Obligation of a fuel purchase and distribution company to pay municipal business license taxObligación de compañía de compra y distribución de combustible de pagar impuesto municipal de patentes

**III.- Object of the proceedings.** The plaintiff company formulates, in essence, a claim aimed at having the absolute nullity declared of various formal actions by the defendant Municipality and the non-hierarchical controller in that matter, through which its Sworn Declaration (Declaración Jurada) for Business License Tax (Impuesto de Patentes, IP) No. 0370, corresponding to the fiscal period from October 1, 2010, to September 30, 2011, was rejected and it was informed that the determination of that tax had to be calculated and paid according to the amount declared before the Dirección General de Tributación, corresponding to the gross sales or income and the net taxable income (renta líquida gravable) for the corresponding fiscal period. Fundamentally, it alleges the following defects: 1) That the special business activity it provides (purchase and distribution of fuel) does not require a municipal license for its operation and requiring it is unreasonable and excessive. 2) The abusive application of the tax rule and improper application of the taxable base (base imponible) of the Business License Tax. It is also sought that the defendant local entity be ordered to return the sums paid for principal, interest paid, and penalties, plus interest up to the day of deposit, as well as an indexation of the sums, on the proportion of the adjustments that are requested to be annulled. The latter is an accessory request that depends on the acceptance of the claimed nullity. For what is considered a better order, the legality examination of the formal actions being challenged and the remaining claims will be addressed in attention to the thematic axes that the plaintiff raises in its grievances and the arguments of the defendant, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, with the corresponding analysis, of course, of everything argued.

**IV.- On the Business License Tax in the canton of Santo Domingo.** Due to the topic under debate, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to indicate that, as a derivation of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, Article 88 of the Municipal Code provides that, to engage in any for-profit activity in the cantons, the interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid during the entire time the for-profit activity is carried out or for the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out. From this norm, it is feasible to distinguish between the license, which corresponds to the administrative act that enables the individual to engage in a specific for-profit activity, and the payment of the corresponding tax for it, which corresponds, precisely, to the Business License Tax. In the case at hand, Ley 7119 of January 13, 1989, is the one that regulates what is related to this tax in the canton of Santo Domingo. Regarding the subjective element and according to the first article of the referred law, the taxpayers are all natural or legal persons who engage in any type of for-profit activity in that canton or obtain the license for such purposes. In relation to the objective element, we have that according to numerals 1, 14, and 15 of the same Law, the taxable event occurs with the exercise of any type of for-profit activity in the canton of Santo Domingo or the obtaining of the license for such purposes. However, it must be clarified that, regarding its spatial aspect, ordinal 13 ibidem taxes the for-profit activity that is distributed in one or more cantons, outside of Santo Domingo, for which the proportion of the business volume generated in that canton must be determined for tax payment purposes. In its quantitative aspects, Article 3 of the referred Law establishes the taxable base of the tax when it indicates that “(…) Except for the cases in which this law determines a different procedure to set the amount of the business license tax, the determining factors of the imposition are established as the net taxable income and the gross sales or income received by the natural or legal persons subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year in which the imposition is made. Sales means the volume of these, after deducting the tax established by the Sales Tax Law. In the case of financial establishments and real estate purchase and sale establishments, what is received for commissions and interest is considered as gross sales or income. (…)”. (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). The Business License Tax rate is regulated, in general, in Article 4 which establishes that “(…) The net taxable income and the annual gross sales or income will determine the amount of the business license tax that each taxpayer must pay. One per thousand will be applied on gross sales or income, plus five per thousand on the net taxable income. Said sum divided by four will determine the quarterly tax to pay. In cases where taxpayers do not obtain net taxable income, being income tax declarants, or when, because they are not, they cannot calculate said income, the factor corresponding to gross sales or income will be applied. (…)”. Then, in numeral 15, a special rate is established for certain activities, namely, “(…) a. Banks and financial establishments, except state banks (banking houses, exchange houses, finance companies and similar, and insurance institutions). They will pay for each quarter on the gross interest or commission income, or both, received in the previous year: ¢ 4.00 per ¢ 1,000.00 Minimum ¢ 1,000.00 quarterly. b. Real estate merchant. They will pay for each quarter on commissions received in the previous year: ¢ 3.00 per each ¢ 1,000.00 Minimum ¢ 1,000.00 c. Entertainment halls where skill or random games, or both, permitted by law are operated. They will pay for each quarter on the gross income of the previous year. ¢ 3,000 per each ¢ 1,000.00 ch. Momentary lodging establishments. They will pay for each quarter on the gross income of the previous year. ¢ 5,000 per each ¢ 1,000.00 (…)”. The indicated norm warns that when different activities from those indicated therein are jointly carried out in the same establishment, the amount of the imposition will be determined according to what is established in Article 12, according to which the amount of the imposition will be determined by the total sum of the tax that corresponds to each one individually. On the other hand, ordinal 16 indicates that to tax any newly established for-profit activity that cannot be subject to the tax procedure of Article 4 referred to, the Municipality may make an estimate based on the procedures authorized by the Code of Tax Provisions and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter CNPT), for oversight purposes; an imposition that will be provisional in nature and must be modified based on the first declaration that the licensee must make, in which case any excess difference must be credited to them, or charged to them otherwise. In addition, it must be understood that there are no deductions to the taxable base because Ley 7114 does not provide for them and because, rather, it indicates that the tax calculation base will be on the gross (not net) sales or income received (not accrued). Regarding the temporal element, we have that Article 5 establishes that the Business License Tax must be declared each year, no later than November 30, before the Municipality of Santo Domingo; with the exception of special cases in which companies have authorization from the Dirección General de Tributación to file the declaration after the date established by law, which may file the Business License Tax declaration with the Municipality up to thirty days after the authorized date. For such purposes, a sworn declaration must be provided indicating the amount of gross sales or income and the net taxable income, for which the Municipality will send the respective forms to the taxpayers. According to Article 10, if the licensee does not file the declaration within the indicated terms, the Municipality will apply the ex officio assessment to them. If they file it later, at most six months after the date indicated in Article 5, the corresponding tax will be assessed. If the taxable amount is lower than the ex officio determination, the Municipality must credit the overpaid sums to the licensee's account. Otherwise, it will proceed in accordance with the previous article. Finally, taxpayers who do not file the declaration within the term will be sanctioned with a fine equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the business license tax corresponding to the previous year. Now then, the cited Ley 7119 does not establish the date on which the tax must be paid, reason for which that norm must be integrated with the general rule established in Article 40 of the CNPT. In accordance with Article 6, licensees who are Income Tax declarants must present a copy of that declaration to the Municipality. While numeral 7 indicates that licensees who are not Income Tax declarants must accompany their Business License Tax declaration with a photocopy of the last payroll payment receipt to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or a certificate from the respective agency of that institution on the total declared salaries; or failing that, an explanatory note of the reasons why they are exempt from contributing to Social Security. Finally, it is worth adding that Article 9 of the same Law authorizes the Municipality of Santo Domingo to verify before the Dirección General de Tributación the accuracy of the data provided by the licensees. If it is verified that there is an alteration of these data, a circumstance that determines that the assigned amount is incorrect, the Municipality will make the corresponding reassessment. Likewise, when the Dirección General de Tributación makes any reassessment in the income tax, it must communicate it ex officio to the Municipality for the corresponding action. The certification from the Municipal Accounting Office, indicating the difference owed by the licensee by virtue of the reassessment, will serve as an executory title for the collection of that difference. The taxpayer's right to challenge the reassessment made by the corresponding office is preserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Code. Once the administrative route is exhausted, the taxpayer will be obliged to pay the established sum, as long as there is no ruling from the competent judicial authority.

**V.- On the legality examination of the challenged formal actions.** The plaintiff company questions the legality of the cited Resolution No. 04-2015, issued by the Third Section of this Tribunal, the cited act No. SDDGC-045-2012, and the resolutions of the Municipal Mayor at 11:20 a.m. on August 14, 2013, and at 1:35 p.m. on September 3, 2013. Strictly speaking, the reason and content of the referred formal actions are questioned in two senses. In the first one, the plaintiff questions the obligation to have a municipal license to operate the distribution of hydrocarbons. The foregoing because, it affirms, the special business activity it provides does not require it and requiring it is unreasonable and excessive. It maintains that the activity it carries out is of a special nature and regulated by the State because it is a public service. It cites for this purpose Article 56 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and numeral 5 of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, according to which the supply of fuel derived from hydrocarbons constitutes a public service. It adds that Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31502-MINAE-S regulates the procedure for obtaining authorization for the development of the activity it deploys. It also refers to judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber No. 8857-2000 at 3:57 p.m. on October 10, 2000, and No. 14961-2016 issued at 9:05 a.m. on October 14, 2016, according to which, it says, by carrying out an activity of a special nature such as the distribution of hydrocarbons, it does not have the duty to have a municipal license because it has already obtained the authorizations required to provide that public service, which are technical and more complex. It explains that the profit margin, in its case, is set by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (hereinafter ARESEP) and is minimal because it is at cost, reason for which it cannot be excessively taxed. It concludes that as a provider of a public service, it does not have the duty to have a municipal license or to pay the tax and that according to the principles of progressivity in human rights, pro homine and pro libertatis, it must be interpreted in favor of an exemption or non-subjection to the Business License Tax. For its part, the representative of the defendant local entity maintains that the license is necessary because a for-profit commercial activity is carried out in the canton. After a measured analysis, the Tribunal considers that the plaintiff's argument is unfounded for the following reasons. Numerals 88 of the Municipal Code (CM) and 1 of the cited Ley 7119, require that prior to engaging in any for-profit activity, in this case, in the canton of Santo Domingo, the respective municipal license must be held, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. It is a legal requirement for the exercise of any for-profit activity, without the norm making any distinction based on who provides it (a private subject, a public entity, or an individual through a concession) or the nature of the activity. In the case at hand, the plaintiff states that it is dedicated to the purchase and distribution of fuel in the national territory and that the domicile of that economic activity is in Santo Domingo, a fact that is admitted by the defendant local entity. In the opinion of this Tribunal, the exercise of this economic activity requires a municipal license because the indicated norms so require and, in addition, because it clearly follows from Article 14 of the cited Ley 7119. That norm indicates, in what is relevant, that "(...) For all for-profit activities that are subsequently indicated, included in the international classification of economic activities, the licensees will pay in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of this law. The activities indicated in Article 15 are excepted. (...) c. Services: Comprising the services provided to the private sector, the public sector, or both, that are attended by private organizations or persons. Comprising transport, storage, communications, and private education and recreation establishments. (...)" (The highlighting does not correspond to the original). Thus, there is no doubt that the norm includes the transport of hydrocarbon derivatives, which is the commercial activity that the plaintiff company here is engaged in, which, in addition, we consider to be for-profit. The foregoing because, although it is a public service that the plaintiff provides, in principle, on the occasion of an enabling act (an aspect we will return to infra), the truth is that there is a profit margin which, although established by the ARESEP based on the principle of cost-of-service, guarantees it a gain or profit. Therefore, we consider that the normative presuppositions that oblige the plaintiff company to have a municipal license in order to carry out its for-profit commercial activity are present. The Tribunal does not share the plaintiff's argument that it is not obliged to obtain that license, given that it was granted an enabling act by virtue of which it provides an activity of a special nature because it is a concessioned public service, which is subject to strong control by the State, the Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo, and the ARESEP; a reason why forcing it to have the referred license is disproportionate and unreasonable. As a first aspect, we must indicate that the plaintiff company did not provide to this proceeding the enabling act it claims to have to engage in the purchase and distribution of fuel, an essential element for this Tribunal to have been able to assess the nature of the referred act and the conditions established therein for the provision of the service. It was a procedural burden incumbent on the plaintiff that has clearly been neglected. But, in any case, in the Tribunal's opinion, even if that enabling act had been granted to it, that does not exempt it from having the municipal license for the exercise of the activity in question because, we reiterate, there are legal norms that impose that obligation on it. Added to the above, we consider that the fact that the purchase, distribution, and supply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons (including: 1) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined to supply national demand in distribution plants and 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer) is established as a public service in accordance with Articles 3 and 5, subsection d) of the ARESEP Law, does not per se suppose that its provision is exempt from the obligation to have a municipal license referred to in Articles 88 of the CM, 1, and 14 of the cited Ley 7119. Especially when the indicated legal norm does not contemplate any exception to the general rule contained in ordinal 1 ibidem and the plaintiff company also does not indicate which regulations, it considers, exempt it from having the license in question. The Tribunal is clear that the transport of hydrocarbon derivatives is a public service that is concessible and susceptible to commercial exploitation by individuals, who can manage it indirectly in exchange for the collection of a rate charged to the users or beneficiaries of the service. Therefore, its provision is subject to a strong Public Law regime that manifests itself in a series of regulations and controls, for example, from the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía regarding the granting of the concession and compliance with the essential requirements for the provision of the service and from the ARESEP, regarding the rate regime, regulation, and service quality. But, in our opinion, this does not exempt the provider or concessionaire from complying with the other conditions or requirements that the legal system establishes for such purposes, as is, in this case, the municipal license to which we have referred and which responds to purposes different from those weighed when the concession is granted or the rate is set. The requirement of the municipal license contributes to the urban planning of the canton because it allows the local corporation to verify, for example, that the activity is carried out within the regulations contained in the regulatory plans in aspects such as land use; which is extremely relevant in the commercial activity carried out by the plaintiff, given its danger and risk. Therefore, in the opinion of this Tribunal, in the absence of a legal norm that expressly exempts from the obligation to have a municipal license to engage in the purchase and distribution of fuel, the plaintiff company must submit to the legal system, which means that it must have the referred license to carry out that for-profit commercial activity in the canton of Santo Domingo. The contrary would be to consent to the non-application of legal norms in the specific case and to incur a differentiation (due to the regime to which the plaintiff's commercial activity is subject) that, in our opinion, has no place in the legal system. Finally, we consider that the constitutional precedents cited by the plaintiff are not applicable in this case. The cited judgment No. 8857-2000 refers to an amparo proceeding against the Municipality of San José and the ARESEP, in which the collection of the Business License Tax from fuel retailing companies, i.e., gas stations, was discussed. Thus, it concerns situations different from the one discussed here since the ruling refers to the collection of the Business License Tax (and not the obtaining of the commercial license) from another municipality and, therefore, regulated in another law, as well as in relation to an activity different from the one exercised by the plaintiff here. On the other hand, the cited judgment No. 14961-2016 refers to an amparo appeal filed by a dentist against the Municipality of Desamparados, for having forced her to obtain a commercial license or patent, a situation different from the one discussed here, given that it concerns the liberal exercise of a profession and not a commercial activity like the one analyzed here. What the plaintiff company intends is that, by resorting to constitutional precedents that are not applicable to the specific case, this Tribunal disapplies legal norms that oblige it to obtain a municipal license to exercise the for-profit commercial activity of purchasing and distributing fuel, a request that exceeds the competence that the Constituent granted to the Administrative Litigation Court in Article 49 of the Magna Carta and which is limited, essentially, to the legality control of the administrative function; which evidently does not include determining whether the requirements that legal norms impose for the exercise of a for-profit commercial activity are disproportionate, unreasonable, or violative of the constitutional principle of equality. Strictly speaking, an examination of that nature is reserved to the Constitutional Chamber by virtue of Article 10 of the Political Constitution and the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, to which the plaintiff company must resort if it considers that the legal norms that oblige it to obtain the referred commercial license are unconstitutional for the reasons already stated. It should be noted that this Tribunal consulted both the Costa Rican Legal Information System and the Constitutional Chamber as to whether any action existed or had been admitted against the cited Ley 7119 and the response was negative. Thus, regarding the legality control for which this Tribunal is competent and for the reasons stated ut supra, it has been determined that the plaintiff carries out a for-profit commercial activity in the canton of Santo Domingo and that there is no legal norm that exempts it from obtaining the commercial license required for such purposes. Therefore, at this point, no deficiency is observed in the challenged actions, reason for which the plaintiff's argument must be rejected, as is hereby done.

