree of participation of the Regulating Authority in order to attribute any liability to it. Although the Tribunal's judgment did not impose payment of damages or costs on it, this does not prevent, it points out, the Chamber from establishing such liability in the event of a cassation appeal by the other parties and it being affected, which is why it appears before this venue. It argues that the judges' ruling regarding standing contravenes numeral 12.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA). It concludes by requesting that, if Aresep's participation in this matter is deemed necessary, its liability be declared only subsidiary.

**III.** The Tribunal considered that, as established by numeral 12 of the CPCA, the administrative bodies with instrumental legal personality must be considered co-defendants insofar as they are authors of the administrative conduct object of the process, jointly with the State or the entity to which they are attached. The purpose of this is a joint defense of the Public Administration's interests. Providing administrative bodies with instrumental personification does not convert them into full, independent procedural subjects, separated from the administrative entity on which they depend and of which they form a part.

**IV.** On standing. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the process is governed by formal or procedural prerequisites and material or substantive prerequisites. The former guarantee the validity of the procedure through jurisdiction, competence, and the capacity of the parties. The latter are linked to the merits of the claim. They are substantive. They refer to standing in its two modalities, the right and current interest. An estimatory judgment is unthinkable where one of the parties has lost standing or interest, as the decision would become unenforceable. For this reason, jurisprudence has leaned towards its ex officio analysis. Substantive prerequisites must be reviewed by the judges at all times in order to verify that a valid pronouncement on the matters debated in the process can be issued. Consult the resolution at 11 hours 48 minutes on July 24, 2019, corresponding to vote number 1585-F-S1-2019. Now, it is important to mention that even though this Chamber, in resolution number 188-F-S1-2016 at 10 hours 45 minutes on March 3, 2017, established that Sutel could act independently from Aresep when the claims in particular only referred to the liability of that Superintendency; the current composition of this Chamber, upon better consideration of the matter, deems it necessary to reconsider the issue under the following analysis. Article 12.2 of the CPCA expressly states: "The following shall be considered defendant parties: [...] 2) Administrative bodies with instrumental legal personality, insofar as they are the authors of the administrative conduct object of the process, jointly with the State or the entity to which they are attached." Meanwhile, the Ley General de Telecomunicaciones number 8642 (hereinafter LGT), in canon 6 section 27, defines Sutel as: "body of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos charged with regulating, supervising, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal order of telecommunications." For its part, ordinal 45 section c) of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos number 7593 (Ley Aresep) provides: "Bodies of the Regulating Authority: [...] c) Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (Sutel)." For its part, numeral 59 idem indicates, in what is of interest: "[...] Sutel is a body of maximum deconcentration attached to the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos; it shall have its own instrumental legal personality to administer the Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, carry out contractual activity, administer its resources and budget, as well as to sign the contracts and agreements it requires for the fulfillment of its functions. [...]" It is concluded from the foregoing that, even though the legislator endowed the Superintendency with maximum deconcentration, it kept it attached to Aresep. Likewise, the legislator decided that in cases such as this, in a judicial conflict, both the deconcentrated body and the entity to which it belongs must be defendant parties. This is intended so that the administered person can find, should their claim succeed, full redress as stipulated in Article 41 of the Political Constitution. The single State theory seeks to ensure the administered person does not suffer situations such as the body lacking budgetary content or even ceasing to exist. Based on the foregoing, the objection must be denied, since both public legal subjects must appear in the process by express provision of law.

**Appeal by Sutel** **Cassation on procedural grounds** **V.** Of this type, it raises the following three grounds. First: it alleges incongruence insofar as the claim for nullity of the challenged acts was subject to also declaring Sutel's incompetence to adopt provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature. Only the non-existence of a normative enabling provision was alleged, which, with the necessary specificity, could expressly attribute "the power (sic) a legislative guide for such proceeding."; thereby violating canon 119 of the CPCA, as well as ordinals 99 and 155 of the Código Procesal Civil (CPC).

**VI.** Incongruence may arise when a ruling omits pronouncement on a point submitted for debate (infra petita), grants more than requested (ultra petita), the decision does not correspond to what was petitioned (extra petita), or it contains contradictory provisions. For this figure to succeed, the described dissonance must occur in the operative part of the judgment. Based on the defect of incongruence, one cannot attempt to discuss the considerations the judge had in making the decision. Furthermore, Article 137 section 2) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes that procedural grounds can only be alleged by the party harmed by the non-observance of the procedural rule and requires having requested the rectification of the defect before said body, when possible. In the case under study, the plaintiff's principal claim refers to three specific points: 1- the nullity of the administrative acts, 2- ordering Sutel and Aresep to refrain from issuing future guidelines of a general nature, and 3- costs to be borne by the co-defendants. The operative part of the challenged judgment granted point one of the petition, without stating anything regarding the second point. The Tribunal limited itself to declaring the nullity of the acts issued by the Superintendency insofar as it considered them contrary to the legal system. For this Chamber, the alleged defect is not present, because even assuming a lack of pronouncement, this flaw in no way affects Sutel; on the contrary, it benefits it, as the Tribunal's decision was aimed at limiting its actions. As explained above, for the procedural defect to be admissible, it must cause harm to the party invoking it; in this case, the plaintiff sought the limitation of a public power. The cassation appellant would lack interest in what it seeks, as no power is being restricted; only the resolution requested by the plaintiff was annulled, which falls within the scope of its claims. Therefore, its claim must be denied.

**VII.** In the second objection, it alleges violation of the right to defense and due process insofar as the Tribunal did not annul the acts based on the arguments outlined by the plaintiff, but rather applied its "ex officio powers" established in numeral 182 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), without having given the parties a hearing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 147 of the CPCA. This has left it defenseless, by applying grounds, assessments, and rules that do not form part of the adversarial proceedings.

**VIII.** It must be noted that the manner in which this grievance is presented deviates from the cassation technique required by numeral 139 section 3) of the CPCA, insofar as the appellant is obliged to state its objections clearly and precisely, without this Chamber having to interpret what was intended. In this particular case, the cassation appellant limits itself to indicating that the Tribunal exceeded its considerations by applying criteria and norms that were not part of the adversarial proceedings; however, it does not indicate which specific grounds of the judgment it refers to, nor does it explain based on which norms the decision was reached by departing from what was discussed. In any case, because a state of defenselessness is invoked, the Chamber has made a detailed review of the judgment, and it must be indicated that the alleged flaws are not observed, as a discussion extraneous to the controverted and delimited matters in the process has not occurred. No normative application or thematic analysis extraneous to the matters controverted by the parties has been found. Consequently, the objection must be rejected.

**IX.** As a third objection, the cassation appellant alleges lack of reasoning in the judgment, insofar as for the Tribunal the main challenged act is of a regulatory nature, yet it never indicated why it considered it had this condition and not that of simple instructions. It points out the Tribunal does not cite any norm that provides a basis for its judgment; the reasoning is incomplete, there are no reasons to conclude it is a regulatory norm, and therefore it declares the nullity of the cited provisions without any basis. It added that there is no logic or coherence in the judges' reasoning.

**X.** Beginning from considering IV of the judgment, page 81, the Tribunal begins its analysis of the case submitted for debate, starting with a doctrinal study on the topic of "Regulation." Subsequently, the judges state that the regulation by Aresep and Sutel being challenged involves economic, financial, and legal parameters. Likewise, they affirm that the regulatory power of the co-defendants is not restricted to the simple issuance of tariff fixations, but rather implies the possibility of exercising a true activity of control and supervision of providers of public services and services of general interest. A criterion based on Articles 5, 6, 24, 25, 59, all of Law 7593. Next, considering V refers to the regulatory power of the Public Administration. Then, in considering VI, it studies the legal nature of Sutel's instruction being challenged, indicating that from the aforementioned norms it is concluded that Aresep was exclusively and excludively reserved the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria), and that Sutel lacks competence to issue any type of regulation. From this point on, it focuses on determining whether the challenged act is of a regulatory type as alleged by the plaintiff or an act of general scope of another type as indicated by the co-defendants. It brings up the reasons supporting the act; as a result, it affirmed that the reason for being of the resolution is to instruct operators and providers regarding the rules that already regulate the activity. Based on the definition provided by the Real Academia de la Lengua Española, it points out that to instruct means to make someone aware of the state of something, to inform them of it, or to communicate or give notices or rules of conduct. To finally conclude that the Instrucciones Regulatorias submitted for review, far from being a mere instruction due to their content and regulated matter, constitute a true regulation that must be annulled, as they are not limited to compiling, informing, or communicating the applicable rules of the protection regime, but on the contrary, impose duties and obligations on operators and providers regarding the form and content of the resolution of claims. In its criterion, it regulates procedural aspects regarding deadlines, form, content, and burden of proof. Moreover, it establishes requirements for the processing of claim files and the provision of information. For the judges, such administrative resolution is of a regulatory nature and cannot be considered as an instruction.

**XI.** The resolution is not confusing as alleged, nor does it refer to matters outside the debate. It sets forth criteria and arguments from which it concludes it is a regulation. As stated, there is no absence of legal basis, as it even transcribes the norms it considers applicable to the case. Consequently, the grievance must be denied insofar as the alleged lack of basis is not established.

**Cassation on substantive grounds** **XII.** Before summarizing the grievances raised, it is important to mention that the appellant, before entering into them, repeatedly asserts that it is beyond any discussion that Sutel does not have regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) and that this was reserved to Aresep. Having set forth the foregoing, it raises a single ground. It states that Sutel has the power of monitoring and control, being a supervisory body of the telecommunications sector. The foregoing is contemplated in numerals 59 and 60 sections d) and e) of the Ley Aresep. It is the exclusive competence of Sutel to issue communications (circulares), instructions (instrucciones), and directives (directrices) in telecommunications matters; however, the Tribunal makes a restrictive analysis of these competences. The challenged act ratifies, consolidates, and expands users' rights; this is a core competence assigned to Sutel by the legislator itself. This First Chamber itself (resolution 1247-2011) has enshrined the normative enabling for supervisory, regulatory, and control bodies; allowing the exercise of minor normative powers based on broad legal norms with clear own purposes. Thus, instructions are provided for minor entities and their bodies as one of their natural powers; this is in accordance with the provisions of ordinals 12.2, 99, 102.1, 103, 105, 107, 124, 125, and 216 all of the LGAP. Such authorization is also given by special norm, canons 59 and 60 of the Ley Aresep, Articles 2 sections a), b) and d), 3 subsection c), 41, 45, and 67 section a) subparagraph 7) all of the LGT. It points out that the infra-regulatory power (potestad infra-reglamentaria) can be exercised by those obliged to ensure real access to services for users. What the Tribunal does in its resolution is sanction the Superintendency for fulfilling the mandates entrusted to it by law. The power to issue instructions is so clear that even the application of the sanctioning regime is permitted in case of non-compliance. The appellant makes a conceptualization regarding: regulation (reglamento), instructions (instrucciones), communication (circular), orders (órdenes), and directives (directrices). As relevant to this case, regarding the instructions, it stated that they are legal norms of regulation, established to teach and instruct. They are an instructive through which it is determined how and when to carry out a public or private conduct and how to achieve its purpose. They can create procedural requirements, but not substantive ones, nor burdens, nor injuries to subjective public rights. They are subject to the regulation and form part of the written sources of the legal order, as stipulated in Article 6 section f) of the LGAP. It adds some characteristics that instructions share with regulations and may cause confusion: they are general, external, normative, require publication, are challengeable, are subject to prior superior norms, and, of course, are subject to legal reserve with respect to the respect for subjective rights. The act discussed in this case is not a regulation; it involves agglutinating into a single instrument a set of pre-existing norms, being an act that reproduces what is already provided in the law. In addition to the foregoing, the appellant adds, it must be understood that the instructions issued by Sutel have a degree of special supremacy insofar as it concerns a typical special subjection (sujeción especial), where the rigid and normal rules of formal legality become impossible, which allows the supervisor to dictate rules and minor norms that direct the behavior of the administered subject. It must be understood, according to precept 12.2 of the LGAP, that Sutel has the power to issue norms of rank inferior to regulations, such as the instruction, especially when it benefits the rights or interests of private parties, in this case within telecommunications, as it concerns an essential modern public service. All the foregoing in accordance with ordinals 8, 11, 33, 39, 41, 49, 140, and 153 of the Constitution. The cassation appellant affirms that the origin of the challenged instructions is due to two factors: the first is related to the increase in claims filed with Sutel by users against operators and providers. The second, as it warned that such discontent arises from a lack of timely resolution action by operators and providers, thereby violating users' rights. This obliged the Superintendency to take regulatory actions, valuing elements of opportunity, convenience, necessity, and utility, under the protection of numeral 45 subsection 22) of the LGT and ordinal 10 of the Reglamento sobre el Régimen de Protección al Usuario Final de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones (hereinafter RPUF). Regarding the content of resolution RCS-298-2014, it states that it regulates the obligation of operators and providers of telecommunications services to attend to and resolve claims filed by end users, which is Sutel's duty in accordance with compliance with the legal order. These are administrative provisions intended to order, apply, and monitor the special regime of protection for the end user. It compiles, integrates, and interprets provisions already contained in higher-level normative instruments, such as laws and regulations. It was issued in accordance with numerals 2, 3 sections c), d) and f), 45 subsections 1), 4), 5), 13) and 14), 47, and 48, all of the LGT. It is a mechanism to guarantee the adequate provision of service to users and ensure compliance with the obligations of operators and providers. Thus, each of the provisions contained in the challenged instruction is completely valid, because, as stated, these are guidelines (lineamientos) that are backed by a superior norm, and this act merely reproduces them. The appellant presents a comparative table indicating the superior legal basis for the various points addressed in resolution RCS-298-2014, to conclude that Sutel did not create a regulation, that it has competence to issue instructions, and that it has respected the reservation of law; therefore, it considers that the procedural norms nor the limits of discretion have been violated. Finally, it argues that, in addition to all the aforementioned numerals, Articles 6, 7, and 11 of the Political Constitution have been violated, as well as Numeral 14, 129, 132, 166, 182 of the LGAP, Anexo 13 of Chapter 13 of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, and ordinal 73 of the Ley Aresep.

