Inapplicability of LGAP Article 340 to the Pre-Charges PhaseImprocedencia de aplicar el artículo 340 LGAP a la fase previa al traslado de cargos

VI.This Chamber has previously addressed the inapplicability of section 340 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) to cases of this type for two reasons. Firstly, it has been explained that this rule governs lapsing (caducidad) in proceedings whose factual premise is that they are in progress, meaning it refers to inactivity in proceedings that have already been initiated by the Administration. Thus, in judgment 00205 – 2021 ( Poder Judicial (poder-judicial.go.cr) it was stated that: “...While Article 340 of the LGAP regulates the lapsing (caducidad) of the proceeding when it is halted for more than six months for reasons attributable to the interested party, when the latter has promoted it, or to the Administration, when the latter has initiated it; said concept is based on the existence of an ongoing proceeding. That is, an administrative proceeding exists and during its course it is halted or becomes inactive for a period exceeding that indicated, and is therefore understood to be abandoned by the interested party, under which premise its lapsing (caducidad) underlies. That is not the situation in the case under review (subexamine), for here the alleged inactivity occurs prior to the formal commencement of the proceeding. It must not be overlooked that the administrative sanctioning proceeding begins with the formal order of opening or notification of charges (traslado de cargos) to the investigated subject, and the lapsing (caducidad) argued here is not based on any inaction occurring after that point, but rather on the time elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). In other words, what is intended to be inflicted is the Administration’s inertia in undertaking the exercise of its sanctioning authority.“ As a second reason, regarding the application of section 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), in that same judgment 00205 – 2021 (poder-judicial.go.cr) it was explained that although previously this Chamber had opted for its application, upon review of that point it was concluded that it is not possible to declare the lapsing (caducidad) of the action undertaken by the National Consumer Commission, as there is no clear, precise, and specific legal rule determining the extinguishment of such action due to the factual situation analyzed, specifically, the passage of a prolonged period between the filing of the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). In that sense, it was stated: “...Regarding the procedure analyzed here, canon 56 of Law No. 7472 provides: “The action before the National Consumer Commission may only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, without it being necessary that they be the party aggrieved by the reported act (…). / The National Consumer Commission shall always process, with priority, complaints related to the goods and services consumed by the lowest-income population, whether those included in the basket of goods and services established by the Executive Branch or, failing that, those considered for calculating the consumer price index (…). /The action to file a complaint lapses (caduca) within a period of two months from the occurrence of the infraction or from when it became known, except for continued acts, in which case, it begins to run from the last act. / The Technical Support Unit must conduct the investigation of the matter. Once concluded, it must forward the case file (expediente) to the National Consumer Commission for resolution. / The National Consumer Commission, within ten days following receipt of the case file (expediente), if it does not order additional evidence for a better resolution through the Technical Support Unit, must issue the final resolution and notify it to the parties (…). / To establish the corresponding sanction, the National Consumer Commission must respect the principles of administrative procedure, established in the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública)”. From the foregoing, it is clear that the transcribed mandate regulates two time periods: the first, to file the complaint (two months, as relevant, counted from the occurrence of the infraction to be sanctioned or when it became known) and the second, to issue the final act (10 days following receipt of the case file (expediente)). Note that it does not expressly establish a lapsing (caducidad) period for initiating the administrative procedure (that is, from when the complaint is filed until the opening order). In the absence of regulation of a lapsing (caducidad) period referring to that interim, in previous opportunities and with a composition different from the current one, this Chamber has carried out a normative integration to fill that silence, which has led it to analogously apply a statute of limitations (prescripción) period, specifically, that established in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República). (In this regard, see vote No. 45 of 9 hours 10 