Reversal of disciplinary statute of limitations for police officerRevocación de prescripción disciplinaria de miembro de la Fuerza Pública

VI.This Court does not share the decision reached by the lower court Judges or the appellant's arguments, in the terms that will be explained. Disciplinary law, in general, is based on the special relationship existing between the State and the officials or public servants, which has been termed by doctrine as "special subjection relationships" (relaciones de sujeción especial), that is, those established between a subject and a Public Administration, by virtue of a special and differentiated condition or title held by that subject before that entity, on account of which they acquire particular rights and obligations. It is worth highlighting that among the main obligations of every public servant is that of being disciplinarily liable for their actions or omissions, when these are considered an infraction or fault, to the detriment of the public service they attend. In the case of public officials, the Costa Rican legal system contemplates diverse regimes in disciplinary matters, since the demands for the protection of the legal rights related to the correct provision of the service are different in each case, and thus, they have been regulated in a scattered manner. Therefore, depending on the disciplinary regime, the regulation of the time limit to exercise the sanctioning power could be diverse. Thus, according to canon 603 of the CT, applicable to servants subject to the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) by express referral of cardinal 51 (of said Statute), the employer has one month to exercise the disciplinary action. Pursuant to ordinal 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), the time limit is five years to impose administrative responsibility on a public treasury official. Meanwhile, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, LOPJ), provision 211, establishes on this matter: "The action to investigate faults must be initiated within the month following the date on which the person who must carry out the investigation becomes aware of them (…)”. It should be noted that, with the enactment of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía) on May 26, 1994 (no. 7410), the "Police Statute" (Estatuto Policial) (contained in Title III of that Law) was approved, which came to regulate the relationship between the members of the police forces that comprise it and the State as employer. Chapter VII of said Statute regulates the disciplinary regime applicable to members of the police forces (types of faults, sanctions, statute of limitations (prescripciones), procedure in disciplinary investigation, administrative action in the event of criminal proceedings, among others). Of interest, it is inferred from Article 83 of the LGP that the legitimate and timely exercise of the power to discipline infractions by members of the police forces expires (prescribe) in two years for serious faults (faltas graves). The cited precept states: "Minor faults (faltas leves) will expire (prescribirán) in one month and serious ones (graves), in two years. The statute of limitations (prescripción) will be interrupted (interrumpirá) when the disciplinary procedure is initiated." Such time limit refers to the maximum temporal limit for the Administration to exercise its disciplinary power. Now, derived from canons 603 of the CT, 211 of the LOPJ, and 71 of the LOCGR, it must be understood as a general principle that the cited two years run from the moment when the competent body becomes aware of the facts that could constitute a servant's fault. That is, in the case of members of the police forces, from the moment the Legal Disciplinary Department (Departamento Disciplinario Legal) of the MSP becomes aware of the alleged irregularities committed by the official. A Department, it is worth adding, which is responsible for the instruction of the procedure, preparing the respective report, and transferring the matter to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) for resolution in the first instance (provisions 57 and 84 of the LGP). Likewise, as the Judges and the appellant rightly argued, the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the servant is the action that marks the beginning of the procedure and by reason of which the pertinent time limit is interrupted. The purpose of this communication is to inform the interested party of the occurrence of an act or fact of legal relevance, so that they may exercise their right of defense (ordinal 39 of the Political Constitution). Through this act, the accusation is formalized, with express indication of the reprehensible conduct, aspects of manner, time, and place, evidence for the prosecution, the servant's rights, among others. Thus, with respect to the exercise of the disciplinary power, both the issuance of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) and its communication to the administrated party (notification of the act), must be carried out within the time limit established by law for the initiation of the procedure (two years according to the LGP). In the same vein, see the judgment of this Court 00112-F-TC-2015 of 9 hours 40 minutes on October 8, 2015. The foregoing because every administrative act, besides being valid, must be effective, and the latter happens with the respective notification (cardinal 334 of the LGAP). As a corollary to the above, if from the date when the Legal Disciplinary Department (Departamento Disciplinario Legal) learned of the facts attributed to the official until it notifies the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the servant, the two years enshrined in precept 83 of the LGP have not elapsed, the disciplinary action would be in accordance with the law. In the matter under review, it is an undisputed fact that the MSP exercised its disciplinary power in accordance with the temporal limits imposed by the legal system, since the said Department learned of the alleged facts constituting a disciplinary fault on January 24, 2007; this was through the official letter sent to it by the Cantonal Delegate of the Upala Delta 84 Community Policing (no. 0034-PPU-2007), and Mr. Greivin was notified of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) on the following March 16. Therefore, regarding the initial exercise of the disciplinary power, at the moment when the Administration communicated the opening order of the procedure to the servant, the two-year time limit regulated in Article 83 of the LGP had not elapsed, as both the Court and the appellant reasoned. Now, contrary to the appellant's opinion, the time limit established in the cited canon is circumscribed exclusively to the initiation of the disciplinary action, the only scenario contemplated in the rule. While it is true, provision 83 of the LGP stipulates a specific case of interruption, which is the communication of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the official, it is erroneous to consider that this act entails the start, from zero, of a new computation from the moment the competent body issues the respective recommendation until the imposition of the sanction, and then, another new computation for the execution of the final act (the LGP says nothing in that regard). Such a thesis would imply distorting the nature of the precept, perpetuating disciplinary procedures (since one would have: two years to initiate it, another two years to impose the sanction after the respective recommendation is issued, and two more years to execute the final act), with the consequent obligation, on the part of the Administration, to keep the servant who has committed a serious fault (falta grave) active during the course of the proceedings. Furthermore, the purpose of the Administration's sanctioning powers would be distorted