Stockbroker fined for omitting buyback information in client presentationsAgente de bolsa multado por omitir información de recompras en presentaciones a cliente

Document PJEDITOR  Res. 000122-F-TC-2025 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, at nine hours fifteen minutes on September eleventh, two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding, established in the Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, brought by Randall Mauricio Díaz Solís, represented by his special judicial attorneys, Roberto Bolaños Fonseca, Roberto Bolaños Prada and Stephanie Arce Quesada; against Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR), the Superintendencia General De Valores (SUGEVAL) and the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (CONASSIF), whose special judicial attorneys are Marianne Kott Salas, Rodrigo Hidalgo Pacheco, Ligia Vega Hidalgo and Fresia Ramírez Villalobos. The plaintiff files a cassation appeal against judgment 2024005349 issued at sixteen hours four minutes on August twentieth, two thousand twenty-four, signed by Judge Karla Madriz Martínez (rapporteur) and Judges Francisco Hidalgo Rueda and Martín Conejo Cantillo.

Authored by Magistrate Vargas Vásquez;

CONSIDERANDO

This matter originates from a sanctioning administrative proceeding. In substance, the plaintiff indicated that, on January 3, 2004, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López entered into an estate planning trust contract called “Minnie / Cuscatlán” with Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica S.A., now Banco CITIBANK de Costa Rica S.A. In said contract, the bank acted as trustee (fiduciario), Mr. Matheu López as settlor (fideicomitente), and the trust beneficiaries (fideicomisarios) were Pedro Jaime de Matheu Quesada, Michelle Marie de Matheu López, Noemi Quesada Alvarado and Alexandra de Matheu Bissell. The fourth clause of the contract stipulated that the trust assets (patrimonio fideicometido) would be initially invested in Fondos Cuscatlán S.F.I S.A., through the Puesto de Bolsa Valores Cuscatlán S.A. (now Citi Valores Accival S.A.), without restriction on the type of investment, and it was established that the settlor could make decisions and give instructions without liability for the trustee. On January 29, 2004, Mr. Matheu López sent a note to the brokerage agent requesting that the trust serve as the holder of his assets and that, upon his death, the assets be transferred to his children and wife. He indicated the trust name as “Minnie”. The trust was formally identified as “Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán”. Between January 2004 and July 2009, a professional advisory relationship was maintained with Mr. Matheu López, where investment strategies were determined. The instructions were authorized by letter by the authorized signatories on the signature registration card. The relationship ended in July 2009, because he no longer worked for the brokerage house (puesto), at which time another brokerage agent took over the management of the trust. On November 28, 2005, a General Contract for Stock Market Operations was signed between Valores Cuscatlán Puesto de Bolsa and the Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán, represented by the trustee, Mr. Alberto Blanco Meléndez. In said contract, it was established that the persons authorized to carry out operations would be those registered with the Puesto de Bolsa. He indicated that, from January 3, 2004, until the signing of that contract in November 2005, the authorized signatures corresponded only to the trustee, and were registered on a form dated March 23, 2004: Alberto Blanco Meléndez, Yadira Hernández González, Marcela Chaverri Coto and Felipe Meléndez Morales, who signed individually. Subsequently, on December 6, 2005, a new form was signed that modified the authorized signatures, designating the following to sign jointly (mancomunadamente): Alberto Blanco Meléndez, Yadira Hernández González, Ruth Gutiérrez Morales and Mary Jane Mora Gómez. From the signing of the stock market contract on November 28, 2005, until the request for the transfer of securities from the trust to Mercado de Valores Puesto de Bolsa S.A. made by Mr. Matheu López on August 13, 2009, the account statements for the operations carried out by the trust were sent to postal box 6531-1000, corresponding to the trustee. He highlighted that Mr. Manuel Marenco Fernández, representative of Citi Valores Accival S.A., in a note dated November 3, 2009, indicated that the account statements were sent punctually to the client at his address, and the control of the arrangements between settlor and trust beneficiaries was beyond their review. He added that the stock market contract of November 28, 2005, established that account statements would be sent monthly and their remittance by fax, mail, e-mail or other means was permitted, although a specific address for their receipt was not established. On September 6, 2007, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López authorized in writing his wife, Mrs. Noemy Quesada Alvarado, to make investments and liquidations in Banco Cuscatlán, Valores Cuscatlán and Fondos Cuscatlán, within the framework of the Fideicomiso Minnie. This authorization had no amount limit or expiration, except for express revocation. On November 10, 2007, Mr. de Matheu López signed a new authorized signatures form, including his wife among the persons empowered to operate on behalf of the trust. He related that, on an undetermined date but prior to 2008, an “Investor Risk Profile” form was completed identifying the Fideicomiso Minnie as the client, but indicating Mr. de Matheu López as the natural person. According to the evaluation, he was classified as a “moderate” profile investor, with a score of 42 points. The document was signed by him, by an unidentified analysis executive, and by the responsible agent. Subsequently, they began to accept direct instructions from Mr. de Matheu López for stock market operations, providing him with advice as a decision-maker, along with the trustee. In letters signed by Mr. de Matheu López between January 2006 and February 2009, he expressed his satisfaction with the administration of his portfolio, acknowledging the associated risks and authorizing the maintenance of the investment strategy. On August 6, 2008, Mr. de Matheu authorized an investment in Apple shares, through a letter in which he stated that he knew the risks and released the agent and the brokerage house from liability. The transaction was executed with ticket No. 60106343. On October 28, 2008, a new investor profile form was completed for Citi Valores Accival and Citi Fondos, again classifying Mr. de Matheu as a “moderate” investor. The document was signed by him, by the trust officer Yadira Hernández González, and by an unidentified risk analysis representative. During the first half of 2009, meetings were held with Mr. de Matheu to design investment strategies, occasionally preparing PowerPoint presentations under the title “Seguimiento de Inversiones Fideicomiso Minnie”, with the Citi logo. These were prepared at the request of Mr. de Matheu, and contained information on the trust assets held in custody by both the brokerage house and the trustee. On June 24, 2009, a first addendum to the trust contract was signed, in which Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. assumed the position of trustee in substitution of Banco Cuscatlán. Finally, on August 27, 2009, a Transaction Order was signed for cash sell-repurchase operations in the account of the client Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán with Citi Valores Accival S.A. The Order states that said client authorizes the indicated brokerage house “...to carry out the following transactions, in accordance with the Regulatory Framework and the Commission Contract for carrying out Stock Market Operations…”. These transactions corresponded to operations numbers 1090822953, 1090822959,1090822961 and 1090822963. The transaction order was signed only by Mrs. Mary Jane Mora Gómez. He highlighted that by that date she no longer worked for Citi Valores, making the accusation made by SUGEVAL in the statement of charges for the opening of the administrative proceeding vague and imprecise. On August 19, 2009, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López requested by email to Mr. Manuel Marenco, representative of Citi Valores Accival, that the securities of the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán be transferred to the Puesto de Bolsa Mercado de Valores, reiterating that this request had been made since August 13 without being executed. Between August 20 and September 9, 2009, the transfer of the securities was not completed, due to disagreements between Mr. de Matheu and Citi Valores Accival regarding the content of a release (finiquito) requested by the latter entity regarding the trust contract. On September 10, 2009, a release of the trust contract was signed between Mr. de Matheu as settlor and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., by which the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán was extinguished. The document was received by the banking entity on September 14, 2011. That same September 10, Mrs. Yadira Hernández, representing the trust, authorized Citi Valores Accival S.A. to transfer securities from CEVAL account 015760 to the Puesto de Bolsa Mercado de Valores S.A., in the name of Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López. On September 16, 2009, the transfer of securities was managed, and the process was completed electronically on the 18th of that month. On August 21, 2009, Mr. de Matheu filed a complaint with the Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) for alleged inconsistencies in the management of the trust's investment portfolio, which led him to learn only on July 24, 2009, about the investment portfolio of said Trust. The relationship between the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán and the Puesto de Bolsa arose from the trust contract signed in 2004, which authorized Banco Cuscatlán (now Banco Citibank) as trustee to make stock market investments through said brokerage house. In accordance with current regulations, the trustee held the legal representation of the trust, and was the one who contracted with the brokerage house. By resolution SGV-R 2246 at 9:30 a.m. on May 24, 2010, SUGEVAL initiated a sanctioning administrative proceeding for alleged inconsistencies in the management of the investment portfolio, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) was appointed, and the investigative phase of the proceeding began. Finally, in the instruction of the proceeding, the trust and its legal representative, Banco Cuscatlán (now Banco Citibank), were not included as a party, despite being the entity that contracted with the brokerage house on behalf of the trust. By official letter SGV-R-2612, the Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) resolved the sanctioning proceeding stating the following: “…Declare the Agent Corredor de Bolsa Randall Díaz Solís responsible for failing to comply with the duties of diligence and information established in articles 60, 108 and 109 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores concurrently with the brokerage house for which he worked. Consequently, in accordance with articles 157 subsections 5) and 29), 163 subsection a), point 3, of the same legal body, he is sanctioned with a fine equivalent to 20 base salaries in accordance with Ley 7758, according to the amount in force for the base salary for the year 2009 (¢269,000.00), for a total fine in the sum of ¢5,380,000.00 (five million three hundred eighty thousand exact colones…”. He highlighted that he filed a motion for reversal with a subsidiary appeal, alleging, among other things, the failure to include the trustee as a party to the proceeding, despite it being the one who held the legal representation of the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán. As a result, by resolution SGV-R-2704 at 10:00 a.m. on September 3, 2012, the Superintendencia General de Valores partially granted the appeal filed by Citi Valores, modified the amount of the fine imposed on said entity, and absolved both the brokerage house and the appealing official of the breach of the duty of information. However, it imposed on the latter a fine equivalent to ten base salaries, corresponding to the sum of ¢2,690,000.00, for a single alleged breach of the duty of diligence provided for in articles 60 and 108 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, concurrently with the brokerage house. On September 4, 2012, by resolution SGV-R-2705, SUGEVAL rejected the motion for reversal filed regarding the sanction for breach of the duty of diligence and omitted to rule on his appeal regarding the duty of information. Both parties appeared before the CONASSIF, reiterating their arguments and raising motions to nullify (incidentes de nulidad). He emphasized that he filed a motion to nullify against resolution SGV-R-2704. On April 8, 2014, through an agreement adopted in session 1101-2014, CONASSIF annulled resolution SGV-R-2704, and absolved him for the duty of diligence, but sanctioned him for breach of the duty of information with a fine of ₡5,380,000.00. For its part, CONASSIF never ruled and left SUGEVAL resolution SGV-R-2705 intact. On April 9, 2015, he filed a contentious-administrative proceeding, under file 15-003035-1027-CA. By judgment 000064-F-TC-2019 at 9:30 a.m. on May 16, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-921923), the Tribunal de Casación confirmed what was resolved by SUGEVAL and partially annulled the CONASSIF agreement, for having imposed a sanction without respecting due process, ordering a new pronouncement to be issued. In compliance with what was ordered, CONASSIF ordered in article 11 of session 1513-2019 of July 2, 2019, to declare the appeal against what was ordered in resolution SGV-R-2612 at 12:00 p.m., February 16, 2012, of the Superintendencia General de Valores without merit, regarding the point that the Sala de Casación ordered it to review. Nor did it impose any sanction or fine for failing to comply with the duty of information. However, on July 31, 2019, judicial resolution 000113-F-TC-2019 at 2:20 p.m. on July 11, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-928791) was notified, in which a request for clarification and addition was rejected, which gave finality to ruling 000064-F-TC-2019. Finally, on March 2, 2020, through session 1562-2020, CONASSIF annulled the previous agreement for having been issued prematurely and, upon resolving again, reiterated the rejection of the appeal against resolution SGV-R-2612, without imposing a sanction or fine for breach of the duty of information, limiting itself to pointing out that what was ordered in session 1101-2014 remained intact. Based on that relationship of facts, the claims were set so that the judgment declares: “...1. The absolute nullity or, alternatively, for being contrary to the Legal System (sic), the agreement of the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (CONASSIF) adopted in article 11 of the minutes of session 1562-2020, held on March 2, 2020, be revoked and left without any value or legal effect. 2. That as a consequence of the declaration of nullity requested: A) it be declared that no sanction has fallen upon the undersigned within the Sanctioning Ordinary Administrative Proceeding (sic) ordered in resolution SGV-R 2246, at 9:30 a.m. on May 24, 2010, of the Superintendencia General de Valores; B) the corresponding authority be ordered to exclude me from the Registry of Disciplinary Measures (sic) of SUGEVAL, and eliminate the record of disciplinary measures from my personal information in the Registro Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios (sic) and C) the refund of the fine imposed that was duly paid be ordered, as well as interest at the legal rate, from the moment of its payment in the administrative venue and until its effective refund, and the respective material fact be published. 3. That the State (sic) be ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding...”. Once the legal transfer was granted, the representation of the defendant party appeared in the proceedings, responded negatively to the claim, filed the prior defense of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material) (declared without merit by oral resolution No. 1561-2021 at 10:35 a.m. on 09/11/2021), and the exceptions of lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) and lack of current interest. It requested that the present action be declared without merit and the plaintiff be ordered to pay the costs. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, by judgment 2024005349 issued at sixteen hours four minutes on August twentieth, two thousand twenty-four, ordered: “The exceptions of material res judicata, lack of passive standing and lack of current interest are rejected. The exception of lack of right is upheld and the claim filed by Randall Díaz Solís against the Banco Central de Costa Rica, the Superintendencia General de Valores, and the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero is declared without merit in all its aspects. Costs are imposed on the plaintiff, amounts that will be liquidated in the execution of the judgment, only for the defendants”. Disagreeing with the ruling, the plaintiff filed a cassation appeal, which was admitted by this Chamber on appeal for its resolution. Under the provisions of articles 137 and 138 of the CPCA, the procedural grievance will be addressed first, followed by the substantive one.

Cassation for procedural reasons.

The appellant raises a grievance of this nature. He alleges violation of procedural rules, in accordance with subsection c) of article 137 of the CPCA. He claims the judgment lacks a clear and precise determination regarding the facts it has deemed proven. He indicates that the Tribunal, when referring to the administrative file, establishes as Proven Fact 7) that: "…the information contained in the Power Point presentations from the months of January to June 2009 delivered to Pedro Jaime de Matheu López does not correspond to the account statements for that same period sent to the trustee—specifically in the asset line item—since it is higher than those indicated as the total final investments in the account statements, given that the Power Point presentations did not include data relating to repurchases (recompras) and their financing…". However, the CONASSIF agreement adopted in session 1562-2020, which is being challenged in the proceeding, expressly limits the reproach of informational inconsistency to the presentations for June and July 2009. To support this, he cites “Considerando III. Sobre el fondo del asunto” of said agreement, which states: “…In accordance with proven facts 4, 11, 13 and 16 (of CONASSIF agreement 1101-2014) within this administrative proceeding, approximately from January 2004 to July 2009, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López and Mr. Randall Díaz Solís maintained a professional advisory relationship, where the former, as an investor and the latter as a brokerage agent representing the brokerage house, jointly determined the investment strategies to follow; a relationship that is verified and carried out through telephone communications, emails and face-to-face meetings with certain regularity…”. Furthermore, he refers to Proven Fact 16 of CONASSIF agreement 1101-2014, which indicates: “…16. … At least in the presentations made for the months of June and July 2009, the data appearing on the slide called "Activos Actuales" does not coincide with the data found in the formal Account Statements of the Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán, in the "Resumen de Inversiones" section, with the line item called "Total" of current assets in the presentation slide offering a higher amount than that indicated in the "Total Final de Inversiones" line item of the corresponding account statements…”. He maintains that the Tribunal incurs in a lack of clear and precise determination when formulating Proven Fact 7), insofar as it extends and imputes a supposed discrepancy in the information provided to the client to all presentations made between January and June 2009, when the specific fact is limited exclusively to the presentations for the months of June and July 2009. He adds that Proven Fact 7) itself relies, among other sources, on expert report number 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued on December 9, 2014, by the Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, within criminal case number 10-001434-0612-PE, which is also limited solely to the analysis of the PowerPoint presentations corresponding to June and July 2009. He refutes that this imprecision places him in a situation of defenselessness, forcing him to refute a proven fact that does not correspond to the objective limits of the accusation made, nor to the evidentiary elements of the file, since the presentations from January to May 2009 were not the subject of accusation, were not introduced as evidence, discussed in the debate, or used as the basis for the sanction being challenged in this ordinary proceeding.

