Dismissal of action against Notarial Code articles on disciplinary regimeRechazo de acción contra artículos del Código Notarial sobre régimen disciplinario

**Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.** San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-eight minutes on the twenty-eighth of April, two thousand ten.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by Sergio Leiva Urcuyo, of legal age, notary public, holder of identity card number 3-192-, resident of San José; against Articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 and 170 of the Notarial Code.

**Whereas:** 1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at fourteen hours on the twenty-fifth of March, 2010, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 and 170 of the Notarial Code be declared. He alleges that said provisions harm Articles 9 paragraphs 1 and 2, 10, 121, 140, 152, 153 and 177 second paragraph of the Political Constitution, which provide for the principle of separation of powers, the specific functions of the Judicial Branch, the percentage of the Republic's budget that corresponds to it, and the principle of exclusivity of jurisdiction. He also considers that they violate the principle of equality before the law contained in Article 33 of the Political Constitution, which is a subjective right of all inhabitants of the Republic, insofar as notaries are the only professionals whose disciplinary processes are conducted in the jurisdictional avenue with resolutions of res judicata (cosa juzgada). This procedure harms the principle of due process and defense contained in Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the principle of legal certainty, and constitutional jurisprudence stemming from Voto 5236-99, reiterated in judgments 1738-92 and 8858-98. It fails to comply with the principle of prompt and complete justice derived from Articles 27 and 41 of the Political Constitution, defined by the Constitutional Chamber as “the fundamental right to Justice,” related to that of legal certainty, legality, and effective judicial protection. The principle of budgetary specificity is violated, since funds from the Judicial Branch budget were taken for the creation, maintenance, and function of the Notarial Courts and Tribunals, decreasing the resources that, by express provision of the second paragraph of Article 177 of the Political Constitution, are intended to cover the expenses of this branch so that it may exercise the jurisdictional function that corresponds to it. Notarial jurisdiction is not jurisdictional by its nature, but administrative. The control and exercise of disciplinary matters related to Notaries is a strictly administrative matter, under the competence of the Executive Branch. In Voto 02-010070-0007-CO of May 31, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber declared the assignment of the National Directorate of Notarial Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) to the Judicial Branch unconstitutional. Based on the reasoning of the magistrates, it is also not constitutional to create, with the denomination of Courts and Tribunals within the jurisdictional sphere, bodies that will handle the disciplinary matters of notaries, thus monitoring their conduct and professional performance, an activity that is eminently administrative, the competence of professional associations (colegios profesionales). The Legislative Branch, in enacting the notarial courts and tribunals, exceeded its power by delegating strictly administrative actions to the Judicial Branch, thus violating principles of constitutional order. Certainly, the notarial courts and tribunals exercise a jurisdictional function, understood as the issuance of resolutions with the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada), which has led some experts to think there is no unconstitutionality. However, the unconstitutionality derives precisely from giving them jurisdictional powers to hear processes of an administrative order and nature, which does not correspond to the competencies of the Judicial Branch. The division of functions or powers and the impossibility of delegating the functions of each body are established in Article 9 of the Political Constitution. The creation of notarial courts and tribunals harms this principle, since they will hear matters of an administrative order such as disciplinary matters, without it being possible to validly understand that one is in the presence of the extraordinary administrative function exercised by the Judicial Branch. The Constitutional Chamber, in Voto 7965-06, noted that by application of the constitutional principle of reserve or exclusivity of jurisdiction, it is imperative that the Judicial Branch must use and allocate the majority of its resources to the exercise of a materially jurisdictional function. Not doing so harms the principle of budgetary specificity. The non-existence of a College of Notaries Public does not legitimize the Legislative Assembly to transfer, through the enactment of the Notarial Code, competencies to the Judicial Branch that are not within its scope. The only legitimate competence of the Judicial Branch in disciplinary matters is to act as a jurisdictional controller, whether through the amparo avenue or the contentious-administrative avenue, where administrative sanctions can be reviewed, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 48 and 49 of the Political Constitution. The claimant states that the challenged rules harm the principle of equality because notaries are the only professionals whose disciplinary processes are conducted in the jurisdictional avenue with a res judicata (cosa juzgada) resolution. This constitutes different, odious, and discriminatory treatment compared to other liberal professionals, compared to public officials or those who exercise a public function, and those who hold the character of public certifiers (fedatarios públicos) such as accountants, surveyors, and those who exercise a certification function, among them physicians. The constitutional principle of due process and the right of defense are also violated insofar as, with the current jurisdictional process, the unavoidable obligation of the Notary to answer the complaint and the threat (contained in Article 163 of the Notarial Code which is challenged) that in case of not answering, a default judgment (rebeldía) will be declared, obligates the investigated person to testify against himself, which is inappropriate for a disciplinary investigation. Disciplinary complaints against notaries are treated by the Notarial Court as an ordinary civil action, without the constitutional guarantee of being able to abstain from testifying and having a deadline to present evidence broadly and at the time of the hearing. The challenged Article 153 is imperative and obligates notaries to answer the complaint, without the possibility of abstaining from doing so, thus harming the right to abstain from testifying against oneself. The claimant points out that the principle of legal certainty is violated, since the Notarial Court has maintained that actions do not prescribe while they are under the Court's knowledge, as provided in Article 164 of the Notarial Code. This is despite the fact that the established deadlines are not respected, nor are the procedural actions filed addressed. In sanctioning matters, no action can be imprescriptible. The principle of prompt and complete justice is also harmed, as it is unknown within what period the disciplinary procedure must conclude. Finally, he argues that the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is harmed.

2.- The claimant bases the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality on the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. The prior matter is a disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court, file number 09-000181-627-NO.

3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any action submitted to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous identical or similar rejected action.

Authored by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and, **Considering:** **I.- Considering:** **I.- Object of the action.** The claimant challenges the following rules of the Notarial Code:

Article 18.- Disciplinary responsibility Notaries shall be sanctioned disciplinarily, according to this code, for non-compliance with the law, its regulations, the rules and principles of professional ethics, the provisions issued by the National Directorate of Notarial Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) and any of its bodies responsible for fulfilling functions related to notarial activity.

Article 19.- Independence of responsibilities The responsibilities indicated in the previous articles are not mutually exclusive. Notaries may be sanctioned in different fields independently, simultaneously, or successively, except for cases that must be excluded by virtue of the force of res judicata (cosa juzgada) of judicial judgments.

The country's tribunals that hear processes related to improper actions by notaries public must immediately notify the National Directorate of Notarial Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) so that it may proceed accordingly.

Article: 138.- Competence Except for the sanctions that, according to this code, the National Directorate of Notarial Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) is responsible for imposing, it is the competence of the Judicial Branch, through the bodies determined in this law, to exercise the disciplinary regime of notaries public and to enforce civil liability for their faults.

Article 141.- Jurisdictional competence In all other cases, disciplinary competence shall correspond to the jurisdictional bodies indicated in Article 169.

Article 150.- Standing In disciplinary matters, proceedings may be initiated at the instance of the interested party or through a complaint from any public office.

Article 151.- Compensatory claim Those who consider themselves harmed by the notary's action may claim, within the disciplinary proceeding, the damages and losses caused to them and enforce their right over the bond provided.

If an arrangement is reached regarding the compensation corresponding to the claimant, it shall be understood that such an arrangement has been made and that the plaintiff waives any other claim in the jurisdictional-civil avenue.

Article 152.- Formalities of the complaint The complaint shall be addressed to the competent body of the Judicial Branch, according to Articles 140 and 141 of this code. It must indicate the corresponding facts and the evidence invoked as grounds. It may be presented orally before said body.

If a compensatory claim is exercised, the complainant shall be considered the plaintiff. In such case, the latter must litigate under the sponsorship of an attorney and indicate, in their claim, the nature of the damages and losses and their estimation.

Article 153.- Transfer and notification Regarding the complaint and claim, as applicable, the competent body shall grant a transfer of eight days to the notary. Within this period, the notary must address the facts under investigation and offer the evidence deemed to be in their interest.

If the process is conducted in a jurisdictional body, the same resolution shall consider the National Director of Notarial Affairs (Director Nacional de Notariado) as a party, who within the same period may offer the evidence considered pertinent.

For the purposes of the notification of the transfer and subsequent notifications, the provisions for civil proceedings shall apply.

In cases of the notary's absence without a registered legal representative (apoderado), notification shall be made by means of an edict published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and the process shall continue with a public defender.

Article 154.- Appearance The body in charge of the proceeding shall order the receipt of evidence that reasonably leads to the object of the debate and that which, on its own initiative, it deems necessary. To receive it, it shall summon the parties to an appearance, with a minimum of fifteen days' notice.

In the appearance, only the notary, the plaintiff, their attorney, and the National Director of Notarial Affairs (Director Nacional de Notariado) or the attorney official they designate may intervene.

Documentary evidence may be added to the file by order (mandamiento), when so requested.

If the competent body deems it necessary, it may commission a judicial authority for the receipt of evidence.

If at that appearance, the notary and the affected party reach an agreement, they shall so inform the corresponding judge, who shall terminate the proceeding. However, in cases of seriousness qualified by the judge, the latter may accept the arrangement only to mitigate the penalty.

Article 155.- Appreciation of evidence Evidence shall be appreciated without the limitations that govern common processes; but the reasons for which they are denied or granted a certain value must be recorded.

The determination of the amount of damages and losses must be based on technical evidence, in accordance with civil legislation.

Article 156.- Final hearing and judgment Once the appearance has passed or all ordered evidence has been produced, the parties shall be granted a hearing so that, within a period of three days, they may argue conclusions. The judgment shall be issued within fifteen days following this period.

Article 157.- Ordinary appeals The resolutions issued in the proceeding shall have no appeal other than reconsideration (revocatoria), except the judgment and rulings that prevent the exercise of actions or defenses or that deny evidence, and those of the execution of the judgment that resolve liquidations, which may be appealed before the jurisdictional body established by the Supreme Court of Justice, within the three days following notification. However, when reviewing the judgment, the appellate body may decree nullities or order the restitutions it deems necessary for the validity of the proceeding.

Article 158.- Effects of judgments. Cassation appeal Only judgments issued by jurisdictional bodies, in matters referred to in Article 138, shall have the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). If a compensatory claim has been involved, an appeal before the Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación) established by the Supreme Court of Justice shall be admissible, when the amount in controversy of the matter permits it. The appeal shall be governed by the provisions corresponding to the third rogated instance in labor matters.

In such cases, the competence of the cassation tribunal shall be limited to pecuniary matters; it may only review the disciplinary matter and shall impose, if applicable, the corresponding sanction when the disagreement lies in the existence or non-existence of the fault attributed to the notary.

Article 160.- Costs Judgments issued in disciplinary matters shall only contain a ruling on costs when a compensatory claim has been involved. In this regard, the corresponding provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) shall apply.

Article 161.- Publication and effectiveness of suspensions Once a judgment of suspension is final (firme), a notice shall be published, one single time, in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) to report it; in addition, it shall be communicated to the Notarial Archive, the National Registry (Registro Nacional), and the Civil Registry (Registro Civil). The sanction's effectiveness shall begin eight calendar days after publication.

Both suspensions and other disciplinary measures shall be recorded in the registry that the National Directorate of Notarial Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Notariado) must maintain. The jurisdictional bodies that hear this matter must communicate them.

Article 164.- Statute of limitations period The disciplinary action prescribes within a term of two years, counted from the date on which the act giving rise to it was committed, unless it is continuous and the timely reiteration of the action or omission prevents the fulfillment of the term.

The statute of limitations is interrupted by the notification of the complaint to the notary. Once this act is carried out and while the process is being processed, no statute of limitations period shall run.

The prescription of the disciplinary power is declarable ex officio.

Article 169.- Creation of tribunals Tribunals are created with competence to hear disciplinary processes against notaries in the jurisdictional venue, with seats in the province of San José, which shall have the number of judges or sections, category, and degree of instance established by the Supreme Court of Justice.

Article 170.- Requirements for judges In notarial disciplinary matters, judges must meet the requirements of ordinary judges; in addition, experience in notarial matters, as well as specialization in Notarial and Registry Law (Derecho Notarial y Registral). They shall be governed by the judicial career system.” **II.- Admissibility of the action.** Article 75 of the cited Law of this jurisdiction provides that to file an action of unconstitutionality, it is necessary that there be a matter pending resolution before the courts of justice (which may be a habeas corpus or amparo appeal) or in the administrative avenue (in the exhaustion of administrative remedies phase), in which the constitutionality of one or several provisions being applied is questioned, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed. In this specific case, the claimant alleges that his standing derives from Article 75 first paragraph of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since there is a disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court. On this topic, the Chamber has stated:

"[When] Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, in principle, the existence of a matter pending resolution in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed, as a requirement for filing the action, it does not refer to a simple procedural formality; it is not an innocuous or inconsequential detail to complicate and hinder constitutional control; rather, it is a direct manifestation of the principle according to which the jurisdictional function, of which constitutional control is a substantial and fundamental part, is exercised through the resolution of disputes that are real and find remedy in a definitive judgment (...). It is also necessary that the action of unconstitutionality be a reasonable means of protecting the defense of the right or interest considered harmed, that is, that with the declaration of unconstitutionality eventually made by the Chamber, the claimant obtains a benefit within the process or proceeding underlying said action, without this necessarily meaning the full attainment of their claims within the prior matter (...)" (No. 1468-90 of 15:45 hours on October 30, 1990; underlining is not original).

In this case, the claimant's standing derives from the prior matter, which means that what is resolved in the action must affect the notarial disciplinary proceeding being followed against him. The claimant alleges generally that Articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150 to 158, 160, 161, 164, 169, and 170 of the Notarial Code violate the principle of separation of functions, the principle of budgetary specificity, the principle of equality, and the principle of due process, without specifically indicating which rules violate which principles or if all violate all the principles alleged. He also alleges the violation of the principles of prompt and complete justice and the principle of reasonableness and proportionality. In this sense and for the sake of order, the challenged provisions shall be analyzed according to the subject matter they regulate. Thus, Articles 18 and 19 of the Notarial Code refer to the disciplinary and other types of responsibility that notaries may incur. The claimant, however, does not substantiate the reasons why such provisions are unconstitutional, nor does he indicate which principles they harm. Hence, in relation to these rules, the action must be rejected. The next group of rules consists of Articles 138, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code, which refer to subject-matter competence, jurisdictional competence, and the creation of tribunals. In relation to these rules, the claimant alleges that they violate the principle of separation of functions and the principle of equality. Regarding the first, the claimant does not specifically indicate how the fact that jurisdictional bodies have competence to hear and resolve the disciplinary regime of Notaries affects him. For this Tribunal, the alleged lack of competence of the notarial courts to hear notarial disciplinary matters does not affect the claimant's rights. Alleging the violation of the principle of separation of functions, without justifying the concrete harm derived for him in the specific case, constitutes a mere intellectual exercise that makes the action inadmissible from that point of view. He also states that the rules harm the principle of equality, insofar as the legislator created a specialized jurisdiction to analyze the disciplinary matters of notaries. Other professionals who, like the notary public, have public faith (fé pública) (accountants, surveyors, physicians) resolve disciplinary matters before their respective professional associations (colegios profesionales) (administrative avenue) and may discuss the resolution in the contentious-administrative avenue. Regarding this topic, it is necessary to indicate that certainly, from an objective point of view, there is different treatment regarding the nature of the jurisdiction and the bodies that hear the disciplinary matters of notaries, in relation to other professionals who, like them, have public faith (fé pública). However, the challenge is inadmissible, as that different treatment does not cause any harm to the claimant's rights. On the contrary, the circumstance that those faults that the legislator deemed most serious are heard and resolved through a judicial proceeding by a jurisdictional body constitutes a full guarantee for the accused that all principles derived from due process, which must be absolutely observed in the jurisdictional avenue, shall be respected. Therefore, there is also no violation of the right to due process or the right of defense. The claimant states that some of these provisions harm the principles of due process and the right of defense. Of the challenged rules, those referring to the procedure are Articles 150 to 158 and 160 of the Notarial Code. However, the claimant only substantiates the alleged unconstitutionality of Articles 153, 157, and 158 of the cited code. Hence, the action is rejected outright in relation to all provisions, except for Articles 153, 157, and 158, which shall be analyzed later. Finally, he alleges the alleged violation by these rules of the principle of budgetary specificity, insofar as the creation of the notarial jurisdiction diverts funds from the Judicial Branch budget that could be used in matters of its competence. Given that regarding this principle the Chamber has admitted standing by diffuse interests, despite it not being the one the claimant alleges, ex officio the challenge is admitted of those rules that are related to the foregoing, namely, Articles 139, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code. Thus, Articles 138, 141, 153, 157, 158, and 169 of the Notarial Code are admitted for analysis on the merits for violation of the principles of budgetary specificity, due process, and defense. Regarding the alleged violation of the principles of prompt and complete justice and reasonableness and proportionality, a ruling is omitted because their alleged harm was not duly substantiated.