**VI.-** The plaintiff company also alleges the abusive and improper application of the tax rules and the taxable base in the Business License Tax. It explains that, if it is interpreted that it requires a municipal license, having to assume the payment of the Business License Tax, the way in which the defendant municipality calculates the tax is totally illegal. It considers that the principle of economic reality provided in Article 8 of the CNP must be applied and cites rulings from the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Tribunal and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that develop it. It considers that as its activity is completely regulated by the ARESEP, which establishes the profit margin, applying the Business License Tax rate on gross income constitutes a transgression of the economic reality of its company and illegitimate enrichment of the municipal corporation. It argues that the abuse of the municipal action in that sense has been recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in judgments No. 8857-2000 and No. 094-2001, where it was declared unconstitutional to seek to collect the referred tax using gross income as the taxable base in the fuel distribution and retailing activity. It affirms it is in a factual situation analogous to what the Constitutional Chamber has already declared as unfounded and, therefore, harmful to its rights and guarantees. It cites in its support Article 20 of the ARESEP Law. In this aspect, the representative of the defendant local entity maintains that the way to calculate the tax is given by law. After careful analysis, the Tribunal considers that, as it is formulated, this argument must also be rejected. The foregoing because the plaintiff company's questioning relates to the quantitative element of the Business License Tax, i.e., the calculation base of the referred tax; an element that according to Article 5, subsection a) of the CNPT is reserved to the Law. Thus, it was the legislator who, in Article 3 of the cited Ley 7119, established that the taxable base of the tax in question would be set taking into account the net taxable income and the gross sales or income received by the natural or legal persons subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year in which the imposition is made. Thus, it is not possible to establish that the plaintiff must pay the tax according to the profit margin approved by the ARESEP because that is not the calculation base established by the legislator. At this point, it should be added that, if Ley 7119 does not contemplate a different taxable base for cases in which the commercial activity has a regulated profit margin, neither the challenged formal actions nor this Tribunal could establish differentiated treatment, because that would result in a direct non-application of what is established in the referred ordinal 3. Again, if the plaintiff considers that the calculation base established by the legislator is unreasonable, disproportionate, or violates tax equity or justice (by taxing gross sales or income received and not the profit margin established by the ARESEP), it must raise that challenge before the Constitutional Chamber, the competent body in accordance with Article 10 of the Magna Carta and the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and given the concentrated control that exists in this matter. On the other hand, we consider that the reference to the principle of economic reality is not pertinent for the purpose of seeking that the tax in question be calculated on a calculation base different from the one legally provided. In relation to the issue, it is necessary to point out that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 01181, issued at 2:48 p.m. on November 12, 2009, indicated, in what is relevant, "(...) in tax matters, it is possible to distinguish two spheres of application of the cited principle. The first, properly referring to the interpretation of the content of the norm, understanding that the legal operator should not limit himself to the simple meaning of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of carrying out this intellectual operation, must privilege the purpose that the legislator pursued when creating the tax. In the matter in question, the taxing power of the State aims to tax a specific source of wealth, so that, when defining the scope of a norm, the (economic, of course) reality that justified the exercise of this power must be taken into account. At the base of this approach is the recognition that the regulation, although carried out from a legal perspective, refers to economic transactions, so that it is these particularities that must define the content of the provisions, and not the legal concepts, alien in many cases to this reality. However, this does not imply an open type through which the legislation can be modified by means of interpretations, which would be equivalent to illegitimately substituting the Legislative Assembly, as well as a breach of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. On the contrary, what is sought to be avoided is that the constitutional duty to contribute to public burdens, characteristic of a Social and Democratic State of Law, is rendered nugatory through legal technicalities, privileging the assessment of reality, the purpose of the tax norm, and the economic capacity that was intended to be taxed.(...)" (The underlining is ours). Along those lines, this principle refers to the interpretation of the content of the tax norm in the sense that the legal operator should not limit himself to the simple meaning of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of carrying out the intellectual analysis, is obliged to give priority to the purpose that the legislator pursued when creating the tax.

But the judgment in question is also clear in indicating that the foregoing does not imply the creation of an open-ended category through which legislation could be modified by means of interpretations, which would result in an illegitimate substitution of the legislator, as well as the violation of the principles of separation of powers, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the plaintiff, alleging the principle of economic reality, to seek to disregard or change the tax base of the IP established by the legislator because that would entail, we reiterate, the non-application and singular repeal of a valid legal norm in its favor, in open violation of the Principle of Legality.

VII.- We further consider that the constitutional precedents cited by the plaintiff are not applicable to the specific case. The foregoing because both judgment No. 8857-2000 and No. 094-2001 cited refer to amparo appeals (not unconstitutionality actions) in which the IP of municipalities other than the one sued here (San José and Belén) was discussed in relation to a specific activity (fuel retailers or gas stations) different from that exercised by the plaintiff. But, in addition, it should be noted that, although both rulings established, in essence, that the charging of the IP to fuel retailers in those cantons, in the manner it was being done, was violative of the principle of equality, as well as unreasonable and disproportionate, because it was not taking into account the existence of a profit margin previously set by the State; the truth is that this was so because it was also considered that the payment of the IP was not incorporated into the operating cost structure by ARESEP nor was it considered when establishing the price or profit margin. Even in the referenced judgment No. 8857-2000, there are dissenting votes that declare the appeal without merit because they considered that "(…) if the payment of municipal taxes were deductible as an operating cost, or what is the same, if the cost could be integrated to determine the sale price of fuel to the consumer, the cause of the mismatch in the application of the tax to fuel retailers –such as the protected companies– would disappear, and consequently, there would be no violation whatsoever of the principle of equality to their detriment. (..)"; and they had it as accredited in the specific case that "(…) as the Regulador General points out in his report, the appellants themselves provided to the case file a copy of the certification issued by him, in which it is determined that in the case of fuel supply, the methodology used does recognize a percentage to cover the costs of taxes and patents (see report on folio 15 and copy of certification on folio 6), which corresponds to 0.0862% of the gross income established in the model station. Thus, the present amparo truly consists of the appellants' disagreement with that percentage and not that they are given a different treatment than other merchants, since under oath the Regulador General is emphatic in indicating that the current model contemplates a percentage for the recognition of patent taxes, which is applied to the activity carried out by the protected companies. Thus, it is not for this Chamber to determine the percentage assigned by the regulatory body as recognition for the payment of municipal patent and in general for operating costs, within the cost structure that the protected companies must assume, as this is a matter of an eminently technical nature, which cannot be aired in the summary amparo process. Given the above, what actually corresponds is for the appellants to present the corresponding petition, so that the percentage amount assigned as recognition for the payment of municipal patent within the cost structure is reviewed, and not for this Chamber to issue any pronouncement in this regard, because it is reiterated, this is a matter of legality outside the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. (…)". The foregoing is important because, as we explained, in our view the tax base of the IP is determined by the cited Law No. 7119 and cannot be set aside in the specific case by this Court, to establish a different one for the plaintiff, by the mere fact that the lucrative commercial activity it exercises is so by virtue of a concession and with a regulated profit margin, because that exceeds the jurisdiction that has been attributed to this Court and the legality control of the administrative function it is responsible for exercising. We again reiterate that, if the plaintiff considers that the tax base established in section 3 of Law No. 7119 is disproportionate, unreasonable, or violative of the principle of constitutional equality, it must file the respective action to obtain its declaration of unconstitutionality, which has not been done, as we indicated ut supra.

VIII.- Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the rates and prices of public services (such as that provided by the plaintiff) are set based on a series of guiding principles, of which it is pertinent to highlight two that derive from articles 3 and 31 of Law No. 7593. First, the service-at-cost principle, according to which the setting must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service, which allow for competitive compensation and guarantee the adequate development of the activity. Second, the financial equilibrium principle, which assures the provider the economic benefit that has been agreed upon. For these purposes, article 31 of Law No. 7593 indicates, in what is relevant, that when setting the rates and prices of public services, ARESEP will take into account, as a general rule, the model production structures for each public service, according to the development of knowledge, technology, the possibilities of the service, the activity in question, and the size of the providing companies. Only if there is proven impossibility of applying this procedure, will the particular situation of each company be considered. The indicated norm adds that ARESEP must apply models for the annual adjustment of rates, based on the modification of variables external to the administration of the service providers, such as inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, hydrocarbon prices, salary fixes made by the Executive Branch, and any other variable the regulatory body considers pertinent. Also, that the rates of public services must contemplate the following aspects and criteria, when applicable: a) Guarantee financial equilibrium. b) The recognition of the cost schemes of the different mechanisms for contracting project financing, their special forms of payment, and their effective costs, among others. For its part, section 32 of the same Law establishes which costs shall not be considered in the price structure, among them, fines imposed on service providers for non-compliance with the obligations established by this law, unnecessary or extraneous expenditures to the provision of the public service, contributions, expenses, investments, and debts incurred for activities extraneous to the administration, operation, or maintenance of the regulated activity, operating expenses disproportionate in relation to the normal expenses of equivalent activities, investments rejected by ARESEP for being considered excessive for the provision of the public service, the value of billings not collected by the regulated companies, with the exception of percentages technically fixed by the regulatory body. Finally, it is appropriate to point out that article 20 of this same law enshrines, in essence, the duty of public service providers to keep separate accounting records that differentiate the public service activity from those that are not. It also indicates that common income and costs must be recorded in accordance with technical rules that allow a distribution that does not harm the public service activity.

IX.- Well then, in our view, from the norms set forth it can be concluded that the expenditures incurred by the public service provider for the payment of taxes constitute, as a general rule, a cost that forms part of the price structure of the service and that, therefore, must be considered when establishing the profit margin of the public service providers. Consequently, if in the case of the structure applied to the service provided by the plaintiff (i.e., the purchase and distribution of fuels) this is not so, it is evident that what can be subject to control is the methodology used in the specific case. However, the truth is that the plaintiff company did not challenge the referenced methodology in this proceeding, which is why this Court cannot review its legality nor establish whether in its case it considers or does not consider the payment of the IP or the extent to which this affects its profit margin. Note that what is challenged here are, solely, administrative acts that rejected the IP tax return filed by the plaintiff corporation, indicating that it had to calculate the tax according to the legally established tax base. Thus, the factual and legal grounds that serve as the basis for that decision did exist, both really and legally, at the time of its adoption (because the plaintiff carried out the taxable event of the IP and the quantitative elements of that tax are established by legal norms that have not been declared unconstitutional) so its content is lawful insofar as it substantially conforms to the legal system. Therefore, the primary claim is unfounded, and the petition seeking that the nullity of any administrative act derived from the aforementioned resolutions, and that are related to the present matter specifically regarding the questioned points, be declared must also be rejected. Besides the fact that it is not specified which those formal acts are, which prevents a concrete legality comparison, the truth is that, if these were accessory to or intended to execute the challenged acts, they would also be valid formal acts.