Regarding the causal ground alleged, the Sala Primera has expressed on repeated occasions the following: “V.- Regarding the procedural defect of lack of clear and precise determination of the proven facts, provided for by mandate 137 subsection c) of the CPCA, this Chamber has maintained that it consists of a confusing statement of such degree that it prevents certainty about the circumstance itself, or else, by a clear contradiction between the different factual elements. Likewise, that this procedural error must be distinguished from the preterition or improper weighing of evidence leading to the disregard of substantive rules. In this sense, in judgment no. 396-F-SI-2012 at 8 hours 55 minutes on March 22, 2012, it was noted that the "intellectual work developed by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is capable of being reviewed from different perspectives in cassation venue, which, furthermore, must not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes. In this sense, the disagreement may be due to substantial aspects, when the factual picture that the Tribunal had as proven is not consistent with the reality that emerges from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or of law, provided for in article 138 CPCA), or, to procedural errors, either for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the process or for a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Tribunal, when establishing the relevant factual picture for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confusing manner, in such a way that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation is that it intends to explain, or else, when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what the weighing carried out by the judges in their deliberation was. This responds to the purpose of the procedural causal grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to guarantee that the processing of the distinct stages that make up the jurisdictional process has proceeded through the channels provided for by the legal system, as well as that the judgment was issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable adjective norms (in this sense, vote no. 687-F-S1-2010 at 13 hours on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the fixing of the facts performed is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the proper scope of this causal ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. […]”. In this sense, votes 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575) can be consulted. In accordance with the above, this causal ground for cassation for procedural reasons occurs when the statement of the facts is imprecise, making it impossible to have certitude about the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have an appropriate knowledge of the factual situation intended to be taken as proven. It also occurs when there is an evident contradiction between the different factual elements, so the error must be of such magnitude that there can be no certainty of what the weighing carried out by the Tribunal was. Contrary to what the appellant maintains, this Chamber considers that proven fact number 7 does not suffer from the alleged defect. Indeed, the Tribunal clearly and understandably stated that the PowerPoint format presentations delivered to the complainant during the months of January to June 2009 did not include information relating to repurchases or their financing, which generated a discrepancy with the total value of investments reflected in the formal account statements sent to the trustee. This conclusion is duly supported by the documentary evidence in the administrative file (folios 1224 to 1307, 1469 to 1550 of volume 4, and 2574 to 2633 of volume 7), as well as by expert opinion No. 200-DEF-A-117-14 issued by the Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, whose content was expressly transcribed in the appealed judgment, and in which it was concluded that there was a gap between the balances reflected in the presentations and those recorded in the account statements, precisely because the repurchases were not included. Although the plaintiff objects to this conclusion, his disagreement is not aimed at a lack of clarity, precision or coherence in the formulation of the proven fact, but rather essentially raises disagreements with the content of the expert opinion and the joint weighing of the evidence. Such disagreement corresponds to a grievance of a substantive nature, outside the framework of the causal ground invoked, since the existence of an internal contradiction between the facts deemed proven, or an ambiguous formulation that prevents its full understanding, is neither objected to nor demonstrated. By virtue of the foregoing, the reproach lacks basis in accordance with article 137.1 subsection c) of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, because the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Tribunal is not appreciated. Neither is a contradiction observed between the factual situations taken as proven that makes it impossible to verify the appreciation of the evidence carried out by the Tribunal, much less, a violation of due process. Consequently, the charge is unfounded and must be rejected.

Cassation for substantive reasons.

The appellant alleges a substantive ground. He accuses improper weighing of the documentary and testimonial evidence that erroneously supports the sanction imposed by SUGEVAL and confirmed by the Tribunal Contencioso, for an alleged breach of the duty of information between January and July 2009. He reproaches the improper weighing of evidence that includes PowerPoint presentations, client communications, balance confirmations, authorizations for financing operations, and an expert report from the OIJ. He maintains that this evidence allows demonstrating that he did inform the client about the repurchases and their financing, so there was no concealment or omission of information. He emphasizes that the accusation of liability stems from an inadequate reading of the evidence, especially regarding the alleged discrepancy between the PowerPoint presentations and the account statements. He argues that these differences have an accounting and logical explanation, since the presentations and the account statements do not correspond to the same valuation date. He specifies that it cannot be taken as proven that they referred to the same period, as the Tribunal erroneously concludes by establishing it in proven fact 7.

It argues that the slides themselves contain explicit warnings regarding the exclusion of repurchase agreements, with annotations such as "does not include repurchase agreements," "reduction to zero of debts, margin calls, repurchase agreements, or outstanding balances," and that such warnings are acknowledged both in the expert report of the OIJ and in agreement 1562-2020 of CONASSIF. It alleges that the content of the presentations stems from a specific investment strategy requested by the client, and they do not constitute investment reports comparable to account statements. It reproaches the Court for stating that the content of the presentations provided by the complainant was not rebutted, when documentary evidence in the case file shows that all slides corresponding to January-July 2009 were indeed provided, in which express mention is made of repurchase agreements. It indicates that such a statement violates the principle of the presumption of innocence and the in dubio pro-reo principle, as the sanctioned party is required to prove his innocence despite the acknowledged doubt regarding the integrity of the evidence supporting the sanction. It argues the assessment of a balance certificate issued by the plaintiff in April 2009, since its coincidence with the account statement of the same date does not justify concluding that he had access to all information on other dates, such as July 2009, when he no longer worked at the brokerage firm. It notes that the Court overlooked relevant documentary evidence demonstrating that the client was informed of the risks and the status of the repurchase agreements: letters signed between 2008 and 2009 by Mr. de Matheu, authorizing operations, acknowledging the risks, and receiving reports. It emphasizes the improper assessment of the testimony of the brokerage firm's head of operations, who stated that there was no obligation to deliver account statements to the client, thereby rebutting another charge. It considers that the judgment relies on a fragmentary and biased assessment of the evidence, in contradiction to the rules of sound judgment, the principle of administrative sanction legality, and the constitutional principles of the presumption of innocence and in dubio pro-reo. It requests the annulment of the ruling for substantive violation of the legal system.

Of what was argued by the appellant, the Court resolved that the allegations of nullity raised by the plaintiff regarding the sanction imposed for breach of the duty to inform, pursuant to Article 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), were without merit. In the final act issued by CONASSIF on April 8, 2014, the sanction originally imposed by SUGEVAL had been partially revoked, acquitting the plaintiff of the breach of the duty of diligence, but upholding the sanction related to the informative omission. Subsequently, by judgment No. 000064-F-TC-2019 of May 16, 2019, the Court of Cassation partially annulled said administrative agreement because it was issued without allowing the adequate exercise of the right of defense. Consequently, CONASSIF was ordered to issue a new ruling on the alleged infringement of the duty to inform. In compliance with said order, the analysis of the offense focused on points 5 and 6 of the statement of charges: the omission to provide complete, clear, precise, and relevant information for Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López's investment decision-making, who, although formally holding the role of settlor (fideicomitente), had de facto assumed the client's position by giving direct investment instructions to the agent and the brokerage firm. The Court emphasized that this practical relationship should prevail over the legal structure of the trust (fideicomiso) contract, pursuant to Article 57 of Law No. 7523. Likewise, it established that the plaintiff had access to all information contained in the trust's account statements and there was no limitation regarding the quality or quantity of data he had to make available to the client. Such circumstance was proven by the issuance of a balance certificate as of April 16, 2009. However, it was determined that, between January and July 2009, the information delivered in the PowerPoint presentations did not coincide with the official account statements, particularly in the assets item, as it omitted relevant elements such as repurchase agreements and their financing, which were essential to establish the real balance of the portfolio. The Court considered as fundamental evidence expert report No. 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the OIJ on December 9, 2014, within criminal case No. 10-001434-0612-PE. This report concluded that the presentations showed balances higher than those reported in the official account statements, omitting essential information that could have misled the complainant and jeopardized his assets. Although the report indicated that it could not be guaranteed that the analyzed slides represented all those used, this limitation did not detract from the validity of its main findings. No contrary technical evidence was provided to rebut its content. The Court also dismissed the plaintiff's arguments that the discrepancies were due to projections requested by the client or to disclosed exclusions, as it was not proven that such warnings were uniform, clear, or accompanied by sufficient technical explanations to allow the client to adequately understand the difference with the account statements. Likewise, letters from previous years (2006 to 2008) were rejected as irrelevant, since the investigated facts corresponded exclusively to the year 2009. Finally, the Court concluded that both resolution No. SGV-R-2612 of SUGEVAL, issued on February 16, 2012, and the agreement adopted by CONASSIF in a session held on March 2, 2020, did not suffer from nullity defects nor contravene the legal system. Consequently, it rejected the plaintiff's claim to obtain the refund of the fine of ¢5,300,000.00 imposed on him and his removal from the SUGEVAL Disciplinary Measures Registry (Registro de Medidas Disciplinarias de la SUGEVAL), and declared the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects.

When confronting the alleged grievance and what was resolved by the Court, it is evident that we are faced with a lack of substantiation. The appeal objects to the conclusion reached by the administrative authority regarding the existence of an informative omission to the detriment of Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, attributed to the plaintiff in his capacity as a broker. In particular, it reproaches the fact that conclusive value was given to the contradiction between the PowerPoint presentations used in private meetings and the official account statements of the Minnie/Cuscatlán Trust (Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán) portfolio, without considering—in its view—the technical warnings inserted in the presentations or the possible temporal disparity between both documents. After a comprehensive analysis of the case file, this Chamber considers that such allegations are insufficient to undermine the validity of the reasoning contained in the appealed resolution. In the first place, expert report number 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued on December 9, 2014, by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), within criminal case number 10-001434-0612-PE, is of particular relevance. In said expert opinion, it was concluded that the presentations shown by the plaintiff to the complainant reflected higher asset values compared to those recorded in the official account statements, due to the omission of the repurchase agreements item, an essential element to determine the real balance of the trust. This was expressly stated: “...When comparing the slides provided by the victim with the account statements supplied by the brokerage firm through the lifting of bank secrecy, we realize that the amounts do not match, since the slides showed a higher balance in assets than the account statements, because they did not include repurchase agreements, an essential item to establish the real balance of the account; a situation that could have caused the victim to be misled and make decisions that put his assets at risk...”. This conclusion was not rebutted by the cassation appellant through contrary evidence of the same nature, nor does evidence of equal lineage exist in the record that reliably demonstrates that the methodological foundations used or the documentation examined were inaccurate. However, although the expert report indicates that it cannot be guaranteed that the analyzed slides constitute the entirety of those presented by the plaintiff, this does not diminish the relevance of its main finding: the existence of substantial discrepancies between the examined documents and the official account statements. Consequently, the expert report constitutes decisive evidence to establish the plaintiff's liability. On the other hand, the cassation appellant's assertions that the differences between the presentations and the account statements were explained by expressly indicated exclusions—such as the omission of repurchase agreements—or because they were projections prepared at the client's request, are insufficient to rebut the objective findings contained in the expert opinion, supported by the comparative analysis between documents obtained through the lifting of bank secrecy and the slides provided by the complainant. In light of this, it was not proven that the warnings contained in the presentations were uniform, explicit, or accompanied by sufficient explanations to allow the client to distinguish between merely projected information and real data of his portfolio. For this Chamber, a deficiency is observed in the standard of diligence required in this type of relationship, which obliges the broker to provide complete, understandable, and truthful information, especially in the case of higher-risk investments, as established by Article 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law. In the same vein, one may consult vote of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) No. 02758-2020 of 15:40 hrs. on November 19, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1010733). Therefore, the annotations inserted in the slides, such as "does not include repurchase agreements" or "projected scenarios at the client's request," do not exempt him from his obligation; on the contrary, they reflect his knowledge of the data presented, which were not complete, without it being proven that he offered the information necessary to remedy said omission. Nor is the argument that there was no duty to inform the settlor receivable. Regardless of what was agreed in the brokerage commission contract, it is recorded in the case file—and the Court reasoned as such—that the settlor in fact assumed the role of direct client of the brokerage firm, by issuing investment instructions directly. Under such circumstances, it was required to provide transparent and sufficient information to support his decisions, which, as demonstrated, did not occur during the first half of 2009. Furthermore, the cassation appellant petitions the application of the criminal principle in dubio pro-reo, considering that there were reasonable doubts about the facts supporting the sanction. However, for this Chamber, it is legally inappropriate to transfer said principle to the contentious-administrative process when the evidentiary assessment carried out by the Court has been in accordance with the principles of objectivity and sound judgment, Article 82.4 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo). Hence, the expert report—not rebutted with evidence of the same nature—acquires decisive weight to substantiate the plaintiff's liability, proving to be objective, impartial, and decisive evidence in the comprehensive assessment of the case. On the other hand, the letters signed by the complainant between 2006 and 2008, as well as the testimony of Mr. Javier Solís Arroyo, were correctly assessed as irrelevant, as they bear no relation to the period January-July 2009, nor to the specific facts upon which the accusation was based. Likewise, no pretermission of evidence is observed, given that the body of evidence provided by the appellant was duly analyzed and dismissed with sufficient reasoning by the Court. Similarly, no impact on the principle of culpability is observed, given that the formulated accusation is based on specific facts, proven through objective evidence, and in response to which the plaintiff was able to exercise his right of defense in the administrative and appellate stages. Therefore, this Chamber concludes that neither an improper evidentiary assessment nor an incorrect application of substantive law has occurred. For these reasons, the alleged grievance is unfounded and must be declared as such.

In light of the foregoing, none of the objections having succeeded, the appeal must be declared without merit. Pursuant to Article 150.3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the cassation appellant must be ordered to pay the costs generated by the exercise of this instance.

