Unilateral withdrawal of salary bonuses and lesividadSupresión unilateral de pluses salariales y lesividad

I.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL. The appellant claims that, having been granted payment for police availability and risk (disponibilidad y riesgo policial)—amounts that were paid to her in the first two weeks of April 2010—, the respondent authorities eliminated the payment of those salary incentives through official letter No. 101180. She considers the principle of the irrevocability of one’s own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios) has been violated.

III.- THE Ex Officio ANNULMENT OR REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO OR DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL. This possibility available to public administrations and their bodies constitutes a qualified exception to the doctrine of the non-revocability of acts that are the administration’s own and favorable to the individual, or to the principle of the irrevocability of one’s own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios), to which this specialized Chamber has conferred constitutional rank as it derives from section 34 of the Political Constitution (See judgments Nos. 2186-94 of 5:03 p.m. on May 4, 1994 and 899-95 of 5:18 p.m. on February 15, 1995). The general rule is that the respective public administration cannot annul an act declaratory of rights for the individual, with the exceptions being annulment or ex officio review. To that end, the public administration, as a general principle, must appear, as the plaintiff and following a prior declaration of lesividad (lesividad) of the act against public, economic, or any other type of interests, in the lesividad process (artículos 10, párrafo 5°, and 34 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which has traditionally been understood as a guarantee for individuals. On this matter, this Constitutional Court in Voto No. 897-98 of February 11, 1998, stated that "(...) the Administration is barred from suppressing by its own action those acts it has issued conferring subjective rights upon private parties. Thus, subjective rights constitute a limit regarding the powers of revocation (or modification) of administrative acts, in order to be able to demand greater procedural guarantees. The Administration, upon issuing an act and subsequently issuing another contrary to the first, to the detriment of subjective rights, is disregarding these rights, which it had granted through the first act, whether by error or for any other reason. This implies that the only way the State has to eliminate one of its acts from the legal system is the jurisdictional process of lesividad (lesividad), as this process is conceived as a procedural guarantee in favor of the individual; or alternatively, in our legal system there exists the possibility of going against one's own acts through the administrative channel, in the case of absolute, evident, and manifest nullities, following a prior opinion from the Contraloría General de la República and the Procuraduría General de la República (as an additional guarantee in favor of the individual) and in accordance with article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Consequently, if the Administration has disregarded the rules of these procedures, or has omitted them in whole or in part (...) the principle of one’s own acts determines that the effect of said irregularity is the invalidity of the act (…)". Pursuant to section 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a public entity or body may well annul through the administrative channel an act declaratory of rights for the individual but detrimental to the public or patrimonial interests of the former, without the need to resort to the administrative contentious process of lesividad (lesividad) regulated in articles 10, párrafo 5°, and 34 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (a process in which the plaintiff is a public administration challenging its own act that is favorable to the individual but detrimental to it) when it is vitiated by an evident and manifest absolute nullity. The evident and manifest absolute nullity must be previously and favorably determined by opinion of the Procuraduría or the Contraloría General de la República—a preparatory act for the final annulment act. It shall correspond to the Contraloría when the nullity concerns administrative acts directly related to the budget process or administrative contracting (Hacienda Pública). That opinion is indispensable, to such an extent that this Chamber in Voto No. 1563-91 of 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, considered that "(…) It is evident, therefore, that from the entry into force of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the competence to annul in the administrative venue can only be admitted if the duty to bring forward an expert and external criterion to the body that will issue the final act is fulfilled (…)". It is an opinion of a binding nature—from which the consulting body or entity cannot deviate—, as provided by sections 2° of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República and 173, párrafo 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Through this opinion, a kind of prior or preventive legality control is exercised, insofar as it precedes the final act of the ordinary procedure initiated to decree the ex officio annulment, which does not conflict with any of the degrees of administrative autonomy, as it is a specific manifestation of the inherent oversight authority of intersubjective direction (dirección intersubjetiva) or administrative oversight (tutela administrativa). It is logical that such an opinion must be favorable to the annulment claim of the consulting administration, and above all, that it positively verifies the seriousness and nature of the defects that justify the exercise of the ex officio review or annulment power. The respective Public Administration is prevented by the sub-constitutional (infraconstitucional) legal system from determining when there is an evident and manifest nullity, since this extreme is reserved for the technical-legal and consultative body called the Procuraduría General de la República, as a deconcentrated body of the Ministry of Justice. In cases where the opinion must be rendered by the Contraloría General de la República, it also has a binding nature by virtue of the provisions in article 4°, final paragraph, of its Ley Orgánica No. 7428 of September 7, 1994.