minutes of April 6, 2017, in which a matter similar to the present one was resolved, as well as judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) No. 517 of 9 hours 35 minutes of May 3, 2012 and No. 479 of 11 hours 40 minutes of April 7, 2011 and the decision of this Tribunal No. 22 of 8 hours 40 minutes of March 13, 2014). However, after a deep and conscientious reflection, the conviction is reached that it is not viable to apply a statute of limitations (prescripción) period to undertake the sanctioning action under review (remember that actions lapse (caducan) and rights are subject to statutes of limitations (prescriben)). Furthermore, according to canon 66 of the LGAP: “1. The powers of authority and their exercise, and public duties and their fulfillment, shall be inalienable, non-transferable, and not subject to statutes of limitations (imprescriptibles). 2. Only by law may commitments be established not to exercise a power of authority. Said commitment may only be given within a bilateral and onerous act or contract. 3. The exercise of powers in specific cases may be expressly subject to lapsing (caducidad), by virtue of other laws” (emphasis supplied). Under the tenor of said provision, as a general rule, powers of authority, including the sanctioning power, are not subject to statutes of limitations (imprescriptibles), non-transferable, and inalienable; however, their exercise could be subject to a lapsing (caducidad) period, which must be established by Law. In this case, as indicated supra, the legislator provided a lapsing (caducidad) period for reporting the infraction; however, after that act, it did not establish any period for the Administration to initiate the exercise of its power. It is the criterion of this Decision-Making Body that, if the Law did not provide a time limit for this, the judge should not impose one. From that standpoint, it is not possible to declare the lapsing (caducidad) of the action undertaken by the National Consumer Commission, insofar as there is no clear, precise, and specific legal rule determining the extinguishment of such action due to the factual situation analyzed here (passage of two years between the filing of the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos)). Now, of course, this does not justify the Administration in taking excessively long to initiate the processing of the case; however, that fact alone cannot serve as a parameter to decree its lapsing (caducidad), since this, as provided for in the cited article 66 and as upheld by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), can only be established by Law. (In this regard, one may consult, among others, the decisions of said Chamber No. 14021 of 14 hours 39 minutes of September 1, 2009, No. 7787 of 14 hours 58 minutes of April 28, 2010 and No. 11347 of 15 hours of June 29, 2010).” This line of thought is shared by the current composition of this Tribunal, in the sense that, it is reiterated, section 340 of the LGAP is not applicable as this is a rule applicable to ongoing proceedings, and; in addition to this, no lapsing (caducidad) would operate in this case because it is not possible to decree a lapsing (caducidad) due to the passage of time between the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos), insofar as the current regulations did not provide a time limit for this. Thus, the grievance must be rejected."

In other words, what is sought to be inflicted is the Administration's inertia in undertaking the exercise of its sanctioning power." As a second ground, regarding the application of numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), in that same judgment 00205 – 2021 ([poder-judicial.go.cr](https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-1067977)) it was explained that although previously this Chamber had opted for its application, upon a review of that point it was concluded that it is not feasible to declare the expiration (caducidad) of the action (acción) undertaken by the National Consumer Commission (Comisión Nacional del Consumidor), as there is no clear, precise, and specific legal rule that determines the extinction of such action based on the factual scenario analyzed, specifically, the passage of an extended period between the filing of the complaint (denuncia) and the notification of the statement of objections (traslado de cargos). In that regard, it was stated: "… Regarding the procedure analyzed here, canon 56 of Law No. 7472 provides: 'The action before the National Consumer Commission may only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, who need not necessarily be the aggrieved party by the act reported (…). / The National Consumer Commission shall always process, with priority, complaints related to goods and services consumed by the lower-income population, whether those included in the basket of goods and services established by the Executive Branch or, failing that, those considered for calculating the consumer price index (…). / The action to file a complaint expires in a period of two months from the occurrence of the infraction or