Denial of common-law marriage recognition due to parallel relationships of the requesting cohabitantReconocimiento de unión de hecho denegado por relaciones paralelas del conviviente solicitante

I.In the judgment that is the subject of this instance, the common-law union (unión de hecho) between the plaintiff and the defendant is recognized, it is established that each cohabitant acquires the right to participate in fifty percent of the assets found in the other's estate, one real property is declared to have this character, and this condition is denied for a vehicle. It establishes that the plaintiff has no right to receive alimony (pensión alimentaria), and the defendant is exempted from paying procedural and personal costs. Against said judgment, the defendant filed an appeal, alleging that the plaintiff's love affairs were not sporadic adultery or a one-night passionate encounter but were stable, and therefore he claims that the cohabitation was not "unique." He alleges that the plaintiff has been sharing her life with her current sentimental partner for more than six years. He argues that the plaintiff's evidence is contradictory, and that the testimony of the plaintiff's sister, in which she states that the plaintiff has had a relationship with [Name 010] for more than six years, is not assessed. That the confessional evidence is also not assessed since the plaintiff and her sister totally contradict each other.

II.Regarding the proven facts contained in the appealed judgment, they are approved, but the following must be added: 9) That for several years of the cohabitation with the defendant, the plaintiff [Name 001] maintained a parallel couple relationship with a man named [Name 010], who, after the separation of the parties, has been the plaintiff's partner (answer to the complaint on folios 27 to 31, testimonies of [Name 013], on folio 63, and of [Name 008], on folio 74). For what will be stated later, the assertion marked as b) must be eliminated as a relevant claim not demonstrated in this case.

III.It is interesting to note that this issue of the common-law union or concubinage (concubinato) has been an entire process in which the statistics, which reflect the reality within the social fabric, evidenced a gap with the legal regulation, so to avoid injustices, some situations were gradually recognized and legally protected. We can list some examples of norms that began the path: the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime Regulation, the Sickness and Maternity Regime Regulation (both from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund), the Law on War Pensions and Indemnities #1922 of August 5, 1955, the Law for the Social Promotion of Women (reform of Article 43 of the Family Code to include cohabitants as possible beneficiaries of the family dwelling regime; also modifies Article 152 CPP regarding leaving the home and alimony in cases of aggression; and reforms Article 572 subsection 1 of the Civil Code, which grants intestate succession rights to the cohabitant who meets certain conditions). Also Article 232 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch in case of pensions.

IV.For example, also at the jurisprudential level, the perspective was gradually opened. The ruling 145-92 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) can be cited, which pronounced on approving the effects of the de facto partnership (sociedad de hecho) for a concubinage: "...No. 145 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at fourteen hours forty-five minutes on October thirtieth, nineteen ninety-two. Ordinary trial established in the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, by ..., against “Estate of ...”, (...). XIV.- Having stated the foregoing regarding the facts alleged in the complaint, it is appropriate to examine whether they are legally apt to consider a de facto partnership as configured, in this specific case. This legal figure supposes the union of efforts by two or more individuals with a view to developing a specific activity capable of providing them with distributable profit. In that event, the law offers the possibility of channeling such an aspiration in an adequate and fair manner for them, as well as for third parties, through the partnership contract.

In accordance with the guiding principles of this legal institute, its three integrating elements are, namely: a plurality of persons involved in the activity; a community of assets, money, or industry, destined for the realization of the agreed purpose, and the agreement to distribute the profits. To these elements, another of vital importance must be added, which is the will to unite, the intention of the contracting parties to share a common fate, which implies risks and disadvantages. This is an animic disposition, known as “affectio societatis” or “animus contrahendae societatis”, which entails a convergence of interests; a functional coordination of services directed at obtaining the proposed common goal. These are the characteristics of a partnership in general terms. The de facto one -that is, the one that interests us here- presents the same traits, but with a defect of form, that is, despite the express or tacit will of the partners regarding its existence, it is not recorded in writing.

Consequently -and in this it coincides with irregular ones- it also does not appear registered in the Public Registry. Such a defect determines that the partners can request its liquidation at any time, but it does not imply the nullity of the tacit contract that supports it. In its development, the de facto partnership is regulated by the general provisions relating to formally constituted ones. It presents legal personality but diminished, conceived as such by virtue of a technical artifice necessary to regulate relations with third parties in good faith, arising from its objective existence. XV.- Having made the foregoing relation regarding the constitutive elements of a de facto partnership, it is easy to determine their concurrence -in accordance with the preceding considerations on the assessment of evidence- in the prolonged relationship observed by Mrs. ... and Mr. ... . While it is true, they cohabited, within the very heart of that relationship, an active, deliberate, and egalitarian collaboration was emerging, until consolidating, for the sake of the development and strengthening of a common lucrative enterprise, both subjecting, in that endeavor, decisively, the fruit of personal effort to the contingencies of the social businesses.

That is, parallel to the cohabitation, a distinct relationship was being born, with peculiar characteristics which confer its own identity, based not on personal affection, but on the interest of profit. Pursuing that end, they unite their efforts in an endeavor, which generates duties and responsibilities that transcend the boundaries of marital life, as they are of a different nature. The result of that common effort is consequently translated into distributable profits, so all that activity needs to be subjected to an adequate regime, namely that of the de facto partnership. If it were not so, upon the relationship ending, one of the parties would enrich themselves at the expense of the other, iniquitously depriving them, and for their own benefit, of the fruit of their effort or their contributions. That cannot be protected by law, a vehicle for the realization of justice. As a result of what has been stated, a different relationship is born from the very heart of the concubinary relationship, with its own identity, whose cause and object are also different.

In the specific case, that cause is configured by the facts recorded in the complaint, as the factual basis of the claim. It is therefore a licit cause, in accordance with good customs and morals, whereby the stated thesis does not impinge upon what is established by Article 627, subsection 3, in relation to Article 631, both of the Civil Code. The fear or objection raised in situations analogous to the present one is thus dispelled. Nor does this thesis mean that concubinage itself makes the partnership intention presumed. This latter, as has been seen, arises under the shelter of interests and objectives foreign to the “affectus maritalis”, as they are those proper to the “affectio societatis”. The former reflects the intention of the couple to cohabit as husband and wife; the latter, as has been seen, within the mutual trust and inter-partes identification it entails, tends towards the union of their assets or their efforts, or both at once, for the sake of obtaining a common benefit.

In accordance with what has been said, the following is concluded: if the characteristics proper to a de facto partnership are present within a cohabitation (amancebamiento), the mere existence of the latter cannot stand as an obstacle to considering the former as configured. This by virtue of the fact that the recognition of the de facto partnership, according to the preceding legal reasons, does not constitute or imply a legal endorsement in favor of concubinage. It is therefore imperative to consider as existing, in the sub-judice case, the de facto partnership alleged by the plaintiff (...)" This has been one of the most representative rulings of the jurisprudence prior to the legislation on the subject.

V.The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has had a decisive intervention on the subject, although we will see in the notes to Article 246 that it gave a negative criterion in the case of the common-law union of persons who are not eligible to marry. But it has been emphatic in pointing out that the Constitution does not exclude the family not founded on marriage: i.- For example, ruling 346-94 of the Constitutional Chamber weighed that: "...It is logical to think that the difference in treatment created by the legislator between the couple constituted by marriage and the de facto couple -for the purposes of the transcribed norm-, could be motivated by the intention to compensate for the helplessness in which the woman who has a family relationship based on a common-law union often finds herself when the bond is dissolved, compared to the woman who has legal protection because her bond was constituted by marriage.

This practice is common in many countries of the free world, which use compensatory measures in legislation to try to equate situations that in reality are disadvantageous, and to seek a fairer or more egalitarian position. To cite an example, in the United States of America, there exist in all its States hundreds of norms that protect minorities based on differences of race or sex. Within this line of thought, Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights was enacted, which seeks equality between men and women, but introducing an element of temporality, stipulating that the measures taken by the States Parties aimed at achieving real equality between men and women are not discriminatory in any way as long as they are of a temporary nature. The Chamber considers that although the issue of equality between men and women is intimately linked to this action, the core point is in reality that of the family; concretely, the inequality created by the norm, as indicated supra, between two possible modalities: the legally constituted one and that which, despite having the proper characteristics of the first, such as singularity, publicity, and stability, has been consolidated de facto.

It is our criterion that when the legislator established this difference favoring the unmarried woman, what was intended was to protect her, in the eventuality of the dissolution of the couple relationship, because she is the one who in most cases is left with the responsibility of educating and feeding the children; and that is nothing more than the search for the protection of the family through the protection of the woman. Article 51 of our Constitution, by stating that: The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State... recognizes the importance of family life, by establishing the duty of the State to protect it specially for being the natural element and foundation of society whose purposes, among others, are to form a community of persons, to be at the service of the life of its components, and to participate in the development of society.

We find in the constitutional norm two elements of utmost importance in understanding the intention of the legislator when enacting it, which are the “natural element” and “foundation of society”, as basic components of the formation of the family. In the first phrase, we understand that our legislator wanted that in said concept -family- it be observed that its sustenance constitutes a “natural” element, autonomous from formal bonds. On the other hand, and following this same line of thought, we must also understand that when stating that the family is the “foundation of society”, we must not presuppose the existence of legal bonds. Despite this, we must be very clear that there is an intimate relationship between what has been said and the special protection that the constituent undoubtedly wanted to give, as established by constitutional Article 52, to marriage by undoubtedly giving it a privileged rank, without this meaning that, due to the diversity in which the different types of human coexistence can unfold, these cannot obtain constitutional protection.

The Chamber in multiple pronouncements has recognized the duty of the State to provide special protection to the family, as well as the fundamental right that every human being has to constitute one. The family is, without a doubt, the primary and fundamental nucleus of society for the full physical, mental, moral, and social development of the individual. We must then, from this guidance, understand the term family in its substantial and not formal sense, surpassing the traditional concept of family, handled in the different fields of law, in which many times the very essence of that nucleus is left aside. Undoubtedly, the family is the ideal vehicle for achieving human development and preparation for life in society; it is the framework in which the individual is responsible for learning -among other things- to respect the rights and properties of others, and it is there where the principles of cooperation and mutual aid are formed, the basis of the modern family, which are transferred from generation to generation giving us the social stability we enjoy. - Intimately linked with this right of every human being to form a family, enshrined in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration, of the American Declaration, 23 of the International Pact, and 17 of the American Convention, is the intrinsic need to have a dwelling that allows them to satisfy their basic needs and be the central nucleus of all their activities.

It is from this perspective, that the Chamber is convinced that the norm and the protection it establishes for the unmarried woman were created. The article does not establish explicitly or by reference to social development programs, that eventually pre-existed with the legal system, but implicitly in it the existence of these is admitted, promoted by the State and its Institutions, to transfer real properties to individuals, in order to provide them with a place where the principles of well-being and family protection, which the constituent sought to concretize when enacting Article 51 of our Constitution, can develop. - Once the constitutional foundation of social development programs and the eventual transfer of real estate property from the State to private hands is clarified, it is necessary to analyze the problem derived from its registration in the registry, in the name of both spouses or the female cohabitant, as indicated by the analyzed article, due to the material impossibility of registering the same in favor of its real recipient: the family.

Historically, and due to socio-cultural considerations, the protection of the family has been directed at those linked by the institution of marriage, evidently as a consequence of the text of constitutional Article 52, and the concepts of the constituents on the institution of marriage, qualified as the “essential basis of society” (Act 116, pg. 579, National Constituent Assembly). But this cannot be to the detriment of relationships that, even though they materially fulfilled all the requirements of marriage -universality, unity, opposability, and stability-, their bond is not legally recognized, forgetting in some way that the holders of that common-law union are also creditors of constitutional protection. However, this situation has been gradually changing, and the legal system has extended its protection to common-law unions in order to safeguard, mainly, the rights of the woman and minor children.

Indeed, by providing in Article 52 of the Political Constitution that marriage is the essential basis of the family, it does not exclude that the family can be formed in a different way and entails, of course, that by the principle of equality, from that de facto bond derive identical legal effects as in marriage. Precisely, the questioned norm is a response to those situations, to which the legal system has given priority status, to thus resolve and protect the woman and children, whose union was not legally established. The norm wanted to fill that legal gap that promoted a situation of inequality that was operating to the detriment of the woman and children, when there was no legally recognized bond between her and her partner, and thus be able to foresee situations in which the woman -or the man in some other cases, which are fewer-, was forced to abandon, along with her children, the roof that had served as the family dwelling.

This article responds then, to the need to legally recognize and give protection to a social phenomenon, for which the legal system did not have an acceptable development, which was the existence of de facto families and their respective regulations, even though, constitutionally, family protection was explicit (Article 51). Added to this, the norm responded to another element of no less importance, which was access to agricultural financing, which had traditionally been denied to her, and it is through this protective function of the State towards an unprotected sector, that a norm is enacted which, as will be seen, suffers from a defect of unconstitutionality consisting of irrationally granting the woman, whose nucleus has not been legally constituted, greater advantages than the woman united by a matrimonial bond, since the norm, when regulating the registration, authorizes that in the case of marriage it be done in the name of both spouses, while in the case of cohabitants, title is granted only in favor of the woman.

While the Chamber considers that the cited Article 7 is the product of a historical reality with which the aim is to protect the de facto family, to avoid the dispossession of assets acquired in the union, such protection cannot be established to the detriment of other relationships privilegedly protected by the State, such as the family founded on marriage, creating a more advantageous situation for one of these family modalities and establishing an irrational discrimination that affects legally constituted families. The norm creates a kind of marginalization that affects the family nucleus and, therefore, society as a whole from the moment one group is treated preferentially and is placed in a socially advantageous situation compared to another group. On the other hand, it is essential to clarify that the discrimination pointed out is not regarding the situation of the woman, but of the legal situation of the different family modalities, because although it is true that constitutional Article 52 establishes that marriage is “the essential basis of the family”, this does not rule out the existence of other bases that we can classify as “non-essential”, on which a family can also be formed, which despite not being protected by a formal bond, deserves and must have constitutional protection, for all the rights that derive from it..." ii.- Ruling 769-93 of the Constitutional Chamber, made the following considerations in the absence of regulations on the common-law union: "...

III.- However: one should not resort to a norm provided to define what happens with the assets of spouses at the time of divorce or judicial separation, or one should not necessarily resort to it, when the situation being discussed is the right that a man or a woman claims regarding the assets of the other –co-ownership–, when there has been a common-law union (unión de hecho) in which through common effort those assets have been acquired. Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations –Article 1198 of the Civil Code cited in its resolution–, or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used according to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes.

It must be added to the foregoing that, according to the first norm cited, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised. Judges have, then, at their disposal, ample possibilities to resolve by express norm, by extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative recreation based on another insufficient one. What does not seem appropriate is to attribute to Article 41 of the Family Code, which was designed to regulate a particular situation and, if you will, the usual one in our environment, discrimination for not referring to other possibilities. That conclusion could not be considered reasonable.- IV.- The insufficiency of our legal system in the matter at hand, as specialized authors have already pointed out, stems from the Political Constitution itself, whose Article 52 establishes that “Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses”.

In the same way, as the Attorney General's Office points out in its report, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948), the International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 1969), instruments in force in our country, indicate that character of marriage as essential to the family and a right for persons. That does not mean, in any way, as some author has pointed out, that marriage is the sole or exclusive basis of the family. Reality shows that, at least in certain regions of the country, there are high percentages of families founded not on marriage, but on a common-law union. The fact that ordinary legislation has not taken charge of developing this problem could not revert against Article 41 as intended in the consultation, hence the Chamber is obliged to indicate that there is no unconstitutionality attributed to that norm, but rather that it finds itself in the parallel duty of indicating to the Court that it has sufficient basis to resolve the specific case according to what was stated supra.

Situations such as those raised in the sub judice matter have been resolved countless times in an estimatory manner, we cannot affirm that always correctly, but rather to emphasize that already the Courts of different hierarchy have been establishing guidelines to resolve cases like the one under the consulting Court's knowledge. In this sense, one can already resort to sufficient specific precedents. The power of the jurisprudence of Family Law in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in decisions of the courts, even some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not thereby lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been determinant for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been most swiftly noticed...." iii.- Perhaps ruling 1154-94 of the Constitutional Chamber is one of the most revealing of a new focus on the common-law union in our legal system: "...

IIº.- On the merits. Regarding the merits of the consultation, the Judge wishes to clarify whether the Constitution, when speaking of “spouse”, is excluding common-law unions, or if the contrary can be interpreted, that is, that the consulted norms do not exclude stable couples and families united without a legal bond. It is important, when making a constitutional analysis, not to focus solely on the norm most related to the subject, but to see the Constitution as a harmonious whole, and interpret it as the set of ideas and values it is, in light of the principles that sustain it. On this particular subject, any analysis made must be along these lines, otherwise it would be biased and superficial. Indeed, one cannot analyze the exposed subject solely in light of what Article 36 provides; it is necessary to relate that norm to constitutional Articles 51 and 52, which refer to the protection of the family, as they are intimately linked to the first.

In the judgment of this Chamber, the harmonious interpretation of the cited Articles 36, 51, and 52 does not allow concluding that the guarantee referred to in Article 36 is only for the family based on marriage; on the contrary, such an interpretation would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, as will be seen. IIIº. Article 36, as this Chamber has already analyzed (see judgment 264-91), aims to protect the cohesion of the family nucleus, a concern that, together with Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution, reflects the conviction of the constituent legislator on the importance of the family as a social nucleus. In order, those norms state: “Article 36. In criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against himself, nor against his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives up to the third degree inclusive of consanguinity or affinity”. “Article 51. The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State” “Article 52.

Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses”. A literal interpretation of Articles 51 and 52 in relation to Article 36 transcribed supra can easily lead us to the conclusion that the power of abstention referred to in Article 36 is only for those who, in addition to cohabiting out of their desire to share love, to assist each other, and to form a family, are united by a legal bond. The doubt could originate from a simplistic interpretation of the relationship of Articles 51 and 52, whose conclusion could be: “Marriage is the essential basis of the family”. However, if we analyze the records of the National Constituent Assembly, the legislator's intention not to exclude de facto families from constitutional protection can be corroborated. As the Attorney General's Office rightly states, the first motion discussed in relation to the norm under comment was drafted in the following terms: “Marriage is the legal basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses”.

Deputy Ortíz opposed this motion, saying that: “...saying ‘legal’ means excluding those de facto families, which without having their origin in marriage, are nonetheless families.” Due to that opposition, Article 52 was approved in its current terms, eliminating the phrase “legal basis” and replacing it with “essential basis”, which means that the fact the legislator gave constitutional protection to marriage, considering it the essential basis of the family, is not exclusive of other types of family. Marriage is then, the essential basis, but not the only one, of the family, in the eyes of the legislator. If we further take into consideration that the legislator wanted to protect the “family” -without making distinctions- in Article 51, we cannot interpret that “family” is only that constituted by a legal bond, but on the contrary, that the term is inclusive of other family nuclei, even though the legislator may have expressed their preference for those constituted by marriage. IVº.

According to the foregoing, for the constituent legislator, so-called “common-law families” and marriage are simultaneously two moral and legal sources of family (it must be taken into account that there is no legal impediment to forming a common-law family); both guarantee the stability necessary for permanent family life, because they originate from a common source: the love that binds a man and a woman, the desire to share, to assist and support each other mutually, and to have offspring. In our country, according to data from the Office of Statistics and Census of July nineteen ninety-three, eighteen point thirteen percent (18.13%) of couples who cohabit do so in free union, with the vast majority of these unions occurring in rural areas, for cultural and historical reasons, which it is not proper to censure or ignore in light of the freedom of worship, expression, and thought protected by the Political Constitution.

That historical and cultural reality, which remains strong even a few years before the turn of the century, existed long before law and religion created marriage. Studies on the matter recognize that since time immemorial, man and woman have shared a common life to help each other bear life’s burdens and perpetuate the species through procreation. In Roman Law, for example, concubinage was recognized and regulated, coexisting with cö emptio, confarreatio, and usus—forms of celebrating justae nuptiae. With the advent of Christianity, concubinage also coexisted with religious marriage, as is proven by the Council of Toledo, held in the year four hundred (400) of our era, until it was prohibited at the Council of Trent in fifteen sixty-three (1563), which ordered “the obligation to contract marriage before the parish priest, in a public ceremony..., as well as ordering that concubines who did not separate upon the third warning would incur excommunication and if they persisted in living together would be liable for heresy and adultery.” Vº.

Despite the qualifiers that some religions have given to concubinage, it remains today a source of family, and ignoring this social reality only leads us to inequality and lack of protection for those who make up that nucleus, including the children, who in light of the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” and our Constitution, deserve protection above social or moral prejudices. The common-law family is a source of “family,” understood as the group of persons who, linked by the stable union of a man and a woman, live under the same roof and form a primary social unit. However, it must be clear that love affairs or sporadic or superficial relationships cannot be equated with common-law unions; common-law unions fulfill family functions equal to those of marriage, and are characterized, like marriage, by being endowed at least with stability (to the same extent as marriage), publicity (it is not hidden but is public and notorious), cohabitation (living together under the same roof, the desire to share a common life, to assist and help each other mutually), and singularity (it is not a plural relationship in several living centers).

VIº. Our system of life is based on principles that maintain the belief that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, without distinction of race, sex, color, language, religion, or political opinion. The family, on the other hand, is indisputably the natural and fundamental element of society because it is within it that the fundamental elements for the development of the best qualities of the human being occur and where our customs, traditions, and teachings are transmitted from generation to generation. Consequently, the family, composed of free individuals equal in dignity and rights before the law, has the right to the protection of society and the State regardless of the cause that gave rise to it; its nature and importance justify its protection. This Chamber recognized this in judgment number 2984-93, by extending the right to abstain from testifying, contemplated in Article 36 of the Constitution, to the cohabiting partner, considering that the protection of family cohesion is as important in the common-law family as in the legally constituted one...” iv.- Other votes of the Constitutional Chamber on the topic of common-law union are: 2776-92 (Art. 36 Constitution), 3798-92 (criminal matter), 769-93 (Art. 41 Family Code), 1151-94 (criminal), 1153-94 (criminal), 1155-94 (criminal), 2129-94 (572 sub-paragraph ch Civil Code), 2648-94 (Regulation for Disability, Old Age, and Death), 3064-94 (denial of loan due to free union status), 3693-94 (consultation on law), 6798-94 (criminal), 7515-94 (consultation on law), 3027-95 (case of INVU), 3340-96 (Article 85 of the Labor Code), 5429-96 (consultation of the Third Chamber).

