Contract extension denial and damages denied for lack of serious breach by INAImprocedencia de prórroga contractual y daños por falta de incumplimiento grave del INA

“IV.- Regarding the object of the proceedings: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of the present proceedings is to determine whether the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje incurred liability for contractual breach (incumplimiento contractual) related to procurement CD-09-2008, or whether, on the contrary, the actions of said entity conform to the terms of the administrative procurement (contratación administrativa) that is the subject of the proceedings.

V.- On administrative procurement as a manifestation of administrative conduct and the specific case: V.I.- Prior to the substantive analysis of the specific case, it is appropriate to make the following general considerations regarding the applicable law in the matter: In order to determine in the specific case whether we are facing a situation of contractual liability on the part of the Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, it is necessary to specify the general framework in which administrative procurement occurs in our country and the consequences of the different situations of contractual non-performance (inejecución contractual). In this sense, we must begin from the premise that the Public Administration employs various means for the fulfillment of public purposes, which are not exhausted in mere material actions or formal administrative acts, insofar as it also resorts to the technique of administrative procurement, in which the fulfillment of an object is agreed upon with a contractor, as a collaborating subject in achieving the public interest sought. However, unlike a private contract, in administrative procurement there exists a series of elements that transcend the mere agreement of wills rubricated in a document and that condition its formation, development, and extinction. It is thus that the administrative contract is conditioned in its origin, evolution, and termination by the specific legal framework that governs the matter and the specific procurement. The act of will, free and sovereign of the contractor, is filtered by the administrative legal system, and fundamentally by the regulations of the procurement, that is, the bid specifications (cartel) or set of conditions (pliego de condiciones), which is the basis thereof. Article 10 of the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa states it as follows: "In any administrative procurement procedure, the offeror is fully subject to the Costa Rican legal system, especially to the postulates of this Law, its Executive Regulation, the corresponding institutional regulation, the bid specifications (cartel) of the respective procedure, and, in general, to any other administrative regulation related to the procurement procedure in question." Furthermore, a series of principles will always be underlying in any administrative procurement procedure, principles that have been delimited by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) based on Voto 0998-98 at 11:30 hours on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent rulings, and which are basically summarized as free participation, equal treatment among offerors, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of the contract, patrimonial intangibility, and control of procedures. From the standpoint of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both contracting entities and contracting companies is contemplated in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Article 15 of said normative body expressly states as an obligation of every contracting Administration, the following: "The Administration is obligated to comply with all commitments, validly acquired, in the administrative procurement and to provide collaboration so that the contractor executes the agreed object in an appropriate manner." Likewise, complementary to this norm, Article 17 of the indicated Law states: "Contractors have the right to fully execute what has been agreed, except if any of the situations mentioned in Article 11 of this Law occur." On the other hand, correlatively to said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following: "Contractors are obligated to comply fully with what was offered in their proposal and in any formal documented statement, which they have additionally provided, in the course of the procedure or in the formalization of the contract." Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in contracting, through which the parties are guided in the fulfillment of their obligations by a duty of mutual compliance and collaboration. A fundamental reference point for contractual obligations is the bid specifications (cartel) of the competition, insofar as the bases thereof are established in it, according to the needs of the respective Public Administration. Article 51 of the Regulation to the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa provides with respect to said nature: "The bid specifications (cartel) constitute the specific regulation of the procurement being promoted, and all legal norms and constitutional principles applicable to the respective procedure are understood to be incorporated into its clauses. It must constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad regarding the opportunity to participate...." In this order of ideas, as has been stated, the bid specifications (cartel) are equated to the regulation of the procurement by defining the conditions under which it will materialize. For this reason, it is a source of interpretation of the administrative procurement, given that it is based on this that the offeror prepares its proposal (oferta), which has the characteristic of being integral in all its components, that is, both in the content of the main document and in the designs, plans, samples, and catalogs that accompany it. With respect to the nature of the proposal (oferta) in this matter, Article 61 of the aforementioned Regulation establishes: "The proposal (oferta) is the manifestation of will by the participant, directed to the Administration, for the purpose of entering into a contract with it, in accordance with the bid specification (cartelario) stipulations." In accordance with the foregoing provision, the proposal (oferta) must strictly comply with its content, both in the rules of the procedure to follow, documents, and especially the requirements requested; if the proposal does not comply with what is stipulated in the set of conditions (pliego de condiciones), it must be excluded from the competition. The proposal contained in the sealed envelope (plica) binds the offeror, because if he is the successful bidder, he must submit not only to the bid specification (cartelario) conditions established for that purpose, but also to the terms he offered in said document, and the Administration, insofar as its acceptance will mean admitting the delimitation of the terms and conditions of the procurement according to what was proposed by the contractor. That is to say, bid specifications (cartel) and proposal (oferta) must be seen in an integral and integrated manner, it being so that in the analysis of the latter, what is established in the former cannot be lost from sight. Therefore, the procurement cannot be analyzed in its components in an isolated manner, nor abstracted from the legal system, nor without taking into consideration the integrality of the proposal and the bid specifications to which it refers. Based on the latter and the contents of the awarded proposal, the respective administrative contract is founded, which must be interpreted based on the legal instruments that comprise it, that is, the set of conditions, the awarded proposal, and the regulations and principles inherent to administrative procurement. In turn, the award is the formal act through which the contractual relationship is perfected, as established by Article 189 of the Regulation to the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, insofar as it provides: "The contractual relationship between the Administration and the contractor shall be considered perfected when the act of award or re-award becomes final and, in cases where the constitution of a performance guarantee is required, this is validly granted." In this order of ideas, the contract-document is not an indispensable condition for contractual validity and effectiveness, insofar as it is only necessary when required for the correct understanding of the scope of the rights and obligations of the parties (Art. 190 of the RLCA), whereas in the case that said document does not exist, the bid specifications (cartel), the proposal (oferta), and the award mentioned above shall apply. By reason of the foregoing, in matters of administrative procurement, the determination of effective compliance with the obligation by both contracting parties, as expressed in the contract, must refer both to the bid specifications (cartel) and to the proposal (oferta) considered in an integral manner, as well as to the respective act of award – and to the contract, if it exists – and always guided by compliance with the principle of good faith between the subscribing parties and in attention to the public interest that guided the Administration’s decision to carry out the respective procurement. V.II.