Commercial Prescription in University Education Service ContractPrescripción mercantil en contrato de servicios educativos universitarios

**V. Regarding the Statute of Limitations (Prescripción):** For reasons of logic, the appeal filed by the defendant will be addressed first, and within it, that concerning the statute of limitations defense (excepción de prescripción). The appellant states in this regard, to support the rejection of the statute of limitations defense, the lower court (a quo) violates the doctrinal, jurisprudential, and legal principles applicable to the matter, by distorting the established commercial relationship, confusing it with a civil one. She then cites an excerpt from the judge's analysis on this point to assert that, in his analysis, the judge disregards the provisions of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), solely based on the nature of one of the parties involved in the relationship. She assures, based on the provisions of Article 1 of the Commercial Code, that the relationship must be examined by its nature and content, which in this case involves, on one hand, a university organization that offers educational and training services, and on the other, students who acquire them for consideration and as consumers. She adds that it is timely to note that the law creating CONESUP (6693 of 2/11/81), originally required the sponsoring or founding entities of private universities to be non-profit, so they had to adopt the associative forms known as "Associations" or "Foundations," a requirement declared unconstitutional by the Chamber in ruling 7494-1997, which she cites in her support. She affirms that this Court and Section, through ruling number 18-2010 of 2:20 p.m. on January 15, 2010, determined that the statute of limitations in these cases is commercial, and therefore the four-year term applies. For the foregoing reasons, the appellant says, the fact that she is an Association party to the legal relationship does not distort its commercial nature, regardless of whether her creation and operation are regulated by the Law of Associations (Ley de Asociaciones), especially given what is indicated in Article 2 of said Law, a provision arbitrarily disregarded in the judgment. She states that as a consequence of the possibility indicated by this latter provision, what is provided in Article 26 of the aforementioned Law applies, meaning that contracts of any kind can be entered into, regardless of the nature of the legal entity; this is to say that she does not need to be a corporation (sociedad anónima) to enter into commercial contracts, hence the judgment's conclusions stem from a partial and improper interpretation of the legal system, which causes her real harm. She reiterates that it is false that only commercial legal entities can enter into contracts and establish relationships of that type, because as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated, it is not necessary to "alter real situations to conceal an economic purpose that is evident in practice." Finally, the appellant states that there is no doubt that a relationship of indisputable commercial nature was established between the plaintiff and the university, by its characteristics of provision and acquisition of educational services for consideration, which is why the defense was raised in light of the provisions of the Commercial Code, which regulates the matter, since, in this case, the prescribed term elapsed more than amply between 1997 and 2002, and between the latter and the year 2008. The claim is admissible. The first-instance judge based the rejection of the statute of limitations defense on the following terms: "However, the defendant is not correct in her arguments, and the Civil Code's regime, which establishes a general statute of limitations period of ten years, is applicable to this case. The relationship that exists in these types of cases is not of a commercial nature, but strictly contractual civil. The foregoing is deduced primarily from the parties participating in that contract. This follows from the very associative basis under which the defendant was constituted as an Association and not as a commercial legal entity. For this reason, all of its activity is governed by Law No. 218, called the Law of Associations, which in Articles 1 and 2 provides: 'Article 1: The right of association may be freely exercised in accordance with what this law prescribes. Consequently, associations for scientific, artistic, sporting, charitable, recreational, and any other lawful purposes that do not have profit or gain as their sole and exclusive object are subject to this text. Guilds and mutual aid, welfare, and employer associations shall also be governed by this law./ The foregoing means that if the plaintiff chose this form of organization, unless proven otherwise, the fulfillment of its purposes does not have profit or gain as its sole and exclusive object. Therefore, its activity cannot be classified as typically commercial. The defendant herself on folio 128 indicates: "ULACIT is constituted with the objective of training professionals, in the exercise of freedom of education, and within the legal framework established in Law 6693, of November 27, 1981." - Nor did she allege in her arguments that the purpose of her activity in the training of professionals is strictly commercial. - Now, the aforementioned Law 6693 creates CONESUP as a legal entity of the State whose objective is the supervision and oversight of private higher education activity, and to that extent, the activity carried out by the defendant cannot be considered commercial either. Nor could the underlying relationship for the student in this type of contract be considered commercial, because the ultimate goal pursued by the student is to obtain a professional academic degree or title, as part of their personal and professional fulfillment and logically to seek an improvement in their employment opportunities, and not a profit-making purpose. - For all the foregoing, it is ruled out in this case that the regime applicable to the statute of limitations in this matter is that regulated by the Commercial Code. - In that sense, the regime established in the Civil Code is therefore applicable, as stated, which establishes a term of ten years for the statute of limitations of the action and the corresponding right. - (Article 868).-" (sic). As can be seen, the lower court considers that the legal relationship between the parties to this proceeding is of a civil nature, as the defendant is an association and not a commercial legal entity, to which the provisions of subsection 1 of the Law of Associations apply, and not commercial laws, especially since it did not prove that the purpose of its activity is strictly for profit, and also due to the fact that the defendant's activity is regulated by the Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada (CONESUP). However, these assessments are insufficient for the resolution of this matter. The Court considers that, before determining whether said legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is commercial or civil, a comprehensive analysis of the current legal system should have been conducted. First, we have that Law No. 218, called the Law of Associations, which came into force on August 8, 1939, established in its articles: "Article 1: The right of association may be freely exercised in accordance with what this law prescribes. Consequently, associations for scientific, artistic, sporting, charitable, recreational, and any other lawful purposes that do not have profit or gain as their sole and exclusive object are subject to this text. Guilds and mutual aid, welfare, and employer associations shall also be governed by this law./ Article 2: Associations that, not being among those listed in the previous article, propose a merely commercial or civil purpose shall be governed by commercial or civil laws, as the case may be." However, this concept has undoubtedly changed over time, given the enactment of laws subsequent to it. Indeed, the Commercial Code, which came into effect on May 27, 1964, established in Article 5 two different criteria for determining who is a merchant, one objective and one subjective. According to the first, a merchant is a person with legal capacity who, in their own name, engages in commercial acts as a habitual occupation; according to the second, companies constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Code are considered merchants, regardless of what their purpose or activity may be. For their part, numerals 1 and 6 of said body of laws highlight the importance of the objective criterion by clearly stating: "Article 1.- The provisions contained in this Code govern the acts and contracts determined therein, even if the persons who execute them are not merchants. ...Article 6.- Those who occasionally carry out commercial acts shall not be considered merchants, but they are subject, regarding those acts, to the laws and regulations governing commercial acts." On this last point, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has stated: "III.