from when it became known, except for continuous acts, in which case it begins to run from the last act. / The Technical Support Unit (Unidad Técnica de Apoyo) must conduct the investigation (instrucción) of the matter. Once concluded, it must transfer the case file to the National Consumer Commission for resolution. / The National Consumer Commission, within ten days after receiving the case file, if it does not order evidence for better resolution through the Technical Support Unit, must issue the final resolution (resolución) and notify the parties (…). / To establish the corresponding sanction, the National Consumer Commission must respect the principles of the administrative procedure established in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).' From the foregoing, it is clear that the transcribed mandate regulates two periods: the first, to formulate the complaint (two months, in what is relevant, counted from the occurrence of the infraction to be sanctioned or when it becomes known) and the second, to issue the final act (10 days after receiving the case file). As can be seen, a period of expiration for initiating the administrative procedure (i.e., from when the complaint is filed until the order of initiation) is not expressly established. Given the lack of regulation of an expiration period referring to that interim, in prior opportunities and with a composition different from the current one, this Chamber has made a normative integration to fill that silence, which has led it to apply by analogy a statute of limitations (prescripción) period, specifically, the one established in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. (In this regard, see vote No. 45 of 9:10 a.m. on April 6, 2017, in which a matter similar to the present one was resolved, as well as judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) No. 517 of 9:35 a.m. on May 3, 2012, and No. 479 of 11:40 a.m. on April 7, 2011, and the ruling of this Court No. 22 of 8:40 a.m. on March 13, 2014)." Nevertheless, after deep and careful reflection, the conviction is reached that it is not viable to apply a prescription (prescripción) period to undertake the sanctioning action under review (recall that actions expire (caducan) and rights prescribe (prescriben)). Moreover, pursuant to canon 66 of the LGAP: “1. The powers of imperium (potestades de imperio) and their exercise, and the public duties and their fulfillment, shall be inalienable (irrenunciables), non-transferable (intransmisibles), and imprescriptible (imprescriptibles). 2. Only by law may commitments be established to not exercise a power of imperium. Said commitment may only be given within a bilateral and onerous act or contract. 3. The exercise of powers in specific cases may be expressly subject to expiration (caducidad), by virtue of other laws” (highlighting supplied). In accordance with that provision, as a general rule, the powers of imperium, including the sanctioning power, are imprescriptible, non-transferable, and inalienable; however, their exercise could be subject to an expiration period, which must be provided by Law. In this case, as indicated supra, the legislator provided an expiration period to report the infraction; however, after that act, it did not establish any period for the Administration to initiate the exercise of its power. It is the criterion of this Deciding Body (Órgano decisor) that, if the Law did not provide a temporal limit for that, the adjudicator must not impose one. From that standpoint, it is not possible to declare the expiration of the action undertaken by the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, as long as there is no clear, precise, and specific legal norm that determines the extinguishment of such action by the fact pattern analyzed here (the passage of two years between the filing of the complaint (denuncia) and the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos)). Now, of course, this does not justify the Administration excessively delaying the initiation of the case proceedings; however, that single fact cannot serve as a parameter to decree its expiration, since this, as provided by cited ordinal 66 and as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has held, can only be established by Law. (In this regard, one may consult, among others, the rulings of said Chamber No. 14021 of 14 hours 39 minutes of September 1, 2009, No. 7787 of 14 hours 58 minutes of April 28, 2010, and No.

of the Administrative Court (expediente 11347 at 15:00 hours on June 29, 2010).” This line of reasoning is shared by the current composition of this Court, in the sense that, it is reiterated, numeral 340 of the LGAP is not applicable because this is a norm applicable to proceedings in progress, and; in addition to this, no expiration (caducidad) would operate in this case either because it is not possible to decree an expiration due to the passage of time between the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos), insofar as the valid regulations did not foresee a time limit for that. Thus, the grievance must be rejected".