**III.- On the violation of the principle of budgetary specificity.** The claimant alleges that Articles 138, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code harm the principle of budgetary specificity because, as the notarial courts and tribunals are bodies outside the competence constitutionally assigned to the Judicial Branch, the public funds used for their operation are being misused. However, recently in judgment 2010-2892 of 14:39 hours on February 10, 2010, this Tribunal ruled on the constitutionality of the rules through which the notarial jurisdiction was created. Indeed, in said judgment it stated:

“The Chamber does not share the claimant's criterion that the work performed by the notarial courts is administrative and therefore, their creation violates the principle of budgetary specificity. The Political Constitution attributes to the Judicial Branch the possibility of creating courts to hear those matters determined by law. Precisely, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and in this case the Notarial Code, create the Notarial Courts to hear the faults committed by notaries in the exercise of their functions. According to the principle of reserve of jurisdiction, the tribunals have been established to resolve definitively the controversies or litigation submitted by the parties through the issuance of a judgment with the force of legal truth. Article 153 of the Political Constitution enunciates the hard core of the materially jurisdictional function that must be exercised privately and exclusively by the Judicial Branch through the Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice, the tribunals, and courts established by law (Article 152 ibidem). According to the provisions of Articles 154 of the Political Constitution and 1° and 2° of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it corresponds to this Branch to definitively resolve matters submitted to its knowledge and to execute the resolutions it pronounces, with the help of the public force if necessary. Precisely, in judgment 7965-06, the Chamber indicated that the hard core of the jurisdictional function consists of hearing and resolving cases with the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), a condition held by the resolutions issued by the Notarial Courts. Likewise, in judgment No. 2009-14281, it endorsed the jurisdictional function developed by these offices. In that sense, it noted:

“In the case of the disciplinary process of Notaries Public, the disciplinary matter enjoys an additional guarantee when the procedure designed by the legislator corresponds to a judicial process; consequently, the disciplinary power exercised by the State over the Notary Public is protected by the guarantees provided for judicial processes in the Political Constitution, and the same applies to those who hold these positions (Article 170 of the Notarial Law (Ley Notarial)). In this sense, the legislator establishes the corrective power in general, or the disciplinary power over those under the State's tutelage, when there is legal and regulatory coverage that allows the imposition of sanctions, proportional and excluding all arbitrariness. Consequently, if the conduct derives from a normative interpretation, it must be the result of an objective analysis of facts, contrasting the material content of a provision, regarding the functional duties and obligations of Notaries Public. In this sense, the Chamber deems it constitutionally valid for the Judge to exercise a degree of appreciation in each particular case, to verify the conduct and unravel the true content of the provisions containing the duties and obligations of the munera pubblica.” In this sense, if the notarial jurisdiction is constitutionally valid, the funds used for its creation and operation fulfill the purposes that the Political Constitution assigns to the Judicial Branch.

**IV.- On Article 153 of the Notarial Code.** The claimant alleges that Article 153 violates the principles of due process and the right of defense because its content is imperative and obligates reported notaries to answer the complaint, without the possibility of abstaining from doing so. Regarding this aspect, it is important to remind the claimant that the omission of the Notarial Code to expressly provide that the notary may abstain from testifying or answering the complaint does not mean that the right against “self-incrimination” does not apply in the notarial sanctioning procedure. The guarantee contained in Article 36 of the Political Constitution applies absolutely in criminal proceedings, but also in any sanctioning procedure, whether of a jurisdictional or administrative nature. The disciplinary proceeding processed in the notarial courts is of a sanctioning nature, so it is clear that said principle shall be mandatory for judges to observe. In this sense, it is worth recalling that the transfer and notification of the complaint provides the accused with the opportunity to address the facts alleged and to broadly exercise their right of defense. The answer to the complaint by the accused constitutes one more evidentiary element; however, in exercising their right of defense, the claimant may or may not answer the complaint, in whole or in part, if they deem it appropriate in order to protect their rights and interests, as a derivation of the guarantee contained in Article 36 of the Political Constitution, which clearly provides that no one can be compelled to testify against themselves. This guarantee is directly applicable in any proceeding, so the notary may abstain from making any statements that, in their judgment, could harm them. In each specific case, the Judge must assess said abstention and the consequences deriving therefrom.

V.- Regarding Article 157. This Tribunal analyzed the constitutionality of this article in judgment number 9083 of 15:05 hours on September 18, 2002, in which it stated:

“IV.- Regarding Article 157, it also does not violate the principles of due process. Although the right to appeal a ruling before a higher court, in general or for specific cases, is not expressly enshrined in any constitutional text, Articles 1 and 73(d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and 48 of the Constitution itself recognize, as parameters of constitutionality, both the norms and the principles, not only of the Constitution itself but also of International Law in force in Costa Rica. In this way, if from any of said sources it were possible to deduce the existence of the fundamental right invoked, the questioned provision or its interpretation would indeed be unconstitutional to the extent that they deny or exclude it. Indeed, an important derivative of due process is the right to have a higher court examine or reexamine, by means of appeal, the legality and reasonableness of every judgment or jurisdictional resolution that imposes on the person an irreparable or difficult-to-repair harm, at least when that harm affects one of their substantial fundamental rights or freedoms (of enjoyment). In this sense, it is first worth noting that Article 8.2(h) of the American Convention on Human Rights (or “Pact of San José de Costa Rica”, approved by Law No. 4534 of February 23 and ratified on April 8, 1970), is not applicable to resolve this appeal, since that international norm is limited to recognizing the right to appeal before a higher court, specifically in favor of the accused against the ruling (understood as condemnatory) in a criminal case for a crime; a situation that, obviously, has nothing to do with interlocutory resolutions issued in a disciplinary proceeding such as the one being pursued against the claimant. Today, the prevailing thesis in Public Law generally recognizes, in principle, the right to challenge procedural or preparatory acts, normally non-appealable, when they have “own effect,” that is, those that in Administrative Law are known as “separable acts (actos separables)” insofar as they cause by themselves a harm beyond the very proceeding in which they are issued, so that effect could not be corrected by the normal solution of having to wait to challenge them jointly with the final act they are intended to prepare (See, e.g., Article 163.2 General Law of Public Administration). By this right to appeal against separable acts arising from a general principle of Public Law, ergo it is a principle of constitutional law, with the same rank as its express norms (as recognized by Article 7.1 of the same General Law). In this case, although the norm excludes some acts and resolutions from being reviewed in two instances, the truth is that the main ones, those that have “own effects” or that could impede an adequate exercise of the defense, have an appeal remedy; those that do not have one, however, may be challenged together with the final resolution.” VI.- Regarding Article 158 of the Notarial Code. In relation to this provision, the Chamber ruled on its constitutionality in judgment 4867 of 14:59 hours on May 5, 2004.

“Having analyzed the provision, this Chamber considers that it does not violate any constitutional provision or principle. The circumstance that, within the disciplinary proceeding followed in the jurisdictional venue, access to the cassation appeal has been limited to those cases involving a pecuniary claim is not a violation of due process. This Chamber has already stated that, regarding remedies, the Political Constitution does not contemplate the right to a second instance as a rule, and that it is the condemnatory sentence, in criminal matters, which, under the American Convention on Human Rights, has appeal before a ‘higher judge’ (Article 8.2.h). Consequently, the fact that the judgment does not have a cassation appeal does not, per se, imply a violation of the Political Constitution, in its Articles 27, 41, 33, 46 and 153.

Thus, referring to due process and the cassation appeal, the Tribunal in judgment No. 1070-95 stated the following:

‘Whatever the amount of a matter discussed in the ordinary jurisdiction, due process is duly guaranteed, and it is for this reason that the fact that some have the option of cassation appeal and others do not is a decision of legislative policy regarding the procedure.’ Indeed, the special nature of the subject matter of the litigation, the claims of the interested parties, and the public interest at stake empower legislators to design different types of processes adapted to it, integrating the constitutional guarantees of due process. This in no way implies impairment of the right of defense.

The fact that the right to appeal in cassation is limited does not entail a violation of the principles of defense and due process, since the Notary has the possibility of filing an appeal and having the lower court’s judgment reviewed by a collegiate court in second instance. Moreover, during the process, they have had broad guarantees to defend their rights. Accordingly, the arguments put forth by the claimant regarding this point are not admissible.” VII.- Regarding Articles 161 and 164 of the Notarial Code.- The claimant challenges the content of Articles 161 and 164 of the Notarial Code, alleging that they violate the principles of due process and the right of defense. The Chamber ruled on the constitutionality of Article 161 in judgment 15390-2003 of 15:56 hours on September 11, 2003, in which it stated:

“IV.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 161 OF THE NOTARIAL CODE. From the preceding transcription, it is verified that the notification of suspension sanctions in the exercise of the notarial function has its own mechanism, differentiated from that provided in Article 2 of the Law on Notifications, Summonses and Other Judicial Communications, number 7637, regarding the following judicial actions, ‘The following shall be notified personally, at the dwelling house or the indicated address, as applicable.

1.- The first resolution for the person being notified, in any type of process.

2.- The transfer of the complaint in all processes.

3.- The resolution calling for confession or to acknowledge a document, only as a preliminary activity.

4.- The first instance judgment to the defaulting defendant.

5.- The first order setting the auction, unless a designated address for receiving notifications has already been provided.

6.- The resolution pursuing the civil damages action, unless the civil defendant has indicated an address for receiving notifications.

7.- When ordered by the court, deeming it necessary to avoid defenselessness.

8.- In other cases where the law so requires. Likewise, when the person being notified is detained, the indictment order, the request for elevation to trial or direct summons, and the order for elevation to trial shall be notified personally.

If for any reason the detained accused does not attend the full reading of the judgment, it must be notified to them personally at the place of detention.

In the cases provided for in this article, including notification by post office box, the notification shall be accompanied by copies of the writings and documents submitted by the opposing party.’ However, it can in no way be considered that this norm is contrary to Constitutional Law, or that it infringes due process. Indeed, as argued by the claimant, this principle derives from the provisions of Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and is applicable to all jurisdictional proceedings, not only criminal ones, and is understood to extend to all administrative procedures. It has been identified or equated with the concepts of ‘bilaterality of the hearing,’ ‘due legal process,’ and ‘principle of contradiction’; and it has direct implications in the various stages of the procedure, evidencing its instrumental character for the process, as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution of the proceeding. Constitutional jurisprudence has indicated, at minimum, and without this constituting a closed list, the following elements as components of due process:

‘[...] a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered person to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered person to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and of the reasons on which it is based; and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued...’ (Judgment number 15-90).

In this sense, it must be taken into account that the challenged norm does not substitute the Administration’s obligation to personally notify the notary against whom a disciplinary proceeding is being pursued, since, as previously noted, it is a guarantee that forms part of due process. It must be understood that the challenged norm is the one establishing the time period for the imposed sanction to take effect, that is, it is the norm that establishes the effective date of the imposed sanction, since it implies the suspension of the exercise of a public function, that of the notariat, due to the direct implications it has on the sphere of third parties; in the terms previously stated by this Tribunal, ‘The publication in the Judicial Bulletin provided for in Article 161 of the Notarial Code has effectiveness before third parties regarding the moment the ordered sanction enters into force. It does not produce the effects of a notification to the interested party, as that would entail leaving them in a state of complete defenselessness’ (judgment number 8197-99, of fifteen hours forty-two minutes on October twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred ninety-nine).

Hence, the form established in the challenged norm for carrying out this notification is not only pertinent but also adequate, precisely because of the effects of the sanction imposed, that of suspension in the exercise of the notariat, which directly affects and impacts third parties, understood as such, the Public Registry of Property, the Directorate of Notarial Affairs, and the potential clients of the notary. In this sense, it is necessary to consider that given the seriousness of the sanction in question, it requires general publicity, and this is achieved only through the system established in the challenged norm.” Regarding the content of Article 164 of the Notarial Code, the claimant argues that it is unconstitutional because actions do not prescribe while they are under the knowledge of the Court. They consider that the liberatory principle is all-encompassing and applicable to all obligations. Providing through a legal provision that a sanctioning proceeding is imprescriptible violates the principle of legal certainty and the subjective rights of notaries. The Chamber ruled on this norm in judgment number 6320-2003 of 14:12 hours on July 3, 2003, in which it stated the following:

“III.- IMPRESCRIPTIBLE CHARACTER OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS. Section 164 of the Notarial Code is situated, from a systematic point of view, in Chapter III, titled ‘Prescription of the Disciplinary Action’ of Title VII called ‘Of the Disciplinary Regime of Notaries.’ From this finding, it is easy to conclude that the challenged norm refers to the disciplinary or sanctioning power, which is par excellence of an administrative nature. Administrative powers, by essence, are imprescriptible, inalienable, and non-transferable (Article 66, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration); consequently, the general rule is their inextinguishable character. In this regard, it is necessary to recall that competencies or imperium powers, that is, insofar as they negatively impact – through acts of burden or unfavorable administrative acts – the sphere of the administered person or a public official subject to a special subjection relationship, are reserved to law (Article 59, first paragraph, of the General Law of Public Administration), so that their extinction by the passage of time, whether by expiration or prescription, must also be a matter reserved to law (Article 63, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration). Precisely for this reason, the ordinary legislator, on many occasions, subjects the exercise of disciplinary or sanctioning power to expiration or prescription periods for reasons of legal certainty, as happens with the first paragraph of section 164 of the Notarial Code. Under this understanding, the extinction of public or administrative powers and competencies cannot be analyzed under the perspective of rights in the field of Private Law or of penalties in the field of Criminal Law, under penalty of incurring serious legal inconsistencies.

IV.- FORMS OF INTERRUPTING PRESCRIPTION. The interruption of the prescription of a public power or competency, when expressly established in text, may be due to acts that are exhausted by their mere production or acts of continued or continuous effects. A hypothesis of interruption with continued effects is constituted by the establishment and commencement of an administrative procedure, so it must be understood that from the moment it is initiated until it is resolved by a final firm administrative act, the prescription is considered interrupted. The above does not relieve the administrative body from observing the principles of effectiveness, efficiency, celerity, procedural economy, and ex officio impulse; that is, it is not a reason or sufficient motive for the body in charge of instructing it to cause undue delays or procrastination in its processing, since, if that were to happen, the fundamental right of the interested parties to a prompt and fulfilled administrative procedure (Article 41 of the Political Constitution) would be violated. The norm accused of unconstitutionality precisely establishes a ground for interruption with continuous effects by stipulating that once the notification of the complaint to the notary has been carried out “...and while the process is being processed, no prescription period shall run.” The mere initiation of a disciplinary proceeding and its substantiation, as long as it is reasonably driven forward, makes evident the body’s will not to leave the infraction unpunished from a disciplinary point of view, so that while the procedure is pending resolution, the power cannot be extinguished. It must be taken into consideration that, in certain cases, there are very complex disciplinary proceedings that require the practice and evacuation of diverse and multiple pieces of evidence with the purpose of ascertaining the real truth of the factual and legal grounds that will support the eventual disciplinary sanction. Additionally, on certain occasions, someone subjected to a disciplinary proceeding may employ in bad faith various fraudulent and dilatory strategies and tactics to achieve a spurious extinction of the disciplinary power and, in that way, achieve their disciplinary impunity. It is important to note that the norm of the second paragraph of Article 164 of the Notarial Code is not disproportionate or irrational, since its purpose is to avoid the impunity of irregularities or infractions committed by public notaries, given the delicate and transcendental function they perform regarding the lives and assets of those who use their services and, consequently, the achievement of greater integrity, honesty, correctness, decorum, and transparency in their practice. The means employed – continued interruption while the disciplinary proceeding is being substantiated – is perfectly suited to achieving such ends of clear and profound constitutional roots.

V.- INSTRUMENTS TO AVOID UNDUE DELAYS OR PROCRASTINATION IN THE PROCESSING OF THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING. The circumstance of the continued interruption of the prescription established in the second paragraph of section 164 of the Notarial Code does not mean compelling the investigated party to have to endure sine die or ad infinitum an administrative proceeding against them. The legal system foresees and regulates a series of instruments that allow a party subjected to a disciplinary proceeding of such nature to avoid undue and unreasonable delays or procrastination that affect their right to a prompt and fulfilled procedure, such as complaints before the body itself, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, or the amparo recourse to avoid such anomalous situations.” VIII.- Conclusion.- In relation to the challenged provisions, the claimant reiterates some of the arguments that were analyzed in the partially transcribed judgments, without contributing any new element that would motivate this Tribunal to reconsider the criterion expressed in each of them. For this reason, and in relation to the articles analyzed, the action is rejected on the merits. The challenge regarding the other norms must be rejected outright, as stated.

Therefore:

The action is rejected on the merits in relation to Articles 138, 141, 153, 157, 158, and 169 of the Notarial Code. In all other respects, it is rejected outright.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.

Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional **Exp: 10-004408-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2010007787** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-eight minutes on the twenty-eighth of April, two thousand ten.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by Sergio Leiva Urcuyo, of age, notary public, bearer of identity card number 3-192-, resident of San José; against articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 and 170 of the Notarial Code.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at fourteen hours on the twenty-fifth of March, 2010, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 and 170 of the Notarial Code be declared. He alleges that said provisions violate articles 9 paragraphs 1 and 2, 10, 121, 140, 152, 153 and 177 second paragraph of the Political Constitution, which provide for the principle of division of powers, the inherent functions of the Judicial Branch, the percentage of the Republic's budget that corresponds to it, and the principle of exclusivity of jurisdiction. He also considers that they violate the principle of equality before the law contained in article 33 of the Political Constitution, which is a subjective right of all inhabitants of the Republic, insofar as notaries are the only professionals whose disciplinary proceedings are conducted in the jurisdictional channel with res judicata decisions. That procedure violates the principle of due process and defense contained in articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the principle of legal certainty, and the constitutional jurisprudence based on vote 5236-99, reiterated in judgments 1738-92 and 8858-98. The principle of swift and complete justice derived from articles 27 and 41 of the Political Constitution, defined by the Constitutional Chamber as "the fundamental right to Justice," related to that of legal certainty, legality, and effective judicial protection, is breached. The principle of budgetary specificity is violated, since funds were taken from the budget of the Judicial Branch for the creation, maintenance, and operation of the Notarial Courts and Tribunals, diminishing the resources that, by express provision of the second paragraph of article 177 of the Political Constitution, are destined to cover the expenses of this branch so that it exercises the jurisdictional function that corresponds to it. The notarial jurisdiction is not jurisdictional by its nature, but rather administrative. The control and exercise of disciplinary matters related to Notaries is a properly administrative matter, the competence of the Executive Branch. In vote 02-010070-0007-CO of May 31, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber declared the attachment of the National Directorate of Notariats to the Judicial Branch unconstitutional. Based on the reasoning of the magistrates, it is also not constitutional to create, with the denomination of Courts and Tribunals within the jurisdictional sphere, organs that will attend to the disciplinary matters of notaries, thus monitoring their conduct and professional performance, an activity that is eminently administrative, the competence of professional associations. The Legislative Branch, by enacting the notarial courts and tribunals, exceeded its power by delegating properly administrative actions to the Judicial Branch, thus violating principles of constitutional order. Certainly, the notarial courts and tribunals exercise a jurisdictional function, understood as the issuance of decisions with res judicata character, which has led some knowledgeable persons to think that there is no unconstitutionality. However, the unconstitutionality derives precisely from granting them jurisdictional powers to hear proceedings of an administrative order and nature, which does not correspond with the competencies of the Judicial Branch. The division of functions or powers and the impossibility of delegating the functions in each organ are established in article 9 of the Political Constitution. The creation of notarial courts and tribunals violates this principle, since they will hear matters of an administrative order, such as disciplinary matters, without it being validly understood that this falls under the extraordinary administrative function exercised by the Judicial Branch. The Constitutional Chamber, in vote 7965-06, indicated that by application of the constitutional principle of the reserve or exclusivity of jurisdiction, it is required that the Judicial Branch use and allocate the majority of its resources to the exercise of a materially jurisdictional function. Not doing so violates the principle of budgetary specificity. The non-existence of a College of Notaries Public does not legitimize the Legislative Assembly to transfer, through the enactment of the Notarial Code, competencies to the Judicial Branch that are not within its sphere. The only legitimate competence of the Judicial Branch in disciplinary matters is to act as a jurisdictional controller, that is, through the amparo channel or the contentious-administrative channel, where administrative sanctions can be reviewed, in accordance with the provisions of articles 48 and 49 of the Political Constitution. The claimant states that the challenged norms violate the principle of equality since notaries are the only professionals whose disciplinary proceedings are conducted in the jurisdictional channel with a res judicata decision. This constitutes different, odious, and discriminatory treatment compared to other liberal professionals, compared to public officials or those who exercise a public function, and those who hold the character of public attestors such as accountants, surveyors, and those who exercise a certifying function, among them doctors. The constitutional principle of due process and the right of defense are also violated insofar as, with the current jurisdictional proceeding, the unavoidable obligation of the Notary to answer the complaint and the threat (contained in article 163 of the Notarial Code which is challenged) that in case of not answering, a default will be declared, forces the investigated party to declare against himself, which is improper for a disciplinary investigation. Disciplinary complaints against notaries are treated by the Notarial Court like an ordinary civil action, without the existence of the constitutional guarantee of being able to abstain from declaring and of having a deadline to present evidence in a broad manner and at the time of the hearing. The challenged article 153 is imperative and obliges notaries to answer the complaint, without the possibility of abstaining from doing so, thus violating the right to abstain from declaring against oneself. The claimant indicates that the principle of legal certainty is violated, since the Notarial Court has maintained that actions do not prescribe while they are under the cognizance of the Court, as provided by article 164 of the Notarial Code. This despite the fact that the established deadlines are not respected, nor are the procedural motions filed attended to. In sanctioning matters, no action can be imprescriptible.

The principle of prompt and complete justice is also harmed, since the time limit within which the disciplinary procedure must conclude is unknown. Finally, he argues that the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is harmed.

2.- The petitioner bases his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality on the first paragraph of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. The underlying matter is a disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court, case file number 09-000181-627-NO.

3.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, on procedural grounds or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any action brought before it that is manifestly inadmissible, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a mere reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal or similar action that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.- Considering:

I.- Object of the action. The petitioner challenges the following norms of the Notarial Code:

Article 18.- Disciplinary liability Notaries shall be sanctioned disciplinarily, according to this code, for failure to comply with the law, its regulations, the norms and principles of professional ethics, the provisions issued by the National Directorate of Notariats and any of its bodies charged with carrying out functions related to notarial activity.

Article 19.- Independence of liabilities The liabilities indicated in the preceding articles are not mutually exclusive. Notaries may be sanctioned in different fields independently, simultaneously, or successively, except in cases that must be excluded by virtue of the force of res judicata of judicial rulings.

The courts of the country that hear proceedings related to improper actions by public notaries must immediately notify the National Directorate of Notariats, so that it may proceed accordingly.

Article 138.- Competence Except for sanctions that, according to this code, are the responsibility of the National Directorate of Notariats to impose, it is the competence of the Judicial Branch, through the bodies determined in this law, to exercise the disciplinary regime of public notaries and to enforce civil liability for their faults.

Article 141.- Jurisdictional competence In all other cases, disciplinary competence shall correspond to the jurisdictional bodies indicated in article 169.

Article 150.- Standing In disciplinary matters, proceedings may be initiated at the instance of the interested party or by complaint from any public office.

Article 151.- Claim for damages Those who consider themselves harmed by the notary's actions may claim, within the disciplinary procedure, the damages and losses caused to them and enforce their right against the bond posted.

If a settlement is reached regarding the compensation corresponding to the plaintiff, such settlement shall be deemed to have been reached and the plaintiff shall be understood to waive any other claim in the civil-jurisdictional route.

Article 152.- Formalities of the complaint The complaint shall be addressed to the competent body of the Judicial Branch, according to articles 140 and 141 of this code. It must indicate the corresponding facts and the evidence invoked as grounds. It may be presented orally before said body.

If a claim for damages is brought, the complainant shall be considered the plaintiff. In such case, they must litigate under the sponsorship of an attorney and indicate, in their complaint, what the damages and losses consist of and their estimation.

Article 153.- Transfer and notification Regarding the complaint and claim, as applicable, the competent body shall grant a transfer of eight days to the notary. Within that period, the notary must address the facts under investigation and offer any evidence they deem in their interest.

If the proceeding is processed before a jurisdictional body, in the same resolution the National Director of Notariats shall be considered a party, who within the same period may offer the evidence deemed pertinent.

For purposes of notification of the transfer and subsequent notifications, the rules provided for civil proceedings shall apply.

In cases of absence of the notary without a registered legal representative, notification shall be made by means of an edict published in the Judicial Bulletin, and the proceeding shall continue with a public defender.

Article 154.- Hearing The body in charge of the procedure shall order the admission of evidence that reasonably leads to the object of the debate and that which, on its own initiative, it deems necessary. To admit it, it shall convene the parties to a hearing, with a minimum of fifteen days' notice.

Only the notary, the plaintiff, their attorney, and the National Director of Notariats or the attorney official designated by him may participate in the hearing.

Documentary evidence may be sent to the case file by judicial order, when so requested.

If the competent body deems it necessary, it may commission a judicial authority for the reception of evidence.

If, at that hearing, the notary and the affected party reach an agreement, they shall so inform the corresponding judge, who will terminate the trial. However, in cases of gravity qualified by the judge, the judge may accept the settlement only to mitigate the penalty.

Article 155.- Assessment of evidence Evidence shall be assessed without the limitations that govern ordinary proceedings; but the reasons for which it is denied or granted a certain value must be stated.

Setting the amount of damages and losses must be based on technical evidence, in accordance with civil legislation.

Article 156.- Final hearing and judgment Once the hearing has concluded or all ordered evidence has been taken, the parties shall be granted a hearing so that, within a period of three days, they may present closing arguments. The judgment shall be rendered within the fifteen days following this period.

Article 157.- Ordinary remedies Resolutions issued in the procedure shall have no remedy other than reconsideration, except for the judgment and pronouncements that prevent the exercise of actions or defenses, or those that deny evidence, and those from the execution of the judgment that resolve liquidations, which may be appealed before the jurisdictional body established by the Supreme Court of Justice, within the three days following notification. However, when hearing the appeal of the judgment, the appellate body may decree any annulments or order any restitutions it deems necessary for the validity of the procedure.

Article 158.- Effects of judgments. Cassation remedy Only judgments rendered by jurisdictional bodies, in the matters referred to in article 138, shall have the authority of material res judicata. If a claim for damages was brought, a remedy shall lie before the Cassation Chamber established by the Supreme Court of Justice, when the amount in controversy so permits. The remedy shall be governed by the provisions corresponding to the third rogated instance in labor matters.

In such cases, the competence of the cassation court shall be limited to pecuniary matters; it may only review the disciplinary aspect and shall impose, if applicable, the corresponding sanction when the disagreement lies in the existence or non-existence of the fault attributed to the notary.

Article 160.- Costs Judgments rendered in disciplinary matters shall only contain a pronouncement on costs when a claim for damages was brought. On this matter, the corresponding provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply.

Article 161.- Publication and effective date of suspensions Once a judgment of suspension is final, a notice shall be published, a single time, in the Judicial Bulletin to give account of it; furthermore, it shall be communicated to the Notarial Archive, the National Registry, and the Civil Registry. The sanction shall take effect eight calendar days after publication.

Both suspensions and other disciplinary measures shall be recorded in the registry that the National Directorate of Notariats must maintain. The jurisdictional bodies that hear this matter must communicate them to it.

Article 164.- Statute of limitations period The disciplinary action prescribes in the term of two years, counted from the date when the act giving rise to it was committed, unless the act is continuous and the timely reiteration of the action or omission prevents the expiration of the period.

The statute of limitations is interrupted by the notification of the complaint to the notary. Once this act is performed and while the proceeding is being processed, no statute of limitations period shall run.

The prescription of disciplinary power is declarable ex officio.

Article 169.- Creation of courts Courts are created with competence to hear disciplinary proceedings against notaries in the jurisdictional venue, with seats in the province of San José, which shall have the number of judges or sections, category, and level of instance established by the Supreme Court of Justice.

Article 170.- Requirements for judges In notarial disciplinary matters, judges must meet the requirements of ordinary judges; in addition, experience in notarial matters, as well as specialization in Notarial and Registry Law. They shall be governed by the judicial career system." II.- Admissibility of the action. Article 75 of the cited Law of this jurisdiction provides that to bring an action of unconstitutionality, there must be a matter pending resolution before the courts of justice (which may be a remedy of habeas corpus or amparo) or in the administrative route (in the exhaustion of administrative remedies phase), in which the constitutionality of one or several provisions being applied is questioned, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed. In the specific case, the petitioner claims that his standing derives from article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as there is a disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court. On this topic, the Chamber has stated:

"[When] article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, in principle, the existence of a matter pending resolution in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed, as a requirement for bringing the action, it does not refer to a simple procedural formality; it is not an innocuous or insignificant detail to complicate and hinder constitutional control; rather, it is a direct manifestation of the principle according to which the jurisdictional function, of which constitutional control is a substantial and fundamental part, is exercised through the resolution of controversies that are real and find remedy in a definitive judgment (...). It is also necessary that the action of unconstitutionality be a reasonable means of protecting the defense of the right or interest considered harmed, that is, that with the declaration of unconstitutionality that the Chamber eventually makes, the petitioner obtains a benefit within the process or procedure underlying said action, without necessarily meaning the full obtainment of their claims within the underlying matter (...)" (No. 1468-90 of 3:45 p.m. on October 30, 1990; the underlining is not from the original).

In this case, the petitioner's standing derives from the underlying matter, which means that the decision made in the action must have an impact on the notarial disciplinary procedure being pursued against him. The petitioner generally alleges that articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150 to 158, 160, 161, 164, 169, and 170 of the Notarial Code violate the principle of separation of functions, the principle of budgetary specificity, the principle of equality, and the principle of due process, without specifically indicating which norms violate which principles or whether all violate all the alleged principles. He also alleges violation of the principles of prompt and complete justice and the principle of reasonableness and proportionality. In this sense and as a matter of order, the challenged provisions will be analyzed according to the object they regulate. Thus, articles 18 and 19 of the Notarial Code refer to the disciplinary and other types of liability that notaries may incur. The petitioner, however, does not substantiate the reasons why such provisions are unconstitutional, nor does he indicate which principles they harm. Hence, regarding these norms, the action must be rejected. The next group of norms consists of articles 138, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code, which refer to competence by subject matter, jurisdictional competence, and the creation of courts. Regarding these norms, the petitioner alleges that they violate the principle of separation of functions and the principle of equality. Regarding the first, the petitioner does not concretely indicate how he is affected by the fact that jurisdictional bodies have competence to hear and decide on the disciplinary regime of Notaries. For this Court, the alleged lack of competence of the notarial courts to hear notarial disciplinary matters does not affect the petitioner's rights. Alleging the violation of the principle of separation of functions, without justifying what specific harm derives for him in the specific case, constitutes a mere intellectual exercise that makes the action inadmissible from that point of view. He also states that the norms harm the principle of equality, insofar as the legislator created a specialized jurisdiction to analyze disciplinary matters of notaries. Other professionals who, like the public notary, have public faith (accountants, surveyors, doctors) resolve disciplinary matters before their respective professional associations (administrative route) and can discuss the decision in the contentious-administrative route. Regarding this topic, it is necessary to indicate that certainly, from an objective point of view, there is a different treatment regarding the nature of the jurisdiction and the bodies that hear disciplinary matters of notaries, in relation to other professionals who, like them, have public faith. However, the challenge is inadmissible, since that different treatment does not cause any harm to the petitioner's rights. On the contrary, the circumstance that those faults that the legislator deemed more serious are heard and resolved through a judicial procedure by a jurisdictional body constitutes a full guarantee for the accused that all the principles derived from due process will be respected, which in the jurisdictional route must be absolutely observed. Therefore, there is no violation of the right to due process or the right to defense. The petitioner states that some of those provisions harm the principles of due process and the right to defense. Of the challenged norms, those referring to the procedure are articles 150 to 158 and 160 of the Notarial Code. However, the petitioner only substantiates the presumed unconstitutionality of articles 153, 157, and 158 of the cited code. Hence, the action is rejected on procedural grounds regarding all provisions, with the exception of articles 153, 157, and 158, which will be analyzed further below. Finally, he alleges the presumed violation by those norms of the principle of budgetary specificity, insofar as the creation of the notarial jurisdiction diverts funds from the Judicial Branch budget that could be used for matters within its competence. Given that regarding this principle, the Chamber has admitted standing for diffuse interests, even though it is not the one the petitioner claims, the challenge to those norms related to the matter is admitted ex officio, namely, articles 139, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code. Thus, articles 138, 141, 153, 157, 158, and 169 of the Notarial Code are admitted for analysis on the merits for violation of the principles of budgetary specificity, due process, and defense. Regarding the presumed violation of the principles of prompt and complete justice and reasonableness and proportionality, a pronouncement is omitted because the alleged harm was not duly substantiated.

III.- Regarding the violation of the principle of budgetary specificity. The petitioner alleges that articles 138, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code harm the principle of budgetary specificity because, since the notarial courts and tribunals are bodies outside the competence constitutionally assigned to the Judicial Branch, the public funds used for their operation are being misused. However, recently in judgment 2010-2892 of 2:39 p.m. on February 10, 2010, this Court ruled on the constitutionality of the norms through which the notarial jurisdiction was created. Indeed, in said judgment, it indicated:

"The Chamber does not share the petitioner's criterion that the work performed by the notarial courts is administrative and therefore, their creation violates the principle of budgetary specificity. The Political Constitution attributes to the Judicial Branch the possibility of creating courts to hear those matters determined by law. Precisely the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and in this case the Notarial Code, create the Notarial Courts to hear the faults committed by notaries in the exercise of their functions. According to the principle of jurisdictional reservation, courts have been established to resolve the controversies or disputes submitted to them by the parties in a definitive manner through the issuance of a judgment with the force of legal truth.

Article 153 of the Political Constitution sets forth the hard core of the materially jurisdictional function that the Judicial Branch must exercise privately and exclusively through the Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice, the tribunals, and the courts established by law (article 152 ibidem). As provided in articles 154 of the Political Constitution and 1 and 2 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, this Branch is responsible for definitively resolving matters submitted for its consideration and for executing the resolutions it issues, with the assistance of public force if necessary. Precisely, in judgment 7965-06 the Chamber indicated that the hard core of the jurisdictional function consists of hearing and resolving cases with the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), a condition held by the resolutions issued by the Notarial Courts. Likewise, in judgment No. 2009-14281 it endorsed the jurisdictional function carried out by these offices. In that regard, it stated:

“In the case of the disciplinary process for Notaries Public, the disciplinary matter enjoys an additional guarantee when the procedure designed by the legislator corresponds to a judicial process; consequently, the disciplinary power exercised by the State over the Notary Public is protected by the guarantees provided for judicial processes in the Political Constitution, and likewise for those who hold these positions (article 170 of the Notarial Law). In this sense, the legislator establishes the general corrective or disciplinary power over those who are under the tutelage of the State, when there is legal and regulatory coverage that allows for the imposition of sanctions, which are proportional and exclude all arbitrariness. Consequently, if the conduct derives from a normative interpretation, it must be the result of an objective analysis of facts, contrasting the material content of a provision related to the functional duties and obligations of Notaries Public. In this regard, the Chamber considers it constitutionally valid for the Judge to exercise a degree of appreciation in each particular case, to verify the conduct and unravel the true content of the provisions that contain the duties and obligations of the public function (munera pubblica).” In this sense, if the notarial jurisdiction is constitutionally valid, the funds used for its creation and operation fulfill the purposes that the Political Constitution assigns to the Judicial Branch.