- ...However, although this is an element that must be assessed to justify the application of the commercial regime, it is not the only one, since the mere fact that one of the parties engages in commercial activities does not mean that all legal relationships in which it participates acquire this nature. On the contrary, one must adhere to the specific characteristics of that legal relationship in order to determine which regulations govern that particular bond. It is worth noting that the first paragraph of the Commercial Code highlights this aspect by stating that said normative body will govern 'the acts and contracts determined therein, even if the persons who execute them are not merchants' (underlining supplied). As can be inferred from the above, it is clear that the scope of application is linked to the existence of a commercial act, and not to the nature of those intervening in that legal transaction. In this line of thought, it is fundamental to analyze the legal relationship in question in order to determine the rules of prescriptibility based on which the conflict must be resolved." (see ruling number 31 of 09:10:00 a.m. on 01/19/2012) (highlighting supplied). Now, Law 7472, called the Law on Competition and Effective Consumer Protection (Ley de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), enacted on December 20, 1994, came to regulate several issues of interest to the case. Specifically, numeral 2 defines the figures of consumer and merchant as follows: "Consumer/ Any natural person or de facto or de jure entity that, as the final recipient, acquires, enjoys, or uses goods or services, or receives information or proposals for them ...Merchant or provider/ Any natural person, de facto or de jure entity, private or public, that, in its own name or on behalf of another, is habitually engaged in offering, distributing, selling, leasing, granting the use or enjoyment of goods, or in providing services, without this necessarily being its main activity." In relation to the above definitions, the National Consumer Commission (Comisión Nacional del Consumidor), in ruling 2173-98 of 1:30 p.m. on 11/02/1998, illustratively stated: "SECOND.- ...In principle, the definition of merchant was necessary to delimit the subject matter that would be heard by commercial courts and not by civil ones. Several criteria tried to determine then which relationships would be regulated by Commercial Law. One of these criteria consists of determining whether one of the subjects is a merchant (subjective criterion). Another criterion establishes that such protection will depend on whether the act is a commercial act regardless of who performs it (objective criterion). For example, the Costa Rican Commercial Code is considered predominantly objective, given that Article 1 provides that the provisions contained in that code govern the acts and contracts determined therein 'even if the persons who execute them are not merchants; contracts between merchants are presumed to be commercial acts,' while Article 5 defines who is a merchant. In this sense, although there are a series of acts that are commercial (those contained in that code), there is also a definition of who is a merchant for the purposes of applying the presumption. ...THIRD.- From the definition of merchant contained in Article 2, it can be concluded that merchants can be natural or legal persons, public or private, acting in their own name or on behalf of another, who habitually offer, sell, lease, grant the use or enjoyment of goods, or provide services, without this necessarily being their main activity. Habituality refers to the fact that the activity must be carried out professionally, must manifest itself externally and be directed to the market in a public, systematic, and continuous manner; although the activity can be interrupted, it must not be occasional. Nor must it be their main activity; it can be accessory. This is the subject obligated by Article 31 of Law 7472. The fact that a variety of entities perform commercial acts or can perform them lawfully does not per se imply that they can be sanctioned by the National Consumer Commission, unless they can be qualified as such in accordance with Article 2 of that Law..." (bold highlighting is from the original). In turn, provision 6 of this law established the elimination of a series of restrictions on commerce, among which is the following: "...The power of chambers and private associations to self-regulate their economic activity is recognized, to guarantee the efficient provision of services to society, with strict observance of ethical principles and respect for the freedom of competition of economic agents, and to prevent the conducts prohibited and sanctioned in this Law. The participation of these entities may not limit free access to the corresponding market nor impede the competitiveness of new economic actors." Within this recounting, we cannot set aside the fact that on November 23, 1981, the Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada (CONESUP), attached to the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública), was created through Law 6693 called the Law on Private Universities (Ley de Universidades Privadas), which provided, among others, the following provisions of interest: "Article 5.- To request authorization for the operation of a private university, a foundation or association must be constituted for this purpose, whose representative will submit the respective request, addressed to the Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada./ ...Article 15.- The purpose of profit in university higher education is prohibited. Any surplus that private universities may eventually obtain must be reinvested for the same educational purposes pursued by the institution, on the understanding that a part of those surpluses will be dedicated to granting scholarships to students with good academic grades and scarce economic resources. Likewise, the constitution of corporations, or any type of commercial enterprise, for the purpose of providing university education is prohibited. Infringement of this provision shall imply the immediate application of subsection b) of Article 17 of this law." However, both articles were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in ruling 7494-97 of 3:45 p.m. on 11/11/1997, corresponding to the action brought by the ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE UNIVERSIDADES PRIVADAS against several articles of the aforementioned law and its regulation, because said high Court considered that they contravened the rights to freedom of association, freedom of education, and freedom of enterprise, giving the following reasons: "...IV.- MODELS OF ORGANIZATION: Article 5 is challenged insofar as it imposes certain organizational models, eliminating the negotiating capacity of the administered parties, thereby violating Articles 25, 28.2, 46 and 79 of the Political Constitution. Article 5 states that to request authorization for the operation of a private university, a foundation or association must be constituted for this purpose. Said provision is unconstitutional, as it violates both the freedom of enterprise regulated by Article 46 of the Political Constitution, and the freedom of education enshrined in numeral 79. Persons may associate as they see fit to channel their interests, in this case, educational ones. The freedom of education, which as mentioned contemplates both the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn, requires that those who wish to constitute themselves as members of a higher education institution choose the corporate model that best suits their interests, and it is not contrary to the purposes of education for these enterprises to have profit as their purpose, certainly not as their primary one, nor in a way that constitutes an obstacle to the interested party's access to the educational system, an extreme that will be analyzed next./ V.- PURPOSE OF PROFIT AND OVERSIGHT BY THE COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE: ...Article 15 of the Law...The plaintiff states that this article prevents the centers from organizing themselves as companies, and also prohibits profit, which is not prohibited in the exercise of any other fundamental right, not even in pre-university education. He considers that enterprise and teaching activity are not incompatible concepts. This article is contrary to the Political Constitution. In the first place, regarding the purpose of profit in education, it is unconstitutional to prohibit private universities from pursuing an economic or lucrative objective in their activity, because it is contrary to the freedom of enterprise protected in Article 46 of the Political Constitution. The opposite leads to altering real situations to conceal an economic purpose that is evident in practice. Obviously, this profit motive cannot be to the detriment of the right to education that the students have, and therefore it cannot be unrestricted; rather, the State must ensure that there is an adequate balance, so that fair tariffs are charged, proportional to the service provided and in accordance with the criteria already expressed in this ruling in this regard. Regarding the corporate forms that a university higher education organization can assume, as indicated when analyzing Article 5 of the Law, it is unconstitutional to establish limitations, because it contravenes the freedom of