In other words, what is sought to be imposed is the Administration's inertia in undertaking the exercise of its sanctioning power." As a second ground, regarding the application of section 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), in that same judgment 00205 – 2021 (poder-judicial.go.cr) it was explained that although previously this Chamber had opted for its application, upon a review of that point it was concluded that it is not possible to declare the expiration (caducidad) of the action (acción) brought by the National Consumer Commission (Comisión Nacional del Consumidor), since there is no clear, precise, and specific legal rule that determines the extinguishment of such action under the factual scenario analyzed, specifically, the lapse of a prolonged period between the filing of the complaint (denuncia) and the notification of the statement of objections (traslado de cargos). In that regard, it was stated: "...Regarding the proceeding analyzed here, canon 56 of Law No. 7472 provides: 'The action before the National Consumer Commission can only be initiated by virtue of a complaint from any consumer or person, who need not necessarily be the party aggrieved by the act denounced (…). / The National Consumer Commission shall always process, as a priority, complaints related to goods and services consumed by the lower-income population, whether those included in the basket of goods and services established by the Executive Branch or, failing that, those considered for calculating the consumer price index (…). /The action to file a complaint expires in a period of two months from the occurrence of the infraction or from when it became known, except for continuous acts, in which case, it begins to run from the last act. / The Technical Support Unit must carry out the investigation (instrucción) of the matter. Once concluded, it must transfer the file to the National Consumer Commission for resolution. / The National Consumer Commission, within ten days following receipt of the file, if it does not order additional evidence for a better resolution through the Technical Support Unit, must issue the final resolution and notify the parties (…). / To establish the corresponding sanction, the National Consumer Commission must respect the principles of the administrative procedure, established in the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública).' From the foregoing, it is clear that the transcribed mandate regulates two time limits: the first, for filing the complaint (two months, in relevant matters, counted from the occurrence of the infraction to be sanctioned or when it becomes known) and the second, for issuing the final act (10 days following receipt of the file). It can be seen that a statute of limitations (plazo de caducidad) is not expressly established for initiating the administrative proceeding (i.e., from when the complaint is filed until the order to proceed). Given the lack of regulation of a statute of limitations regarding that interim, on previous occasions and with a composition different from the current one, this Chamber has performed a normative integration to fill that silence, which has led it to analogically apply a prescriptive period (plazo de prescripción), specifically, the one established in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. (In this regard, see vote No. 45 of 9:10 a.m. on April 6, 2017, which resolved a matter similar to this one, as well as the judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) No. 517 of 9:35 a.m. on May 3, 2012 and No. 479 of 11:40 a.m. on April 7, 2011 and the ruling of this Tribunal No. 22 of 8:40 a.m. on March 13, 2014).

Nevertheless, after profound and careful reflection, one reaches the conviction that it is not viable to apply a statute of limitations period to undertake the sanctioning action under review (recall that actions expire and rights prescribe). Furthermore, according to canon 66 of the LGAP: "1. The powers of governmental authority and their exercise, and public duties and their fulfillment, shall be inalienable, nontransferable, and imprescriptible. 2. Only by law may commitments be established not to exercise a power of governmental authority. Such commitment may only be given within a bilateral and onerous act or contract. 3. The exercise of powers in specific cases may be expressly subject to expiration (caducidad), by virtue of other laws" (the highlighting is supplied). Pursuant to that provision, as a general rule, powers of governmental authority, including the sanctioning power, are imprescriptible, nontransferable, and inalienable; however, their exercise could be subject to an expiration period, which must be established by Law. In this case, as indicated supra, the legislator provided an expiration period for reporting the infraction; however, after that act, it did not establish any period for the Administration to initiate the exercise of its power. It is the criterion of this Deciding Body that, if the Law did not provide a temporal limit for that, the adjudicator must not impose one. From that standpoint, it is not possible to declare the expiration (caducidad) of the action undertaken by the Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, insofar as there is no clear, precise, and concrete legal norm that determines the extinction of such action by the factual situation analyzed here (the passage of two years between the filing of the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges). Now, of course, this does not justify the Administration excessively delaying the initiation of the case proceedings; however, that sole fact cannot serve as a parameter to decree its expiration, since this, as provided by cited canon 66 and as sustained by the Sala Constitucional, may only be established by Law. (In this regard, one may consult, among others, the rulings of said Chamber No. 14021 of 14 hours 39 minutes of September 1, 2009, No. 7787 of 14 hours 58 minutes of April 28, 2010, and No. 11347 of 15 hours of June 29, 2010)." This line of thought is shared by the current composition of this Tribunal, in the sense that, it is reiterated, numeral 340 of the LGAP is not applicable because it is a norm applicable to ongoing proceedings, and; coupled with this, no expiration would operate in this case because it is not possible to decree an expiration by the passage of time between the complaint and the notification of the statement of charges, as the current regulations did not provide a temporal limit for that.