X.- On the other claims. The plaintiff also asks that the return of the sums paid for principal, interest paid, and penalties, plus interest up to the day of deposit, be ordered, as well as an indexation of the sums, on the proportion of the adjustments whose annulment is requested. What is requested is unfounded. On the one hand, it has not been proven in this proceeding that the plaintiff has paid any sum of money to the sued local entity for the payment of the IP discussed here. But, in addition, within the logical framework of this action, the recently mentioned claims are directly linked to the request for a declaration of invalidity of the challenged acts. These are aspects with respect to which there is an undeniable relationship of accessory nature with the nullity claim. Therefore, by establishing in this judgment the validity of the actions taken at the administrative stage and with it, the substantial conformity with the legal system of the act subject to challenge, it is evident that the indicated petitions are unfounded. Consequently, said items must be denied." (…)(…)”. Subsequently, numeral 15 establishes a special rate for certain activities, namely, “(…) a. Banks and financial establishments, except state banks (banking houses, exchange houses, finance companies and similar entities, and insurance institutions). They shall pay each quarter on the gross interest or commission income, or both, received in the previous year: ¢4.00 per ¢1,000.00 Minimum ¢1,000.00 quarterly. b. Real estate dealers. They shall pay each quarter on commissions received in the previous year: ¢3.00 per ¢1,000.00 Minimum ¢1,000.00 c. Entertainment halls operating skill or chance games, or both, permitted by law. They shall pay each quarter on the gross income of the previous year. ¢3,000 per ¢1,000.00 ch. Short-stay lodging establishments. They shall pay each quarter on the gross income of the previous year. ¢5,000 per ¢1,000.00 (…)”. The indicated rule warns that when different activities from those listed therein are carried out jointly in the same establishment, the amount of the levy shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 12, according to which the amount of the levy shall be determined by the total sum of the tax corresponding to each one individually. On the other hand, ordinal 16 indicates that to tax any newly established for-profit activity (actividad lucrativa) that cannot be subject to the tax procedure of the referred Article 4, the Municipality may make an estimate based on the procedures authorized by the Code of Tax Regulations and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter CNPT), for oversight purposes; a levy that shall be provisional and must be modified based on the first declaration the patent holder (patentado) is required to make, in which case any excess difference must be credited to them, or charged in the opposite case. Furthermore, it must be understood that deductions from the tax base are not applicable because Law No. 7114 does not provide for them and because, rather, it states that the calculation basis for the tax shall be on the gross sales or income (not net) received (not accrued). Regarding the temporal element, we have that Article 5 establishes that the IP must be declared each year, no later than November 30, before the Municipality of Santo Domingo; with the exception of special cases in which companies have authorization from the Directorate General of Taxation to file the declaration after the date established by law, which may present the IP declaration to the Municipality up to thirty days after the authorized date. For such purposes, a sworn declaration must be provided indicating the amount of gross sales or income and the net taxable income, for which the Municipality shall send the respective forms to the taxpayers. In accordance with Article 10, if the patent holder does not file the declaration within the indicated terms, the Municipality shall apply an ex officio assessment. If it is filed later, at most six months after the date indicated in Article 5, the corresponding tax shall be assessed. If the taxable amount is lower than that determined ex officio, the Municipality must credit the overpaid sums to the patent holder's account. In the opposite case, the procedure shall be in accordance with the previous article. Finally, taxpayers who do not file the declaration within the term shall be penalized with a fine equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the business license tax (impuesto de patente) corresponding to the previous year. Now then, the cited Law No. 7119 does not establish the date on which the tax must be paid, a reason for which that regulation must be integrated with the general rule established in Article 40 of the CNPT. In accordance with Article 6, patent holders who are Income Tax filers must submit a copy of that declaration to the Municipality. While numeral 7 indicates that patent holders who are not Income Tax filers must accompany their IP declaration with a photocopy of the latest payroll payment receipt to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), or a certification from the respective agency of that institution regarding the total declared salaries; or failing that, an explanatory note of the reasons for which they are exempt from contributing to Social Security. Finally, it should be added that Article 9 of the same Law authorizes the Municipality of Santo Domingo to verify, before the Directorate General of Taxation, the accuracy of the data provided by the patent holders. If it is proven that there is an alteration of this data, a circumstance determining that the assigned amount is incorrect, the Municipality shall make the corresponding reassessment. Likewise, when the Directorate General of Taxation makes any reassessment in the income tax, it must officially communicate it to the Municipality for the appropriate purposes. The certification of the Municipal Accounting Office, indicating the difference owed by the patent holder by virtue of the reassessment, shall serve as an enforceable instrument for the purposes of collecting that difference. The taxpayer's right to challenge the reassessment made by the corresponding office is preserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Code. Once the administrative channel is exhausted, the taxpayer shall be obligated to pay the established sum, pending a ruling from the competent judicial authority.

              **V.- On the legality review of the contested formal conducts.** The plaintiff company questions the legality of the cited Resolution No. 04-2015, issued by the Third Section of this Court, the cited act No. SDDGC-045-2012, and the resolutions of the Municipal Mayor of 11:20 a.m. on August 14, 2013, and of 1:35 p.m. on September 3, 2013. Strictly speaking, the motive and content of the referred formal conducts are questioned in two senses. In the first of them, the petitioner **questions the obligation to have a municipal license to operate the distribution of hydrocarbons**. The foregoing because, it affirms, the special business activity it provides does not require it and demanding it is unreasonable and excessive. It maintains that the activity it carries out is of a special nature and regulated by the State because it is a public service. It cites, to that effect, Article 56 of the Organic Environmental Law and numeral 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, according to which the supply of fuel derived from hydrocarbons constitutes a public service. It adds that Executive Decree No. 31502-MINAE-S regulates the procedure for obtaining authorization to develop the activity it deploys. It also refers to the judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber No. 8857-2000 at 3:57 p.m. on October 10, 2000, and No. 14961-2016 issued at 9:05 a.m. on October 14, 2016, according to which, it says, for carrying out an activity of a special nature such as the distribution of hydrocarbons, it does not have the duty to possess a municipal license because it already obtained the authorizations required to provide that public service, which are technical and more complex. It explains that the profit margin, in its case, is set by the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, hereinafter ARESEP) and is minuscule because it is at cost, a reason for which it cannot be excessively taxed. It concludes that because it is a provider of a public service, it does not have the duty to possess a municipal license nor to pay the tax and that, in accordance with the principles of progressivity in human rights, pro homine and pro libertatis, interpretation must favor an exemption or non-subjection to the IP. For its part, the representative of the **local entity sued** maintains that the license is necessary because a for-profit commercial activity is carried out in the canton. After a measured analysis, the Court considers that the petitioner's argument is unfounded for the following reasons. Numerals 88 of the CM and 1 of the cited Law No. 7119 require that prior to the exercise of any for-profit activity, in this case, in the canton of Santo Domingo, the respective municipal license must be obtained, which is obtained through the payment of a tax. This is a legal requirement for the exercise of any for-profit activity, without the rule making any distinction regarding who provides it (a private subject, a public entity, or a private individual through a concession) or the nature of the activity. In the case at hand, the petitioner states that it is dedicated to the purchase and distribution of fuel in the national territory and that the domicile of this economic activity is in Santo Domingo, a fact admitted by the local entity sued. In this Court's opinion, the exercise of this economic activity requires a municipal license because the indicated rules so require and, furthermore, because this clearly follows from Article 14 of the cited Law No. 7119. That rule states, pertinently, that "(...) For all the for-profit activities listed below, contained in the international classification of economic activities, patent holders shall pay in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of this law. The activities indicated in Article 15 are exempted. (...) c. Services: Includes services provided to the private sector, the public sector, or both, that are attended by private organizations or individuals. Includes **transportation**, storage, communications, and private educational and recreation establishments. (...)" (the highlighting does not correspond to the original). Thus, there is no doubt that the rule includes the transportation of hydrocarbon derivatives, which is the commercial activity to which the plaintiff company here is dedicated, which, furthermore, we deem to be for-profit. The foregoing because, although it is a public service that the plaintiff provides, in principle, on the occasion of an enabling act (an aspect to which we will return infra), the truth is that a profit margin does exist which, although established by ARESEP based on the principle of service at cost, guarantees it a gain or profit. Therefore, we deem that the normative presuppositions obligating the plaintiff company to have a municipal license in order to exercise its for-profit commercial activity are present. The Court does not share the plaintiff's argument according to which it is not obligated to obtain that license, given that it was granted an enabling act by virtue of which it provides an activity of a special nature because it is a concesioned public service, which is subject to strong State control, the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery, and ARESEP; a reason for which obligating it to have the referred license is disproportionate and unreasonable. As a first aspect, we must indicate that the plaintiff company did not provide to this process the enabling act it claims to have to dedicate itself to the purchase and distribution of fuel, an indispensable element for this Court to have been able to assess the nature of the referred act and the conditions established therein for the provision of the service. This was a procedural burden incumbent on the plaintiff and which has clearly been disregarded. But, in any case, in the Court's opinion, even if that enabling act had been granted to it, that does not exempt it from having the municipal license for the exercise of the activity in question because, we reiterate, there are legal rules that impose that obligation on it. In addition to the foregoing, we deem that the fact that the purchase, distribution, and supply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons (which include: 1) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined to supply the national demand at distribution facilities and 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer) is established as a public service in accordance with Articles 3 and 5, subsection d) of the ARESEP Law, does not per se suppose that its provision is exempt from the obligation to hold a municipal license referenced in Articles 88 of the CM, 1 and 14 of the referred Law No. 7119. Especially when the indicated legal rule does not contemplate any exception to the general rule contained in ordinal 1 ibidem and the plaintiff company also does not indicate which regulation, it deems, exempts it from holding the license in question. It is clear to the Court that the transportation of hydrocarbon derivatives is a public service that is concessionable and susceptible to commercial exploitation by private individuals, who can manage it indirectly in exchange for the collection of a rate charged to the users or beneficiaries of the service. Therefore, its provision is subject to a strong Public Law regime manifested in a series of regulations and controls, for example, by the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the granting of the concession and compliance with the indispensable requirements for the provision of the service, and by ARESEP, regarding the rate regime, regulation, and quality of the service. But, in our opinion, this does not exempt the provider or concessionaire from compliance with the other presuppositions or requirements that the legal system establishes for such purposes such as, in this case, the municipal license to which we have made reference and which responds to purposes different from those pondered when the concession is granted or the rate is set. The requirement of the municipal license contributes to the urban planning of the canton because it allows the local corporation to verify, for example, that the activity is carried out within the regulations contained in the regulatory plans in aspects such as land use; which is extremely relevant in the commercial activity carried out by the plaintiff, given its dangerousness and risk. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, in the absence of a legal rule that expressly exempts from the obligation to have a municipal license to engage in the purchase and distribution of fuel, the plaintiff company must submit to the legal system, which supposes that it must have the referred license to carry out that for-profit commercial activity in the canton of Santo Domingo. To do otherwise would be to consent to the non-application of legal rules in the specific case and to incur a differentiation (by reason of the regime to which the plaintiff's commercial activity is subject) that, in our opinion, finds no place in the legal system. Finally, we consider that the constitutional precedents cited by the plaintiff are not applicable in this case. The cited Judgment No. 8857-2000 refers to an amparo proceeding against the Municipality of San José and ARESEP, in which the charging of the IP to fuel retailing companies, that is, gas stations, was discussed. In this way, these are situations different from the one discussed here, since the ruling refers to the charging of the IP (and not the obtaining of the commercial license) of another municipality and, therefore, regulated in another law, as well as in relation to an activity distinct from the one exercised by the plaintiff here. On the other hand, Judgment No.

The cited case 14961-2016 refers to an amparo action filed by a dentist against the Municipality of Desamparados for having forced her to obtain a commercial license or patent, a situation different from the one discussed here, given that it concerns the liberal practice of a profession and not a commercial activity like the one analyzed here. What the plaintiff corporation seeks is for this Court, by invoking constitutional precedents that are not applicable to the specific case, to disapply legal rules that obligate it to obtain a municipal license to engage in the lucrative commercial activity of purchasing and distributing fuel, a request that exceeds the competence that the Constituent Assembly granted to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction in Article 49 of the Magna Carta and which is limited, in its essence, to the legality control of the administrative function; which evidently does not include determining whether the requirements imposed by legal rules for the exercise of a lucrative commercial activity are disproportionate, unreasonable, or violative of the principle of constitutional equality. Strictly speaking, an examination of that nature is reserved to the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) by virtue of Article 10 of the Political Constitution and the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to which the plaintiff corporation must resort if it deems that the legal rules obligating it to obtain said commercial license are unconstitutional for the reasons already stated. It should be noted that this Court consulted both the Costa Rican Legal Information System and the Constitutional Chamber as to whether any action existed or had been admitted against the cited Law No. 7119, and the response was negative. Thus, regarding the legality control for which this Court is competent and for the reasons set forth ut supra, it has been determined that the plaintiff engages in a lucrative commercial activity in the canton of Santo Domingo and that no legal rule exempts it from obtaining the commercial license required for such purposes. Therefore, no deficiency is observed in the challenged conduct on this point, for which reason the plaintiff's argument must be rejected, as is hereby done.

VI.- The plaintiff corporation also alleges the abusive and improper application of tax rules and the taxable base in the IP. It explains that, if it were interpreted that it requires a municipal license and must assume the payment of the IP, the way in which the defendant municipality calculates the tax is totally illegal. It considers that the principle of economic reality provided for in Article 8 of the CNP must be applied and cites rulings from the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that develop it. It considers that since its activity is completely regulated by ARESEP, which establishes the profit margin, applying the IP rate on gross income constitutes a transgression of the economic reality of its company and an illegitimate enrichment of the municipal corporation. It argues that the abuse of municipal action in that sense has been recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in rulings No. 8857-2000 and No. 094-2001, where it was declared unconstitutional to attempt to charge the said tax using gross income as the taxable base in the activity of distribution and sale of fuels. It affirms that it is in a factual scenario analogous to that which the Constitutional Chamber has already declared as improper and, therefore, harmful to its rights and guarantees. It cites in its support Article 20 of the ARESEP Law. In this regard, the representative of the defendant local entity maintains that the method of calculating the tax is set by law. After a careful analysis, the Court considers that, as it is framed, this argument must also be rejected. The foregoing because the plaintiff corporation's challenge relates to the quantitative element of the IP, that is, the calculation base of the said tax; an element that, in accordance with Article 5, subsection a) of the CNPT, is reserved to the Law. Thus, it was the legislator who, in Article 3 of the cited Law No. 7119, established that the taxable base of the tax in question would be set taking into account the net taxable income and the sales or gross income received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year in which the assessment occurs. Thus, it is not possible to establish that the plaintiff must pay the tax based on the profit margin that ARESEP approved for it because that is not the calculation base established by the legislator. On this point, it should be added that, if Law No. 7191 does not contemplate a different taxable base for cases in which the commercial activity has a regulated profit margin, neither the challenged formal conduct nor this Court could establish differentiated treatment, because that would result in a direct disapplication of what is established in the cited Article 3. Again, if the plaintiff considers that the calculation base established by the legislator is unreasonable, disproportionate, or violates tax equity or justice (by taxing the sales or gross income received and not the profit margin established by ARESEP), it must raise that challenge before the Constitutional Chamber, the competent body in accordance with Article 10 of the Magna Carta and the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and given the concentrated control that exists in this matter. On the other hand, we consider that the reference to the principle of economic reality is not acceptable for the purpose of seeking to calculate the tax in question on a calculation base different from the one legally provided. In relation to the issue, it is necessary to note that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 01181, issued at 14 hours 48 minutes on November 12, 2009, indicated, as relevant, "(...) in tax matters, it is possible to distinguish two areas of application of the cited principle. The first, referring properly to the interpretation of the content of the rule, understanding that the legal operator must not limit himself to the simple sense of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of carrying out this intellectual operation, must prioritize the purpose pursued by the legislator when creating the tax. In the matter in question, the taxing power of the State has the objective of taxing a specific source of wealth, so that, when defining the scope of a rule, one must take into account the reality (economic, of course) that justified the exercise of this power. At the base of this approach lies the recognition that the regulation, although carried out from a legal perspective, refers to economic transactions, so these particularities are what should define the content of the provisions, and not the legal concepts, which are in many cases alien to this reality. However, this does not imply an open type through which legislation can be modified through interpretations, which would be equivalent to illegitimately substituting the Legislative Assembly, as well as a breach of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. On the contrary, what is sought to avoid is that the constitutional duty to contribute to public burdens, characteristic of a Social and Democratic State of Law, is rendered nugatory through legal technicalities, prioritizing the assessment of reality, the purpose of the tax rule, and the economic capacity that was intended to be taxed. (...)" (underlining is ours). Along those lines, this principle refers to the interpretation of the content of the tax rule in the sense that the legal operator must not be limited to the simple sense of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of performing the intellectual analysis, is obliged to give priority to the purpose pursued by the legislator when creating the tax. But the ruling in question is also clear in indicating that the foregoing does not imply the creation of an open type through which legislation can be modified through interpretations, which would result in an illegitimate substitution of the legislator, as well as the transgression of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. Therefore, it is improper for the plaintiff, by alleging the principle of economic reality, to seek to disregard or change the calculation base of the IP provided by the legislator because that would entail, we reiterate, the disapplication and singular repeal of a valid legal rule in its favor, in open violation of the Principle of Legality.