association, the freedom of education, and the freedom of enterprise. ..." (the highlighting is not from the original). The normative development set forth and the cited resolutions allow us to conclude that, to date, regardless of how a legal entity is constituted, whether under the Law of Associations or under any of the corporate forms established in the Commercial Code, whether its main purpose is profit or not, or whether it must be regulated by the Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada (CONESUP), it is governed by commercial laws with respect to the commercial acts it carries out. Thus, this Chamber has no doubt whatsoever that the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant is of a commercial nature, as it is a commercial act. It is public and notorious that, in the economic market, the defendant is a legally constituted private person, who in her own name is habitually engaged in offering private education services to the consumer in their capacity as final recipient, such as the plaintiff, who acquires, uses, and enjoys them. In this vein, for purposes of the statute of limitations, said relationship is governed by the provisions of the Commercial Code, specifically by provision 984, which establishes a term of four years for these cases. It should be noted that this Court and Section had already ruled in this sense in ruling 18 of 2:20 p.m. on 01/15/2010, when it stated: "XI.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Based on Ruling number 7494-97 of the Constitutional Chamber, the defendant party maintains that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred (prescritas), because the Chamber in said ruling established that the activities carried out by private universities are of a commercial nature. Accordingly, it is alleged that the plaintiff's formal graduation should have occurred in 2005, without prejudice to obtaining the certification confirming his professional status. Even though that certification indicated that the plaintiff had regulatory requirements to fulfill, he opted for inertia and did not perform any act interrupting or tending to suspend the one-year statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) established in Article 984 of the Commercial Code. Therefore, it is alleged that his claim to recover the damages and losses caused is time-barred. The lower court denied that defense, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations was the ten-year one, according to numeral 868 of the Civil Code. The Court admits the thesis of the defendant party, insofar as it maintains that the statute of limitations applicable to the case is the commercial one; however, we consider that it is not the one-year term but the four-year term established in 984 ibidem. Let us see why. The provision in question (984) establishes a series of one-year statute of limitations scenarios; however, none of the subsections regulate the situation of damages and losses and their collection. Thus, if any statute of limitations period were to be applied, it would be the four-year one...." Taking the foregoing into account, it is now appropriate to determine whether that fatal term elapsed in the sub litem case. Based on what the plaintiff stated in the first paragraph of the fifth and tenth facts of the complaint on folios 83 to 97 and what he spontaneously stated in the second paragraph of folio 367 of the statement of grievances (escrito de expresión de agravios), it is proven that after the last four-month term of 1997, specifically starting in January 1998, when the enrollment process for the beginning of the year began, the defendant decided not to allow the plaintiff to enroll in the Directed Research Seminar III (Seminario de Investigación Dirigida III), corresponding to the presentation and defense of the thesis, because it considered that he had pending course AD6143 Design Methods and Budgets for Tourism Programs (Métodos de Diseño y Presupuestos de Programas Turísticos). It is also demonstrated that after that date, it was not until September 13, 2002 (folio 206), that Mr. [Name1] submitted a new request to the Postgraduate Department (Dirección de Posgrados) in which he reiterated the completion of that requirement. As we can see, between the knowledge of the University's decision and the plaintiff's new request, the four-year period elapsed amply, and therefore the defense raised must be upheld, but only with respect to the plaintiff's claims regarding his having taken and passed course AD6143 Design Methods and Budgets for Tourism Programs at ULACIT University, that by reason thereof he must be allowed to enroll in the final graduation requirement, and that the defendant be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused by not being able to graduate all these years and opt for a better job position." The claim is admissible. The lower court judge based the rejection of the statute of limitations defense on the following terms: "However, the defendant's arguments are not correct, and the regime of the Civil Code, which establishes a general statute of limitations period of ten years, is applicable to the case. The relationship in this type of case is not of a commercial nature, but strictly civil contractual. This is deduced fundamentally from the parties that participate in that contract. Thus, it is evident from the very associative basis under which the defendant was constituted as an Association and not as a commercial legal entity. Therefore, all its activity is governed by Law No. 218, called the Law of Associations, which in its articles 1 and 2 provides: 'Article 1.- The right of association may be freely exercised in accordance with the provisions of this law. Consequently, associations for scientific, artistic, sporting, charitable, recreational, and any other lawful purposes that do not have profit or gain as their sole and exclusive object are subject to this text. Guilds and mutual aid, welfare, and patronage associations shall also be governed by this law./ The foregoing means that if the plaintiff chose that form of organization, barring proof to the contrary, the fulfillment of its purposes does not have profit or gain as its sole and exclusive object. Therefore, its activity cannot be classified as typically commercial. The defendant herself on page 128 states: 'ULACIT was established with the objective of training professionals, in the exercise of the freedom of education, and within the legal framework established in Law 6693, of November 27, 1981.' Nor did she allege in her arguments that the purpose of her professional training activity is strictly commercial. Now, the aforementioned Law 6693 created CONESUP as a state legal entity whose objective is the supervision and oversight of private higher education activity, and to that extent, the activity carried out by the defendant cannot be considered commercial either. Nor can the underlying relationship for the student in this type of contract be considered commercial, since the ultimate goal pursued by the student is to obtain a professional academic degree or title, as part of their personal and professional fulfillment and naturally to seek an improvement in their employment possibilities, and not a profit-making purpose. For all the foregoing reasons, it is ruled out in this case that the regime applicable to the statute of limitations in this matter is the one regulated by the Commercial Code. In that sense, as stated, the regime established in the Civil Code is applicable, which establishes a ten-year period for the statute of limitations of the action and the corresponding right. (Article 868)." (sic). As can be seen, the a quo court considers that the legal relationship between the parties in this proceeding is of a civil nature, since the defendant is an association and not a commercial legal entity, to which the provisions of subsection 1 of the Law of Associations are applicable, and not commercial laws, especially since it failed to prove that the purpose of its activity is strictly for profit, and additionally, due to the fact that the defendant's activity is regulated by the National Council of Private University Higher Education (Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada, CONESUP). However, these assessments are insufficient for the resolution of this matter. The Court considers that, prior to determining whether said legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is of a commercial or civil nature, a comprehensive analysis of the current legal system should have been conducted. First of all, Law number 218, called the Law of Associations, which came into effect on August 8, 1939, established in its articles: "Article 1.- The right of association may be freely exercised in accordance with the provisions of this law. Consequently, associations for scientific, artistic, sporting, charitable, recreational, and any other lawful purposes that do not have profit or gain as their sole and exclusive object are subject to this text. Guilds and mutual aid, welfare, and patronage associations shall also be governed by this law./ Article 2.