Thus, the grievance must be rejected.

"VI. Esta Cámara ya con anterioridad se ha referido a la improcedencia de la aplicación del numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública a casos de este tipo por dos motivos. En primer lugar, se ha explicado que esa norma regula la caducidad en procesos que tienen como supuesto de hecho el estar en trámite, es decir, se refiere a la inactividad en procesos que ya han sido iniciados por la Administración. Así, en sentencia 00205 – 2021 ( Poder Judicial (poder-judicial.go.cr) se indicó que: “...Si bien el artículo 340 de la LGAP regula la caducidad del procedimiento cuando este se paralice por más de seis meses por causa imputable al interesado, cuando este lo haya promovido, o a la Administración, cuando esta lo haya iniciado; dicha figura tiene como base la existencia de un procedimiento en curso. Es decir, existe un proceso administrativo y durante su trámite este se paraliza o inactiva por un plazo superior al señalado, por lo que se entiende abandonado por el interesado y, bajo esa premisa, subyace su caducidad. Esa no es la situación del subexamine, pues aquí la inactividad que se achaca se da de previo al inicio formal del proceso. No debe obviarse que el procedimiento administrativo sancionador inicia con el auto formal de apertura o traslado de cargos al sujeto investigado y la caducidad aquí argüida no se sustenta en alguna inacción acaecida después de ese punto, sino, más bien, en el plazo transcurrido entre la interposición de la denuncia y la notificación del traslado de cargos. En otras palabras, lo que se pretende infligir es la inercia de la Administración por emprender el ejercicio de su potestad sancionatoria.“ Como segundo motivo, en cuanto a la aplicación del numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, en esa misma sentencia 00205 – 2021 (poder-judicial.go.cr) se explicó que si bien con anterioridad esta Cámara se decantó por su aplicación, en una revisión de ese punto se concluyó que no es dable declarar la caducidad de la acción emprendida por la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, en tanto no hay norma legal clara, precisa y concreta que determine la extinción de tal acción por el supuesto de hecho analizado, en concreto, el transcurso de un plazo prolongado entre la interposición de la denuncia y la notificación del traslado de cargos. En ese sentido se dijo: “...En cuanto al procedimiento aquí analizado, el canon 56 de la Ley No. 7472 dispone: “La acción ante la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor sólo puede iniciarse en virtud de una denuncia de cualquier consumidor o persona, sin que sea necesariamente el agraviado por el hecho que denuncia (…). / La Comisión Nacional del Consumidor siempre evacuará, con prioridad, las denuncias relacionadas con los bienes y los servicios consumidos por la población de menores ingresos, ya sea los incluidos en la canasta de bienes y servicios establecida por el Poder Ejecutivo o, en su defecto, los considerados para calcular el índice de precios al consumidor (…). /La acción para denunciar caduca en un plazo de dos meses desde el acaecimiento de la falta o desde que esta se conoció, salvo para los hechos continuados, en cuyo caso, comienza a correr a partir del último hecho. / La Unidad Técnica de Apoyo debe realizar la instrucción del asunto. Una vez concluida, debe trasladar el expediente a la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor para que resuelva. / La Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, dentro de los diez días posteriores al recibo del expediente, si por medio de la Unidad Técnica de Apoyo, no ordena prueba para mejor resolver, debe dictar la resolución final y notificarla a las partes (…). / Para establecer la sanción correspondiente, la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor debe respetar los principios del procedimiento administrativo, establecidos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública”. De lo anterior, queda claro, el mandato trascrito regula dos plazos: el primero, para formular la denuncia (dos