Annuity Payments Denied to Banco Popular Employees as Non-State Public EntityImprocedencia de anualidades para empleados del Banco Popular por ser ente público no estatal

"SIXTH: ANALYSIS of the CASE under STUDY.[...] Having established the foregoing, for the case at hand it is essential to bear in mind that the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, Law No. 4351, which entered into force on July 11, 1969, in its Article 2 expressly provides: “The Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is a non-state public law institution (institución de Derecho Público no estatal), with its own legal personality and assets, with full administrative and functional autonomy. Its operation shall be governed by the rules of Public Law. The Bank shall have as its fundamental objective to provide economic protection and well-being to workers, through the promotion of savings and the satisfaction of their credit needs. For this purpose, it shall seek the economic and social development of workers, for which it may grant loans for urgent needs, as well as for the worker's participation in job-generating enterprises that have economic viability. Likewise, it may finance community development programs.” (Reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 7031 of April 14, 1986). (Emphasis supplied). From the foregoing regulation, it also follows that, as a public institution, it is subject to Public Law legislation, such as the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica (No. 7558), and the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), as confirmed by Article 46 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal when providing that: “The Bank shall be subject to the supervision of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law of the Banco Central and Chapter III of Title I of the Organic Law of the National Banking System. The Bank shall also be subject to the oversight of the Contraloría General de la República (…)”. (Thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 5776 of August 18, 1975, and reformed by Article 167 of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, No. 7558 of November 3, 1995). From the above, it is inferred that the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is an entity that, by express provision of law, has the legal nature corresponding to a non-state public body (ente público no estatal). In this sense, it is worth mentioning that, to know about the recognition of annual salary increments (anualidades) to a worker who has worked in different public entities, one must distinguish which is the institution of origin, that is, the one in which the employee worked and whose time of service they seek to have another, the receiving institution, recognize for the payment of the salary supplement (sobresueldo). In the specific case, this Chamber agrees with what was decided by the trial judge, since the recognition of that salary benefit does not apply in those entities (non-state public bodies), as is the case of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. The foregoing, because, as the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also clearly explained, “(…) the service relationships of its collaborators are not governed by public law, but by common labor law (…)”. (See in this regard, among others, Ruling No. 1532-2021 of 12:05 p.m. on July 7, 2021). Furthermore, the appellant alleges that the Second Chamber of the Court, through Ruling No. 70-2008 of 9:40 a.m. on February 1, 2008, decided that the obligation to pay annual salary increments provided for in the Public Administration Salary Law applies to the entire public sector. It is true that, through the aforementioned ruling, the High Labor Court granted the payment of annual salary increments, indicating that it applies to the entire public sector, but later, that same body has generated a change of criterion in this regard, and evidence of this is the aforementioned Ruling No. 1532-2021. Regarding the jurisprudential criterion of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, concerning the subject matter of the dispute, the members of this Chamber consider it necessary to record what was explained by that jurisdictional body in Judgment No. 1101-2012 of 9:55 a.m. on September 5, 2012, in which the following was broadly and illustratively recounted: “(…) As of the entry into force of Law 6835, the jurisprudence that developed was to the effect that that regulation established the right of all persons who held the status of public servant (servidor público) to have the seniority worked in any entity of the Public Sector recognized and to be paid annual salary increments, regardless of whether the employment regime was subject to that of the Civil Service (Servicio Civil), thereby establishing the theory of the ‘single employer State’ (Estado patrono único), which was already being recognized at the judicial and administrative level. In judgment number 300, of 9:10 a.m. on October 11, 1996, it was indicated: ‘[…] the restriction imposed, by the Civil Service Statute, on the application of the Public Administration Salary Law, and, by the latter, only to employees covered by the statutory regime, lost its concrete effects upon the entry into force of the aforementioned Law No. 6835; since the latter, in its Article 1, by reforming Article 4 of Law No. 2166, of October 9, 1957, and its amendments, created a new Salary Scale, providing that the same ‘shall govern for the entire Public Sector’ and, furthermore, produced the addition of subsection d), to Article 12—referred to in the appeal—for all ‘servants of the Public Sector’; thereby generalizing both its effects and its scope of application. This means, then, that by generalizing and standardizing the remuneration system for the entire Public Sector, the concept that had been used of ‘State’—which in most cases is restrictive—was set aside. Hence, since the current wording of the Public Administration Salary Law does not establish any restriction or condition for its application, and Law No. 6835 repealed any provision that opposed it, it must be understood that the scope of its application was expanded.’ In the same vein, it is noted that in relation to several regulations considered atypical for having been included in budget laws, through which the right to the recognition of annual salary increments was incorporated in various sectors, the Chamber held in a more than repeated manner that the right was born for all public servants from the entry into force of the aforementioned Law 6835 and that said regulations were nothing more than a reiteration of that right. Thus, for example, in ruling number 325, of 10:10 a.m. on December 17, 1993, it was explained: ‘Regarding the second ground of disagreement raised, the State representation alleges that it is with Laws Numbers 6963, of July 30, and 6966, of September 25, both of 1984, that a special regulation is created to recognize annual increases to those servants whose employment relationship is of an occasional and special nature. Such an argument is also not admissible, since the recognition of seniority in the Public Sector, for purposes of the payment of annual increases for the time worked in its institutions, is a right of all public servants, whether or not they are covered by the Civil Service Statute. This finds legal basis in numerals 4 and 12, subsection d), of the Public Administration Salary Law, reformed by Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982. With the indicated Article 4, a new salary scale was established for the entire Public Sector; and, with numeral 12, subsection d), the right of all public servants, permanent or interim, was born to receive the increases referred to in Article 5 of said law, recognizing the time of services rendered in other entities of the Public Sector. (See judgments numbers: 58, of 2:30 p.m. on April 30, 1986; 82, of 10:10 a.m. on July 5, 1989, and 181, of 10:10 a.m. on October 2, 1991). The aforementioned atypical regulations did not modify what said subsection d) had provided, and are rather reiterative, in recognizing a right to servants excluded from the Civil Service regime who had one year or more of working for the Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry of the Presidency, the Rural Assistance Guard, the Civil Guard, and the Directorate of Social Adaptation —according to the twelfth regulation of Law No. 6963—; and, in addition to these, of the Ministry of Public Security and the Directorate of Migration and Immigration —according to the seventh regulation of Law No. 6966—, a right that such servants already held. The promulgation of these budgetary regulations does not prevent that, as of the entry into force of the aforementioned addition, every public servant has the right to the recognition of the time of services rendered in the Public Administration, for purposes of the annual increases indicated in Article 5 of the Public Administration Salary Law, whether or not covered by the Civil Service regime. Such regulations do not constitute authentic interpretations and, even less, any amendment that affects the validity or efficacy of Law 6835; they constitute a complement that declares a right as of a certain date, which was also not necessary, since Law 6835 had already established it.’ Now, since judgments of old date, it was already discernible that the right was understood to be granted in favor of persons who held the status of public servants (servidores y servidoras públicas) properly speaking. The rulings in which this circumstance was revealed were more than repeated. For example, the Chamber stated: ‘Law Number 6835 of December 22, 1982, which added a subsection d) to the Public Administration Salary Law, recognizes the payment for annual salary increments to every public servant, for the time worked in the Public Sector.’ (1992-283). ‘In accordance with all of the foregoing, it is legally undeniable that employees with a service relationship with […], form part of the so-called Public Sector; a concept even broader than that of Public Administration, as it is enshrined in the General Law of Public Administration and in the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.’ (1997-58). ‘Said clause openly conflicts with the provisions of Law 6835 of December 22, 1982, which adds subsection d) to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, since it denies the right of workers to the recognition of time served that had concluded with payment of legal benefits, for purposes of the increase in annual salary increments; a right that this law enshrines for every public servant without any distinction.’ (1992-257). ‘From its reading, it is easily extracted that the same is applicable to persons who have or acquire the character of public servant, permanent or interim; which establishes the right of those employees to have recognized, for purposes of annual increases, the time of services rendered in the Public Sector.’ (1993-53). ‘However, it should be remembered that annual salary increments constitute a salary supplement (sobresueldo) that has been recognized only to public servants, on the occasion of the application of the Public Administration Salary Law and its reforms…’ (1995-18). Starting with ruling 291, of 10:20 a.m. on March 17, 2000, the analysis of the nature of the relationship was addressed, for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff in that proceeding was governed by Public Law or Labor Law and, hence, whether or not he had the right to the payment of the annual salary increments he was claiming. In judgment 513, of 9:50 a.m. on August 29, 2001, it was expressly stated that the right to annual salary increments was provided for public servants, properly speaking. After that decision, a series of lawsuits of the same nature were analyzed, in which this criterion was reiterated. Indeed, there have been many judgments in which it has been indicated that the right to annual increases belongs to public servants properly, so the employment regime was analyzed to determine its applicability. In this regard, among others, the following rulings can be consulted: From 2001: 674 and 716. From 2002: 194, 445, 565, 568 and 569. From 2003: 438. From 2004: 11. From 2005: 228, 284 and 675. From 2006: 20, 37, 218, 882 and 1059. From 2007: 534, 588, 806, 807 and 926. From 2008: 48, 64 and 630. From 2009: 1159. From 2011: 189. Now, based on that criterion, the Chamber has denied the right to annual increases to persons who work in the Public Sector, who do not hold the status of public officials (funcionarios públicos) properly speaking, insofar as their relationships are governed by private Labor Law, making it clear that it is not enough to work in a public office to access the right, but rather it is required to be a public official (funcionario público) (…)”. (Emphasis supplied). In that ruling, as is discernible, reference is made to the change in jurisprudential criterion that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had on the issue of recognition of annual salary increments in favor of workers of non-state public institutions who do not meet the condition of public official. [...] On the matter, it must be kept in mind that in compliance with the public policy regulation (mandatory compliance) of Article 409 of the Labor Code, when it is alleged that an action actually responds to circumstances of discrimination as contemplated in Article 404 of the same legal body, whoever alleges such discrimination must specifically indicate the factual basis on which they base their allegation and the terms of comparison that substantiate their claim, which is deemed not to be fulfilled in this proceeding given that indeed, the particular employment situation of the plaintiff is not exactly the same as that of the persons referred to both in the complaint and in the appeal. For further substantiation of the criterion expressed above, it is appropriate to cite the binding jurisprudence of the High Constitutional Court (Article 13 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction), by providing the following: “(…) Provision established in Article 33 of our Political Constitution and which implies giving equal treatment among equals and a differentiated treatment among unequals. The Chamber has been consistent in stating that it is summarized in the right to be treated equally to others in each and every one of the legal relationships that are established. Likewise, it has been defined that equality is, at the same time, a constitutional obligation consisting of treating equally those who are in equal factual conditions, thus erecting itself as a limit to the action of public power. However, it has also been established that the principle of equality does not have an absolute character, since it does not grant, properly, a right to be equated to any individual without distinction of circumstances, but rather, to demand that the law not make differences between two or more persons who are in the same legal situation or in identical conditions. In this sense, equal treatment cannot be sought when the conditions or circumstances are unequal, or when the situation denounced is illegal or irregular, since respect for equality does not imply an equalization of conditions contrary to the legal order. In accordance with these considerations, for the constitutional jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the right to equality, a parameter of comparison must be established that allows for elucidation of whether or not discriminatory treatment has existed (…)”. (Emphasis supplied). (Ruling No. 2021003288 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of 09:30 a.m. on February 19, 2021). Thus, since the criticisms expressed by the appellant against the contested judgment are not admissible, the appeal must be rejected." (Amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7031 of April 14, 1986). (Emphasis supplied). From the foregoing regulations, it is also clear that, as a public institution, it is subject to public law legislation, such as the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (No. 7558), and the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), as confirmed by provision 46 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal when it provides that: "The Bank shall be subject to the supervision of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law of the Central Bank and Chapter III of Title I of the Organic Law of the National Banking System. The Bank shall also be subject to the oversight of the Contraloría General de la República" (…) (…). (Thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 5776 of August 18, 1975, and amended by Article 167 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, No. 7558 of November 3, 1995). From the foregoing, it is understood that the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is an entity that, by express provision of law, has the legal nature of a non-state public entity (ente público no estatal). In this regard, it is worth mentioning that, in order to determine the recognition of annual increments (anualidades) to a worker who has worked in different public entities, a distinction must be made as to which is the institution of origin, that is, the one where the employee worked and whose time of service they seek to have another, the receiving institution, recognize for the payment of the salary supplement.