**XIII.** Article 124 of the LGAP provides that instructions are administrative acts of a general nature. Through instructions, a public administration issues guidelines aimed at instructing the subjects to whom they are addressed on aspects already contained in the legal order and which it considers relevant to organize and inform about. In the case of Sutel, Article 59 of the Ley Aresep provides that it is responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal order of telecommunications. Additionally, numeral 60 idem, in what is of interest, establishes as part of its fundamental obligations: “[…] d) Guarantee and protect the rights of telecommunications users. e) Ensure compliance with the duties and rights of network operators and telecommunications service providers. […] k) Hear and sanction administrative infractions incurred by network operators and telecommunications service providers; as well as establish the civil liability of their officials.” Within the limits of these norms, the Chamber will conduct the corresponding analysis of the provisions of the challenged resolution RSC-298-2014. Said Instrucciones Regulatorias are visible starting from page 109 of the administrative file, and without making extensive transcriptions of its content, a brief reference will be made to each of the points it touches upon. Point A refers to the Obligations for the attention (atención) and resolution (resolución) of claims (reclamaciones) by Telecommunications Service Operators and Providers. There, the Superintendency regulates various aspects: 1- Duty of the operator or provider to implement mechanisms for public information so the user knows their right to file claims. 2- Attend to and receive claims free of charge, providing a consecutive service code (código de atención) for this purpose. 3- Make available to the end user physical or electronic documents that expedite the filing of claims. It regulates a minimum amount of information they must contain (page 117 administrative file). 4- Provide, within the legal term, an effective and adequate resolution. This response must contain the following: a) if the response to the complaint is positive, the proposed solution; b) if negative, indicate the technical, administrative, and legal reasons; c) in both cases, the operator or provider must support within its claims management system: the reference code, the service file, the filing date, the date of communication of the resolution, and the evidence that supported its response. 5- The maximum term to provide a response is 10 calendar days. The omission of a response is classified as a serious fault. Next, point B of the act provides, Regarding claims processed through the intervention of Sutel. In this section, it indicates: 1- To elevate the claim to Sutel, the administrative procedures established in the LGAP shall apply. 2- The Operator or Provider must send the complete file to Sutel within a maximum term of three business days. It indicates the information the file must contain (page 119 of the administrative file). 3- The burden of proof falls on the Provider or Operator. 4- Based on the principle “Benefit of the User” (Principio “Beneficio del Usuario”), Operators or Providers must provide the information established in section A of that administrative act, with the aim of processing, investigating, and resolving the claims filed with Sutel. 5- The Superintendency may request any additional information. 6- It warns of Sutel's power to issue precautionary measures. 7- It allows the parties to resort to any alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

Finally, section C, entitled: On the general reports of claims filed against telecommunications service operators or providers; reports on compliance with the following duties related to general reports. 1- Issue general reports on a semi-annual basis regarding claims. 2- The first semester is understood to be from July to December and the second from January to June. 3- Contain the information requested by Sutel (folio 120 of the administrative file). 4- Report on the general provisions adopted. 5- Emphasizes that failures to comply with Sutel's instructions are legally established as very serious. 6- The Superintendency will make these general claims reports available to users.

XIV.After a detailed analysis of the challenged administrative act, this Chamber disagrees with the criterion issued by the Tribunal, insofar as it is evident that the provisions established therein bear the character of instructions. Article 46, paragraph 5 of the Constitution (Carta Magna) provides: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. [...]". The underlining does not correspond to the original. Thus, along this line of thought, it must be noted that the ordinances contained in the challenged act are procedures that protect the user in consideration of this constitutional right that shelters them. Furthermore, each of the guidelines set forth in said administrative resolution has normative support in different articles, insofar as norms of legal and regulatory rank already exist that contemplate the situation. Thus, articles 3, 8, 47, 48, 66, and 67 of the LGT, and precepts 4, 10, 11, and 13 of the RPUF; in all of them, each of the rules ordered by Sutel will be found, including matters concerning deadlines, precautionary measures, requests for additional information, procedures, and sanctions. The provisions issued by Sutel in this resolution are aimed at ensuring that the user not only knows the rights they have before Telecommunications Operators and Providers, but also that they can easily, expeditiously, and effectively file the claims they deem necessary. Thereby, the fundamental rights of the consumer and user are being safeguarded, as well as, within the framework of free competition, the possibility of choosing or changing operators. The nullity decreed by the Tribunal has no useful effect, insofar as the content of RCS-298-2014 is already stipulated and regulated in other normative provisions, as explained. The conduct of the judges disregards the aforementioned constitutional article 46, article 124 of the LGAP, and the previously referenced norms of the LGT, RPUF, and the Aresep Law (Ley Aresep). Thus, the appellant is correct and their objection must be upheld.

XV.Given the manner in which this matter is being resolved, it is necessary, even ex officio, to refer to the issue of costs. The Tribunal resolved without special condemnation in costs, insofar as it considered that, due to the subject matter and object of the proceeding, there existed sufficient reason to litigate. However, this Chamber dissents from such an assessment; because, as explained, the administrative act issued by Sutel bears the character of an instruction insofar as it is not a new norm (normativa exnovo) issued by the Superintendency, but rather, on the contrary, what it did was a normative condensation that regulates the subject of claims in protection of the user and in response to recurrent complaints about the inadequate channeling of their claims. Faced with this scenario, it is evident that Infocom knew that the guidelines established in the act it challenged had normative and regulatory backing, including of constitutional rank. Hence, no sufficient reason to litigate is evident and, therefore, the exoneration is improper. By virtue of this, both costs of the proceeding must be imposed on the losing plaintiff.

XVI.In accordance with the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority (Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos) shall be declared without merit, and the costs of this appeal shall be borne by it. The cassation appeal filed by the Superintendency of Telecommunications (Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones) shall be partially granted, accepting only the substantive ground. The Tribunal's judgment shall be vacated (casada), and the ruling on the lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) shall remain unaltered. Consequently, ruling on the merits, the complaint filed by the Infocommunication and Technology Chamber Association (Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología) against the Superintendency of Telecommunications and the Public Services Regulatory Authority is hereby declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs of the proceeding shall be imposed on the losing party.

POR TANTO

The cassation appeal filed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority is declared without merit. The costs of this appeal are borne by it. The cassation appeal filed by the Superintendency of Telecommunications is partially granted, accepting only the substantive ground. The Tribunal's judgment is vacated, and the ruling on the lack of passive standing remains unaltered. Consequently, ruling on the merits, the complaint filed by the Infocommunication and Technology Chamber Association against the Superintendency of Telecommunications and the Public Services Regulatory Authority is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs of the proceeding shall be imposed on the losing party.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jorge Alberto López González Jessica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez A favorable judgment where one of the parties has lost standing or interest is unthinkable, given that the decision would become unenforceable. For this reason, case law has leaned toward its sua sponte analysis. The substantive prerequisites must be reviewed by the judges at all times in order to verify that a valid pronouncement can be issued on what was debated in the proceeding. See the resolution issued at 11:48 a.m. on July 24, 2019, corresponding to vote number 1585-F-S1-2019. Now, it is important to mention that even though this Chamber, in resolution number 188-F-S1-2016 issued at 10:45 a.m. on March 3, 2017, established that Sutel could act independently of Aresep when the claims specifically referred only to the responsibility of that Superintendency, the current composition of this Chamber, upon a better weighing of the matter, considers it necessary to reconsider the issue under the following analysis. Article 12.2 of the CPCA expressly states: "The following shall be considered the defendant party: […] 2) Administrative bodies with instrumental legal personality, insofar as they are the authors of the administrative conduct that is the subject of the proceeding, jointly with the State or the entity to which they are attached." For its part, the General Telecommunications Law number 8642 (hereinafter LGT), in canon 6 subsection 27, defines Sutel as: "a body of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services responsible for regulating, supervising, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications." In turn, ordinal 45 subsection c) of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services number 7593 (Ley Aresep) provides: "Bodies of the Regulatory Authority: […] c) Superintendency of Telecommunications (Sutel)." For its part, numeral 59 of the same law indicates, in what is of interest: "[…] Sutel is a body of maximum deconcentration attached to the Regulatory Authority of Public Services; it shall have its own instrumental legal personality to administer the National Telecommunications Fund, carry out contractual activity, administer its resources and its budget, as well as to sign the contracts and agreements it requires for the fulfillment of its functions. […]" From the foregoing, it is concluded that, even though the legislator endowed the Superintendency with maximum deconcentration, it kept it attached to Aresep. Likewise, the legislator decided that in cases such as these, before a judicial conflict, both the deconcentrated body and the entity to which it belongs must be defendant parties; this is intended so that the administered party can find, should its claim succeed, full redress as stipulated in Article 41 of the Political Constitution. The theory of the single State seeks to prevent the administered party from suffering situations such as the body lacking budgetary content or even ceasing to exist. Therefore, the objection must be denied since both public legal subjects must appear in the proceeding by express provision of law.

**Appeal by Sutel** *Cassation on procedural grounds* **V.** Of this type, it raises the following **three** grounds. **First**: it alleges inconsistency insofar as the claim for nullity of the challenged acts was contingent upon also declaring Sutel's lack of competence to adopt provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature. It was only alleged that there was no normative authorization that, with the necessary specificity, could expressly attribute "the power (sic) a legislative guide for such proceeding."; violating canon 119 of the CPCA, as well as ordinals 99 and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

**VI.** Inconsistency may occur when a ruling is omitted on any point submitted to debate (infra petita), more is granted than requested (ultra petita), what is decided does not correspond to what was petitioned (extra petita), or it contains contradictory provisions. For this defect to proceed, the dissonance explained must occur in the operative part of the judgment. Based on the defect of inconsistency, one cannot seek to discuss the considerations the judge may have had to make their decision. Furthermore, Article 137 subsection 2) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code establishes that procedural grounds for cassation can only be alleged by the party who has been harmed by the non-observance of the procedural rule and requires having requested before said body the rectification of the defect, when possible. In the case at hand, the plaintiff's main claim refers to three specific points: 1- the nullity of the administrative acts, 2- Sutel and Aresep be ordered to refrain from issuing future general guidelines, and 3- costs to be borne by the co-defendants. The operative part of the challenged judgment granted what concerned point one of the petition, without stating anything regarding the second aspect. The Court limited itself to declaring the nullity of the acts issued by the Superintendency as it considered them contrary to the legal system. For this Chamber, the alleged defect is not present, because even starting from a lack of pronouncement, this flaw in no way affects Sutel; on the contrary, it favors it because what the Court ordered was aimed at limiting its actions. As explained above, for the procedural defect to be admissible, it is necessary that it causes harm to the party invoking it; in the case at hand, the plaintiff sought the limitation of a public power. The appellant would lack interest, insofar as no power is being restricted; only the resolution requested by the plaintiff was annulled, which falls within the framework of its claims. Thus, its objection must be denied.

**VII.** In the **second** objection, it alleges violation of the right of defense and due process insofar as the Court did not annul the acts based on the arguments put forth by the plaintiff, but rather applied its "sua sponte powers" established in numeral 182 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), without having given the parties a hearing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 147 of the CPCA. This has left it in a state of defenselessness, applying grounds, assessments, and regulations that are not part of the adversarial process.

**VIII.** It must be noted that the manner in which this grievance is set forth deviates from the cassation technique required by numeral 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA, insofar as it is the appellant's obligation to clearly and precisely state its disagreements, without this Chamber having to interpret what it meant to point out. In this particular case, the appellant merely indicates that the Court exceeded its considerations by applying criteria and rules that were not part of the adversarial process; however, it does not indicate which grounds of the judgment it refers to, nor does it explain on what basis the ruling resolved by departing from what was discussed. In any case, as a state of defenselessness is invoked, the Chamber has made a detailed review of the judgment, and it must be stated that the alleged flaws are not evident, since there has been no discussion outside of what was contested and delimited in the proceeding. No normative application or thematic analysis outside what was contested by the parties has been found. Therefore, the objection must be rejected.

**IX.** As a **third** objection, the appellant alleges lack of reasoning of the judgment, insofar as for the Court the main challenged act has a regulatory nature, yet it never indicated why it considered it had that condition and not that of simple instructions. It points out that the Court does not cite any rule that provides a basis for its judgment; the reasoning is incomplete, there are no reasons to conclude that it is a regulatory norm and, therefore, it declares the nullity of the cited provisions without any basis. It added that there is no logic or coherence in the judges' reasoning.

**X.** Starting from recital IV of the judgment, folio 81, the Court begins the analysis of the case submitted to debate, starting with a doctrinal study on the topic of "Regulation." Subsequently, the judges state that the regulation by Aresep and Sutel being challenged involves economic, financial, and legal parameters. Likewise, they affirm that the regulatory power of the co-defendants is not restricted to the simple issuance of tariff fixings, but implies the possibility of exercising a true activity of control and supervision over providers of public services and services of general interest. A criterion it bases on articles 5, 6, 24, 25, 59 all of Law 7593. Next, recital V refers to the regulatory power of the Public Administration. Then in recital VI, it conducts a study on the legal nature of Sutel's instruction being contested, where it indicates that from the aforementioned rules it is concluded that Aresep was reserved exclusively and preclusively the regulatory power, and that Sutel lacks the competence to issue any type of regulation. From this point on, it focuses on elucidating whether the challenged act is of a regulatory type as the plaintiff alleges or a general-scope act of another type as the co-defendants indicate. It brings up the reasons supporting the act; as a result, it affirmed that the reason for the resolution is to instruct the operators and providers about the regulations that already govern the activity. Based on the definition by the Real Academia de la Lengua Española, it points out that to instruct means to let someone know the state of something, to inform them about it, or to communicate or give warnings or rules of conduct. To finally conclude that the Regulatory Instructions under examination, far from being a mere instruction due to their content and regulated matter, constitute a true regulation that must be annulled, as they are not limited to compiling, informing, or communicating the applicable regulations of the protection regime, but on the contrary, impose duties and obligations on operators and providers regarding the form and content of the resolution of claims. In its view, it regulates procedural aspects regarding time limits, form, content, and burden of proof. Furthermore, it establishes requirements for the processing of claim files and the provision of information. For the judges, such an administrative resolution has a regulatory nature and cannot be considered an instruction.