IV.- THE EVIDENT AND MANIFEST NULLITY AS A PREREQUISITE THAT ENABLES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS TO EXERCISE THEIR POWER OF Ex Officio ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL. Not any degree of invalidity or nullity authorizes a public entity or body to decree the ex officio annulment of an administrative act declaratory of rights for an individual, given that the administrative legal system requires that certain specific and aggravated characteristics or connotations converge to qualify it. The nullity that justifies ex officio review must have such transcendence and magnitude that it must be, pursuant to the provisions established in section 173, párrafo 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, "evident and manifest" (evidente y manifiesta). The evident and manifest is that which is patent, notorious, ostensible, palpable, clear, certain, and which offers no margin of doubt or which does not require a dialectical or logical process or effort of verification to discover it, precisely because of its gross and serious nature. In this sense, it is sufficient to compare the administrative act with the legal or regulatory norm that covers it to reach such a conclusion, without the need for any hermeneutics or exegesis. It is necessary to add that section 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not create a kind of bipartition of absolute nullities, some of them being simple and others evident and manifest, but rather seeks to promote that in the case of the latter, the deep and expert analysis of the administrative-contentious judge is unnecessary or dispensable in order to facilitate its review through the administrative channel.

V.- THE NEED TO INITIATE AN ORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE Ex Officio REVIEW OR ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS FAVORABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL. The respective public administration—author of the act that is intended to be annulled or reviewed—, prior to the declaration of nullity, must open an ordinary administrative procedure in which the principles and guarantees of due process and defense must be observed (article 173, párrafo 3°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública); the justification for observing this procedure is that the final act may suppress a subjective right of the individual (article 308 ibidem). During the substantiation of the ordinary procedure, it is indispensable to obtain the opinion of the Procuraduría or the Contraloría, it being an intermediate proceeding of the same. As indicated supra, the opinion must expressly pronounce on the absolute, manifest, and evident nature of the nullity (article 173, párrafo 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). If the opinion of the Procuraduría or the Contraloría General de la República is unfavorable, in the sense that the absolute nullity of the administrative act is not evident and manifest, the respective public administration will be legally prevented from annulling the act through the administrative channel and must inevitably resort to the ordinary administrative contentious process of lesividad (lesividad). The opinion of the two cited consultative bodies is binding on the respective administration regarding the evident and manifest nature of the nullity. On this point, article 183, párrafo 3°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública prescribes that "(…) Outside the cases provided for in article 173 of this Code, the Administration may not annul ex officio acts declaratory of rights in favor of the individual and to obtain their elimination must resort to the process of lesividad (lesividad), provided for in the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo.".

VI.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 173 OF THE LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA. The ex officio review or annulment in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding considerandos "whether due to omission of the provided formalities or because it is not absolute, evident and manifest" (e.g., the opinion is unfavorable, the opinion was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened) is absolutely null and renders both the public administration and the official responsible for the damages and losses caused (article 173, párrafo 5°, ibidem).

VII.- EXPIRY OF THE EX OFFICIO REVIEW POWER FOR ACTS DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS. The power of ex officio review or annulment of favorable acts expires for the interested and respective public administration within a period of one year, unless its effects endure over time (article 173, párrafo 4°, LGAP). It is a rigid and fatal expiry period (caducidad)—acceleratory and peremptory—that does not admit interruptions or suspensions in the interests of the legal security and certainty of individuals who derive subjective rights from the administrative act sought to be reviewed and annulled, with the only indicated nuance being an act that presents an absolute and manifest nullity and has continuous efficacy. Under this understanding, the opening of the ordinary administrative procedure and the request for an opinion from the Procuraduría or Contraloría General de la República do not interrupt or suspend the period.