- Associations that, not being among those listed in the previous article, propose a merely commercial or civil object shall be governed by commercial or civil laws, as the case may be." However, this concept has undoubtedly changed over time, given the enactment of laws subsequent to it. Indeed, the Commercial Code, which came into force on May 27, 1964, established in Article 5 two different criteria for determining who is a merchant, one objective and the other subjective. Under the first, a merchant is considered to be a person with legal capacity who, in their own name, engages in acts of commerce as a habitual occupation, and under the second, companies constituted in accordance with the provisions of that Code, regardless of the object or activity they carry out. For their part, numerals 1 and 6 of said body of laws highlight the importance of the objective criterion by clearly stating: "Article 1.- The provisions contained in this Code govern the acts and contracts determined therein, even if the persons who execute them are not merchants. ...Article 6.- Those who occasionally carry out acts of commerce shall not be considered merchants, but are subject, regarding those acts, to the laws and regulations governing acts of commerce." Regarding the latter, the First Chamber has stated: "III.- ...However, although this is an element that must be assessed to justify the application of the commercial regime, it is not the only one, since the mere fact that one of the parties engages in commercial activities does not mean that all legal relationships in which it participates acquire this nature. On the contrary, one must consider the specific characteristics of that legal relationship in order to determine which regulations govern that particular link. It should be noted that the first ordinal of the Commercial Code highlights this aspect, by pointing out that said normative body will govern 'the acts and contracts determined therein, even if the persons who execute them are not merchants' (the underlining is supplied). As can be inferred from the above, it is clear that the scope of application is linked to the existence of a commercial act, and not to the nature of those involved in that legal transaction. In this vein, it is fundamental to analyze the legal relationship in question in order to determine the rules of prescription based on which the conflict must be resolved." (see ruling number 31 of 09:10:00 hours of 01/19/2012) (the highlighting is supplied). Now, Law 7472, called the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, enacted on December 20, 1994, came to regulate several topics of interest to the case. Indeed, numeral 2 defines the figures of consumer and merchant as follows: "Consumer/ Any natural person or de facto or de jure entity that, as the final recipient, acquires, enjoys, or uses goods or services, or receives information or proposals for this purpose ...Merchant or provider/ Any natural person, de facto or de jure entity, private or public, that, in its own name or on behalf of another, habitually engages in offering, distributing, selling, leasing, granting the use or enjoyment of goods, or providing services, without this necessarily being its main activity." In relation to the above definitions, the National Consumer Commission, in ruling 2173-98 of 1:30 p.m. on 11/02/1998, illustratively stated: "SECOND.- ...In principle, the definition of merchant was made necessary to define the matters that would be under the jurisdiction of commercial courts and not civil ones. Several criteria then tried to determine which relationships would be regulated by Commercial Law. One of these criteria consists of determining if one of the subjects is a merchant (subjective criterion); another criterion establishes that this protection will depend on whether the act is a commercial act, regardless of who performs it (objective criterion). Thus, for example, the Costa Rican Commercial Code is considered predominantly objective, since Article 1 provides that the provisions contained in this Code govern the acts and contracts determined therein 'even if the persons who execute them are not merchants, contracts between merchants are presumed to be commercial acts,' while Article 5 defines who is a merchant. In this context, although there are a series of acts that are commercial (those contained in that Code), there is also a definition of who is a merchant for the purposes of applying the presumption. ...THIRD.- From the definition of merchant contained in Article 2, it can be concluded that merchants can be natural or legal persons, public or private, acting in their own name or on behalf of another, who habitually offer, sell, lease, grant the use or enjoyment of goods, or provide services, without this necessarily being their main activity. Habituality refers to the fact that the activity must be developed professionally, must be manifested externally and directed to the market in a public, systematic, and continuous manner; although the activity can be interrupted, it must not be occasional. Nor must it be their main activity; it can be an accessory one. This is the subject bound by Article 31 of Law 7472. The fact that a variety of entities carry out commercial acts or can lawfully perform them does not per se imply that they can be sanctioned by the National Consumer Commission, unless they can be classified as such in accordance with Article 2 of that Law..." (the bold highlighting is from the original). In turn, rule 6 of this law established the elimination of a series of restrictions on commerce, among which is the following: "...The authority of private chambers and associations to self-regulate their economic activity is recognized, to guarantee the efficient provision of services to society, with strict observance of ethical principles and respect for the freedom of concurrence of economic agents, and to prevent the conducts prohibited and sanctioned in this Law. The participation of these entities may not limit free access to the corresponding market nor impede the competitiveness of new economic adjustments." Within this recounting, we cannot ignore the fact that on November 23, 1981, the National Council of Private University Higher Education (CONESUP), attached to the Ministry of Public Education, was created by Law 6693, called the Law of Private Universities, which provided, among others, the following rules of interest: "Article 5.- To request authorization for the operation of a private university, a foundation or association must be constituted for that purpose, whose legal representative shall submit the respective application, addressed to the National Council of Private University Higher Education./ ...Article 15.- The objective of profit in university higher education is prohibited. The surpluses that private universities eventually obtain must be reinvested for the same educational purposes pursued by the institution, with the understanding that a part of these surpluses shall be dedicated to granting scholarships to students with good academic grades and limited economic resources. Likewise, the constitution of corporations, or any type of commercial enterprise, with the purpose of providing university education is prohibited. The violation of this rule shall imply the immediate application of subsection b) of Article 17 of this law." However, both articles were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 7494-97 of 3:45 p.m. on 11/11/1997, corresponding to the action filed by the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES against various articles of said law and its regulation, since that high Court considered that they contravened the rights to freedom of association, freedom of education, and freedom of enterprise, giving the following reasons: "...IV.-ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS: Article 5 is challenged insofar as it imposes certain organizational models, eliminating the negotiating capacity of the administered parties, thereby violating Articles 25, 28.2, 46, and 79 of the Political Constitution. Article 5 indicates that to request authorization for the operation of a private university, a foundation or association must be constituted for that purpose. Such a rule is unconstitutional, because it violates both the freedom of enterprise regulated by Article 46 of the Political Constitution, and the freedom of education enshrined in numeral 79. Persons may associate as they deem most convenient to channel their interests, in this case, educational ones. Freedom of education, which as mentioned encompasses both the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn, requires that those who wish to become members of a higher education institution choose the corporate model that best suits their interests, and it is not contrary to the purposes of education for those enterprises to have profit as an objective, provided it is not primary, nor in such a way that it constitutes an obstacle to the interested party's access to the educational system, an extreme that will be analyzed next./ V.