by the delay in imposing the sanction. Without ignoring the violation of the principles of legal certainty, economy, celerity, effectiveness, and efficiency, which must prevail in every administrative procedure. Consequently, once the disciplinary proceeding is initiated, the time limit contained in numeral 83 of the LGP is suspended. It is worth noting that, even though said Law establishes the administrative disciplinary procedure for imposing sanctions on members of the police forces, such procedure does not find much further regulation in that normative body, since, as indicated, it only stipulates the time limit to initiate the action (two years in the case of serious faults (faltas graves), Article 83). Therefore, in accordance with the principle of normative self-integration of administrative law (provision 9 of the LGAP), in the absence of a special provision within the LGP that regulates the matter (understood as the following stages of the procedure, namely: processing and imposition of the sanction and its execution), it is necessary to apply the time limits and terms established by Book Two of the LGAP; particularly those referring to the ordinary administrative procedure (cardinal 366 ibidem). Contrary to what was decided by the Judges, it is improper to resort to the provisions of the Labor Code, a normative body that regulates private relationships, which yields to particular and express regulations of an administrative nature (LGAP), especially when they incorporate different rules on the subject. Thus, under the protection of provisions 261 and 340 of the LGAP, the procedure must be processed within the two months following its initiation; additionally, when it is stalled for more than six months by virtue of a cause attributable to the Administration that initiated it, its expiration (caducidad) will occur. It must be taken into account that the sanction recommendation agreed upon by the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) and the issuance of the final act are part of the processing of the procedure. It is worth emphasizing that exceeding the time limits set in the cited rules does not imply, per se, the nullity of the proceedings, nor does it inhibit the Administration from exercising its due competence and issuing the final act, as they are ordering time limits (plazos ordenatorios). In this regard, precept 329 of the LGAP enshrines: "1. The Administration shall always have the duty to resolve expressly within the time limits of this law. 2. Failure to do so shall be considered a serious fault of service. 3. The final act issued after the deadline shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless otherwise provided by law." In this regard, see the judgment of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 000608-F-S1-2012 of 11 hours 55 minutes on May 16, 2012. It should be added that the referred delay does not imply the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, which only occurs when it is stalled for more than six consecutive months (canon 340 of the LGAP). Likewise, the procedural effects of expiration (caducidad) require that it has been requested or declared within the procedure, precisely to put an end to it. The foregoing means that the administrative decision issued after a six-month period of inactivity exclusively attributable to the Administration, when it has not been alleged or declared, is fully valid. In that sense, see the ruling of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 1001-A-S1-2013 of 16 hours 15 minutes on August 1, 2013. It is clear that the only sanction established by the administrative legal system (specifically: LGAP) in case of non-compliance with the referred ordering time limits (plazos ordenatorios) is the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, conditioned on the stalling of the latter for more than six months and that the administrated party so claims in administrative venue, as the possibility of doing so later would be precluded. In the matter under study, it should be clarified, said expiration (caducidad) has already been examined and resolved with the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada) by this Court of Cassation (judgment 123-F-TC-2015), which ruled its impropriety since it was not adduced during the processing of the procedure and before the issuance of the final act. In that sense, the Judges err in considering the sanctioning power of the Administration time-barred (prescrita). It is important to note that, once the final act is issued, the statute-of-limitations period (plazo prescriptivo) to execute the sanctioning power begins to run (material execution of the imposed sanction). Regarding this point, it is also improper to resort to the provisions of the Labor Code (canon 603), as it is reiterated, that normative body regulates private relationships, hence it yields to particular and express regulations of an administrative nature (LGAP), especially when they incorporate different rules on the subject of expiration (caducidad) and the statute of limitations (prescripción). This Collegiate Body has pointed out that the time limit to execute the sanction is four years, based on the following: "Therefore, in attention to the order of precedence of the sources of normative integration established in the aforementioned Article 9, one must resort to cardinal 156 of the LGAP, which, of interest to the specific case, provides: ' (…) 3. Unfavorable acts for the administrated party may be revoked, even if they are already final (firmes) for the individual, subject to a prior opinion from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). // 4. The power of revocation enshrined in the previous paragraph shall expire (caducará) in four years.' The transcribed norm expressly recognizes the Administration's power to revoke (extinguish) acts unfavorable to the administrated party, even if they have already become final (firmeza), a power subject to a maximum temporal limit of four years. Now, this Cassation Body considers the cited precept analogically applicable to the sub judice, given that, in the case of the expiration (caducidad) of the power of executing an act of an unfavorable nature – as is the final disciplinary act – the legal consequence of the Administration's inactivity, which does not exercise its power in a timely manner, is precisely the extinguishment (fenecimiento) of this power, in other words, the decay of the possibility of materializing the final and firm sanctioning act. This means that, although valid and final (firme), the act becomes ineffective and unenforceable, and as such loses its enforceability (ejecutoriedad). Thus, in both scenarios – safeguarding the conceptual technical differences – the unfavorable act born to legal life as a valid, and even final (firme), act will have no effect on the administrated party. It is so then that – without prejudice to an express rule regulating some special case – by resorting to ordinal 156, subsection 4) of the LGAP, the regulatory gap noted in the sub examine can be filled." (Vote no. 108-F-TC-2019, at 15 hours on July 4, 2019). In the case under study, it appears in the records that the final act of the procedure was issued by resolution 2010-2592-D.M of July 27, 2010, and the communication to the administrated party Vargas Obando occurred on September 24 of the same year. It is evident, regarding the exercise of the disciplinary power, from the issuance of the final act until its respective execution, the four-year time limit indicated above has not elapsed. For the reasons stated, it is undeniable that the Administration exercised the disciplinary power in accordance with the temporal limits imposed by the legal system, ergo, the dismissal act in question is valid and in accordance with the law. Consequently, it will proceed to reverse the appealed judgment.