**XI.** The resolution is not confusing as alleged, nor does it refer to matters outside the debate. It sets forth criteria and arguments from which it concludes that it is a regulation. As stated, there is no absence of legal basis, insofar as it even transcribes the rules it considers applicable to the case. Therefore, the grievance must be denied as the alleged lack of basis is not established.

*Cassation on substantive grounds* **XII.** Before summarizing the grievances raised, it is important to mention that the appellant, before addressing them, repeatedly asserts that it is beyond discussion that Sutel does not have regulatory power and that this was reserved for Aresep. Having stated the above, it raises a **single** ground. It states that Sutel has the power of surveillance and control, as it is a supervisory body of the telecommunications sector. The foregoing is contemplated in numerals 59 and 60 subsections d) and e) of the Ley Aresep. It is Sutel's exclusive competence to issue circulars, instructions, and directives in the field of telecommunications; however, the Court makes a restrictive analysis of these competencies. The challenged act does nothing more than ratify, consolidate, and expand the rights of users; this is a core competence assigned to Sutel by the legislator itself. The First Chamber itself (resolution 1247-2011) has established the normative authorization for oversight, regulatory, and control bodies; allowing the exercise of lesser normative powers based on broad legal norms with clear specific purposes. Thus, instructions are provided for lesser entities and their bodies as one of their natural powers; this in accordance with ordinals 12.2, 99, 102.1, 103, 105, 107, 124, 125, and 216 all of the LGAP. Such authorization is also given by special law, canons 59 and 60 of the Ley Aresep, articles 2 subsections a), b) and d), 3 section c), 41, 45 and 67 subsection a) item 7) all of the LGT. It points out that the infra-regulatory power can be exercised by the entity that has the obligation to ensure real access to services by the user. What the Court does in its resolution is sanction the Superintendency for fulfilling the mandates entrusted to it by law. The power to issue instructions is so clear that it is even permitted to apply the sanctioning regime in case of non-compliance. The appellant provides a conceptualization of: regulation, instructions, circular, orders, and directives. Regarding what is relevant to the case, it stated that instructions are legal norms of regulation, established to teach and instruct. It is an instructive document through which it is determined how and when to carry out public or private conduct and how to achieve its purpose. They can create procedural requirements, but not substantive ones, nor burdens, nor violations of subjective public rights. They are subject to the regulation and form part of the written sources of the legal system, as stipulated in Article 6 subsection f) of the LGAP. It adds that some characteristics that instructions share with the regulation and can cause confusion are that they are: general, external, normative, require publication, are challengeable, subject to prior superior norms, and, of course, subject to legislative reserve in relation to respect for subjective rights. The act under discussion in this case is not a regulation; it involves compiling into a single instrument a set of pre-existing norms, being an act that reproduces what is already provided for in the law. In addition to the above, the appellant adds, it must be understood that the instructions issued by Sutel have a degree of special supremacy insofar as it is a typical special subjection, where the rigid and normal rules of formal legality become impossible, which allows the supervisor to issue rules and minor norms that guide the behavior of the administered subject. It must be understood, according to precept 12.2 of the LGAP, that Sutel has the power to issue norms of a rank lower than the regulation, such as the instruction, especially when it benefits the rights or interests of individuals, in this case within telecommunications, as it is an essential modern public service. All of the foregoing in accordance with ordinals 8, 11, 33, 39, 41, 49, 140, and 153 of the Magna Carta. The appellant affirms that the origin of the challenged instructions stems from two factors, the first related to the increase in claims filed before Sutel by users against operators and providers. The second, insofar as it noted that these discontents derive from a lack of timely resolution action on the part of operators and providers, thus violating the rights of users. This forced the Superintendency to take regulatory actions by evaluating elements of opportunity, convenience, necessity, and utility, under the protection of numeral 45 section 22) of the LGT and ordinal 10 of the Regulation on the Regime of Protection for the End User of Telecommunications Services (hereinafter RPUF). Regarding the content of resolution RCS-298-2014, it states that it regulates the obligation of telecommunications operators and service providers to attend to and resolve claims filed by end users, which is Sutel's duty in accordance with compliance with the legal system. These are administrative provisions intended to order, apply, and monitor the special regime for the protection of the end user. It compiles, integrates, and interprets the provisions already contained in higher-level normative instruments, such as laws and regulations. It was issued in accordance with numerals 2, 3 subsections c), d) and f), 45 sections 1), 4), 5), 13) and 14), 47 and 48 all of the LGT. It is a mechanism to guarantee the adequate provision of service to users and ensure compliance with the obligations of operators and providers. Thus, each of the provisions set forth in the challenged instruction is completely valid, since as stated, they are guidelines that have support in a superior norm and this act merely reproduces them. The appellant provides a comparative chart indicating the superior legal basis for the various points addressed in resolution RCS-298-2014, to conclude that Sutel did not create a regulation, and that it has the competence to issue instructions and has respected the legislative reserve; therefore, it believes that no procedural rules or the limits of discretion have been violated. Finally, it argues that in addition to all the numerals already cited, articles 6, 7, and 11 of the Political Constitution, numeral 14, 129, 132, 166, 182 of the LGAP, Annex 13 of Chapter 13 of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, and ordinal 73 of the Ley Aresep have been violated.

**XIII.** Article 124 of the LGAP provides that instructions are administrative acts of a general nature. Through instructions, a public administration issues guidelines aimed at instructing the subjects to whom they are directed on aspects already contained in the legal system that it deems relevant to organize and inform about. In the case of Sutel, Article 59 of the Ley Aresep provides that it is responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications. Furthermore, numeral 60 of the same law, in what is of interest, establishes as part of its fundamental obligations: "[…] d) Guarantee and protect the rights of telecommunications users. e) Ensure compliance with the duties and rights of network operators and telecommunications service providers. […] k) Hear and sanction administrative infractions incurred by network operators and telecommunications service providers; as well as establish the civil liability of their officials." Within the limits of this norm, the Chamber shall conduct the corresponding analysis of what is provided in challenged resolution RSC-298-2014. Said Regulatory Instructions are visible starting from folio 109 of the administrative file and, without making extensive transcriptions of their content, a brief reference will be made to each of the points it addresses. Point **A** refers to the *Obligations for the attention and resolution of claims by Telecommunications Operators and Service Providers*. There, the Superintendency regulates various aspects: 1- Duty of the operator or provider to implement mechanisms for informing the public, so that the user knows their right to file claims. 2- Attending to and receiving their claims free of charge, providing a consecutive service code for this. 3- Making physical or electronic documents available to the end user to expedite the filing of claims. It regulates a minimum amount of information they must contain (folio 117 administrative file). 4- Provide, within the legal timeframe, an effective and adequate resolution. A response that must contain the following: a) if the response to the complaint is positive, the proposed solution; b) if negative, indicate the technical, administrative, and legal reasons; c) in both cases, the operator or provider must support within its claims management system: the reference code, the service file, the filing date, the date of communication of the resolution, the proof and the evidence that supported its response. 5- The maximum time limit to provide a response is 10 business days. Failure to respond is classified as a serious fault. Next, point **B** of the act provides, *Regarding claims processed through the intervention of Sutel*. In this section, it states: 1- To elevate the claim to Sutel, the administrative procedures established in the LGAP shall apply. 2- The Operator or Provider must send Sutel the complete file within a maximum period of three business days. It indicates the information the file must contain (folio 119 of the administrative file). 3- The burden of proof rests on the Provider or Operator. 4- Based on the principle of "Benefit of the User," Operators or Providers must provide the information established in section A of that administrative act, in order to process, investigate, and resolve claims filed before Sutel. 5- The Superintendency may request any additional information. 6- It warns of Sutel's power to issue precautionary measures. 7- It allows the parties to resort to any alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Finally, section **C** called: *Regarding the general reports of claims filed before operators or providers of telecommunication services*; it reports on compliance with the following duties related to general reports. 1- Issue general reports on a semi-annual basis regarding claims. 2- The first semester is understood as July to December and the second as January to June. 3- Contain the information requested by Sutel (folio 120 of the administrative file). 4- Report on the general provisions adopted. 5- Emphasizes that non-compliance with Sutel's instructions are legally established as very serious. 6- The Superintendency shall make these general reports of claims available to users.

**XIV.** After a detailed analysis of the challenged administrative act, this Chamber disagrees with the criterion issued by the Court, insofar as it is evident that the provisions established therein have the character of instructions.

Article 46, paragraph 5 of the Magna Carta provides: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment." [...] The underlining is not in the original. Thus, along this line of thought, it must be noted that the ordinances contained in the challenged act are procedures that protect the user in observance of this constitutional right that shelters them. Furthermore, each of the guidelines set forth in said administrative resolution has normative support in different articles, insofar as legal and regulatory provisions already exist that contemplate the scenario. Thus, numerals 3, 8, 47, 48, 66, and 67 of the LGT, and precepts 4, 10, 11, and 13 of the RPUF; all of the rules ordered by Sutel can be found in them, including those concerning deadlines, precautionary measures (medidas cautelares), requests for additional information, procedures, and sanctions. The provisions issued by Sutel in this resolution are aimed at ensuring the user not only knows their rights vis-à-vis Telecommunications Operators and Providers, but also can file the claims they deem necessary in an easy, expeditious, and effective manner. This safeguards the fundamental rights of the consumer and user, and, within the framework of free competition, the possibility of choosing or changing operators. The annulment decreed by the lower court (Tribunal) has no useful effect, insofar as the content of RCS-298-2014 is already stipulated and regulated in other normative provisions, as explained. The judges' action disregards the aforementioned constitutional principle 46, article 124 of the LGAP, and the previously referenced provisions of the LGT, RPUF, and the Aresep Law. As such, the appellant is correct, and its objection must be sustained.

**XV.** Given the manner in which this matter is being resolved, it is necessary, even on the court's own motion, to address the issue of costs. The lower court resolved without a special award of costs, insofar as it considered, due to the subject matter and object of the process, that there was sufficient reason to litigate. However, this Chamber disagrees with such an assessment; because, as explained, the administrative act issued by Sutel bears the character of an instruction (instrucción) insofar as it is not a new normative creation issued by the Superintendency, but rather, on the contrary, what it did was a normative condensation that regulates the matter of claims for user protection in the face of recurring complaints about the inadequate channeling of their claims. In this scenario, it is evident that Infocom knew that the guidelines established in the act it challenged had normative, regulatory, and even constitutional support. Hence, no sufficient reason to litigate is evident, and, therefore, the exoneration is improper. By virtue of this, both costs of the process must be imposed on the losing plaintiff.

**XVI.** In accordance with the foregoing, the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos will be declared without merit; the costs of this appeal shall be borne by it. The cassation appeal filed by the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones will be partially granted, accepting only the substantive ground. The lower court's judgment will be cassated, and the ruling on the lack of passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva) shall remain unaltered. Consequently, ruling on the merits, the claim filed by the Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología against the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones and the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs of the process are imposed on the losing party.

**POR TANTO** The cassation appeal filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos is declared without merit. The costs of this appeal shall be borne by it. The cassation appeal filed by the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones is partially granted, accepting only the substantive ground. The lower court's judgment is cassated, with the ruling on the lack of passive legal standing remaining unaltered. Consequently, ruling on the merits, the claim filed by the Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología against the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones and the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs of the process are imposed on the losing party.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** **Jorge Alberto López González** **Jessica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez** For the procedural defect to be admissible, it is necessary that it causes harm to the party invoking it (article 137.2 Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) (voto 1263-F-2021).

Grounds of a procedural nature may only be alleged by the party whom the non-observance of the procedural rule has harmed, and it requires having sought before that body the rectification of the defect, when possible (article 137.2 Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) (voto 1263-F-2021).

The manner in which the grievance is set forth departs from the cassation technique required by numeral 139.3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, insofar as it is the obligation of the appellant to clearly and precisely state their objections, without this Chamber having to engage in interpretations of what was intended to be indicated. The cassation appellant merely indicates that the Tribunal exceeded its considerations, applying criteria and rules that were not part of the adversarial process. However, it does not indicate which foundations of the judgment it refers to, nor does it explain on the basis of which regulations the decision was made departing from what was discussed (voto 1263-F-2021).

The decision is not confusing as alleged, nor does it refer to matters outside the debate. It sets forth criteria and arguments from which it concludes that it is a regulation. There is no absence of legal foundation, insofar as it even transcribes the rules it considers applicable to the case. Thus, the alleged lack of foundation is not established (voto 1263-F-2021).

Instructions are administrative acts of a general nature (rule 124 Ley General de la Administración Pública). Through them, a Public Administration issues guidelines intended to instruct the subjects to whom they are directed, on aspects already contained in the legal system that it considers relevant to organize and inform about. This Chamber finds that the provisions established in the "Instrucciones Regulatorias para la Atención y Resolución Efectiva de Reclamaciones interpuestas ante los Operadores o Proveedores de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones" have the character of instructions. The ordinances contained in the challenged act are procedures that protect the user in accordance with the constitutional right of rule 46, fifth paragraph, which shelters them. Furthermore, each of the guidelines set forth in said administrative resolution has regulatory support in different articles, insofar as there already exist legal and regulatory norms that contemplate the situation (numerals 3, 8, 47, 48, 66 and 67 Ley 8642; 4, 10, 11 and 13 Reglamento sobre el Régimen de Protección al Usuario Final de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones).