- On the specific case: As a first argument, the plaintiff party indicates that the defendant entity did not comply with the requirements established in the signed contract for its automatic renewal (prórroga automática) and communicated the contrary without any legal basis and by unauthorized persons; based on the foregoing, it requests that the non-conformity of the administrative conduct with the legal system be declared, as well as its right to the extremes claimed, as they are contractual. In this regard, upon an analysis of the evidence offered by the parties and admitted in the present proceedings, this Court considers that it has been duly demonstrated, and it is thus recorded in the case file, that on September 5, 2008, the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE APRENDIZAJE and JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. signed contract number 09-2008 for the provision of training and professional education services, and it being so that the same established the possibility of renewals (prórrogas) that were termed automatic, but in reality, they are conditional upon a favorable report at least two months in advance, with an evaluation of the service provided and the justification for maintaining the contract, by the Head of the Area of Contracting Training and Professional Education Services of the Contracting Unit, as well as upon the corresponding approval by the respective Local Regional Commission. From the evidence provided to the case file, it is evident that in the case under analysis, through official communication URHE-134-2009 of July 2, 2009, the Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit of the INA informed the plaintiff party that, according to the directive issued in note GG-699-2009 of September 11, the contract would not be renewed (prorrogaría) based on the non-existence of sufficient administrative personnel to give it due follow-up and the lack of budget allocation to cover the respective costs. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that the plaintiff party’s argument is not correct, insofar as the defendant entity complied in a timely manner with the prior procedure established to inform of the administrative will not to renew (prorrogar) the signed contract, it being so that, in any case, as indicated by the representative of the INA, the corresponding decision was optional (facultativa) and not mandatory for the contracting party. From the case file, it is evident that in session recorded in minutes 02-2009 of July 1, 2009, of the Local Regional Commission for Contracting Training Services, Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit, the situation of the contracts signed with Brasileños Diesel, Educaribe, and Jossan del Atlántico S.A. was made known, and the inadmissibility of their renewal (prórroga) was determined, it being so that through official communication URHE-134-2009 of July 2, 2009, the Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit of the INA informed the plaintiff party of the foregoing, based on what was agreed by said collegiate administrative instance. With this, what was established in clause four of the signed contract was fully complied with. In this order of ideas, this collegiate body considers that the act determining the eventual renewal (prórroga) of an administration procurement is a discretionary act that is adopted by the latter, after weighing the regulated and non-regulated elements established in the legal system and necessary for its adoption. A corollary of this consideration is that there is no subjective right to contractual renewal (prórroga) per se, but rather it is up to the criterion of the contracting entity to determine the admissibility or not of continuing with the contractual execution. In this sense, one can refer to rulings number 113-2011 at eleven o'clock on May nine, two thousand eleven of the Sixth Section and number 158-2011 at sixteen hours twenty minutes on June fifteen, two thousand eleven, of the Fifth Section of this Court. Adopting a contrary decision, that is, renewing (prorrogar) the contract in question without having the due budget allocation, would violate Article 110 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, insofar as it provides the following: "In addition to those provided for in other laws and regulations specific to the service relationship, the following shall be acts generating administrative liability, independently of the civil or criminal liability to which they may give rise ....f) The authorization or realization of commitments or expenditures without there being sufficient economic content, duly budgeted." Additionally, executing a contract without having the necessary resources to continue its oversight would imply weakening the institutional internal control system, in accordance with Article 11 of the Ley General de Control Interno, given that it would prevent verifying the correct contractual execution. From an analysis of the acts giving rise to the decision objected to by the plaintiff’s representative, it is noted that the same are duly founded and no defect of nullity is observed in any of their elements, nor the pursuit of a purpose other than the public interest and the applicable regulations in the matter. Inclusively, with respect to the officials responsible for issuing both acts, it is to be noted that the agreement not to renew (no prórroga) was duly adopted by the competent Commission established in the signed contract, and its communication was materialized by the highest regional instance, the Head of the Unit responsible for presiding over it. Finally, with respect to the argument to the effect that there exists differential treatment with respect to the company NONO VIGA S.A., it is to be noted that the acts referred to this contractor are prior to the agreements of the Local Regional Commission for Contracting Training Services, Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit, dated July 1, 2009. Indeed, it is recorded in the case file that the INA, through official communication URHE-PA-397-2009 of May 11, 2009, requested the representative of NONO VIGA, S. A. to indicate whether it was in a position to renew (prorrogar) the same for one more year; said company expressed its consent the following day, so its legal situation is different from that of the plaintiff party. In this order of ideas, this Court does not consider reasonable any argument tending to equate two procurements at different times and where the decision on one occurs prior to that of the plaintiff party, at least 20 days in advance. In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the said arguments in all their extremes.- VI.- Additionally, the representative of JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. argues that the INA paid them according to the number of students at the payment cut-off date, it being so that the same should have been made on the last day of the second week after the start of the training services. It alleges, in this sense, "enormous harm" to the principle of financial equilibrium. In this regard, in the first place, it must be noted that clause eight of the respective contract expressly provided that the cut-off to define enrollment must be made on the last day of the second week of classes, it being so that it has not been demonstrated by any evidence whatsoever that this contractual provision was not respected, in such a manner that it would signify a serious breach generating contractual liability. Moreover, the plaintiff party has not demonstrated an impact on the equilibrium of its finances, nor a negative consequence due to the cut-off dates made by the defendant entity. In this order of ideas, it is necessary to recall that it is not enough to invoke the existence of a damage, but rather it corresponds to the party expressing it to prove it in a reliable manner, demonstrating its existence, and applying to the case under examination the provisions of Article 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, which provides: “The burden of proof falls: 1) On whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting their right...”, (in this respect, see ruling of the First Chamber of the Court, number 797-F-00 at 16 hours 17 minutes on October 25, 2000). The foregoing, without ignoring what has been indicated regarding the damage subject of claims in this matter, according to Article 58. inc. e) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. By virtue of the considerations made, it is appropriate to reject this argument. [...]