**IV.- Regarding article 153 of the Notarial Code.** The claimant alleges that article 153 violates the principles of due process and the right of defense because its content is imperative and obliges accused notaries to answer the complaint, without the possibility of refraining from doing so. In relation to this aspect, it is important to remind the claimant that the omission of the Notarial Code to expressly provide that the notary may refrain from testifying or answering the complaint does not mean that the right against “self-incrimination” does not apply in the notarial sanctioning procedure. The guarantee contained in article 36 of the Political Constitution applies absolutely in criminal proceedings, but also in any sanctioning procedure, whether jurisdictional or administrative in nature. The disciplinary process conducted in the notarial courts is of a sanctioning nature, so it is clear that this principle must be mandatorily observed by the judges. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the transfer and notification of the complaint provides the accused with the opportunity to address the alleged facts and to broadly exercise his right of defense. The answer to the complaint by the accused constitutes one more element of evidence; however, in the exercise of his right of defense, the claimant may or may not answer the complaint, doing so completely or partially, if he deems it appropriate to protect his rights and interests, as a derivation of the guarantee contained in article 36 of the Political Constitution, which clearly provides that no one can be compelled to testify against himself. This guarantee is of direct application in any process, so the notary may refrain from making any statements that, in his judgment, could harm him. In each specific case, the Judge must assess such abstention and the consequences derived from it.

**V.- Regarding article 157.** This Tribunal analyzed the constitutionality of this article in judgment number 9083 of 15:05 hours on September 18, 2002, in which it stated:

“IV.- As for article 157, it also does not violate the principles of due process. Although the right to appeal a ruling before a superior tribunal, in general or for specific cases, is not expressly enshrined in any constitutional text, articles 1 and 73 subsection d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and 48 of the Constitution itself recognize, as parameters of constitutionality, both the norms and the principles, not only of the Constitution itself but also of International Law in force in Costa Rica. In this way, if the existence of the invoked fundamental right could be deduced from any of those sources, the questioned provision or its interpretation would, indeed, be unconstitutional to the extent that they deny or exclude it. In effect, an important derivative of due process is the right to have a superior tribunal examine or re-examine, by means of an appeal, the legality and reasonableness of every judgment or jurisdictional resolution that imposes an irreparable or difficult-to-repair harm on the person, at least when that harm affects one of their substantial fundamental rights or freedoms (of enjoyment). In this sense, it is appropriate, first of all, to note that article 8.2, subsection h) of the American Convention on Human Rights (or 'Pact of San José, Costa Rica', approved by Law No. 4534 of February 23 and ratified on April 8, 1970), is not applicable to resolve the present appeal, because that international norm is limited to recognizing the right to appeal before a superior tribunal, specifically in favor of the accused against the (understand, condemnatory) ruling in a criminal case for a crime; a situation that, obviously, has nothing to do with interlocutory resolutions issued in a disciplinary process such as the one being pursued against the claimant. Today, the thesis prevails in Public Law in general that recognizes, in principle, the right to challenge procedural or preparatory acts, normally unappealable, when they have a 'self-contained effect,' that is, those which in Administrative Law are known as 'separable acts' insofar as they cause, by themselves, a harm beyond the procedure itself in which they are issued, such that this effect could not be corrected by the normal solution of having to wait to challenge them jointly with the final act they are intended to prepare (See, e.g., art., 163.2 General Law of Public Administration). Since this right to appeal against separable acts arises from a general principle of Public Law, ergo it is a right of the Constitution, with the same rank as its express norms (as recognized by art. 7.1 of the same General Law). In this case, although the norm excludes some acts and resolutions from being heard in a second instance (doble instancia), the truth is that the main ones, those that have 'self-contained effects' or that could impede an adequate exercise of defense, are subject to appeal (recurso de alzada); those that are not, however, may be challenged together with the final resolution.” **VI.- Regarding article 158 of the Notarial Code.** In relation to this provision, the Chamber ruled on its constitutionality in judgment 4867 of 14:59 hours on May 5, 2004.

“Having analyzed the provision, this Chamber considers that it does not violate any constitutional provision or principle. The circumstance that within the disciplinary process pursued in the jurisdictional venue, access to the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) has been limited to those cases where a pecuniary claim is involved, is not a violation of due process. This Chamber has already expressed that, in matters of appeals, the Political Constitution does not contemplate the right to a second instance (doble instancia), as a rule, and that it is the condemnatory judgment, in criminal matters, which, by the American Convention on Human Rights, has an appeal before a 'superior judge' (article 8.2.h). Consequently, the fact that the judgment does not have a cassation appeal does not, per se, imply a violation of the Political Constitution, in its articles 27, 41, 33, 46, and 153.

Thus, referring to due process and the cassation appeal, the Tribunal in judgment No. 1070-95 stated the following:

'Whatever the amount of a matter discussed in the ordinary jurisdiction, due process is duly guaranteed, and that is why the fact that some have the option of cassation appeal and others do not is a decision of legislative policy regarding the procedure.' In effect, the special nature of the object of the litigation, the claims of the interested parties, and the public interest involved empower legislators to design different types of processes that adapt to it, integrating the constitutional guarantees of due process. This in no way implies a detriment to the right of defense.

The fact that the right to appeal in cassation is limited does not entail a violation of the principles of defense and due process, since the Notary has the possibility of filing an appeal (recurso de apelación) and having the judgment of the a quo reviewed by a collegiate tribunal in a second instance. Furthermore, during the process, he has had ample guarantees to defend his rights. Thus, the arguments given by the claimant in relation to this point are not admissible.” **VII.- Regarding articles 161 and 164 of the Notarial Code.-** The claimant challenges the content of articles 161 and 164 of the Notarial Code, alleging that they violate the principles of due process and the right of defense. The Chamber ruled on the constitutionality of article 161 in judgment 15390-2003 of 15:56 hours on September 11, 2003, in which it stated:

**“IV.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 161 OF THE NOTARIAL CODE.** From the preceding transcription, it is verified that the notification of suspension sanctions in the exercise of the notarial function has its own mechanism, differentiated from the one provided in article 2 of the Law on Notifications, Citations, and Other Judicial Communications, number 7637, in relation to the following judicial actions:

'The following shall be notified personally, at the residence address or the indicated address, as appropriate.

1.- The first resolution for the notified party, in any kind of process.

2.- The transfer of the complaint in all processes.

3.- The resolution that calls for confession or to acknowledge a document, only as a preliminary activity.

4.- The first instance judgment to the defaulting defendant.

5.- The first order that orders the auction, unless a place for attending notifications has already been designated.

6.- The resolution that processes the civil compensatory action, unless the civil defendant has indicated a place for attending notifications.

7.- When the tribunal so orders, considering it necessary to prevent defenselessness (indefensión).

8.- In other cases where the law so requires. Likewise, when the notified party is detained, the processing order, the request for elevation to trial or direct citation, and the elevation to trial order shall be personally notified.

If for any reason the detained accused does not attend the integral reading of the judgment, this must be personally notified to him at the place of detention.

In the cases provided for in this article, including notification by post office box, the notification shall be accompanied by copies of the writings and documents submitted by the opposing party.' However, in no way can it be considered that this norm is contrary to the Law of the Constitution, or that it violates due process. Indeed, as the claimant argues, this principle derives from the provisions of articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and is applicable to all jurisdictional processes, not only criminal ones, and is understood to be extended to all administrative procedures. It has been identified or equated with the concepts of 'bilaterality of the hearing,' 'legal due process,' and 'principle of contradiction'; and it has direct implications in the various stages of the procedure, which evidences its instrumental character to the process, as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution of the procedure. Constitutional jurisprudence has indicated, as a minimum, and without this in any way constituting a closed list, the following elements as components of due process:

'[...] a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and the reasons on which it is based and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued...'(Judgment number 15-90).

In this sense, it must be considered that the challenged norm does not replace the Administration's obligation to personally notify the notary subject to a disciplinary process, since, as noted above, it is a guarantee that forms part of due process. It must be understood that the challenged norm is the one that establishes the term for the imposed sanction to take effect, that is, it is the norm that establishes the effective date of the imposed sanction, since it implies the suspension of the exercise of a public function, that of the notary, due to the direct implications it has on the sphere of third parties; in the terms previously indicated by this Tribunal, 'The publication in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) provided for in article 161 of the Notarial Code has efficacy before third parties regarding the moment the ordered sanction comes into effect. It does not produce the effects of a notification to the interested party, as that would entail leaving him in a state of complete defenselessness' (judgment number 8197-99, of fifteen hours forty-two minutes on October twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-nine).

Hence, the form established in the challenged norm for carrying out this notification is not only pertinent but also appropriate, precisely because of the effects of the sanction imposed, that of suspension in the practice of the notarial function, which directly affects and has an incidence on third parties, understood as such the Public Property Registry, the Directorate of Notarial Affairs, and the notary's potential clients. In this sense, it is necessary to consider that it is in view of the seriousness of the sanction in question that general publicity is required, and this is achieved only through the system established in the challenged norm.” Regarding the content of article 164 of the Notarial Code, the claimant argues that it is unconstitutional because actions do not prescribe while they are under the cognizance of the Court. He considers that the liberating principle is all-encompassing and applicable to all obligations. Providing through a legal provision that a sanctioning procedure is imprescriptible violates the principle of legal certainty and the subjective rights of notaries. The Chamber ruled in relation to this norm in judgment number 6320-2003 of 14:12 hours on July 3, 2003, in which it stated the following:

“III.- **IMPRESCRIPTIBLE NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS.** Article 164 of the Notarial Code is located, from a systematic point of view, in Chapter III, entitled 'Prescription of the disciplinary action' of Title VII called 'On the Disciplinary Regime for Notaries'. Based on this observation, it is easy to conclude that the challenged norm refers to the disciplinary or sanctioning power, which is quintessentially administrative in nature. Administrative powers are, by essence, imprescriptible, inalienable, and non-transferable (article 66, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration); consequently, the general rule is their inextinguishable nature. In this regard, it is necessary to remember that competencies or powers of authority, that is, insofar as they negatively affect –through acts of administrative burden (actos administrativos de gravamen) or unfavorable acts– the sphere of the administered party or a public official subject to a special relationship of subjection, are a matter reserved for law (article 59, first paragraph, of the General Law of Public Administration), so their extinction by the passage of time, whether by expiration (caducidad) or prescription (prescripción), must also be a matter reserved for law (article 63, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration). Precisely for this reason, the ordinary legislator, on many occasions, subjects the exercise of the disciplinary or sanctioning power to expiration or prescription terms for reasons of legal certainty, as happens with the first paragraph of article 164 of the Notarial Code. Under this understanding, the extinction of public or administrative powers and competencies cannot be analyzed from the perspective of rights in the field of Private Law or penalties in the field of Criminal Law, without incurring serious legal inconsistencies.

**IV.- FORMS OF INTERRUPTING PRESCRIPTION.** The interruption of the prescription of a public power or competency, when it has been established by express text, can be due to acts that are exhausted with their mere production or acts of continuous or ongoing effects. A hypothesis of interruption of continuous effects is the establishment and initiation of an administrative procedure, for which it must be understood that from the moment it is filed until it is resolved by a final, firm administrative act, the prescription is considered interrupted. The foregoing does not relieve the administrative body from observing the principles of efficacy, efficiency, speed, procedural economy, and official impulse, that is, it is not a reason or sufficient motive for the body in charge of its processing to cause undue delays or dilations in its handling, since, if this were to happen, the fundamental right of the interested parties to a prompt and fulfilled administrative procedure would be violated (article 41 of the Political Constitution). The norm accused of unconstitutionality precisely establishes a cause for interruption of continuous effects by stipulating that once the notification of the complaint to the notary is carried out '...and while the process is being processed, no prescription period shall run.' The mere initiation of a disciplinary procedure and its substantiation, as long as it is advanced reasonably, makes clear the body's will not to leave the fault unpunished from a disciplinary point of view, such that while the procedure is pending resolution, the power cannot expire. It must be taken into consideration that, in certain cases, there are very complex disciplinary procedures that require the practice and completion of diverse and multiple pieces of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the real truth of the factual and legal grounds that will support the eventual disciplinary sanction. Additionally, on certain occasions, someone subjected to a disciplinary procedure may employ, in bad faith, various fraudulent and dilatory strategies and tactics to achieve a spurious extinction of the disciplinary power and, in that way, achieve their disciplinary impunity. It is important to note that the norm of the second paragraph of article 164 of the Notarial Code is not disproportionate or irrational, since its purpose is to avoid the impunity of irregularities or faults committed by notaries public, given the delicate and transcendent function they perform with respect to the lives and assets of those who use their services and, consequently, to achieve greater integrity, honesty, correctness, decorum, and transparency in their practice. The means used –continuous interruption while the disciplinary procedure is being substantiated– perfectly suits the achievement of such ends of clear and profound constitutional roots.

**V.- INSTRUMENTS TO AVOID UNDUE DELAYS OR DILATIONS IN THE PROCESSING OF THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.** The circumstance of the continuous interruption of the prescription established in the second paragraph of article 164 of the Notarial Code, does not mean forcing the investigated party to have to endure sine die or ad infinitum an administrative procedure against him.

The legal system provides for and regulates a series of instruments that allow a party subjected to a disciplinary procedure of this nature to avoid undue and unreasonable delays or procrastinations that affect their right to a prompt and fulfilled procedure, such as complaints before the body itself, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, or the amparo appeal to prevent such anomalous situations." VIII.- Conclusion.- Regarding the challenged provisions, the claimant reiterates some of the arguments that were analyzed in the partially transcribed rulings, without providing any new element that would motivate this Tribunal to reconsider the criteria expressed in each one. For this reason, and in relation to the articles analyzed, the action is rejected on the merits. The challenge regarding the other norms must be rejected outright, as stated above.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en relación con los artículos 138, 141, 153, 157, 158 y 169 del Código Notarial. En lo demás, se rechaza de plano.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.

Articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 and 170 of the Notarial Code.

The constitutional principle of due process and the right of defense are also violated, in that with the current jurisdictional process, the unavoidable obligation of the Notary to answer the complaint and the threat (contained in Article 163 of the Notarial Code being challenged) that failure to answer will result in a declaration of default (rebeldía), forces the investigated party to testify against himself, which is improper in a disciplinary investigation. Disciplinary complaints against notaries are treated by the Notarial Court (Juzgado Notarial) like an ordinary civil action, without the constitutional guarantee of being able to abstain from testifying and of having a period to present evidence broadly and at the time of the hearing. The challenged Article 153 is imperative and obliges notaries to answer the complaint, without the possibility of abstaining from doing so, thus violating the right to abstain from testifying against oneself. The petitioner points out that the principle of legal certainty is violated, since the Notarial Court has held that actions do not prescribe while they are pending before the Court, as provided in Article 164 of the Notarial Code. This is despite the fact that the established deadlines are not respected, nor are the procedural motions filed addressed. In sanctioning matters, no action can be imprescriptible. The principle of swift and complete justice is also violated, as it is unknown within what period the disciplinary procedure must conclude. Finally, he argues that the principle of reasonableness and proportionality is violated.

**2.-** The petitioner bases his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality on the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). The prior matter is a disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court, case file number 09-000181-627-NO.

**3.-** Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any motion brought to its attention that proves to be manifestly unfounded, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a previous, identical or similar motion that was rejected.