- PROFIT PURPOSE AND COMPTROLLER'S OVERSIGHT: ...Article 15 of the Law...The plaintiff points out that this article prevents the centers from being organized as companies, also prohibits profit, which is not prohibited in the exercise of any other fundamental right, not even in pre-university education. It considers that enterprise and educational activity are not incompatible concepts. This article is contrary to the Political Constitution. First, regarding the profit purpose in education, it is unconstitutional to prohibit private universities from pursuing an economic or lucrative objective in their activity, because this is contrary to the freedom of enterprise protected in Article 46 of the Political Constitution. The contrary leads to altering real situations to conceal an economic purpose that is noted in practice. Obviously, that profit purpose cannot be detrimental to the right of education held by the students, so it cannot be unrestricted; instead, the State must ensure that there is an adequate balance, so that fair rates are charged, proportional to the service provided and in accordance with the criteria already expressed in this ruling in that regard. Regarding the corporate forms that a university higher education organization can assume, as indicated when analyzing Article 5) of the Law, it is unconstitutional to establish limitations, because it contravenes freedom of association, freedom of education, and freedom of enterprise. ..." (the highlighting is not from the original). The aforementioned normative development and cited rulings allow us to conclude that, as of today, regardless of the manner in which a legal entity is constituted, whether under the Law of Associations or under one of the corporate forms established in the Commercial Code, whether its main purpose is or is not profit, or whether it must be regulated by the National Council of Private University Higher Education (CONESUP), it is governed by commercial laws, with respect to the commercial acts it carries out. Thus, this Chamber has no doubt whatsoever that the contract signed between the plaintiff and the defendant is of a commercial nature, as it is a commercial act. It is public and notorious that, in the economic market, the defendant is a private person, legally constituted, who in its own name habitually engages in offering private education services to the consumer in their capacity as the final recipient, such as the plaintiff, who acquires, uses, and enjoys them. In this vein, for statute of limitations purposes, said relationship is governed by the provisions of the Commercial Code, specifically by rule 984, which establishes a period of four years for these cases. It should be noted that this Court and Section had already ruled in that sense in ruling 18 of 2:20 p.m. on 01/15/2010, when it stated: "XI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Basing itself on Ruling number 7494-97 of the Constitutional Chamber, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred, because the Chamber in said ruling established that the activities carried out by private universities are of a commercial nature. According to this, it is alleged that the plaintiff's formal graduation should have occurred in the year two thousand five, without prejudice to obtaining the certification verifying his professional status. Despite that certification indicating that the plaintiff had regulatory requirements to fulfill, he opted for inaction and did not carry out any act interrupting or tending to suspend the negative one-year statute of limitations established by Article 984 of the Commercial Code. Therefore, it is alleged that his claim to seek damages is time-barred. The a-quo court denied that defense, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations was the ten-year one, pursuant to numeral 868 of the Civil Code. The Court admits the thesis of the defendant, in that it maintains that the statute of limitations applicable to the case is the commercial one; nevertheless, we consider that it is not the one-year period but the four-year period established by 984 ibid. Let us see why. The rule in question (984) establishes a series of one-year statute of limitations scenarios; however, none of the subsections regulate the situation of damages and their collection. Thus, if any statute of limitations period were to apply, it would be the four-year one...." Taking the foregoing into account, it is now appropriate to determine whether that fatal period elapsed in the sub litem case. Based on what was stated by the plaintiff in the first paragraph of the fifth fact and the tenth fact of the complaint on pages 83 to 97, and on what he spontaneously stated in the second paragraph of page 367 of the expression of grievances brief, it can be established that after the last quarter of 1997, specifically starting in January 1998, when the enrollment process for the beginning of the year began, the defendant decided not to allow the plaintiff to take the Directed Research Seminar III, corresponding to the presentation and defense of the thesis, on the grounds that he had pending course AD6143 Methods of Design and Budgeting of Tourism Programs. It is also established that after that date, it was not until September 13, 2002 (page 206) that Mr. [Name1] submitted a new request to the Graduate Studies Directorate, in which he reiterated the fulfillment of that requirement.

As we can see, between the knowledge of the University's decision and the plaintiff's new action, the four-year period elapsed amply, so the raised exception must be upheld, albeit only with respect to the plaintiff's claims, in the sense that he completed and passed the course AD6143 Métodos de Diseño y Presupuestos de Programas Turísticos at ULACIT University, that by reason thereof he must be allowed to enroll in the final graduation requirement, and that the defendant be condemned to the damages and losses caused by his inability to graduate all these years and opt for a better employment position."</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p></div></body></html> Article 5 states that, in order to request authorization to operate a private university, a foundation or association must be formed for that purpose. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">This regulation is unconstitutional because it violates both the freedom of enterprise regulated by Article 46 of the Political Constitution and the freedom of education enshrined in numeral 79. Individuals may associate in whatever manner they deem appropriate to channel their interests, in this case, educational ones. Freedom of education, which as mentioned encompasses both the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn, requires that those wishing to form part of a higher education institution choose the corporate model that best suits their interests, and it is not contrary to the purposes of education for these enterprises to have a for-profit purpose, provided it is not the primary purpose, nor in such a way that it becomes an obstacle to the interested party's access to the educational system</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">, a point that will be analyzed below./ </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">V.- FOR-PROFIT PURPOSE AND COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S OFFICE OVERSIGHT</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">: ...Article 15 of the Law...The claimant points out that this article prevents centers from organizing as companies, and furthermore prohibits for-profit activity, which is not prohibited in the exercise of any other fundamental right, not even in pre-university education; he considers that enterprise and teaching activity are not incompatible concepts. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">This article is contrary to the Political Constitution. In the first place, regarding the for-profit purpose in education, it is unconstitutional to prohibit private universities from pursuing an economic or for-profit objective in their activity, because this is contrary to the freedom of enterprise protected in Article 46 of the Political Constitution. To hold otherwise leads to the alteration of real situations to conceal an economic purpose that is evident in practice. Obviously, this for-profit purpose cannot impair the right to education that students hold, so it cannot be unrestricted; rather, the State must ensure that an adequate balance exists, so that fair fees are charged, proportional to the service provided and in accordance with the criteria already set forth in this judgment on this matter. Regarding the corporate forms that a university-level higher education organization may assume, as indicated when analyzing Article 5) of the Law, it is unconstitutional to establish limitations, because it contravenes freedom of association, freedom of education, and freedom of enterprise</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">. ..." </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">(the highlighting is not from the original). The regulatory development set forth and the cited resolutions allow us to conclude that, as of today, regardless of the manner in which a legal entity is constituted, whether in accordance with the Associations Law or under any of the corporate forms established in the Commercial Code, whether its main purpose is for-profit or not, or whether it must be regulated by the National Council for Private University Higher Education (Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada), it is governed by commercial laws regarding the commercial acts it carries out. Thus, this Chamber has no doubt whatsoever that the contract signed between the plaintiff and the defendant is of a commercial nature, as this is a commercial act. It is public and notorious that, in the economic market, the defendant is a private person, legally constituted, which in its own name habitually engages in offering private education services to the consumer as the final recipient, such as the plaintiff, who acquires, uses, and enjoys them. In this vein, for purposes of the statute of limitations (prescripción), this relationship is governed by the provisions of the Commercial Code, specifically by rule 984, which establishes a four-year term for these cases. It should be noted that this Court and Section had already pronounced itself in this sense in vote 18 of 14:20 on 15/01/2010, when it stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">"XI.- ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN). Based on Vote number 7494-97 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the defendant maintains that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred (prescritas), because the Chamber in that vote established that the activities carried out by private universities are of a commercial nature. According to this, it is alleged that the plaintiff's formal graduation should have occurred in the year two thousand five, without prejudice to obtaining the certification verifying his professional status. Although that certification indicated that the plaintiff had regulatory requirements to fulfill, he opted for inertia and did not make any act interrupting or tending to suspend the one-year negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) established by Article 984 of the Commercial Code. Therefore, it is alleged that his claim for the damages caused is time-barred. The lower court denied that defense, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations was the ten-year one, pursuant to numeral 868 of the Civil Code. The Court admits the defendant's thesis, insofar as it holds that the statute of limitations applicable to the case is the commercial one; however, we consider that it is not the one-year term but the four-year term established by 984 ibid. Let us see why. The rule in question (984) establishes a series of one-year statute of limitations scenarios; however, none of the subsections regulates the situation of damages and their collection. Thus, if any statute of limitations term were to apply, it would be the four-year one...." </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Considering the foregoing, we must now determine whether that definitive term was met in the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">sub litem</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. Based on what the plaintiff stated in the first paragraph of the fifth and tenth facts of the complaint on pages 83 to 97, and what he spontaneously declared in the second paragraph of page 367 of the statement of grievances, it is established that after the last four-month term of 1997, specifically starting in January 1998, when the enrollment process for the beginning of the year began, the defendant decided not to allow the plaintiff to take the Directed Research Seminar III, corresponding to the presentation and defense of the thesis, because it deemed that he had pending course AD6143 Methodologies for Design and Budgeting of Tourism Programs. It is also established that after that date, it was not until September 13, 2002 (page 206), that Mr. [Name1] submitted a new petition to the Graduate Studies Office, in which he reiterated the fulfillment of that requirement. As we see, between the knowledge of the University's decision and the plaintiff's new petition, the four-year term was amply exceeded, and therefore the raised defense must be upheld, but only regarding the plaintiff's claims that he took and passed course AD6143 Methodologies for Design and Budgeting of Tourism Programs at Universidad ULACIT, that consequently he should be allowed to enroll in the final graduation requirement, and that the defendant be ordered to pay the damages caused by not being able to graduate during all these years and pursue a better job position."</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html>

“V. Sobre la Prescripción: Por una cuestión de lógica se atenderá primeramente, el recurso interpuesto por la demandada y de este, lo concerniente a la excepción de prescripción. Señala al respecto la apelante, para fundamentar el rechazo de la excepción de prescripción, el a quo violenta los principios doctrinarios, jurisprudenciales y legales aplicables a la materia, al desvirtuar la relación mercantil establecida, confundiéndola con una de carácter civil. A continuación cita un extracto del análisis llevado a cabo por el juzgador sobre ese punto, para así manifestar, que el juez desaplica en su análisis las disposiciones del Código de Comercio, por la sola consideración de la naturaleza de una de las partes intervinientes en la relación. Asegura, con base en lo dispuesto por el artículo primero del Código de Comercio, la relación debe examinarse por su naturaleza y contenido, que en este caso trata, por un lado, de una organización universitaria que oferta servicios de carácter educativo y formativo, y el otro, estudiantes, que los adquieren a título oneroso y como consumidores. Agrega, es oportuno indicar que la ley de creación del CONESUP (6693 de 2/11/81), originalmente obligaba a que los entes auspiciadores o fundadores de universidades privadas fueran sin fines de lucro, por lo que habrían de adoptar las formas asociativas conocidas como "Asociaciones" o "Fundaciones", requerimiento declarado inconstitucional por la Sala en el voto 7494-1997, que cita en su apoyo. Afirma, este Tribunal y Sección, mediante voto número 18-2010 de las 14:20 horas del 15 de enero de 2010, determinó que la prescripción en estos casos es mercantil, por lo que se aplica el plazo de cuatro años. Por lo expuesto, dice la apelante, el hecho de que ella sea una Asociación parte en la relación jurídica, no desnaturaliza el carácter comercial de la misma, independientemente de que su creación y funcionamiento esté regulado por la Ley de Asociaciones, máxime, por lo indicado en el artículo 2 de dicha Ley, norma que arbitrariamente se desaplica en la sentencia. Expresa, como consecuencia de la posibilidad que señala ésta última norma, se tiene lo dispuesto por el artículo 26 de la referida Ley, por lo que, sí se pueden celebrar contratos de cualquier índole, indistintamente de la naturaleza de la entidad jurídica, esto quiere decir, que ella no necesita ser una sociedad anónima para celebrar contratos mercantiles, de ahí que, las conclusiones de la sentencia parten de una parcial e indebida interpretación del ordenamiento jurídico, lo cual le causa un verdadero perjuicio. Reitera, es falso que solo las personas jurídicas de orden mercantil, pueden celebrar contratos y establecer relaciones de ese tipo, pues como lo dijo la Sala Constitucional, no es necesario que "se alteren situaciones reales para encubrir un fin económico que en la práctica se denota". Finalmente indica la recurrente, no hay duda que entre el actor y la universidad se estableció una relación de indiscutible carácter mercantil, por sus características de prestación y adquisición de servicios educativos a título oneroso, motivo por el cual se opuso la excepción a la luz de las disposiciones del Código de Comercio, el cual regula la materia, por cuanto, en este caso, el plazo previsto transcurrió sobradamente entre el año de 1997 y el 2002, y entre este último y el año 2008. El reclamo es de recibo. El juzgador de primera instancia fundamentó el rechazo de la excepción de prescripción en los siguientes términos: "No obstante, no lleva razón la demandada en sus argumentos y al caso resulta aplicable el régimen del Código Civil que establece como regla general un plazo de prescripción de diez años.- La relación que existe en este tipo de casos no es de orden mercantil, sino estrictamente contractual civil.- Lo anterior se deduce fundamentalmente de las partes que participan en esa contratación.- Así se desprende de la propia base asociativa bajo la cual se constituyó la demandada como Asociación y no como persona jurídica de orden mercantil.- En razón de ello toda su actividad se encuentra regida por la Ley Nº 218 denominada Ley de Asociaciones que en sus artículos 1 y 2 disponen: "Artículo 1º.- El derecho de asociación puede ejercitarse libremente conforme a lo que preceptúa esta ley. En consecuencia, quedan sometidos al presente texto las asociaciones para fines científicos, artísticos, deportivos, benéficos, de recreo y cualesquiera otros lícitos que no tengan por único y exclusivo objeto el lucro o la ganancia. Se regirán también por esta ley los gremios y las asociaciones de socorros mutuos, de previsión y de patronato./ Lo anterior significa que si la actora eligió esa forma de organización, salvo prueba en contrario, el cumplimiento de sus fines no tiene como único y exclusivo objeto el lucro o ganancia. Por lo tanto no puede ser calificada su actividad como típica mercantil. La propia demandada a folio 128 indica: "La ULACIT se constituye con el objetivo de formar profesionales, en el ejercicio de la libertad de enseñanza, y dentro del marco jurídico establecido en la Ley 6693, del 27 de noviembre de 1981".