Chapter VII of said Statute regulates the disciplinary regime applicable to members of the police forces (types of offenses, sanctions, statutes of limitations (prescripciones), procedure in disciplinary investigation, administrative action in the event of criminal proceedings, among others). Of interest here, it follows from Article 83 of the LGP that the legitimate and timely exercise of the power to discipline infractions by members of the police forces prescribes in two years for serious offenses (faltas graves). The cited provision states: "Minor offenses (faltas leves) shall prescribe in one month and serious offenses, in two years. The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated." This time limit refers to the maximum temporal limit for the Administration to exercise its disciplinary power. Now, derived from canons 603 of the CT, 211 of the LOPJ, and 71 of the LOCGR, it must be understood as a general principle that the cited two years run from the moment when the competent body learns of the facts that could constitute an offense by the public servant. That is, in the case of members of the police forces, from when the Legal Disciplinary Department (Departamento Disciplinario Legal) of the MSP learns of the alleged irregularities committed by the official. A Department, it is worth adding, that is charged with the direction of the proceeding, preparing the respective report, and referring the matter to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) for it to decide in the first instance (mandates 57 and 84 of the LGP). Likewise, as the Judges and the appellant correctly argued, the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the public servant is the action that marks the initiation of the proceeding and by reason of which the time limit in question is interrupted. The purpose of this communication is to inform the interested party of the occurrence of an act or fact of legal relevance, so that they may exercise their right of defense (clause 39 of the Political Constitution). Through this act, the accusation is formalized, with an express indication of the reprehensible conduct, aspects of manner, time, and place, incriminating evidence, the rights of the public servant, among others. Thus, regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, both the issuance of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) and its communication to the administrated party (notification of the act) must be carried out within the time limit established by the law for the initiation of the proceeding (two years according to the LGP). In the same sense, one may consult the judgment of this Court 00112-F-TC-2015 of 9:40 a.m. on October 8, 2015. The foregoing is because every administrative act, besides being valid, must be effective, and the latter occurs with the respective notification (cardinal 334 of the LGAP). As a corollary to the foregoing, if from the date when the Legal Disciplinary Department (Departamento Disciplinario Legal) learns of the facts imputed to the official until it notifies the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the public servant, the two years enshrined in precept 83 of the LGP have not elapsed, the disciplinary action would be lawful. In the matter under review, it is an undisputed fact that the MSP exercised its disciplinary power in accordance with the temporal limits imposed by the legal system, since the said Department learned of the alleged facts constituting a disciplinary offense on January 24, 2007; this by means of the official letter sent to it by the Cantonal Delegate of the Upala Delta 84 Community Policing (no. 0034-PPU-2007), and for his part, Mr. Greivin was notified of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) on the following March 16. Therefore, with respect to the initial exercise of the disciplinary power, at the time the Administration communicated the order to open proceedings to the public servant, the two-year time limit regulated in Article 83 of the LGP had not elapsed, as both the Court and the appellant reasoned. Now, contrary to the appellant's criterion, the time limit established in the cited canon is circumscribed exclusively to the initiation of the disciplinary action, the sole situation contemplated in the norm. Even though it is true that mandate 83 of the LGP stipulates a specific case of interruption, which is the communication of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the official, it is erroneous to consider that this act entails the start, from scratch, of a new calculation period from when the competent body issues the respective recommendation until the imposition of the sanction and then, another new calculation period for the execution of the final act (the LGP says nothing in this regard). Such a thesis would imply distorting the nature of the precept, perpetuating disciplinary proceedings (since one would have: two years to initiate it, another two years to impose the sanction after the respective recommendation is issued, and two more years to execute the final act), with the consequent obligation, on the part of the Administration, to keep the public servant who has incurred a serious offense active during the course of the proceeding. Furthermore, the purpose of the Administration's punitive powers would be distorted by the delay in imposing the sanction. Not to mention the violation of the principles of legal certainty, economy, celerity, efficacy, and efficiency, which must prevail in every administrative proceeding. Consequently, once the disciplinary proceeding is initiated, the time limit contained in numeral 83 of the LGP is suspended. It is worth noting that, even though said Law establishes the administrative disciplinary proceeding for the purpose of imposing sanctions on members of the police forces, such proceeding does not find major regulation in that normative body, since, as stated, it only stipulates the time limit to initiate the action (two years in the case of serious offenses (faltas graves), Article 83). Therefore, in accordance with the principle of normative self-integration of administrative law (mandate 9 of the LGAP), in the absence of a special provision within the LGP that regulates the matter (i.e., the subsequent stages of the proceeding, such as: processing and imposition of the sanction and its execution), it is necessary to apply the time limits and terms established by Book Two of the LGAP; particularly those referring to the ordinary administrative proceeding (cardinal 366 ibid). Contrary to what was ordered by the Judges, it becomes improper to resort to the provisions of the Labor Code, a normative body that regulates private relationships, which yields to particular and express regulations of an administrative nature (LGAP), especially insofar as they incorporate diverse rules on the subject. Thus, under mandates 261 and 340 of the LGAP, the proceeding must be completed within the two months following its initiation; additionally, when it is stalled for more than six months by reason of a cause attributable to the Administration that initiated it, its expiration (caducidad) will occur. Keep in mind that the disciplinary recommendation agreed upon by the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) and the issuance of the final act are part of the processing of the proceeding. It is worth highlighting that exceeding the time limits set in the cited norms does not, per se, imply the nullity of the actions taken, nor does it inhibit the Administration from exercising its proper competence and issuing the final act, as these are regulatory time limits. In this regard, precept 329 of the LGAP enshrines: "1. The Administration shall always have the duty to resolve expressly within the time limits of this law. 2. Failure to do so shall be deemed a serious service offense (falta grave de servicio). 3. The final act issued outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal effects, unless the law provides otherwise." In this regard, one may consult the judgment of the First Chamber no. 000608-F-S1-2012 of 11:55 a.m. on May 16, 2012. It should be added that said delay does not imply the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding, which only occurs when it is stalled for more than six consecutive months (canon 340 of the LGAP). Likewise, the procedural effects of expiration (caducidad) require that it has been requested or declared within the proceeding, precisely to put an end to it.

