Moral damages for cruelty and adultery in divorceDaño moral por sevicia y adulterio en el divorcio

III.- [Nombre1]: [...] It must be understood that there is no legal definition of what constitutes the grounds for [Nombre1], which is linked to the duty of respect that spouses owe each other enshrined in Articles 11 and 34 of the Family Code. The definition of what [Nombre1] is will have a historical-social character in accordance with the legal parameters of Article 10 of the Civil Code: “...ARTICLE 10.- Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose...” Furthermore, the content of said grounds will be systematically determined by higher-ranking norms; in the case of [Nombre1], above all by those instruments respecting human rights, and regarding women, it must be clearly stated that there are sectoral international treaties for the protection of that part of the population that undeniably determine the content of the acts that may be understood as included in the grounds for [Nombre1]. This Tribunal has already noted how the driving force behind the current development of Family Law is human rights. An author who conducts a jurisprudential study identifies this premise and points out the following: “The study of this jurisprudence has convinced me not only that human rights have application in the family sphere but that they have become the main driving force behind the current evolution of family law...” ([Nombre2], Aida: Human Rights and Family Law, in Memoria del XI Congreso Internacional de Derecho de Familia) This Tribunal agrees with that perspective which derives not only from the comparative study of jurisprudence, but also because this development trend occurs in other legal spheres such as law and doctrine. The highest Tribunal on this matter in our country, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, regarding the issue of [Nombre1], makes the link with international instruments and human rights: “...II.- The Family Code does not define the scope of the grounds for [Nombre1], provided for in subsection 4), of Article 48 of the Family Code, and it falls to the judge to do so in light of the doctrine and jurisprudence on the subject, since not just any act or its reiteration, even when reprehensible, can be invoked as justification for the dissolution of the marriage, given that the legal system has a special interest in its preservation, as it is considered the essential basis of the family and, the latter, the natural element and foundation of society, deserving of protection by the State (Articles 51 and 52 of the Political Constitution) (see, in this sense, Vote of this Chamber number 212, of 9:40 a.m., of October 1, 1993). To assess the facts on which the divorce is based, it must be taken into consideration that the aforementioned numeral 52 contemplates the principle of equality of rights between spouses. In the same vein, subsection [Nombre3]), of point 1, of Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ratified by Costa Rica, by Law Number 6968, of October 2, 1984, expresses: \"1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: ... [Nombre3]) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution.\". These rules are, in turn, collected and developed by the Family Code, which, in its Article 11, provides that the purpose of marriage is life in common, cooperation, and mutual aid, and the following Article 34 establishes: “Spouses share responsibility and governance of the family. Jointly they must regulate domestic affairs, provide for the education of their children, and prepare their future. Likewise, they are obligated to respect each other, to remain faithful, and to mutually assist each other …” That respect which must always prevail within the family is referred to not only the physical integrity of a person, but also their psychological and moral integrity; it is nothing other than respect for the spouse, insofar as they are a person with equal rights and opportunities; a postulate enshrined in general terms in Articles 33 and 40 of the Political Constitution, which protect every person against discrimination, cruel and degrading treatment to the detriment of their physical, psychological, and moral integrity, as there exists a fundamental right to have their honor and dignity respected; as also expressed in Articles 5 and 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights. For the specific case of violence against women, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará”, adopted by the Organization of American States, on June 9, 1994, in force in the country by Law number 7499, of May 2, 1995, provides, in its first article, that violence constitutes any action or conduct, based on gender, that causes death, harm, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere. Likewise, that instrument establishes that every woman has the right to a life free of violence, both in the public and private spheres, and to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise, and protection of all human rights, including respect for her physical, psychological, and moral integrity (Articles 3 and 4). Consequently, it can be concluded that when these values are seriously breached by the spouse, this may give rise to a declaration of judicial separation or divorce, depending on the conduct taken into account by the legislator to enumerate the grounds for decreeing them (Vote number 189, of 3:00 p.m., of July 24, 1998)...” (vote 2001-00032 of two twenty p.m. on January twelfth, two thousand one) That vote continues, developing the relationship between the grounds for [Nombre1] and the protection of human rights, especially those of women: “...III.- Peace within the family sphere and the effects its absence causes is a problem that affects society in general; the aforementioned equality between spouses and the right of all family members to live in an environment free of violence, guaranteeing their integral development, must always be considered when resolving the dispute. In the effort to protect the human rights of all persons and especially of women, various norms have been issued nationally and internationally that attempt to eradicate the violence and discrimination they have historically suffered in all spheres (family, political, social, etc.). In the search for a just response to the reality of our society, in the case of invoking violence against the wife, we must turn to the special regulations in her regard. For the purposes of assessing the existence of [Nombre1] invoked as grounds for divorce, it is relevant to know the issue of domestic violence, particularly that suffered by the wife at the hands of her husband; which is not always physical, but can also be sexual and psychological. According to doctrine and jurisprudence, [Nombre1], as grounds for divorce, is configured by the physical or moral violence used by one of the spouses against the other or their children, whether through acts or words, or by actions or omissions, which, being highly mortifying, disturb both physical and mental health and consequently make life as a couple practically impossible (Vote number 213, of 10:00 a.m., of September 24, 1997).....” (vote 2001-00032 of two twenty p.m. on January twelfth, two thousand one) [...] IV.- DAMAGES: The other issue on which the appellant disagrees concerns damages. After analyzing the situations that have been presented in light of the current legislation, this Tribunal also reaches the conclusion that in this aspect, the judgment must also be modified, so that instead the claim is granted in the version of moral damages (daño moral). In order to understand this decision, the framework of damages in family law must be explained, specifically in matters of divorce. Regarding the issue of damages arising from divorce, it must be noted that it is especially in Argentine law where we find a broad concern for this topic, and it is worthwhile to review some aspects in order to serve as a foundation and illustrate our development around a relatively new legal reform, the addition of Article 48 bis to the Family Code in the year of 1997. We can find very illustrative works covering the historical evolution from Roman law, ancient Spanish law, French law (authors pay particular attention to this one due to the richness of its jurisprudence), Swiss law, German law, among others. This topic is specifically addressed, especially in Argentina, by authors such as [Nombre4] (“Civil liability of the adulterous spouse and his accomplice for adultery” and “Nature of liability and prescription regime of the action for damages brought by one of the spouses against the other for nullity of marriage”), [Nombre5] (“Issues of civil liability in family law”), P.V. [Nombre6] (“Is the notion of fault in subjective civil liability identical to fault in divorce?”), [Nombre7]. [Nombre8] (“The first Argentine judgment that ordered compensation for moral damages arising from a divorce”, “civil liability in Family Law”, “Damages arising from divorce”, and “Liability for damages resulting from divorce”), [Nombre9] (“Damages arising from divorce”, “Damages arising from divorce before the reform of the Civil Code”, Damages arising from divorce and the annulment of marriage”), [Nombre10] (“The facts that gave rise to divorce and compensation for moral damages” and “Compensation for moral damages in case of adultery”), [Nombre11] (“Reflections on the compensation of damages in personal separation and divorce”), [Nombre12] (“Moral damages in family relations”), [Nombre13] (“Divorce and civil liability” and “Damages. Civil liability derived from divorce”), F. [Nombre14] and E. [Nombre16] (“Damage between spouses”), [Nombre17] (\"Divorce and liability for moral damages”), L. A. [Nombre18] (Compensation for damage caused by the wife’s adultery”), [Nombre19] (“Action for damages against the spouse at fault for divorce”), P. [Nombre20] of damages versus family law”), [Nombre21] (Inadmissibility of compensation for moral damages in divorce proceedings and its admissibility in nullity of marriage”), [Nombre22] (“Liability between spouses in case of divorce”), [Nombre23] (\"Maintenance and compensation in separation and divorce”), [Nombre24] (“Compensation for damages in personal separation and divorce” and “Compensable damages in divorce”), [Nombre25] (“The liability of spouses between themselves and regarding their children”), [Nombre2] (“Civil liability in family law”), [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] (“The situation of divorce as generating civil liability between spouses”), L. [Nombre28] (“Family and civil liability”, “Personal separation and divorce and the compensation of moral damages”) [Nombre29] (“Compensation for damages and losses due to divorce”), Jorge A. [Nombre31] (“The plenary ruling on moral damages in divorce”), [Nombre3] (“Damage between spouses”, “Damages arising from divorce jurisprudential evolution”), [Nombre32] (“Personal separation, divorce and civil liability. Its foundations”), N. [Nombre33] (“Damages arising from divorce and judicial judgment”), [Nombre34] (“Inadmissibility of compensation for damages in divorces decreed on subjective grounds”, “A new ruling regarding damages in divorce”), [Nombre35] (“Damages emerging from divorce”), A. Salas (“Compensation for damages derived from divorce”) [Nombre37] (“Civil liability derived from the spouse at fault in personal separation and divorce”), [Nombre38] (“Rethinking the issue of damages in divorce”). For example, the author [Nombre7]. [Nombre8] in his book “Damages Arising from Divorce” places Roman law as the first historical precedent for this topic. He explains that in the imperial era, before the Christian era, divorces increased, and to prevent their frequency, pecuniary penalties were applied to the spouse at fault in favor of the innocent spouse, the latter being the one who received the sum of money with a clearly compensatory character. [Nombre8] continues relating that Justinian law followed the same path, applying a pecuniary sanction that was relevant for the wealthy classes to the extreme that it was highly effective in discouraging a spouse from intending to break the marital bond. This author then reviews that in Las Partidas of Spanish law there is also a precedent, as the woman guilty of adultery was imposed the loss of the dowry (dote) and the earnest money (arras). Likewise, in French law before the Revolution, there was a sentence against the accomplice of the adulterous woman to compensate the husband. After the Civil Code came into force in 1804, French courts admitted the award of material and moral damages against the spouse guilty of adultery and against his accomplice, based on liability derived from the crime. [Nombre8] reviews the cases “[Nombre39] [Nombre3]. Femme [Nombre39] et Dubarry” and that of “[Nombre40] [Nombre3]. [Nombre41]”, famous cases in French jurisprudence referring to damages with adultery. [Nombre9] in his monograph “Damages Arising from Divorce and the Annulment of Marriage” emphasizes that it was in a ruling by the Court of Montpellier in 1897, in which the compensation for material and moral damages caused by the facts generating the divorce was generally admitted, considering that these, while being grounds for divorce at the same time, were quasi-delicts. On this case and others in the same sense, [Nombre8] comments: “...The Court declared that the causes for divorce may cause the offended spouse moral and material harm that its author is obligated to compensate. And in particular –regarding the case it had to judge-, that the husband's refusal to consummate the marriage, who besides continuing his intimate relations with his lover, constituted not only a grievous insult (injuria grave) to pronounce the divorce in favor of the woman, but at the same time a quasi-delict susceptible of giving rise in her favor to a monetary compensation set by the judges. It invoked Arts. 231 and 1382 of the Civ. Code. From then on, civil liability was applied to all the facts generating divorce, in a general manner. Said jurisprudential orientation continues; in various rulings, compensation was ordered for: The attitude of the woman upon leaving the town hall where the civil marriage had been celebrated, publicly regretting having done so, promoting odious and ridiculous scenes, refusing to fulfill the conjugal debt and finally filing a divorce action without any reason. The court considered that such facts had caused the husband material damages assessable in money (expenses for the wedding party and for changes in his house). The husband’s refusal to consummate the marriage and his abandonment of the home two months after having married. The husband’s abandonment –married to a woman twenty years older- occurring a few days after the marriage and accompanied by the theft of bonds that constituted the woman’s savings. The adulterous relations of the husband with a typist from his office and his abandonment of the home, to settle near his lover. He was ordered to compensate the harm suffered by the wife upon being rejected from the home at age 50 and deprived of a brilliant economic position she had helped conquer (material damage); moreover, what she suffered in her affection and dignity by fighting incessantly to win back her husband (she had come to confront the lover) and failing (moral damage). The unjustified abandonment of the home by the husband, to join his concubine. The lack of attendance of the woman, after the civil marriage, to the religious ceremony and her refusal to reunite with her husband. The moral damage arising from the husband's attitude, who made frequent visits to one of his neighbors...” (pp. 147 to 149). This jurisprudential iter understands differently the damages arising from the divorce itself, which it considers compensated by the maintenance payment, from those derived from the act constituting the grounds for divorce. Now, [Nombre9] reviews that in 1941 and 1948 some reforms were made to the French Civil Code, adding paragraphs to Article 301 and 311, and specifies that from there “the doctrine distinguished three categories of harm arising from divorce or legal separation: 1) those derived from the disappearance of material assistance, which were compensated through the maintenance payment contemplated by Art. 301, first paragraph of the Civ. Code; 2) the material and moral harm resulting from the dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, other than that consisting of the disappearance of the obligation of material assistance in the divorce, compensated according to Art. 301, second paragraph, and Art. 311, fourth paragraph; 3) the material and moral harm distinct from that arising from the dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, experienced as a consequence of the fault of the spouse, which the jurisprudence prior to 1941 had admitted, whether for the facts that had given rise to the divorce or legal separation, or for others distinct but always attributable to the spouse, to which the new texts alluded when referring to “all other reparations” and which are compensated based on Art. 1382...” (pp. 6 and 7). [Nombre9] goes on to explain that in 1975 in France, a general reform of the divorce regime was also carried out, which replaced all its previous regulation, and it is numeral 266 of the Civil Code that now refers to the subject at hand, insofar as it states “When the divorce has been decreed through the exclusive fault of one of the spouses, the latter may be condemned to damages as compensation for the material or moral harm that the dissolution of the marriage causes his spouse to suffer”. This norm excludes compensation in cases where the divorce occurs through the fault of both spouses. The authors [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] also refer to Swiss law, as its 1907 Civil Code expressly provided for the subject that interests us thus: “The innocent spouse whose pecuniary interests, even eventual ones, are compromised by the divorce, has the right to equitable compensation from the spouse at fault. If the facts that have determined the divorce have caused a serious attack on the personal interests of the innocent spouse, the judge may also grant him a sum of money by way of moral reparation.” These authors also refer to German law, a relationship worth paraphrasing since the statement of motives of said normative body expressly touched on the topic, rejecting the possibility. [Nombre8] translates as follows: “a) the idea that marriage cannot be based on moral order principles, while granting compensation would assimilate it to a legal act that could be a source of pecuniary advantages; b) because the innocent spouse could be seduced by the thought of receiving a sum of money as compensation and be inclined to invoke minimal causes to obtain a divorce; [Nombre3]) because the setting of compensation would be more or less arbitrary, and d) because it would not be effective as a means of coercion for the spouses to fulfill their obligations emerging from the marriage...” (p. 172). In Argentine law there is no express regulation, so the doctrine has been divided. The authors classify the theses into “negative” and “positive” and [Nombre24] refers to the “intermediate” thesis. The negative thesis is represented by [Nombre42] and [Nombre43] (even though the latter rectified some specific points) and is based on ethical, legal, and psychosocial arguments to refute the pertinence of civil liability in divorce. The positive one is represented by the majority of the authors: [Nombre44], Salas, Acuña, [Nombre4], [Nombre18], [Nombre9], [Nombre12], [Nombre46], [Nombre47], [Nombre48], [Nombre31], [Nombre8], D Antonio, [Nombre2], [Nombre35], [Nombre32], [Nombre50], [Nombre51], [Nombre10], [Nombre29], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre13], [Nombre22], [Nombre23], [Nombre54]. [Nombre55], [Nombre56], Medina, [Nombre58]. As a general rule, these authors accept the application of the general principles of civil liability in this matter, which jurisprudence has accepted. The intermediate thesis referred to by Ferrer is championed by [Nombre17] in the sense that the legislator's silence is ex professo and that therefore there are no bases to support the application of the common norms of civil liability, but he does accept that “when the facts leading to divorce have an expansion and gravity that, aside from the conjugal separation, entail a true moral damage”. Later, Ferrer highlights the thesis of doctors [Nombre26], [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] who specify that upon their legislation adopting the remedy divorce, they maintain that even if there are no culpable conducts, harm may still be generated arising from the situation of divorce. They propose that the causal relationship no longer works between fault and damage, but rather between divorce and damage, evolving more towards a type of strict liability based on the factor of “equity.”The author [Nombre3] makes special reference to Spanish jurisprudence and dwells on the case of the Court of Barcelona of June 1, 1999, Section 6, which deals with a sentence of two million pesetas as moral damages to the husband, for having raped his wife while they were separated. Regarding the jurisprudence of the United States of America, Medina reports that for a long time the courts of that country insisted on rejecting this type of claim, considering that husband and wife could not sue each other. This has been evolving although many States retain immunity between spouses, but increasingly accept exceptions. Medina relates that the case Thomson v. Thompson of 1910 is the one that has set the standard. The author [Nombre24] provides a recount of other American legislation, such as for example Article 288, last paragraph of the Civil Code of Mexico which provides “When the divorce causes damages or losses to the interests of the innocent spouse, the spouse at fault shall be liable for them as the author of an unlawful act”; also Article 144 of the Family Code of Bolivia establishes that the spouse at fault for the divorce may be ordered to compensate the material and moral damage he may have caused the innocent spouse by the dissolution of the marriage. For its part, the Civil Code of Peru in its Article 351 establishes that if the facts that have determined the divorce seriously compromise the legitimate personal interest of the innocent spouse, the Judge may grant a sum of money as compensation for moral damages. Ferrer also reviews Salvadoran law which receives compensatory maintenance. He alludes to the fact that in Brazilian law, the doctrine supports the admissibility of compensation for material and moral damages in favor of the innocent spouse. This author stopped at Costa Rican law with the previous version of Article 41 of the Family Code and the maintenance provided for in Article 57. In 1997, in Costa Rica, Law number 7689 of August 6, published in that year in La Gaceta number 172 of September 8, added an Article 48 bis to the Family Code, while numerals 8, 41 and 98 of that same normative body were reformed. The appreciation of evidence, a point touched upon in the previous section of this ruling, the cassation appeal, the elimination of consequences in the matter of community property (gananciales) due to fault in the grounds, the breadth regarding evidence of filiation, and damages arising from some grounds for divorce are the topics of said law. The said Article 48 bis includes a specific regulation on claims for damages for cases in which the divorce is decreed based on the grounds of subsections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 48. Regarding numeral 48 bis, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has initiated the path of application with votes 170-03 of 10:40 a.m. on April 9, 2003 and 413-03 of 11:20 a.m. on August 8, 2003. In vote 170-03, the Chamber develops the duty of the plaintiff to comply with the provisions of Article 290, subsection 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In vote 413-03, the Chamber developed the following: \"...XI.- OF MORAL DAMAGES IN FAMILY MATTERS: The defendant-counterclaimant, in her second claim, requested that Mr. ... be ordered to pay the damages caused –which technically are moral damages-, both to her and her son. In the first case as a result of the adultery and, in both cases due to the suffering caused to them by the [Nombre1] attributed to the plaintiff-counterdefendant, which caused psychological, emotional, and psychological affectation. She estimates said damages at the sum of ten million colones (¢10,000,000). Prima facie, it should be noted that damage is gradually acquiring transcendental relevance in divorce matters, both from a moral and a patrimonial point of view. The former, that is, moral damages, occurs when a person's feelings are injured; it is an “affection damage” that occurs when feelings such as love, dignity, and the honor of one of the spouses are injured and translate into sorrow, sadness, mortification, displeasure, or personal insecurity. These repeated or non-repeated conducts may constitute grounds for personal separation and divorce penalty that may cause moral damages; whether they injure matrimonial subjective rights of a non-patrimonial nature (such as infidelities) or of a patrimonial nature (as could occur in the case of fraudulent simulated acts by one of the spouses to the detriment of the rights of the other in the case of community property). Even if we analyze in detail the psychological sequelae and the bases of each case of separation or divorce specifically, we could find that they may also be susceptible of causing moral damages. Regarding the proof of this type of damage, it arises from the demonstration of the very facts constituting the grounds invoked, according to the general rules of the matter, in this case family matters; and it will correspond, in any case, to the responsible party to demonstrate the existence of some objective situation that allows excluding, in the specific case, that type of damage or that reduces its extent. Moral damages, then, are deduced from the unlawful acts themselves that have harmed the person in their most intimate affections, in their physical or psychological integrity, or both, in their honor, etc. Without the need, even, to specially demonstrate the sorrow or pain of the subject or its family or social transcendence. Therefore, it seems ruled out to consider that an adultery, by virtue of being discreet, does not produce serious damage susceptible to reparation. Or an offense or humiliation that is not public or even an attack against one's own dignity. Now then, regarding the minor, the same premise is possible to apply (in this regard, GONZÁLEZ MORA, R (compiler). Damages in the Divorce Process and Judicial Separation. Judicial School, pp. 61 to 89, may be consulted). Having established the foregoing and analyzed the evidence presented to the process in light of sound criticism and correct human understanding, it is concluded that both Mrs. ... and her son were harmed by the amoral and illegitimate behavior of the plaintiff-counterdefendant. Thus, in the “Forensic Clinical Psychological Expert Opinion” performed by the Licensed Psychologist ..., visible from folio 329 to 333, on Mrs. ..., the presence of evident sequelae of emotional and psychological damage was highlighted, precisely as a result of the broken relationship existing between the litigating couple.