POR TANTO

The cassation appeal is declared without merit. The costs caused by its exercise shall be borne by the party who promoted it. CBE  DAMARIS MARIA VARGAS VASQUEZ - MAGISTRATE  LINDSAY MANUELA RODRIGUEZ CUBERO - MAGISTRATE  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRATE (today Citi Valores Accival S.A.), without restriction on the type of investment, and it was established that the settlor (fideicomitente) could make decisions and give instructions without liability for the trustee (fiduciario). On January 29, 2004, Mr. Matheu López sent a note to the stockbroker requesting that the trust (fideicomiso) serve as the holder of his assets and that, after his death, the assets be transferred to his children and wife. He indicated the trust name as “Minnie”. The trust was formally identified as “Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán”. Between January 2004 and July 2009, a professional advisory relationship was maintained with Mr. Matheu López, where investment strategies were determined. The instructions were authorized by letter by the authorized signatories on the signature registration card. The relationship ended in July 2009, because he no longer worked for the position, at which time another stockbroker took over the servicing of the trust. On November 28, 2005, a General Contract for Stock Market Operations was signed between Valores Cuscatlán Puesto de Bolsa and the Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán, represented by the trustee, Mr. Alberto Blanco Meléndez. In said contract, it was established that the persons authorized to carry out operations would be those registered with the Brokerage Firm (Puesto de Bolsa). He noted that, from January 3, 2004, until the signing of that contract in November 2005, the authorized signatures corresponded solely to the trustee, and were registered on a form dated March 23, 2004: Alberto Blanco Meléndez, Yadira Hernández González, Marcela Chaverri Coto, and Felipe Meléndez Morales, who signed individually. Subsequently, on December 6, 2005, a new form was signed modifying the authorized signatures, designating the following to sign jointly (mancomunadamente): Alberto Blanco Meléndez, Yadira Hernández González, Ruth Gutiérrez Morales, and Mary Jane Mora Gómez. From the signing of the stock market contract on November 28, 2005, until the request for the transfer of the trust's securities to Mercado de Valores Puesto de Bolsa S.A. made by Mr. Matheu López on August 13, 2009, the account statements for the operations carried out by the trust were sent to P.O. Box 6531-1000, corresponding to the trustee. He emphasized that Mr. Manuel Marenco Fernández, representative of Citi Valores Accival S.A., in a note dated November 3, 2009, indicated that the account statements were sent punctually to the client at his address, and that the control of the provisions between settlor and beneficiaries (fideicomisarios) was beyond his review. He added that the stock market contract of November 28, 2005, established that account statements would be sent monthly and their delivery by fax, mail, email, or other means was accepted, although a specific address for their receipt was not established. On September 6, 2007, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López authorized in writing his wife, Mrs. Noemy Quesada Alvarado, to make investments and liquidations at Banco Cuscatlán, Valores Cuscatlán, and Fondos Cuscatlán, within the framework of the Fideicomiso Minnie. This authorization had no limit on amount or expiration, except for express revocation. On November 10, 2007, Mr. de Matheu López signed a new authorized signatures form, including his wife among the persons empowered to operate on behalf of the trust. He related that, on an unspecified date but before 2008, an “Investor Risk Profile” (“Perfil de Riesgo del Inversionista”) form was completed identifying the client as the Fideicomiso Minnie, but indicating Mr. de Matheu López as the natural person. According to the evaluation, he was classified as a “moderate” (“moderado”) profile investor, with a score of 42 points. The document was signed by him, by an unidentified analysis executive, and by the responsible agent. Subsequently, they began to accept direct instructions from Mr. de Matheu López for stock market operations, providing him advice as a decision-maker, along with the trustee. In letters signed by Mr. de Matheu López between January 2006 and February 2009, he expressed his satisfaction with the management of his portfolio, acknowledging the associated risks and authorizing the maintenance of the investment strategy. On August 6, 2008, Mr. de Matheu authorized an investment in Apple shares, through a letter in which he stated that he knew the risks and released the agent and the brokerage firm from liability. The transaction was executed with ticket No. 60106343. On October 28, 2008, a new investor profile form was completed for Citi Valores Accival and Citi Fondos, again qualifying Mr. de Matheu as a “moderate” (“moderado”) investor. The document was signed by him, by the trustee Yadira Hernández González, and by an unidentified risk analysis representative. During the first half of 2009, meetings were held with Mr. de Matheu to design investment strategies, occasionally preparing PowerPoint presentations titled “Seguimiento de Inversiones Fideicomiso Minnie”, with the Citi logo. These were prepared at the request of Mr. de Matheu, and contained information on the trust's assets held in custody by both the brokerage firm and the trustee. On June 24, 2009, a first addendum to the trust agreement was signed, in which Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. assumed the position of trustee, replacing Banco Cuscatlán. Finally, on August 27, 2009, a Transaction Order was signed for Sale-Repo Cash operations in the account of the client Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán at Citi Valores Accival S.A. The Order states that said client authorizes the indicated brokerage firm “...to carry out the following transactions, in accordance with the Regulatory Framework and the Commission Contract for the Execution of Stock Market Operations…”. Said transactions corresponded to operations numbers 1090822953, 1090822959, 1090822961, and 1090822963. The transaction order was signed only by Mrs. Mary Jane Mora Gómez. He emphasized that, by that date, she no longer worked for Citi Valores, which makes the charge made by SUGEVAL in the statement of objections for the opening of the administrative procedure vague and imprecise. On August 19, 2009, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López requested by email to Mr. Manuel Marenco, representative of Citi Valores Accival, that the transfer of the securities of the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán to the Puesto de Bolsa Mercado de Valores be carried out, reiterating that said request had been made since August 13 without being executed. Between August 20 and September 9, 2009, the transfer of the securities was not completed, due to disagreements between Mr. de Matheu and Citi Valores Accival regarding the content of a settlement (finiquito) requested by the latter entity regarding the trust agreement. On September 10, 2009, a settlement of the trust agreement was signed between Mr. de Matheu as settlor and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., whereby the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán was terminated. The document was received by the banking entity on September 14, 2011. That same September 10, Mrs. Yadira Hernández, representing the trust, authorized Citi Valores Accival S.A. to transfer securities from account CEVAL 015760 to the Puesto de Bolsa Mercado de Valores S.A., in the name of Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López. On September 16, 2009, the transfer of securities was managed and the process was completed electronically on the 18th of that month. On August 21, 2009, Mr. de Matheu filed a complaint before the Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) for alleged inconsistencies in the management of the trust's investment portfolio, which is why he had knowledge of matters related to said Trust's investment portfolio up to July 24, 2009. The relationship between the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán and the Brokerage Firm arose from the trust agreement signed in 2004, which empowered Banco Cuscatlán (today Banco Citibank) as trustee to make stock market investments through said firm. In accordance with the regulations in force, the trustee held the legal representation of the trust and was the one who contracted with the brokerage firm. By resolution SGV-R 2246 at 9:30 a.m. on May 24, 2010, SUGEVAL initiated a sanctioning administrative procedure for alleged inconsistencies in the management of the investment portfolio; the Directing Body (Órgano Director) was appointed and the investigative phase of the procedure began. Finally, during the evidentiary phase (instrucción) of the procedure, neither the trust nor its legal representative, Banco Cuscatlán (today Banco Citibank), were joined as a party, despite being the entity that contracted with the brokerage firm on behalf of the trust. By official letter SGV-R-2612, the Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) resolved the sanctioning procedure, indicating the following: “…Declare that the Agente Corredor de Bolsa Randall Díaz Solís is responsible for failing to comply with the duties of diligence and information established in articles 60, 108, and 109 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, jointly with the brokerage firm for which he worked. Consequently, in accordance with articles 157 subsections 5) and 29), 163 subsection a), point 3, of the same legal body, he is sanctioned with a fine equivalent to 20 base salaries in accordance with Ley 7758, according to the amount in force for the base salary for the year 2009 (¢269,000.00), for a total fine in the sum of ¢5,380,000.00 (exact five million three hundred eighty thousand colones…)". He emphasized having filed a motion for reversal with an alternative appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio), alleging, among other things, the failure to include the trustee as a party to the proceeding, despite the fact that it was the one who held the legal representation of the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán. As a result, by resolution SGV-R-2704 at 10:00 a.m. on September 3, 2012, the Superintendencia General de Valores partially granted the appeal filed by Citi Valores, modified the amount of the fine imposed on said entity, and acquitted both the brokerage firm and the appealing officer of the breach of the duty of information.

Nonetheless, it imposed on the latter a fine equivalent to ten base salaries, corresponding to the sum of ¢2,690,000.00, for a single alleged breach of the duty of diligence (deber de diligencia) provided for in articles 60 and 108 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), in concurrence with the brokerage house (puesto de bolsa). On September 4, 2012, through resolution SGV-R-2705, SUGEVAL rejected the appeal for reversal filed regarding the sanction for breach of the duty of diligence and failed to rule on his appeal regarding the duty of information (deber de información). Both parties appeared before CONASSIF, reiterating their arguments and raising motions to nullify. He emphasized having filed a motion to nullify against resolution SGV-R-2704. On April 8, 2014, through an agreement adopted in session 1101-2014, CONASSIF annulled resolution SGV-R-2704, and absolved him regarding the duty of diligence, but sanctioned him for breach of the duty of information with a fine of ₡5,380,000.00. For its part, CONASSIF never ruled and left SUGEVAL resolution SGV-R-2705 untouched. On April 9, 2015, he filed a contentious-administrative proceeding, under case file 15-003035-1027-CA. By judgment 000064-F-TC-2019 of 9:30 a.m. on May 16, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-921923), the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) confirmed what was decided by SUGEVAL and partially annulled the CONASSIF agreement, for having imposed a sanction without respecting due process, ordering a new ruling to be issued. In compliance with the order, CONASSIF ordered in article 11 of session 1513-2019 of July 2, 2019, to dismiss the appeal against what was ordered in resolution SGV-R-2612 of 12:00 noon, on February 16, 2012, from the Superintendencia General de Valores, regarding the part the Cassation Chamber (Sala de Casación) ordered it to review. Nor did it impose any sanction or fine for breach of the duty of information. However, on July 31, 2019, judicial resolution 000113-F-TC-2019 of 2:20 p.m. on July 11, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-928791) was notified, in which a request for clarification and addition was rejected, giving finality to ruling 000064-F-TC-2019. Finally, on March 2, 2020, through session 1562-2020, CONASSIF annulled the previous agreement for having been issued prematurely and, upon ruling again, reiterated the rejection of the appeal against resolution SGV-R-2612, without imposing a sanction or fine for breach of the duty of information, limiting itself to pointing out that what was ordered in session 1101-2014 remained untouched. Based on that statement of facts, the claims were fixed so that the judgment would declare: “...1. The absolute nullity or, as the case may be, for being contrary to the Legal System (sic), the agreement of the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (CONASSIF) adopted in article 11 of the minutes of session 1562-2020, held on March 2, 2020, be revoked and left without any legal value or effect (sic). 2. That as a consequence of the declaration of nullity requested: A) it be declared that no sanction has fallen upon the undersigned within the Ordinary Sanctioning Administrative Procedure (Procedimiento Administrativo Ordinario Sancionatorio) (sic) ordered in resolution SGV-R 2246, of 9:30 a.m. on May 24, 2010, of the Superintendencia General de Valores; B) the corresponding authority be ordered to exclude me from the Registry of Disciplinary Measures (Registro de Medidas Disciplinarias) (sic) of SUGEVAL, and to eliminate the record of disciplinary measures from my personal information in the National Registry of Securities and Intermediaries (Registro Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios) (sic) and C) the return of the imposed fine that was duly paid in a timely manner be ordered, as well as interest at the legal rate, from the moment of its payment at the administrative venue and until its effective return, and the respective relevant fact be published. 3. That the State (sic) be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding...”. Once the legal transfer had been granted, the representation of the defendant party appeared in the record, answered the lawsuit in the negative, raised the preliminary defense of material res judicata (declared without merit through oral resolution No. 1561-2021 of 10:35 a.m. on 11/09/2021), and the exceptions of lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva), and lack of current interest. It requested that this action be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, through judgment 2024005349 issued at four minutes past four in the afternoon on August twenty, two thousand twenty-four, ordered: “The exceptions of material res judicata, lack of passive standing, and lack of current interest are rejected. The exception of lack of right is upheld, and the lawsuit filed by Randall Díaz Solís against the Banco Central de Costa Rica, the Superintendencia General de Valores, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are imposed on the plaintiff, amounts that shall be settled in execution of judgment, solely by the defendants”. Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff party filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación), which was admitted by this Chamber on appeal for its resolution. By virtue of the provisions of articles 137 and 138 of the CPCA, the grievance of a procedural nature will be addressed first and, subsequently, that of a substantive nature.

Cassation for procedural reasons.

The appellant raises one grievance of this nature. He alleges a violation of procedural rules, pursuant to subsection c) of article 137 of the CPCA. He claims the judgment incurs a lack of clear and precise determination regarding the facts it has deemed proven. He points out that the Tribunal, when referring to the administrative file, establishes as Proven Fact 7) that: “...the information contained in the Power Point presentations from the months of January to June 2009 delivered to Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, does not correspond with the account statements from that same period sent to the trustee -specifically in the assets line item-, since it is greater than those indicated as the final total of investments in the account statements, given that the Power Point presentations did not include the data related to the repurchases and their financing…”. However, the CONASSIF agreement adopted in session 1562-2020, which is challenged in the proceeding, expressly limits the reproach of informational inconsistency to the presentations of June and July 2009. To support this, he cites “Considering III. On the merits of the matter” of said agreement, which states: “…In accordance with proven facts 4, 11, 13 and 16 (of CONASSIF agreement 1101-2014) within this administrative proceeding, approximately from January 2004 until July 2009, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López and Mr. Randall Díaz Solís maintained a professional advisory relationship, where the former, as an investor and the latter, as a stockbroker representing the brokerage house, jointly determined the investment strategies to follow; a relationship that is evidenced and carried out through telephone communications, emails and face-to-face meetings with certain regularity…” Furthermore, he refers to Proven Fact 16 of CONASSIF agreement 1101-2014, which states: “ … “…16. … At least in the presentations made for the months of June and July 2009, the data appearing on the slide called "Current Assets" do not coincide with the data found in the formal Account Statements of the Minnie Cuscatlán Trust, in the "Investment Summary" section, given that in both months the line item called "Total" of current assets on the presentation slide offers an amount greater than that indicated in the "Final Total of Investments" line item of the corresponding account statements…” He maintains that the Tribunal incurrs a lack of clear and precise determination when formulating Proven Fact 7), insofar as it extends and imputes to all presentations made between January and June 2009 an alleged discrepancy in the information provided to the client, when the specific fact is limited exclusively to the presentations from the months of June and July 2009. He adds that Proven Fact 7) itself relies, among other sources, on expert report number 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued on December 9, 2014, by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), within criminal case number 10-001434-0612-PE, which is also limited solely to the analysis of the PowerPoint presentations corresponding to June and July 2009. He refutes that this imprecision places him in a state of defenselessness, by forcing him to refute a proven fact that does not correspond to the objective limits of the accusation made, nor to the evidentiary elements of the file, given that the presentations from January to May 2009 were not the object of accusation, nor were they introduced as evidence, discussed in the debate, nor used as the basis for the sanction challenged in this declaratory proceeding.

Regarding the alleged ground, the First Chamber has repeatedly expressed the following: “V.- Regarding the procedural defect of lack of clear and precise determination of the proven facts, provided for by mandate 137 subsection c) of the CPCA, this Chamber has held that it consists of a confusing exposition of such a degree that it prevents certainty about the circumstance itself, or else, by a glaring contradiction between the different factual elements. Likewise, that this procedural error must be differentiated from the omission or improper valuation of the evidence that entails the non-observance of substantive rules. In this sense, in judgment no. 396-F-SI-2012 of 8 hours 55 minutes on March 22, 2012, it was pointed out that the “intellective work developed by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is capable of being reviewed from different perspectives at the cassation venue, which, moreover, should not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes.