The foregoing means that the administrative decision issued after a six-month period of inertia attributable exclusively to the Administration, when it has not been alleged or declared, is entirely valid. In this regard, see ruling no. 1001-A-S1-2013 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) at 4:15 p.m. on August 1, 2013. It is clear that the only sanction established by the administrative legal system (specifically: LGAP) for non-compliance with the aforementioned procedural deadlines is the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding, conditioned upon the paralysis of the latter for more than six months and upon the individual subject to the proceeding so claiming in the administrative venue, since the possibility of doing so later would be precluded. In the matter under study, it should be clarified, said expiration was already examined and resolved with the authority of res judicata by this Court of Cassation (ruling 123-F-TC-2015), which found it inapplicable because it was not raised during the processing of the proceeding and before the issuance of the final act. In this regard, the Judges err in considering the Administration's sanctioning power to have prescribed. It is important to note that, once the final act is issued, the prescriptive period for executing the sanctioning power (material enforcement of the imposed sanction) begins to run. Regarding this point, it is also inappropriate to resort to the provisions of the Labor Code (canon 603), for it is reiterated that this body of law regulates private relationships, so it yields to specific and express administrative regulations (LGAP), especially insofar as they incorporate different rules on the subject of expiration (caducidad) and the statute of limitations (prescripción). This Collegiate Body has indicated that the period to execute the sanction is four years, based on the following: "Therefore, in accordance with the order of precedence of sources of normative integration set forth in Article 9 cited above, one must turn to Article 156 of the LGAP, which, in relevant part to the specific case, provides: '(...) 3. Acts unfavorable to the individual may be revoked, even if they are already final for the individual, after a prior report from the Contraloría General de la República. // 4. The power of revocation enshrined in the preceding paragraph shall expire in four years.' The transcribed norm expressly recognizes the Administration's power to revoke (extinguish) acts unfavorable to the individual, even if these have already become final, a power subject to a maximum time limit of four years. Now, this Court of Cassation considers that the cited precept is applicable analogically to the case at hand since, in the case of the expiration of the power to execute an unfavorable act – as is the final disciplinary act –, the legal consequence of the Administration's inactivity in failing to exercise its power in a timely manner is precisely the termination of that power, in other words, the decay of the possibility of materializing the final sanctioning act. This means that, although valid and final, the act becomes ineffective and unenforceable, and as such loses its enforceability (ejecutoriedad). Thus, in both scenarios – bearing in mind their conceptual technical differences –, the unfavorable act born into legal life as a valid, and even final, act will not have effect on the individual. Therefore – without prejudice to any express norm regulating a special case – by resorting to section 4 of Article 156 of the LGAP, the normative gap noted in the sub examine can be filled." (Vote no. 108-F-TC-2019, at 3:00 p.m. on July 4, 2019). In the case under study, the record shows that the final act of the proceeding was issued by resolution 2010-2592-D.M of July 27, 2010, and the communication to the individual subject to the proceeding Vargas Obando occurred on September 24 of that same year. It is evident, as far as the exercise of disciplinary power is concerned, that from the issuance of the final act until its respective enforcement, the four-year period indicated above did not elapse. For the reasons stated, it is unobjectionable that the Administration exercised its disciplinary power in accordance with the time limits imposed by the legal system, ergo, the dismissal act in question is valid and lawful. Therefore, the appealed ruling will be revoked." For its part, the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, LOPJ), article 211, establishes on the subject: "The action to investigate offenses must be initiated within the month following the date on which the person who must commence the investigation becomes aware of them (…)." It should be noted that, with the enactment of the General Police Law on May 26, 1994 (No. 7410), the "Police Statute" (Estatuto Policial) (contained in Title III of that Law) was approved, which came to regulate the relationship between the members of the police forces that comprise it and the State as employer. Chapter VII of said Statute regulates the disciplinary regime applicable to members of the police forces (types of offenses, sanctions, statutes of limitations, disciplinary investigation procedure, administrative action in the event of criminal proceedings, among others). As relevant, it follows from Article 83 of the LGP that the legitimate and timely exercise of the power to discipline infractions by members of the police forces prescribes in two years for serious offenses. The aforementioned precept states: "Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated." This period refers to the maximum time limit for the Administration to exercise its disciplinary power.