Therefore, the nullity decreed by the Tribunal has no useful effect, insofar as the content of the instructions is already stipulated and regulated in other normative provisions (Voto 1263-F-2021).\r\n" }, "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [] } ], "contenidosInteresOrden": "4", "despacho": "Sala Primera de la Corte", "despachoOrden": "3", "enteSistematizador": "SALA PRIMERA", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esProtegida": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "1", "esVotoSalvado": "0", "expediente": "150081831027CA", "fecha": "2021-08-26", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "hora": "09:18", "id": "sen-1-0004-1053538", "numeroDocumento": "01263", "redactor": "Iris Rocío Rojas Morales", "sentenciasRelacionadas": "sen-1-0004-1072813", "sourceName": "Documentos", "subNumeroDocumento": "0", "tipoDocumento": "SNT", "tipoInformacion": "Resolución Judicial", "tipoResolucion": "De Fondo", "resultado": "Con 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GnfgwAnpe/F2/jls2B1p3LgckO744y9JdaiccESXeL2BcVfhpZqaO7P6bbi4p2eYNOmVkC1fiJ0vN5aLdNQcJ+BLX/pSCn+YmMMLLQYj3jGkFaknXZwHylMUksinyckiKSUdZ8BoA4JKgTeE1h4hh3ThwqaVxpKcS0nXMSPdG40M9psEV+4e5UqlCAfLRToQThBXE9cS7TcSUUo8dpk0JvE13iNCOa8YxaQzVDZ69Jg08M5REQ4R2lihWR9tAKWkOyIjXTn1uqKx3KQzynDvvVNil112TYPkxl5ramoKe5uOYtJtttnmcfDBf0hhGPE52R+lRF4ajJRMmHBn1hBZS3xI8KEhHVChY8fenohnWQljpdKH8mGppqCYdDxa46mSN2WPcCaWFQjXseNJ9YbZ2jNKSXfiUtTrikJFSAeCrHfddXeKtwmBcCyoXQHbpS3bSm1Sy4auVBbi/vznP095dcX5cMsC4Vo244dZ0nXp2CVi2RREi6BipAO2G+nWrVu3NNLAWzXWaXzTcBISifQbEVCQgncql82kHaMRKmvLLbeNESNGNcmGy+N/wLFZWqIoMAnyPLni72C7sREI2chUfekx+bP6vdzfDriHBIVKz3ArRj3SdSk/PruiUVHSgUoXKuGxCpdQcfvt9+vkuSrGWq2WrshvI9F4pvaRcCqLIzFt2tKH1MQFBYuNzRrCso00YLTEMJiGzoEsYoW33TYuDZWNHj06jbVSwQjLyTGOqzOUEl74xvUcL8xTPB7LvOD0eA4JA9OnT0+/g2N46CYyW7fPDDQpXsur9g05eo7icvTRJ8Xmm+9UR7o8JFVaDBWuSFScdMUgdVT49OkzEikMZ5lRnxfZI6SfmffIk49SFAeHGwJp4hz245ZbbpmG1VSmeyK9/DqZx8WLZGsoIZszz+yUvGG5eDxuhJHuxGH5xS9+Eb/61a8SKXO4l/FfZBHkFh4aPXpsHek4ThwogXKdJw+S22/Ijulg/ofAtkwY0yBlOS8rXnlmekwZclwq13b+Sey/3cofqPQ6fce667z4ZG3GTkuiWUlXCiqGJMoL1ZijXJyuMUgtJ5U0JuJZqCcfhnMtY7oSS4sXy9bg7M0999wzDc/JVnGv2oySron8PnnNxpFzUpGOpLGgrFEYw3ETJ96d9osluo98PSbFgQcemKSmdxXI9t8XMpGZHY5HSA6SVQ2aCgkOZrAdvP/usfP3Vq5oOWi/ndO1vXtLoUVJ1xiWhXT+QYeNqKGdJ12JbaixSRZkRBz/WZGTbu7cRzPb8vCkwtma1D/SI4nRDlKOvUV6Imw+KUdyAskku4VTIm2Ks5SrbdukNnUrRR9BgXpm27q2XL0ciMh+bSrp3JPNm6vM5io6YUuhTZKORCPpfObTFqWeI52sYaqQrXjEEUck0klM6Nfv+iTFxP2QNF8FSQ6eLGM2INWMdDJmeNzIzRinvo37Ija7jMRDSPckPR03ZszYFOohIUk50okDxTnKSeccqVauJRT05ptvZe85rV52Tg4ZWZMnP5b+5oDKVzy7d1O8d76dmwWK7/l2Q9+Li3ds6BmaA22SdGwsUglJLFdhAhDjX9Yw0pigo8FJJHYcsiCpEREEMwSXp0dpBE5NrpqdLwsZUdli7M6zzjorSUhGOIlWG5ccm1R6rjZ79746pWZRn7kHTxKLN7onNUw1S+NaZ511Eukcd8klPRpscNGiyZNfz2zGh+OWW2YWysOZHTwjldrfa7eLj/E9327oe16mTJnZ4gsItUnSFYNxL+uXXYIknAmE1OikALUpPKNiSSiqTWpVrh4t2mNcOB+W4xQgnXQqZDVFkb2T237du3dPqqh37z7JMSBdgbpmL5JKPFizy0hAql7CAqlEKjMLqGqOj5VKnddQaIgjbuJbc5ZKjqk2FW2edMiigYU/irOESQ//RyZ8YTYYlYdAJv2QRsVkoVrzhmdDkVC8WaRxnmsiXv4neSTqk0/Or7sGILpnGDFiRFLdpDEJ6Hqyb8z7dU3P636O87ztLiG1CWjzpAMOAW8YQYpB/Wr4HEgi3lZ8nPOKj4Fyv4FzlWKylcL+UriWa+bItz1HuePbO9oF6apoW6iSrooWR5V0VbQ4qqSrosXRKkln/LKhJcGqaPtoNaQT2xI0tTKTeRHCCVW0T7Qa0ollCeYaIBfMbShgWkXbR6shnQxhAV0B3Crh2jdaDemq+PCgSroqWhxNIp3hGpm07C5ZtnLBijNyWwIyNKR8GzS/7rrrY+bM2WlckzouNyfhwwhDalK5JC1Iu2qt9dIo6ZDNoLcXkB9m8NzguswJuWomUDc3jFEinHubwyCr5MILL0rE5/FKGfqwk87cD8kE0rskHZgWIPm0dCy6taBB0hmUNtdAPplFCxn3epKphgx+K2iaXtjcQGwVau6rbA9rGHsucy9kj3iu1lq5LQFtIlfQpCBSTgaLFK7GkhJWNBokncwN0wUlPmpYKTj5uiM8zWuvvT4T46PSdnNCQqaeS6JVsSS0kUxpC0winlEcOYBLm2e8olGWdCQHm+2CCy5IPQnZ5JiRMECdyZydN69pf3wrxYi4/yDrkSA7qSqtOv979vYCuXVmrVlKrXTFq6bgqafmx9lnn5eSUkn9Pn36xGGHHZGZIDem6ZJ5buGyYOrUB2Pu3MeWSMWqNMqSjmhmtyEdApqkYnKI73oXAgngIlNTwC689NJLU3q3Xrgsy0S4pwqU4bvVVlul+QBWTZdMaZJLa1YjSwOiUItWu7IaAjNmWWDurGmU7GwEdp1jj+2QOqcJQ8s6fs02vOqqXmmNZo5jc8VLy5LODc3MZ5QCCWe0gPNgIops22VJPuRl8jrNzjKm2pQ/LimGXifd3HnmyVqI2owtM76o3uK/XGpL0KFII/VjYrr6XRbpJJu5U6dOSUpytkwAMtcXAaXScwCXBerRzDYTmzhphIO2Hjp0WMaJhv9BR9t6hqY+ez3ScSAYpP71Jp8JTqLphQblGanLKnpVqp5nvinbo6kSEtzLvdkujGRSM1+w2qQa/yFWuvB1W4M6552bN6F+mwqSjj0njZ4GoUkMI9IA7PFlncuKNFQ14tJkzCj30GbFKyWUglonTJrKi7KkMxPKzCZ5/Tn0ShctJYwH84By/nN7i5imglUEqYl01IAJKcWqlfTysA2pFeeZWGOSDMJpGPNKfc/VvIkww4YNS2rW9cx/8Ek1FKsI3z0P6a04JodZWZ6rWF3bX1MzOnXA/J1VvPoRmiBZfDcPI7d1wbGejwQePnxko1Ldse5rok+vXn1SY+f/keGaru1aDYF6NnuN6SE2J4ZqZps6QxTv4Jh8ESLtw0bOyeFe+XGAdEwXqw841vuZ++G9i80Y0QQOi7kg2sE1HYMjgBM1NWNiyJBhdVNDi1GPdCDgapFDK5k3Bg9rmQVzQU3TsxSsF9TLLNdg3RJiV8aIiqEW8wdzD8u+nnVW5/SiJFgpVLpzVKgGUi688MI0I0tlUgdmV7HvvBgx73ierh6q8jhESJ1LRdLE8hVCQSqUKjJTi6p2vucXpkFuE7GpPMepaDP1EdbMM8/AmfI3of6rArybSlYnyCJFS900BB3Bfg3veWgCz41wzAjL3Xpez1gOSCGElAftEc6MNTae+hDaMiuOQGAOeSd1iVzuYfqmmWpm0SGKaZgkpU7l2kDVOkd9g3rwvEwl7UYyc4Rycqk7Kp/TqK38rZb6K0ZZ0nnAY445JjbccMOyL6xySRQX5HDkKhBJEYzh72HZf16OKmQT6sleWA9BFscwdtkf5ewBEhSR2RWkEWfEfFaGsuMRKm9gPdM8V0QhqVWUCiepVLZ3QRTvo4Ht812sEZFUlHci7XjKVBMyqTzvR42ZmojQ1LklbD2TymdLaSTvjdx6vYr2793esxxIcURhO7m+xlR/JKM6Jd1JcLYeQjQGnVGbqRd1oL7Uj4iDd6F+dSbXJFURVYdRSEoOCOeBmjT5HOlIMG2qo3F2nEN6m7CujrQrkpKq/uTPuzvHEhuOo+20q/ZoEulUIPXhYiq3dJqcSiBFSAxEAJJLBSOKRjRyYN/Chc9lx16XSKznko5ewnVJPy+oF5F0pXaD33jQVjpSaUjiWbycl2Z/uI9rOhZBSTq9TkWSvipG5ZtVr8JJR7bqgAGDMvLMSipb5ZhIXSt9x8Raa30tEQDxNKaOQQrynJ2vgfRyje0dzJD3Dn/84x/TfXK1pMI1gGdDshyuocNtscUWqUOqT6qOhsi1hE7K9NB43ru04crBNXRsZFVPSGhbx3IfHrJ9pJO60DkJAMQxwtOv3w2Z9DstTVAnhR3j3ZCTaYLApFo+BErADB48LEUV1IlhSom46lu9ITvt4vk9m/qCsqQDDUuMWuzFvxpqXDfHaJ9Unwcyu544pw5IEKsZaWhSjhRAQNJCL1ORjnW+c62gpCdTj35DpGJoPD1f5VERJBpppFLYm54pt5kcS+rpqXqseyKKSnZt/4p45pmdM0JOTvblFVf0SmpF5WoQ5+X/SatDWL9EY7kOyUES6cUkCFLn4STq17mOoxrVB2ngvhqDca/CizuU8zScToHsnCQNfPvt47J36p/sVGpy0KChWb3WZB3zzrKaoBSPPDI363hnJaKrD/VJWruP9yJBbevoVB8h4b46r3efM+eRJH39rt08I+LQCgilfa3/fP75F2TXmJDqzTK7+MFR1Ebijuq6d+++yQyxr2/ffkkYLZV04OHpaQ2LgCSC717GPhVB1Zh8TNXozX4HkkkjYLnf9HaN5UVsE9fIo0GRtLFKzZ0CoxNI75Nkye+VwzURM38OvdN3z5yTwbN6DqojdzIcq9d7h9xZQhT3Iv1sU98cF4TxLrlDRNV4B+9rH5tGx/KeOki+4kAp8jrQcAjtfs59773aRRXVnYbK668U2sXzkoa5veVdEQbpcnhWtp17kX7OcbxnVe+eTxt6Rvch+bSLZyF4nG9//n6u4Z7MFtIMvKt7qDvHeBd14lztUexkQKGray9QIXqf3ky1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width=\"157\" height=\"80\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; line-height:21pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:14pt\"></span><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:14pt\"></span><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:14pt\"></span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">Exp. 15-008183-1027-CA</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:14pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Res. 00</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">1263</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">-F-S1-20</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">21</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">San José, a las </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">nueve </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">horas </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">dieciocho </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">minutos del </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">veintiséis</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> de </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">agosto</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> de </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">dos mil veintiuno</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"width:36pt; display:inline-block\">&#xa0;</span><a name=\"_Hlk56089260\"></a><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">Proceso de conocimiento, establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por </span><a name=\"_Hlk38373534\"></a><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">ASOCIACIÓN CÁMARA DE INFOCOMUNICACIÓN Y TECNOLOGÍA</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, representada por su Presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma Óscar Emilio Barahona León, empresario; contra la </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">SUPERINTENDENCIA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, representada por Manuel Emilio Ruiz Gutiérrez, licenciado en ciencias de la computación</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">y la </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">AUTORIDAD REGULADORA DE SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, representada por su apoderada general judicial Viviana Lizano Ramírez. Se apersonó ante esta Sala Claro CR Telecomunicaciones S.A., representada por su apoderada general judicial Jenniffer Salazar Ramírez. Participan como apoderados especiales judiciales por la parte actora Aldo Milano Sánchez y María Lourdes Echandi Gurdían. Por la Sutel Óscar Eduardo González Camacho, Andrés Alonso Castro Segura, Freddy Artavia Castro y Natalia Ramírez Alfaro. Por la Aresep Jeremy Andrés Moya Bermúdez. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y con las salvedades hechas abogados.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Redacta la magistrada Rojas Morales; y,</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">CONSIDERANDO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">I. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">El 9 de septiembre de 2015, el representante de la Asociación Cámara de Infocumunicación y Tecnología (en adelante Infocom) presentó demanda ordinaria contra la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (en lo sucesivo Sutel), integrándose con posterioridad a la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep). Ante esta Sala se apersonó la representante de Claro CR Telecomunicaciones S.A., como tercera interesada. En lo medular la actora manifestó, el 24 de septiembre de 2014 el Consejo de la Sutel mediante acuerdo 034-055-2014 aprobó y sometió a consulta la resolución </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-234-2014</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> denominada </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Instrucciones Regulatorias para la Atención y Resolución Efectiva de Reclamaciones interpuestas ante los Operadores o Proveedores de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> (en lo conducente se referirá a esta solo como Instrucciones Regulatorias). Posteriormente en resolución </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-298-2014</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> del 3 de diciembre de 2014, la Sutel emitió las referidas Instrucciones Regulatorias. Determinados proveedores, se manifestaron opuestos por considerar que esa Superintendencia carecía de competencia para emitir un acto como ese, lo que generó la resolución </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RSC-038-2015</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> publicada el 27 de marzo de 2015 en el Diario Oficial, donde acogieron parcialmente algunas de las cuestiones impugnadas, mantuvo otras y además, sostuvo el criterio de ser competente para emitir este tipo de disposiciones. Adujo la actora, la Sutel no tiene competencia para emitir reglamentos y por eso la resolución RCS-298-2014 que contiene las Instrucciones Regulatorias es absolutamente nula. Con base en esta relación de hechos y conforme quedó establecido en audiencia preliminar, en lo de interés solicitó </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline\">de manera principal</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">: 1- se declaren nulas las resoluciones </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-298-2014</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-234-2014</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> y </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-038-2015</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> por carecer tanto la Aresep como la Sutel de competencia para adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. 2- Se ordene a las codemandadas abstenerse a futuro de adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. 3- Las costas a cargo de las coaccioandas. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline\">Subsidiariamente</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> peticionó: 1- la nulidad de las resoluciones RCS-298-2014, RCS-234-2014 y RCS-038-2015 en el tanto la Sutel excedió sus potestades para adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. 2- Se ordene a las codemandadas, en especial a la Sutel que en caso de adoptar a futuro disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general, se debe ajustar a los siguiente limites: a) aplicar analógicamente el procedimiento previo dispuesto en el artículo 36 de la Ley de la Aresep; b) podrá reglar detalles y procedimientos que desarrolla la Ley, solo cuando esta haya definido sus aspectos y alcances básicos y no los remitiera genéricamente a regulaciones paralelas pero distintas a las que regula; c) no podrá mediante tales actos de aplicación general, crear sanciones (penas, multas, tasas, exacciones o cargas similares) y demás restricciones, ni procedimientos regulatorios, por ser materia reservada a la ley; d) no puede con estos actos generales, suplir la ley; e) las disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general han de limitar su alcance normativo a los operadores en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones en virtud de un título administrativo, no así al usuario que no podrá resultar obligado ni siquiera en forma potencial. 3- Las costas a cargo de las codemandadas. La Aresep contestó de manera negativa e interpuso las excepciones de falta de: derecho y de legitimación pasiva. La Sutel también se manifestó opuesta y adujo las defensas de falta de: derecho e interés actual. El Tribunal en resolución número 53-2017-VII de las 14 horas 55 minutos del 28 de julio de 2017, rechazó las excepciones opuestas. Acogió la demanda, declaró disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico la resolución </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-298-2014</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> y por conexidad también anuló los actos </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-234-2014</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> y </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">RCS-038-2015</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. Resolvió sin especial condena en costas.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">Inconforme la Aresep y la Sutel interpusieron cada una recurso de casación. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Recurso de la Aresep</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">II.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> Aduce un </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">único</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> motivo por razones de </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">fondo</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">, relacionado con el rechazo de la falta de legitimación pasiva. El Tribunal, señala, no tomó en cuenta la relación jurídico procesal subyacente, lo cual es importante para determinar el grado de participación de la Autoridad Reguladora para poder endilgarle alguna responsabilidad. Aunque la condena del Tribunal no le impuso pago de daños y perjuicios, y tampoco se le condenó en costas, ello no obsta, señala, para que la Sala pueda ante un recurso de casación de las demás partes establecer una responsabilidad de ese tipo y se vea afectada razón por la cual acude a esta sede. Aduce, lo dispuesto por los juzgadores en torno a la legitimación, contraviene el numeral 12.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA). Finaliza, de considerarse que la participación de la Aresep era necesaria en este asunto, solicita se declare que su responsabilidad es solo subsidiaria. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">III.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> El Tribunal consideró que conforme lo establece el numeral 12 del CPCA, deben tenerse como parte demandada a los órganos administrativos con personalidad jurídica instrumental, en el tanto sean autores de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso, conjuntamente con el Estado o el ente al que se encuentren adscritos. Lo que tiene por objeto, una defensa conjunta de los intereses de la Administración Pública. El proporcionar a órganos administrativos personificación instrumental, no los convierte en sujetos procesales plenos e independientes, separados del ente administrativo del cual dependen y forman parte. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">IV.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Sobre la legitimación. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">En reiteradas ocasiones ha señalado esta Cámara, el proceso se rige por presupuestos formales o procesales y materiales o sustantivos. Los primeros garantizan la validez del procedimiento por medio de la jurisdicción, competencia y capacidad de las partes. Los segundos, se vinculan con la procedencia de la pretensión. Son de fondo. Se refieren a la legitimación en sus dos modalidades, el derecho e interés actual. Es impensable una sentencia estimatoria en donde alguna de las partes haya perdido la titularidad el interés, dado que la decisión se tornaría inejecutable. Por esta razón, la jurisprudencia se ha inclinado por su análisis oficioso. Los presupuestos de fondo deben ser revisados por los juzgadores en todo momento con el fin de verificar se pueda emitir un pronunciamiento válido sobre lo debatido en el proceso. Consúltese la resolución de las 11 horas 48 minutos del 24 de julio de 2019, que responde al voto número 1585-F-S1-2019. Ahora bien, resulta importante mencionar que aún y cuando esta Cámara en resolución número 188-F-S1-2016 de las 10</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">horas 45 minutos del 3 de marzo de 2017, estableció que la Sutel podía actuar de manera independiente de la Aresep cuando las pretensiones en particular solo se refirieran a responsabilidad de aquella Superintendencia; la integración actual de esta Sala, bajo una mejor ponderación del asunto, considera necesario reconsiderar el tema bajo el siguiente análisis. El artículo 12.2 del CPCA señala expresamente: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Se considerará parte demandada:</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> [</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">] </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">2) Los órganos administrativos con personalidad jurídica instrumental, en tanto sean autores de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso, conjuntamente con el Estado o el ente al que se encuentren adscritos.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. Por su parte la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones número 8642 (en adelante LGT), en el canon 6 inciso 27 define a la Sutel como: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">órgano de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos encargado de regular, supervisar, aplicar, vigilar y controlar el ordenamiento jurídico de las telecomunicaciones.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. Por su parte el ordinal 45 inciso c) de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos número 7593 (Ley Aresep) dispone: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">Órganos de la Autoridad Reguladora:</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> [</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">] </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">c) Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (Sutel)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. Por su parte, el numeral 59 ídem indica en lo de interés: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">[</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">] </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic\">la Sutel es un órgano de desconcentración máxima adscrito a la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos; tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental propia, para administrar el Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, realizar actividad contractual, administrar sus recursos y su presupuesto, así como para suscribir los contratos y convenios que requiera para el cumplimiento de sus funciones.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> [</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">]</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. De lo anterior se concluye que, aún y cuando el legislador, dotó de desconcentración máxima a la Superintendencia, la mantuvo adscrita a la Aresep. Asimismo, el legislador decidió que en casos como estos, ante un conflicto judicial, tienen que ser parte demandada tanto el órgano desconcentrado como el ente al que pertenecen; ello tiene como finalidad que el administrado pueda encontrar, en caso de prosperar su reclamo, un resarcimiento pleno conforme lo estipula el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política. La teoría del Estado único busca que el administrado no tenga que sufrir situaciones como que el órgano no cuente con contenido presupuestario o incluso, deje de existir. Por lo expuesto el reparo deberá denegarse ya que ambos sujetos jurídicos públicos deben comparecer al proceso por expresa disposición de ley.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Recurso de la Sutel</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">V.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> Formula </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">tres</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\"> motivos por razones de </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">fondo</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\">Primero</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline\">Interpretación errónea del numeral 6 inciso 27 de la LGT</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\"> Segundo</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline\">Falta de aplicación del canon 73 de la LGT</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold\"> Tercero</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline\">Violación indirecta por indebida valoración de los elementos probatorios constantes en autos</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA\">.</span></p></div></body></html>" Appeal by Sutel Cassation on procedural grounds