VI.- The common-law union was regulated in the Family Code by an addition made to it through Ley Nº 7532 of August 8, 1995, published in La Gaceta Nº 162 of Monday, August 28, 1995. Said law established two types of common-law union, but one of them, the so-called irregular common-law union, was declared unconstitutional by means of vote 3858-99 issued at sixteen hours forty-eight minutes on the twenty-fifth of May, nineteen ninety-nine. Said common-law union that was declared unconstitutional is that in which the cohabitants did not have legal aptitude to marry. Thus, only that union called regular remains in effect. It is Articles 242, 243, and 244 which refer to this one. Article 242 of the Family Code provides the following: “ARTICLE 242.- The public, notorious, unique, and stable common-law union, for more than three years, between a man and a woman who possess the legal aptitude to contract marriage, shall produce all the patrimonial effects proper to legally formalized marriage, when it ends for any cause.” There are eight requirements for this common-law union, then:

• 1)common-law union;
• 2)public;
• 3)notorious;
• 4)unique;
• 5)stable;
• 6)for more than three years;
• 7)between a man and a woman;
• 8)with the legal aptitude to marry. Common-law union refers to couple relationships not founded on marriage, that is, to the so-called concubinage. The requirements of publicity and notoriety imply that the couple's relationship is not conducted in a clandestine or hidden manner, but rather is evident, patent, manifest, in sight and knowledge of all. The uniqueness or singularity of the relationship excludes simultaneous relationships. In this way, a relationship not founded on marriage is protected, but one most similar to marriage regarding monogamy and fidelity. Regarding stability, this is one of the most interesting requirements, as it implies solidity and permanence. It is worth reiterating here the concepts that the Constitutional Chamber developed in vote 1154-94, on the conditions of a common-law union: “...The common-law family is a source of “family,” understood as the group of persons who, linked by the stable union of a man and a woman, live under the same roof and form a primary social unit. However, it must be clear that love affairs or sporadic or superficial relationships cannot be equated with common-law unions; common-law unions fulfill family functions equal to those of marriage, and are characterized, like marriage, by being endowed at least with stability (to the same extent as marriage), publicity (it is not hidden but is public and notorious), cohabitation (living together under the same roof, the desire to share a common life, to assist and help each other mutually), and singularity (it is not a plural relationship in several living centers)....”. Regarding the three-year term, this constitutes the parameter of stability, or permanence over time. Regarding it being a union between a man and a woman, it is absolutely clear that this refers to heterosexual relationships. The legal aptitude to marry refers above all to the exclusion of a marital bond. VII.- Within this context, and in accordance with the assessment of evidence required in family proceedings pursuant to Article 8 of the Family Code, the present case must be analyzed. Said Article 8 of the Family Code, in its second paragraph, establishes the following: “...However, judges in family matters shall interpret the evidence without being bound by the positive rules of ordinary law, taking into account all the circumstances and the elements of conviction that the case file may provide; but in every case, the reasons for their assessment must be recorded...” On the item of evidence assessment in family procedural law, the flexibility implied by that norm, and its limits, must be pointed out. What does it mean that evidence shall be interpreted without being bound by the rules of ordinary evidence? It implies another departure from the civil process, since in the first place those norms that give a specific value to evidence, such as Articles 338, 370, 379 of the Civil Procedure Code, must be set aside, and it could even mean a modification to numerals 330 and 417 of the same Code (although in this case –as we shall see– it ends up in the same place since sound judgment is the basis of the system), to achieve a different system of evidence assessment and appreciation, which definitively also includes a subtraction from the rules of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, which enunciates the traditional conception of the rules of the burden of proof, as this Court indicated in vote 707-04 of 8:20 a.m. on April 29, 2004. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized again that the flexibility that has evolved is a middle ground that does not imply absolute laxity. This is how the Constitutional Chamber considered it when analyzing an analogous situation: “...V. ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE IN CONSCIENCE. The challenged Article 493 provides: \"Unless expressly provided otherwise in this Code, in the judgment, evidence shall be assessed in conscience, without being bound by the rules of Ordinary Law; but the Judge, when analyzing the evidence received, is obligated to express the principles of equity or of any nature that form the basis of their criterion.\" The representation of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is correct in concluding that from the transcribed norm it is impossible to derive authorization for labor judges to violate constitutional rights or norms, since it only establishes the jurisdictional power to assess evidence in conscience, establishing two assumptions under which this is legitimate: a) insofar as it is not within the hypothesis that, in accordance with the legal system, it is expressly prohibited; and b) that when done, it be in a substantiated manner, be it on the principle of equity or of any nature. In this way, assessing evidence in conscience does not imply resolving in an arbitrary manner, since every judge -as a public official- is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adaptation of public action, not only to the specific norms on a determined object, but to the entire block of legality; therefore, they cannot rule in disregard of constitutional principles and rights, as they are limited by the rules of sound judgment and principles of reasonableness, which, properly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional assessment with the Political Constitution, as this Chamber understood in judgment 3484-94, of twelve o'clock on July eighth, nineteen ninety-four, in which it determined that the faculties of judges to assess evidence in conscience are not contrary to the judge's obligation to ground their rulings, a constitutional principle that integrates due process: \"IV.- Regarding the assessment of evidence, Article 26 of the Law being questioned [Notary Law] establishes: \"In the qualification of evidence, the Tribunal shall have broad freedom of assessment and shall not be obligated to be bound by the rules of ordinary evidence. If it comes to have the conviction that the accused charge is true, it shall impose the corresponding correction ...\". This article does not establish a system of intimate conviction, as the plaintiff alleges, but rather that of free assessment of evidence or free conviction, which implies that everything can be proven and by any lawful evidentiary means, a system of assessment that is not unconstitutional, especially if we take into account that in every administrative process, the evidence that serves as the basis for the resolution must be legal, valued rationally, and the resolution must, in every case, be duly substantiated. The evidentiary freedom established by Article 26 is not unrestricted; any means of evidence considered in the procedure shall be analyzed in accordance with reasonableness criteria and with the rules of sound criticism. On this topic, the Chamber specified: \"The principle of reasonable assessment of evidence: The criminal process especially, at least as it must be understood in our country, .... the judge, who has, ..., the power and obligation to assess the evidence received according to the rules of rational sound criticism, which recognize their discretion but subject it to objective criteria, therefore invocable to challenge an arbitrary or erroneous assessment. Of course, arbitrariness or error can occur, both when unduly rejecting pertinent evidentiary elements or possibilities of conviction, and when attributing inaccurate content to the evidence received or dismissing the true one -errors of fact-, as well as, finally, when granting it a probative value that it reasonably lacks or denying it the value it reasonably has, as, in synthesis, when violating the principles of sound criticism conducive to a correct determination of the truth of the relevant facts of the case.\" (judgment number 1739-92 of eleven hours forty-five minutes on the first of July, nineteen ninety-two.) Although such judgment refers to the criminal procedure, the truth is that the principles expressed therein are fully applicable to the administrative sanctioning process. Consequently, the last paragraph of Article 26 that is being questioned is not unconstitutional, as long as it is interpreted that the procedure applied respects the minimum contents of the right of defense and that the interpretation of the evidence is subject to the criteria of sound criticism and the conclusions are substantiated.\" VI. In this manner, far from affecting a constitutional right, it establishes a formal procedural prerequisite precisely to guarantee due process: that of substantiating the assessment of evidence that will allow the eventual aggrieved party their defense in relation to what is the object of their grievance and the superior body to make a fair examination of the case file that is elevated to its knowledge. Likewise, it is appropriate to note that this principle is a manifestation of the application of the protective principle governing labor jurisdiction, and that is concretized in the principle \"indubio pro operario\" (in doubt, for the worker), which is justified by virtue of the basic inequality that exists between the parties -employer/worker-, not only because of the subordination relationship in which the worker finds themselves, but, fundamentally, because of the natural availability of means of evidence that the employer has, which contrasts sensitively with the difficulty of the employee in this aspect. A warning must be made that what is contrary to the constitutional order is ruling in conscience and with total disregard for the other elements of conviction, as this Chamber indicated in constitutionality judgment number 5546-95, of fifteen hours six minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-four. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to interpret the norm in question in such a way that the faculty of labor judges to assess evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, as long as a substantiated ruling is issued, in application of the rules of sound criticism and reasonableness...” (vote 724-98 of twelve hours fifteen minutes on February sixth, nineteen ninety-eight of the CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE) Thus it must be concluded, then, that said flexibility regarding the specific situation presented must adhere to the application of the rules of sound criticism and reasonableness. VIII.- In our case under study, the plaintiff has indicated that first she and the defendant were married, that they later divorced, that they separated for a short time and later maintained a common-law union, and that it was until eight months before the lawsuit that they definitively separated. The defendant denies the facts relating to the common-law union, indicating that the plaintiff has had relations with many men and that the cohabitation has not been stable. The Tribunal agrees with the Judge of first instance in the initial analyses made in their judgment, but does not share the considerations of section VIII of the appealed judgment, a point on which this Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct. From the analysis of the evidence presented, it can be deduced that the parties' relationship of cohabitation does not fully comply with the requirements established by law. In accordance with the testimony of some of the witnesses, proposed by both parties, it emerges how the plaintiff had parallel relationships with the defendant [Name 002] as well as with her current partner [Name 010], and that the couple relationship with [Name 010] dates back some six years, as the defendant had stated in his response. This is explained, for example, by the plaintiff's sister [Name 013]. First, she states that the plaintiff's current partner is Mr. [Name 010]: “...My sister [Name 001] has another couple relationship with a man named [Name 010]; they do not live together; he sometimes comes to visit her at the house. As far as I know, she did not have other couple relationships...”. Upon cross-examination, the witness offered by the plaintiff herself clarifies: “...I understand that sister [Name 001] and [Name 010] have had a couple relationship for about six years...”. For his part, the son of the parties, named [Name 008], on this aspect that is brought up in the appeal regarding the relationship of the plaintiff with a third party named [Name 010]: “...My mother went out with a man known as [Name 017]; and with [Name 010] who was the last one. My mother, [Name 010] and my sister [Name 009] used to go on outings; I accompanied them. We went to pools and to beaches. My father realized that my mother was seeing those guys; he confronted them; they denied it; but my mother continued with them...”. Many times, while living with my father, my mother several times brought [Name 010] to the house; and I washed his car. On weekends –Saturday and Sunday– my mother would leave with [Name 010]; she told us she was going to visit my aunt; but in reality, she went to [Name 010]'s house or to the beach...”. Regarding the duration of that relationship of the plaintiff with this person named [Name 010], the witness indicates: “...My mother was seeing [Name 010] since approximately six or seven years ago, when I was still in school...”. These statements deserve faith from the Tribunal since they come from witnesses proposed by both the plaintiff and the defendant, and ultimately, when the relationship ends, the one who remains as the plaintiff's partner is this gentleman named [Name 010]. This leads us unequivocally to parallel relationships for at least four and a half years of the cohabitation of [Name 002] and [Name 001], during which [Name 001] also had a couple relationship with [Name 010]. The Judge of first instance considered in the section marked as VIII of the elaborate ruling that the short separations that occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant do not remove the requirement of stability from the common-law union and that neither do the casual love affairs of the plaintiff, with other men, alluded to by the witnesses, detract from the requirement of uniqueness or singularity of that union and cites judgment 34-01 of 14:40 hours on January 12, 2001 of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. In the case before us, certain circumstances concur that seriously compromise the requirement of uniqueness or singularity. While it is true that it is not derived from the file that [Name 001] cohabited with [Name 010], she did have and maintain a relationship with [Name 010], and by the logical principle of exclusion—that things cannot be and not be at the same time—it is not possible that [Name 001] cohabited with [Name 002] and [Name 010] simultaneously; the truth is that this is not a unique relationship from the viewpoint of analyzing [Name 001]'s situation. A relationship that spanned six years, overlapping for about four and a half years with the relationship with [Name 002], cannot be classified as casual or fleeting. The jurisprudential case cited by the Judge is different (the same analysis could be made for other cases where this aspect was analyzed, such as those ruled by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment number 2000-00951 of 8:40 hours on November 24, 2000, and number 2003-00111 of 14:30 hours on March 14, 2003) because the person seeking to assert the common-law union is precisely a cohabitant who believes themselves to be "unique," and who from that perspective acted in good faith, and cannot be affected by a double life of the other cohabitant since that is contrary to equity. But it turns out that the person seeking to assert a common-law union is that cohabitant with parallel lives in couple relationships, the truth is that the principle of application in accordance with good faith and equity no longer covers them. The situation raised would have a parallel with what happens with the effects for a null marriage, when our law indicates in numeral 66 of the Family Code that a null or annulled marriage produces all civil effects in favor of the spouse who acted in good faith, and a contrario sensu, would not have those effects for the spouse who has not acted in good faith. This Tribunal is not raising a moral judgment since the Family Judge must accept reality as it is, and the case presented is not outside of a range of what occurs in our society, but what it does raise is that at those points of interpretation of the requirements in borderline cases of the prerequisites, equity and good faith must be the governing parameters. And this case is borderline regarding the prerequisite of singularity or uniqueness. We have already said that the uniqueness or singularity of the relationship excludes simultaneous relationships, thus protecting a relationship not founded on marriage, but one most similar to marriage regarding monogamy and fidelity, and it cannot be said that [Name 001], who seeks to assert the common-law union, did not have simultaneous relationships. What has occurred is a sickly ambivalence and dysfunctionality that has evidently affected the offspring of the couple. The interpretation given must be reasonable, since as stated, it cannot be demanded that, for the requirement of singularity to be diluted in a case of parallel relationships, parallel "cohabitations" or "cohabitation" (convivencias) must concur. We can note that the essence of the common-law relationship is such that in those borderline cases regarding an apparent essence of the same, which could be the cohabitation (cohabitación) under the same roof, we discover an interesting variable that reveals to us that the crux of the matter is not that. A jurisprudential series in this sense convinces us in this regard. We refer to the cases of votes 2000-00642 of 9:40 hours on June 30, 2000, 2002-00037 of 10:30 hours on February 6, 2002, and 2003-00559 of 11:50 hours on October 10, 2003, in which there has been distance in the relationship due to very special situations and even so a common-law union has been considered to exist. In this manner, a parallel couple relationship need not have the characteristic of cohabitation (convivencia) or cohabitation (cohabitación) for it to dilute –for the cohabitant who acts in bad faith– the requirement or prerequisite of singularity or uniqueness, but rather it must be a couple relationship with significant permanence, as this Tribunal considers the relationship of [Name 001] with [Name 010], parallel to that of [Name 001] with [Name 002], to be. In this manner, this Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct in their objections, and therefore, the appealed judgment must be revoked and in its place the lawsuit for the declaration of common-law union must be dismissed in all its respects, even though costs must be waived since this is a borderline matter regarding one of the prerequisites, for which reason the litigation must be considered brought with evident good faith.\"", "markdown": "I.- En la sentencia que es objeto de esta instancia, se reconoce la unión de hecho entre actora y demandado, se establece que cada conviviente adquiere el derecho de participar en el cincuenta por ciento de los bienes que se constaten en el patrimonio del otro, declara que un inmueble tiene este carácter, y se deniega esta condición para un vehículo. Establece que la actora no tiene derecho a recibir pensión alimentaria, y se exime al demandado del pago de las costas procesales y personales. Contra dicha sentencia, presentó recurso de apelación el demandado quien alega que las relaciones amorosas de la actora no fue un adulterio esporádico o de una noche pasional sino que fueron estables, por lo que alega que la convivencia no fue “única”. Alega que la actora tiene más de seis años de compartir con su actual compañero sentimental. Argumenta que la prueba de la actora es contradictoria, y que no se valora el testimonio de la hermana de la actora en donde expresa que la actora tiene relaciones con [Nombre 010] desde hace más de seis años. Que tampoco se valora la prueba confesional ya que la actora y su hermana se contradicen totalmente. II.- Respecto a los hechos probados que contiene la sentencia recurrida los mismos se aprueban, más debe agregarse el siguiente:
• 9)Que por varios años de la convivencia con el demandado la actora [Nombre 001] mantuvo una relación de pareja paralela con un señor de nombre [Nombre 010], quien después de la separación de las partes ha sido la pareja de la actora (contestación de la demanda a folios 27 a 31, testimonios de [Nombre 013], a folio 63, y de [Nombre 008], a folio 74). Por lo que se dirá posteriormente debe eliminarse como afirmación relevante no demostrada en este caso la marcada como b). III.- Es interesante denotar que este tema de la unión de hecho o concubinato ha sido todo un proceso en el que las estadísticas, que reflejan la realidad dentro del tejido social, evidenciaban un desfase con la regulación jurídica, por lo que para evitar injusticias, se fueron reconociendo y tutelando legalmente, poco a poco algunas situaciones. Podemos enunciar algunos ejemplos de normas que iniciaron el camino: Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, Reglamento del Régimen de Enfermedad y Maternidad (ambos de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social), Ley de Pensiones e Indemnizaciones de Guerra #1922 del 5 de agosto de 1955, Ley de Promoción Social de la Mujer (reforma artículo 43 del Código de Familia para incluir a convivientes como posibles beneficiarios del régimen de habitación familiar; modifica también artículo 152 CPP en cuanto a salida del hogar y alimentos en casos de agresiones; y reforma artículo 572 inciso 1 del Código Civil, que otorga derechos sucesorios ab intestato al conviviente que cumpla ciertas condiciones). También el artículo 232 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial en caso de jubilaciones. IV.- Por ejemplo, también a nivel jurisprudencial, se fue abriendo la perspectiva. Se puede citar el voto 145-92 de la Sala Primera que se pronunció en aprobar los efectos de la sociedad de hecho para un concubinato: “...Nº 145 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y dos. Juicio ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, por ..., contra “Sucesión de ...”, (...). XIV.- Sentado lo anterior tocante a los hechos aducidos en el escrito de demanda, conviene reparar si ellos resultan legalmente aptos para tener por configurada, en la especie, una sociedad de hecho. Esta figura jurídica supone la unión de esfuerzos por dos o más individuos con miras a desarrollar una determinada actividad susceptible de procurarles una ganancia partible. En ese evento, el derecho ofrece la posibilidad de canalizar tal aspiración en forma adecuada y justa para ellos, así como para los terceros, a través del contrato societario. De conformidad con los principios inspiradores de este instituto jurídico, tres son sus elementos integradores, a saber: una pluralidad de personas involucradas en la actividad; una comunidad de bienes, dinero o industria, destinados a la realización del fin pactado, y el acuerdo de repartir las ganancias.", "text": "\"I.- En la sentencia que es objeto de esta instancia, se reconoce la unión de hecho entre actora y demandado, se establece que cada conviviente adquiere el derecho de participar en el cincuenta por ciento de los bienes que se constaten en el patrimonio del otro, declara que un inmueble tiene este carácter, y se deniega esta condición para un vehículo. Establece que la actora no tiene derecho a recibir pensión alimentaria, y se exime al demandado del pago de las costas procesales y personales. Contra dicha sentencia, presentó recurso de apelación el demandado quien alega que las relaciones amorosas de la actora no fue un adulterio esporádico o de una noche pasional sino que fueron estables, por lo que alega que la convivencia no fue “única”. Alega que la actora tiene más de seis años de compartir con su actual compañero sentimental. Argumenta que la prueba de la actora es contradictoria, y que no se valora el testimonio de la hermana de la actora en donde expresa que la actora tiene relaciones con [Nombre 010] desde hace más de seis años. Que tampoco se valora la prueba confesional ya que la actora y su hermana se contradicen totalmente. II.- Respecto a los hechos probados que contiene la sentencia recurrida los mismos se aprueban, más debe agregarse el siguiente:
• 9)Que por varios años de la convivencia con el demandado la actora [Nombre 001] mantuvo una relación de pareja paralela con un señor de nombre [Nombre 010], quien después de la separación de las partes ha sido la pareja de la actora (contestación de la demanda a folios 27 a 31, testimonios de [Nombre 013], a folio 63, y de [Nombre 008], a folio 74). Por lo que se dirá posteriormente debe eliminarse como afirmación relevante no demostrada en este caso la marcada como b). III.- Es interesante denotar que este tema de la unión de hecho o concubinato ha sido todo un proceso en el que las estadísticas, que reflejan la realidad dentro del tejido social, evidenciaban un desfase con la regulación jurídica, por lo que para evitar injusticias, se fueron reconociendo y tutelando legalmente, poco a poco algunas situaciones. Podemos enunciar algunos ejemplos de normas que iniciaron el camino: Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, Reglamento del Régimen de Enfermedad y Maternidad (ambos de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social), Ley de Pensiones e Indemnizaciones de Guerra #1922 del 5 de agosto de 1955, Ley de Promoción Social de la Mujer (reforma artículo 43 del Código de Familia para incluir a convivientes como posibles beneficiarios del régimen de habitación familiar; modifica también artículo 152 CPP en cuanto a salida del hogar y alimentos en casos de agresiones; y reforma artículo 572 inciso 1 del Código Civil, que otorga derechos sucesorios ab intestato al conviviente que cumpla ciertas condiciones). También el artículo 232 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial en caso de jubilaciones. IV.- Por ejemplo, también a nivel jurisprudencial, se fue abriendo la perspectiva. Se puede citar el voto 145-92 de la Sala Primera que se pronunció en aprobar los efectos de la sociedad de hecho para un concubinato: “...Nº 145 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y dos. Juicio ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, por ..., contra “Sucesión de ...”, (...). XIV.- Sentado lo anterior tocante a los hechos aducidos en el escrito de demanda, conviene reparar si ellos resultan legalmente aptos para tener por configurada, en la especie, una sociedad de hecho. Esta figura jurídica supone la unión de esfuerzos por dos o más individuos con miras a desarrollar una determinada actividad susceptible de procurarles una ganancia partible. En ese evento, el derecho ofrece la posibilidad de canalizar tal aspiración en forma adecuada y justa para ellos, así como para los terceros, a través del contrato societario. De conformidad con los principios inspiradores de este instituto jurídico, tres son sus elementos integradores, a saber: una pluralidad de personas involucradas en la actividad; una comunidad de bienes, dinero o industria, destinados a la realización del fin pactado, y el acuerdo de repartir las ganancias.\"\nSegún lo expuesto, para el legislador constituyente, las llamadas “familias de hecho” y el matrimonio son simultáneamente dos fuentes morales y legales de familia (hay que tomar en cuenta que no existe impedimento legal para constituir una familia de hecho); ambos garantizan la estabilidad necesaria para una permanente vida familiar, porque se originan en una fuente común: el amor que vincula al hombre y la mujer, el deseo de compartir, de auxiliarse y apoyarse mutuamente y de tener descendencia. En nuestro país, según datos de la Oficina de Estadística y Censo de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres, un dieciocho punto trece porciento (18.13 %) de las parejas que conviven, lo hacen en unión libre, dándose la gran mayoría de esas uniones en el área rural, por razones culturales e históricas, que no es propio censurar ni desconocer a la luz de la libertad de culto, expresión y pensamiento que protege la Constitución Política. Esa realidad histórica y cultural que se mantiene con fuerza aún a pocos años del cambio de siglo, existió mucho antes de que el derecho y la religión crearan al matrimonio. Estudios sobre la materia reconocen que desde tiempos inmemoriales, el hombre y la mujer han llevado vida común para ayudarse a sobrellevar las cargas de la vida y perpetuar la especie por medio de la procreación. En el Derecho Romano por ejemplo, se reconoció y reguló el concubinato, coexistiendo con la cö emptio, la confarreatio y el usus- formas de celebrar las justae nuptiae. Con el advenimiento del Cristianismo, el concubinato también coexitió con el matrimonio religioso, como se comprueba con el Concilio de Toledo, celebrado en el año cuatrocientos (400) de nuestra era, hasta que fue prohibido en el Concilio de Trento de mil quinientos sesenta y tres (1563) que dispuso “la obligatoriedad de contraer matrimonio ante el cura párroco, en ceremonia pública..., como también dispuso que los concubinos que no se separasen a la tercera advertencia incurrirían en excomunión y si persistiesen en vivir juntos serían pasibles de herejía y adulterio”. Vº. No obstante los calificativos que algunas religiones le han dado al concubinato, sigue siendo hoy en día una fuente de familia, y desconocer esta realidad social, sólo nos lleva a la desigualdad y desprotección de quienes componen ese núcleo, incluyendo a los hijos, quienes a la luz de la “Convención de Derechos del Niño” y de nuestra Constitución, merecen una protección por encima de prejuicios sociales o morales. La familia de hecho es una fuente de “familia”, entendida esta como el conjunto de personas que vinculadas por la unión estable de un hombre y una mujer, viven bajo el mismo techo e integran una unidad social primaria. Sin embargo, debe quedar claro que no pueden equipararse a las uniones de hecho, los amoríos o las relaciones esporádicas o superficiales; las uniones de hecho, cumplen funciones familiares iguales a las del matrimonio, y se caracterizan al igual que éste, por estar dotados al menos de, estabilidad (en la misma medida en que lo está el matrimonio), publicidad (no es oculta es pública y notoria), cohabitación (convivencia bajo el mismo techo, deseo de compartir una vida en común, de auxiliarse y socorrerse mutuamente) y singularidad (no es una relación plural en varios centros convivenciales). VIº. Nuestro sistema de vida está basado en principios que guardan la creencia de que todos los seres humanos nacemos libres, e iguales en dignidad y derechos, sin distinción de raza, sexo, color, idioma, religión u opinión política. La familia por otra parte, es indiscutiblemente el elemento natural y fundamental de la sociedad porque es en ella que se dan los elementos fundamentales para el desarrollo de las mejores cualidades del ser humano y donde se traspasan nuestras costumbres, tradiciones y enseñanzas de generación en generación. En consecuencia, la familia, compuesta por individuos libres e iguales en dignidad y derechos ante la ley, tiene derecho a la protección de la sociedad y del Estado independientemente de la causa que le haya dado origen; su naturaleza e importancia justifican su protección. Así lo reconoció esta Sala en sentencia número 2984-93, al extender el derecho de abstenerse de declarar contemplado en el artículo 36 de la Constitución, a la concubina, estimando que la protección de la cohesión familiar es tan importante en la familia de hecho como en la constituida legalmente...” iv.- Otros votos de la Sala Constitucional sobre el tema de la unión de hecho son: 2776-92 (art. 36 Constitución), 3798-92 (asunto penal), 769-93 (art. 41 C. Familia), 1151-94 (penal), 1153- 94 (penal), 1155-94 (penal), 2129-94 (572 inc ch C. Civil), 2648-94 (Reglamento Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), 3064-94 (denegación de préstamo por condición de unión libre), 3693-94 (consulta sobre ley), 6798-94 (penal), 7515-94 (consulta sobre ley), 3027-95 (caso del INVU), 3340-96 (artículo 85 del Código de Trabajo), 5429-96 (consulta de Sala Tercera). VI.- La unión de hecho fue regulada en el Código de Familia por adición que se le hiciera mediante Ley Nº 7532 de 8 de agosto de 1995, publicada en La Gaceta Nº 162 del lunes 28 de agosto de 1995. Dicha Ley estableció dos tipos de unión de hecho mas una de ellas, la denominada unión de hecho irregular, fue declarada inconstitucional mediante voto 3858-99 dictado a las dieciséis horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veinticinco de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y nueve. Dicha unión de hecho que se declaró inconstitucional es aquella en la que los convivientes no tenían aptitud legal para casarse. Así queda en vigencia únicamente aquella unión denominada regular. Son los artículos 242, 243 y 244 los cuales se refieren a ésta. El artículo 242 del Código de Familia dispone lo siguiente: “ARTÍCULO 242.- La unión de hecho pública, notoria, única y estable, por más de tres años, entre un hombre y una mujer que posean aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio, surtirá todos los efectos patrimoniales propios del matrimonio formalizado legalmente, al finalizar por cualquier causa.” Son ocho los requisitos de esta unión de hecho, entonces:
• 1)unión de hecho;
• 2)pública;
• 3)notoria;
• 4)única;
• 5)estable;
• 6)por más de tres años;
• 7)entre hombre y mujer;
• 8)con aptitud legal para casarse. La unión de hecho se refiere a las relaciones de pareja no fundadas en el matrimonio, es decir al denominado concubinato. Los requisitos de publicidad y notoriedad, implican que la relación de la pareja no se da en forma clandestina u oculta, sino que la misma es evidente, patente, manifiesta, a la vista y conocimiento de todos. La unicidad o singularidad de la relación excluye relaciones simultáneas. De esta manera, se tutela una relación no fundada en el matrimonio, pero lo mas parecida al matrimonio en cuanto a la monogamia y la fidelidad. En cuanto a la estabilidad se trata de uno de los requisitos mas interesantes, pues implica solidez y permanencia. Vale la pena reiterar aquí los conceptos que desarrolló la Sala Constitucional en el voto 1154-94, sobre las condiciones de la unión de hecho: “...La familia de hecho es una fuente de “familia”, entendida esta como el conjunto de personas que vinculadas por la unión estable de un hombre y una mujer, viven bajo el mismo techo e integran una unidad social primaria. Sin embargo, debe quedar claro que no pueden equipararse a las uniones de hecho, los amoríos o las relaciones esporádicas o superficiales; las uniones de hecho, cumplen funciones familiares iguales a las del matrimonio, y se caracterizan al igual que éste, por estar dotados al menos de, estabilidad (en la misma medida en que lo está el matrimonio), publicidad (no es oculta es pública y notoria), cohabitación (convivencia bajo el mismo techo, deseo de compartir una vida en común, de auxiliarse y socorrerse mutuamente) y singularidad (no es una relación plural en varios centros convivenciales)....”. En cuanto al plazo de tres años se constituye en el parámetro de estabilidad, o permanencia en el tiempo es éste. Sobre que se trate de una unión de hombre y mujer queda absolutamente claro que se trata de relaciones heterosexuales. La aptitud legal para casarse se refiere sobre todo a la exclusión de un vínculo matrimonial. VII.- Dentro de este contexto, y conforme con la valoración de la pruebas que se impone en el proceso familiar conforme con el artículo 8 del Código de Familia, ha de analizarse el presente caso. Dicho artículo 8 del Código de Familia, en su párrafo segundo, establece lo siguiente: “...Sin embargo, los jueces en materia de familia interpretarán las probanzas sin sujeción a las reglas positivas del derecho común, atendiendo todas las circunstancias y los elementos de convicción que los autos suministren; pero en todo caso deberán hacerse constar las razones de su valoración...” Sobre el ítem de la valoración de la prueba en el derecho procesal familiar, ha de señalarse la flexibilidad que implica esa norma, y sus límites. ¿qué significa que las pruebas se interpretarán sin sujeción a las reglas de la prueba común? Ello implica otro distanciamiento del proceso civil, puesto que en primer término han de marginarse aquellas normas que dan una valoración específica a las pruebas como lo son los artículos 338, 370, 379 del Código Procesal Civil, e incluso podría significar una modificación a los numerales 330 y 417 del mismo Código (aunque en este caso –como lo veremos- viene a situarse en el mismo lugar pues la sana crítica es la base del sistema), para lograr un sistema diferente de valoración y apreciación de la prueba, que definitivamente incluye también una sustracción de las reglas del artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, que enuncia la concepción tradicional de las reglas de la carga de la prueba, como lo señaló este Tribunal en el voto 707-04 de las 8:20 horas del 29 de abril del 2004. No obstante ha de enfatizarse nuevamente, que la flexibilidad a que se ha evolucionado es un término medio que no implica la laxitud absoluta. Así lo consideró la Sala Constitucional al analizar una situación análoga: “...V. DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA APRECIACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA EN CONCIENCIA. El artículo 493 impugnado dispone: \"Salvo disposición expresa en contrario de este Código, en la sentencia se apreciará la prueba en conciencia, sin sujeción a las normas de Derecho Común; pero el Juez, al analizar la que hubiere recibido, está obligado a expresar los principios de equidad o de cualquier naturaleza en funde su criterio.\" Lleva razón la representación de la Procuraduría General de la República al concluir que de la norma transcrita es imposible derivar una autorización para que los jueces laborales violen los derechos o normas constitucionales, por cuanto únicamente se establece el poder jurisdiccional de apreciar la prueba en conciencia, estableciendo dos supuestos en la que ésta resulta legítima: a) en el tanto no se esté en la hipótesis de que de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico ello resulte expresamente prohibido; y b) que cuando se haga sea en forma fundamentada, sea en el principio de equidad o de cualquier naturaleza. De esta manera, la apreciación de la prueba en conciencia no implica resolver en forma arbitraria, por cuanto todo juez -como funcionario público que es- se encuentra sujeto al principio de legalidad, el cual constituye un imperativo de adecuación de la acción pública, no sólo de las normas específicas sobre un objeto determinado, sino a todo el bloque de legalidad; por lo que no puede fallar con desprecio de los principios y derechos constitucionales, ya que está limitado por las reglas de la sana crítica y principios de razonabilidad, que debidamente aplicados conducen a la armonía de la apreciación jurisdiccional con la Constitución Política, tal y como lo entendió esta Sala en sentencia 3484-94, de las doce horas del ocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, en que determinó que las facultades de los jueces de apreciar la prueba en conciencia no resultan contrarias a la obligación del juez de fundamentar sus fallos, principio constitucional que integra el debido proceso: \"IV.- Sobre la valoración de la prueba, establece el artículo 26 de la Ley que se cuestiona [Ley de Notariado]: \"En la calificación de las probanzas tendrá el Tribunal dicho amplia libertad de apreciación y no estará obligado a sujetarse a las reglas de la prueba común. Si llegare a tener la convicción de que es cierto el cargo acusado, impondrá la corrección que corresponda ...\". Este artículo no establece un sistema de íntima convicción, como lo alega el accionante, sino el de la libre apreciación de la prueba o libre convicción, que implica que todo se puede probar y cualquier medio probatorio lícito, sistema de apreciación que no resulta inconstitucional, máxime si tomamos en cuenta que en todo proceso administrativo, la prueba que sirva de fundamento a la resolución debe ser legal, valorada racionalmente y la resolución tiene, en todo caso, que estar debidamente fundamentada. La libertad probatoria que establece el artículo 26 no es irrestricta, todo medio de prueba que se considere en el procedimiento, se analizará de conformidad con criterios de razonabilidad y con las reglas de la sana crítica. Sobre este tema, la Sala precisó: \"El principio de valoración razonable de la prueba: El proceso penal especialmente, al menos tal como debe entenderse en nuestro país, .... el juzgador, el cual tiene, ..., la potestad y obligación de valorar la prueba recibida conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, que reconocen su discrecionalidad pero la someten a criterios objetivos, por lo tanto invocables para impugnar una valoración arbitraria o errónea. Desde luego, la arbitrariedad o el error pueden darse, tanto al rechazar indebidamente elementos o posibilidades de convicción pertinentes, como al atribuir a las pruebas recibidas un contenido inexacto o al desdeñar el verdadero -errores de hecho-, como, finalmente, al otorgarles un valor probatorio del que razonablemente carecen o negarles el que razonablemente tienen, como, en síntesis, al violar los principios de la sana crítica conducentes a un correcta determinación de la verdad de los hechos relevantes del caso.\" (sentencia número 1739-92 de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos.) Si bien tal sentencia se refiere al procedimiento penal, lo cierto es que los principios que allí se expresan son plenamente aplicables al proceso sancionatorio administrativo. En consecuencia, el párrafo último del artículo 26 que se cuestiona no es inconstitucional, siempre y cuando se interprete que el procedimiento que se aplique respete los contenidos mínimos del derecho de defensa y que la interpretación de la prueba se sujete a los criterios de la sana crítica y se fundamenten las conclusiones.\" VI. De esta manera, lejos de afectar un derecho constitucional, establece un presupuesto procesal formal para garantizar precisamente el debido proceso: el de fundamentar la apreciación de la prueba que permitirá al eventual agraviado su defensa en relación con lo que es objeto de su perjuicio y al órgano superior hacer un examen justo de los autos que sean elevados a su conocimiento. Asimismo, cabe señalar que este principio es una manifestación de la aplicación del principio protector que rige la jurisdicción laboral, y que se concreta en el principio \"indubio pro operario\", que se justifica en virtud de la desigualdad básica que se da entre las partes -patrono/trabajador-, no sólo por la relación de subordinación en que se halla el trabajador, sino, fundamentalmente por las natural disponibilidad de los medios de prueba que tiene el empleador, la cual constrasta sensiblemente con la dificultad del empleado en este aspecto. Debe hacerse la advertencia que lo que sí resulta contrario al orden constitucional es el fallar en conciencia y con total prescindencia de los demás elementos de convicción, tal y como lo señaló esta Sala en sentencia de constitucionalidad número 5546-95, de las quince horas seis minutos del once de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. Con fundamento en lo anterior, es que procede interpretar la norma en cuestión de tal manera que no resulta inconstitucional la facultad de los jueces laborales de apreciar la prueba en conciencia, siempre y cuando se dicte un fallo fundamentado, en aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica y razonabilidad...” (voto 724-98 de las doce horas quince minutos del seis de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho de la SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA) Así ha de concluirse, entonces que dicha flexibilidad en cuanto a la situación concreta que se presenta ha de obedecer a la aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica y la razonabilidad. VIII.- En nuestro caso bajo estudio, la parte actora ha señalado que primeramente ella y el demandado estuvieron casados, que luego se divorciaron, que se separaron por poco tiempo y luego mantuvieron una unión de hecho y que fue has ocho meses antes de la demanda que ellos definitivamente se separaron. El demandado niega los hechos relativos a la unión de hecho, pues señala que la actora ha tenido relaciones con muchos hombres y que la convivencia no ha sido estable. El Tribunal coincide con el Juzgador de primera instancia en los primeros análisis que realiza en su sentencia, pero no comparte las consideraciones del aparte VIII de la sentencia recurrida, punto en el cual estima este Tribunal que el apelante lleva razón. Del análisis de la prueba evacuada, se desprende que la relación de convivencia de las partes no cumple plenamente con los requisitos que establece la ley. De conformidad con los testimonios de algunos de los testigos, propuestos por una y otra parte, se desprende cómo la actora tenía relaciones paralelas con el demandado [Nombre 002] como con su actual pareja [Nombre 010], y que la relación de pareja con [Nombre 010] data de unos seis años, como lo había dicho el demandado en su contestación. Así lo explica por ejemplo la hermana de la actora [Nombre 013]. Primero narra que actualmente la pareja de la actora es el señor [Nombre 010]: “...Mi hermana [Nombre 001] tiene otra relación de pareja con un hombre que se llama [Nombre 010]; ellos no viven juntos; él llega a veces a visitarla la casa. Que yo sepa, ella no tuvo otras relaciones de pareja...”. Ante una repregunta, la testigo ofrecida por la misma actora aclara: “...Entiendo que hermana [Nombre 001] y [Nombre 010] tienen como seis años de tener una relación de pareja...”. Por su parte el hijo de las partes de nombre [Nombre 008] sobre este aspecto que se trae a colación en el recurso sobre la relación de la actora con un tercero de nombre [Nombre 010]. Mi mamá anduvo con un hombre conocido como [Nombre 017]; y con [Nombre 010] que fue el último. Mi mamá, [Nombre 010] y mi hermana [Nombre 009] iban a pasear; yo los acompañaba. Ibamos a piscinas y a playas. Mi papá se daba cuenta de que mi mamá andaba con esos muchachos; él les reclamaba; ellos se negaban; pero mi mamá seguía con ellos...”. Varias veces, estando conviviendo con mi papá, mi mamá varias veces llevó a [Nombre 010] a la casa; y yo le levaba el carro. Los fines de semana –sábado y domingo- mi mamá se iba con [Nombre 010]; nos decía que ella iba a ir a pasear donde mi tía; pero en realidad, ella se iba para la casa de [Nombre 010] o para la playa...”. Sobre la duración de esa relación de la actora con esta persona de nombre [Nombre 010], el testigo señala: “...Mi mamá andaba con [Nombre 010] desde hace aproximadamente seis o siete años, cuando yo todavía estaba en la escuela...”. Estas declaraciones merecen fe al Tribunal pues vienen de testigos propuestos tanto por la actora como por el demandado, y que al final de cuentas, cuando termina la relación quien se mantiene como pareja de la actora es este señor de nombre [Nombre 010]. Esto nos lleva unívocamente a relaciones paralelas por lo menos en cuatro años y medio de la convivencia de [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 001], en que también [Nombre 001] tenía una relación de pareja con [Nombre 010]. El señor Juez de primera instancia consideró en la sección marcada como VIII del elaborado fallo que las separaciones cortas que se dieron entre la actora y el demandado, no le quitan el requisito de estabilidad a la unión de hecho y que tampoco los amoríos casuales de la actora, con otros hombres, a que aluden los testigos desvirtúan el requisito de unicidad o singularidad de esa unión y cita la sentencia 34-01 de las 14:40 horas del 12 de enero del 2001de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. En el caso que nos ocupa concurren ciertas circunstancias que comprometen seriamente el requisito de unicidad o singularidad. Si bien es cierto que no se deriva del expediente que [Nombre 001] conviviera con [Nombre 010], sí tuvo y mantuvo una relación con [Nombre 010], y por el principio de lógica de exclusión de que las cosas sean y no sean al mismo tiempo, no es posible que [Nombre 001] conviviera con [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 010] al mismo tiempo; lo cierto es que no se trata de una relación única desde el punto de vista del análisis de la situación de [Nombre 001]. Una relación que se proyecta por seis años, traslapada unos cuatro años y medio con la relación con [Nombre 002], no puede calificarse de casual o fugaz. El caso jurisprudencial que cita el señor Juez es diferente (el mismo análisis podría hacerse para otros casos en que este aspecto se analizó como lo son los fallados por la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia sentencia número 2000-00951 de las 8:40 hrs del 24 de noviembre del 2000, y número 2003-00111 de las 14:30 hrs del 14 de marzo del 2003) pues quien quiere hacer valer la unión de hecho es precisamente un conviviente que se cree “único”, y que desde esa perspectiva ha actuado de buena fe, y no puede afectarlo una doble vida del otro conviviente pues ello es contrario a la equidad. Pero resulta que quien quiere hacer valer una unión de hecho es ese conviviente con vidas paralelas en relaciones de pareja, lo cierto es que el principio de aplicación conforme a la buena fe y a la equidad ya no lo cobija. Lo que se plantea tendría un parangón con lo que sucede con los efectos para un matrimonio nulo, cuando nuestra ley señala en el numeral 66 del Código de Familia que el matrimonio nulo o anulado produce todos los efectos civiles a favor del cónyuge que obró de buena fe, y a contrario sensu, no tendría esos efectos para el cónyuge que no ha actuado de buena fe. Este Tribunal no está planteando un juicio moral por cuanto el Juez de Familia ha de tomar la realidad tal y cómo es, y el caso que se plantea no está fuera de un rango de lo que ocurre en nuestra sociedad, pero lo que sí plantea es que en aquellos punto de interpretación de los requisitos en casos limítrofes de los presupuestos, han de ser, la equidad y la buena fe, los parámetros que han de prevalecer. Y este caso es limítrofe en cuanto al presupuesto de singularidad o unicidad. Ya hemos dicho que la unicidad o singularidad de la relación excluye relaciones simultáneas, tutelándose una relación no fundada en el matrimonio, pero lo mas parecida al matrimonio en cuanto a la monogamia y la fidelidad, y no puede decirse que [Nombre 001], quien quiere hacer valer la unión de hecho, no tuviera relaciones simultáneas. Lo que ha ocurrido es una ambivalencia y disfuncionalidad enfermiza que evidentemente ha afectado a los vástagos de la pareja. Ha de ser razonable la interpretación que se de, pues como se dijo no puede exigirse que, para que el requisito de singularidad se diluya en un caso de relaciones paralelas, han de concurrir “convivencias” o “cohabitaciones” paralelas. Podemos notar que la esencia de la relación de hecho es tal que en aquellos casos limítrofes en cuanto a una aparente esencia de la misma que podría ser la cohabitación bajo el mismo techo, descubrimos una variable interesante que nos revela que el quid del asunto no es ese. Una serie jurisprudencial en este sentido nos convence al respecto. Nos referimos a los casos de los votos 2000-00642 de las 9:40 hrs. del 30 de junio del 2000, 2002-00037 de las 10:30 hrs. del 6 de febrero del 2002 y 2003-00559 de las 11:50 hrs. del 10 de octubre del 2003, en los cuales ha existido distancia en la relación por situaciones muy especiales y aún así se ha considerado que existe unión de hecho. De esta manera tampoco ha de exigirse a una relación de pareja paralela la característica de convivencia o cohabitación para que la misma diluya –para el conviviente que actúa de mala fe- el requisito o presupuesto de singularidad o unicidad, sino que ha de tratarse de una relación de pareja con una permanencia importante, como considera este Tribunal es la relación de [Nombre 001] con [Nombre 010], paralela a la [Nombre 001] con [Nombre 002]. De esta manera, considera este Tribunal que lleva razón la parte apelante en sus reproches, y por ende, ha de revocarse la sentencia apelada y en su lugar debe declararse sin lugar la demanda de declaratoria de unión de hecho en todos sus extremos, aún y cuando, ha de absolverse en costas puesto que se trata de un asunto limítrofe en uno de los presupuestos, por lo cual la litis ha de considerarse planteada con evidente buena fe.\"" } To those elements must be added another of vital importance, namely the will to unite, the intention of the contracting parties to share a common fate, which implies risks and disadvantages. This is a mental disposition, known as "affetio societatis" or "animus contrahendae societatis," which entails a convergence of interests; a functional coordination of contributions directed toward achieving the proposed common goal. These are the characteristics of a partnership in general terms. The de facto partnership—that is, the one of interest here—presents the same features, but with a defect of form, that is, despite the express or tacit will of the partners regarding its existence, it is not recorded in writing. Consequently—and in this it coincides with irregular partnerships—it is also not registered in the Public Registry. Such a defect means that the partners may request its liquidation at any time, but it does not imply the nullity of the tacit contract that supports it. In its operation, the de facto partnership is governed by the general provisions relating to formally constituted ones. It possesses legal personality, but a diminished one, conceived as such by virtue of a technical artifice necessary to regulate relations with third parties in good faith, arising from its objective existence. XV.