VIII.- SPECIFIC CASE. As can be inferred from the relationship of demonstrated facts, through personnel action No. 410007083, effective April 1, 2010, and with an application date of April 15, 2010, the appellant had been granted the salary bonuses for police risk and availability (folio 08). However, by official letter No. 101180 of April 22, 2010, the Director of Human Resources of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes ordered the Registro y Control Department to eliminate those incentives for officials transferred to the Unidad de Apoyo Legal—among whom the petitioner is included—until the Dirección Jurídica rules on the appropriateness of paying those items. Thus, through personnel action No. 4100011925 of April 30, 2010, the payment of the mentioned salary bonuses was suppressed for the protected party (folio 09). While it is not the purview of this Jurisdiction to determine whether or not an official is entitled to payment for police availability and risk, since it refers to an ordinary legality discussion, the truth is that the Administration cannot abruptly suppress the payment of those recognized bonuses—via personnel action—as subjective rights, as occurred in the sub lite case. By unilaterally suspending the referred payment, the Administration disregarded a subjective right that had been incorporated into the appellant's legal sphere without having, for that purpose, observed the formal and substantive requirements of section 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. This situation undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the principle of the irrevocability of one’s own acts (intangibilidad de los actos propios). That said, it is clarified to the respondent authorities that this Chamber does not question their authority to verify compliance with the current regulations regarding the granting of bonuses, which could even lead them to determine the inappropriateness of paying those items and manage the reimbursement or recovery of the sums paid; however, that analysis must be carried out in strict adherence to the Legal System and, above all, with respect for the constitutional guarantees indicated in this judgment.

IX.- CONSEQUENCE. As a corollary of the foregoing, the amparo appeal filed must be granted, with the consequences detailed in the operative part of this judgment.” On this point, Article 183, paragraph 3, of the General Law on Public Administration provides that <i>"(…) Outside of the cases provided for in Article 173 of this Code, the Administration may not ex officio annul acts declaratory of rights in favor of the administered party and, to obtain their elimination, must resort to the lesividad (lesividad) process, provided for in the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo."</i>.

**VI.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 173 OF THE GENERAL LAW ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.** The ex officio review or annulment in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding considerandos (considerandos) "whether due to omission of the required formalities or because the nullity is not absolute, evident, and manifest" (e.g., the opinion is unfavorable, the opinion was not obtained, or an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened) is absolutely null and renders both the public administration and the official responsible for the damages caused (Article 173, paragraph 5, ibidem).

**VII.- EXPIRY OF THE POWER OF EX OFFICIO REVIEW OF ACTS DECLARATORY OF RIGHTS.** The power of ex officio review or annulment of favorable acts expires for the interested and respective public administration within a period of one year, unless its effects endure over time (Article 173, paragraph 4, LGAP). This is a rigid and fatal expiry period (plazo de caducidad) —acceleratory and peremptory— that does not admit interruptions or suspensions in the interest of the legal security and certainty of administered parties who derive subjective rights from the administrative act sought to be reviewed and annulled, with the sole noted exception of an act that presents an absolute and manifest nullity and has continuous efficacy. Under this understanding, the opening of the ordinary administrative procedure and the request for an opinion from the Procuraduría or Contraloría Generales de la República do not interrupt or suspend the period.

