Res. 00177-2020 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago — Exclusion of evidence due to illegality of telephone tracking

OutcomeResultado

Partially grantedParcialmente con lugar

The court partially granted the prosecutor's appeal, excluded the telephone tracking evidence as tainted, and partially annulled the acquittal, ordering a new trial only on the charge of aggravated homicide.El tribunal declaró parcialmente con lugar el recurso del Ministerio Público, excluyó la prueba de rastreos telefónicos por ser espuria, y anuló parcialmente la sentencia absolutoria, ordenando un nuevo juicio únicamente por el delito de homicidio calificado.

SummaryResumen

The Court of Appeals of Criminal Sentences of Cartago, in resolution 00177-2020, partially granted the prosecutor's appeal against an acquittal for aggravated homicide. The court held that the telephone tracking data contained in an OIJ report constituted tainted evidence, obtained without a court order or the consent of the person under investigation, violating Article 24 of the Political Constitution and the General Telecommunications Law, which requires judicial authorization or consent to access traffic data. It departed from previous case law that treated telephone tracking as distinct from wiretapping and not requiring a court order, adopting the more recent criterion of the Constitutional Chamber (ruling 2016-12831). It also partially annulled the acquittal due to an error in evaluating the post-mortem interval, confusing the forensic approximation with the actual time of death, and ordered a new trial solely on the charge of aggravated homicide.El Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, en resolución 00177-2020, resolvió parcialmente con lugar el recurso del Ministerio Público contra una sentencia absolutoria por homicidio calificado. El tribunal determinó que la información proveniente de "rastreos telefónicos" contenida en un informe del OIJ constituía prueba espuria, al haberse obtenido sin orden judicial ni consentimiento de la persona investigada, vulnerando el artículo 24 de la Constitución Política y la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, que exige autorización judicial o consentimiento para acceder a datos de tráfico. Se apartó de la línea jurisprudencial anterior que consideraba los rastreos telefónicos como una figura distinta a la intervención de comunicaciones y que no requerían orden judicial, acogiendo el criterio más reciente de la Sala Constitucional (voto 2016-12831). Asimismo, anuló parcialmente la sentencia absolutoria por un error en la valoración del intervalo post mortem, al confundir la aproximación médico forense con la hora real de la muerte, ordenando un juicio de reenvío solo por el delito de homicidio calificado.

Key excerptExtracto clave

Taking into account the above, it is the majority opinion that the information related to 'telephone tracking' contained in report number 850-DRC-CI-2016 produced by the Judicial Investigation Organization of Cartago is tainted evidence that must be excluded from the analysis of this case, and that the activity carried out by the Judicial Police to obtain private data of the defendant and other investigated persons constitutes a clear absolute procedural defect, which is hereby declared and its exclusion from this proceeding is ordered. Accordingly, the argument raised by the appellant regarding the incorrect weighing of the information derived from said evidence becomes irrelevant, since it was evidence illegitimately incorporated into the process, which in any case could not be taken into consideration by the court to render the challenged judgment. [...] Regarding the issue of the time of death of the victim or post mortem interval, the appellant is correct in arguing that the court made a serious error in the reasoning of the judgment when it held that said period is '…outside the margins alleged by the Public Prosecutor's Office,' given that the autopsy DA-2016-01081-PF establishes that: '…his time of death was sixty (60) to seventy-two (72) hours before the examination…,' which was performed on April 28, 2016 at 8:00 a.m., meaning that for medico-legal purposes the time of death of the victim was placed between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. on April 25, 2016. However, what the judgment overlooked is that the post mortem interval is simply an approximation of the moment when a person's death occurred, highlighting in the doctrine that: 'Sometimes it is a matter of establishing the hour or the day; at other times, only an estimate in weeks, months, years or even centuries can be made. The calculation will be more approximate the earlier it is carried out. For the remembered New York master [Name7]: The estimation of the post mortem interval is notoriously one of the most difficult and imprecise techniques in forensic pathology—none of the tests are certain—and all possible evidence must be correlated to try to arrive at some sensible chronological criterion within which the death may have occurred.'Tomando en consideración lo anteriormente mencionado, es criterio de mayoría, que la información relacionada con los “rastreos telefónicos” que constan en el informe número 850-DRC-CI-2016 realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial de Cartago es prueba espuria que debe ser excluida del análisis del presente asunto y que la actividad desplegada por la Policía Judicial para imponerse de datos de carácter privado de la imputada [Nombre6] y otras personas investigadas, constituye una clara actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto, razón por la que así se declara y procede su exclusión de este proceso. De acuerdo con lo anterior, se aprecia que el alegato planteado por el recurrente en relación con la incorrecta ponderación de la información derivada de dicho elemento probatorio resulta intrascendente, toda vez que se trató de una prueba ilegítimamente incorporada al proceso, que de todas formas no podía ser tomada en consideración por parte del tribunal para dictar la sentencia impugnada. [...] En relación con el tema del periodo de muerte del ofendido o intervalo post mortem, lleva razón el recurrente al sostener que el tribunal comete un grave error en la fundamentación del fallo cuando sostiene que dicho periodo se encuentra “…fuera de los márgenes acusados por el Ministerio Público”, toda vez que la autopsia DA-2016-01081-PF establece que: “…su tiempo de fallecimiento es de sesenta (60) a setenta y dos (72) horas antes del examen…”, mismo que se practicó el 28 de abril de 2016 a las 08:00 horas, lo que equivale a decir que la hora de muerte de la víctima se situó para efectos médico legales entre las 08:00 horas y las 20:00 horas del 25 de abril de 2016. Sin embargo, lo que dejó de lado la sentencia es que el intervalo post mortem consiste simplemente en una aproximación al momento en que se produjo la muerte de una persona, destacándose en la doctrina que: “En ocasiones se trata de establecer la hora o el día; en otras, sólo se puede hacer una estimación en semanas, meses, años o aun siglos. El cálculo será tanto más aproximado cuanto más temprano se lleve a cabo. Para el recordado maestro neoyorkino [Nombre7] : La estimación del intervalo post mortem es notoriamente una de las técnicas más difíciles e imprecisas en patología forense -ninguna de las pruebas es segura-, y toda la evidencia posible debe correlacionarse para tratar de arribar a algún criterio cronológico sensato dentro del cual pudo haber acontecido la muerte”.

Pull quotesCitas destacadas

"Los operadores y proveedores deberán garantizar que las comunicaciones y los datos de tráfico asociados a ellas, no serán escuchadas, gravadas, almacenadas, intervenidas ni vigiladas por terceros sin su consentimiento, salvo cuando se cuente con la autorización judicial correspondiente, de conformidad con la ley."

"Operators and providers must guarantee that communications and the traffic data associated with them will not be heard, recorded, stored, intercepted, or monitored by third parties without their consent, except when the corresponding judicial authorization is obtained, in accordance with the law."

Cita del artículo 42, párrafo tercero, de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones

"Los operadores y proveedores deberán garantizar que las comunicaciones y los datos de tráfico asociados a ellas, no serán escuchadas, gravadas, almacenadas, intervenidas ni vigiladas por terceros sin su consentimiento, salvo cuando se cuente con la autorización judicial correspondiente, de conformidad con la ley."

Cita del artículo 42, párrafo tercero, de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones

"el consentimiento o la orden jurisdiccional son los únicos factores que permitirían la utilización de los llamados “rastreos telefónicos"

"consent or a court order are the only factors that would allow the use of so-called 'telephone tracking'"

Considerando II

"el consentimiento o la orden jurisdiccional son los únicos factores que permitirían la utilización de los llamados “rastreos telefónicos"

Considerando II

"la información relacionada con los “rastreos telefónicos” que constan en el informe número 850-DRC-CI-2016 realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial de Cartago es prueba espuria que debe ser excluida del análisis del presente asunto y que la actividad desplegada por la Policía Judicial para imponerse de datos de carácter privado de la imputada […] y otras personas investigadas, constituye una clara actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto."