She also detected feelings of fear, sadness, and helplessness in her—the defendant. With respect to the minor, in the respective expert report..." (sic) (folios 334 to 338), the same professional indicated that on an emotional level he showed signs of anxiety, a demand for attention and affection, irritability, anger, aggressive behavior, loneliness, sadness, low tolerance for limits, confusion regarding the family situation; aspects she attributes to his parents' separation. There is no doubt, then, that a causal relationship exists between the adulterous and cruel (sevicio) conduct of Mr. ... and the psychological disorder of his partner and child. Article 48 bis of the Family Code (Código de Familia) establishes: "If the marital bond is dissolved based on any of the grounds established in subsections 2), 3), and 4) of Article 48 of this Code, the innocent spouse may request, jointly with the action for separation or divorce, damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) in accordance with Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)" (As added by Law No. 7689 of August 21, 1997). For its part, numeral 1045 of the Civil Code states: "Anyone who, through intent (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses (perjuicios)." This general rule, applicable to the case, allows the conclusion that Mr. ... must repair the damages and losses caused to the defendant and her son, which are prudentially set at the sum of two million colones (¢2,000,000) for each one...." Mr. [Nombre61] comments in Costa Rican Family Law (Derecho de Familia Costarricense) that formerly the Courts had rejected claims for damages and losses derived from divorce: "Our courts (Cass. No. 381 of 1973), however, had dismissed this type of compensation for moral damages, because they considered that the sanction that could be obtained through it was included in the legal consequences imposed on the guilty spouse (loss of community property rights and of the right to request spousal support). Law No. 7689 of August 21, 1997, cited above, has deprived this jurisprudence of its basis by expressly granting the innocent spouse the right to request, jointly with the action for separation or divorce, damages and losses in accordance with Article 1045 of the Civil Code." (Juricentro, 1998, Volume I, p. 287) Mr. Ricardo González, for his part, concludes in his work "Damages and Losses in the Divorce and Judicial Separation Process -Anthology-" (Judicial School, 1999), the following: "...From a doctrinal point of view, the appropriateness of compensation for damages and losses derived from family relationships is unquestionable. From a normative point of view, the possibility of demanding reparation for damages and losses seems to be limited to the cases expressly mentioned in Article 48 bis of the Family Code. To extend the application of the compensatory principle to other cases of divorce and judicial separation, one must resort to an integral and expansive interpretation of the Civil Code rules relating to extra-contractual civil liability. In general terms, compensation must cover both moral and material damages, and their set-off is not appropriate, nor is it to be understood that they are settled through the payment of the support obligation that may subsist in favor of the innocent spouse. Furthermore, reparation will normally be in monetary terms and may eventually also be claimed against third parties who participated in the ground giving rise to the claim." (pp. 90 and 91) Guilt and innocence would now have importance for purposes of standing to petition for divorce (Article 49 of the Family Code), for the matter of spousal support (Article 57), and for this matter of damages and losses derived from a divorce decreed on the grounds of attempted murder, corruption, and [Nombre1]. Naturally, this numeral is related to Article 41 of the Political Constitution and to Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which the added article itself cites. Article 41 of the Political Constitution states: "...Seeking recourse under the laws, all persons must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be provided prompt, complete, and uncompromised justice, in strict conformity with the laws..." Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which refers to subjective civil liability or [Nombre63] liability, states: "...Anyone who, through intent (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses (perjuicios)..." Let us review, with some citations of jurisprudence from the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, the requirements for extra-contractual civil liability: "... IV.- Regarding extra-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has stated: "Through civil liability, a subject is attributed the obligation to repair, indemnify, or compensate (this last being the case for moral damages) for harm inflicted on the legal sphere of another subject, as a consequence of an act or activity carried out by the former.- This liability is divided into subjective liability and objective liability, according to the imputation criterion used in each case: in the first, the debtor's will, which acts in a culpable manner; in the second, objective criteria such as risk, expressly established by law. It is also usually divided into contractual and extra-contractual, depending on whether it arises from the breach of an obligation freely agreed upon by the parties, or from the breach of the general duty not to cause harm to others... For its part, extra-contractual liability falls on whoever, outside of any prior contractual relationship, has caused harm in the legal sphere of another subject, through fault (culpa), or through the launching of a risky activity or creation of a social risk. This liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but from the violation of the general duty not to harm others. Its regime is based on Articles 1045, 1046, 1047, and 1048 of the Civil Code. The first of these provides that: 'Anyone who, through intent (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses (perjuicios).'- A principle which is the foundation of all civil liability." (Resolution number 320 of 14:20 Hrs. of November 9, 1990). Regarding the regulation of Article 1045, this Chamber has said: "IX.- Article 1045 of the Civil Code establishes the foundation of subjective extra-contractual liability: 'Anyone who, through intent (dolo), fault (falta), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia), causes harm to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses (perjuicios).' The duty of compensation, in this case, derives from the culpable breach of the general principle of 'not causing harm to others.' For liability to exist, the harm must have been caused with fault (culpa) (negligence, imprudence, or lack of skill), or intent (dolo) of the agent. The burden of proof then falls on the creditor, that is, on the victim who requests compensation..." (Resolution number 34 of 14:25 Hrs. of March 22, 1991). Modern scientific doctrine, when analyzing the figure of intent (dolo), agrees in indicating that it presupposes the will to perform an unlawful act with knowledge of its illegality, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without necessarily having foreseen or been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. In this sense, it is affirmed, the intention to cause harm is not required; the will to breach the duty, bad faith, and the awareness that an illicit act is being performed suffice. Intent (dolo) presumes knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual intent). It is also affirmed that a lack of intention does not constitute intent (dolo); here we are in the presence of what is called "gross negligence" (culpa lata). However, extreme negligence should entail the consequences of intent (dolo) for the agent. For its part, fault (culpa) presupposes negligent, careless, improvident conduct that causes harm without intending to. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's conduct can lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless hopes that under the given circumstances it will not occur; while in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. In any case, for fault (culpa) to exist, the harmful result must have been foreseen as possible, or must have had to be foreseen, a likelihood of the result that cannot be so small that even if the person acted according to their duties, it would not have made them desist from the action. It is affirmed that to determine if the act is negligent, it is relevant to consider whether a reasonable person could foresee that it would cause harm. Fault (culpa) consists, then, in a lack of the required care, precaution, and diligence. Diligence has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harm may derive, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected of a normally reasonable and sensible person belonging to the technical sphere of the case. That is, whether the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection in view of avoiding harm to the legally protected property of others. Indeed, doctrine indicates that the required diligence encompasses not only the precautions and care required in each case by regulations but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm. Regarding the burden of proof, in matters of extra-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has indicated: "VII.- One of the fundamental differences between contractual and extra-contractual civil liability lies in the burden of proof, because in liability derived from a contract, the creditor is not obliged to prove the debtor's fault (culpa), since it is presumed as long as the latter does not prove that their breach or delay is not attributable to them, such as fortuitous event or force majeure; however, in extra-contractual or [Nombre63] liability, the injured party is responsible for proving the culpability of the author of the illicit act. Thus, Article 317, subsection 1), of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), provides that whoever formulates a claim bears the burden of proof regarding the facts constituting their right... Furthermore, one of the constituent elements of subjective extra-contractual liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the harm, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of extra-contractual liability, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the compensatory claim to succeed..." (Judgment number 17 of 15:00 Hrs. of January 29, 1992)...." (Voto 53-98 issued at 15:10 hrs on May 27, 1998, by the First Chamber). Now, in our case, damages and losses are requested that correspond to the social and moral harm that the defendant [Name 002] has caused with his actions. The grounds of adultery and [Nombre1] have been considered proven. Although the ground of adultery is not contemplated among the grounds listed in Article 48 bis, the truth is that the integrality of this [Nombre1] in the context of an adultery like the one that has been presented, in application of Article 48 bis of the Family Code in connection with Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which is a general clause of the legal system, and in relation to numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, mean that the claim must be upheld. The moral-type harm produced in the defendant's wife and family by his actions is undeniable, and the requested sum of three million colones is not inappropriate or exorbitant but rather representative of reasonable and proportional compensation for the moral damages caused to the plaintiff. The conduct presented injures feelings such as dignity, respect, and honor, and has resulted in sadness, grief, mortification, displeasure, and personal insecurity. Moral damage, then, is inferred from the unlawful acts themselves that have harmed the wife in her most intimate affections, in her physical or psychic integrity or both, in her honor, in her family sphere, etc. Without even needing to specifically prove the grief or pain of the subject or its family or social transcendence. In these cases, it is not appropriate to appoint an expert; rather, it falls upon the judge, as expert of experts, to assess a representative amount, and in this case, this Tribunal estimates that the requested amount is an adequate sum, and therefore the judgment must be revoked on this point, instead granting the claim for moral damage in the sum of three million colones.-" After the Civil Code came into force in 1804, French courts admitted awards for material and moral damages against the spouse guilty of adultery and against their accomplice, based on liability arising from the crime. [Nombre8] reviews the cases "[Nombre39] [Nombre3]. Femme [Nombre39] et Dubarry" and that of "[Nombre40] [Nombre3]. [Nombre41]", famous cases in French jurisprudence regarding damages from adultery.

