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Res. 00619-2013 Tribunal de Familia · Tribunal de Familia · 29/07/2013
OutcomeResultado
PANI's request to order the forced internment of the minor in a drug rehab center was denied because family courts lack jurisdiction and the decision must be based on medical-technical criteria by administrative authorities.La solicitud del PANI de ordenar el internamiento forzoso del menor en un centro de rehabilitación de adicciones fue rechazada porque los tribunales de familia no son competentes para ello y la decisión debe basarse en criterios médico-técnicos de las autoridades administrativas.
SummaryResumen
The Family Court rules on an incident for removal of a judicial depository in which the National Children's Trust (PANI) requested a court order to forcibly intern a 17-year-old with drug addiction, against his will. PANI argued the measure was necessary to protect the minor's health and integral development, within the state's duty to guarantee children's right to health. The court denied the request, holding that family courts lack jurisdiction to order internment against the will of a minor for drug dependency, as such decision must be based on technical and medical criteria by specialized administrative authorities (CCSS, IAFA, ICD). The decision also emphasizes that forced internment violates minors' autonomy, recognized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Childhood and Adolescence Code, and that PANI breached its duty of diligence by resorting to court instead of exhausting the administrative protective measures provided by law.El Tribunal de Familia resuelve un incidente de remoción de depositario judicial en el que el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (PANI) solicitó una orden judicial para internar forzosamente a un joven de 17 años con problemas de adicción a las drogas, en contra de su voluntad. El PANI argumentó que la medida era necesaria para proteger la salud y el desarrollo integral del menor, en el marco del deber estatal de garantizar el derecho a la salud de los niños, niñas y adolescentes. El tribunal rechazó la solicitud, señalando que los órganos jurisdiccionales de familia no son competentes para ordenar un internamiento contra la voluntad de una persona menor de edad por razones de farmacodependencia, ya que esa decisión debe basarse en criterios técnicos y médicos de las autoridades administrativas especializadas (CCSS, IAFA, ICD). Además, la resolución recuerda que el internamiento forzoso vulnera el principio de autonomía de la voluntad de los menores, reconocido en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y el Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia, y que el PANI incumplió su deber de diligencia al acudir a la vía judicial en lugar de agotar las medidas administrativas de protección previstas en la ley.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Now, if as correctly stated in the aforementioned administrative decision, “(...) the National Children's Trust has the power to issue protective measures in favor of minors who are in a state of vulnerability, as is the case of (...) [Name 003], who according to his mother is using drugs, so that upon learning of the situation the adolescents must be involved and given an opportunity in accordance with the special legislation on the matter and the Childhood and Adolescence Code, to keep him in a Rehabilitation center or program for addicted persons.”; if “The norm mentions the obligation of the State to promote detoxification and rehabilitation of minors who frequently engage in this type of consumption, and both legal bodies grant the National Children's Trust the power to adopt measures deemed necessary to that effect.” (Pages 23-26); if the decision to intern a person, whether over or under eighteen, must respond to technical and medical criteria which, in principle, are the exclusive domain of specialized administrative authorities (see, in similar terms, Constitutional Court vote No. 2013-4919, of 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013) and if, as a general rule, family courts are not competent to order a measure such as the one sought, the judicial representative of that entity cannot be right in seeking an order for the young man [Name 003] to be interned in a specialized addiction treatment center. It is worth noting that by resorting to this court to request the internment at issue, the petitioning entity breached its obligations and, in particular, did not act with due diligence to procure for the young man the care and treatment that, in its view, he should receive, with the aggravating factor that, if the described risk situation is assumed to be true, that inertia has undoubtedly disregarded his best interests and his right to health (see, in similar terms, Constitutional Court vote No. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012).Ahora bien, si como acertadamente se estableció en la resolución administrativa supra citada, “(…) el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia está facultado para dictar medidas de protección en [sic] favor de personas menores de edad que se encuentren en estado de vulnerabilidad, como es el caso de (…) [Nombre 003] , quien según menciona su madre est[á] consumiendo drogas, por lo que al conocer la situación se debe involucrar a los adolescentes y darle una oportunidad conforme a la legislación especial en la materia y al Código de la Niñez y la –Adolescencia, mantenerl[o] en un centro o progama de Rehabilitación para personas adictas.”; si “La norma menciona la obligación que el Estado tiene de promover la desintoxicación y la rehabilitación de las personas menores de edad que frecuentan este tipo de consumos, y otorgan ambos cuerpos legales, la potestad al Patronato Nacional de la Infancia para adoptar las medidas que se consideren necesarias al efecto.” (Folios 23-26); si la decisión de internar a una persona, sea mayor o menor de dieciocho años, ha de responder a criterios técnicos y médicos que, en principio, son de resorte exclusivo de las autoridades administrativas especializadas (ver, en similares términos, el voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 2013-4919, de las 9:05 horas del 12 de abril de 2013) y si, por regla general, los órganos jurisdiccionales en materia de familia no somos competentes para decretar una medida como la pretendida, no puede asistirle razón a la apoderada judicial de esa entidad cuando pretende que se le ordene al joven [Nombre 003], su internamiento en un centro especializado en el tratamiento de adicciones. No sobra mencionar que al haber acudido a esta sede a solicitar que se ordene el internamiento en cuestión, la entidad gestionante incumplió sus obligaciones y, en particular, no actuó con la diligencia debida para procurarle al joven la atención y el tratamiento que, en su criterio, ha de recibir, con el agravante de que, si se asume que es cierta la situación de riesgo descrita, esa inercia ha hecho caso omiso, sin duda, de su mejor interés y de su derecho a la salud (ver, en términos similares, el voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 2012-15171, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de octubre de 2012).
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"si la decisión de internar a una persona, sea mayor o menor de dieciocho años, ha de responder a criterios técnicos y médicos que, en principio, son de resorte exclusivo de las autoridades administrativas especializadas […] no puede asistirle razón a la apoderada judicial de esa entidad cuando pretende que se le ordene al joven [Nombre 003], su internamiento en un centro especializado en el tratamiento de adicciones."
"if the decision to intern a person, whether over or under eighteen, must respond to technical and medical criteria which, in principle, are the exclusive domain of specialized administrative authorities […] the judicial representative of that entity cannot be right in seeking an order for the young man [Name 003] to be interned in a specialized addiction treatment center."
Considerando VI
"si la decisión de internar a una persona, sea mayor o menor de dieciocho años, ha de responder a criterios técnicos y médicos que, en principio, son de resorte exclusivo de las autoridades administrativas especializadas […] no puede asistirle razón a la apoderada judicial de esa entidad cuando pretende que se le ordene al joven [Nombre 003], su internamiento en un centro especializado en el tratamiento de adicciones."
Considerando VI
"Considero que las decisiones del Juzgado de la Niñez y la Adolescencia (…), ordenando el internamiento del actor en un centro hospitalario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para su desintoxicación y rehabilitación, aún en contra de su voluntad, socavan esos dos pilares fundamentales de los derechos de los menores de edad."
"I consider that the decisions of the Juvenile Court (…), ordering the internment of the plaintiff in a hospital of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund for detoxification and rehabilitation, even against his will, undermine those two fundamental pillars of minors' rights."
Considerando VII
"Considero que las decisiones del Juzgado de la Niñez y la Adolescencia (…), ordenando el internamiento del actor en un centro hospitalario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para su desintoxicación y rehabilitación, aún en contra de su voluntad, socavan esos dos pilares fundamentales de los derechos de los menores de edad."
Considerando VII
"la adicción a los estupefacientes requiere de atención estatal y puede llevar a las personas a los más graves deterioros físicos, mentales y de su dignidad, pero no por ello debe imponerse a quienes sufren de esta patología tratamientos forzados, con menoscabo de su libertad personal y en centros que no fueron creados con ese fin."
"drug addiction requires state care and can lead people to the most serious physical, mental and dignity deterioration, but that is no reason to impose forced treatments on those suffering from this condition, to the detriment of their personal freedom and in centers not created for that purpose."
Considerando VII
"la adicción a los estupefacientes requiere de atención estatal y puede llevar a las personas a los más graves deterioros físicos, mentales y de su dignidad, pero no por ello debe imponerse a quienes sufren de esta patología tratamientos forzados, con menoscabo de su libertad personal y en centros que no fueron creados con ese fin."
Considerando VII
"No sobra mencionar que al haber acudido a esta sede a solicitar que se ordene el internamiento en cuestión, la entidad gestionante incumplió sus obligaciones y, en particular, no actuó con la diligencia debida para procurarle al joven la atención y el tratamiento que, en su criterio, ha de recibir."
"It is worth noting that by resorting to this court to request the internment at issue, the petitioning entity breached its obligations and, in particular, did not act with due diligence to procure for the young man the care and treatment that, in its view, he should receive."
Considerando VI
"No sobra mencionar que al haber acudido a esta sede a solicitar que se ordene el internamiento en cuestión, la entidad gestionante incumplió sus obligaciones y, en particular, no actuó con la diligencia debida para procurarle al joven la atención y el tratamiento que, en su criterio, ha de recibir."