"the information related to 'telephone tracking' contained in report number 850-DRC-CI-2016 produced by the Judicial Investigation Organization of Cartago is tainted evidence that must be excluded from the analysis of this case, and that the activity carried out by the Judicial Police to obtain private data of the defendant […] and other investigated persons constitutes a clear absolute procedural defect."

Considerando II

"la información relacionada con los “rastreos telefónicos” que constan en el informe número 850-DRC-CI-2016 realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial de Cartago es prueba espuria que debe ser excluida del análisis del presente asunto y que la actividad desplegada por la Policía Judicial para imponerse de datos de carácter privado de la imputada […] y otras personas investigadas, constituye una clara actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto."

Considerando II

Full documentDocumento completo

II. [...] The appeal is partially granted for the following reasons: The first point the appellant raises concerns the allegedly incorrect analysis of report number 850-DRC-CI-2016 prepared by the Judicial Investigation Organization of Cartago. However, what the appellant fails to note is that a significant amount of information generated by that report was obtained spuriously, as it was not received in accordance with the provisions of Costa Rican legislation, specifically articles 175, 201 of the Código Procesal Penal, 1, 2 of the Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones number 7425 of August 9, 1994, and article 42 of the Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, number 8642 of June 4, 2008, which is why it could not be taken into consideration to support a conviction against the defendant. Admittedly, the appealed judgment omits any type of analysis regarding the legality of this evidentiary element, despite its essential nature, perhaps following the jurisprudential line that has been followed by the Sala Tercera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, among others, in votes [Telf1] of 9:30 a.m. on October 14, 2005, and 2011-259 of 9:02 a.m. on March 11, 2011, regarding the legality of phone traces (rastreos telefónicos). This jurisprudential line was consolidated by the position adopted by the Sala Constitucional in response to the judicial consultation on constitutionality made by the Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José regarding the circular of the Fiscalía General de la República number 02-2006, which authorized the Judicial Police and prosecutorial representatives to conduct the seizure (secuestro) and examination of so-called “phone traces (rastreos telefónicos).” This judicial consultation was resolved in vote number [Telf2] of 4:02 p.m. on February 22, 2012, which stated: “The issue raised in this consultation has already been the subject of several pronouncements by this Chamber. Thus, in judgments 2007-17097, 2007-17550, and 2007-17935, it was resolved: ‘…it is worth clarifying to the appellant that this Chamber has repeatedly held that phone tracing (rastreo de llamadas) and phone tapping (intervención telefónica) are different concepts, and while the latter is protected by Article 24 of the Constitución Política and can only be authorized by a competent judge in the cases exhaustively provided for by the respective law, the former is not subject to such restrictions and does not violate the content of said constitutional article, meaning it may well be ordered by the Ministerio Público. [...] It should be added that, in accordance with Article 8, subsection c) of the Ley de Protección de la Persona frente al Tratamiento de sus Datos Personales, Law number 8968 of July 7, 2011, the right to informational self-determination is limited in cases of prevention, prosecution, investigation, detention, and repression of criminal offenses. Based on the foregoing and as there is no reason to justify a reconsideration of the expressed criterion, the consultation is answered in the sense that directive number 02-2006 of January 27, 2006, issued by the Fiscalía General de la República, as well as the practice of ordering the seizure, registration, and examination (secuestro, registro y examen) of the list of incoming and outgoing phone calls for a telephone number, without a judicial order, does not violate Article 24 of the Constitution. Judges [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] dissent and declare that the consulted directive is contrary to Article 24 of the Constitution.’” However, in the opinion of those signing this resolution, that position of the Sala Constitucional was modified by the new composition of said High Court, and there are new legal reasons to consider that the reasoning previously employed by the Sala Constitucional and the Sala Tercera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia can no longer be sustained. Regarding the first of these points, it should be noted that in the Sala Constitucional vote, number 2016-12831 of 10:15 a.m. on September 9, 2016, when resolving the amparo appeal (recurso de amparo) filed against a disciplinary procedure followed against two public employees, the constitutional judges considered it important for resolving the matter to revisit what was stated in vote number 2007-3890 of 3:51 p.m. on March 20, 2007, in which that Chamber had addressed the issue of so-called “phone traces (rastreos telefónicos),” stating the following: “III.- On phone call tracing (rastreo de llamadas telefónicas) within a disciplinary procedure.