V.Of this type, it raises the following three grounds. First: it alleges incongruence insofar as the claim for nullity of the contested acts was contingent upon a declaration of Sutel's incompetence to adopt provisions, instructions, or guidelines of a general nature. It was only alleged that there was no normative authorization, which with the necessary specificity, could expressly attribute "the power (sic) a legislative guide for such proceeding."; contravening canon 119 of the CPCA, as well as ordinals 99 and 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil, CPC).

VI.Incongruence may occur when a pronouncement on any matter submitted for debate is omitted (infra petita), more than what was requested is granted (ultra petita), what is decided does not correspond to what was petitioned (extra petita), or by containing contradictory provisions. For this figure to proceed, the explained dissonance must exist in the operative part of the ruling. Based on the defect of incongruence, one cannot seek to discuss the considerations the judge had in making their decision. Furthermore, Article 137 subsection 2) of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) establishes that procedural grounds for cassation may only be alleged by the party who has been harmed by the non-observance of the procedural rule and requires having requested the rectification of the defect from said body, whenever possible. In the case under study, the plaintiff's main claim refers to three specific points: 1- the nullity of the administrative acts, 2- ordering Sutel and Aresep to refrain from issuing future guidelines of a general nature, and 3- costs to be borne by the co-defendants. The operative part of the challenged ruling granted what concerned point one of the petition, without stating anything regarding the second aspect. The Tribunal limited itself to declaring the nullity of the acts issued by the Superintendency insofar as it considered them contrary to the legal system. For this Chamber, the alleged defect is not present, because even assuming a lack of pronouncement, that deficiency in no way affects Sutel; on the contrary, it favors it, as what the Tribunal ordered was aimed at limiting its actions. As explained above, for a procedural defect to be admissible, it is necessary that it causes harm to the party invoking it; in the case under study, the plaintiff sought the limitation of a public power. The appellant would lack interest in what it seeks, insofar as no power is being restricted; the resolution requested by the plaintiff was merely annulled, which falls within the framework of its claims. Thus, its claim must be denied.

VII.In the second objection, it alleges a violation of the right of defense and due process insofar as the Tribunal did not annul the acts based on the arguments outlined by the plaintiff, but rather applied its "ex officio powers" established in numeral 182 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), without having granted a hearing to the parties, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 147 of the CPCA. This has left it in a state of defenselessness, applying grounds, assessments, and regulations that were not part of the adversarial proceedings.

VIII.It must be noted that the manner in which this grievance is presented departs from the cassation technique required by numeral 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA, insofar as it is the appellant's obligation to clearly and precisely state its objections, without this Chamber having to interpret what was intended. In this particular case, the appellant merely indicates that the Tribunal exceeded its considerations by applying criteria and norms that were not part of the adversarial proceedings; however, it does not specify which grounds of the ruling it refers to, nor does it explain on which legal basis the ruling departed from what was discussed. In any case, since a state of defenselessness is invoked, the Chamber has conducted a detailed review of the ruling, and it must be indicated that the alleged deficiencies are not observed, since there has been no discussion outside of what was disputed and delimited in the proceedings. No regulatory application or thematic analysis outside of what was disputed by the parties has been found. Therefore, the objection must be rejected.

IX.As a third point of disagreement, the appellant alleges a lack of reasoning in the ruling, insofar as, for the Tribunal, the main contested act is of a regulatory nature; however, it never indicated why it considered it had that condition and not that of mere instructions. It points out that the Tribunal does not cite any norm that underpins its ruling; the reasoning is incomplete; there are no reasons to conclude that it is a regulatory norm and, consequently, it declares the nullity of the cited provisions without any basis. It added that there is no logic or coherence in the judges' reasoning.

X.Starting from recital IV of the judgment, folio 81, the Tribunal begins its analysis of the case submitted for debate, starting with a doctrinal study on the topic of "Regulation." Subsequently, the judges say that the regulation by Aresep and Sutel being challenged involves economic, financial, and legal parameters. Likewise, they affirm that the regulatory power of the co-defendants is not restricted to the simple issuance of tariff settings, but implies the possibility of exercising a true activity of control and supervision over providers of public services and services of general interest. This criterion is based on Articles 5, 6, 24, 25, 59, all of Law 7593. Next, recital V refers to the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) of the Public Administration. Then, in recital VI, it conducts a study on the legal nature of the Sutel instruction being challenged, where it indicates that from the aforementioned norms it is concluded that Aresep was exclusively and exclusionarily reserved the regulatory power, and that Sutel lacks the competence to issue any type of regulation. From this point on, it focuses on elucidating whether the contested act is regulatory in nature, as the plaintiff alleges, or an act of general scope of another type, as the co-defendants claim. It brings up the reasons supporting the act; because of this, it affirmed that the purpose of the resolution is to instruct operators and providers about the regulations already governing the activity. Based on the definition by the Real Academia de la Lengua Española, it points out that "instruir" means to make someone aware of the state of something, to inform them of it, or to communicate to them, to give notices or rules of conduct. To finally conclude that the Regulatory Instructions under examination, far from being a mere instruction due to their content and the matter regulated, constitute a true regulation that must be annulled, because they are not limited to compiling, informing, or communicating the applicable regulations of the protection regime, but rather, on the contrary, impose duties and obligations on operators and providers regarding the form and content of the resolution of claims. In its opinion, they regulate procedural aspects regarding deadlines, form, content, and burden of proof. Furthermore, they establish requirements for the processing of claim files and the supply of information. For the judges, such an administrative resolution is regulatory in nature and cannot be considered an instruction.

XI.The resolution is not confusing as alleged, nor does it refer to matters outside the debate. It sets forth criteria and arguments from which it concludes that it is a regulation. As stated, there is no absence of legal basis, insofar as it even transcribes the norms it considers applicable to the case. Therefore, the grievance must be denied insofar as the alleged lack of basis is not established.