VII.- The plaintiff party additionally seeks to have the Administration ordered to pay damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by its conduct. It considers that the damages (daños) consist of the investments made to adapt the training center to the administration’s requirements, the purchase of computer equipment, licenses, rentals, and for the granting of the direct procurement in question. Additionally, it considers as lost profits (perjuicios) the profits it ceased to receive, which it provisionally estimated at the sum of C. 50,000,000.00 (fifty million colones). In this regard, this Court considers that it is not appropriate to grant what is requested, given that, as has been indicated, no serious contractual breach by the INA is discernible that could generate liability for such reason. As has been indicated, the conducts reproached by the representative of the plaintiff party cannot be considered as departing from the bid specifications (cartel), proposal (oferta), and signed contract, and therefore a claim in such a sense is not admissible. It must further be noted that the expenses claimed as damage (daño) cannot be considered as such, insofar as they comprise the necessary investment that any company had to make for the provision of services. Precisely, if the INA decided at the time to contract with JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A., it did so based on a pre-installed management capacity and not one created ad hoc for this procurement. This can be deduced both from the prior administrative decision for its adoption and from the very statements of the plaintiff party in its proposal (oferta). To conclude otherwise would be to assume that the origin of the contractual relationship was not based on the expertise, capacity, and prior knowledge of the company but on an unfounded decision, which is neither the subject of debate nor has been demonstrated in the case file by any of the parties. Through evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver), the plaintiff intends to demonstrate the existence of a lease agreement, as well as an alleged sworn statement from the purported lessor, documents that, besides being simple copies, do not in any way demonstrate the existence of a damage (daño) on account of the contractual execution by the INA and that, in any case, pertain to the necessary infrastructure that the company had to have to provide the contracted services, and therefore does nothing to counteract the considerations made in this resolution. Regarding lost profits (perjuicios), the plaintiff party neither demonstrates – just as it also did not do so regarding damages (daños) – their existence nor a causal link with any administrative conduct generating a serious contractual breach. In any case, one cannot speak of the existence of lost profits in the present case, given that, as indicated, the plaintiff party did not have a subjective right to contractual renewal (prórroga), nor did it have to operate automatically upon mere request, as the former intended. For the foregoing reasons, this extreme is also rejected.–” Article 10 of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) states the following: "<i>In any administrative procurement procedure, the offeror is fully subject to the Costa Rican legal system, especially the principles of this Law, its Executive Regulations (Reglamento Ejecutivo), the corresponding institutional regulations, the tender specifications (cartel) of the respective procedure, and, in general, any other administrative regulation related to the procurement procedure in question</i>". Furthermore, underlying every administrative procurement procedure will always be a series of principles that have been delimited by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) based on vote 0998-98 at 11:30 a.m. on February 16, 1998, and reiterated in subsequent rulings, which are basically summarized as free participation, equal treatment among offerors, publicity, legal certainty, legality and transparency, good faith, balance of interests, mutability of contract, asset intangibility, and procedural control. From the perspective of positive law, the general regulatory framework for the obligations of both contracting entities and contractor companies is set forth in the Public Procurement Law. Article 15 of said regulatory body expressly states the following as an obligation of every contracting Administration: "<i>The Administration (la Administración) is obligated to fulfill all commitments, validly acquired, in the administrative procurement and to provide collaboration so that the contractor ideally executes the agreed-upon object</i>." Likewise, complementary to this rule, Article 17 of the indicated Law states: "<i>Contractors have the right to fully execute what was agreed, except if any of the assumptions mentioned in Article 11 of this Law occur."</i> Moreover, correlatively to said duty, Article 20 of the same law establishes the following: "<i>Contractors are obligated to completely fulfill what was offered in their proposal and in any documented formal statement they have additionally provided during the procedure or in the formalization of the contract</i>." Both obligations arise from a principle of good faith in procurement, whereby the parties, as their guiding principle in fulfilling their obligations, have a duty of mutual compliance and collaboration. A fundamental reference for contractual obligations is the tender specifications (cartel), insofar as the bases of the tender are established therein, according to the needs of the respective Public Administration. Article 51 of the Regulations to the Public Procurement Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), regarding said nature, provides: "<i>The tender specifications constitute the specific regulation of the procurement being promoted, and all legal rules and constitutional principles applicable to the respective procedure are understood to be incorporated into its terms.</i> <i>It shall constitute a body of clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad technical specifications regarding the opportunity to participate...."</i> In this line of thought, as has been stated, the tender specifications are equivalent to the procurement regulations by defining the conditions under which it will be realized. For this reason, it is a source of interpretation of the administrative procurement, given that it is based on this that the offeror prepares its offer, which has the characteristic of being integral in all its components, i.e., both in the content of the main document, and in the designs, plans, samples, catalogs that accompany it. Regarding the nature of the offer in this matter, Article 61 of the mentioned Regulations establishes: "<i>The offer is the expression of the participant's will, directed to the Administration, in order to conclude a contract with it, in accordance with the tender specification stipulations (estipulaciones cartelarias)</i>." In accordance with the previous provision, the offer must strictly comply with its content, both in the rules of the procedure to follow, documents, and especially the requested requirements; if the offer does not comply with what is stipulated in the tender documents, it must be excluded from the competition. The offer contained in the sealed bid binds the offeror, since in the event of being awarded the contract, it must submit not only to the tender specification conditions established for that purpose, but also to the terms offered by it in said document, and to the Administration, insofar as its acceptance will mean admitting the delimitation of the terms and conditions of the procurement according to what was proposed by the contractor. That is, the tender specifications and the offer must be seen in an integral and integrated manner, being that in the analysis of the second, one cannot lose sight of what is established in the first. Therefore, the procurement cannot be analyzed in its components in isolation, nor abstracted from the legal system, nor without taking into consideration the integrality of the offer and the tender specifications to which it refers. Based on this and the contents of the awarded offer, the respective administrative contract is founded, which must be interpreted from the basis of the legal instruments that comprise it, i.e., the tender documents, the awarded offer, and the rules and principles specific to administrative procurement. Furthermore, the award is the formal act through which the contractual relationship is perfected, as established by Article 189 of the Regulations to the Public Procurement Law, while it provides: "<i>The contractual relationship between the Administration and the contractor shall be considered perfected when the award or re-award act becomes final and, in cases where the posting of a performance guarantee is required, it is validly granted</i>." In this line of thought, the contract-document is not an essential condition for contractual validity and efficacy, as it is only necessary when required for the correct understanding of the scope of the parties' rights and obligations (art. 190 of the RLCA), since in the absence of said document, the tender specifications, the offer, and the award mentioned above (ut supra) shall apply. By reason of the foregoing, in matters of administrative procurement, the determination of the effective compliance with the obligation by both contracting parties expressed in the contract, must refer both to the tender specifications and to the offer considered in an integral manner, as well as to the respective award act - and to the contract, if it exists - and always oriented toward compliance with the principle of good faith between the signing parties and in consideration of the public interest that guided the Administration's decision to carry out the respective procurement. **V.II.