The Chamber deems it appropriate to refer in this case to the provisions of amparo judgment number 2007-3890 of fifteen hours and fifty-one minutes of March twenty, two thousand seven, in which the issue of call tracing within disciplinary proceedings is analyzed due to a violation of the right to privacy. On that occasion, the Chamber annulled the dismissal act because it was based on evidence obtained without the authorization of the competent judge. It held on that occasion: […] VII.- The argument of the President of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, to the effect that the use of the "trace" of outgoing calls from the telephone in question is not illegitimate because the content of the calls was not used, but rather the record only includes the telephone numbers to which the calls were directed, the date, time, and duration thereof, which in accordance with judgment 7239-98 of this chamber does not violate the fundamental rights of the amparo petitioner, is not acceptable. The indicated precedent is not applicable, because in that case the Chamber concluded that the use of the call records did not violate the amparo petitioner's right to privacy, because the tracing of calls made and received from his cell phone was ordered for the purpose of verifying whether his defense argument, to the effect that he had spoken with an alleged informant, and that, for that reason, he had had to take the official vehicle, was true or not. That is, upon the investigated party offering said argument, the respondent party found it necessary to corroborate it, from which it follows that the former consented to the analysis of the call records of his telephone in order to verify his statement. Consent is the relevant element in that case, since it is the holder of the right who allows that area of privacy to be analyzed. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the appeal must be granted, given the verified infringement of numeral 24 of the Political Constitution, and therefore the resolution that sanctioned the amparo petitioner must be annulled. […] IV.- On the merits. From the report rendered by the representatives of the respondent authority – which is considered given under oath, with timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in numeral 44 of the Law governing this jurisdiction – and other evidentiary elements on file, it is deemed accredited that by Resolution of the General Management of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (ICAA), of nine hours and thirty minutes of June twenty-third, two thousand sixteen, the opening of Disciplinary Proceeding File No. 2016-146 was ordered and decreed against the employee [[Nombre3]  ], for: "(...) alleged use of institutional resources for personal activities, specifically making long-duration calls during work time and neglecting user service duties thereby allegedly failing to fulfill her functions (...)" […] Thus, this Tribunal considers that the appellants are correct in the sense that the use of the recording of the referenced conversations, in the disciplinary cause pursued against the appellant [[Nombre3]  ], violates their fundamental rights. In the first place, because the Political Constitution, in its numeral 24, establishes that the intervention of any type of communication is only legitimate by judicial order, when it is absolutely indispensable to clarify criminal matters submitted to its knowledge. None of these conditions are met in the present case, since the amparo petitioner is subject to a disciplinary cause, not an investigation related to a crime, and consequently the intervention was never ordered by a judicial authority. It must be borne in mind that Article 24 of the Political Constitution provides for the intervention of any type of communication, for the investigation of crimes, an investigation that is carried out both in the police investigation stage, in order to identify the alleged perpetrators and initiate criminal proceedings against them, and during the judicial investigation stage of the matter, a stage in which the required action of the judge is as a guarantee of compliance with the restrictions that the Constitution establishes in protection of the privacy of the inhabitants of The Nation (see judgment No. 3195-95 of 15:12 hours of June 20, 1995). In this line of reasoning, it is clear to the Chamber that, as it is a disciplinary cause, the use of the recordings of the calls held between the amparo petitioners violates numeral 24 of the Constitution. The argument of the respondent officials, to the effect that they acknowledge that a compact disc (CD) provided by the Head of the UEN of Commercial User Service GAM is on file in docket No. 2016-146, but they claim they are unaware of its content, and that the referenced compact disc will not be used as evidence within said disciplinary proceeding, is not acceptable. This is because the Chamber deems it accredited that the recordings of the telephone communications between the appellants were made without a judge's order, as indicated previously, and having been provided andbeing present in the file, it constitutes spurious, invalid, and absolutely null and void evidence, obtained through an invasion of the private and intimate sphere of the appellants, and therefore it cannot be incorporated into the disciplinary file; and consequently, it must be eliminated. The case of the records of said calls is different, a copy of which is provided by the appellants themselves, containing the time, date, and duration of each call, as well as the extension number, because having been made between internal extensions of the respondent institution – not private lines for personal use – they are institutional assets, over which the Administration may dispose as it did, and incorporate the referenced data as evidence into the file, since the right to privacy and the secrecy of communications is not at stake” (Sic). (The highlighting is supplied). In other words, contrario sensu , the Constitutional Chamber interprets that the records of private calls could not be used as evidence in a disciplinary proceeding – and much less in a criminal one – if they have not been collected through a judicial order, because they compromise the right to privacy of individuals and the secrecy of communications. Said conclusion can be drawn from the reasoning presented by the Constitutional Chamber and the precedent used as its basis, in which the Judicial Inspection had already been told that it was not true that the use of "call tracing" of private individuals did not violate the privacy of persons, but rather that in the specific case being analyzed, the holder of the right had consented to its use. The foregoing reasoning of the Constitutional Chamber leads us to the second point, for which this Chamber considers that the jurisprudential position that has prevailed in this regard can no longer be used, and it consists of the enactment of legislation subsequent to the criterion used by the Constitutional Chamber and the Third Chamber, which reiterates the most recent position of the Constitutional Chamber, in the sense that consent or a judicial order are the only factors that would allow the use of so-called "telephone tracing ", a concept that technically corresponds to the designation "traffic data" made by the General Telecommunications Law number 8642 of June 4, 2008, in its Articles 42 and 43. Doctrinally, it has been understood that:  “ Traffic data, or metadata, in a communication are the data surrounding the message being transmitted, but which are not part of said message. They are a byproduct of the connections, which will materialize depending on the type of communication. Thus, in a telephone call, it involves the calling telephone number, the name and address of the originating subscriber, the destination number and the name and address of the destination subscriber, the date and time of the start and end of the communication, the telephone service used, and other specific data from mobile telephony (the international mobile subscriber identity [IMSI] of the caller and the recipient of the call; the international mobile equipment identity [IMEI], also of the caller and the recipient of the call; if the service is prepaid: the date and time of the first activation of the service and the location label or cell identifier from which the service was activated). In contrast, in internet access and  in electronic mail, metadata will be, both for the origin and the destination of the communication, the assigned user identification, the name and address of the subscriber or user to whom an internet protocol (IP) address has been assigned; the date and time of connection and disconnection of the internet access service; the internet service used; or the digital subscriber line (DSL) [...] As can be seen, these accessory data to the communication detail who, when, where, and with whom it occurs without entering into its content. In general, we are dealing with subscriber and user data that are necessarily processed by communication providers to carry out the communication itself, but which are susceptible to being used in very different ways, while at the same time they can violate fundamental rights.” (Fernández [Nombre4], [Nombre5]. (2016). Communication traffic data: in search of an adequate legal regime that eliminates the risk of permanent control. Spanish Journal of Constitutional Law(108), 93-122. doi:http//dx.doi.org./10.18042/cepc/redc.108.03, pp. 96-97). As observed, this involves accessory data to a telecommunication containing a series of information that should not be known by third parties, since through it it is possible to establish the identity of the communicating persons, the duration in minutes of the communication, the frequency and location from which the communications are made or sent, among other data of private interest that serve so that the companies providing telecommunication services can bill their clients (as indicated by Article 43 of the General Telecommunications Law). It is for this reason that the Costa Rican legislator, in the third paragraph of Article 42 of the General Telecommunications Law, has provided that: “Operators and providers must guarantee that