In the specific case, this Court agrees with the decision of the lower court judge, since the recognition of that salary benefit does not proceed in those entities (non-state public entities), as is the case of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. This is because, as the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has also clearly explained, "(…) the service relationships of its collaborators are not governed by public law, but by common labor law (…) (…)". (See in this regard, among others, Ruling No. 1532-2021 of 12:05 p.m. dated July 7, 2021).

Furthermore, the appellant alleges that the Second Chamber of the Court, through Ruling No. 70-2008 of 9:40 a.m. on February 1, 2008, resolved that the obligation to pay annual increments provided for in the Public Administration Salary Law applies to the entire public sector.

It is true that, through the aforementioned ruling, the High Labor Court granted the payment of annual increments (anualidades), indicating that it applies to the entire public sector, but some time later, that same body has generated a change of opinion on the matter, and evidence of this is the aforementioned Voto N° 1532-2021. Regarding the jurisprudential opinion of the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, with respect to the subject matter of the litigation, the members of this Chamber deem it necessary to record what was explained by that jurisdictional body in Sentencia N° 1101-2012 of 9:55 a.m. on September 5, 2012, in which the following was broadly and illustratively outlined: “(…) As of the entry into force of Ley 6835, the jurisprudence that developed was to the effect that said regulation established the right of all persons who held the status of public servant to have the seniority (antigüedad) worked in any entity of the Public Sector recognized and to be paid the annual increments (anualidades), regardless of whether the employment regime was subject to that of the Civil Service, thus establishing the theory of the ‘single employer State’ (Estado patrono único), which had already been recognized at the judicial and administrative level.

In ruling number 300, issued at 9:10 a.m. on October 11, 1996, it was stated: “[…] the restriction imposed, by the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), on the application of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), and, by this same law, solely to those employees covered by the statutory regime, lapsed in its concrete effects upon the entry into force of the cited Law No. 6835; since the latter, in its Article 1, by amending Article 4 of Law No. 2166, of October 9, 1957, and its amendments, created a new Salary Scale, providing that it ‘shall apply to the entire Public Sector’ and, furthermore, produced the addition of subsection d), to Article 12 – which is referenced in the appeal – for all ‘Public Sector employees’; thereby generalizing both its effects and its scope of application. This means, then, that by generalizing and standardizing the remuneration regime for the entire Public Sector, the previously used concept of ‘State’ – which in most cases is restrictive – was set aside. Hence, since the current wording of the Public Administration Salary Law establishes no restriction or conditioning whatsoever for its application, by Law No. 6835 repealing any provision contrary to it, it must be understood that its scope of application was broadened.” In the same vein, it is established that in relation to several provisions considered atypical for having been included in budget laws, through which the right to recognition of annual increments (anualidades) was incorporated in various sectors, the Chamber (sala) held in a more than repeated manner that the right arose for all public employees upon the entry into force of the cited Law No. 6835, and that said provisions were nothing more than a reiteration of that right. Thus, for example, in ruling number 325, issued at 10:10 a.m. on December 17, 1993, it was explained: “As for the second ground of disagreement raised, the State representation alleges that it is with Laws numbers 6963, of July 30, and 6966, of September 25, both of the year 1984, that a special regulation is created to recognize annual increases for those employees whose employment relationship is of an occasional and special nature. This argument is also not acceptable, since the recognition of seniority (antigüedad) in the Public Sector, for purposes of payment of annual increases, for time worked in its institutions, is a right of all public employees, whether or not they are covered by the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil).

This finds its legal basis in Articles 4 and 12, subsection d), of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), as amended by Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982. The aforementioned Article 4 established a new salary scale for the entire Public Sector; and, with Article 12, subsection d), the right was created for all public servants, whether permanent or interim (interinos), to receive the increases referred to in Article 5 of said law, with their time of service rendered in other Public Sector entities being recognized. (See judgments numbers: 58, of 2:30 p.m. on April 30, 1986; 82, of 10:10 a.m. on July 5, 1989, and 181, of 10:10 a.m. on October 2, 1991). The cited atypical norms did not modify what said subsection d) had provided, and are rather reiterative, in recognizing a right for servants excluded from the Civil Service regime (régimen del Servicio Civil) who had one year or more of working for the Presidency of the Republic (Presidencia de la República), the Ministry of the Presidency (Ministerio de la Presidencia), the Rural Assistance Guard (Guardia de Asistencia Rural), the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), and the Social Adaptation Directorate (Dirección de Adaptación Social) – according to the twelfth provision of Law No. 6963-; and, in addition to these, from the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública) and Immigration Control and Foreign Affairs (Control de Migración y Extranjería) – according to the seventh provision of Law No. 6966-, a right that such servants already held. The promulgation of these budgetary norms does not prevent, since the effective date of the aforementioned addition, every public servant from having the right to the recognition of time of service rendered in the Public Administration (Administración Pública), for the purpose of the annual increases indicated in Article 5 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), whether or not covered by the Civil Service regime (régimen del Servicio Civil).