Considerando VI
Full documentDocumento completo
II.- This Chamber is aware of and shares the broad and rights-protective interpretation of Article 21 of the Political Constitution that has enabled the development by the Constitutional Chamber of an extensive doctrine on the fundamental right to health, by virtue of which it has considered it a primary obligation of the State to ensure the effective protection of the physical and mental integrity of each of its inhabitants (see, among others, votes nos. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17; 2005-16145, of 8:37 a.m. on November 25, both of 2005; 2010-4587, of 10:03 a.m. on March 5, 2010 and 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012). We are also clear that, in the case of persons under eighteen years of age, Articles 3, 19 and 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child impose on it the duty to promote and ensure for them the conditions necessary to guarantee to the maximum extent possible their survival and development and the highest attainable standard of health, as well as to implement appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure their protection and the care required for their well-being. Finally, it is indisputable that addiction to enervating drugs constitutes a delicate public health problem that obliges both the prevention of their consumption and the treatment of drug-dependent persons, especially if they are children and adolescents. As that same Chamber pointed out in vote no. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005 and reiterated in no. 2013-3131, of 9:20 a.m. on March 8, 2013, "In the case of minors, care must be redoubled, since addiction in highly vulnerable individuals has extremely serious and hardly reversible consequences on their physical, social and personal development. It is due to the seriousness of this disease that the legal system has designed a complex system of competences for the prevention of drug addiction and the care of persons affected by this affliction (…)." In sum, as vote no. 2010-4587, of 10:03 a.m. on March 5, 2010 synthesizes it, "The Constitutional Court, in abundant case law, has recognized that the right to health has constitutional coverage as well as the right to a healthy environment; from this it also follows that the State must ensure the health, protection of children and the family, that it has the responsibility to ensure that all persons receive health services in a timely manner, especially minors and in this specific case, the phenomenon of drugs negatively affects the individual and public health of these minors in general, for which reason it must also encourage and develop programs related to the social reintegration of rehabilitated minors. (…). In this way, it is an obligation of the State to guarantee above all the right of children and adolescents to be protected, to have their identity, to personal integrity and to health, rights indispensable for personal fulfillment and an essential condition for the economic and social development of a country. (…). In view of the foregoing, the State must (…) ensure the health of the population and especially give primary attention to minors, regardless of which body or entity is competent, because the child and adolescent population affected by the scourge of drug addiction and alcoholism has the right to receive comprehensive care from the State or its institutions to preserve and restore their health. Furthermore, there is no doubt that in the present case the State is compelled, both by domestic and international regulations, to provide immediate care to minors suffering from some addiction, without budgetary or other reasons rendering such right nugatory, because acting to the contrary or delaying care puts their life, their health and their comprehensive development at risk, for which reason the State is obliged above all other things to adopt administrative, legislative and any other kind of measures to guarantee the full effectiveness of the right to health and integrity for minors, having as its axis the best interests of the child."- III.- As noted, current legislation establishes a complex system of competences in the area of drug-addiction prevention and of care, treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration of drug-dependent persons. In vote no. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that "(…) the governance and administration of social insurance was constitutionally entrusted to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) (Article 41), so that in general terms, the care of persons' health conditions corresponds to said public entity, for which the Fundamental Law itself recognizes its financial independence, and even the duty of the State to transfer to it from its Budget the revenues necessary to fulfill its duties. In this way, no reason (of a merely budgetary nature) given by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) to evade its duties towards persons is valid. (In this sense the Chamber has pronounced itself, among others, in judgments 1997-05934, 1998-07728, 1998-08411, 2003-01432, etc.) Since addiction to narcotic drugs is a disease –even being one of a very special nature due to its addictive character– the fact is that it is the duty of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) to provide the due health services to those persons affected by this affliction. In addition to the foregoing, Ley 8204, in its Article 166, provided the following rule: 'The CCSS is authorized to create specialized centers for the care of drug-dependent persons, within a maximum period of four years.' Even if Ley 8204 had not conferred these competences on the institution (we will not enter here into a discussion about the governmental autonomy granted to that entity), the fact is that the Political Constitution itself, in its Article 73, is what entrusts the referred entity with the provision of the healthcare services that persons require, as administrator of health insurance, so that the cited provision merely develops the generic mandate contained in the Fundamental Law. Notwithstanding this clear duty given to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), the fact is that the formal legislator has taken charge of distributing the burden implied by caring for a health problem as complex as the one analyzed, assigning to various institutions competences complementary to those of the CCSS." In accordance with numerals 21 and 22 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health, No. 5412, of November 8, 1973, and its amendments, the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia, IAFA) —a body with minimal deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Health— is in charge of "(…) the technical direction, study, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation of addiction to alcohol, tobacco and other licit or illicit drugs; in addition, it shall carry out other functions that the law establishes and shall be responsible for coordinating and approving all programs, both public and private, related to its purposes; it must request the suspension or closure of such programs if they fail to comply with the guidelines stipulated for that purpose." Article 99 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, No. 8204, of December 16, 2001, and its amendments, entrusts the Costa Rican Drug Institute (Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas) —a body of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of the Presidency (Article 98 ibid.)— with "(…) coordinating, designing and implementing policies, plans and strategies for the prevention of drug consumption, treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration of drug-dependent persons, as well as policies, plans and strategies against illicit drug trafficking and related activities, money laundering and terrorist financing. / Said Institute, as the body responsible for the design and coordination in the execution of policies for addressing the drug phenomenon, money laundering and terrorist financing, shall coordinate with the institutions executing related programs and projects in these areas." Under the terms of Article 3 ibid., "It is the duty of the State to prevent the improper use of narcotics, psychotropic substances and any other product capable of producing physical or psychic dependence; likewise, to ensure the prompt identification, treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation and social readaptation of the affected persons, and to procure the economic resources necessary to recover drug-dependent persons and those affected, directly or indirectly, by drug consumption, in order to educate them, provide them with physical and mental rehabilitation treatment and readapt them to society. / The treatments shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) and the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia, IAFA), and of any other entity or institution legally authorized by the State. If the case involves minors, in order to achieve said treatment the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) must issue the necessary protection measures provided for in the Childhood and Adolescence Code. / In any case, it corresponds to IAFA to exercise technical leadership and supervision in the matter of prevention and treatment, as well as to propose, design and evaluate programs for the prevention of drug consumption." (The underlining does not belong to the original). For its part, subsection n) of Article 3 of its Organic Law, No. 7648, of December 9, 1996, stipulates as one of the purposes of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) to plan, execute and supervise prevention programs jointly with the respective institutions in order to eradicate, in the population under eighteen years, all forms of drug addiction, alcoholism or other causes that harm their integrity. It is obvious, then, that, as responsible for the special protection of persons under eighteen years of age, as provided for in Article 55 of the Political Constitution, complementary competences are attributed to the appellant entity to make the care of patients in that age group affected by addictive diseases a reality; among them, the issuance of the necessary protection measures to guarantee their best interests. And it is not superfluous to mention that in vote no. 2013-4919, of 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated that since no. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005, it had ordered "(…) the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI), the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia, IAFA) and the Costa Rican Drug Institute (Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas) to take all necessary measures so that within a period of eighteen months from the notification of that judgment, the country has a specialized center for the care of minors addicted to drugs, capable of providing comprehensive care to minors affected by this affliction, in accordance with the real demand for these services throughout the national territory. It was also ordered that as long as a center as mentioned had not been opened, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) was obliged to keep a care module operating at the Dr. Roberto Chacón Paut Hospital, capable of providing the necessary treatment for the minor population, without prejudice to the outpatient care provided by the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia, IAFA)."- IV.- As is known, at the national level, the Childhood and Adolescence Code is the minimum legal framework for the protection of the rights of persons under eighteen years of age. It establishes the principles that guarantee their social or community participation and respect for their status as subjects of rights in administrative and judicial proceedings that involve or affect their interests. In addition, it contains the general obligation of the State to adopt administrative, legislative, budgetary and any other kind of measures to achieve the full effectiveness of their fundamental rights (see, in similar terms, votes of the Constitutional Chamber nos. 2004-222, of 3:44 p.m. on January 14, 2004 and 2005-9063, of 10:22 a.m. on July 8, 2005). As that same body pointed out in vote no. 2000-368, of 7:45 p.m. on January 11, 2000, reiterated in nos. 2000-9795, of 10:06 a.m. on November 3, 2000 and 2001-7598, of 9:46 a.m. on August 3, 2001: "This code also establishes a special protection process in the administrative venue that shall be carried out by the local offices of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI); a process that aims to issue protection measures for minors when the rights recognized in that code are threatened or violated for different causes, among which are cited the lack, omission or abuse by parents, guardians, caregivers or responsible persons. It is established that the special protection process may be initiated ex officio or upon complaint filed by any person, authority or human rights body. Once the fact is known or the complaint is received, the local office of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) shall verify the situation, hear the parties involved, receive the evidence they present and issue, immediately, the corresponding protection measures, being a summary and informal procedure. In the event that the existence of evidence of mistreatment or abuse to the detriment of a minor is verified in the administrative venue, the criminal complaint must be filed immediately. Among the protection measures that may be ordered, as established by Article 136 of that Code, is the temporary shelter of the minor in public or private entities. In this regard, Article 138 of that same normative body establishes the following: / 'When applying the measures indicated in Articles 135 and 136, the needs of the affected persons shall be taken into account and those aimed at strengthening family and community ties shall prevail. / The foreseen measures may be adopted separately or jointly and be substituted at any time. In the case of provisional care in a substitute family and temporary shelter in a public or private entity, the measure may not exceed six months.' / Now then, there also exists the protection process in the judicial venue regarding which, it shall be the family judges of the jurisdiction of the minor's domicile who are competent to hear the process. Through this process in the judicial venue, situations arising from the issuance of protection measures by the local offices of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) pursuant to Articles 135, 136 and 137 of the code shall be processed, and in order to resort to this, the administrative channel must first be exhausted. Once this process is initiated, the judge shall review the results obtained with the measures ordered in the administrative venue and shall set a day and time for the hearing, which must be held within a maximum period of five days, and once the evidence is received and assessed in accordance with the rules of sound discretion, the Judge shall issue a final resolution within a maximum period of five days, and in that resolution may confirm the measure ordered by the local office of the PANI, extend it for an equal period, substitute it for another, or revoke it." (The bold is added. See, in a similar sense, vote no. 2002-7538, of 10:41 a.m. on July 30, 2002).- V.- From all of the foregoing it is inferred that it constitutes an obligation of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) to act diligently in order to procure the due treatment for drug-dependent persons under eighteen years of age, for which its own Organic Law; the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism; and the Childhood and Adolescence Code recognize its authority to issue the necessary protection measures (see, in similar terms, Constitutional Chamber vote no. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012). Note that it is not only the governing institution, par excellence, of childhood (see, in this regard, vote no. 227-93, of 12:36 p.m. on January 15, 1993), but also that the person who directs it, "(…) upon being constituted as the guardian and temporary depositary of minors by operation of law, must employ the same criteria and rules established by the legislator in the Family Code regarding the different aspects related to the best interests of minors. That is to say, the Organic Law of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) and the Family Code complement each other since they constitute part of a system conceived by the Constitution, international instruments and the common legislator to protect in a reinforced manner the best interests of the minor and also the values upon which the unity of the family rests. On the one hand, the PANI as a decentralized institution of the Executive Branch with constitutional rank, as provided by Article 55 of the constitution, in whose charge is 'The special protection of the mother and the minor...'; '...with the collaboration of other State institutions.' On the other, and the oversight and assistance of the family courts pursuant to the Code, they have the legal capacity to grant the mother and children the protection that the Constitution demands." (Constitutional Chamber Vote no. 4760-93, of 5:09 p.m. on September 29, 1993, reiterated in nos. 2000-5669, of 10:44 a.m. on July 7, 2000; 2001-2491, of 4:23 p.m. on March 27; 2001-9834, of 4:03 p.m. on September 26, both of 2001; 2002-5982, of 11:28 a.m. on June 14, 2002; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003; 2004-222, of 3:44 p.m. on January 14, 2004; 2005-9063, of 10:22 a.m. on July 8, 2005 and 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012. See, in a similar sense, votes nos. 6456-94, of 6:21 p.m. on November 2, 1994; 2001-306, of 8:38 a.m. on January 12, 2001; 2001-7597, of 9:45 a.m. on August 3, 2001; 2004-2299, of 9:00 a.m. on March 5, 2004). And it is not excessive to repeat that, "(…) in the interests of the protection of the minor in an accredited high-risk situation, the PANI is authorized to make the provisional placement of the minor in the family or institution it deems appropriate; since said measure entails extreme seriousness, as it implies the separation of the child from his or her natural family, the Institution must resort, within a reasonable term, to the family judge, so that he or she may review the legality of the precautionary measure adopted and determine whether or not it is appropriate. Said measures are precautionary measures to protect minors, only provisionally valid, while the family judge intervenes and resolves definitively, since otherwise, it could result that an administrative act decides upon the guardianship, upbringing and education of the minors. Thus, once that type of measure is adopted, (…), the PANI must resort, within a reasonable term, to the respective jurisdictional venue and submit the agreed measure to the knowledge of the judge so that he or she may pronounce on the matter (…)." (Constitutional Chamber Vote no. 1033-94, of 11:15 a.m. on February 18, 1994, reiterated in nos. 2001-7597, of 9:45 a.m. on August 3, 2001; 2001-9834, of 4:03 p.m. on September 26, 2001; 2002-5982, of 11:28 a.m. on June 14, 2002; 2003-5319, of 9:12 a.m. on June 20, 2003; 2003-5319, of 9:12 a.m. on June 20, 2003; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003 and 2004-2299, of 9:00 a.m. on March 5, 2004). It must be clear, then, that "(…) the child may be separated from his or her parents (against their will), only by way of exception, to protect his or her physical and emotional integrity, when it is duly accredited that he or she is a victim of mistreatment or neglect. Likewise, the State has the obligation to provide protection and assistance, particularly to minors who find themselves in this situation, such as temporary placement in institutions suitable for their protection, in foster homes, and even through the institute of adoption. In accordance with the foregoing, it must then be clear that, exceptionally, the child may be separated from the place where he or she resides if it is necessary to ensure his or her protection." (Vote no. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012), and that, as established by the Constitutional Chamber in vote no. 2000-368, of 7:45 p.m. on January 11, 2000: "(…) the PANI has full competence to issue the protection measures that are necessary to guarantee the exercise of the fundamental rights of the minors involved. In this sense, this Court has repeatedly indicated that the intervention of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) in what refers to the protection of minors is constitutionally protected and therefore it is authorized to take the measures and directives it considers convenient in order to provide protection to the minors and prevent certain circumstances from harming their health and emotional stability, provided that the resolutions it issues are duly reasoned and subsequently proceed as appropriate to prevent such measures from subsisting indefinitely without a judicial pronouncement." (See, in the same sense, vote no. 2001-7598, of 9:46 a.m. on August 3, 2001). Finally, in the recent vote no. 2013-6531, of 3:30 p.m. on May 14, 2013, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated that "(…) it is not only the authority of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) to ensure the best interests of the minor, but it is also its obligation to intervene and impose the necessary and temporary precautionary measures or protection measures, to safeguard the interests of a minor within any corresponding administrative or jurisdictional process. Likewise, it is the responsibility of the medical and social work authorities of hospitals, in the face of a risk situation, to take the pertinent measures in order to guarantee, jointly with the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI), the determination of the possible risk situations to which a minor may be exposed, and to activate the state mechanisms to safeguard his or her best interests, all in fulfillment of a state duty, provided for not only by domestic constitutional and legal law, but also by international human rights law and children's rights law." (See, in the same terms, no. 2013-7142, of 9:05 a.m. on May 24, 2013).- VI.- In her initial brief, visible from folio 1 to 6, the appellant stated that the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI), by resolution of 1:00 p.m. on April 16, 2012, ordered the inclusion of the young man [Name 003] in official or community programs at the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia) (IAFA), until his rehabilitation is concluded (folios 23-26). She also noted that, after verifying that this protection measure could not be made effective, in one of the follow-up sessions with his mother, Mrs. [Name 001], "(…) new options for internment and treatment for [Name 003] are provided so that she can evaluate them with her husband, however Mrs. [Name 001] states that [Name 003] at this moment is closed to any support resource." According to the intervention report on folios 34-35 and the management report on folios 61-64, that session took place on August 24, 2012. Lastly, she specified her petition to this venue in the following terms: "(…) I appear in this venue to request that the young man [Name 003] be ordered to enter a protection alternative that allows him the rehabilitation of his consumption and support in the elaboration of an edifying life project, taking into account the young man's refusal to do so voluntarily (…)." The judge of first instance based the contested flat rejection on the provisions of Article 3, subsection e), of the Organic Law of the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) and on the principles of dejudicialization and of comprehensive and inter-institutional approach. He also ordered "(…) the acting entity to coordinate that relative to the referred young man in the administrative venue, through the Comprehensive Care Department (Departamento de Atención Integral), whether through Licenciada Ana Yeri Alvarado, or another professional in charge, as this is a program that entity has and that works in direct association with that medical center specially structured for the care of cases such as the one that occupies us, this being the way in which the problem of addictions such as those described has been addressed until now (…)." (Folio 65). Now then, if, as was correctly established in the aforementioned administrative resolution, "(…) the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) is empowered to issue protection measures in favor of minors who find themselves in a state of vulnerability, as is the case of (…) [Name 003], who according to his mother is consuming drugs, for which reason, upon learning of the situation, the adolescents must be involved and given an opportunity in accordance with the special legislation on the matter and the Childhood and Adolescence Code, to keep him in a center or program of Rehabilitation for addicted persons."; if "The rule mentions the obligation the State has to promote the detoxification and rehabilitation of minors who frequent this type of consumption, and both legal bodies grant the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) the authority to adopt the measures deemed necessary for that purpose." (Folios 23-26); if the decision to intern a person, whether over or under eighteen years of age, must respond to technical and medical criteria that, in principle, fall under the exclusive purview of specialized administrative authorities (see, in similar terms, Constitutional Chamber vote no. 2013-4919, of 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013), and if, as a general rule, jurisdictional bodies in family matters are not competent to decree a measure such as that sought, the judicial representative of that entity cannot be right when she seeks to have the young man [Name 003] ordered to be interned in a center specialized in the treatment of addictions.- -------- Note: The original text ends abruptly and contains scanning artifacts ("_\r\n\r\n\r\n\n _" and "-\n\r\n\r\n\n ") which are preserved here as empty lines, reflecting the original structure. The translation captures all content up to the final clause, including incomplete suggestions ("en el Hospital Dr. Roberto Chacón Paut" preserved as "at the Dr. Roberto Chacón Paut Hospital"). Long dash sequences ("-") are retained to match the original rhetorical style, which uses them as section separators or emphatic pauses. All citation numbers, vote references, dates, and proper names are left verbatim, including the case-specific redactions like "[Nombre 001]" and "[Nombre 003]".
It is worth noting that by appearing before this court to request the internment in question, the managing entity failed to comply with its obligations and, in particular, did not act with the due diligence required to secure for the young person the care and treatment that, in its view, he should receive, with the aggravating factor that, if the described risk situation is assumed to be true, such inaction has undoubtedly disregarded his best interests and his right to health (see, in similar terms, the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012).- II.- Furthermore, this Tribunal adopts the following reasoning of Magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber, Dr. Gilberth Armijo Sancho, by virtue of which he issued a dissenting vote in judgment No. 2005-16145, of 8:37 a.m. on November 25, 2005: “During the 1990s, a paradigm shift occurred in our country’s legal regulation concerning minors, largely due to the signing of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The modification involved moving from a tutelary conception of the minor, where they were conceived of as an incapable being, to the doctrine of their integral protection, in which they are rediscovered in their fullness as a person, as a subject of rights and obligations, with an awareness, of course, of their special characteristics as a minor human being (Articles 5, 9, 10, and 24 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)). The consequences for the principle of autonomy of will are evident. It is no longer a case of that alieni juris openly ignored by administrative and judicial authorities, who decided on matters that concerned them immediately—often with serious consequences—without even realizing or worrying about their presence, but rather someone with the right to know what is happening with their life, to express themselves, to opine, and to decide. Another field in which a broad rethinking of the legal norms in force until then took place was in the deprivation of liberty of minors [sic]. The rules of the process that could involve their deprivation of liberty were redefined [sic] and this sanction was qualified as completely exceptional (Articles 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 1, 2, and 11 of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty; 131 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil)). I consider that the decisions of the Childhood and Adolescence Court (…) ordering the internment of the plaintiff in a hospital center of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) for his detoxification and rehabilitation, even against his will, undermine these two fundamental pillars of the rights of minors. There is a medical opinion that discharges the appellant and advises against hospital internment for an indefinite period (f. 88 exp. 04-00362-673-NA), and there is not the slightest reference to the commission of any illicit act that explains the imperativeness of the internment, as well as its temporal indeterminacy—this last condition being absolutely prohibited by domestic and international law, even in relation to the most serious crimes. Certainly, addiction to narcotics requires state attention and can lead people to the most serious physical, mental, and dignity-related deteriorations, but forced treatments should not be imposed on those suffering from this pathology, to the detriment of their personal liberty and in centers that were not created for that purpose.”” III.- As noted, current legislation establishes a complex system of competencies regarding the prevention of drug addiction and the care, treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration of persons with drug dependency (farmacodependientes). In ruling No. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that “(…) the government and administration of social insurance was constitutionally entrusted to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) (Article 41), so that in general terms, the care of people’s health conditions corresponds to said public entity, for which the Fundamental Law itself recognizes its financial independence, and even the State's duty to transfer from its Budget the necessary revenues to fulfill its duties. Thus, no reason (of a merely budgetary nature) given by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund to evade its duties to people is valid. (In this sense, the Chamber has pronounced, among others, in judgments 1997-05934, 1998-07728, 1998-08411, 2003-01432, etc.) Since addiction to narcotic drugs is a disease—even being one of a very special nature due to its addictive character—the truth is that it is the duty of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund to provide the due health services to those people affected by this affliction. In addition to the above, Law 8204, in its Article 166, provided the following rule: ‘The CCSS is authorized to create specialized centers for the care of persons with drug dependency (farmacodependientes), within a maximum period of four years.’ Even if Law 8204 had not conferred these competencies on the institution (we will not enter here into a discussion about the governmental autonomy granted to that entity), the truth is that the Political Constitution itself, in its Article 73, is what entrusts the referred entity with the provision of the health services that people require, as the administrator of health insurance, so that the cited provision merely develops the generic mandate contained in the Fundamental Law. Notwithstanding this clear duty assigned to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the truth is that the formal legislator [sic] has been responsible for distributing the burden involved in addressing a health problem as complex as the one analyzed, assigning various institutions competencies complementary to those of the Fund.” In accordance with numerals 21 and 22 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud), No. 5412, of November 8, 1973, and its amendments, the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia)—a body with minimum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Health—is responsible for “(…) the technical direction, study, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of addiction to alcohol, tobacco, and other licit or illicit drugs; furthermore, it shall perform other functions established by law and shall be responsible for coordinating and approving all public and private programs related to its purposes; it must seek the suspension or closure of such programs if they fail to comply with the guidelines stipulated for this purpose.” Article 99 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism (Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo), No. 8204, of December 16, 2001, and its amendments, entrusts the Costa Rican Drug Institute (Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas)—a body of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of the Presidency (Article 98 ibidem)—with “(…) coordinating, designing, and implementing policies, plans, and strategies for the prevention of drug consumption, the treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration of persons with drug dependency (farmacodependientes), as well as policies, plans, and strategies against illicit drug trafficking and related activities, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism. / Said Institute, as the body responsible for the design and coordination in the execution of policies for addressing the phenomenon of drugs, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism, shall coordinate with the institutions executing related programs and projects in these matters.” Pursuant to Article 3 ibidem, “It is the duty of the State to prevent the improper use of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and any other product capable of producing physical or psychic dependence; likewise, to ensure the prompt identification, treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation, and social readaptation of affected persons, and to procure the necessary economic resources to recover persons with drug dependency (farmacodependientes) and those affected, directly or indirectly, by drug consumption, in order to educate them, provide them with physical and mental rehabilitation treatment, and readapt them to society. / Treatments shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), and the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency (IAFA), and of any other entity or institution legally authorized by the State. If they are minors, to achieve such treatment, the National Children's Trust (Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, PANI) must issue the necessary protection measures provided for in the Childhood and Adolescence Code. / In any case, it is the responsibility of the IAFA to exercise technical stewardship and supervision in matters of prevention and treatment, as well as to propose, design, and evaluate drug consumption prevention programs.” (The underlining does not belong to the original). For its part, subsection n) of ordinal 3 of its Organic Law, No. 7648, of December 9, 1996, stipulates that one of the purposes of the National Children's Trust is to plan, execute, and supervise prevention programs jointly with the respective institutions with the object of eradicating, in the population under eighteen years of age, all forms of drug addiction, alcoholism, or other causes that harm their integrity. It is obvious, then, that, as the entity responsible for the special protection of persons under eighteen years of age, as provided in Article 55 of the Political Constitution, the appellant entity is attributed complementary competencies to make the care of patients from that age group (grupo etario) affected by addictive diseases a reality; among them, the issuance of the necessary protection measures to guarantee their best interest. And it is not superfluous to mention that in ruling No. 2013-4919, of 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated that since No. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005, it had ordered “(…) the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the National Children's Trust, the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency, and the Costa Rican Drug Institute to take all necessary measures so that within a period of eighteen months from the notification of that judgment, the country would have a specialized center for the care of minors [sic] addicted to drugs, capable of providing comprehensive care to the male and female minors [sic] affected by this affliction, in accordance with the real demand for these services throughout the national territory. It was also ordered that until such a center as mentioned was opened, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund was obliged to keep a care module operating at the Dr. Roberto Chacón Paut Hospital, capable of providing the necessary treatment for the minor population, without prejudice to the outpatient care provided by the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency.”” IV.- As is known, at the national level, the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la niñez y la adolescencia) is the minimum legal framework for the protection of the rights of persons under eighteen years of age. It establishes the principles that guarantee their social or community participation and respect for their condition as subjects of rights in administrative and judicial processes that involve or affect their interests. Furthermore, it sets out the general obligation of the State to adopt administrative, legislative, budgetary, and any other type of measures to achieve the full effectiveness of their fundamental rights (see, in similar terms, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2004-222, of 3:44 p.m. on January 14, 2004, and 2005-9063, of 10:22 a.m. on July 8, 2005). As that same body noted in ruling No. 2000-368, of 7:45 p.m. on January 11, 2000, reiterated in No. 2000-9795, of 10:06 a.m. on November 3, 2000, and 2001-7598, of 9:46 a.m. on August 3, 2001: “This code also establishes a special protection process at the administrative level (sede administrativa) to be carried out by the local offices of the National Children's Trust; a process that tends to dictate protection measures for minors when the rights recognized in that code are threatened or violated by different causes, among which are cited the fault, omission, or abuse of parents, guardians, caretakers, or responsible parties. It is established that the special protection process may be initiated ex officio or by complaint filed by any person, authority, or human rights organization. Once the fact is known or the complaint is received, the local office of the National Children's Trust shall verify the situation, listen to the involved parties, receive the evidence they present, and immediately dictate the corresponding protection measures, this being a summary and informal proceeding. If it is verified at the administrative level that there are indications of mistreatment or abuse to the detriment of a minor, the criminal complaint must be filed immediately. Among the protection measures that can be dictated, as established by Article 136 of that Code, is the temporary shelter of the minor in public or private entities. In this regard, Article 138 of that same normative body establishes the following: / ‘When applying the measures indicated in Articles 135 and 136, the needs of those affected shall be taken into account, and those aimed at strengthening family and community ties shall prevail. / The provided measures may be adopted separately or jointly and be substituted at any time. In the case of provisional care in a foster family and temporary shelter in a public or private entity, the measure may not exceed six months.’ / Now then, there also exists the protection process through judicial channels (vía judicial) regarding which, the family judges (jueces y juezas) of the jurisdiction of the minor's domicile shall be competent to hear the process. Situations arising from the issuance of protection measures by the local offices of the National Children's Trust, according to Articles 135, 136, and 137 of the code, shall be processed through this judicial channel, and to resort to this channel, the administrative channel (vía administrativa) must first be exhausted. Once this process is initiated, the judge (juez o jueza) shall review the results obtained with the measures dictated at the administrative level and shall set a day and time for the hearing, which must be held within a maximum period of five days. Once the evidence is received and evaluated according to the rules of sound judgment, the Judge (Juez o Jueza) shall issue a final decision within a maximum period of five days, and in that decision may confirm the measure ordered by the local office of the Trust, extend it for an equal period, substitute it for another, or revoke it.” (The bold text is added. See, in a similar sense, ruling No. 2002-7538, of 10:41 a.m. on July 30, 2002).- V.- From all the foregoing, it can be deduced that it is an obligation of the National Children's Trust to act diligently in order to procure the due treatment for persons under eighteen years of age with drug dependency (farmacodependientes), for which its own Organic Law, the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism, and the Childhood and Adolescence Code recognize its power to dictate the necessary protection measures (see, in similar terms, the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012). Note that it is not only the governing institution, par excellence, of childhood (see, in this regard, ruling No. 227-93, of 12:36 p.m. on January 15, 1993), but also that the person who directs it, “(…) upon being constituted as the guardian and temporary custodian of the minor [sic] by operation of law, must employ the same criteria and rules established by the legislator [sic] in the Family Code (Código de Familia) regarding the different aspects related to the best interest of minors. That is, the Organic Law of the National Children's Trust and the Family Code complement each other since they constitute part of a system conceived by the Constitution, international instruments, and the common legislator [sic] to protect in a reinforced manner the superior interests of the minor [sic] and also the values on which the family unit rests. On the one hand, the Trust as a decentralized institution of the Executive Branch with constitutional rank, as provided by Article 55 of the Constitution, which is responsible for ‘The special protection of the mother and the minor...’; ‘...with the collaboration of other State institutions.’ On the other, the oversight and coadjuvancy (coadyuvancia) of the family courts in accordance with the Code, have the legal capacity to grant the mother and children the protection required by the Constitution.” (Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 4760-93, of 5:09 p.m. on September 29, 1993, reiterated in No. 2000-5669, of 10:44 a.m. on July 7, 2000; 2001-2491, of 4:23 p.m. on March 27; 2001-9834, of 4:03 p.m. on September 26, both of 2001; 2002-5982, of 11:28 a.m. on June 14, 2002; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003; 2004-222, of 3:44 p.m. on January 14, 2004; 2005-9063, of 10:22 a.m. on July 8, 2005, and 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012. See, in a similar sense, rulings No. 6456-94, of 6:21 p.m. on November 2, 1994; 2001-306, of 8:38 a.m. on January 12, 2001; 2001-7597, of 9:45 a.m. on August 3, 2001; 2004-2299, of 9:00 a.m. on March 5, 2004). And it is worth repeating that, “(…) in the interest of the protection of the minor [sic] in an accredited high-risk situation, the Trust is empowered to make the provisional placement of the minor [sic] in the family or institution it deems appropriate, as such a measure entails extreme seriousness, since it involves the separation of the child from their natural family, the Institution must appear, within a reasonable term, before the family judge (juez o jueza), so that the latter may review the legality of the adopted precautionary measure and determine whether or not it is appropriate. Said measures are precautionary provisions to protect minors [sic], only valid provisionally, as long as the family judge intervenes and resolves definitively, since otherwise it could result that the guardianship, upbringing, and education of the minors were decided by an administrative act [sic].” Therefore, once such measures have been adopted, (…) <i>, the Patronato must, within a reasonable time, resort to the respective jurisdictional avenue and submit the agreed measure to the knowledge of the judge so that he [or she] may rule on the matter (…)</i> <i>.” </i>(Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Voto de la Sala Constitucional) no. 1033-94, at 11:15 a.m. on February 18, 1994, reiterated in nos. 2001-7597, at 9:45 a.m. on August 3, 2001; 2001-9834, at 4:03 p.m. on September 26, 2001; 2002-5982, at 11:28 a.m. on June 14, 2002; 2003-5319, at 9:12 a.m. on June 20, 2003; 2003-5319, at 9:12 a.m. on June 20, 2003; 2003-8262, at 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003; 2003-8262, at 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003 and 2004-2299, at 9:00 a.m. on March 5, 2004). It must be clear, then, that <i>“(…) the child may be separated from his or her parents (against their will), only by way of exception, to protect his or her physical and emotional integrity, when it has been duly proven that he or she is a victim of abuse or neglect. Likewise, the State has the obligation to provide</i> <i>protection and assistance, particularly to minors who […</i> <i>are…] in this situation, such as temporary placement in appropriate institutions for their protection, in foster homes, and even through the institution of adoption. In accordance with the foregoing, it must then be clear that, exceptionally, the child may be separated from the place where he or she resides, if it is necessary to ensure his or her protection.” </i>( Ruling (Voto) no. 2012-15171, at 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012), and that, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) established, in ruling (voto) no. 2000-368, at 7:45 p.m. on January 11, 2000: <i>“(…) the Patronato has full competence to issue the protective measures that are necessary to guarantee the exercise of the fundamental rights of the minors involved. In that sense, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated that the intervention of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia regarding the protection of minors is constitutionally protected and therefore it is legitimized to take the measures and directives it deems convenient in order to protect minors and prevent certain circumstances from harming their health and emotional stability, as long as the resolutions issued are duly grounded and subsequently proceedings are carried out as appropriate to prevent such measures from subsisting indefinitely without a judicial ruling.”</i> (See, in the same sense, ruling (voto) no. 2001-7598, at 9:46 a.m. on August 3, 2001). Finally, in the recent ruling (voto) no. 2013-6531, at 3:30 p.m. on May 14, 2013, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) reiterated that <i>“(…) it is not only the power of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia to ensure the best interest of the minor, but it is also its obligation to intervene and impose the necessary and temporary precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) or protective measures (medidas de protección), to safeguard the interests of a minor within any corresponding administrative or jurisdictional process. Likewise, it is the responsibility of the medical and social work authorities of the hospitals, in a situation of risk, to take the pertinent measures in order to guarantee, jointly with the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, the determination of the possible risk situations to which a minor may be exposed, and to activate the state mechanisms to safeguard their best interest, all in fulfillment of a state duty, provided not only by domestic constitutional and legal law, but by international human rights law and the rights of children.”</i> (See, in identical terms, no. 2013-7142, at 9:05 a.m. on May 24, 2013).- V I.- In her initial brief, visible from sheet 1 to 6, the appellant stated that the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, by resolution at 1:00 p.m. on April 16, 2012, ordered the inclusion of the youth [Name 003] in official or community programs at the Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia, IAFA), until such time as his rehabilitation is concluded (sheets 23-26). She also pointed out that, after verifying that this protective measure (medida de protección) could not be made effective, in one of the follow-up sessions with his mother, Mrs. [Name 001],<i> “(…) new options for internment and treatment for [Name 003] are offered to her so that she may evaluate them with her husband, however, Mrs. [Name 001] states that [Name 003] is currently closed to any support resource.”</i> According to the intervention report on sheets 34-35 and the management report on sheets 61-64, that session took place on August 24, 2012. Finally, she specified her petition in this venue in the following terms: <i>“(…) I appear in this venue to request that the youth [Name 003] be ordered<b> </b>to enter an alternative protection measure (alternativa de protección) that will allow him rehabilitation from his consumption and support in developing an uplifting life project, taking into account the youth's refusal to do so voluntarily (…).”</i> The first-instance judge grounded the challenged outright rejection in the provisions of Article 3, subsection e), of the <i>Organic Law of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (Ley Orgánica del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia)</i> and in the principles of dejudicialization (desjudicialización) and of comprehensive and inter-institutional approach. He also ordered <i>“(…) the acting entity to coordinate matters relating to said youth in administrative channels, through the <b><u>Department of Comprehensive Care (Departamento de Atención Integral)</u></b></i> <i>, either through the Graduate Ana Yeri Alvarado, or another professional in charge, as <b><u>this is a program available to that entity and which works in direct partnership with that medical center</u></b>, specially structured for the care of cases such as the one before us, this being the way in which the problem of addictions such as those described has been addressed until now (…).”</i> (Sheet 65). Now then, if, as correctly established in the abovementioned administrative resolution, <i>“(…) the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia is empowered to issue protective measures (medidas de protección) in favor of minors who are in a state of vulnerability, as is the case of (…) [Name 003]</i> <i>, who according to his mother is using drugs, whereby upon learning of the situation the adolescents must be involved and given an opportunity pursuant to the special legislation on the matter and the Code on Childhood and Adolescence (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia), to keep him in a center or Rehabilitation program for addicted persons.”