[Nombre9], in his monograph "Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio y de la anulación del matrimonio," emphasizes that it is in an 1897 ruling of the Court of Montpellier in which the reparation of material and moral damages caused by the acts giving rise to the divorce is generally admitted, considering that these acts, while grounds for divorce, were also quasi-offenses (cuasidelitos). Regarding this case and others in the same vein, [Nombre8] comments:

"...The Court declared that the grounds for divorce can cause the offended spouse moral and material harm that its author is obliged to repair. And particularly—regarding the case it had to judge—that the husband's refusal to consummate the marriage, who also continued his intimate relations with his lover, constituted not only a serious insult to pronounce divorce in favor of the wife, but at the same time a quasi-offense (cuasidelito) capable of giving rise, in her favor, to a monetary indemnity (indemnización en dinero) set by the judges. It invoked Arts. 231 and 1382 of the Civil Code. From then on, civil liability (responsabilidad civil) was applied to all acts giving rise to divorce, in a general manner. Said jurisprudential orientation continues; in various rulings, payment of indemnity was ordered for: The wife's attitude upon leaving the mayor's office where the civil marriage had been celebrated, publicly lamenting having done so, promoting hateful and ridiculous scenes, refusing to fulfill the conjugal debt (débito conyugal), and finally filing for divorce without any reason. The court considered that such acts had caused the husband material damages (daños materiales) measurable in money (expenses for the wedding party and for changes to his house). The husband's refusal to consummate the marriage and his abandonment of the home two months after contracting it. The husband's abandonment—married to a woman twenty years his senior—occurring a few days after the marriage and accompanied by the theft of bonds that constituted the woman's savings. The husband's adulterous relations with a typist from his office and his abandonment of the home, to settle near his lover. An award was ordered to indemnify the damages suffered by the wife upon being rejected from the home at age 50 and deprived of a brilliant economic position that she had helped to achieve (material damage (daño material)); furthermore, that suffered in her affections and her dignity by incessantly struggling to win over her husband (she had gone so far as to confront the lover) and failing (non-material damage (daño moral)). The unjustified abandonment of the home by the husband, to unite with his concubine. The wife's failure to attend, after the civil marriage, the religious ceremony and her refusal to live with the husband. The non-material damage (daño moral) arising from the husband's attitude, who made frequent visits to one of his neighbors..." (pp. 147 to 149).

This jurisprudential path understands differently the damages arising from the divorce itself, which it considers compensated by the spousal support (pensión alimentaria), from those arising from the act constituting the grounds for divorce. Now, [Nombre9] recounts that in 1941 and 1948 reforms were made to the French Civil Code, adding paragraphs to Article 301 and to Article 311, and specifies that from then on "the doctrine distinguished three categories of damages arising from divorce or separation of bodies: 1) those arising from the disappearance of material assistance, which were repaired through the spousal support (pensión alimentaria) contemplated by Art. 301, first paragraph of the Civil Code; 2) the material and non-material harm (perjuicio material y moral) resulting from the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of bodies, apart from that consisting of the disappearance of the obligation of material assistance in the divorce, compensated according to Art. 301, second paragraph, and Art. 311, fourth paragraph; 3) the material and non-material harm (perjuicio material y moral) distinct from that which arises from the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of bodies, experienced as a consequence of the fault of the spouse, which had been admitted by the pre-1941 jurisprudence, whether for the acts that had given rise to the divorce or to the separation of bodies, or for other distinct acts but always attributable to the spouse, to which the new texts alluded when referring to 'all other reparations' and which are compensated based on Art. 1382..." (pp. 6 and 7). [Nombre9] goes on to explain that in 1975 in France, a general reform of the divorce regime was also carried out, replacing all its previous regulation, and it is numeral 266 of the Civil Code that now refers to the matter at hand, as it states "When the divorce has been decreed on the exclusive fault of one of the spouses, the latter may be ordered to pay damages as reparation for the material or non-material harm (perjuicio material o moral) that the dissolution of the marriage causes his spouse to suffer." This rule excludes indemnity (indemnización) in cases where the divorce occurs due to the fault of both spouses.

The authors [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] also refer to Swiss law (derecho suizo), since its Civil Code of 1907 expressly provided for the matter that interests us as follows: "The innocent spouse whose pecuniary interests, even eventual ones, are compromised by the divorce, has the right to an equitable indemnity (indemnización) from the guilty spouse. If the acts that have led to the divorce have caused a serious attack on the personal interests of the innocent spouse, the judge may furthermore grant them a sum of money as non-material reparation (reparación moral)." Said authors also make reference to German law (derecho alemán), an account that is worth paraphrasing since in the explanatory statement of said normative body, the matter was touched upon, expressly rejecting the possibility. [Nombre8] translates thus: "a) the idea that marriage cannot be based on principles of a moral order, while the granting of the indemnity (indemnización) would liken it to a legal act that could be a source of pecuniary advantages; b) because the innocent party could be seduced by the thought of receiving a sum of money as an indemnity (indemnización) and inclined to invoke minimal causes to obtain the divorce; [Nombre3]) because the setting of the indemnity (indemnización) would be more or less arbitrary, and d) because it would not be effective as a means of coercion for the spouses to comply with their obligations arising from the marriage..." (p. 172). In Argentine law (derecho argentino) there is no express regulation, so the doctrine has been divided. The authors classify the theses as "negative" and "positive" and [Nombre24] refers to the "intermediate" thesis. The negative thesis is represented by [Nombre42] and [Nombre43] (even though the latter rectified on some specific points) and is based on ethical, legal, and psychosocial arguments to refute the relevance of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) in divorce. The positive thesis by the majority of authors: [Nombre44], Salas, Acuña, [Nombre4], [Nombre18], [Nombre9], [Nombre12], [Nombre46], [Nombre47], [Nombre48], [Nombre31], [Nombre8], D Antonio, [Nombre2], [Nombre35], [Nombre32], [Nombre50], [Nombre51], [Nombre10], [Nombre29], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre13], [Nombre22], [Nombre23], [Nombre54]. [Nombre55], [Nombre56], Medina, [Nombre58]. As a general rule, these authors accept the application of the general principles of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) in this matter, which the jurisprudence has adopted. The intermediate thesis that Ferrer refers to is championed by [Nombre17] in the sense that the legislator's silence is ex professo and that therefore there are no bases to sustain the application of the common rules of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), but he does accept it "when the acts leading to divorce have an expansion and gravity that, apart from the marital separation, entail a true non-material damage (daño moral)." Then Ferrer highlights the thesis of doctors [Nombre26], [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] who specify that upon their legislation adopting the no-fault divorce (divorcio remedio), they maintain that even if there is no culpable conduct, damages may equally arise from the divorce situation. They propose that the causal link no longer operates between fault and damage, but between the divorce and the damage, evolving more toward a strict liability (responsabilidad de tipo objetivo) based on the factor of "equity." The author [Nombre3] makes special reference to Spanish jurisprudence (jurisprudencia española) and dwells on the case of the Audiencia de Barcelona of June 1, 1999, Section 6, which deals with a judgment of two million pesetas as non-material damage (daño moral) to the husband, for having raped his wife while they were separated. Regarding the jurisprudence of the United States of America (jurisprudencia de los Estados Unidos de América), Medina recounts that for a long time the courts of that country insisted on rejecting this type of claim, considering that husband and wife could not sue each other. This has been evolving although many States retain interspousal immunity (inmunidad entre cónyuges), but with more and more exceptions being accepted. Medina recounts that the case Thomson v. Thompson of 1910 is the one that has set the standard. The author [Nombre24] makes a recount of other American legislation, such as, for example, the last paragraph of Article 288 of the Civil Code of Mexico (Código Civil de México) which provides: "When due to the divorce damages or losses originate to the interests of the innocent spouse, the guilty party shall answer for them as the author of an illicit act"; likewise Article 144 of the Family Code of Bolivia (Código de Familia de Bolivia) establishes that the spouse guilty of the divorce may be ordered to pay compensation for the material and non-material damage (daño material y moral) that they have caused to the innocent party through the dissolution of the marriage. For its part, the Civil Code of Peru (Código Civil de Perú) in its Article 351 establishes that if the acts that have led to the divorce seriously compromise the legitimate personal interest of the innocent spouse, the Judge may grant a sum of money as reparation for the non-material damage (daño moral). Ferrer also reviews Salvadoran law (derecho salvadoreño) which incorporates the compensatory allowance (pensión compensatoria). He alludes to the fact that in Brazilian law (derecho brasileño) the doctrine sustains the appropriateness of the indemnity (indemnización) for material and non-material damage (daño material y moral) in favor of the innocent spouse. This author dwelt on Costa Rican law with the previous version of Article 41 of the Family Code and the allowance (pensión) provided for in Article 57.

In 1997, in Costa Rica, Law number 7689 of August 6, published that year in La Gaceta number 172 of September 8, added an article 48 bis to the Family Code, at the same time that numerals 8, 41, and 98 of that same normative body were reformed. The assessment of evidence, a point touched upon in the previous section of this ruling, the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación), the elimination of the consequences regarding jointly owned property (gananciales) from guilt in the grounds for divorce, the broadness regarding filiation evidence, and the damages arising from some grounds for divorce are the themes of said law. Said Article 48 bis includes a specific regulation on claims for damages for cases in which the divorce is decreed based on the grounds in subsections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 48. Regarding numeral 48 bis, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has begun the path of application with votes 170-03 of 10:40 a.m. on April 9, 2003, and 413-03 of 11:20 a.m. on August 8, 2003. In vote 170-03, the Chamber develops the duty of the plaintiff party to comply with what is prescribed by Article 290, subsection 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. In vote 413-03, the Chamber developed the following:

"...XI.- REGARDING NON-MATERIAL DAMAGE IN FAMILY MATTERS: The defendant-counterclaimant, in her second claim, requested that Mr. ... be ordered to pay the damages caused—which is technically non-material damage (daño moral)—both to her and to her son. In the first case as a product of adultery and, in both cases, for the suffering caused to them by the [Nombre1] attributed to the plaintiff-counterdefendant, which caused psychological, emotional, and mental distress. She estimates said damages at the sum of ten million colones (¢10,000,000). Prima facie, it is appropriate to warn that damage gradually acquires transcendental relevance in divorce matters, both from the moral and the patrimonial point of view. The first, that is, the moral one, occurs when a person's feelings are injured; it is an 'affection damage' («daño de afección») that occurs when feelings such as love, dignity, and honor of one of the spouses are injured and are translated into grief, sadness, mortification, displeasure, or personal insecurity. These repeated or non-repeated conducts, can constitute grounds for personal separation and sanction divorce that can produce damages of a moral order; whether they injure subjective matrimonial rights of an extra-patrimonial nature (such as, for example, infidelities) or of a patrimonial nature (as could occur in the case of fraudulent simulated acts by one of the spouses to the detriment of the other's rights in the case of jointly owned property (gananciales)). Even, if we analyze in detail the psychological sequelae and the bases of each separation or divorce case in particular, we could find that they may also be susceptible to causing non-material damage (daño moral). Regarding the proof of this type of damage, it arises from the demonstration of the very acts constituting the grounds invoked, according to the general rules of the matter, in this case family matters; and it shall correspond, in any case, to the responsible party, to demonstrate the existence of some objective situation that allows excluding in the specific case that type of damage or that diminishes its entity. Non-material damage (daño moral), then, is deduced from the very illicit acts that have harmed the person in their most intimate affections, in their physical or mental integrity or in both, in their honor, etc. Without the need, even, to especially demonstrate the subject's grief or pain or its family or social transcendence. Therefore, it seems ruled out to consider that an adultery, by the mere fact of being discreet, does not produce a serious damage susceptible to reparation. Or an offense or humiliation that is not public or even an attack against one's own dignity. Now, regarding the minor child, the same premise is possible to apply (on this, one may consult, GONZÁLEZ MORA, R (compiler). Daños y Perjuicios en el Proceso de Divorcio y de la Separación Judicial. Escuela Judicial, p. 61 to 89). Having stated the above and analyzed the evidence adduced to the process in the light of sound criticism and correct human understanding, it is concluded that both Mrs. ... and her son were harmed by the amoral and illegitimate behavior of the plaintiff-counterdefendant. Thus, in the 'Forensic Clinical Psychological Expert Opinion' («Dictamen Pericial Psicológico Clínico Forense») performed by the Licensed Psychologist ..., visible from folio 329 to 333, of Mrs. ..., the presence of evident sequelae of emotional and psychological damage was highlighted, a product, precisely, of the broken relationship existing between the litigating couple. Also, she detected feelings in her—the defendant—of fear, sadness, and impotence. Regarding the minor, in the respective expert opinion..." (sic) (folios 334 to 338), the same professional indicated that on an emotional level he presented signs of anxiety, demand for attention and affection, irritability, anger, aggressive behavior, loneliness, sadness, little tolerance for limits, confused before the family situation; aspects she attributes to the separation of his parents. There is no doubt, then, that there is a causal relationship between the adulterous and cruel (seviciosa) conduct of Mr. ...and the psychological disorder of his partner and son. Article 48 bis of the Family Code establishes: 'If the marital bond is dissolved, based on any of the grounds established in subsections 2), 3) and 4) of Article 48 of this Code, the innocent spouse may request, jointly with the action for separation or divorce, damages in accordance with Article 1045 of the Civil Code' (Thus added by means of Law No. 7689 of August 21, 1997). For its part, numeral 1045 of the Civil Code provides: 'Whosoever by malice, fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses.' This general rule, applicable to the case, allows concluding that Mr. ... must repair the damages caused to the defendant and to her son, which are set, prudentially, at the sum of two million colones (¢2,000,000) for each one...." Mr. [Nombre61] comments in Derecho de Familia Costarricense that formerly the Courts had rejected claims for damages derived from divorce: "Our courts (Cassation No. 381 of 1973), however, had dismissed this type of indemnity (indaminización) for non-material damages (daños moral), because they considered that the sanction that could be obtained through it was included in the legal consequences imposed on the guilty spouse (loss of jointly owned property (gananciales) and the right to request support), Law No. 7689 of August 21, 1997, cited above, has removed the basis for this jurisprudence by expressly granting the innocent spouse the right to request, jointly with the action for separation or divorce, damages in accordance with Article 1045 of the Civil Code." (Juricentro, 1998, volume I, p. 287) Mr. Ricardo González, for his part, concludes in his work "Daños y perjuicios en el proceso de divorcio y de la separación judicial -Antología-" (Escuela Judicial, 1999), the following: "...From a doctrinal point of view, the appropriateness of the indemnity (indemnización) for damages arising from family relations is unquestionable. From a normative point of view, the possibility of demanding reparation for damages seems to be reduced to the cases expressly mentioned in Article 48 bis of the Family Code. To extend the application of the indemnity principle to the other cases of divorce and judicial separation, one must resort to an integral and expansive interpretation of the rules of the Civil Code relating to extra-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual). In general terms, the indemnity (indemnización) must cover both non-material and material damages (daños morales como materiales), and its compensation is not appropriate, nor should it be understood that they are cancelled through the payment of the maintenance obligation (obligación alimentaria) that may subsist in favor of the innocent spouse. Furthermore, the reparation will normally be in monetary terms and may eventually also be charged to third parties who participated in the ground giving rise to the claim." (pp. 90 and 91) Guilt and innocence would now have importance for the purposes of standing (legitimación) to request divorce (Article 49 of the Family Code), for the issue of spousal support (pensión alimentaria) (Article 57) and for this issue of damages derived from divorce decreed on the grounds of attempted murder, corruption, and [Nombre1]. Naturally, this numeral is related to Article 41 of the Political Constitution and to Article 1045 of the Civil Code that the added article itself cites. Article 41 of the Political Constitution provides: "...Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, and moral interests. Justice must be done promptly, completely, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws..." Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which refers to subjective civil liability (responsabilidad civil subjetiva) or [Nombre63] liability, provides: "...Whosoever by malice, fault, negligence, or recklessness, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the losses..." Let us review, with some jurisprudential quotes from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), the prerequisites of extra-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual): "... IV.- Regarding extra-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), this Chamber has expressed: 'Through civil liability (responsabilidad civil) a subject is attributed the obligation to repair, indemnify, or compensate (the latter being the case of non-material damage (daño moral)), a harm inflicted on the legal sphere of another subject, as a consequence of an act or an activity carried out by the former. This liability is divided into subjective liability and strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), according to the criterion of imputation used in each case: in the first, the will of the debtor, who acts culpably; in the second, objective criteria such as risk, expressly established by law. It is also usually divided into contractual and extra-contractual, depending on whether it arises from the breach of an obligation freely agreed by the parties, or from the breach of the general duty not to cause harm to others... For its part, extra-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual) falls on whosoever, outside any prior contractual relationship, has caused damage in the legal sphere of another subject, through fault, or through the setting in motion of a risky activity or creation of a social risk. This liability is not born from the breach of a specific bond, but from the violation of the general duty not to harm others. Its regime is based on Articles 1045, 1046, 1047, and 1048 of the Civil Code.' The first of these provides that: "Anyone who through deceit, fault, negligence, or recklessness causes harm to another is obligated to repair it along with the consequential losses (perjuicios)." - A principle that is the foundation of all civil liability." (Resolution number 320 of 14:20 hrs. on November 9, 1990). Regarding the regulation of Article 1045, this Chamber has stated: "IX.- Article 1045 of the Civil Code establishes the basis for subjective non-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual subjetiva): 'Anyone who through deceit, fault, negligence, or recklessness causes harm to another is obligated to repair it along with the consequential losses (perjuicios).' The duty to compensate, in this case, derives from the culpable breach of the general principle of 'do not cause harm to others.' For liability to exist, it is required that the harm was caused with fault (culpa) (negligence, recklessness, or lack of skill), or deceit (dolo) of the agent. The burden of proof then falls on the creditor, that is, on the victim who seeks compensation..." (Resolution number 34 of 14:25 hrs. on March 22, 1991). Modern legal doctrine, when analyzing the concept of deceit (dolo), is unanimous in indicating that it involves the will to perform an unlawful act with knowledge of its illegality, with its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without the need to have foreseen or been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. In this sense, it is affirmed that the intention to harm is not necessary; the will to breach the duty, bad faith, the awareness that an unlawful act is being committed, is sufficient. Deceit (dolo) presumes knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual deceit - dolo eventual). It is also affirmed that a lack of intention does not constitute deceit (dolo); here we are in the presence of what is called "gross negligence (culpa lata)". However, extreme negligence should bring upon the agent the consequences of deceit (dolo). For its part, fault (culpa) involves negligent, careless, imprudent conduct that causes harm without intending it. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct can lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless hopes that in the given circumstances it will not occur, while, in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. In any case, for fault (culpa) to exist, the harmful result must have been foreseen as possible, or should have been foreseen, a likelihood of the result that cannot be so small that even if the person acted according to their duties, it would not have made them desist from the action. It is affirmed that to determine if the act is negligent, it is relevant to consider whether a reasonable person could foresee that it would cause harm. Fault (culpa) consists, then, in a lack of due care, precaution, and diligence. Diligence has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that must accompany all acts from which harm may arise, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected from a normally reasonable and sensible person, belonging to the technical sphere of the case. That is, if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection with a view to avoiding harm to legally protected property of others. Even doctrine indicates that the required diligence encompasses not only the precautions and care mandated in each case by regulations, but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm. Regarding the burden of proof in matters of non-contractual civil liability, this Chamber has indicated: "VII.- One of the fundamental differences between contractual and non-contractual civil liability lies in the burden of proof, since in liability derived from a contract, the creditor is not obligated to demonstrate the fault (culpa) of the debtor, as this is presumed as long as the latter does not demonstrate that his breach or delay is not attributable to him, such as a fortuitous event or force majeure; in contrast, in non-contractual liability or [Name63], it falls upon the injured party to demonstrate the culpability of the author of the unlawful act. Thus, Article 317, paragraph 1), of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that whoever formulates a claim bears the burden of proof regarding the facts constituting his right... Furthermore, one of the constitutive elements of subjective non-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual subjetiva) is the direct or efficient causal link that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the harm, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of non-contractual liability, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the compensation claim to prosper..." (Judgment number 17 of 15:00 hrs. on January 29, 1992)...." (Vote 53-98 issued at 15:10 hrs on May 27, 1998 by the First Chamber). Now, in our case, damages and consequential losses (daños y perjuicios) are requested that correspond to the social and moral harm (daño social y moral) caused by the defendant [Name 002] through his actions. The grounds of adultery and [Name1] have been deemed proven. While the ground of adultery is not contemplated within the grounds listed in Article 48 bis, the fact is that the entirety of that [Name1] in the context of adultery as has been presented, in application of Article 48 bis of the Family Code in connection with Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which is a general clause of the legal system, and in relation to numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, mean that the claim must be granted. The moral harm (daño moral) caused to the defendant's wife and family by his actions is undeniable, and the requested sum of three million colones is neither inadequate nor exorbitant but rather representative of reasonable and proportional compensation for the moral harm (daños morales) caused to the plaintiff. The conduct presented injures feelings such as dignity, respect, honor, and has translated into sadness, sorrow, mortification, displeasure, and personal insecurity. Moral harm (daño moral), then, is deduced from the unlawful acts themselves that have harmed the wife in her most intimate affections, in her physical or psychological integrity or both, in her honor, in her family environment, etc. Without even needing to specifically demonstrate the sorrow or pain of the subject or its family or social transcendence. It is not appropriate in these cases to appoint an expert; rather, it falls to the judge, as an expert of experts, to assess a representative amount, and in this case, this Court considers the amount requested to be an adequate sum, and therefore the judgment must be revoked on this point, to instead award the claim for moral harm (daño moral) in the sum of three million colones." According to doctrine and jurisprudence, [Nombre1], as a ground for divorce, is established by the physical or moral violence used by one of the spouses to the detriment of the other or their children, whether through acts or words, or through highly mortifying actions or omissions that disturb both physical and mental health and consequently make life as a couple practically impossible (Voto número 213, de las 10:00 horas, del 24 de setiembre de 1997).....” (voto 2001-00032 de las catorce horas veinte minutos del doce de enero del dos mil uno) **IV.- DAMAGES (DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS):** The other issue on which the appellant disagrees concerns damages (daños y perjuicios). After analyzing the situations that have arisen in light of current legislation, this Court also concludes that in this regard, the judgment must also be modified, so that instead, the claim is granted in the form of moral damages (daño moral). In order to understand this decision, the framework of damages (daños y perjuicios) in family law, specifically in divorce matters, must be explained. Regarding the issue of damages (daños y perjuicios) arising from divorce, it must be noted that it is above all in Argentine law where we find a broad concern for this topic, and it is worthwhile to review some aspects in order to lay the foundation for and illustrate our reasoning concerning a relatively new legal reform, the addition of Article 48 bis to the Family Code in 1997. We can find very illustrative works covering the historical evolution from Roman law, old Spanish law, French law (authors dwell on this particularly due to the richness of its jurisprudence), Swiss law, German law, among others. This topic is specifically addressed, especially in Argentina, by authors such as [Nombre4] ("Civil liability of the adulterous spouse and their accomplice for adultery" and "Nature of liability and statute of limitations for the compensatory action brought by one spouse against the other due to annulment of marriage"), [Nombre5] ("Issues of civil liability in family law"), P.V. [Nombre6] ("Is the notion of fault in subjective civil liability identical to fault in divorce?"), [Nombre7]. [Nombre8] ("The first Argentine judgment ordering reparation for moral damages arising from divorce", "Civil liability in Family Law", "Damages arising from divorce", and "Liability for damages resulting from divorce"), [Nombre9] ("Damages arising from divorce", "Damages arising from divorce in light of the Civil Code reform", "Damages arising from divorce and from annulment of marriage"), [Nombre10] ("The acts giving rise to divorce and compensation for moral damages" and "Compensation for moral damages in cases of adultery"), [Nombre11] ("Reflections on compensation for damages in legal separation and divorce"), [Nombre12] ("Moral damages in family relations"), [Nombre13] ("Divorce and civil liability" and "Damages. Civil liability arising from divorce"), F. [Nombre14] and E. [Nombre16] ("Damages between spouses"), [Nombre17] ("Divorce and liability for moral damages"), L. A. [Nombre18] ("Compensation for damages caused by the wife's adultery"), [Nombre19] ("Action for damages against the spouse at fault in the divorce"), P. [Nombre20] ("Liability for damages versus family law"), [Nombre21] ("Inadmissibility of compensation for moral damages in divorce proceedings and its admissibility in annulment of marriage"), [Nombre22] ("Liability between spouses in case of divorce"), [Nombre23] ("Alimony and reparations in separation and divorce"), [Nombre24] ("Compensation for damages in legal separation and divorce" and "Compensable damages in divorce"), [Nombre25] ("The liability of spouses towards each other and towards their children"), [Nombre2] ("Civil liability in family law"), [Nombre26] and [Nombre27] ("The situation of divorce as a generator of civil liability between spouses"), L. [Nombre28] ("Family and civil liability", "Legal separation, divorce, and the reparation of moral damages"), [Nombre29] ("Compensation for damages due to divorce"), Jorge A. [Nombre31] ("The plenary ruling on moral damages in divorce"), [Nombre3] ("Damages between spouses", "Damages arising from divorce - jurisprudential evolution"), [Nombre32] ("Legal separation, divorce, and civil liability. Their foundations"), N. [Nombre33] ("Damages arising from divorce and from the judicial sentence"), [Nombre34] ("Inadmissibility of compensation for damages in divorces decreed on subjective grounds", "A new ruling on damages in divorce"), [Nombre35] ("Damages emerging from divorce"), A. Salas ("Compensation for damages arising from divorce"), [Nombre37] ("Civil liability arising from the spouse at fault in legal separation and divorce"), [Nombre38] ("Rethinking the topic of damages in divorce"). For example, the author [Nombre7]. [Nombre8], in his book "Damages arising from divorce," locates Roman law as the first historical antecedent of this topic. He explains that in the imperial era, before the Christian era, divorces increased, and to prevent their frequency, pecuniary penalties were applied to the spouse at fault for the benefit of the innocent spouse, who received the sum of money with a clearly compensatory character. [Nombre8] continues relating that Justinian law followed the same course, applying a pecuniary sanction that was relevant for the wealthy classes to the extent that it was highly effective in discouraging a spouse from the purpose of breaking the marital bond. The author then outlines that in the *Siete Partidas* of Spanish law, there is also an antecedent, as the wife guilty of adultery was punished with the loss of her dowry (dote) and her earnest money (arras). Likewise, in French law prior to the Revolution, there existed a condemnation against the accomplice of the adulterous wife to compensate the husband. After the Civil Code came into effect in 1804, French courts admitted the condemnation for material and moral damages against the spouse guilty of adultery and against their accomplice, based on liability arising from the delict (delito). [Nombre8] reviews the cases "[Nombre39] [Nombre3]. Femme [Nombre39] et Dubarry" and "[Nombre40] [Nombre3]. [Nombre41]", famous cases in French jurisprudence concerning damages related to adultery.