**VIII.- SPECIFIC CASE.** As can be deduced from the recitation of proven facts, through personnel action No. 410007083, effective April 1, 2010, and with an application date of April 15, 2010, the appellant had been granted the salary supplements of police risk and availability (folio 08). However, by official communication No. 101180 of April 22, 2010, the Director of Human Resources of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport ordered the Department of Registry and Control to eliminate those incentives for officials transferred to the Legal Support Unit —among whom the protected party is found— until the Legal Directorate rules on the appropriateness of the payment of those items. Thus, through personnel action No. 4100011925 of April 30, 2010, the payment of the mentioned salary supplements was suppressed for the protected party (folio 09). While it is not for this Jurisdiction to determine whether or not an official is entitled to payment for police availability and risk, as this refers to a matter of ordinary legality, the truth is that the Administration cannot abruptly suppress the payment of those supplements recognized —via personnel action— as subjective rights, as happened in the sub lite. By suspending the referenced payment unilaterally, the Administration disregarded a subjective right that had been incorporated into the legal sphere of the appellant, without having observed, for that purpose, the formal and substantive requirements of Section 173 of the General Law on Public Administration. This situation undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts. Now then, it is clarified to the respondent authorities that this Chamber does not question their authority to verify compliance with the regulations in force regarding the recognition of supplements, which could even lead them to determine the inappropriateness of the payment of those items and to manage the reimbursement or recovery of the sums paid; however, that analysis must be carried out in strict adherence to the Legal System and, above all, with respect for the constitutional guarantees indicated in this judgment.

**IX.- CONSEQUENCE.** As a corollary of the foregoing, it is imperative to declare the amparo (amparo) appeal filed as granted, with the consequences detailed in the operative part of this judgment." **VI.- LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ORDINAL 173 OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION LAW.** The ex officio review or annulment in breach of the legal requirements referred to in the preceding considerandos—"whether due to omission of the prescribed formalities or because it is not absolute, evident, and manifest" (e.g., that the opinion of the Attorney General's Office (dictamen) is unfavorable, that the opinion was not obtained, or that an ordinary administrative procedure was not opened)—is absolutely null and void and makes both the public administration and the official liable for the damages caused (Article 173, paragraph 5, ibidem).

**VII.- EXPIRY OF THE POWER OF EX OFFICIO REVIEW OF ACTS DECLARING RIGHTS.** The power of ex officio review or annulment of favorable acts lapses for the interested and respective public administration within a period of one year, unless the effects of the act endure over time (Article 173, paragraph 4, LGAP). This is a rigid and fatal limitation period—acceleratory and peremptory—that does not admit interruptions or suspensions in the interest of the legal certainty and security of the administered parties who derive subjective rights from the administrative act that is sought to be reviewed and annulled, with the sole qualification noted regarding an act that presents an absolute and manifest nullity and has continuous efficacy. Under this understanding, the opening of the ordinary administrative procedure and the request for the opinion from the Procuraduría or Contraloría Generales de la República do not interrupt or suspend the period.

**VIII.- SPECIFIC CASE.** As is clear from the statement of proven facts, through personnel action No. 410007083, effective April 1, 2010, and with an application date of April 15, 2010, the appellant had been granted the salary bonuses for risk and police availability (folio 08). However, by official letter No. 101180 of April 22, 2010, the Human Resources Director of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) ordered the Department of Registration and Control to eliminate these incentives for officials transferred to the Legal Support Unit—among whom the protected party is found—until the Legal Directorate rules on the appropriateness of paying these items. Thus, through personnel action No. 4100011925 of April 30, 2010, the protected party's payment of the aforementioned salary bonuses was eliminated (folio 09). Although it is not for this Jurisdiction to determine whether an official is or is not entitled to payment for police availability and risk, since this refers to a discussion of ordinary legality, the truth is that the Administration cannot abruptly eliminate the payment of those bonuses recognized—via personnel action—as subjective rights, as occurred in the sub lite. By unilaterally suspending the referenced payment, the Administration disregarded a subjective right that had been incorporated into the appellant's legal sphere without, for that purpose, having observed the formal and substantive requirements of ordinal 173 of the General Public Administration Law. This situation undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios). Now, it is clarified to the respondent authorities that this Chamber does not question their power to verify compliance with the regulations in force regarding the recognition of bonuses, which could even lead them to determine the inappropriateness of the payment of those items and to manage the reimbursement or recovery of the sums paid; however, that analysis must be carried out in strict compliance with the Legal System and, above all, with respect for the constitutional guarantees indicated in this judgment.

**IX.- CONSEQUENCE.** As a corollary of the foregoing, the amparo action filed must be granted with the consequences detailed in the operative part of this judgment."