- Having made the foregoing account regarding the constitutive elements of a de facto partnership, it is easy to determine their concurrence—in accordance with the aforementioned considerations on the assessment of evidence—in the prolonged relationship observed by Mrs. ... and Mr. ... . While it is true they cohabited, within the very heart of that relationship, an active, deliberate, and egalitarian collaboration for the development and strengthening of a common for-profit enterprise emerged, until it became consolidated, with both decisively subjecting the fruit of their personal effort in that endeavor to the contingencies of the social businesses. That is to say, parallel to the cohabitation, a distinct relationship arose, with peculiar characteristics that give it its own identity, between the plaintiff and the deceased, based not on personal affection, but on the interest of profit. For this purpose, they united their efforts in an endeavor that generates duties and responsibilities transcending the boundaries of marital life, as they are of a different nature. The result of that common effort is consequently translated into divisible profits, so all that activity must be subjected to an adequate regime, which is that of the de facto partnership. Were it not so, at the end of the relationship, one of the parties would enrich themselves at the expense of the other, unjustly depriving them, and for their own benefit, of the fruit of their effort or contributions. This cannot be protected by law, the vehicle for the realization of justice. As a result of the foregoing, there arises from the very heart of the concubinage relationship a distinct bond, with its own identity, whose cause and object are also different. In the specific case, that cause is configured by the facts set forth in the complaint, as the factual basis of the claim. It is therefore a lawful cause, in accordance with good customs and morality, whereby the stated thesis does not conflict with the provisions of Article 627, subsection 3, in relation to Article 631, both of the Civil Code. Thus, the fear or objection raised in situations analogous to the present one is dispelled. Nor does said thesis mean that concubinage in itself presumes the partnership intention. The latter, as has been seen, arises under the shelter of interests and objectives foreign to the "affectus maritales," for they are those of the "affetio societatis." The former reflects the couple's intention to cohabit as husband and wife; the latter, as has been seen, within the mutual trust and inter-party identification it entails, tends toward the union of their property or their efforts, or both at once, in order to obtain a common benefit. In accordance with what has been said, the following is concluded: if the characteristics proper to a de facto partnership exist within a concubinage, the mere existence of the latter cannot stand as an obstacle to finding the former established. This is by virtue of the fact that the recognition of the de facto partnership, according to the preceding legal reasons, does not constitute or imply legal endorsement in favor of concubinage. It is therefore necessary to find the de facto partnership alleged by the plaintiff to exist in the sub-júdice (...).” This has been one of the most representative votes of the case law prior to legislation on the subject. V.- The Constitutional Chamber has had a decisive involvement in the matter, although we will see in the notes to Article 246 that it gave a negative opinion in the case of a de facto union of persons who lack the capacity to marry. But it has been emphatic in pointing out that the Constitution does not exclude the family not founded on marriage: i.- For example, Voto 346-94 of the Constitutional Chamber considered that: “...It is logical to think that the difference in treatment created by the legislator between a couple constituted by marriage and a de facto couple—for the purposes of the transcribed provision—could be motivated by the intention to compensate for the helplessness in which a woman in a family relationship based on a de facto union often finds herself when the bond is dissolved, compared to a woman who has legal protection because her bond was constituted by marriage. This practice is common in many countries of the free world, which use compensatory measures in legislation to try to equate situations that are in reality disadvantageous, and to seek a more just or egalitarian position. To cite an example, in the United States of America, there exist in all its States hundreds of norms that protect minorities based on differences of race or sex. Within this line of thought, Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights was enacted, seeking equality between men and women, but introducing an element of temporality, stipulating that the measures taken by the States Parties aimed at achieving real equalization between men and women are not discriminatory in any way so long as they are temporary in nature. The Chamber considers that while the issue of equality between men and women is intimately linked to this action, the core point is in reality that of the family; concretely, the inequality created by the norm as noted supra between two possible modalities: the legally constituted one and that which, despite having the characteristics proper to the first, such as singularity, publicity, and stability, has been consolidated de facto. It is our criterion that when the legislator established this difference favoring the unmarried woman, what was intended was to protect her in the eventuality of the dissolution of the couple's relationship, as she is the one who in the majority of cases remains with the responsibility of educating and feeding the children; and that is nothing more than the pursuit of the protection of the family through the protection of the woman. Article 51 of our Constitution, by stating that: The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State... recognizes the importance of family life, establishing the duty of the State to protect it specially for being the natural element and foundation of society, whose purposes, among others, are to form a community of persons, to be at the service of the life of its members, and to participate in the development of society. We find in the constitutional norm two elements of utmost importance in understanding the intention of the legislator upon enacting it, which are the “natural element” and “foundation of society,” as basic components of the formation of the family. In the first phrase, we understand that our legislator intended that in said concept—family—it be observed that its sustenance constitutes a “natural” element, autonomous from formal bonds. On the other hand, and following this same line of thought, we must also understand that in saying the family is the “foundation of society,” we should not presuppose the existence of juridical bonds. Despite this, we must be very clear that there is an intimate relationship between what has been said and the special protection that the constitution-maker undoubtedly intended to give, in accordance with Article 52 of the Constitution, to marriage, by undoubtedly giving it a privileged rank, without this meaning that, due to the diversity in which different types of human coexistence can develop, these may not obtain constitutional protection. The Chamber in multiple pronouncements has recognized the duty of the State to provide special protection to the family, as well as the fundamental right of every human being to constitute one. The family is, without a doubt, the primary and fundamental nucleus of society for the full physical, mental, moral, and social development of the individual. We must then, from this guideline, understand the term family in its substantial and not formal sense, surpassing the traditional concept of family, handled in the different fields of law, in which the very essence of that nucleus is often set aside. Undoubtedly, the family is the ideal vehicle for achieving human development and preparation for life in society; it is the framework in which the individual is responsible for learning—among other things—to respect the rights and properties of others, and it is there that the principles of cooperation and mutual aid, the basis of the modern family, are formed, which are transmitted from generation to generation giving us the social stability we enjoy. - Intimately linked to this right of every human being to form a family, enshrined in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration, of the American Declaration, 23 of the International Covenant, and 17 of the American Convention, is the intrinsic need to have a dwelling that allows them to satisfy their basic needs and serves as the central nucleus of all their activities. It is from this perspective that the Chamber is convinced that the norm and the protection it establishes for the unmarried woman were created. The article does not establish explicitly or by reference to social development programs that might have pre-existed with the legal order, but implicitly it admits the existence of these, promoted by the State and its Institutions, to transfer real properties to private individuals, in order to provide them with a place where the principles of well-being and family protection, which the constitution-maker sought to realize upon enacting Article 51 of our Constitution, can develop. - Having clarified the constitutional basis of social development programs and the eventual transfer of real property from the State to private hands, it is necessary to analyze the problem derived from the registry inscription of the same, in the name of both spouses or the cohabiting woman, as indicated in the article under analysis, due to the material impossibility of registering it in favor of its real beneficiary: the family. Historically, and due to socio-cultural considerations, the protection of the family has been directed at those linked by the institution of marriage, evidently as a consequence of the text of Article 52 of the Constitution, and the concepts of the constitution-makers about the institution of marriage, qualified as the “essential basis of society” (Acta 116, p. 579, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente). But this cannot be to the detriment of relationships that, even if they materially meet all the requirements of marriage—universality, unity, opposability, and stability—their bond is not legally recognized, somehow forgetting that the holders of that de facto union are also entitled to constitutional protection. However, this situation has been changing gradually and the legal system has extended its protection to de facto unions in order to safeguard, mainly, the rights of women and minor children. Indeed, when Article 52 of the Political Constitution provides that marriage is the essential basis of the family, it does not exclude that it may be formed in a different way and entails, of course, that by the principle of equality, identical juridical effects derive from that de facto bond as in marriage. Precisely, the questioned norm is a response to those situations, to which the legal system has given a priority character, in order to support and protect women and children whose union was not juridically established. The norm sought to fill that legal gap that fostered a situation of inequality operating to the detriment of women and children when there was no legally recognized bond between her and her partner, and thus to be able to foresee situations in which the woman—or the man in some other cases, which are the minority—was forced to abandon, along with her children, the roof that had served as the family home. This article responds, then, to the need to juridically recognize and provide protection to a social phenomenon for which the legal system did not have an acceptable development, which was the existence of de facto families and their respective regulation, even though constitutionally, family protection was explicit (Article 51). Added to this, the norm responded to another element of no less importance, which was access to agricultural financing, which had been traditionally denied, and it is through this protective function of the State toward an unprotected sector that a norm is enacted which, as will be seen, suffers from a defect of unconstitutionality consisting of irrationally granting the woman, whose nucleus has not been legally constituted, greater advantages than to the one united by a matrimonial bond, since the norm, when regulating registration, authorizes that in the case of marriage it be done in the name of both spouses, while in the case of cohabitants, title is granted only in favor of the woman. Although the Chamber considers that the cited Article 7 is the product of a historical reality intended to protect the de facto family, to prevent the despoiling of the assets acquired in the union, such protection cannot be established to the detriment of other relationships privilegedly protected by the State, such as the family founded on marriage, creating a more advantageous situation for one of those family modalities and establishing an irrational discrimination that affects legally constituted families. The norm creates a kind of marginalization that affects the family nucleus and, therefore, society as a whole from the moment one group is treated preferentially and placed in a socially advantageous situation compared to another group. On the other hand, it is essential to clarify that the discrimination noted is not regarding the situation of women, but regarding the juridical situation of the different family modalities, for while it is true that Article 52 of the Constitution establishes that marriage is “the essential basis of the family,” this does not rule out the existence of other bases that we can classify as “non-essential,” on which a family can also be formed, which, despite not being protected by a formal bond, merits and must have constitutional protection for all the rights that derive from it...” ii.- Voto 769-93 of the Constitutional Chamber made the following considerations in the absence of regulations on the de facto union: “... III.- Now then: one should not resort to a norm designed to define what happens to the property of spouses at the time of divorce or judicial separation, or one should not necessarily resort to it, when the situation discussed is the right claimed by a man or a woman regarding the property of the other—co-ownership—when there has been a de facto union in which through common effort those assets have been acquired. Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations—Article 1198 of the Civil Code cited in its resolution—or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used according to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the above that, in accordance with the first cited norm, a tribunal cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised. Judges thus have at their disposal broad possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative recreation based on another insufficient one. What does not seem appropriate is to attribute to Article 41 of the Family Code, which was designed to regulate a particular and, if you will, the usual situation in our environment, discrimination for not referring to other possibilities. That conclusion could not be considered reasonable.- IV.- The insufficiency of our legal system in the matter at hand, as specialized authors have already pointed out, stems from the Political Constitution itself, whose Article 52 establishes that “Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses.” Similarly, as the Procuraduría General de la República points out in its report, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 1969), instruments in force in our country, indicate that character of marriage as essential to the family and a right for persons. That does not mean, by any means, as some author has pointed out, that marriage is the sole or exclusive basis of the family. Reality shows that, at least in certain regions of the country, there are high percentages of families founded not on marriage but on a de facto union. That ordinary legislation has not taken charge of developing this problematic cannot revert against Article 41 as is intended in the consultation, hence the Chamber is obliged to indicate that the unconstitutionality attributed to that norm does not exist, but it is under the parallel duty to indicate to the Tribunal that it has sufficient basis to resolve the specific case in accordance with what was stated supra. Situations like those raised in the sub judice matter have been resolved countless times in an estimatory manner; we cannot affirm always correctly, but we can to emphasize that Tribunals of different hierarchy have already been establishing guidelines to resolve cases like the one under the consulting Tribunal's knowledge. In this sense, one can already resort to sufficient specific precedents. The power of Family Law case law in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, including some of a markedly dissident or minority tone, but not for that reason devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been determinant for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field, and it could even be said that this behavior has been noticed with the greatest celerity here....” iii.- Perhaps it is Voto 1154-94 of the Constitutional Chamber that is one of the most revealing of a new approach to the de facto union in our legal system: “... IIº.- On the merits. Regarding the merits of the consultation, the Judge wishes to be clarified whether the Constitution, when speaking of “spouse,” is excluding de facto unions, or whether the opposite can be interpreted, that is, that the consulted norms do not exclude stable couples and families united without a legal bond. It is important, when making a constitutional analysis, not to focus only on the norm most related to the subject, but to view the Constitution as a harmonious whole, and interpret it as the set of ideas and values it is, in light of the principles that sustain it. On this particular subject, any analysis made must be along this line; otherwise, it would be partial and superficial. Indeed, the exposed subject cannot be analyzed solely in light of what Article 36 provides; it is necessary to relate that norm to Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution, which refer to the protection of the family, as they are intimately linked to the first. In the judgment of this Chamber, the harmonious interpretation of the cited Articles 36, 51, and 52 does not allow concluding that the guarantee referred to in Article 36 is only for the family based on marriage; on the contrary, such an interpretation would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, as will be seen. IIIº. Article 36, as this Chamber has already analyzed (see judgment 264-91), has as its object protecting the cohesion of the family nucleus, a concern that, together with Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution, reflects the conviction of the constitutional legislator regarding the importance of the family as a social nucleus. In order, these norms state: “Article 36. In criminal matters, no one is obliged to testify against themselves, or against their spouse, ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives up to the third degree inclusive of consanguinity or affinity.” “Article 51. The family, as the natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State.” “Article 52. Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses.” A literal interpretation of Articles 51 and 52 in relation to Article 36 transcribed supra can easily lead us to the conclusion that the power of abstention referred to in Article 36 is only for those who, in addition to cohabiting due to their desire to share love, to assist one another, and to form a family, are united by a juridical bond. The doubt could originate in a simplistic interpretation of the relationship of Articles 51 and 52, whose conclusion could be: “marriage is the essential basis of the family.” However, if we analyze the Acts of the National Constituent Assembly, the legislator's intention not to exclude de facto families from constitutional protection can be corroborated. As the Procuraduría rightly states, the first motion discussed in relation to the norm under commentary was drafted in the following terms: “Marriage is the legal basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses.” Deputy Ortíz opposed this motion, saying that: “... saying ‘legal’ means excluding those de facto families, which, without having their origin in marriage, are nevertheless families.” Due to that opposition, Article 52 was approved in its current terms, eliminating the phrase “legal basis” and substituting it with “essential basis,” which means that the fact that the legislator gave constitutional protection to marriage, considering it the essential basis of the family, is not exclusive of other types of family. Marriage is then an essential basis, but not the sole basis of family, in the eyes of the legislator. If we further take into consideration that the legislator intended to protect the “family”—without making distinctions—in Article 51, we cannot interpret that “family” is only that constituted by a legal bond, but on the contrary, that the term encompasses other family nuclei, even though the legislator manifested a preference for those constituted by marriage. IVº. According to what has been stated, for the constitutional legislator, the so-called “de facto families” and marriage are simultaneously two moral and legal sources of family (one must take into account that there is no legal impediment to constituting a de facto family); both guarantee the stability necessary for a permanent family life, because they originate in a common source: the love that binds man and woman, the desire to share, to assist and support one another mutually, and to have descendants. In our country, according to data from the Oficina de Estadística y Censo of July nineteen ninety-three, eighteen point thirteen percent (18.13%) of couples who cohabit do so in common-law union, the great majority of these unions occurring in rural areas, for cultural and historical reasons that it is not proper to censure or ignore in light of the freedom of worship, expression, and thought protected by the Political Constitution. That historical and cultural reality, which remains strong even a few years before the turn of the century, existed long before law and religion created marriage. Studies on the matter recognize that since time immemorial, man and woman have led a common life to help each other bear the burdens of life and perpetuate the species through procreation. In Roman Law, for example, concubinage was recognized and regulated, coexisting with cö emptio, confarreatio, and usus—forms of celebrating justae nuptiae. With the advent of Christianity, concubinage also coexisted with religious marriage, as is proven by the Council of Toledo, held in the year four hundred (400) of our era, until it was prohibited in the Council of Trent of fifteen sixty-three (1563), which ordered “the obligation to contract marriage before the parish priest, in a public ceremony..., and also ordered that concubines who did not separate upon the third warning would incur excommunication, and if they persisted in living together, they would be liable for heresy and adultery.” Vº. Despite the qualifiers that some religions have given to concubinage, it continues to be today a source of family, and ignoring this social reality only leads to the inequality and lack of protection of those who compose that nucleus, including the children, who, in light of the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” and our Constitution, deserve protection above social or moral prejudices. The de facto family is a source of “family,” understood as the group of persons who, linked by the stable union of a man and a woman, live under the same roof and form a primary social unit. However, it must be clear that love affairs or sporadic or superficial relationships cannot be equated to de facto unions; de facto unions fulfill family functions equal to those of marriage, and are characterized, like it, by being endowed with at least stability (to the same extent that marriage is), publicity (it is not hidden; it is public and notorious), cohabitation (living together under the same roof, desire to share a common life, to assist and succor each other mutually), and singularity (it is not a plural relationship in several cohabitational centers). VIº. Our system of life is based on principles that hold the belief that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, without distinction of race, sex, color, language, religion, or political opinion. The family, on the other hand, is indisputably the natural and fundamental element of society because it is within it that the fundamental elements for the development of the best human qualities are found and where our customs, traditions, and teachings are transmitted from generation to generation. Consequently, the family, composed of free individuals equal in dignity and rights before the law, has the right to the protection of society and the State, independently of the cause that gave it origin; its nature and importance justify its protection. This was recognized by this Chamber in judgment number 2984-93, by extending the right to abstain from testifying contemplated in Article 36 of the Constitution to the concubine, considering that the protection of family cohesion is as important in the de facto family as in the legally constituted one...” iv.- Other votes of the Constitutional Chamber on the subject of de facto union are: 2776-92 (Art. 36 Constitution), 3798-92 (criminal matter), 769-93 (Art. 41 C. Familia), 1151-94 (criminal), 1153-94 (criminal), 1155-94 (criminal), 2129-94 (Art. 572, subsection ch, C. Civil), 2648-94 (Reglamento Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), 3064-94 (denial of loan due to common-law union status), 3693-94 (consultation on law), 6798-94 (criminal), 7515-94 (consultation on law), 3027-95 (case of the INVU), 3340-96 (Article 85 of the Labor Code), 5429-96 (consultation of Sala Tercera). VI.- The de facto union was regulated in the Family Code by an addition made to it through Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, published in La Gaceta No. 162 of Monday, August 28, 1995. Said Law established two types of de facto union, one of them, the so-called irregular de facto union, was declared unconstitutional through Voto 3858-99 issued at sixteen hours forty-eight minutes on May twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-nine.