- Regarding the specific case**: As a first argument, the plaintiff indicates that the defendant entity did not comply with the requirements established in the signed contract for its automatic extension and communicated the contrary without any legal basis and by unauthorized persons; based on the foregoing, it requests that the non-conformity of the administrative conduct with the legal system be declared, as well as its right to the claimed amounts for being contractual. In this regard, upon an analysis of the evidence offered by the parties and admitted in this process, this Court considers that it has been duly demonstrated, and it is on record in the case file, that on September 5, 2008, the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE APRENDIZAJE and JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. signed contract number 09-2008 for the provision of training and professional education services, and thus, the same established the possibility of extensions that were called automatic, but in reality are conditional upon a favorable report at least two months in advance, with an evaluation of the service provided and the justification for maintaining the contract, by the Head of the Contracting Area for Training and Professional Education Services of the Contracting Unit (Unidad Contratante), as well as the corresponding approval by the respective Regional Local Commission (Comisión Local). From the evidence provided to the case file, it is evident that in the case under analysis, through official communication URHE-134-2009 of July 2, 2009, the Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit (Unidad Regional) of the INA informed the plaintiff that according to the directive issued in note GG-699-2009 of September 11, the contract would not be extended based on the lack of sufficient administrative personnel to give it due follow-up and the lack of budgetary content to cover the respective costs. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that the plaintiff is not correct in its argument, insofar as the defendant entity complied in a timely manner with the prior procedure established to inform about the administrative will not to extend the signed contract, and in any case, as indicated by the representation of the INA, the corresponding decision was optional and not mandatory for the contracting party. From the case file, it is evident that in session recorded in minutes 02-2009 of July 1, 2009, of the Regional Local Commission for the Procurement of Training Services, Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit, the situation of the contracts signed by Brasileños Diesel, Educaribe, and Jossan del Atlántico s.a. was heard, determining the inadmissibility of their extension, and thus through official communication URHE-134-2009 of July 2, 2009, the Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit of the INA informed the plaintiff of the foregoing, based on what was agreed by said collegiate administrative body. With this, what was established in the fourth clause of the signed contract was fully complied with. In this line of thought, this collegiate body considers that the act determining the eventual extension of an administration procurement is a discretionary act that is adopted by the latter, upon prior weighing of the regulated and non-regulated elements established in the legal system and necessary for its adoption. A corollary of this consideration is that there is no subjective right to a contractual extension per se, but rather it remains within the criterion of the contracting entity to determine whether or not it is appropriate to continue with the contractual execution. In this sense, see votes number 113-2011 at eleven o'clock on May 9, two thousand eleven, of the Sixth Section (Sección Sexta) and number 158-2011 at sixteen hours twenty minutes on June 15, two thousand eleven, of the Fifth Section (Sección Quinta) of this Court. To adopt a decision to the contrary, that is, to extend the contract in question without the due budgetary content, would be to violate Article 110 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), as it provides the following: "<i><span style='color:#010101'>In addition to those provided in other laws and regulations specific to the service relationship, the following shall be events generating administrative responsibility, independently of the civil or criminal liability they may give rise to ....f) The authorization or execution of commitments or expenditures without sufficient economic content, duly budgeted</span></i>." Additionally, executing a contract without having the necessary resources to continue its oversight would imply weakening the institutional internal control system, in accordance with Article 11 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control interno), given that it would prevent verification of the correct contractual execution. From an analysis of the acts that give rise to the decision objected to by the plaintiff's representative, it is noted that they are duly grounded and no defect of nullity is observed in any of their elements, nor the pursuit of an end different from the public interest and the applicable regulations in the matter. Including with respect to the officials responsible for issuing both acts, it must be noted that the agreement not to extend was duly adopted by the competent Commission (Comisión) established in the signed contract, and its communication was materialized by the highest regional instance, the Head (Jefe) of the Unit (Unidad) responsible for presiding over it. Finally, regarding the argument that there is differentiated treatment with respect to the company NONO VIGA S.A., it must be noted that the acts referring to this contractor are prior to the agreements of the Regional Local Commission for the Procurement of Training Services, Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit, dated July 1, 2009. Indeed, it is on record in the case file that the INA, through official communication URHE-PA-397-2009 of May 11, 2009, requested the representative of NONO VIGA, S. A. to indicate if it was in a position to extend it for one more year; said company expressed its consent the following day, so its legal situation is different from that of the plaintiff. In this line of thought, this Court does not consider reasonable any argument tending to equate two procurements at different times and where the decision on one is made prior to that of the plaintiff, at least 20 days in advance. In accordance with the foregoing, it is appropriate to reject the aforesaid arguments in all their extremes.- **VI.-** Additionally, the representative of JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. argues that the INA paid them according to the number of students at the payment cutoff, and that the same should have been made on the last day of the second week after the training services began. It alleges, in this sense, "enormous harm" to the principle of financial balance. In this regard, first of all, it must be noted that clause eight of the respective contract expressly provided that the cutoff to define enrollment had to be made on the last day of the second week of classes, and thus it has not been demonstrated with any evidence that said contractual provision was not respected, in such a way that it would mean a serious breach generating contractual liability. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not demonstrated an impact on the balance of its finances, nor a negative consequence due to the cutoff dates made by the defendant entity. In this line of thought, it is necessary to remember that it is not enough to invoke the existence of a harm, but rather it is incumbent upon the party expressing it to prove it convincingly, proving the existence of the same, and the provisions of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) must apply to the case under examination, which provides: "<i>The burden of proof falls on: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the assertions of the facts constituting its right..."</i> (in this regard, see vote of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court (Corte), number 797-F-00 at 16 hours 17 minutes on October 25, 2000). The foregoing, without ignoring what is indicated regarding the harm subject to claims in this matter, according to Article 58, subsection e) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). By virtue of the considerations made, it is appropriate to reject this argument. [...]