Now, derived from canons 603 of the CT, 211 of the LOPJ, and 71 of the LOCGR, it must be understood as a general principle that the cited two years run from the moment when the competent body becomes aware of the facts that could constitute an offense by the employee. That is, regarding members of the police forces, from when the Legal Disciplinary Department (Departamento Disciplinario Legal) of the MSP becomes aware of the alleged irregularities committed by the official. A Department, it is worth adding, that is responsible for the instruction of the proceeding, preparing the respective report, and transferring the matter to the Personnel Council (Consejo de Personal) for resolution in the first instance (articles 57 and 84 of the LGP). Likewise, as both the Judges and the appellant rightly argued, the notification of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) to the employee is the action that marks the initiation of the proceeding and by reason of which the period in question is interrupted. The purpose of this communication is to inform the interested party of the occurrence of a legally relevant act or fact, so that they may exercise their right of defense (article 39 of the Political Constitution). Through that act, the accusation is formalized, with an express indication of the reprehensible conduct, aspects of manner, time, and place, evidence for the prosecution, the employee's rights, among others.

Thus, regarding the exercise of disciplinary power, both the issuance of the statement of charges and its communication to the individual (notification of the act) must be carried out within the period established in the law for the initiation of the proceeding (two years according to the LGP). In the same vein, the judgment of this Court 00112-F-TC-2015 of 9:40 a.m. on October 8, 2015, may be consulted. The foregoing because every administrative act, in addition to being valid, must be effective, and the latter occurs upon the respective notification (article 334 of the LGAP).

A corollary of the above is that if, from the date when the Legal Disciplinary Department becomes aware of the facts attributed to the official and until it notifies the employee of the statement of charges, the two years enshrined in precept 83 of the LGP do not elapse, the disciplinary action would be in accordance with the law. In the matter under review, it is an uncontroverted fact that the MSP exercised the disciplinary power in accordance with the time limits imposed by the legal system, since the referred Department became aware of the alleged facts constituting a disciplinary offense on January 24, 2007; this through the official letter sent to it by the Cantonal Delegate of the Community Policing of Upala Delta 84 (No. 0034-PPU-2007), and Mr. Greivin was notified of the statement of charges on the following March 16.

Therefore, concerning the initial exercise of the disciplinary power, at the time when the Administration notified the employee of the order initiating the proceeding, the two-year period regulated in Article 83 of the LGP had not elapsed, as reasoned by both the Trial Court and the appellant. Now, contrary to the appellant's view, the period established in the cited canon is strictly limited to the initiation of the disciplinary action, the only scenario contemplated in the rule. While it is true that Article 83 of the LGP stipulates a specific scenario for interruption, which is the communication of the statement of charges to the official, it is erroneous to consider that this act carries with it the start, from zero, of a new calculation from when the competent body issues the respective recommendation until the imposition of the sanction, and then, another new calculation for the execution of the final act (the LGP says nothing in that regard). Such a thesis would imply distorting the nature of the precept, eternalizing disciplinary proceedings (as one would have: two years to initiate it, another two years to impose the sanction after the respective recommendation is issued, and two more years to execute the final act), with the consequent obligation, on the Administration's part, to keep the employee who has incurred a serious offense active during the course of the case. Furthermore, the purpose of the Administration's sanctioning powers would be distorted by the delay in imposing the sanction. Without overlooking the violation of the principles of legal certainty, economy, celerity, effectiveness, and efficiency, which must prevail in every administrative proceeding. Consequently, once the disciplinary case is initiated, the period contained in numeral 83 of the LGP is suspended. It is worth warning that, even though said Law establishes the disciplinary administrative proceeding to impose sanctions on members of the police forces, such proceeding does not find further regulation in that normative body, since as indicated, it solely stipulates the period to initiate the action (two years in the case of serious offenses, Article 83).

Consequently, in accordance with the principle of normative self-integration of administrative law (article 9 of the LGAP), in the absence of a special provision within the LGP that regulates the matter (meaning the subsequent stages of the proceeding, namely: processing and imposition of the sanction and its execution), it is necessary to apply the periods and terms established by the Second Book of the LGAP; particularly those referring to the ordinary administrative proceeding (article 366, ibid). Contrary to what the Judges ruled, it is inappropriate to resort to the provisions of the Labor Code, a normative body that regulates private relationships, which yields to specific and express administrative regulations (LGAP), especially when they incorporate different rules on the subject.

Thus, under articles 261 and 340 of the LGAP, the proceeding must be processed within two months of its initiation; additionally, if it is suspended for more than six months by reason of a cause attributable to the Administration that initiated it, its expiration will occur. It should be noted that the recommendation for sanction agreed upon by the Personnel Council and the issuance of the final act are part of the processing of the proceeding. It is worth highlighting that exceeding the periods set in the cited rules does not imply, per se, the nullity of the actions taken, much less does it inhibit the Administration from exercising its due competence and issuing the final act, since these are directory periods.