VII.- We consider, furthermore, that the constitutional precedents cited by the plaintiff are not applicable to the specific case. The foregoing because both ruling No. 8857-2000 and No. 094-2001 cited refer to amparo actions (not actions of unconstitutionality) in which the IP of other municipalities different from the one sued here (San José and Belén) was discussed in relation to a specific activity (fuel retailers or gas stations) different from that exercised by the plaintiff. But, in addition, it should be noted that, although in both rulings it was established, in essence, that the charging of the IP to fuel retailers in those cantons, in the way it was being done, was violative of the principle of equality, as well as unreasonable and disproportionate, because it was not taking into account the existence of a profit margin previously set by the State; the truth is that this was so because it was also considered that the payment of the IP was not incorporated into the operating cost structure by ARESEP nor was it considered when establishing the price or profit margin. In fact, in the cited ruling No. 8857-2000 there are dissenting votes that declare the appeal without merit because they considered that "(...) if the payment of municipal taxes were deductible as an operating cost, or what is the same, if the cost could be integrated to determine the sale price of fuel to the consumer, the cause of the misalignment in the application of the tax to fuel retailers —like the protected companies— would disappear, and consequently, there would be no violation whatsoever of the principle of equality to their detriment. (...)"; and they had established as proven in the specific case that "(...) as noted by the Regulador General in his report, the appellants themselves provided to the record a copy of the certification issued by him, in which it is determined that in the case of fuel supply, the methodology used does recognize a percentage to cover costs of taxes and patents (see report on folio 15 and copy of certification on folio 6), corresponding to 0.0862% of the gross income established in the model station. Thus, the present amparo really consists of the appellants' disagreement with that percentage and not that they are being treated differently than other merchants, since under oath the Regulador General is emphatic in indicating that the current model contemplates a percentage for the recognition of patent taxes, which is applied to the activity developed by the protected companies. Thus, it is not for the Chamber to determine the percentage assigned by the regulatory body as recognition for payment of municipal patent and in general for operating costs, within the cost structure that the protected companies must assume, this being a matter of an eminently technical nature, which cannot be aired in the summary amparo proceeding. Given the foregoing, what is actually appropriate is for the appellants to submit the corresponding request, so that the percentage amount assigned as recognition for the concept of municipal patent payment within the cost structure is reviewed, and not for the Chamber to issue any pronouncement in this regard, since it is reiterated, this is a matter of legality outside the competencies of the Constitutional Court. (...)". The foregoing is important because, as we explained, in our judgment the calculation base of the IP is determined by the cited Law No. 7119 and cannot be disapplied in the specific case by this Court, to establish a different one for the plaintiff, for the sole reason that the lucrative commercial activity it exercises is by virtue of a concession and with a regulated profit margin, because this exceeds the competence that has been attributed to this Court and the legality control of the administrative function that it is responsible for exercising. Again, we reiterate that, if the plaintiff considers that the calculation base established in Article 3 of Law No. 7119 is disproportionate, unreasonable, or violative of the principle of constitutional equality, it must file the respective action in order to obtain its declaration of unconstitutionality, which has not been done, as we indicated ut supra.

VIII.- For further support, it must be kept in mind that the rates and prices of public services (such as the one provided by the plaintiff) are set based on a series of guiding principles, of which it is pertinent to highlight two that derive from Articles 3 and 31 of Law No. 7593. First, the principle of service at cost, according to which the setting must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service, which allow for a competitive retribution and guarantee the adequate development of the activity. Second, the principle of financial equilibrium, which ensures the provider the economic benefit that has been agreed. For such purposes, Article 31 of Law No. 7593 indicates, as relevant, that when setting the rates and prices of public services, ARESEP will take into account, as a general rule, the model productive structures for each public service, according to the development of knowledge, technology, the possibilities of the service, the activity in question, and the size of the provider companies. Only if there is a proven impossibility to apply this procedure, will the particular situation of each company be considered. The indicated rule adds that ARESEP must apply models for annual rate adjustments, depending on the modification of variables external to the administration of the service providers, such as inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, hydrocarbon prices, salary adjustments made by the Executive Branch, and any other variable that the regulatory body considers pertinent. Also, that the rates for public services must contemplate the following aspects and criteria, when applicable: a) Guarantee financial equilibrium. b) The recognition of the cost schemes of the various project financing contracting mechanisms, their special forms of payment, and their effective costs, among others. For its part, Article 32 of the same Law establishes which costs will not be considered in the price structure, among them, fines imposed on the service providers for failure to comply with obligations established by this law, unnecessary expenditures or those unrelated to the provision of the public service, contributions, expenses, investments, and debts incurred for activities unrelated to the administration, operation, or maintenance of the regulated activity, operating expenses disproportionate in relation to the normal expenses of equivalent activities, investments rejected by ARESEP for considering them excessive for the provision of the public service, the value of billings not collected by the regulated companies, with the exception of the percentages technically set by the regulatory body. Finally, it is worth noting that Article 20 of this same law enshrines, in essence, the duty of public service providers to maintain separate accounting that differentiates the public service activity from those that are not.

It also notes that common revenues and costs must be recorded in accordance with technical standards that allow for a distribution that does not harm the public service activity.

**IX.-** Thus, in our view, from the stated rules it can be concluded that the expenditures incurred by the public service provider for the payment of taxes constitute, as a general rule, a cost that forms part of the service price structure and that, therefore, must be considered when establishing the profit margin (margen de utilidad) of public service providers. Consequently, if in the case of the structure applicable to the plaintiff's activity (that is, the purchase and distribution of fuels) this is not the case, it is evident that what may be subject to control is the methodology used in the specific case. However, the fact is that the plaintiff company did not challenge this methodology in this proceeding, which is why this Court cannot review its legality nor establish whether, in its case, it considers or not the payment of the IP or the extent to which this affects its profit margin. It should be noted that what is being challenged here are, solely, administrative acts (actos administrativos) that rejected the IP declaration filed by the plaintiff company, informing it that it had to calculate the tax according to the legally established calculation basis. Thus, the factual and legal grounds serving as the basis for that decision did exist actually and legally at the time of its adoption (because the plaintiff performed the taxable event (hecho generador) of the IP and the quantitative elements of that tax are established by legal rules that have not been declared unconstitutional), so its content is lawful insofar as it is substantially in conformity with the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico). Therefore, the first claim is unfounded, and the request seeking a declaration of nullity of any administrative act derived from the preceding resolutions, and that are related to the present matter specifically on the questioned points, must also be rejected. Besides the fact that these formal conducts are not specified, which prevents a concrete legality comparison, the fact is that, if these were ancillary or aimed at executing the challenged acts, they would also be valid formal conducts.

**X.- On the other claims.** The plaintiff also requests that the refund (devolución) of the sums paid for principal, interest paid, and penalties be ordered, plus interest until the day of the deposit, as well as an indexation of the sums, on the proportion of the adjustments they request be annulled. The request is unfounded. On the one hand, it has not been proven in this proceeding that the plaintiff has paid any sum of money to the defendant local entity for the payment of the IP discussed here. But, furthermore, within the logical framework of this action, the recently mentioned claims are directly linked to the request for a declaration of invalidity of the challenged conducts. These are aspects regarding which there is an undeniable accessory relationship with the nullity claim. Therefore, by establishing in this judgment the validity of what was done in the administrative venue (sede administrativa) and with it, the substantial conformity with the legal system of the conduct being challenged, it is evident that the indicated requests are unfounded. Consequently, said items must be denied." (…)(…)” (emphasis not in original). The **rate** of the IP is regulated, in general, in Article 4, which establishes that “(…) The net taxable income and the annual gross sales or revenues shall determine the amount of the patent tax that each taxpayer must pay. One per thousand shall be applied to the gross sales or revenues, plus five per thousand on the net taxable income. Said sum divided by four shall determine the quarterly tax payable. In cases where taxpayers do not obtain net taxable income, being income tax declarants, or when not being so they cannot calculate such income, the corresponding factor shall be applied to the gross sales or revenues. (…)” Subsequently, section 15 establishes a special rate for certain activities, namely, “(…) a. Banks and financial establishments, except state banks (banking houses, exchange houses, finance companies and similar entities, and insurance institutions). They shall pay for each quarter on gross interest or commission income, or both, received in the previous year: ¢ 4.00 per ¢ 1,000.00 Minimum ¢ 1,000.00 quarterly. b. Real estate broker. They shall pay for each quarter on commissions received in the previous year: ¢ 3.00 per each ¢ 1,000.00 Minimum ¢ 1,000.00 c. Entertainment venues in which skill or chance games, or both, permitted by law are operated. They shall pay for each quarter on the gross income of the previous year. ¢ 3,000 per each ¢ 1,000.00 ch. Short-stay lodging establishments. They shall pay for each quarter on the gross income of the previous year. ¢ 5,000 per each ¢ 1,000.00 (…)” The indicated rule warns that when different activities listed therein are carried out jointly in the same establishment, the amount of the levy shall be determined in accordance with what is established in Article 12, according to which the amount of the levy shall be determined by the total sum of the tax corresponding to each one individually. On the other hand, section 16 indicates that to tax any newly established lucrative activity that cannot be subject to the tax procedure of the aforementioned Article 4, the Municipality may make an estimate based on the procedures authorized by the Tax Code of Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, hereinafter CNPT), for oversight purposes; a levy that shall be provisional and must be modified based on the first declaration that the patent holder must make, in which case any excess difference must be credited to them, or charged in the opposite case. Furthermore, it must be understood that there are no deductions from the taxable base because Law No. 7114 does not provide for them and because, rather, it states that the tax calculation base shall be on the gross (not net) sales or revenues received (not accrued). Regarding the **temporal element**, we have that Article 5 establishes that the IP must be declared each year, no later than November 30, before the Municipality of Santo Domingo; with the exception of special cases in which companies have authorization from the Dirección General de Tributación to file the declaration after the date established by law, which may file the IP declaration with the Municipality up to thirty days after the authorized date. For such purposes, a sworn declaration must be provided indicating the amount of gross sales or revenues and the net taxable income, for which the Municipality shall send the respective forms to the taxpayers. According to Article 10, if the patent holder does not file the declaration within the indicated terms, the Municipality shall apply an ex officio assessment. If it is filed later, at most six months after the date indicated in Article 5, the corresponding tax shall be assessed. If the assessable amount is lower than that determined ex officio, the Municipality must credit the overpaid sums to the patent holder's account. Otherwise, it shall proceed in accordance with the previous article. Finally, taxpayers who do not file the declaration within the term shall be sanctioned with a fine equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the patent tax corresponding to the previous year. Now, the cited Law No. 7119 does not establish the date on which the tax must be paid, which is why that rule must be integrated with the general rule established in Article 40 of the CNPT. In accordance with Article 6, patent holders who are Income Tax declarants must submit a copy of that declaration to the Municipality. Meanwhile, section 7 indicates that patent holders who are not Income Tax declarants must accompany their IP declaration with a photocopy of the last payroll payment receipt to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or a certificate from the respective agency of that institution regarding the total declared salaries; or failing that, an explanatory note of the reasons why they are exempt from contributing to Social Security. Finally, it should be added that Article 9 of the same Law authorizes the Municipality of Santo Domingo to verify with the Dirección General de Tributación the accuracy of the data provided by the patent holders. If it is proven that there is an alteration of that data, a circumstance that determines that the assigned amount is incorrect, the Municipality shall make the corresponding reassessment. Likewise, when the Dirección General de Tributación makes any reassessment in the income tax, it must communicate it ex officio to the Municipality for the appropriate action. The certification of the Municipal Accounting Office, indicating the difference owed by the patent holder by virtue of the reassessment, shall serve as an executive title for the purposes of collecting that difference. The taxpayer's right is preserved to challenge the reassessment made by the corresponding office, in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Code. Once the administrative route is exhausted, the taxpayer shall be obliged to pay the established sum, as long as there is no ruling from the competent judicial authority.