Cassation on substantive grounds

XII.Before summarizing the grievances raised, it is important to mention that the appellant, before addressing them, repeatedly asserts that it is beyond all discussion that Sutel does not have regulatory power and that this was reserved to Aresep. Having stated the above, it raises a single ground. It states that Sutel has supervisory and control power, being a supervisory body of the telecommunications sector. The foregoing is contemplated in numerals 59 and 60 subsections d) and e) of the Aresep Law. It is Sutel's exclusive competence to issue circulars, instructions, and directives in telecommunications matters; however, the Tribunal conducts a restrictive analysis of these competences. The contested act does is ratify, consolidate, and expand the rights of users; this is a core competence assigned to Sutel by the legislator itself. The First Chamber itself (resolution 1247-2011) has established the normative authorization for oversight, regulation, and control bodies; allowing the exercise of minor normative powers based on broad legal norms with clear own purposes. Thus, instructions are provided for minor entities and their organs as one of their natural powers; this is in accordance with what ordinals 12.2, 99, 102.1, 103, 105, 107, 124, 125, and 216, all of the LGAP, stipulate. Such authorization is also given by a special norm, canons 59 and 60 of the Aresep Law, articles 2 subsections a), b) and d), 3 section c), 41, 45 and 67 subsection a) paragraph 7) all of the LGT. It points out that the sub-regulatory power (potestad infra-reglamentaria) is exercisable by whoever has the obligation to ensure real access to services by the user. What the Tribunal does in its resolution is sanction the Superintendency for fulfilling the mandates entrusted to it by law. The power to issue instructions is so clear that it is even permitted to apply the sanctioning regime in case of non-compliance. The appellant provides a conceptualization of: regulation, instructions, circular, orders, and directives. Regarding what is of interest to the case, on instructions, it stated that they are legal norms of regulation, established to teach and instruct. They are an instructive through which it is determined how and when to carry out a public or private conduct and how to achieve its purpose. They can create procedural requirements, but not substantive ones, nor burdens, nor harms to subjective public rights. They are subject to the regulation and form part of the written sources of the legal system, as stipulated in Article 6 subsection f) of the LGAP. It adds that some characteristics that instructions share with regulations and that can cause confusion are that they are: general, external, normative, required to be published, challengeable, subject to higher prior norms, and, of course, subject to legal reserve concerning respect for subjective rights. The act discussed in this case is not a regulation; it is about consolidating a set of pre-existing norms into a single instrument, being an act that reproduces what is already stipulated in the law. In addition to the above, the appellant adds, it must be understood that the instructions issued by Sutel have a degree of special supremacy insofar as it is a typical special sujeción especial relationship, where the rigid and normal rules of formal legality become impossible, which allows the supervisor to issue lesser rules and norms that direct the behavior of the administered subject. It must be understood, according to precept 12.2 of the LGAP, that Sutel has the power to issue norms of a rank lower than regulation, such as instructions, especially when it benefits the rights or interests of individuals, in this case within telecommunications, insofar as it is an essential modern public service. All of the foregoing in accordance with ordinals 8, 11, 33, 39, 41, 49, 140, and 153 of the Magna Carta. The appellant affirms that the origin of the contested instructions is due to two factors, the first related to the increase in claims before Sutel by users against operators and providers. The second, insofar as it noted that said discontent derives from a lack of timely resolutory action by operators and providers, thus violating the rights of users. This forced the Superintendency to take regulatory actions assessing elements of opportunity, convenience, necessity, and utility, under the protection of numeral 45 section 22) of the LGT and ordinal 10 of the Regulation on the Protection Regime for the End User of Telecommunications Services (Reglamento sobre el Régimen de Protección al Usuario Final de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones, hereinafter RPUF). Regarding the content of resolution RCS-298-2014, it states that this regulates the obligation of telecommunications operators and service providers to attend to and resolve claims filed by end users, which is a duty of Sutel in accordance with compliance with the legal system. These are administrative provisions intended to order, apply, and monitor the special protection regime for the end user. It compiles, integrates, and interprets the provisions already contained in higher-level regulatory instruments, such as laws and regulations. It was issued in accordance with the provisions of numerals 2, 3 subsections c), d) and f), 45 sections 1), 4), 5), 13) and 14), 47 and 48 all of the LGT. It is a mechanism to guarantee the adequate provision of service to users and to ensure compliance with the obligations of operators and providers. Thus, each of the provisions set forth in the contested instruction is completely valid, because, as stated, these are guidelines that have backing in a higher norm, and this act merely reproduces them. The appellant provides a comparative table where it indicates the higher legal basis for the various points addressed in resolution RCS-298-2014, to conclude that Sutel did not create a regulation, and that it has the competence to issue instructions and has respected the legal reserve, therefore it considers that procedural norms and the limits of discretion have not been violated. Finally, it argues that, in addition to all the numerals already cited, Articles 6, 7, and 11 of the Political Constitution have been contravened. Numeral 14, 129, 132, 166, 182 of the LGAP. Annex 13 of Chapter 13 of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, and ordinal 73 of the Aresep Law.

XIII.Article 124 of the LGAP stipulates that instructions are administrative acts of a general nature. Through instructions, a public administration issues guidelines aimed at instructing the subjects to whom it is directed on aspects already contained in the legal system that it considers relevant to organize and inform about. In the case of Sutel, Article 59 of the Aresep Law stipulates that it is responsible for regulating, applying, monitoring, and controlling the legal framework of telecommunications. Furthermore, numeral 60 of the same law, concerning the matter of interest, establishes as part of its fundamental obligations: "[…] d) Guarantee and protect the rights of telecommunications users. e) Ensure compliance with the duties and rights of network operators and telecommunications service providers. […] k) Hear and sanction the administrative infractions incurred by network operators and telecommunications service providers; as well as establish the civil liability of their officials." Within the limits of this regulation, the Chamber will conduct the corresponding analysis of the provisions of the contested resolution RSC-298-2014. Said Regulatory Instructions are visible starting from folio 109 of the administrative file and, without making extensive transcriptions of their content, a brief reference will be made to each of the points it addresses. Point A refers to Obligations for the attention and resolution of claims by Telecommunications Service Operators and Providers. There, the Superintendency regulates various aspects: 1- Duty of the operator or provider to implement public information mechanisms, so that the user knows their right to file claims. 2- Attend to and receive their claims free of charge, providing a consecutive reference code for it. 3- Make available to the end user physical or electronic documents that allow expediting the filing of claims. Regulates a minimum amount of information they must contain (folio 117 administrative file). 4- Provide, within the legal term, an effective and adequate resolution. A response that must contain the following: a) if the response to the complaint is positive, the proposed solution; b) if negative, indicate technical, administrative, and legal reasons; c) in both cases, the operator or provider must support within its claims management system: the reference code, the service file, filing date, date of communication of the resolution, the evidence that supported its response. 5- The maximum period to provide a response is 10 calendar days. The omission of a response is classified as a serious fault. Next, point B of the act stipulates, Regarding claims processed through the intervention of Sutel. In this section, it indicates: 1- To bring the claim to Sutel, the administrative procedures established in the LGAP shall apply. 2- The Operator or Provider must send the complete file to Sutel within a maximum period of three business days. Indicates the information the file must contain (folio 119 of the administrative file). 3- The burden of proof falls on the Provider or Operator. 4- Based on the principle of "Benefit of the User," Operators or Providers must provide the information established in section A of that administrative act, with the objective of processing, investigating, and resolving the claims filed before Sutel. 5- The Superintendency may request any additional information. 6- Warns of Sutel's power to issue interim measures (medidas cautelares). 7- Allows the parties to resort to any alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Finally, section C called: Regarding general reports of claims filed before telecommunications service operators or providers; reports on compliance with the following duties related to general reports. 1- Issue general reports semi-annually on claims. 2- The first semester is understood as July to December and the second as January to June. 3- Contain the information requested by Sutel (folio 120 of the administrative file). 4- Report on the provisions of a general nature adopted. 5- Stresses that failures to comply with Sutel's instructions are legally established as very serious. 6- The Superintendency will make these general claims reports available to users.

XIV.After a detailed analysis of the contested administrative act, this Chamber disagrees with the criterion issued by the Tribunal, insofar as it is evident that the provisions established therein are in the nature of instructions. Article 46 paragraph 5 of the Magna Carta stipulates: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. […]". The underlining does not correspond to the original. Thus, in this line of thought, it must be noted that the ordinances contained in the contested act are procedures that protect the user in accordance with this constitutional right that shelters them. Furthermore, each of the guidelines set forth in said administrative resolution has regulatory support in different articles, insofar as norms of legal and regulatory rank already exist that contemplate the scenario. Thus, numerals 3, 8, 47, 48, 66, and 67 of the LGT, and precepts 4, 10, 11, and 13 of the RPUF; in all of them, each of the rules stipulated by Sutel can be found, including that concerning deadlines, interim measures, requests for additional information, procedures, and sanctions. The provisions issued by Sutel in this resolution are aimed at ensuring that the user not only knows the rights they have before Telecommunications Operators and Providers, but also can file the claims they deem necessary in an easy, expeditious, and effective manner. This is safeguarding the fundamental rights of the consumer and user, as well as, within the framework of free competition, the possibility of choosing or changing operators. The nullity decreed by the Tribunal has no useful effect, insofar as the content of RCS-298-2014 is already stipulated and regulated in other regulatory provisions, as explained. The judges' conduct disregards the referred constitutional Article 46, Article 124 of the LGAP, and the previously cited norms of the LGT, RPUF, and the Aresep Law. Therefore, the appellant is correct, and its objection must be upheld.

XV.Given the manner in which this matter is being resolved, it is necessary, even ex officio, to refer to the issue of costs. The Tribunal resolved the matter without special award of costs (sin especial condenatoria en costas), insofar as it considered that, due to the subject matter and purpose of the proceedings, there was sufficient reason to litigate. However, this Chamber dissents from such an assessment; because, as explained, the administrative act issued by Sutel is in the nature of an instruction insofar as it does not involve an entirely new regulation (normativa exnovo) issued by the Superintendency, but rather, on the contrary, what it did was create a regulatory condensation that regulates the subject of claims in protection of the user, in the face of recurring complaints about the inadequate channeling of their claims. Given this scenario, it is evident that Infocom knew that the guidelines established in the act it challenged had regulatory and regulatory support, and even of constitutional rank. Consequently, a sufficient reason to litigate is not evident, and, therefore, the exoneration is inappropriate. By virtue of this, both costs of the proceedings must be imposed on the losing plaintiff.

XVI.In accordance with the foregoing, the cassation appeal filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos will be dismissed, and the costs of this appeal shall be borne by it. The cassation appeal filed by the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones will be partially upheld, only the substantive ground being accepted. The Tribunal's judgment will be partially overturned (casada), and what was decided regarding the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) will remain intact. Consequently, ruling on the merits, the lawsuit filed by the Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología against the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones and the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos will be dismissed in all its aspects. Both costs of the proceedings are imposed on the losing party.

</span></p> **POR TANTO** The cassation appeal filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos is dismissed. The costs of this appeal are to be borne by it. The cassation appeal filed by the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones is partially granted, accepting only the substantive claim. The judgment of the Tribunal is overturned, while the ruling on the lack of passive standing remains undisturbed. Consequently, ruling on the merits, the lawsuit filed by the Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología against the Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones and the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos is dismissed in its entirety. Both costs of the proceeding shall be borne by the losing party.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** **Jorge Alberto López González** **Jessica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez** <div style="-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both"> </div>

20170004000915-3703012-1.rtf  Res. 001263-F-S1-2021 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas dieciocho minutos del veintiséis de agosto de dos mil veintiuno.

Proceso de conocimiento, establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por ASOCIACIÓN CÁMARA DE INFOCOMUNICACIÓN Y TECNOLOGÍA, representada por su Presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma Óscar Emilio Barahona León, empresario; contra la SUPERINTENDENCIA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES, representada por Manuel Emilio Ruiz Gutiérrez, licenciado en ciencias de la computación y la AUTORIDAD REGULADORA DE SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS, representada por su apoderada general judicial Viviana Lizano Ramírez. Se apersonó ante esta Sala Claro CR Telecomunicaciones S.A., representada por su apoderada general judicial Jenniffer Salazar Ramírez. Participan como apoderados especiales judiciales por la parte actora Aldo Milano Sánchez y María Lourdes Echandi Gurdían. Por la Sutel Óscar Eduardo González Camacho, Andrés Alonso Castro Segura, Freddy Artavia Castro y Natalia Ramírez Alfaro. Por la Aresep Jeremy Andrés Moya Bermúdez. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad y con las salvedades hechas abogados.

Redacta la magistrada Rojas Morales; y,

CONSIDERANDO

I.El 9 de septiembre de 2015, el representante de la Asociación Cámara de Infocumunicación y Tecnología (en adelante Infocom) presentó demanda ordinaria contra la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (en lo sucesivo Sutel), integrándose con posterioridad a la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Aresep). Ante esta Sala se apersonó la representante de Claro CR Telecomunicaciones S.A., como tercera interesada. En lo medular la actora manifestó, el 24 de septiembre de 2014 el Consejo de la Sutel mediante acuerdo 034-055-2014 aprobó y sometió a consulta la resolución RCS-234-2014 denominada “Instrucciones Regulatorias para la Atención y Resolución Efectiva de Reclamaciones interpuestas ante los Operadores o Proveedores de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones” (en lo conducente se referirá a esta solo como Instrucciones Regulatorias). Posteriormente en resolución RCS-298-2014 del 3 de diciembre de 2014, la Sutel emitió las referidas Instrucciones Regulatorias. Determinados proveedores, se manifestaron opuestos por considerar que esa Superintendencia carecía de competencia para emitir un acto como ese, lo que generó la resolución RSC-038-2015 publicada el 27 de marzo de 2015 en el Diario Oficial, donde acogieron parcialmente algunas de las cuestiones impugnadas, mantuvo otras y además, sostuvo el criterio de ser competente para emitir este tipo de disposiciones. Adujo la actora, la Sutel no tiene competencia para emitir reglamentos y por eso la resolución RCS-298-2014 que contiene las Instrucciones Regulatorias es absolutamente nula. Con base en esta relación de hechos y conforme quedó establecido en audiencia preliminar, en lo de interés solicitó de manera principal: 1- se declaren nulas las resoluciones RCS-298-2014, RCS-234-2014 y RCS-038-2015 por carecer tanto la Aresep como la Sutel de competencia para adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. 2- Se ordene a las codemandadas abstenerse a futuro de adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. 3- Las costas a cargo de las coaccioandas. Subsidiariamente peticionó: 1- la nulidad de las resoluciones RCS-298-2014, RCS-234-2014 y RCS-038-2015 en el tanto la Sutel excedió sus potestades para adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. 2- Se ordene a las codemandadas, en especial a la Sutel que en caso de adoptar a futuro disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general, se debe ajustar a los siguiente limites: a) aplicar analógicamente el procedimiento previo dispuesto en el artículo 36 de la Ley de la Aresep; b) podrá reglar detalles y procedimientos que desarrolla la Ley, solo cuando esta haya definido sus aspectos y alcances básicos y no los remitiera genéricamente a regulaciones paralelas pero distintas a las que regula; c) no podrá mediante tales actos de aplicación general, crear sanciones (penas, multas, tasas, exacciones o cargas similares) y demás restricciones, ni procedimientos regulatorios, por ser materia reservada a la ley; d) no puede con estos actos generales, suplir la ley; e) las disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general han de limitar su alcance normativo a los operadores en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones en virtud de un título administrativo, no así al usuario que no podrá resultar obligado ni siquiera en forma potencial. 3- Las costas a cargo de las codemandadas. La Aresep contestó de manera negativa e interpuso las excepciones de falta de: derecho y de legitimación pasiva. La Sutel también se manifestó opuesta y adujo las defensas de falta de: derecho e interés actual. El Tribunal en resolución número 53-2017-VII de las 14 horas 55 minutos del 28 de julio de 2017, rechazó las excepciones opuestas. Acogió la demanda, declaró disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico la resolución RCS-298-2014 y por conexidad también anuló los actos RCS-234-2014 y RCS-038-2015. Resolvió sin especial condena en costas. Inconforme la Aresep y la Sutel interpusieron cada una recurso de casación.