Drawn by Magistrate **Calzada Miranda**; and, **Considering:** **I.-** **Considering:** **I.-** **Object of the action.** The petitioner challenges the following provisions of the Notarial Code (Código Notarial):

*Article 18.- Disciplinary liability* *Notaries shall be sanctioned disciplinarily, according to this code, for non-compliance with the law, its regulations, the rules and principles of professional ethics, the provisions issued by the National Directorate of Notaries (Dirección Nacional de Notariado), and any of its bodies responsible for carrying out functions related to notarial activity.* *Article 19.- Independence of liabilities* *The liabilities indicated in the preceding articles are not mutually exclusive. Notaries may be sanctioned in different fields independently, simultaneously, or successively, except in cases that must be excluded by virtue of the res judicata (fuerza de cosa juzgada) effect of judicial sentences.* *The courts of the country hearing proceedings related to improper actions by public notaries must immediately notify the National Directorate of Notaries, so that it may proceed accordingly.* *Article: 138.- Competence* *Except for the sanctions that, according to this code, correspond to the National Directorate of Notaries to impose, it is the competence of the Judicial Branch, through the bodies determined in this law, to exercise the disciplinary regime over public notaries and to enforce civil liability for their faults.* *Article 141.- Jurisdictional competence* *In all other cases, disciplinary competence shall correspond to the jurisdictional bodies indicated in Article 169.* *Article 150.- Standing* *In disciplinary matters, proceedings may be initiated at the request of the interested party or through a complaint (denuncia) from any public office.* *Article 151.- Claim for compensation (Pretensión resarcitoria)* *Those who consider themselves harmed by the notary's actions may claim, within the disciplinary procedure, the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to them and enforce their right against the bond (garantía) provided.* *If an agreement is reached regarding the compensation corresponding to the plaintiff, such agreement shall be deemed to have taken place and that the plaintiff waives any other claim in the civil-jurisdictional channel.* *Article 152.- Formalities of the complaint* *The complaint shall be addressed to the competent body of the Judicial Branch, according to Articles 140 and 141 of this code. It shall indicate the corresponding facts and the evidence invoked as grounds. It may be presented orally before said body.* *If a claim for compensation is exercised, the complainant shall be deemed the plaintiff. In such case, the latter must litigate under the sponsorship of an attorney and indicate, in their complaint, the nature of the damages (daños y perjuicios) and their estimation.* *Article 153.- Transfer and notification* *Regarding the complaint and claim, as the case may be, the competent body shall grant a transfer period of eight days to the notary. Within that period, the notary must address the facts under investigation and offer the evidence deemed to be in their interest.* *If the proceeding is processed in a jurisdictional body, the National Director of Notaries shall be considered a party in the same resolution, who within the same period may offer the evidence deemed pertinent.* *For the purposes of notification of the transfer and subsequent notifications, the provisions for civil proceedings shall apply.* *In cases of the notary's absence without a registered legal representative (apoderado), notification shall be made by means of an edict (edicto) published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), and the proceeding shall continue with a public defender (defensor público).* *Article 154.- Hearing (Comparecencia)* *The body in charge of the procedure shall order the receipt of evidence that reasonably leads to the object of the debate and that which, on its own initiative, it deems necessary. To receive it, it shall summon the parties to a hearing (comparecencia), with a minimum of fifteen days' notice.* *Only the notary, the plaintiff, their attorney, and the National Director of Notaries or the attorney-official designated by the latter may participate in the hearing.* *Documentary evidence may be submitted to the case file by order (mandamiento), when so requested.* *If the competent body deems it necessary, it may commission a judicial authority for the receipt of evidence.* *If, in that hearing, the notary and the affected party reach an agreement, they shall inform the corresponding judge, who will terminate the proceeding. However, in cases of seriousness qualified by the judge, the latter may accept the agreement only to mitigate the penalty.* *Article 155.- Assessment of evidence* *Evidence shall be assessed without the limitations governing ordinary proceedings; but the reasons for which a certain value is denied or granted must be stated.* *The determination of the amount of damages (daños y perjuicios) must be based on technical evidence, in accordance with civil legislation.* *Article 156.- Final hearing and judgment* *After the hearing (comparecencia) has concluded or all ordered evidence has been taken, the parties shall be granted a hearing so that, within a period of three days, they may present final arguments (aleguen conclusiones). The judgment (sentencia) shall be issued within the fifteen days following this period.* *Article 157.- Ordinary remedies (Recursos ordinarios)* *The resolutions issued in the proceeding shall have no remedy (recurso) other than reconsideration (revocatoria), except for the judgment (sentencia) and rulings that prevent the exercise of actions or defenses, or that deny evidence, and those from the execution of the judgment that resolve liquidations, which may be appealed (apelados) to the jurisdictional body established by the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), within the three days following notification. However, when hearing the judgment, the appellate body may decree nullities or order the restitutions it deems necessary for the validity of the proceeding.* *Article 158.- Effects of judgments. Cassation appeal (Recurso de casación)* *Only judgments (sentencias) issued by jurisdictional bodies, in the matters referred to in Article 138, shall have the authority of substantive res judicata (cosa juzgada material). If a claim for compensation (pretensión resarcitoria) was involved, an appeal (recurso) shall be admissible before the Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación) established by the Supreme Court of Justice, when the amount in controversy allows it. The appeal shall be governed by the provisions corresponding to the third instance by petition (tercera instancia rogada) in labor matters.* *In such cases, the competence of the cassation court shall be limited to pecuniary matters; it may only review the disciplinary aspect and shall impose, if applicable, the corresponding sanction when the disagreement lies in the existence or non-existence of the fault attributed to the notary.* *Article 160.- Costs (Costas)* *Judgments (sentencias) issued in disciplinary matters shall only contain a ruling on costs (costas) when a claim for compensation (pretensión resarcitoria) was involved. In this regard, the corresponding provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) shall apply.* *Article 161.- Publication and effectiveness of suspensions* *Once a judgment (sentencia) of suspension is final (firme), a notice shall be published, once only, in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) to report it; furthermore, it shall be communicated to the Notarial Archive (Archivo Notarial), the National Registry (Registro Nacional), and the Civil Registry (Registro Civil). The effectiveness of the sanction shall begin eight calendar days after publication.* *Both suspensions and other disciplinary measures shall be recorded in the registry that the National Directorate of Notaries must keep. The jurisdictional bodies hearing this matter must communicate them to the Directorate.* *Article 164.- Statute of limitations (Plazo de prescripción)* *The disciplinary action prescribes within a term of two years counted from the date the act giving rise to it was committed, unless the act is continuous and the timely reiteration of the action or omission prevents the fulfillment of the term.* *The statute of limitations is interrupted by the notification of the complaint (denuncia) to the notary. Once this act has been performed and while the proceeding is underway, no statute of limitations period shall run.* *The statute of limitations on disciplinary power is declarable ex officio (de oficio).* *Article 169.- Creation of courts* *Courts are created with competence to hear disciplinary proceedings against notaries in the jurisdictional venue, with seats in the province of San José, which shall have the number of judges or sections, category, and degree of instance established by the Supreme Court of Justice.* *Article 170.- Requirements for judges* *In notarial disciplinary matters, judges must meet the requirements of ordinary judges; in addition, experience in notarial matters, as well as a specialty in Notarial and Registry Law. They shall be governed by the judicial career system."* **II.- Admissibility of the action**. Article 75 of the aforementioned Law of this jurisdiction provides that to bring an action of unconstitutionality, there must be a matter pending resolution before the courts of justice (which may be a habeas corpus or amparo appeal) or in the administrative channel (at the exhaustion of administrative remedies phase), in which the constitutionality of one or more provisions being applied is challenged, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered violated. In the specific case, the petitioner claims that his standing derives from the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as there is a disciplinary proceeding being processed against him before the Notarial Court. On this topic, the Chamber has stated:

*"[When] Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction requires, in principle, the existence of a matter pending resolution in which unconstitutionality is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered violated, as a requirement for filing the action, it does not refer to a simple procedural formality; it is not an innocuous or irrelevant detail intended to complicate and hinder constitutional control; rather, it is a direct manifestation of the principle according to which the jurisdictional function, of which constitutional control is a substantial and fundamental part, is exercised through the resolution of controversies that are real and find remedy in a final judgment (...). It is also necessary that the action of unconstitutionality be a reasonable means of protecting the defense of the right or interest considered violated, that is, that with the declaration of unconstitutionality that the Chamber eventually makes, the petitioner obtains a benefit within the process or proceeding underlying said action, without this necessarily meaning obtaining the full satisfaction of their claims within the prior matter (...)" (No. 1468-90 of 3:45 p.m. on October 30, 1990; the underlining is not from the original).* In this case, the petitioner's standing derives from the prior matter, which means that what is resolved in the action must have an impact on the notarial disciplinary proceeding being pursued against him. The petitioner alleges in a general manner that Articles 18, 19, 138, 141, 150 to 158, 160, 161, 164, 169, and 170 of the Notarial Code violate the principle of separation of functions, the principle of budgetary specificity (especialidad presupuestaria), the principle of equality, and the principle of due process, without specifically indicating which norms violate which principles or whether all violate all the principles alleged. He also alleges that the principles of swift and complete justice and the principle of reasonableness and proportionality are violated. In this sense and as a matter of order, the challenged provisions will be analyzed according to the object they regulate. Thus, Articles 18 and 19 of the Notarial Code refer to disciplinary and other types of liability that notaries may incur. The petitioner, however, does not provide grounds for the reasons why such provisions are unconstitutional, nor does he indicate which principles they violate. Hence, in relation to those norms, the action must be rejected. The following group of norms is formed by Articles 138, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code, which refer to subject-matter competence, jurisdictional competence, and the creation of courts. In relation to these norms, the petitioner alleges that they violate the principle of separation of functions and the principle of equality. In relation to the former, the petitioner does not specifically indicate how the fact that jurisdictional bodies have competence to hear and resolve the disciplinary regime of Notaries affects him. For this Court, the alleged lack of competence of the notarial courts to hear notarial disciplinary matters does not affect the petitioner's rights. Alleging a violation of the principle of separation of functions, without justifying what the specific harm derived for him in the specific case is, constitutes a mere intellectual exercise that makes the action inadmissible from that standpoint. He also states that the norms violate the principle of equality, in that the legislator created a specialized jurisdiction to analyze the disciplinary matters of notaries. Other professionals who, like the public notary, have public faith (contadores, topógrafos, médicos) resolve disciplinary matters before their respective professional associations (vía administrativa) and can challenge the decision in the contentious-administrative channel. In relation to this topic, it is necessary to indicate that certainly, from an objective standpoint, there is a different treatment regarding the nature of the jurisdiction and the bodies that hear the disciplinary matters of notaries, in relation to other professionals who, like them, have public faith. However, the challenge is unfounded, as this different treatment does not cause any harm to the petitioner's rights. On the contrary, the circumstance that those faults that the legislator considered more serious are heard and resolved through a judicial proceeding by a jurisdictional body constitutes a full guarantee for the accused that all the principles derived from due process, which must be absolutely observed in the jurisdictional channel, will be respected. Therefore, there is also no violation of the right to due process or the right of defense. The petitioner states that some of those provisions violate the principles of due process and the right of defense. Of the challenged norms, those referring to the procedure are Articles 150 to 158 and 160 of the Notarial Code. However, the petitioner only provides grounds for the alleged unconstitutionality of Articles 153, 157, and 158 of the cited code. Hence, the action is rejected outright in relation to all provisions, with the exception of Articles 153, 157, and 158, which will be analyzed below. Finally, he alleges the presumed violation by these norms of the principle of budgetary specificity, in that the creation of the notarial jurisdiction diverts funds from the Judicial Branch's budget that could be used for matters within its competence. Given that, regarding this principle, the Chamber has admitted standing based on diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although it is not the one the petitioner claims, ex officio the challenge is admitted for those norms related to the matter, namely, Articles 139, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code. Thus, Articles 138, 141, 153, 157, 158, and 169 of the Notarial Code are admitted for analysis on the merits for violation of the principles of budgetary specificity, due process, and defense.

Regarding the alleged violation of the principles of swift and complete justice and reasonableness and proportionality, a ruling is omitted because its alleged injury was not duly substantiated.

**III.- Regarding the violation of the principle of budgetary specificity.** The claimant alleges that articles 138, 141, and 169 of the Notarial Code violate the principle of budgetary specificity because, since the notarial courts and tribunals are bodies outside the jurisdiction constitutionally assigned to the Judicial Branch, the public funds used for their operation are being misused. However, recently in ruling 2010-2892 of 14:39 hours on February 10, 2010, this Court ruled on the constitutionality of the rules through which the notarial jurisdiction was created. In fact, in said ruling it stated:

*"The Chamber does not share the claimant's opinion that the work performed by the notarial courts is administrative and, therefore, their creation violates the principle of budgetary specificity. The Political Constitution attributes to the Judicial Branch the possibility of creating courts to hear those matters determined by law. Precisely, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, and in this case the Notarial Code, create the Notarial Courts to hear offenses committed by notaries in the exercise of their functions. According to the principle of jurisdictional reservation, the courts have been established to resolve the controversies or disputes submitted to them by the parties in a definitive manner through the issuance of a judgment with the force of legal truth. Article 153 of the Political Constitution enunciates the hard core of the materially jurisdictional function that the Judicial Branch must exercise exclusively and privately through the Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice, and the tribunals and courts established by law (article 152 ibidem). According to the provisions of articles 154 of the Political Constitution and 1° and 2° of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is the responsibility of this Branch to definitively resolve the matters submitted to its knowledge and to execute the resolutions it pronounces, with the help of the public force if necessary. Precisely, in ruling 7965-06 the Chamber indicated that the hard core of the jurisdictional function consists of hearing and resolving cases with the authority of material res judicata, a condition met by the resolutions issued by the Notarial Courts. Likewise, in ruling No. 2009-14281 it endorsed the jurisdictional function carried out by these offices. In that regard, it stated:* *"In the case of the disciplinary process for Public Notaries, the disciplinary matter enjoys an additional guarantee when the procedure designed by the legislator corresponds to a judicial process; consequently, the disciplinary power exercised by the State over the Public Notary is protected by the guarantees provided for judicial processes in the Political Constitution, and the same applies to those who hold these positions (article 170 of the Notarial Law). In this sense, the legislator establishes the corrective power in general, or the disciplinary power over those under the State's tutelage, when the legal and regulatory coverage exists to allow the imposition of sanctions, which are proportional and exclude all arbitrariness. Consequently, if the conduct derives from a normative interpretation, it must be the result of an objective analysis of facts, contrasting the material content of a provision pertaining to the official duties and obligations of Public Notaries. In this regard, the Chamber considers it constitutionally valid for the Judge to exercise a degree of appreciation in each particular case, to verify the conduct and unravel the true content of the provisions containing the duties and obligations of the munera pubblica."* In this sense, if the notarial jurisdiction is constitutionally valid, the funds used for its creation and operation fulfill the purposes that the Political Constitution assigns to the Judicial Branch.

**IV.- Regarding article 153 of the Notarial Code.** The claimant alleges that article 153 violates the principles of due process and the right of defense insofar as its content is imperative and obligates denounced notaries to answer the complaint, with no possibility of abstaining from doing so. In relation to this aspect, it is important to remind the claimant that the Notarial Code's omission of an express provision stating that the notary may abstain from testifying or answering the complaint does not mean that the right against "self-incrimination" does not apply in the notarial sanctioning procedure. The guarantee contained in article 36 of the Political Constitution applies absolutely in criminal proceedings, but also in any sanctioning procedure, whether of a jurisdictional or administrative nature. The disciplinary process conducted in the notarial courts is of a sanctioning nature, so it is clear that this principle must be mandatorily observed by the judges. In this sense, it is worth recalling that the transfer and notification of the complaint provides the accused with the opportunity to refer to the facts being charged and to broadly exercise their right of defense. The answer to the complaint by the accused constitutes one more element of proof; however, in exercising their right of defense, the claimant may or may not answer the complaint, in whole or in part, as they deem appropriate in order to protect their rights and interests, as a derivation of the guarantee contained in article 36 of the Political Constitution, which clearly provides that no one can be compelled to testify against themselves. This guarantee is directly applicable in any proceeding, so the notary may abstain from making any statements that, in their judgment, could harm them. In each specific case, the Judge must assess said abstention and the consequences derived from it.

**V.- Regarding article 157.** This Court analyzed the constitutionality of this article in ruling number 9083 of 15:05 hours on September 18, 2002, in which it stated:

*"IV.- Regarding article 157, it also does not violate the principles of due process. Although the right to appeal a ruling before a superior court, in general or for specific cases, is not expressly enshrined in any constitutional text, articles 1° and 73(d) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and 48 of the Constitution itself recognize, as parameters of constitutionality, both the norms and the principles, not only of the Constitution itself but also of the International Law in force in Costa Rica. In this way, if from any of said sources it were possible to deduce the existence of the fundamental right invoked, the questioned provision or its interpretation would, effectively, be unconstitutional to the extent that they deny or exclude it. Indeed, an important derivative of due process is the right to have a superior court examine or re-examine, by way of appeal, the legality and reasonableness of every judgment or jurisdictional resolution that imposes on the person an irreparable or difficult-to-repair harm, at least when that harm affects one of their substantial fundamental rights or freedoms (of enjoyment). In this sense, it is first appropriate to note that article 8.2(h) of the American Convention on Human Rights (or "Pact of San José de Costa Rica", approved by Law No. 4534 of February 23 and ratified on April 8, 1970), is not applicable to resolve this appeal, since that international norm is limited to recognizing the right to appeal before a superior court, specifically in favor of the accused against a final judgment (understood as a conviction) in a criminal case for a crime; a situation that, obviously, has nothing to do with interlocutory resolutions issued in a disciplinary process such as the one being pursued against the claimant. Nowadays, the prevailing thesis in Public Law in general recognizes, in principle, the right to challenge procedural or preparatory acts, normally non-appealable, when they have an "independent effect", that is, what in Administrative Law are known as "separable acts" insofar as they cause harm by themselves beyond the procedure itself in which they are issued, so that this effect could not be corrected with the normal solution of having to wait to challenge them together with the final act they are intended to prepare (See, e.g., art. 163.2 General Law of Public Administration). Since this right to appeal against separable acts arises from a general principle of Public Law, ergo, from the law of the Constitution, it holds the same rank as its express norms (as recognized by art. 7.1 of the same General Law). In this case, although the norm excludes some acts and resolutions from being heard in a two-tier system, the truth is that the main ones, those that have "independent effects" or that could impede an adequate exercise of the defense, have an appeal; those that do not, however, may be challenged together with the final resolution."* **VI.- Regarding article 158 of the Notarial Code.** In relation to this provision, the Chamber ruled on its constitutionality in ruling 4867 of 14:59 hours on May 5, 2004.