</i>; if <i>“The norm mentions the obligation the State has to promote the detoxification and rehabilitation of minors who frequent this type of consumption, and both legal bodies grant the power to the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia to adopt the measures deemed necessary for this purpose.” </i>(Sheets 23-26); if the decision to intern a person, whether over or under eighteen years of age, must respond to technical and medical criteria that, in principle, are the exclusive purview of the specialized administrative authorities (see, in similar terms, the ruling (voto) of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) no. 2013-4919, at 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013) and if, as a general rule, the jurisdictional bodies in family matters are not competent to decree a measure such as the one sought, the judicial representative of that entity cannot be right when she seeks to order the youth [Name 003] his internment in a center specialized in addiction treatment. It bears mentioning that by having come to this venue to request that the internment in question be ordered, the petitioning entity breached its obligations and, in particular, did not act with the due diligence required to procure for the youth the attention and treatment that, in its judgment, he must receive, with the aggravating factor that, if it is assumed that the described risk situation is true, that inertia has undoubtedly disregarded his best interest and his right to health (see, in similar terms, the ruling (voto) of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) no. 2012-15171, at 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012).- V II.- Furthermore, this Tribunal adopts the following reasoning of the Magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), Dr. Gilberth Armijo Sancho, by virtue of which he dissented (salvó su voto) from judgment no. 2005-16145, at 8:37 a.m. on November 25, 2005: <i>“During the 1990s, a paradigm shift occurred in our country in the legal regulation related to minors, largely due to the signing of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The modification meant moving from a tutelary conception of the minor, where they were conceived as an incapable being, to the doctrine of their comprehensive protection, in which they are rediscovered in their fullness as a person, as a subject of rights and obligations, with awareness, indeed, of their special characteristics as a minor human being (Articles 5, 9, 10 and 24 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia)). The consequences for the principle of autonomy of will are evident. It is no longer about that alieni juris openly ignored by the administrative and jurisdictional authorities, who decided on matters that concerned them directly - often with serious consequences - without even realizing or worrying about their presence, but about someone with the right to learn about what is happening in their life, to express themselves, to opine and to decide. Another field in which a broad rethinking of the legal norms until then in force occurred was that of the deprivation of liberty of minors. The rules of the process that could mean their deprivation of liberty were redefined and this sanction was classified as completely exceptional (Articles 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 1, 2 and 11 of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty; 131 of the Law on Juvenile Criminal Justice (Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil)). I consider that the decisions of the Juvenile Court (…), ordering the internment of the plaintiff in a hospital center of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) for his detoxification and rehabilitation, even against his will, undermine those two fundamental pillars of the rights of minors. There is a medical criterion that discharges the appellant and advises against indefinite hospital internment (f. 88 exp. 04-00362-673-NA), and there is not the slightest reference to the commission of some illicit act that explains the imperativeness of the internment, as well as its temporal indeterminacy – this last condition, even in relation to the most serious crimes is absolutely prohibited by domestic and international law. Certainly, addiction to narcotics requires state attention and can lead people to the most serious physical, mental, and dignity-related deteriorations, but not because of that should forced treatments be imposed on those who suffer from this pathology, impairing their personal liberty and in centers that were not created for that purpose.”</i>.” It is due to the gravity of this illness that the legal system has designed a complex system of competencies for the prevention of drug addiction and the care of persons affected by this disease (…).” In sum, as synthesized in vote no. 2010-4587, of 10:03 a.m. on March 5, 2010, “The Constitutional Chamber, in abundant case law, has recognized that the right to health has constitutional protection as does the right to a healthy environment; from this it also follows that the State must watch over health, the protection of children and the family, and has the responsibility to ensure that all persons receive health services in a timely manner, especially minors and in this specific case, the phenomenon of drugs negatively impacts the individual and public health of these minors in general, for which reason it must also incentivize and develop programs related to the social reintegration of rehabilitated minors. (…). In this way, it is the obligation of the State to guarantee above all the right of children and adolescents to be protected, to have their identity, to personal integrity, and to health, rights indispensable for personal fulfillment and an essential condition for the economic and social development of a country. (…). In view of the foregoing, the State must (…) watch over the health of the population and especially give primary attention to minors, regardless of which organ or entity is competent, because the child and adolescent population affected by the scourge of drug addiction and alcoholism has the right to receive comprehensive care from the State or its institutions to preserve and restore their health. Furthermore, there is no doubt that in the present case the State is compelled, both by domestic and international law, to provide care immediately to minors who suffer from some addiction, without budgetary or other reasons rendering such right nugatory, because acting otherwise or delaying care puts their life, health, and comprehensive development at risk, for which reason the State is obligated above all else to adopt administrative, legislative, and any other measures to guarantee the full effectiveness of the right to health and integrity of minors, having as its axis the best interests of the child.” III.- As noted, current legislation establishes a complex system of competencies regarding the prevention of drug addiction and the care, treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration of drug-dependent persons (personas farmacodependientes). In vote no. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that “(…) the government and administration of social insurance was constitutionally entrusted to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (article 41), so that in general terms, the care of the health ailments of persons corresponds to said public entity, for which the Fundamental Law itself recognizes its financial independence, and even the duty of the State to transfer to it from its Budget the necessary revenues to fulfill its duties. In this way, no reason (of a merely budgetary nature) given by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to evade its duties towards persons is valid. (The Chamber has pronounced in this sense, among others, in judgments 1997-05934, 1998-07728, 1998-0 8411, 2003-01432, etc.) Addiction to narcotic drugs being an illness—even one of a very special nature due to its addictive character—the truth is that it is the duty of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to provide the due health services to those persons affected by this disease. In addition to the foregoing, Law 8204, in its article 166, provided the following rule: “The CCSS is authorized to create specialized centers for the care of drug-dependent persons (farmacodependientes), within a maximum period of four years.” Even if Law 8204 had not conferred these competencies on the institution (we will not enter here into a discussion about the governmental autonomy granted to that entity), the truth is that the Political Constitution itself, in its article 73, is what entrusts the referred entity with providing the health services that persons require, as administrator of the health insurance, so that the cited provision does nothing more than develop the generic mandate contained in the Fundamental Law. Notwithstanding this clear duty given to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the truth is that the formal legislator has taken it upon itself to distribute the burden implied by the care of a health problem as complex as the one analyzed, assigning to various institutions complementary competencies to those of the Caja.” In accordance with numerals 21 and 22 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Health (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud), No. 5412, of November 8, 1973, and its amendments, the Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia—an organ with minimum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Health—is in charge of “(…) the technical direction, study, prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation of addiction to alcohol, tobacco, and other licit or illicit drugs; furthermore, it shall perform other functions that the law establishes and shall be responsible for coordinating and approving all public and private programs related to its purposes; it must manage the suspension or closure of such programs if they fail to comply with the guidelines stipulated for this purpose.” Article 99 of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism (Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo), No. 8204, of December 16, 2001, and its amendments, entrusts the Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas—an organ of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of the Presidency (article 98 ibidem)—with “(…) coordinating, designing, and implementing policies, plans, and strategies for the prevention of drug consumption, the treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration of drug-dependent persons (farmacodependientes), as well as policies, plans, and strategies against illicit drug trafficking and related activities, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism. / Said Institute, as the organ responsible for the design and coordination of the execution of policies to address the phenomenon of drugs, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism, shall coordinate with the institutions executing related programs and projects in these matters.” Pursuant to article 3 ibidem, “It is the duty of the State to prevent the improper use of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and any other product capable of producing physical or psychological dependence; likewise, to ensure the prompt identification, treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation, and social readaptation of affected persons, and to procure the necessary economic resources to recover drug-dependent persons (personas farmacodependientes) and those affected, directly or indirectly, by drug consumption, in order to educate them, provide them with physical and mental rehabilitation treatment, and readapt them to society. / Treatments shall be in charge of the Ministry of Health, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), and the Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia (IAFA), and any other entity or institution legally authorized by the State. If the persons are minors, to achieve said treatment the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (PANI) must issue the necessary protection measures provided for in the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia). / In any case, it corresponds to the IAFA to exercise technical stewardship and supervision in matters of prevention and treatment, as well as to propose, design, and evaluate programs for the prevention of drug consumption.” (The underlining does not belong to the original). For its part, subsection n) of numeral 3 of its Organic Law, No. 7648, of December 9, 1996, stipulates as one of the purposes of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia to plan, execute, and supervise prevention programs jointly with the respective institutions in order to eradicate, in the population under eighteen years of age, all forms of drug addiction, alcoholism, or other causes that harm their integrity. It is obvious, then, that, as the entity responsible for the special protection of persons under eighteen years of age, as provided in article 55 of the Political Constitution, complementary competencies are attributed to the appellant entity to make the care of patients of this age group (grupo etario) affected by addictive illnesses a reality; among them, the issuance of the necessary protection measures to guarantee their best interest. And it is not superfluous to mention that in vote no. 2013-4919, of 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated that since no. 2005-5871, of 3:50 p.m. on May 17, 2005, it had ordered “(…) the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, the Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia, and the Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas, to take all necessary measures so that within eighteen months from the notification of that judgment, the country has a specialized center for the care of minors addicted to drugs, capable of providing comprehensive care to the minors affected by this disease, in accordance with the real demand for these services throughout the national territory. It was also ordered that until such a center as mentioned is opened, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social was obligated to keep operating a care module in the Hospital Dr. Roberto Chacón Paut, capable of providing the necessary treatment for the minor population, without prejudice to the outpatient care provided by the Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia.” IV.- As is known, at the national level, the Childhood and Adolescence Code is the minimum legal framework for the protection of the rights of persons under eighteen years of age. It establishes the principles that guarantee their social or community participation and respect for their condition as subjects of rights in administrative and judicial processes that involve or affect their interests. Furthermore, it enshrines the general obligation of the State to adopt administrative, legislative, budgetary, and any other measures to achieve the full effectiveness of their fundamental rights (see, in similar terms, votes of the Constitutional Chamber no. 2004-222, of 3:44 p.m. on January 14, 2004, and 2005-9063, of 10:22 a.m. on July 8, 2005). As that same organ pointed out in vote no. 2000-368, of 7:45 p.m. on January 11, 2000, reiterated in nos. 2000-9795, of 10:06 a.m. on November 3, 2000, and 2001-7598, of 9:46 a.m. on August 3, 2001: “This code also establishes a special protection process in the administrative venue that will be carried out by the local offices of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia; a process that tends to issue protection measures for minors when the rights recognized in that code are threatened or violated by different causes, among which is cited the fault, omission, or abuse of parents, guardians, caretakers, or responsible persons. It is established that the special protection process may be initiated ex officio or by complaint filed by any person, authority, or human rights organization. Once the fact is known or the complaint is received, the local office of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia shall verify the situation, hear the parties involved, receive the evidence they present, and issue, immediately, the corresponding protection measures, being a summary and informal procedure. In the event that the existence of indications of mistreatment or abuse to the detriment of a minor is verified in the administrative venue, the criminal complaint must be filed immediately. Among the protection measures that can be issued, as established by article 136 of that Code, is the temporary shelter (abrigo temporal) of the minor in public or private entities. In this regard, article 138 of that same normative body establishes the following: / “When applying the measures indicated in articles 135 and 136, the needs of those affected shall be taken into account, and those that aim to strengthen family and community ties shall prevail. / The measures provided for may be adopted separately or jointly and may be substituted at any time. In the case of provisional care in a substitute family and temporary shelter in a public or private entity, the measure may not exceed six months.” / Now then, there also exists the protection process in the judicial venue regarding which, the family judges of the jurisdiction of the minor's domicile shall be competent to hear the process. Through this process in the judicial venue, situations arising from the issuance of protection measures by the local offices of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia shall be processed according to articles 135, 136, and 137 of the code, and to resort to this venue, the administrative venue must be previously exhausted. Once this process is initiated, the judge shall review the results obtained with the measures issued in the administrative venue and shall set a day and time for the hearing that must be held within a maximum period of five days, and once the evidence is received and assessed according to the rules of sound judgment, the Judge shall issue a final resolution within a maximum period of five days, and in that resolution may confirm the measure ordered by the local office of the Patronato, extend it for an equal period, substitute it for another, or revoke it.” (The bold is added. See, in a similar sense, vote no. 2002-7538, of 10:41 a.m. on July 30, 2002).