**VII.-** The plaintiff additionally seeks that the Administration be ordered to pay damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by its conduct. It considers that the damages consist of the investments made to adapt the training center to the administration's requirements, the purchase of computer equipment, licenses, rentals, and for the granting of the direct procurement in question. Additionally, it estimates as losses the profits ceased to be earned, which it estimated provisionally in the amount of C. 50,000,000.00 (fifty million colones). In this regard, this Court considers that it is not appropriate to grant what is requested, given that, as has been indicated, no serious contractual breach by the INA that could generate liability for such a reason is noted. As has been indicated, the conducts reproached by the plaintiff's representative cannot be considered as departing from the tender specifications, offer, and signed contract, and therefore a claim in that sense is not appropriate. More abundantly, it must be noted that the expenses claimed as damages cannot be considered as such, insofar as they comprise the necessary investment that any company had to make for the provision of services. Precisely, if the INA decided at the time to contract with JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A., it was based on a pre-installed management capacity and not one created ad hoc for this procurement. This is evident both from the prior administrative decision for its adoption, and from the plaintiff's own statements in its offer. The contrary would be to assume that the origin of the contractual relationship was not founded on prior expertise, capacity, and knowledge of the company but on an unfounded decision, which is neither the subject of debate nor has been demonstrated in the case file by any of the parties. Through evidence for a better ruling, the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate the existence of a lease contract, as well as a presumed sworn declaration from whoever is said to be the lessor, documents which, besides being a simple copy, in no way demonstrate the existence of a harm due to the contractual execution by the INA and which, in any case, pertain to the necessary infrastructure that the company had to have to provide the contracted services, so it in no way contributes to distorting the considerations made in this resolution. With respect to the losses, the plaintiff neither demonstrates - just as it did not do with respect to the damages - their existence nor a causal link with any administrative conduct generating a serious contractual breach.

In any event, one cannot speak of the existence of lost profits in the present case, given that, as indicated, the plaintiff did not possess a subjective right to the contractual extension, nor did it have to operate automatically upon mere request, as the former claimed. In view of the foregoing, this claim is also rejected.-” In this regard, see votes number 113-2011 of eleven hours of nine May two thousand eleven of the Sixth Section and number 158-2011 of sixteen hours twenty minutes of fifteen June two thousand eleven of the Fifth Section of this Tribunal. Adopting a contrary decision, that is, extending the contract in question without having the proper budgetary content, would violate article 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, as it provides the following: *"In addition to those provided for in other laws and regulations specific to the employment relationship, the following shall be grounds for administrative liability, independently of any civil or criminal liability they may give rise to ....f) The authorization or undertaking of commitments or expenditures without there being sufficient economic content, duly budgeted".* Additionally, executing a contract without having the necessary resources to continue its oversight would imply weakening the institutional internal control system, in accordance with article 11 of the General Law on Internal Control, given that it would prevent verification of proper contractual execution. From an analysis of the acts giving rise to the decision objected to by the plaintiff's representative, it is noted that these are duly grounded and no defect of nullity is observed in any of their elements, nor the pursuit of an end different from the public interest and the applicable regulations on the matter. Even with respect to the officials responsible for issuing both acts, it must be noted that the non-extension agreement was duly adopted by the competent Commission established in the signed contract and its communication was carried out by the highest regional authority, the Head of the Unit responsible for presiding over it. Finally, regarding the argument that there is differentiated treatment with respect to the company NONO VIGA S.A., it must be noted that the acts referring to this contractor are prior to the agreements of the Regional Local Commission for the Contracting of Training Services, Huetar Atlántica Regional Unit, dated July 1, 2009. Indeed, the record shows that the INA, through official letter URHE-PA-397-2009 of May 11, 2009, cautioned the representative of NONO VIGA, S. A., to indicate whether it was in a position to extend the same for one more year; said company expressed its consent the following day, meaning its legal situation is different from that of the plaintiff. In this order of ideas, this Tribunal does not find reasonable any argument tending to equate two contracts at different moments and where the decision on one occurs prior to that of the plaintiff, by at least 20 days in advance. In accordance with the foregoing, the arguments stated are rejected in their entirety.- **VI.-** Additionally, the representative of JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. argues that the INA paid them according to the number of students at the payment cut-off date, given that it should have been made on the last day of the second week after the training services began. She alleges, in this regard, "enormous harm" to the principle of financial equilibrium. In this respect, it must first be noted that clause eight of the respective contract expressly provided that the cut-off to define enrollment must be made on the last day of the second week of classes, and thus it has not been proven by any evidence that said contractual provision was not respected, such that it would constitute a serious breach generating contractual liability. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not demonstrated an impact on the equilibrium of its finances, nor a negative consequence resulting from the cut-off dates carried out by the defendant entity. In this order of ideas, it is necessary to recall that it is not enough to invoke the existence of damage, but it is incumbent upon the party expressing it to demonstrate it convincingly, proving its existence, and the provisions of article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the case under review, which provides: *“The burden of proof falls on: 1) Whoever formulates a claim, regarding the affirmations of the facts constituting their right...”,* (in this regard, see vote of the First Chamber of the Court, number 797-F-00 of 16 hours 17 minutes of October 25, 2000). The foregoing, without ignoring what is indicated regarding damage subject to claims in this matter, according to article 58, subparagraph e) of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code. By virtue of the considerations made, this argument is rejected. [...]