- Tampoco alegó dentro de sus argumentos que el fin de su actividad en la formación de profesionales sea estrictamente mercantil.- Ahora bien la referida Ley 6693, crea el CONESUP como una entidad jurídica del Estado cuyo objetivo es la supervisión y vigilancia de la actividad privada de la educación superior y en ese tanto tampoco, la actividad que ejerce la accionada puede considerarse como mercantil.- Tampoco de la relación que subyace para el alumno en este tipo de contratación, podría considerarse como mercantil, pues el fin último que persigue el estudiante es obtener un título o grado académico profesional, como parte de su realización personal y profesional y lógicamente para buscar un mejoramiento en sus posibilidades laborales y no un fin de lucro.- Por todo lo anterior, se descarta en la especie que el régimen aplicable a la prescripción en este asunto, sea el regulado por el Código de Comercio.- En ese sentido entonces resulta aplicable, según se dijo, el régimen establecido en el Código Civil, el cual establece un plazo de diez años para la prescripción de la acción y el correspondiente derecho.- (Artículo 868).-" (sic). Como se aprecia, el a quo estima que la relación jurídica entre las partes de este proceso es de naturaleza civil, al ser la demandada una asociación y no una persona jurídica de orden mercantil, a la cual le resulta aplicable lo dispuesto por el inciso 1 de la Ley de Asociaciones y no la leyes comerciales, máxime que no acreditó, que el fin de su actividad sea estrictamente de lucro, además, por el hecho de que la actividad de la accionada está regulada por el Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada (CONESUP). Sin embargo, estas apreciaciones son insuficientes para la resolución de este asunto. El Tribunal considera, que previo a determinar que dicha relación jurídica entre el actor y la demandada, es de carácter mercantil o civil, se ha debido proceder a un análisis integral del ordenamiento jurídico vigente. En primer lugar tenemos que, la ley número 218, denominada Ley de Asociaciones, que entró a regir el 08 de agosto de 1939, estableció en su articulado: "Artículo 1º.- El derecho de asociación puede ejercitarse libremente conforme a lo que preceptúa esta ley. En consecuencia, quedan sometidos al presente texto las asociaciones para fines científicos, artísticos, deportivos, benéficos, de recreo y cualesquiera otros lícitos que no tengan por único y exclusivo objeto el lucro o la ganancia. Se regirán también por esta ley los gremios y las asociaciones de socorros mutuos, de previsión y de patronato./ Artículo 2º.- Las asociaciones que no siendo de las enumeradas en el artículo anterior se propongan un objeto meramente comercial o civil se regirán por las leyes comerciales o civiles, según el caso.". Sin embargo este concepto, indudablemente ha variado con el transcurso del tiempo, dada la promulgación de leyes posteriores a la misma. En efecto, el Código de Comercio, que entró en vigencia el 27 de mayo de 1964 estableció en el artículo 5, dos criterios diferentes para determinar quien es comerciante, uno objetivo y otro subjetivo. En el primero de ellos se estima que es comerciante, aquella persona con capacidad jurídica que ejerce en nombre propio, actos de comercio como ocupación habitual, y en el segundo, las sociedades constituidas de conformidad con las disposiciones de ese Código, independientemente de cual pueda ser el objeto o actividad que lleven a cabo. Por su parte, los numerales 1 y 6 de dicho cuerpo de leyes resaltan la importancia del criterio objetivo al señalar claramente: "Artículo 1.- Las disposiciones contenidas en el presente Código rigen los actos y contratos en él determinados, aunque no sean comerciantes las personas que los ejecuten. ...Artículo 6.- Los que ocasionalmente lleven a cabo actos de comercio no serán considerados comerciantes, pero quedan sometidos, en cuanto a esos actos, a las leyes y reglamentos que rigen los actos de comercio.". Sobre esto último ha señalado la Sala Primera: "III.- ...Empero, si bien este es un elemento que debe ser valorado para justificar la aplicación del régimen mercantil, no es el único, ya que por el solo hecho de que una de las partes ejerza actividades de comercio, no debe entenderse que todas las relaciones jurídicas en que participe adquieren esta naturaleza. Por el contrario, debe atenerse a las características propias de esa relación jurídica a efectos de determinar cuál es la normativa que regula ese vínculo particular. Cabe destacar que el ordinal primero del Código de Comercio pone de relieve este aspecto, al señalar que dicho cuerpo normativo regirá “los actos y contratos en él determinados, aunque no sean comerciantes las personas que los ejecuten” (el subrayado es suplido). Como se logra colegir de lo anterior, resulta claro que el ámbito de aplicación está ligado a la existencia de un acto de comercio, y no a la naturaleza de quienes intervengan en ese negocio jurídico. En este orden de ideas, resulta fundamental analizar la relación jurídica en cuestión para así determinar las reglas de prescriptibilidad con base en las cuales se debe resolver el conflicto." (ver voto número 31 de las 09:10:00 horas del 19/01/2012) (el resaltado es suplido). Ahora bien, la ley 7472 denominada Ley de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, promulgada en fecha 20 de diciembre de 1994, vino a regular varios temas de interés al caso. Efectivamente, el numeral 2 define las figuras del consumidor y comerciante de la siguiente manera: "Consumidor/ Toda persona física o entidad de hecho o de derecho, que, como destinatario final, adquiere, disfruta o utiliza los bienes o los servicios, o bien, recibe información o propuestas para ello ...Comerciante o proveedor/ Toda persona física, entidad de hecho o de derecho, privada o pública que, en nombre propio o por cuenta ajena, se dedica en forma habitual a ofrecer, distribuir, vender, arrendar, conceder el uso o el disfrute de bienes o a prestar servicios, sin que necesariamente esta sea su actividad principal.". En relación a las definiciones anteriores, la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, en el voto 2173-98 de las 13:30 del 02/11/1998 de forma ilustrativa señaló: "SEGUNDO.- ...En principio la definición de comerciante, se hizo necesaria para delimitar la materia que sería de co­nocimiento de los tribunales mercantiles y no de los civiles, varios criterios trataron de determinar entonces cuáles relaciones serían reguladas por el Derecho Mercantil, uno de estos criterios consiste en determinar si uno de los sujetos es un comerciante (criterio subjetivo), otro de los criterios establece que esa tutela dependerá de si el acto es un acto de comercio con indepen­dencia de quien lo realice (criterio objetivo). Así por ejemplo el Código de Comercio costarricense es considerado predominantemente objetivo, lo ante­rior por cuanto el artículo 1 dispone que las disposiciones contenidas en ese código rigen los actos y contratos en él determinados "aunque no sean co­merciantes las personas que los ejecuten, los contratos entre comerciantes se presumen actos de comercio", en tanto que el artículo 5 define quién es co­merciante, en este orden de cosas si bien existen una serie de actos que son de comercio (los contenidos en ese código), también existe una definición de quien es comerciante a efectos de aplicar la presunción. ...TERCERO.- De la definición de comerciante contenida en el artículo 2, puede concluirse que los comerciantes pueden ser personas físicas o jurídi­cas, públicas o privadas, que actúen en nombre propio o por cuenta ajena que en forma habitual ofrezca, venda, arriende, conceda el uso o disfrute de bienes o preste servicios, sin que necesariamente ésta sea su actividad prin­cipal. La habitualidad se refiere a que la actividad debe desarrollarse profesionalmente, debe manifestarse al exterior y dirigirse al mercado en forma pública, sistemática y continua, aunque la actividad puede ser interrumpida no debe ser ocasional. Tampoco debe ser su actividad principal, puede ser accesoria. Este es el sujeto obligado por el artículo 31 de la Ley 7472, el hecho de que una variedad de entes realicen actos de comercio o puedan realizarlos lícitamente, no implica per se que puedan ser sancionados por la Comisión Nacional del Consumidor, a menos que puedan ser calificados como tales de conformidad con el artículo 2 de esa Ley..." (el resaltado en negrita es del original). Por su parte, en la norma 6 de esta ley se estableció la eliminación de una serie de restricciones al comercio, entre las cuales está la siguiente: "...Se reconoce la facultad de las cámaras y las asociaciones privadas para autorregular su actividad económica, para garantizar la prestación eficiente de servicios a la sociedad, con estricta observancia de los principios éticos y de respeto por la libertad de concurrencia de los agentes económicos y para prevenir las conductas que en esta Ley se prohíben y sancionan. La participación de esas entidades no podrá limitar el libre acceso al mercado correspondiente ni impedir la competitividad de nuevos ajustes económicos.". Dentro de este recuento no podemos dejar de lado el hecho de que el 23 de noviembre de 1981, se crea el Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada, adscrito al Ministerio de Educación Pública, mediante la ley 6693 denominada Ley de Universidades Privadas, la cual dispuso, entre otras, las siguientes normas de interés: "Artículo 5º.