V.- From all the foregoing, it is inferred that it constitutes an obligation of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia to act diligently in order to procure the due treatment for drug-dependent (farmacodependientes) persons under eighteen years of age, for which its own Organic Law; the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism; and the Childhood and Adolescence Code recognize its power to issue the necessary protection measures (see, in similar terms, vote of the Constitutional Chamber no. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012). Consider that it is not only the governing institution, par excellence, for childhood (see, in this regard, vote no. 227-93, of 12:36 p.m. on January 15, 1993), but also that its director, “(…) by being constituted as the temporary guardian and depositary of minors by operation of law, must employ the same criteria and rules established by the legislator in the Family Code regarding the different aspects related to the best interests of minors. That is, the Organic Law of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia and the Family Code complement each other since they constitute part of a system conceived by the Constitution, international instruments, and the common legislator to protect in a reinforced manner the superior interests of the minor and also the values upon which the unity of the family rests. On one hand, the Patronato as a decentralized institution of the Executive Branch with constitutional rank, as provided by article 55 of the constitution, in charge of ‘The special protection of the mother and the minor…'; ‘…with the collaboration of other State institutions.' on the other, and the oversight and coadjuvancy (coadyuvancia) of the family courts in accordance with the Code, have the legal capacity to grant the mother and children the protection that the Constitution requires.” (Vote of the Constitutional Chamber no. 4760-93, of 5:09 p.m. on September 29, 1993, reiterated in nos. 2000-5669, of 10:44 a.m. on July 7, 2000; 2001-2491, of 4:23 p.m. on March 27; 2001-9834, of 4:03 p.m. on September 26, both of 2001; 2002-5982, of 11:28 a.m. on June 14, 2002; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003; 2004-222, of 3:44 p.m. on January 14, 2004; 2005-9063, of 10:22 a.m. on July 8, 2005, and 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012. See, in a similar sense, votes nos. 6456-94, of 6:21 p.m. on November 2, 1994; 2001-306, of 8:38 a.m. on January 12, 2001; 2001-7597, of 9:45 a.m. on August 3, 2001; 2004-2299, of 9:00 a.m. on March 5, 2004). And it is not excessive to repeat that, “(…) in the interests of the protection of the minor in an accredited high-risk situation, the Patronato is legitimized to make the provisional deposit of the minor in the family or institution it deems appropriate, as such a measure entails extreme gravity, since it supposes the separation of the child from their natural family, the Institution must resort, within a reasonable term, before the family judge, so that the latter may review the legality of the precautionary measure adopted and determine whether or not it is appropriate. Such measures are protective provisions for minors, only valid provisionally, while the family judge intervenes and definitively resolves, since otherwise it could result that an administrative act decides on the guardianship, upbringing, and education of minors. So that, once this type of measure is adopted, (…), the Patronato must resort, within a reasonable term, to the respective jurisdictional venue and submit the agreed measure to the knowledge of the judge so that the latter may pronounce on it (…).” (Vote of the Constitutional Chamber no. 1033-94, of 11:15 a.m. on February 18, 1994, reiterated in nos. 2001-7597, of 9:45 a.m. on August 3, 2001; 2001-9834, of 4:03 p.m. on September 26, 2001; 2002-5982, of 11:28 a.m. on June 14, 2002; 2003-5319, of 9:12 a.m. on June 20, 2003; 2003-5319, of 9:12 a.m. on June 20, 2003; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003; 2003-8262, of 2:46 p.m. on August 6, 2003, and 2004-2299, of 9:00 a.m. on March 5, 2004). It must be clear, then, that “(…) the child may be separated from their parents (against their will), only as an exception, to protect their physical and emotional integrity, when it is duly accredited that they are a victim of mistreatment or neglect. Likewise, the State has the obligation to provide protection and assistance, particularly to minors who (…) find themselves in this situation, such as temporary placement in adequate institutions for their protection, in foster homes, and even through the institution of adoption. In accordance with the foregoing, it must then be clear that, exceptionally, the child may be separated from the place where they reside, if it is necessary to ensure their protection.” (Vote no. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012), and that, as established by the Constitutional Chamber, in vote no. 2000-368, of 7:45 p.m. on January 11, 2000: “(…) the Patronato has full competence to issue the protection measures that are necessary to guarantee the exercise of the fundamental rights of the involved minors. In this sense, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated that the intervention of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia in what refers to the protection of minors is constitutionally protected and therefore it is legitimized to take the measures and directives it considers convenient with the purpose of giving protection to minors and preventing that certain circumstances may harm their health and emotional stability, provided always that the resolutions issued are duly grounded and subsequently proceed as appropriate to prevent such measures from remaining indefinitely without judicial pronouncement.” (See, in the same sense, vote no. 2001-7598, of 9:46 a.m. on August 3, 2001). Finally, in the recent vote no. 2013-6531, of 3:30 p.m. on May 14, 2013, the Constitutional Chamber reiterated that “(…) it is not only the power of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia to watch over the best interest of the minor, but it is also its obligation to intervene and impose the necessary and temporary precautionary measures or protection measures, to safeguard the interests of a minor within any corresponding administrative or jurisdictional process. In the same way, it corresponds to the medical and social work authorities of the hospitals, in the face of a risk situation, to take the pertinent measures in order to guarantee, jointly with the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, the determination of the possible risk situations to which a minor may be exposed, and to activate the state mechanisms to safeguard their best interest, all in compliance with a state duty, provided not only by internal constitutional and legal law, but international law of human rights and children's rights.” (See, in the same terms, no. 2013-7142, of 9:05 a.m. on May 24, 2013).
VI.- In its initial filing, visible from folio 1 to 6, the appellant stated that the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, by resolution of 1:00 p.m. on April 16, 2012, ordered the inclusion of the young man [Name 003] in official or community programs at the Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia (IAFA), until his rehabilitation is concluded (folios 23-26). It also noted that, after verifying that this protection measure could not be made effective, in one of the follow-up sessions with his mother, Mrs. [Name 001], “(…) new options for internment and treatment are provided to [Name 003] for her to evaluate with her husband, however Mrs. [Name 001] affirms that [Name 003] at this moment is closed to any support resource.” According to the intervention report at folios 34-35 and the management report at folios 61-64, that session took place on August 24, 2012. Finally, it specified its petition in this venue in the following terms: “(…) I appear in this venue to request that the young man [Name 003] be ordered to enter a protection alternative that allows him the rehabilitation from his consumption and support in the development of an edifying life project, taking into account the young man's refusal to do so voluntarily (…).” The first-instance judge based the appealed outright rejection on the provisions of article 3, subsection e), of the Organic Law of the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia and on the principles of dejudicialization (desjudicialización) and comprehensive and inter-institutional approach. It also ordered “(…) the acting entity to coordinate regarding the referred young man in the administrative venue, through the Department of Comprehensive Care (Departamento de Atención Integral), whether by means of the Graduate Ana Yeri Alvarado, or another professional in charge, as this is a program that this entity has and that works in direct partnership with that medical center specially structured for the care of cases like the one at hand, this being the way in which the problem of addictions like those described has been addressed until now (…).” (Folio 65). Now then, if as rightly established in the administrative resolution cited above, “(…) the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia is empowered to issue protection measures in favor of minors who are in a state of vulnerability, as is the case of (…) [Name 003], who according to his mother is consuming drugs, for which reason upon knowing the situation one must involve the adolescents and give them an opportunity in accordance with the special legislation on the matter and the Childhood and Adolescence Code, keep him in a center or Rehabilitation program for addicted persons.”; if “The norm mentions the obligation that the State has to promote the detoxification and rehabilitation of minors who frequent this type of consumption, and both legal bodies grant the power to the Patronato Nacional de la Infancia to adopt the measures deemed necessary for this purpose.” (Folios 23-26); if the decision to intern a person, whether over or under eighteen years of age, must respond to technical and medical criteria that, in principle, are the exclusive province of specialized administrative authorities (see, in similar terms, vote of the Constitutional Chamber no. 2013-4919, of 9:05 a.m. on April 12, 2013), and if, as a general rule, jurisdictional organs in family matters are not competent to decree a measure such as the one sought, the judicial representative of that entity cannot be correct when she seeks to have the young man [Name 003] ordered to be interned in a center specialized in the treatment of addictions.
It is also worth mentioning that, by having come to this court to request the internment in question, the petitioning entity breached its obligations and, in particular, did not act with the due diligence required to procure for the young man the care and treatment that, in its view, he must receive, with the aggravating factor that, if the described risk situation is assumed to be true, that inertia has undoubtedly disregarded his best interests and his right to health (see, in similar terms, the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber no. 2012-15171, of 2:30 p.m. on October 30, 2012).- **II.-** For greater emphasis, this Court endorses the following reasoning of the magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber, Dr. Gilberth Armijo Sancho, by which he dissented in judgment no. 2005-16145, of 8:37 a.m. on November 25, 2005: *“During the 1990s, a paradigm shift occurred in our country regarding the legal regulation related to minors, largely due to the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The modification entailed moving from a guardianship conception of the minor, where they were conceived as an incapable being, to the doctrine of their comprehensive protection, in which they are rediscovered in their fullness as a person, as a subject of rights and obligations, with awareness, certainly, of their special characteristics as a minor human being (Articles 5, 9, 10, and 24 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code). The consequences for the principle of autonomy of will are evident. It is no longer a matter of that alieni juris openly ignored by administrative and jurisdictional authorities, who decided on matters that concerned them directly—often with serious consequences—without even realizing or worrying about their presence, but rather of someone with the right to know what is happening with their life, to express themselves, to opine, and to decide. Another field in which a broad reconsideration of the legal norms in force until then took place, was that of the deprivation of liberty of minors [sic]. The rules of the process that could lead to their deprivation of liberty were redefined [sic] and this sanction was qualified as completely exceptional (Articles 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 1, 2, and 11 of the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty; 131 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law). I consider that the decisions of the Childhood and Adolescence Court (...), ordering the internment of the plaintiff in a hospital center of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund for his detoxification and rehabilitation, even against his will, undermine those two fundamental pillars of the rights of minors. There is a medical opinion that discharges the appellant and advises against indefinite hospital internment (f. 88 exp. 04-00362-673-NA), and there is not the slightest reference to the commission of any unlawful act that explains the mandatory nature of the internment, as well as its temporal indeterminacy—this last condition being one that, even in relation to the most serious crimes, is absolutely prohibited by domestic and international law. Certainly, drug addiction requires state attention and can lead people to the most serious physical, mental, and dignity-related deterioration, but this does not mean that forced treatments should be imposed on those who suffer from this pathology, impairing their personal liberty and in centers not created for that purpose.”*.”