**V.- Regarding the legality review of the challenged formal conducts.** The plaintiff company questions the legality of the cited resolution No. 04-2015, issued by the Third Section of this Court, the cited act No. SDDGC-045-2012, and the resolutions of the Municipal Mayor at 11:20 a.m. on August 14, 2013, and at 1:35 p.m. on September 3, 2013. In truth, the motive and content of the referred formal conducts are questioned in two senses. In the first of them, the plaintiff party **challenges the obligation to have a municipal license to operate the distribution of hydrocarbons**. The foregoing because, it affirms, the special business activity it provides does not require one and demanding it is unreasonable and excessive. It maintains that the activity it carries out is of a special nature and regulated by the State because it is a public service. It cites to this effect Article 56 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and section 5 of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, according to which the supply of fuel derived from hydrocarbons constitutes a public service. It adds that Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31502-MINAE-S regulates the procedure for obtaining the authorization for developing the activity it deploys. It also refers to the judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber No. 8857-2000 at 3:57 p.m. on October 10, 2000, and No. 14961-2016, issued at 9:05 a.m. on October 14, 2016, according to which, it says, by carrying out an activity of a special nature such as the distribution of hydrocarbons, it does not have the duty to have a municipal license because it already obtained the authorizations required to provide that public service, which are technical and more complex. It explains that the profit margin, in its case, is set by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (hereinafter ARESEP) and is minimal because it is at cost, which is why it cannot be excessively taxed. It concludes that as a provider of a public service, it does not have the duty to have a municipal license or to pay the tax, and that according to the principles of progressivity in human rights, pro homine, and pro libertatis, an exemption or non-subjection to the IP must be interpreted in its favor. For its part, the representative of the **defendant local entity** maintains that the license is necessary because a lucrative commercial activity is carried out in the canton. After a measured analysis, the Court considers that the plaintiff party's argument is unfounded for the following reasons. Sections 88 of the CM and 1 of the cited Law No. 7119 require that prior to carrying out any lucrative activity, in this case, in the canton of Santo Domingo, the respective municipal license must be obtained, which shall be obtained by paying a tax. This is a legal requirement demanded for carrying out any lucrative activity, without the rule making any distinction depending on who provides it (a private subject, a public entity, or an individual through a concession) or the nature of the activity. In the case at hand, the plaintiff party states that it is dedicated to the purchase and distribution of fuel in the national territory and that the domicile of this economic activity is in Santo Domingo, a fact that is admitted by the defendant local entity. In the Court's opinion, carrying out this economic activity requires a municipal license because the indicated rules require it and, furthermore, because it clearly follows from Article 14 of the cited Law No. 7119. That rule states, of interest, that "(...) For all the lucrative activities that are listed below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the patent holders shall pay in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of this law. The activities indicated in Article 15 are excepted. (...) c. Services: Comprises services provided to the private sector, the public sector, or both, that are attended by organizations or private persons. Comprises transportation, storage, communications, and private educational and recreational establishments. (...)" (emphasis not in original). Thus, there is no doubt that the rule includes the transportation of hydrocarbon derivatives, which is the commercial activity to which the plaintiff company here is dedicated, which, additionally, we estimate is lucrative. The foregoing because, even though it is a public service that the plaintiff provides, in principle, on the occasion of an enabling act (an aspect we shall return to infra), the truth is that a profit margin does exist, which, although established by ARESEP based on the principle of service at cost, guarantees it a gain or profit. Therefore, we estimate that the normative assumptions that oblige the plaintiff company to have a municipal license in order to carry out its lucrative commercial activity are present. The Court does not share the plaintiff's argument that it is not obliged to obtain that license, given that it was granted an enabling act by virtue of which it provides an activity of a special nature because it is a concessioned public service, which is subject to strong control by the State, the Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo, and ARESEP; a reason why obliging it to have the referred license is disproportionate and unreasonable. As a first aspect, we must indicate that the plaintiff company did not provide to this process the enabling act it claims to have to dedicate itself to the purchase and distribution of fuel, an indispensable element for this Court to have been able to assess the nature of the referred act and the conditions established therein for the provision of the service. This was a procedural burden incumbent upon the plaintiff and which has clearly been disregarded. But, in any case, in the Court's opinion, even if that enabling act had been granted to it, that does not exempt it from having the municipal license for carrying out the activity in question because, we reiterate, there are legal rules that impose that obligation.

In addition to the above, we consider that the fact that the purchase, distribution, and supply of hydrocarbon-derived fuels (within which are included: 1) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined to supply national demand at distribution plants and 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer) is established as a public service in accordance with articles 3 and 5 subsection d) of the ARESEP Law, does not mean in and of itself (persé) that its provision is exempt from the obligation to obtain a municipal license referred to in articles 88 of the CM, 1 and 14 of the cited Law No. 7119. Especially when the indicated legal norm does not contemplate any exception to the general rule contained in ordinal 1 ibidem and the plaintiff company also does not indicate which is the regulation that, it considers, exempts it from having the license in question. The Tribunal is clear that the transport of hydrocarbon derivatives is a public service that is concessionable and susceptible to commercial exploitation by private parties, who can manage it indirectly in exchange for the collection of a rate charged to the users or beneficiaries of the service. Therefore, its provision is subject to a strong Public Law regime manifested in a series of regulations and controls, for example, from the Ministry of Environment and Energy regarding the granting of the concession and compliance with the indispensable requirements for the provision of the service, and from ARESEP, regarding the rate regime, regulation, and quality of the service. But, in our opinion, this does not exempt the provider or concessionaire from compliance with the other budgets or requirements that the legal system establishes for such purposes, such as, in this case, the municipal license to which we have referred and which responds to purposes different from those weighed when the concession is granted or the rate is set. The requirement of the municipal license contributes to the urban planning of the canton because it allows the local corporation to verify, for example, that the activity is carried out within the regulations contained in the regulatory plans in aspects such as land use; which is of utmost relevance in the commercial activity carried out by the plaintiff, given its dangerousness and risk. Therefore, in the opinion of this Tribunal, in the absence of a legal norm that expressly exempts from the obligation to have a municipal license to engage in the purchase and distribution of fuel, the plaintiff company must submit to the legal system, which means it must have the referred license to carry out that lucrative commercial activity in the canton of Santo Domingo. To do otherwise would be to consent to the disapplication of legal norms in the specific case and to incur in a differentiation (by reason of the regime to which the commercial activity of the plaintiff is subject) that, in our opinion, has no place in the legal system. Finally, we consider that the constitutional precedents cited by the plaintiff are not applicable in this case. The cited judgment No. 8857-2000 refers to an amparo proceeding against the Municipality of San José and ARESEP, in which the charging of the IP to fuel retail companies, i.e., gas stations, was discussed. Thus, these are situations different from the one discussed here since the ruling refers to the charging of the IP (and not the obtaining of the commercial license) by another municipality and, therefore, regulated in another law, as well as in relation to an activity different from the one exercised by the plaintiff here. On the other hand, the cited judgment No. 14961-2016 refers to an amparo appeal filed by a dentist against the Municipality of Desamparados, for having forced her to obtain a commercial license or patent, a situation different from the one discussed here, given that it involves the liberal practice of a profession and not a commercial activity like the one analyzed here. What the plaintiff company seeks is, by resorting to constitutional precedents that are not applicable to the specific case, for this Tribunal to disapply legal norms that oblige it to obtain a municipal license to exercise the lucrative commercial activity of fuel purchase and distribution, a request that exceeds the competence that the Constituent granted to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction in article 49 of the Magna Carta and which is limited, in essence, to the legality control of the administrative function; which evidently does not include determining whether the requirements imposed by legal norms for the exercise of a lucrative commercial activity are disproportionate, unreasonable, or violative of the principle of constitutional equality. Strictly speaking, such an examination is reserved for the Constitutional Chamber by virtue of article 10 of the Political Constitution and the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, to which the plaintiff company must resort if it considers that the legal norms that oblige it to obtain the referred commercial license are unconstitutional for the reasons already set forth. It should be noted that this Tribunal consulted both the Costa Rican Legal Information System and the Constitutional Chamber whether any action existed or had been admitted against the cited Law No. 7119, and the response was negative. Thus, with respect to the legality control for which this Tribunal is competent and for the reasons set forth ut supra, it has been determined that the plaintiff exercises a lucrative commercial activity in the canton of Santo Domingo and that no legal norm exists that exempts it from obtaining the commercial license required for such purposes. Therefore, on this point no deficiency is observed in the contested conducts, which is why the plaintiff's argument must be rejected, as is hereby done.

VI.- The plaintiff company also alleges the abusive and improper application of tax norms and the taxable base in the IP. It explains that, if it were interpreted that it requires a municipal license and must assume the payment of the IP, the way in which the defendant municipality calculates the tax is totally illegal. It considers that the principle of economic reality provided for in article 8 of the CNP must be applied and cites rulings from the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal and from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that develop it. It considers that as its activity is completely regulated by ARESEP, which establishes the profit margin, applying the IP rate on gross income constitutes a transgression of the economic reality of its company and an illegitimate enrichment of the municipal corporation. It argues that the abuse of municipal action in that sense has been recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in judgments No. 8857-2000 and No. 094-2001, where it was declared unconstitutional to attempt to charge the referred tax using gross income as the taxable base in the activity of fuel distribution and retail. It affirms being in a factual framework analogous to what the Constitutional Chamber has already declared as improper and, therefore, harmful to its rights and guarantees. It cites in its support article 20 of the ARESEP Law. In this regard, the representative of the defendant local entity maintains that the method of calculating the tax is given by law. After a careful analysis, the Tribunal considers that, in the manner it is presented, this argument must also be rejected. The foregoing because the questioning of the plaintiff company is in relation to the quantitative element of the IP, that is, the calculation basis of the referred tax; an element that in accordance with article 5 subsection a) of the CNPT is reserved to the Law. Thus, it was the legislator who in article 3 of the cited Law No. 7119 established that the taxable base of the tax in question would be fixed taking into account the taxable net income and the sales or gross income received by the individuals or legal entities subject to the tax, during the fiscal period prior to the year in which the imposition occurs. Thus, it is not possible to establish that the plaintiff must pay the tax based on the profit margin approved by ARESEP because that is not the calculation basis established by the legislator. On this point, it should be added that, if Law No. 7191 does not contemplate a different taxable base for cases in which the commercial activity has a regulated profit margin, neither the contested formal conducts nor this Tribunal could establish a differentiated treatment, because that would result in a direct disapplication of what is established in the referred ordinal 3. Again, if the plaintiff considers that the calculation basis established by the legislator is unreasonable, disproportionate, or violates tax equity or justice (by taxing the gross sales or income received and not the profit margin established by ARESEP), it must raise that question before the Constitutional Chamber, the competent body in accordance with article 10 of the Magna Carta and the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and given the concentrated control that exists in this matter. On the other hand, we consider that the reference to the principle of economic reality is not acceptable for the purpose of seeking to calculate the tax in question on a calculation basis different from the one legally provided. In relation to the issue, it is necessary to point out that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 01181, issued at 14 hours 48 minutes on November 12, 2009, indicated, in relevant part, "(...) in tax matters, it is possible to distinguish two areas of application of the cited principle. The first, referring properly to the interpretation of the content of the norm, understanding that the legal operator should not limit themselves to the simple sense of the words used by it, but rather, at the moment of performing this intellectual operation, must privilege the purpose pursued by the legislator in creating the tax. In the matter in question, the taxing power of the State aims to tax a specific source of wealth, so that, when defining the scope of a norm, one must take into account the reality (economic, of course) that justified the exercise of this power. At the base of this approach lies the recognition that regulation, although carried out from a legal perspective, refers to economic transactions, so that it is these particularities that should define the content of the provisions, and not legal concepts, which are in many cases alien to this reality. However, this does not imply an open type through which legislation may be modified by means of interpretations, which would be equivalent to illegitimately substituting the Legislative Assembly, as well as a violation of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. On the contrary, what is sought to be avoided is that the constitutional duty to contribute to public burdens, characteristic of a Social and Democratic State of Law, becomes nugatory through legal technicalities, privileging the assessment of the reality, the purpose of the tax norm, and the economic capacity that was intended to be taxed.(...)" (the underlining is ours). In that line, this principle refers to the interpretation of the content of the tax norm in the sense that the legal operator should not limit themselves to the simple sense of the words used by it, but rather, at the time of performing the intellectual analysis, is obligated to prioritize the purpose pursued by the legislator in creating the tax. But the judgment in question is also clear in indicating that the foregoing does not imply the creation of an open type through which legislation may be modified by means of interpretations, which would result in an illegitimate substitution of the legislator, as well as the transgression of the principles of division of functions, legal certainty, legality, and legal reserve. Therefore, it is improper for the plaintiff, alleging the principle of economic reality, to seek to disregard or change the calculation basis of the IP provided by the legislator because that would entail, we reiterate, the disapplication and singular derogation of a current legal norm in its favor, in open violation of the Principle of Legality.