In relation to this, precept 329 of the LGAP establishes: “1. The Administration shall always have the duty to resolve expressly within the time limits set forth in this law. 2. Failure to do so shall be deemed a serious breach of duty. 3. The final act issued outside the time limit shall be valid for all legal purposes, except as otherwise provided by law.” In this regard, see the judgment of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 000608-F-S1-2012 of 11:55 a.m. on May 16, 2012. It should be added that the aforementioned delay does not entail the lapsing (caducidad) of the procedure, which only occurs when the procedure is halted for more than six consecutive months (canon 340 of the LGAP). Likewise, the procedural effects of lapsing (caducidad) require that it has been requested or declared within the procedure, precisely to put an end to it. The foregoing means that an administrative decision issued after a six-month period of inactivity attributable exclusively to the Administration, when lapsing has not been claimed or declared, is fully valid. In that sense, see the ruling of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 1001-A-S1-2013 of 4:15 p.m. on August 1, 2013. It is clear that the only sanction established by the administrative legal system (specifically: LGAP), in case of non-compliance with the aforementioned procedural time limits, is the lapsing (caducidad) of the procedure, conditioned upon the latter being halted for more than six months and upon the individual subject to the administration so claiming in the administrative venue, since the possibility of doing so later would be precluded. In the matter under study, it must be clarified, said lapsing (caducidad) was already examined and resolved with the force of res judicata by this Court of Cassation (sentence 123-F-TC-2015), which ruled it was inadmissible because it had not been asserted during the processing of the procedure and before the issuance of the final act. In that sense, the Judges erred in considering the Administration's sanctioning power to be time-barred. It is important to note that, once the final act is issued, the statute of limitations for executing the sanctioning power (material execution of the imposed sanction) begins to run. On this point, it is also inadmissible to resort to the provisions of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo, canon 603), since it is reiterated, that normative body regulates private relationships, and therefore it yields to specific and express regulations of an administrative nature (LGAP), especially insofar as they incorporate different rules on the matter of lapsing (caducidad) and the statute of limitations. This Collegiate Body has indicated that the time limit to execute the sanction is four years, based on the following: “Therefore, pursuant to the order of precedence of the sources of normative integration established in Article 9 cited above, one must resort to cardinal 156 of the LGAP, which, in what is of interest to the specific case, provides: ‘(…) 3. Acts unfavorable to the individual subject to the administration may be revoked, even if they are already final for the individual, following an opinion from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). // 4. The power of revocation enshrined in the preceding paragraph shall lapse (caducará) in four years.’ The transcribed norm expressly recognizes the Administration's power to revoke (extinguish) acts unfavorable to the individual subject to the administration, even if these have already become final, a power subject to a maximum time limit of four years. Now, this Cassation Body considers that the cited precept is analogously applicable to the sub judice since, in the case of the lapsing (caducidad) of the power to execute an act of an unfavorable nature – as is the final disciplinary act – the legal consequence of the Administration's inactivity, which does not exercise its power in time, is precisely its expiration, in other words, the extinguishment of the possibility of materializing the final sanctioning act. This means that, although valid and final, the act becomes ineffective and unenforceable, and as such loses its enforceability. Thus, in both cases – bearing in mind the conceptual technical differences – the unfavorable act born into legal life as a valid, and even final, act will not have effect on the individual subject to the administration. It is thus then that – without prejudice to any express norm regulating a special case – by resorting to ordinal 156, subsection 4) of the LGAP, the normative gap observed in the sub examine can be filled.” (Voto no. 108-F-TC-2019, of 3:00 p.m. on July 4, 2019). In the case under study, it is evident from the case file that the final act of the procedure was issued by resolution 2010-2592-D.M of July 27, 2010, and communication to the individual subject to the administration, Vargas Obando, occurred on September 24 of the same year. It is evident that, regarding the exercise of the disciplinary power, from the issuance of the final act until its respective execution, the four-year period indicated above did not elapse. For the reasons stated, it is unimpeachable that the Administration exercised the disciplinary power in accordance with the temporal limits imposed by the legal system, ergo, the dismissal act in question is valid and in accordance with the law. Thus, it shall be appropriate to reverse the appealed judgment."

"VI. Este Tribunal no comparte lo resuelto por los Juzgadores de instancia ni los argumentos del recurrente, en los términos que se dirán. El derecho disciplinario en general tiene fundamento en la relación especial que existe entre el Estado y los funcionarios o servidores públicos, lo que ha sido denominado por la doctrina “relaciones de sujeción especial”, es decir, aquellas que se establecen entre un sujeto y una Administración Pública, en razón de una condición o título especial y diferenciado que ostenta ese sujeto frente a esa entidad, en razón de la cual adquiere particulares derechos y obligaciones. Cabe destacar, dentro de las principales obligaciones de todo servidor público se encuentra la de responder disciplinariamente por sus acciones u omisiones, cuando éstas sean consideradas una infracción o falta, en detrimento de la atención del servicio público que atiende. Tratándose de funcionarios públicos, el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense contempla diversos regímenes en materia disciplinaria, pues las exigencias de protección de los bienes jurídicos relativos a la correcta prestación del servicio son distintas en cada caso y así, de forma dispersa, se han regulado. Entonces, dependiendo del régimen disciplinario, podría