[Nombre9], in his monograph "Damages arising from divorce and from annulment of marriage," emphasizes that it is in a ruling of the Court of Montpellier in 1897 where the reparation of material and moral damages caused by the acts giving rise to the divorce was generally admitted, considering that these acts, while simultaneously constituting grounds for divorce, were quasi-delicts (cuasidelitos). On this case and others in the same vein, [Nombre8] comments:

"...The Court declared that the causes for divorce can cause the offended spouse moral and material harm that its author is obligated to repair. And in particular – regarding the case it had to judge – that the husband's refusal to consummate the marriage, who besides continuing his intimate relations with his lover, constituted not only a serious injury justifying the pronouncement of divorce in favor of the wife, but at the same time a quasi-delict (cuasidelito) capable of giving rise in her favor to a monetary compensation fixed by the judges. It invoked Arts. 231 and 1382 of the Civil Code. From then on, civil liability was applied to all acts giving rise to divorce, in a general manner. This jurisprudential orientation continues; in various rulings, payment of compensation was ordered for: The wife's attitude upon leaving the town hall where the civil marriage had been celebrated, publicly regretting having done so, promoting odious and ridiculous scenes, refusing to fulfill the conjugal debt, and finally filing a divorce petition without any reason. The court considered that such acts had caused the husband material damages appreciable in money (expenses for the wedding party and for changes in his house). The husband's refusal to consummate the marriage and his abandonment of the home two months after having contracted it. The abandonment by the husband – married to a woman twenty years older – occurring a few days after the marriage and accompanied by the theft of bonds that constituted the woman's savings. The husband's adulterous relations with a typist from his office and his abandonment of the home to settle near his lover. Compensation was ordered for the harm suffered by the wife upon finding herself rejected from the home at age 50 and deprived of a brilliant economic position she had helped achieve (material damage); additionally, the suffering to her affectivity and dignity from incessantly struggling to win back her husband (she had gone so far as to confront the lover) and failing (moral damage). The unjustified abandonment of the home by the husband to unite with his concubine. The wife's failure to attend the religious ceremony after the civil marriage and her refusal to reunite with the husband. The moral damage arising from the husband's attitude, who made frequent visits to one of his neighbors..." (pp. 147 to 149).

This jurisprudential path understands the damages arising from the divorce itself, which it considers compensated by spousal support (pensión alimentaria), differently from those arising from the act constituting the ground for divorce. Now, [Nombre9] reviews that in 1941 and 1948, reforms were made to the French Civil Code, adding paragraphs to Article 301 and Article 311, and specifies that from that point "the doctrine distinguished three categories of harm arising from divorce or legal separation: 1) those arising from the disappearance of material assistance, which were repaired through the spousal support (pensión alimentaria) contemplated by Art. 301, first paragraph of the Civil Code; 2) the material and moral harm resulting from the dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, aside from that consisting of the disappearance of the obligation of material assistance in the divorce, compensated in accordance with Art. 301, second paragraph, and Art. 311, fourth paragraph; 3) the material and moral harm distinct from that arising from the dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, suffered as a consequence of the spouse's fault, which the jurisprudence prior to 1941 had admitted, either for the acts that had given rise to the divorce or legal separation, or for other different ones but always imputable to the spouse, to which the new texts alluded when referring to “all other reparations” and which are compensated based on Art. 1382..." (pp. 6 and 7).

[Nombre9] continues explaining that in 1975 in France, a general reform of the divorce regime was also carried out, replacing all its prior regulation, and it is Article 266 of the Civil Code that now refers to the topic at hand, expressing: "When the divorce has been decreed through the exclusive fault of one of the spouses, this one may be condemned to damages (daños y perjuicios) as reparation for the material or moral harm that the dissolution of the marriage causes his/her spouse to suffer." This rule excludes compensation in cases where the divorce occurs through the fault of both spouses. The authors [Nombre9] and [Nombre8] also refer to Swiss law, since its 1907 Civil Code expressly provided for the topic that concerns us, thus: "The innocent spouse whose pecuniary interests, even eventual ones, are compromised by the divorce, has the right to equitable compensation from the spouse at fault. If the acts that led to the divorce have caused a serious attack on the personal interests of the innocent spouse, the judge may also grant him/her a sum of money by way of moral reparation." These authors also make reference to German law, a relation worth paraphrasing, since in the explanatory memorandum of that normative body, the topic was touched upon, expressly rejecting the possibility. [Nombre8] translates thus: "a) the idea that marriage cannot be based on principles of moral order, whereas the granting of compensation would assimilate it to a legal act that could be a source of pecuniary advantages; b) because the innocent party could be seduced by the thought of receiving a sum of money by way of compensation and inclined to invoke minimal causes to obtain the divorce; c) because the fixing of the compensation would be more or less arbitrary, and d) because it would not be effective as a means of coercion for the spouses to fulfill their obligations arising from marriage..." (p. 172).

In Argentine law there is no express regulation, so doctrine has been divided. The authors classify the theses into "negative" and "positive," and [Nombre24] refers to the "intermediate" thesis. The negative thesis is represented by [Nombre42] and [Nombre43] (even though the latter rectified on some specific points); it is based on ethical, legal, and psychosocial arguments to rebut the pertinence of civil liability in divorce. The positive thesis is supported by the majority of authors: [Nombre44], Salas, Acuña, [Nombre4], [Nombre18], [Nombre9], [Nombre12], [Nombre46], [Nombre47], [Nombre48], [Nombre31], [Nombre8], D Antonio, [Nombre2], [Nombre35], [Nombre32], [Nombre50], [Nombre51], [Nombre10], [Nombre29], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre13], [Nombre22], [Nombre23], [Nombre54]. [Nombre55], [Nombre56], Medina, [Nombre58]. As a general principle, these authors accept the application of the general principles of civil liability in this matter, which jurisprudence has embraced. The intermediate thesis that Ferrer refers to is championed by [Nombre17] in the sense that the legislator's silence is ex professo and that therefore there are no bases to sustain the application of the common rules of civil liability, but he does accept it "when the acts leading to the divorce have an expansion and gravity that, aside from the conjugal separation, entail true moral damage." Then Ferrer highlights the thesis of Doctors [Nombre26], [Nombre26] and [Nombre27], who specify that upon their legislation adopting no-fault divorce (divorcio remedio), they maintain that even if there are no culpable conducts, harms derived from the divorce situation can still be generated. They propose that the causal relationship no longer functions between fault and damage, but rather between the divorce and the damage, evolving more towards an objective type of liability based on the factor of "equity." The author [Nombre3] makes special reference to Spanish jurisprudence and dwells on the case of the Audiencia de Barcelona of June 1, 1999, Section 6, which deals with a condemnation of two million pesetas in concept of moral damages to the husband, for having raped his wife while they were separated. As for the jurisprudence of the United States of America, Medina relates that for a long time the courts of that country insisted on rejecting this type of claim, considering that husband and wife could not sue each other. This has evolved, although many States preserve interspousal immunity (inmunidad entre cónyuges), but increasingly accepting exceptions. Medina outlines that the case Thomson v. Thompson of 1910 is the one that has set the standard. The author [Nombre24] gives an account of other American legislation, such as Article 288, last paragraph of the Civil Code of Mexico, which provides: "When the divorce causes damages or harm to the interests of the innocent spouse, the guilty party shall answer for them as the author of an illicit act"; also, Article 144 of the Family Code of Bolivia establishes that the spouse at fault for the divorce may be condemned to the compensation for the material and moral damage caused to the innocent spouse by the dissolution of the marriage. For its part, the Civil Code of Peru, in Article 351, establishes that if the acts that have led to the divorce seriously compromise the legitimate personal interest of the innocent spouse, the Judge may grant a sum of money by way of reparation for moral damage. Ferrer also reviews Salvadoran law, which incorporates the compensatory allowance (pensión compensatoria). He alludes that in Brazilian law, the doctrine supports the appropriateness of compensation for material and moral damages for the innocent spouse. This author paused on Costa Rican law with the previous version of Article 41 of the Family Code and the allowance provided in Article 57.

In 1997, in Costa Rica, Law number 7689 of August 6, published that year in La Gaceta number 172 of September 8, added an Article 48 bis to the Family Code, while articles 8, 41, and 98 of that same normative body were reformed. The assessment of evidence—a point touched upon in the previous section of this ruling—the cassation appeal, the elimination of the consequences regarding community property (gananciales) based on fault in the ground for divorce, the broadening regarding proof of filiation, and the damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from some grounds for divorce are the subjects of said law. Said Article 48 bis includes a specific regulation on claims for damages (daños y perjuicios) for cases in which the divorce is decreed based on the grounds in subsections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 48. Regarding Article 48 bis, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has begun the path of application with rulings 170-03 of 10:40 a.m. on April 9, 2003, and 413-03 of 11:20 a.m. on August 8, 2003. In ruling 170-03, the Chamber develops the duty of the plaintiff to comply with what is prescribed by Article 290, subsection 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. In ruling 413-03, the Chamber developed the following:

"...XI.- ON MORAL DAMAGES IN FAMILY MATTERS: The defendant-counterclaimant, in her second claim, requested that Mr. ... be condemned to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused – which technically are moral damages (daño moral) –, both to her and her son. In the first case, as a product of adultery, and in both cases, for the suffering caused to them by the [Nombre1] attributed to the plaintiff-counterdefendant, which caused psychic, emotional, and psychological affectation. She estimates said damages at the sum of ten million colones (¢10,000,000). Prima facie, it is appropriate to note that damages (daño) are gradually acquiring a transcendental relevance in divorce matters, both from the moral and the patrimonial point of view. The former, that is, moral damages, occur when the feelings of a person are injured; it is an "affection damage" that occurs when feelings such as love, dignity, and honor of one of the spouses are injured and translate into sorrow, sadness, mortification, displeasure, or personal insecurity. These repeated or isolated conducts may constitute grounds for legal separation and fault-based divorce (divorcio sanción) that can produce damages of a moral order; whether they injure subjective matrimonial rights of an extra-patrimonial nature (such as infidelities) or of a patrimonial nature (as could occur in the case of fraudulent simulated acts by one of the spouses to the detriment of the other's rights regarding community property). Even if we analyze in detail the psychological sequelae and the bases of each specific case of separation or divorce, we could find that they may also be susceptible to causing moral damages. Regarding the proof of this type of damage, it arises from the demonstration of the very facts constituting the grounds invoked, according to the general rules of the matter, in this case those of family law; and it will correspond, in any case, to the responsible party, to demonstrate the existence of some objective situation that allows the exclusion, in the specific case, of that type of damage or that diminishes its entity. Moral damages, then, are deduced by the very illicit acts that have harmed the person in their most intimate affections, in their physical or psychic integrity or both, in their honor, etc., without even needing to specially demonstrate the subject's sorrow or pain or its family or social transcendence. Therefore, it seems out of the question to consider that an adultery, by the mere fact of being discreet, does not produce serious damage susceptible to reparation. Or an offense or humiliation that is not public, or even an attack against one's own dignity. Now, regarding the minor child, the same premise can be applied (in this regard, see GONZÁLEZ MORA, R (compiler). Daños y Perjuicios en el Proceso de Divorcio y de la Separación Judicial. Escuela Judicial, pp. 61 to 89). Having established the foregoing and analyzed the evidence presented in the process in light of sound criticism and correct human understanding, it is concluded that both Mrs. ... and her son were harmed by the amoral and illegitimate behavior of the plaintiff-counterdefendant. Thus, in the "Forensic Clinical Psychological Expert Opinion" conducted by the Psychology Graduate ..., visible on pages 329 to 333, regarding Mrs. ..., the presence of evident sequelae of emotional and psychological damage was highlighted, a product, precisely, of the broken relationship existing between the litigating couple. It also detected feelings in her – the defendant – of fear, sadness, and impotence. Regarding the minor, in the respective opinion..." (sic) (pages 334 to 338), the same professional indicated that on the emotional plane, he presented signs of anxiety, demand for attention and affection, irritability, anger, aggressive behavior, loneliness, sadness, low tolerance for limits, confusion before the family situation; aspects that she attributes to his parents' separation. There is no doubt, then, that there is a causal relationship between the adulterous and cruel behavior of Mr. ... and the psychological disorder of his partner and son.

Article 48 bis of the Family Code establishes: “If the marital bond is dissolved, based on any of the grounds established in subsections 2), 3), and 4) of Article 48 of this Code, the innocent spouse may request, jointly with the action for separation or divorce, damages and losses in accordance with Article 1045 of the Civil Code” (As added by Law No. 7689 of August 21, 1997). For its part, section 1045 of the Civil Code provides: “Anyone who, through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another is obligated to repair it along with the losses.” This general rule, applicable to the case, allows the conclusion that Mr. ... must repair the damages and losses caused to the defendant and her son, which are set, prudentially, in the sum of two million colones (¢2,000,000) for each one....

Mr. [Name61] comments in Derecho de Familia Costarricense that formerly the Tribunals had rejected claims for damages and losses arising from divorce:

"Our tribunals (Cas. No. 381 of 1973), however, had dismissed this type of compensation for moral damages, because they considered that the sanction that could be obtained through it was included in the legal consequences imposed on the guilty spouse (loss of community property rights and of the right to request spousal support). Law No. 7689 of August 21, 1997, cited above, has removed the foundation of this jurisprudence by expressly granting the innocent spouse the right to request, jointly with the action for separation or divorce, damages and losses in accordance with Article 1045 of the Civil Code." (Juricentro, 1998, Volume I, p. 287) Mr. Ricardo González, for his part, concludes in his work "Damages and Losses in the Divorce and Judicial Separation Process -Anthology-" (Judicial School, 1999), the following:

"...From a doctrinal point of view, the appropriateness of compensation for damages and losses arising from family relations is undoubted. From a normative point of view, the possibility of demanding reparation for damages and losses seems to be reduced to the cases expressly mentioned in Article 48 bis of the Family Code. To extend the application of the compensation principle to the other cases of divorce and judicial separation, one must resort to a comprehensive and expansive interpretation of the Civil Code rules relating to extracontractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual). In general terms, compensation must cover both moral and material damages, and their set-off is not appropriate, nor should they be understood as cancelled by the payment of the support obligation that may subsist in favor of the innocent spouse. Furthermore, the reparation will normally be in monetary terms and eventually may also be charged to third parties who participated in the ground giving rise to the claim." (pp. 90 and 91) Culpability and innocence would now be important for purposes of standing to petition for divorce (Article 49 of the Family Code), for the issue of spousal support (Article 57), and for this matter of damages and losses deriving from the divorce decreed based on the grounds of attempted murder, corruption, and [Name1].