Such rules do not constitute authentic interpretations and, even less so, any modification that affects the validity or effectiveness of Law 6835; they constitute a complement that declares a right as of a certain date, which was also unnecessary, since Law 6835 had already established it.” Now, already from judgments of old date, it was discerned that the right was understood to be granted in favor of persons who held the status of public servants properly speaking. The votes in which that circumstance was made evident were more than reiterated. For example, the chamber indicated: “Law Number 6835 of December 22, 1982, which added a subsection d) to the Public Administration Salary Law, recognizes the payment for years of service (anualidades) to every public servant, for time worked in the Public Sector.” (1992-283). “In accordance with all of the foregoing, it is legally undeniable that, servants with an employment relationship of […], form part of the so-called Public Sector; a concept even broader than that of the Public Administration, as embodied in the General Public Administration Law and in the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction.” (1997-58). “Said clause openly contravenes the provisions of Law 6835 of December 22, 1982, which adds subsection d), to article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, since it denies workers the right to recognition of time served that had concluded with payment of legal benefits, for purposes of the increase for years of service (anualidades); a right that this law enshrines for every public servant without any distinction.” (1992-257). "From its reading, it is easily extracted that it is applicable to persons who have or acquire the status of public servant (carácter de servidor público) in a permanent or interim capacity; which establishes the right of those workers to have recognized, for purposes of annual increases, the time of services rendered in the Public Sector (Sector Público)." (1993-53). "However, it should be remembered that the annual increases (anualidades) constitute a bonus that has been recognized solely to public servants (servidores públicos), on the occasion of the application of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) and its amendments…" (1995-18). Beginning with vote 291, at 10:20 hours on March 17, 2000, the analysis of the nature of the relationship was addressed, for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff in that proceeding was subject to Public Law or Labor Law and, hence, whether or not they had the right to payment of the annual increases (anualidades) they claimed. In ruling 513, at 9:50 hours on August 29, 2001, it was expressly stated that the right to annual increases (anualidades) was provided for public servants (servidores públicos), properly speaking. After that resolution, a series of trials of the same nature were analyzed, in which that criterion was reiterated. Indeed, there have been many rulings in which it has been indicated that the right to annual increases is for public servants properly speaking, so the employment regime was analyzed to determine its applicability. In that sense, among others, the following rulings may be consulted: From 2001: 674 and 716. From 2002: 194, 445, 565, 568 and 569. From 2003: 438. From 2004: 11. From 2005: 228, 284 and 675. From 2006: 20, 37, 218, 882 and 1059. From 2007: 534, 588, 806, 807 and 926. From 2008: 48, 64 and 630. From 2009: 1159. From 2011: 189. Now then, based on that criterion, the chamber has denied the right to annual increases to persons who work in the Public Sector, who do not hold the condition of public officials (funcionarios públicos) properly speaking, insofar as their relationships are governed by private Labor Law, making it clear that it is not enough to work in a public agency to access the right, but rather it is required to be a public official (funcionario público) (…)". (Emphasis supplied). In that ruling, as glimpsed, reference is made to the change in jurisprudential criterion that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had on the issue of recognizing annual increases in favor of workers of non-state public institutions who do not meet the condition of a public official (persona funcionaria pública).

[...]&nbsp;</span>In this regard, it must be borne in mind that in compliance with the public-order regulations (of mandatory observance) of article 409 of the Labor Code, when it is alleged that an action actually responds to discriminatory circumstances as contemplated in ordinal 404 of the same legal body, whoever alleges such discrimination must specifically indicate the factual basis on which their claim is founded and the comparators (términos de comparación) that substantiate their assertion, which is deemed not to be fulfilled in this proceeding given that, effectively, the particular employment situation of the plaintiff is not exactly the same as that of the persons referred to both in the statement of claim and in the appeal action.<span data-mce-style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;" style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;">&nbsp;</span>For further substantiation of the criterion expressed above, it is fitting to cite the binding jurisprudence of the High Constitutional Court (canon 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which provides as follows: <span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">“</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">(</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">…</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">)</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: spaces;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">&nbsp; </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">Provision established in Article 33 of our Political Constitution and which implies giving equal treatment among equals and differentiated treatment among unequals. The Chamber has been consistent in stating that it is summarized as the right to be treated equally to others in each and every legal relationship that is constituted. Likewise, it has been defined that equality is, at the same time, a constitutional obligation consisting of treating equally those who find themselves in equal factual conditions, thereby erecting itself as a limit to the exercise of public power. </span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">However, it has also been established that the principle of equality is not absolute in nature, since it does not properly grant a right to be equated to any individual without distinction of circumstances, but rather to demand that the law not make differences between two or more persons who find themselves in the same legal situation or in identical conditions</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">. In this sense, equal treatment cannot be sought when the conditions or circumstances are unequal, or when the situation denounced is illegal or irregular, since respect for equality does not imply an equalization of conditions contrary to the legal system. In accordance with these considerations, for the constitutional jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the right to equality, a parameter of comparison (parámetro de comparación) must be established that allows for the elucidation of whether or not discriminatory treatment has existed</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> (</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">…</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">)</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">”</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">. (</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Emphasis supplied). (</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">Voto Nº 2021003288</span><span data-mce-style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;" style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> of the Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 09:30 hours on February 19, 2021).</span> "**SIXTH: ANALYSIS of the CASE under STUDY.**[...] Having established the foregoing, for the case at hand it is essential to bear in mind that the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, **Law No. 4351** which entered into force on July 11, 1969, in its **Article 2** expressly provides: **“***The* ***Banco Popular*** ***y de Desarrollo Comunal is a non-state Public Law institution, with legal personality and its own patrimony, with full administrative and functional autonomy.*** *Its operation shall be governed by the rules of Public Law.* *The Bank shall have as its fundamental objective to provide economic protection and well-being to workers, by promoting savings and satisfying their credit needs. For this purpose it shall seek the economic and social development of workers, for which it may grant loans for urgent needs, as well as for the worker's participation in job-generating enterprises that are economically viable. Likewise, it may finance community development programs***”**. (Reformed by **Article 1** of **Law No. 7031** of April 14, 1986).

(Emphasis supplied). From the foregoing regulations it also follows that, as a public institution, it is subject to public law legislation, such as the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica (No. 7558), and the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (No. 7428), as confirmed by numeral 46 of the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal when it provides that: “The Bank shall be subject to the supervision of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Law of the Central Bank and in Chapter III of Title I of the Organic Law of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. The Bank shall also be subject to the oversight of the Contraloría General de la República (…)”. (As added by article 1° of Law No. 5776 of August 18, 1975, and amended by article 167 of the Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, No. 7558 of November 3, 1995). From the foregoing it is extracted that the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal is an entity that, by express provision of law, has the legal nature corresponding to a non-state public entity (ente público no estatal). In that sense, it is worth mentioning that, in order to decide regarding the recognition of annual bonuses (anualidades) to a worker who has worked in different public entities, a distinction must be made as to what the institution of origin is, that is, the one in which the employee worked and whose time of service another, the receiving institution, is asked to recognize for the payment of the additional salary.