In this sense, the disagreement may be due to substantive aspects, when the factual picture that the Court considered proven does not match the reality derived from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or law, provided for in article 138 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA)), or to procedural errors, whether because it was based on illegitimate means of proof or those introduced in an illegal manner into the proceeding, or due to a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Court, in establishing the relevant factual picture for the specific case, formulates one or more facts in a confusing manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation it intends to make explicit is, or when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of the assessment made by the judges during deliberations. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to guarantee that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional process has flowed through the channels provided for by the legal system, as well as that the judgment was issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable procedural rules (in this regard, see vote no. 687-F-S1-2010 of 1:00 p.m. on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any question regarding whether the determination of the facts made is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of a substantive claim. […]”.. In this sense, see votes 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). In accordance with the foregoing, this ground for cassation for procedural reasons occurs when the exposition of facts is imprecise, making it impossible to be certain of the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have appropriate knowledge of the factual situation intended to be held as proven. It likewise occurs when there is an evident contradiction between the different factual elements, such that the error must be of such magnitude that there can be no certainty of the assessment made by the Court. Contrary to what the appellant maintains, this Chamber considers that proven fact number 7 does not suffer from the alleged defect. Indeed, the Court clearly and comprehensibly explained that the PowerPoint presentations delivered to the complainant during the months of January to June 2009 did not include information regarding the repurchases (recompras) or their financing, which generated a discrepancy with the total investment value reflected in the formal account statements sent to the trustee (fiduciario). This conclusion is duly supported by the documentary evidence in the administrative case file (folios 1224 to 1307, 1469 to 1550 of volume 4, and 2574 to 2633 of volume 7), as well as by expert opinion No. 200-DEF-A-117-14 issued by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), whose content was expressly transcribed in the appealed judgment, and which concluded that there was a mismatch between the balances shown in the presentations and those recorded in the account statements, precisely because the repurchases were not included. While the plaintiff objects to this conclusion, their disagreement is not directed at a lack of clarity, precision, or coherence in the formulation of the proven fact, but rather fundamentally raises disagreements with the content of the expert opinion and the joint assessment of the evidence. Such disagreement corresponds to a grievance of a substantive nature, outside the framework of the invoked ground, since the existence of an internal contradiction between the facts held as proven or an ambiguous formulation preventing their full comprehension is not objected to, much less demonstrated. By virtue of the foregoing, the reproach lacks basis pursuant to article 137.1 subsection c) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), given that a lack of clear and precise determination of the facts proven by the Court is not observed. Nor is a contradiction observed between the factual situations held as proven, which would make it impossible to verify the assessment of the evidence carried out by the Court, even less a violation of due process. Consequently, the claim is inadmissible and must be rejected.

Cassation for substantive reasons.

The appellant alleges a substantive ground. He claims improper assessment of the documentary and testimonial evidence that erroneously supports the penalty imposed by SUGEVAL and confirmed by the Contentious-Administrative Court, for an alleged breach of the duty to inform between January and July 2009. He reproaches improper assessment of the evidence including PowerPoint presentations, client communications, balance certificates, authorizations for financing operations, and an expert report from the OIJ. He maintains that this evidence allows demonstrating that he did inform the client about the repurchases and their financing, and therefore there was no concealment or omission of information. He stresses that the attribution of responsibility stems from an improper reading of the evidence, especially regarding the alleged discrepancy between the PowerPoint presentations and the account statements. He argues that these differences have an accounting and logical explanation, since the presentations and the account statements do not correspond to the same valuation date. He points out that it cannot be held as proven that they referred to the same period, as the Court erroneously concludes when establishing it in proven fact 7. He argues that the slides themselves contain explicit warnings about the exclusion of repurchases, with annotations such as “does not include repurchases (no incluye recompras)”, “reduction to zero of debts, margin calls, repurchases or balances receivable (disminución a cero de las deudas, llamadas al margen, recompras o saldos por cobrar)”, and that such warnings are recognized both in the expert report of the OIJ and in agreement 1562-2020 of CONASSIF. He alleges that the content of the presentations responds to a specific investment strategy requested by the client, and does not constitute investment reports comparable to account statements. He reproaches that the Court affirms that the content of the presentations provided by the complainant was not refuted, when documentary evidence exists in the case file showing that all slides corresponding to January-July 2009 were indeed provided, in which express mention is made of the repurchases. He indicates that such affirmation violates the principle of presumption of innocence and the in dubio pro-reo principle, since the sanctioned party is required to demonstrate his innocence despite the recognized doubt regarding the integrity of the evidence forming the basis for the penalty. He argues the assessment of a balance certificate issued by the actor in April 2009, since its coincidence with the account statement of the same date does not justify concluding that he had access to all information on other dates, such as July 2009, when he no longer worked at the brokerage house. He points out that the Court disregarded relevant documentary evidence demonstrating that the client was informed of the risks and the status of the repurchases: letters signed between 2008 and 2009 by Mr. de Matheu, authorizing operations, acknowledging the risks, and receiving reports. He emphasizes the improper assessment of the testimony of the brokerage house's operations chief, who stated that it was not an obligation to deliver account statements to the client, thereby refuting another of the charges. He considers that the judgment relies on a fragmented and biased appreciation of the evidence, in contradiction with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), the principle of sanctioning legality, and the constitutional principles of presumption of innocence and in dubio pro-reo. He requests the annulment of the ruling for substantive infraction of the legal system.

From what the appellant argued, the Court resolved that the nullity claims raised by the plaintiff regarding the penalty imposed for non-compliance with the duty to inform, pursuant to article 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), were not valid. In the final act issued by CONASSIF on April 8, 2014, the penalty originally imposed by SUGEVAL had been partially revoked, absolving the actor of the breach of the duty of diligence, but maintaining the penalty relating to the information omission. Subsequently, through judgment No. 000064-F-TC-2019 of May 16, 2019, the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) partially annulled said administrative agreement because it had been issued without allowing the adequate exercise of the right of defense. Consequently, CONASSIF was ordered to issue a new pronouncement on the alleged infraction of the duty to inform. In compliance with this order, the analysis of the breach focused on points 5 and 6 of the statement of charges (intimación de hechos): the omission to provide complete, clear, precise, and relevant information for investment decision-making to Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, who, although formally holding the role of trustor (fideicomitente), had de facto assumed the position of the client by giving direct investment instructions to the agent and the brokerage house. The Court highlighted that this practical relationship should prevail over the legal structure of the trust agreement, in accordance with article 57 of Law No. 7523. Likewise, it established that the actor had access to all the information contained in the trust's account statements and there was no limitation regarding the quality or quantity of data he had to make available to the client. This circumstance was proven by the issuance of a balance certificate (constancia de saldo) as of April 16, 2009. However, it was determined that, between January and July 2009, the information delivered in the PowerPoint presentations did not coincide with the official account statements, particularly in the assets line item, as it omitted relevant elements such as repurchases and their financing, which were indispensable for establishing the real balance of the portfolio. The Court considered as fundamental evidence the expert opinion No. 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the OIJ on December 9, 2014, within criminal case No. 10-001434-0612-PE. This report concluded that the presentations showed balances higher than those reported in the official account statements, omitting essential information that could have induced the complainant into error and compromised his assets. Despite the report indicating that it could not be guaranteed that the analyzed slides represented the totality of those used, this limitation did not detract from the validity of its main findings. No contrary technical evidence was provided to refute its content. The Court also dismissed the actor's arguments that the discrepancies were due to projections requested by the client or to advised exclusions, because it was not proven that such warnings were uniform, clear, or accompanied by sufficient technical explanations to allow the client to adequately understand the difference with the account statements. Likewise, letters from previous years (2006 to 2008) were rejected as irrelevant, since the investigated facts corresponded exclusively to the year 2009. Finally, the Court concluded that both resolution No.

SGV-R-2612 of the SUGEVAL, issued on February 16, 2012, and the agreement adopted by CONASSIF in a session held on March 2, 2020, did not suffer from nullity defects nor contravene the legal system. Consequently, it rejected the plaintiff’s claim for the refund of the fine of ¢5,300,000.00 imposed against him and his removal from the Register of Disciplinary Measures (Registro de Medidas Disciplinarias) of the SUGEVAL and dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety.

Upon comparing the grievance raised and what was resolved by the Tribunal, it is evident that we are faced with a lack of proper reasoning. The appeal objects to the conclusion reached by the administrative authority regarding the existence of an informational omission to the detriment of Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, attributed to the appellant in his capacity as a stockbroker. In particular, it criticizes having given conclusive weight to the contradiction between the PowerPoint presentations used in private meetings and the official portfolio statements of the Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán, without considering—in its view—the technical warnings inserted in the presentations or the potential temporal disparity between the two documents. After a comprehensive analysis of the case file, this Chamber considers that such arguments are not sufficient to undermine the validity of the reasoning contained in the appealed decision. Firstly, expert report number 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued on December 9, 2014, by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), within criminal case number 10-001434-0612-PE, is of special relevance. In said opinion, it was concluded that the presentations shown by the appellant to the complainant reflected higher asset values compared to those recorded in the official account statements, due to the omission of the repurchase item, an indispensable element for determining the real balance of the trust. Thus, it was expressly stated: "...When comparing the slides provided by the injured party with the account statements supplied by the brokerage firm through the lifting of banking secrecy, we realize that the amounts do not match, since the slides showed a higher balance in assets than the account statements, because they did not include repurchases, an indispensable item for establishing the real balance of the account; a situation that could have led the injured party into error and caused him to make decisions that put his assets at risk...". This conclusion was not rebutted by the cassation appellant through contrary evidence of the same nature, nor does the record contain evidence of equal lineage that conclusively demonstrates that the methodological foundations used or the documentation examined were imprecise. However, although the expert report indicates that it cannot be guaranteed that the analyzed slides constitute the entirety of those presented by the appellant, this does not diminish the relevance of its main finding: the existence of substantial discrepancies between the examined documents and the official account statements. Consequently, the expert report constitutes decisive evidence to establish the appellant's responsibility. Moreover, the cassation appellant's claims, in the sense that the differences between the presentations and the account statements were explained by expressly indicated exclusions—such as the omission of repurchases—or because they were projections prepared at the client's request, are not sufficient to rebut the objective findings contained in the expert opinion, supported by the comparative analysis between documents obtained through the lifting of banking secrecy and the slides provided by the complainant. Faced with this, it was not proven that the warnings contained in the presentations had been uniform, explicit, or accompanied by sufficient explanations that would allow the client to distinguish between merely projected information and real data from his portfolio. For this Chamber, a deficiency is observed in the standard of diligence required in this type of relationship, which obliges the stockbroker to provide complete, comprehensible, and truthful information, especially in the case of higher-risk investments, as established by Article 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores). In the same vein, see vote no. 02758-2020 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) at 15:40 hrs. on November 19, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1010733). Therefore, the annotations inserted in the slides, such as "does not include repurchases" or "scenarios projected at the client's request," do not exonerate him from his obligation; on the contrary, they reflect the knowledge he possesses about the data presented, which was not complete, without it having been proven that he offered the necessary information to correct said omission. Nor is the argument that there was no duty to inform the trustor (fideicomitente) acceptable. Regardless of what was agreed in the brokerage commission contract, it is recorded in the case file—and thus reasoned by the Tribunal—that the trustor (fideicomitente) effectively assumed the role of the direct client of the brokerage firm, by directly issuing investment instructions. Under such circumstances, it was mandatory to provide transparent and sufficient information to support his decisions, which, as was demonstrated, did not occur during the first half of 2009. On the other hand, the cassation appellant requests the application of the criminal principle in dubio pro-reo, considering that reasonable doubts existed about the facts supporting the sanction. However, for this Chamber, it is legally improper to transfer said principle to the contentious-administrative process when the evidentiary assessment carried out by the Tribunal has been in accordance with the principles of objectivity and sound judgment (sana crítica), Article 82.4 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo). Hence, the expert report—not rebutted with evidence of the same nature—acquires decisive weight to substantiate the appellant's responsibility, as it constitutes objective, impartial, and decisive evidence in the comprehensive assessment of the case. Furthermore, the letters signed by the complainant between 2006 and 2008, as well as the testimony of Mr. Javier Solís Arroyo, were correctly assessed as irrelevant, as they bear no relation to the period January-July 2009, nor to the specific facts upon which the accusation fell. Likewise, a failure to consider evidence (preterición probatoria) is not perceived, given that the set of evidence provided by the appellant was duly analyzed and dismissed with sufficient reasoning by the Tribunal. Similarly, an impact on the principle of culpability is not verified, given that the formulated accusation is based on specific facts, proven through objective evidence, and in response to which the appellant was able to exercise his right to defense in the administrative and appellate venue. For the foregoing reasons, this Chamber concludes that neither an improper evidentiary assessment nor an incorrect application of substantive law is configured. For these reasons, the grievance raised becomes unfounded and must be declared so.

On the merits of the foregoing, none of the objections having succeeded, the appeal must be dismissed. Pursuant to Article 150.3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the cassation appellant must be ordered to pay the costs generated by the exercise of this instance.

POR TANTO

The cassation appeal is dismissed.

The costs incurred in its exercise are borne by the person who promoted it. CBE

For this Chamber, a deficiency is observed in the standard of diligence required in this type of relationship, which obligates the stockbroker to provide complete, understandable, and truthful information, especially in the case of higher-risk investments, as established by article 109 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores. In the same sense, see the ruling of the First Chamber no. 02758-2020 of 15:40 hrs. on November 19, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1010733).