meses, en lo de interés, contados desde el acaecimiento de la falta a sancionar o cuando ésta se conozca) y el segundo, para dictar el acto final (10 días posteriores al recibo del expediente). Véase, no se establece expresamente un plazo de caducidad para iniciar el procedimiento administrativo (es decir, desde cuando se plantea la denuncia y hasta el auto de apertura). Ante la falta de regulación de un plazo de caducidad referente a ese ínterin, en anteriores oportunidades y con una composición distinta a la actual, esta Cámara ha hecho una integración normativa para suplir ese silencio, lo que la ha llevado a aplicar analógicamente un plazo de prescripción, concretamente, el estatuido en el precepto 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. (Al respecto puede consultarse el voto No. 45 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 6 de abril de 2017, en el que se resolvió un asunto similar al presente, así como las sentencias de la Sala Primera No. 517 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 3 de mayo de 2012 y No. 479 de las 11 horas 40 minutos del 7 de abril de 2011 y el fallo de este Tribunal No. 22 de las 8 horas 40 minutos del 13 de marzo de 2014). No obstante, luego de una profunda y concienzuda reflexión, se llega al convencimiento de que no resulta viable aplicar un plazo de prescripción para emprender la acción sancionatoria en examen (recuérdese que las acciones caducan y los derechos prescriben). Además, conforme el canon 66 de la LGAP: “1. Las potestades de imperio y su ejercicio, y los deberes públicos y su cumplimiento, serán irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles. 2. Sólo por ley podrán establecerse compromisos de no ejercer una potestad de imperio. Dicho compromiso sólo podrá darse dentro de un acto o contrato bilateral y oneroso. 3. El ejercicio de las potestades en casos concretos podrá estar expresamente sujeto a caducidad, en virtud de otras leyes” (el resaltado es suplido). Al tenor de dicha disposición, por regla general, las potestades de imperio, dentro de ellas, la sancionatoria, son imprescriptibles, intransmisibles e irrenunciables; sin embargo, su ejercicio podría estar sujeto a un plazo de caducidad, el cual ha de estar dispuesto por Ley. En este caso, según se indicó supra, el legislador previó un lapso de caducidad para denunciar la falta; sin embargo, después de ese acto, no estableció plazo alguno para que la Administración iniciara el ejercicio de su potestad. Es criterio de este Órgano decisor que, si en la Ley no se previó un límite temporal para ello, no debe el juzgador imponer uno. Desde ese plano, no es dable declarar la caducidad de la acción emprendida por la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, en tanto no hay norma legal clara, precisa y concreta que determine la extinción de tal acción por el supuesto de hecho aquí analizado (transcurso de dos años entre la interposición de la denuncia y la notificación del traslado de cargos). Ahora, desde luego, ello no justifica a la Administración para tardar excesivamente en iniciar el trámite de la causa; no obstante, ese solo hecho no puede fungir como parámetro para decretar su caducidad, pues esta, tal cual lo prevé el ordinal 66 citado y lo ha sostenido la Sala Constitucional, sólo por Ley puede establecerse. (Al respecto, se pueden consultar, entre otros, los fallos de dicha Cámara No. 14021 de las 14 horas 39 minutos del 1° de setiembre de 2009, No. 7787 de las 14 horas 58 minutos del 28 de abril de 2010 y No. 11347 de las 15 horas del 29 de junio de 2010).” Esta línea de pensamiento es compartida por la actual integración de este Tribunal, en el sentido de que, se reitera, no resulta aplicable el numeral 340 de la LGAP por ser esta una norma aplicable a los procesos en curso, y; aunado a esto, tampoco operaría caducidad alguna en este caso porque no es posible decretar una caducidad por el transcurso del tiempo entre la denuncia y la notificación del traslado de cargos, en el tanto la normativa vigente no previó un límite temporal para ello. Así, el agravio debe rechazarse".