In the specific case, this Tribunal shares the decision of the trial judge, since the recognition of that salary benefit does not proceed in those entities (non-state public entities), as is the case of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. The foregoing, because, as has also been clearly explained by the jurisprudence of the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, “(…) the service relations of its collaborators are not governed by public law, but by common labor law (…).” (See in this regard, among others, Voto No. 1532-2021 at 12:05 hours on July 7, 2021).

On the other hand, the appellant alleges that the Sala Segunda de la Corte, through Voto No. 70-2008 at 9:40 hours on February 1, 2008, resolved that the obligation to pay annual bonuses (anualidades) provided for in the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública applies to the entire public sector.

It is true that, through the aforementioned vote, the High Labor Court granted the payment of annuities (anualidades), indicating that it applies to the entire public sector, but some time later, that same body has generated a change of criteria in this regard, and proof of this is the aforementioned Voto N° 1532-2021. Regarding the jurisprudential criteria of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), as to the subject matter of the dispute, the members of this Chamber deem it necessary to record what was explained by that jurisdictional body in Judgment No. 1101-2012 (Sentencia N° 1101-2012) at 9:55 a.m. on September 5, 2012, in which the following was broadly and illustratively outlined: “(…) As of the effective date of Law 6835 (Ley 6835), the jurisprudence that developed was to the effect that said regulation established the right of all persons holding the status of public servant (servidor público) to have their seniority (antigüedad) worked in any entity of the Public Sector recognized and to be paid annuities, regardless of whether the employment regime was subject to that of the Civil Service, thereby establishing the theory of the ‘single employer State’ (Estado patrono único), which was already being recognized at the judicial and administrative level.

In judgment number 300, of 9:10 a.m. on October 11, 1996, it was stated: “[…] the restriction imposed, by the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), on the application of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), and, by the same, solely to the servants covered by the statutory regime, decayed in its concrete effects, upon the entry into force of the cited Law No. 6835; since the latter, in its Article 1, by reforming Article 4 of Law No. 2166, of October 9, 1957, and its amendments, created a new Salary Scale, providing that the same 'shall govern for the entire Public Sector' and, furthermore, produced the addition of subsection d), to Article 12—to which reference is made in the appeal—, for all 'servants of the Public Sector'; with which it generalized both effects and its scope of application. This means, then, that by generalizing and standardizing the remuneration regime for the entire Public Sector, the concept of 'State'—which in most cases is restrictive—that had been used was set aside. Hence, since the current wording of the Public Administration Salary Law establishes no restriction or conditioning whatsoever for its application, by Law No. 6835 repealing any provision that opposed it, it must be understood that its scope of application was broadened.” In the same line of thought, it is found that in relation to several norms considered atypical for having been included in budget laws, through which the right to the recognition of annual increments (anualidades) was incorporated in various sectors, the Court held in a more than repeated manner that the right was born for all public servants as of the entry into force of the cited Law No. 6835 and said norms were nothing more than a reiteration of that right. Thus, for example, in vote number 325, of 10:10 a.m. on December 17, 1993, it was explained: “As to the second ground for disagreement raised, the state representation alleges that it is with Laws No. 6963, of July 30, and 6966, of September 25, both of the year 1984, that a special regulation was created to recognize annual increases for those servants whose employment relationship is of an occasional and special nature. Such argument is also not admissible, since the recognition of seniority in the Public Sector, for purposes of paying annual increases, for the time worked in its institutions, is a right of all public servants, whether or not they are covered by the Civil Service Statute.” This is legally based on numerals 4º and 12, subsection d), of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), as amended by Law No. 6835 of December 22, 1982. The indicated Article 4º established a new salary scale for the entire Public Sector; and, with numeral 12, subsection d), the right was created for all public servants, whether permanent or interim, to receive the increases referred to in Article 5º of said law, with their time of services rendered in other Public Sector entities being recognized. (See judgments numbers: 58, of 14:30 hours on April 30, 1986; 82, of 10:10 hours on July 5, 1989; and 181, of 10:10 hours on October 2, 1991). The cited atypical norms did not modify what said subsection d) had provided, and are rather reiterative, in recognizing a right for servants excluded from the Civil Service regime (régimen del Servicio Civil) who had been working for a year or more for the Presidency of the Republic, the Ministry of the Presidency, the Rural Assistance Guard, the Civil Guard, and the Directorate of Social Adaptation -according to the twelfth norm of Law No. 6963-; and, in addition to these, for the Ministry of Public Security and of Migration Control and Foreigners -according to the seventh norm of Law No. 6966-, a right that such servants already held. The promulgation of those budgetary norms does not prevent, from the effective date of the aforementioned addition, every public servant from having the right to recognition of time of services rendered in the Public Administration, for purposes of the annual increases indicated in Article 5º of the Public Administration Salary Law, whether or not covered by the Civil Service regime.