The de facto union that was declared unconstitutional is that in which the cohabitants did not have the legal capacity to marry. Thus, only the union called regular remains in force. It is articles 242, 243, and 244 that refer to this. Article 242 of the Family Code provides as follows: "ARTICLE 242.- A public, notorious, unique, and stable de facto union (unión de hecho), for more than three years, between a man and a woman who possess the legal capacity to contract marriage, shall produce all the patrimonial effects of a legally formalized marriage, upon its termination for any cause." The requirements for this de facto union are eight, therefore:

• 1)de facto union;
• 2)public;
• 3)notorious;
• 4)unique;
• 5)stable;
• 6)for more than three years;
• 7)between a man and a woman;
• 8)with the legal capacity to marry. The de facto union refers to couple relationships not founded on marriage, that is, to what is called concubinage. The requirements of publicity and notoriety imply that the couple's relationship is not carried out clandestinely or in a hidden manner, but rather that it is evident, patent, manifest, in plain view and knowledge of all. The uniqueness or singularity of the relationship excludes simultaneous relationships. In this way, a relationship not founded on marriage is protected, but one as similar as possible to marriage in terms of monogamy and fidelity. Regarding stability, this is one of the most interesting requirements, as it implies solidity and permanence. It is worth reiterating here the concepts developed by the Constitutional Chamber in vote 1154-94, on the conditions of the de facto union: "...The de facto family is a source of 'family', understood as the group of people who, linked by the stable union of a man and a woman, live under the same roof and constitute a primary social unit. However, it must be clear that love affairs or sporadic or superficial relationships cannot be equated with de facto unions; de facto unions fulfill family functions equal to those of marriage, and are characterized, like it, by being endowed at least with stability (to the same extent that marriage is), publicity (it is not hidden, it is public and notorious), cohabitation (living together under the same roof, a desire to share a life in common, to assist and help each other mutually), and singularity (it is not a plural relationship in several cohabitational centers)....". Regarding the term of three years, this constitutes the parameter of stability, or permanence over time. Regarding the matter of it being a union between a man and a woman, it is absolutely clear that it refers to heterosexual relationships. The legal capacity to marry refers above all to the exclusion of a marital bond. VII.- Within this context, and in accordance with the evaluation of the evidence that is required in family proceedings pursuant to article 8 of the Family Code, the present case must be analyzed. Said article 8 of the Family Code, in its second paragraph, establishes the following: "...However, judges in family matters shall interpret the evidence without subjection to the positive rules of common law, taking into account all the circumstances and elements of conviction that the case file provides; but in every case, the reasons for their evaluation must be stated..." Regarding the item of evidence assessment in family procedural law, the flexibility that this rule implies and its limits must be pointed out. What does it mean that evidence shall be interpreted without subjection to the rules of common evidence? This implies another distancing from the civil process, since, in the first place, those rules that give a specific valuation to evidence must be set aside, such as articles 338, 370, 379 of the Civil Procedure Code, and it could even mean a modification to numerals 330 and 417 of the same Code (although in this case –as we shall see– it comes to be situated in the same place because sound criticism (sana crítica) is the basis of the system), to achieve a different system of evidence valuation and appreciation, which definitively also includes a subtraction from the rules of article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, which states the traditional conception of the rules on the burden of proof, as this Court indicated in vote 707-04 of 8:20 a.m. on April 29, 2004. However, it must be emphasized again that the flexibility that has evolved is a middle ground that does not imply absolute laxity. This was considered by the Constitutional Chamber when analyzing a similar situation: "...V. ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE IN CONSCIENCE. The challenged article 493 provides: \"Except for express provision to the contrary in this Code, in the judgment the evidence shall be appreciated in conscience, without subjection to the rules of Common Law; but the Judge, when analyzing the evidence received, is obliged to express the principles of equity or of any nature on which he bases his criterion.\" The representation of the Attorney General's Office is correct in concluding that it is impossible to derive from the transcribed rule an authorization for labor judges to violate constitutional rights or rules, because it only establishes the jurisdictional power to appreciate the evidence in conscience, establishing two assumptions under which this is legitimate: a) insofar as it is not in the hypothesis that, in accordance with the legal system, it is expressly prohibited; and b) that when it is done, it be in a reasoned manner, be it on the principle of equity or any other nature. In this way, the appreciation of the evidence in conscience does not imply resolving in an arbitrary manner, because every judge - as a public official that he is - is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adaptation of public action, not only to the specific rules on a given subject, but to the entire block of legality; therefore, he cannot rule with disregard for constitutional principles and rights, since he is limited by the rules of sound criticism and principles of reasonableness, which, properly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional appreciation with the Political Constitution, as this Chamber understood in judgment 3484-94, at twelve o'clock on July eighth, nineteen ninety-four, in which it determined that the powers of judges to appreciate evidence in conscience are not contrary to the judge's obligation to provide grounds for his judgments, a constitutional principle that integrates due process: \"IV.- On the valuation of the evidence, article 26 of the Law under question [Law of Notaries] establishes: \"In the qualification of the evidence, the Tribunal shall have broad freedom of appreciation and shall not be obliged to subject itself to the rules of common evidence. If it comes to the conviction that the accused charge is true, it shall impose the corresponding correction ...\". This article does not establish a system of intimate conviction, as the plaintiff claims, but rather that of free appreciation of the evidence or free conviction, which implies that everything can be proven and by any lawful evidentiary means, a system of appreciation that is not unconstitutional, especially if we take into account that in every administrative process, the evidence serving as the basis for the resolution must be legal, valued rationally, and the resolution must, in any case, be duly grounded. The evidentiary freedom established by article 26 is not unrestricted; every means of evidence considered in the procedure shall be analyzed in accordance with criteria of reasonableness and with the rules of sound criticism. On this subject, the Chamber specified: \"The principle of reasonable valuation of evidence: The criminal process especially, at least as it must be understood in our country, .... the judge, who has, ..., the power and obligation to value the evidence received in accordance with the rules of rational sound criticism, which recognize his discretion but subject it to objective criteria, therefore invocable to challenge an arbitrary or erroneous valuation. Of course, arbitrariness or error can occur, both when unduly rejecting pertinent elements or possibilities of conviction, as when attributing to the evidence received an inexact content or dismissing the true one -errors of fact-, as, finally, when granting it a probative value that it reasonably lacks or denying it the one it reasonably has, as, in summary, by violating the principles of sound criticism conducive to a correct determination of the truth of the relevant facts of the case.\" (judgment number 1739-92 at eleven forty-five hours on July first, nineteen ninety-two.) Although such a judgment refers to the criminal procedure, the truth is that the principles expressed therein are fully applicable to the administrative sanctioning process. Consequently, the last paragraph of article 26 under question is not unconstitutional, as long as it is interpreted that the procedure applied respects the minimum contents of the right of defense and that the interpretation of the evidence is subject to the criteria of sound criticism and the conclusions are grounded.\" VI. In this way, far from affecting a constitutional right, it establishes a formal procedural prerequisite to guarantee precisely due process: that of grounding the appreciation of the evidence that will allow the eventual aggrieved party his defense in relation to what is the object of his prejudice and allow the higher body to make a fair examination of the case file records that are brought to its knowledge. Likewise, it is worth noting that this principle is a manifestation of the application of the protective principle that governs labor jurisdiction, and which is concretized in the principle \"in dubio pro operario\", which is justified by virtue of the basic inequality that exists between the parties - employer/worker -, not only due to the subordination relationship in which the worker finds himself, but, fundamentally, due to the natural availability of the means of proof that the employer has, which contrasts significantly with the difficulty of the employee in this aspect. The warning must be made that what is indeed contrary to the constitutional order is ruling in conscience and with total disregard for the other elements of conviction, as this Chamber indicated in constitutional judgment number 5546-95, at fifteen hours six minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-four. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to interpret the rule in question in such a way that the power of labor judges to appreciate evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, as long as a grounded judgment is issued, in application of the rules of sound criticism and reasonableness...” (vote 724-98 at twelve hours fifteen minutes on February sixth, nineteen ninety-eight of the CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE) Thus, it must be concluded, then, that such flexibility regarding the specific situation presented must obey the application of the rules of sound criticism and reasonableness. VIII.- In our case under study, the plaintiff has indicated that first she and the defendant were married, that then they divorced, that they separated for a short time and then maintained a de facto union and that it was up to eight months before the lawsuit that they definitively separated. The defendant denies the facts relating to the de facto union, as he points out that the plaintiff has had relationships with many men and that the cohabitation has not been stable. The Court agrees with the Judge of first instance in the initial analyses carried out in his judgment, but does not share the considerations of section VIII of the appealed judgment, a point on which this Court considers that the appellant is correct. From the analysis of the evidence presented, it is inferred that the cohabitational relationship of the parties does not fully comply with the requirements established by law. In accordance with the testimonies of some of the witnesses, proposed by one and the other party, it is inferred how the plaintiff had parallel relationships with the defendant [Name 002] as well as with her current partner [Name 010], and that the couple relationship with [Name 010] dates back about six years, as the defendant had stated in his answer. This is explained, for example, by the plaintiff's sister [Name 013]. First she narrates that currently the plaintiff's partner is Mr. [Name 010]: "...My sister [Name 001] has another couple relationship with a man named [Name 010]; they do not live together; he sometimes comes to visit her at the house. As far as I know, she did not have other couple relationships...". In response to a cross-question, the witness offered by the plaintiff herself clarifies: "...I understand that sister [Name 001] and [Name 010] have had a couple relationship for about six years...". For his part, the son of the parties named [Name 008] on this aspect that is brought up in the appeal regarding the plaintiff's relationship with a third party named [Name 010]. My mom went around with a man known as [Name 017]; and with [Name 010] who was the last one. My mom, [Name 010] and my sister [Name 009] used to go out; I accompanied them. We went to pools and beaches. My dad found out that my mom was going around with those guys; he complained to them; they denied it; but my mom continued with them...". Several times, while living with my dad, my mom several times brought [Name 010] to the house; and I drove the car for him. On weekends –Saturday and Sunday– my mom would leave with [Name 010]; she told us she was going to visit my aunt; but in reality, she went to [Name 010]'s house or to the beach...". Regarding the duration of this relationship of the plaintiff with this person named [Name 010], the witness states: "...My mom was with [Name 010] for approximately six or seven years, when I was still in school...". These statements are credible to the Court as they come from witnesses proposed by both the plaintiff and the defendant, and who, at the end of the day, when the relationship ends, the one who remains as the plaintiff's partner is this man named [Name 010]. This leads us unequivocally to parallel relationships for at least four and a half years of the cohabitation of [Name 002] and [Name 001], in which [Name 001] also had a couple relationship with [Name 010]. The Judge of first instance considered in the section marked as VIII of the elaborate judgment that the short separations that occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant do not remove the requirement of stability from the de facto union and that neither do the casual love affairs of the plaintiff with other men, to which the witnesses allude, distort the requirement of uniqueness or singularity of that union and cites judgment 34-01 at 14:40 hours on January 12, 2001, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. In the case before us, certain circumstances concur that seriously compromise the requirement of uniqueness or singularity. While it is true that it does not derive from the case file that [Name 001] cohabited with [Name 010], she did have and maintained a relationship with [Name 010], and by the logical principle of exclusion that things cannot be and not be at the same time, it is not possible that [Name 001] cohabited with [Name 002] and [Name 010] at the same time; the truth is that it is not a unique relationship from the point of view of the analysis of [Name 001]'s situation. A relationship that extends for six years, overlapping for about four and a half years with the relationship with [Name 002], cannot be classified as casual or fleeting. The jurisprudential case cited by the Judge is different (the same analysis could be made for other cases in which this aspect was analyzed, such as those adjudicated by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment number 2000-00951 at 8:40 a.m. on November 24, 2000, and number 2003-00111 at 14:30 hours on March 14, 2003) because the one who seeks to assert the de facto union is precisely a cohabitant who believes himself to be "unique", and who from that perspective has acted in good faith, and cannot be affected by a double life of the other cohabitant because that is contrary to equity. But it turns out that the one who seeks to assert a de facto union is that cohabitant with parallel lives in couple relationships; the truth is that the principle of application according to good faith and equity no longer protects her. What is raised would have a parallel with what happens with the effects for a null marriage, when our law indicates in numeral 66 of the Family Code that a null or annulled marriage produces all civil effects in favor of the spouse who acted in good faith, and a contrario sensu, would not have those effects for the spouse who has not acted in good faith. This Court is not posing a moral judgment because the Family Judge must take reality as it is, and the case presented is not outside the range of what occurs in our society, but what it does pose is that at those points of interpretation of the requirements in borderline cases of the prerequisites, equity and good faith must be the parameters that must prevail. And this case is borderline regarding the prerequisite of singularity or uniqueness. We have already said that the uniqueness or singularity of the relationship excludes simultaneous relationships, protecting a relationship not founded on marriage, but as similar as possible to marriage in terms of monogamy and fidelity, and it cannot be said that [Name 001], who seeks to assert the de facto union, did not have simultaneous relationships. What has occurred is an unhealthy ambivalence and dysfunctionality that has evidently affected the couple's offspring. The interpretation given must be reasonable, because as stated, it cannot be required that, for the requirement of singularity to dissolve in a case of parallel relationships, parallel "cohabitations" or "living together" must concur. We can note that the essence of the de facto relationship is such that in those borderline cases regarding an apparent essence of the same, which could be cohabitation under the same roof, we discover an interesting variable that reveals to us that the crux of the matter is not that. A jurisprudential series in this sense convinces us in this regard. We refer to the cases of votes 2000-00642 at 9:40 a.m. on June 30, 2000, 2002-00037 at 10:30 a.m. on February 6, 2002, and 2003-00559 at 11:50 a.m. on October 10, 2003, in which there has been distance in the relationship due to very special situations and yet a de facto union has been considered to exist. In this way, neither must a parallel couple relationship be required to have the characteristic of cohabitation or living together in order for it to dissolve –for the cohabitant acting in bad faith– the requirement or prerequisite of singularity or uniqueness, but rather it must be a couple relationship with significant permanence, as this Court considers the relationship of [Name 001] with [Name 010] to be, parallel to that of [Name 001] with [Name 002]. Thus, this Court considers the appellant party to be correct in its reproaches, and therefore, the appealed judgment must be revoked and in its place, the lawsuit for the declaration of the de facto union must be dismissed in all its aspects, even though, the defendant must be absolved from paying costs since it is a borderline matter in one of the prerequisites, for which reason the litigation must be considered filed with evident good faith."</span></p></div></body></html>" The defendant appealed said judgment, alleging that the plaintiff's amorous relationships were not a sporadic adultery or a one-night passionate encounter but rather were stable, and therefore argues that the cohabitation was not "unique." He alleges that the plaintiff has been sharing her life with her current romantic partner for over six years. He argues that the plaintiff's evidence is contradictory, and that the testimony of the plaintiff's sister, in which she states that the plaintiff has been in a relationship with [Nombre 010] for more than six years, is not valued. That the confessional evidence is also not valued since the plaintiff and her sister completely contradict each other.

II.Regarding the facts deemed proven contained in the appealed judgment, they are approved, but the following must be added: 9) That for several years of the cohabitation with the defendant, the plaintiff [Nombre 001] maintained a parallel partner relationship with a man named [Nombre 010], who, after the parties' separation, has been the plaintiff's partner (response to the complaint at folios 27 to 31, testimonies of [Nombre 013], at folio 63, and of [Nombre 008], at folio 74). For what will be stated later, the one marked as b) must be eliminated as a relevant assertion not proven in this case.

III.It is interesting to note that this topic of the common-law marriage (*unión de hecho*) or concubinage has been an entire process in which statistics, reflecting the reality within the social fabric, evidenced a mismatch with legal regulation, so to avoid injustices, some situations were gradually recognized and legally protected. We can list some examples of regulations that began the path: Regulations of the Disability, Old Age, and Death Regime, Regulations of the Sickness and Maternity Regime (both of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund), Law on Pensions and War Indemnities #1922 of August 5, 1955, Law for the Social Promotion of Women (reform of Article 43 of the Family Code to include cohabitants as possible beneficiaries of the family housing regime; also modifies Article 152 CPP regarding leaving the home and alimony in cases of aggression; and reforms Article 572 subsection 1 of the Civil Code, which grants intestate succession rights to the cohabitant who meets certain conditions). Also, Article 232 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch in the case of pensions.

IV.For example, also at the jurisprudential level, the perspective was gradually opening. One can cite vote 145-92 of the First Chamber which ruled to approve the effects of the *de facto* partnership (*sociedad de hecho*) for a concubinage: "...Nº 145 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at fourteen hours forty-five minutes of October thirtieth, nineteen ninety-two. Ordinary trial established in the Civil Court of Santa Cruz, by ..., against “Succession of ...”, (...). XIV.- Having set out the foregoing regarding the facts alleged in the complaint brief, it is appropriate to examine whether they are legally suitable for considering a *de facto* partnership to be configured, in the present case. This legal figure supposes the union of efforts by two or more individuals with a view to developing a certain activity capable of securing them a distributable profit. In that event, the law offers the possibility of channeling such an aspiration in an adequate and just manner for them, as well as for third parties, through the partnership contract.

In accordance with the inspiring principles of this legal institute, three are its integrating elements, namely: a plurality of persons involved in the activity; a community of goods, money, or industry, destined for the realization of the agreed purpose, and the agreement to share the profits. To these elements, it is necessary to add another of vital importance, which is the will to unite, the intention of the contracting parties to share a common fate, which implies risks and disadvantages. It is a matter of a disposition of the mind, known as “*affetio societatis*” or “*animus contrahendae societatis*”, which entails a convergence of interests; a functional coordination of services directed at obtaining the proposed common goal. Here are the characteristics of the partnership in general terms. The *de facto* one -namely, the one that interests us here-, presents the same features, but with a defect of form, that is, notwithstanding the express or tacit will of the partners regarding its existence, it is not recorded in writing.

Consequently -and in this it coincides with irregular ones- it also does not appear registered in the Public Registry. Such a defect determines that the partners may request its liquidation at any time, but it does not imply the nullity of the tacit contract that sustains it. In its development, the *de facto* partnership is regulated by the general provisions relating to those formally constituted. It presents legal personality but diminished, conceived thus by virtue of a technical artifice necessary to regulate relations with bona fide third parties, arising from its objective existence. XV.- Having made the foregoing enumeration regarding the constitutive elements of a *de facto* partnership, it is easy to determine their concurrence -in accordance with the aforementioned considerations on the assessment of evidence- in the prolonged relationship observed by Mrs. ... and Mr. ... . Although it is true, they cohabited, within the very heart of that relationship, an active, deliberate, and egalitarian collaboration was emerging, until consolidating, for the sake of the development and strengthening of a common lucrative enterprise, both subjecting in that endeavor, decisively, the fruit of personal effort, to the contingencies of the social businesses.

That is to say, parallel to the cohabitation, a different relationship was being born, with peculiar characteristics which confer upon it its own identity, between the plaintiff and the deceased, based not on personal affection, but on the interest of profit. Following that goal they unite their efforts in an endeavor, which generates duties and responsibilities that transcend the boundaries of marital life, as they are of a different nature. The result of that common effort consequently translates into distributable profits, for which all that activity needs to be submitted to an adequate regime, which is that of the *de facto* partnership. If it were not so, upon the end of the relationship, one of the parties would enrich themselves at the expense of the other, inequitably depriving them, and for their own benefit, of the fruit of their effort or their contributions. This cannot be protected by law, a vehicle for the realization of justice.

As a result of the foregoing, from the very heart of the concubinary relationship, a different linkage is born, with its own identity, whose cause and object are also different. In the specific case, that cause is configured by the facts recorded in the complaint brief, as the factual basis of the claim. It is therefore a lawful cause, in accordance with good customs and morality, for which the thesis presented does not conflict with the provisions of Article 627, subsection 3, in relation to 631, both of the Civil Code. Thus, the fear or objection expressed in situations analogous to the present one is dispelled. Nor does this thesis mean that concubinage in itself makes the partnership intention presumed. The latter, as has been seen, arises under the shelter of interests and objectives alien to the “*affectus maritales*”, as they are proper to the “*affetio societatis*”. The former reflects the couple's intention to live as man and wife; the latter, as has been seen, within the mutual trust and inter-party identification it entails, tends towards the union of their goods or their efforts, or both at once, for the sake of obtaining a common benefit.

In accordance with what has been said, it is concluded as follows: if the proper characteristics of a *de facto* partnership are present within cohabitation (*amancebamiento*), the mere existence of the latter cannot erect itself as an obstacle to considering the former as configured. This is by virtue of the fact that the recognition of the *de facto* partnership, in accordance with the preceding legal reasons, does not constitute or imply a legal endorsement in favor of concubinage. It is necessary, then, to consider as existent, in the *sub-júdice*, the *de facto* partnership alleged by the plaintiff (...)" This has been one of the most representative votes of the jurisprudence prior to the legislation on the topic.

V.The Constitutional Chamber has had a decisive intervention on the topic, although we will see in the notes to Article 246 that it gave a negative criterion in the case of common-law marriage of persons who do not have the capacity to marry. But it has been emphatic in pointing out that the Constitution does not exclude the family not founded on marriage:

i.- For example, vote 346-94 of the Constitutional Chamber pondered that: “...It is logical to think that the difference in treatment created by the legislator between a couple constituted by marriage and a *de facto* one -for the effects of the transcribed norm-, could be motivated by the intention to compensate for the helplessness in which a woman who has a family relationship based on a common-law marriage often finds herself when the bond is dissolved, with respect to the woman who has legal protection because her bond was constituted by marriage. This practice is common in many countries of the free world, which use compensatory measures in legislation to try to equate situations that are in reality disadvantageous, and to procure a fairer or more egalitarian position. To cite an example, in the United States of America there exist in all its States hundreds of norms that protect minorities based on differences of race or sex.

Within this line of thought, Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights was enacted, which seeks equality between men and women, but introducing an element of temporality, stipulating that measures taken by State Parties aimed at achieving real equality between men and women are not discriminatory in any way as long as they are temporary in nature. The Chamber considers that although the issue of equality between men and women is intimately linked to this action, the core point is in reality that of the family; specifically, the inequality created by the norm as noted *supra* between two possible modalities: the one legally constituted and the one that, despite having the proper characteristics of the former, such as singularity, publicity, and stability, has been consolidated *de facto*. It is our criterion that when the legislator established this difference favoring the unmarried woman, what was intended was to protect her, in the eventuality of the dissolution of the couple relationship, because she is the one who in the majority of cases is left with the responsibility of educating and feeding the children; and that is nothing more than the pursuit of the protection of the family through the protection of the woman.

Article 51 of our Constitution, by stating that: The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State... recognizes the importance of family life, by establishing the duty of the State to protect it in a special way for being the natural element and foundation of society whose purposes, among others, are to form a community of persons, to be at the service of the life of its members, and to participate in the development of society. We find in the constitutional norm two elements of utmost importance in understanding the intention of the legislator upon enacting it, which are the “natural element” and “foundation of society”, as basic components of the formation of the family. In the first phrase, we understand that our legislator wanted it to be observed in said concept -family- that its sustenance constitutes a “natural” element, autonomous from formal bonds.

On the other hand, and following this same line of thought, we must also understand that when it is said that the family is the “foundation of society”, we should not presuppose the existence of legal bonds. Despite this, we must be very clear that there is an intimate relationship between what has been said and the special protection that undoubtedly the constituent wanted to give, as established by Article 52 of the Constitution, to marriage by indisputably giving it a privileged rank, without this meaning, that due to the diversity in which the different types of human coexistence can unfold, these cannot obtain constitutional protection. The Chamber in multiple pronouncements has recognized the duty of the State to provide special protection to the family, as well as the fundamental right that every human being has to constitute one. The family is, without a doubt, the primary and fundamental nucleus of society for the full physical, mental, moral, and social development of the individual.

We must then, from this guideline, understand the term family in its substantial and not formal sense, overcoming the traditional concept of family, handled in the different fields of law, in which the very essence of that nucleus is often left aside. Undoubtedly the family is the ideal vehicle to achieve human development and preparation for life in society; it is the framework in which it falls to the individual to learn -among other things- to respect the rights and properties of others and it is there where the principles of cooperation and mutual aid are formed, the basis of the modern family, which are transmitted from generation to generation giving us the social stability we enjoy. - Intimately linked to this right of every human being to form a family, enshrined in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration, of the American Declaration, 23 of the International Covenant, and 17 of the American Convention, is the intrinsic need to have a dwelling that allows them to satisfy their basic needs and be the central nucleus of all their activities.

It is from this perspective, that the Chamber is convinced that the norm and the protection it establishes for the unmarried woman was created. The article does not establish explicitly or by reference to social development programs, which might have pre-existed with the system, but implicitly in it the existence of these is admitted, promoted by the State and its Institutions, to transfer real estate to individuals, in order to provide them with a place where the principles of family well-being and protection develop, which the constituent sought to concretize upon enacting Article 51 of our Constitution. - Clarified the constitutional foundation of social development programs and the eventual transfer of real estate property from the State to private hands, it is necessary to analyze the problems derived from its registry inscription, in the name of both spouses or the cohabiting woman, as indicated by the analyzed article, due to the material impossibility of registering it in favor of its true recipient: the family.

Historically, and by reason of socio-cultural considerations, the protection of the family has been directed at those who were linked by the institution of marriage, evidently as a consequence of the text of Article 52 of the Constitution, and the concepts of the constituents about the institution of marriage, qualified as the “essential basis of society” (Act 116, p. 579, National Constituent Assembly). But this cannot be to the detriment of relationships that, even though they materially met all the requirements of marriage -universality, unity, enforceability, and stability-, their bond is not legally recognized, somewhat forgetting that the holders of that common-law marriage, are also entitled to constitutional protection. However, this situation has been changing gradually and the legal system has extended its protection to common-law marriages in order to safeguard, mainly, the rights of the woman and minor children.

Indeed, by providing that Article 52 of the Political Constitution states that marriage is the essential basis of the family, it does not exclude that it may be formed in a different way and entails, of course, that by the principle of equality, from that *de facto* bond derive identical legal effects as in marriage. Precisely, the questioned norm is a response to those situations, to which the legal system has given the character of priority, in order to solve and protect the woman and children, whose union was not legally established. The norm sought to fill that legal gap that fostered a situation of inequality that was operating to the detriment of the woman and children, when a legally recognized bond did not exist between her and her partner, and thus be able to foresee situations in which the woman -or the man in some other cases, which are the minority-, was forced to abandon, along with her children, the roof that had served as the family dwelling.

This article responds then, to the need to legally recognize and give protection to a social phenomenon, for which the legal system did not have an acceptable development, which was the existence of *de facto* families and their respective regulations, even though constitutionally, family protection was explicit (Article 51). Added to this, the norm responded to another element of no less importance, which was access to agricultural financing, which had traditionally been forbidden to her and it is through this protective function of the State to an unprotected sector, that a norm is enacted which, as will be seen, suffers from a defect of unconstitutionality consisting of irrationally granting to the woman, whose nucleus has not been legally constituted, greater advantages than to the one united by marital bond, since the norm when regulating the inscription authorizes that in the case of marriage it be done in the name of both spouses, while in the case of cohabitants title is granted only in favor of the woman.

Although the Chamber considers that the cited Article 7 is a product of a historical reality with which it is intended to protect the *de facto* family, to avoid the dispossession of the goods acquired in the union, such protection cannot be established to the detriment of other relationships privilegedly protected by the State, such as the family founded on marriage, creating a more advantageous situation for one of those family modalities and establishing an irrational discrimination that affects legally constituted families. The norm creates a kind of marginalization that affects the family nucleus and therefore, society as a whole from the moment one group is treated preferentially and placed in a socially advantageous situation compared to another group. On the other hand, it is essential to clarify that the discrimination noted is not regarding the situation of the woman, but regarding the legal situation of the different family modalities, because although it is true that Article 52 of the Constitution establishes that marriage is “the essential basis of the family”, this does not rule out the existence of other bases that we can classify as “non-essential”, on which a family can also be formed, which despite not being protected by a formal bond, deserves and must have constitutional protection, for all the rights that derive from it...” ii.- Vote 769-93 of the Constitutional Chamber, made the following considerations in the absence of regulations on common-law marriage: “...

III.- Now then: one should not resort to a norm provided to define what happens with the spouses' assets at the time of divorce or judicial separation, or one should not necessarily resort to it, when the situation under discussion is the right that a man or a woman claims regarding the other's assets –co-ownership–, when there has been a common-law marriage in which through common effort those assets have been acquired. Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations –Article 1198 of the Civil Code cited in its resolution–, or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes.

It must be added to the foregoing, that in accordance with the first cited norm, a tribunal cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised. Judges have, then, at their disposal, ample possibilities to resolve with express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative recreation based on another insufficient one. What does not seem appropriate is to attribute to Article 41 of the Family Code, which was designed to regulate a particular situation and, if you will, the usual one in our environment, discrimination for not referring to other possibilities. That conclusion could not be considered reasonable.- IV.- The insufficiency of our legal system in the matter that occupies us, as specialized authors have already pointed out, stems from the Political Constitution itself, whose Article 52 establishes that “Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses”.

Likewise, as the Attorney General's Office points out in its report, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 1969), instruments in force in our country, indicate that character of marriage as essential to the family and a right for persons. That does not mean, by any means, as some author has pointed out, that marriage is the sole or exclusive basis of the family. Reality demonstrates that, at least in certain regions of the country, there are high percentages of families founded not on marriage, but on a common-law marriage. That ordinary legislation has not taken charge of developing this problem could not revert against Article 41 as intended in the consultation, for which the Chamber is obliged to indicate that there is not the unconstitutionality attributed to that norm, but rather that it is under the parallel duty to indicate to the Court that it has sufficient basis at its disposal to resolve the specific case in accordance with what was stated *supra*.