VII.- We consider, in addition, that the constitutional precedents cited by the plaintiff are not applicable to the specific case. The foregoing because both the cited judgment No. 8857-2000 and No. 094-2001 refer to amparo appeals (not unconstitutionality actions) in which the IP of other municipalities different from the defendant here (San José and Belén) was discussed in relation to a specific activity (fuel retailers or gas stations) different from the one exercised by the plaintiff. But, moreover, it should be noted that, although in both rulings it was established, in essence, that the charging of the IP made to fuel retailers in those cantons, in the way it was being done, was violative of the principle of equality, as well as unreasonable and disproportionate, because it was not taking into account the existence of a profit margin previously set by the State; the truth is that this was so because it was also considered that the payment of the IP was not incorporated into the operating cost structure by ARESEP nor considered when establishing the price or profit margin. Even in the referred judgment No. 8857-2000 there are dissenting votes that dismiss the appeal because they considered that "(...) if the payment of municipal taxes were deductible as an operating cost, or what is the same, if the cost could be integrated to determine the sale price of fuel to the consumer, the cause of the mismatch in the application of the tax to fuel retailers – like the protected companies- would disappear, and consequently, there would be no violation whatsoever of the principle of equality to their detriment. (..)"; and they had as accredited in the specific case that " (...) as stated by the General Regulator in their report, the appellants themselves provided to the case file a copy of the certification issued by him, in which it is determined that in the case of fuel supply the methodology used does recognize a percentage to cover costs of taxes and patents (see report at folio 15 and copy of certification at folio 6), which corresponds to 0.0862% of the gross income established in the model station. Thus, this amparo really consists of the appellants' disagreement with that percentage and not that they are given different treatment than other merchants, since under oath the General Regulator is emphatic in indicating that the current model contemplates a percentage for the recognition of patent taxes, which is applied to the activity developed by the protected companies. Thus, it does not fall to the Chamber to determine the percentage assigned by the regulatory body as recognition for payment of municipal patent and in general for operating costs, within the cost structure that the protected companies must assume, as this is eminently technical matter, which cannot be aired in the summary amparo proceeding. Given the foregoing, what actually corresponds is for the appellants to submit the corresponding petition, so that the percentage amount assigned as recognition for the concept of municipal patent payment within the cost structure is reviewed, and not for the Chamber to issue any pronouncement in this regard, as it is reiterated, it is a matter of legality beyond the competencies of the Constitutional Tribunal. (...)." The foregoing is important because, as we explained, in our opinion the calculation basis of the IP is determined by the cited Law No. 7119 and cannot be disapplied in the specific case by this Tribunal, to establish a different one for the plaintiff, for the sole fact that the lucrative commercial activity it exercises is by virtue of a concession and with a regulated profit margin, because that exceeds the competence that has been attributed to this Tribunal and the legality control of the administrative function it is called to exercise. We reiterate again that, if the plaintiff considers that the calculation basis established in ordinal 3 of Law No 7119 is disproportionate, unreasonable, or violative of the principle of constitutional equality, it must file the respective action in order to obtain its declaration of unconstitutionality, which has not been done, as we indicated ut supra.

VIII.- For greater abundance, it must be kept in mind that the rates and prices of public services (such as the one provided by the plaintiff) are fixed based on a series of guiding principles, of which it is relevant to highlight two that derive from articles 3 and 31 of Law No. 7593. First, the cost-of-service principle, according to which the fixing must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service, which allow a competitive remuneration and guarantee the adequate development of the activity. Second, the financial equilibrium, which assures the provider the economic benefit that has been agreed upon. For such purposes, article 31 of Law No. 7593 states, in relevant part, that when fixing the rates and prices of public services, ARESEP will take into account, as a general rule, the model productive structures for each public service, according to the development of knowledge, technology, the possibilities of the service, the activity in question, and the size of the providing companies. Only if there is proven impossibility to apply this procedure, will the particular situation of each company be considered.

The indicated standard adds that ARESEP must apply models for the annual adjustment of rates, based on changes in variables external to the management of the service providers, such as inflation, exchange rates, interest rates, fuel prices, salary adjustments made by the Executive Branch, and any other variable the regulatory body considers pertinent. Also, that the rates for public services must consider the following aspects and criteria, when applicable: a) Guarantee financial equilibrium. b) The recognition of cost schemes for the different mechanisms for contracting project financing, their special forms of payment, and their effective costs, among others. For its part, Article 32 of the same Law establishes which costs shall not be considered in the price structure, including: fines imposed on service providers for failure to comply with the obligations established by this law, unnecessary expenditures or those unrelated to the provision of the public service, contributions, expenses, investments, and debts incurred for activities unrelated to the administration, operation, or maintenance of the regulated activity, operating expenses that are disproportionate in relation to the normal expenses of equivalent activities, investments rejected by ARESEP for being considered excessive for the provision of the public service, and the value of uncollected billings by regulated companies, with the exception of the percentages technically set by the regulatory body. Finally, it is worth noting that Article 20 of this same law enshrines, at its core, the duty of public service providers to keep separate accounting records that differentiate public service activity from activities that are not. It also indicates that common income and costs must be recorded according to technical standards that allow for a distribution that does not harm the public service activity.

**IX.-** Therefore, in our opinion, from the cited standards it can be concluded that expenditures incurred by the public service provider for the payment of taxes constitute, as a general rule, a cost that forms part of the service's price structure and, therefore, must be considered when establishing the profit margin of public service providers. Hence, if in the case of the structure applied to the service provided by the plaintiff (that is, the purchase and distribution of fuels) this is not the case, it is evident that what can be subject to review is the methodology used in the specific case. However, the fact is that the plaintiff company did not challenge that methodology in this proceeding, which is why this Court cannot review its legality nor establish whether, in its case, it considers the payment of the IP or the extent to which it affects its profit margin. Note that what is being challenged here are, solely, administrative acts that rejected the IP declaration (declaración del IP) filed by the plaintiff company, indicating that it had to calculate the tax according to the legally established tax base. Thus, the factual and legal grounds serving as the basis for that decision did exist, in reality and legally, at the time of its adoption (because the plaintiff carried out the taxable event of the IP and the quantitative elements of that tax are established by legal standards that have not been declared unconstitutional), so its content is lawful insofar as it substantially conforms to the legal order. Consequently, the first claim is without merit, and the request to declare the nullity of any administrative act derived from the previous resolutions, and related to this matter specifically on the points questioned, must also be rejected. Besides the fact that it is not specified what those formal acts are, which prevents a concrete legality comparison, the truth is that, if these were accessory to or intended to execute the challenged acts, they would also be valid formal acts.

**X.- Regarding the other claims.** The plaintiff also requests that the return be ordered of the sums paid for principal, interest paid, and penalties, plus interest up to the day of deposit, as well as an indexation of the sums, on the proportion of the adjustments requested to be annulled. The request is without merit. On the one hand, it has not been proven in this proceeding that the plaintiff has paid any sum of money to the defendant local entity for the payment of the IP discussed herein. But, furthermore, within the logical framework of this action, the aforementioned claims are directly linked to the request for a declaration of invalidity of the challenged acts. These are issues regarding which there is an undeniable relationship of accessoriness with the nullity claim. Therefore, upon this judgment establishing the validity of what was acted upon at the administrative level, and with it, the substantial conformity with the legal order of the act subject to challenge, it is evident that the indicated requests are without merit. Consequently, these items must be denied."

"III.- Objeto del proceso. La sociedad actora formula, en lo medular, una pretensión tendente a que se declare la nulidad absoluta de diferentes conductas formales de la Municipalidad accionada y el contralor no jerárquico en esa materia, mediante las cuales se le rechazó la Declaración Jurada de IP No. 0370, correspondiente al período fiscal que iba del primero de octubre del 2010 al 30 de setiembre del 2011 y se le comunicó que la determinación de ese tributo debía calcularse y cancelarse conforme al monto declarado ante la Dirección General de Tributación, correspondiente a las ventas o ingresos brutos y la renta líquida gravable del período fiscal correspondiente. En lo fundamental, alega los siguientes vicios: 1) Que la actividad empresarial especial que presta (compra y distribución de combustible) no requiere licencia municipal para su operación y exigirla es irrazonable y excesivo. 2) La abusiva aplicación de la norma tributaria e indebida aplicación de la base imponible del IP. Se pretende, además, que se ordene al ente local accionado devolver las sumas pagadas por concepto de principal, intereses pagados, y sanciones, más intereses hasta el día del depósito, así como una indexación de las sumas, sobre la proporción de los ajustes que se solicitan se anulen. Se trata, este último, de un pedimento accesorio que depende del acogimiento de la nulidad reclamada. Para lo que se considera un mejor orden, se abordará el examen de legalidad de las conductas formales que se impugnan y las restantes pretensiones en atención a los ejes temáticos que en sus agravios plantea el demandante y las argumentaciones del accionado, a fin de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias, con el correspondiente análisis, claro está, de todo lo argüido.

IV.- Sobre el Impuesto de Patentes en el cantón de Santo Domingo. Por el tema que se debate, el Tribunal estima conveniente indicar que, como derivación del artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, el artículo 88 del Código Municipal dispone que, para ejercer cualquier actividad lucrativa en los cantones, los interesados deberán contar con la licencia municipal respectiva, la cual se obtendrá mediante el pago de un impuesto. Dicho impuesto se pagará durante todo el tiempo en que se ejerza la actividad lucrativa o por el tiempo que se haya poseído la licencia, aunque la actividad no se haya realizado. A partir de esa norma es viable distinguir entre la licencia, la cual responde al acto administrativo que habilita al particular para ejercer determinada actividad de naturaleza lucrativa y el pago del tributo correspondiente por ello, que responde, precisamente, al IP. En el caso que nos ocupa, la Ley No. 7119 del 13 de enero de 1989, es la que regula lo referido a este tributo en el cantón de Santo Domingo. En lo que toca al elemento subjetivo y conforme al artículo primero de la referida ley, son sujetos pasivos todas las personas físicas o jurídicas que se dediquen al ejercicio de cualquier tipo de actividad lucrativa en ese cantón u obtengan la licencia para tales efectos. En relación con el elemento objetivo, tenemos que conforme a los numerales 1, 14 y 15 de la misma Ley, el hecho generador ocurre con el ejercicio de cualquier tipo de actividad lucrativa en el cantón de Santo Domingo o la obtención de la licencia para tales efectos. No obstante, hay que aclarar que, en cuanto a su aspecto espacial, el ordinal 13 ibídem grava la actividad lucrativa que se distribuya en uno o más cantones, fuera de Santo Domingo, para lo cual deberá determinarse la proporción del volumen del negocio que se genera en ese cantón, para efectos del pago del impuesto. En sus aspectos cuantitativos, el artículo 3 de la referida Ley establece la base imponible del tributo cuando indica que “(…) Salvo los casos en que esta ley determina un procedimiento diferente para fijar el monto del impuesto de patente, se establecen como factores determinantes de la imposición, la renta líquida gravable y las ventas o ingresos brutos que perciban las personas físicas o jurídicas afectas al impuesto, durante el período fiscal anterior al año en que se dé la imposición. Por ventas se entiende el volumen de éstas, hecha la deducción del impuesto que establece la Ley del Impuesto sobre las Ventas. en el caso de establecimientos financieros y de compra y venta de bienes raíces, se considera como ventas o ingresos brutos lo percibido por concepto de comisiones e intereses. (…)”. (el resaltado no corresponde al original). La tarifa del IP se regula, de manera general, en el artículo 4 el cual establece que “(…) La renta líquida gravable y las ventas o ingresos brutos anuales determinarán el monto del impuesto de patente que le corresponde pagar a cada contribuyente. Se aplicará el uno por mil sobre las ventas o ingresos brutos, más un cinco por mil sobre la renta líquida gravable. Dicha suma dividida entre cuatro determinará el impuesto trimestral por pagar. En los casos en que los contribuyentes no obtengan renta líquida gravable, siendo declarantes del impuesto sobre la renta, o cuando por no serlo no puedan calcular dicha renta, se aplicará el factor correspondiente a las ventas o ingresos brutos. (…)”. Luego, en el numeral 15 se establece una tarifa especial para ciertas actividades, a saber, “(…) a. Bancos y establecimientos financieros, excepto los bancos estatales (casas de banca, de cambio, financieras y similares e instituciones aseguradoras). Pagarán por cada trimestre sobre los ingresos por intereses brutos o comisiones, o por ambos, percibidos en el año anterior: ¢ 4,00 por ¢ 1.000,00 Mínimo ¢ 1.000,00 trimestral. b. Comerciante de bienes inmuebles. Pagarán por cada trimestre sobre comisiones percibidas en el año anterior: ¢ 3,00 por cada ¢ 1.000,00 Mínimo ¢ 1.000,00 c. Salones de diversión en los que se exploten juegos de habilidad o aleatorios, o ambos, permitidos por ley. Pagarán por cada trimestre sobre los ingresos brutos del año anterior. ¢ 3,000 por cada ¢ 1.000,00 ch. Establecimientos de hospedaje momentáneo. Pagarán por cada trimestre sobre los ingresos brutos del año anterior. ¢ 5,000 por cada ¢ 1.000,00 (…)”. La norma indicada advierte que cuando en un mismo establecimiento se realicen conjuntamente diferentes actividades de las ahí señaladas, el monto de la imposición se determinará de acuerdo con lo que se establece en el artículo 12, según el cual el monto de la imposición lo determinará la suma total del impuesto que corresponda a cada una individualmente. Por otra parte, el ordinal 16 señala que para gravar toda actividad lucrativa recién establecida que no pueda sujetarse al procedimiento impositivo del artículo 4 referido, la Municipalidad podrá hacer una estimación con base en los procedimientos autorizados por el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (en adelante CNPT), para los efectos de fiscalización; imposición que tendrá carácter provisional y deberá modificarse con base en la primera declaración que le corresponda hacer al patentado, en cuyo caso deberá acreditársele a éste cualquier diferencia por exceso, o cargársele en caso contrario. Además, hay que entender que no caben deducciones a la base imponible porque la Ley No. 7114 no las prevé y porque, más bien, señala que la base de cálculo del tributo será sobre las ventas o ingresos brutos (que no netos) percibidos (que no devengados). Respecto al elemento temporal, tenemos que el artículo 5 establece que el IP debe declararse cada año, a más tardar el 30 de noviembre, ante la Municipalidad de Santo Domingo; con excepción de casos especiales en que las empresas tengan autorización de la Dirección General de Tributación para presentar la declaración con posterioridad a la fecha que establece la ley, las que podrán presentar la declaración del IP a la Municipalidad hasta treinta días después de la fecha autorizada. Para tales efectos, deberá aportarse una declaración jurada que indique el monto de las ventas o los ingresos brutos y la renta líquida gravable, para lo cual la Municipalidad remitirá a los contribuyentes los formularios respectivos. Conforme al artículo 10, si el patentado no presenta la declaración dentro de los términos indicados, la Municipalidad le aplicará la calificación de oficio. Si la presenta posteriormente, como máximo seis meses después de la fecha indicada en el artículo 5, se procederá a calificar el impuesto que corresponda. Si el monto imponible fuere inferior al determinado de oficio, la Municipalidad deberá acreditar a la cuenta del patentado las sumas pagadas de más. En caso contrario se procederá de acuerdo con el artículo anterior. Finalmente, los contribuyentes que no presenten la declaración dentro del término, serán sancionados con una multa equivalente al diez por ciento (10%) del impuesto de patente que corresponda al año anterior. Ahora bien, la Ley No. 7119 citada, no establece la fecha en que debe pagarse el tributo, razón por la cual, esa norma debe integrarse con la regla general establecida en el artículo 40 del CNPT. De conformidad con el artículo 6º, los patentados que sean declarantes del Impuesto sobre la Renta deberán presentar una copia de esa declaración a la Municipalidad. Mientras que el numeral 7 señala que los patentados que no sean declarantes del Impuesto sobre la Renta deberán acompañar a su declaración del IP, una fotocopia del último recibo del pago de planillas a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro social, o una constancia de la agencia respectiva de esa institución sobre el total de los salarios declarados; o en su defecto, una nota explicativa de las razones por las cuales se les exime de cotizar para el Seguro Social. Finalmente, cabe agregar que el artículo 9 de la misma Ley autoriza a la Municipalidad de Santo Domingo para que verifique ante la Dirección General de Tributación, la exactitud de los datos suministrados por los patentados. Si se comprobara que existe alteración de esos datos, circunstancia que determine que el monto asignado es incorrecto, la Municipalidad hará la recalificación correspondiente. Asimismo, cuando la Dirección General de Tributación hiciere alguna recalificación en el impuesto sobre la renta, deberá comunicarlo de oficio a la Municipalidad para o que corresponda. La certificación de la Contaduría Municipal, en la que se indique la diferencia adeudada por el patentado en virtud de la recalificación, servirá de título ejecutivo para efectos del cobro de esa diferencia. Queda a salvo el derecho del contribuyente para impugnar la recalificación hecha por la oficina correspondiente, conforme con las disposiciones del Código Municipal. Agotada la vía administrativa, el contribuyente estará obligado a pagar la suma establecida, mientras no exista pronunciamiento de la autoridad judicial competente.