*"Having analyzed the provision, this Chamber considers that it does not violate any constitutional provision or principle. The circumstance that, within the disciplinary process conducted in a judicial venue, access to the cassation appeal has been limited to those cases involving a pecuniary claim is not a violation of due process. This Chamber has already expressed that, in matters of appeals, the Political Constitution does not contemplate the right to a two-tier system as a rule, and that it is the conviction in criminal matters that, under the American Convention on Human Rights, has an appeal before a "superior judge" (article 8.2.h). Consequently, the fact that the judgment does not have a cassation appeal does not imply, per se, a violation of the Political Constitution, in its articles 27, 41, 33, 46, and 153.* *Thus, referring to due process and the cassation appeal, the Court in ruling No. 1070-95 stated the following:* *"Whatever the amount of a matter discussed in the ordinary jurisdiction, due process is duly guaranteed, and that is why the fact that some have the option of the cassation appeal and others do not is a legislative policy decision regarding the procedure."* *In effect, the special nature of the object of the dispute, the claims of the interested parties, and the public interest involved empower legislators to design different types of processes adapted to it, integrating the constitutional guarantees of due process. This in no way implies detriment to the right of defense.* *The fact that the right to appeal in cassation is limited does not entail a violation of the principles of defense and due process, since the Notary has the possibility of filing an appeal and having the judgment of the a quo reviewed by a collegiate court in a second instance. Furthermore, during the process, the Notary has had broad guarantees to defend their rights. Thus, the arguments given by the claimant regarding this point are not receivable."* **VII.- Regarding articles 161 and 164 of the Notarial Code.-** The claimant challenges the content of articles 161 and 164 of the Notarial Code, alleging that they violate the principles of due process and the right of defense. The Chamber ruled on the constitutionality of article 161 in ruling 15390-2003 of 15:56 hours on September 11, 2003, in which it was stated:

***"IV.- ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 161 OF THE NOTARIAL CODE.** *From the preceding transcription, it is verified that the notification of sanctions of suspension from the exercise of the notarial function have their own mechanism, differentiated from that provided in article 2 of the Law on Notifications, Citations, and other Judicial Communications, number 7637, in relation to the following judicial actions,* *"The following shall be notified personally, at the place of residence or the indicated address, as applicable:* *1.- The first resolution for the person to be notified, in any type of process.* *2.- The transfer of the complaint in all processes.* *3.- The resolution calling for confession or to acknowledge a document, solely as a prior activity.* *4.- The first-instance judgment to the defaulting defendant.* *5.- The first order scheduling an auction, unless a place for receiving notifications has already been designated.* *6.- The resolution processing the civil compensatory action, unless the civil defendant has indicated a place for receiving notifications.* *7.- When ordered by the court, deeming it necessary to prevent defenselessness.* *8.- In other cases as required by law. Likewise, when the person to be notified is detained, the indictment order, the request for committal to trial or for direct citation, and the committal order shall be personally notified.* *If for any reason the detained accused does not attend the full reading of the judgment, it must be personally notified at the place of detention.* *In the cases provided for in this article, including notification by postal box, the notification shall be accompanied by copies of the writings and documents presented by the opposing party."* *However, in no way can it be considered that this norm is contrary to the Law of the Constitution, or that it infringes upon due process. Effectively, as argued by the claimant, this principle derives from the provisions of articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and is applicable to all jurisdictional processes, not only criminal ones, and is understood to extend to all administrative procedures. It has been identified or equated with the concepts of "bilateral hearing", "due legal process", and "principle of contradiction"; and has direct implications in the various stages of the procedure, which demonstrates its instrumental character in the process, as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution of the procedure. Constitutional jurisprudence has indicated, at a minimum, and without this in any way constituting a closed list, the following elements as components of due process:* *"[...] a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and the grounds on which it is based and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued..."(Ruling number 15-90).* *In this sense, it must be taken into account that the challenged norm does not replace the Administration's obligation to personally notify the notary who is subject to a disciplinary process, since, as previously indicated, it is a guarantee that forms part of due process. It must be understood that the challenged norm is the one that establishes the period for the imposed sanction to take effect, that is, it is the norm that establishes the effective date of the imposed sanction, given that it implies the suspension of the exercise of a public function, that of the notary profession, due to the direct implications it has on the sphere of third parties; in the terms previously indicated by this Tribunal,* *"The publication in the Judicial Bulletin provided for in article 161 of the Notarial Code is effective before third parties regarding the moment the ordered sanction enters into force. It does not produce the effects of a notification to the interested party, as that would leave them in a state of complete defenselessness" (ruling number 8197-99, at fifteen hours and forty-two minutes on October twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-nine).* *Hence, the form established in the challenged norm for carrying out this notification is not only pertinent but adequate, precisely because of the effects of the sanction imposed—suspension from the exercise of the notary profession—which has a direct impact and incidence on third parties, understood as the Public Registry of Property, the Notarial Directorate, and the notary's potential clients. In this sense, it is necessary to consider that due to the seriousness of the sanction in question, it requires general publicity, and this is achieved solely through the system established in the challenged norm."* Regarding the content of article 164 of the Notarial Code, the claimant argues that it is unconstitutional because actions do not prescribe while they are under the Court's consideration. They consider that the liberating principle is all-encompassing and applicable to all obligations. Providing through a legal provision that a sanctioning procedure is imprescriptible violates the principle of legal certainty and the subjective rights of notaries. The Chamber ruled in relation to this norm in ruling number 6320-2003 of 14:12 hours on July 3, 2003, in which it stated the following:

*"III.- **IMPRESCRIPTIBLE NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS.** Ordinal 164 of the Notarial Code is placed, from a systematic point of view, in Chapter III, titled "Prescription of the disciplinary action" of Title VII called "On the Disciplinary Regime for Notaries". From this observation, it is easy to conclude that the challenged norm refers to the disciplinary or sanctioning power, which is par excellence of an administrative nature. Administrative powers, by essence, are imprescriptible, inalienable, and non-transferable (article 66, paragraph 1°, of the General Law of Public Administration), consequently, the general rule is their inextinguishable character. In this regard, it is necessary to remember that competencies or powers of authority, that is, insofar as they have a negative impact – through acts of administrative sanction or unfavorable acts – on the sphere of the administered party or a public official subject to a special relationship of subjection, are reserved to law (article 59, first paragraph, of the General Law of Public Administration), so that their extinction over time, whether by expiration or prescription, must also be a matter reserved to law (article 63, paragraph 2°, of the General Law of Public Administration). Precisely for this reason, the ordinary legislator, on many occasions, subjects the exercise of the disciplinary or sanctioning power to expiration or prescription periods for reasons of legal certainty, as occurs with the first paragraph of numeral 164 of the Notarial Code. Under this understanding, the extinction of public or administrative powers and competencies cannot be analyzed from the perspective of rights in the field of Private Law or penalties in the field of Criminal Law, under penalty of incurring serious legal inconsistencies.* ***IV.- FORMS OF INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION.** *The interruption of the prescription of a public power or competency, when it has been expressly established, can be due to acts that are exhausted with their sole production or acts of continued or continuous effects. One hypothesis of interruption with continued effects is the establishment and initiation of an administrative procedure; therefore, it must be understood that from the moment it is initiated until it is resolved by a final administrative act, the prescription is considered interrupted. The foregoing does not relieve the administrative body from observing the principles of efficacy, efficiency, celerity, procedural economy, and ex officio impulse; that is, it is not a reason or sufficient motive for the body responsible for instructing it to cause undue delays or dilations in its processing, since, if this were to happen, the fundamental right of the interested parties to a swift and complete administrative procedure would be violated (article 41 of the Political Constitution). The norm accused of unconstitutionality precisely establishes a cause for interruption with continuous effects by stipulating that once the notification of the complaint to the notary has been carried out "...and while the process is being conducted, no prescription period shall run". The mere initiation of a disciplinary procedure and its substantiation, as long as it is pursued reasonably, makes clear the body's will not to leave the offense unpunished from a disciplinary point of view, in such a way and manner that while the procedure is pending resolution, the power cannot be extinguished.*" It must be taken into consideration that, in certain cases, there are very complex disciplinary procedures that require the practice and discharge of diverse and multiple pieces of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the real truth of the factual and legal grounds that will support the eventual disciplinary sanction. Additionally, on certain occasions, a person subjected to a disciplinary procedure may employ, in bad faith, various fraudulent and dilatory strategies and tactics to achieve a spurious extinction of the disciplinary power and, in that way, secure their disciplinary impunity. It is important to note that the provision of the second paragraph of article 164 of the Código Notarial is not disproportionate or irrational, since its purpose is to avoid the impunity of irregularities or faults committed by notaries public, given the delicate and transcendent function they fulfill regarding the life and assets of those who use their services and, consequently, the achievement of greater integrity, honesty, correctness, decorum, and transparency in their practice. The means employed—continued interruption while the disciplinary procedure is ongoing—is perfectly suited to the achievement of such ends of clear and profound constitutional foundation.

**V.- INSTRUMENTS TO AVOID UNDUE DELAYS OR DILATORY TACTICS IN THE PROCESSING OF THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE.** The circumstance of the continued interruption of the statute of limitations (prescripción) established in the second paragraph of ordinal 164 of the Código Notarial does not mean obliging the investigated party to have to endure sine die or ad infinitum an administrative procedure against them. The legal system provides for and regulates a series of instruments that allow a party subjected to a disciplinary procedure of such nature to avoid undue and unreasonable delays or dilatory tactics that affect their right to a prompt and complete procedure, such as complaints before the body itself, the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, or the recurso de amparo to avoid such anomalous situations." **VIII.- Conclusion.-** Regarding the challenged provisions, the petitioner reiterates some of the arguments that were analyzed in the partially transcribed rulings, without providing any new element that would motivate this Court to reconsider the criterion expressed in each of them. For this reason, and in relation to the articles analyzed, the action is rejected on the merits. The challenge concerning the other norms must be rejected outright, according to what has been stated.

**Por tanto:** Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en relación con los artículos 138, 141, 153, 157, 158 y 169 del Código Notarial. En lo demás, se rechaza de plano.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.

**EXPEDIENTE N° 10-004408-0007-CO**

hmendez hmendez 2 0 2010-09-08T15:37:00Z 2010-09-08T15:37:00Z 5 7567 41620 Poder Judicial 346 98 49089 12.00 21 false false false ES-CR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 *100044080007CO* Res. Nº 2010007787 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas y cincuenta y ocho minutos del veintiocho de abril del dos mil diez.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Sergio Leiva Urcuyo, mayor, notario público, portador de la cédula de identidad número 3-192-, vecino de San José; contra los artículos 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 y 170 del Código Notarial.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las catorce horas del veinticinco de marzo del 2010, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 18, 19, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 y 170 del Código Notarial. Alega que dichas disposiciones lesionan los artículos 9 párrafos 1 y 2, 10, 121, 140, 152, 153 y 177 párrafo segundo de la Constitución Política, los cuales disponen sobre el principio de división de poderes, las funciones propias del Poder Judicial, el porcentaje del presupuesto de la República que le corresponde y el principio de exclusividad de la jurisdicción. Estima además que violan el principio de igualdad ante la ley contenido en el artículo 33 de la Constitución Política, que es un derecho subjetivo de todos los habitantes de la República, en tanto los notarios son los únicos profesionales cuyos procesos disciplinarios que se ventilan en la vía jurisdiccional con resoluciones de cosa juzgada. Ese procedimiento lesiona el principio del debido proceso y de defensa contenido en los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, así como los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, el principio de seguridad jurídica y la jurisprudencia constitucional a partir del voto 5236-99, reiterado en las sentencias 1738-92 y 8858-98. Se incumple el principio de justicia pronta y cumplida derivado de los artículos 27 y 41 de la Constitución Política, definido por la Sala Constitucional como “el derecho fundamental a la Justicia”, relacionado con el de seguridad jurídica, legalidad y la tutela judicial efectiva. Se violenta el principio de especialidad presupuestaria, pues se tomaron fondos del presupuesto del Poder Judicial, para la creación, mantenimiento y función de los Juzgados y Tribunales Notariales, disminuyendo los recursos que por disposición expresa del párrafo segundo del artículo 177 de la Constitución Política, tienen como destino sufragar los gastos de este poder para que ejerza la función jurisdiccional que le corresponde. La jurisdicción notarial no es jurisdiccional por su naturaleza, sino administrativa. El control y ejercicio de la materia disciplinaria relacionada con los Notarios es materia administrativa propiamente dicha, competencia del Poder Ejecutivo. En el voto 02-010070-0007-CO del 31 de mayo del 2006, la Sala Constitucional declaró inconstitucional la adscripción de la Dirección Nacional de Notariado al Poder Judicial. A partir del razonamiento de los señores magistrados, tampoco resulta constitucional crear con la denominación de Juzgados y Tribunales dentro del ámbito jurisdiccional, órganos que atenderán la materia disciplinaria de los notarios, vigilando así su conducta y desempeño profesional, actividad que es eminentemente administrativa, competencia de los colegios profesionales. El Poder Legislativo al promulgar los juzgados y tribunales notariales, sobrepasó su potestad al delegar en el Poder Judicial actuaciones propiamente administrativas, violentando así principios de orden constitucional. Ciertamente, los juzgados y tribunales notariales ejercen una función jurisdiccional, entendida como la emanación de resoluciones de carácter de cosa juzgada, lo que ha hecho pensar a algunos conocedores que no hay inconstitucionalidad. Sin embargo, la inconstitucionalidad deriva justamente de darle potestades jurisdiccionales para que conozcan de procesos de orden y naturaleza administrativa lo que no corresponde con las competencias del Poder Judicial. La división de funciones o poderes y la imposibilidad de delegar las funciones en cada órgano, están establecidas en el artículo 9 de la Constitución Política. La creación de juzgados y tribunales notariales lesiona este principio, pues van a conocer materia de orden administrativo como lo es la materia disciplinaria, sin que pueda entenderse válidamente que se está en presencia de la función administrativa extraordinaria que ejerce el Poder Judicial. La Sala Constitucional, en el voto 7965-06 señaló que por aplicación del principio constitucional de la reserva o exclusividad de jurisdicción se impone que el Poder Judicial debe utilizar y destinar la mayoría de sus recursos al ejercicio de una función, materialmente, jurisdiccional. No hacerlo así, lesiona el principio de especialidad presupuestaria. La inexistencia de un Colegio de Notarios Públicos no legitima a la Asamblea Legislativa para trasladarle mediante la promulgación del Código Notarial, competencias al Poder Judicial que no son de su ámbito. La única competencia legítima del Poder Judicial en materia disciplinaria es fungir como contralor jurisdiccional, sea mediante la vía de amparo o de la contencioso-administrativa, donde puedan revisarse las sanciones administrativas, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 48 y 49 de la Constitución Política. Manifiesta el accionante que las normas impugnadas lesionan el principio de igualdad pues los notarios son los únicos profesionales cuyos procesos disciplinarios se ventilan en la vía jurisdiccional con resolución de cosa juzgada. Ello constituye un trato diferente, odioso y discriminante frente a otros profesionales liberales, frente a los funcionarios públicos o quienes ejercen una función pública y los que ostentan el carácter de fedatarios públicos como los contadores, los topógrafos y los que ejercen una función certificadora, entre ellos los médicos. También se viola el principio constitucional del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa en tanto con el actual proceso jurisdiccional, la obligación ineludible del Notario de contestar la demanda y la amenaza (contenida en el artículo 163 del Código Notarial que se impugna) de que en caso de no contestar se declarará una rebeldía, se obliga al investigado a declarar contra sí mismo, lo que resulta impropio de una investigación disciplinaria. Las denuncias disciplinarias en contra de los notarios son tratadas por el Juzgado Notarial como una acción ordinaria civil, sin que exista la garantía constitucional de poder abstenerse de declarar y de tener un plazo para presentar pruebas de manera amplia y al momento de la audiencia. El artículo 153 impugnado es imperativo y obliga a los notarios a contestar la demanda, sin posibilidad de abstenerse de hacerlo, lesionando así el derecho a abstenerse a declarar contra sí mismo. Señala el accionante que se viola el principio de seguridad jurídica, pues el Juzgado Notarial ha sostenido que las acciones no prescriben mientras estén en conocimiento del Juzgado, según dispone el artículo 164 del Código Notarial. Esto a pesar de que los plazos establecidos no se respetan, ni se atienden las gestiones procesales que se interponen. En materia sancionatoria ninguna acción puede ser imprescriptible. También se lesiona el principio de justicia pronta y cumplida, pues se desconoce en qué plazo debe concluir el procedimiento disciplinario. Finalmente, aduce que se lesiona el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.

2.- El accionante fundamenta la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. El asunto previo es un proceso disciplinario que se tramita en su contra ante el Juzgado Notarial, expediente número 09-000181-627-NO.

3.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta la Magistrada Calzada Miranda; y,

Considerando:

I.- Considerando:

I.- Objeto de la acción. El accionante impugna las siguientes normas del Código Notarial:

Artículo 18.- Responsabilidad disciplinaria Los notarios serán sancionados disciplinariamente, según este código, por el incumplimiento de la ley, sus reglamentos, las normas y los principios de la ética profesional, las disposiciones que dicten la Dirección Nacional de Notariado y cualquiera de sus órganos encargados de cumplir funciones relacionadas con la actividad notarial.