communications and the traffic data associated with them, shall not be listened to, recorded, stored, intercepted, or monitored by third parties without their consent, except when the corresponding judicial authorization is obtained, in accordance with the law ”. According to the foregoing, it is clear that the thesis upheld by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling 2016-12831 is in harmony with the provisions established by the legislator after the opening of telecommunications carried out with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America (CAFTA) and with the criterion the Chamber had been holding, as it also refers to the two parameters established so that it is appropriate to use information derived from traffic data in an investigative process: the consent of the holder of the right or the existence of a judicial order in accordance with the provisions of the law. That law is none other than the " Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones privadas", number 7425 of August 9, 1994, which in its Article 2 clearly establishes that the order to search any type of private documentation constitutes an exclusive power of the judge, not of the Public Prosecutor's Office, much less of the Police. In this sense, it cannot be forgotten that this criterion of the Constitutional Chamber is not novel, but rather responds to the position originally held by said jurisdictional body in the decade of the nineties, as already indicated through ruling 4454-95 of 11:12 hours of August 11, 1995: “(…) the consequences of the so-called 'tracing', in matters of telephone interventions, where the content of the call is not recorded, which is an exchange, an oral communication taking place at that moment via telephone between two persons speaking simultaneously, but rather only the number dialed, the duration, and the moment the communication occurs are recorded. These aspects that can technically be derived from the telephone intervention materialize in a written report and, consequently, in a document, which contains, as noted, information of a private nature, at risk of violating the privacy of the affected persons, so that, in criminal matters, and as long as this element is intended to be used within the process, the procedure established by the cited Registration Law must be followed, regarding private documents, specifically what is indicated in Articles 2, 3, 4”. Taking into consideration the aforementioned, it is the majority criterion that the information related to the "telephone tracing" contained in report number 850-DRC-CI-2016 carried out by the Judicial Investigation Organization of Cartago is spurious evidence that must be excluded from the analysis of this matter and that the activity deployed by the Judicial Police to become aware of data of a private nature belonging to the accused [Nombre6]  and other investigated persons constitutes a clear defective procedural act of an absolute nature, which is the reason why it is so declared and its exclusion from this process is ordered. In accordance with the foregoing, it is observed that the claim raised by the appellant regarding the incorrect weighting of the information derived from said evidentiary element is inconsequential, since it was evidence illegitimately incorporated into the process, which in any case could not have been taken into consideration by the court to issue the contested judgment. [...] Regarding the issue of the time of death of the victim or post mortem interval, the appellant is correct in asserting that the court makes a serious error in the reasoning of the judgment when it states that said period is "…outside the margins alleged by the Public Prosecutor's Office ”, given that autopsy DA-2016-01081-PF establishes that: "…its time of death is sixty (60) to seventy-two (72) hours before the examination…", which was performed on April 28, 2016, at 08:00 a.m., which is equivalent to saying that the time of death of the victim, for medicolegal purposes, was between 08:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. on April 25, 2016. However, what the judgment overlooked is that the post mortem interval simply consists of an approximation of the moment in which a person's death occurred, with doctrine highlighting that: “Sometimes it is a matter of establishing the hour or the day; at other times, only an estimate can be made in weeks, months, years, or even centuries. The calculation will be all the more approximate the earlier it is carried out. For the renowned New York master [Nombre7]: The estimation of the post mortem interval is notoriously one of the most difficult and imprecise techniques in forensic pathology - none of the tests are certain - and all possible evidence must be correlated to try to arrive at some sensible chronological criterion within which death could have occurred”. (Vargas [Nombre8] , . (2000). Medicina legal, 2nd. Edition. México: Trillas, pp. 125-126). According to the foregoing, it is erroneous to consider the time of death established in the autopsy as the real or exact time in which the victim's homicide occurred, as this data consists of an approximation made by the forensic pathologist in accordance with the rest of the evidentiary elements available at that time to determine the moment of death. It cannot be forgotten that at that time, although the Judicial Police already had suspicions regarding the participation of the accused [Nombre6]  in the events, formally she was listed as a victim; to the point that she had filed a complaint before the Judicial Investigation Organization and had reported that the last time she had seen the deceased alive had been on Monday, April 25, 2016, at around 08:00 a.m., when some Colombians came looking for him at the house (see folios s430-431 of the virtual file), which evidently constituted an aspect to be taken into account to determine the possible time of death. However, subsequently a series of investigative steps were carried out by the judicial police that allowed the version initially maintained by the accused in this process to be disproven, the Public Prosecutor's Office presented its accusatory hypothesis in which it maintains that the deceased was actually killed between 01:14 a.m. and 02:44:52 a.m. on Monday, April 25, 2016, and that the person responsible for that death was the defendant, without it being apparent that with this specific attribution there is possible defenselessness for her, which is why a defect in the judgment is evidenced that warrants declaring it ineffective. Said ineffectiveness must be declared partially, given that the prosecutorial representation did not file any appeal against the decision to acquit the accused of the crime of simulation of a crime that was being attributed to her, but rather expressly stated that it was appealing the decision to acquit the accused only for the crime of aggravated homicide. In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to partially grant the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, order the partial ineffectiveness of the contested judgment, and order a retrial for new substantiation before a different panel of the same court, solely for the attribution made against the accused for the crime of aggravated homicide." II. [...] The appeal is partially granted for the reasons set forth below: The first point raised by the appellant concerns the allegedly incorrect analysis of report number 850-DRC-CI-2016 prepared by the Judicial Investigation Agency of Cartago. However, what the appellant overlooks is that a significant amount of information generated by said report was obtained in a spurious manner, as it was not received in accordance with Costa Rican legislation, specifically as provided in Articles 175 and 201 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código Procesal Penal), Articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 7425 on the Registration, Seizure and Examination of Private Documents and Interception of Communications of August 9, 1994, and Article 42 of the General Telecommunications Law (Ley General de Telecomunicaciones) No. 8642 of June 4, 2008, and therefore could not be taken into consideration to support a conviction against the defendant. Certainly, the appealed judgment omits any type of analysis regarding the legality of said evidentiary element, despite its essentiality, perhaps following the jurisprudential line that has been followed by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, among others, in votes [Telf1] of 9:30 a.m. on October 14, 2005, and 2011-259 of 9:02 a.m. on March 11, 2011, regarding the legality of phone tracking (rastreos telefónicos). Said jurisprudential line was consolidated with the position adopted by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in response to the judicial consultation of constitutionality made by the Criminal Sentencing Appeals Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José regarding Circular No. 02-2006 of the Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalía General de la República), which authorized the Judicial Police and prosecutorial representatives to carry out the seizure and examination of so-called "phone tracking." Said judicial consultation was resolved in vote number [Telf2] of 4:02 p.m. on February 22, 2012, in which it was stated: "The issue raised in this consultation has already been the subject of several pronouncements by this Chamber. Thus, in judgments 2007-17097, 2007-17550, and 2007-17935, it was resolved: '…it is necessary to clarify to the appellant that this Chamber has repeatedly held that phone tracking (rastreo de llamadas) and phone interception (intervención telefónica) are different figures, and while the latter is protected by Article 24 of the Political Constitution and can only be authorized by a competent judge in the cases exhaustively provided for by the respective law, the former is not subject to such restrictions and does not violate the content of said constitutional article, and therefore may well be ordered by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público). [...] It should be added that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8(c) of the Law on the Protection of Individuals Regarding