On November 10, 2007, Mr. de Matheu López signed a new authorized signatures form, including his wife among the persons empowered to operate on behalf of the trust (fideicomiso). He recounted that, on an unspecified date but prior to 2008, an "Investor Risk Profile" form was completed identifying the Minnie Trust (Fideicomiso Minnie) as the client, but indicating Mr. de Matheu López as the natural person. According to the assessment, he was classified as a "moderate" profile investor, with a score of 42 points. The document was signed by him, by an unidentified analysis executive, and by the responsible agent. Subsequently, they began accepting direct instructions from Mr. de Matheu López for stock market operations, providing him with advisory services as a decision-maker, along with the trustee. In letters signed by Mr. de Matheu López between January 2006 and February 2009, he expressed his satisfaction with the management of his portfolio, acknowledging the associated risks and authorizing the maintenance of the investment strategy. On August 6, 2008, Mr. de Matheu authorized an investment in Apple shares, through a letter in which he stated he was aware of the risks and released the agent and the brokerage firm (puesto de bolsa) from liability. The transaction was executed with ticket No. 60106343. On October 28, 2008, a new investor profile form was completed for Citi Valores Accival and Citi Fondos, once again classifying Mr. de Matheu as a "moderate" investor. The document was signed by him, by the trustee Yadira Hernández González, and by an unidentified risk analysis representative. During the first half of 2009, meetings were held with Mr. de Matheu to design investment strategies, occasionally preparing PowerPoint presentations under the title "Minnie Trust Investment Monitoring" ("Seguimiento de Inversiones Fideicomiso Minnie"), with the Citi logo. These were prepared at the request of Mr. de Matheu, and contained information on the trust's assets held in custody by both the brokerage firm and the trustee. On June 24, 2009, a first addendum to the trust agreement was signed, in which Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. assumed the position of trustee in substitution of Banco Cuscatlán. Finally, on August 27, 2009, a Transaction Order was signed for sale-reporto cash operations in the client account Minnie Cuscatlán Trust at Citi Valores Accival S.A. The Order states that said client authorizes the indicated brokerage firm "...to carry out the following transactions, in accordance with the Regulatory Framework and the Commission Agreement for the Execution of Stock Market Operations…". These transactions corresponded to operation numbers 1090822953, 1090822959, 1090822961, and 1090822963. The transaction order was signed solely by Mrs. Mary Jane Mora Gómez. He emphasized that, by that date, she no longer worked for Citi Valores, which makes the charge leveled by SUGEVAL in the statement of objections for the opening of the administrative procedure vague and imprecise. On August 19, 2009, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López requested via email to Mr. Manuel Marenco, representative of Citi Valores Accival, that the transfer of the securities of the Minnie/Cuscatlán Trust to the brokerage firm Mercado de Valores be carried out, reiterating that said request had been raised since August 13 without being executed. Between August 20 and September 9, 2009, the transfer of the securities was not completed, due to disagreements between Mr. de Matheu and Citi Valores Accival regarding the content of a release requested by this latter entity concerning the trust agreement. On September 10, 2009, a release of the trust agreement was signed between Mr. de Matheu as settlor (fideicomitente) and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., by which the Minnie/Cuscatlán Trust was extinguished. The document was received by the banking entity on September 14, 2011. On that same September 10, Mrs. Yadira Hernández, representing the trust, authorized Citi Valores Accival S.A. to transfer securities from CEVAL account 015760 to the brokerage firm Mercado de Valores S.A., in the name of Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López. On September 16, 2009, the transfer of the securities was managed and the process was completed electronically on the 18th of that month. On August 21, 2009, Mr. de Matheu filed a complaint before the Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) for alleged inconsistencies in the management of the trust's investment portfolio, for which reason he only learned about the investment portfolio of said Trust up to July 24, 2009. The relationship between the Minnie/Cuscatlán Trust and the brokerage firm arose from the trust agreement signed in 2004, which empowered Banco Cuscatlán (now Banco Citibank) as trustee, to make stock market investments through said brokerage firm. In accordance with the regulations in force, the trustee held the legal representation of the trust, and was the one who contracted with the brokerage firm. By resolution SGV-R 2246 of 9:30 a.m. on May 24, 2010, SUGEVAL initiated an administrative sanctioning procedure for alleged inconsistencies in the management of the investment portfolio, the directing body (Órgano Director) was appointed, and the investigative phase of the procedure began. Finally, in the procedural instruction, neither the trust nor its legal representative, Banco Cuscatlán (now Banco Citibank), were included as a party, despite being the entity that contracted with the brokerage firm on behalf of the trust. By official communication SGV-R-2612, the Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) resolved the sanctioning procedure, stating the following: "…Declare the Stock Broker Agent Randall Díaz Solís responsible for failing to comply with the duties of diligence and information established in articles 60, 108, and 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores) in concurrence with the brokerage firm for which he worked. Consequently, in accordance with articles 157 subsections 5) and 29), 163 subsection a), point 3, of the same legal body, he is sanctioned with a fine equivalent to 20 base salaries in accordance with Law 7758, according to the amount in force for the base salary for the year 2009 (¢269,000.00), for a total fine in the sum of ¢5,380,000.00 (exactly five million three hundred eighty thousand colones…"). He emphasized having filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal, alleging, among other things, the failure to include the trustee as a party to the procedure, even though it was the one holding the legal representation of the Minnie/Cuscatlán Trust. As a result, by resolution SGV-R-2704 of 10:00 a.m. on September 3, 2012, the Superintendencia General de Valores partially granted the appeal filed by Citi Valores, modified the amount of the fine imposed on said entity, and absolved both the brokerage firm and the appellant official of the breach of the duty to inform. However, it imposed on the latter a fine equivalent to ten base salaries, corresponding to the sum of ¢2,690,000.00, for a single alleged breach of the duty of diligence provided for in articles 60 and 108 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law, in concurrence with the brokerage firm. On September 4, 2012, by resolution SGV-R-2705, SUGEVAL rejected the motion for reconsideration filed regarding the sanction for breach of the duty of diligence and failed to rule on his appeal regarding the duty to inform. Both parties appealed to CONASSIF, reiterating their arguments and raising nullity incidents. He emphasized having filed a nullity incident against resolution SGV-R-2704. On April 8, 2014, by agreement adopted in session 1101-2014, CONASSIF annulled resolution SGV-R-2704, and absolved him of the duty of diligence, but sanctioned him for breach of the duty to inform with a fine of ₡5,380,000.00. For its part, CONASSIF never ruled and left SUGEVAL resolution SGV-R-2705 intact. On April 9, 2015, he filed a contentious-administrative proceeding, under case file 15-003035-1027-CA. By judgment 000064-F-TC-2019 of 9:30 a.m. on May 16, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-921923), the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) confirmed what was resolved by SUGEVAL and partially annulled the CONASSIF agreement, for having imposed a sanction without respecting due process, ordering a new ruling to be issued. In compliance with what was ordered, CONASSIF ordered in article 11 of session 1513-2019 of July 2, 2019, to declare the appeal without merit against what was ordered in resolution SGV-R-2612 of 12:00 noon, February 16, 2012 of the Superintendencia General de Valores, regarding the aspect that the Cassation Chamber ordered it to review. Nor did it impose any sanction or fine for failing to comply with the duty to inform. However, on July 31, 2019, judicial resolution 000113-F-TC-2019 of 2:20 p.m. on July 11, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-928791) was notified, in which a request for clarification and addition was rejected, which gave finality to judgment 000064-F-TC-2019. Finally, on March 2, 2020, through session 1562-2020, CONASSIF annulled the previous agreement for having been issued prematurely and, upon resolving again, reiterated the rejection of the appeal against resolution SGV-R-2612, without imposing a sanction or fine for breach of the duty to inform, limiting itself to pointing out that what was ordered in session 1101-2014 remained intact. Based on that relation of facts, the claims were fixed so that in the judgment it be declared: "...1. The absolute nullity or, in its case, for being contrary to the Legal System (sic) the agreement of the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, CONASSIF) adopted in article 11 of the minutes of session 1562-2020, held on March 2, 2020 be revoked and left without any legal value or effects (sic). 2.

That as a consequence of the declaration of nullity requested: A) it be declared that no sanction has been imposed on the undersigned within the Ordinary Administrative Sanctioning Proceeding (sic) ordered in resolution SGV-R 2246, of 9:30 a.m. on May 24, 2010, of the Superintendencia General de Valores; B) the corresponding authority be ordered to exclude me from the Registry of Disciplinary Measures (sic) of SUGEVAL, and to eliminate the record of disciplinary measures from my personal information in the Registro Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios (sic) and C) the refund of the imposed fine that was duly paid be ordered, as well as interest at the legal rate, from the time of its payment in the administrative venue until its effective refund, and the respective material fact be published. 3. That the State (sic) be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding..." After the legal transfer was granted, the representation of the defendant party appeared in the record, answered the lawsuit in the negative, filed the preliminary defense of material res judicata (declared without merit by oral resolution No. 1561-2021 of 10:35 a.m. on 11/09/2021), and the exceptions of lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva), and lack of current interest (falta de interés actual). It requested that this action be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, by judgment 2024005349 issued at sixteen hours and four minutes on August 20, two thousand twenty-four, ordered: "The exceptions of material res judicata, lack of passive standing, and lack of current interest are rejected. The exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) is upheld and the lawsuit filed by Randall Díaz Solís against the Banco Central de Costa Rica, the Superintendencia General de Valores, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are imposed on the plaintiff, amounts to be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment phase, exclusively by the defendants." Disagreeing with the ruling, the plaintiff filed an appeal for cassation (recurso de casación), which was admitted by this Chamber on appeal for its resolution. By virtue of the provisions in articles 137 and 138 of the CPCA, the procedural grievance will be addressed first and, subsequently, the substantive one.

**Cassation for procedural reasons.** The cassation appellant raises one grievance of this nature. He alleges violation of procedural rules, in accordance with subsection c) of article 137 of the CPCA. He claims the judgment incurs in a lack of clear and precise determination regarding the facts it has deemed proven. He points out that the Tribunal, when referring to the administrative file, establishes as Proven Fact 7) that: "…the information contained in the Power Point presentations from the months of January to June 2009 delivered to Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, does not correspond to the account statements for that same period sent to the fiduciary—specifically in the assets line item—since it is greater than that indicated as the final total of investments in the account statements, given that the Power Point presentations did not include data related to repurchases and their financing…". However, the CONASSIF agreement adopted in session 1562-2020, which is challenged in the proceeding, expressly limits the reproach of informational inconsistency to the June and July 2009 presentations. To support this, he cites “Considerando III. On the merits of the matter” of that agreement, it is stated: “…Pursuant to proven facts 4, 11, 13 and 16 (of CONASSIF agreement 1101-2014) within this administrative proceeding, approximately from January 2004 to July 2009, Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López and Mr. Randall Díaz Solís maintained a professional advisory relationship, where the former, as an investor, and the latter, as a stockbroker representing the brokerage position, jointly determined the investment strategies to follow; a relationship that is verified and carried out through telephone communications, emails, and face-to-face meetings of certain regularity…” He further refers to Proven Fact 16 of CONASSIF agreement 1101-2014, which states: "… “…16. … At least in the presentations made for the months of June and July 2009, the data appearing on the slide called ‘Current Assets’ does not coincide with the data found in the formal Account Statements of the Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán, in the ‘Investment Summary’ section, given that in both months the line item called ‘Total’ of current assets on the presentation slide provides an amount higher than that indicated in the ‘Final Total of Investments’ line item of the corresponding account statements…” He maintains that the Tribunal incurs in a lack of clear and precise determination when formulating Proven Fact 7), insofar as it extends and imputes an alleged discrepancy in the information provided to the client to all presentations made between January and June 2009, when the specific fact is limited exclusively to the presentations for the months of June and July 2009. He adds that Proven Fact 7) itself relies, among other sources, on expert report number 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued on December 9, 2014, by the Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, within criminal case number 10-001434-0612-PE, which is also circumscribed solely to the analysis of the PowerPoint presentations corresponding to June and July 2009. He refutes that this imprecision places him in a situation of defenselessness, forcing him to rebut a proven fact that does not correspond to the objective limits of the imputation made, nor to the evidentiary elements of the file, since the presentations from January to May 2009 were not the object of imputation, nor were they introduced as evidence, discussed in the debate, nor used as the basis for the sanction challenged in this cognizance proceeding.

Regarding the alleged ground, the Sala Primera has repeatedly stated the following: "V.- On the procedural defect of lack of clear and precise determination of the proven facts, provided for by mandate 137 subsection c) of the CPCA, this Chamber has held that it consists of an exposition so confusing that it makes it impossible to be certain of the circumstance itself, or, by a blatant contradiction between the different factual elements. Likewise, this procedural error must be differentiated from the omission or improper assessment of evidence, which entails the non-observance of substantive rules. In this sense, in judgment no. 396-F-SI-2012 of 8:55 a.m. on March 22, 2012, it was indicated that the ‘intellectual work carried out by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is susceptible to being reviewed from different perspectives in the cassation venue, which, moreover, should not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes. In this sense, the disagreement may stem from substantial aspects, when the factual picture that the Tribunal deemed proven is not consistent with the reality that emerges from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or of law, provided for in article 138 CPCA), or else, from procedural errors, whether because it was based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the proceeding, or because of a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Tribunal, in establishing the relevant factual picture for the specific case, formulates one or more facts in a confusing manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation is that it intends to make explicit, or when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what the assessment made by the judges during deliberation was. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to guarantee that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional proceeding has proceeded through the channels provided for by the legal system, as well as that the judgment has been issued in the form prescribed by the applicable procedural rules (in this sense, vote no. 687-F-S1-2010 of 1:00 p.m. on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the determination of the facts made is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. […]’”.. In this sense, consult votes 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). In accordance with the above, this ground for cassation for procedural reasons occurs when the exposition of the facts is imprecise, making it impossible to have certainty of the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have an adequate understanding of the factual situation intended to be deemed proven. Likewise, it occurs when there is an evident contradiction between the different factual elements, such that the error must be of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what the assessment made by the Tribunal was. Contrary to what the appellant maintains, this Chamber considers that proven fact number 7 does not suffer from the alleged defect. Indeed, the Tribunal clearly and understandably set forth that the PowerPoint presentations delivered to the complainant during the months of January to June 2009 did not include information relating to repurchases or their financing, which generated a discrepancy with the total value of investments reflected in the formal account statements sent to the fiduciary. Such a conclusion is duly supported by the documentary evidence contained in the administrative file (pages 1224 to 1307, 1469 to 1550 of volume 4, and 2574 to 2633 of volume 7), as well as by expert opinion No. 200-DEF-A-117-14 issued by the Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, the content of which was expressly transcribed in the appealed judgment, and in which it was concluded that there was a mismatch between the balances reflected in the presentations and those recorded in the account statements, precisely because repurchases were not included. While the plaintiff objects to that conclusion, his disagreement is not directed at a lack of clarity, precision, or coherence in the formulation of the proven fact, but rather, at its core, raises disagreements with the content of the expert opinion and the joint assessment of the evidence.

Such disagreement corresponds to a grievance of a substantive nature, outside the framework of the invoked ground, since what is objected to is not, much less is it demonstrated, the existence of an internal contradiction among the facts taken as accredited or an ambiguous formulation that impedes their full comprehension. By virtue of the foregoing, the reproach lacks support pursuant to article 137.1 subsection c) of the Contencioso-Administrativo Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), given that a lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Tribunal is not appreciated. Nor is a contradiction observed among the factual situations taken as demonstrated, which makes it impossible to verify the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence, much less a violation of due process (debido proceso). Consequently, the charge is groundless and must be rejected.

**Appeal on substantive grounds (Casación por razones sustantivas).** 4. The appellant alleges a ground on the merits. He challenges the improper assessment of the documentary and testimonial evidence that erroneously supports the sanction imposed by SUGEVAL and confirmed by the Contencioso-Administrativo Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso), for an alleged failure to comply with the duty to inform between January and July 2009. He reproaches the improper assessment of evidence including PowerPoint presentations, client communications, balance certificates, authorizations for financing operations, and an expert report from the OIJ. He maintains that this evidence demonstrates that he did inform the client about the repurchases and their financing, so there was no concealment or omission of information. He emphasizes that the attribution of responsibility stems from an inadequate reading of the evidence, especially regarding the supposed discrepancy between the PowerPoint presentations and the account statements. He argues that these differences have an accounting and logical explanation, since the presentations and the account statements do not correspond to the same value date. He specifies that it cannot be taken as proven that they referred to the same period, as the Tribunal erroneously concluded by establishing this in proven fact 7. He argues that the slides themselves contain explicit warnings about the exclusion of repurchases, with notes such as "does not include repurchases" (“no incluye recompras”), "reduction to zero of debts, margin calls, repurchases, or balances receivable" (“disminución a cero de las deudas, llamadas al margen, recompras o saldos por cobrar”), and that such warnings are acknowledged both in the expert report of the OIJ and in CONASSIF agreement 1562-2020. He alleges that the content of the presentations follows a specific investment strategy requested by the client, and they do not constitute investment reports comparable to account statements. He reproaches the Tribunal for stating that the content of the presentations provided by the complainant was not refuted, when documentary evidence in the case file shows that all slides corresponding to January-July 2009 were indeed provided, in which express mention is made of the repurchases. He indicates that such an affirmation violates the principle of presumption of innocence (presunción de inocencia) and the principle of in dubio pro-reo, since the sanctioned party is required to prove his innocence despite the acknowledged doubt about the integrity of the evidence forming the basis of the sanction. He argues regarding the assessment of a balance certificate issued by the plaintiff in April 2009, that its coincidence with the account statement of the same date does not justify concluding that the complainant had access to all information on other dates, such as July 2009, when he no longer worked at the brokerage firm. He points out that the Tribunal disregarded relevant documentary evidence demonstrating that the client was informed of the risks and the status of the repurchases: letters signed between 2008 and 2009 by Mr. de Matheu, authorizing operations, acknowledging risks, and receiving reports. He emphasizes the improper assessment of the testimony of the brokerage firm's head of operations, who affirmed that there was no obligation to deliver account statements to the client, thereby refuting another of the charges. He considers that the judgment relies on a fragmented and biased assessment of the evidence, in contradiction with the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica), the principle of punitive legality, and the constitutional principles of presumption of innocence and in dubio pro-reo. He requests the annulment of the ruling due to substantive infringement of the legal system.