Recurso de la Aresep

II.Aduce un único motivo por razones de fondo, relacionado con el rechazo de la falta de legitimación pasiva. El Tribunal, señala, no tomó en cuenta la relación jurídico procesal subyacente, lo cual es importante para determinar el grado de participación de la Autoridad Reguladora para poder endilgarle alguna responsabilidad. Aunque la condena del Tribunal no le impuso pago de daños y perjuicios, y tampoco se le condenó en costas, ello no obsta, señala, para que la Sala pueda ante un recurso de casación de las demás partes establecer una responsabilidad de ese tipo y se vea afectada razón por la cual acude a esta sede. Aduce, lo dispuesto por los juzgadores en torno a la legitimación, contraviene el numeral 12.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA). Finaliza, de considerarse que la participación de la Aresep era necesaria en este asunto, solicita se declare que su responsabilidad es solo subsidiaria.

III.El Tribunal consideró que conforme lo establece el numeral 12 del CPCA, deben tenerse como parte demandada a los órganos administrativos con personalidad jurídica instrumental, en el tanto sean autores de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso, conjuntamente con el Estado o el ente al que se encuentren adscritos. Lo que tiene por objeto, una defensa conjunta de los intereses de la Administración Pública. El proporcionar a órganos administrativos personificación instrumental, no los convierte en sujetos procesales plenos e independientes, separados del ente administrativo del cual dependen y forman parte.

IV.Sobre la legitimación. En reiteradas ocasiones ha señalado esta Cámara, el proceso se rige por presupuestos formales o procesales y materiales o sustantivos. Los primeros garantizan la validez del procedimiento por medio de la jurisdicción, competencia y capacidad de las partes. Los segundos, se vinculan con la procedencia de la pretensión. Son de fondo. Se refieren a la legitimación en sus dos modalidades, el derecho e interés actual. Es impensable una sentencia estimatoria en donde alguna de las partes haya perdido la titularidad el interés, dado que la decisión se tornaría inejecutable. Por esta razón, la jurisprudencia se ha inclinado por su análisis oficioso. Los presupuestos de fondo deben ser revisados por los juzgadores en todo momento con el fin de verificar se pueda emitir un pronunciamiento válido sobre lo debatido en el proceso. Consúltese la resolución de las 11 horas 48 minutos del 24 de julio de 2019, que responde al voto número 1585-F-S1-2019. Ahora bien, resulta importante mencionar que aún y cuando esta Cámara en resolución número 188-F-S1-2016 de las 10 horas 45 minutos del 3 de marzo de 2017, estableció que la Sutel podía actuar de manera independiente de la Aresep cuando las pretensiones en particular solo se refirieran a responsabilidad de aquella Superintendencia; la integración actual de esta Sala, bajo una mejor ponderación del asunto, considera necesario reconsiderar el tema bajo el siguiente análisis. El artículo 12.2 del CPCA señala expresamente: “Se considerará parte demandada: […] 2) Los órganos administrativos con personalidad jurídica instrumental, en tanto sean autores de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso, conjuntamente con el Estado o el ente al que se encuentren adscritos.”. Por su parte la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones número 8642 (en adelante LGT), en el canon 6 inciso 27 define a la Sutel como: “órgano de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos encargado de regular, supervisar, aplicar, vigilar y controlar el ordenamiento jurídico de las telecomunicaciones.”. Por su parte el ordinal 45 inciso c) de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos número 7593 (Ley Aresep) dispone: “Órganos de la Autoridad Reguladora: […] c) Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones (Sutel).”. Por su parte, el numeral 59 ídem indica en lo de interés: “[…] la Sutel es un órgano de desconcentración máxima adscrito a la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos; tendrá personalidad jurídica instrumental propia, para administrar el Fondo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, realizar actividad contractual, administrar sus recursos y su presupuesto, así como para suscribir los contratos y convenios que requiera para el cumplimiento de sus funciones. […]”. De lo anterior se concluye que, aún y cuando el legislador, dotó de desconcentración máxima a la Superintendencia, la mantuvo adscrita a la Aresep. Asimismo, el legislador decidió que en casos como estos, ante un conflicto judicial, tienen que ser parte demandada tanto el órgano desconcentrado como el ente al que pertenecen; ello tiene como finalidad que el administrado pueda encontrar, en caso de prosperar su reclamo, un resarcimiento pleno conforme lo estipula el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política. La teoría del Estado único busca que el administrado no tenga que sufrir situaciones como que el órgano no cuente con contenido presupuestario o incluso, deje de existir. Por lo expuesto el reparo deberá denegarse ya que ambos sujetos jurídicos públicos deben comparecer al proceso por expresa disposición de ley.

Recuso de la Sutel Casación por razones procesales

V.De este tipo aduce los siguientes tres motivos. Primero: alega incongruencia en el tanto la pretensión de nulidad de los actos impugnados quedó sujeta a que se declarara también la incompetencia de la Sutel para adoptar disposiciones, instrucciones o lineamientos de carácter general. Solo se alegó inexistencia de una habilitación normativa, que con una especificidad necesaria, pudiera atribuir de modo expreso “la facultad (sic) una guía legislativa para tal proceder.”; conculcándose el canon 119 del CPCA, así como los ordinales 99 y 155 del Código Procesal Civil (CPC).

VI.La incongruencia, puede presentarse cuando se omite pronunciamiento sobre algún extremo sometido a debate (infra petita), se otorga más de lo rogado (ultra petita), lo resuelto no guarda correspondencia con lo peticionado (extra petita), o bien, por contener disposiciones contradictorias. Para que esta figura proceda, la disonancia explicada, debe darse en la parte dispositiva del fallo. Con base en el defecto de la incongruencia, no se pueden pretender discutir las consideraciones que haya tenido el juzgador, para tomar su decisión. Además, El artículo 137 inciso 2) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, establece, que las causales de orden procesal solo pueden alegarse por la parte a quien haya perjudicado la inobservancia de la norma procesal y exige haber gestionado ante dicho órgano la rectificación del vicio, cuando sea posible. En el caso de estudio, la pretensión principal de la actora está referida a tres puntos específicos: 1- la nulidad de los actos administrativos, 2- se le ordene a la Sutel y a la Aresep abstenerse de emitir futuros lineamientos de carácter general y 3- las costas a cargo de las codemandadas. La parte dispositiva del fallo cuestionado, concedió lo concerniente al punto uno de la petitoria, sin manifestar nada respecto del aspecto segundo. El Tribunal se limitó a declarar la nulidad de los actos emitidos por al Superintendencia en tanto los consideró contrarios del ordenamiento jurídico. Para esta Cámara, no se presenta el vicio acusado, pues aún partiendo de falta de pronunciamiento, esa falencia en nada afecta a la Sutel, por el contrario, le favorece pues lo dispuesto por el Tribunal se dirigió a limitarle su actuación. Como se explicó líneas atrás, para que el vicio procesal sea procedente, se hace necesario que este cause una afectación a quien lo invoca; en el caso de estudio la actora pretendió la limitación a una potestad pública. Carecería de interés lo pretendido por la casacionista, en el tanto ninguna potestad se le está restringiendo, únicamente se anuló la resolución peticionada por la actora lo que se encuentra en el marco de sus pretensiones. De tal manera, su reclamo deberá denegarse.

VII.En el segundo reparo alega violación al derecho de defensa y debido proceso en el tanto el Tribunal no anuló los actos basándose en los argumentos esbozados por la actora, sino que aplicó sus “apoderamientos oficiosos” establecidos en el numeral 182 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), ello sin haber dado audiencia a las partes, en apego a lo estipulado en el artículo 147 del CPCA. Lo que le ha dejado en estado de indefensión, aplicando fundamentos, valoraciones y normativa que no forman parte del contradictorio.

VIII.Ha de señalarse que la manera en que está expuesto este agravio, se aleja de la técnica casacional exigida por el numeral 139 inciso 3) del CPCA, en el tanto es obligación del recurrente plantear de forma clara y precisa sus inconformidades, sin que tenga que entrar esta Cámara a hacer interpretaciones sobre lo que se quiso señalar. En el caso particular, la casacionista se limita a indicar que el Tribunal se excedió en sus consideraciones aplicando criterios y normas que no fueron parte del contradictorio; sin embargo, no señala a cuáles fundamentos del fallo se refiere, no explica con base en qué normativa se resolvió apartándose de lo discutido. En todo caso, por invocarse un estado de indefensión, la Sala ha hecho una revisión detallada del fallo, debiéndose indicar que no se advierten las falencias que se aducen, ya que, no se ha dado una discusión ajena a lo controvertido y delimitado en el proceso. No se ha encontrado una aplicación normativa o un análisis temático ajeno a lo controvertido por las partes. Así las cosas el reparo deberá rechazarse.

IX.Como tercera inconformidad, aduce la casacionista falta de motivación del fallo, en el tanto para el Tribunal el acto principal impugnado reviste un carácter reglamentario, sin embargo, nunca indicó por qué consideraba que tenía esa condición y no la de simples instrucciones. Señala el Tribunal no cita ninguna norma que dé fundamento a su fallo; el razonamiento es incompleto, no existen razones para concluir que se trata de una norma reglamentaria y, por ende declara la nulidad de las disposiciones citadas, sin ningún fundamento. Agregó, no hay lógica ni coherencia en el razonamiento de los jueces.

X.A partir del considerando IV de la sentencia, folio 81, inicia el Tribunal el análisis del caso sometido a debate, empezando con un estudio doctrinario sobre el tema de “la Regulación”. Posteriormente, dicen los jueces que la regulación de la Aresep y la Sutel que se impugna involucra parámetros económicos, financieros y legales. Asimismo, afirman que la potestad regulatoria de las codemandadas no se restringe simple emisión de fijaciones tarifarias, sino que implica la posibilidad de ejercer una verdadera actividad de control y supervisión de los prestadores de los servicios públicos y de servicios de interés general. Criterio que basa en los artículos 5, 6, 24, 25, 59 todos de la Ley 7593. A continuación, el considerando V hace referencia a la potestad reglamentaria de la Administración Pública. Luego en considerando VI, realiza un estudio sobre la naturaleza jurídica de la instrucción de la Sutel que se combate, en donde indica que de las normas antes mencionadas se concluye que a la Aresep le fue reservada de manera exclusiva y excluyente la potestad reglamentaria, siendo que la Sutel carece de competencia para emitir cualquier tipo de reglamentación. A partir de este momento se centra a dilucidar si el acto impugnado es de tipo reglamentario como lo alega la actora o un acto de alcance general de otro tipo como lo señalan las codemandadas. Trae a colación los motivos que sustentan el acto; a raíz de ello afirmó, la razón de ser de la resolución es instruir a los operadores y proveedores acerca de la normativa que ya regula la actividad. Basándose en la definición que hace la Real Academia de la Lengua Española, señala que, instruir significa dar a conocer a alguien el estado de algo, informarle de ello, o comunicarle a darle avisos o reglas de conducta. Para finalmente concluir que las Instrucciones Regulatorias sometido a examen lejos de ser una mera instrucción por su contenido y materia regulada, constituye un verdadero reglamento que debe ser anulado, pues no se limita a recabar, informar o comunicar la normativa aplicable del régimen de protección, sino que por el contrario, impone deberes y obligaciones a los operadores y proveedores en cuanto a la forma y contenido de la resolución de los reclamos. En su criterio, regula aspectos procedimentales en cuanto a plazos, forma, contenido y carga probatoria. Además, establece requisitos para la tramitación de expedientes de reclamación y suministro de información. Para los jueces, tal resolución administrativa reviste carácter reglamentario y no puede ser considerada como una instrucción.

XI.La resolución no es confusa como se alega, tampoco refiere a cuestiones ajenas al debate. Deja plasmado criterios y argumentos a partir de los cuales concluye que es un reglamento. Como se dijo, no hay ausencia de fundamento jurídico, en el tanto hasta transcribe las normas que considera son de aplicación al caso. Así las cosas, el agravio deberá denegarse en el tanto no se configura la falta de fundamento aducida.