Situations like those raised in the *sub judice* matter have been resolved countless times in an estimatory manner, we cannot affirm that always correctly, but it is to emphasize that already the Courts of different hierarchy have been establishing guidelines to resolve cases like the one the consulting Court has under its cognizance. In this sense, one can already resort to sufficient specific precedents. The power that Family Law jurisprudence has had in our country has been such, that it has also been categorically affirmed, that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in decisions of the tribunals, even some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been determinant for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been most swiftly noticed....” iii.- Perhaps vote 1154-94 of the Constitutional Chamber is one of the most revealing of a new approach to common-law marriage in our legal system: “...

IIº.- On the merits. Regarding the merits of the consultation, the Judge wishes to be clarified whether the Constitution when speaking of “spouse” is excluding common-law marriages, or if the contrary can be interpreted, that is, that the consulted norms do not exclude stable couples and families united without a legal bond. It is important when conducting a constitutional analysis, not to focus only on the norm that most relates to the topic, but to see the Constitution as a harmonious whole, and interpret it as the set of ideas and values that it is, in light of the principles that sustain it. In this particular topic, any analysis that is done must be in this line, otherwise it would result partialized and superficial. Indeed, one cannot analyze the exposed topic, in light of what Article 36 provides solely; it is necessary to relate that norm with Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution, which refer to the protection of the family, as they are intimately linked to the first.

In the judgment of this Chamber, the harmonious interpretation of the cited Articles 36, 51, and 52, does not allow the conclusion that the guarantee referred to in Article 36 is only for the family based on marriage; on the contrary, such an interpretation would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, as will be seen. IIIº. Article 36, as this Chamber has already analyzed (see judgment 264-91), has as its object to protect the cohesion of the family nucleus, a concern that, together with Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution, reflects the conviction of the constituent legislator about the importance of the family as a social nucleus. In order, these norms state: “Article 36. In criminal matters no one is obliged to testify against themselves, nor against their spouse, ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives up to the third degree inclusive of consanguinity or affinity”.

“Article 51. The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State” “Article 52. Marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses”. A literal interpretation of Articles 51 and 52 in relation to transcribes Article 36 *supra*, can easily lead us to the conclusion that the power of abstention referred to in Article 36, is only for those who, besides cohabiting due to their desire to share love, to assist one another, and to form a family, are united by a legal bond. The doubt could originate in a simplistic interpretation of the relationship of Articles 51 and 52, whose conclusion could be: “marriage is the essential basis of the family”. However, if we analyze the records of the National Constituent Assembly, the legislator's intention of not excluding *de facto* families from constitutional protection can be corroborated.

As the Attorney General's Office well affirms, the first motion discussed in relation to the norm under commentary was drafted in the following terms: “Marriage is the legal basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses”. Deputy Ortíz opposed this motion saying that: “... saying 'legal' means excluding those *de facto* families, which without originating in marriage, are nonetheless families.” Due to that opposition, Article 52 was approved in its current terms, eliminating the phrase “legal basis” and substituting it with “essential basis”, which means that the fact that the legislator has given constitutional protection to marriage, considering it the essential basis of the family, is not exclusive of other types of family. Marriage is then, an essential basis, but not the sole basis of family, in the eyes of the legislator. If we further take into consideration that the legislator wanted to protect the “family” -without making distinctions-, in Article 51, we cannot interpret that “family” is only that constituted by legal bond, but on the contrary, that the term is inclusive of other family nuclei, even though the legislator may have manifested their preference for those constituted by marriage.

IVº. According to the foregoing, for the constituent legislator, the so-called “*de facto* families” and marriage are simultaneously two moral and legal sources of family (one must take into account that there is no legal impediment to constituting a *de facto* family); both guarantee the stability necessary for permanent family life, because they originate from a common source: the love that binds man and woman, the desire to share, to assist and support each other and to have descendants. In our country, according to data from the Office of Statistics and Census of July nineteen ninety-three, eighteen point thirteen percent (18.13%) of couples that cohabit, do so in free union, the great majority of those unions occurring in rural areas, for cultural and historical reasons, which it is not proper to censure or ignore in light of the freedom of worship, expression, and thought protected by the Political Constitution.

That historical and cultural reality that remains strongly even a few years from the turn of the century, existed long before law and religion created marriage. Studies on the matter recognize that since time immemorial, man and woman have led a common life to help each other bear the burdens of life and perpetuate the species through procreation. In Roman Law for example, concubinage was recognized and regulated, coexisting with *coemptio*, *confarreatio*, and *usus* - forms of celebrating the *justae nuptiae*.

With the advent of Christianity, concubinage also coexisted with religious marriage, as evidenced by the Council of Toledo, held in the year four hundred (400) of our era, until it was prohibited at the Council of Trent in fifteen hundred and sixty-three (1563), which stipulated “the obligation to contract marriage before the parish priest, in a public ceremony..., and also stipulated that cohabitants who did not separate after the third warning would incur excommunication, and if they persisted in living together, they would be liable for heresy and adultery.” Vº. Despite the labels that some religions have given to concubinage, it continues to be a source of family today, and ignoring this social reality only leads to inequality and lack of protection for those who make up that nucleus, including the children, who, in light of the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” and our Constitution, deserve protection above social or moral prejudices.

The de facto family is a source of “family,” understood as the group of people who, linked by the stable union of a man and a woman, live under the same roof and form a primary social unit. However, it must be clear that flings or sporadic or superficial relationships cannot be equated with de facto unions; de facto unions fulfill the same family functions as marriage and are characterized, like marriage, by at least being endowed with stability (to the same extent as marriage), publicity (it is not hidden, but public and well-known), cohabitation (living together under the same roof, the desire to share a common life, to mutually aid and assist each other), and singularity (it is not a plural relationship in several living centers). VIº. Our way of life is based on principles that uphold the belief that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, without distinction of race, sex, color, language, religion, or political opinion.

The family, on the other hand, is indisputably the natural and fundamental element of society because it is within it that the fundamental elements for developing the best qualities of the human being occur and where our customs, traditions, and teachings are passed down from generation to generation. Consequently, the family, composed of free individuals equal in dignity and rights before the law, has the right to protection from society and the State regardless of the cause that gave it origin; its nature and importance justify its protection. This was recognized by this Chamber in judgment number 2984-93, by extending the right to abstain from testifying, contemplated in Article 36 of the Constitution, to the concubine, holding that the protection of family cohesion is as important in the de facto family as in the legally constituted one...” iv.- Other rulings of the Constitutional Chamber on the subject of the de facto union are: 2776-92 (Art. 36 Constitution), 3798-92 (criminal matter), 769-93 (Art. 41 Family Code), 1151-94 (criminal), 1153-94 (criminal), 1155-94 (criminal), 2129-94 (subsection ch, Art. 572 Civil Code), 2648-94 (Regulation on Disability, Old Age and Death), 3064-94 (loan denial due to common-law union status), 3693-94 (legislative consultation), 6798-94 (criminal), 7515-94 (legislative consultation), 3027-95 (INVU case), 3340-96 (Article 85 of the Labor Code), 5429-96 (consultation from the Third Chamber).

VI.- The de facto union was regulated in the Family Code by an addition made to it through Law No. 7532 of August 8, 1995, published in La Gaceta No. 162 of Monday, August 28, 1995. Said Law established two types of de facto union, but one of them, the so-called irregular de facto union, was declared unconstitutional through ruling 3858-99 issued at sixteen hours forty-eight minutes on May twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-nine. That de facto union which was declared unconstitutional is one in which the cohabitants did not have the legal capacity to marry. Thus, only the so-called regular de facto union remains in effect. Articles 242, 243, and 244 are those which refer to it. Article 242 of the Family Code provides the following: “ARTICLE 242.- A public, well-known, unique, and stable de facto union, lasting more than three years, between a man and a woman who possess the legal capacity to contract marriage, shall produce all the patrimonial effects of a legally formalized marriage upon its termination for any reason.” The requirements for this de facto union are eight, then:

• 1)de facto union;
• 2)public;
• 3)well-known;
• 4)unique;
• 5)stable;
• 6)for more than three years;
• 7)between a man and a woman;
• 8)with the legal capacity to marry. The de facto union refers to couple relationships not founded in marriage, that is, to so-called concubinage. The requirements of publicity and notoriety imply that the couple’s relationship does not occur in a clandestine or hidden form, but rather is evident, patent, manifest, in the sight and knowledge of all. The uniqueness or singularity of the relationship excludes simultaneous relationships. In this way, a relationship not founded in marriage is protected, but one most similar to marriage in terms of monogamy and fidelity. Regarding stability, this is one of the most interesting requirements, as it implies solidity and permanence. It is worth reiterating here the concepts that the Constitutional Chamber developed in ruling 1154-94, on the conditions of the de facto union: “...The de facto family is a source of ‘family,’ understood as the group of people who, linked by the stable union of a man and a woman, live under the same roof and form a primary social unit. However, it must be clear that flings or sporadic or superficial relationships cannot be equated with de facto unions; de facto unions fulfill the same family functions as marriage and are characterized, like marriage, by at least being endowed with stability (to the same extent as marriage), publicity (it is not hidden, but public and well-known), cohabitation (living together under the same roof, the desire to share a common life, to mutually aid and assist each other), and singularity (it is not a plural relationship in several living centers)....”. As for the three-year period, it constitutes the parameter of stability, or permanence over time. Regarding the fact that it is a union of a man and a woman, it is absolutely clear that it refers to heterosexual relationships. The legal capacity to marry refers above all to the exclusion of a marital bond. VII.- Within this context, and in accordance with the assessment of evidence required in family proceedings pursuant to Article 8 of the Family Code, the present case must be analyzed. The said Article 8 of the Family Code, in its second paragraph, establishes the following: “...However, judges in family matters shall interpret the evidence without being subject to the positive rules of common law, taking into account all the circumstances and elements of conviction that the case file provides; but in all cases, the reasons for their assessment must be recorded...” On the item of the assessment of evidence in family procedural law, the flexibility implied by that rule and its limits must be noted. What does it mean that evidence shall be interpreted without being subject to the rules of common evidence? It implies another distancing from the civil process, since firstly, those rules that give a specific value to evidence, such as Articles 338, 370, and 379 of the Civil Procedure Code, must be set aside, and it could even mean a modification to numerals 330 and 417 of the same Code (although in this case—as we shall see—it ends up in the same place because sound judgment is the basis of the system), to achieve a different system for the valuation and appreciation of evidence, which definitively also includes a removal from the rules of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, which sets forth the traditional conception of the rules of the burden of proof, as this Tribunal stated in ruling 707-04 at 8:20 a.m. on April 29, 2004. However, it must be emphasized again that the flexibility that has evolved is a middle ground that does not imply absolute laxity. This was the view of the Constitutional Chamber when analyzing an analogous situation: “...V. ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE IN CONSCIENCE. The challenged Article 493 provides: \”Except for express provision to the contrary in this Code, in the judgment, evidence shall be assessed in conscience, without being subject to the rules of Common Law; but the Judge, when analyzing that which has been received, is obliged to express the principles of equity or of any nature on which his judgment is based.\” The representation of the Procuraduría General de la República rightly concludes that it is impossible to derive from the transcribed rule an authorization for labor judges to violate constitutional rights or norms, since it merely establishes the jurisdictional power to appreciate evidence in conscience, establishing two assumptions under which this is legitimate: a) to the extent that it is not under the hypothesis that, in accordance with the legal system, it is expressly prohibited; and b) that when it is done, it must be done in a reasoned manner, be it on the principle of equity or any other nature. Thus, the assessment of evidence in conscience does not imply resolving arbitrarily, since every judge—as a public official—is subject to the principle of legality, which constitutes an imperative of adaptation of public action, not only to the specific rules on a particular object, but to the entire body of legality; therefore, they cannot rule with disregard for constitutional principles and rights, as they are limited by the rules of sound judgment and principles of reasonableness, which, properly applied, lead to the harmony of jurisdictional appreciation with the Political Constitution, just as this Chamber understood in judgment 3484-94, at twelve o'clock on July eighth, nineteen ninety-four, in which it determined that the powers of judges to assess evidence in conscience are not contrary to the judge's obligation to provide reasons for their decisions, a constitutional principle that integrates due process: \”IV.- Regarding the assessment of evidence, Article 26 of the Law being questioned [Notary Law] establishes: ‘In the qualification of the evidence, the Tribunal shall have broad freedom of appreciation and shall not be obliged to subject itself to the rules of common evidence. If it should become convinced that the charge accused is true, it shall impose the corresponding penalty ...’. This article does not establish a system of intimate conviction, as claimed by the petitioner, but rather that of free appreciation of evidence or free conviction, which implies that everything can be proven and by any lawful means of proof, a system of appreciation that is not unconstitutional, especially if we consider that in every administrative proceeding, the evidence that serves as the basis for the resolution must be legal, valued rationally, and the resolution must, in any case, be duly reasoned. The evidentiary freedom established in Article 26 is not unrestricted; every means of proof considered in the proceeding shall be analyzed in accordance with criteria of reasonableness and the rules of sound judgment. On this matter, the Chamber clarified: ‘The principle of reasonable assessment of evidence: Criminal proceedings especially, at least as they should be understood in our country, .... the judge, who has, ..., the power and obligation to assess the evidence received in accordance with the rules of rational sound judgment, which recognize their discretion but submit it to objective criteria, therefore invocable to challenge an arbitrary or erroneous assessment. Of course, arbitrariness or error can occur, both by improperly rejecting pertinent elements or possibilities of conviction, and by attributing inaccurate content to the evidence received or by disdaining its true content—errors of fact—or, finally, by granting it a probative value that it reasonably lacks or denying it that which it reasonably has, as, in short, by violating the principles of sound judgment leading to a correct determination of the truth of the relevant facts of the case.’ (judgment number 1739-92 at eleven hours forty-five minutes on July first, nineteen ninety-two.) Although such judgment refers to criminal proceedings, the truth is that the principles expressed therein are fully applicable to the administrative sanctioning process. Consequently, the last paragraph of the questioned Article 26 is not unconstitutional, provided it is interpreted that the procedure applied respects the minimum contents of the right of defense and that the interpretation of the evidence is subject to the criteria of sound judgment and the conclusions are reasoned.\” VI. In this way, far from affecting a constitutional right, it establishes a formal procedural requirement to precisely guarantee due process: that of providing reasons for the assessment of evidence that will allow the eventual aggrieved party to defend themselves in relation to what is the object of their harm and allow the higher body to make a fair examination of the proceedings elevated to its knowledge. Likewise, it should be noted that this principle is a manifestation of the application of the protective principle that governs labor jurisdiction, and which is materialized in the principle ‘in dubio pro operario,’ which is justified by virtue of the basic inequality that exists between the parties—employer/worker—not only because of the subordination relationship in which the worker finds himself but, fundamentally, because of the natural availability of evidence that the employer has, which contrasts markedly with the difficulty of the employee in this aspect. It should be warned that what is contrary to the constitutional order is ruling in conscience and with total disregard for the other elements of conviction, as this Chamber stated in constitutional judgment number 5546-95, at fifteen hours six minutes on October eleventh, nineteen ninety-four. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to interpret the rule in question in such a way that the power of labor judges to assess evidence in conscience is not unconstitutional, provided a reasoned judgment is issued, applying the rules of sound judgment and reasonableness...” (ruling 724-98 at twelve hours fifteen minutes on February sixth, nineteen ninety-eight of the CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE) Thus, it must be concluded that such flexibility regarding the specific situation presented must obey the application of the rules of sound judgment and reasonableness. VIII.- In our case under study, the plaintiff has indicated that first, she and the defendant were married, then they divorced, separated for a short time, and then maintained a de facto union, and that it was until eight months before the lawsuit that they definitively separated. The defendant denies the facts related to the de facto union, as he states that the plaintiff has had relationships with many men and that the cohabitation has not been stable. The Tribunal agrees with the Judge of first instance in the initial analyses carried out in their judgment, but does not share the considerations of section VIII of the appealed judgment, a point on which this Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct. From the analysis of the evidence adduced, it is deduced that the cohabitational relationship of the parties does not fully meet the requirements established by law. In accordance with the testimonies of some of the witnesses, proposed by both parties, it is deduced how the plaintiff had parallel relationships with the defendant [Name 002] and with her current partner [Name 010], and that the couple relationship with [Name 010] dates back some six years, as the defendant had stated in his reply. This is explained, for example, by the plaintiff's sister [Name 013]. She first narrates that currently the plaintiff's partner is Mr. [Name 010]: “...My sister [Name 001] has another couple relationship with a man named [Name 010]; they do not live together; he sometimes comes to visit the house. As far as I know, she had no other couple relationships...”. Upon a cross-question, the witness offered by the plaintiff herself clarifies: “...I understand that sister [Name 001] and [Name 010] have been in a couple relationship for about six years...”. For his part, the son of the parties named [Name 008] testifies on this aspect brought up in the appeal regarding the plaintiff's relationship with a third party named [Name 010]. “My mother went out with a man known as [Name 017]; and with [Name 010] who was the last one. My mother, [Name 010], and my sister [Name 009] would go out for walks; I accompanied them. We went to pools and beaches. My father would find out that my mother was going out with those guys; he would complain to them; they would deny it; but my mother continued with them...”. Several times, while living with my father, my mother brought [Name 010] to the house; and I would drive the car. On weekends—Saturday and Sunday—my mother would leave with [Name 010]; she would tell us she was going to visit my aunt's; but in reality, she went to [Name 010]’s house or to the beach...”. Regarding the duration of this relationship the plaintiff had with this person named [Name 010], the witness states: “...My mother had been going out with [Name 010] for approximately six or seven years, when I was still in school...”. These statements deserve faith from the Tribunal because they come from witnesses proposed by both the plaintiff and the defendant, and at the end of the day, when the relationship ends, the one who remains as the plaintiff's partner is this man named [Name 010]. This leads us unequivocally to parallel relationships for at least four and a half years of the cohabitation between [Name 002] and [Name 001], during which [Name 001] also had a couple relationship with [Name 010]. The Judge of first instance considered in the section marked as VIII of the detailed judgment that the short separations that occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant do not remove the requirement of stability from the de facto union, and that neither do the casual flings of the plaintiff with other men, alluded to by the witnesses, detract from the requirement of uniqueness or singularity of that union, and cites judgment 34-01 at 2:40 p.m. on January 12, 2001, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. In the case before us, certain circumstances exist that seriously compromise the requirement of uniqueness or singularity. While it is true that it is not derived from the case file that [Name 001] cohabited with [Name 010], she did have and maintain a relationship with [Name 010], and by the logical principle of exclusion that things cannot be and not be at the same time, it is not possible that [Name 001] cohabited with [Name 002] and [Name 010] simultaneously; the truth is that it is not a unique relationship from the point of view of the analysis of [Name 001]’s situation. A relationship that extends for six years, overlapping for about four and a half years with the relationship with [Name 002], cannot be described as casual or fleeting. The jurisprudential case cited by the Judge is different (the same analysis could be made for other cases where this aspect was analyzed, such as those ruled by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, judgment number 2000-00951 at 8:40 a.m. on November 24, 2000, and number 2003-00111 at 2:30 p.m. on March 14, 2003) because the one who seeks to enforce the de facto union is precisely a cohabitant who believes themselves to be “unique,” and who from that perspective acted in good faith, and cannot be affected by a double life of the other cohabitant, as that is contrary to equity. But it turns out that when the one who seeks to enforce a de facto union is that cohabitant with parallel lives in couple relationships, the truth is that the principle of application in accordance with good faith and equity no longer covers them. The situation raised would have a parallel with what happens with the effects of a void marriage, when our law states in numeral 66 of the Family Code that a void or annulled marriage produces all civil effects in favor of the spouse who acted in good faith, and conversely, it would not have those effects for the spouse who has not acted in good faith. This Tribunal is not making a moral judgment, as the Family Judge must take reality as it is, and the case presented is not outside the range of what occurs in our society, but what it does set forth is that in those points of interpreting the requirements in borderline cases of the prerequisites, equity and good faith must be the parameters that must prevail. And this case is borderline regarding the prerequisite of singularity or uniqueness. We have already said that the uniqueness or singularity of the relationship excludes simultaneous relationships, protecting a relationship not founded in marriage, but most similar to marriage in terms of monogamy and fidelity, and it cannot be said that [Name 001], who seeks to enforce the de facto union, did not have simultaneous relationships. What has occurred is an unhealthy ambivalence and dysfunctionality that has evidently affected the offspring of the couple. The interpretation given must be reasonable, for as has been said, it cannot be demanded that, for the requirement of singularity to be diluted in a case of parallel relationships, parallel “cohabitations” must concur. We can note that the essence of the de facto relationship is such that in those borderline cases regarding an apparent essence of the same—which could be cohabitation under the same roof—we discover an interesting variable that reveals that this is not the crux of the matter. A jurisprudential line in this sense convinces us of this. We refer to the cases of rulings 2000-00642 at 9:40 a.m. on June 30, 2000, 2002-00037 at 10:30 a.m. on February 6, 2002, and 2003-00559 at 11:50 a.m. on October 10, 2003, in which distance existed in the relationship due to very special situations and yet it was considered that a de facto union existed. In this way, neither must a parallel couple relationship be required to have the characteristic of cohabitation for it to dilute—for the cohabitant acting in bad faith—the requirement or prerequisite of singularity or uniqueness, but rather it must be a couple relationship with significant permanence, as this Tribunal considers the relationship of [Name 001] with [Name 010] to be, parallel to that of [Name 001] with [Name 002]. Thus, this Tribunal considers that the appellant is correct in their reproaches, and therefore, the appealed judgment must be revoked, and in its place, the lawsuit for the declaration of a de facto union must be declared without merit in all its respects, even though costs must be waived since this is a borderline matter regarding one of the prerequisites, for which reason the litis must be considered to have been filed with evident good faith.

"I.- En la sentencia que es objeto de esta instancia, se reconoce la unión de hecho entre actora y demandado, se establece que cada conviviente adquiere el derecho de participar en el cincuenta por ciento de los bienes que se constaten en el patrimonio del otro, declara que un inmueble tiene este carácter, y se deniega esta condición para un vehículo. Establece que la actora no tiene derecho a recibir pensión alimentaria, y se exime al demandado del pago de las costas procesales y personales. Contra dicha sentencia, presentó recurso de apelación el demandado quien alega que las relaciones amorosas de la actora no fue un adulterio esporádico o de una noche pasional sino que fueron estables, por lo que alega que la convivencia no fue “única”. Alega que la actora tiene más de seis años de compartir con su actual compañero sentimental. Argumenta que la prueba de la actora es contradictoria, y que no se valora el testimonio de la hermana de la actora en donde expresa que la actora tiene relaciones con [Nombre 010] desde hace más de seis años.

Que tampoco se valora la prueba confesional ya que la actora y su hermana se contradicen totalmente. II.- Respecto a los hechos probados que contiene la sentencia recurrida los mismos se aprueban, más debe agregarse el siguiente: 9) Que por varios años de la convivencia con el demandado la actora [Nombre 001] mantuvo una relación de pareja paralela con un señor de nombre [Nombre 010], quien después de la separación de las partes ha sido la pareja de la actora (contestación de la demanda a folios 27 a 31, testimonios de [Nombre 013], a folio 63, y de [Nombre 008], a folio 74). Por lo que se dirá posteriormente debe eliminarse como afirmación relevante no demostrada en este caso la marcada como b). III.- Es interesante denotar que este tema de la unión de hecho o concubinato ha sido todo un proceso en el que las estadísticas, que reflejan la realidad dentro del tejido social, evidenciaban un desfase con la regulación jurídica, por lo que para evitar injusticias, se fueron reconociendo y tutelando legalmente, poco a poco algunas situaciones.