the Processing of Their Personal Data (Ley de Protección de la Persona frente al Tratamiento de sus Datos Personales), Law No. 8968 of July seven, two thousand and eleven, the right to informational self-determination is limited in cases of prevention, prosecution, investigation, detention, and repression of criminal offenses. Based on the foregoing and as there are no reasons justifying a reconsideration of the stated criterion, the consultation formulated is resolved in the sense that Directive No. 02-2006 of January twenty-seventh, two thousand and six, issued by the Office of the Attorney General, as well as the practice of ordering the seizure, registration, and examination of the list of incoming and outgoing phone calls from a telephone number, without a jurisdictional order, does not violate Article 24 of the Constitution. Judges [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] dissent and declare that the consulted directive is contrary to Article 24 of the Constitution.'" However, in the opinion of those undersigning this resolution, that position of the Constitutional Chamber was modified by the new composition of said High Court, and there are new legal reasons to consider that the reasoning previously employed by the Constitutional Chamber and the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice cannot be sustained at present. Regarding the first of the points indicated, it should be noted that in vote No. 2016-12831 of the Constitutional Chamber, at 10:15 a.m. on September 9, 2016, when resolving the amparo action filed against a disciplinary proceeding against two public officials, the constitutional judges considered it important, for resolving the matter, to revisit what was stated in vote No. 2007-3890 of 3:51 p.m. on March 20, 2007, in which that Chamber had addressed the issue of so-called "phone tracking," stating the following: "III.- Of phone tracking (rastreo de llamadas telefónicas) within the disciplinary proceeding. The Chamber deems it appropriate to refer in this case to the provisions of amparo judgment No. 2007-3890 of three fifty-one p.m. on March twentieth, two thousand and seven, in which the issue of communications tracking within the disciplinary proceeding is analyzed, for violation of the right to privacy. On that occasion, the Chamber annulled the dismissal act because it was based on evidence obtained without having the authorization of the competent judge. It ordered on that occasion: [...] VII.- The argument of the President of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection is not admissible, in the sense that the use of the "tracking" of outgoing calls from the telephone in question is not illegitimate, because the content thereof was not used, but rather the registry only includes the telephone numbers to which the calls were directed, the date, time, and duration thereof, which, in accordance with judgment 7239-98 of this Chamber, does not harm the fundamental rights of the petitioner. The precedent cited is not applicable, because in that case, the Chamber concluded that the use of call logs did not harm the petitioner's right to privacy, because the tracking of calls sent and received from their cell phone was ordered for the purpose of verifying whether their defense argument—that they had spoken with an alleged informant and, for that reason, had to take the official vehicle—was true or not. That is to say, by offering said argument, the investigated party made it necessary for the respondent party to corroborate it, resulting in the former consenting to the analysis of the call logs from their telephone to verify their statement. Consent is the relevant element in that case, as it is the holder of the right who allows that sphere of privacy to be analyzed. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber finds that the appeal must be granted, as the violation of Article 24 of the Political Constitution is verified, and therefore the resolution that sanctioned the petitioner must be annulled. [...] IV.- On the merits. From the report rendered by the representatives of the respondent authority—which is given under oath, with timely warning of the consequences, including criminal ones, provided for in Article 44 of the Law governing this jurisdiction—and other evidentiary elements in the record, it is proven that by a Resolution of the General Management of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, ICAA), at nine thirty a.m. on June twenty-third, two thousand and sixteen, the opening of Disciplinary Proceeding File No. 2016-146 was ordered and decreed against the employee [[Nombre3] ], for: '(...) alleged use of institutional resources for personal activities, specifically making long-duration calls during working hours and neglecting user service duties, thereby allegedly failing to perform her duties (...)' [...] Thus, this Court finds that the appellants are correct in that the use of the recording of the referred conversations, in the disciplinary cause against the appellant [[Nombre3] ], harms their fundamental rights. Firstly, because the Political Constitution, in its Article 24, establishes that only by jurisdictional order is the interception of any type of communication legitimate, when it is absolutely indispensable to clarify criminal matters submitted for its cognizance. None of these conditions are met in the present case, as a disciplinary cause is pending against the petitioner, not an investigation related to a crime, and consequently the interception was never ordered by a jurisdictional authority. It must be kept in mind that Article 24 of the Political Constitution provides for the interception of any type of communication for the investigation of crimes, an investigation that is carried out both during the police investigation stage, in order to identify the alleged perpetrators and bring criminal proceedings against them, and during the judicial investigation stage of the matter, a stage in which the judge's required action serves as a guarantee of compliance with the restrictions that the Constitution establishes to protect the privacy of the inhabitants of the Nation (see judgment No. 3195-95 of 3:12 p.m. on June 20, 1995). In that vein, it is clear to the Chamber that, as it is a disciplinary cause, the use of the recordings of the calls held between the petitioners violates Article 24 of the Constitution. The argument of the respondent officials is not admissible, in that they acknowledge that file No. 2016-146 contains a compact disc (CD) that was provided by the Head of the UEN of Commercial User Service GAM, but they claim to be unaware of its content, and that said compact disc will not be used as evidence within that disciplinary proceeding. This is because the Chamber holds it as proven that the recordings of the telephone communications between the appellants were made without a judge's order, as previously indicated, and having been provided and found in the file, it constitutes spurious evidence (prueba espuria), invalid and vitiated by absolute nullity absolute nullity, obtained by invading the private and intimate sphere of the appellants, and therefore it cannot be incorporated into the disciplinary file; consequently, it must be eliminated. The case is different for the records of said calls, a copy of which the appellants themselves provide, containing the time, date, and duration of each call, as well as the extension number, because as they were made between internal extensions of the respondent institution—not private lines for personal use—they are institutional assets, over which the Administration can dispose as it did, and incorporate the referred data as evidence in the file, since the right to privacy and the secrecy of communications is not at stake" (Sic). (The highlighting is supplied). In other words, a contrario sensu, the Constitutional Chamber interprets that the records of private calls could not be used as evidence in a disciplinary proceeding—and much less in a criminal one—if they have not been collected through a jurisdictional order, because they compromise the right to privacy of individuals and the secrecy of communications. This conclusion can be drawn from the argumentation presented by the Constitutional Chamber and the precedent they use as its basis, in which the Judicial Inspection had already been told that it was not true that the use of "phone tracking" of private individuals did not harm their privacy, but rather that in the specific case being analyzed, the holder of the right had consented to its use. The foregoing argumentation of the Constitutional Chamber leads us to the second point, for which this Chamber considers that the prevailing jurisprudential position on this matter can no longer be used, and this consists of the enactment of legislation subsequent to the criterion used by the Constitutional Chamber and the Third Chamber, which reiterates the more recent position of the Constitutional Chamber, in the sense that consent or the jurisdictional order are the only factors that would allow the use of so-called "phone tracking", a concept that technically corresponds to the designation "traffic data" (datos de tráfico) used by the General Telecommunications Law No. 8642 of June 4, 2008, in its Articles 42 and 43. Doctrinally, it has been understood that: "Traffic data, or metadata, in a communication are the data that surround the message being transmitted, but which are not part of said message. They are a by-product of the connections, which will take shape depending on the type of communication. Thus, in a telephone call, it consists of the calling telephone number, the name and address of the originating subscriber, the destination number and the name and address of the destination subscriber, the date and time of the start and end of the communication, the telephone service used, and other specific mobile telephony data (the international mobile subscriber identity [IMSI] of both the caller and the call receiver; the international mobile equipment identity [IMEI], also of both the caller and the call receiver; if the service is prepaid: date and time of the first activation of the service and the location label or cell identifier from which the service was activated).