V.- Sobre el examen de legalidad de las conductas formales impugnadas. La sociedad accionante cuestiona la legalidad de la resolución N° 04-2015 citada, emitida por la Sección Tercera de este Tribunal, el acto No. SDDGC-045-2012 citado y las resoluciones del Alcalde Municipal de las 11 horas 20 minutos del 14 de agosto de 2013 y de las 13 horas 35 minutos del 3 setiembre de 2013. En rigor, se cuestiona el motivo y contenido de las referidas conductas formales en dos sentidos. En el primero de ellos, la parte actora cuestiona la obligación de contar con una licencia municipal para operar la distribución de hidrocarburos. Lo anterior porque, afirma, la actividad empresarial especial que presta no la requiere y exigirla es irrazonable y excesivo. Sostiene que la actividad que ejerce es de naturaleza especial y regulada por el Estado porque se trata de un servicio público. Cita al efecto el artículo 56 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y el numeral 5 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, conforme a los cuales el suministro de combustible derivado de hidrocarburos constituye un servicio público. Agrega que el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31502-MINAE-S regula el procedimiento para la obtención de la autorización para el desarrollo de la actividad que despliega. Refiere, también, a las sentencias dictadas por la Sala Constitucional No. 8857-2000 de las 15 horas 57 minutos del 10 de octubre del 2000 y No. 14961-2016 dictada a las 9 horas 5 minutos del 14 de octubre del 2016, conforme a las cuales, dice, por efectuar una actividad de naturaleza especial como la distribución de hidrocarburos, no tiene el deber de contar con una licencia municipal porque ya obtuvo las autorizaciones exigidas para prestar ese servicio público, las cuales son técnicas y más complejas. Explica que el margen de utilidad, en su caso, lo fija la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (en adelante ARESEP) y es ínfimo porque es al costo, razón por la cual no puede gravarse excesivamente. Concluye que por ser prestataria de un servicio público no tiene el deber de contar con una licencia municipal ni de pagar el tributo y que acorde a los principios de progresividad en derechos humanos, pro homine y pro libertatis, hay que interpretar en favor de una exención o no sujeción al IP. Por su parte, el representante del ente local accionado sostiene que la licencia si es necesaria porque se ejerce una actividad comercial lucrativa en el cantón. Luego de un mesurado análisis, el Tribunal estima que el argumento de la parte actora es improcedente por las siguientes razones. Los numerales 88 del CM y 1 de la Ley No. 7119 citada, exigen que previo al ejercicio de cualquier actividad lucrativa, en este caso, en el cantón de Santo Domingo, se deberá contar con la licencia municipal respectiva, la cual se obtendrá mediante el pago de un impuesto. Se trata de una exigencia legal requerida para el ejercicio de cualquier actividad lucrativa, sin que la norma haga distinción alguna atendiendo a quien la preste (un sujeto privado, un ente público o un particular por medio de una concesión) o a la naturaleza de la actividad. En el caso que nos ocupa, la parte actora expone que se dedica a la compra y distribución de combustible en el territorio nacional y que el domicilio de esa actividad económica está en Santo Domingo, hecho que es admitido por el ente local accionado. En criterio de este Tribunal, el ejercicio de esta actividad económica requiere licencia municipal porque así lo exigen las normas indicadas y, además, porque así se desprende claramente del artículo 14 de la Ley No. 7119 citada. Esa norma señala, en lo que interesa, que "(...) Por todas las actividades lucrativas que seguidamente se señalan, comprendidas en la clasificación internacional de actividades económicas, los patentados pagarán conforme con lo dispuesto en los artículos 3 y 4 de esta ley. Se exceptúan las actividades señaladas en el artículo 15. (...) c. Servicios: Comprende los servicios prestados al sector privado, al sector público, o a ambos, que sean atendidos por organizaciones o personas privadas. Comprende el transporte, el almacenaje, las comunicaciones, y los establecimientos de enseñanza privada y de esparcimiento. (...)" (el resaltado no corresponde al original). Así, no hay duda de que la norma incluye el transporte de derivados de hidrocarburos, que es la actividad comercial a la que se dedica la sociedad aquí actora, la cual, además, estimamos que es lucrativa. Lo anterior porque, aunque se trate de un servicio público que la accionante presta, en principio, con ocasión de un acto habilitante (aspecto sobre el cual volveremos infra), lo cierto es que sí existe un margen de utilidad el cual, si bien establecido por la ARESEP con base en el principio del servicio al costo, le garantiza una ganancia o utilidad. Por ello, estimamos que se presentan los presupuestos normativos que obligan a la sociedad accionante a contar con una licencia municipal para poder ejercer su actividad comercial lucrativa. No comparte el Tribunal el argumento de la actora según el cual no está obligada a obtener esa licencia, dado que se le otorgó un acto habilitante en virtud del cual presta una actividad de naturaleza especial por tratarse de un servicio público concesionado, que está sometida a un fuerte control del Estado, la Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo y la ARESEP; razón por la cual obligarla a contar con la referida licencia resulta desproporcionado e irrazonable. Como primer aspecto, debemos indicar que la sociedad demandante no aportó a este proceso el acto habilitante que dice tener para dedicarse a la compra y distribución de combustible, elemento indispensable para que este Tribunal pudiera haber valorado la naturaleza del referido acto y las condiciones ahí establecidas para la prestación del servicio. Se trataba de una carga procesal que incumbía a la accionante y que claramente ha sido desatendida. Pero, en todo caso, en criterio del Tribunal aún y cuando ese acto habilitante le hubiera sido concedido, ello no la exime de contar con la licencia municipal para el ejercicio de la actividad en cuestión porque, reiteramos, existen normas legales que le imponen esa obligación. Aunado a lo anterior, estimamos que el hecho de que la compra, distribución y suministro de combustibles derivados de hidrocarburos (dentro de los que se incluyen: 1) los derivados del petróleo, asfaltos, gas y naftas destinados a abastecer la demanda nacional en planteles de distribución y 2) los derivados del petróleo, asfaltos, gas y naftas destinados al consumidor final) esté establecido como servicio público de conformidad con los artículos 3 y 5 inciso d) de la Ley de la ARESEP, no supone persé que su prestación esté exenta de la obligación de contar con licencia municipal a la que hacen referencia los artículos 88 del CM, 1 y 14 de la Ley No. 7119 referida. Máxime cuando la norma legal indicada no contempla ninguna excepción a la regla general contenida en el ordinal 1 ibídem y la sociedad actora tampoco indica cuál es la normativa que, estima, la exime de contar con la licencia en cuestión. Tiene claro el Tribunal que el transporte de derivados de hidrocarburos es un servicio público que es concesionable y susceptible de explotación comercial por los particulares, quienes pueden gestionarlo indirectamente a cambio del cobro de una tarifa que se cobra a los usuarios o beneficiarios del servicio. Por ello, su prestación está sometida a un fuerte régimen de Derecho Público que se manifiesta en una serie de regulaciones y controles, por ejemplo, del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía en lo que concierne al otorgamiento de la concesión y el cumplimiento de los requisitos indispensables para la prestación del servicio y de la ARESEP, respecto del régimen tarifario, reglamentación y calidad del servicio. Pero, en nuestro criterio, ello no exime al prestatario o concesionario del cumplimiento de los demás presupuestos o requerimientos que el ordenamiento jurídico establece para tales efectos como es, en este caso, la licencia municipal a la que hemos hecho referencia y la cual responde a fines distintos a los que se ponderan cuando se otorga la concesión o se fija la tarifa. La exigencia de la licencia municipal coadyuva a la planificación urbanística del cantón porque permite a la corporación local verificar, por ejemplo, que la actividad se ejerza dentro de las regulaciones contenidas en los planes reguladores en aspectos como el uso de suelo; lo que resulta de suma relevancia en la actividad comercial que lleva a cabo la accionante, dada su peligrosidad y riesgo. Por ello, en criterio de este Tribunal, ante la ausencia de una norma legal que expresamente exima de la obligación de contar con una licencia municipal para ejercer la compra y distribución de combustible, la sociedad accionante debe someterse al ordenamiento jurídico, lo que supone que deberá contar con la referida licencia para llevar a cabo esa actividad comercial lucrativa en el cantón de Santo Domingo. Lo contrario, sería consentir la desaplicación de normas legales en el caso concreto e incurrir en una diferenciación (en razón del régimen a que se encuentra sometida la actividad comercial de la accionante) que, en nuestro criterio, no encuentra cabida en el ordenamiento jurídico. Finalmente, estimamos que los precedentes constitucionales que cita la accionante no resultan aplicables en este caso. La sentencia No. 8857-2000 citada refiere a un proceso de amparo en contra de la Municipalidad de San José y la ARESEP, en la que se discutía el cobro del IP a las empresas expendedoras de combustibles, sea, las gasolineras. De esta forma, se trata de situaciones diversas a la que aquí se discute ya que el fallo refiere al cobro del IP (y no la obtención de la licencia comercial) de otra municipalidad y, por ende, regulado en otra ley, así como en relación con una actividad distinta a la que ejerce la aquí actora. Por otra parte, la sentencia No. 14961-2016 citada refiere a un recurso de amparo planteado por una dentista en contra de la Municipalidad de Desamparados, por haberla obligado a obtener una licencia o patente comercial, situación diversa a la que aquí se discute, dado de que se trata del ejercicio liberal de una profesión y no una actividad comercial como la que aquí se analiza. Lo que la sociedad actora pretende es que, acudiendo a precedentes constitucionales que no resultan aplicables al caso concreto, este Tribunal desaplique normas legales que la obligan a obtener una licencia municipal para ejercer la actividad comercial lucrativa de compra y distribución de combustible, pedido que excede de la competencia que el Constituyente otorgó a la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa en el artículo 49 de la Carta Magna y que se limita, en lo medular, al control de legalidad de la función administrativa; lo que evidentemente no incluye determinar si los requisitos que imponen normas legales para el ejercicio de una actividad comercial lucrativa son desproporcionados, irrazonables o violatorios del principio de igualdad constitucional. En rigor, un examen de esa naturaleza está reservado a la Sala Constitucional en virtud del artículo 10 de la Constitución Política y la Ley de Jurisdiccional Constitucional, a lo cual deberá acudir la sociedad actora si estima que las normas legales que la obligan a obtener referida licencia comercial son inconstitucionales por las razones ya expuestas. Cabe señalar que este Tribunal consultó tanto en el Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica como en la Sala Constitucional si existía o se había admitido alguna acción en contra de la Ley No. 7119 citada y la respuesta fue negativa. Así, en lo que respecta al control de legalidad para el cual este Tribunal resulta competente y por las razones expuestas ut supra, se ha determinado que la actora ejerce una actividad comercial lucrativa en el cantón de Santo Domingo y que no existe ninguna norma legal que la exima de obtener la licencia comercial requerida para tales efectos. Por ende, en este punto no se observa ninguna deficiencia en las conductas impugnadas, razón por la cual el argumento de la accionante debe ser rechazado, como en efecto se hace.