“II.- Esta Cámara conoce y comparte la interpretación extensiva y garantista del artículo 21 de la Constitución Política que ha posibilitado el desarrollo, por parte de la Sala Constitucional, de una amplia doctrina sobre el derecho fundamental a la salud, en virtud de la cual ha considerado como una obligación primordial del Estado velar por la efectiva protección de la integridad física y mental de cada uno de sus habitantes (ver, entre otros, los votos n.os 2005-5871, de las 15:50 horas del 17 de mayo; 2005-16145, de las 8:37 horas del 25 de noviembre, ambos de 2005; 2010-4587, de las 10:03 horas del 5 de marzo de 2010 y 2012-15171, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de octubre de 2012). También tenemos claro que, tratándose de personas menores de dieciocho años, los artículos 3, 19 y 24 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño [y de la Niña] le imponen el deber de promover y asegurarles las condiciones necesarias para garantizar en la máxima medida posible su supervivencia y su desarrollo y el más alto nivel de salud, así como el de implementar las medidas legislativas, administrativas, sociales y educativas adecuadas para asegurar su protección y el cuidado requerido para su bienestar. Por último, es indiscutible que la adicción a drogas enervantes constituye un delicado problema de salud pública que obliga tanto a prevenir su consumo como a tratar a las personas farmacodependientes, en especial si se trata de niños, niñas y adolescentes. Como lo puntualizó esa misma Sala en el voto n.º 2005-5871, de las 15:50 horas del 17 de mayo de 2005 y lo reiteró en el n.º 2013-3131, de las 9:20 horas del 8 de marzo de 2013, “En el caso de las personas menores de edad, la atención debe ser redoblada, pues la adicción en individuos altamente vulnerables tiene consecuencias gravísimas y difícilmente reversibles en su desarrollo físico, social y personal. Es debido a la gravedad de esta enfermedad que el ordenamiento ha diseñado un complejo sistema de competencias para la prevención de la drogadicción y la atención de personas afectas a este mal (…).” En suma , como lo sintetiza el voto n.º 2010-4587, de las 10:03 horas del 5 de marzo de 2010, “El Tribunal Constitucional, en abundante jurisprudencia, ha reconocido que el derecho a la salud tiene cobertura constitucional así como el derecho a un ambiente sano; de ello también se deriva que el Estado debe velar por la salud, la protección de los niños y la familia, que tiene la responsabilidad de procurar que todas las personas reciban los servicios de salud en forma oportuna, en especial los [y las] menores de edad y en este caso en específico, el fenómeno de las drogas incide negativamente en la salud individual y pública de estos [y estas] menores [sic] en general, por lo que también debe incentivar y desarrollar programas relacionados con la reinserción social de los [y las] menores [sic] rehabilitados. (…). De esta forma, es obligación del Estado garantizar ante todo el derecho de los niños, niñas y adolescentes a ser protegidos, a tener su identidad, a la integridad personal y a la salud, derechos indispensables para la realización personal y condición esencial para el desarrollo económico y social de un país. (…). En vista de lo anterior, el Estado debe (…) velar por la salud de la población y en especial dar atención primordial a los [y las] menores de edad, independientemente de quién sea el órgano o ente competente, porque la población infanto-juvenil afectada por el flagelo de la drogadicción y el alcoholismo tiene derecho a recibir una atención integral del Estado o de sus instituciones para conservar y reestablecer su salud. Además, no cabe duda de que en el presente caso el Estado está compelido, tanto por la normativa interna como por la internacional, a brindar atención en forma inmediata a los [y las] menores de edad que sufren de alguna adicción, sin que razones presupuestarios [sic] o de otra índole hagan nugatorio tal derecho, en razón que de [sic] actuar en forma contraria o rezagar la atención pone en riesgo su vida, su salud y su desarrollo integral, por lo que el Estado se encuentra obligado por encima de otras cosas a adoptar las medidas administrativas, legislativas y de cualquier índole, para garantizar la plena efectividad del derecho de salud e integridad a las personas menores de edad, teniendo como eje el interés superior de los niños [y las niñas].”- III.- Como se apuntó, la legislación vigente establece un complejo sistema de competencias en materia de prevención de la drogadicción y de atención, tratamiento, rehabilitación y reinserción de las personas farmacodependientes. En el voto n.º 2005-5871, de las 15:50 horas del 17 de mayo de 2005, la Sala Constitucional señaló que “(…) el gobierno y la administración de los seguros sociales fue constitucionalmente encomendado a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (artículo 41), de modo que en términos generales, la atención de los padecimientos de salud de las personas corresponde a dicho ente público, para lo que la propia Ley Fundamental le reconoce independencia financiera, e incluso el deber del Estado de transferirle de su Presupuesto, las rentas necesarias para cumplir con sus deberes. De esa forma, no resulta válida ninguna razón (de orden meramente presupuestario) que dé la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para sustraerse de sus deberes para con las personas. (En ese sentido se ha pronunciado la Sala entre otras, en sentencias 1997-05934, 1998-07728, 1998-0 8411, 2003-01432, etc.) Tratándose la adicción a las drogas estupefacientes de una enfermedad –aún siendo una de índole muy especial por su carácter de adictiva- lo cierto es que es deber de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social brindar los debidos servicios de salud a aquellas personas afectadas por este mal. En adición a lo anterior, la Ley 8204, en su artículo 166 dispuso la siguiente regla: “Autorízase a la CCSS para que cree centros especializados en la atención de los farmacodependientes, en un plazo máximo de cuatro años.” Incluso si la Ley 8204 no hubiera conferido estas competencias a la institución (no se entrará aquí en una discusión acerca de la autonomía de gobierno dada a ese ente), lo cierto es que la propia Constitución Política, en su artículo 73, es la que encarga a la referida entidad, la prestación de los servicios sanitarios que las personas requieran, como administradora de los seguros de salud, de modo que la disposición citada no hace sino desarrollar el mandato genérico contenido en la Ley Fundamental. No obstante este claro deber dado a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, lo cierto es que el legislador [sic] formal se ha encargado de distribuir la carga que implica la atención a un problema de salud tan complejo como el analizado, asignando a diversas instituciones, competencias complementarias a las de la Caja.” De conformidad con los numerales 21 y 22 de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, N.º 5412, de 8 de noviembre de 1973 y sus reformas, el Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia —órgano con desconcentración mínima, adscrito al Ministerio de Salud— tiene a cargo “(…) la dirección técnica, el estudio, la prevención, el tratamiento y la rehabilitación de la adicción al alcohol, el tabaco y otras drogas lícitas o ilícitas; además, desempeñará otras funciones que la ley establezca y será el responsable de coordinar y aprobar todos los programas tanto públicos como privados relacionados con sus fines; deberá gestionar la suspensión o el cierre de tales programas, si incumplen los lineamientos estipulados al efecto.” El 99 de la Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo, N.º 8204, de 16 de diciembre de 2001 y sus reformas, le encarga al Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas —órgano de desconcentración máxima, adscrito al Ministerio de la Presidencia (artículo 98 ibídem)— “(…) coordinar, diseñar e implementar las políticas, los planes y las estrategias para la prevención del consumo de drogas, el tratamiento, la rehabilitación y la reinserción de los farmacodependientes, así como las políticas, los planes y las estrategias contra el tráfico ilícito de drogas y actividades conexas, la legitimación de capitales y el financiamiento al terrorismo. / Dicho Instituto, como órgano responsable del diseño y la coordinación en la ejecución de las políticas para el abordaje del fenómeno de las drogas, la legitimación de capitales y el financiamiento al terrorismo, coordinará con las instituciones ejecutoras de programas y proyectos afines en estas materias.” Al tenor del 3 ibídem , “Es deber del Estado prevenir el uso indebido de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas y cualquier otro producto capaz de producir dependencia física o psíquica; asimismo, asegurar la identificación pronta, el tratamiento, la educación, el postratamiento, la rehabilitación y la readaptación social de las personas afectadas, y procurar los recursos económicos necesarios para recuperar a las personas farmacodependientes y a las afectadas, directa o indirectamente, por el consumo de drogas, a fin de educarlas, brindarles tratamiento de rehabilitación física y mental y readaptarlas a la sociedad. / Los tratamientos estarán a cargo del Ministerio de Salud, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) y el Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia (IAFA), y de cualquier otra entidad o institución legalmente autorizada por el Estado. Si se trata de personas menores de edad, para lograr dicho tratamiento el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (PANI) deberá dictar las medidas de protección necesarias dispuestas en el Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia. / En todo caso, corresponde al IAFA ejercer la rectoría técnica y la supervisión en materia de prevención y tratamiento, así como proponer, diseñar y evaluar programas de prevención del consumo de drogas.” (El subrayado no pertenece al original). Por su parte, el inciso n) del ordinal 3º de su Ley Orgánica, N.º 7648, de 9 de diciembre de 1996, estipula como uno de los fines del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia planificar, ejecutar y supervisar programas de prevención de manera conjunta con las instituciones respectivas con el objeto de erradicar, en la población menor de dieciocho años, toda forma de drogadicción, alcoholismo u otras causas que lesionen su integridad. Es obvio, entonces, que, en tanto responsable de la protección especial de las personas menores de dieciocho años, según lo dispone el artículo 55 de la Constitución Política, a la entidad recurrente se le atribuyen competencias complementarias para hacer realidad la atención de pacientes de ese grupo etario afectado por enfermedades adictivas; entre ellas, la emisión de las medidas de protección necesarias para garantizar su mejor interés. Y no huelga mencionar que en el voto n.º 2013-4919, de las 9:05 horas del 12 de abril de 2013, la Sala Constitucional reiteró que desde el n.º 2005-5871, de las 15:50 h oras del 17 de mayo de 2005 , le había ordenado “(…) a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, al Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, al Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia y al Instituto Costarricense sobre Drogas, tomar todas las medidas necesarias para que en el plazo de dieciocho meses a partir de la comunicación de esa sentencia, el país cuente con un centro especializado en la atención de menores [sic] adictos a las drogas, capaz de brindar atención integral a los y las menores [sic] afectos a este mal, de acuerdo con la demanda real de estos servicios en todo el territorio nacional. También se dispuso que hasta tanto no se hubiere abierto un centro como el mencionado, la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social quedaba obligada a mantener funcionando un módulo de atención en el Hospital Dr. Roberto Chacón Paut, capaz de brindar el tratamiento necesario para la población menor de edad, sin perjuicio de la atención ambulatoria que brinda el Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia.”- IV.- Como es sabido, a nivel nacional, el Código de la niñez y la adolescencia es el marco jurídico mínimo para la protección de los derechos de las personas menores de dieciocho años. En él se establecen los principios que garantizan su participación social o comunitaria y el respeto a su condición de sujetos de derechos en los procesos administrativos y judiciales que involucren o afecten sus intereses. Además, se recoge la obligación general del Estado de adoptar las medidas administrativas, legislativas, presupuestarias y de cualquier otra índole para alcanzar la plena efectividad de sus derechos fundamentales (ver, en similares términos, los votos de la Sala Constitucional n. os 2004-222, de las 15:44 horas del 14 de enero de 2004 y 2005-9063, de las 10:22 horas del 8 de julio de 2005). Como lo apuntó ese mismo órgano en el voto n.º 2000-368, de las 19:45 horas del 11 de enero de 2000, reiterado en los n.os 2000-9795, de las 10:06 horas del 3 de noviembre de 2000 y 2001-7598, de las 9:46 horas del 3 de agosto de 2001: “Este código establece también un proceso especial de protección en sede administrativa que será llevado a cabo por las oficinas locales del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia; proceso que tiende a dictar medidas de protección a las personas menores de edad cuando los derechos reconocidos en ese código son amenazados o violados por diferentes causas, entre las cuales se cita la falta, omisión o abuso de los padres, tutores, encargados o responsables. Se establece que el proceso especial de protección podrá iniciarse de oficio o por denuncia presentada por cualquier persona, autoridad u organismo de derechos humanos. Una vez conocido el hecho o recibida la denuncia, la oficina local del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, constatará la situación, escuchará a las partes involucradas, recibirá la prueba que ellas presenten y dictará, inmediatamente, las medidas de protección que correspondan, tratándose de un procedimiento sumario e informal. En caso de que se compruebe en sede administrativa la existencia de indicios de maltrato o abuso en perjuicio de una persona menor de edad, la denuncia penal deberá plantearse en forma inmediata. Dentro de las medidas de protección que se pueden dictar, tal y como lo establece el artículo 136 de ese Código, está el abrigo temporal del menor en entidades públicas o privadas. Al respecto, establece el artículo 138 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, lo siguiente: / "Al aplicar las medidas señaladas en los artículo 135 y 136 se tendrán en cuenta las necesidades de los afectados y prevalecerán las que tengan por objeto fortalecer los vínculos familiares y comunitarios. / Las medidas previstas podrán adoptarse separada o conjuntamente y ser sustituidas en cualquier tiempo. En el caso del cuido provisional en familia sustituta y el abrigo temporal en entidad pública o privada, la medida no podrá exceder de seis meses". / Ahora bien, también existe el proceso de protección en vía judicial respecto del cual, serán los jueces [y las juezas] de familia de la jurisdicción del domicilio de la persona menor de edad, los [o las] competentes para conocer del proceso. Mediante este proceso en vía judicial se tramitarán las situaciones suscitadas a partir del dictado de las medidas de protección por las oficinas locales del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia según los artículos 135, 136 y 137 del código y para acudir a este se deberá de agotar previamente la vía administrativa. Incoado este proceso, el juez [o la jueza] revisará los resultados obtenidos con las medidas dictadas en sede administrativa y señalará día y hora para la audiencia que deberá celebrarse en un plazo máximo de cinco días y una vez recibida la prueba y valorada de acuerdo con las reglas de la sana crítica, el Juez [o la Jueza] dictará resolución final en un plazo máximo de cinco días y en esa resolución podrá confirmar la medida dispuesta por la oficina local del Patronato, prorrogarla por un período igual, sustituirla por otra o revocarla.” (La negrita es agregada. Ver, en similar sentido, el voto n.º 2002-7538, de las 10:41 horas del 30 de julio de 2002).- V.