Such rules do not constitute authentic interpretations (interpretaciones auténticas) and, even less, any modification that affects the validity or effectiveness of Law 6835; they constitute a complement that declares a right as of a certain date, which was also unnecessary, since Law 6835 had already established it." Now, since rulings of old date, it was already discerned that the right was understood to be granted in favor of persons who held the status of public servants (servidores y servidoras públicas) properly speaking. The votes in which that circumstance was revealed were more than reiterated. For example, the chamber indicated: "Law Number 6835 of December 22, 1982, which added subsection d) to the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), recognizes the payment for the concept of annual increments (anualidades) to every public servant, for the time worked in the Public Sector" (1992-283). "In accordance with all of the foregoing, it is legally undeniable that, servants with an employment relationship (relación de servicio) with [...], form part of the so-called Public Sector; a concept even broader than that of the Public Administration, as embodied in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and in the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa)" (1997-58). "Said clause openly contradicts the provisions of Law 6835 of December 22, 1982, which adds subsection d), to Article 12 of the Public Administration Salary Law, since it denies workers the right to recognition of time served that had concluded with payment of legal benefits, for purposes of the increase for annual increments; a right that this law enshrines for every public servant without any distinction whatsoever." (1992-257). “From its reading, it is easily extracted that it is applicable to persons who have or acquire the status of public servant, whether permanent or interim; which establishes the right of those workers to have their time of service rendered in the Public Sector recognized for purposes of annual increases” (1993-53). “However, it should be recalled that the annual increases (anualidades) constitute a supplementary salary that has been recognized only to public servants, on the occasion of the application of the Public Administration Salary Law and its amendments…” (1995-18). Starting from vote 291, at 10:20 a.m. on March 17, 2000, the analysis of the nature of the relationship was addressed, for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff in that process was subject to Public Law or Labor Law and, hence, whether or not they were entitled to payment of the annual increases (anualidades) they claimed. In judgment 513, at 9:50 a.m. on August 29, 2001, it was expressly stated that the right to annual increases (anualidades) was provided for public servants, properly speaking. After that resolution, a series of lawsuits of the same nature were analyzed, in which that criterion was reiterated. Indeed, there have been many judgments in which it has been indicated that the right to annual increases is for public servants properly, so the employment regime was analyzed to determine its applicability. In that sense, among others, the following rulings can be consulted: From 2001: 674 and 716. From 2002: 194, 445, 565, 568 and 569. From 2003: 438. From 2004: 11. From 2005: 228, 284 and 675. From 2006: 20, 37, 218, 882 and 1059. From 2007: 534, 588, 806, 807 and 926. From 2008: 48, 64 and 630. From 2009: 1159. From 2011: 189. Now, based on that criterion, the chamber has denied the right to annual increases to persons working in the Public Sector who do not hold the status of public officials, properly speaking, insofar as their relationships are governed by private Labor Law, making it clear that it is not enough to work in a public agency to access the right, but rather one must be a public official (…)” (Emphasis supplied). In that ruling, as is glimpsed, reference is made to the change in jurisprudential criterion that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had on the issue of recognition of annual increases (anualidades) in favor of workers of non-state public institutions who do not meet the condition of public official.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that in compliance with the public-order regulations (of mandatory observance) of article 409 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), when it is alleged that an action actually responds to circumstances of discrimination as contemplated in subsection 404 of the same legal body, whoever alleges such discrimination must specifically indicate the factual basis on which their claim is founded and the terms of comparison that substantiate their assertion, which is deemed not to be fulfilled in this proceeding given that, effectively, the particular employment situation of the plaintiff is not exactly the same as that of the persons referred to both in the complaint and in the appeal action. For further substantiation of the criterion expressed above, it is appropriate to cite the binding jurisprudence of the High Constitutional Tribunal (canon 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which provides as follows: “(…) Provision established in Article 33 of our Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which implies giving equal treatment among equals and differentiated treatment among unequals. The Chamber has been consistent in stating that it is summed up in the right to be treated the same as everyone else in each and every legal relationship that is constituted. Likewise, it has been defined that equality is, at the same time, a constitutional obligation consisting of treating in the same manner those who find themselves in equal factual conditions, thus establishing itself as a limit on the exercise of public power. However, it has also been established that the principle of equality does not have an absolute character, since it does not, properly speaking, grant a right to be equated to any individual without distinction of circumstances, but rather, to demand that the law not make differences between two or more persons who find themselves in the same legal situation or in identical conditions. In that sense, equal treatment cannot be sought when the conditions or circumstances are unequal, or when the situation being denounced is illegal or irregular, since respect for equality does not imply an equalization of conditions contrary to the legal order. In accordance with these considerations, in order for the constitutional jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been a violation of the right to equality, a parameter of comparison must be established that allows for the elucidation of whether or not discriminatory treatment has existed (…).” (Emphasis supplied). (Voto Nº 2021003288 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at 09:30 on the 19th of February, 2021). Thus, the reproaches expressed by the appellant against the challenged judgment being unacceptable, the appeal must be rejected."