Artículo 19.- Dependencia de las responsabilidades Las responsabilidades indicadas en los artículos anteriores, no son excluyentes entre sí. Los notarios pueden ser sancionados en distintos campos en forma independiente, simultánea o sucesiva, a excepción de los casos que deban excluirse en virtud de la fuerza de cosa juzgada de las sentencias judiciales.

Los tribunales del país que conozcan de procesos relacionados con actuaciones indebidas de los notarios públicos, deberán comunicarlo de inmediato a la Dirección Nacional de Notariado, para que proceda de conformidad.

Artículo: 138.- Competencia Excepto las sanciones que, según este código, le corresponde imponer a la Dirección Nacional de Notariado, es competencia del Poder Judicial, por medio de los órganos determinados en la presente ley, ejercer el régimen disciplinario de los notarios públicos y hacer efectiva la responsabilidad civil por sus faltas.

Artículo 141.- Competencia jurisdiccional En todos los demás casos, la competencia disciplinaria les corresponderá a los órganos jurisdiccionales indicados en el artículo 169.

Artículo 150.- Legitimación En materia disciplinaria, los procedimientos podrán iniciarse a instancia de la parte interesada o mediante denuncia de cualquier oficina pública.

Artículo 151.- Pretensión resarcitoria Quienes se consideren perjudicados por la actuación del notario podrán reclamar, dentro del procedimiento disciplinario, los daños y perjuicios que se les hayan causado y hacer efectivo su derecho sobre la garantía rendida.

De producirse un arreglo en cuanto a la indemnización que corresponda al accionante, se entenderá por producido tal arreglo y que el actor renuncia a cualquier otra reclamación en vía jurisdiccional-civil.

Artículo 152.- Formalidades de la denuncia La denuncia se dirigirá al órgano competente del Poder Judicial, según los artículos 140 y 141 de este código. Deberá indicar los hechos correspondientes y las pruebas que se invocan como fundamento. Podrá ser presentada en forma oral ante dicho órgano.

Si se ejercitare una pretensión resarcitoria, se tendrá al denunciante como demandante. En tal caso, este deberá litigar bajo el patrocinio de un abogado e indicar, en su demanda, en qué consisten los daños y perjuicios y su estimación.

Artículo 153.- Traslado y notificación Sobre la denuncia y demanda, en su caso, el órgano competente dará un traslado por ocho días al notario. Dentro de ese lapso el notario deberá referirse a los hechos investigados y ofrecer las pruebas que estime de su interés.

Si el proceso se tramitare en un órgano jurisdiccional, en la misma resolución se tendrá como parte al Director Nacional de Notariado, quien dentro del mismo lapso podrá ofrecer las pruebas que considere pertinentes.

Para efectos de la notificación del traslado y notificaciones posteriores, se estará a lo previsto para los procesos civiles.

En los casos de ausencia del notario sin apoderado inscrito, la notificación se realizará por medio de un edicto que se publicará en el Boletín Judicial y el proceso seguirá con un defensor público.

Artículo 154.- Comparecencia El órgano encargado del procedimiento ordenará recibir las pruebas que razonablemente conduzcan al objeto del debate y las que, por iniciativa propia, estime necesarias. Para recibirlas, convocará a las partes a una comparecencia, con quince días de anticipación como mínimo.

En la comparecencia, podrán intervenir únicamente el notario, el demandante, su abogado y el Director Nacional de Notariado o el funcionario abogado que él designe.

La prueba documental podrá hacerse llegar al expediente por mandamiento, cuando así se pida.

Si el órgano competente lo estimare necesario, podrá comisionar a una autoridad judicial para la recepción de las probanzas.

Si en esa comparecencia, el notario y la parte afectada llegaren a un acuerdo, así lo harán saber al juez correspondiente, quien dará por terminado el juicio. No obstante, en casos de gravedad calificada por el juez, este podrá aceptar el arreglo únicamente para atenuar la pena.

Artículo 155.- Apreciación de las pruebas Las pruebas serán apreciadas sin las limitaciones que rigen para los procesos comunes; pero deberán consignarse las razones por las cuales se les niega u otorga determinado valor.

La fijación del monto de los daños y perjuicios deberá fundamentarse en pruebas técnicas, conforme a la legislación civil.

Artículo 156.- Audiencia final y sentencia Transcurrida la comparecencia o evacuadas todas las pruebas ordenadas, se les dará audiencia a las partes para que, dentro de un plazo de tres días, aleguen conclusiones. La sentencia se dictará dentro de los quince días posteriores a este lapso.

Artículo 157.- Recursos ordinarios Las resoluciones que se dicten en el procedimiento no tendrán más recurso que el de revocatoria, excepto la sentencia y los pronunciamientos que impidan el ejercicio de acciones o defensas o el que deniegue pruebas y los de la ejecución de la sentencia que resuelva sobre liquidaciones, los cuales podrán ser apelados para ante el órgano jurisdiccional que establezca la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dentro de los tres días siguientes a la notificación. Sin embargo, al conocer de la sentencia, el órgano de alzada podrá decretar las nulidades u ordenar las reposiciones que estime necesarias para la validez del procedimiento.

Artículo 158.- Efectos de las sentencias. Recurso de casación Únicamente las sentencias dictadas por órganos jurisdiccionales, en los asuntos referidos en el artículo 138, tendrán autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Si hubiere mediado pretensión resarcitoria, cabrá recurso ante la Sala de Casación que establezca la Corte Suprema de Justicia, cuando la cuantía del asunto lo permita. El recurso se regirá por las disposiciones correspondientes a la tercera instancia rogada en materia laboral.

En tales casos, la competencia del tribunal de casación se limitará a lo pecuniario, solo podrá revisar lo disciplinario e impondrá, si fuere del caso, la sanción correspondiente cuando la disconformidad radique en la existencia o inexistencia de la falta atribuida al notario.

Artículo 160.- Costas Las sentencias dictadas en asuntos disciplinarios únicamente contendrán pronunciamiento sobre costas cuando haya mediado pretensión resarcitoria. Sobre el particular, regirán las disposiciones correspondientes del Código Procesal Civil.

Artículo 161.- Publicación y vigencia de las suspensiones Firme la sentencia de una suspensión, se publicará, por una sola vez, un aviso en el Boletín Judicial para dar cuenta de ella; además, se comunicará al Archivo Notarial, el Registro Nacional y el Registro Civil. La vigencia de la sanción empezará a regir ocho días naturales después de la publicación.

Tanto las suspensiones como otras medidas disciplinarias se anotarán en el registro que deberá llevar la Dirección Nacional de Notariado. Los órganos jurisdiccionales que conozcan de esta materia, deberán comunicárselas.

Artículo 164.- Plazo de prescripción La acción disciplinaria prescribe en el término de dos, años contados a partir de la fecha cuando se cometió el hecho que la origina, salvo si este fuere continuo y la reiteración oportuna de la acción o de la omisión impidiere el cumplimiento del plazo.

La prescripción se interrumpe por la notificación de la denuncia al notario. Una vez practicado este acto y mientras se tramita el proceso, no correrá plazo de prescripción alguno.

La prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria es declarable de oficio.

Artículo 169.- Creación de tribunales Créanse los tribunales con competencia para conocer de los procesos disciplinarios contra los notarios en sede jurisdiccional, con asientos en la provincia de San José, los cuales tendrán el número de jueces o secciones, categoría y grado de instancia que establezca la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

Artículo 170.- Requisitos de los jueces En materia disciplinaria notarial, los jueces deberán reunir los requisitos de los jueces comunes; además, experiencia en materia notarial, así como la especialidad en Derecho Notarial y Registral. Se regirán por el sistema de la carrera judicial.” II.- Admisibilidad de la acción. El artículo 75 de la citada Ley de esta jurisdicción dispone que para interponer una acción de inconstitucionalidad es necesario que exista un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales de justicia (que puede ser un recurso de habeas corpus o de amparo) o en la vía administrativa (en la fase de agotamiento de la vía), en el cual se cuestione la constitucionalidad de una o varias disposiciones que se estén aplicando, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En el caso concreto, el accionante alega que su legitimación deriva del artículo 75 párrafo primero de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues existe un procedimiento disciplinario que se tramita en su contra ante el Juzgado Notarial. Sobre este tema la Sala ha dicho:

"[Cuando] el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional exige, en principio, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolución en que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado, como requisito para la interposición de la acción, no hace referencia a una simple formalidad procesal; no se trata de un detalle inocuo o intrascendente para complicar y entorpecer el control constitucional; antes bien, es una manifestación directa del principio según el cual la función jurisdiccional, de la cual forma parte sustancial y fundamental el control constitucional, se ejerce mediante la resolución de controversias, que sean reales y encuentren remedio en una sentencia definitiva (...). Es preciso además, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad sea medio razonable de amparar la defensa del derecho o interés que se considera lesionado, esto es, que con la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad que eventualmente realice la Sala, el accionante obtenga un beneficio dentro del proceso o procedimiento subyacente a dicha acción, sin que necesariamente ello signifique la obtención plena de sus pretensiones dentro del asunto previo (...)" (Nº 1468-90 de las 15:45 horas del 30 de octubre de 1990; el subrayado no es del original).

En este caso, la legitimación del actor deriva del asunto previo, lo que significa que lo que se resuelva en la acción, debe incidir en el procedimiento disciplinario notarial que se sigue en su contra. El actor alega de manera general que los artículos 18, 19, 138, 141, 150 a 158, 160, 161, 164, 169 y 170 del Código Notarial violan el principio de separación de funciones, el principio de especialidad presupuestaria, el principio de igualdad y el principio del debido proceso, sin indicar concretamente cuáles normas violan cuáles principios o si todas violan todos los principios alegados. También alega como violados los principios de justicia pronta y cumplida y el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. En este sentido y por una cuestión de orden, se van a analizar las disposiciones impugnadas según el objeto que regulen. Así, los artículos 18 y 19 del Código Notarial se refieren a la responsabilidad disciplinaria y de otro tipo en que pueden incurrir los notarios. El accionante, sin embargo, no fundamenta los motivos por los que tales disposiciones son inconstitucionales, ni indica cuáles principios lesionan. De ahí que en relación con esas normas, la acción deba rechazarse. El siguiente grupo de normas está formado por los artículos 138, 141 y 169 del Código Notarial, que se refieren a la competencia por materia, a la competencia jurisdiccional y a la creación de tribunales. En relación con estas normas, el accionante alega que violan el principio de separación de funciones y el principio de igualdad. En relación con el primero, el accionante no indica de manera concreta cómo le afecta el hecho de que los órganos jurisdiccionales tengan competencia para conocer y resolver sobre el régimen disciplinario de los Notarios. Para este Tribunal la presunta falta de competencia de los juzgados notariales para conocer de la materia disciplinaria notarial no afecta los derechos del accionante. Alegar la violación al principio de separación de funciones, sin justificar cuál es el perjuicio concreto que se deriva para él en el caso concreto, constituye un mero ejercicio intelectual que hace la acción inadmisible desde ese punto de vista. También manifiesta que las normas lesionan el principio de igualdad, en tanto el legislador creó una jurisdicción especializada para analizar los temas disciplinarios de los notarios. Otros profesionales que como el notario público tienen fé pública (contadores, topógrafos, médicos) dilucidan los asuntos disciplinarios ante sus respectivos colegios profesionales (vía administrativa) y pueden discutir lo resuelto en la vía contencioso-administrativo. En relación con este tema es preciso indicar que ciertamente, desde un punto de vista objetivo, existe un trato diferente en cuanto a la naturaleza de la jurisdicción y de los órganos que conocen los asuntos disciplinarios de los notarios, en relación con otros profesionales que, como ellos, tienen fé pública. Sin embargo, la impugnación resulta improcedente, pues ese trato diferente no provoca lesión alguna a los derechos del accionante. Por el contrario, la circunstancia de que aquellas faltas que el legislador estimó de mayor gravedad sean conocidas y resueltas a través de un procedimiento judicial por un órgano jurisdiccional constituye plena garantía para el denunciado de que se respetarán todos los principios que se derivan del debido proceso, que en la vía jurisdiccional se deben observar en forma absoluta. Por ello, tampoco hay violación al derecho a un debido proceso ni al derecho de defensa. Manifiesta el accionante que algunas de esas disposiciones lesionan los principios del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa. De las normas impugnadas, aquellas que se refieren al procedimiento son los artículos 150 a 158 y 160 del Código Notarial. Sin embargo, el accionante solamente fundamenta la presunta inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 153, 157 y 158 del código citado. De ahí que la acción se rechace de plano en relación con todas las disposiciones, con excepción de los artículos 153, 157 y 158, que se analizarán más adelante. Por último, alega la presunta violación por parte de esas normas del principio de especialidad presupuestaria, en tanto la creación de la jurisdicción notarial distrae fondos del presupuesto del Poder Judicial que podría utilizar en asuntos de su competencia. Dado que frente a este principio la Sala ha admitido la legitimación por intereses difusos, no obstante que no es la que el accionante aduce, de oficio se admite la impugnación de aquellas normas que tienen relación con lo expuesto, a saber, los artículos 139, 141 y 169 del Código Notarial. Así se admiten para ser analizados por el fondo los artículos 138, 141, 153, 157, 158 y 169 del Código Notarial por violación a los principios de especialidad presupuestaria, debido proceso y defensa. Sobre la presunta violación a los principios de justicia pronta y cumplida y razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, se omite pronunciamiento debido a que su presunta lesión no fue debidamente fundamentada.

III.- Sobre la violación al principio de especialidad presupuestaria. Alega el accionante que los artículos 138, 141 y 169 del Código Notarial lesionan el principio de especialidad presupuestaria pues al ser los juzgados y tribunales notariales órganos ajenos a la competencia constitucionalmente asignada al Poder Judicial, los fondos públicos que se utilizan para su funcionamiento están siendo mal utilizados. Sin embargo, recientemente en la sentencia 2010-2892 de las 14:39 horas del 10 de febrero del 2010, este Tribunal se pronunció sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas a través de las cuales se creó la jurisdicción notarial. En efecto, en dicha sentencia indicó:

“La Sala no comparte el criterio del accionante relativo a que la labor que realizan los juzgados notariales es administrativa y por tanto, su creación viola el principio de especialidad presupuestaria. La Constitución Política atribuye al Poder Judicial la posibilidad de crear juzgados para conocer de aquellos asuntos que determine la ley. Precisamente la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, y en este caso el Código Notarial, crean los Juzgados Notariales para conocer de las faltas cometidas por los notarios en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Según el principio de reserva de jurisdicción, los tribunales han sido establecidos para resolver las controversias o litigios que le sometan las partes en forma definitiva a través del dictado de una sentencia con fuerza de verdad legal. El artículo 153 de la Constitución Política enuncia el núcleo duro de la función materialmente jurisdiccional que le corresponde ejercer en forma privativa y exclusiva al Poder Judicial a través de las Salas de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, los tribunales y juzgados que establezca la ley (artículo 152 ibídem). Según lo dispuesto en los artículos 154 de la Constitución Política y 1° y 2° de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, corresponde a este Poder resolver definitivamente sobre los asuntos sometidos a su conocimiento y ejecutar las resoluciones que pronuncie, con la ayuda de la fuerza pública si fuere necesario. Precisamente, en la sentencia 7965-06 la Sala indicó que el núcleo duro de la función jurisdiccional consiste en conocer y resolver las causas con autoridad de cosa juzgada material, condición que revisten las resoluciones que dictan los Juzgados Notariales. Asimismo, en la sentencia No. 2009-14281 avaló la función jurisdiccional que desarrollan estos despachos. En ese sentido señaló:

“En el caso del proceso disciplinario de los Notarios Públicos, la materia disciplinaria goza de una garantía adicional cuando el procedimiento diseñado por el legislador corresponde a un proceso judicial, consecuentemente la potestad disciplinaria que ejerce el Estado sobre el Notario Público queda amparada a las garantías dispuestas para los procesos judiciales en la Constitución Política y lo mismo para quienes ocupan estos cargos (artículo 170 de la Ley Notarial). En este sentido, el legislador establece la potestad correctiva en general o la disciplinaria sobre quienes están bajo la tutela del Estado, cuando concurra la cobertura legal y reglamentaria que permita la imposición de sanciones, proporcionales y excluyentes de toda arbitrariedad. Consecuentemente, si se derivan las conductas de una interpretación normativa, deberá ser resultado de un análisis objetivo de hechos, contrastando el contenido material de una disposición, atinente a los deberes y obligaciones funcionariales de los Notarios Públicos. En este sentido, estima la Sala que es constitucionalmente válido que el Juez ejerza un grado de apreciación en cada caso particular, para comprobar la conducta y desentrañar el verdadero contenido de las disposiciones que contienen los deberes y obligaciones del munera pubblica.” En este sentido, si la jurisdicción notarial es constitucionalmente válida, los fondos que se utilicen para su creación y funcionamiento cumplen los fines que la Constitución Política asigna al Poder Judicial.