5. From what was argued by the appellant, the Tribunal resolved that the nullity reproaches raised by the plaintiff regarding the sanction imposed for non-compliance with the duty to inform, pursuant to article 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores), were unfounded. In the definitive act issued by CONASSIF on April 8, 2014, the sanction originally imposed by SUGEVAL had been partially revoked, absolving the plaintiff of the breach of the duty of diligence, but maintaining the sanction related to the informational omission. Subsequently, through judgment No. 000064-F-TC-2019 of May 16, 2019, the Court of Appeal (Tribunal de Casación) partially annulled said administrative agreement because it had been issued without allowing the adequate exercise of the right of defense (derecho de defensa). Consequently, CONASSIF was ordered to issue a new ruling on the alleged infringement of the duty to inform. In compliance with said order, the analysis of the fault focused on points 5 and 6 of the notice of facts (intimación de hechos): the omission to provide complete, clear, precise, and relevant information for investment decision-making to Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, who, although formally holding the role of trustor, had de facto assumed the position of the client by issuing direct investment instructions to the agent and the brokerage firm. The Tribunal emphasized that this practical relationship should prevail over the legal structure of the trust contract, pursuant to article 57 of Law No. 7523. It also established that the plaintiff had access to all the information contained in the trust's account statements and that there was no limitation regarding the quality or quantity of data that he should make available to the client. Such a circumstance was accredited with the issuance of a balance certificate as of April 16, 2009. However, it was determined that, between January and July 2009, the information delivered in the PowerPoint presentations did not match the official account statements, particularly in the line item of assets, as it omitted relevant elements such as repurchases and their financing, which were indispensable for establishing the real portfolio balance. The Tribunal considered as fundamental evidence the expert report No. 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the OIJ on December 9, 2014, within criminal case No. 10-001434-0612-PE. This report concluded that the presentations showed balances higher than those reported in the official account statements, omitting essential information that could have misled the complainant and compromised his assets. Although the report noted that it could not be guaranteed that the analyzed slides represented all of those used, this limitation did not detract from the validity of its main findings. No contrary technical evidence was provided to refute its content. The Tribunal also dismissed the plaintiff's allegations that the discrepancies were due to projections requested by the client or to exclusion warnings, since it was not accredited that such warnings were uniform, clear, or accompanied by sufficient technical explanations to allow the client to adequately understand the difference from the account statements. Likewise, letters from previous years (2006 to 2008) were rejected as irrelevant, since the investigated facts corresponded exclusively to the year 2009. Finally, the Tribunal concluded that both resolution No. SGV-R-2612 of SUGEVAL, issued on February 16, 2012, and the agreement adopted by CONASSIF in a session held on March 2, 2020, did not suffer from nullity defects nor contravene the legal system. Consequently, it rejected the plaintiff's claim to obtain the refund of the fine of ¢5,300,000.00 imposed against him and his exclusion from SUGEVAL's Registry of Disciplinary Measures (Registro de Medidas Disciplinarias), and declared the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects.

6. When confronting the grievance raised and what was resolved by the Tribunal, it is evident that we are faced with a lack of substantiation. The appeal objects to the conclusion reached by the administrative authority regarding the existence of an informational omission to the detriment of Mr. Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, attributed to the plaintiff in his capacity as a stockbroker (agente de bolsa). In particular, it reproaches that conclusive value was given to the contradiction between the PowerPoint presentations used in private meetings and the official account statements of the portfolio of the Minnie/Cuscatlán Trust (Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán), without considering—in his judgment—the technical warnings inserted in the presentations nor the eventual temporal disparity between both documents. After a comprehensive analysis of the case file, this Chamber (Cámara) considers that such allegations are not sufficient to undermine the validity of the reasoning contained in the appealed resolution. In the first place, the expert report number 200-DEF-A-117-14, issued on December 9, 2014, by the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial, OIJ), within criminal case number 10-001434-0612-PE, is of special relevance. In said opinion, it was concluded that the presentations shown by the plaintiff to the complainant reflected higher asset values compared to those recorded in the official account statements, due to the omission of the repurchases line item, an indispensable element for determining the real balance of the trust. It was expressly stated thus: “...Al comparar las diapositivas aportadas por el ofendido con los estados de cuenta suministrados por el puesto de bolsa por medio del levantamiento de secreto bancario, nos damos cuenta que no coinciden los montos, ya que las dispositivas mostraban un saldo mayor en activos que los estados de cuenta, porque no incluían las recompras, rubro indispensable para establecer el saldo real de la cuenta; situación que pudo provocar que se indujera a error al ofendido y que tomara decisiones que pusieran en riesgo su patrimonio...”. This conclusion was not refuted by the appellant through contrary evidence of the same nature, nor does the record contain evidence of the same lineage that reliably demonstrates that the methodological foundations used or the documentation examined were inaccurate. However, although the expert report indicates that it cannot be guaranteed that the analyzed slides constitute all of those presented by the plaintiff, this does not diminish the relevance of its main finding: the existence of substantial discrepancies between the examined documents and the official account statements. Consequently, the expert report constitutes decisive evidence for establishing the plaintiff's responsibility. On the other hand, the appellant's assertions, to the effect that the differences between the presentations and the account statements were explained by exclusions expressly indicated—such as the omission of repurchases—or because they were projections prepared at the client's request, are not sufficient to refute the objective findings contained in the expert opinion, supported by the comparative analysis between documents obtained through the lifting of banking secrecy (levantamiento del secreto bancario) and the slides provided by the complainant. Faced with this, it was not accredited that the warnings contained in the presentations had been uniform, explicit, or accompanied by sufficient explanations to allow the client to distinguish between merely projected information and real data of his portfolio. For this Chamber, a shortfall is observed in the standard of diligence (diligencia) required in this type of relationship, which obliges the stockbroker to provide complete, understandable, and truthful information, especially in the case of higher-risk investments, as established by article 109 of the Securities Market Regulatory Law. In the same sense, one may consult the vote of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no.

02758-2020 of the</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">15:40 hrs. of November 19, 2020 (</span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1010733\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-weight:normal; text-decoration:underline; color:#0563c1\">https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1010733</span></a><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">). Therefore, the annotations inserted in the slides, such as </span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">“</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">does not include repurchases</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">”</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\"> or </span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">“</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">scenarios projected at the client's request</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">”</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">, do not exonerate him from his obligation; on the contrary, they reflect the knowledge he possesses regarding the data presented, which were not complete, without it having been proven that he offered the necessary information to remedy said omission. Nor is the argument that there was no duty to inform the trustor (fideicomitente) tenable. Regardless of what was agreed in the brokerage commission contract, it is evident in the case file </span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">—</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">and the Court so reasoned</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">—</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\"> that the trustor (fideicomitente) assumed, in practice, the role of the direct client of the brokerage house, by giving investment instructions directly. In such circumstances, it was required to provide transparent and sufficient information to support his decisions, which, as was demonstrated, did not occur during the first half of 2009. On the other hand, the cassation appellant petitions the application of the criminal law principle </span><span style=\"font-weight:normal; font-style:italic\">in dubio pro-reo</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">, considering that there were reasonable doubts about the facts supporting the sanction. However, for this Chamber, it is legally improper to transfer said principle to the administrative litigation process when the evidentiary assessment carried out by the Court has been in accordance with the principles of objectivity and sound judgment (sana crítica), Article 82.4 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo). Hence, the expert report </span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">—</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">not refuted by evidence of the same nature</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">—</span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\"> acquires decisive weight to ground the plaintiff's liability, as it constitutes objective, impartial, and determinative evidence in the comprehensive assessment of the case. Furthermore, the letters signed by the complainant between the years 2006 and 2008, as well as the testimony of Mr. Javier Solís Arroyo, were correctly assessed as irrelevant, insofar as they do not relate to the period January-July 2009, nor to the specific facts upon which the charge was based. Likewise, no pretermitting of evidence (preterición probatoria) is observed, given that the set of evidence provided by the appellant was duly analyzed and dismissed with sufficient reasoning by the Court. Similarly, no violation of the principle of culpability is observed, given that the charge formulated is based on specific facts, proven through objective evidence, and against which the plaintiff was able to exercise his right of defense in the administrative and appellate venues. For the foregoing, this Chamber concludes that neither an improper evidentiary assessment nor an incorrect application of substantive law is configured. For these reasons, the grievance raised is unfounded and must be so declared.</span></li><li style=\"text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; background-color:#ffffff; list-style-position:inside; -aw-list-padding-sml:8.05pt\"><span style=\"font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-weight:normal\">By virtue of the foregoing, as none of the objections have succeeded, the appeal must be declared without merit. In accordance with the provisions of Article 150.3 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the payment of the costs generated by the exercise of this instance must be imposed on the cassation appellant.</span></li></ol><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">POR TANTO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">The cassation appeal is declared without merit. The costs caused by its exercise shall be borne by the party who promoted it.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">CBE</span></p><table cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" style=\"width:100%; border-collapse:collapse\"><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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margin-bottom:1pt; text-align:center; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; background-color:#ffffff; -aw-border-bottom:0pt single\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Tel</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">é</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">fonos: (506) 2295-3658 o 2295-3659, correo electr</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">ó</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">nico [email protected]</span></p></div></div></body></html>"

Documento PJEDITOR  Res. 000122-F-TC-2025 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas quince minutos del once de setiembre de dos mil veinticinco.

Proceso de conocimiento, establecido en el Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, promovido por Randall Mauricio Díaz Solís, representado por sus apoderados especiales judiciales, Roberto Bolaños Fonseca, Roberto Bolaños Prada y Stephanie Arce Quesada; contra Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR), la Superintendencia General De Valores (SUGEVAL) y el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (CONASSIF), cuyos apoderados especiales judiciales son Marianne Kott Salas, Rodrigo Hidalgo Pacheco, Ligia Vega Hidalgo y Fresia Ramírez Villalobos. La parte actora formula recurso de casación contra la sentencia 2024005349 dictada a las dieciséis horas con cuatro minutos del veinte de agosto del dos mil veinticuatro, suscrita por la jueza Karla Madriz Martínez (ponente) y los jueces Francisco Hidalgo Rueda y Martín Conejo Cantillo.

Redacta la Magistrada Vargas Vásquez;