ser diversa la regulación del plazo para ejercer la potestad sancionadora. Así, conforme al canon 603 del CT, aplicable a los servidores sujetos al Estatuto del Servicio Civil por remisión expresa del cardinal 51 (de dicho Estatuto), el patrono dispone de un mes para ejercer la acción disciplinaria. Al tenor del ordinal 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR), son cinco años para imponer responsabilidad administrativa a un funcionario de la hacienda pública. Por su parte la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ), mandado 211, establece en torno al tema: "La acción para investigar las faltas deberá iniciarse, dentro del mes siguiente a la fecha en que quien deba levantar la investigación tenga conocimiento de ellas (…)”. Tómese en cuenta, con la promulgación de la Ley General de Policía el 26 de mayo de 1994 (no. 7410), se aprobó el “Estatuto Policial” (contenido en el Título III de esa Ley), el cual vino a regular la relación entre los miembros de las fuerzas policiales que lo integran y el Estado como patrono. El Capítulo VII de dicho Estatuto reglamenta el régimen disciplinario aplicable a los miembros de los cuerpos de policía (tipos de faltas, sanciones, prescripciones, procedimiento en investigación disciplinaria, actuación administrativa en caso de proceso penal, entre otros). En lo de interés, del artículo 83 de la LGP se desprende que el ejercicio legítimo y oportuno de la potestad para disciplinar las infracciones de los miembros de las fuerzas policiales prescribe en dos años para las faltas graves. Reza el referido precepto: “Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario”. Tal plazo refiere al límite temporal máximo para que la Administración ejerza la potestad disciplinaria. Ahora bien, derivado de los cánones 603 del CT, 211 de la LOPJ y 71 de la LOCGR, debe entenderse como un principio general que, los dos años de cita corren a partir del momento cuando el órgano competente conoce de los hechos que pudieran constituir falta del servidor. Es decir, tratándose de miembros de las fuerzas de policía, desde que el Departamento Disciplinario Legal del MSP conoce de las presuntas irregularidades cometidas por el funcionario. Departamento, valga agregar, que tiene a su cargo la instrucción del procedimiento, preparar el informe respectivo y trasladar el asunto al Consejo de Personal para que resuelva en primera instancia (mandados 57 y 84 de la LGP). Asimismo, como bien argumentaron los Juzgadores y el casacionista, la notificación del traslado de cargos al servidor es la actuación que marca el inicio del procedimiento y a raíz del cual se interrumpe el plazo en cuestión. La finalidad de ésta comunicación estriba en poner en conocimiento del interesado el acaecimiento de un acto o hecho de relevancia jurídica, a fin de que ejerza su derecho de defensa (ordinal 39 de la Constitución Política). Mediante ese acto se formaliza la imputación, con expreso señalamiento de las conductas reprochables, aspectos de modo, tiempo y lugar, prueba de cargo, derechos del servidor, entre otros. Así las cosas, respecto al ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria, tanto el dictado del traslado de cargos como su puesta en conocimiento al administrado (notificación del acto), deben realizarse dentro del plazo señalado en la ley para el inicio del procedimiento (dos años conforme a la LGP). En igual sentido puede consultarse la sentencia de este Tribunal 00112-F-TC-2015 de las 9 horas 40 minutos del 8 de octubre de 2015. Lo anterior por cuanto, todo acto administrativo además de válido debe ser eficaz y esto último sucede con la respectiva notificación (cardinal 334 de la LGAP). Corolario de lo expuesto, si desde la fecha cuando el Departamento Disciplinario Legal conoce de los hechos imputados al funcionario y hasta cuando notifica el traslado de cargos al servidor, no trascurren los dos años consagrados en el precepto 83 de la LGP, la acción disciplinaria resultaría conforme a derecho. En el asunto de examen, constituye un hecho no controvertido que el MSP ejerció la potestad disciplinaria con arreglo a los límites temporales que le impone el ordenamiento jurídico, pues el referido Departamento conoció de los presuntos hechos constitutivos de falta disciplinaria el 24 de enero de 2007; ello mediante el oficio que le remitió el Delegado Cantonal de la Policía de Proximidad de Upala Delta 84 (no. 0034-PPU-2007), por su parte Don Greivin fue comunicado del traslado de cargos el 16 de marzo siguiente. Entonces, en lo que al ejercicio inicial de la potestad disciplinaria respecta, al momento cuando la Administración comunicó al servidor el auto de apertura del procedimiento no había trascurrido el plazo de los dos años regulado en el artículo 83 de la LGP, tal y como razonaron tanto el Tribunal como el recurrente. Ahora bien, contrario al criterio del casacionista, el plazo establecido en el canon de cita se circunscribe exclusivamente al inicio de la acción disciplinaria, único supuesto contemplado en la norma. Si bien es cierto, el mandato 83 de la LGP estipula un supuesto específico de interrupción, cual es la comunicación del traslado de cargos al funcionario, resulta erróneo considerar que ese acto trae aparejado el inicio, desde cero, de un nuevo computo a partir de que el órgano competente emite la recomendación respectiva y hasta la imposición de la sanción y luego, de otro nuevo computo para la ejecución del acto final (la LGP no dice nada en ese sentido). Tal tesis implicaría desvirtuar la naturaleza del precepto, eternizar los procedimientos disciplinarios (pues se tendría: dos años para iniciarlo, otros dos años para imponer la sanción después de emitida la recomendación respectiva y dos años más para ejecutar el acto final), con la consecuente obligación, a cargo de la Administración, de mantener activo durante el curso de la causa al servidor que ha incurrido en una falta grave. Además, la finalidad de las potestades sancionatorias de la Administración se vería desvirtuada por la demora en imponer la sanción. Sin obviar, el quebranto de los principios de seguridad jurídica, economía, celeridad, eficacia y eficiencia, los cuales deben imperar en todo procedimiento administrativo. En consecuencia, iniciada la causa disciplinaria el plazo contenido en el numeral 83 de la LGP se suspende. Valga advertir, aún y cuando dicha Ley establece el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario a efecto de imponer sanciones a los miembros de las fuerzas de policía, tal procedimiento no encuentra mayor regulación en ese cuerpo normativo, pues según se indicó, tan solo estipula el plazo para iniciar la acción (dos años tratándose de faltas graves, artículo 83). Por consiguiente, conforme con el principio