**VII.-** The plaintiff additionally seeks to have the Administration ordered to pay damages and losses caused by its conduct. She considers that the damages consist of the investments made to adapt the training center to the administration's requirements, the purchase of computer equipment, licenses, rentals, and for the award of the direct contract in question. Additionally, she estimates as losses the lost profits, which she provisionally estimated at the sum of C. 50,000,000.00 (fifty million colones). In this regard, this Tribunal considers that the requested relief cannot be granted, given that, as has been indicated, no serious contractual breach by the INA that could generate liability for such reason is observed. As has been indicated, the conduct reproached by the plaintiff's representative cannot be considered as departing from the tender specifications, offer, and signed contract, and therefore a claim in this sense is not appropriate. Furthermore, it must be noted that the expenditures claimed as damage cannot be considered as such, since they comprise the necessary investment that any company had to make for the provision of services. Precisely, if the INA decided at the time to contract with JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A., it was based on a pre-installed management capacity and not one created ad hoc for this contract. This is evident both from the prior administrative decision for its adoption, and from the plaintiff's own statements in its offer. To do otherwise would be to assume that the origin of the contractual relationship was not based on the company's prior expertise, capacity, and knowledge but on an unfounded decision, which is neither subject to debate nor has been proven in the record by any of the parties. Through evidence for better resolution, the plaintiff seeks to prove the existence of a lease contract, as well as an alleged sworn statement from the supposed lessor, documents which, besides being a simple copy, do not in any way prove the existence of damage due to the contractual execution by the INA and which, in any case, pertain to the necessary infrastructure that the company had to have to provide the contracted services, so it in no way contributes to disproving the considerations made in this resolution. Regarding the losses, the plaintiff neither demonstrates - just as it did not do regarding the damages - their existence nor a causal link with any administrative conduct giving rise to a serious contractual breach. In any case, one cannot speak of the existence of lost profits in the present case, given that, as indicated, the plaintiff did not possess a subjective right to the contractual extension, nor did it have to operate automatically with the mere request, as the plaintiff intended. On the grounds of the foregoing, this claim is also rejected.-

“IV.- Del objeto del proceso: De lo del presente proceso estriba en determinar si el Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje incurrió en responsabilidad por incumplimiento contractual con motivo de la contratación CD-09-2008, o sí por el contrario lo actuado por dicho ente se ajusta a los términos de la contratación administrativa objeto del proceso.

V.- S obre la contratación administrativa como manifestación de la conducta administrativa y el caso concreto : V.I.- De previo al análisis de fondo en el caso concreto procede realizar las siguientes consideraciones de carácter general sobre el derecho aplicable en la materia: Con el fin de determinar en el caso concreto si estamos frente a un supuesto de responsabilidad contractual por parte del Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje, es menester precisar el marco general en que se da la contratación administrativa en nuestro país y las consecuencias de los diferentes supuestos de inejecución contractual. En este sentido, debemos partir de que la Administración Pública emplea diversos medios para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos, que no se agotan en las meras actuaciones materiales o en actos administrativos formales, en tanto que también se recurre a la técnica de la contratación administrativa, en la cual, se pacta el cumplimiento de un objeto con un contratista, como sujeto colaborador del logro del interés público buscado. No obstante, a diferencia de un contrato privado, en la contratación administrativa existe una serie de elementos que trascienden el mero acuerdo de voluntades rubricado en un documento y que condicionan su nacimiento, desarrollo y extinción. Es así como el contrato administrativo está condicionado en su origen, evolución y finalización al ordenamiento propio que rige la materia y la contratación en específico. El acto de voluntad, libre y soberano del contratista, queda filtrado por el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, y fundamentalmente por la reglamentación de la contratación, sea el cartel o pliego de condiciones, base de la misma. El artículo 10 de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, lo señala de la siguiente manera: "En cualquier procedimiento de contratación administrativa, el oferente queda plenamente sometido al ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, en especial a los postulados de esta Ley, su Reglamento Ejecutivo, el reglamento institucional correspondiente, el cartel del respectivo procedimiento y, en general, a cualquier otra regulación administrativa relacionada con el procedimiento de contratación de que se trate". Además siempre estará subyacente en todo procedimiento de contratación administrativa, una serie de principios que han sido delimitados por la Sala Constitucional a partir del voto 0998-98 de las 11:30 horas del 16 de febrero de 1998 y reiterado en los fallos posteriores, y que se resumen básicamente en la libre concurrencia, igualdad de trato entre los oferentes, la publicidad, la seguridad jurídica, la legalidad y transparencia, la buena fe, el equilibrio de intereses, mutabilidad del contrato, intangibilidad patrimonial y control en los procedimientos. Desde el punto de vista del derecho positivo, el marco general regulador de las obligaciones tanto de los entes contratantes como de las empresas contratistas se encuentra contemplado en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. En el artículo 15 de dicho cuerpo normativo, expresamente se señala como obligación de toda Administración contratante, lo siguiente: "La Administración está obligada a cumplir con todos los compromisos, adquiridos válidamente, en la contratación administrativa y a prestar colaboración para que el contratista ejecute en forma idónea el objeto pactado". Asimismo de manera complementaria a esta norma, el artículo 17 de la indicada Ley señala: "Los contratistas tienen derecho de ejecutar plenamente lo pactado, excepto si se produce alguno de los supuestos mencionados en el artículo 11 de esta Ley" . Por otra parte, de manera correlativa a dicho deber, el artículo 20 de la misma ley, establece lo siguiente: "Los contratistas están obligados a cumplir, cabalmente, con lo ofrecido en su propuesta y en cualquier manifestación formal documentada, que hayan aportado adicionalmente, en el curso del procedimiento o en la formalización del contrato". Ambas obligaciones surgen de un principio de buena fe en la contratación, mediante el cual, las partes, tienen como norte en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones un deber de cumplimiento y colaboración mutuos. Un referente fundamental para las obligaciones contractuales, es el cartel del concurso, en tanto que en él se establecen las bases de éste, según las necesidades de la respectiva Administración Pública. El artículo 