Podemos enunciar algunos ejemplos de normas que iniciaron el camino: Reglamento del Régimen de Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte, Reglamento del Régimen de Enfermedad y Maternidad (ambos de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social), Ley de Pensiones e Indemnizaciones de Guerra #1922 del 5 de agosto de 1955, Ley de Promoción Social de la Mujer (reforma artículo 43 del Código de Familia para incluir a convivientes como posibles beneficiarios del régimen de habitación familiar; modifica también artículo 152 CPP en cuanto a salida del hogar y alimentos en casos de agresiones; y reforma artículo 572 inciso 1 del Código Civil, que otorga derechos sucesorios ab intestato al conviviente que cumpla ciertas condiciones). También el artículo 232 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial en caso de jubilaciones. IV.- Por ejemplo, también a nivel jurisprudencial, se fue abriendo la perspectiva. Se puede citar el voto 145-92 de la Sala Primera que se pronunció en aprobar los efectos de la sociedad de hecho para un concubinato: “...Nº 145 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las catorce horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y dos.

Juicio ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Civil de Santa Cruz, por ..., contra “Sucesión de ...”, (...). XIV.- Sentado lo anterior tocante a los hechos aducidos en el escrito de demanda, conviene reparar si ellos resultan legalmente aptos para tener por configurada, en la especie, una sociedad de hecho. Esta figura jurídica supone la unión de esfuerzos por dos o más individuos con miras a desarrollar una determinada actividad susceptible de procurarles una ganancia partible. En ese evento, el derecho ofrece la posibilidad de canalizar tal aspiración en forma adecuada y justa para ellos, así como para los terceros, a través del contrato societario. De conformidad con los principios inspiradores de este instituto jurídico, tres son sus elementos integradores, a saber: una pluralidad de personas involucradas en la actividad; una comunidad de bienes, dinero o industria, destinados a la realización del fin pactado, y el acuerdo de repartir las ganancias.

A dichos elementos precisa añadir otro de vital importancia, cual es la voluntad de unión, el ánimo de los contratantes de correr una suerte común, la cual implica riesgos y desventajas. Trátase de una disposición anímica, conocida como “affetio societatis” o “animus contrahendae societatis”, la cual entraña una convergencia de intereses; una coordinación funcional de prestaciones dirigidas a la obtención del fin común propuesto. He aquí las características de la sociedad en términos generales. La de hecho -a saber, la que aquí interesa-, presenta los mismos rasgos, pero con un defecto de forma, sea, no obstante la voluntad expresa o tácita de los socios en cuanto a su existencia, ésta no consta por escrito. Consecuentemente -y en esto coincide con las irregulares- tampoco aparece inscrita en el Registro Público. Tal defecto determina que los socios puedan pedir en cualquier momento su liquidación, pero no implica la nulidad del contrato tácito que la sustenta.

En su desenvolvimiento, la sociedad de hecho queda regulada por las disposiciones generales relativas a las formalmente constituidas. Presenta personalidad jurídica pero menguada, concebida así en virtud de un artificio técnico necesario para regular las relaciones con terceros de buena fe, provenientes de su objetiva existencia. XV.- Hecha la relación anterior tocante a los elementos constitutivos de una sociedad de hecho, fácil es determinar su concurrencia -con arreglo a las consideraciones trasanteriores sobre la apreciación de la prueba- en la prolongada relación observada por doña ... y don... . Si bien es cierto, convivieron ellos, en el seno mismo de esa relación, fue surgiendo, hasta consolidarse, una activa colaboración deliberada e igualitaria en aras del desarrollo y fortalecimiento de una empresa lucrativa común, sometiendo ambos en ese empeño, decididamente, el fruto del esfuerzo personal, a las contingencias de los negocios sociales.

Sea que, paralelamente a la convivencia fue naciendo, con características peculiares las cuales le confieren su propia identidad, una relación distinta, entre la actora y el causante, basada no en el afecto personal, sino en el interés de lucro. Tras ese fin unen sus esfuerzos en un empeño, el cual genera deberes y responsabilidades que trascienden las fronteras de la vida marital, pues son de naturaleza distinta. El resultado de ese esfuerzo común se traduce consecuentemente en utilidades partibles, por lo que toda esa actividad precisa ser sometida a un régimen adecuado, cual es el de la sociedad de hecho. De no ser así, al finalizar la relación, una de las partes se enriquecería a costa de la otra, privándole inicuamente, y en provecho propio, del fruto de su esfuerzo o de sus aportes. Ello no lo puede amparar el derecho, vehículo para la realización de la justicia. A resultas de lo expuesto, nace del seno mismo de la relación concubinaria, una vinculación distinta, con identidad propia, cuya causa y objeto son también diferentes.

En el caso concreto, esa causa está configurada por los hechos consignados en el escrito de demanda, como fundamento fáctico de la pretensión. Se trata por ende, de una causa lícita, acorde con las buenas costumbres y la moral, por lo cual la tesis expuesta no roza con lo estatuido por el artículo 627, inciso 3º, en relación con el 631, ambos del Código Civil. Disípase así el temor o reparo expuestos en situaciones análogas a la presente. Tampoco significa dicha tesis que el concubinato en sí, haga presumir la intención societaria. Esta última, según se ha visto, surge al cobijo de intereses y objetivos ajenos a la “affectus maritales”, pues son los propios de la “affetio societatis”. Aquélla refleja la intención de la pareja de convivir como marido y mujer; ésta, como se ha visto, dentro de la confianza mutua e identificación inter-partes que entraña, propende a la unión de sus bienes o de sus esfuerzos, o de ambos a la vez, en aras de obtener un beneficio común.

Con arreglo a lo que viene dicho, conclúyese en lo siguiente: si se dan las características propias de una sociedad de hecho dentro de un amancebamiento, la mera existencia de éste no puede eregirse en óbice para tener por configurada la primera. Ello en virtud de que el reconocimiento de la sociedad de hecho, de acuerdo con las razones jurídicas precedentes, no constituye o implica espaldarazo legal en favor del concubinato. Se impone pues tener por existente, en el sub-júdice, la sociedad de hecho aducida por la parte actora (...)” Este ha sido uno de los votos mas representativos de la jurisprudencia previa a la legislación sobre el tema. V.- La Sala Constitucional ha tenido una intervención decidida en el tema, aunque veremos en las notas al artículo 246 que dio un criterio negativo en caso de la unión de hecho de personas que no tienen aptitud para casarse. Pero ha sido enfática al señalar que la Constitución no excluye la familia no fundada en el matrimonio: i.- Por ejemplo, el voto 346-94 de la Sala Constitucional ponderó que: “...Es lógico pensar que la diferencia de trato que creó el legislador entre la pareja constituida por matrimonio y la de hecho -para los efectos de la norma transcrita-, podría estar motivada en la intención de compensar el desamparo en que en muchas ocasiones se encuentra la mujer que tiene una relación familiar basada en una unión de hecho, cuando el vínculo es disuelto, con respecto a la mujer que tiene un amparo legal por haber sido su vínculo constituido por matrimonio.

Esta práctica es común en muchos países del mundo libre, que utilizan medidas compensatorias en la legislación para tratar de equiparar situaciones que en la realidad son de desventaja, y procurar una posición más justa o igualitaria. Para citar un ejemplo, en los Estados Unidos de América existen en todos sus Estados cientos de normas que protegen a las minorías basados en las diferencias de raza o sexo. Dentro de esta línea de pensamiento, se dictó el artículo 4 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, que busca una igualdad entre el hombre y la mujer, pero introduciendo un elemento de temporalidad, estipulándose que las medidas que tomen los Estados partes encaminadas a lograr una equiparación real entre el hombre y la mujer, no resultan discriminatorias en modo alguno en el tanto estas tengan carácter temporal. Estima la Sala que si bien el tema de la igualdad entre hombre y mujer está íntimamente ligado con esta acción, el punto medular es en realidad el de la familia; concretamente, la desigualdad que crea la norma como se señaló supra entre dos modalidades posibles: la constituida legalmente y aquella que pese a tener las características propias de la primera, como singularidad, publicidad y estabilidad, se ha consolidado de hecho.

Es nuestro criterio que cuando el legislador estableció esta diferencia favoreciendo a la mujer no casada, lo que pretendió fue protegerla, en la eventualidad de la disolución de la relación de pareja, por ser ella quien en la mayoría de los casos se queda con la responsabilidad de educar y alimentar a los hijos; y eso no es más que la búsqueda de la protección de la familia a través de la protección de la mujer. El artículo 51 de nuestra Constitución al señalar que: La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado... reconoce la importancia de la vida en familia, al establecer el deber del Estado de protegerla en forma especial por ser el elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad cuyos fines, entre otros, son los de formar una comunidad de personas, estar al servicio de la vida de sus componentes y participar en el desarrollo de la sociedad.

Encontramos en la norma constitucional dos elementos de suma importancia en la comprensión de la intención del legislador al promulgarla, cuales son el “elemento natural” y “fundamento de la sociedad”, como componentes básicos de la formación de la familia. En la primer frase, entendemos que nuestro legislador quiso que en dicho concepto -familia- se observara que su sustento constituye un elemento “natural”, autónomo de los vínculos formales. Por otro lado, y siguiendo esta misma línea de pensamiento, también debemos entender que al decirse que la familia es el “fundamento de la sociedad”, no debemos presuponer la existencia de vínculos jurídicos. A pesar de ello, debemos tener muy claro que existe una íntima relación entre lo dicho y la protección especial que sin duda el constituyente quiso dar, conforme lo establece el artículo 52 constitucional, al matrimonio al darle indudablemente un rango privilegiado, sin que ello signifique, que por la diversidad en que pueda desenvolverse los diferentes tipos de la convivencia humana, estos no puedan obtener el amparo constitucional.

La Sala en múltiples pronunciamientos ha reconocido el deber del Estado de brindar especial protección a la familia, así como el derecho fundamental que tiene todo ser humano de constituirla. La familia, es sin duda, el núcleo primario y fundamental de la sociedad para el pleno desarrollo físico, mental, moral y social del individuo. Debemos entonces, desde este lineamiento, entender el término familia en su sentido sustancial y no formal, superando el concepto tradicional de familia, manejado en los diferentes campos del derecho, en los cuales muchas veces se deja de lado la esencia misma de ese núcleo. Indudablemente la familia es el vehículo ideal para lograr el desarrollo humano y la preparación de la vida en sociedad; es el marco en el cual le corresponde al individuo aprender -entre otras cosas-, a respetar los derechos y propiedades de los otros y es allí donde se forman los principios de cooperación y mutuo auxilio, base de la familia moderna, los que se trasladan de generación en generación dándonos la estabilidad social de la que gozamos. - Intimamente vinculado con este derecho de todos ser humano a formar una familia, consagrado en el artículo 16 de la Declaración Universal, de la Declaración Americana, 23 del Pacto Internacional y 17 de la Convención Americana, se encuentra la necesidad intrínseca a tener una vivienda que le permita satisfacer sus necesidades básicas y sea el núcleo central de todas sus actividades.

Es desde esta óptica, que la Sala está convencida que fue creada la norma y la protección que ella establece a la mujer no casada. No establece el artículo de modo explícito o por referencia a programas de desarrollo social, que eventualmente preexistieran con el ordenamiento, pero implícitamente en ella se admite la existencia de éstos, promovidos por el Estado y sus Instituciones, para transferir propiedades inmuebles a particulares, con el fin de dotarlos de un lugar donde se desarrollen los principios de bienestar y protección familiar, que buscó concretar el constituyente al promulgar el artículo 51 de nuestra Constitución. - Aclarada la fundamentación constitucional de los programas de desarrollo social y el eventual traslado de la propiedad inmobiliaria del Estado a manos particulares, es necesario analizar la problemática derivada de la inscripción registral de la misma, en cabeza de ambos cónyuges o de la mujer conviviente, conforme señala el artículo analizado, por la imposibilidad material de registrar la misma a favor de su real destinatario: la familia.

Históricamente, y en razón de consideraciones socio-culturales, la protección de la familia ha estado encaminada a aquéllas que estuvieran ligadas por la institución del matrimonio, evidentemente que como consecuencia del texto del artículo 52 constitucional, y los conceptos de los constituyentes sobre la institución del matrimonio, calificado como “base esencial de la sociedad” (Acta 116, pág. 579, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente). Pero ello no puede ir en detrimento, de las relaciones que, aún cuando cumpliesen materialmente con todos los requisitos del matrimonio -universalidad, unidad, oponibilidad y estabilidad-, su vínculo no está legalmente reconocido, olvidando de alguna manera que los titulares de esa unión de hecho, también son acreedores de la protección constitucional. Sin embargo, esta situación ha ido cambiando paulatinamente y el ordenamiento jurídico ha extendido su protección a las uniones de hecho a fin de salvaguardar, principalmente, los derechos de la mujer y de los hijos menores de edad.

En efecto, al disponer el artículo 52 de la Constitución Política que el matrimonio es la base esencial de la familia, no excluye que ésta pueda conformarse de manera distinta y conlleva, desde luego, que por el principio de igualdad, de ese vínculo de hecho devienen idénticos efectos jurídicos que en el matrimonio. Precisamente, la norma cuestionada es respuesta a esas situaciones, a las que el ordenamiento les ha dado el carácter de prioritarias, para así solventar y proteger a la mujer e hijos, cuya unión no se encontrara establecida jurídicamente. La norma quiso llenar esa laguna legal que propiciaba una situación de desigualdad que venía operando en detrimento de la mujer e hijos, cuando no existía entre ella y su compañero un vínculo legalmente reconocido, y así poder prever situaciones en las cuales la mujer -o el hombre en algunos otros casos, que son los menos-, era obligada a abandonar junto con sus hijos, el techo que había servido de vivienda familiar.

Este artículo responde entonces, a la necesidad de reconocer jurídicamente y dar protección a un fenómeno social, para el cual el ordenamiento jurídico no tenía un desarrollo aceptable, cual era la existencia de las familias de hecho y su respectiva normativa, aunque constitucionalmente, estuviera explícita la protección familiar (artículo 51). Sumado a ello, la norma respondía a otro elemento de no menos importancia, como lo era el acceso al financiamiento agrícola, el cual le había sido vedado tradicionalmente y es a través de esta función protectora del Estado a un sector desprotegido, que se dicta una norma que, conforme se verá, adolece de un vicio de inconstitucionalidad que consiste en otorgar irracionalmente a la mujer, cuyo núcleo no ha sido constituido legalmente, mayores ventajas que a la unida mediante vínculo matrimonial, ya que la norma al regular la inscripción autoriza que en caso de matrimonio se haga en cabeza de ambos cónyuges, mientras que en el caso de los convivientes se titula solo a favor de la mujer.

Si bien la Sala considera que el artículo 7 citado es producto de una realidad histórica con la cual se pretende proteger a la familia de hecho, para evitar el despojamiento de los bienes habidos en la unión, tal protección no puede establecerse en detrimento de otras relaciones privilegiadamente protegidas por el Estado, como lo es la familia fundada en el matrimonio, creando una situación más ventajosa para una de esas modalidades familiares y estableciendo una discriminación irracional que afecta a las familias legalmente constituidas. La norma crea una especie de marginación que afecta al núcleo familiar y por ende, a la sociedad en su conjunto desde el momento en que un grupo es tratado en forma preferencial y se le coloca en una situación socialmente ventajosa frente a otro grupo. Por otra parte, es esencial clarificar que la discriminación que se apunta no lo es respecto de la situación de la mujer, sino de la situación jurídica de las diferentes modalidades de familia, pues si bien es cierto el artículo 52 constitucional establece que el matrimonio es “la base esencial de la familia”, ello no descarta la existencia de otras bases que podemos calificar como “no esenciales”, sobre las cuales también puede conformarse una familia, la que a pesar de no estar amparada en un vínculo formal, merece y debe tener la protección constitucional, para todos los derechos que de ella deriven...” ii.- El voto 769-93 de la Sala Constitucional, hizo las siguientes consideraciones ante la ausencia de normativa sobre la unión de hecho: “...

III.- Ahora bien: no debe acudirse a una norma prevista para definir lo que pasa con los bienes de los esposos al momento del divorcio o la separación judicial, o no debe acudirse necesariamente a ella, cuando la situación que se discute es el derecho que alega un hombre o una mujer respecto de los bienes del otro –copropiedad–, cuando ha habido una unión de hecho en la que por el esfuerzo común se han adquirido esos bienes. Aquí, como lo anticipa el propio Tribunal consultante, podría acudirse a otra normativa –el artículo 1198 del Código Civil que cita su resolución–, o a otros parámetros igualmente autorizados por el ordenamiento, cuando haya insuficiencia en la regulación de una determinada materia. Esos criterios podrían ser los principios generales de derecho, que están autorizados por el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el artículo 1º del Código Civil; la equidad, que podría utilizarse a tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 11 del Código Civil, y hasta la aplicación analógica, que el artículo 12 siguiente autoriza.

Debe agregarse a lo anterior, que conforme a la primera norma citada, un tribunal no puede excusar el conocimiento de un asunto, ni resolverlo negativamente, alegando falta de ley aplicable al caso planteado. Tienen los jueces, pues, a su haber, amplias posibilidades para resolver con norma expresa, con aplicación extensiva (interpretativa analógica) y hasta mediante la recreación normativa a base de otra insuficiente. Lo que no parece apropiado es atribuirle al artículo 41 del Código de Familia, que fue diseñado para regular una situación particular y, si se quiere, la usual en nuestro medio, discriminación por no referirse a otras posibilidades. Esa conclusión no podría tenerse como razonable.- IV.- La insuficiencia de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico en la materia que nos ocupa, como ya lo han señalado autores especializados, parte de la propia Constitución Política, cuyo artículo 52 establece que “El matrimonio es la base esencial de la familia y descansa en la igualdad de derechos de los cónyuges”.

En igual forma, como lo puntualiza la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe, la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (París, 1948), el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Nueva York, 1966) y la Convención Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos (San José, 1969), instrumentos vigentes en nuestro país, señalan ese carácter del matrimonio como esencial de la familia y un derecho para las personas. Eso no significa, de toda suerte, como algún autor ha señalado, que el matrimonio sea la base única o exclusiva de la familia. La realidad demuestra que, por lo menos en ciertas regiones del país, hay altos porcentajes de familias fundadas no en el matrimonio, sino en una unión de hecho. Que la legislación ordinaria no se haya encargado de desarrollar esta problemática, no podría revertir en contra del artículo 41 como se pretende en la consulta, de ahí que la Sala se vea obligada a indicar que no hay la inconstitucionalidad que se le atribuye a esa norma, sino que se encuentra en el deber, paralelo, de indicar al Tribunal que tiene a su haber suficiente base para resolver el caso concreto conforme a lo que se dijo supra.

Situaciones como las planteadas en el asunto sub judice han sido resueltas innumerables veces en forma estimatoria, no podemos afirmar que siempre acertadamente, pero sí para enfatizar que ya los Tribunales de diferente jerarquía han ido estableciendo pautas para resolver casos como el que tiene bajo su conocimiento el Tribunal consultante. En este sentido, ya puede acudirse a suficientes precedentes específicos. El poder que la jurisprudencia del Derecho de Familia en nuestro país ha sido tal, que también se ha afirmado con carácter categórico, que muchas de las normas del Código de Familia tienen su origen en decisiones de los tribunales, incluso algunas de tono marcadamente disidente o minoritario, pero no por ello ayunas de justicia o equidad. Por el contrario, el desarrollo histórico del Derecho de Familia nos indica cómo el paso del tiempo ha sido determinante para una evolución de sus conceptos y sus soluciones.

Nuestro país no es excepción en este campo e incluso podría decirse que es donde con más celeridad ese comportamiento se ha notado....” iii.- Tal vez es el voto 1154-94 de la Sala Constitucional, uno de los más reveladores de un nuevo enfoque sobre la unión de hecho en nuestro ordenamiento: “... IIº.- Sobre el fondo. En cuanto al fondo de la consulta, el Juez desea que se le aclare si la Constitución al hablar de “cónyuge” está excluyendo a las uniones de hecho, o bien si se puede interpretar lo contrario, es decir, que no excluyen las normas consultadas a las parejas y familias estables unidas sin vínculo legal. Es importante a la hora de hacer un análisis constitucional, no centrase sólo en la norma que más se relaciona con el tema, sino ver la Constitución como un todo armónico, e interpretarla como el conjunto de ideas y valores que es, a la luz de los principios que la sustentan. En este tema en particular, cualquier análisis que se haga debe ser en esta línea, de lo contrario resultaría parcializado y superficial.

En efecto, no se puede analizar el tema expuesto, a la luz de lo que dispone el artículo 36 únicamente; es necesario relacionar esa norma con los artículos que 51 y 52 constitucionales, que se refieren a la protección de la familia, por estar íntimamente ligados con el primero. A juicio de esta Sala, la interpretación armónica de los artículos 36, 51 y 52 citados, no permite concluir que la garantía a que se refiere el artículo 36 sea únicamente para la familia basada en el matrimonio; por el contrario, tal interpretación resultaría contraria al espíritu de la Constitución, según se verá. IIIº. El artículo 36, según ya lo ha analizado esta Sala (ver sentencia 264-91), tiene como objeto proteger la cohesión del núcleo familiar, preocupación que, junto con los artículos 51 y 52 de la Constitución, reflejan la convicción del legislador constituyente sobre la importancia de la familia como núcleo social.

Por su orden señalan esas normas: “Artículo 36. En materia penal nadie está obligado a declarar en contra de sí mismo, ni contra su cónyuge, ascendientes, descendientes o parientes colaterales hasta el tercer grado inclusive de consanguinidad o afinidad”. “Artículo 51. La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado” “Artículo 52. El matrimonio es la base esencial de la familia y descansa en la igualdad de derechos de los cónyuges”. Una interpretación literal de los artículos 51 y 52 en relación con el 36 transcrito supra, nos puede llevar fácilmente a la conclusión de que la potestad de abstención a que se refiere el artículo 36, es únicamente para quienes, además de convivir por su deseo de compartir amor, de auxiliarse y formar una familia, están unidos por un vínculo jurídico. La duda podría originarse en una interpretación simplista de la relación de los artículos 51 y 52, cuya conclusión podría ser: “el matrimonio es la base esencial de la familia”.

No obstante, si analizamos las actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, se puede corroborar la intención del legislador de no excluir a las familias de hecho de la protección constitucional. Como bien lo afirma la Procuraduría, la primera moción discutida en relación con la norma de comentario se redactó en los siguientes términos: “El matrimonio es la base legal de la familia y descansa en la igualdad de derechos de los cónyuges”. A esta moción se opuso el Diputado Ortíz diciendo que: “... decir “legal” significa excluir a aquellas familias de hecho, que sin tener origen en el matrimonio, son sin embargo familias.” Por esa oposición, se aprobó el artículo 52 en los términos actuales, eliminándose la frase “base legal” y sustituyéndose por la de “base esencial”, lo cual significa que el hecho de que el legislador le haya dado protección constitucional al matrimonio, considerándolo la base esencial de la familia, no es excluyente de otros tipos de familia.