"SEXTO: ANÁLISIS del CASO en ESTUDIO.[...] Establecido lo anterior, para el caso que nos ocupa resulta indispensable tener en cuenta que la Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, Ley N° 4351 que entró en vigor en fecha 11 de julio del año 1969, en su artículo 2 dispone de manera expresa: “El Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal es una institución de Derecho Público no estatal, con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio, con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional. Su funcionamiento se regirá por las normas del Derecho Público. El Banco tendrá como objetivo fundamental dar protección económica y bienestar a los trabajadores, mediante el fomento del ahorro y la satisfacción de sus necesidades de crédito. Con este propósito procurará el desarrollo económico y social de los trabajadores, para lo cual podrá conceder créditos para necesidades urgentes, así como para la participación del trabajador en empresas generadoras de trabajo que tengan viabilidad económica. Asimismo, podrá financiar programas de desarrollo comunal”. (Reformado por el artículo 1° de la Ley N° 7031 de fecha 14 de abril del año 1986). (Énfasis suplido). De la anterior normativa se desprende también que, como institución pública está sometida a legislación de Derecho Público, como es la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica (N° 7558), y la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (N° 7428), tal y como lo confirma el numeral 46 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal al disponer que: “El Banco estará sometido a la supervisión de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, de acuerdo con lo establecido en la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central y en el Capítulo III del Título I de Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional. También el Banco estará sometido a la fiscalización de la Contraloría General de la República (…)”. (Así adicionado por el artículo 1° de la Ley N° 5776 del 18 de agosto del año 1975, y reformado por el artículo 167 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, N° 7558 del 3 de noviembre del año 1995). De lo anterior se extrae que, el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal es una entidad que por disposición expresa de ley, tiene la naturaleza jurídica correspondiente a un ente público no estatal. En ese sentido, vale mencionar que, para conocer respecto del reconocimiento de las anualidades a una persona trabajadora que ha laborado en diferentes entidades públicas, se debe distinguir cuál es la institución de origen, es decir en la que laboró la persona servidora y cuyo tiempo de servicio pretende que otra, la receptora, le reconozca para el pago del sobresueldo. En el caso concreto, este Tribunal comparte lo resuelto por la juzgadora de instancia, pues el reconocimiento de ese beneficio salarial no procede en esas entidades (entes públicos no estatales), como es el caso del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal. Lo anterior, por cuanto, según también lo ha explicado con claridad la jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, “(…) las relaciones de servicio de sus colaboradores no están regidas por el derecho público, sino por el laboral común (…)”. (Véase al respecto, entre otros, el Voto N° 1532-2021 de las 12:05 horas de fecha 07 de julio del año 2021). Por otra parte, quien recurre alega que, la Sala Segunda de la Corte mediante Voto N° 70-2008 de las 9:40 horas del 01 de febrero del año 2008, resolvió que la obligación del pago de las anualidades prevista en la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública aplica para todo el sector público. Es cierto que, mediante el voto supra citado, el Alto Tribunal Laboral, concedió el pago de las anualidades, indicando que aplica para todo el sector público, pero tiempo después, ese mismo órgano ha generado un cambio de criterio al respecto, y muestra de ello es el Voto N° 1532-2021 antes citado. Sobre el criterio jurisprudencial de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en cuanto al tema objeto de litis, quienes integran esta Cámara estiman necesario consignar lo explicado por ese órgano jurisdiccional en la Sentencia N° 1101-2012 de las 9:55 horas de fecha 05 de setiembre del año 2012, en el cual de manera amplia e ilustrativa se reseñó lo siguiente: “(…) A partir de la vigencia de la Ley 6835, la jurisprudencia que se desarrolló fue en el sentido de que esa normativa estableció el derecho de todas las personas que ostentaran la condición de servidor público a que se les reconociera la antigüedad laborada en cualquier entidad del Sector Público y se le pagaran las anualidades, con independencia de que el régimen de empleo estuviera sujeto al del Servicio Civil, instaurando de esa manera la teoría del “Estado patrono único”, que ya venía reconociéndose a nivel judicial y administrativo. En la sentencia número 300, de las 9:10 horas del 11 de octubre de 1996, se indicó: “[…] la restricción impuesta, por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil, a la aplicación de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, y, por esta misma, únicamente a los servidores cobijados por el régimen estatutario, decayó en sus efectos concretos, al entrar en vigencia la citada Ley Nº 6835; pues ésta, en su artículo 1º, al reformar el artículo 4º de la Ley Nº 2166, del 9 de octubre de 1957, y sus modificaciones, creó una nueva Escala de Salarios, disponiendo que la misma 'regirá para todo el Sector Público' y, además, produjo la adición del inciso d), al artículo 12 -al cual se hace referencia en el recurso-, para todos los 'servidores del Sector Público'; con lo que generalizó tanto efectos como su ámbito de aplicación. Quiere ello decir, entonces, que al generalizarse y al uniformarse el régimen retributivo, para todo el Sector Público, se dejó de lado el concepto, que se venía empleando, de 'Estado' -que en la mayoría de los casos es restrictivo-. De ahí que no estableciendo la redacción vigente de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, restricción ni condicionamiento algunos para su aplicación, al derogar la Nº 6835 cualquier disposición que se le opusiera, debe entenderse que el ámbito de su aplicación quedó ampliado”. En el mismo orden de ideas, se tiene que en relación con varias normas consideradas atípicas por haber sido incluidas en leyes de presupuesto, por las cuales se incorporaba el derecho al reconocimiento de anualidades en diversos sectores, la sala sostuvo en forma más que repetida que el derecho nació para todos los servidores públicos a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la Ley 6835 citada y dichas normas no eran otra cosa sino una reiteración de ese derecho. Así, por ejemplo, en el voto número 325, de las 10:10 horas del 17 de diciembre de 1993, se explicó: “En cuanto al segundo motivo de inconformidad planteado, alega la representación estatal, que es con las leyes Números 6963, de 30 de julio, y 6966, de 25 de setiembre, ambas del año 1984, que se crea una normativa especial para reconocer aumentos anuales a aquellos servidores, cuya relación de trabajo es de naturaleza ocasional y especial. Tal argumento tampoco es de recibo, por cuanto el reconocimiento de la antigüedad en el Sector Público, para efectos del pago de aumentos anuales, por el tiempo laborado en sus instituciones, es un derecho de todos los servidores públicos, estén aquellos o no, cubiertos por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Ello encuentra base jurídica en los numerales 4º y 12, inciso d), de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, reformados por la Ley Nº 6835, de 22 de diciembre de 1982. Con el artículo 4º indicado se estableció una nueva escala de salarios para todo el Sector Público; y, con el numeral 12, inciso d), nació el derecho de todos los servidores públicos, en propiedad o interinos, para percibir los aumentos a que se refiere el artículo 5º de dicha ley, reconociéndoseles el tiempo de servicios prestados en otras entidades del Sector Público. (Ver sentencias números: 58, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de abril de 1986; 82, de