“ I.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO. La recurrente reclama que, habiéndole reconocido el pago de disponibilidad y riesgo policial —extremos que le fueron cancelados en la primera quincena de abril de 2010—, las autoridades recurridas eliminaron el pago de esos incentivos salariales a través del oficio No. 101180. Considera violentado el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios.

III.- LA ANULACIÓN O REVISIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES O DECLARATORIOS DE DERECHOS PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. Esta posibilidad que tienen las administraciones públicas y sus órganos constituye una excepción calificada a la doctrina de la inderogabilidad de los actos propios y favorables para el administrado o del principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, al que esta Sala especializada le ha conferido rango constitucional por derivar del ordinal 34 de la Constitución Política (Ver sentencias Nos. 2186-94 de las 17:03 hrs. del 4 de mayo de 1994 y 899-95 de las 17:18 hrs. del 15 de febrero de 1995). La regla general es que la administración pública respectiva no puede anular un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado, siendo las excepciones la anulación o revisión de oficio. Para ese efecto, la administración pública, como principio general, debe acudir, en calidad de parte actora y previa declaratoria de lesividad del acto a los intereses públicos, económicos o de cualquier otra naturaleza, al proceso de lesividad (artículos 10, párrafo 5°, y 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), el cual se ha entendido, tradicionalmente, como una garantía para los administrados. Sobre este particular, este Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto No. 897-98 del 11 de febrero de 1998 señaló que "(...) a la Administración le está vedado suprimir por su propia acción aquellos actos que haya emitido confiriendo derechos subjetivos a los particulares. Así, los derechos subjetivos constituyen un límite respecto de las potestades de revocación (o modificación) de los actos administrativos, con el fin de poder exigir mayores garantías procedimentales. La Administración, al emitir un acto y con posterioridad al emanar otro contrario al primero, en menoscabo de derechos subjetivos, está desconociendo estos derechos, que a través del primer acto había concedido, sea por error o por cualquier otro motivo. Ello implica que la única vía que el Estado tiene para eliminar un acto suyo del ordenamiento es el proceso de jurisdiccional de lesividad, pues este proceso está concebido como una garantía procesal a favor del administrado, o bien, en nuestro ordenamiento existe la posibilidad de ir contra los actos propios en la vía administrativa, en la hipótesis de nulidades absolutas, evidentes y manifiestas, previo dictamen de la Contraloría General de la República y de la Procuraduría General de la República (como una garantía más a favor del administrado) y de conformidad con el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En consecuencia, si la Administración ha inobservado las reglas de estos procedimientos, o bien, las ha omitido del todo o en parte (...) el principio de los actos propios determina como efecto de dicha irregularidad la invalidez del acto (…)". A tenor del numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, un ente u órgano público bien puede anular en vía administrativa un acto declaratorio de derechos para el administrado pero lesivo para los intereses públicos o patrimoniales de la primera, sin necesidad de recurrir al proceso contencioso administrativo de lesividad normado en los artículos 10, párrafo 5°, y 34 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (proceso en el cual la parte actora es una administración pública que impugna un acto propio favorable para el administrado pero lesivo para ella) cuando el mismo este viciado de una nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta. La nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta debe ser dictaminada, previa y favorablemente, por la Procuraduría o la Contraloría Generales de la República —acto preparatorio del acto anulatorio final—. Le corresponderá a la Contraloría cuando la nulidad verse sobre actos administrativos relacionados directamente con el proceso presupuestario o la contratación administrativa (Hacienda Pública). Ese dictamen es indispensable, a tal punto que esta Sala en el Voto No. 1563-91 de las 15 hrs. del 14 de agosto de 1991 estimó que "(…) Es evidente, entonces, que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la competencia de anular en sede administrativa solamente puede ser admitida si se cumple con el deber de allegar un criterio trata de un dictamen de carácter vinculante —del que no puede apartarse el órgano o ente consultante—, así lo disponen los ordinales 2° de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República y el 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. A través de ese dictamen se ejerce una suerte de control previo o preventivo de legalidad, en cuanto antecede el acto final del procedimiento ordinario incoado para decretar la anulación oficiosa, que no riñe con ninguno de los grados de autonomía administrativa, por ser manifestación específica de la potestad de control inherente a la dirección intersubjetiva o tutela administrativa. Resulta lógico que tal dictamen debe ser favorable a la pretensión anulatoria de la administración consultante, y sobre todo que constate, positivamente, la gravedad y entidad de los vicios que justifican el ejercicio de la potestad de revisión o anulación oficiosa. La Administración Pública respectiva está inhibida por el ordenamiento infraconstitucional de determinar cuándo hay una nulidad evidente y manifiesta, puesto que, ese extremo le está reservado al órgano técnico- jurídico y consultivo denominado Procuraduría General de la República, como órgano desconcentrado del Ministerio de Justicia. En los supuestos en que el dictamen debe ser vertido por la Contraloría General de la República, también, tiene naturaleza vinculante en virtud de lo dispuesto en artículo 4°, párrafo in fine, de su Ley Orgánica No. 7428 del 7 de septiembre de 1994.