IV.- Sobre el artículo 153 del Código Notarial. Alega el accionante que el artículo 153 lesiona los principios del debido proceso y derecho de defensa en tanto su contenido es imperativo y obliga a los notarios denunciados a contestar la demanda, sin posibilidad de abstenerse de hacerlo. En relación con este aspecto, es importante recordar al accionante que la omisión del Código Notarial de disponer de manera expresa que el notario puede abstenerse de declarar o de contestar la demanda, no significa que el derecho a la no “autoincriminación” no se aplique en el procedimiento sancionatorio notarial. La garantía contenida en el artículo 36 de la Constitución Política se aplica de manera absoluta en el proceso penal, pero también en cualquier procedimiento sancionatorio, sea de naturaleza jurisdiccional o administrativa. El proceso disciplinario que se tramita en los juzgados notariales es de naturaleza sancionatoria, por lo que es claro que dicho principio será de observancia obligatoria por parte de los jueces. En este sentido conviene recordar que el traslado y la notificación de la demanda brinda al denunciado la oportunidad para que se refiera a los hechos que se acusan y pueda ejercer de manera amplia su derecho de defensa. La contestación de la demanda por parte del denunciado constituye un elemento probatorio más; sin embargo, en ejercicio de su derecho de defensa el accionante podrá o no contestar la demanda, hacerlo completa o parcialmente, si así lo estima oportuno a fin de proteger sus derechos e intereses, como derivación de la garantía contenida en el artículo 36 de la Constitución Política que claramente dispone que nadie puede ser obligado a declarar contra sí mismo. Esta garantía es de aplicación directa en cualquier proceso, por lo que el notario podrá abstenerse de hacer todas aquellas manifestaciones que a su juicio lo pueden perjudicar. En cada caso concreto, el Juez deberá valorar dicha abstención y las consecuencias que se deriven de ella.

V.- Sobre el artículo 157. Este Tribunal analizó la constitucionalidad de este artículo en la sentencia número 9083 de las 15:05 horas del 18 de setiembre del 2002 en la cual indicó:

“IV.- En cuanto al artículo 157, tampoco viola los principios del debido proceso. Si bien el derecho a recurrir de un fallo ante un tribunal superior, en general o para determinados supuestos, no se encuentra consagrado expresamente por ningún texto constitucional, los artículos 1 ° y 73 inc. d) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y 48 de la propia Constitución reconocen, como parámetros de constitucionalidad, tanto las normas como los principios, no solo de la Constitución misma sino también del Derecho Internacional vigente en Costa Rica. De esta forma, si de alguna de dichas fuentes cupiera deducir la existencia del derecho fundamental que se invoca, la disposición cuestionada o su interpretación serian, efectivamente, inconstitucionales en la medida en que lo nieguen o excluyan. En efecto, un importante derivado del debido proceso es el derecho a que un tribunal superior examine o reexamine, por vía de recurso, la legalidad y razonabilidad de toda sentencia o resolución jurisdiccional que imponga a la persona un gravamen irreparable o de difícil reparación, al menos cuando ese gravamen incida sobre uno de sus derechos o libertades fundamentales sustanciales (de goce). En este sentido, cabe en primer lugar, advertir que el artículo 8.2, inciso h) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (o "Pacto de San José de Costa Rica", aprobado por Ley No. 4534 de 23 de febrero y ratificada el 8 de abril de 1970), no es de aplicación para resolver el presente recurso, por cuanto esa norma internacional se limita a reconocer el derecho a recurrir ante un tribunal superior, específicamente a favor del imputado contra el fallo (entiéndase, condenatorio) en una causa penal por delito; situación que, obviamente, nada tiene que ver con resoluciones interlocutorias dictadas en un proceso disciplinario como el que se sigue en contra del accionante. Hoy día, prevalece en el Derecho Público en general la tesis que reconoce, de principio, el derecho de impugnar los actos de procedimiento o preparatorios, normalmente irrecurribles, cuando tengan "efecto propio", es decir, los que en Derecho Administrativo se conocen como "actos separables" en cuanto causan por si mismos un gravamen más allá del procedimiento mismo en que se dictan, de manera que ese efecto no podría corregirse con la solución normal de tener que esperar para impugnarlos conjuntamente con el acto final que están llamados a preparar (V., p. e j., art., 163.2 Ley General de la Adm. Pública). Al nacer, pues, ese derecho a recurrir contra los actos separables, de un principio general de Derecho Público, ergo lo es del derecho de la Constitución, con el mismo rango que sus normas expresas (como lo reconoce el art. 7.1 de la misma Ley General). En este caso, si bien la norma excluye algunos actos y resoluciones de ser conocidos en doble instancia, lo cierto es que los principales, aquellos que tienen “efectos propios” o que podrían impedir un adecuado ejercicio de la defensa, tienen recurso de alzada; los que no lo tienen sin embargo, podrán ser impugnados junto con la resolución final.” VI.- Sobre el artículo 158 del Código Notarial. En relación con esta disposición, la Sala se pronunció sobre su constitucionalidad en la sentencia 4867 de las 14:59 horas del 5 de mayo del 2004.

“Analizada la disposición, esta Sala estima que no viola ninguna disposición ni principio constitucional. La circunstancia de que dentro del proceso disciplinario que se sigue en sede jurisdiccional, se haya limitado el acceso al recurso de casación a aquellos casos en que medie una pretensión pecuniaria, no es violatorio del debido proceso. Ya esta Sala ha expresado que, en materia de recursos, la Constitución Política no contempla el derecho a la doble instancia, como regla, y que es la sentencia condenatoria, en materia penal, la que por la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, tiene recurso ante "juez superior" (artículo 8.2.h). En consecuencia, el hecho de que la sentencia no tenga recurso de casación, no implica, per sé, una violación a la Constitución Política, en sus artículos 27,41,33,46 y 153.

Así, refiriéndose al debido proceso y al recurso de casación, el Tribunal en la sentencia No. 1070-95 señaló lo siguiente:

"Sea cual sea la cuantía de un asunto que se discuta en la jurisdicción ordinaria, el debido proceso está debidamente garantizado y es por ello que el hecho de que algunos tengan opción al recurso de casación y otros no, es una decisión de política legislativa en cuanto al procedimiento.” En efecto, la especial naturaleza del objeto del litigio, las pretensiones de los interesados y el interés público que exista de por medio, facultan a los legisladores para diseñar diferentes tipos de procesos que se adecuen a la misma, en los que se integren las garantías constitucionales del debido proceso. Ello en ningún momento supone menoscabo del derecho de defensa.

El hecho de que se limite el derecho a recurrir en casación, no conlleva una violación a los principios de defensa y debido proceso, por cuanto el Notario tiene posibilidad de interponer recurso de apelación y que la sentencia del a quo sea revisada por un tribunal colegiado en segunda instancia. Además, durante el proceso, ha contado con amplias garantías para defender sus derechos. De esta manera, los argumentos dados por la accionante en relación con este extremo no son de recibo.” VII.- Sobre los artículos 161 y 164 del Código Notarial.- El accionante impugna el contenido de los artículos 161 y 164 del Código Notarial, pues alega que lesionan los principios del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa. La Sala se pronunció sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 161 en la sentencia 15390-2003 de las 15:56 horas del 11 de setiembre del 2003, en la cual se indicó:

“IV.- DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL ARTÍCULO 161 DEL CÓDIGO NOTARIAL. De la transcripción anterior, se constata que la notificación de las sanciones de suspensión en el ejercicio de la función notarial tienen un mecanismo propio y diferenciado del previsto en el artículo 2 de la Ley de Notificaciones, Citaciones y otras Comunicaciones Judiciales, número 7637, en relación de las siguientes actuaciones judiciales, "Se notificarán personalmente, en la casa de habitación o la dirección indicada, según corresponda.

1.- La primera resolución para el notificando, en cualquier clase de proceso.

2.- El traslado de la demanda en todos los procesos.

3.- La resolución que llame a confesión o a reconocer un documento, únicamente como actividad previa.

4.- La sentencia de primera instancia al demandado rebelde.

5.- El primer auto que ordene el remate, salvo que ya se hubiere hecho señalamiento para atender notificaciones.

6.- La resolución que curse la acción civil resarcitoria, salvo que el demandado civil haya indicado lugar para atender notificaciones.

7.- Cuando lo disponga el tribunal, por considerarlo necesario para evitar indefensión.

8.- En los demás casos en que así lo exija la ley. Asimismo, cuando el notificando se encontrare detenido, se notificará personalmente el auto de procesamiento, el requerimiento de elevación a juicio o de citación directa y el auto de elevación a juicio.

Si por cualquier causa el imputado detenido no asistiere a la lectura integral de la sentencia, esta deberá notificársele personalmente en el lugar de detención.

En los casos previstos en este artículo, incluso en la notificación por apartado, la notificación se acompañará de copias de los escritos y documentos presentados por la parte contraria." Sin embargo, en modo alguno puede estimarse que esta norma sea contraria al Derecho de la Constitución, o que infrinja el debido proceso. Efectivamente, tal y como lo arguye el accionante, éste principio deriva de lo dispuesto en los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, y que resulta de aplicación para todos los procesos de índole jurisdiccional, no sólo el penal, y que se entiende extendido respecto de todos los procedimientos administrativos. Se ha identificado o equiparado con los conceptos de "bilateralidad de la audiencia", "debido proceso legal" y "principio de contradicción"; y tiene implicaciones directas en las diversas etapas del procedimiento, lo que evidencia su carácter instrumental del proceso, en tanto está dispuesto para garantizar la mejor resolución del procedimiento. La jurisprudencia constitucional ha señalado como mínimo, y sin que en modo alguno constituya una lista cerrada, los siguientes elementos como integantes del debido proceso:

"[...] a) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento; b) derecho a ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c) oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; ch) derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas; d) notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la Administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde y e) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada..."(Sentencia número 15-90).

En este sentido, debe tenerse en cuenta que la norma impugnada no sustituye la obligación que tiene la Administración para notificar en forma personal al notario al que se le sigue un proceso disciplinario, por cuanto, según se señaló anteriormente, es una garantía que integra el debido proceso. Debe entenderse que la norma impugnada es la que establece el plazo para que la sanción impuesta surta sus efectos, sea, que es la norma que establece la fecha de vigencia de la sanción impuesta, toda vez que implica la suspensión del ejercicio de una función pública, la del notariado, por las implicaciones directas que tiene en la esfera de terceros; en los términos señalados con anterioridad por este Tribunal, "La publicación en el Boletín Judicial prevista en el artículo 161 del Código Notarial tiene eficacia ante terceros en cuanto al momento de entrada en vigencia de la sanción dispuesta. No produce los efectos de una notificación al interesado, pues ello conllevaría dejarlo en un estado de entera indefensión" (sentencia número 8197-99, de las quince horas cuarenta y dos minutos del veintisiete de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve).

De ahí que sea, no sólo pertinente, sino adecuada, la forma establecida en la norma impugnada para realizar esta notificación, precisamente en razón de los efectos de la sanción que se impone, la de suspensión en el ejercicio del ejercicio del notariado, que tiene directa afectación e incidencia con terceros, entendiendo por tales, al Registro Público de la Propiedad, a la Dirección de Notariado y a los posibles clientes del notario. En este sentido, es necesio considerar que es en atención a la gravedad de la sanción de que se trata, obliga a una publicitación general, y ello se logra únicamente mediante el sistema establecido en la norma impugnada.” En cuanto al contenido del artículo 164 del Código Notarial, el accionante aduce que es inconstitucional pues las acciones no prescriben mientras estén en conocimiento del Juzgado. Estima que el principio liberatorio es omnicomprensivo y aplicable a todas las obligaciones. Disponer a través de una disposición legal que un procedimiento sancionatorio es imprescriptible lesiona el principio de seguridad jurídica y los derechos subjetivos de los notarios. La Sala se pronunció en relación con esta norma en la sentencia número 6320-2003 de las 14:12 horas del 3 de julio del 2003, en la que indicó lo siguiente:

“III.- CARÁCTER IMPRESCRIPTIBLE DE LAS POTESTADES ADMINISTRATIVAS. El ordinal 164 del Código Notarial se encuentra emplazado, desde un punto de vista sistemático, en el Capítulo III, intitulado “Prescripción de la acción disciplinaria” del Título VII llamado “Del Régimen Disciplinario de los Notarios”. A partir de esa constatación es fácil concluir que la norma impugnada está referida a la potestad disciplinaria o sancionadora, la cual es por antonomasia de naturaleza administrativa. Las potestades administrativas, por esencia, son imprescriptibles, irrenunciables e intransferibles (artículo 66, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), consecuentemente, la regla general es su carácter inextinguible. Al respecto, es preciso recordar que las competencias o potestades de imperio, esto es, en cuanto repercuten negativamente –mediante actos administrativos de gravamen o desfavorables- en la esfera del administrado o de un funcionario público sometido a una relación de sujeción especial, son reserva de ley (artículo 59, párrafo primero, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), de modo que su extinción por el transcurso del tiempo, ya sea por caducidad o prescripción, debe ser, también, un asunto reservado a la ley (artículo 63, párrafo 2°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Precisamente por lo anterior, el legislador ordinario, en muchas ocasiones, somete el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria o sancionadora a plazos de caducidad o prescripción por razón de seguridad jurídica, tal y como acontece con el párrafo primero del numeral 164 del Código Notarial. Bajo esta inteligencia, la extinción de las potestades y competencias públicas o administrativas no puede ser analizada bajo la óptica de los derechos en el ámbito del Derecho Privado o de las penas en el campo del Derecho Penal, so pena de incurrir en serias inconsistencias jurídicas.

IV.- FORMAS DE INTERRUPCION DE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN. La interrupción de la prescripción de una potestad o competencia pública cuando ha sido establecida a texto expreso, puede obedecer a actos que se agotan con su sola producción o de efectos continuados o continuos. Una hipótesis de la interrupción de efectos continuados lo constituye el establecimiento e inicio de un procedimiento administrativo, por lo que debe entenderse que desde el momento de ser entablado hasta que sea resuelto por acto administrativo final firme se tiene por interrumpida la prescripción. Lo anterior no releva al órgano administrativo de observar los principios de eficacia, eficiencia, celeridad, economía procedimental y de impulsión de oficio, esto es, no es razón o motivo suficiente para que el órgano encargado de instruirlo propicie retardos o dilaciones indebidas en su tramitación, puesto que, de acontecer de esa forma se estaría transgrediendo el derecho fundamental de las partes interesadas a un procedimiento administrativo pronto y cumplido (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política). La norma que se acusa de inconstitucionalidad precisamente establece una causal de interrupción de efectos continuos al estipular que una vez practicada la notificación de la denuncia al notario “...y mientras se tramita el proceso, no correrá plazo de prescripción alguno”. La sola incoación de un procedimiento disciplinario y su substanciación mientras esta sea impulsada de forma razonable, deja patente la voluntad del órgano de no dejar impune la falta desde el punto de vista disciplinario, de modo y manera que mientras esté pendiente de resolverse el procedimiento no puede extinguirse la potestad. Debe tomarse en consideración que, en determinados supuestos, existen procedimientos disciplinarios muy complejos que requieren la práctica y evacuación de diversas y múltiples pruebas con el propósito de averiguar la verdad real de los fundamentos fácticos y jurídicos que le darán fundamento a la eventual sanción disciplinaria. Adicionalmente, en ciertas ocasiones, quien se ve sometido a un procedimiento disciplinario puede emplear de mala fe diversas estrategias y tácticas fraudulentas y dilatorias para conseguir una extinción espuria de la potestad disciplinaria y, de esa forma, lograr su impunidad disciplinaria. Importa señalar que la norma del párrafo segundo del artículo 164 del Código Notarial no resulta desproporcionada o irracional, puesto que, el fin de la misma es evitar la impunidad de las irregularidades o faltas cometidas por los notarios públicos, dada la delicada y trascendente función que cumplen éstos respecto de la vida y patrimonio de quienes utilizan sus servicios y, por consiguiente, el logro de una mayor integridad, honradez, corrección, decoro y transparencia en su ejercicio. El medio empleado –interrupción continuada mientras se sustenta el procedimiento disciplinario- se adecua, perfectamente, al logro de tales fines de clara y profunda raigambre constitucional.

V.- INSTRUMENTOS PARA EVITAR LOS RETARDOS O DILACIONES INDEBIDAS EN LA TRAMITACIÓN DEL PROCEDIMIENTO DISCIPLINARIO. La circunstancia de la interrupción continuada de la prescripción establecida en el párrafo segundo del ordinal 164 del Código Notarial, no significa obligar a la parte investigada a tener que soportar sine die o ad infinitum un procedimiento administrativo en su contra. El ordenamiento jurídico prevé y regula una serie de instrumentos que le permiten a una parte sometida a un procedimiento disciplinario de tal naturaleza evitar retardos o dilaciones indebidas e irrazonables que afecten su derecho a un procedimiento pronto y cumplido, tales como las quejas ante el propio órgano, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial o bien el recurso de amparo para evitar tales situaciones anómalas.” VIII.- Conclusión.- En relación con las disposiciones impugnadas el accionante reitera algunos de los argumentos que se analizaron en las sentencias parcialmente transcritas, sin aportar ningún elemento nuevo que motive a este Tribunal a hacer un replanteamiento del criterio vertido en cada una de ellas. Por tal motivo, y en relación con los artículos analizados, la acción se rechaza por el fondo. La impugnación relativa a las otras normas debe rechazarse de plano, según lo expuesto.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en relación con los artículos 138, 141, 153, 157, 158 y 169 del Código Notarial. En lo demás, se rechaza de plano.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Gilbert Armijo S. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Roxana Salazar C. Ricardo Guerrero P.