El matrimonio es entonces, base esencial, pero no única de familia, a los ojos del legislador. Si además tomamos en consideración que el legislador quiso proteger a la “familia” -sin hacer distingos-, en el artículo 51, no podemos interpretar que “familia” sea sólo la constituida por vínculo legal, sino por el contrario, que el término es comprensivo de otros núcleos familiares, aún cuando el legislador haya manifestado su preferencia por los constituidos por matrimonio. IVº. Según lo expuesto, para el legislador constituyente, las llamadas “familias de hecho” y el matrimonio son simultáneamente dos fuentes morales y legales de familia (hay que tomar en cuenta que no existe impedimento legal para constituir una familia de hecho); ambos garantizan la estabilidad necesaria para una permanente vida familiar, porque se originan en una fuente común: el amor que vincula al hombre y la mujer, el deseo de compartir, de auxiliarse y apoyarse mutuamente y de tener descendencia.

En nuestro país, según datos de la Oficina de Estadística y Censo de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres, un dieciocho punto trece porciento (18.13 %) de las parejas que conviven, lo hacen en unión libre, dándose la gran mayoría de esas uniones en el área rural, por razones culturales e históricas, que no es propio censurar ni desconocer a la luz de la libertad de culto, expresión y pensamiento que protege la Constitución Política. Esa realidad histórica y cultural que se mantiene con fuerza aún a pocos años del cambio de siglo, existió mucho antes de que el derecho y la religión crearan al matrimonio. Estudios sobre la materia reconocen que desde tiempos inmemoriales, el hombre y la mujer han llevado vida común para ayudarse a sobrellevar las cargas de la vida y perpetuar la especie por medio de la procreación. En el Derecho Romano por ejemplo, se reconoció y reguló el concubinato, coexistiendo con la cö emptio, la confarreatio y el usus- formas de celebrar las justae nuptiae.

Con el advenimiento del Cristianismo, el concubinato también coexistió con el matrimonio religioso, como se comprueba con el Concilio de Toledo, celebrado en el año cuatrocientos (400) de nuestra era, hasta que fue prohibido en el Concilio de Trento de mil quinientos sesenta y tres (1563) que dispuso “la obligatoriedad de contraer matrimonio ante el cura párroco, en ceremonia pública..., como también dispuso que los concubinos que no se separasen a la tercera advertencia incurrirían en excomunión y si persistiesen en vivir juntos serían pasibles de herejía y adulterio”. Vº. No obstante los calificativos que algunas religiones le han dado al concubinato, sigue siendo hoy en día una fuente de familia, y desconocer esta realidad social, sólo nos lleva a la desigualdad y desprotección de quienes componen ese núcleo, incluyendo a los hijos, quienes a la luz de la “Convención de Derechos del Niño” y de nuestra Constitución, merecen una protección por encima de prejuicios sociales o morales.

La familia de hecho es una fuente de “familia”, entendida esta como el conjunto de personas que vinculadas por la unión estable de un hombre y una mujer, viven bajo el mismo techo e integran una unidad social primaria. Sin embargo, debe quedar claro que no pueden equipararse a las uniones de hecho, los amoríos o las relaciones esporádicas o superficiales; las uniones de hecho, cumplen funciones familiares iguales a las del matrimonio, y se caracterizan al igual que éste, por estar dotados al menos de, estabilidad (en la misma medida en que lo está el matrimonio), publicidad (no es oculta es pública y notoria), cohabitación (convivencia bajo el mismo techo, deseo de compartir una vida en común, de auxiliarse y socorrerse mutuamente) y singularidad (no es una relación plural en varios centros convivenciales). VIº. Nuestro sistema de vida está basado en principios que guardan la creencia de que todos los seres humanos nacemos libres, e iguales en dignidad y derechos, sin distinción de raza, sexo, color, idioma, religión u opinión política.

La familia por otra parte, es indiscutiblemente el elemento natural y fundamental de la sociedad porque es en ella que se dan los elementos fundamentales para el desarrollo de las mejores cualidades del ser humano y donde se traspasan nuestras costumbres, tradiciones y enseñanzas de generación en generación. En consecuencia, la familia, compuesta por individuos libres e iguales en dignidad y derechos ante la ley, tiene derecho a la protección de la sociedad y del Estado independientemente de la causa que le haya dado origen; su naturaleza e importancia justifican su protección. Así lo reconoció esta Sala en sentencia número 2984-93, al extender el derecho de abstenerse de declarar contemplado en el artículo 36 de la Constitución, a la concubina, estimando que la protección de la cohesión familiar es tan importante en la familia de hecho como en la constituida legalmente...” iv.- Otros votos de la Sala Constitucional sobre el tema de la unión de hecho son: 2776-92 (art. 36 Constitución), 3798-92 (asunto penal), 769-93 (art. 41 C. Familia), 1151-94 (penal), 1153- 94 (penal), 1155-94 (penal), 2129-94 (572 inc ch C. Civil), 2648-94 (Reglamento Invalidez, Vejez y Muerte), 3064-94 (denegación de préstamo por condición de unión libre), 3693-94 (consulta sobre ley), 6798-94 (penal), 7515-94 (consulta sobre ley), 3027-95 (caso del INVU), 3340-96 (artículo 85 del Código de Trabajo), 5429-96 (consulta de Sala Tercera).

VI.- La unión de hecho fue regulada en el Código de Familia por adición que se le hiciera mediante Ley Nº 7532 de 8 de agosto de 1995, publicada en La Gaceta Nº 162 del lunes 28 de agosto de 1995. Dicha Ley estableció dos tipos de unión de hecho mas una de ellas, la denominada unión de hecho irregular, fue declarada inconstitucional mediante voto 3858-99 dictado a las dieciséis horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veinticinco de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y nueve. Dicha unión de hecho que se declaró inconstitucional es aquella en la que los convivientes no tenían aptitud legal para casarse. Así queda en vigencia únicamente aquella unión denominada regular. Son los artículos 242, 243 y 244 los cuales se refieren a ésta. El artículo 242 del Código de Familia dispone lo siguiente: “ARTÍCULO 242.- La unión de hecho pública, notoria, única y estable, por más de tres años, entre un hombre y una mujer que posean aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio, surtirá todos los efectos patrimoniales propios del matrimonio formalizado legalmente, al finalizar por cualquier causa.” Son ocho los requisitos de esta unión de hecho, entonces:

• 1)unión de hecho;
• 2)pública;
• 3)notoria;
• 4)única;
• 5)estable;
• 6)por más de tres años;
• 7)entre hombre y mujer;
• 8)con aptitud legal para casarse. La unión de hecho se refiere a las relaciones de pareja no fundadas en el matrimonio, es decir al denominado concubinato. Los requisitos de publicidad y notoriedad, implican que la relación de la pareja no se da en forma clandestina u oculta, sino que la misma es evidente, patente, manifiesta, a la vista y conocimiento de todos. La unicidad o singularidad de la relación excluye relaciones simultáneas. De esta manera, se tutela una relación no fundada en el matrimonio, pero lo mas parecida al matrimonio en cuanto a la monogamia y la fidelidad. En cuanto a la estabilidad se trata de uno de los requisitos mas interesantes, pues implica solidez y permanencia. Vale la pena reiterar aquí los conceptos que desarrolló la Sala Constitucional en el voto 1154-94, sobre las condiciones de la unión de hecho: “...La familia de hecho es una fuente de “familia”, entendida esta como el conjunto de personas que vinculadas por la unión estable de un hombre y una mujer, viven bajo el mismo techo e integran una unidad social primaria. Sin embargo, debe quedar claro que no pueden equipararse a las uniones de hecho, los amoríos o las relaciones esporádicas o superficiales; las uniones de hecho, cumplen funciones familiares iguales a las del matrimonio, y se caracterizan al igual que éste, por estar dotados al menos de, estabilidad (en la misma medida en que lo está el matrimonio), publicidad (no es oculta es pública y notoria), cohabitación (convivencia bajo el mismo techo, deseo de compartir una vida en común, de auxiliarse y socorrerse mutuamente) y singularidad (no es una relación plural en varios centros convivenciales)....”. En cuanto al plazo de tres años se constituye en el parámetro de estabilidad, o permanencia en el tiempo es éste. Sobre que se trate de una unión de hombre y mujer queda absolutamente claro que se trata de relaciones heterosexuales. La aptitud legal para casarse se refiere sobre todo a la exclusión de un vínculo matrimonial. VII.- Dentro de este contexto, y conforme con la valoración de la pruebas que se impone en el proceso familiar conforme con el artículo 8 del Código de Familia, ha de analizarse el presente caso. Dicho artículo 8 del Código de Familia, en su párrafo segundo, establece lo siguiente: “...Sin embargo, los jueces en materia de familia interpretarán las probanzas sin sujeción a las reglas positivas del derecho común, atendiendo todas las circunstancias y los elementos de convicción que los autos suministren; pero en todo caso deberán hacerse constar las razones de su valoración...” Sobre el ítem de la valoración de la prueba en el derecho procesal familiar, ha de señalarse la flexibilidad que implica esa norma, y sus límites. ¿qué significa que las pruebas se interpretarán sin sujeción a las reglas de la prueba común? Ello implica otro distanciamiento del proceso civil, puesto que en primer término han de marginarse aquellas normas que dan una valoración específica a las pruebas como lo son los artículos 338, 370, 379 del Código Procesal Civil, e incluso podría significar una modificación a los numerales 330 y 417 del mismo Código (aunque en este caso –como lo veremos- viene a situarse en el mismo lugar pues la sana crítica es la base del sistema), para lograr un sistema diferente de valoración y apreciación de la prueba, que definitivamente incluye también una sustracción de las reglas del artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, que enuncia la concepción tradicional de las reglas de la carga de la prueba, como lo señaló este Tribunal en el voto 707-04 de las 8:20 horas del 29 de abril del 2004. No obstante ha de enfatizarse nuevamente, que la flexibilidad a que se ha evolucionado es un término medio que no implica la laxitud absoluta. Así lo consideró la Sala Constitucional al analizar una situación análoga: “...V. DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA APRECIACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA EN CONCIENCIA. El artículo 493 impugnado dispone: "Salvo disposición expresa en contrario de este Código, en la sentencia se apreciará la prueba en conciencia, sin sujeción a las normas de Derecho Común; pero el Juez, al analizar la que hubiere recibido, está obligado a expresar los principios de equidad o de cualquier naturaleza en funde su criterio." Lleva razón la representación de la Procuraduría General de la República al concluir que de la norma transcrita es imposible derivar una autorización para que los jueces laborales violen los derechos o normas constitucionales, por cuanto únicamente se establece el poder jurisdiccional de apreciar la prueba en conciencia, estableciendo dos supuestos en la que ésta resulta legítima: a) en el tanto no se esté en la hipótesis de que de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico ello resulte expresamente prohibido; y b) que cuando se haga sea en forma fundamentada, sea en el principio de equidad o de cualquier naturaleza. De esta manera, la apreciación de la prueba en conciencia no implica resolver en forma arbitraria, por cuanto todo juez -como funcionario público que es- se encuentra sujeto al principio de legalidad, el cual constituye un imperativo de adecuación de la acción pública, no sólo de las normas específicas sobre un objeto determinado, sino a todo el bloque de legalidad; por lo que no puede fallar con desprecio de los principios y derechos constitucionales, ya que está limitado por las reglas de la sana crítica y principios de razonabilidad, que debidamente aplicados conducen a la armonía de la apreciación jurisdiccional con la Constitución Política, tal y como lo entendió esta Sala en sentencia 3484-94, de las doce horas del ocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, en que determinó que las facultades de los jueces de apreciar la prueba en conciencia no resultan contrarias a la obligación del juez de fundamentar sus fallos, principio constitucional que integra el debido proceso: "IV.- Sobre la valoración de la prueba, establece el artículo 26 de la Ley que se cuestiona [Ley de Notariado]: "En la calificación de las probanzas tendrá el Tribunal dicho amplia libertad de apreciación y no estará obligado a sujetarse a las reglas de la prueba común. Si llegare a tener la convicción de que es cierto el cargo acusado, impondrá la corrección que corresponda ...". Este artículo no establece un sistema de íntima convicción, como lo alega el accionante, sino el de la libre apreciación de la prueba o libre convicción, que implica que todo se puede probar y cualquier medio probatorio lícito, sistema de apreciación que no resulta inconstitucional, máxime si tomamos en cuenta que en todo proceso administrativo, la prueba que sirva de fundamento a la resolución debe ser legal, valorada racionalmente y la resolución tiene, en todo caso, que estar debidamente fundamentada. La libertad probatoria que establece el artículo 26 no es irrestricta, todo medio de prueba que se considere en el procedimiento, se analizará de conformidad con criterios de razonabilidad y con las reglas de la sana crítica. Sobre este tema, la Sala precisó: "El principio de valoración razonable de la prueba: El proceso penal especialmente, al menos tal como debe entenderse en nuestro país, .... el juzgador, el cual tiene, ..., la potestad y obligación de valorar la prueba recibida conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, que reconocen su discrecionalidad pero la someten a criterios objetivos, por lo tanto invocables para impugnar una valoración arbitraria o errónea. Desde luego, la arbitrariedad o el error pueden darse, tanto al rechazar indebidamente elementos o posibilidades de convicción pertinentes, como al atribuir a las pruebas recibidas un contenido inexacto o al desdeñar el verdadero -errores de hecho-, como, finalmente, al otorgarles un valor probatorio del que razonablemente carecen o negarles el que razonablemente tienen, como, en síntesis, al violar los principios de la sana crítica conducentes a un correcta determinación de la verdad de los hechos relevantes del caso." (sentencia número 1739-92 de las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos.) Si bien tal sentencia se refiere al procedimiento penal, lo cierto es que los principios que allí se expresan son plenamente aplicables al proceso sancionatorio administrativo. En consecuencia, el párrafo último del artículo 26 que se cuestiona no es inconstitucional, siempre y cuando se interprete que el procedimiento que se aplique respete los contenidos mínimos del derecho de defensa y que la interpretación de la prueba se sujete a los criterios de la sana crítica y se fundamenten las conclusiones." VI. De esta manera, lejos de afectar un derecho constitucional, establece un presupuesto procesal formal para garantizar precisamente el debido proceso: el de fundamentar la apreciación de la prueba que permitirá al eventual agraviado su defensa en relación con lo que es objeto de su perjuicio y al órgano superior hacer un examen justo de los autos que sean elevados a su conocimiento. Asimismo, cabe señalar que este principio es una manifestación de la aplicación del principio protector que rige la jurisdicción laboral, y que se concreta en el principio "indubio pro operario", que se justifica en virtud de la desigualdad básica que se da entre las partes -patrono/trabajador-, no sólo por la relación de subordinación en que se halla el trabajador, sino, fundamentalmente por las natural disponibilidad de los medios de prueba que tiene el empleador, la cual constrasta sensiblemente con la dificultad del empleado en este aspecto. Debe hacerse la advertencia que lo que sí resulta contrario al orden constitucional es el fallar en conciencia y con total prescindencia de los demás elementos de convicción, tal y como lo señaló esta Sala en sentencia de constitucionalidad número 5546-95, de las quince horas seis minutos del once de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. Con fundamento en lo anterior, es que procede interpretar la norma en cuestión de tal manera que no resulta inconstitucional la facultad de los jueces laborales de apreciar la prueba en conciencia, siempre y cuando se dicte un fallo fundamentado, en aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica y razonabilidad...” (voto 724-98 de las doce horas quince minutos del seis de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho de la SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA) Así ha de concluirse, entonces que dicha flexibilidad en cuanto a la situación concreta que se presenta ha de obedecer a la aplicación de las reglas de la sana crítica y la razonabilidad. VIII.- En nuestro caso bajo estudio, la parte actora ha señalado que primeramente ella y el demandado estuvieron casados, que luego se divorciaron, que se separaron por poco tiempo y luego mantuvieron una unión de hecho y que fue has ocho meses antes de la demanda que ellos definitivamente se separaron. El demandado niega los hechos relativos a la unión de hecho, pues señala que la actora ha tenido relaciones con muchos hombres y que la convivencia no ha sido estable. El Tribunal coincide con el Juzgador de primera instancia en los primeros análisis que realiza en su sentencia, pero no comparte las consideraciones del aparte VIII de la sentencia recurrida, punto en el cual estima este Tribunal que el apelante lleva razón. Del análisis de la prueba evacuada, se desprende que la relación de convivencia de las partes no cumple plenamente con los requisitos que establece la ley. De conformidad con los testimonios de algunos de los testigos, propuestos por una y otra parte, se desprende cómo la actora tenía relaciones paralelas con el demandado [Nombre 002] como con su actual pareja [Nombre 010], y que la relación de pareja con [Nombre 010] data de unos seis años, como lo había dicho el demandado en su contestación. Así lo explica por ejemplo la hermana de la actora [Nombre 013]. Primero narra que actualmente la pareja de la actora es el señor [Nombre 010]: “...Mi hermana [Nombre 001] tiene otra relación de pareja con un hombre que se llama [Nombre 010]; ellos no viven juntos; él llega a veces a visitarla la casa. Que yo sepa, ella no tuvo otras relaciones de pareja...”. Ante una repregunta, la testigo ofrecida por la misma actora aclara: “...Entiendo que hermana [Nombre 001] y [Nombre 010] tienen como seis años de tener una relación de pareja...”. Por su parte el hijo de las partes de nombre [Nombre 008] sobre este aspecto que se trae a colación en el recurso sobre la relación de la actora con un tercero de nombre [Nombre 010]. Mi mamá anduvo con un hombre conocido como [Nombre 017]; y con [Nombre 010] que fue el último. Mi mamá, [Nombre 010] y mi hermana [Nombre 009] iban a pasear; yo los acompañaba. Ibamos a piscinas y a playas. Mi papá se daba cuenta de que mi mamá andaba con esos muchachos; él les reclamaba; ellos se negaban; pero mi mamá seguía con ellos...”. Varias veces, estando conviviendo con mi papá, mi mamá varias veces llevó a [Nombre 010] a la casa; y yo le levaba el carro. Los fines de semana –sábado y domingo- mi mamá se iba con [Nombre 010]; nos decía que ella iba a ir a pasear donde mi tía; pero en realidad, ella se iba para la casa de [Nombre 010] o para la playa...”. Sobre la duración de esa relación de la actora con esta persona de nombre [Nombre 010], el testigo señala: “...Mi mamá andaba con [Nombre 010] desde hace aproximadamente seis o siete años, cuando yo todavía estaba en la escuela...”. Estas declaraciones merecen fe al Tribunal pues vienen de testigos propuestos tanto por la actora como por el demandado, y que al final de cuentas, cuando termina la relación quien se mantiene como pareja de la actora es este señor de nombre [Nombre 010]. Esto nos lleva unívocamente a relaciones paralelas por lo menos en cuatro años y medio de la convivencia de [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 001], en que también [Nombre 001] tenía una relación de pareja con [Nombre 010]. El señor Juez de primera instancia consideró en la sección marcada como VIII del elaborado fallo que las separaciones cortas que se dieron entre la actora y el demandado, no le quitan el requisito de estabilidad a la unión de hecho y que tampoco los amoríos casuales de la actora, con otros hombres, a que aluden los testigos desvirtúan el requisito de unicidad o singularidad de esa unión y cita la sentencia 34-01 de las 14:40 horas del 12 de enero del 2001de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. En el caso que nos ocupa concurren ciertas circunstancias que comprometen seriamente el requisito de unicidad o singularidad. Si bien es cierto que no se deriva del expediente que [Nombre 001] conviviera con [Nombre 010], sí tuvo y mantuvo una relación con [Nombre 010], y por el principio de lógica de exclusión de que las cosas sean y no sean al mismo tiempo, no es posible que [Nombre 001] conviviera con [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 010] al mismo tiempo; lo cierto es que no se trata de una relación única desde el punto de vista del análisis de la situación de [Nombre 001]. Una relación que se proyecta por seis años, traslapada unos cuatro años y medio con la relación con [Nombre 002], no puede calificarse de casual o fugaz. El caso jurisprudencial que cita el señor Juez es diferente (el mismo análisis podría hacerse para otros casos en que este aspecto se analizó como lo son los fallados por la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia sentencia número 2000-00951 de las 8:40 hrs del 24 de noviembre del 2000, y número 2003-00111 de las 14:30 hrs del 14 de marzo del 2003) pues quien quiere hacer valer la unión de hecho es precisamente un conviviente que se cree “único”, y que desde esa perspectiva ha actuado de buena fe, y no puede afectarlo una doble vida del otro conviviente pues ello es contrario a la equidad. Pero resulta que quien quiere hacer valer una unión de hecho es ese conviviente con vidas paralelas en relaciones de pareja, lo cierto es que el principio de aplicación conforme a la buena fe y a la equidad ya no lo cobija. Lo que se plantea tendría un parangón con lo que sucede con los efectos para un matrimonio nulo, cuando nuestra ley señala en el numeral 66 del Código de Familia que el matrimonio nulo o anulado produce todos los efectos civiles a favor del cónyuge que obró de buena fe, y a contrario sensu, no tendría esos efectos para el cónyuge que no ha actuado de buena fe. Este Tribunal no está planteando un juicio moral por cuanto el Juez de Familia ha de tomar la realidad tal y cómo es, y el caso que se plantea no está fuera de un rango de lo que ocurre en nuestra sociedad, pero lo que sí plantea es que en aquellos punto de interpretación de los requisitos en casos limítrofes de los presupuestos, han de ser, la equidad y la buena fe, los parámetros que han de prevalecer. Y este caso es limítrofe en cuanto al presupuesto de singularidad o unicidad. Ya hemos dicho que la unicidad o singularidad de la relación excluye relaciones simultáneas, tutelándose una relación no fundada en el matrimonio, pero lo mas parecida al matrimonio en cuanto a la monogamia y la fidelidad, y no puede decirse que [Nombre 001], quien quiere hacer valer la unión de hecho, no tuviera relaciones simultáneas. Lo que ha ocurrido es una ambivalencia y disfuncionalidad enfermiza que evidentemente ha afectado a los vástagos de la pareja. Ha de ser razonable la interpretación que se de, pues como se dijo no puede exigirse que, para que el requisito de singularidad se diluya en un caso de relaciones paralelas, han de concurrir “convivencias” o “cohabitaciones” paralelas. Podemos notar que la esencia de la relación de hecho es tal que en aquellos casos limítrofes en cuanto a una aparente esencia de la misma que podría ser la cohabitación bajo el mismo techo, descubrimos una variable interesante que nos revela que el quid del asunto no es ese. Una serie jurisprudencial en este sentido nos convence al respecto. Nos referimos a los casos de los votos 2000-00642 de las 9:40 hrs. del 30 de junio del 2000, 2002-00037 de las 10:30 hrs. del 6 de febrero del 2002 y 2003-00559 de las 11:50 hrs. del 10 de octubre del 2003, en los cuales ha existido distancia en la relación por situaciones muy especiales y aún así se ha considerado que existe unión de hecho. De esta manera tampoco ha de exigirse a una relación de pareja paralela la característica de convivencia o cohabitación para que la misma diluya –para el conviviente que actúa de mala fe- el requisito o presupuesto de singularidad o unicidad, sino que ha de tratarse de una relación de pareja con una permanencia importante, como considera este Tribunal es la relación de [Nombre 001] con [Nombre 010], paralela a la [Nombre 001] con [Nombre 002]. De esta manera, considera este Tribunal que lleva razón la parte apelante en sus reproches, y por ende, ha de revocarse la sentencia apelada y en su lugar debe declararse sin lugar la demanda de declaratoria de unión de hecho en todos sus extremos, aún y cuando, ha de absolverse en costas puesto que se trata de un asunto limítrofe en uno de los presupuestos, por lo cual la litis ha de considerarse planteada con evidente buena fe."