In contrast, in internet access and email, metadata will include, for both the origin and destination of the communication, the assigned user identification, the name and address of the subscriber or user to whom an internet protocol (IP) address has been assigned; the date and time of connection and disconnection of the internet access service; the internet service used; or the digital subscriber line (DSL) [...] As can be seen, these accessory data to the communication detail who, when, where, and with whom it occurs without entering into its content. In general, we are dealing with subscriber and user data that are necessarily processed by communications providers to carry out the communication itself, but which are susceptible to being used in very different ways, while also being capable of violating fundamental rights." (Fernández [Name4], [Name5]. (2016). *Los datos de tráfico de comunicaciones: en búsqueda de un adecuado régimen jurídico que elimine el riesgo de control permanente*. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional(108), 93-122. doi:http//dx.doi.org./10.18042/cepc/redc.108.03, pp. 96-97). As observed, these are accessory data to a telecommunication that contain a series of information that should not be known by third parties, since through it it is possible to establish the identity of the communicating persons, the number of minutes of the communication, the frequency and place from which the communications are made or sent, among other data of private interest that serve so that the companies providing telecommunication services can bill their clients (as indicated by Article 43 of the Ley General de Telecomunicaciones). It is for this reason that the Costa Rican legislator, in the third paragraph of Article 42 of the Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, has provided that: *"Operators and providers must guarantee that communications **and the traffic data associated with them**, **will not be** listened to, recorded, stored, **intercepted, or monitored by third parties** **without their consent**, **except when there is a corresponding judicial authorization, in accordance with the law**".* According to the foregoing, it is clear that the thesis upheld by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling 2016-12831 is in harmony with the provisions established by the legislator after the opening of telecommunications carried out with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America (CAFTA) and with the criterion that the Chamber had been maintaining, since it also refers to the two parameters established for it to be appropriate to use the information derived from traffic data in an investigative process: the consent of the right holder or a judicial order in accordance with the provisions of the law. That law is none other than the "*Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones privadas*", number 7425 of August 9, 1994, which in its Article 2 clearly establishes that the order to register any type of private documentation constitutes an exclusive power of the judge, not of the Public Ministry, much less of the Police. In that sense, it cannot be forgotten that this criterion of the Constitutional Chamber is not novel, but responds to the position originally maintained by said jurisdictional body in the 1990s, since already through ruling 4454-95 of 11:12 hours on August 11, 1995, it was indicated: "(…) *the consequences of the so-called 'tracing', in matters of telephone interceptions, where the content of the call is not recorded, which is indeed an exchange, an oral communication that is taking place at that moment via telephone, between two people speaking simultaneously, but rather only the number called, the duration, and the moment in which the communication occurs are recorded. These aspects that can technically be derived from the telephone interception are materialized in a written report and, consequently, in a document, which contains, as noted, information of a private nature, at risk of harming the privacy of the affected persons, therefore, in criminal matters, and as long as one wishes to use that element within the process, the procedure established by the aforementioned Registration Law must be followed, with regard to private documents, specifically what Articles 2, 3, 4 indicate*". Taking into consideration the aforementioned, it is the majority's criterion that the information related to the "telephone tracings" contained in report number 850-DRC-CI-2016 prepared by the Judicial Investigation Organization of Cartago is spurious evidence that must be excluded from the analysis of this matter and that the activity carried out by the Judicial Police to obtain private data of the accused [Name6] and other investigated persons constitutes a clear, absolutely defective procedural activity, which is why it is declared as such and its exclusion from this process is ordered. In accordance with the above, it is appreciated that the argument raised by the appellant regarding the incorrect weighing of the information derived from said evidentiary element is inconsequential, since it was evidence illegitimately incorporated into the process, which in any case could not be taken into consideration by the court to issue the challenged sentence. [...] In relation to the issue of the period of death of the victim or *post mortem* interval, the appellant is correct in maintaining that the court makes a serious error in the reasoning of the ruling when it holds that said period is *“…outside the margins stated by the Public Ministry*”, since autopsy DA-2016-01081-PF establishes that: *“…his time of death is sixty (60) to seventy-two (72) hours before the examination…*”, which was performed on April 28, 2016, at 08:00 hours, which is equivalent to saying that the victim's time of death was situated for forensic medical purposes between 08:00 hours and 20:00 hours on April 25, 2016. However, what the sentence set aside is that the *post mortem* interval simply consists of an approximation of the moment in which a person's death occurred, highlighting in the doctrine that: *“Sometimes it is a matter of establishing the hour or the day; at other times, only an estimate in weeks, months, years, or even centuries can be made. The calculation will be more accurate the earlier it is carried out. For the remembered New York teacher [Name7]: The estimation of the post mortem interval is notoriously one of the most difficult and imprecise techniques in forensic pathology -none of the tests are certain-, and all possible evidence must be correlated to try to arrive at some sensible chronological criterion within which death could have occurred.”* (Vargas [Name8], . (2000). *Medicina legal*, 2nd. Edition. Mexico: Trillas, pp. 125-126). According to the foregoing, it is erroneous to consider the time of death established in the autopsy as the real or exact time in which the victim's homicide occurred, since that data consists of an approximation made by the forensic pathologist in accordance with the rest of the evidentiary elements available at that time to determine the moment of death. It cannot be forgotten that at that time, although the Judicial Police already had suspicions about the participation of the accused [Name6] in the events, formally she appeared as a victim; to the point that she had filed a complaint before the Judicial Investigation Organization and had reported that the last time she had seen the victim alive had been on Monday, April 25, 2016, at around 08:00 hours when some Colombians came to the house looking for him (see folio s430-431 of the virtual file), which evidently was an aspect to be taken into account to determine the possible time of death. However, subsequently a series of investigative steps were carried out by the judicial police that allowed the version initially held by the accused in this process to be disproven, the Public Ministry presented its accusatory hypothesis in which it maintains that the victim was actually killed between 01:14 hours and 02:44:52 hours on Monday, April 25, 2016, and that the person responsible for that death was the defendant, without it being apparent that this specific attribution creates a possible defenselessness for her, which is why a defect in the sentence is evidenced that merits declaring its ineffectiveness. Said ineffectiveness must be carried out partially, by virtue of the fact that the prosecutorial representation did not file any appeal against the decision to acquit the accused for the crime of feigning an offense that was being attributed to her, but rather expressly indicated that it was appealing the decision to acquit the accused only for the crime of qualified homicide. In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to partially grant the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Ministry, to order the partial ineffectiveness of the challenged sentence, and to order the holding of a retrial for new proceedings before a different panel of the same court, solely for the attribution made against the accused for the crime of qualified homicide."