VI.- La sociedad accionante alega, también, la abusiva e indebida aplicación de las normas tributarias y de la base imponible en el IP. Explica que, si se interpretara que ella requiere licencia municipal debiendo asumir el pago del IP, la forma en que la municipalidad demandada calcula el tributo es totalmente ilegal. Estima que debe aplicarse el principio de realidad económica previsto en el artículo 8 del CNP y cita sentencias del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda y de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que lo desarrollan. Considera que como su actividad es completamente regulada por la ARESEP, quien establece el margen de utilidad, aplicar la tarifa del IP sobre ingresos brutos constituye una transgresión a la realidad económica de su compañía y un enriquecimiento ilegítimo de la corporación municipal. Argumenta que el abuso de la actuación municipal en ese sentido, ha sido reconocido por la Sala Constitucional en las sentencias No. 8857-2000 y No. 094-2001, donde se declaró inconstitucional el pretender cobrar el referido tributo utilizando como base imponible los ingresos brutos en la actividad de distribución y expendio de combustibles. Afirma estar en un cuadro fáctico análogo al que la Sala Constitucional ya ha declarado como improcedente y, por ende, lesivo a sus derechos y garantías. Cita en su apoyo el artículo 20 de la Ley de la ARESEP. En este aspecto, el representante del ente local accionado sostiene que la forma de calcular el tributo está dada por ley. Luego de un cuidadoso análisis, el Tribunal estima que, de la forma en que está planteado, este argumento debe, también, ser rechazado. Lo anterior porque el cuestionamiento de la sociedad accionante lo es en relación con el elemento cuantitativo del IP, sea, la base de cálculo del referido tributo; elemento que conformidad con el artículo 5 inciso a) del CNPT está reservado a la Ley. Así las cosas, fue el legislador quien en el artículo 3 de la Ley No. 7119 citada estableció que la base imponible del impuesto en cuestión se fijaría tomando en cuenta la renta líquida gravable y las ventas o ingresos brutos que perciban las personas físicas o jurídicas afectas al impuesto, durante el período fiscal anterior al año en que se dé la imposición. Así, no es posible establecer que la actora debe pagar el tributo atendiendo al margen de utilidad que le aprobó la ARESEP porque esa no es la base de cálculo que estableció el legislador. En este punto, cabe agregar que, si la Ley No. 7191 no contempla una base imponible distinta para los casos en que la actividad comercial tenga un margen de utilidad regulado, no podrían ni las conductas formales impugnadas ni este Tribunal establecer un trato diferenciado, porque ello resultaría una desaplicación directa de lo establecido en el ordinal 3 referido. Nuevamente, si la parte actora estima que la base de cálculo establecida por el legislador es irrazonable, desproporcionada o atenta contra la equidad o justicia tributaria (al grabar sobre las ventas o ingresos brutos percibidos y no sobre el margen de utilidad establecido por la ARESEP), deberá plantear ese cuestionamiento ante la Sala Constitucional, órgano competente de conformidad con el artículo 10 de la Carta Magna y la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y dado el control concentrado que existe en esta materia. Por otra parte, estimamos que no resulta atendible la referencia al principio de realidad económica a efectos de pretender que se calcule el tributo en cuestión sobre una base de cálculo distinta a la legalmente prevista. En relación con el tema, es menester señalar que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en la sentencia No. 01181, dictada a las 14 horas 48 minutos del 12 de noviembre de 2009, indicó, en lo que interesa, "(...) en materia tributaria, es posible distinguir dos ámbitos de aplicación del citado principio. El primero, referido propiamente a la interpretación del contenido de la norma, entendiendo que el operador jurídico no debe limitarse al simple sentido de las palabras utilizadas por esta, sino que, al momento de realizar esta operación intelectiva, debe privilegiar la finalidad que persiguió el legislador al crear el tributo. En la materia en cuestión, el poder tributario del Estado tiene por objetivo gravar una determinada fuente de riqueza, de forma tal que, al definir los alcances de una norma se debe tomar en cuenta la realidad (económica, claro está) que justificó el ejercicio de esta potestad. En la base de este planteamiento se ubica el reconocimiento de que la regulación, si bien realizada desde una perspectiva jurídica, se refiere a transacciones económicas, de modo que, son estas particularidades las que deben definir el contenido de las disposiciones, y no los conceptos jurídicos, ajenos en muchos de los casos a esta realidad. Empero, esto no implica un tipo abierto a través del cual se permita modificar la legislación mediante interpretaciones, lo que equivaldría a sustituir ilegítimamente a la Asamblea Legislativa, así como un quebranto de los principios de división de funciones, seguridad jurídica, legalidad y reserva legal. Por el contrario, lo que se procura evitar es que se torne nugatorio el deber constitucional de contribuir con las cargas públicas, propio de un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, mediante tecnicismos jurídicos, privilegiando la valoración de la realidad, la finalidad de la norma tributaria y la capacidad económica que se pretendió gravar.(...)" (el subrayado es nuestro). En esa línea, este principio refiere a la interpretación del contenido de la norma tributaria en el sentido que el operador jurídico no debe limitarse al simple sentido de las palabras utilizadas por ésta, sino que, al momento de realizar el análisis intelectivo, se encuentra obligado a dar prioridad a la finalidad que persiguió el legislador al crear el tributo. Pero también es clara la sentencia en cuestión en indicar que lo anterior no implica la creación de un tipo abierto a través del cual se permita modificar la legislación mediante interpretaciones, lo que resultaría en una sustitución ilegítima del legislador, así como la transgresión a los principios de división de funciones, seguridad jurídica, legalidad y reserva legal. Por ello, resulta improcedente que, alegando el principio de realidad económica, la accionante pretenda desconocer o cambiar la base de cálculo del IP dispuesta por el legislador porque ello supondría, reiteramos, la desaplicación y derogatoria singular de una norma legal vigente en su favor, en abierta violación al Principio de Legalidad.

VII.- Estimamos, además, que los precedentes constitucionales que cita la demandante no resultan aplicables al caso concreto. Lo anterior porque tanto la sentencia No. 8857-2000 como la No. 094-2001 citadas refieren a recursos de amparo (no acciones de inconstitucionalidad) en los que se discutió el IP de otras municipalidades distintas de la aquí demandada (San José y Belén) en relación con una actividad específica (expendedores de combustibles o gasolineras) diferente de la que ejerce la accionante. Pero, además, cabe señalar que, si bien en ambos fallos se estableció, en lo medular, que el cobro que se les hacía a los expendedores de combustible del IP en esos cantones, de la forma en que se estaba haciendo, era violatorio del principio de igualdad, así como también irrazonable y desproporcionado, porque no estaba tomando en cuenta la existencia de un margen de utilidad previamente fijado por el Estado; lo cierto es que ello fue así porque también se consideró que el pago del IP no se incorporaba a la estructura de costos de operación por parte de la ARESEP ni se consideraba al momento de establecer el precio o margen de utilidad. Incluso, en la sentencia No. 8857-2000 referida existen votos salvados que declaran sin lugar el recurso porque estimaron que “(…) si el pago de los impuestos municipales fuera deducible como costo de operación, o lo que es lo mismo, si pudiera integrarse el costo para determinar el precio de venta del combustible al consumidor, desaparecería la causa del desajuste en la aplicación del impuesto a los expendedores de combustibles –como las empresas amparadas- y en consecuencia, no existiría vulneración alguna al principio de igualdad en su perjuicio. (..)”; y tuvieron por acreditado en el caso concreto que “(…) tal y como lo hace ver el Regulador General en su informe, los mismos recurrentes aportaron a los autos una copia de la certificación emitida por él, en la cual se determina que en el caso del suministro de combustibles la metodología utilizada sí reconoce un porcentaje para cubrir costos de impuestos y patentes (ver informe a folio 15 y copia de certificación a folio 6), que corresponde a un 0,0862% de los ingresos brutos establecidos en la estación modelo. Así las cosas, el presente amparo realmente consiste en la inconformidad de los recurrentes con ese porcentaje y no a que se les dé un trato diferente que a los demás comerciantes, puesto que bajo juramento el Regulador General es enfático al indicar que el actual modelo contempla un porcentaje para el reconocimiento de los impuestos de patente, que se aplica a la actividad desarrollada por las empresas amparadas. Así las cosas, no compete a la Sala determinar el porcentaje asignado por el órgano regulador como reconocimiento por pago de patente municipal y en general por costos de operación, dentro de la estructura de costos que deben asumir las empresas amparadas, tratándose como es de materia eminentemente técnica, que no puede ventilarse en el proceso sumario del amparo. Dado lo expuesto, lo que corresponde en realidad es que los recurrentes presenten la petición correspondiente, a fin de que se revise el monto porcentual asignado como reconocimiento por concepto de pago de patente municipal dentro de la estructura de costos, y no que la Sala emita pronunciamiento alguno al respecto, pues se reitera, se trata de materia de legalidad ajena a las competencias del Tribunal Constitucional. (…)”. Lo anterior es importante porque, como explicamos, en nuestro criterio la base de cálculo del IP está determinada por la Ley No. 7119 citada y no puede ser desaplicada en el caso concreto por este Tribunal, para establecerle una distinta a la accionante, por el solo hecho de que la actividad comercial lucrativa que ejerce lo sea en virtud de una concesión y con un margen de utilidad regulado, porque ello excede de la competencia que ha sido atribuida a este Tribunal y del control de legalidad de la función administrativa que le corresponde ejercer. Nuevamente reiteramos que, si la actora estima que la base de cálculo establecida en el ordinal 3 de la Ley No 7119 es desproporcionada, irrazonable o violatoria del principio de igualdad constitucional, deberá establecer la acción respectiva a efectos de obtener su declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad, lo que no se ha efectuado, según indicamos ut supra.

VIII.- A mayor abundamiento, debe tenerse presente que las tarifas y precios de los servicios públicos (como el que presta la actora) se fijan teniendo como base una serie de principios rectores, de los cuales interesa destacar dos que se derivan de los artículos 3 y 31 de la Ley No. 7593. Primero, el servicio al costo, según el cual en la fijación deben contemplarse únicamente los costos necesarios para prestar el servicio, que permitan una retribución competitiva y garanticen el adecuado desarrollo de la actividad. Segundo, el equilibrio financiero, que asegura al prestador el beneficio económico que ha sido convenido. Para tales efectos., el artículo 31 de la Ley No. 7593 señala, en lo que interesa, que al fijar las tarifas y los precios de los servicios públicos, la ARESEP tomará en cuenta, como regla general, las estructuras productivas modelo para cada servicio público, según el desarrollo del conocimiento, la tecnología, las posibilidades del servicio, la actividad de que se trate y el tamaño de las empresas prestadoras. Solo si existe imposibilidad comprobada para aplicar este procedimiento, se considerará la situación particular de cada empresa. Agrega la norma indicada que la ARESEP deberá aplicar modelos de ajuste anual de tarifas, en función de la modificación de variables externas a la administración de los prestadores de los servicios, tales como inflación, tipos de cambio, tasas de interés, precios de hidrocarburos, fijaciones salariales realizadas por el Poder Ejecutivo y cualquier otra variable que el ente regulador considere pertinente. También, que las tarifas de los servicios públicos, se deberán contemplar los siguientes aspectos y criterios, cuando resulten aplicables: a) Garantizar el equilibrio financiero. b) El reconocimiento de los esquemas de costos de los distintos mecanismos de contratación de financiamiento de proyectos, sus formas especiales de pago y sus costos efectivos, entre otros. Por su parte, el ordinal 32 de la misma Ley establece cuáles costos no serán considerados en la estructura de precios, entre ellos, las multas que les sean impuestas a los prestadores del servicio por incumplimiento de las obligaciones que establece esta ley, las erogaciones innecesarias o ajenas a la prestación del servicio público, las contribuciones, los gastos, las inversiones y deudas incurridas por actividades ajenas a la administración, la operación o el mantenimiento de la actividad regulada, los gastos de operación desproporcionados en relación con los gastos normales de actividades equivalentes, las inversiones rechazadas por la ARESEP por considerarlas excesivas para la prestación del servicio público, el valor de las facturaciones no cobradas por las empresas reguladas, con excepción de los porcentajes técnicamente fijados por el ente regulador. Finalmente, conviene señalar que el artículo 20 de esta misma ley consagra, en lo medular, el deber de los prestadores de servicios públicos de llevar contabilidades separadas que diferencien la actividad de servicio público de las que no lo son. Señala, también, que los ingresos y costos comunes deberán consignarse de acuerdo con las normas técnicas que permitan una distribución que no perjudique la actividad del servicio público.

IX.- Pues bien, en nuestro criterio, de las normas expuestas se puede concluir que las erogaciones en las que incurra el prestador del servicio público por el pago de tributos constituye, por regla general, un costo que forma parte de la estructura del precio del servicio y que, por tanto, debe ser considerado al establecer el margen de utilidad de los prestadores del servicio público. Por ende, si en el caso de la estructura que aplica al que presta la accionante (sea, la compra y distribución de combustibles) ello no es así, es evidente que lo que puede ser objeto de control es la metodología utilizada en el caso concreto. Sin embargo, lo cierto es que la empresa demandante no impugnó en este proceso acto la referida metodología, razón por la cual este Tribunal no puede revisar su legalidad ni establecer si en su caso ésta considera o no el pago del IP o la medida en que ello incide sobre su margen de utilidad. Nótese que aquí lo que se impugna son, únicamente, actos administrativos que rechazaron la declaración del IP presentada por la sociedad actora, indicándole que debía calcular el tributo conforme a la base de cálculo establecida legalmente. Así, los motivos de hecho y derecho que sirven de fundamento a esa decisión sí existían real y jurídicamente al momento de su adopción (porque la actora realizó el hecho generador del IP y los elementos cuantitativos de ese tributo están establecidos por normas legales que no ha sido declaradas inconstitucionales) por lo que su contenido resulta lícito en tanto se conforma sustancialmente con el ordenamiento jurídico. Por ende, la pretensión primera es improcedente, debiendo rechazarse también el pedimento dirigido a que se declare la nulidad de cualquier acto administrativo derivado de las anteriores resoluciones, y que se encuentren relacionados con el presente asunto específicamente sobre los puntos cuestionados. Amén de que no se especifican cuáles son esas conductas formales, lo que impide un cotejo de legalidad concreto, lo cierto es que, si éstos fueran accesorias o tendentes a ejecutar los actos impugnados, también serían conductas formales válidas.

X.- Sobre las otras pretensiones. La parte actora pide, también, que se ordene la devolución de las sumas pagadas por concepto de principal, intereses pagados y sanciones, más intereses hasta el día del depósito, así como una indexación de las sumas, sobre la proporción de los ajustes que se solicitan se anulen. Lo pedido es improcedente. Por un lado, en este proceso no se ha acreditado que la accionante haya cancelado alguna suma de dinero al ente local accionado por concepto de pago del IP que aquí se discute. Pero, además, en el marco lógico de esta acción, las pretensiones recién mencionadas se vinculan de manera directa con la solicitud de declaratoria de invalidez de las conductas impugnadas. Se trata de extremos respecto de los cuales existe una innegable relación de accesoriedad con la pretensión de nulidad. Por ende, al establecerse en esta sentencia la validez de lo actuado en sede administrativa y con ello, la conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico de la conducta objeto de impugnación, es evidente que resultan improcedentes los pedimentos indicados. En consecuencia, dichas partidas deben ser denegadas."