51 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, dispone con respecto a dicha naturaleza: " El cartel, constituye el reglamento específico de la contratación que se promueve y se entienden incorporadas a su clausulado todas las normas jurídicas y principios constitucionales aplicables al respectivo procedimiento. Deberá constituir un cuerpo de especificaciones técnicas, claras, suficientes, concretas, objetivas y amplias en cuanto a la oportunidad de participar...." En este orden de ideas, como se ha dicho, el cartel se equipara al reglamento de la contratación al definir las condiciones en que ella se concretará. Por dicha razón, el mismo es fuente de interpretación de la contratación administrativa , dado que es con base en éste, que el oferente elabora su oferta, la cual tiene la característica de ser integral en todos sus componentes, sea, tanto en el contenido del escrito principal, como de los diseños, planos, muestras, catálogos que la acompañan. Con respecto a la naturaleza de la oferta en esta materia, el artículo 61 del mencionado Reglamento, establece: " La oferta es la manifestación de voluntad del participante, dirigida a la Administración, a fin de celebrar un contrato con ella, conforme a las estipulaciones cartelarias". De conformidad con la anterior disposición, la oferta debe cumplir de forma estricta su contenido, tanto en las reglas del procedimiento a seguir, documentos y sobre todo requisitos solicitados, si la oferta no cumple lo estipulado en el pliego de condiciones, ésta debe ser excluida del concurso. La oferta contenida en la plica vincula al oferente, pues en caso de resultar adjudicatario, deberá someterse no sólo a las condiciones cartelarias al efecto establecidas, sino también a los términos por él ofertados en dicho documento y a la Administración, en tanto que su aceptación significará admitir la delimitación de los términos y condiciones de la contratación según lo propuesto por el contratista. Es decir, cartel y oferta deben ser vistos de manera integral e integrada, siendo así que en el análisis de la segunda no se puede perder de vista lo establecido en el primero. Por lo anterior, la contratación no puede ser analizada en sus componentes de manera aislada, ni abstraída del ordenamiento jurídico ni sin tomar en consideración la integralidad de la oferta y el cartel al cual se refiere. Con base en éste y los contenidos de la oferta adjudicada, es que se funda el respectivo contrato administrativo, el cual, debe interpretarse, desde la base de los instrumentos legales que lo integran, sea, el pliego de bases, la oferta adjudicada y la normativa y principios propios de la contratación administrativa. Por su parte, la adjudicación es el acto formal mediante el cual se llega a perfeccionar la relación contractual, tal y como lo establece el artículo 189 del Reglamento a la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, en tanto dispone: "Se tendrá por perfeccionada la relación contractual entre la Administración y el contratista cuando el acto de adjudicación o readjudicación adquiera firmeza y, en los casos que se exija constitución de la garantía de cumplimiento, ésta sea válidamente otorgada". En este orden de ideas, el contrato- documento no es condición imprescindible para la validez y eficacia contractual, en tanto que sólo resulta necesario cuando se requiera para el correcto entendimiento de los alcances de los derechos y obligaciones de las partes (art. 190 del RLCA), en tanto que en caso de no existir dicho documento aplicarán el cartel, la oferta y la adjudicación mencionados ut supra. En razón de lo anterior, en materia de contratación administrativa, la determinación del cumplimiento efectivo de la obligación por ambas partes contratantes expresada en el contrato, debe hacer referencia tanto al cartel como a la oferta considerada de manera integral, así como al respectivo acto de adjudicación - y al contrato, en caso de existir- y siempre orientado al cumplimiento del principio de buena fe entre las partes suscribientes y en atención al interés público que orientó la decisión de la Administración de realizar la respectiva contratación. V.II.- Sobre el caso en concreto: Como primer argumento la parte actora indica que el ente demandado no cumplió con los requisitos establecidos en el contrato suscrito para su prórroga automática y se comunicó lo contrario sin ninguna fundamentación legal y por personas no autorizadas, con base en lo anterior solicita se declare la disconformidad de la conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento; así como su derecho a los extremos reclamados por ser contractuales. Al respecto, hecho un análisis de la prueba ofrecida por las partes y admitida en el presente proceso, estima este Tribunal que ha quedado debidamente demostrado y así consta en autos que el 5 de setiembre de 2008 el INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE APRENDIZAJE y JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. suscribió el contrato número 09-2008 para la prestación de servicios de capacitación y formación profesional, siendo así que el mismo estableció la posibilidad de prórrogas que se denominaron como automáticas, mas en la realidad se encuentran condicionadas a un informe favorable con al menos dos meses de anticipación, con una evaluación del servicio prestado y la justificación de mantener el contrato, por parte del Encargado del Area de Contratación de Servicios de Capacitación y Formación Profesional de la Unidad Contratante, así como a la correspondiente aprobación por parte de la Comisión Local Regional respectiva. De la prueba aportada a los autos se evidencia que en el caso de análisis, mediante oficio URHE-134-2009 de 2 de julio de 2009, la Unidad Regional Huetar Atlántica del INA, informó a la parte actora que según la directriz girada en nota GG-699-2009 de 11 de septiembre, el contrato no se prorrogaría con base en la inexistencia de suficiente personal administrativo para darle debido seguimiento y en la carencia de contenido presupuestario para cubrir los costos respectivos. De conformidad con lo anterior, este Tribunal estima que no lleva razón la parte actora en su argumentación, en tanto que el ente demandado cumplió en tiempo con el procedimiento previo establecido para informar sobre la voluntad administrativa de no prorrogar el contrato suscrito, siendo así que en todo caso, tal y como lo indica la representación del INA, la decisión correspondiente era facultativa y no obligatoria para la parte contratante. De los autos se evidencia que en sesión de acta 02-2009 de 1 de julio de 2009 de la Comisión Local Regional de Contratación de Servicios de Capacitación, Unidad Regional Huetar Atlántica, se conoció la situación de los contratos suscritos por Brasileños Diesel, Educaribe y Jossan del Atlántico s.a, determinándose la improcedencia de su prórroga, siendo así que mediante oficio URHE-134-2009 de 2 de julio de 2009, la Unidad Regional Huetar Atlántica del INA, informó a la parte actora lo anterior, fundado en lo acordado por dicha instancia administrativa colegiada. Con lo anterior, se cumplió a cabalidad lo establecido en la cláusula cuarta del contrato suscrito. En este orden de ideas, estima este colegio que el acto que determina la eventual prórroga de una contratación de la administración, es un acto discrecional que es adoptado por ésta, previa ponderación de los elementos normados y no regulados establecidos en el ordenamiento y necesarios para su adopción. Corolario de esta consideración es que no existe un derecho subjetivo a la prórroga contractual per se, sino que queda en criterio del ente contratante el determinar la procedencia o no de continuar