CONSIDERANDO

El presente asunto se origina en un procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio. En lo sustancial, la parte actora señaló que, el 3 de enero de 2004, el señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López suscribió un contrato de fideicomiso de planeamiento patrimonial denominado “Minnie / Cuscatlán” con el Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica S.A., hoy Banco CITIBANK de Costa Rica S.A. En dicho contrato, el banco actuaba como fiduciario, el señor Matheu López como fideicomitente, y los fideicomisarios eran Pedro Jaime de Matheu Quesada, Michelle Marie de Matheu López, Noemi Quesada Alvarado y Alexandra de Matheu Bissell. La cláusula cuarta del contrato estipuló que el patrimonio fideicometido sería invertido inicialmente en Fondos Cuscatlán S.F.I S.A., por medio del Puesto de Bolsa Valores Cuscatlán S.A. (hoy Citi Valores Accival S.A.), sin restricción sobre el tipo de inversión, y se estableció que el fideicomitente podía tomar decisiones e instrucciones sin responsabilidad para el fiduciario. El 29 de enero de 2004, el señor Matheu López remitió una nota al agente de bolsa solicitando que el fideicomiso sirviera como titular de sus bienes y que, tras su fallecimiento, los activos fueran traspasados a sus hijos y esposa. Señaló como nombre del fideicomiso la denominación “Minnie”. El fideicomiso quedó formalmente identificado como “Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán”. Entre enero de 2004 y julio de 2009, se mantuvo una relación de asesoría profesional con el señor Matheu López, donde se determinaron las estrategias de inversión. Las instrucciones eran autorizadas mediante carta por los firmantes autorizados en la tarjeta de registro de firmas. La relación finalizó en julio de 2009, debido que no laboraba para el puesto, momento en que otro agente de bolsa asumió la atención del fideicomiso. El 28 de noviembre de 2005, se suscribió un Contrato General para Operaciones Bursátiles entre Valores Cuscatlán Puesto de Bolsa y el Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán, representado por el fiduciario, el señor Alberto Blanco Meléndez. En dicho contrato se estableció que las personas autorizadas para realizar operaciones serían las registradas ante el Puesto de Bolsa. Señaló, desde el 3 de enero de 2004 hasta la suscripción de ese contrato en noviembre de 2005, las firmas autorizadas correspondían únicamente al fiduciario, y fueron registradas en formulario del 23 de marzo de 2004: Alberto Blanco Meléndez, Yadira Hernández González, Marcela Chaverri Coto y Felipe Meléndez Morales, quienes firmaban de forma individual. Posteriormente, el 6 de diciembre de 2005, se suscribió un nuevo formulario que modificó las firmas autorizadas, quedando designadas para firmar mancomunadamente: Alberto Blanco Meléndez, Yadira Hernández González, Ruth Gutiérrez Morales y Mary Jane Mora Gómez. Desde la firma del contrato bursátil el 28 de noviembre de 2005, hasta la solicitud de traslado de valores del fideicomiso a Mercado de Valores Puesto de Bolsa S.A. realizada por el señor Matheu López el 13 de agosto de 2009, los estados de cuenta de las operaciones realizadas por el fideicomiso fueron enviados al apartado postal 6531-1000, correspondiente al fiduciario. Destacó, el señor Manuel Marenco Fernández, representante de Citi Valores Accival S.A., en nota del 3 de noviembre de 2009, indicó que los estados de cuenta se remitieron puntualmente al cliente en su dirección, y el control de las disposiciones entre fideicomitente y fideicomisarios escapaban a su revisión. Agregó, el contrato bursátil del 28 de noviembre de 2005 estableció que los estados de cuenta se enviarían mensualmente y se admitía su remisión por fax, correo, e-mail u otros medios, aunque no se estableció un domicilio específico para su recepción. El 6 de septiembre de 2007, el señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López autorizó por escrito a su esposa, la señora Noemy Quesada Alvarado, para efectuar inversiones y liquidaciones en Banco Cuscatlán, Valores Cuscatlán y Fondos Cuscatlán, dentro del marco del Fideicomiso Minnie. Esta autorización no tenía límite de monto ni vencimiento, salvo revocatoria expresa. El 10 de noviembre de 2007, el señor de Matheu López firmó un nuevo formulario de firmas autorizadas, incluyendo a su esposa entre las personas facultadas para operar en nombre del fideicomiso. Relató, en fecha no determinada pero anterior a 2008, se completó un formulario de “Perfil de Riesgo del Inversionista” identificando como cliente al Fideicomiso Minnie, pero señalando como persona natural al señor de Matheu López. Según la evaluación, fue clasificado como inversionista de perfil “moderado”, con una calificación de 42 puntos. El documento fue firmado por él, por un ejecutivo de análisis no identificado, y por el agente responsable. Posteriormente, comenzaron a aceptar instrucciones directas del señor de Matheu López para operaciones bursátiles, prestándole asesoría como tomador de decisiones, junto con el fiduciario. En cartas suscritas por el señor de Matheu López entre enero de 2006 y febrero de 2009, manifestó su satisfacción con la administración de su portafolio, reconociendo los riesgos asociados y autorizando el mantenimiento de la estrategia de inversión. El 6 de agosto de 2008, el señor de Matheu autorizó una inversión en acciones de Apple, mediante carta en la que manifestó conocer los riesgos y liberó de responsabilidad al agente y al puesto de bolsa. La transacción se ejecutó con boleta N° 60106343. El 28 de octubre de 2008 se completó un nuevo formulario de perfil de inversionista para Citi Valores Accival y Citi Fondos, calificando nuevamente al señor de Matheu como inversionista “moderado”. El documento fue firmado por él, por la fiduciaria Yadira Hernández González y por un representante no identificado de análisis de riesgos. Durante el primer semestre del 2009, se sostuvo reuniones con el señor de Matheu para diseñar estrategias de inversión, elaborando ocasionalmente presentaciones en PowerPoint bajo el título “Seguimiento de Inversiones Fideicomiso Minnie”, con el logotipo de Citi. Estas se elaboraron a solicitud del señor de Matheu, y contenían información de los activos del fideicomiso custodiados tanto por el puesto de bolsa como por la fiduciaria. El 24 de junio de 2009 se firmó un primer adicional al contrato de fideicomiso, en el que Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. asumió la posición de fiduciario en sustitución del Banco Cuscatlán. Finalmente, el 27 de agosto de 2009 se suscribió una Orden de Transacción para operaciones de Venta-reporto efectivo en la cuenta del cliente Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán en Citi Valores Accival S.A. La Orden refiere que dicho cliente autoriza al puesto de bolsa indicado “...para realizar las siguientes transacciones, de conformidad con el Marco Regulatorio y al Contrato de Comisión para la realización de Operaciones Bursátiles…”. Dichas transacciones correspondían a las operaciones números 1090822953, 1090822959,1090822961 y 1090822963. La orden de transacción se encontraba firmada únicamente por la señora Mary Jane Mora Gómez. Destacó, para la fecha ya no laboraba para Citi Valores lo cual la imputación que hace la SUGEVAL en el traslado de cargos para la apertura del procedimiento administrativo es vaga e imprecisa. El 19 de agosto de 2009, el señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López solicitó por correo electrónico al señor Manuel Marenco, representante de Citi Valores Accival, que se realizara el traslado de los valores del Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán hacia el Puesto de Bolsa Mercado de Valores, reiterando que dicha solicitud había sido planteada desde el 13 de agosto sin que se ejecutara. Entre el 20 de agosto y el 9 de septiembre de 2009 no se concretó el traslado de los valores, debido a desacuerdos entre el señor de Matheu y Citi Valores Accival respecto al contenido de un finiquito solicitado por esta última entidad sobre el contrato de fideicomiso. El 10 de septiembre de 2009 se firmó un finiquito del contrato de fideicomiso entre el señor de Matheu como fideicomitente y Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., mediante el cual se dio por extinguido el Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán. El documento fue recibido por la entidad bancaria el 14 de septiembre de 2011. Ese mismo 10 de septiembre, la señora Yadira Hernández, en representación del fideicomiso, autorizó a Citi Valores Accival S.A. el traspaso de valores de la cuenta CEVAL 015760 al Puesto de Bolsa Mercado de Valores S.A., a nombre del señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López. El 16 de septiembre de 2009 se gestionó el traslado de los valores y el proceso se completó electrónicamente el 18 de ese mes. El 21 de agosto de 2009, el señor de Matheu presentó ante la Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) una denuncia por supuestas inconsistencias en el manejo del portafolio de inversión del fideicomiso, por lo que conoció hasta el 24 de julio del año 2009 lo referente a la cartera de inversión de dicho Fideicomiso. La relación entre el Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán y el Puesto de Bolsa surgió a partir del contrato de fideicomiso suscrito en 2004, que facultaba al Banco Cuscatlán (hoy Banco Citibank) como fiduciario, a realizar inversiones bursátiles por medio de dicho puesto. Conforme a la normativa vigente, el fiduciario ostentaba la representación legal del fideicomiso, y era quien contrataba con el puesto de bolsa. Mediante resolución SGV-R 2246 de las 9:30 horas del 24 de mayo de 2010, la SUGEVAL inició un procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio, por supuestas inconsistencias en el manejo del portafolio de inversión, se nombró el Órgano Director e inició la fase investigativa del procedimiento. Finalmente, en la instrucción del procedimiento no se incorporó como parte al fideicomiso ni a su representante legal, el Banco Cuscatlán (hoy Banco Citibank), a pesar de ser la entidad que contrató con el puesto de bolsa en representación del fideicomiso. Mediante oficio SGV-R-2612, la Superintendencia General de Valores (SUGEVAL) resolvió el procedimiento sancionatorio indicando lo siguiente: “…Declarar al Agente Corredor de Bolsa Randall Díaz Solís responsable de no cumplir con los deberes de diligencia e información establecidos en los artículos 60, 108 y 109 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores en concurrencia con el puesto de bolsa para el cual laboraba. En consecuencia, de conformidad los artículos 157 incisos 5) y 29), 163 inciso a), punto 3, del mismo cuerpo legal, se le sanciona con multa equivalente a 20 salarios base de acuerdo con la Ley 7758, según el monto vigente para el salario base al año 2009 (¢269.000.00), para una multa total en la suma de ¢5.380.000.00 (cinco millones trescientos ochenta mil colones exactos…”. Destacó, haber interpuesto recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, alegando, entre otras cosas, la falta de inclusión del fiduciario como parte del procedimiento, pese a que era quien ostentaba la representación legal del Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán. Como resultado, mediante resolución SGV-R-2704 de las 10:00 horas del 3 de setiembre de 2012, la Superintendencia General de Valores declaró parcialmente con lugar el recurso presentado por Citi Valores, modificó el monto de la multa impuesta a dicha entidad y absolvió tanto al puesto de bolsa como al funcionario recurrente del incumplimiento al deber de información. No obstante, impuso a este último una multa equivalente a diez salarios base, correspondiente a la suma de ¢2.690.000,00, por un único supuesto incumplimiento al deber de diligencia previsto en los artículos 60 y 108 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, en concurrencia con el puesto de bolsa. El 4 de septiembre de 2012, mediante resolución SGV-R-2705, SUGEVAL rechazó el recurso de revocatoria interpuesto respecto de la sanción por incumplimiento del deber de diligencia y omitió pronunciarse sobre su recurso respecto al deber de información. Ambas partes acudieron ante el CONASSIF, reiterando sus argumentos y planteando incidentes de nulidad. Enfatizó, haber presentado incidente de nulidad contra la resolución SGV-R-2704. El 8 de abril de 2014, mediante acuerdo adoptado en la sesión 1101-2014, el CONASSIF anuló la resolución SGV-R-2704, y lo absolvió por el deber de diligencia, pero lo sancionó por el incumplimiento del deber de información con una multa de ₡5.380.000,00. Por su parte, CONASSIF nunca se pronunció y dejó incólume la resolución de SUGEVAL SGV-R-2705. El 9 de abril de 2015, promovió un proceso contencioso-administrativo, bajo el expediente 15-003035-1027-CA. Mediante sentencia 000064-F-TC-2019 de las 9:30 hrs. del 16 de mayo de 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-921923), el Tribunal de Casación confirmó lo resuelto por SUGEVAL y anuló parcialmente el acuerdo del CONASSIF, por haber impuesto una sanción sin respetar el debido proceso, ordenando emitir nuevo pronunciamiento. En cumplimiento de lo ordenado, el CONASSIF dispuso en el artículo 11 de la sesión 1513-2019 del 2 de julio de 2019, declarar sin lugar el recurso de apelación contra lo ordenado en la resolución SGV-R-2612 de las 12:00 horas, del 16 de febrero de 2012 de la Superintendencia General de Valores, respecto del extremo que la Sala de Casación le ordenó revisar. Tampoco le impuso sanción o multa alguna por incumplir con el deber de información. No obstante, el 31 de julio de 2019 se notificó la resolución judicial 000113-F-TC-2019 de las 14:20 horas del 11 de julio del 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-1011-928791), en la que se rechazó una solicitud de aclaración y adición, lo que dio firmeza al fallo 000064-F-TC-2019. Finalmente, el 2 de marzo de 2020, mediante sesión 1562-2020, el CONASSIF anuló el acuerdo anterior por haberse dictado prematuramente y, al resolver de nuevo, reiteró el rechazo del recurso contra la resolución SGV-R-2612, sin imponer sanción o multa por incumplimiento del deber de información, limitándose a señalar que lo dispuesto en la sesión 1101-2014 permanecía incólume. Con base en esa relación de hechos, las pretensiones quedaron fijadas para que en sentencia se declare: “...1. La nulidad absoluta o, en su caso, por ser contrarios al Ordenamiento Jurídico (sic) se revoque y se deje sin ningún valor ni efectos legal (sic) el acuerdo del Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (CONASSIF) adoptado en el artículo 11 del acta de la sesión 1562-2020, celebrada el 2 de marzo de 2020. 2. Que como consecuencia de la declaratoria de nulidad que se solicita: A) se declare que sobre el suscrito no ha recaído sanción alguna dentro del Procedimiento Administrativo Ordinario Sancionatorio (sic) ordenado en resolución SGV-R 2246, de las 9:30 horas del 24 de mayo del año 2010 de la Superintendencia General de Valores; B) se ordene a la autoridad correspondiente excluirme del Registro de Medidas Disciplinarias (sic) de SUGEVAL, y eliminar el registro de medidas disciplinarias de mi información personal en el Registro Nacional de Valores e Intermediarios (sic) y C) se ordene la devolución de la multa impuesta que oportunamente fue pagada, así como los intereses al tipo legal, a partir del momento de su cancelación en sede administrativa y hasta su efectiva devolución, y se publique el hecho relevante respectivo. 3. Que se condene al Estado (sic) al pago de ambas costas del presente proceso...”. Conferido el traslado de ley, la representación de la parte demandada se apersonó a los autos, contestó en forma negativa la demanda, interpuso la defensa previa de cosa juzgada material (declarada sin lugar mediante resolución oral N° 1561-2021 de las 10:35 horas del 09/11/2021), y las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de interés actual. Solicitó, se declare sin lugar la presente acción y se condene al actor al pago de ambas costas. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, mediante sentencia 2024005349 dictada a las dieciséis horas con cuatro minutos del veinte de agosto del dos mil veinticuatro, dispuso: “Se rechazan las excepciones de cosa juzgada material, de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de interés actual. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho y se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos, la demanda interpuesta por Randall Díaz Solís contra el Banco Central de Costa Rica, la Superintendencia General de Valores, el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Se imponen ambas costas a la parte actora, extremos que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia, únicamente por los demandados”. Disconforme con lo resuelto, la parte actora presentó recurso de casación, el cual fue admitido por esta Cámara en alzada para su resolución. En virtud de lo dispuesto en los ordinales 137 y 138 del CPCA, se atenderá en primer lugar el agravio de naturaleza procesal y, posteriormente el de índole sustantivo.

Casación por razones procesales.

El casacionista plantea un agravio de esta naturaleza. Acusa violación de normas procesales, conforme al inciso c) del artículo 137 del CPCA. Alega, la sentencia incurre en falta de determinación clara y precisa respecto de los hechos que ha tenido por acreditados. Señala, el Tribunal, al referirse al expediente administrativo, establece como Hecho Probado 7) que:"…la información contenida en las presentaciones de Power Point de los meses de enero a junio del 2009 entregadas a Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, no se corresponden con los estados de cuenta de ese mismo período enviados al fiduciario -específicamente en el rubro de activos-, ya que es mayor a las indicadas como total final de inversiones en los estados de cuenta, dado que en las presentaciones de Power Point no se incluían los datos relativos a las recompras y al financiamiento de las mismas…". Sin embargo, el acuerdo del CONASSIF adoptado en la sesión 1562-2020, que se impugna en el proceso, limita expresamente el reproche de inconsistencia informativa a las presentaciones de junio y julio de 2009. Para sustentar esto, cita el “Considerando III. Sobre el fondo del asunto” de dicho acuerdo, se afirma:“…De conformidad con los hechos probados 4, 11, 13 y 16 (del acuerdo del CONASSIF 1101-2014) dentro de presente procedimiento administrativo, aproximadamente desde enero del 2004 hasta julio del 2009, el señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López y el señor Randall Díaz Solís mantuvieron una relación de asesoría profesional, donde el primero, en calidad de inversionista y el segundo en calidad de agente de bolsa representante del puesto de bolsa, determinaban conjuntamente las estrategias de inversión a seguir; relación que se constata y realiza mediante comunicaciones telefónicas, correos electrónicos y reuniones presenciales de cierta regularidad…” Además, remite al Hecho Probado 16 del acuerdo del CONASSIF 1101-2014, que señala:"… “…16. … Al menos en las presentaciones realizadas para los meses de junio y julio del 2009, los datos que constan en la diapositiva denominada "Activos Actuales" no es coincidente con los datos que se encuentran en los Estados de Cuenta formales del Fideicomiso Minnie Cuscatlán, en el apartado de "Resumen de Inversiones", siendo que en ambos meses el rubro denominado "Total" de activos actuales en la diapositiva de la presentación ofrece un monto superior al indicado en el rubro "Total Final de Inversiones" de los estados de cuenta correspondientes…” Sostiene, el Tribunal incurre en falta de determinación clara y precisa al formular el Hecho Probado 7), en tanto extiende e imputa a todas las presentaciones realizadas entre enero y junio de 2009 una supuesta discrepancia en la información suministrada al cliente, cuando el hecho concreto se limita exclusivamente a las presentaciones de los meses de junio y julio de 2009. Añade, el propio Hecho Probado 7) se apoya, entre otras fuentes, en el informe pericial número 200-DEF-A-117-14, emitido el 9 de diciembre de 2014 por la Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, dentro de la causa penal número 10-001434-0612-PE, el cual también se circunscribe únicamente al análisis de las presentaciones de PowerPoint correspondientes a junio y julio de 2009. Refuta, esta imprecisión lo coloca en una situación de indefensión, al obligarlo a rebatir un hecho acreditado que no se corresponde con los límites objetivos de la imputación efectuada, ni con los elementos probatorios del expediente, toda vez que las presentaciones de enero a mayo de 2009 no fueron objeto de imputación, ni fueron introducidas como prueba, discutidas en el debate, ni empleadas como fundamento de la sanción que se impugna en este proceso de conocimiento.

En lo tocante a la causal acusada, la Sala Primera ha expresado en reiteradas oportunidades lo siguiente: “V.- Sobre el vicio procesal de falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos acreditados, previsto por el mandato 137 inciso c) del CPCA, esta Sala ha sostenido que consiste en una exposición confusa de grado tal que impide tener certeza de la circunstancia misma, o bien, por una contradicción palmaria entre los distintos elementos fácticos. Asimismo, que debe diferenciarse este yerro procesal con la preterición o indebida valoración de las probanzas que apareja la inobservancia de normas de orden sustantivo. En este sentido, en la sentencia no. 396-F-SI-2012 de las 8 horas 55 minutos del 22 de marzo de 2012, se señaló que la “labor intelectiva desarrollada por los juzgadores en relación con los hechos del caso es pasible de ser revisada desde distintas ópticas en sede casacional, las cuales, además, no deben ser confundidas, no solo porque conducen a efectos distintos, sino porque responden a finalidades diversas. En este sentido, la inconformidad puede obedecer a aspectos sustanciales, cuando el cuadro fáctico que tuvo por demostrado el Tribunal no es conteste con la realidad que se desprende de las pruebas (en cuyo caso se trata de un error de hecho o de derecho, previstos en el artículo 138 CPCA), o bien, a yerros procesales, ya sea por haberse fundado en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos en forma ilegal al proceso o por una defectuosa formulación (falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos). Este último vicio se produce cuando el Tribunal, al establecer el cuadro fáctico pertinente para el caso concreto, fórmula uno o varios hechos de manera confusa, de forma tal que no sea posible tener un adecuado entendimiento de cuál es la situación fáctica que pretende explicitar, o bien, cuando exista una contradicción en el elenco de hechos probados de tal envergadura que sea imposible tener certeza de cuál fue la valoración realizada por los juzgadores al deliberar. Esto responde a la finalidad de las causales procesales que dan cabida a este medio impugnaticio extraordinario, las cuales tienen por objetivo garantizar que la tramitación de las distintas etapas que conforman el proceso jurisdiccional haya discurrido por los cauces previstos por el ordenamiento jurídico, así como que la sentencia se haya dictado en la forma prescrita por las normas adjetivas aplicables (en este sentido, voto no. 687-F-S1-2010 de las 13 horas del 9 de junio de 2010). Por ello, cualquier cuestionamiento relativo a si la fijación de los hechos realizada resulta acorde o no a las pruebas excede el ámbito propio de esta causal, formando parte, por el contrario, de una de índole sustantivo. […]”.. En este sentido se pueden consultar los votos 559-2024 del 30 de mayo de 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), 1710-2020 del 29 de abril de 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), y 1444-2012 del 30 de octubre de 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). De conformidad con lo anterior, esta causal de casación por motivos adjetivos acaece cuando la exposición de los hechos es imprecisa, lo que imposibilita tener certidumbre de la propia circunstancia que se juzga. Sea, que no es factible tener un apropiado conocimiento de la situación fáctica que se pretende tener por acreditada. Igualmente se produce cuando existe una contradicción evidente entre los distintos elementos de hecho, por lo que el yerro debe ser de tal magnitud que no puede tenerse seguridad de cuál fue la valoración efectuada por el Tribunal. Contrario a lo sostenido por el recurrente, esta Cámara considera que el hecho probado número 7 no adolece del vicio alegado. Efectivamente, el Tribunal expuso de manera clara y comprensible que las presentaciones en formato PowerPoint entregadas al denunciante durante los meses de enero a junio del año 2009 no incluían información relativa a las recompras ni al financiamiento de estas, lo cual generaba una discrepancia con el valor total de inversiones reflejado en los estados de cuenta formales remitidos al fiduciario. Tal conclusión se encuentra debidamente respaldada en las pruebas documentales que obran en el expediente administrativo (folios 1224 a 1307, 1469 a 1550 del tomo 4, y 2574 a 2633 del tomo 7), así como en el dictamen pericial N° 200-DEF-A-117-14 emitido por la Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, cuyo contenido fue expresamente transcrito en la sentencia recurrida, y en el cual se concluyó que existía un desfase entre los saldos reflejados en las presentaciones y aquellos consignados en los estados de cuenta, precisamente por no incluir las recompras. Si bien la parte actora objeta dicha conclusión, su inconformidad no se dirige a una falta de claridad, precisión o coherencia en la formulación del hecho acreditado, sino que en el fondo plantea disconformidades con el contenido del dictamen pericial y la valoración conjunta de la prueba. Tal desacuerdo corresponde a un agravio de naturaleza sustantiva, ajeno al marco de la causal invocada, pues no se objeta, ni mucho menos se demuestra, la existencia de una contradicción interna entre los hechos tenidos por acreditados o una formulación ambigua que impida su cabal comprensión. En virtud de lo expuesto, el reproche carece de sustento conforme el artículo 137.1 inciso c) del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, en virtud que no se aprecia la falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos acreditados por el Tribunal. Tampoco se observa contradicción entre las situaciones fácticas tenidas por demostradas, que haga imposible constatar la apreciación de la prueba efectuada por el Tribunal, menos aún, una vulneración del debido proceso. En consecuencia, el cargo resulta improcedente y debe ser rechazado.