"II. [...] El recurso se declara parcialmente con lugar por las razones que seguidamente se exponen: El primer punto que el recurrente reclama tiene que ver con el supuesto análisis incorrecto del informe número 850-DRC-CI-2016 realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial de Cartago. Sin embargo, lo que echa de menos el impugnante es que una importante cantidad de información generada por dicho informe fue obtenida de forma espuria, al no recibirse de conformidad con lo dispuesto por la legislación costarricense, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por los artículos 175, 201 del Código Procesal Penal, 1, 2 de la Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones número 7425 del 09 de agosto de 1994 y el artículo 42 de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, número 8642 del 04 de junio de 2008, razón por la que no podía ser tomada en consideración para sustentar una sentencia condenatoria en contra de la justiciable. Ciertamente en la sentencia recurrida se omite cualquier tipo de análisis sobre la legalidad de dicho elemento probatorio, a pesar de su esencialidad, quizás atendiendo a la línea jurisprudencial que ha venido siguiendo la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia entre otros, en los votos [Telf1] de las 9:30 horas del 14/10/2005 y 2011-259 de las 9:02 horas del 11 de marzo de 2011, en relación con la legalidad de los rastreos telefónicos. Dicha línea jurisprudencial se consolidó con la posición que adoptó la Sala Constitucional ante la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad que realizó el Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José respecto de la circular de la Fiscalía General de la República número 02-2006 en la que se autorizaba a la Policía Judicial y a los representantes fiscales para realizar el secuestro y examen de los llamados “rastreos telefónicos”. Dicha consulta judicial se resolvió en el voto número [Telf2] de las 16:02 horas del 22 de febrero de 2012, en el que se indicó: “El tema planteado en esta consulta ya ha sido objeto de varios pronunciamientos por parte de esta Sala. Así, en sentencias 2007-17097, 2007-17550 y 2007-17935, se resolvió: “…cabe aclarar al recurrente que esta Sala ha sostenido reiteradamente que el rastreo de llamadas y la intervención telefónica son figuras diferentes, y en tanto la última está protegida por el artículo 24 de la Constitución Política y sólo puede ser autorizada por juez competente en los casos que taxativamente prevé la ley respectiva, la primera no está sometida a dichas restricciones y no viola el contenido del citado artículo constitucional, por lo que bien puede ser ordenada por el Ministerio Público. [...] Debe agregarse que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 8 inciso c) de la Ley de Protección de la Persona frente al Tratamiento de sus Datos Personales, Ley número 8968 del siete de julio del dos mil once, el derecho a la autodeterminación informativa se encuentra limitado en los casos de prevención, persecución, investigación, detención y represión de las infracciones penales. Con base en lo anteriormente expuesto y por no existir razones que justifiquen una reconsideración del criterio vertido, se evacua la consulta formulada en el sentido de que la directriz número 02-2006 del veintisiete de enero del dos mil seis, emitida por la Fiscalía General de la República , así como la práctica de ordenar el secuestro, registro y examen del listado de llamadas telefónicas entrantes y salientes de un número telefónico, sin orden jurisdiccional, no vulnera el artículo 24 constitucional. Los Magistrados [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] salvan el voto y declaran que la directriz consultada es contraria al artículo 24 constitucional”. Sin embargo, en criterio de quienes suscriben esta resolución, esa posición de la Sala Constitucional fue modificada por la nueva integración de dicho Alto Tribunal y existen nuevas razones legales para considerar que el razonamiento empleado anteriormente por la Sala Constitucional y por la Sala Tercera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia no pueden sostenerse en la actualidad. En relación con el primero de los puntos señalados, cabe indicar que en el voto de la Sala Constitucional, número 2016-12831 de las 10:15 horas del 9 de setiembre de 2016, al resolver el recurso de amparo que fue planteado contra un procedimiento disciplinario seguido contra dos funcionarias públicas, los magistrados constitucionales consideraron importante para resolver el asunto retomar lo indicado en el voto número 2007- 3890 de las 15:51horas del 20/03/2007 en el que esa Sala había abordado el tema de los llamados “rastreos telefónicos”, señalando lo siguiente: “III.- Del rastreo de llamadas telefo´nicas dentro del procedimiento disciplinario. La Sala estima oportuno referirse en este caso a lo dispuesto en sentencia de amparo nu´mero 2007- 3890 de las quince horas y cincuenta y un minutos del veinte de marzo de dos mil siete, en que se analiza el tema del rastreo de comunicaciones dentro del procedimiento disciplinario, por violacio´n al derecho a la intimidad. En esa ocasio´n, la Sala anulo´ el acto de despido por cuanto e´ste se fundamento´ en la prueba obtenida sin contar con la autorizacio´n del juez competente. Dispuso en esa ocasio´n: […] VII.- No es de recibo el argumento del Presidente del Tribunal de la Inspeccio´n Judicial, en el sentido de que no resulta ilegi´tima la utilizacio´n del “rastreo” de llamadas salientes del tele´fono en cuestio´n, porque el contenido de las mismas no fue utilizado, sino que el registro contempla u´nicamente los nu´meros telefo´nicos a los que se dirigieron las llamadas, fecha hora y duracio´n de las mismas, lo cual de conformidad con la sentencia de esta sala 7239-98 no lesiona los derechos fundamentales de la amparada. El precedente sen~alado no resulta aplicable, pues en ese caso concluyo´ la Sala que la utilizacio´n de los registros de llamadas no lesionaba el derecho a la intimidad del amparado, porque se ordeno´ el rastreo de las llamadas enviadas y recibidas desde su tele´fono celular con el objeto de verificar su argumento de defensa, en el sentido de que habi´a conversado con un supuesto informante, y que en razo´n de ello, habi´a tenido que tomar el vehi´culo de uso oficial, era cierta o no. Es decir, al ofrecer dicho argumento el investigado, la parte recurrida se vio en la necesidad de corroborarlo, de lo que resulta que e´ste consintio´ en que se analizaran los registros de llamadas de su tele´fono a fin de verificar su dicho. El consentimiento es el elemento relevante en ese caso, pues es el titular del derecho, el que permite que ese a´mbito de intimidad sea analizado. En atencio´n a lo expuesto, estima la Sala que el recurso debe estimarse, por constatarse la infraccio´n al numeral 24 de la Constitucio´n Poli´tica, por lo que la resolucio´n que sanciono´ a la amparada debe ser anulada. […] IV.- Sobre el fondo. Del informe rendido por los representantes de la autoridad recurrida –que se tiene dado bajo fe de juramento, con oportuno apercibimiento de las consecuencias, incluso penales, previstas en el numeral 44, de la Ley que rige esta jurisdiccio´n- , y dema´s elementos probatorios que obran en autos, se tiene por acreditado que mediante Resolucio´n de la Gerencia General del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (ICAA), de las nueve horas con treinta minutos del veintitre´s de junio del dos mil diecise´is, se ordeno´ y dicto´ la apertura del Procedimiento Disciplinario Expediente N°2016-146, contra la servidora [[Nombre3] ], por: "(...) supuesta utilizacio´n de recursos institucionales para actividades personales, especi´ficamente la realizacio´n de llamadas de larga duracio´n en tiempo laboral y desatendiendo las labores de atencio´n de los usuarios con lo que supuestamente incumple sus funciones (...)" […] De este modo, estima este Tribunal, que llevan razo´n las recurrentes en el sentido de que la utilizacio´n de la grabacio´n de las conversaciones referidas, en la causa disciplinaria seguida en contra de la recurrente [[Nombre3] ], lesiona sus derechos fundamentales. En primer te´rmino, porque la Constitucio´n Poli´tica, en su numeral 24, establece que so´lo por orden jurisdiccional resulta legi´tima la intervencio´n de cualquier tipo de comunicacio´n, cuando sea absolutamente indispensable para esclarecer asuntos penales sometidos a su conocimiento. Ninguna de esas condiciones se cumple en el presente caso, pues a la amparada se le sigue una causa disciplinaria, no una investigacio´n relacionada con un delito, y por consiguiente la intervencio´n nunca fue ordenada por una autoridad jurisdiccional. Debe tenerse presente, que el arti´culo 24, de la Constitucio´n Poli´tica, preve´ la intervencio´n de cualquier tipo de comunicacio´n, para la investigacio´n de delitos, investigacio´n que se realiza tanto en la etapa de investigacio´n policial, a fin de identificar a los presuntos responsables e incoar en su contra un proceso penal, como durante la etapa de la instruccio´n judicial del asunto, etapa en la que la actuacio´n exigida del juez lo es como garanti´a de cumplimiento de las restricciones que la Constitucio´n establece en proteccio´n de la intimidad de los habitantes de La Nacio´n (ver sentencia N°3195-95 de las 15:12 horas del 20 de junio de 1995). En ese orden de ideas, resulta claro para la Sala, que al tratarse de una causa disciplinaria, la utilizacio´n de las grabaciones de las llamadas sostenidas entre las amparadas, lesiona el numeral 24, Constitucional. No es de recibo el argumento de los funcionarios recurridos, en el sentido de que reconocen que en el expediente N°2016-146 consta un disco compacto (CD) que fue aportado por la Jefatura de la UEN de Servicio al Usuario Comercial GAM, pero aseguran que desconocen su contenido, y que el referido disco compacto no sera´ usado como prueba dentro de dicho procedimiento disciplinario. Ello por cuanto la Sala tiene por acreditado que las grabaciones de las comunicaciones telefo´nicas entre las recurrentes se efectuaron sin orden de un juez, como se indico´ anteriormente, y al haber sido aportado y encontrarse en el expediente, constituye prueba espuria, inva´lida y viciada de nulid ad absoluta, obtenida con invasio´n al fuero privado e i´ntimo de las recurrentes, por lo que no puede estar incorporada al expediente disciplinario; y en consecuencia, debe ser eliminada. Distinto es el caso de los registros de dichas llamadas, cuya copia aportan las propias recurrentes, que contienen hora, fecha y duracio´n de cada llamada, asi´ como el nu´mero de extensio´n, porque al haberse efectuado entre extensiones internas de la institucio´n recurrida –no li´neas privadas de uso personal-, se trata de activos institucionales, sobre los cuales la Administracio´n puede disponer como lo hizo, e incorporar los datos referidos como prueba al expediente, ya que no esta´ de por medio y derecho a la intimidad y el secreto a las comunicaciones” (Sic). El resaltado es suplido). En otras palabras, a contrario sensu , la Sala Constitucional interpreta que los registros de llamadas privadas no podrían ser utilizadas como prueba en un proceso disciplinario -y mucho menos en uno penal- si no han sido recabados mediante una orden jurisdiccional, porque comprometen el derecho a la intimidad de las personas y el secreto de las comunicaciones. Dicha conclusión puede realizarse a partir de la argumentación expuesta por la Sala Constitucional y el precedente que utilizan como base de ella, en el que ya se le había señalado a la Inspección Judicial que no era cierto que la utilización del “rastreo de llamadas” de particulares no