IV.- LA NULIDAD EVIDENTE Y MANIFIESTA COMO PRESUPUESTO QUE HABILITA A LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PUBLICAS PARA EJERCER SU POTESTAD DE ANULACIÓN OFICIOSA DE ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. No cualquier grado de invalidez o nulidad autoriza a un ente u órgano público para decretar la anulación oficiosa de un acto administrativo declaratorio de derechos para un administrado, dado que, el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo exige que concurran ciertas características o connotaciones específicas y agravadas que la califiquen. La nulidad que justifica la revisión de oficio debe tener tal trascendencia y magnitud que debe ser, a tenor de lo establecido en el numeral 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, "evidente y manifiesta". Lo evidente y manifiesto es lo que resulta patente, notorio, ostensible, palpable, claro, cierto y que no ofrece ningún margen de duda o que no requiere de un proceso o esfuerzo dialéctico o lógico de verificación para descubrirlo, precisamente, por su índole grosera y grave. En tal sentido, basta confrontar el acto administrativo con la norma legal o reglamentaria que le da cobertura para arribar a tal conclusión, sin necesidad de hermenéutica o exégesis ninguna. Es menester agregar que el numeral 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública no crea una suerte de bipartición de las nulidades absolutas, siendo algunas de ellas simples y otras evidentes y manifiestas, sino lo que trata de propiciar es que en el supuesto de las segundas sea innecesario o prescindible el análisis profundo y experto del juez contencioso-administrativo para facilitar su revisión en vía administrativa.

V.- LA NECESIDAD DE INCOAR UN PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO ORDINARIO PARA LA REVISIÓN O ANULACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS FAVORABLES PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. La administración pública respectiva —autora del acto que se pretende anular o revisar—, de previo a la declaratoria de nulidad, debe abrir un procedimiento administrativo ordinario en el que se deben observar los principios y las garantías del debido proceso y de la defensa (artículo 173, párrafo 3°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), la justificación de observar ese procedimiento está en que el acto final puede suprimir un derecho subjetivo del administrado (artículo 308 ibidem). Durante la sustanciación del procedimiento ordinario, resulta indispensable recabar el dictamen de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría siendo un acto de trámite del mismo. Tal y como se indicó supra, el dictamen debe pronunciarse, expresamente, sobre el carácter absoluto, manifiesto y evidente de la nulidad (artículo 173, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Si el dictamen de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría Generales de la República es desfavorable, en el sentido que la nulidad absoluta del acto administrativo no es evidente y manifiesta, la respectiva administración pública se verá impedida, legalmente, para anular el acto en vía administrativa y tendrá que acudir, irremisiblemente, al proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo de lesividad. El dictamen de los dos órganos consultivos citados es vinculante para la administración respectiva en cuanto al carácter evidente y manifiesto de la nulidad. Sobre este punto, el artículo 183, párrafo 3°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública preceptúa que "(…) Fuera de los casos previstos en el artículo 173 de este Código, la Administración no podrá anular de oficio los actos declaratorios de derechos en favor del administrado y para obtener su eliminación deberá acudir al proceso de lesividad, previsto en el Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo.".