Naturally, this section is related to Article 41 of the Political Constitution and to Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which the added article itself cites. Article 41 of the Political Constitution provides: "...Recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, and moral interests. Justice must be done promptly, completely, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws ..." Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which refers to subjective civil liability or [Name63] liability, provides: "...Anyone who, through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another is obligated to repair it along with the losses..." Let us review, with some jurisprudential citations from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the **presuppositions of extracontractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual)**:

“...IV.- Regarding extracontractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), this Chamber has stated: "Through civil liability, a subject is attributed the obligation to repair, indemnify, or compensate (the latter in the case of moral damages), a harm inflicted on the legal sphere of another subject, as a consequence of an act or activity carried out by the former.- This liability is divided into subjective liability and objective liability, according to the criterion of imputation used in each case: in the first, the will of the debtor, who acts culpably; in the second, objective criteria such as risk, expressly established by law. It is also usually divided into contractual and extracontractual, depending on whether it stems from the breach of an obligation freely agreed upon by the parties, or from the breach of the general duty not to cause harm to others...For its part, extracontractual liability falls on whoever, outside of any prior contractual relationship, has caused harm in the legal sphere of another subject, through fault, or through the setting in motion of a risky activity or creation of a social risk. This liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but from the violation of the general duty not to harm others. Its regime is based on Articles 1045, 1046, 1047, and 1048 of the Civil Code. The first of them provides that: 'Anyone who, through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another is obligated to repair it along with the losses.'- A principle that is the foundation of all civil liability." (Resolution number 320 of 2:20 p.m. on November 9, 1990). Regarding the regulation of Article 1045, this Chamber has said: "IX.- Article 1045 of the Civil Code establishes the foundation of subjective extracontractual liability: 'Anyone who, through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another is obligated to repair it along with the losses.' The duty to compensate, in this case, derives from the culpable breach of the general principle of 'do not cause harm to others.' For liability to exist, it is required that the harm was caused with fault (negligence, imprudence, or lack of skill), or deceit of the agent. The burden of proof then falls on the creditor, that is, on the victim who requests compensation..." (Resolution number 34 of 2:25 p.m. on March 22, 1991). Modern scientific doctrine, when analyzing the figure of deceit, is in agreement in indicating that it presumes the will to carry out an unlawful act with knowledge of its illegality, its author knowing that it may be harmful to others, but without necessarily having foreseen or been able to foresee each and every one of its possible effects. In this sense, it is affirmed, the intention to harm is not necessary; the will to infringe the duty, bad faith, the awareness that an illicit act is being committed, is sufficient. Deceit presumes the knowledge of the production of harm, at least probable, as a consequence of the desired action (eventual deceit). It is affirmed, likewise, that the lack of intention does not constitute deceit; here we are in the presence of what is called "gross fault (culpa lata)." However, extreme negligence should entail for the agent the consequences of deceit. For its part, fault presumes negligent, careless, improvident conduct that causes harm without wanting it. Culpable conduct has been divided into conscious and unconscious. The first occurs when, even recognizing that one's own conduct may lead to a certain harmful result, the agent nevertheless hopes that under the given circumstances it will not occur, while in the second, the author does not recognize the possibility of the result. In any case, for fault to exist, the harmful result must have been foreseen as possible, or must have had to be foreseen, a likelihood of the result that cannot be so small that even if the person acts according to their duties, it would not have made them desist from the action. It is affirmed that to determine if the act is negligent, it is relevant to consider whether a reasonable person could foresee that it would cause harm. Fault consists, then, of a lack of required care, precaution, and diligence. Diligence has been considered as the rational and ordinary caution that should accompany all acts from which harm may derive, according to the type of activity in question and that which can and should be expected from a normally reasonable and sensible person belonging to the technical sphere of the case. That is, if the person acted with the required care, attention, or perseverance and with the necessary reflection aimed at avoiding the detriment of legally protected interests of others. Indeed, doctrine indicates that the required diligence encompasses not only the precautions and care ordered in each case by regulations, but also all the prudence necessary to avoid harm. Regarding the burden of proof, in matters of extracontractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), this Chamber has indicated: "VII.- One of the fundamental differences between contractual and extracontractual civil liability lies in the burden of proof, since in liability derived from a contract the creditor is not obligated to demonstrate the fault of the debtor, as this is presumed as long as the latter does not demonstrate that their breach or delay is not attributable to them, such as fortuitous event or force majeure; in contrast, in extracontractual liability or [Name63] liability, the injured party is responsible for demonstrating the culpability of the author of the illicit act. Thus, Article 317, subsection 1), of the Civil Procedure Code provides that whoever formulates a claim bears the burden of proof regarding the facts constituting their right...On the other hand, one of the constituent elements of subjective extracontractual liability is the relationship of direct or efficient causality that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the harm, the latter being the presupposition of any type of extracontractual liability, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the compensation claim to succeed..." (Judgment number 17 of 3:00 p.m. on January 29, 1992)....” (Voto 53-98 issued at 3:10 p.m. on May 27, 1998, by the First Chamber).

Now then, in our case, damages and losses are requested that correspond to the social and moral harm that the defendant [Name 002] has caused with his actions. The grounds of adultery and [Name1] have been deemed proven. Although the ground of adultery is not contemplated within the grounds listed by Article 48 bis, the truth is that the entirety of that [Name1] in the context of an adultery such as has occurred here, in application of Article 48 bis of the Family Code in connection with Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which is a general clause of the legal system, and in relation to section 41 of the Political Constitution, means the claim must be granted. The moral harm produced to the wife and family of the defendant by his actions is undoubted, and the requested sum of three million colones is not inadequate or exorbitant but rather representative of a reasonable and proportional compensation for the moral damages caused to the plaintiff. The conduct presented injures feelings such as dignity, respect, and honor, and has translated into sadness, sorrow, mortification, displeasure, and personal insecurity. Moral harm is deduced, then, from the unlawful facts themselves that have harmed the wife in her most intimate affections, in her physical or psychological integrity or both, in her honor, in her family sphere, etc. Without the need, even, to especially demonstrate the sorrow or grief of the subject or its family or social transcendence. In these cases, it is not appropriate to appoint an expert; rather, it falls to the judge as the expert of experts to assess a representative amount, and in this case, this Tribunal estimates that the requested amount is an adequate sum, and therefore the judgment must be revoked on this point, to instead grant the moral damages in the sum of three million colones. -"