lesionara la intimidad de las personas, sino que en el caso concreto que se analizaba, el propio titular del derecho había consentido su utilización. La anterior argumentación de la Sala Constitucional nos lleva al segundo punto, por el que esta Cámara considera que la posición jurisprudencial que ha imperado al respecto no puede seguir siendo utilizada, y consiste en la promulgación de legislación posterior al criterio utilizado por la Sala Constitucional y la Sala Tercera, que reitera la posición más reciente de la Sala Constitucional, en el sentido de que el consentimiento o la orden jurisdiccional son los únicos factores que permitirían la utilización de los llamados “rastreos telefónicos ”, concepto que técnicamente responde a la denominación de “datos de tráfico” que hace la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones número 8642 del 04 de junio de 2008, en sus artículos 42 y 43. Doctrinariamente se ha entendido que: “ Los datos de tráfico, o metadatos, en una comunicación son los datos que rodean el mensaje que se transmite, pero que no forman parte de dicho mensaje. Son un subproducto de las conexiones, que se concretará en función del tipo de comunicación. Así, en una llamada telefónica, se trata del número de teléfono de llamada, el nombre y la dirección del abonado de origen, el número de destino y el nombre y dirección del abonado de destino, la fecha y hora del comienzo y fin de la comunicación, el servicio telefónico utilizado, y otros datos específicos de la telefonía móvil (la identidad internacional del abonado [lMSI] que llama y del que recibe la llamada; la identidad internacional del equipo móvil [IMEI], también del que llama y del que recibe la llamada; si el servicio es de pago por adelantado: fecha y hora de la primera activación del servicio y la etiqueta de localización o identificador de celda desde la que se haya activado el servicio). En cambio, en el acceso a internet y en el correo electrónico serán metadatos, tanto para el origen como para el destino de la comunicación, la identificación de usuario asignada, el nombre y la dirección del abonado o usuario al que se le ha atribuido una dirección de protocolo de internet (IP); la fecha y hora de conexión y desconexión del servicio de acceso a internet; el servicio de internet utilizado; o la línea digital de abonado (DSL) [...] Como se ve, estos datos accesorios a la comunicación detallan quién, cuándo, dónde y con quién se produce esta sin entrar en su contenido. En general estamos ante unos datos de abonados y usuarios que son necesariamente tratados por los proveedores de comunicaciones para efectuar la propia comunicación, pero que son susceptibles de ser usados de formas muy diferentes, a la vez que pueden agredir los derechos fundamentales.” (Fernández [Nombre4], [Nombre5]. (2016). Los datos de tráfico de comunicaciones: en búsqueda de un adecuado régimen jurídico que elimine el riesgo de control permanente. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional(108), 93-122. doi:http//dx.doi.org./10.18042/cepc/redc.108.03, págs. 96-97). Como se observa, se trata de datos accesorios a una telecomunicación que contienen una serie de información que no debería ser conocida por terceros, pues por medio de la misma es posible establecer la identidad de las personas que se comunica, la cantidad de minutos de la comunicación, la frecuencia y lugar desde el que se realizan o se envían las comunicaciones, entre otros datos de interés privado que sirven para que las empresas que brindan los servicios de telecomunicación puedan facturar a sus clientes (tal como es señalado por el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones). Es por ello que el legislador costarricense, en el párrafo tercero del artículo 42 de la Ley General de Telecomunicaciones ha dispuesto que: “Los operadores y proveedores deberán garantizar que las comunicaciones y los datos de tráfico asociados a ellas, no serán escuchadas, gravadas, almacenadas, intervenidas ni vigiladas por terceros sin su consentimiento, salvo cuando se cuente con la autorización judicial correspondiente, de conformidad con la ley ”. De acuerdo con lo anterior, es claro que la tesis sostenida por la Sala Constitucional en el voto 2016-12831 se encuentra en armonía con las disposiciones establecidas por el legislador con posterioridad a la apertura de las telecomunicaciones llevada a cabo con la suscripción del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de América (CAFTA) y al criterio que había venido teniendo la Sala, pues también hace referencia a los dos parámetros establecidos para que resulte procedente utilizar en un proceso investigativo la información derivada de los datos de tráfico: el consentimiento del titular del derecho o que medie una orden judicial de conformidad con lo que dispone la ley. Esa ley no es otra que la “ Ley sobre registro, secuestro y examen de documentos privados e intervención de las comunicaciones privadas”, número 7425 del 09 de agosto de 1994, que en su artículo 2º establece con claridad que la orden para registrar cualquier tipo de documentación privada, constituye una potestad exclusiva del juez, no del Ministerio Público, ni mucho menos de la Policía. En ese sentido, no puede olvidarse que este criterio de la Sala Constitucional no es novedoso, sino que responde a la posición que originalmente mantenía dicho órgano jurisdiccional en la década de los años noventa, pues ya mediante el voto 4454-95 de las 11:12 horas del 11 de agosto de 1995, se indicó: “(…) las consecuencias del llamado rastreo», en materia de intervenciones telefónicas, en donde no se registra el contenido de la llamada, que sí es un intercambio, una comunicación oral que se está dando en ese momento vía telefónica, entre dos personas que hablan simultáneamente, sino que se registra únicamente el número al que se dirigió, la duración y el momento en que la comunicación se produce. Estos aspectos que técnicamente se pueden desprender de la intervención telefónica, se materializan en un reporte escrito y, en consecuencia, en un documento, que contiene, como se señaló, información de carácter privado, en riesgo de lesionar la intimidad de las personas afectadas, por lo que, en materia penal, y mientras se quiera utilizar ese elemento dentro del proceso, ha de seguirse el procedimiento que establece la Ley de Registro citada, en lo referente a los documentos privados, específicamente lo que señalan los artículos 2, 3, 4”. Tomando en consideración lo anteriormente mencionado, es criterio de mayoría, que la información relacionada con los “rastreos telefónicos” que constan en el informe número 850-DRC-CI-2016 realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial de Cartago es prueba espuria que debe ser excluida del análisis del presente asunto y que la actividad desplegada por la Policía Judicial para imponerse de datos de carácter privado de la imputada [Nombre6] y otras personas investigadas, constituye una clara actividad procesal defectuosa de carácter absoluto, razón por la que así se declara y procede su exclusión de este proceso. De acuerdo con lo anterior, se aprecia que el alegato planteado por el recurrente en relación con la incorrecta ponderación de la información derivada de dicho elemento probatorio resulta intrascendente, toda vez que se trató de una prueba ilegítimamente incorporada al proceso, que de todas formas no podía ser tomada en consideración por parte del tribunal para dictar la sentencia impugnada. [...] En relación con el tema del periodo de muerte del ofendido o intervalo post mortem, lleva razón el recurrente al sostener que el tribunal comete un grave error en la fundamentación del fallo cuando sostiene que dicho periodo se encuentra “…fuera de los márgenes acusados por el Ministerio Público ”, toda vez que la autopsia DA-2016-01081-PF establece que: “…su tiempo de fallecimiento es de sesenta (60) a setenta y dos (72) horas antes del examen…”, mismo que se practicó el 28 de abril de 2016 a las 08:00 horas, lo que equivale a decir que la hora de muerte de la víctima se situó para efectos médico legales entre las 08:00 horas y las 20:00 horas del 25 de abril de 2016. Sin embargo, lo que dejó de lado la sentencia es que el intervalo post mortem consiste simplemente en una aproximación al momento en que se produjo la muerte de una persona, destacándose en la doctrina que: “En ocasiones se trata de establecer la hora o el día; en otras, sólo se puede hacer una estimación en semanas, meses, años o aun siglos. El cálculo será tanto más aproximado cuanto más temprano se lleve a cabo. Para el recordado maestro neoyorkino [Nombre7] : La estimación del intervalo post mortem es notoriamente una de las técnicas más difíciles e imprecisas en patología forense -ninguna de las pruebas es segura-, y toda la evidencia posible debe correlacionarse para tratar de arribar a algún criterio cronológico sensato dentro del cual pudo haber acontecido la muerte”. (Vargas [Nombre8] , . (2000). Medicina legal, 2ª. Edición. México: Trillas, págs. 125-126). De acuerdo con lo anterior, resulta errado considerar la hora de muerte establecida en la autopsia como la hora real o exacta en la que se produjo el homicidio de la víctima, pues ese dato consiste en una aproximación realizada por el médico forense de acuerdo con el resto de elementos probatorios que se tenían hasta ese momento para determinar el momento del deceso. No puede olvidarse que en ese entonces, aunque la Policía Judicial ya tenía sospechas sobre la participación de la imputada [Nombre6] en los hechos, formalmente esta figuraba como víctima; al punto que había presentado una denuncia ante el Organismo de Investigación Judicial y había informado que la última vez que había observado con vida al ofendido había sido el día lunes 25 de abril de 2016 a eso de las 08:00 horas cuando llegaron unos colombianos a buscarlo a la casa (ver folio s430-431 del expediente virtual), lo que evidentemente consistió un aspecto a tomar en cuenta para determinar la posible hora de la muerte. No obstante, con posterioridad se llevaron a cabo una serie de diligencias de investigación por parte de la policía judicial que permitieron desvirtuar la versión que inicialmente sostuvo la imputada en este proceso, el Ministerio Público planteó su hipótesis acusatoria en la que sostiene que al ofendido realmente se le dio muerte entre las 01:14 horas y las 02:44:52 horas del día lunes 25 de abril de 2016 y que la responsable de esa muerte fue la encartada, sin que con dicha atribución concreta se vislumbre que exista una posible indefensión para ella, razón por la que se evidencia un vicio en la sentencia que amerita que se declare su ineficacia. Dicha ineficacia debe realizarse de manera parcial, en virtud de que la representación fiscal no presentó recurso alguno contra la decisión de absolver a la imputada por el delito de simulación de delito que se le venía atribuyendo, sino que expresamente indicó que recurría en apelación contra la decisión de absolver a la imputada únicamente por el delito de homicidio calificado. De conformidad con lo expuesto, procede declarar parcialmente con lugar el recurso de apelación incoado por el representante del Ministerio Público, disponer la ineficacia parcial de la sentencia impugnada y ordenar la realización de un juicio de reenvío para nueva sustanciación ante otra integración del mismo tribunal, únicamente por la atribución realizada a la imputada por el delito de homicidio calificado."

Exclusion of evidence due to illegality of telephone trackingExclusión de prueba por ilegalidad en rastreos telefónicos

Stay Informed Mantente Informado

Email Updates Actualizaciones por Correo

WhatsApp Channel Canal de WhatsApp