VI.- CONSECUENCIAS JURÍDICAS DE LA INOBSERVANCIA DE LOS RECAUDOS FORMALES Y SUSTANCIALES DEL ORDINAL 173 DE LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA. La revisión oficiosa o anulación con quebranto de los requisitos legales referidos en los considerandos precedentes "sea por omisión de las formalidades previstas o por no ser absoluta, evidente y manifiesta" (v. gr. que el dictamen sea desfavorable, que no se recabó el dictamen o que no se abrió un procedimiento administrativo ordinario) es absolutamente nula y hace responsable por los daños y perjuicios provocados tanto a la administración pública como al funcionario (artículo 173, párrafo 5°, ibidem).

VII.- CADUCIDAD DE LA POTESTAD DE REVISIÓN DE OFICIO DE LOS ACTOS DECLARATORIOS DE DERECHOS. La potestad de revisión o anulación de oficio de los actos favorables, le caduca a la administración pública interesada y respectiva en el plazo de un año, salvo que sus efectos perduren en el tiempo (artículo 173, párrafo 4°, LGAP). Se trata, de un plazo rígido y fatal de caducidad —aceleratorio y perentorio— que no admite interrupciones o suspensiones en aras de la seguridad y certeza jurídicas de los administrados que derivan derechos subjetivos del acto administrativo que se pretende revisar y anular, con la única matización apuntada del acto que presente una nulidad absoluta y manifiesta y tenga una eficacia continúa. Bajo esta inteligencia, la apertura del procedimiento administrativo ordinario y la solicitud del dictamen a la Procuraduría o Contraloría Generales de la República no interrumpen o suspenden el plazo.

VIII.- CASO CONCRETO. Según se desprende de la relación de hechos demostrados, mediante la acción de personal No. No.410007083, con rige 1 de abril de 2010 y fecha de aplicación 15 de abril de 2010, se le había reconocido a la recurrente los pluses salariales de riesgo y disponibilidad policial (folio 08). No obstante, por oficio No. 101180 de 22 de abril de 2010, el Director de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes le ordenó al Departamento de Registro y Control, eliminar esos incentivos a los funcionarios trasladados a la Unidad de Apoyo Legal —entre los que se encuentra la amparada— hasta tanto la Dirección Jurídica se pronuncie sobre la procedencia del pago de esos extremos. Así, a través de la acción de personal No.4100011925 de 30 de abril de 2010, se le suprimió a la tutelada el pago de los pluses salariales mencionados (folio 09). Si bien, no le compete a esta Jurisdicción determinar si a un funcionario le corresponde o no el pago por concepto de disponibilidad y riesgo policial, ya que, hace referencia a una discusión de legalidad ordinaria, lo cierto es que la Administración no puede suprimir, intempestivamente, el pago de esos pluses reconocidos —vía acción de personal— como derechos subjetivos, tal y como sucedió en el sub lite. Al suspender el pago referido de forma unilateral, la Administración desconoció un derecho subjetivo que se había incorporado en la esfera jurídica de la recurrente sin que para ese efecto, haya observado los recaudos formales y sustanciales del ordinal 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esta situación configura, sin duda, un quebranto al principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios. Ahora bien, se aclara a las autoridades recurridas que esta Sala no cuestiona la facultad que tienen para verificar el cumplimiento de la normativa vigente en materia de reconocimiento de pluses, lo que, incluso, podría llevarlas a determinar la improcedencia del pago de esos extremos y gestionar el reembolso o recuperación de las sumas pagadas, sin embargo, ese análisis debe efectuarse con estricto apego al Ordenamiento Jurídico y, sobre todo, con respeto de las garantías constitucionales indicadas en esta sentencia.

IX.- CONSECUENCIA. Como corolario de lo expuesto, se impone declarar con lugar el recurso de amparo interpuesto con las consecuencias que se detallan en la parte dispositiva de esta sentencia.”