"III.- [Nombre1]:[...] Ha de entenderse que no existe una definición legal de lo que constituye la causal de [Nombre1], la cual está concatenada con el deber de respeto que se deben los cónyuges consagrado en los artículos 11 y 34 del Código de Familia. La definición de lo que es [Nombre1] tendrá un carácter histórico-social acorde con los parámetros legales del artículo 10 del Código Civil: “...ARTÍCULO 10.- Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas...” Además el contenido de dicha causal estará determinado sistemáticamente por las normas de rango superior, en el caso de la [Nombre1], sobre todo por aquellos instrumentos de respeto a los derechos humanos, y entratándose de la mujer, ha de señalarse claramente que existen tratados internacionales sectoriales para la protección de esa parte de la población y que innegablemente determinan el contenido de los actos que pueden entenderse comprendidos en la causal de [Nombre1]. Ya este Tribunal ha señalado cómo el motor del desarrollo actual del Derecho de Familia son los derechos humanos. Una autora que realiza un estudio jurisprudencial identifica esta premisa y señala lo siguiente: “El estudio de esa jurisprudencia me ha convencido no sólo de que los derechos humanos tienen aplicación en el ámbito de la familia sino que se han constituido en el principal motor de la actual evolución del derecho de familia...” ([Nombre2], Aida: Derechos Humanos y Derecho de Familia, en Memoria del XI Congreso Internacional de Derecho de Familia) Este Tribunal coincide con esa perspectiva que deriva no sólo del estudio comparado de la jurisprudencia, sino que esa tendencia de desarrollo se da en los demás planos jurídicos como lo son la ley y la doctrina. El máximo Tribunal de la materia en nuestro país, la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en cuanto al tema de la [Nombre1] realiza el enlace con los instrumentos internacionales y con los derechos humanos: “...II.- El Código de Familia no define los alcances de la causal de [Nombre1], prevista en el inciso 4), del artículo 48 del Código de Familia, debiendo hacerlo el juzgador a la luz de la doctrina y jurisprudencia sobre el tema, pues no es cualquier hecho o su reiteración, aún cuando sea reprochable, el que puede invocarse como justificante de la disolución del matrimonio, dado que, el ordenamiento jurídico, tiene un interés especial en su preservación, al considerársele la base esencial de la familia y, ésta, elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, merecedora de tutela por parte del Estado (artículos 51 y 52 de la Constitución Política) (ver, en tal sentido el Voto de esta Sala número 212, de las 9:40 horas, del 1 de octubre de 1993). Para valorar los hechos en que se funda el divorcio, se debe tomar en consideración que, el numeral 52 mencionado, contempla el principio de la igualdad de derechos entre los cónyuges. En el mismo sentido, el inciso [Nombre3]), del punto 1, del artículo 16 de la Convención Sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer, ratificada por Costa Rica, por Ley Número 6968, del 2 de octubre de 1984, expresa: "1. Los Estados Partes adoptarán todas las medidas adecuadas para eliminar la discriminación contra la mujer en todos los asuntos relacionados con el matrimonio y las relaciones familiares y, en particular, asegurarán en condiciones de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres: ... [Nombre3]) Los mismos derechos y responsabilidades durante el matrimonio y con ocasión de su disolución.". Esas reglas son, a su vez, recogidas y desarrolladas por el Código de Familia, el cual, en su artículo 11, dispone que el matrimonio tiene por objeto la vida en común, la cooperación y el mutuo auxilio y, el 34 siguiente, establece: “Los esposos comparten la responsabilidad y el gobierno de la familia. Conjuntamente deben regular los asuntos domésticos, proveer a la educación de sus hijos y preparar su porvenir. Asimismo están obligados a respetarse, a guardarse fidelidad y a socorrerse mutuamente …” Ese respeto que debe siempre imperar en el seno familiar, está referido no sólo a la integridad física de una persona, sino, también a su integridad psíquica y moral; no es otra cosa que el respeto al cónyuge, en tanto es una persona con igualdad de derechos y de oportunidades; postulado consagrado en términos generales en los artículos 33 y 40 de la Constitución Política, que protegen a toda persona contra la discriminación, los tratos crueles y degradantes en perjuicio de su integridad física, psíquica y moral, por existir un derecho fundamental a que se le respete su honra y su dignidad; tal y como también lo expresan los artículos 5 y 11 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. Para el particular caso de la violencia en perjuicio de la mujer, la Convención Interamericana para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra la mujer “Convención de Belem do Pará”, adoptada por la Organización de Estados Americanos, el 9 de junio de 1994, vigente en el país por Ley número 7499, del 2 de mayo de 1995, dispone, en su artículo primero, que constituye violencia cualquier acción o conducta, basada en su género que cause daño, muerte o sufrimiento físico, sexual o psicológico a la mujer, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado. Asimismo, ese instrumento establece que toda mujer tiene derecho a una vida libre de violencia, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado y a que se le reconozca el goce, ejercicio y protección de todos los derechos humanos, incluyendo que se respete su integridad física, psíquica y moral (artículos 3 y 4). En consecuencia, se puede concluir que cuando esos valores son gravemente incumplidos por el cónyuge, ello puede dar lugar a la declaración de la separación judicial o del divorcio, dependiendo de la conducta tomada en cuenta por el legislador, para enumerar las causales para decretarlos (Voto número 189, de las 15:00 horas, del 24 de julio de 1998)...” (voto 2001-00032 de las catorce horas veinte minutos del doce de enero del dos mil uno) Continúa ese voto, desarrollando la relación que tiene la causal de la [Nombre1] con la tutela de los derechos humanos, en especial de las mujeres: “...III.- La paz en el ámbito familiar y los efectos que su ausencia provoca, es un problema que afecta a la sociedad en general; debiendo considerarse siempre para resolver la litis, la aludida igualdad entre cónyuges y el derecho, de todos los miembros de la familia, a vivir en un ambiente libre de violencia, garante de su desarrollo integral. Con el afán de tutelar los derechos humanos de todas las personas y en especial de las mujeres, se han dictado diversas normas a nivel nacional e internacional que tratan de erradicar la violencia y la discriminación que ellas han sufrido, históricamente, en todos los ámbitos (familiar, político, social etc). En la búsqueda de una respuesta justa a la realidad de nuestra sociedad, tratándose de la invocación de violencia en perjuicio de la esposa, debemos acudir a la normativa especial a su respecto. A los efectos de valorar la existencia de una [Nombre1] invocada como fundamento del divorcio, interesa conocer el tema de la violencia doméstica, particularmente de la sufrida por la cónyuge a causa de su esposo; la cual, no siempre es física, sino que también puede ser sexual y psicológica. Según la doctrina y la jurisprudencia, la [Nombre1], en tanto causal de divorcio, se configura, por la violencia física o moral empleada por uno de los cónyuges en perjuicio del otro o de sus hijos, ya sea por medio de hechos o de palabras, o bien por acciones u omisiones, las que siendo altamente mortificantes perturban tanto la salud física como mental y por consiguiente hacen prácticamente imposible la vida en pareja (Voto número 213, de las 10:00 horas, del 24 de setiembre de 1997).....” (voto 2001-00032 de las catorce horas veinte minutos del doce de enero del dos mil uno) [...] IV.- DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS: El otro tema en que la apelante se muestra inconforme es en cuanto a los daños y perjuicios. Luego de analizar las situaciones que se han presentado a la luz de la legislación vigente, este Tribunal también llega a la conclusión de que en este aspecto, también debe ser modificada la sentencia, para que en su lugar se conceda el extremo en la versión del daño moral. A efecto de comprender esta decisión debe explicarse el marco de los daños y perjuicios en el derecho de familia, concretamente en materia de divorcio. En cuanto al tema de los daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio ha de señalarse que es sobre todo en el derecho argentino donde encontramos una amplia preocupación por este tema y bien vale hacer una reseña de algunos aspectos con el objeto de que sirva para cimentar e ilustrar nuestro desarrollo en torno a una reforma legal relativamente nueva, la adición del artículo 48 bis al Código de Familia en el año de 1997. Podemos encontrar trabajos muy ilustrativos que abarcan la evolución histórica desde el derecho romano, el antiguo derecho español, el derecho francés (los autores se detienen en éste en forma muy especial por la riqueza de su jurisprudencia), el suizo, el alemán entre otros. Este tema es abordado específicamente sobre todo en Argentina por autores como [Nombre4] (“Responsabilidad civil del cónyuge adúltero y su cómplice por causa de adulterio” y “Naturaleza de la responsabilidad y régimen de prescripción de la acción resarcitoria ejercida por uno de los cónyuges contra el otro por causa de nulidad de matrimonio”), [Nombre5] (“Cuestiones de responsabilidad civil en el derecho de familia”), P.V. [Nombre6] (“¿Es la noción de culpa de la responsabilidad civil subjetiva idéntica a la culpa en el divorcio?”), [Nombre7]. [Nombre8] (“La primera sentencia argentina que condena a reparar el daño moral derivado de un divorcio”, “la responsabilidad civil en el Derecho de Familia”, “Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio”, y “Responsabilidad por daños resultantes del divorcio”), [Nombre9] (“Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio”, “Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio frente a la reforma del Código Civil”, Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio y de la anulación del matrimonio”), [Nombre10] (“Los hechos que dieron origen al divorcio y la indemnización por daño moral” e “Indemnización del daño moral en caso de adulterio”), [Nombre11] (“Reflexiones sobre la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios en la separación personal y en el divorcio”), [Nombre12] (“El daño moral en las relaciones de familia”), [Nombre13] (“Divorcio y responsabilidad civil” y “Daños y perjuicios. Responsabilidad civil derivada del divorcio”), F. [Nombre14] y E. [Nombre16] (“Daño entre cónyuges”), [Nombre17] ("El divorcio y la responsabilidad por el daño moral”), L. A. [Nombre18] (Indemnización del daño producido por el adulterio de la esposa”), [Nombre19] (“Acción de daños y perjuicios contra el cónyuge culpable del divorcio”), P. [Nombre20] de daños versus derecho de familia”), [Nombre21] (Improcedencia del resarcimiento del daño moral en el juicio de divorcio y su admisibilidad en la nulidad del matrimonio”), [Nombre22] (“Responsabilidad entre cónyuges en caso de divorcio”), [Nombre23] ("Alimentos y reparaciones en la separación y el divorcio”), [Nombre24] (“Resarcimiento de daños en la separación personal y en el divorcio” y “Daños resarcibles en el divorcio”), [Nombre25] (“La responsabilidad de los cónyuges entre sí y respecto de los hijos”), [Nombre2] (“Responsabilidad civil en el derecho de familia”), [Nombre26] e [Nombre27] (“La situación de divorcio como generadora de responsabilidad civil entre cónyuges”), L. [Nombre28] (“Familia y responsabilidad civil”, “La separación personal y el divorcio y la reparación de daños morales”) [Nombre29] (“Resarcimiento de daños y perjuicios a causa del divorcio”), Jorge A. [Nombre31] (“El fallo plenario sobre el daño moral en el divorcio”), [Nombre3] (“Daño entre cónyuges”, “Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio evolución jurisprudencial), [Nombre32] (“Separación personal, divorcio y responsabilidad civil. Sus fundamentos”), N. [Nombre33] (“Los daños derivados del divorcio y de la sentencia judicial”), [Nombre34] (“Improcedencia de las indemnizaciones por daños en los divorcios decretados por causales subjetivas”, “Un nuevo pronunciamiento acerca de los daños y perjuicios en el divorcio”), [Nombre35] (“Los daños emergentes del divorcio”), A. Salas (“Indemnización de los daños derivados del divorcio”) [Nombre37] (“Responsabilidad civil derivada del cónyuge culpable en la separación personal y en el divorcio”), [Nombre38] (“Repensando el tema de los daños y perjuicios en el divorcio”). Por ejemplo, el autor [Nombre7]. [Nombre8] en su libro “Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio” ubica el derecho romano como primer antecedente histórico de este tema. Explica que en la época imperial, antes de la era cristiana, los divorcios aumentaron, y para impedir su frecuencia se aplicaban penas pecuniarias al cónyuge culpable y a favor del cónyuge inocente siendo éste quien recibía la suma de dinero con un carácter claramente resarcitorio. Sigue relatando [Nombre8] que el derecho justinianeo siguió el mismo derrotero, aplicándose una sanción pecuniaria que resultaba relevante para las clases pudientes al extremo que era altamente eficaz para desestimular al cónyuge de un propósito de romper el vínculo matrimonial. Luego reseña este autor que en Las Partidas del derecho español también hay un antecedente, pues se imponía a la mujer culpable del adulterio la pérdida de la dote y de las arras. Igualmente en el derecho francés anterior a la Revolución existía una condena al cómplice de la mujer adúltera para indemnizar al marido. Luego de la vigencia del Código Civil, 1804, los tribunales franceses admitieron la condena de daños y perjuicios materiales y morales contra el cónyuge culpable de adulterio y contra su cómplice, con base en la responsabilidad derivada del delito. Reseña [Nombre8] los casos “[Nombre39] [Nombre3]. Femme [Nombre39] et Dubarry” y el de “[Nombre40] [Nombre3]. [Nombre41]”, casos célebres en la jurisprudencia francesa referidos a los perjuicios con el adulterio. [Nombre9] en su monografía “Daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio y de la anulación del matrimonio” enfatiza que es en un fallo de la Corte de Montpellier de 1897, en el cual se admite en general la reparación de los daños y perjuicios materiales y morales causados por los hechos generadores del divorcio, al estimar que éstos, al mismo tiempo que causales de divorcio eran cuasidelitos. Sobre este caso y otros en el mismo sentido [Nombre8] comenta: “...El Tribunal declaró que las causas de divorcio pueden ocasionar al esposo ofendido un perjuicio moral y material que su autor está obligado a reparar. Y en particular –a propósito de caso que le tocaba juzgar-, que la negativa del marido a consumar el matrimonio, quien además de continuar sus relaciones íntimas con su amante, constituía no solamente una injuria grave para hacer pronunciar el divorcio a favor de la mujer, sino al mismo tiempo un cuasidelito susceptible de dar lugar a favor de ella a una indemnización en dinero fijada por los jueces. Invocó los arts. 231 y 1382 del Cód. Civil. Desde entonces en adelante se aplicó la responsabilidad civil a todos los hechos generadores del divorcio, de un modo general. Dicha orientación jurisprudencial continúa; en diversos fallos se condenó a pagar indemnización por: La actitud de la mujer al salir de la alcaldía donde se había celebrado el matrimonio civil, lamentó públicamente haberlo hecho, promovió escenas odiosas y ridículas, se negó a cumplir el débito conyugal y finalmente promovió demanda de divorcio sin motivo alguno. El tribunal consideró que tales hechos habían ocasionado al marido daños materiales apreciables en dinero (gastos para la fiesta de casamiento y para cambios en su casa). La negativa del marido a consumar el matrimonio y su abandono del hogar a los dos meses de haberlo contraído. El abandono del marido –casado con mujer veinte años mayor- producido a los pocos días del matrimonio y acompañado de la sustracción de bonos que constituían los ahorros de la mujer. Las relaciones adulterinas del marido con una dactilógrafa de su oficina y su abandono del hogar, para instalarse cerca de su amante. Se condenó a indemnizar los perjuicios sufridos por la esposa al verse rechazada del hogar a los 50 años y privada de una brillante posición económica que ella había contribuido a conquistar (daño material); además, lo sufrido en su afectividad y en su dignidad al luchar incesantemente por conquistar a su marido (había llegado a enfrentar a la amante) y fracasar (daño moral). El abandono injustificado del hogar por parte del marido, para unirse a su concubina. La falta de asistencia de la mujer, después del matrimonio civil, a la ceremonia religiosa y su negativa a reunirse con el marido. El daño moral derivado de la actitud del marido, que hacía frecuentes visitas a una de sus vecinas...” (pp. 147 a 149). Este íter jurisprudencial entiende diferente los daños derivados del divorcio en sí, que estima indemnizados con la pensión alimentaria, de aquellos derivados del hecho constitutivo de la causal de divorcio. Ahora bien, [Nombre9] reseña que en 1941 y 1948 se dieron unas reformas al Código Civil francés, agregando al artículo 301 y al 311 párrafos, y especifica que desde ahí “la doctrina distinguió tres categorías de perjuicios derivados del divorcio o de la separación de cuerpos: 1) los derivados de la desaparición de asistencia material, que eran reparados mediante la pensión alimentaria contemplada por el art. 301, primer párrafo del Cód. Civil; 2) el perjuicio material y moral resultante de la disolución del matrimonio o de la separación de cuerpos, fuera del que consiste en la desaparición de la obligación de asistencia material en el divorcio, indemnizado conforme al art. 301, segundo párrafo, y el art.. 311, cuarto párrafo; 3) el perjuicio material y moral distinto del que surge de la disolución del matrimonio o de la separación de cuerpos, experimentado como consecuencia de la culpa del cónyuge, que había admitido la jurisprudencia anterior a 1941, fuera por los hechos que habían dado lugar al divorcio o a la separación de cuerpos, fuera por otros distintos pero imputables siempre al cónyuge, al cual los nuevos textos aludían al referirse a “todas las otras reparaciones” y que se indemnizan con fundamento en el art. 1382...” (pp. 6 y 7). [Nombre9] sigue explicando que en 1975 en Francia también se llevó a cabo una reforma general al régimen del divorcio que sustituyó toda su anterior regulación, y es el numeral 266 del Código Civil el que ahora se refiere al tema que nos ocupa, en cuanto expresa “Cuando el divorcio ha sido decretado por culpa exclusiva de uno de los esposos, éste puede ser condenado a daños y perjuicios como reparación del perjuicio material o moral que la disolución del matrimonio hace sufrir a su cónyuge”. Esta norma excluye la indemnización en casos en que el divorcio se dé por culpa de ambos cónyuges. Los autores [Nombre9] y [Nombre8] se refieren también al derecho suizo , pues su Código Civil de 1907 previó expresamente el tema que nos interesa así “El esposo inocente cuyos intereses pecuniarios, aún eventuales, son comprometidos por el divorcio, tiene derecho a una equitativa indemnización de parte del cónyuge culpable. Si los hechos que han determinado le divorcio han causado un grave atentado a los intereses personales del esposo inocente, el juez le puede conceder además una suma de dinero a título de reparación moral.”