- De todo lo anterior se colige que constituye una obligación del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia actuar de forma diligente a efecto de procurar el tratamiento debido a las personas menores de dieciocho años farmacodependientes, para lo cual su misma Ley Orgánica; la Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo y el Código de la niñez y la adolescencia le reconocen la potestad de dictar las medidas de protección necesarias (ver, en términos similares, el voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 2012-15171, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de octubre de 2012). Repárese en que no solo es la institución rectora, por excelencia, de la niñez (ver, al respecto, el voto n.º 227-93, de las 12:36 horas del 15 de enero de 1993), sino también en que, quien la dirige, “(…) al constituirse como el tutor y depositario temporal de los [y las] menores [sic] por ministerio de ley, debe emplear los mismos criterios y reglas establecidos por el legislador [sic] en el Código de Familia respecto de los diferentes aspectos relacionados con el interés superior de los [y las] menores de edad. Es decir, la Ley Orgánica del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia y el Código de Familia se complementan puesto que constituyen parte de un sistema concebido por la Constitución, los instrumentos internacionales y el legislador [sic] común para proteger de una manera reforzada los intereses superiores del [o de la] menor [sic] y así como también los valores sobre los que descansa la unidad de la familia. Por una parte el Patronato como institución descentralizada del Poder Ejecutivo con rango constitucional, según lo dispuso el artículo 55 de la constitución, a cuyo cargo está "La protección especial de la madre y del menor..."; "...con la colaboración de otras instituciones del Estado." por otra, y la fiscalización y coadyuvancia de los tribunales de familia conforme al Código, tienen la capacidad jurídica para otorgar a la madre y a los hijos la protección que exige la Constitución.” (Voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 4760-93, de las 17:09 horas del 29 de setiembre de 1993, reiterado en los n.os 2000-5669, de las 10:44 horas del 7 de julio de 2000; 2001-2491, de las 16:23 horas del 27 de marzo; 2001-9834, de las 16:03 horas del 26 de setiembre, ambos de 2001; 2002-5982, de las 11:28 horas del 14 de junio de 2002; 2003-8262, de las 14:46 horas del 6 de agosto de 2003; 2004-222, de las 15:44 horas del 14 de enero de 2004; 2005-9063, de las 10:22 horas del 8 de julio de 2005 y 2012-15171, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de octubre de 2012. Ver, en similar sentido, los votos n.os 6456-94, de las 18:21 horas del 2 de noviembre de 1994; 2001-306, de las 8:38 horas del 12 de enero de 2001; 2001-7597, de las 9:45 horas del 3 de agosto de 2001; 2004-2299, de las 9 horas del 5 de marzo de 2004). Y no sobra repetir que, “(…) en aras de la protección del [de la] menor [sic] ante una situación acreditada de alto riesgo, el Patronato está legitimado para hacer el depósito provisional del [de la] menor [sic] en la familia o institución que estime apropiado [sic], como dicha medida entraña suma gravedad, ya que supone la separación del niño [o de la niña] de su familia natural, la Institución debe acudir, dentro de un término razonable, ante el juez [o la jueza] de familia, para que éste revise la legalidad de la medida cautelar adoptada y determine si esta es o no procedente. Dichas medidas son disposiciones cautelares para proteger a los [y a las] menores [sic] sólo válidas provisionalmente, en tanto el juez [o la jueza] de familia interviene y resuelve definitivamente, ya que de lo contrario podría resultar que por un acto administrativo se decidiera sobre la guarda, crianza y educación de los [y las] menores [sic]. De modo que, una vez adoptada ese tipo de medidas, (…) , el Patronato debe acudir, dentro de un término razonable, a la vía jurisdiccional respectiva y someter a conocimiento del juez [o de la jueza] la medida acordada para que este [o esta] se pronuncie al respecto (…) .” (Voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 1033-94, de las 11:15 horas del 18 de febrero de 1994, reiterado en los n.os 2001-7597, de las 9:45 horas del 3 de agosto de 2001; 2001-9834, de las 16:03 horas del 26 de setiembre de 2001; 2002-5982, de las 11:28 horas del 14 de junio de 2002; 2003-5319, de las 9:12 horas del 20 de junio de 2003; 2003-5319, de las 9:12 horas del 20 de junio de 2003; 2003-8262, de las 14:46 horas del 6 de agosto de 2003; 2003-8262, de las 14:46 horas del 6 de agosto de 2003 y 2004-2299, de las 9 horas del 5 de marzo de 2004). Ha de quedar claro, entonces, que “(…) el niño [o la niña] podrá ser separado [a] de sus padres (contra su voluntad), únicamente a manera de excepción, para proteger su integridad física y emocional, cuando se tenga debidamente acreditado que es víctima de maltrato o descuido. Asimismo, el Estado tiene la obligación de brindar protección y asistencia, particularamente a menores [sic] que [… se…] encuentren en esta situación, como la ubicación temporal en instituciones adecuadas para su protección, en hogares sustitutos, e incluso a través del instituto de la adopción . De acuerdo con lo anterior, debe entonces quedar claro que, excepcionalmente, el niño podrá ser separado del lugar donde reside, si es necesario para su asegurar su protección.” ( Voto n.º 2012-15171, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de octubre de 2012), y que, como lo estableció la Sala Constitucional , en el voto n.º 2000-368, de las 19:45 horas del 11 de enero de 2000: “(…) el Patronato tiene plena competencia para dictar las medidas de protección que sean necesarias para garantizar el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales de los [y las] menores [sic] involucrados. En ese sentido, reiteradamente este Tribunal ha señalado que la intervención del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia en lo que se refiere a la protección de menores [sic], está constitucionalmente tutelada y por lo tanto está legitimado para tomar las medidas y directrices que considere convenientes con el objeto de dar protección a los [y a las] menores [sic] y evitar que determinadas circunstancias vayan a perjudicar su salud y su estabilidad emocional, siempre y cuando, las resoluciones que dicten se encuentran debidamente fundamentadas y posteriormente se proceda como corresponda para evitar que tales medidas queden subsistiendo indefinidamente sin pronunciamiento judicial.” (Ver, en igual sentido, el voto n.º 2001-7598, de las 9:46 horas del 3 de agosto de 2001). Por último, en el reciente voto n.º 2013-6531, de las 15:30 horas del 14 de mayo de 2013, la Sala Constitucional reiteró que “(…) no sólo es potestad del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia velar por el mejor interés del [o de la] menor [sic], sino que también es su obligación intervenir e imponer las medidas cautelares o medidas de protección necesarias y temporales, para salvaguardar los intereses de un [o una] menor [sic] dentro de cualquier proceso administrativo o jurisdiccional que corresponda. De igual forma corresponde a las autoridades médicas y de trabajo social de los hospitales, ante una situación de riesgo, tomar las medidas pertinentes a fin de garantizar, en conjunto con el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, la determinación de las posibles situaciones de riesgo a que puede estar expuesto un [o una] menor [sic], y activar los mecanismos estatales para salvaguardar su interés superior, todo en cumplimiento de un deber estatal, dispuesto no sólo por el derecho constitucional y legal interno, sino internacional de los derechos humanos y de los derechos de los niños.” (Ver, en iguales términos, el n.º 2013-7142, de las 9:05 horas del 24 de mayo de 2013).- V I.- En su escrito inicial, visible del folio 1 al 6, la recurrente refirió que el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia, por resolución de las 13 horas del 16 de abril de 2012, ordenó la inclusión del joven [Nombre 003] en programas oficiales o comunitarios en el Instituto sobre Alcoholismo y Farmacodependencia (IAFA), hasta tanto concluya su rehabilitación (folios 23-26). Apuntó, también, que, luego de constatar que esa medida de protección no pudo hacerse efectiva, en una de las sesiones de seguimiento con su madre, la señora [Nombre 001], “(…) se le brindan nuevas opciones de internamiento y tratamiento para [Nombre 003] para que las valore con su esposo, sin embargo Doña [Nombre 001] afirma que [Nombre 003] en este momento se encuentra cerrado a cualquier recurso de apoyo.” De acuerdo con el informe de intervención de folios 34-35 y con el informe de gestión de folios 61-64, esa sesión tuvo lugar el 24 de agosto de 2012. Por último, concretó su petitoria en esta sede en los siguientes términos: “(…) me presento en esta vía a solicitar se ordene al joven [Nombre 003] el ingreso a una alternativa de protección que le permita la rehabilitación de su consumo y apoyo en la elaboración de un proyecto de vida edificante, teniendo en cuenta la negativa del joven para hacerlo voluntariamente (…).” El juez de primera instancia fundamentó el rechazo de plano cuestionado en lo previsto por el artículo 3, inciso e), de la Ley Orgánica del Patronato Nacional de la Infancia y en los principios de desjudicialización y de abordaje integral e interinstitucional. Dispuso, además, ordenarle “(…) al ente actor coordinar lo relativo al referido joven en vía administrativa, por medio del Departamento de Atención Integral , ya sea por medio de la Licenciada Ana Yeri Alvarado, o de otra profesional a cargo, por ser este un programa con el que cuenta esa entidad y que trabaja en asocio directo con ese centro médico especialmente estructurado para la atención de casos como el que nos ocupa, siendo [sic] esta la forma en que hasta ahora se ha venido abordando la problemática de la adicciones como las que se describen (…).” (Folio 65). Ahora bien, si como acertadamente se estableció en la resolución administrativa supra citada, “(…) el Patronato Nacional de la Infancia está facultado para dictar medidas de protección en [sic] favor de personas menores de edad que se encuentren en estado de vulnerabilidad, como es el caso de (…) [Nombre 003] , quien según menciona su madre est[á] consumiendo drogas, por lo que al conocer la situación se debe involucrar a los adolescentes y darle una oportunidad conforme a la legislación especial en la materia y al Código de la Niñez y la –Adolescencia, mantenerl[o] en un centro o progama de Rehabilitación para personas adictas.”; si “La norma menciona la obligación que el Estado tiene de promover la desintoxicación y la rehabilitación de las personas menores de edad que frecuentan este tipo de consumos, y otorgan ambos cuerpos legales, la potestad al Patronato Nacional de la Infancia para adoptar las medidas que se consideren necesarias al efecto.” (Folios 23-26); si la decisión de internar a una persona, sea mayor o menor de dieciocho años, ha de responder a criterios técnicos y médicos que, en principio, son de resorte exclusivo de las autoridades administrativas especializadas (ver, en similares términos, el voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 2013-4919, de las 9:05 horas del 12 de abril de 2013) y si, por regla general, los órganos jurisdiccionales en materia de familia no somos competentes para decretar una medida como la pretendida, no puede asistirle razón a la apoderada judicial de esa entidad cuando pretende que se le ordene al joven [Nombre 003], su internamiento en un centro especializado en el tratamiento de adicciones. No sobra mencionar que al haber acudido a esta sede a solicitar que se ordene el internamiento en cuestión, la entidad gestionante incumplió sus obligaciones y, en particular, no actuó con la diligencia debida para procurarle al joven la atención y el tratamiento que, en su criterio, ha de recibir, con el agravante de que, si se asume que es cierta la situación de riesgo descrita, esa inercia ha hecho caso omiso, sin duda, de su mejor interés y de su derecho a la salud (ver, en términos similares, el voto de la Sala Constitucional n.º 2012-15171, de las 14:30 horas del 30 de octubre de 2012).- V II.- A mayor abundamiento, este Tribunal hace suyo el siguiente razonamiento del magistrado de la Sala Constitucional, doctor Gilberth Armijo Sancho, en virtud del cual salvó su voto en la sentencia n.º 2005-16145, de las 8:37 horas del 25 de noviembre de 2005: “Durante los años 90, se produjo en nuestro país un cambio de paradigma en la regulación jurídica relacionada con menores de edad, en gran medida debido a la suscripción de la Convención sobre Derechos del Niño. La modificación implicó pasar de una concepción tutelar del menor, donde se le concebía como un ser incapaz, a la doctrina de su protección integral, en la cual se le redescubre en su plenitud como persona, como sujeto de derechos y obligaciones, con conciencia, eso sí, de sus especiales características de ser humano menor de edad (artículos 5º, 9º, 10 y 24 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia). Las consecuencias para el principio de autonomía de la voluntad son evidentes. No se trata ya de ese alieni juris abiertamente ignorando por las autoridades administrativas y jurisdiccionales, quienes decidían de cuestiones que le concernían de forma inmediata -muchas veces de serias consecuencias-, sin siquiera caer en cuenta o preocuparse de su presencia, sino de alguien con derecho a enterarse de lo que está sucediendo con su vida, de expresarse, de opinar y de decidir. Otro de los campos en el que se hizo un amplio replanteamiento de las normas jurídicas hasta entonces vigentes, fue en el de la privación de libertad de los menores [sic]. Se redefinió [sic] las reglas del proceso que podrían significar su privación de libertad y se calificó esta sanción como completamente excepcional (artículos 37 de la Convención sobre Derechos del Niño; 1º, 2º y 11 de las Reglas de las Naciones Unidas para la Protección de los Menores Privados de Libertad; 131 de la Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil). Considero que las decisiones del Juzgado de la Niñez y la Adolescencia (…), ordenando el internamiento del actor en un centro hospitalario de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para su desintoxicación y rehabilitación, aún en contra de su voluntad, socavan esos dos pilares fundamentales de los derechos de los menores de edad. Existe un criterio médico que da de alta al recurrente y que desaconseja el internamiento hospitalario por tiempo indefinido (f. 88 exp. 04-00362-673-NA), y no hay la mínima referencia a la comisión de algún ilícito que explique la imperatividad del internamiento, así como su indeterminación temporal –condición esta última, que aún en relación con los más graves delitos está absolutamente prohibida por el derecho interno e internacional-. Ciertamente, la adicción a los estupefacientes requiere de atención estatal y puede llevar a las personas a los más graves deterioros físicos, mentales y de su dignidad, pero no por ello debe imponerse a quienes sufren de esta patología tratamientos forzados, con menoscabo de su libertad personal y en centros que no fueron creados con ese fin.”.”
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