con la ejecución contractual. En este sentido, pueden verse los votos número 113-2011 de once horas de nueve de mayo de dos mil once de la Sección Sexta y número 158-2011 de dieciséis horas veinte minutos de quince de junio de dos mil once de la Sección Quinta de este Tribunal. Adoptar una decisión en contrario, es decir, prorrogar el contrato de marras sin contar con el debido contenido presupuestario, sería violentar el artículo 110 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, en tanto dispone lo siguiente: "Además de los previstos en otras leyes y reglamentaciones propias de la relación de servicio, serán hechos generadores de responsabilidad administrativa, independientemente de la responsabilidad civil o penal a que puedan dar lugar ....f) La autorización o realización de compromisos o erogaciones sin que exista contenido económico suficiente, debidamente presupuestado". Adicionalmente, ejecutar un contrato sin tener los recursos necesarios para continuar con su fiscalización implicaría debilitar el sistema de control interno institucional, de conformidad con el artículo 11 de la Ley General de Control interno, habida cuenta que se impediría verificar la correcta ejecución contractual. De un análisis de los actos que dan origen a la decisión objetada por la representante de la actora, se advierte que los mismos se encuentran debidamente fundamentados y no se advierte vicio alguno de nulidad en alguno de sus elementos, ni la búsqueda de un fin distinto al interés público y a la normativa aplicable en la materia. Inclusive, con respecto a los funcionarios responsables de dictar ambos actos, es de advertir que el acuerdo de no prórroga fue debidamente adoptado por la Comisión competente establecida en el contrato suscrito y su comunicación fue materializada por la máxima instancia regional, la Jefe de la Unidad responsable de presidir aquella. Finalmente con respecto al argumento en el sentido de que existe un trato diferenciado con respecto a la empresa NONO VIGA S.A. es de advertir que los actos referidos a esta contratista son previos a los acuerdos de la Comisión Local Regional de Contratación de Servicios de Capacitación, Unidad Regional Huetar Atlántica, de fecha 1 de julio de 2009. En efecto, consta en autos que el INA mediante oficio URHE-PA-397-2009 de 11 de mayo de 2009, previno al representante de NONO VIGA, S. A., le indicara si estaba en condiciones de prorrogar el mismo por un año más; manifestando dicha empresa su anuencia al día siguiente, por lo que su situación jurídica es diferente a la de la parte actora. En este orden de ideas, no estima razonable este Tribunal cualquier argumento tendiente a equiparar dos contrataciones en momentos diferentes y en donde la decisión de una se da previamente a la de la parte actora, con al menos 20 días de anticipación. De conformidad con lo anterior, procede rechazar los argumentos dichos en todos sus extremos.- VI.- Adicionalmente la representante de JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A. argumenta que el INA les pagó de acuerdo al número de estudiantes al corte de pago, siendo así que el mismo debía realizarse el último día de la segunda semana después de iniciados los servicios de capacitación. Alega en este sentido, "perjuicio enorme" al principio de equilibrio financiero. Al respecto en primer término es de advertir que la cláusula ocho del respectivo contrato dispuso expresamente que el corte para definir la matrícula debía realizarse el último día de la segunda semana de clases, siendo así que no se ha demostrado con prueba alguna, de que no se respetó dicha disposición contractual, de tal manera que significara un incumplimiento grave generador de responsabilidad contractual. Por otra parte, no ha demostrado la parte actora una afectación al equilibrio de sus finanzas, ni una consecuencia negativa con motivo de las fechas de corte realizadas por el ente demandado. En este orden de ideas, es menester recordar que no basta invocar la existencia de un daño, sino que corresponde a la parte que lo expresa, demostrarlo de manera fehaciente, probando la existencia del mismo, debiendo aplicarse al caso de examen, lo dispuesto en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, que dispone: “La carga de la prueba incumbe: 1) A quien formule una pretensión, respecto a las afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho...”, (al respecto ver voto de Sala Primera de la Corte, número 797-F-00 de 16 horas 17 minutos del 25 de octubre del 2000). Lo anterior, sin obviar lo indicado con respecto al daño objeto de pretensiones en esta materia, según el artículo 58. inc. e) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. En virtud de las consideraciones hechas, procede rechazar este argumento. […]

VII.- La parte actora pretende adicionalmente se condene a la Administración al pago de daños y perjuicios ocasionados con su conducta. Considera que los daños consisten en las inversiones realizadas para adaptar el centro de capacitación a las exigencias de la administración, la compra del equipo de cómputo, licencias, alquileres y para la concesión de la contratación directa en cuestión. Adicionalmente, estima como perjuicios las utilidades dejadas de percibir, las cuales estimó provisionalmente en la suma de C. 50.000.000,00 (cincuenta millones de colones). Al respecto, este Tribunal considera que no procede acoger lo solicitado, habida cuenta que como se ha indicado no se advierte ningún incumplimiento contractual grave del INA que pueda generar responsabilidad por tal motivo. Tal y como se ha indicado, las conductas reprochadas por la representante de la parte actora no pueden ser consideradas como apartadas del cartel, oferta y contrato suscrito, por lo que no procede en consecuencia un reclamo en tal sentido. A mayor abundamiento es de advertir que las erogaciones reclamadas como daño no pueden ser consideradas como tales, en tanto que comprenden la necesaria inversión que toda empresa debía realizar para la prestación de servicios. Precisamente si el INA decidió en su momento contratar con JOSSAN DEL ATLÁNTICO S.A., fue partiendo de una capacidad de gestión pre instalada y no creada ad hoc para esta contratación. Así se desprende tanto de la decisión administrativa previa para su adopción, como de las mismas manifestaciones de la parte actora en su oferta. Lo contrario sería partir de que el origen de la relación contractual no se fundó en una infundada, lo cual ni es objeto de debate ni se ha demostrado en autos por ninguna de las partes. Mediante prueba para mejor resolver la actora pretende demostrar la existencia de un contrato de arrendamiento, así como una presunta declaración jurada de quien se dice arrendante, documentos que además de ser una copia simple, no demuestran de manera alguna la existencia de un daño con motivo de la ejecución contractual por parte de lNA y que en todo caso, obedecen a la infraestructura necesaria que la empresa debía contar para prestar los servicios contratados, por lo que en nada contribuye a desvirtuar las consideraciones hechas en la presente resolución. Con respecto a los perjuicios, la parte actora ni demuestra - como tampoco lo hizo con respecto a los daños, ni su existencia ni un vínculo causal con alguna conducta administrativa generadora de un incumplimiento contractual grave. En todo caso, no se puede hablar de la existencia de utilidades dejadas de percibir en el presente caso, dado que como se indicó, la parte actora no poseía un derecho subjetivo a la prórroga contractual, ni está tenía por qué operar en la forma automática con la mera solicitud, tal y como pretendía aquella. En razón de lo anterior, también se rechaza este extremo.-”