- Para solicitar la autorización de funcionamiento de una universidad privada, deberá constituirse, para ese efecto, una fundación o asociación, cuyo personero presentará la respectiva solicitud, dirigida al Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada./ ...Artículo 15.- Se prohíbe la finalidad de lucro en la enseñanza superior universitaria. Los excedentes que eventualmente obtuvieren las universidades privadas, deberán reinvertirse par los mismos fines educativos que persigue la institución, en el entendido de que una parte de esos excedentes se dedicará a otorgar becas a estudiantes de buenas calificaciones académicas y de escasos recursos económicos. Asimismo, se prohíbe la constitución de sociedades anónimas, o de cualquier tipo de empresa comercial, con el objeto de brindar enseñanza universitaria. La infracción a esta norma, implicará la aplicación inmediata del inciso b) del artículo 17 de esta ley.". Empero, ambos artículos fueron declarados inconstitucionales por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el voto 7494-97 de las 15:45 horas del 11/11/1997, correspondiente a la acción planteada por la ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE UNIVERSIDADES PRIVADAS contra varios artículos de la referida ley y su reglamento, esto, por considerar ese alto Tribunal, que los mismos contravenían los derechos a la libertad de asociación, la libertad de enseñanza y la libertad de empresa, dando para ello los siguientes motivos: "...IV.-MODELOS DE ORGANIZACION: Se impugna el artículo 5 en cuanto impone determinados modelos organizativos, eliminando la capacidad negocial de los administrados, vulnerándose de esa forma los artículos 25, 28.2, 46 y 79 de la Constitución Política. Señala el artículo 5 que para solicitar la autorización de funcionamiento de una universidad privada, deberá constituirse, para ese efecto, una fundación o asociación. Tal norma es inconstitucional, por cuanto vulnera tanto la libertad de empresa que regula el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política, como la libertad de enseñanza consagrada en el numeral 79. Las personas pueden asociarse como mejor crean conveniente para canalizar sus intereses, en este caso, educativos. La libertad de enseñanza, que como se mencionó contempla tanto la libertad de enseñar como la libertad de aprender, exige que quienes deseen constituirse como miembros de una institución de enseñanza superior elijan el modelo societario que mejor se adapte a sus intereses y no resulta contrario a los fines de la educación el que esas empresas tengan como fin el lucro, desde luego que no como primordial, ni de manera tal que se constituya en un valladar para el acceso del interesado al sistema educativo, extremo que se analizará de seguido./ V.- FINALIDAD DE LUCRO Y FISCALIZACION DE LA CONTRALORIA: ...el artículo 15 de la Ley...Señala el accionante que ese artículo impide que los centros puedan organizarse como sociedades, además prohíbe el lucro, lo cual no se prohíbe en el ejercicio de ningún otro derecho fundamental, ni siquiera en la educación infra-universitaria, considera que empresa y actividad de enseñanza no son conceptos incompatibles entre sí. Ese artículo es contrario a la Constitución Política. En primer término, en cuanto a la finalidad de lucro en la enseñanza, resulta inconstitucional prohibir a las universidades privadas la consecusión de un objetivo económico o lucrativo en su actividad, por cuanto ello es contrario a la libertad de empresa que se encuentra tutelada en el artículo 46 de la Constitución Política. Lo contrario conlleva a que se alteren situaciones reales para encubrir un fin económico que en la práctica se denota. Obviamente, ese fin de lucro no puede ir en menoscabo del derecho de enseñanza que tienen los educandos, por lo que no puede ser irrestricto, sino que el Estado debe velar para que exista un adecuado equilibrio, para que se cobren tarifas justas, proporcionales al servicio que se presta y de conformidad a los criterios ya externados en esta sentencia al respecto. Con relación a las formas societarias que puede asumir una organización de enseñanza superior universitaria, conforme se indicó al analizar el artículo 5) de la Ley, resulta inconstitucional establecer limitaciones, por cuanto contraviene la libertad de asociación, la libertad de enseñanza y la libertad de empresa. ..." (el resaltado no es del original). El desarrollo normativo expuesto y las resoluciones de cita, permiten concluir, que al día de hoy, independientemente de la manera en que se constituya una persona jurídica, ya sea, conforme a la Ley de Asociaciones o bajo alguna de las formas societarias establecidas en el Código de Comercio, si su fin principal es o no el lucro, o bien, deba ser regulada por el Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza Superior Universitaria Privada, se rige por las leyes comerciales, en cuanto a los actos de comercio que lleve a cabo. Es así como, no le cabe la menor duda a esta Cámara, que el contrato suscrito entre entre el demandante y la accionada es de carácter mercantil, por ser este un acto de comercio. Es público y notorio, que en el mercado económico, la demandada es una persona privada, legalmente constituida, que a nombre propio se dedica en forma habitual a ofrecer servicios de educación privada al consumidor en su calidad de destinatario final, como lo es el actor, quien los adquiere, utiliza y disfruta. En ese orden de ideas, para efectos de prescripción, dicha relación se rige por las disposiciones del Código de Comercio, específicamente por la norma del 984, que establece para estos casos un plazo de cuatro años. Cabe señalar que ya este Tribunal y Sección se había pronunciado en ese sentido en el voto 18 de las 14:20 horas del 15/01/2010, cuando dijo: "XI.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN. Fundamentándose en el Voto número 7494-97 de la Sala Constitucional, la parte accionada, sostiene que las pretensiones del actor se encuentran prescritas, ello porque la Sala en dicho voto estableció que las actividades que realizan las universidades privadas son de índole mercantil. De acuerdo a esto, se alega que la graduación formal del actor debió de producirse en el año dos mil cinco, ello sin perjuicio de obtener la certificación en que se corrobora su condición profesional. A pesar de que esa certificación indicaba que el actor tenía requisitos reglamentarios que cumplir, él optó por la inercia y no efectuó ningún acto interruptor o tendiente a suspender la prescripción negativa de un año que establece el artículo 984 del Código de Comercio. Por ende, se alega que su pretensión para reclamar los daños y perjuicios causados se encuentra prescrita. El a-quo denegó esa defensa, argumentando que la prescripción aplicable era la decenal, conforme al numeral 868 del Código Civil. El Tribunal admite la tesis de la parte accionada, en tanto sostiene que la prescripción aplicable al caso es la mercantil, no obstante, consideramos que no es la del año sino la de los cuatro años que establece el 984 ibídem. Veamos el por qué. La norma en cuestión (984) establece una serie de supuestos de prescripción de un año, sin embargo, en ninguno de los incisos se encuentra regulada la situación de los daños y perjuicios y su cobro. Así las cosas, en caso de aplicarse algún plazo de prescripción sería la de los cuatro años....". Tomando en cuenta lo anterior, corresponde ahora determinar si ese plazo fatal se cumplió en el sub litem. Con base en lo expuesto por el actor en el párrafo primero del hecho quinto y décimo de la demanda de folios 83 a 97 y lo manifestado por él de manera espontánea en el párrafo segundo de folio 367 del escrito de expresión de agravios, se logra acreditar, que luego del último cuatrimestre de 1997, específicamente a partir de enero de 1998, que inició el proceso de matrícula de principio de año, la demandada decidió no permitir al actor cursar el Seminario de Investigación Dirigida III, correspondiente a la presentación y defensa de la tesis, esto, por estimar que el mismo tenía pendiente el curso AD6143 Métodos de Diseño y Presupuestos de Programas Turísticos. Asimismo se tiene por demostrado, que luego de esa fecha, no es sino, hasta el 13 de setiembre de 2002 (folio 206), que don [Nombre1], presenta una nueva gestión a la Dirección de Posgrados, en la que reitera el cumplimiento de ese requisito. Como vemos, entre el conocimiento de la decisión de la Universidad y la nueva gestión del actor, transcurrió sobradamente el plazo de cuatro años, por lo que deberá acogerse la excepción planteada, eso sí, únicamente respecto las pretensiones del demandante, en el sentido de que él curso y aprobó la materia AD6143 Métodos de Diseño y Presupuestos de Programas Turísticos en la Universidad ULACIT, que en razón de ello debe permitírsele matricular el requisito final de graduación y que se condene a la demandada a los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por no poder graduarse en todos estos años y optar por una mejor posición laboral.”