Casación por razones sustantivas

XII.Previo a realizar el resumen de los agravios planteados, importa mencionar que la recurrente antes de entrar a ellos, asevera de manera reiterada, que está fuera de toda discusión el que la Sutel no tienen potestad reglamentaria y que esta le fue reservada a la Aresep. Expuesto lo anterior, aduce un único motivo. Manifiesta, la Sutel tiene potestad de vigilancia y control, por ser este un órgano supervisor del sector de las telecomunicaciones. Lo anterior está contemplado en los numerales 59 y 60 incisos d) y e) de la Ley Aresep. Es competencia exclusiva de la Sutel emitir circulares, instrucciones y directrices en materia de telecomunicaciones; sin embargo, el Tribunal hace un análisis restrictivo sobre estas competencias. El acto impugnado, lo que hace es ratificar, consolidar y expandir los derechos de los usuarios; esta es una competencia medular que le fue asignada a la Sutel por el propio legislador. La propia Sala Primera (resolución 1247-2011) ha plasmado la habilitación normativa para los órganos de fiscalización, regulación y control; permitiendo el ejercicio de potestades normativas menores sobre la base de normas legales amplias y con fines propios claros. Así, las instrucciones están previstas para los entes menores y sus órganos como una de sus potestades naturales; ello conforme lo disponen los ordinales 12.2, 99, 102.1, 103, 105, 107, 124, 125 y 216 todos de la LGAP. Tal autorización además viene dada por norma especial, cánones 59 y 60 de la Ley Aresep, artículos 2 incisos a), b) y d), 3 acápite c), 41, 45 y 67 inciso a) apartado 7) todos de la LGT. Señala que, la potestad infra-reglamentaria, es de posible ejercicio por quien tiene la obligación de velar por el real acceso a los servicios por parte del usuario. Lo que hace el Tribunal en su resolución, es sancionar a la Superintendencia por cumplir los mandatos que le ha encomendado la ley. La potestad para emitir instrucciones es tan clara, que incluso se le permite en caso de incumplimiento a la aplicación del régimen sancionatorio. La recurrente hace una conceptualización sobre: reglamento, instrucciones, circular, órdenes y directrices. Para lo que al caso interesa, sobre las instrucciones manifestó que, son normas jurídicas de regulación, establecidas para enseñar e instruir. Se trata de un instructivo mediante el cual se determina cómo y cuándo realizar una conducta pública o privada y como alcanzar su fin. Pueden crear requisitos procedimentales, pero no sustantivas, ni cargas, ni lesiones a los derechos públicos subjetivos. Están sometidas al reglamento y forman parte de las fuentes escritas del ordenamiento jurídico, conforme lo estipula el artículo 6 inciso f) de la LGAP. Agrega, algunas características que las instrucciones comparten con el reglamento y puede generar confusión es que son: generales, externas, normativas, requeridas de publicación, impugnables, supeditadas a normas anteriores superior y, desde luego, sometidas a reserva de ley con relación al respeto a los derechos subjetivos. El acto que se discute en este caso no es un reglamento, se trata de aglutinar en un solo instrumento un conjunto de normas prexistentes, siendo un acto que reproduce lo ya dispuesto en la ley. Aunado a lo anterior, agrega la recurrente, debe entenderse que las instrucciones emitidas por la Sutel, tienen un grado de supremacía especial en el tanto se trata de una típica sujeción especial, en donde se tornan imposibles las reglas rígidas y normales de la legalidad formal, lo que le permite al supervisor el dictado de reglas y normas menores que dirigen el comportamiento del sujeto administrado. Se debe entender, de acuerdo con el precepto 12.2 de la LGAP, que la Sutel tiene potestad de emitir normas de rango inferior al reglamento, como lo es la instrucción, en especial, cuando beneficia los derechos o intereses de los particulares, en este caso dentro de las telecomunicaciones, en tanto se trata de un servicio público esencial moderno. Todo lo anterior acorde con los ordinales 8, 11, 33, 39, 41, 49, 140 y 153 de la Carta Magna. Afirma la casacionista, que el origen de las instrucción impugnadas, obedece a dos factores, el primero relacionado con el aumento de reclamaciones ante la Sutel por parte de los usuarios en contra de las operadoras y los proveedores. El segundo, en tanto advirtió que dichos descontentos derivan de una falta de actuación resolutoria oportuna por parte de las operadoras y proveedores, vulnerando así el derecho de los usuarios. Ello obligó a la Superintendencia a tomar acciones regulatorias valorando elementos de oportunidad, conveniencia, necesidad y utilidad, al amparo del numeral 45 acápite 22), de la LGT y del ordinal 10 del Reglamento sobre el Régimen de Protección al Usuario Final de los Servicios de Telecomunicaciones (en adelante RPUF). Sobre el contenido de la resolución RCS-298-2014, manifiesta, esta regula la obligación de los operadores y proveedores de servicios de telecomunicaciones a atender y resolver los reclamos interpuestos por los usuarios finales, lo cual es deber de la Sutel conforme al cumplimiento del ordenamiento jurídico. Se trata de disposiciones administrativas que pretenden ordenar, aplicar y vigilar el régimen especial de protección al usuario final. Recopila, integra e interpreta las disposiciones ya contenidas en instrumentos normativos de más alto nivel, como leyes y reglamentos. Se emitió conforme a lo dispuesto en los numerales 2, 3 incisos c), d) y f), 45 acápites 1), 4), 5), 13) y 14), 47 y 48 todos de la LGT. Es un mecanismo para garantizar la prestación adecuada del servicio a los usuarios y; asegurar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de los operadores y proveedores. Así, cada una de las disposiciones dispuestas en la instrucción impugnada son completamente válidas, pues como se dijo se trata de lineamientos que tienen respaldo en una norma superior y este acto solamente las reproduce. Realiza la recurrente un cuadro comparativo en donde señala el fundamento jurídico superior de los diversos puntos tratados en la resolución RCS-298-2014, para concluir que la Sutel no creó un reglamento, y que tiene competencia para emitir instrucciones y, ha respetado la reserva de ley, por ello estima, no se han violentado las normas procedimentales, ni los límites de la discrecionalidad. Finalmente aduce que se han conculcado además de todos los numerales ya citados, los artículos 6, 7 y 11 de la Constitución Política. Numeral 14, 129, 132, 166, 182 de la LGAP. Anexo 13 del Capítulo 13 del Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos de Norteamérica y el ordinal 73 de la Ley Aresep.

XIII.El artículo 124 de la LGAP dispone que las instrucciones son actos administrativos de carácter general. Mediante las instrucciones una administración pública emite lineamientos que tienen como fin instruir a los sujetos a los que va dirigida, sobre aspectos ya contenidos en el ordenamiento jurídico y que considera relevante ordenarlos e informar sobre ellos. En el caso de la Sutel, el artículo 59 de la Ley Aresep dispone que le corresponde regular, aplicar, vigilar y controlar el ordenamiento jurídico de las telecomunicaciones. Además, el numeral 60 ídem, en lo de interés, establece como parte de sus obligaciones fundamentales: “[…] d) Garantizar y proteger los derechos de los usuarios de las telecomunicaciones. e) Velar por el cumplimiento de los deberes y derechos de los operadores de redes y proveedores de servicios de telecomunicaciones. […] k) Conocer y sancionar las infracciones administrativas en que incurran los operadores de redes y los proveedores de servicios de telecomunicaciones; así como establecer la responsabilidad civil de sus funcionarios.”. Dentro de los límites de esta normativa, la Sala hará el análisis correspondiente sobre lo dispuesto en la resolución impugnada RSC-298-2014. Dichas Instrucciones Regulatorias se encuentra visibles a partir de folio 109 del expediente administrativo y, sin realizar transcripciones extensas de su contenido, se hará una breve referencia sobre cada uno de los puntos que toca. El punto A alude a las Obligaciones para la atención y resolución de reclamaciones por parte de los Operadores y Proveedores de Servicios de Telecomunicaciones. Allí la Superintendencia regula diversos aspectos: 1- Deber del operador o proveedor de implementar mecanismos de información al público, para que el usuario conozca su derecho a presentar reclamos. 2- Atender y recibir de forma gratuita sus reclamaciones, brindando un código de atención consecutivo para ello. 3- Poner a disposición del usuario final documentos físicos o electrónicos que permitan agilizar la interposición de reclamos. Regula un mínimo de información que deben contener (folio 117 expediente administrativo). 4- Brindar, dentro del término de ley, una resolución efectiva y adecuada. Respuesta que debe contener lo siguiente: a) en caso de ser positiva la respuesta a la queja, la solución planteada; b) en caso de ser negativa, indicar razones técnicas, administrativas y jurídicas; c) en ambos supuestos el operador o proveedor deberá respaldar dentro de su sistema de gestión de reclamaciones: el código de referencia, el expediente de atención, fecha de interposición, fecha de la comunicación de la resolución, la prueba y la evidencia que sustentó su respuesta. 5- El plazo máximo para brindar respuesta es de 10 días naturales. La omisión de respuesta es calificada falta grave. A continuación, el punto B del acto dispone, Sobre las reclamaciones tramitadas mediante la intervención de la Sutel. En este apartado señala: 1- Para elevar el reclamo a la Sutel, serán aplicables los procedimientos administrativos estatuidos en la LGAP. 2- El Operador o Proveedor debe remitir a la Sutel en el plazo máximo de tres días hábiles, el expediente completo. Indica la información que debe contener el expediente (folio 119 del expediente administrativo). 3- La carga de la prueba recae sobre el Proveedor u Operador. 4- Con base en el principio “Beneneficio del Usuario” los Operadores o Proveedores deberán aportar la información establecida en la sección A de ese acto administrativo, con el objetivo de tramitar, investigar y resolver los reclamos que se presenten ante la Sutel. 5- La Superintendencia, podrá solicitar cualquier información adicional. 6- Advierte de la facultad que tiene la Sutel para emitir medidas cautelares. 7- Permite a las partes acudir a cualquier mecanismo alterno de conflictos. Finalmente el apartado C denominado: Sobre los informes generales de reclamaciones interpuestas ante los operadores o proveedores de los servicios de telecomunicación; informa del cumplimiento de los siguientes deberes relacionados con los informes generales. 1- Emitir informes generales de manera semestral sobre las reclamaciones. 2- Se entiende primer semestre de julio a diciembre y el segundo de enero a junio. 3- Contener la información que le solicita la Sutel (folio 120 del expediente administrativo). 4- Informar sobre las disposiciones de carácter general adoptadas. 5- Recalca que incumplimientos de las instrucciones de la Sutel, son legalmente establecidas como muy graves. 6- La Superintendencia pondrá estos informes generales de reclamaciones al alcance de los usuarios.

XIV.Luego de un análisis detallado del acto administrativo impugnado, discrepa esta Cámara del criterio emitido por el Tribunal, en el tanto se evidencia que las disposiciones allí establecidas revisten el carácter de instrucciones. El artículo 46 párrafo 5 de la Carta Magna dispone: “Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección, y a un trato equitativo. […]”. El subrayado no responde al original. Así en esta línea de pensamiento, se debe advertir que las ordenanzas contenidas en el acto impugnado son procedimientos que protegen al usuario en atención a este derecho constitucional que lo cobija. Además, cada uno de los lineamientos planteados en dicha resolución administrativa, tienen sustento normativo en diferentes articulados, en el tanto ya existe normas de rango legal y reglamentarias que contempla el supuesto. Así, los numerales 3, 8, 47, 48, 66 y 67 de LGT, y los preceptos 4, 10, 11 y 13 del RPUF; en todos ellos se encontrará cada una de las reglas dispuestas por la Sutel, incluyendo lo concerniente a plazos, medidas cautelares, requerimientos de información adicional, procedimientos y sanciones. Las disposiciones emitidas por la Sutel en ésta resolución, van encaminadas al que el usuario no solo conozca los derechos que tiene ante los Operadores y Proveedores de telecomunicaciones, sino que, de manera fácil, expedita y efectiva pueda interponer las reclamaciones que consideren necesarias. Con ello se están resguardando los derechos fundamentales del consumidor y usuario, además, dentro del marco de la libre competencia, la posibilidad de elegir o cambiar de operador. La nulidad que decreta por el Tribunal no tiene efecto útil, en el tanto el contenido de la RCS-298-2014 ya se encuentra estipulado y regulado en otras disposiciones normativas, tal y como se explicó. El proceder de los juzgadores desconoce el cardinal 46 constitucional referido, del artículo 124 de la LGAP y las normas previamente referidas de la LGT, RPUF y la Ley Aresep. Así las cosas, lleva razón el recurrente y su reparo deberá ser acogido.

XV.Dada la manera cómo se está resolviendo este asunto, se impone necesario aún de oficio, hacer referencia al tema de las costas. El Tribunal resolvió sin especial condenatoria en costas, en el tanto consideró, por la materia y objeto del proceso existía motivo suficiente para litigar. Sin embargo, disiente esta Sala de tal apreciación; pues, como se explicó, el acto administrativo emitido por la Sutel reviste el carácter de instrucción en el tanto no se trata normativa exnovo emitida por parte de la Superintendencia, sino por el contrario, lo que hizo fue una condensación normativa que regula el tema de las reclamaciones en protección del usuario y ante recurrentes reclamos sobre la inadecuada canalización de sus reclamos. Ante este panorama, es evidente, Infocom sabía que los lineamientos establecidos en el acto que impugnó tenían respaldo normativo y reglamentario e inclusive de rango constitucional. De allí, no se evidencia motivo suficiente para litigar y, por ende, es improcedente la exoneración. En virtud de ello, se deberá imponer ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la actora vencida.

XVI.Conforme a lo expuesto, se declarará sin lugar el recurso de casación establecido por la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos, serán las costas de éste a su cargo. Se declarará parcialmente con lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, acogiéndose solo el cargo sustantivo. Se casará la sentencia del Tribunal, y se mantendrá incólume lo resuelto sobre la falta de legitimación pasiva. En consecuencia, fallando por el fondo, se declarará sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda interpuesta por la Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología en contra de la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones y la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Se impondrán ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la parte vencida.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación establecido por la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos. Son las costas de éste a su cargo. Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto por la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones, acogiéndose solo el cargo sustantivo. Se casa la sentencia del Tribunal, manteniéndose incólume lo resuelto sobre la falta de legitimación pasiva. En consecuencia, fallando por el fondo, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda interpuesta por la Asociación Cámara de Infocomunicación y Tecnología en contra de la Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones y la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Se impondrán ambas costas del proceso a cargo de la parte vencida.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jorge Alberto López González Jessica Alejandra Jiménez Ramírez