Casación por razones sustantivas.

El casacionista alega un motivo de fondo. Acusa, indebida valoración de la prueba documental y testimonial que sustenta erróneamente la sanción impuesta por la SUGEVAL y confirmada por el Tribunal Contencioso, por un presunto incumplimiento del deber de información entre enero y julio de 2009. Reprocha, indebida valoración de la prueba que incluye presentaciones de Power Point, comunicaciones del cliente, constancias de saldo, autorizaciones de operaciones de financiamiento, y un informe pericial del OIJ. Sostiene, estas evidencias permiten demostrar que sí informó al cliente sobre las recompras y sus financiamientos, por lo que no existió ocultamiento ni omisión de información. Subraya, la imputación de responsabilidad parte de una lectura inadecuada de las pruebas, especialmente en lo que respecta a la supuesta discrepancia entre las presentaciones de Power Point y los estados de cuenta. Aduce, estas diferencias tienen explicación contable y lógica, ya que las presentaciones y los estados de cuenta no responden a la misma fecha valor. Precisa, no se puede tener por probado que se referían al mismo período, como erróneamente concluye el Tribunal al establecerlo en el hecho probado 7. Argumenta, las propias filminas contienen advertencias explícitas sobre la exclusión de recompras, con anotaciones como “no incluye recompras”, “disminución a cero de las deudas, llamadas al margen, recompras o saldos por cobrar”, y que tales advertencias son reconocidas tanto en el informe pericial del OIJ como en el acuerdo 1562-2020 del CONASSIF. Alega, el contenido de las presentaciones obedece a una estrategia de inversión específica solicitada por el cliente, y no constituyen reportes de inversión comparables con estados de cuenta. Reprocha, el Tribunal afirma que no se desvirtuó el contenido de las presentaciones aportadas por el denunciante, cuando consta en el expediente prueba documental que sí fueron aportadas todas las filminas correspondientes a enero-julio 2009, en las cuales se hace mención expresa a las recompras. Indica, tal afirmación vulnera el principio de presunción de inocencia y el de in dubio pro-reo, ya que se le exige al sancionado demostrar su inocencia pese a la duda reconocida sobre la integridad de la prueba base de la sanción. Arguye, la valoración de una constancia de saldo emitida por el actor en abril de 2009, ya que su coincidencia con el estado de cuenta de la misma fecha no justifica concluir que tenía acceso a toda la información en otras fechas, como julio de 2009, cuando ya no laboraba en el puesto de bolsa. Apunta, el Tribunal pretirió prueba documental relevante que demuestra que el cliente estaba informado de los riesgos y del estado de las recompras: cartas firmadas entre 2008 y 2009 por el señor de Matheu, autorizando operaciones, reconociendo los riesgos y recibiendo informes. Enfatiza, indebida valoración del testimonio del jefe de operaciones del puesto de bolsa, quien afirmó que no era obligación entregar estados de cuenta al cliente, con lo cual se desvirtúa otro de los cargos. Estima, la sentencia se apoya en una apreciación fragmentaria y sesgada de la prueba, en contradicción con las reglas de la sana crítica, el principio de legalidad sancionatoria y los principios constitucionales de presunción de inocencia e in dubio pro-reo. Solicita, la anulación del fallo por infracción sustantiva del ordenamiento jurídico.

De lo argüido por el recurrente, el Tribunal resolvió que no asistía razón a los reproches de nulidad planteados por la parte actora en relación con la sanción impuesta por el incumplimiento al deber de información, conforme al artículo 109 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores. En el acto definitivo dictado por el CONASSIF el 8 de abril de 2014, se había revocado parcialmente la sanción originalmente impuesta por la SUGEVAL, absolviendo al actor por la falta al deber de diligencia, pero manteniendo la sanción relativa a la omisión informativa. Posteriormente, mediante sentencia N.º 000064-F-TC-2019 del 16 de mayo de 2019, el Tribunal de Casación anuló parcialmente dicho acuerdo administrativo por haberse dictado sin permitir el adecuado ejercicio del derecho de defensa. En consecuencia, se ordenó al CONASSIF emitir un nuevo pronunciamiento sobre la presunta infracción al deber de información. En cumplimiento de dicha orden, el análisis de la falta se centró en los puntos 5 y 6 de la intimación de hechos: la omisión en suministrar información completa, clara, precisa y relevante para la toma de decisiones de inversión al señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, quien, aunque formalmente ostentaba el rol de fideicomitente, había asumido de facto la posición del cliente al girar instrucciones de inversión directas al agente y al puesto de bolsa. El Tribunal destacó que esta relación práctica debía prevalecer sobre la estructura jurídica del contrato de fideicomiso, conforme al artículo 57 de la Ley N.º 7523. Asimismo, estableció que el actor tenía acceso a toda la información contenida en los estados de cuenta del fideicomiso y no existía limitación en cuanto a la calidad o cantidad de datos que debía poner a disposición del cliente. Tal circunstancia quedó acreditada con la emisión de una constancia de saldo al 16 de abril de 2009. No obstante, se determinó que, entre enero y julio de 2009, la información entregada en las presentaciones PowerPoint no coincidía con los estados de cuenta oficiales, en particular en el rubro de activos, ya que omitía elementos relevantes como las recompras y su financiamiento, indispensables para establecer el saldo real del portafolio. El Tribunal consideró como prueba fundamental el informe pericial N.º 200-DEF-A-117-14, emitido por la Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros del OIJ el 9 de diciembre de 2014, dentro de la causa penal N.º 10-001434-0612-PE. Este informe concluyó que las presentaciones mostraban saldos superiores a los reportados en los estados de cuenta oficiales, omitiendo información esencial que pudo inducir a error al denunciante y comprometer su patrimonio. A pesar de que el informe señalaba que no podía garantizarse que las diapositivas analizadas representaran la totalidad de las utilizadas, esta limitación no restaba validez a sus hallazgos principales. No se aportó prueba técnica en contrario que desvirtuara su contenido. El Tribunal también desestimó los alegatos del actor relativos a que las discrepancias se debían a proyecciones solicitadas por el cliente o a exclusiones advertidas, por cuanto no se acreditó que tales advertencias fueran uniformes, claras ni acompañadas de explicaciones técnicas suficientes para permitir al cliente comprender adecuadamente la diferencia con los estados de cuenta. Asimismo, se rechazaron como impertinentes las cartas de años anteriores (2006 a 2008), ya que los hechos investigados correspondían exclusivamente al año 2009. Finalmente, el Tribunal concluyó que tanto la resolución No. SGV-R-2612 de la SUGEVAL, dictada el 16 de febrero de 2012, como el acuerdo adoptado por el CONASSIF en sesión celebrada el 2 de marzo de 2020, no adolecían de vicios de nulidad ni contravenían el ordenamiento jurídico. En consecuencia, rechazó la pretensión del actor de obtener la devolución de la multa por ¢5.300.000,00 impuesta en su contra y su exclusión del Registro de Medidas Disciplinarias de la SUGEVAL y declaró sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.

Al confrontar el agravio planteado y lo resuelto por el Tribunal, resulta evidente que nos encontramos ante una falta de fundamentación. El recurso objeta la conclusión alcanzada por la autoridad administrativa en cuanto a la existencia de una omisión informativa en perjuicio del señor Pedro Jaime de Matheu López, atribuida al actor en su condición de agente de bolsa. En particular, reprocha que se haya conferido valor concluyente a la contradicción entre las presentaciones PowerPoint utilizadas en reuniones privadas y los estados de cuenta oficiales del portafolio del Fideicomiso Minnie/Cuscatlán, sin considerar —a su juicio— las advertencias técnicas insertas en las presentaciones ni la eventual disparidad temporal entre ambos documentos. Luego de un análisis integral del expediente, esta Cámara considera que tales alegatos no resultan suficientes para enervar la validez del razonamiento contenido en la resolución recurrida. En primer término, reviste especial relevancia el informe pericial número 200-DEF-A-117-14, emitido el 9 de diciembre de 2014 por la Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, dentro de la causa penal número 10-001434-0612-PE. En dicho dictamen, se concluyó que las presentaciones exhibidas por el actor al denunciante reflejaban valores superiores en activos respecto de los consignados en los estados de cuenta oficiales, debido a la omisión del rubro de recompras, elemento indispensable para determinar el saldo real del fideicomiso. Así se consignó expresamente:“...Al comparar las diapositivas aportadas por el ofendido con los estados de cuenta suministrados por el puesto de bolsa por medio del levantamiento de secreto bancario, nos damos cuenta que no coinciden los montos, ya que las dispositivas mostraban un saldo mayor en activos que los estados de cuenta, porque no incluían las recompras, rubro indispensable para establecer el saldo real de la cuenta; situación que pudo provocar que se indujera a error al ofendido y que tomara decisiones que pusieran en riesgo su patrimonio...”. Esta conclusión no fue desvirtuada por el casacionista mediante prueba en contrario de igual naturaleza, ni consta en autos prueba de igual linaje que demuestre fehacientemente que los fundamentos metodológicos empleados o la documentación examinada fueran imprecisos. No obstante, si bien el informe pericial señala que no puede garantizarse que las diapositivas analizadas constituyan la totalidad de las presentadas por el actor, ello no menoscaba la relevancia de su hallazgo principal: la existencia de discrepancias sustanciales entre los documentos examinados y los estados de cuenta oficiales. En consecuencia, el informe pericial constituye prueba determinante para establecer la responsabilidad del actor. Por otra parte, las afirmaciones del casacionista, en el sentido de que las diferencias entre las presentaciones y los estados de cuenta se explicaban por exclusiones expresamente indicadas —como la omisión de recompras— o por tratarse de proyecciones elaboradas a solicitud del cliente, no resultan suficientes para desvirtuar los hallazgos objetivos contenidos en el dictamen pericial, sustentado en el análisis comparativo entre documentos obtenidos mediante levantamiento del secreto bancario y las filminas aportadas por el denunciante. Frente a ello, no se acreditó que las advertencias contenidas en las presentaciones hubieran sido uniformes, explícitas ni acompañadas de explicaciones suficientes que permitieran al cliente distinguir entre información meramente proyectada y datos reales de su portafolio. Para esta Cámara, se constata una falencia en el estándar de diligencia exigible en este tipo de relaciones, el cual obliga al agente de bolsa a brindar información completa, comprensible y veraz, especialmente en el caso de inversiones de mayor riesgo, tal como lo establece el artículo 109 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores. En igual sentido, puede consultarse el voto de la Sala Primera no. 02758-2020 de las 15:40 hrs. del 19 de noviembre del 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1010733). Por ello, las anotaciones insertas en las filminas, tales como “no incluye recompras” o “escenarios proyectados a solicitud del cliente”, no lo exoneran de su obligación; por el contrario, reflejan el conocimiento que posee sobre los datos presentados, los cuales no estaban completos, sin que se haya acreditado que ofreciera la información necesaria para subsanar dicha omisión. Tampoco resulta atendible el argumento de que no existía deber de informar al fideicomitente. Independientemente de lo pactado en el contrato de comisión bursátil, consta en autos —y así lo razonó el Tribunal— que el fideicomitente asumió en los hechos el rol del cliente directo del puesto de bolsa, al impartir instrucciones de inversión de forma directa. En tales circunstancias, resultaba exigible brindar información transparente y suficiente para sustentar sus decisiones, lo que, conforme se demostró, no ocurrió durante el primer semestre del año 2009. Por otro lado, el casacionista peticiona la aplicación del principio penal in dubio pro-reo, al considerar que existían dudas razonables sobre los hechos que sustentan la sanción. No obstante, para esta Cámara, resulta jurídicamente improcedente trasladar dicho principio al proceso contencioso-administrativo cuando la valoración probatoria realizada por el Tribunal ha sido conforme a los principios de objetividad y sana crítica, artículo 82.4 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo. De ahí que, el informe pericial —no desvirtuado con prueba de igual naturaleza— adquiere peso decisivo para fundamentar la responsabilidad del actor, al resultar una prueba objetiva, imparcial y determinante en la valoración integral del caso. Por otra parte, las cartas suscritas por el denunciante entre los años 2006 y 2008, así como el testimonio del señor Javier Solís Arroyo, fueron correctamente valorados como impertinentes, en tanto no guardan relación con el período enero-julio de 2009, ni con los hechos concretos sobre los cuales recayó la imputación. Asimismo, no se aprecia preterición probatoria, dado que el conjunto de pruebas aportado por el recurrente fue debidamente analizado y desestimado con motivación suficiente por el Tribunal. Del mismo modo, no se constata una afectación al principio de culpabilidad, dado que la imputación formulada se sustenta en hechos específicos, acreditados mediante prueba objetiva, y frente a los cuales el actor pudo ejercer su derecho de defensa en sede administrativa y recursiva. Por lo anterior, esta Cámara concluye que no se configura una indebida valoración probatoria ni una aplicación incorrecta del derecho sustantivo. Por estas razones, el agravio planteado deviene infundado y así debe declararse.

En mérito de lo expuesto, no habiendo prosperado ninguno de los reproches, el recurso deberá declararse sin lugar. Conforme a lo señalado por el artículo 150.3 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, deberá imponerse al casacionista el pago de las costas generadas con el ejercicio de esta instancia.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación. Las costas causadas con su ejercicio corren a cargo de quien lo promovió. CBE  DAMARIS MARIA VARGAS VASQUEZ - MAGISTRADO/A  LINDSAY MANUELA RODRIGUEZ CUBERO - MAGISTRADO/A  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRADO/A