. También hacen referencia dichos autores al derecho alemán, relación que vale la pena parafrasear puesto que en la exposición de motivos de dicho cuerpo normativo se tocó el tema expresamente rechazando la posibilidad. [Nombre8] traduce así: “a) la idea de que el matrimonio no puede basarse en principios de orden moral, mientras que el otorgamiento de la indemnización lo asimilaría a un acto jurídico que pudiera ser fuente de ventajas pecuniarias; b) porque el inocente podría verse seducido por el pensamiento de recibir una suma de dinero a título de indemnización e inclinarse a invocar causas mínimas para obtener el divorcio; [Nombre3]) porque la fijación de la indemnización sería más o menos arbitraria, y d) porque no sería eficaz como medio de coerción para que los cónyuges diesen cumplimiento a sus obligaciones emergentes del matrimonio...” (p. 172). En el derecho argentino no existe una regulación expresa, por lo que la doctrina se ha dividido. Los autores clasifican las tesis en “negativas” y “positivas” y [Nombre24] se refiere a la tesis “intermedia”. La tesis negativa es representada por [Nombre42] y [Nombre43] (aún y cuando éste último rectificó en algunos puntos específicos) se fundamenta en argumentos éticos, jurídicos y psicosociales para rebatir la pertinencia de la responsabilidad civil en el divorcio. La positiva por la mayoría de los autores: [Nombre44], Salas, Acuña, [Nombre4], [Nombre18], [Nombre9], [Nombre12], [Nombre46], [Nombre47], [Nombre48], [Nombre31], [Nombre8], D Antonio, [Nombre2], [Nombre35], [Nombre32], [Nombre50], [Nombre51], [Nombre10], [Nombre29], [Nombre52], [Nombre53], [Nombre13], [Nombre22], [Nombre23], [Nombre54]. [Nombre55], [Nombre56], Medina, [Nombre58]. Como regla de principio estos autores aceptan la aplicación de los principios generales de la responsabilidad civil en esta materia, lo que ha acogido la jurisprudencia. La tesis intermedia que refiere Ferrer la abandera [Nombre17] en el sentido de que el silencio del legislador es ex professo y que por lo tanto no hay bases para sostener la aplicación de las normas comunes de la responsabilidad civil, pero si la acepta que “cuando los hechos que lleven al divorcio tengan una expansión y gravedad que, al margen de la separación conyugal, entrañen un verdadero daño moral”. Luego Ferrer destaca la tesis de las doctoras [Nombre26], [Nombre26] e [Nombre27] que especifican que al receptar su legislación el divorcio remedio, sostienen que aunque no existan conductas culpables, igualmente pueden generarse perjuicios derivados de la situación de divorcio. Plantean que la relación de causalidad ya no funciona entre culpa y daño, sino entre el divorcio y el daño evolucionando más a una responsabilidad de tipo objetivo basado en el factor de la “equidad”.La autora [Nombre3] hace especial referencia a la jurisprudencia española y se detiene en el caso de la Audiencia de Barcelona del 1 de junio de 1999, Sección 6, que trata de una condena de dos millones de pesetas en concepto de daño moral al esposo, por haber violado a su esposa mediando separación entre ellos. En cuanto a la jurisprudencia de los Estados Unidos de América, Medina refiere que por un largo tiempo los tribunales de ese país insistieron en rechazar este tipo de pretensiones, considerando que esposo y esposa no podían demandarse mutuamente. Esto ha ido evolucionando aunque muchos Estados conservan la inmunidad entre cónyuges, pero aceptando cada vez más excepciones. Reseña Medina que el caso Thomson v. Thompson de 1910 es el que ha marcado la pauta. El autor [Nombre24] hace un recuento de otra legislación americana, como por ejemplo el artículo 288 último párrafo del Código Civil de México que dispone “Cuando por el divorcio se originan daños o perjuicios s los interesados del cónyuge inocente, el culpable responderá de ellos como el autor de un hecho ilícito”; también el artículo 144 del Código de Familia de Bolivia establece que el cónyuge culpable del divorcio puede ser condenado al resarcimiento del daño material y moral que haya causado al inocente por la disolución del matrimonio. Por su parte el Código Civil de Perú en su artículo 351 establece que si los hechos que han determinado el divorcio comprometen gravemente el legítimo interés personal del cónyuge inocente el Juez podrá conceder una suma de dinero por concepto de reparación del daño moral. También reseña Ferrer el derecho salvadoreño que recepta la pensión compensatoria. Alude a que en el derecho brasileño la doctrina sostiene la procedencia de la indemnización del daño material y moral a favor del cónyuge inocente. Este autor se detuvo en el derecho costarricense con la anterior versión del artículo 41 del Código de Familia y la pensión prevista en el artículo 57 En 1997, en Costa Rica, la Ley número 7689 del 6 de agosto, publicada en ese año en La Gaceta número 172 del 8 de setiembre, adicionó un artículo 48 bis al Código de Familia, a la vez que se reformaron los numerales 8, 41 y 98 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. La apreciación de la prueba punto tocado en el aparte anterior de este fallo, el recurso de casación, la eliminación de las consecuencias en el tema de gananciales de la culpabilidad en la causal, la amplitud en cuanto a las pruebas de filiación, y los daños y perjuicios derivadas de algunas causales de divorcio son los temas de dicha ley. El artículo 48 bis dicho, incluye una regulación específica sobre petitorias de daños y perjuicios para casos en que el divorcio se decrete con fundamento en las causales de los incisos 2, 3 y 4 del artículo 48. Sobre el numeral 48 bis la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha iniciado el camino de la aplicación con los votos 170-03 de las 10:40 horas del 9 de abril del 2003 y 413-03 de las 11:20 horas del 8 de agosto del 2003. En el voto 170-03 la Sala desarrolla el deber de la parte actora de cumplir con lo que preceptúa el artículo 290 inciso 5 del Código Procesal Civil. En el voto 413-03 la Sala desarrolló lo siguiente: "...XI.- DEL DAÑO MORAL EN MATERIA DE FAMILIA: La demandada-reconventora, en su segunda pretensión, solicitó que se condene al señor ... al pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados –que técnicamente es daño moral-, tanto a ella como a su hijo. En el primer caso como producto del adulterio y, en ambos casos por el sufrimiento que les causó la [Nombre1] atribuidas al actor-reconvenido, la cual ocasionó afectación psíquica, emocional y psicológica. Estima dichos perjuicios en la suma de diez millones de colones (¢10.000.000). Prima facie, conviene advertir que el daño adquiere poco a poco una relevancia trascendental en materia de divorcio, tanto desde el punto de vista moral como del patrimonial. El primero, sea el moral, se produce cuando se lesionan los sentimiento de una persona, es un “daño de afección” que se da cuando se lesionan sentimientos como el amor, la dignidad y el honor de uno de los cónyuges y se traducen en pena, tristeza, mortificación, disgusto o inseguridad personal. Estas conductas reiteradas o no, pueden ser constitutivas de separación personal y de divorcio sanción que pueden producir daños de orden moral; ya sea que lesionen derechos subjetivos matrimoniales de orden extra patrimonial (como por ejemplo las infidelidades) o del patrimonial (como podría ocurrir en el caso de los actos simulados fraudulentos de uno de los cónyuges en perjuicio de los derechos del otro en el caso de los bienes gananciales). Incluso, si analizamos detalladamente las secuelas psicológicas y las bases de cada caso de separación o de divorcio en concreto, podríamos encontrar que también pueden ser susceptibles de ocasionar daño moral. Con respecto a la prueba de esta clase de daño, surge de la demostración de los hechos mismos constitutivos de las causales invocadas, según las reglas generales de la materia, en este caso las de familia; y le corresponderá, en todo caso, al responsable, la demostración de la existencia de alguna situación objetiva que permita excluir en el caso en concreto ese tipo de daño o que disminuya su entidad. El daño moral, entonces, se deduce por los propios hechos ilícitos que han perjudicado a la persona en sus afecciones más íntimas, en su integridad física o psíquica o en ambas, en su honor, etc. Sin necesidad, incluso, de demostrar especialmente la pena o el dolor del sujeto o su trascendencia familiar o social. Por ello, pareciera descartado considerar que un adulterio por el hecho de ser discreto no produce un daño grave susceptible de reparación. O una ofensa o humillación que no sea pública o incluso un atentado contra la propia dignidad. Ahora bien, en cuanto al menor de edad, la misma premisa es posible aplicar (al respecto pueden consultarse, GONZÁLEZ MORA, R (compilador). Daños y Perjuicios en el Proceso de Divorcio y de la Separación Judicial. Escuela Judicial, pág. 61 a 89). Sentado lo anterior y analizadas las probanzas vertidas al proceso a la luz de la sana crítica y del correcto entendimiento humano, se concluye que tanto doña ... como su hijo resultaron perjudicados por el comportamiento amoral e ilegítimo del actor-reconvenido. Así, en el “Dictamen Pericial Psicológico Clínico Forense” practicado por la Licenciada en Psicología ..., visible de folio 329 a 333, a la señora ..., se destacó la presencia de evidentes secuelas de daño emocional y psicológico producto, justamente, de la quebrantada relación existente entre la pareja litigante. También, detectó sentimientos en ella- la demandada- de temor, tristeza e impotencia. Con respecto al menor, en el dictamen respectivo...” (sic) (folios 334 a 338), la misma profesional indicó que en el plano emocional presentaba signos de ansiedad, demanda de atención y afecto, irritabilidad, enfado, conducta agresiva, soledad, tristeza, poca tolerancia a los límites, confuso ante la situación familiar; aspectos que atribuye a la separación de sus padres. No hay duda, entonces, que existe una relación de causalidad entre la conducta adúltera y seviciosa de don ...y el trastorno psicológico de su pareja e hijo. El artículo 48 bis del Código de Familia establece: “De disolverse el vínculo matrimonial, con base en alguna de las causales establecidas en los incisos 2), 3) y 4) del artículo 48 de este Código, el cónyuge inocente podrá pedir, conjuntamente con la acción de separación o de divorcio, daños y perjuicios de conformidad con el artículo 1045 del Código Civil” (Así adicionado mediante Ley N° 7689 de 21 de agosto de 1997). Por su parte, el numeral 1045 del Código Civil, dispone: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia, o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios”. Esta norma general, aplicable a la especie, permite concluir que el señor ... debe reparar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a la demandada y a su hijo, los cuales se fijan, prudencialmente, en la suma de dos millones de colones (¢2.000.000) para cada uno...." Don [Nombre61] comenta en el Derecho de Familia Costarricense que antaño los Tribunales habían rechazado las demandas de daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio: "Nuestros tribunales (Cas. No. 381 de 1973), empero, habían desestimado este tipo de indeminización por daños moral, porque consideran que la sanción que mediante ésta se podría obtener iba incluída en las consecuencias legales que se imponían al cónyuge culpable (pérdida de gananciales y del derecho a solicitar pensión), La Ley No. 7689 de 21 de agosto de 1997, antes citada, ha restado fundamento a esta jurisprudencia al conceder expresamente al cónyuge inocente el derecho a solicitar, conjuntamente con la acción de separación o de divorcio, daños y perjuicios de conformidad con el artículo 1045 del Código Civil". (Juricentro, 1998, tomo I, p. 287) Don Ricardo González por su parte concluye en su trabajo "Daños y perjuicios en el proceso de divorcio y de la separación judicial -Antología-" (Escuela Judicial, 1999), lo siguiente: "...Desde un punto de vista doctrina, es indudable la procedencia de la indemnización por daños y perjuicios derivados de las relaciones familiares. Desde un punto de vista normativo, la posibilidad de exigir reparación de daños y perjuicios parece quedar reducida a los casos expresamente mencionados en el artículo 48 bis del Código de Familia. Para extender la aplicación del principio indemnizatorio a los demás supuestos de divorcio y separación judicial, debe recurrirse a una interpretación integral y expansiva de las normas del Código Civil relativas a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual. En términos generales, la indemnización debe abarcar tanto daños morales como materiales, y no cabe su compensación, ni entender que se encuentran cancelados con el pago de la obligación alimentaria que pueda subsistir a favor del cónyuge inocente. Además la reparación normalmente será en términos dinerarios y eventualmente podrá cobrarse también a terceros que participaron en la causal que origina el reclamo." (pp. 90 y 91) La culpabilidad e inocencia tendrían ahora importancia para efectos de la legitimación para pedir el divorcio (artículo 49 del Código de Familia), para el tema de pensión alimentaria (artículo 57) y para éste de los daños y perjuicios derivados del divorcio decretado por las causales de atentado, corrupción y [Nombre1]. Naturalmente este numeral tiene relación con el 41 de la Constitución Política y con el 1045 del Código Civil que el mismo artículo adicionado cita. El artículo 41 de la Constitución Política dispone: "...Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad e intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes ..." El 1045 del Código Civil que se refiere a la responsabilidad civil subjetiva o responsabilidad [Nombre63], dispone: "...Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios..."Repasemos con algunas citas de jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual: “... IV.- Tocante a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, esta Sala ha expresado: " Mediante la responsabilidad civil se atribuye a un sujeto la obligación de reparar, indemnizar o compensar (caso este último del daño moral), un daño infligido a la esfera jurídica de otro sujeto, como consecuencia de un acto o una actividad realizada por aquél.- Esta responsabilidad se divide en responsabilidad subjetiva y responsabilidad objetiva, de acuerdo con el criterio de imputación que se utiliza en cada caso: en el primero, la voluntad del deudor, que actúa en forma culpable; en el segundo, criterios objetivos tales como el riesgo, expresamente establecidos por la ley. También suele ser dividida en contractual y extracontractual, según provenga del incumplimiento de una obligación convenida libremente por las partes, o del incumplimiento del deber general de no causar daño a los demás...Por su parte, la responsabilidad extracontractual recae sobre quien, fuera de toda relación contractual previa, ha causado un daño en la esfera jurídica de otro sujeto, por culpa, o a través de la puesta en marcha de una actividad riesgosa o creación de un riesgo social. Esta responsabilidad no nace del incumplimiento de un vínculo determinado, sino de la violación del deber general de no dañar a los otros. Su régimen está basado en los artículos 1045, 1046, 1047 y 1048 del Código Civil. El primero de ellos dispone que: "Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios".- Principio que es fundamento de toda responsabilidad civil." (Resolución número 320 de las 14:20 Hrs. del 9 de noviembre de 1990). Tocante a la regulación del artículo 1045, esta Sala ha dicho: "IX.- El artículo 1045 del Código Civil establece el fundamento de la responsabilidad extracontractual subjetiva: "Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios." El deber de resarcimiento, en este caso, deriva del incumplimiento culposo del principio general de "no causar daño a los demás." Para que haya responsabilidad, se requiere que el daño haya sido ocasionado con culpa (negligencia, imprudencia o impericia), o dolo del agente. La carga de la prueba corresponde entonces al acreedor, es decir, a la víctima que solicita el resarcimiento..." (Resolución número 34 de las 14:25 Hrs. del 22 de marzo de 1991). La doctrina científica moderna, al analizar la figura del dolo, es conteste al indicar que supone la voluntad de realizar un acto antijurídico con conocimiento de su ilegalidad, sabiendo, su autor, que puede ser dañoso a los demás, pero sin necesidad de que haya previsto o podido prever todos y cada uno de sus posibles efectos. En este sentido, se afirma, no precisa la intención de dañar, basta la voluntad de infringir el deber, la mala fe, la conciencia de que se realiza un acto ilícito. El dolo presume el conocimiento de la producción de un daño, al menos probable, como consecuencia de la acción querida (dolo eventual). Se afirma, asimismo, la falta de intención no constituye el dolo, aquí estamos en presencia de la denominada "culpa lata". Sin embargo, una negligencia extrema debería acarrear para el agente las consecuencias del dolo. Por su parte, la culpa supone un actuar negligente, descuidado, imprevisor que causa un daño sin quererlo. Se ha dividido, la conducta culposa, en consciente e inconsciente. La primera se da cuando, aún reconociendo que la propia conducta puede conducir a cierto resultado dañoso, el agente tiene, sin embargo, la esperanza de que en las circunstancias dadas no se ha de producir, mientras, en la segunda, el autor no reconoce la posibilidad del resultado. En todo caso, para que exista culpa, es preciso que el resultado dañoso haya sido previsto como posible, o que haya tenido que ser previsto, verosimilitud del resultado que no puede ser tan pequeña que aunque la persona actúe conforme a sus deberes no le hubiere hecho desistir de la acción. Se afirma que para determinar si el acto es negligente, es relevante considerar si una persona razonable podía prever que ha de causar daño. La culpa consiste, entonces, en una falta de cuidado, precaución y diligencia exigibles. La diligencia se ha considerado como la racional y ordinaria cautela que debe acompañar a todos los actos de los que puedan derivarse daños, según la clase de actividad de que se trate y la que puede y debe esperarse de persona, normalmente razonable y sensata, perteneciente a la esfera técnica del caso. Es decir, si la persona obró con el cuidado, atención o perseverancia exigibles y con la reflexión necesaria con vistas a evitar el perjuicio de bienes ajenos, jurídicamente protegidos. Incluso, la doctrina indica que la diligencia obligada no abarca sólo las precauciones y cuidados ordenados en cada caso por los reglamentos, sino también toda la prudencia precisa para evitar el daño. Tocante a la carga de la prueba, en materia de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, esta Sala ha indicado: "VII.- Una de las diferencias fundamentales entre la responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual, radica en la carga de la prueba, pues en la responsabilidad derivada de un contrato el acreedor no está obligado a demostrar la culpa del deudor, ya que ésta se presume en tanto el segundo no demuestre que su incumplimiento o el atraso no le son imputables, como el caso fortuito o la fuerza mayor; en cambio, en la responsabilidad extracontractual o [Nombre63] le compete al damnificado demostrar la culpabilidad del autor del acto ilícito. Así el artículo 317, inciso 1), del Código Procesal Civil, dispone que a quien formule una pretensión le incumbe la carga de la prueba respecto de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho...Por otra parte, uno de los elementos configurantes de la responsabilidad extracontractual subjetiva, lo constituye la relación de causalidad directa o eficiente que debe existir entre el comportamiento o conducta antijurídica y el daño, siendo este último el presupuesto de cualquier tipo de responsabilidad extracontractual por lo que su demostración también constituye un requisito sine quo non para que prospere la pretensión resarcitoria..." (Sentencia número 17 de las 15 Hrs. del 29 de enero de 1992)....” (Voto 53-98 dictado a las 15:10 hrs del 27 de mayo de 1998 por la Sala Primera). Ahora bien, en nuestro caso se pide daños y perjuicios que corresponden al daño social y moralque ha causado el demandado [Nombre 002] con su actuar. Se han tenido por demostradas las causales de adulterio y de [Nombre1]. Si bien la causal de adulterio no está contemplada dentro de las causales que enuncia el artículo 48 bis, lo cierto es que la integralidad de esa [Nombre1] en el contexto de un adulterio como el que se ha presentado, en aplicación del artículo 48 bis del Código de Familia en conexión con el 1045 del Código Civil que es cláusula general del ordenamiento y en relación con el numeral 41 de la Constitución Política, hacen que deba acogerse la pretensión. Es indudable el daño que se ha producido de tipo moral en la esposa y familia del demandado con su actuar, y que, la suma pedida de tres millones de colones, no resulta inadecuada ni exorbitante sino representativa de una indemnización a los daños morales causados a la actora razonable y proporcional. Las conductas presentadas lesionan los sentimientos como la dignidad, el respeto, el honor, y se han traducido en tristeza, pena, mortificación, disgusto e inseguridad personal. El daño moral, entonces, se deduce por los propios hechos antijurídicos que han perjudicado a la esposa en sus afecciones más íntimas, en su integridad física o psíquica o en ambas, en su honor, en su ámbito familiar, etc. Sin necesidad, incluso, de demostrar especialmente la pena o el dolor del sujeto o su trascendencia familiar o social. No corresponde en estos casos nombrar un perito sino que recae en el juez como perito de los peritos justipreciar un monto representativo, y en este caso, este Tribunal estima que el monto pedido es una suma adecuada, y por ende ha de revocarse la sentencia en este extremo para en su lugar otorgar el extremos de daño moral en la suma de tres millones de colones.-"