las 10:10 horas del 5 de julio de 1989, y 181, de las 10:10 horas del 2 de octubre de 1991). Las citadas normas atípicas, no modificaron lo que dicho inciso d) había dispuesto, y son más bien reiterativas, al reconocer un derecho a los servidores excluidos del régimen del Servicio Civil que tuvieran un año o más de laborar para la Presidencia de la República, el Ministerio de la Presidencia, la Guardia de Asistencia Rural, la Guardia Civil y la Dirección de Adaptación Social -según la norma decimosegunda de la Ley Nº 6963-; y, además de éstos, del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública y de Control de Migración y Extranjería -según la norma séptima de la Ley Nº 6966-, derecho que tales servidores ya ostentaban. La promulgación de esas normas presupuestarias, no obsta para que, desde la vigencia de la adición mencionada, todo servidor público tenga el derecho al reconocimiento del tiempo de servicios prestados en la Administración Pública, para efecto de los aumentos anuales indicados en el artículo 5º de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, estuviera o no cubierto por el régimen del Servicio Civil. Tales normas no constituyen interpretaciones auténticas y, menos aún, modificación alguna que afecte la validez o la eficacia de la Ley 6835; constituyen un complemento que declara un derecho a partir de determinada fecha, lo que tampoco era necesario, pues ya la Ley 6835, lo había establecido”. Ahora bien, ya desde sentencias de antigua data, se vislumbraba que el derecho se entendía otorgado a favor de las personas que ostentaran la condición de servidores y servidoras públicas propiamente tales. Los votos en los cuales se dejó ver esa circunstancia fueron más que reiterados. Por ejemplo, la sala señaló: “La Ley Número 6835 de 22 de diciembre de 1982, la cual adicionó un inciso d) a la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, reconoce, el pago por concepto de anualidades a todo servidor público, por el tiempo laborado en el Sector Público”. (1992-283). “De conformidad con todo lo expuesto, jurídicamente es innegable que, los servidores con relación de servicio de […], forman parte del denominado Sector Público; concepto aún más amplio que el de la Administración Pública, tal y como está plasmado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública y en la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa”. (1997-58). “Dicha cláusula riñe abiertamente con lo dispuesto en la Ley 6835 de 22 de diciembre de 1982, la cual agrega el inciso d), al artículo 12 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, toda vez que niega el derecho de los trabajadores al reconocimiento del tiempo servido que hubiere concluido con pago de prestaciones legales, para efectos del incremento por concepto de anualidades; derecho que consagra esta ley a todo servidor público sin distingo alguno”. (1992-257). “De su lectura, con facilidad se extrae que, la misma, es aplicable a las personas que tengan o adquieran el carácter de servidor público en propiedad o interinos; la cual establece el derecho de esos trabajadores a que se les reconozca, para efectos de los aumentos anuales, el tiempo de servicios prestados en el Sector Público”. (1993-53). “Sin embargo, recuérdese que las anualidades constituyen un sobresueldo que se le ha reconocido únicamente a los servidores públicos, con ocasión de la aplicación de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública y sus reformas…” (1995-18). A partir del voto 291, de las 10:20 horas del 17 de marzo de 2000 se abordó el análisis de la naturaleza de la relación, a los efectos de determinar si al actor en ese proceso le era aplicable el Derecho Público o el Derecho Laboral y, de ahí, si tenía o no derecho al pago de las anualidades que reclamaba. En la sentencia 513, de las 9:50 horas del 29 de agosto de 2001 se manifestó en forma expresa que el derecho a las anualidades estaba previsto para las y los servidores públicos, propiamente tales. Después de esa resolución se analizaron una serie de juicios de igual naturaleza, en los que se reiteró ese criterio. En efecto, han sido muchas las sentencias en las que se ha indicado que el derecho a los aumentos anuales es para los servidores públicos propiamente, por lo que se analizó el régimen de empleo para determinar su procedencia. En ese sentido, entre otros, pueden consultarse los siguientes fallos: Del 2001: 674 y 716. Del 2002: 194, 445, 565, 568 y 569. Del 2003: 438. Del 2004: 11. Del 2005: 228, 284 y 675. Del 2006: 20, 37, 218, 882 y 1059. Del 2007: 534, 588, 806, 807 y 926. Del 2008: 48, 64 y 630. Del 2009: 1159. Del 2011: 189. Ahora bien, partiendo de ese criterio, la sala ha negado el derecho a los aumentos anuales a personas que laboran en el Sector Público, que no ostentan la condición de funcionarios o funcionarias públicas propiamente tales, en el tanto en que sus relaciones se encuentran regidas por el Derecho Laboral privado, dejando claro que no basta laborar en una dependencia pública para acceder al derecho, sino que se requiere ser funcionario público (…)”. (Énfasis suplido). En ese fallo, como se vislumbra, se hace referencia al cambio de criterio jurisprudencial que tuvo la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia sobre el tema de reconocimiento de las anualidades a favor de personas trabajadoras de instituciones públicas no estatales que no reúnen la condición de persona funcionaria pública. [...] Sobre el particular, se ha de tener presente que en cumplimiento de la normativa de orden público (de obligado acatamiento) del artículo 409 del Código de Trabajo, cuando se alega que una actuación en realidad responde a circunstancias de discriminación de las contempladas en el ordinal 404 del mismo cuerpo legal, quien alegue esa discriminación deberá señalar específicamente el sustento fáctico en el que funda su alegato y los términos de comparación que substancie su afirmación, lo cual se estima no se cumple en este proceso dado que efectivamente, la situación laboral particular del actor no es exactamente igual a la de las personas a las que se hace referencia tanto en el líbelo de demanda como en la acción recursiva. Para una mayor fundamentación sobre el criterio antes expresado, conviene hacer cita de la jurisprudencia vinculante del Alto Tribunal Constitucional (canon 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), al disponer lo siguiente: “(…) Disposición establecida en el artículo 33 de nuestra Constitución Política y que implica dar un trato entre iguales y uno diferenciado entre desiguales. La Sala ha sido conteste en manifestar, que se resume en el derecho a ser tratado igual que los demás en todas y cada una de las relaciones jurídicas que se constituyan. Asimismo, se ha definido que la igualdad es, al mismo tiempo, una obligación constitucional que consiste en tratar de igual forma a los que se encuentren en iguales condiciones de hecho, erigiéndose como tal en un límite a la actuación del poder público. Sin embargo, también se ha establecido que el principio de igualdad no tiene un carácter absoluto, pues no concede, propiamente, un derecho a ser equiparado a cualquier individuo sin distinción de circunstancias, sino, más bien, a exigir que la ley no haga diferencias entre dos o más personas que se encuentran en una misma situación jurídica o en condiciones idénticas. En ese sentido, no puede pretenderse un trato igual cuando las condiciones o circunstancias son desiguales, o bien, cuando la situación que se denuncia es ilegal o irregular, pues el respeto a la igualdad no implica una equiparación de condiciones contrarias al ordenamiento. De conformidad con estas consideraciones, para que la jurisdicción constitucional determine si ha existido o no un quebranto al derecho a la igualdad, debe establecerse un parámetro de comparación que permita dilucidar si ha existido o no un trato discriminatorio (…)”. (Énfasis suplido). (Voto Nº 2021003288 de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las 09:30 horas del día 19 de febrero del año 2021). Así las cosas, al no resultar de recibo los reproches manifestados por el recurrente a la sentencia impugnada, se debe rechazar el recurso de alzada."