de autointegración normativa del derecho administrativo (mandato 9 de la LGAP), en ausencia de disposición especial dentro de la LGP que regule la materia (entiéndase las etapas siguientes del procedimiento, llámese: tramitación e imposición de la sanción y su ejecución), resulta necesario aplicar los plazos y términos establecidos por el Libro Segundo de la LGAP; en particular aquellos referidos al procedimiento ordinario administrativo (cardinal 366 ibíd). Contrario a lo dispuesto por los Jueces, deviene improcedente acudir a las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo, cuerpo normativo que regula las relaciones de carácter privado, el cual cede frente a regulaciones particulares y expresas de índole administrativo (LGAP), en especial en cuanto incorporen reglas diversas sobre el tema. Así las cosas, al amparo de los mandatos 261 y 340 de la LGAP el procedimiento debe tramitarse dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación, además, cuando este se paralice por más de seis meses en virtud de causa imputable a la Administración que lo haya iniciado, se producirá su caducidad. Téngase en cuenta, la recomendación de sanción acordada por el Consejo de Personal y el dictado del acto final hacen parte de la tramitación del procedimiento. Conviene resaltar, el hecho de sobrepasar los plazos fijados en las normas de cita no supone, per se, la nulidad de lo actuado, ni mucho menos inhibe a la Administración para ejercer la competencia debida y dictar el acto final, al tratarse de plazos ordenatorios. En relación consagra el precepto 329 de la LGAP: “1. La Administración tendrá siempre el deber de resolver expresamente dentro de los plazos de esta ley. 2. El no hacerlo se reputará falta grave de servicio. 3. El acto final recaído fuera de plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo disposición en contrario de la ley”. Al respecto puede consultarse la sentencia de la Sala Primera no. 000608-F-S1-2012 de las 11 horas 55 minutos del 16 de mayo de 2012. Cabe agregar, la referida demora no implica la caducidad del procedimiento, la cual, únicamente, se produce cuando éste se paralice por más de seis meses consecutivos (canon 340 de la LGAP). Asimismo, los efectos procedimentales de la caducidad requieren que se haya solicitado o declarado dentro del procedimiento, precisamente para ponerle fin. Lo anterior conlleva a que la decisión administrativa dictada luego de una inercia de seis meses atribuible con exclusividad a la Administración, cuando no se haya alegado o declarado, sea totalmente válida. En ese sentido véase el fallo de la Sala Primera no. 1001-A-S1-2013 de las 16 horas 15 minutos del 1° de agosto de 2013. Queda claro, la única sanción establecida por el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo (concretamente: LGAP), en caso de incumplimiento a los referidos plazos ordenatorios, lo es la caducidad del procedimiento, condicionada a la paralización de éste último por más de seis meses y que, el administrado así lo reclame en sede administrativa, pues la posibilidad de hacerlo posteriormente estaría precluída. En el asunto de estudio, cabe aclarar, dicha caducidad ya fue examinada y resuelta con carácter de cosa juzgada por este Tribunal de Casación (sentencia 123-F-TC-2015), quien dispuso su improcedencia al no haberse aducido durante la tramitación del procedimiento y antes del dictado del acto final. En ese sentido, erran los Jueces al estimar prescrita la potestad sancionadora de la Administración. Interesa advertir, una vez dictado el acto final empieza a correr el plazo prescriptivo para ejecutar la potestad sancionadora (ejecución material de la sanción impuesta). En cuanto a este punto, también deviene improcedente acudir a las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo (canon 603), pues se reitera, ese cuerpo normativo regula las relaciones de carácter privado, por lo que este cede frente a regulaciones particulares y expresas de índole administrativo (LGAP), en especial en cuanto incorporan reglas diversas sobre el tema de la caducidad y la prescripción. Este Órgano Colegiado ha señalado que el plazo para ejecutar la sanción es de cuatro años, con base en lo siguiente: “Por ende, en atención al orden de prelación de las fuentes de integración normativa dispuesto en el artículo 9 supracitado, debe acudirse al cardinal 156 de la LGAP, que en lo de interés al caso concreto dispone: “ (…) 3. Los actos desfavorables al administrado podrán ser revocados, aun si ya son firmes para el particular, previo dictamen de la Contraloría General de la República. // 4. La potestad de revocación consagrada en el párrafo anterior caducará en cuatro años”. La norma transcrita expresamente se reconoce a la Administración la potestad de revocar (extinguir) actos desfavorables al administrado, incluso aún si éstos ya han alcanzado firmeza, potestad sujeta a un límite máximo temporal de cuatro años. Ahora bien, estima este Órgano Casacional, el precepto de cita deviene aplicable analógicamente al subjúdice toda vez que, entratándose de la caducidad de la potestad de ejecución de un acto de naturaleza desfavorable –como lo es el acto final disciplinario-, la consecuencia jurídica de la inactividad de la Administración, quien no ejerce su potestad en tiempo, es precisamente el fenecimiento de ésta, en otras palabras, el decaimiento de la posibilidad de materializar el acto sancionatorio firme. Ello significa que, aunque válido y firme, el acto se torna ineficaz e inejecutable, y como tal pierde su ejecutoriedad. Así, en ambos supuestos –guardando las diferencias técnicas conceptuales-, el acto desfavorable nacido a la vida jurídica como un acto válido, e incluso firme, no surtirá efecto en el administrado. Es así entonces que –sin perjuicio de norma expresa que regule algún caso especial- recurriendo al ordinal 156 inciso 4) de la LGAP se puede suplir el vacío normativo advertido en el sub examine.” (Voto no. 108-F-TC-2019, de las 15 horas del 04 de julio de 2019). En el caso de estudio, consta en autos, el acto final del procedimiento se dictó por resolución 2010-2592-D.M del 27 de julio de 2010 y la comunicación al administrado Vargas Obando se dio el 24 de setiembre del mismo año. Resulta evidente, en lo que al ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria respecta, desde la emisión del acto final hasta su respectiva ejecución, no trascurrió el plazo de cuatro años indicado líneas atrás. Por los motivos expuestos, resulta inobjetable que la Administración ejerció la potestad disciplinaria con arreglo a los límites temporales que le impone el ordenamiento jurídico, ergo, el acto de despido en cuestión deviene válido y conforme a derecho. Así las cosas, procederá revocar la sentencia recurrida".